International Seminar On Nuclear War And Planetary Emergencies - 31st Session: The Cultural Planetary Emergency-Focus on Terrorism 9789812702388, 9789812560575

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INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON

NUCLEAR WAR AND PLANETARY EMERGENCIES 31st Session:

THE CULTURAL PLANETARY EMERGENCY: FOCUS ON TERRORISM MULTIDISCIPLINARYGLOBAL APPROACH OF GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES. SOCIETAL RESPONSE -SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLICY ECONOMICS - HUMAN RIGHTS - COMMUNICATION CONFLICT RESOLUTION - CROSS-DISCIPLINARYRESPONSESTO CBRN THREATS CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICALTERRORISM - CO-OPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST - ASYMMETRICALCONFLICTS - CBW IMPACT CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, MEDIA INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ROLE OF MEDIA IN GLOBAL EMERGENCIES- EMERGENCY RESPONDERS - WORKlNG GROUPS’ REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ~

~

THE SCIENCE AND CULTURE SERIES Nuclear Strategy and Peace Technology ~~

Series Editor: Antonino Zichichi ~~

1981

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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 1st Session: The World-wide Implications of Nuclear War

1982 - International Seminar on Nuclear War -2nd Session: How to Avoid a Nuclear War 1983 1984

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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 3rd Session: The Technical Basis for Peace International Seminar on Nuclear War - 4th Session: The Nuclear Winter and the New Defence Systems: Problems and Perspectives

1985 - International Seminar on Nuclear War - 5th Session: SDI, Computer Simulation, New Proposals to Stop the Arms Race 1986

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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 6th Session: InternationalCooperation: The Alternatives

1987

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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 7th Session: The Great Projects for Scientific Collaboration East-West-North-South

1988

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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 8th Session: The New Threats: Space and Chemical Weapons - What Can be Done with the Retired I.N.F. Missiles-LaserTechnology

1991 1991 -

1989

1990

International Seminar on Nuclear War - 9th Session: The New Emergencies International Seminar on Nuclear War - 10th Session: The New Role of Science International Seminar on Nuclear War - 11th Session: Planetary Emergencies International Seminar on Nuclear War - 12th Session: Science Confronted with War (unpublished)

1991 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 13th Session: Satellite Monitoring of the Global Environment (unpublished) 1992 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 14th Session: Innovative Technologies for Cleaning the Environment 1992 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 15th Session (1st Seminar after Rio): Science and Technology to Save the Earth (unpublished) 1992 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 16th Session (2nd Seminar after Rio): Proliferationof Weapons for Mass Destruction and Cooperation on Defence Systems 1993

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International Seminar on Planetary Emergencies - 17th Workshop: The Collision of an Asteroid or Comet with the Earth (unpublished)

1993 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 18th Session (4th Seminar after Rio): Global Stability Through Disarmament 1994

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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 19th Session (5th Seminar after Rio): Science after the Cold War

1995 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 20th Session (6th Seminar after Rio):The Role of Science in the Third Millennium 1996

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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 21st Session (7th Seminar after Rio): New Epidemics, Second Cold War, Decommissioning, Terrorism and Proliferation

1997

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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 22nd Session (8th Seminar after Rio): Nuclear Submarine Decontamination, Chemical Stockpiled Weapons, New Epidemics, Cloning of Genes, New Military Threats, Global Planetary Changes, Cosmic Objects & Energy

1998 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 23rd Session (9th Seminar after Rio): Medicine & Biotechnologies, Proliferation & Weapons of Mass Destruction, Climatology & El Nino, Desertification, Defence Against Cosmic Objects, Water & Pollution, Food, Energy, Limits of Development, The Role of Permanent Monitoring Panels 1999

International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 24th Session: HIV/AIDS Vaccine Needs, Biotechnology, Neuropathologies, Development Sustainability - Focus Africa, Climate and Weather Predictions, Energy, Water, Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Role of Permanent Monitoring Panels, HIV Think Tank Workshop, Fertility Problems Workshop

2000

International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 25th Session: Water - Pollution, Biotechnology - Transgenic Plant Vaccine, Energy, Black Sea Pollution, Aids - Mother-Infant HIV Transmission, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, Limits of Development - Megacities, Missile Proliferation and Defense, Information Security, Cosmic Objects, Desertification, Carbon Sequestration and Sustainability, Climatic Changes, Global Monitoring of Planet, Mathematics and Democracy, Science and Journalism, Permanent Monitoring Panel Reports, Water for Megacities Workshop, Black Sea Workshop, Transgenic Plants Workshop, Research Resources Workshop, Mother-Infant HIV Transmission Workshop, Sequestration and Desertification Workshop, Focus Africa Workshop

2001

International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 26th Session: AIDS and Infectious Diseases - Medication or Vaccination for Developing Countries; Missile Proliferation and Defense; Tchernobyl - Mathematics and Democracy; Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy; Floods and Extreme Weather Events Coastal Zone Problems; Science and Technology for Developing Countries; Water Transboundary Water Conflicts; Climatic Changes - Global Monitoring of the Planet; Information Security; Pollution in the Caspian Sea; Permanent Monitoring Panels Reports; Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Workshop; AIDS and Infectious Diseases Workshop; Pollution Workshop

2002 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 27th Session: Society and Structures: Historical Perspectives - Culture and Ideology; National and Regional Geopolitical Issues; Globalization - Economy and Culture; Human Rights - Freedom and Democracy Debate; Confrontations and Countermeasures: Present and Future Confrontations; Psychology of Terrorism; Defensive Countermeasures; Preventive Countermeasures; General Debate; Science and Technology: Emergencies; Pollution, Climate - Greenhouse Effect; Desertification, Water Pollution, Algal Bloom; Brain and Behaviour Diseases; The Cultural Emergency: General Debate and Conclusions; Permanent Monitoring Panel Reports; Information Security Workshop; Kangaroo Mother‘s Care Workshop; Brain and Behaviour Diseases Workshop 2003 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 29th Session: Society and Structures: Culture and Ideology - Equity - Territorial and Economics - Psychology - Tools and Countermeasures - Worldwide Stability - Risk Analysis for Terrorism - The Asymmetric Threat - America’s New “Exceptionalism” - Militant lslamist Groups Motives and Mindsets - Analysing the New Approach The Psychology of Crowds - Cultural Relativism - Economic and Socio-economic Causes and Consequences -The Problems of American Foreign Policy Understanding Biological Risk Chemical Threats and Responses - Bioterrorism Nuclear Survivial Criticalities - Responding to the Threats - National Security and Scientific Openness - Working Groups Reports and Recommendations

2004 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 30th Session: Anniversary Celebrations: The Pontifical Academy of Sciences 400th - The ‘Ettore Majorana’ Foundation and Centre for Scientific Culture 40th - H.H. John Paul II Apostolate 25th -Climate/GlobalWarming: The Cosmic Ray Effect; Effects on Species and Biodiversity; Human Effects; Paleoclimate Implications; Evidence for Global Warming - Pollution: Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals; Hazardous Material; Legacy Wastes and Radioactive Waste Management in USA, Europe; Southeast Asia and Japan -The Cultural Planetary Emergency: Role of the Media; Intolerance; Terrorism; Iraqi Perspective; Open Forum Debate - AIDS and Infectious Diseases: Ethics in Medicine; AIDS Vaccine Strategies -Water: Water Conflicts in the Middle East - Energy: Developing Countries; Mitigation of Greenhouse Warming Permanent Monitoring Panels Reports -Workshops: Long-Term Stewardship of Hazardous Material; AIDS Vaccine Strategies and Ethics 2004 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 31st Session: MultidisciplinaryGlobal Approach of Governmentsand InternationalStructures: Societal Response - Scientific Contributions to Policy - Economics - Human Rights Communication - Conflict Resolution - Cross-Disciplinary Responses to CBRN Threats: Chemical and Biological Terrorism - Co-operation Between Russia and the West - Asymmetrical Conflicts - CBW Impact - Cross-Disciplinary Challenges to Emergnecy Management, Media Information and Communication: Role of Media in Global Emergencies - Emergency Responders - Working Groups’ Reports and Recommendations

THE SCIENCE A N D CULTURE SERIES Nuclear Strategy and Peace Technology

”E. Majorana” Centre for Scientific Culture Erice, Italy, 7-12 May 2004

Series Editor and Chairman: A. Zichichi

Edited by R. Ragaini

\b World Scientific N E W JERSEY * LONDON * SINGAPORE

BElJlNG * SHANGHAI

HONG KONG

TAIPEI

CHENNAI

Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA ofice: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK ofice: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON NUCLEAR WAR AND PLANETARY EMERGENCIES 31" SESSION: MULTIDISCIPLINARY GLOBAL APPROACH O F GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES: SOCIETAL RESPONSE-SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLICY - ECONOMICS '- HUMAN RIGHTS - COMMUNICATION - CONFLICT RESOLUTION - CROSSDISCIPLINARY RESPONSES TO CBRN THREATS: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM CO-OPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST-ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS CBW IMPACT - CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, MEDIA INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION: ROLE OF MEDIA IN GLOBAL EMERGENCIES-EMERGENCY RESPONDERS - WORKING GROUPS' REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Copyright 0 2004 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. Thisbook, orparts thereoJ may notbe reproducedinanyformorbyanymeans, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

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PREFACE

The World Federation of Scientists (WFS) has identified The Culture of Our Times as one of the Planetary Emergencies and has focused on Terrorism being one of its worst manifestations. Members of the WFS met in Erice four times between 2002 and 2004, to consider the problem and to ifentify solutions to the scourge'. The overwhelming nature of the global emergency of terrorism was best described by the President of the WFS when he stated: "... we believe that the need to identify the motivationsfor and the mechanisms of terrorist acts, as well as guarding against them, has become even more essential ... Our hope, of course, is that the voice of our international congregation of scientists will make itself heard amidst the clamour of confusing arguments being presented by various parties'I2. Different facets of terrorism have been examined using cross-disciplinary methods. Various reports and recommendations have been issued, amongst which a set of WFS Recommendations on Information Security, since adopted by the United Nations Information and Communication Technologies Task Force. During the May 2004 Seminar, four Working Groups established guidelines for future processes to mitigate terrorism. As a result of these discussions, a decision was taken to establish a Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism (PMPT) to conduct a scientific study of the scourge and its possible solutions. Further deliberations in the year 2004 to 2005, and work by scientists in the four Working Groups who have provided the current momentum, will focus on the task of translating new solutions from the Permanent Monitoring Panel into applications for counter-measures, new theory and practice in risk management, and longer-term cultural delibrations on the resolution of divisions and inequalities that have strengthened terrorism as a global phenomenon.

Dr Sally Leivesley, May 2004

'Proceedings of the 27th. 29th, 30th and 31st Sessions of the International Seminars on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies -World Scientific Publications 'Professor Antonino Zichichi

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CONTENTS

1.

OPENING SESSION

Antoriino Zichichi Arriving at the Unpredictable -A Cross-disciplinary Challenge

2.

3

MULTIDISCIPLINARY GLOBAL APPROACH

Norman k? Neureiter The Role of Science and Technology in the War on Terrorism

7

Ahmad Kamal Terrorism -An International Perspective

11

Lillian Alurralde Regional Response to Terrorism

15

Elisabeth Giacobino French Approaches to Counter-terrorism

30

Henning Wegener Germany’s Response to the Global Emergency

33

Mohd Kamarulnizam Abdullah Limiting the Threats of Ideological-based Terror Groups: Lessons to be learned from Malaysia?

39

Anutoly Adumish in Russian Federation Options and Policy

51

Robert Fox Myth, Reality and Realism in UK Government Response and Media Perception of Terrorism

55

Anatoly S. Kulikov The World Community against Globalization of Criminality and Terrorism

58

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3.

CROSS-DISCIPLINARY RESPONSES TO CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR THREATS

Ronald G. Munley Chemical Terrorism -Five Strategic Challenges

65

Charles R. Penn Biological Terrorism - Quantifying and Communicating Uncertainty

71

Sally Leivesley Cross-disciplinary Mitigation of CBRNE Risk

76

Vulery Krivokhiza Fight against Terrorism: Prospects of Co-operation between Russia and the West

94

Vulery Kukhur Ukraine and Problems of Terrorism

100

Hiltrnar Schubert Safety Aspects of Asymmetric Threats

104

Murk Wheelis Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Lessons from History

110

4.

CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES TO EMERGENCY AND COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT, MEDIA INFORMATION

Michael Stiirrner Danse Macabre: Terrorism and Western Media

117

Amy E. Srnithson Preparedness Challenges from the Perspective of Emergency Response Personnel

120

Gary W McConnell People: The Key Element in Disaster Response

129

xi

A. D. Vickery Key Issues in Disaster Response: Ensuring Critical Systems and Equipment Work when Needed

136

Jody Westby The Intersection of Information, Communication Technologies and Terrorism (Not available for publication)

141

5.

CROSS-CULTRUAL AND CROSS-DISCIPLINARY TOOLS AND COUNTERMEASURES WORKING GROUP SESSION

Ronald G. Manley and Reiner K. Huber Cross-cultural and Cross-disciplinary Tools and Countermeasures Working Group Report

6.

145

CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES TO QUANTIFICATION OF R~SK WORKING GROUP SESSION

Richard Wilson and Charles R. Penn Cross-Disciplinary Challenges to Quantification of Risk Working Group Report

153

John Adams Science and Terrorism: Challenges to the Quantification of the Risks of Terrorism

163

Olivia Bosch Counter-terrorism Post-Madrid 2004: Information Sharing and UNSCR 1540

171

Richard Wilson Quantifying Terrorism: A Cross-disciplinary Challenge. From Precise to Speculative, from Objective to Subjective: Where does the Risk of Terrorism Belong?

178

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7.

CROSS-CULTURAL AND CROSS-DISCIPLINARY COMMUNITY RESPONSE WORKING GROUP SESSION

Amy E. Smithson Report of the Cross-cultural and Cross Disciplinary Community Response Working Group

187

A. R. Green The Global Emergency: A Cross-disciplinary Approach to Risk

194

Leslee Stein-Spencer TOPOFF 2: Appreciating the Importance of Disaster Drills

207

8.

CROSS-CULTURAL EVALUATION OF SOCIETAL RESPONSE WORKING GROUP SESSION

Ahmad Kumal Report of the Working Group on Cross-cultural Evaluation of Societal Response

219

Scott Atrun Trends in Suicide Terrorism: Sense and Nonsense

222

Furhang Mehr Globalisation of Terrorism

255

FranGois Waelbroeck Terrorism and the Law of Talion

263

Seminar Participants

267

1.

OPENING SESSION

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ARRIVING AT THE UNPREDICTABLE CHALLENGE

- A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY

ANTONTNO ZICHICHI CERN, Geneva, Switzerland and University of Bologna, Italy Last year in May, we held the 29th Session of the International Seminars on the Cultural Emergency, which was focused on Terrorism. At one point, during the opening of the 2gthSession, I said: So here we are again, meeting as a dedicated group, somewhat overwhelmed by the frightening acceleration of events since our August meeting, which confirmed our worst fears. Without wanting to sound too pessimistic, we believe that the need to identi& the motivations for and the mechanisms of terrorist acts, as well as guarding against them, has become even more essential. Our hope, of course, is that the voice of our international congregation of scientists will make itself heard amidst the clamor of confusing arguments being presented by various parties. Needless to say, terrorism and international violence have meanwhile snowballed and spread to such proportions that all the political powers are at loss to abate this Planetary Emergency. It has become a challenge of the highest order of magnitude, requiring a determined cross-disciplinary effort to reach a solution. Diplomacy alone will not solve the problem; neither will the military, the social scientists nor those who devise the most ingenious countermeasures. The need for cross-disciplinary solutions is accepted by specialists in all fields today, and holds especially true for the Cultural Emergency. This is nothing new for the WFS, who has advocated a multidisciplinary approach to problems for the last 25 years. How can we hope to demystify the unpredictable without meeting and debating amongst ourselves? This is what we shall try to do for the next four days. As indicated on the Seminar Programme you were given on arrival, the next four Seminar sessions will be Plenary Sessions. In the first session, diplomats and well-informed speakers will present their insight into their government's reaction to the Emergency. The second, will be dedicated to the Cross-DisciplinaryResponses to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats. The subject of the third session is the Cross-disciplinary Challenges to Quantification of Risk and it will be followed by a session on Cross-disciplinary Challenges to Emergency Management Media Information and Communication. Four dedicated parallel sessions of the Working Groups will then take place as follows: Cross-cultural and Cross-disciplinary Tools and Countermeasures Chair Dr. R. Manley - Co-chair Professor Reiner Huber Cross-disciplinary Challenges to Quantification of Risk Chair Professor Richard Wilson - Co-chair Professor Charles Penn Cross-cultural and Cross-disciplinary Community Response Chair Dr. A. Smithson Cross-cultural Evaluation of Societal Response Chair Dr. Ahmad Kamat

3

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2.

MULTIDISCIPLINARY GLOBAL APPROACH

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THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM NORMAN P. NEUREITER Director, AAAS Center for Science, Technology and Security Washington, D.C., USA

In the past 20 years of international terrorist acts, there have been large numbers of dead and injured throughout the world. Until September 11, 2001, the U.S. had been minimally affected, while Latin America, Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Western Europe all suffered extended sieges. However when those four airplanes were hijacked on 9/11, and those two great buildings were brought down in New York, and I saw outside my State Department window the clouds of black smoke billowing up from the blazing Pentagon, it was clear that things had changed. The U.S. was now a direct target; terrorists were aiming for high consequence acts of terror with many casualties; and they were able to commit such acts within the United States. This realization shook the nation and its people, but it was especially hard for the Bush Administration and the new Congress. They had been in office for less than one year and this had happened on their watch. They were determined to bring the people involved to justice and to prevent a similar act from ever happening again. They declared America's global War on Terrorism. In the subsequent 2 1/2 years, the country has profoundly changed - economically, sociologically, politically, and in its foreign policy and national priorities. There are the unfinished wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, miltary bills that will approach $500B this year, frequent yellow and orange alerts of terrorism risk in Washington, stringent security measures at airports, new visa laws, and the Patriot Act with countervailing concerns over civil rights, to name but a few of the changes. The echo of 9/11 continues to resound daily in people's lives. In almost any speech today by the President or members of his Administration, we are reminded that the US. is in a state of war. And it is very possible that the outcome of the election this November will depend on who the American people believe will be the best wartime president. It is certain to be a very tough election campaign. So in this atmosphere, what is happening in the U.S. Science and Technology (S&T) community? In fact, this community was extremely prompt in responding with a concerted effort to show how S&T could contribute to the challenge of dealing with terrorism. With their own funds, the three institutions comprising the National Academies initiated a major study co-chaired by Lewis Branscomb and Richard Klausner, involving over 150 expert contributors and reviewers on how S&T could serve the nation in this new crisis. The result was an important book entitled "Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism." This volume is an enduring handbook for the application of S&T in this battle. In addition, the continuous interaction of the study's scientific panels with the White House Office of Science and Technology, the Congress, and the people working on a blueprint for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) greatly influenced the structure of this new Department and the future government machinery for combating terrorism. DHS was

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formally established on November 25,2002, with a projected 170,000employees from all or parts of 22 different government agencies and an initial budget for FY 2004 of $30.4 billion one of the swiftest and most remarkable re-organizations of government in U.S. history. The scope of the National Strategy to counter terrorism is enormous, covering fourteen sectors of national activity plus protection of the nation's key assets. The list includes agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, the defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, the chemical industry and hazardous materials, the postal system and shipping, as well as national monuments and icons, nuclear power plants, dams, government facilities, and commercial key assets. The task for DHS is huge. A salient feature of the organization of DHS is that one of the directorates reporting to Secretary Ridge and his Deputy is Science and Technology, headed by an Under Secretary, Charles McQueary. This is clearly the result of the efforts of the science and engineering communities. The other key directorates are Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), and Border and Transportation Security (BTS). The role of IAIP is to analyze the available information on threats to the nation, to assess the risks, and to take action to protect the nation's infrastructure. The EPS directorate builds on the emergency structures that were previously in place and must work to prepare first responders throughout the country to deal with any acts of terrorism that may occur. BTS is the largest directorate, with a immense responsibilty for policing the coasts and all borders, for the security of air traffic and other transport, and all immigration and visa policy. This last area is presently a source of considerable concern for the American S&T community. While the Department of State and its embassies and consulates throughout the world still issue the visas, the policies that determine whether visas are given to visitors or potential immigrants are now the responsibility of BTS. This is a major change, and the current regulations, as they are now being implemented, are having a significant, negative impact on the ability of foreign scientists, graduate students and postdoctoral researchers in science and engineering to visit or work in the United States. In the long term, I believe a continuation of the present trend will have a very deleterious impact on the quality of American science and technology and what that implies for international competitiveness and national security. It is essential that we do a better job of balancing America's traditional openness with the demands of protecting the nation from potential terrorists. The total budget for research and development (R&D) to counter terrorism in FY 2004 is $3.44 billion, However, DHS has just under $1 billion, while the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has $1.64 billion, reflecting great concern in the country and the Congress over a possible biological attack. The rest of the budget for S&T is divided among the Departments of Energy, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture and Justice, and the National Science Foundation. The budget proposed for FY 2005, which is now in the Congress, totals $3.63 billion, with increases for the Defense Department and HHS, and the other agencies at approximately the same or slightly reduced levels. The mission of the S&T Directorate of DHS is to conduct, stimulate and enable research, development, testing, evaluation and timely transition of homeland security

9 capabilities to federal, state and local operational end-users. DHS is taking a systems engineering, end-to-end assessment approach to the complex systems with which they must deal. They want to leverage existing technologies and related research including that performed by other Government agencies, academia, the private sector and international partners. In fact, there is an international relations section in the S&T Directorate that is beginning to explore cooperative opportunites with other countries. Their S&T research agenda covers the following areas: biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear, and explosives countermeasures; standards; threat and vulnerability, testing and assessment; critical infrastructure protection; emerging threats and conventional missions. The S&T Directorate must also seek to fill technology gaps in the mission areas of the operational directorates of DHS. Partnerships with end-users will be used to achieve effective mission-focused technologies, which will be developed as part of an "all-hazards'' infrastructure. Decisions on priorities for R&D are driven by their ability to maximize risk reduction within a system-level security framework. The S&T Directorate now has over 200 people. They have in the first months made significant grants to universities for work in specific areas. They also have a DHS Fellowship Program. Bio and nuclear/radiologicalcountermeasures, along with the threat and vulnerability, testing and assessment areas have been priority areas for funding in this first year or operation. The kinds of research identified as priority needs include the following: "system of systems" analysis, modeling and simulation; problem oriented interdisciplinary research in the physical and life sciences, engineering and social sciences; and basic research to understand threats and consequences, as well as better ways to reduce vulnerability and enhance response and recovery. There is a need to address both near-term tactical issues and longer-term technical issues. For instance, in addressing the WMD problem, it is deemed essential to consider the totality of the challenge in a comprehensive preparedness strategy: including preevent, the event itself and post-event. This means work on prevention, protection, surveillance and detection, and response and recovery. It includes research, development and acquisition; threat assessment and awareness (both domestic and international); information management and communications and a future threat initiative. Because of particular concern about the possible consequences of a bio-attack, three high-priority programs have already been implemented in the U.S. BIOWATCH is the deployment of environmental surveillance systems in major U.S. cities to detect the presence of bio-agents. BIOSENSE is the tracking of clinical symptoms throughout the U.S. to sense whether a bio-attack may have occurred. And BIOSHIELD is the preparation of countermeasures such as vaccines to respond to a specific bio-attack. There are also major efforts underway to monitor border crossings by people, freight, containers and vehicles. Aircraft security is, of course, of top priority. Biometrics have already been introduced into the visa process and bio-passports will be required in the future. Finally, it is useful to note that private foundations have also begun to make grants on a selective basis for work in the area of science and security. For example, in three days' time I will become the Director of the Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Washington. The Center is funded by a three-year grant from the John D. and Catherine

10 T. MacArthur Foundation as part of their $50 million Science, Technology and Security Initiative. Under this program MacArthur has funded a number of universities and policy institutions in the U.S. and abroad to work in the area of S&T and security and to develop scholarly centers of excellence in this field. Our role at A A A S will be to serve as a "smart portal" between these other institutions and the policy community in Washington. Our hope is to be able catalyze the formation of effective linkages and excellent two-way communication that will contribute to the formation of the best possible policies in this increasingly complex, but essential, discipline.

TERRORISM - AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

AHMAD KAMAL Senior Fellow United Nations Institute for Training and Research Over the three years that we have now addressed this terrible scourge of Terrorism in Erice, almost everything that can be said, has been said already. There is little doubt that, while the events of 11 September 2001 have moved us into a new phase of world history, the impact of those events, and the methodology of our own reactions, still leave us groping in the dark both about the depth of the underlying motivations as well as the possible solutions to this increasingly dangerous problem. Yet, most of the relevant factors are already abundantly clear: Firstly, a marked shift has taken place in the techniques and spread of terrorism over these past few years. Acts of terrorism were not new, nor were they geographically confined to any one part of the world only. What is new is the use of modem information technology, the extraordinary coordination between separate teams working independently, the increasing intensity in the motivation of suicide bombers, and the complete metastasis of the Al-Qaida organization as it decentralizes into an international movement. These are all new factors. Secondly, it is obvious that any response to this threat must be a combination of a “top-down’’ approach, which concentrates on security counter-measures, and a “bottomup” approach which addresses the root causes of the frustration and despair which sustain the terrorist movement. Unfortunately, most of our responses have been focused on devising counter-measures; little if anything has been done to address the root causes. Many of these root causes are of our own creation, and when the history of our times is judged, the verdict will be severe about the political injustices that we perpetrated, the economic gaps that we ignored, and the pathetic social governance structures that we selectively countenanced. All of these have contributed to creating an atmosphere in which terrorism has flourished. Thirdly, despite the enormous effort expended and the resources committed so far, and despite our protestations to the contrary, the world is not safer today than it was before the events of 11 September 2001. Terrorism has already spread from its original sources in Afghanistan, to France, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Uzbekistan, just to name a few of the countries that have suffered from variations of the original attacks. It is likely to spread further and faster, perhaps here in Italy also. As this happens, the overall cost of the counter-measures for preparedness and response is enormous, and is adversely impacting even the strongest economies. Fourthly, the asymmetry, which distinguished the problem, has grown exponentially. Whereas the original planning and preparation of the 11 September attacks must have taken the combined effort of a significantly large part of an organization, the actions of just a handful of individuals now, or even those of a single individual, are beginning to generate an ever wider spiral of consequential reactions, which can consume and preoccupy whole nations. To the extent that the primary purpose

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12 of terrorism is to sow panic and to draw a non-proportional response, this asymmetrical development represents a considerable success for terrorists in their nefarious plans. Fifthly, the emergence of new doctrines like preemptive war, or preventive war, or detention without legal counsel and trial, or a deliberate non-recourse to established national or international judicial institutions, are nullifying years, if not centuries, of effort to codify rules of civilized behavior and legal norms. These new doctrines are being justified by the extraordinary nature of the new threat, and by the argument that if you wait to go through “due process”, it will be too late. While the argument is understandable, the implications of these new doctrines will nevertheless have profound consequences on the future of established norms of civilized conduct. Sixthly and finally, most of our current thinking and approaches are exacerbating the problem rather than pacifying the situation. A cultural divide is deepening in the world, and extremism is growing inside our own countries. In fact, extremist views are gaining a new respectability, and as that happens, the moderate center is losing ground, and becoming increasingly silent, throughout the world. To be moderate, or to counsel caution, is now considered as unpatriotic in many countries. All these are depressing factors, even if they are not entirely unexpected. For years now, many have been arguing in favor of a more comprehensive approach in rooting out terrorism, under which our current emphasis on single-focus “top-down” countermeasures would be properly and duly complemented with a much greater attention to addressing the root causes of frustration and despair. These views are currently being largely ignored. Our missionary zeal in turning a blind eye to these root causes now places our societies in continuing and ever increasing danger. The question then is, where do we go from here? The Member States of the United Nations wrestled with the problem of terrorism for decades, and floundered because they could not come up with a definition of terrorism which would properly differentiate between acts of terrorism and acts in defense of the legitimate struggle for selfdetermination. That debate could not find a satisfactory agreement or consensus. The arguments were far too strong on both sides, and too many countries, including even those who had themselves come into existence as a result of the exercise of that very right of self-determination,were now arguing against that right. Attention in the United Nations then shifted to slicing terrorism into specific subsections, and of then plugging each one of these with a separate convention, rather than getting bogged down in a prolonged debate on a single “comprehensive” convention, the achievement of which would have had little or no chances of success. In the process, we were able to identify a dozen such sub-sections, and to sign conventions on each one of them; on the hijacking of aircraft or ships, on violence in aircraft or ships or oil rigs, on kidnapping or hostage taking, on the protection of nuclear materials or plastic explosives, on terrorist bombings, and on the financing of terrorist acts. This then left open only the question of the crime of aiding or abetting or harboring terrorists, and this was addressed in the Security Council in the immediate aftermath of the 1 1 September events in Resolution 1373. It is noteworthy that none of these basic documents even attempts to address root causes. So much for the codification of laws in the international sphere. In the national sphere, actions have achieved much less of a consensus. Public opinion has been deeply divided, not so much about the response to terrorism, but rather over the unrelated

13 geographical direction into which this response has taken us. Around the world, people look on in horror at the consequences of a war in which the charring of foreign bodies is accompanied by gloating and dancing locals, or the equally disturbing photographs about the torture of prisoners and the glee on the faces of the torturers. The political divide over the justification for this war has also created serious cleavages among populations even in some developed countries, with many beginning to question or vote out the governments that they themselves had elected in the first instance. An even deeper cultural divide has also set in between countries and regions. This is by far the most dangerous consequence of the current situation. All the work done with so much effort in the post World War I1 years to create a new and durable Rule of Law appears to have been lost, as new and untested paradigms are touted with missionary zeal. In the process, extremists who seek to justify their warped terrorism in the name of God, are being responded to by equally irresponsible politicians seeking to settle old scores, also in the name of God. Nobody asks how God can possibly be on both sides of this divide. Despite all that zeal, the fact remains that we are no nearer a solution today than we were three years ago. If anything, we stand further back. Frustration and despair have noticeably increased in the world. This may be due to economic causes, with overall poverty having actually increased in the world. Every individual in every developing country knows about poverty and its impact on the standard of living and freedom of choice. Everybody knows about the growing economic gap in the world, with rampant and reprehensible over-consumption in the developed world, with eyes turned away increasingly from the three quarters of the remaining peoples who remain mired in depressing conditions. How long can this blindness be sustained or defended. Do we not see the effects of declining Official Development Assistance and Foreign Direct Investment, and little or no change in the levels of protectionism and subsidies in the developed countries? Do we not realize that many of our own actions go against all the fundamental values and market economics, which we ourselves profess? Do we not realize that this indefensible gap between the haves and the have-nots is providing fodder to those who rejoice in exploiting this atmosphere while they perform their criminal agenda against innocent civilians? The frustration and despair may also be due to political causes, as a result of the continuing and historic injustices that we support in the major zones of tension in the world. Persistent injustice swirls around that common focal center of our religious being, where generations have been nurtured on nothing but prolonged war and deprivation and refugee camps. In a vain effort to sustain a bridge-head in alien territory, we continue to pump in billions of dollars into what is perceived as a forward fortress, and turn a blind eye to the latter’s own actions which fly in the face of all norms of law or justice. The frustration and despair may finally be due to social causes, primarily the poor governance which is being evidenced by non-representative governments in most developing countries, frequently supported from abroad by external foreign policy interests. In the process, even the moderate public in large parts of the Muslim world has been alienated. Even the authoritarian and non-representative rulers of that world, many of whom we keep in power against all canons of democracy, are now unable to prolong their lives for any length of time against a groundswell of public discontent. While this

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may well turn out to be one of the positive results of the situation, its destabilizing regional effects are likely to be long-lasting, with spiraling social and political consequences. Irrespective of causes, the criminality of a few individuals is more than matched by the irresponsibility of some states, as they experiment with shortsighted policies, policies that evidence a poor knowledge of the lessons of the past. The monumental errors that we are committing day by day in seeking linkages where none exist, for example between Islam and terrorism, will only draw equally irresponsible counter-reactions and dig us deeper into the sand. This is the true planetary emergency today. Where does Erice figure in this? In the front line one would hope. When criminal terrorists and naNe politicians both lose control of their senses, it is for the scientists to bring them back to the path of cold logic and empirical thought. We are in the middle of a vicious cycle of stimulus and response, where each action draws a counter-reaction, which in turn then sets off a new and even more violent action. History has seen such collective madnesses before, just as it has known that the only losers in such battles are the innocent bystanders who get caught in these wild crossfires. Someone has to break that cycle of violence. That is why the bells should ring out from this hill-top in Erice, which concretizes centuries of scientific thought and achievement, to pull us back from a dangerous slide towards an abyss. Just meeting and talking around a table will not do. It is essential that we try to determine a concrete and do-able set of principles and recommendations, and then direct them towards those who may have the power to reverse this course and its consequences. That should be our agenda at this meeting. History will never forgive us if we too are found wanting.

REGIONAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: PURPOSE, PRINCIPLES AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK TO PREVENT, COMBAT AND ELIMINATE TERRORISM IN THE AMERICAS IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9-11. PERSISTENT CHALLENGES AND NEW THREATS. AN ASSESSMENT. AMBASSADOR LILLIAN ALURRALDE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, Argentina “Individually and collectively we will deny terrorist groups the capacity to operate in this Hemisphere. This American family stands united.” Declaration by the Organization of American States, September 1I , 2001.

1. The Organization of American States (OAS) was the first international body to rise in condemnation of the 9-11 massacre. All countries of the Hemisphere except Cuba whose government was excluded from the Organization 40 years ago subscribed the above-quoted Declaration at the General Assembly that, on the day of the attack, was meeting in Lima, Peru in order to approve the Inter-American Democratic Charter, that spells the syllabus of the Latin American countries’ return to the democratic fold. It was far more than an emotional reaction. National, bilateral, sub-regional and regional measures were promptly devised and put into effect, hemispheric cooperation was enhanced and with the thorough support of the Summit of the Americas - the periodic meeting of Heads of State and of Government of the member countries - an all-encompassing strategy was put in place. In fact, only ten days after, on September 21, a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of member countries was called and a Resolution on Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat and Eliminate Terrorism - RC 23Res. 01/01 - was passed in its first plenary session. The Resolution entrusted the Permanent Council to prepare a draft Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism; called upon the Committee on Hemispheric Security to expedite preparation for a Special Conference on Security in the Americas; instructed the Secretary General to provide the necessary support; and invited the Inter-American Defense Board to provide advisory services as requested. 2. An assessment of the regional response to terrorism in the aftermath of 9-1 1 will consequently require to take into account the substantial institutional framework that was developed, dealing with both persistent and new terrorists threats in the region, as well as with the political, economic, social and cultural themes to which it relates. A brief reference to the historical context is also in order. The main instruments that channel and coordinate anti-terrorist activities in the Hemisphere are, specifically, the Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) and, concurrently, the earlier established Committee on Hemispheric Security. Both develop their responsibilities within a plexus of closely-knit institutions involving the main bodies of the Organization and its substantive normative documents - the OAS

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16 Charter, the Rio Treaty on collective regional security, the Bogota Pact on pacific settlement of disputes, the American Convention on Human Rights and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America (known as the Tlatelolco Treaty) as well as a number of “new generation” conventions and resolutions adopted, among others, by meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Justice and Attorneys General, Ministers of Defense, and Ministers of Political and Security Affairs, together with the activities of the attending number of experts and government officials involved in their application. As it happened elsewhere, it was not the first time that the countries of the region had to face the scourge of terrorism. The first Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortions that are of International Significance - a gauche, long and convoluted title - had been signed in 1971, at the height of widespread guerrilla warfare. Before global terrorism had raised its ugly head, Latin America had gone through the scary experience of terrorism - urban, rural, state - and had taken action to deter it at the inter-American level. When democracy was restored, Latin American govemments, survivors of the state terrorism that had left no legal parameter untouched and resulted in brutal repression and thousands of victims, many of them innocent civilians caught in the strife - had a different perspective on the ways and means to face the terrorist menace. And the nature of the menace had changed. The guerrilla movement had either been decimated and, in a new international environment, somewhat bereft of its ideological bearings, or reconverted to take its place in the political arena with varied electoral luck - the Peruvian Luminous Path in the way of becoming but a shadow of its former self, the Colombian guerrilla standing as the only substantially resilient one. The brutal attacks both occurring in Buenos Aires, on the Embassy of Israel in 1992 and on a Jewish Community Center in 1994 commanding a large number of victims, signaled the presence of a different kind of terrorist danger, heavily suspected - though the investigation is still unfinished - of being planned and executed from outside the region, though abetted by a local connection. The multifaceted character of the new threat had to be reappraised with emphasis on the need of an equally multiple response that should take into account the connections established with organized crime, drug and arms traffic, paralegal financial transactions and possible enclaves to sustain it, corruption reaching the security forces and an undisclosed political motivation seemingly unrelated to the local scene. It was imperative to improve legal cooperation and insure a fluid flow of information. Two Specialized Conferences on Terrorism were held, in 1996 and in 1998, and in 1999, through a Resolution on Hemispheric Cooperation to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism - AG/Res. 1650 (XXXWO/99) - the General Assembly of the OAS established CICTE, with points of contact (POC) in the governments of all member countries as its principal professional level liaison, and an instance soon to be raised to the level of an Executive Directorship in the OAS Secretariat. When 9-1 1 arrived it gave momentum and renewed focus to OAS action. The Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism was signed in Bridgetown, Barbados in 2002, and in 2003 the Declaration on National Security in the Americas was adopted by the Special Conference on Security that met in Mexico last October. The texts of both these instruments are appended as an Annex to this paper. They hardly operate in an institutional vacuum. A series of Conventions signed from 1983 to 2003, mostly on legal cooperation, transparency in governmental operations, and arms control as well

17 as the organs established to implement them, reinforce action against terrorism. In chronological order they include the Convention on Extradition, the Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments, the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad, the Convention on International Tra@c in Minors, the Convention Against Corruption, the Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Traffickmg in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, and the Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. Through CITCE up-to-date information on relevant actions and data pertaining to the struggle against terrorism are collected and reported at the national, bilateral, sub-regional and regional level. The 3+1 Agreement on the Triple Zone, signed by Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay with the assistance of the United States, is a particularly interesting case of sub-regional cooperation as it targets an area singled out for potentially dangerous terrorism-related activities. Of particular significance is the work undertaken in cooperation with the American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) and with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (ACHR), which deserves special consideration. CICTE works also in close contact with the UN CTC acting as its regional counterpart, and both Committees foster the signing of UN bodies’ sponsored conventions, agreements and resolutions, with special reference to air and maritime transportation, port and airport security, arms and dangerous materials traffic, cyber-security etc. A measure of the region’s participation in mainstream WMD arms control measures is provided by the fact that of the six UN bodies concerned - the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the United Nations Panel of Experts, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - four are at present directed by Latin American (Argentine) officials. The Committee on Hemispheric Security has also encouraged Latin American participation in the UN International Standardized Register of Military Expenditures and the Register on Conventional Arms, as well as in agreement with the new spirit of mutual cooperation that presides over the present era of inter-American relations, promoted regional arrangements to develop Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) that have replaced the traditional rivalries and hypotheses of conflict that used to affect relations between neighbour countries. 3. In implementing this multi-pronged regional strategy and coordinating the network established to support it - not devoid of the perils of bureaucratic superposition that plague national and other international systems - the relationships with human rights institutions is of the essence. All the new above mentioned main documents stress that anti-terrorist action should be carried out within the rule of law and full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Any wiggling around this commitment will encounter immediate rejection. Together with a definition of terrorism that includes an assessment of its prejudicial effect on both democracy and social and economic progress, it has become the mantra to stave off the scars left by state terrorism. And by mantra we do not mean whispered words. In fact, no other than the Declaration on Security in the Americas includes reference upon reference to constitutional rule, democratic principles, individual freedoms and respect for human rights, together with a comprehensive list of social and economic rights, implying a

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total reversal of the doctrine of national security once invoked by state terrorists in pursuit of their ungodly task. Furthermore, in 2003, a special Resolution on Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism - AGfRes. 1931-0103 - was passed by the General Assembly reaffirming the duty of all member states to keep their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, international law on refugees and international humanitarian law. A special paragraph focuses on the rights of the members of those groups that might find themselves vulnerable, disadvantaged or threatened with discrimination as a result of terrorist violence or anti-terrorist initiatives. The Resolution encourages the dialogue between CICTE and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and requests the Permanent Council to report on its implementation to the next meeting of the General Assembly. None of this should be construed as detracting from the fight against terrorism in both preventive and remedial ways. To find a balance between the rule of law and the imperatives of security is never an easy task, but the democratic contention posits that, unless a legal path is followed, anti-terrorism action would undo the very premises it is designed to uphold. This concept was already ensconced in Resolution RC 23/Res.01/01 passed on September 21, 2001 mentioned in the first paragraph of this paper which calls on all member states engaged in the fight against terrorism to promote widespread tolerance and social harmony and commands respect for diversity - ethnic, racial, religious, cultural - as stated in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The wisdom of this provision should certainly be highlighted. In spite of the many commitments taken on non-discrimination - gender included discrimination subsists inherited and newly-minted, blurring the transparency of social communication and political understanding. Stereotyping is in this sense a particularly pernicious kind of discrimination. So that, when, without mincing words, and nowhere else but in a most respected publication on international relations, a major U.S. intellectual, after predicting the clash of civilizations, expresses - and his comments reach the media - his oracular fear that the United States will become a mongrel society where the Latino ascendancy will corrupt the morally immaculate ethos of the WASPs, one is made to wonder whether we are not back to square one and will soon be hectored about the white man’s burden and the lesser races frailties. This is the stuff our worst nightmares are made of. By the turn of the century - the previous one - action had followed similar words, to Latin America’s great grief. Stereotypes breed stereotypes. Latin American thinkers in search of an intellectual lair to hide the malaise brought up by the Spanish Wur, appealed to a Shakespearean metaphor: Caliban, the force, Ariel, the spirit, the U.S. the epitome of material success, Latin America of defeated humanism. Ours was the siesta and the fiesta, theirs the hard work and moral responsability. This stereotype, diminishing for both, was never totally dispelled as witness Mr. Huntington’s stance, a most unwelcome revival, that calls for effective social response. Discourse is a main component of politics and the message carried out in official or even non-official words weighs as heavily as the military or the economic arsenal in the spectator’s eye. Is it too much to ask, in a delicate political context, to avoid a bruising manner even in words? The political rhetoric of the Founding Fathers should not fall into such hands. It is still not only among the best, if not the best, ever penned, but it remains the key to what now would be called U S . soft power and the eventual dismantling of the terrorist threat by the best means. The

19 resurgence of anti-Semitism and xenophobia, the social fracture that derives from relaying extensive ethnic or cultural groups to a different - lower - status in mature and successful democratic societies, and the blandishment of fear-mongering ideologies could severely impair the fight against terrorism and embark it on a most distressful path.

4. No effort to gauge the scope and the nature of the regional response to terrorism would be complete without reference to the political, economic, social and cultural circumstances of the environment in which it operates. And those are dire circumstances. A recently published UNDP study gives a grim picture of socioeconomic conditions in Latin America and of a dismayingly declining faith in the effectiveness of democratic institutions. Anti-parliamentary sentiments and little respect for political parties are rife. The disparity in income distribution - the richest 10% thirty times richer than the poorest - a majority under the poverty line lacking social security, clean water, education and health facilities, is compounded by the rise of crude violence of an anomic strain affecting all social strata. There are 55 murders per 100.000 persons in the region, a proportion that more than triples the number in Canada, and 55 percent of those in prison have not been convicted. Dissatisfaction with politicians extends to the judicial and penitentiary systems; corruption in security forces and police brutality have yet to be overcome, and the number of uneducated unemployed young people involved in crime is wont to give way, and it has, to a call for harsher penalties and an iron-fist approach to social unrest. The study goes on to suggest the need for the return of the state as an actor in the pursuit of the common good and the redress of the excesses of deregulation, privatization and extreme laissez-faire policies that reigned unchallenged in the name of its own self-ascribed role of orthodox economics, a fundamentalism of sorts, that should have its own roots and motivation examined. Allowing those to whom extraordinary privileges accrued as an outcome of those policies any kind of encouragement in support of the perpetuation of their individual interests, would raise once again the ghost of institutional upheaval that has plagued Latin America through decades and a return to violence as a means of political action, that would undo the fundamental advances gained in restoring democratic rule. Let us keep in mind that the OAS is a regional organization that includes 35 member states - the original twenty-one - the U.S. and the Latin American countries that signed the OAS Charter in 1948 - plus Canada and the Caribbean countries that joined after independence. From the start the over-riding interests of all members have been both political and economic - to avoid foreign intervention and secure the peaceful settlement of disputes and to promote economic well-being within a democratic perspective, the U.S. concerned with extra-continental penetration and its own economic objectives, the Latin Americans bent on the principle of nonintervention, from whatever source, and demanding the equivalent of a Marshall Plan for the region, in the hope of benefiting from the dividends of peace, both vowing to comply with the rules of International Law. In the more than fifty years elapsed thereafter, and as the disparity of power between the members of the Organization increased, the original objectives are still present, however flawed in their application: a whole chapter on shared values is included in the Declaration on Security in the Americas and made part of the concept of security. In this context the institutional inter-American framework set up to face the challenge posed by terrorism, as described, reads as an attempt to bring together

20 what, in previous Erice Seminars on the subject, had appeared as the counter measures and the roots and motivations approach - or what Mr. Blair succinctly defined as tough on terrorism, tough on the causes of terrorism. It is still too early to judge the success of this double approach; how much true commitment is there, how much is lip-service or bureaucratic enhancement? The invasion of Iraq, on the other hand, found a majority of the OAS members in opposition of preemptive intervention outside of the UN, and only Colombia, who had insisted and obtained that the Colombian guerilla be labeled as terrorists, and a few Central-America countries awaiting the signature of a commercial free-trade agreement with the US., became part of the coalition, some already announcing they will leave in the aftermath of M-11 and the departure of Spanish troops. Neither Canada nor the rest of the OAS member states would participate in the coalition. Mexico and Chile, besides, which have the friendliest possible relationship with the US., and under severe pressure, did not support the U.S./U.K. proposal in the UN Security Council. The possibility of a larger U.S. intervention in Colombia, although not openly voiced, weighs heavily in everyone’s mind and Mr. Powell’s words last year at the Council of Foreign Affairs - “Bogota is not so far >om Baghdad” cannot easily be forgotten. An all-out effort to annihilate the guerilla in the Colombian jungles is being suggested, with more than an advisory participation of the U S . forces Southern Command. Venezuela is already being accused of harboring Colombian guemllas across the border. Some think it bliss to have the U.S. involved elsewhere. The economic situation of the subcontinent being what it is, growing dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Washington-promoted policies adhered to in the 90s is being expressed by recently-elected Latin American governments more responsive to social demands and enjoying wide popular support. The time has come to put some teeth into the metaphor quoted in the epigraph to this paper and have the American family stand united not only in its commitment to free the hemisphere from terrorism, but with the same unwavering determination, to free its people from the deadly scourge of underdevelopment, a comfortable word, come to think of it, that allows us to refer in polite society to the obscene conditions under which the larger part of the people of the region lead their brutally short lives, a couple of failed states looming on the horizon.

5. Will the defeat of terrorism by itself induce a change in these conditions? One need not subscribe, intellectually or otherwise, to the contention that violence is the humanism of the dispossessed to realize that if not terrorism, terrorism-related evils can find in this environment a propitious breeding ground. Better than to look at widespread poverty as a potential hotbed of terrorism or of the kind of behavior that can lead to it - and end up targeting the destitute or their leaders as main culprits - one should perhaps try to establish the roots of such dismal social and economic conditions and address them with the same urgency and as much investment of intellectual, social, financial and institutional resources as applied to deter terrorism. True, in considering global issues, terrorism seems to be the one more present in our minds and more pressing to be addressed. The amval of mega-terrorism right in the heart of the wealthy countries and the danger posed by the proliferation of WMD warrants of itself the adoption of the strategic and tactical measures required for an all-out fight to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism, and has strengthened the will to put out an all-comprehensive effort to thwart it. But, even the Chairman of the World Bank has wondered on whether the war on terrorism may be detracting from

21 the war on poverty. You all know the numbers. But let me remind you that Mr. Wolfensohn has most recently observed that: None of the Group of Eight rich countries spent the promised 0.7 percent of gross national income on development aid. Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden are the only countries to have hit the target set out in the Millenium Development Goals, which aims to halve global poverty by 2015. The world’s major governments were willing to spend $900 billion on defense but provided just $60 billion for overseas aid, of which only a fraction is in cash. He went on to observe that the issue of development andpoverty is an important and urgent question as the question of Iraq, as the question of Afghanistan or Gaza and dared to express his sense that we do not have the leadership at the moment that can take us through in a satisfactory way in dealing with these questions. Mr. Camdessus, a well-disposed gentleman, former Director of the IMF, used to refer at length to poverty in his public addresses, while the enactment of the Washington Consensus policies he supported was wrecking havoc with Latin American economies that exhibit colossal debt together with equally colossal social distress. So much for globalization and its discontents. If, after all, the left-right dilemma, dubbed archaic, seems not to worry us anymore having been sufficiently decried or rather, along with ideology pronounced dead, and as such leading to the end of history as we know it, maybe the age-old contest of guns versus butter should be borne in mind, alive and kicking as it is. A concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a relatively small group of countries and the unparalleled unequal distribution of resources contemporary with the process of globalization as it has developed, will not be solved exclusively by the defeat of terrorism. An old world has died and the new one is still to emerge. We remain in the dark about its shape and the shape of things to come, the path to be followed a major challenge to our imagination that weighs heavily on our hearts and minds - or so it should. Should we become immune to the moral threat, we will end up in a Brave New World - at best the nightmarish fantasy that Aldous Huxley foresaw sixty years ago, the Third World a picturesque destination for adventure tourism; at worst, a travesty on the triumph of civilization, where terrorism might have no place but neither will any of the values we cherish, disdain, resentment and exasperation our daily bread. Who can take comfort in the survival of the contented, without feeling ashamed of belonging to the happy few? Lest moral stamina forever lose its battle with uncontrolled greed, let us put in a word for enlightened self-interest. For as it was so poignantly said by an English poet many centuries ago, and I quote, “No man is an island unto himself’, so that, and I paraphrase, do not ask for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for us. 6. We have described the substantial institutional framework the inter-American system has devised in response to the terrorist threat, with reference to the political, economic, social and cultural substratum to which it relates. What is true for the Americas is true for the world at large. Terrorism is not the only unfinished business we have to face, the bane, lethal and obnoxious of the wellto-do who do not hesitate to aver that the poor will always be with us, as sullying a concept to the dignity of man as can be found.

22 Without a belief in the commonality of the human experience, the demise of terrorism will remain at best a surgical operation breathing temporary relief into a seriously damaged social body, the underlying disease left untouched. To join in this struggle is our inexcusable responsibility and our unalienable right, a moral imperative the 21" Century cannot set aside. Let the family of man stand united. The world is but the Americas writ large.

INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST TERRORISM THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION, BEARING IN MIND the purposes and principles of the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Charter of the United Nations; CONSIDERING that terrorism represents a serious threat to democratic values and to international peace and security and is a cause of profound concern to all member states; REAFFIRMING the need to adopt effective steps in the inter-American system to prevent, punish, and eliminate terrorism through the broadest cooperation; RECOGNIZING that the serious economic harm to states which may result from terrorist acts is one of the factors that underscore the need for cooperation and the urgency of efforts to eradicate terrorism; REAFFIRMING the commitment of the states to prevent, combat, punish, and eliminate terrorism; and BEARING IN MIND resolution RC.23RES. 1/01 rev. 1 corr. 1, “Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism,” adopted at the Twenty-third Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, HAVE AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING:

Article 1 Object and purposes The purposes of this Convention are to prevent, punish, and eliminate terrorism. To that end, the states parties agree to adopt the necessary measures and to strengthen cooperation among them, in accordance with the terms of this Convention. Article 2 Apdicable international instruments 1. For the purposes of this Convention, “offenses” means the offenses established in the international instruments listed below: a. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on December 16, 1970. b. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on September 23, 1971. c. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 14, 1973. d. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 17, 1979. e. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, signed at Vienna on March 3, 1980. f. Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on February 24, 1988.

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24 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on March 10, 1988. h. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on March 10, 1988. i. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 15, 1997. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of j Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9, 1999. Upon depositing its instrument of ratification to this Convention, a state party that is not a party to one or more of the international instruments listed in paragraph 1 of this article may declare that, in application of this Convention to such state party, that particular instrument shall be deemed not to be included in that paragraph. The declaration shall cease to have effect as soon as that instrument enters into force for that state party, which shall notify the depositary of this fact. When a state party ceases to be a party to one of the international instruments listed in paragraph 1 of this article, it may make a declaration, as provided in paragraph 2 of this article, with respect to that instrument. g.

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Article 3 Domestic measures Each state party, in accordance with the provisions of its constitution, shall endeavor to become a party to the international instruments listed in Article 2 to which it is not yet a party and to adopt the necessary measures to effectively implement such instruments, including establishing, in its domestic legislation, penalties for the offenses described therein. Article 4 Measures to prevent. combat. and eradicate the financing of terrorism 1. Each state party, to the extent it has not already done so, shall institute a legal and regulatory regime to prevent, combat, and eradicate the financing of terrorism and for effective international cooperation with respect thereto, which shall include: a. A comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks, other financial institutions, and other entities deemed particularly susceptible to being used for the financing of terrorist activities. This regime shall emphasize requirements for customer identification, record-keeping, and the reporting of suspicious or unusual transactions. b. Measures to detect and monitor movements across borders of cash, bearer negotiable instruments, and other appropriate movements of value. These measures shall be subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information and should not impede legitimate capital movements. Measures to ensure that the competent authorities dedicated to c. combating the offenses established in the international instruments listed in Article 2 have the ability to cooperate and exchange

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information at the national and international levels within the conditions prescribed under its domestic law. To that end, each state party shall establish and maintain a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national center for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of pertinent money laundering and terrorist financing information. Each state party shall inform the Secretary General of the Organization of American States of the authority designated to be its financial intelligence unit. When implementing paragraph 1 of this article, states parties shall use as guidelines the recommendations developed by specialized international and regional entities, in particular the Financial Action Task Force and, as appropriate, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and the South American Financial Action Task Force.

Article 5 Seizure and confiscation of funds or other assets 1. Each state party shall, in accordance with the procedures established in its domestic law, take such measures as may be necessary to provide for the identification, freezing or seizure for the purposes of possible forfeiture, and confiscation or forfeiture, of any funds or other assets constituting the proceeds of, used to facilitate, or used or intended to finance, the commission of any of the offenses established in the international instruments listed in Article 2 of this Convention. 2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall apply to offenses committed both within and outside the jurisdiction of the state party. Article 6 Predicate offenses to money laundering 1. Each state party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that its domestic penal money laundering legislation also includes as predicate offenses those offenses established in the international instruments listed in Article 2 of this Convention. 2. The money laundering predicate offenses referred to in paragraph 1 shall include those committed both within and outside the jurisdiction of the state party. Article 7 Cooperation on border controls 1. The states parties, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative regimes, shall promote cooperation and the exchange of information in order to improve border and customs control measures to detect and prevent the international movement of terrorists and trafficking in arms or other materials intended to support terrorist activities. 2. In this context, they shall promote cooperation and the exchange of information to improve their controls on the issuance of travel and identity documents and to prevent their counterfeiting, forgery, or fraudulent use. 3. Such measures shall be carried out without prejudice to applicable international commitments in relation to the free movement of people and the facilitation of commerce.

26 Article 8 Cooperation among law enforcement authorities The states parties shall work closely with one another, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat the offenses established in the international instruments listed in Article 2. In this context, they shall establish and enhance, where necessary, channels of communication between their competent authorities in order to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange o f information concerning all aspects of the offenses established in the international instruments listed in Article 2 of this Convention. Article 9 Mutual legal assistance The states parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of expeditious mutual legal assistance with respect to the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of the offenses established in the international instruments listed in Article 2 and proceedings related thereto, in accordance with applicable international agreements in force. In the absence of such agreements, states parties shall afford one another expeditious assistance in accordance with their domestic law. Article 10 Transfer of persons in custody 1. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the temtory of one state party and whose presence in another state party is requested for purposes of identification, testimony, or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence for the investigation or prosecution of offenses established in the international instruments listed in Article 2 may be transferred if the following conditions are met: a. The person freely gives his or her informed consent; and b. Both states agree, subject to such conditions as those states may deem appropriate. 2. For the purposes of this article: a. The state to which the person is transferred shall have the authority and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless otherwise requested or authorized by the state from which the person was transferred. The state to which the person is transferred shall without delay b. implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the state from which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise agreed, by the competent authorities of both states. The state to which the person is transferred shall not require the state c. from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition proceedings for the return of the person. The person transferred shall receive, for time spent in the custody of d. the state to which he or she was transferred, credit toward service of the sentence being served in the state from which he or she was transferred. Unless the state party from which a person is to be transferred in 3. accordance with the present article so agrees, that person, whatever his or her nationality, shall not be prosecuted or detained or subjected to any

27 other restriction of his or her personal liberty in the territory of the state to which that person is transferred in respect of acts or convictions prior to his or her departure from the temtory of the state from which said person was transferred. Article 11 Inapplicability of political offense exception For the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, none of the offenses established in the international instruments listed in Article 2 shall be regarded as a political offense or an offense connected with a political offense or an offense inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or mutual legal assistance may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offense or an offense connected with a political offense or an offense inspired by political motives. Article 12 Denial of refugee status Each state party shall take appropriate measures, consistent with the relevant provisions of national and international law, for the purpose of ensuring that refugee status is not granted to any person in respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that he or she has committed an offense established in the international instruments listed in Article 2 of this Convention.

Article 13 Denial of asylum Each state party shall take appropriate measures, consistent with the relevant provisions of national and international law, for the purpose of ensuring that asylum is not granted to any person in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she has committed an offense established in the international instruments listed in Article 2 of this Convention. Article 14 Nondiscrimination None of the provisions of this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to provide mutual legal assistance if the requested state party has substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion, or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any of these reasons. Article 15 Human rights 1. The measures carried out by the states parties under this Convention shall take place with full respect for the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. 2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as affecting other rights and obligations of states and individuals under international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of American States, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international refugee law.

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Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken or proceedings are camed out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including the enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the state in the temtory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law.

Article 16 Training 1. The states parties shall promote technical cooperation and training programs at the national, bilateral, subregional, and regional levels and in the framework of the Organization of American States to strengthen the national institutions responsible for compliance with the obligations assumed under this Convention. 2. The states parties shall also promote, where appropriate, technical cooperation and training programs with other regional and international organizations conducting activities related to the purposes of this Convention. Article 17 Cooperation through the Organization of American States The states parties shall encourage the broadest cooperation within the pertinent organs of the Organization of American States, including the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), on matters related to the object and purposes of this Convention. Article 18 Consultations among the parties 1. The states parties shall hold periodic meetings of consultation, as appropriate, with a view to facilitating: a. The full implementation of this Convention, including the consideration of issues of interest relating thereto identified by the states parties; and b. The exchange of information and experiences on effective means and methods to prevent, detect, investigate, and punish terrorism. 2. The Secretary General shall convene a meeting of consultation of the states parties after receiving the 10th instrument of ratification. Without prejudice to this, the states parties may hold consultations as they consider appropriate. 3. The states parties may request the pertinent organs of the Organization of American States, including CICTE, to facilitate the consultations referred to in the previous paragraphs and to provide other forms of assistance with respect to the implementation of this Convention. Article 19 Exercise of iurisdiction Nothing in this Convention entitles a state party to undertake in the temtory of another state party the exercise of jurisdiction or performance of functions that are exclusively reserved to the authorities of that other state party by its domestic law.

29 Article 20 Depositary The original instrument of this Convention, the English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. Article 21 Signature and ratification 1. This Convention is open for signature by all member states of the Organization of American States. 2. This Convention is subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. Article 22 Entry into force 1. This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification of the Convention with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. 2. For each state ratifying the Convention after deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the deposit by such state of its instrument of ratification. Article 23 Denunciation 1. Any state party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which notification is received by the Secretary General of the Organization. 2. Such denunciation shall not affect any requests for information or assistance made during the time the Convention is in force for the denouncing state.

FRENCH APPROACHES TO COUNTER-TERROFUSM ELISABETH GIACOBINO Directrice de la Recherche, Ministtke de la Recherche, France In France, as in many other countries, there is a general plan for emergency situations, which includes both natural and industrial disasters and potential terrorist attacks, as well as military attacks. Under the supervision of the President and the Prime Minister’s services, it always involves the Home Office, the Ministries of Finance and of Defence and the other Ministries, depending on the necessary domain of competence. The General Secretary for National Defence (SecrCtariat GCnCral de la DCfense Nationale, SGDN), who is directly responsible to the Prime Minister, plays a central role in the preparation of the various emergency plans and in the operational organisation in case of an alert. France is divided into 95 “DCpartements”, under the administration of a “PrCfet”, who represents the government. For the purpose of emergency plans, the Departements are grouped in seven zones, under the administration of a “Zone PrCfet” who is in charge of the management of crisis situations, other than military actions. Once an attack, or a disaster, has been identified and localised, the information must be reported to the City Mayor in charge of the concerned temtory, and then to the PrCfet, and to the Zone PrCfet. When measures have to be taken within 24 hours, the DCpartement and Zone PrCfets activate the emergency plan and inform the ministerial departments concerned and the Prime Minister’s Office, who may take additional measures. In less urgent cases, the information is transmitted to the Prime Minister’s Office and the SGDN who implement the plan by taking appropriate measures. The general plan is subdivided into several special plans, which cover specific threats. For example, the sub-plan entitled “Nuclear Accident” concerns accidents as well as the consequences of a terrorist act. Other sub-plans are more specifically dedicated to terrorist attacks, such as PIRANET for the response to a terrorist attack on the information and telecommunication systems, PLRATOME if a nuclear terrorist act is suspected, PIRATOX if a chemical terrorist act is suspected, BIOTOX if the use ofbiological weapons by terrorists is suspected. As an example, the “BIOTOX’ plan corresponds to a bio-warfare attack aimed at the human population. The Ministry of Health is the co-ordinator of the plan, involving the DGS (Directorate General for Health), with the help of the InVS (National Institute for Sanitary Surveillance) for epidemiological surveillance, the DHOS (Directorate for Hospitals and Medical Care) for taking charge of potential patients in hospitals and elsewhere, and with the help of AFSSAPS (National Agency for Sanitary Security of Health Products) responsible for medical supplies and therapeutic strategy. A list of the most hazardous micro-organisms and toxins has been established by the health authorities with the help of medical and research experts. This list has to be updated regularly. It includes bacteria and viruses, such as smallpox, which is a subject of many studies presently. It also includes plague, anthrax, viruses responsible for haemorrhagic fevers and toxins such as ricine or botulinic toxin. To avoid an unintentional contribution to the proliferation of biological weapons, strict rules and regulations apply to the circulation and exchange of hazardous biological agents and are regularly updated, particularly in light of international agreements.

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31 France supports the OECD 2001 recommendation regarding the establishment of National Biological Resource Centers (BRC) in order to: Implement a national accreditation mechanism based on international quality criteria; Favor links between biological resource centers; 0 Search for the harmonization of regulations; 0 Create a global network for biological resources. The surveillance provided by accredited National Biological Resource Centers should contribute to bio-security by avoiding the uncontrolled use of pathogen agents. The Ministry of Research is not considered to be on the “front-line” in the fight against terrorism. However the scientific community has a major role to play in this worldwide problem. Firstly, the scientific community must provide accurate expertise at each step of the organisational and operation processes that will be implemented to ensure the population’s security. If we consider the example of bio-terrorism that was mentioned above, it involves microbiologists, pathologists and epidemiologists, to deal with the most fundamental aspects; bio-technologists and experts in public health, if practical aspects in the biological field are considered; sociologists, linguists and jurists if either the causes or consequences of the threat are to be examined. Whatever the threat in question, this approach sheds light on the crucial importance of the scientific community, which is progressively implicated as a whole. The aim is to develop expertise for prospective analysis and modelling that will aid counter-terrorism plans, and to reinforce research infrastructures and skills dedicated to the welfare of society, including nuclear safety, industrial risk assessment, environmental toxicology, new emerging diseases and social and human sciences. This fully justifies the “cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary” approach that is crucial in understanding the causes and development of terrorism. Beyond this first area, we must identify which scientific fields are specifically concerned and, in those fields, which domain of expertise is required. If we take into consideration the likely methods of attack that may develop in a near future, the fields are roughly defined by the meanings covered under the acronym CBRN: C stands for chemical, B for biological, R for radiological and N for nuclear. Moreover, understanding the background of terrorist attacks, whether classical explosives or more elaborate technologies are used, necessitates both human and social sciences. Within these limits, if we take into account recent events, we can point out some agents, such as anthrax and botulinic toxin, as part of the field of biologic threats, although a very small number of attacks have occurred up to now. The measures to be taken against these attacks necessitate the development of specific knowledge and capacities for their prevention. These measures include upgrading major facilities for biology, such as a Safety Level 4 Laboratory, organising a network of Safety Level 3 Laboratories and setting up high safety level animal facilities. Improved epidemiological studies and modelling of disease transmission are also necessary. For example, as far as smallpox is concerned, this implies gathering the data of past epidemics, evaluating the number of people immunised, developing models of transmission and deciding when vaccine will become mandatory. A better understanding of the basic mechanisms of diseases, and how they are spread, also includes genomics. As far as human and social sciences are concerned, examples of relevant research include such subjects as how to optimise the organisation for surveillance

32 and alert; how to predict people’s reactions to attacks or to the announcement of a terrorist attack or of an epidemic. Better knowledge of civilisations and religions, the study of past civilisations is thought to be useful in order to elaborate predictive models. The role of religion, as opposed to the role of wealth and poverty, in encouraging terrorism is a subject of controversy. Terrorism is a multiple effect threat and all effects have to be taken into consideration simultaneously. Therefore the commitment of research to the fight against terrorism must be reinforced in all the fields potentially concerned.

GERMANY’S RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL EMERGENCY HENNING WEGENER Ambassador of Germany (ret.), Madrid, Spain

In the first place, I regret that scheduling problems have prevented a senior German official from the intelligence community to present this overview. I have been asked to do so in his stead, benefiting from some useful official material. However, the presentation is done is entirely on my own responsibility. The current analysis of, and campaign against, international terrorism seems to move broadly in unison among the countries represented here today. If one talks about individual countries, one should therefore concentrate on the specificity of their case. In this sense Germany shows at least three peculiarities: several recent decades of exposure to political terrorism, the country’s central geographical position, and a pronounced federal, i.e. decentralized, structure. Contemporary with the 1968 student unrest and a widespread sense of societal dissatisfaction, Germany in the 70s and 80s lived through a series of political assassinations and abductions, authored mainly by the Red Army Fraction and the Baader-Meinhof group, that shook German society to its roots. That wave of terrorism was a national phenomenon, but with international linkages and an international, anticapitalist agenda (and notable support from Communist East Germany). Apart from the emotional response and new sense of democratic unity, it also gave rise to a thorough modernization of the internal security apparatus. When the series of spectacular terrorist murders subsided definitely in the early nineties, the Federal Criminal Office, the Federal Border Guard Unit and the central and regional Offices for the Protection of the Constitution had been strengthened, information exchange functioned substantially better, offices were equipped with state-of-the-art anticrime technology, and a comprehensive system of deep penetration, standardized “grid” search had been put into successful operation. Enhanced security legislation after 9/11 was able to build on this basis. At the same time, the fight against terrorism had been understood early on as requiring, beyond the police dimension, political and educational measures on a broad scale; and the fundamental debate on the relationship between, and balance of, civil liberties and the security requirements of the State which besets so many countries in the face of the present necessity to face new dimensions of international terrorism, had been basically waged at that time. The debate is, of course, on-going, but has not become a priority item of current German politics. My conclusion is that living with terrorism creates learning experiences and a higher degree of collective maturity in dealing with new terrorist threats. International terrorism since the 9/11 eye-opener, exercises an ever more forceful pull in favour of international cooperation. Germany, in the very center of the continent, has more neighbours and frontiers than any other European state, and thus feels this effect even more strongly. The German Government has become a forceful advocate of strengthening the EU tools for the fight against terrorism and for cooperation worldwide. More on that in a later context.

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34 The third distinctive German feature is the pronounced federalism, with its decentralized structures and jealously guarded regional prerogatives. At present, there are at least 36 independent federal and regional agencies that deal comprehensively with internal security threats, posing intricate challenges for the permeability of information networks and efficient task sharing. The German Government thus faces the new threats of terrorism in a complicated political and technical environment between an as yet very incomplete European network, and a difficult coordination problem at home. Analyzing the characteristics and dimension of international terrorism has been a task for the political science community in most countries for some time, much antedating 2001 and feeding on more than 20 years of experience since, say, the suicide attack on U.S. marines in Beirut 1983; and Germany, academically and on the Government level, has contributed her share. Of course, 9/11 and the new, global nature of terrorism have given a new boost to these inquiries, and both the causalities and thrust, and the size of the challenge are now focussed upon with new clarity. Not surprisingly, here again, our countries analyze and issue recommendations, essentially in unison. But if I read the very rich public and academic debate on this topic in Germany well, there is a particular emphasis, in the tradition of Clausewitz, on the new international terrorism as a 21Stcentury mutation ofwarfare. After the implausibility and improbability of great war, the new asymmetrical strategies of violence are seen as shaping up to become the new form in which global conflict is to be waged. In this school of thought, terrorism is not a means to an end, not a transitory technique, but the very essence of a fundamental, frontier-less attack on the functioning, on the technical and psychic infrastructures of global, i.e. predominantly Western society, through the interruption or destruction of its flows of information and capital, personal movement, and through exploiting the increasing fragility of interwoven, mutually dependent modem societies, as well as the emotional vulnerability of post-heroic populations in the grip of the information deluge. One author compares the strategies of international terrorism - and he refers not only to the Islamic variant, or in particular to the Al-Qaeda network - as a modem sequel to earlier forms of devastation warfare, not interested in conquest, but in anarchy and destruction, not facing battle, but avoiding it through the advantages of surprise, clandestinity and deceit. The traditional notions of victory or defeat thus lose their meaning, an insight that prompts a number of German analysts to criticize U.S. action in Iraq, and also in Afghanistan, as a failure to understand the essence of the new terrorist challenge. However, what all these analyses have in common is the recognition of the fundamental and strategic nature of this deadly challenge, and of the need for strategic responses. Analysts take a comprehensive look at the very broad potential of modern international terrorism, while realizing the predominant current and hture role of Islamic extremism, including Al-Qaeda; but also beyond Al-Qaeda as a hierarchical organization, and spreading towards diverse &had movements in many countries. These new movements possess sufficient motivation to dispense with the charismatic leader figure of Bin Laden and his terror net, and feed on conflicts affecting the Islamic world in their own environment. As regards the more technical evaluation of what is presently in store, the German Federal security services still place the Al-Qaeda network in a central position. Observe, however, that it now works in a decentralized manner, providing impulses and planning

35 directives, while operations are delegated and the preparation of terrorist action is left to regional groups, acting autonomously, in a form of terrorist outsourcing. Although the pressure of the international police search is mounting, the German authorities observe no decrease in the level of threat, but rather an increase in unpredictability - and therefore complexity of prevention and defence. The prime objective is still assumed to be spectacular attacks on targets with a high symbolic value. But, given the security situation, the network is presently redirecting its thrust to “soft targets” with the highest possible number of victims and public impact. Economic targets appear to be secondary, but are included as opportunity gains. Main target areas, apart from the ultra-protected U.S., appear to be U.S.-friendly countries and Islamic “apostate” States, but the services are convinced that no country is safe, and that the threat to Europe, no matter where governments have placed themselves on the Iraq or Palestine questions, is latently high, given the level of secret support structures and the opportunities for manoeuvre in an open multinational environment. Germany with its Islamic component of almost 3.5 m Muslims, roughly 4% of total population, and a highly opaque structure of many of its Islamic communities, provides major challenges to the security authorities. As to the modus operundi observed, and further to expect, the German services stress the long planning processes of Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda-derived action (several months to even years!), and the penchant for synchronization of several parallel attacks (last demonstrated in Madrid). In their view, there is limited capacity and as yet no observable preference for WMD attacks (radiological, biological), while more definite reliance is still placed on proven and effective conventional means. The services conclude that fighting current terrorism, in the face of the new diffuse, flexible and opaque structures is necessarily a long process which needs a complex and integrated defence structure, a mix of instruments, and an extremely effective relationship with intelligence as the prerequisite for prevention, intervention and search. Tackling this task the German security authorities have, especially after September 2001, substantially stepped up these integrated efforts to counter international terrorism. Four main areas of action have been defined: Build-up of a high level of pressure through search and investigation. Since the fall of 2001, the federal authorities have initiated several hundreds of formal investigation procedures against suspected terrorists, and followed up almost 30.000 substantive hints. Inhibiting the formation of terrorist cells in an early phase. Such preventive techniques have, for instance, substantially damaged the access of suspected groups to financial resources. A number of dangerous groups have been disbanded, their members expelled. As in all other countries, control of transfrontier travel, which might serve the preparation of terrorist acts, has been increased. An early-warning system with instant access to information has been improved. The Federal Government bets on the rapid introduction of biometrically based border control. Pilot programs are underway. Increased and integrated efforts for the preventive protection of vital infrastructures and civil populations, including comprehensive monitoring and early warning procedures.

36 (4) Dealing with the root causes and the social environment of terrorism. This vast field of endeavour comprises more social research, but also operative policies like increased integration of immigrant minorities in order to isolate potential terrorists who might feed on these environments, education in the direction of an open civil society, and the stimulation of cross-cultural debate. Much of the hard-core anti-terrorist work could be achieved on the basis of extant legislation by increasing efficiency, resources and organization. New legislation has, however, been necessary, e.g., to unify the competency of the federation and the federated states in civil emergency matters, where now a Federal Office for Population Protection and Emergency Assistance has been established to smoothen the information and resource management throughout the country. A new joint Information and Situation Center (GMLZ), based on a nation-wide satellite-based early-warning system, will provide instant information to the authorities and the public alike. On the whole, the legal system and the instruments of intelligence, police and the judicial system have been successfully redirected to cope with the terrorist threat, and public opinion is increasingly prepared to accept even tough policies. After having mentioned these achievements - happily not as yet put to the test of a major calamity - let me now look at the deficiencies. On the national level, as mentioned before, the federated security architecture of Germany with its compartmentalization of Federal and Lander authorities, the so far (for historical and data protection reasons) rigorous segregation of the law enforcement and the intelligence function, the organizational distinctions between “internal security” (competency of the Lander) and “external security” (in the domain of the central Government), the hitherto prevailing autonomy of the civil emergency authorities, - all these do not satisfy the requirements of modem antiterrorist strategies. Coordination of information is no substitute for a unified data bank on current terrorism with instant broad access. Unified administrative structures and chains of command can act more swiftly than inter-agency coordination meetings and information relays that work on the basis of case-by-case request. Much beyond the progress achieved in the last few years, a new balance will have to be struck between the constitutionally prescribed tenets of federalism and data protection on the one side, and efficiency on the other. This is not so much a debate that invokes great articles of faith, but rather of finetuning compromises whose legitimacy is basically accepted. A problem peculiar to Germany, however, looms prominently in the current political debate: Should provision be made for the Federal Armed Forces to intervene in grave terrorist attacks, against the solemn post-war constitutional prohibition? While a consensus is emerging that such involvement is unavoidable in a grave emergency, opinions differ as to the need of changing the constitution. Successful anti-terrorist strategies, on all levels, depend vitally on international cooperation. While bilateral cooperation is useful and increasingly being practiced, the frame of reference of all Europeans is, in the first instance, joint action in the European Union. Its progress in transforming cooperation in the field of security and justice from an inter-governmental to a integrated community task has been gradual and often difficult. The “Third Pillar” of the Union has been slow to emerge, due to the issues of sovereignty involved. In the fight against terrorism, some landmark decisions have moved the process forward. The EU has established an Action Plan on Terrorism. Police

37 and judicial cooperation in the prevention and prosecution of terrorist acts is being continuously strengthened. There is a common definition of terrorist crimes and a uniform catalogue for penal sanctions. As of January 2004, there exists a European arrest warrant, the handing-over of suspected terrorists follows standard accelerated standard procedures, the EUROJUST system provides for coordination in the search for criminals. There are common provisions against money laundering, and for the freezing of funds belonging to an agreed list of individuals and terrorist associations. But additional common measures are needed. EUROPOL needs more competencies and resources and a universally accessible central register. Information exchanges and common search procedures need to be improved. Automatic frontier control via biometrics and the introduction of sky marshals need to be adopted Europe-wide. Europe-wide search procedures need to be adopted. A German proposal to comprehensively share data of national intelligence offices has so far met with favour only from the Benelux countries and Austria. Let me conclude my brief report about the German responses, and venture some brief, deliberately simple, self-evident conclusions and recommendations from a German perspective: Streamlining national administrative organization to permit rapid timecritical responses is imperative. The German example shows that federal systems have to overcome a particular challenge, although complete centralization with its inherent inflexibilities is no recipe either. In this context, breaking down the information divide between law enforcement and political and intelligence services is unavoidable, with due regard to individual rights and data protection. Seamless international cooperation, both in intelligence along the whole spectrum from preventive to curative, and in prosecution and damage limitation, as well as in research, is the major clue to successful antiterrorist action. In the EU, this is of particular importance, and despite the early achievements not enough is yet done. International efforts should, however, also stimulate bilateral cooperation and upgrade the antiterrorist work of other major multilateral bodies in the direction of global approaches (G8, NATO, Interpol, UN). Complete sharing of all relevant information between national intelligence services with their unique experience and advance knowledge is important not only in the EU context. Although Islamic studies and, generally, academic inquiry into the root causes of terrorism has notably increased, this research effort must not abate and, indeed, increase with appropriate funding. In countries with sizeable minorities, especially Islamic, and especially in Europe, the political emphasis on integration policies in terms of civil entitlements, citizenship, education and employment opportunities must be strengthened. A mature reaction to eventual terror on the part of the population is of the greatest importance to deprive terrorists of the force multiplier offered by exaggerated fears, irresponsible media, panic reaction, etc.

38 No society is exempt from fear in the case of catastrophic occurrences, but past experience with terrorism, like in Germany, soberly digested, can help to produce attitudes of “heroic stoicism” that even in the face of devastating damage maintain a sense of proportion and strengthen resolve for rational counter-action.

LIMITING THE THREATS OF IDEOLOGICAL-BASED TERROR GROUPS: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM MALAYSIA?

MOHD KAMARULNIZAM ABDULLAH, PhD. Strategic Studies and International Relations Program School of History, Politics, and Strategic Studies Universiti Kebangsaan, Malaysia INTRODUCTION Debates on the threats of terrorism are not new’, but the September 11, 2001 incident has heightened interests among scholars and students of conflict studies, policy-makers, politicians and ordinary people. Terrorism could be defined as organized violence by creating a terror act to gain political objectives. Chalk furthermore argues that terrorism could be defined as “the systematic use of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub-states as a means of achieving specific political objectives, these goals differing according to the group ~oncerned Obviously, Chalk’s definition excludes state as one of the major actors that purportedly involve in terror acts, while Wilkinson looks at terrorism as “a weapon or method, which has been used throughout history by both states and sub-state organizations for a whole variety of political causes and p~rposes”~. Basically terrorist groups have political goals and want political change. Laquer argues that terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted’’5.It was also argued that terror acts and terrorism were an integral part of the anti-colonial struggle of the mid-20” century, particularly in the Middle East (such as Algeria, Palestine) and Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines). Although the principle of these national liberation movements of “kill one, frighten thousands” (a slogan adjusted from the communist based movements in the height of Cold War period) clearly associated them with terror acts, they were hardly perceived as terrorist groups, except by the colonial powers. In modem times, terrorism has been associated with separatist movement and ideological based movement such as communist and radical religious groups. One of the inherent problems in debating the issue of terrorism is the question of definition. The problem is perhaps compounded by the complexity and controversial nature of the issue itself. The question still remains: how does one differentiate between terrorists and freedom fighters? Can those groups in Iraq that are involved in the uprisings be considered as terrorists? Were the Soviet Union and the People Republic of China (PRC) labeled as terrorist states for their role in exporting and supporting the armed struggle of the Southeast Asian communist movements against the host governments? Why are Pakistan and Afghanistan called terrorist states for harboring Al-Qaeda? Is the role played by the two states different from that of the Soviet Union and PRC during the Cold War period? Perhaps state-sponsored terrorism, which is not the major focus of this paper, is equally threatening to world stability. Yet there have been an increasing number of ideologically or religiously based sub-state terrorist groups or organizations that resort to organized tactics of extreme political violence. They are becoming more lethal and effective which resulted in mass casualties and total destruction. They do not discriminate between security forces and innocent people as long as their dogmatic political objectives are achieved. Innocent people have been used by these terror groups as a symbolic target to achieve a psychological effect.

39

40 Although the world’s reactions against these ideologically or religiously based sub-state terrorist groups have been swift and firm, their threat is far from over. The United States, which for the first time was directly affected by the threat on its own soil, has launched a global campaign against terrorism and particularly the security challenge posed by the Al-Qaeda network. The superpower and its allies have so far used decisive force such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nonetheless, the war against terrorism campaign has received numerous critiques and strong opposition especially from the Muslim countries, which argue that the war has been inevitably directed towards them and their citizens. The strict immigration procedures by the United States to citizens of Muslim countries and selective use of force against the so-called two rogue states, Iraq and Afghanistan, that happen to be Muslim countries, seem to confirm the argument. It cannot be denied that the September 11 attacks, and the Bali and the Madrid bombings were the works of Muslim terrorist groups. These groups blamed Western dominance in the international system structure, which leads, they argue, to the victimization of the Muslim community all over the world such as in Mindanao, Sarajevo, Kabul, Baghdad and Acheh. Besieged by their own limited ideological understanding and interpretation of Islam, these militant Muslim groups condone political violence to arouse the world’s attention to their political plights. Perhaps they are successful in rousing international Muslim community sympathy that shares their ideas, but their radical acts have given different signals to the world community as a whole. Islam inevitably has been associated with radicalism and militancy. Yet, the moderate Muslim community has categorically rejected and distanced themselves from the dogmatic approach to Islam propagated by these militant Muslim groups. At the regional level, Southeast Asia has been identified as one of the major bases of Muslim terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf group of the Philippines, Kumpulan Mujahiddin Malaysia (KMM), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) of Indonesia that have a close link with Al-Qaeda’s global networking. The region has a large Muslim population with at least 380 million Muslims stretching from some parts of Myanmar (Burma), Southern Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, to the Southern Philippines. In Vietnam and Cambodia, Muslims make up less than 10 percent of the total population. In addition, Malaysia’s alleged connection to the September 11 suicide bombings has put the country in the U.S. limelight. Although Malaysian intelligence had sighted four al-Qaeda members, including Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf AlHazmi (who were involved in the AA Flight 77) in Kuala Lumpur in 2000, and their presence was made known to the CIA, the information was not taken seriously by the security intelligence in Washington. In fact, those Al-Qaeda members were in Malaysia searching for a flying school that could teach them basic flying skills overnight! Malaysia, in particular, has at least a 60 percent Muslim population. The country has faced series of ideologically based terrorist threats since its independence in 1957. Its first major security peril came from the armed rebellion led by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) wanting to set up a communist government in the country. The threat posed by CPM, which was supported by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), was the major security challenge to Malaysia during the Cold War period. The threat nonetheless subsided with the break-up of Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. It left only the PRC as a possible source of threat to Malaysia. Yet, although the PRC is still a regional communist power, Malaysia’s political elites no longer perceive the PRC as a major threat to the country. The changed perception is

41 perhaps due to increasingly close trading ties that developed between the country and the PRC over the last 10 years. In the post-Cold War period, Malaysia has been faced with another type of terrorism. Although ideologue and dogmatic in nature, these terror groups mainly use religion as means and ends to their political struggle. Furthermore, although these groups could also be categorized as radical ideological groups that have used illegitimate violence to achieve their objectives, they differ in many aspects from that of earlier communist threats. But they do have parallel similarities, which will be discussed in the later part of this paper, in terms of objectives, ideas, leadership and organizational structure. Hence, this paper is to discuss the Malaysian experience in controlling and managing the ideological, and later religious based terror groups since its independence up to the recent U.S. global war against terrorism. The major argument of this paper is that Malaysia’s relative success in managing the periodical threats of Communist movements in the early periods of its independence, and of the Islamic based radical movements in recent years, has been due partly to its pluralistic societal structure. The three major ethnic groups, the Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians have rejected the notions of terror act and political violence, and this can be observed in the willingness of the three major groups to share the political power in manning the country. Furthermore, the rise of radical ideological groups is perceived to be detrimental to stability and racial harmony, hence could jeopardize the social and economic development of the country. FORTY YEARS OF DEALING WITH THE TERROR THREAT When the British left Malaysia, then Malaya, the country was faced with an uphill struggle to maintain its sovereignty especially at the height of the Cold War period. As a multi-racial and multi-religious country, its first and major task was to develop trust among the three major ethnic groups, the majority-Malays who were mostly Muslims, the Chinese who were mostly Buddhists, and the Indian who were mostly Hindus. At the same time, the country had to develop a strong society based on Malayan (or Malaysian) identity6. It was not an easy task, since the three major ethnic groups were not integrated fdly in the first 10 years of independence. Occasional ethnic clashes did occur and the major one was the May 13, 1969 incident, the aftermath of which led to the suspension of Parliament and the introduction of a major policy called the National Economic Policy (NEP) aimed at eradicating poverty and strengthening societal cohesion. At the same time, the country was also thrown into turmoil by a guerilla war launched by the Chinese-dominated Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). Upon the defeat of the Japanese, the British-sponsored Malaya’s People anti-Japanese Occupation Movement, or MPAJA, was disbanded and members were paid a small gratuity. Arms supplied by the British during the anti-Japanese campaign were supposed to be handed in but not all of them were. Members of MPAJA were attracted to the Mao’s peasant struggle in China and wanted to emulate his success in Malaya. Hence, ex-MPAJA members who were mostly Malayan Chinese and led by Chin Peng formed the CPM wanting to gain control of the government by destabilizing it through the establishment and control of trade unions. It had some success but was never able to achieve official recognition or become a legitimate political party.

42 The CPM decided to attain its aims by armed insurrection and formed an anticolonial movement called the Malayan People Anti-British Army (MPAB)aimed at attracting and recruiting Malays and Indians. Nonetheless, it failed miserably in its attempt to entice both Malays and Indians to join. A short-lived secret agreement with the left-wing Malay Nationalist Party also failed. They were also terrorizing Chinese and Indian workers living on the plantation estates and tin mines. Their terror tactics of killing one and frightening thousands by sweeping into Malay villages, giving long lectures and executing those who were unwilling to comply, further distanced the other two ethnic groups from their struggle. Support from the Chinese, nonetheless, was divided. The CPM, nonetheless, was practically a Chinese dominated terror group of which only one out of ten regiments in the movement was considered multi-racial. The government’s countermeasures strategy to annihilate the threat could be divided into two: the hard military strategy and a softer approach. The hard military strategy was practically continuous offensive attacks against communist hide-outs in the thick and dense jungle of the country. But what made Malaysia’s strategy to eliminate the threat of Communism a successful one was the softer and humanistic strategy, which was initially introduced by the British and subsequently adopted by the independent Malaysian government. The major aim of the strategy was “to win the hearts and minds” of the people. The mission was to meet and understand the grievances of people rather than those of the communist insurgents7. Among other things, the government emphasized civic action whereby close relations between the military and civilians were established. Subsequently, these relations were structured in the setting up of the Police Special Branch whereby intelligent information gathered from civilians was crucial to the military countermeasures strategy. The second strategy of this soft approach was to launch a major relocation of thousands of the Chinese squatters from the jungle fiinges where they were exposed to the communist insurgents, to relatively safe and controlled new villages. The Chinese population was the major target of communist insurgency. They were forced to join and to supply rations to the insurgents. The resettlement exercises halved the insurgent’s strength by sharply curtailing the recruitment efforts of the communists*. At the same time measures were also taken to have a national registration system and the introduction of identity cards’. Efforts were also made by the government propaganda machineries to demoralize the communist members by propagating democracy through pamphlets and radios. Subsequently, the government also introduced the national education system. Although vernacular Chinese and Indian schools were still allowed to operate, the schools were put under government control in terms of curriculum development and selection of teachers. The national type schools, on the other hand, use Bahasa Melayu (Malay language) as a mode of instruction and parents from all races were encouraged to send their children to school to develop and strengthen societal cohesion and understanding in the country. Equally important was the political strategy intending to maintain the legitimacy of government in the eyes of the people. During the height of the communist insurgency between 1949 and 1960, the government declared Emergency and introduced regulations thereby giving police extra powers, “in effect suspending habeas c o r p u ~ ” ’ ~ One . of the offshoots of this extra power to the police was the introduction of the Internal Security Act 1960 or ISA. ISA was used as a preventive mechanism to contain communist threats. The objectives and applications of the ISA may be similar to that of United States’ McCarran Internal Security Act of 1947 that was intended to protect the superpower against certain un-American and subversive

43 activities by requiring registration of Communist organizations, and for other purposes”. While the steps taken by the Malaysian government were considered severe, the population tended to accept them. Its acceptance may be due to the diligent efforts of government machinery campaigns, especially through newspapers and radios. Furthermore, the ISA was then further applied and expanded to contain narrow racial and political chauvinism and religious militant groups in Malaysia. Basically, Malaysia’s ISA provides the police with unlimited power to arrest suspects without warrant for up to sixty daysI2.Furthermore, on approval of the Home Affairs Minister, suspects can be detained for up to two years without trial. Recently however, the implementation of the act has been under close scrutiny by the High Court for the alleged abuse by the police. Although any police officers, without a warrant, could arrest and detain anyone who he has “reason to believe” has acted or is likely to act in “any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia”, the Malaysian High Court noticed that the police has used the Act not for preventive measures but for a venue to interrogate suspects for further inf~rmation’~. By 1960, it was clear that the counter insurgency campaign was a successful one. The insurgency was practically over as only small-scattered remnants of the once formidable terrorist force were left, mostly secluded to the areas near the Thai border. The government finally decided to declare the Emergency over on 31 July 1960. Nonetheless, the prospect of communist threat was still looming until the CPM decided to make peace with the Malaysian and Thailand governments in December 1989. THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW THREAT The connection between al-Qaeda and some regional “terrorist” organizations and separatist movements such as Abu Sayaff, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Laskar Jihad, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Pattani Union for Liberation Organization (PULO) and Front Pembela Islam put the region under close scrutiny. Malaysia is not an exception, as its locally based militant group, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)I4, was allegedly associated with Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI)I5, a regional militant group believed to be part of Al-Qaeda’s global networking groups. What is more interesting is that although JI is an Indonesian based Muslim terrorist group, it was established in Malaysia by Indonesian’s Darul Islam members led by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakr Basyir who fled to the country amid fear of political prosecution under the Suharto regime. For years, Malaysia was actually a logistical base for Indonesian militant Muslim groups where they nurtured their radical ideas to the locals. These Indonesian militant groups were able to avoid detection by the local authorities since their activities were camed out under the pretext of spreading Islam through dakwah (religious preaching) in the country. Little known to the Malaysian authorities was that the establishment of these JI’s inspired madrasah (religious schools), such as the Madrasah Luqmanul HaqimI6, that were actually used to propagate a radical interpretation of Islam and eventually to produce strong followers of JI. The authorities’ initial liberal attitude toward the mushrooming of religious based movements and institutions was in fact politically motivated. The United Malay National Organization or Umno that forms the majority in the Barisan National (National Front) government was particularly concerned with the strong support the opposition Islamic party of Malaysia (Pas) received from the majority Muslim

44 pop~lation’~. Umno was also concerned with the Pas’s ability in capitalizing on religion as the basis for its political support. Pas’s increasing political influence was in tandem with the country’s Islamic reassertion phenomenon. Pas represented “itself as the mustadhafin (the meek) and fought for the adl’ (‘just), against the Umno of mustakbirin (the arrogant) and zulm (the wicked)””. In addition, Pas also portrayed Umno as infidel for its role in forming an alliance government with other non-Muslim political parties. Thus, Umno, together with the Barisan government which has ruled the country since independence, has had no choice but to take an accommodative approach towards the flowering Islamic consciousness, a failure which would jeopardize its political survival. The strategy was to have a responsive and accommodative policy which could please those who sympathized and supported Pas’s Islam. During the Mahathir administration, for instance, several respected personalities with religious credentials were co-opted to enhance the government’s Islamic image and credibility. The government also portrayed itself as moderately Muslim by propagating the idea of Hadhari Islam. The concept of Hadhari Islam is said to be able to promote unity and harmony, by disseminating excellence as a way of life through proper Islamic teaching for a moderate and progressive nation, especially in a multiracial society like Malaysia”. In addition to that, the Barisan government also introduced the inculcation of an Islamic values program in government machineries and agencies, and policies to further debunk Pas’s claim that the Umno and the Barisan governmental policies are secular in nature. It had become then a partially successful strategy by Umno and the Barisan National government until the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim as the Deputy Prime Minister in 1998. The sacking reduced the Umno’s Malay support. During the 1999 general elections, Pas managed to retain its stronghold state, Kelantan, and captured one more Malay-Muslim majority state, Terengganu. Mahathir’s decision to sack his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, was used by Pas in highlighting the zulm (wicked and discriminated) aspect of the administration. Nonetheless, under the current Abdullah Badawi administration, Pas influence tends to be in waning partly due to the rising concern of militant Muslim threats. Pas’s refusal to condemn local militant Muslim groups, and its support for the suicide bombings all over the world, have cost the party dearly. Although the influence of Pas tends to be in decline, judging from its recent dismissal performance in the 2004 General Election, this ulama-led opposition party could still be a formidable challenger to the Umno authority and political influences. Pas’s formidable challenge could come from elements in the party who are impatient with the leadership’s ability to bring forward the desired changes. This could be seen when some Pas members were involved in the activities of KMM and JI. The head of KMM, for instance, is a Pas member and a son of Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) in the Pas-controlled state of Kelantan. These Pas members were also joined by those who perceived that the Umno-Pas’s fierce political confrontations have been the hindering factor in turning Malaysia into a true Islamic state. They are mostly professionals and do not have any political inclinations. Hence, they formed a group with those who share the same idealism. It is interesting to note that these current Muslim terrorist groups, such as JI and KMM are no different, comparatively, to the communist movements in terms of political philosophy and struggle, recruitment techniques, organizational structure, and modus operandi. Both groups’ political struggle is based on ideological belief and commitments. The communist group believed that only communism could bring

45 equality and justice to the people. Communism also envisaged that the proletariat would be the social force of change, hence the peasants were in the forefront of communist expansion throughout the world. The communist’s political philosophy is also no different to that of the Muslim terrorist groups in the country. Both ideologically based groups do not believe in democracy but believe in revolution as a means to change the political structure of the country. JI and KMM, for instance, believe that political democracy is not a viable solution. What is needed is an immediate change either through revolution or direct armed confrontation so that pristine Islam can be a part of the Malaysian political, social and economic system”. JI’s and KMM’s ideologies are also based on the premise of the government’s failure to implement the idea of political equality and justice. They share the same sentiment as other Muslim terrorist groups worldwide. Firstly, they argue that all Muslim governments, including the Malaysian government, are politically and socioeconomically corrupt by aligning themselves with the Christian West. Secondly, this corruption is also due to the failure by the government to up-hold sharia (Islamic law) based on the Quran. Finally, the only way to solve impurity is to call for a jihad by using force in order to set up an Islamic State based on what was envisaged by the prophet. Hence, these Muslim terrorist groups perceive themselves as “the true bearers of Islam purifying political corrupted society. They believe that only the use of force could create a shavia-based Muslim society”21. The Malaysian Muslim terrorist groups also rely on unsophisticated proletariat low-income class Muslims, such as the peasants and general workers, for support. But unlike the communist groups, the Muslim terrorist groups use “charismatic leaders with make-belief religious credentials” to convince prospective followers to wage a jihad against infidelitJ2. Both groups - the communist and the Muslim terrorist - also argue that their struggle will be a protracted one. Since the “war” is asymmetrical, whereby the balance of forces is likely to be in favor of the government they intend to overthrown, the process to achieve their political goals will be long and difficult. Therefore, both groups are prepared for a protracted warfare forestalling any disillusionment that may occur among the followers in their quest to overthrow the government, The extent of the current threat posed by religiously based militant groups is arguably beyond government expectations. There were in fact limited and isolated cases in the 70s and 80s involving militant Muslim groups such as the Friends of Four, the Qadiyyani, the Tabarani, the Ahmad Nasir Group, the Ahmadiyyah and AlMaunah that propagated radical Islamic understanding of social and political life. The Ahmad Nasir group, for instance, launched an attack on a police station in a small town called Batu Pahat in October 1980. However, these militant groups were never treated as elements that could pose threats to national security since they were easily confined and managed. They were mainly labeled as deviant religious groups. KMM and JI have brought a new type of challenge to the government in terms of strategies to response to the problems. Firstly, it is a delicate issue involving religious and ethnic identity. In comparison, the communist threat during the 1950s to the end of Cold War, came from a Chinese-dominated movement, whereas the current threat of religious terror groups comes mainly from the Malay-dominated groups. Politically, the government has to take careful steps in dealing with the Muslim terror groups so as not to upset the sentiments of the majority Malay population in the country. At the same time, the government has to show that it is in control, especially when leaders of non-Muslim communities expressed their concern with the looming

46 prospect of religious militancy in Malaysia. They accept the idea that the current phenomenon is basically an intra-ethnic problem, but it could lead to inter-ethnic conflict if the non-Muslims were used as scapegoats and the government was unable to manage and control the problem. Furthermore, since Islam is an official religion of the country and the Muslims constitute more that half of Malaysian population, any strategies taken to quash those religious terrorist groups must not allow room for the politicalization of the issue. The politicization of the issue could be seen when the government was accused of using the arrest of members of the Al-Maunah group for its political gains. The group launched Jihad Fi sabilunn (highest form of religious struggle) against the government in February 2001 by seizing ammunition, M-l6s, and a rocket launcher from two army camps. The seizure raised eyebrows and questions regarding the safety and security procedures of all army sites in Malaysia. A question was then raised: why was the group able to infiltrate well-guarded army camps? Pas, in particular, pointed its finger at the government for purposely creating the issue in order to discredit the party for its support to Muslim militant groups worldwide. It cannot be denied that the current threat of Muslim terror groups is associated with the political and spiritual problems faced by the Malay community. Questions beg to be answered, such as why were the Malays involved in terror-type groups? Why have they become attracted to the radical interpretation of the religion since Islam does not condone the use of force in any given situation except for defense? Islam in fact represents the idea of peace “with a vision of social harmony and spiritual repose” like the other major religions in the worldz3. Yet, the phenomenon also defies the popular arguments that people resort to radicalism because of poverty and economic discrimination. As was argued earlier in this paper, in the Malaysian context, those involved in the religious terror groups, like KMM and JI, were professionals and some of them were Western educated people. Atran, in examining the suicide terrorism phenomenon, also argues that “poverty and lack of education per se are not the causes of suicide t e r r o r i ~ m ”Hence, ~ ~ . eliminating the threat by crushing the groups and throwing the members into jail is only a short term solution. Efforts now have to be made to not only restructure the system, i.e. education, moral, religion etc., so as to create a liberal but strong generation, but also to overhaul the governmental and political system so that it is accountable, transparent, and free of corruption. Furthermore, the threat of religious inspired terror groups in Malaysia has to be understood in the context of fluidity of regional stability. The threat does not affect Malaysia alone, since it comes from the spider-like web of regional connections. JI, for instance, recruited local groups in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. Hence, Malaysia needs concerted regional cooperation and effort to manage it. On the other hand, there are limitations to the cooperation that Malaysia would receive from its neighboring countries. Indonesia’s inability to protect its own backyard from the JI threat and Thailand’s failure to hunt down the major culprits behind the series of bombing in the southern part of the country, have shown that regional efforts to combat religious or Muslim terrorist groups is far from being achieved. REACTIONS AND RESPONSES Generally, Malaysia has given its fullest support to America’s war against terrorism, but falls short of providing or offering facilities and logistical support for

47 any U S . military action in the region. But the support, according to Linda Lim from the University of Michigan, is complicated by internal diversity and domestic politics. The war is not as simple as we might have thought. Governments in the region, particularly the Malaysian government, that were “previously chastised by the US. for human rights violations in their internal crackdowns on Islamic radicals are suddenly claiming that the recent events vindicated their own tough and generally unpopular internal security actions”25. Some even claimed Malaysia’s tough acts through some draconian laws such as ISA have been accepted by the U S . to wipe out terrorism in the region. The government has received wide condemnation by the local pro-liberal advocates who argue that the post-September 11 incidents have been used by the administration to strengthen its muscles against its political oppositions. The use of ISA, for instance, has further violated basic human rights and freedom of speech in Malaysia in the name of cracking down on religious terrorism. The reaction and response from ordinary Malaysians are clearly different when compared to the same strategy used by the government to contain the communist threats during the Cold War period. Malaysia’s reactions and responses to the threat of religiously based terror groups like KMM and JI could be analyzed at two different levels. At the individual and societal level, Malaysian Muslims who do not share the radical sentiment propounded by Islamic radicalism have to react and realign themselves. They have to rethink not only about the fundamental teachings of Islam, but also about where they belong in the multiracial society of Malaysia. The main quandary among the ordinary Malaysian Muslims is whether they have to subscribe to the calls made by Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda group? Will they become less Muslims if an Islamic-based state and community do not materialize? At the state and political level, the September 11 incidents and the subsequent global war against terrorism have forced the Barisan government to control the use of Islamic political language for fear that it would have backlash effects, not only to its political legitimacy, but also to the campaign itself. The over-use of Islamic political language might give an extra platform to radical Islamic groups and hamper the effort to contain their influence. The non-Malays may be further upset by the Barisan government continued campaign against pro-Islamic rhetoric. This non-Malays’ sentiment has to be taken seriously by the Barisan government, particularly Umno, since the 1999 General Elections have shown that their votes were crucial when the Malay votes swung to the opposition Pas. At the same time, the Barisan government’s moderate stance on Islamic political issues need superpower support to contain Islamic radicalism. Hence the government has to work closely with major powers, especially the United States, for closer cooperation in eliminating these religious extremisms in the country. Politically, the Barisan government has also gained more from the US’S global war against terrorism. The involvement of Pas members in the religious terrorist groups, and the leadership’s reluctance to condemn openly JI and KMM militant activities, put Pas in a quandary and an awkward position. For years, Pas has tried to win the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims and non-Muslim voters to support their struggle. Pas knew that the increased support it received during the 1999 General Election was not due to its increasing popularity, but mainly due to the internal problems within Umno. Hence, its inability to clearly spell out its position on religious terrorism in the country has reduced the popular support it received from the Malay voters. This has been manifested during the recently concluded 2004 General

48 Elections where the party lost the state of Terengganu, which the party captured during the 1999 elections. Although the party still retains its power in the state of Kelantan, its majority is wafer-thin - only capable of winning four majority seats in the State Assembly. Hence, from the discussion above, it can be argued that Malaysian ability to reduce the threat of ideologically-based terrorist groups, from the communist-based movements (1946-1989) to the current Islamic-based radical movements, has been due partly to its pluralistic societal structure. The three major ethnic groups, the Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians have rejected the notions of terror acts and political violence. During the insurgency period, the communist struggle was largely rejected by the Malays and Indians. These two ethnic groups became the “buffer zone” for the expansion of communism in the country. The government, in addition, cunningly used tactics whereby the Malays and Indians were listed in the security forces to confront the Chinese-dominated communist groups. Although the subsequent division led to mutual hatred among the three major ethnic groups, judging from a series of ethnic clashes that occurred, the policy errors were adjusted when the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced in 1971. The NEP emphasized cordial race relations through confidence-building measures. The effect of the NEP can be seen in the formation of a stronger political alliance among the three ethnic groups, by the setting up of the Barisan Nasional (National Front), and the confidence the three major groups have in the future of their country. Likewise, when the idea and threat of radical Islamism began to proliferate socially and politically in the country, the Chinese, together with the Indians, reacted by using their political rights, i.e. through votes. This reaction could be seen, as pointed out earlier, in the 1999 and 2004 General Elections where non-Malays and non-Muslim votes were crucial to limit and eventually to stop the proliferation of radical Muslim ideas of Islam. For the non-Muslims, the rise of radical ideological groups is perceived to be detrimental to stability and racial harmony, hence could jeopardize the social and economic development of the country. Another strategy whereby the threats of Muslim terrorist groups have been contained is the increasing awareness by the Malaysian society and government on the role of education, especially religious education, among the younger generations. Realizing that madrasah schools have been used by certain quarters as the breeding ground for Muslim radicalism, steps have been made whereby the government, through the Education Ministry, would have full control of the administration of the madrasah schools. The government also argues that the madrasah school system, which dates back to the early 18‘h century, has been used by Pas to recruit cadres although the funding comes from the government. The strategy then is to provide more liberal ideas on Islam. Sahni notes that the current war against terrorism: “...in its present dominant form, substantially, though not exclusively, a war against global an Islamist terror-is an ideological war, and demands responses at the level of ideas’ . -

R,

What he meant here is that the proliferation o f dangerous and destructive creeds must be fought and neutralized at the levels of education and intellectual discourses. WHAT IS NEXT? Greater cooperation at the regional level must be made to curb the rise of terrorist and radical Muslim movements with information exchange, modernized

49 equipment, provision of training and expertise as well as mutual exchange of relevant facilities. I believe that for whatever reasons, Muslim terrorism can be tolerated and has to be contained. This cooperation, however, needs an understanding from every party involved. A country faced with continuous terrorist or Muslim radical threats should be supported politically and financially. Hence, multi-literalism is the best way to enhance this cooperation. Efforts to curb these threats must be jointly organized by all the regional countries affected. Unilateral action won’t solve the problem but will exacerbate the situation There must be efforts both from the Western and Muslim side to have continuous inter-faith dialogues so as to find common ground rather than differences. At the same time, there must be an effort to differentiate between Islam that is practiced by the majority of Muslims in the world, and Islam as it has been propounded by radical Muslim groups. Furthermore, the US, as the sole superpower, should plan an effective indirect strategy based on how to strengthen the organic capacity of governments of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia in order to wipe out terrorist networks within their temtorJ7. Financial and military assistance are aspects that need to be seriously addressed. It is also suggested that the U S . should play a pro-active role in encouraging regional cooperation on counter-terrorism measures. What the U S . is now doing is tryng to limit the threat and the damage from it. Yet the U S . cannot act as a world government and “has to stop insisting on planetary rights of interference” on the pretext of combating terrorism’’. What’s more important is to help the Southeast governments to improve their quality of governance. Finally, the U.S. government should assist influential and moderate Muslim governments to promote the concept of Hadhari Islam for world peace. REFERENCES I The article is based on a paper presented at the Erice International Seminars on Planetary Emergencies: Case Study Terrorism, Organized by the World Federation of Scientists, Erice, Italy, 712 May 2004. * See Adam, James, Secret Armies (New York: Bantam Books, 1989); Martha, Crenshaw, “The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1978,16:383-96 Peter Chalk, “The Evolving Dynamics of Terrorism in the 1990s”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 53(2), 1999, p. 151. Paul Wilkinson, “The Strategic Implication of Terrorism”, at http://www.un.org/deuts/dhl/dhlrus/resources/terroris~el~.htmin,accessed on 15 May 2004 Walter Laquer, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms ofMass Destruction (London: Phoenix Press, 2001), p.3 The population of Malaysia in 2003 was 25.4 million of which the Bumiputras (son of soil, which include the Malays, and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak) constitute about 60 percent of the total population, the Chinese 25 percent, the Indian 11 percent and others 4 percent. Robert G. Thompson, Defeating Communist insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York Praeger, 1966), p. 55. Joel E. Hamby, “Civil-Military Operation: Joint Doctrine and the Malayan Emergencies”, Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2002, p. 58. %JK Organisation of the National Malaya & Borneo Veterans Association (N.M.B.V.A), (http://www.britains-smallwars.comimalavahdex.html, accessed on 20 April 2004). l o Joel E. Hamby, op cit. I ’ Kamarulnizam Abdullah, “Understanding and Responding to the Threats of Muslim Militant Groups in Malaysia’, paper presented at the SEACSN Conference 2004: Issues and Challengesf o r Peace and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia, Penang, 12-15 January 2004. Government has announced that it might review the detention period to only thirty days.

50 The comments and the verdict were widely reported in the local newspapers. KMM was founded in 1986 as a clandestine movement under the name Halaqah Pakindo. Members were mostly graduates of madrasah school systems and were sent to India and Pakistan to further their studies. It is also interesting to note that the association was part of student organizations sponsored by Pas. Halaqah Pakindo had brought in Malaysian ex-Afghan fighters and those from Pas who were impatient with and demanded radical changes in Malaysian political system. The recruitment, like that of communist movement in Malaysia in the 40s and 50s, was done secretly. In 1995, leaders of Halaqah Pakindo convened their frst meeting and decide to form Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia. Its objectives were to purify the society that was perceived to be conupted by worldly affairs, and secondly to ensure that Pas’ political struggle is maintained and protected. Yet, when the group established contact with the JI, it the struggle was enlarged with larger political objectives. See Kamamlnizam Abdullah, Understanding and Responding to the Threats of Muslim Militant Groups in Malaysia’, op. cit. Is JI or Jemaah Islamiyah was established in Malaysia by Indonesian’s Darul Islam members who fled to the country amid fear of political prosecution under the Suharto regime. JI in fact has its roots in the Darul Islam, an organization established during the Indonesian war of independence. The immediate objective of JI is to establish Daulah Islamiah (Islamic state) in the region by using force, based on the concept of Salikuh Salleh. Under this belief, members are obligated to stage jihad (interpreted as physical war) against the “enemy” of Muslim people. l6 Luqmanul Hakim School, which has been closed recently, was the logistical base for the Jemmaah Islamiyyah in the region prior to its re-shifting to Indonesia. For in-depth analysis please refer to Kamarulnizam Abdullah, “Understanding and Responding to the Threats of Muslim Militant Groups in Malaysia’; and ICG Report No 63, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (International Crisis Group, Jakarta and Brussels, 26 August 2003). The other major political parties that formed the Barisan National Front are the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), and several other parties that represent ethnic groups in Malaysia states of Sabah and Sarawak. I’ Kamarulnizam Abdullah, The Politics of Islam in Contemporary Malaysia (Bangi: Penerbit UKM, 2003), p. 191. l9 The Star (Malaysia), April 11 2004. 2o Kamarulnizam Abdullah, “Islamic Militant Movements and Communal Conflict in Malaysia”. In Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia and South-East Asia, edited by S. Yunanto at. al. (Jakarta: Ridep, 2003), p. 224. 2 1 Kamarulnizam Abdullah, “Understanding and Responding to the Threats of Muslim Militant Groups in Malaysia’, op. cit. 22 Ibid. For further discussion on jihad please see Emmanuel Sivan, “The Holy War Tradition in Islam”, Orbis, 1998,42(2): 171-1 194. 23 Mark. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Oxford University Press, 2001), p.9. 24 Scott Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism”, The Washington Quarterly, 27(3), 2004, p. 69 25 “Terrorism and Globalization: Southeast Asia” (Internet Edition), httu://www.fathom.coin/storvlstor , accessed on April 16, 2004. ” Ajai Sahni, “The Locus of errorYHas the Gravity of Terrorism ‘‘Shifted” in Asia”. In Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: threat and Response, edited by Rohan Gunaratna (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), p. 18. 27 Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, “Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia”, The Washington Quarterly, 25:2, pp.161-176. 28 Scott Atran, op. cit., p. 86. I’

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RUSSIAN FEDERATION OPTIONS AND POLICY AMBASSADOR ANATOLY ADAMISHIN Ambassador of Russia (ret.), Moscow, Russia A century and a half ago two Germans whose names were Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels proclaimed: “A specter is haunting Europe - the specter of Communism.” Probably it could have remained just a ghost, if Russian Marxists had not had a disproportionate faith in Communist ideas and set in motion an abnormal experiment that lasted seventy years. Today it is the specter of terrorism that is haunting the Earth. Is there still time to escape it? Or will we permit it to be transformed into a monster that will chase us to the end of our days? This rhetoric leads me to a substantial point - the definition of terrorism. I agree with those who maintain that terrorism is a method. But in our globalized world, where the intellect of “homo sapiens” is at stake, terrorism has gained ground as an instrument of massive biased conscience. When I hear about widespread approval, in vast zones of the globe, of terrorist attacks even perpetuated by human bombs - and for the time being there is no defense against them - I wonder what is more difficult to deal with - deeds or minds, means or ideology? For many years, if not decades, the United Nations have been trying to formulate the definition of terrorism, which could be universally accepted, with little result. I believe that there is room for a scientific contribution to better define such notions as: the right of self-determination for nations; the limitation of human rights under the pretext of providing more security; freedom fighters and state terrorism. Why should we not, from Erice, take a closer look at the draf? of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, introduced by India and undergoing discussion in New York? This could help to accelerate its finalization. Meanwhile it would be good to make the so-called sectarian agreements already existing in this specific field of international law work more efficiently. With all the fathomlessness of terrorism, the vital task is to find out what the movements behind it are. Commonly three categories are singled out: a. Separatism; b. Transnational organized crime; c. Religious extremism. Their structures are known to coexist and to mix in various combinations. Ideally, each of them needs to be addressed accordingly. In the Kosovo, one finds all three together. We follow the situation there with great attention, since its evolution may have serious consequences for many areas, including the Caucasian region. For obvious reasons, it is the jihad networks that have become the focus of general attention. Some observers even speak about European fascism of long ago, draped in Islamic ropes. I would caution against such a term. Italian fascism or German Nazism were confined to their national borders, while Islamic extremism is nothing more than a fragment, and maybe a small one, of the huge - and mostly reasonable - Muslim world. We should take great care not to demonize it. In particular, we must not make al-Qaeda a speaker for the Muslims oppressed all over the globe, or lay at its door the blame for every terrorist act. Fundamentalism, not only Islamic, tends to generate some sort of terror. A clash between civilizations is something we ought to avoid at all costs. We managed to keep the confrontation between the East and the West within the framework of peaceful coexistence. We

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52 may avail ourselves of this experience to secure peaceful coexistence among civilizations. I share the opinion that the American and the European approach to terrorism differ. The U.S. concept, as I understand, means mainly a war against Islamic terrorist groups and all those, including in the governments of certain states, who support and harbor them. The Europeans tend to control and manage terrorism with the tools of mild power. When Russia has to choose between these two approaches, we are definitely on the European side. But we don’t exclude the deployment of military means; in a number of situations it is simply compulsory. Moreover, there is a school of political thought in Russia that considers forceful measures quite acceptable if they are directed at stopping genocide, massive violations of human rights etc. The notion of sovereignty is under reconsideration. Even the ideas of international trusteeship and mandate territories for failed states are coming back. Here, too, scientists are supposed to give their opinion. If anti-terrorist operations, be they pre-emptive or reactive, are implemented at an international level, they must have legitimacy. Exclusively the UN Security Council may provide it. This is not only a matter of law. This is a matter of success. There are few people who will deny that the Iraqi war fuels the kind of extremism it was supposed to curtail. But can we get away from the outcome of the American blunders, once they are committed? There is hardly an alternative other than to help the Americans to conclude the military phase in Iraq as soon as possible and to focus on political settlement. This is exactly what Russia is doing, and not for altruistic reasons. I hope we have learned another lesson: when extremist and criminal networks go hand in hand, they should be tackled in an aggregate way. It includes both “bottom-up” and “top-down’’approaches. Take Afghanistan. The anti-Taliban operation seemed to be a success. But the narcobarons were not hit sufficiently. There is no anti-drug belt along the Afghan borders. As a result, what we witness now is a flourishing drug traffic and a revival of the Taliban. And again Russia is among those who suffer first: a considerable portion of the 300 tonnes of heroin produced annually in Afghanistan passes through our country. That is why we are so keen on cooperating with the Western states. Maybe not everybody knows that we permit Germany and France to transit through Russian territory for supplying their troops in Afghanistan. In a broader perspective, Russia is ready to discuss the most effective ways to engage the Muslim Arab countries in promoting social, economic and political reforms. With its 20 million Muslim population - we see it as a barrier against extremism - Russia is in a good position to contribute substantially to this aim. The key word is modernization, and one of the biggest issues is to conquer young minds. In the Moscow University something like 50 years ago, alas, we were often asked: what is the principal content of our epoch? And the answer was: the merciless competition between the two world systems, capitalism and socialism. But now it is over, and we have got quite a new order of problems instead. There was more stability - even if some call it a negative stability - when we and the Americans, each in our own parish, reined in certain liberties. Who can say today what axis the world revolves around? I dare to say it is a struggle for control, for predominance, stimulated by the fact that the world is badly managed, both globally and locally. The rivals are still difficult to detect, maybe because we have only recently come out of the cold war with its clearly marked fronts. May I mention that in this period, Islamic fundamentalism was an American ally against the USSR? Nowadays, the fronts have changed, but not completely, and we still pay an unnecessary tribute to the stereotypes

53 of the past, instead of concentrating on new challenges. As to these, my impression is that we are pushing ourselves into something, which is surely unprecedented, not dkja vu. Could it be a prelude for a really big bang? This time not between the states, but between them and an anonymous space formed by criminal and extremist networks alien to our civilization. Looking at the cumulative effect of global emergencies, and looking at the increasing gap between the rich North and the poor South and at what happens in the arch of instability where the power vacuum is filled by those whose main weapon is terror, I would not rule out the worst scenario. Russia, perhaps more than others, is sensitive to this for two reasons: first, because it suffered an assault in its own territory earlier than others. We happened to have a full bouquet of drugs and arms trafficking, kidnapping, ethnic conflicts and Islamic extremism. And the Chechen knot, far from being untied, is not the only trouble. And secondly, because Russia is still coming to its senses after ten years of turmoil and I cannot say that we are extremely strong to counter new threats. At the UN summit of the Millennium, almost four years ago, Russia, through its President, said that terrorism was a common enemy to all of the United Nations. Was this voice heard? Unfortunately, not. Moreover, somebody tried to qualify such warnings as dictated by Russian internal problems. The Western world had to wait for 9/11 to estimate the scale of the new menace. Now we at least hear each other. A couple of words on Russia’s practical activity. On a bilateral level, the most advanced cooperation we have is with the United States of America. A special working group on terrorism has been formed which held something like a dozen productive sessions. The cooperation includes not only sharing information between special services but also planning some field operations. We are eager to prevent terrorist actions, not just to react to them. It means in particular: Setting up of measures aimed at hampering any terrorist access to WMD; Neutralizing attempts to reverse the advantages of civilization (means of information, financial fac es, internet etc.) against civilization itself; Finding a response to the terrorist tactics of hitting vulnerable points of democracy, as occurred in Spain. At the same time, we try to convince the Americans to abide by the norms of international law, to combine unilateral decisions if they cannot repudiate them, together with collective actions. We work hard to keep the Americans in a joint harness. It goes without saying, that until there is no peace in the Middle East it will be impossible to get rid of the scourge of terrorism. I would add that the Russian-American pattern has been used to establish antiterrorist cooperation with Germany, Great Britain, India and other countries. On a multilateral level, we seek to be active in all instances, from those created between the CIS countries to “G8” and especially NATO. The latter is becoming an effective mechanism for exchange of knowledge and consulting about mutual policy. Russia attaches great importance to the role of the UN and its Security Council. The lessons of Iraq show that this is the right direction. But I understand that to fulfill its mission, the United Nations must be reformed. For the moment, it is nothing but wishful thinking. Recently, though, an international group of wise men has been convened to study ways of reforming the UN. A very important part of this context is to renew a code of international behavior since the old game rules are mostly no longer valid. At

54 our 2Iih session, in August 2002, I proposed the elaboration of our own drafi of such a code. There is still time to think about it. It is imperative to bring our intellectual capacity nearer to practical needs. I would like to emphasize at least three of them: To form a homogenous anti-terrorist legal space, bringing together national laws as closely as possible since some archaisms still exist, especially in the extradition principle. To reinforce a climate of total intoIerance around terrorism. In every venue, on every occasion, by all international organizations, we have to promote simple but essential truths: there is no bad or good terrorism; it is an absolute evil; no political, religious or other reason can excuse it; punishment for any terrorist act must be inevitable; there is no room for neutrality or appeasing in fighting terror; To produce valuable arguments in the war of ideas. I will close as I started: with an emotional outburst. But a functional one. Erice is not only one of the most renowned intellectual centers. This ancient city is the very expression of the civilization that we consider ours. So this is a good place to say: Russia is ready to stand with the countries that are resolute in uprooting the plague of terrorism. I realize that to achieve this goal, we have to transform a big piece of our world, if not all of it. We have to overcome poverty and despair, inequality and lawless. But there is no other way if we want the rumors about the death of our civilization to disappear.

MYTH, REALITY AND REALISM IN U.K. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AND MEDIA PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM ROBERT FOX Defence Correspondent and Historian, London, U.K. The most frequently asked questions on U.K. radio and TV about terrorism are: “How likely are we to be attacked? Can we do anything about it? “ In this, the U.K. is no different from any other country or culture - the imminence of the terrorist threat, in terms of myths and fears through the media and cyber space, as well as facts on the ground, is a global phenomenon. Examples: the reaction to 9/1 I and the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004. The official response to the imminence of threat from global terrorist networks in the U.K. is like the old rhyme about marriage: ‘Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue.’ In this case the something blue might be some real blue skies thinking, which is at a premium in homeland defence in the U.K. as elsewhere in the U.S. and Europe. There is not much of it happening, judging by the output from official forums. In the UK, homeland defence is defined under the category of Ccivbil Contingency Legislation. This has familiar roots ftom Defence of the Realm Act in World War I1 and Civil Protection against devastating nuclear attack during the Cold War. Much in the legislation and provision of services is based on the practices of these eras. It is open to debate as to how much they can be adapted to the present threat scenario. But first we must look at how the threat is defined and depicted. For Tony Blair, it is something like the dilemma of Chicken Licken in the fable - Chicken Licken, the sky is falling - was the message there. Blair likes to talk about the generality of the threat from global terrorism; this created the desperate times we live in, which call for desperate measures. The Manichean view of the challenge is spelled out in his response to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and his major speech on foreign affairs at the Mansion House the following November. This has been repeated in his major speech on the terrorist threat to his Sedgefield constituency on March 3rd, 2004. The desperate measures are hinted at in the major policy speech during the Kosovo crisis to the Chicago Economic Club in late April 1999. In this he hints that the national sovereignty on which UN membership and the UN Charter is based is not inviolable and can be suspended where there is the threat of crime against humanit or genocide. This has been his line of argument in the Iraq crisis - on September 24t x, 2002 and in the debate in parliament authorising British Forces to be deployed in March 2003. Practical measures have been taken in giving S6 billion to civil contingency and security services, including recruiting a further one thousand officers to the internal security and intelligence service M15, many of them specialists in Arabic and Urdu language skills. The Special Forces Command in the U.K. Army has also been expanded with generous new funds. This area remains outside parliamentary scrutiny and disclosure. It is known that the SAS (Special Air Service) has acquired three new ‘regiments’, for logistics, communication and training. The numbers of ‘teeth’ or Sabre Squadrons in the SAS and the Special Boat Service remain constant at around 500. Training standards are not to be diluted - and the main problem is that too many Special Forces soldiers are quitting after one or two tours to join specialist private firms. Similar increases are believed to have taken place to enhance the external or Secret Intelligence Service MI6, which comes under the Foreign and Commonwealth

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56 Office, General Communications Headquarters, Defence Intelligence, Central Intelligence and the Anti Terrorist and Special Branches of the Police services. The structure of the services supporting the civil contingency arrangements present the profile of something borrowed, something old and something new. All three present difficulties. The borrowed comes from the US, and this has similar difficulties of incoherence, lines of command and operations, and inter-agency rivalry. Under the Civil Contingencies arrangements, extra security staff have been designated for terrorist and national security emergencies, as well as human and natural disasters such as the Foot and Mouth epidemic of 2001, floods and storms. This has led to the configuration of 7000 rapid deployment military staff from the Territorial Army and Volunteer Reserve. They will work from 14 regional centres, which will be largely autonomous from Whitehall during the emergency itself. A wiring diagram of the new supervisory emergency bodies produced during a seminar on the 'Secret State' (provisions against a nuclear attack on the U.K. during the Cold War) at the National Archives, Kew, in March 2004 show the same rigidities and confusions as during the previous arrangements during the Cold War. The wiring diagram for "The Post 9/11 U.K. Protective State (Spring 2004) Policy Development and Events Management Intelligence and Threat Assessments " was introduced by Sir David Omand, the Security Coordinator at the Cabinet Office, and Professor Peter Hennessy of Queen Mary College, University of London. It is a network of some 26 committees, ultimately presided over by a committee of the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Home Secretaries' domestic and overseas threat contingencies, plus the Security Coordinator, namely Sir David Omand. At first glance, it looks cumbersome and owes much to the system for Civil Protection for nuclear attack in the Cold War. It suffers from the weaknesses of the old U.K. 'Protected and Survive' concept when the U.K. Government could theoretically call on the services of some 360,000 officers and Civil Defence volunteers -whereas today the total number of auxiliaries would be less than half that number, including Police and Fire Services. A number of features seem to throw the viability of the Omand/Hennessy architecture into doubt. It suffers from old-fashioned 'stove piping' -too much has to travel to and fro to the committees at the top. The mechanism is too cumbersome - it is predicated on a system where there would be a long warning time through heightened strategic tension, but this time the attack is likely to come without any warning. Input and output are confused. Whereas there is provision for day-to-day coordination of intelligence through a JTAC (Joint Intelligence Analysis Centre) there is no centralising command and control. For a government that has been surprisingly keen to appoint supervising coordinators for anything from drugs to prisons, crime and social services, it is surprising that the Blair administration has not appointed its own version of a National Security Adviser nor head of Counter Terrorist Operations, or CTOC (Counter Terrorism Operational CommandControl). Two aspects of the blueprint revealed by Sir David Omand at Kew in March 2004 are worth considering in the light of the themes of the Erice Conference. Most of the arrangements are predicated on a statist threat, and the information policy regarding media likewise seems to belong to a more formal age - as if the target media for the messages about threat and response are the formal structures, such as the BBC, CNN, the Times or the New York Times. Most of the new threats will not be mediated by states, formed, developed, failed, rogue or otherwise. Similarly the most powerful organised media will be the partisan, semi-formal, semi regulated organs that distribute the tapes of Osama bin Laden, the bloggers and propagandists

57 on the Internet from Salem Pax to A1 Muhajiroun (the militant Islamist organisation in urban UK), and the rumour chorus of Talk Radio. The public media perception of the threat from global network terrorism in the U.K. is largely alarmist and unfocused. It has two related obsessions: the images of the attacks on September 1lth 2001, and the reputation and legend of Osama bin Laden. The public media debate does not seem capable of a wide agenda. Can it conceive of a global terrorist threat that doesn’t stem from Osama bin Laden’s salafist views? How far can it address the issue of the rapidly changing shape of human populations, and how might the alienation this produces drive extreme political violence? This apocalyptic view is suggested by Hardt and Negri’s “Empire ” and is suggested in the worst case scenarios sketched in the report of the ILO’s special commission on Globalisation. Part of the problem is the proclivity of modem media performance for prophecy - the Huntington ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis etc. Modem electronic media plays strongly to narcissistic performance and personality. It believes and promotes what it wants to believe. Thus there is an element of the ‘Apocalypse Waiting to Happen’ in the media portrayal of 9/11. This is reinforced by the detailed study and appraisal in the ‘Ataxia Report’ of the Henry Stimson Foundation, Washington, of underground and informal media portrayals of terrorist activities and movements. In these forums of discussion, values become inverted, members of cults and cells are heroes, forces of light against the darkness and evil of the agents of big business, big government and the new global tyranny represented by the UN. ‘Underground’, the brilliant oral history of the Aum attack on the Tokyo metropolitan railway in March 1995, by the novelist Haruki Mirukami, gives an insight into the world of inverted values of the Aum cult, and why they struck a chord with so many in Japan and beyond. Public service media struggle against the commercial, political and social pressures that constrict the space available to narrative and forensic investigation, and argument of the facts. Daily media have little opportunity to set the historical context. Pity and terror, the ingredients of classical tragedy, are not mitigated by catharsis based on reason and enlightenment, but aggravated by their co-conspirators’ ignorance and fear. In public debates and reporting of contemporary terrorist phenomena, little heed is given to the fact that we are dealing with competing dream worlds, and ideas that are coherent to their own esoteric supporters with little or no reference to the world beyond them.

THE WORLD COMMUNITY AGAINST THE GLOBALIZATION OF CRIMINALITY AND TERRORISM

GENERAL A.S. KULIKOV Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Security of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, and Chairman of the Board of the Anti-criminal and Antiterrorist Forum, Moscow, Russia Analysis of the development of the world community after the terrorist attacks in the USA indicates that the world has changed beyond recognition. The objective reality is such that the new challenges and threats in this period have increased catastrophically. Positive evaluation of the globalization process, which existed among many economists and political scientists, changed into bitter realization of the fact that national, regional, and international safety under the new conditions were unprotected in the face of the growth of terrorism and transnational organized criminality. It must be admitted that neither the world community nor separate coalitions of states have so far found any effective methods of protection against these challenges and threats. It is obvious that there are no easy solutions to the problem, and the militarytechnical solutions are not a panacea. International experience indicates that it is possible to eliminate by force, one way or another, extremist or dictatorial regimes, as happened in Afghanistan or Iraq, but it is impossible to resolve the problem of increased levels of danger from international terrorist organizations this way. Terrorism takes on many forms and is dynamic: it changes form, content, strategy, tactics and geography. Obviously, it is not an adversary that can be designated on military maps or staff monitors and, all the more so, cannot be vanquished in an open fight. For the last several years, international terrorism in the area of world information has been perceived as the priority problem and found dramatic, visible confirmation. Reaction by a frightened society was the emotional thrust to unification and interaction against the obvious common threat. By the beginning of 2003, the September 1lth shock in 2001 and the psychological upset had begun to decrease, both in the U.S. and in the world community as a whole, to a significant extent. The emotional perception of all the occurrences changed for a more sober view as events developed in the world. The thesis "all for one" was substituted by the thesis "one over all". What happened in Iraq does not fall into the traditional understanding of war as a comprehensive counteraction of the air, land and naval forces of two or more sides. Again, it is possible to speak about the use of a new military model, which has been tried earlier in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan. But the effectiveness of the implementation of this model in the global war declared against world terrorism is not at all equal to the effectiveness of the suppression of its subjects (e.g. Afghanistan) and may even provoke an increase of terrorist actions both in the area of concern and beyond it. In this connection let us ask ourselves these questions: do we know the real picture of all the events? For example, do we know all the truth about the events of September 11, 2001? Do we know everything about the capture and rescue of the hostages in the Theatre Center in Dubrovka, Moscow; about the explosions of the House of Government in Chechnya; the UN mission in Iraq; the building of the British Consulate in Istanbul? What is Al-Qaida - a reality or a myth created t o inflict military and political actions on the reconstruction of the world arrangements?

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59 Recently, for example, the experts of the Rand Corporation declared that AlQaida, as a unified organization, does not exist. In their opinion, there are many AlQaidas. The Rand Corporation thinks that Al-Qaida is more a movement than an organization and that it acts on various levels and does not make its own rules, inherent only to it. As this takes place at even the lowest level, in their opinion, some groups act without any contact at all with the central structures of Al-Qaida. Such an approach is possible, certainly, and very convenient in order to assign any acts of terrorism to Al-Qaida depending on political conjuncture. One more question arises: why is the effectiveness of the forces and services involved so low? Bin Laden, and in our country Basayev and Maskhadov, with all their danger, remain alive and free. Emotional understanding of the fact that terror may not be justified often does not allow the realization that it has objective reasons. But they are obvious. After the contradictions between socialism and capitalism came the contradiction between the developed and developing countries, which deepen more and more. Most clearly and immediately it reveals the direct worsening in the conditions of existence of the majority of mankind due to the growth of the minority's wealth. As this occurs, the growing rupture of the two parts, into which mankind is divided, becomes an objective brake on the fkrther progress of its most developed part. All the phenomena significant for development of the latter should be considered through the above-mentioned prism including, most certainly, international terrorism. People in the developing countries, who are falling behind the developed ones rapidly, despite all efforts, appear on the whole to be hostile to the developed countries and their valuables, also because through the world media they find out more about these valuables and, more painfully, realize their inaccessibility for both themselves and their children. The response associated with this regularly engenders animosity and hostility towards the developed countries. As reasonable methods of protest against the obvious injustice collapse, the trend towards terrorist acts in developing countries will inevitably increase. As this takes place, terrorists surely will "exploit" this trend, thereby appearing in the eyes of the absolute majority of mankind not as criminals, but as heroes: revolutionaries fighting for justice and natural human rights, though not always by acceptable methods. Such developments are, unfortunately, the normal course of events. The recent bloodshed and murder in recent European history, where the victims were hundreds of peaceful people, once again reminded the world of the fact that the full-scale global war against terrorism does not stop. Since a large number of states in the world are unstable and moreover, a whole region of "failing" or unstable, states exists - the Near East, and last but not least, Afiica - so we and the next generation will have to live with terrorism. In the long-term, global instability will continue to increase. The main question is how to organize the struggle against the most horrible, catastrophic types of terrorism, to arrange an international net to combat them. In connection with this deterioration and the purpose of creation of a system for adequate response to the new challenges and threats to the world community, it seems necessary to find answers and to solve a number of urgent problems: What is modem terrorism? Is it a self-perpetuating phenomenon or is it first of all an instrument in the hands of certain, carefully concealed criminal, political and financial structures?

60 Are the existing international legislative institutions and organizational structures of the world community capable of adequate response to the attacks of terrorist organizations and the growth of the organized crime? What kind of mechanisms should be created? Should the UNO and its Security Council review the priorities of their activities in connection with this? Are the states themselves ready to relinquish part of their sovereignty in order to create international instruments to combat criminality and terrorism? Is NATO capable of rejecting the existing stereotypes, of ensuring a militarypolice hnction for the protection of the national interests of those countries not included in the alliance? Is the creation of a unified World Anti-terrorist Centre necessary today? Perhaps, in connection with this, it is more reasonable to pose the question of converting Interpol into a centre of this type? Will all the international organizational measures to combat terrorism have an effect if, simultaneously with this, the negative trends of world policy do not change? If, as has happened previously, the process of globalization pushes whole countries and regions beyond the limits of modem civilization, the social basis of terrorism will grow in a geometric progression. Is it possible to maintain the struggle against modem international crime using double standards in the evaluation of one or other phenomena? If, presently, criminal and terrorist groups are, in one case, called freedom fighters, but on the other hand they are dangerous criminals, it is naturally impossible to talk about international suppression of criminal and terrorist threats. Until it has an answer to these questions, the world community will always look like a boxer fighting his own shadow. Nonetheless, questions arise during analysis of the condition of modern organized crime. As this takes place, while the conditions that define "terrorism" as a lawful category remain uncertain, the framework of this notion is forming anyway; but in the case of "organized criminality", it is impossible to say this. Even the well-known UN Convention against transnational organized criminality, adopted in 2000 in Palermo, does not describe this notion. A number of UN documents define this phenomenon as a type of business where the super-profits are generated by corruption, tax avoidance, violence, intimidation of the competitors, and by indulging in forbidden activities. Such a broad definition of organized criminality produces inadequate approaches to the fight against this phenomenon. These approaches in many aspects depend upon the political and ideological views of the officials who make decisions in this field. The incompatibility of these approaches is revealed even in the structure of a country and, moreover, in various divisions of the same law-enforcement organs. For example, I met this during the analysis of materials received by the Committee on Security of the State Duma of Russia, that were necessary for preparing Parliamentary considerations on the problem of counteractions against organized criminality in the country. One kind of leader in the law-enforcement organs understands organized criminality as being the traditional forms of criminality with all the signs of an organization. The other kind subscribes to the notion that organized criminality stems from the actions of all the big economic structures on decreasing tax loads. What can we say on the subject of counteracting organized crime, if even worldrenowned economists call the economics of whole countries criminal? The challenge to the world community from terrorism and criminality has turned out to be so powerful that it cannot be satisfied with the results of the measures taken.

61 The capture of the hostages in Moscow, the explosions in Grozny, Mozdok, Yessentuki and the Moscow Metro, which killed our compatriots, the explosions in Israel, Iraq and Spain became not only the personal tragedy of thousands of people, but also a moment of truth; a witness to the obsolescence and insufficiency of the existing models to combat terrorism. It is obvious that a significant rupture has taken place between real, existing terrorist threats and the anti-terrorist measures taken up to now. One of the main problems lies in the fact that it is necessary to struggle not against the symptoms, but against the causes that produce this dangerous disease. By limiting the response only to those crises that appear, we will continuously lag a step behind and we will not be able to eliminate the system itself, which has transformed terror from marginal single cases into a global phenomenon that threatens the normal functioning of civilization. Furthermore, the struggle against terrorism mainly comes, at the present time, as armed counteractions by the special services and law-enforcement and does not use the potential of other possible means to combat terrorism which should be directed into the creation of an effective world system of measures for the deterrence and prevention of terrorism and criminality. As it has been mentioned, we must state that, unfortunately, the "brains" behind the transnational criminal and terrorist organizations are very consolidated, mobile, informed and energetic in their actions. In many aspects this may be explained by the fact that even authoritative international, intergovernmental organizations, taking part in the struggle against criminality, are significantly slow in their decisions because of fulfillment of the formal procedures. Moreover, the mutual understanding between the official power structures and various public organizations has not been achieved in all problem areas by far. Obviously, it is necessary to search for more effective mechanisms of interaction between all the state and non-state anti-terrorist and anticriminal forces of the world community for the purpose of developing new approaches to the battle against criminality and terrorism. A step in this direction was achieved by the creation of the World Anti-criminal and Anti-terrorist Forum (WAAF) on the initiative of the Russian side. We set the following goals and tasks for the WAAF: Firstly, on the basis of a deep analysis of the modem criminal situation in the world, to prepare and propose to the heads of state and governments, representatives of the organs of legislative and executive powers, representatives of business, officials of culture, employees of the mass media, specialists of court and police organs, scientific, research and educational organizations, participants of political and public societies and movements, options for model (harmonized) laws on the new types of threats. Secondly, to develop unified procedures and technologies for the struggle against transnational criminality and terrorism. It is in the deep analysis of the new challenges and threats and the further development of strategy and tactics of counteraction to terrorism and transnational organized criminality in the present day that the main direction of the activities of the world community forces is foreseen in the fight against the evil of the 2lStCentury.

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3. CROSS-DISCIPLINARY RESPONSES TO CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR THREATS

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CHEMICAL TERRORISM: FIVE STRATEGIC CHALLENGES RON G. MANLEY Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (retired), Dorset, UK INTRODUCTION Over the years chemical weapons have been developed, produced and stockpiled by many countries and the threat of their potential use as a means of warfare has remained a global problem since their first wide scale use during World War I. Following the Sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, carried out by the Aum Shinrikyo Sect in March 1995 however, the threat arising from their potential use by terrorists groups, has gained prominence. While chemical weapon experts around the world may express differing views on the degree of impact a terrorist attack involving chemical weapons might have, there is a general consensus that the risk of such an attack occurring remains high and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. There is a continuing need, therefore, for the development of improved equipment and procedures to deal with such attacks and to minimise their impact. This paper focuses on five areas where, in the opinion of the author, bodies, such as the World Federation of Scientists (WFS), could make a valuable contribution to this task. CONTROLLING ACCESS TO TOXIC CHEMICALS A terrorist planning a chemical attack must first acquire the toxic chemical in sufficient quantity and in a sufficiently pure and stable state for it to remain effective during the transfer and release phase. The terrorist must also either develop or acquire the means to disseminate it. In theory there are many thousands of toxic chemicals that might be used by a terrorist. Due to factors, such as insufficient toxicity, poor stability and poor dispersion characteristics, only a small number of these are likely to make effective chemical weapons.' Toxic chemicals that have been specifically developed and stockpiled as chemical weapons, on the other hand, will, by definition, have the right characteristics and are thus likely to pose the greatest threat. Terrorists might obtain toxic chemicals by several different routes. Some examples are: a) Steal or otherwise acquire a chemical weapon from an existing military stockpile; b) Purchase or steal a toxic chemical from a legitimate commercial source; and c) Synthesise a toxic chemical from commercially available precursor chemicals. Over the years a number of mechanisms have been put in place to try and control the production, shipment, sale and use of known, highly toxic chemicals. These mechanisms range from national health, safety and environmental legislation to international treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).' The CWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons by its member states and requires them to undertake the destruction of any stocks that they may possess by, at the latest, 2012. All facilities used for the production of chemical weapons must also be either destroyed or converted for use for peaceful purposes. In addition to being required to declare and destroy their stocks of chemical

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66 weapons, member states are also required to declare any chemical production facilities, whether commercial or military, that produce either highly toxic chemicals or the precursor chemicals necessary for their synthesis. At the time of writing 162 countries have joined the CWC. The CWC has an intrusive and effective verification regime. Stocks of chemical weapons, chemical weapons related facilities and both military and commercial plants producing or consuming certain toxic chemicals are subject to routine inspection by international inspectors belonging to the organisation responsible for overseeing the implementation of the treaty, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). It is worth noting that since the entry into force of the CWC in April 1997, approximately 8.6 million chemical weapons have been declared to the OPCW and, to date, approximately 2 million of these have been destroyed. The risk from chemical weapons produced by States is gradually being eliminated and the manufacture and use of the key precursor chemicals necessary for their production brought under international control. International treaties, such as the CWC, are primarily aimed at the actions of states rather than at groups or individuals within a state. Prevention of the use of chemical weapons by groups and individuals within a state is dependent on National legislation. Many countries have introduced the necessary legislation to control this aspect of the problem but many others have yet to do so. The OPCW has recently adopted an action plan to encourage those states that do not have the necessary legislation in place to rectify the situation as soon as possible. The establishment of export control agreements, such as the ‘Australia Group’, can add a further layer of protection. The 33 countries belonging to the ‘Australia Group’, for example, have agreed to regulate, strictly, the export of a number of high risk items, such as chemical weapons precursors, dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment and related technologies. While international treaties, such as the CWC and international agreements, such as the ‘Australia group’, are making it more difficult for terrorist groups to obtain access to chemical weapons and their precursors, it would be unrealistic to expect that they will ever be one hundred percent effective. The large scale manufacture of moderately toxic chemicals, such as ammonia, chlorine, phosgene, etc. is an essential component of the world’s chemical industries and such chemicals will continue to be produced, stockpiled and transported in very large quantities. While, as stated earlier, these chemicals pose a much lower risk than those chemicals specifically developed as chemical weapons, their widespread availability means that the danger they pose cannot be ignored. Additional controls, therefore, need to be developed and put in place to prevent unauthorised access to such chemicals during their manufacture, storage and transport. Some countries have already begun to address this problem but many others have yet to do so and there is considerable scope for further work in this area. IDENTIFYING AND HARDENING HIGH RISK TARGETS Many factors can contribute to the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of a terrorist attack involving a chemical weapon. Certain kinds of targets, for example, are likely to be more vulnerable than others to such an attack. It is important to identify these targets and, where practicable, take action to reduce the potential impact of a chemical attack on them. One approach to this problem is to harden the target against such an attack by making changes to its design and construction. While this

67 may not be able to prevent a chemical attack from taking place, particularly in buildings and facilities open to the general public, it could, nevertheless, greatly reduce the impact arising from such an attack. The degree to which any given target can be hardened against a chemical attack will, to a considerable extent, depend on the type of building or facility, its design and how it is used. In many situations the cost of retroactively hardening a building or facility could be very high and thus would only be viable in exceptional circumstances. Building in additional hardening at the design stage or during major refurbishment of a building or facility, on the other hand, could produce a significant increase in its resilience to a chemical attack, for only a marginal increase in cost. Such an approach would equally be applicable to biological or radiological threats. In order for this approach to become normal practice, architects and designers need to be made aware of the design features and types of materials that would increase the resilience of their buildings and facilities to such attacks. In order to gain the full benefit from such an approach, they would also need to be provided with the means to assess whether the building or facility under consideration was likely to be at high, medium or low risk of receiving a terrorist attack. This would enable them to make a more informed decision on the degree of weighting to be given to the incorporation of increased resilience to terrorism in the overall design. Whether or not it would be practicable to develop the means to provide such a risk categorisation, however, needs further consideration. Irrespective of whether it is practical or not, the potential benefits from the inclusion of resilience against a terrorist attack as a normal design factor in new buildings or major refurbishments of old ones would almost certainly outweigh any disadvantages. Ideally the incorporation of features to increase resilience to a terrorist attack would, like health and safety and fire prevention, become part of the normal design process. For example, resilience against the impact of an external chemical attack could be significantly increased in modem, fully air-conditioned buildings by increased attention, during the design phase, to the: a) Design and positioning of air intakes and exhausts; b) Provision of air-locks at all entrances and exits; and c) Design of the structure and the sealing materials and methods used. Similarly, the provision of compartmentalisation, internal airlocks and carefully designed air circulation systems could greatly reduce the impact of an internal chemical attack. Careful selection of materials and finishes would make the problem of decontamination, following an attack, infinitely easier. With good design the incorporation of such factors would not only lead to a significant increase in the building’s resilience but could be made largely transparent to the user and add little to the overall cost. IMPROVING DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

Over the years a range of instruments have been developed to detect and identify the presence of the most important toxic chemicals and this is an area were technology continues to improve, rapidly. Some of these instruments are extremely sophisticated and capable, under the right circumstances, of the rapid detection and identification of the presence of minute traces of these chemicals. Most of this equipment, however, was developed for use either by the military or the chemical industry. In general, such equipment has neither been designed nor evaluated for use in the counter-terrorism field. While in some situations there may be a direct

68 correlation between the designed use and use in a counter-terrorism role, in others no such link will exist. The majority of systems developed for the chemical industry, for example, are designed to monitor for the presence of a specific chemical or a narrowly defined range of chemicals. For use in the counter-terrorism role, on the other hand, there is a need for systems capable of rapidly detecting and identifying the presence of a wide range of toxic chemicals. For operational reasons and to reduce the number of false alarms, chemical detectors and monitors developed for the military are frequently provided with higher alarm thresholds than would be acceptable for use in civilian situations. There is, considerable scope, therefore, for the development of detection and identification equipment specifically designed for use in the counterterrorism field. One example of this is the requirement for systems capable of rapidly detecting the presence of a wide range of toxic chemicals - at trace levels, with a high degree of accuracy and a very low false alarm rate - for installation in high risk buildings and facilities and at key transit points such as airports and ports, etc. A second example is the need for low cost, easy to use and reliable equipment to enable first responders to rapidly detect the presence and identity of a toxic chemical. The development of improved detection and identification techniques for toxic chemicals is an area that would, particularly, benefit from the adoption of a broad based scientific approach, the injection of new ideas and the application of cutting-edge science. TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FIRST RESPONDERS Dealing with the aftermath of a terrorist attack involving the use of chemical weapons requires specialist skills. One approach to this problem, adopted by a number of countries, is to establish specialist teams who have been specifically trained to deal with a CBRN attack. One problem with this approach is that, in many situations, there may be a considerable delay between the on-set of the attack and the arrival of the specialist CBRN response team. This is likely to pose particular problems in the case of a chemical attack where speed in dealing with casualties and contamination is a critical factor. It is inevitable that, in many situations, the immediate responsibility for dealing with casualties and limiting the spread of contamination f?om a chemical attack is going to fall on the local emergency response teams. A strong case can, therefore, be made for providing first responders with the skills and equipment necessary to deal with the problem and thus reduce their dependence on remotely located specialist teams. This will require the provision of specialist training in the identification of chemical agents, treatment of casualties and contamination control to emergency personnel from differing backgrounds and with a wide range of experience and skills. It will require the development of equipment, techniques and training packages specifically designed to meet the needs of this group of people. As highlighted in the previous section there is a particular requirement for the development of low cost, reliable and easy to use equipment for the identification of specific chemical agents and toxic chemicals. Such equipment needs have a long shelf-life and be suitable for wide scale issue to first responders. Another area requiring further development is the provision of first aid to casualties arising from a chemical attack. Medical countermeasures have been developed for most of the known chemical warfare agents and some of the more toxic industrial chemicals. In order to be effective, however, many of them must be administered within minutes following the casualty’s exposure to the toxic chemical. A further complication is that, in order to select the appropriate treatment regime, it is

69 generally necessary to know which toxic chemical or type of toxic chemical has been used. First responders, therefore, will also need to be provided with the means to rapidly identify the chemical, trained in the recognition of the symptoms of poisoning, and on how to administer the appropriate treatment. Contamination control will play a vital role in minimising the impact of a chemical attack. One of the key tasks for the first emergency personnel arriving at the scene of a chemical attack will be to establish the boundary of the contaminated area and take immediate action to control movement across this boundary. This will be particularly important in situations where a persistent chemical agent has been used or is suspected of having been used. While it is fully appreciated that preventing the spread of contamination may be extremely difficult to implement, particularly following the release of a chemical agent in an urban area, the importance of doing so cannot be overstated. The training of all emergency response teams in the importance of contamination control and how to implement it needs to be a key requirement in any CBRN counter-terrorism programme. EDUCATING THE GENERAL PUBLIC TO THE RISKS A major asset in the fight against terrorism is an informed arid vigilant general population. In order to reach this state, however, it is necessary to provide the general public with sufficient, accurate and reliable information to enable them to gain a better understanding of the hazards posed by the different weapons that terrorists might use. They also need to be provided with risk assessments that are both realistic and placed in context with other normal, everyday hazards facing the general population. At present, much of the information available, particularly in relation to CBRN weapons, is both confusing and contradictory. One example of this is the widespread application of the term weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. This has generated a perception among the general public that the impact of an attack involving any one of these weapons would lead to equally catastrophic results. The situation has not been improved by the tendency for the media, when reporting on this issue, to, invariably, focus on the worst-case scenario. In reality, each of these weapons is very different and their use, by terrorists, would produce very different results. While a nuclear blast within an urban area would, inevitably, lead to the death of large numbers of people and large-scale destruction of the surrounding infrastructure, the detonation of a radiological device (dirty bomb) in the same area could result in few, if any, deaths and only minor damage. Both devices, on the other hand, are likely to lead to long term, radioactive contamination in the area surrounding the point of release. The number of casualties arising from either a chemical or biological attack, even in a worst-case scenario, is likely to be orders of magnitude less than those arising from a nuclear attack. While the effects of a chemical attack on those exposed to it would appear almost immediately, it might be hours or days before any symptoms arising from a biological attack became apparent. In addition, a chemical or biological attack would have little, if any, effect on the infrastructure and while contamination may be an immediate problem it is unlikely to pose long-term difficulties. In the case of chemical weapons, experience, albeit limited, of their use against untrained personal suggests that wide-scale panic will be a major problem following a terrorist attack involving these materials. This will not only complicate the task of the emergency personnel but may, in itself, lead to additional casualties and the spread of

70 contamination. This again reinforces the case for providing the general public with information, presented in a clear and easily understood format, on the hazards associated with chemical weapons and with basic guidance on what to do in the event of their becoming involved in a terrorist attack using this weapon. While the provision of such information will not solve the problem of panic following a terrorist attack, having an informed and prepared population will certainly help. CONCLUSION Despite national and international efforts to limit access, by terrorists, to chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals, the risk of an attack involving their use remains high and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. While the intelligence community will continue to focus its efforts on forestalling such attacks, there can be no guarantee that they will always succeed. There will, therefore, be a continuing need to develop better ways of both dealing with and minimising the impact of this form of attack. Bodies, such as the WFS - with its multidisciplinary and multicultural make-up - are well positioned to contribute to this task. REFERENCES 1.

2.

Ron G Manley “Dealing with the Chemical Threat”, In Proceedings of the 29“ Session of the International Seminars on Planetary Emergencies, Erice, Sicily, 10-15 May 2003. CWC. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 32 I.L.M. 800, 13 January 1993. Available at .

BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM: QUANTIFYING AND COMMUNICATING UNCERTAINTY

CHARLES R. PENN Health Protection Agency, Porton Down, Salisbury, UK The deliberate spread of anthrax spores in the USA in 2001, together with recent examples of emergence or spread of natural infections such as S A R S , avian influenza and West Nile fever, have placed emergency health planning and resilience high on political, health and scientific agendas. Such planning and preparedness is predicated on estimation of the likely course of events, their impact and outcomes. These estimations necessarily involve assessment of high levels of uncertainty, some of which (such as the probability of a catastrophic event occurring) are inherent in emergency planning across a wide range of disciplines. Others, such as infection risk, and temporal and spatial spread of disease, have elements particular to biological systems. These two elements in particular are discussed in greater depth below. INFECTION RISK Since a single viable microbial organism (virus or bacterium) can in theory sustain an infection, but for many pathogens rarely does so (and then may still not cause disease), infection risk should be considered as a probability. The larger the number of organisms acquired, the greater the probability of sustaining a viable infection. Infection risk is usually described as the dose required to infect 50 % of the

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72 exposed population (ID~o).For some organisms, this dose may be as low as 1-10, in which case exposure cames a high probability of infection. For others (such as anthrax - see figure 1) this dose may be relatively high (i.e. infectivity is low). In the context of response to bioterrorism, organisms with such a low infectivity can present particular problems where low concentrations of material are dispersed over an area of high population. For example, a dispersion of anthrax spores such that a population of 100,000 is exposed to a dose equivalent to ID0.001 would be predicted to cause only one case of anthrax infection. This creates a public health dilemma - at what point does the likely incidence of infection become sufficiently low for prophylaxis or other health measures to be discontinued? A further confounding factor is that infection (or colonisation) may not always result in severe disease. Meningitis, poliomyelitis, measles are just some examples of infections where only a small proportion of those infected develop a severe life threatening or debilitating disease. In many cases the factors that influence outcome are poorly understood, but may include age, health status, immune status, or genetic predispositionkesistance. This inherent unpredictability of the outcome of individual exposure to a biological agent has a key impact on the use of predictive modelling in emergency preparedness’. On a population basis it is possible to reasonably predict casualty rates but, with low population numbers, or (relatively) low doses of exposure, there will be a high level of uncertainty over the identity of individuals most at risk. Considering infection as a probability helps to explain apparently ‘random’ events such as the outlying cases of anthrax infection in the USA in 2001, and the transmission of S A R S infection on board flight AF171 in March 2003. These two examples are presented here as case studies. Case study 1: Bioterrorism related anthrax 2001 The deliberate distribution of anthrax spores through the USA mail system in 2001 resulted in 22 cases of anthrax, of whom 5 died2. It is however remarkable that many more did not succumb to infection, as the quantity and method of distribution of material will have resulted in many more people exposed to the spores (approximately 10,000 are reported to have been recommended for antibiotic prophylaxis3). A more detailed study of the cases associated with the Trenton Processing and Distribution Center in New Jersey4 showed that of the 6 cases of anthrax infection, 4 worked within the Center, one was mail camer, and the sixth a recipient of mail from the Center (but not the deliberately contaminated mail). The same report records a total of 1069 employees considered to have sufficient risk of exposure to be recommended for antibiotic prophylaxis; no mention is made of the number of the public in receipt of mail and thus at risk of similar exposure to anthrax spores as case 6. Thus while some cases occurred in those at highest risk of exposure (i.e. within the Center), others occurred in individuals with a probable lower exposure, yet staff within the Center remained unaffected. The most extreme example of a lack of evident correlation between exposure (i.e. dose) and consequential infection is that of the 94-year-old Connecticut woman who died from inhalational anthrax on November 21, 20015. In this case there was no identified link between the affected individual and the known high-risk sites of exposure (other than national mail distribution), and no other cases in the same locality. The accepted conclusion is that this individual was exposed through cross contamination of mail. While there are no reliable data, it is likely that many other

73 members of the public will have received and handled such cross-contaminated mail during the period October- November 2001. The example of bioterrorism related anthrax of 2001 illustrates several gaps in our knowledge and capability to both interpret (retrospectively) and predict outcomes. First, the probability of infection will have been influenced by an uneven distribution of spores through the mail system, and by the physical dispersion of the spores at any one point in time. Thus, an individual’s likelihood of serious infection will have depended on whether they were exposed at all (and to how much), and the extent to which material was dispersed into a respirable form. Second, the low incidence of infection, despite substantial quantities of anthrax spores used, calls into question our assumptions concerning the infectivity for man of anthrax. Furthermore such assumptions, derived from animal infection data, make no allowance for demographic variable such as age, other health conditions, and genetic heterogeneity. Case study 2: S A R S 2003 The S A R S epidemic of 2003 provides a dramatic illustration of the potential devastating effects of a release of a transmissible infectious agent. In only a few months, SARS caused over eight thousand cases of illness, and was directly responsible for over 750 deaths6. This epidemic provides several discrete illustrations of the unpredictability inherent in the spread of infectious disease. Epidemiological investigations around individual S A R S cases have revealed a considerable diversity in the extent to which the disease was transmitted, without any evident pattern. In some cases, such as a 52-year-old Pennsylvania resident who contracted S A R S in Toronto, there was no onward transmission, despite extensive contact with others7. This is in contrast to the 70-year-old Beijing woman who infected 10/20 visitors to her hospital room, though 5 relatives (described as ‘close contacts’) remained unaffected8. However, as with the anthrax example above, there are additional variables that will have affected the risk of infection in contacts of SARS patients. These contacts will be highly unlikely to have had the same exposure to the S A R S virus, as the amount of the S A R S virus being shed by the index cases will vary over time, and from case to case. Some of this variability can be discounted in the example of transmission that occurred on board flight AF171 from Hanoi to Paris on March 22, 20039. Epidemiological investigation led to the conclusion that two cases of SARS were the result of infection during the flight. One of these cases was seated close to the index case, the other more distant. Other passengers seated close to the index case remained unaffected. The authors themselves concluded that “prolonged contact does not necessarily result in transmission, and, conversely, a brief or distant exposure might be sufficient”. These observations support the unpredictable (probabilistic) nature of infectious disease. Epidemic Disease In a similar manner the course of an epidemic will be influenced by the individual probabilities of infection, and other variables such as social interactions, population and material movement, and climate. For an established epidemic or outbreak, or for assessment of endemic disease, models have been developed that can reasonably predict case numbers. A recent example of this approach was in the control of the foot and mouth outbreak in the UK in 2001, where such models were used to demonstrate the importance of the speed of culling of affected and

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neighbouring farms". The use of such techniques for determining vaccination rates in public health programmes is well established. There are two particular circumstances where the predictive value of such models may be undermined. Early in the development of an outbreak, when numbers are low, individual (probabilistic) events may have a major role in subsequent outcomes. Second, the extent and variability of people, animal and material movement (globally) is such that the spatial spread of an epidemic, when dependent on these factors, may be highly unpredictable. Techniques used to mitigate such unpredictability include the use of average values (rather than probabilities) in the models (referred to as deterministic models), or averaging the outcomes from multiple iterations of a model (for example Monte Car10 simulation). Models developed in this way can be used to assess the likely impact of interventions, but cannot accurately predict the course of any one outbreak or incident. There are many examples that illustrate this aspect of the unpredictability of the course of epidemics. These include the introduction of West Nile fever into the USA in 1999", the outbreaks of monkeypox (again in the USA) in 2003", and the spread of S A R S to Canada (2003)13. The first hvo of these represent zoonotic diseases endemic elsewhere in the world, which unexpectedly (both in terms of time and geography) appear in a new territory. With the extensive movement of people and animals, such events in principle are not unexpected - it is the time, place, and particular disease that we cannot predict. The same principles can be applied to the spread of S A R S to Canada. That S A R S was likely to spread beyond its origins in China and its immediate neighbours was widely accepted, and most nations increased their health surveillance accordingly. That Canada was more severely affected by far than most other western nations was due to a combination of factors, some of which were a matter of chance. Should a S A R S epidemic re-establish itself in the Far East, we should not expect the same pattern of global spread. Canada would not be at greater risk, yet Canada has probably made a greater investment in health preparedness as a consequence, than most other western nations14 (an example perhaps of the influence of public risk perception). Conclusions Our ability to predict the consequences of a bioterrorist event is undermined by uncertainty inherent in the nature of infection. We have insufficient understanding and knowledge, including in such areas as susceptibility to infection, factors that may influence the relationship between infection and development of severe disease, and accurate data on the relationship between exposure and probability of infection (especially at low levels of exposure). Key areas for future development need to include development of better data in all of these areas, consensus on key variables, and further development of models that adequately allow for these uncertainties. The uncertainties inherent in biological systems are further compounded by societal factors such as travel, and movement of animals and material. These can (especially with low frequency of probability events) further undermine our ability to accurately predict the course of events. The communication of such uncertainty outside of specialist groups needs to be well considered. The public willingness to accept risk outside of their control is low, which leads to a high expectation of assurance, and low tolerance of uncertainty in civil contingencies and public communications. Others who have to act or plan based

75 on expert advice need to understand the methods, knowledge and uncertainty on which it is founded. Finally, while the precise nature of events cannot be predicted, we can be certain that new and unexpected outbreaks of infectious disease will occur, whether deliberate or natural. We should continue to develop and strengthen our emergency and healthcare systems, but in a manner that enhances resilience to such events generically. The recommendations arising from Canada's review of the response to S A R S , and the creating of the Health Protection Agency in the exemplify this approach.

REFERENCES

' See for example Ferguson NM et al., (2003).

Risk assessment and vaccination laming for smallpox outbreaks. Nature 425: 681-685. 'Jernigan DB et al., (2002). Investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax, United States 2001: epidemiological findings. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8: 1019-1028. Shepard CW et al., (2002). Antimicrobial post exposure prophylaxis for anthrax: adverse events and adherence. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8: 1124-1132. Greene CM et al., (2002). Epidemiological investigations of bioterrorism related anthrax. New Jersey 2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8: 1048-1055. Williams AA et al., (2002). Bioterrorism-related anthrax surveillance, Connecticut, September-December, 2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8: 1078-1082. Lingappa JR et al., (2004). Wresting S A R S from uncertainty. Emerging Infectious Diseases. 10: 167-170. Peck AJ et al., (2004). Lack of S A R S transmission and US S A R S Case Patient. Emerging Infectious Diseases. 10: 217-224. Shen Z et al., (2004). Superspreading SARS events, Beijing, 2003. Emerging Infectious Diseases. 10: 256-264. 9 Desenclos J-C et al., (2004). Introduction of S A R S in France, March-April, 2003. Emerging Infectious Diseases. 10: 195-200. 10 Ferguson NM, Donnelly CA & Anderson Rh4 (2001). The foot-and-mouth epidemic in Great Britain: pattern of spread and impact of interventions. Science 292: 1155-1160. I ' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (1999). Outbreak of West Nile like viral encephalitis - New York. MMWR Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 48:845-849 I2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2003). Update: multistate out-break of monkeypox - Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin, 2003. MMWR Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 52: 642-646. 13 For the public's health: a plan of action. Final report of the Ontario expert panel on S A R S and infectious disease control. (2004). httu:llwww.health.qov.on.cd 14 For the public's health: a plan of action. Final report of the Ontario expert panel on S A R S and infectious disease control. (2004). httu:l/www.health.nov.on.cd 15 Getting ahead of the curve: a strategy for combating infectious diseases (including other aspects of health protection). A report by the Chief Medical Officer, England, January 2001. http:/lwww.dh.nov.uk/

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CROSS DISCIPLINARY MITIGATION OF CBRNE’ RISK: CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, EXTREME EXPLOSIVES. ELECTRONIC/DIGITAL ATTACKS

SALLY LEIVESLEY’ Newrisk Limited, London, UK It is knowledge of the limitations to our understanding of risk that will lead to original research and substantial solutions to mitigate the successes of terrorist movements. The outstanding challenge for scientific leaders is to cooperate through global structures, using technology to deliver means for real-time, front line solutions in response to terrorist threats or attacks. Front line scientific effort for physical and virtual cooperation with emergency responders requires changes in scientific thinking away from institutional contexts towards delivery into the real time attack environment. Coordinated simultaneous terrorist attacks with CBRNE2 weapons3 present a planetary emergency that confronts science with significant challenges. Global multidisciplinary scientific research can energise the mitigation of CBRNE2 risk. Solutions are needed that will function within the flux of catastrophic attacks across two hemispheres and alongside political, cultural and economic drivers. Effective counter measures are needed to mitigate risk from high uncertainty attacks and the advanced scientific research and weapons testing by terrorist groups. Challenge 1 is to develop tools for analysis of catastrophic risk that interpret the energy that has been harnessed by global terrorists to threaten the stability of governments, economic systems, mass casualties and irrecoverable damage. Recognition of a near infinity of factors and catastrophic consequences would take scientists beyond the definitions of risk embedded within their disciplines towards new pure and applied research outputs. Challenge 2 is to move science into a cultural context so that the questions asked by scientists are within the context of the cultures that are preparing counter measures and within the sub-culture of terrorism that uses an unfettered scientific environment to produce many end states of risk. Challenge 3 is for science to utilise observations of culture and human response to improve societal preparedness. Societal preparedness is expressed through international cooperation and coordination of scientific research, through the mix of media doing near-real time reporting, the emergency responders and historical, cultural and religious factors. Societal response to global terrorism includes the cultural take-up of terrorism, radicalisation of youth and enculturation of individuals into the terrorist sub-culture. Challenge 4 is to move science and technology into improved solutions to mitigate CBRNE’ attacks. The terrorist use of a mix of advanced scientific knowledge, simplicity of acquisition of materials for weapons and strategic coordinated targeting for catastrophic effect is counter to the logic of scientific research and development. ‘Rogue science’ is a way to describe the application of the principles of research and development that are directed at societal destruction. The basic questions asked within pure and applied science may require a new context away from historical pathways of research and development. Challenge 5 drives science towards the resolution of global planetary vulnerabilities to CBRNE2 risk through global programmes for innovatory research and development including delivery of science on the front line of counter terrorism

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77 response. This moves science from its institutional base into applied problem solving across the spectrum of human behaviour and CBRNE2 risk, and places scientific teams with emergency responders. Since 9/11, scientific establishments have entered into dialogue with national governments to meet the challenges of threats that were previously restricted to the battlefield and classified research solutions4 and this may create a new era of findings and applications. Cross cultural expression of terrorism and globalisation of communications have created many combinations of factors previously unexpressed in threats to populations, cultures, economies and the physical environment. This is a rich field for research into human behaviour, causes and growth of terrorist movements and gaps in knowledge and scientific action that require global cooperation. Examples of 100 research programmes are described within Challenge 5, based on assessments of catastrophic risks from vulnerabilities or weaknesses in counter measures to terrorist attack. These 100 examples illustrate the immediacy and urgency for global cooperation between scientists in response to the planetary emergency. Extracts from the hundred research examples show the breadth of research and the need for global cross-disciplinary cooperation: 1. Design of international structures under G8, NATO Response Force (assistance to countries post terrorist attack); UN, scientific and other organisations to deliver virtual and prelocated scientific teams for problem solving services to the front line of responders (diagnosis, testing and advice) on unusual counter terrorist CBRNE2 attacks on people, critical infrastructure and the environment. 2. Mass communications research to stimulate the energies of populations to report risk and to communicate public strategies for survival from CBRNE2 attacks. 3. Managing CBRN contamination by reduction of biological cross contamination after multiple point releases of weapons; public decontamination within minutes from chemicals or radiological attacks and simple processes for decontamination of cities. 4. Reduction of fire and explosion consequences from nuclear and high impact weapons against city infrastructure including confined tunnels. 5 . City Planning research on alternate cities for displaced economic activity. 6. Information infrastructure research on virtual business and government operations using highly protected and dispersed communication nets. 7. New financial tools to generate rebuilding and recovery by governments and business. 8. New doctrinal solutions for pre-emptive use of small teams of rapid response defence forces in cities and high-risk locations. 9. New psychological and cultural analyses of mass population response to sustained terrorist attacks and catastrophic loss. 10. Research on fundamental principles for international law to develop overarching societal rights for protection against future catastrophic attacks based on assessed risks of individual and group actions.

RISK ANALYSIS Risk analysis spans all disciplines to draw on the understanding of the near infinity of factors that create energy states and of unmeasurable and unforeseeable states that have existed in past time or that are to be created in a future time state.

78 Scientific efforts at risk analysis have been confounded by limited systems for measurement of catastrophic risk and this top end of the risk dimension has stretched the capability of measurement. However, scientific design risk assumptions have underpinned all technological developments and in relation to catastrophic failures, the quantified risk systems have underperfonned. Chemobyl, Three Mile Island, the two USA shuttle failures and train collisions are examples of the limits of design risk and the catastrophic operational outcomes in operating systems. Rail networks are a system that can be modelled for research on quantification of catastrophic risk because design risk assumptions and operational risk management systems are tested many millions of times in any day. They are potential test beds for observations on the patterns of catastrophic failures and demonstrate the interface of design risk and operational risk as there are observable interfaces of technology and processes with a multitude of human factors during rail operations. Catastrophic risk in real conditions rather than in laboratory simulation brings together human factors risk design, technology and the host of environmental factors that coincide in a catastrophic loss event. There is an active interface between all these factors at any time in the rail systems of the world. Cross cultural and cross disciplinary work could define the mathematics of catastrophic risk and model new risk management systems. Rail control rooms present an ideal laboratory for enhancement of risk management in real-time decision making and systems operation. In some parts of the world, the integration of sophisticated tools to assist decision making in rail control systems are direct attempts to mitigate catastrophic risk. An example is the Madrid metro underground rail system where analysis by engineers of catastrophic rail losses throughout the world led to placement of technology for calculation of fire growth curves within the control room to assess safety times for rescue in the underground system and for a tunnel misting system to be a~tivat Work on Australian rail systems has shown that training and systems implemented within the train control system can reduce catastrophic risk of decision making and increase the risk factors calculated by controllers during train movements6. In comparison with rail systems, the failures in design risk assumptions about nuclear power plants have been expressed across greater time intervals and this has led to unfounded psychological confidence in the strength of the risk controls within the nuclear industry. The use of design base threat assessments’ in the nuclear industry to strengthen controls against terrorist attacks will leave gaps if global terrorism has created new combinations of factors that have no basis from past history of events or are identified from ongoing intelligence. Global terrorist groups employ unusual weapons and unknown capabilities that may not fit within the nuclear industry international risk model. The attacks by Al-Qaeda by air, land, sea and underwater create new risk factors. An indication from a USA maritime alert in March 2004 on findings of two dead divers described one body being found within tidal flows of a nuclear power station water outlet. A third diver was sighted near sensitive facilities in the same period.8 New catastrophic risk measurements may assist the nuclear industry to change the design risk assumptions in design and operation and for the storage and transportation of nuclear weapons, materials or waste products. Psychological factors are significant for understanding risk. Engineering risk assessments use assumptions of credible and measurable risk rather than total failure states and unforeseeable risk states. Part of these limitations may arise from human factor influences on researchers from physiological and instinctive drives that translate into limitations on risk perception and psychological denial of total loss. The

79 basic response of the brain is to protect the body from total loss. This translates into physiological changes in the blood and brain and interference with the processes of perception. Risk analysis has generally focused on less than catastrophic loss states. The Channel Tunnel design risk studies focused systematically on risk for all systems and considered that the redundancy plans on all systems would create rail risk at a level no higher than on other parts of the rail network in Britain.' The quantitative risk assessment approach (QRA) evaluated all risks on a common basis. The process was based on identifying a comprehensive set of possible accidents, estimates of likelihood and severity and to combine the outcomes into suitable measures of risk. In the Channel Tunnel fire on 18 November, 1996, there were unexpected failures of power, communications, and in human factor decisions. There was difficulty finding the train and the Official Inquiry Report found it took nearly 40 minutes to get rescue personnel to the train." In the USA Shuttle failure there has been consideration of complex systems and human factor failures. There are similar psychological rationalisations in air craft accidents where the finding of pilot error describes human error. This can be a finding when other technological causes cannot be determined rather than a systematic finding of human failure. The question is whether psychological comfort with human factor failure findings masks design risk assumption failure and the need to change assumptions in risk quantification methodology. Denial of risk is a psychological mechanism that buffers the human brain against the surge of chemicals that come when life is threatened. Risk perception is the moderation of the environmental observations through the senses with interpretations from past experience and learned patterns of behaviour. Past experience of near miss events will shape behaviour. Age and learning act on the personality to moderate behaviour. The maturing of the brain's capability for perceiving risk is evident in the confused response of young children to extreme events such as earthquakes." The same processes are evident in children's deaths in road accidents where cognition of risk factors have not matured under a certain age so they have higher risks of fatality when riding bicycles or crossing the road. Psychological response to catastrophic loss events shows evidence of the brain's response to near miss death events and to mass trauma. Post-traumatic responses are higher when the events are catastrophic and individuals spend a long time after the experience with the brain readjusting to an environment that is not giving cues of danger. Many events cause individuals to react fearfully because cues are similar to those of the incident and the brain experiences night terrors and flash backs of parts of the event.'* The personality is made up of physiological and cultural experiences from life in an environment, and creates a unique interface with risk. Analysis of the behaviour of different types of personality in interaction with risk factors requires some powerful models and observations of behaviour under real stimuli of catastrophic loss events. This type of work is needed for leadership selection, for preparation of emergency responders and for management of post attack community psychological trauma. Risk analysis tools could be developed to measure in real-time the status of critical functions and vulnerability down through many layers of back-up controls. The calculation of the consequences within an impact area (including people, cultures, physical geography, and technology) will give decision makers a measure of the residual risk that remains when all controls fun~tion.'~ Risk is multidimensional - and the dimensions of hazards, impact areas and risk controls and consequences are

80 multifactorial. Each dimension carries large numbers of factors that may come together in any combination at any time. Measuring risk is akin to measuring a near infinity of combinations and the information known to the risk managers is the equivalent to identifying a sole star within a galaxy. With the limitations of knowledge, the strength of the risk controls and the integrity of the system is a stronger indicator of survival from catastrophic attack than is the use of scenarios to develop risk quantification methods. Scenario based exercises are useful tests of the strength of an organisation’s controls including decision making and other human factors but do not quantify the system’s preparedness to withstand catastrophic loss. Extreme loss events can occur in systems with a low history of past losses and it is the strength of the controls in response to any factor or combination of factors in the environment that will quantify the risk.

RISK ANALYSIS FOR OPEN SYSTEMS

Risk Interface moves between organisational failure and low risk depending on coincidence of risk factors in time in any part of the systenis environment E

The analysis of risk controls can test vulnerability down to a specific layer of redundancy. This analysis can be extrapolated to predict survival from unknown energy states from within the system or from the environment based on a calculation of the residual risk of the controls. The calculation includes the interaction of all controls in the system and factors in all possible combinations in the environment. The redundancy or resilience of each control and the controls sitting behind it, including dependant and independent factors, will be indicative of the strength of the organisation or system. This quantification of catastrophic risk is of significance for mitigating CBRNE’ risk where attacks may be an almost infinite combination of capabilities of terrorist groups and weapons in over 40 countries of the world. TERRORISM AS A SUB-CULTURE Global terrorism is a subculture that has emerged alongside the global economy and communications. International transportation and communication and the emergence of terrorist leadership from educated social elites have created linkages and influences across many countries.

81 The conceptual development of Al-Qaeda arose in the late 1 9 8 0 ~ and ’ ~ the movement mirrored the growth of a global corporation without regulators, laws or national boundaries. The sharing of knowledge, weapons and coordination of attacks by global terrorist groups has been similar to the franchising process by global companies creating more effective and frequent terrorist attacks in many countries. The growth in truck bombings, suicide bombings and mass casualties from the simultaneous attack tactics in many countries by Al-Qaeda or groups that have trained with Al-Qaeda are examples of the globalisation processes. Shared training and opportunistic use of international conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq for weapons training, global propaganda and recruitment have created a capability for coordinated simultaneous attacks across a two hemisphere battle front. More seriously, the capability for sustained or continuous attacks has been indicated in attacks in Saudi Arabia, Istanbul and Madrid in 200314. The scale of attacks from Chechen rebels and the multiple attacks in Saudi Arabia where munitions finds have included large numbers of surface to air missiles provide evidence of the potential growth of threats in many countries. Attacks on embassies in Damascus in April 2004 have given even stronger evidence of the recruitment and tactical attack capability of global terrorism regardless of the strength of state control over terrorist groups. Al-Qaeda, from its inception, had an effective recruitment strategy to overcome national defence doctrine which defined security in terms of threats coming from outside national boundaries. The Al-Qaeda recruitment of a country’s nationals is an effective way of inserting terrorist capability into any culture from within. National security will focus on border controls and military operations in other countries, but the effective counter measures to global terrorism may be taught, and rapid response counter terror forces maintained within a country, along with many social counter measures to disrupt and deter recruitment and internal support. Terrorism in 2004 is a global culture with strong subcultures in many countries. There are differences between terrorist subcultures between countries which translate into coordinated or uncoordinated and poorly organised attacks. The transition of AlQaeda into a second generation of capability has given ‘rogue science’ a jump from kitchen bench chemistry to sophisticated post-graduate chemistry. This change in capability has been in evidence in the chemical attack plans of Al-Qaeda member^.'^ A sophisticated use of science could move Al-Qaeda from construction of dirty bombs into tactical nuclear weapons and biological weapons that would impact with shock on any city and would test international preparedness. To date, the open literature has not described definitive electronic/digital weapons within Al-Qaeda. The lack of open information is significant and there may be risks for denial of service on internet systems, attacks on SCADA systems or the telemetry controlling vital infrastructure which could compromise air traffic systems, water systems, rail systems, power facilities and banking services. The integration of a terrorist subculture within any country has considerable implications for education and research in the tertiary institutions where post graduate research establishments may be the training medium. This includes the information war laboratories, the laboratories of the physical scientists, social science and policy units where the development of policies, public information and psychological research are potential contributors to terrorist tactics. The recent linkage of global terrorism with political elections in Spain is an example of Al-Qaeda strategies. The unfettered rogue scientific subculture of terrorists can create many end states of risk under these conditions. With the sophistication of Al-Qaeda’s search for

82 catastrophic weapons, there is an inevitable government security reaction against open sharing of information by scientists. It will require a diplomatic initiative that spans all cultures to ensure science can continue to develop without restrictions on knowledge. Risk assessments that clarify consequences in sharing information may be one of the solutions to the dilemma. HUMAN FACTORS AND SOCIETAL RESPONSE Societal response to CBRNE2 risk includes the counter measures by defence, emergency response groups, and industry and human impacts. It covers communications before, during or after catastrophic attacks, the responses of governments and of media and leaders of industry. Within the microcosm of terrorist subcultures, the societal response will influence the rate of recruitment of suicide bombers, terrorist research and CBRNE2 weapons capability, funding and training of attack teams and support of local people Radicalisation of the young and recruitment of persons who join movements for ideological, emotional or other reasons are cultural factors to be extrapolated and considered for counter measure planning. Some counter measures may be expressed passively through media, training institutions and government policies. Images of injustice, deaths of young children, destruction of religious symbols and communities are powerful influences on perception. Transmission of images and propaganda by mass media, schools, charities, households and workplaces will promote radicalisation of the young and recruitment of vulnerable unattached people of no particular ethnic origin. Many of the solutions remain within the cultural context of terrorist recruitment which means that religious leaders, teachers, parents, charities and editors of mass media may be directly influencing connections to terrorism whereas official government policies, police, social justice and other sub cultures may have no influence on recruitment and support of terrorism. Within this context, acceleration of the internal capabilities of sub cultures to control terrorism may be more effective than external measures from countries acting outside the religious, social and political knowledge base of a particular country. Within any society, counter measures by government, emergency services and media before, during and after emergencies may create significant strategic and local mitigation of CBRNE2 risk. At the strategic level, international management through the G8 nations can bring together the work of governments and industry to strengthen the capability of nations and regions to withstand and recover from catastrophic attacks.I6 Currently, nations are moving into defensive groupings, such as the EU appointment of the former Dutch Justice Minister, Gijs de Vries to coordinate the pooling of anti terrorist efforts and intelligence gathering. It was announced on March 25, 2004 that he is to ensure that information fed into Europe’s Joint Situation Centre, CitCen, dovetails with information sharing at the level of Europol and Eurojust, the two data gathering offices trying to coordinate cross border police and judicial links to the EU.I7 However these early groupings of countries are politically defined rather than being an international effort across all countries. The scale of cooperation for countermeasures is well known in global money laundering, credit card fraud and identity fraud. Industry leaders can make a unique contribution to counter measures by training and informing significant proportions of the workforce and primary family members in any nation on identification of terrorist activity, reducing recruitment and preparing people for self defence against extreme CBRNE2 attacks. At the G8 level (with

83 observer nations), cooperation across industry leaders of many industry sectors threatened by terrorism reduce risk profile of critical infrastructure. Shipping, aviation, energy and international financial services are industry groups with particular risk profiles. The use of shaped charges against a USA naval target and a commercial fuel carrying tanker are significant threats of the capability of terrorist attack using explosives from small boat platforms. The risk to ships within narrow channels and areas close to shore will affect shipping routes and port costs. Singapore became a threatened target of catastrophic attacks soon after 9/11 and these were disrupted. Three suicide small boat attacks on Iraq’s critical oil facilities and tankers in April 2004 shows the flexibility of use of weapons against critical infrastructure. Attacks on aviation through simultaneous suicide attacks by hijacking or destruction of hulls in the air may re-shape the aviation sector with global implications for numbers of airlines and types of plane bodies under construction. Energy sector losses can impact within and across nations by changing the availability of some forms of supply and impacting on industry and domestic access to energy. Financial services suffer even more global consequences because of high connectedness between financial sector services, public confidence and the psychological market responses to perceived risk. A key element in counter terrorism measures is the capture and use of information for near-real time management of CBRN!? attacks. The disruptions are many more in number than the successes of the terrorist groups. In Israel, in 2002, there was a reversal of successful suicide bomb attacks to many bombs being disrupted for each successful attack by interruption of many of the pathways of bomb making materials, recruitment and financing of suicide bombers.” Elsewhere terrorism is more diffise with any combination of nationals perpetrating coordinated simultaneous attacks and disruption can sometimes be characterised as ‘just in time’ security. The ‘just in time’ security activity is an effective use of cooperation by the public, police and security services following any identifiable pattern of activities or unusual happening that allows an intervention which is just in time to stop the threat becoming an attack. This does not allow a broader penetration of the terrorist groups and tends to capture the persons chosen to deliver the attack. Police and government leaders in many countries are providing non specific but bleak warnings to their countries of the inevitability of attacks by Al-Qaeda.” The success of ‘just in time’ security does not indicate a significant reduction of CBRNE’ risk. Near-real-time reporting of data for on-line analysis and interface with risk management systems combines to form tools for pre-emptive advantage. Near-real time information management gives police and security forces additional time to identify the terrorist groups. There are natural limitations from security and data protection to using real-time on line systems. It is a societal challenge to diplomacy to assess the feasibility of using near-real time information systems to create a much stronger response to risk mitigation within countries through access to global risk information. T h s is different to the trickle up and down systems of information that follow prescribed lines of international communication between governments, police and security services and act under prescriptive data protection legislation in some countries. An innovative change would be to consider terrorism information as similar to market data with near-real time information being constantly reported and the risk levels or levels of confidence in the capability of the market sectors being measured through various indices.

a4 There is one model of near-real time information that is a means of catastrophic risk prediction and mitigation. The global news media have some unusual characteristics where there could be a fit of the structure of the global newsroom to any system for intelligence, scientific or other near-real time data sharing and monitoring of CBRNE’ risk status. In the global news room the pattern or flow of data is not pre-determined but arises from communications connections made by the general public in any part of the world, government personnel, and industry and media reporters on a 24-hour basis. Many of the unforeseeable contacts are stimulated by changes of pattern and reports will be broadcast if commercially or socially of interest to the audience of the particular media outlet. This is the equivalent of random information coming into one source without bias of being pre-selected and representing on-the-ground pattern changes in activity. Random reinforcement of a change in pattern comes into the same central news gathering source from other observers so that the story is confirmed or grows in detail and strength or disappears. This information is different to intelligence and secret information gathered by electronic or human information sources in a pre-selected, disciplined and technologically sophisticated way. Intelligence may be correct at its point source but the general global patterns of risk from CBRNE2 are more likely to be correct when taken from the broad open source reporting from media and other open observation points i.e. the trends in the attacks, strengths of weapons and weaknesses of populations and government counter measures are all available through open source data. When open source data is analysed, it provides a powerful global collection of factors along the risk dimensions of hazard, time, impact area and consequence. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CBRNE’ risk mitigation requires an understanding of the research and development methods of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The global sharing of scientific information, weapons technology, target assessment methods, weapons testing, training, propaganda and social welfare by global terrorist movements highlights the terrorist’s capability to transfer a different stream of science and multidisciplinary contributions to achieve mass casualties and global economic disruption. Therefore traditional formats of science and technology development and information sharing between countries may need to change in significant ways to preempt what is effectively ‘rogue science’. Genuine innovations by terrorist groups may overcome traditional counter measures and defeat slower and more traditional scientific contributions. The contributions of terrorist research to effective weapons development is not a new phenomenon and has been noted by explosives engineers working against national terrorist movements such as the IRA who developed many generations of mortars. Similarly, research over a period of years by the ‘Unabomber’ in the United States was uncovered when his small isolated wood cabin was found to store a massive array of equipment for development of more sophisticated forms of pipe bomb. The global terrorist movements have access to national scientific institutions and education to train and develop capability within radicalised recruits into their movements and they can recruit scientists who are already qualified in chemistry, medicine and other disciplines to commit a capability to the movements. The general perception of the terrorists working in primitive conditions and working outside formal institutions has to change to an understanding of rogue science utilising traditional institutions to train and to develop in many disciplines a range of

a5 capabilities to use against populations and governments. The belief by governments that global terrorism is a movement external to their boundaries has driven the allocation of resources to border security and external conflicts. There is not the same allocation of resources to prevention and detection of the internal recruitment, training and development of destructive weapons by internal citizens. Vulnerability within global terrorist groups may arise from the ideological or psychological mind-set of the individuals. The attacks change in format and patterns are not set for weapons or tactics. Their research interest is in broad and atypical use of materials to create fire and explosion or contamination by chemicals, biological or radiological means. Apart from the use of many new materials for this purpose, the construction of some weapons may be different, though, to date, the weapons remain simple in form but highly effective in destruction of life or infrastructure. However, sophisticated and weaponised chemicals and biological agents are within the capability of global terrorists. Above all, the flexibility and capability of the terrorist mind-set by strategists for reconnaissance, plans and targets of large attacks shows a more unpredictable framework than seen in national terrorist movements. The change of tactics by Al-Qaeda in the Madrid bombings from a previous history of suicide attack to the use of mobile phones as timers for coordinated simultaneous explosions on three trains on March 11 shows flexibility for delivery of a devastating attack, shock from the overwhelming number of attacks, mass casualties and political consequences. For scientists to develop counter measures, global data on attacks and trends analyses are vital. Open source data and information technology systems can deliver near-real time data into data bases to assess patterns and changes in activity if scientists recognise the need for this type of analysis. Some patterns and trends can be found in very large data bases on attacks drawn from 40 or more countries in near-real time reporting and recording. It is possible, in open source format, to add significant analytical power to intelligence data to obtain broader patterns of high uncertainty events. Although it is imperative for science to embrace fast and significant realignments of data sharing and data gathering, this has not yet evolved. Science has the challenge of moving quickly through several generations of research and development and to arrive at methodology that will deliver quantified risk measurement and counter measures to pre-empt rogue science. When considering weapons, modes of attack and timings that are unknown, risk methodology may be a useful counter-measure. Measures are more accessible in the risk interface where the risks are most likely in time and location to come together to create a hazard which interfaces with vulnerable parts of the society (people, materiel or environment). The risk interface (Figure, Risk Analysis for Open Systems) is a highly mobile zone of activity that can be more easily analysed. In rail networks for example, trains come into the system with certain risks accredited as being under accepted levels of control and the risk interface is the movement into the network under the control of the railway controller who accepts the movement. During this movement the train controller is in close contact with the driver, has much broader information about the risk environment than the driver and can act to change the risk environment by decisions during the train movement. While the design risk assumptions that may mean several thousand tonnes of ammonium nitrate, diesel and other reactive materials may move on the rail network with separation safety distances, the outcome of the operational risk may be catastrophic. This was evidenced in North Korea in April 2004 when several thousand

86 domestic residences were severely damaged over a range of some miles following a train explosion. The operational risk during this movement can be controlled by the driver, the train controller and many others in the risk interface area while that movement is taking place and actions may contain the risk or human or technological failures. Additional risk controls within the risk interface will create ‘just in time’ safety and can disrupt catastrophic incidents. Outside the risk interface there are options for changes to design risk assumptions, and for global terrorism counter measures, this would mean changing social causes of formation and recruitment into terrorist groups. Working outside the risk interface is a slower and more difficult challenge for science. The understanding of risk interfaces shows that there is a level at which mitigation can commence that is simpler, can be undertaken earlier and ahead of the deeper design risk studies and may provide a layer of protection against catastrophic loss until the longer term risk factors are mitigated. The Figure, Risk Analysis for Open Systems, shows the risk interface dimension moving between high and low risk states depending on the mix of factors in the system’s environment. Many factors are uncontrollable but the consequences of an impact will depend on the strength of the tested and proven controls within the system to protect it - there is a near infinity of risk factors, any combination of which may come together to create the impact. The ellipse in the figure illustrates the system moving between high and low risk states in an environment of risk factors, some of which are controllable. The strength of the system can be measured by the controls within the ellipse without knowing all the external risk factors or ‘scenarios’. CBRNE’ RESEARCH

It is recommended that future research programmes be developed to analyse vulnerabilities and the characteristics of the ‘inherent energy’ of some types of weapons. The changes in capability of global terrorists in relation to types of weapons, access to materials and deployment of weapons means that risk based research may be more useful for planning cooperative programmes between countries with mixed teams of disciplines. Future research involves assessing the vulnerabilities of people, infrastructure, government and business. The globalisation of terrorist groups has led to rogue science being shared and attacks being replicated in different parts of the world. Research across both hemispheres would be an effective counter measure and cooperation with all countries would change the current focus on traditional diplomatic and trade relationships. For this reason, international organisations such as the G8 (with all other countries involved as observers and participants for counter terrorist measures), the United Nations and noted scientific establishments could deliver many cross-disciplinary global research teams. General and specific research to manage CBRNE’ risk is a significant challenge for governments, scientific bodies and for public discussion. A hundred examples of research that address the weaknesses in controls by individuals, business, and governments and in the environment are listed below. This set of recommendations is an initial step towards further discussion between scientists, governments and the general public on methods for the mitigation of CBRNE2risk.

87 RESEARCH ON COUNTER TERRORISM MEASURES - 100 EXAMPLES: 1. 2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

9. 10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

15. 16.

Global international formats for collaboration on responses to rogue science. Development of real-time global scientific contributions for rapid response by C B W 2 specialists in person or as virtual teams to diagnose extreme threats or attacks and to provide advice to front line responders on consequences and means for mitigation. Mobile laboratory platforms for ‘flying squad’ scientists to use on road, rail, air or sea for delivery of preliminary assessments of CBRN weapons effects. Processes for communications between government, science and the media on major scientific findings. Global standards - for example, on building structures, diagnosis of CBRNE’ effects, long term epidemiological assessments, monitoring, sampling techniques in all environments, clean up of CBR contaminated people, buildings, agricultural produce and animals, sharing of information, and ethics for guidance of scientific research. Environmental protection agencies and health and safety organisations are to be central to the agreement of standards within and across nations. Research on fundamental principles for international law to develop overarching societal rights for protection against future catastrophic attacks based on assessed risks of individual and group actions. Risk assessment of all laws for impacts on counter terrorism measures and balance of human rights based on agreed principles between countries. Development of research into defence doctrine and testing of doctrinal beliefs and data against the risks associated with global terrorism. Exercises and scenarios of terrorism in future states to prepare emergency responders and test risk management. Development of modelling of vulnerability of critical controls for lines of protection down to several layers of back-up controls. Research into economic tools for predicting vulnerabilities in the global market to attacks on critical infrastructure including shipping, aviation, telecommunications, financial services and government. Economic analysis of financial support to Al-Qaeda and global terrorists and the means by which funds and materials support catastrophic attacks. Analysis of strategies in global economic terrorism to weaken world markets. Analysis of political framework of Al-Qaeda attacks or of affiliated attacks across all countries. Analysis of the history of terrorist movements, charismatic movements and leadership to determine key factors underpinning the growth, development and failures of movements. Analysis of the personality and other idiosyncratic behaviour of leaders and followers within the Al-Qaeda movement. Analysis of the second generational influences of education, recruitment, religious propaganda and other characteristics of persons within the AlQaeda or affiliated movements in different countries and comparison with the first generation of the movement.

88 17. Analysis of the context of the Qu’ran to identify culturally acceptable and

historic methods for management of conflicts. 18. Analysis of the influence of religious leaders, parents, schools, charities, cultural and employment institutions on the development of young Muslims within different countries. 19. Analysis of the conversion and recruitment of non-Muslims into Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements. 20. Analysis of methods of training and enculturation of Muslim and other recruits into Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements. 21. Analysis of the relationship between suicide bombing and other suicide attacks by Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements with national epidemiological research on suicide. 22. Development of detailed analyses of suicide bombing processes for counter measures by bomb disposal teams, fire, police and other emergency responders. 23. Development of physical cues and other indicators to assist the public to recognise suicide bombers. 24. Development of international data bases on terrorist attacks on near-real time information inputs and distribution between countries. 25. Development of global information technology systems for linkages between multinational companies and governments in response to threats or attacks. 26. Use of hospital ships and expedient hospital ship platforms (e.g. ferries) as reception and treatment centres for contaminated victims after an attack or for contaminated nationals repatriated from another country after an attack. 27. Development of medical programmes for management of contaminated persons from CBR attacks using ships, rail, or other expedient platforms to contain, stabilise and manage mass casualties without use of traditional medical buildings. 28. Design of dry decontamination systems for city infrastructure including porous road and building cladding surfaces and for internal air conditioning systems and technical equipment such as computers. 29. Design of disposable protective covers for medical diagnostic and treatment equipment used in Accident and Emergency wards and in portable emergency medical response kits. 30. Isolation of some medical equipment in sealed containment free of contamination for continuity of use in medical institutions for injured and contaminated persons or in the field with emergency medical response personnel. 31. Design of ventilation systems for hospital ships or expedient hospital ships to manage contaminated airflows from large groups of persons being decontaminated or medically treated on board either in port or at sea. 32. Materials research for recoverable materials after decontamination 33. Develop psychological and cultural analyses of mass population response to continuous terrorist attacks and catastrophic loss including political leaders, forward commanders and responding health and emergency services. 34. Use of research on human behaviour to determine ways of imprinting protective responses so that protection from extreme explosives is more likely to result in self-protective behaviour.

89 35. Use of research into crowd and small group behaviour in different cultures to maximise survival through visual cues, olfactory cues, auditory cues of an attack or of cognition of threat information and warnings from message systems. Chemical Attacks 36. Design of portable eye wash equipment for the general public and on emergency service vehicles so that individuals may self decontaminate their eyes. 37. Design of overshoes, disposable outer clothing and masks suitable for babies, children and adults for purposes of evacuation through contaminated areas. 38. Design of new forms of Breathing Apparatus for fire services to allow entry into confined spaces and contaminated air for periods of several hours without reducing visual fields and restricting mobility for rescue. 39. Studies of mechanisms used by dogs to detect chemicals and of enhanced training methods for dogs and handlers. 40. Chemicals research for neutralisation, recovery or removal of hazardous chemicals and compounds after attacks on infrastructure. 41. Developing materials and processes for reduction of toxicity of chemicals in confined spaces in buildings, planes and other transportation and tunnels. 42. Research into critical function maintenance and how it can be managed in cities, at ground level, below ground and in the air under conditions of various types of contamination to determine times for loss protection. 43. Design of marker processes for chemicals to identify source. 44. Identification of physical geography and environmental conditions that will enhance or reduce chemical attacks and provide templates or models for emergency responders. 45. Identification of three-dimensional models of plumes that will allow warnings and consequence assessment of movements of hazardous gases in cities in open spaces and between the partly confined areas of city infrastructure. 46. Identification of volumes of releases of various chemicals in tunnels and other confined spaces that will have levels of consequences on persons, infrastructure and environment. 47. Identification of volumes and types of releases of chemicals (e.g. with fire and explosion and passive or pressure assisted release) in tunnels to determine the flow of chemicals, radiological or biological materials through ventilation systems into open spaces, into the sub-structure of essential services to city buildings and into ventilation systems of buildings proximate to underground tunnels. Biological Attacks 48. Procedures and materials to create infection barriers in domestic management of smallpox and other highly infectious diseases released in multiple point attacks on populations. 49. Prophylactic drugs for emergency responders that will minimise risk of infection from contact with infected public or with contaminated surfaces and air borne contamination. These drugs need to enhance the natural

90

50. 51.

52.

53. 54.

55. 56.

immune response and be effective for a number of dosage periods during multiple responses to attacks. Prophylactic treatments for the general public to minimise symptoms or impact of chemical attacks. Creation of public washes by showers, or portable passive wash technology that remove biological contaminants from the skin without significant physiological side effects. Identification of patterns of spread of biological hazards in planes, in terminals of airports and into other transport links such as trains and buses and vehicles moving from airports. Assessing risks of genetic engineering by terrorists. Identification of patterns and speed of movement of biological materials under human vector transportation between countries and within a country to consider containment and protection of critical infrastructure and preservation of critical workforce personnel out of contact. Identification of agroterrorism consequences and the weapons of agroterrorism. Identification countermeasures for agroterrorism and natural barriers from physical geography and climatic or other environmental characteristics

Radiological Materials 57. Methods of storage and technology to track movement of radiological materials and provide continuous data on location and status. 58. Methods of handling, decontamination and dose measurement for defence force and emergency responders in contaminated zones. 59. Methods for rendering safe radiological materials in storage so that these do not present sources for weapons. 60. Methods for securing radiological materials within medical systems or in industry to reduce availability of these materials as weapons. 61. Methods for measuring thresholds of doses of radiation to calculate long term population health effects and health care planning for survivors and to enable emergency responders to manage their times of exposure for essential tasks. 62. Epidemiological consequences from the release of radiological materials and potential population dose levels under certain environmental conditions. 63. Calculation of movement of radiological material within the microenvironment of the urban city, through drag, attachment or integration into materials and people who are moving after and attack, on ground surface level and in underground displacement into drains, aquifers or other subterranean routes. 64. Expedient clothing protection systems and detectors that is portable for the general public and for defence or emergency responders moving through radiologically contaminated areas. 65. Methods for decontaminating moving equipment such as motor vehicles and transportation such as trains, buses, planes and ships and the vehicles of emergency responders. 66. Development of computer simulation programmes on critical infrastructure services to industry and commerce to plan new cities or relocation of parts

91 of business from cities destroyed permanently or temporarily by attacks of the equivalent of tactical nuclear weapons. Nuclear Weapons and Facilities 67. Research into ethics and risks of scientific research and collaboration on nuclear science for application as a global standard. 68. Research into storage and movements of weapons and the history of acquisition to ensure that losses are identified. 69. Decontamination of large facilities such as nuclear reactors, housing, land and organic matter within a down wind plume of radiological release following fire and explosion. 70. Re-design of risk assessment methods for nuclear reactors and for storage and transportation of radiological material and weapons to take into account all factors that link into the protection of critical functions of the site rather than those based on knowledge of terrorist capability. 71. Consequence analysis of total loss of reactor containment and means of mitigating consequences and protecting life within downwind areas of people, infrastructure and environment. 72. Development of continuous risk monitoring of human factors alongside physical monitoring and introduction of control room systems for additional management of extreme risk. 73. Calculation of underwater, underground, air and ground attacks from high explosive weapons, contamination and other weapons. 74. Development of international energy models for catastrophic loss and recovery of base load power stations on power grids. Extreme Explosives 75. Research into combinations of chemical and other explosives to define consequences under certain conditions of release - including in air, water, on the ground and in open and confined spaces and under water. 76. Research into tall buildings and design failures from exposure to extreme explosives from the air, ground level, internal and underground attacks. 77. Research into public response to extreme explosives attacks tall building and confined space attacks to determine protective measures of shelter, evacuation and other protective options for the public. 78. Research into materials with high explosion pressure resistance and application to building cladding, glass protection and mitigation of fire and explosion effects within buildings. 79. Research into consequence of total containment loss of fuel and other explosives in containments in ships, in ports, refineries and storage sites. 80. Identification of special risks of containments when in movement and storage of bulk fuels and gas within domestic retail outlets. 81. Development of monitoring techniques for sensing explosives in vehicles from a distance to create an additional buffer protection from suicide attacks. 82. Use of dogs and dolphins for identification of explosives. 83. Development of research on the application of extreme explosives under water and the use of water to enhance explosive effects.

92 Electronic/Digital and Communications 84. Develoament of systems for real time information flow in airuorts and in air traffic control systems on specific threats within the immediate environment of air traffic. 85. Development of information systems that allow registration and tracking of movements of fuels and other components of large explosive devices or of large quantities of explosive materials with automatic alerting . 86. Development of data flows of terrorist propaganda to identify patterns and modes of use of information system for purposes of recruitment, persuasion and distribution of information. 87. Analysis of data networks in real-time to identify flows or changes in patterns for pattern recognition of financial and information movements across networks to identify terrorists. 88. Development of crowd simulation data to identify smoke and explosion effects delivered in ways different to the assumptions used in original fire design protection of buildings. 89. Use of computer systems for development of footprints of buildings and collapse profiles of internal parts of buildings to pre-identify locations for survivors. 90. Use of engineering research on structural and ventilation characteristics of old and new buildings in domestic, business and government areas to determine potential shelter locations, evacuation routes and ventilation flows that may maximise survival. 91. Research into forms of communication that will reach people and decision makers under conditions of disruption of traditional networks from extreme explosives 92. Development of policies based on data analysis of vulnerabilities of critical information infrastructure. 93. Development of international policies on telecommunications and data management that minimise the potential disruptive effects of major attacks on critical components. 94. Development of simulation programmes for tracking and identifying potential design failures of telecommunications redundancy. 95. Development of unique methods of recognition of the origin of information for security and validity of content. 96. Use of mass media systems to design models for real time international risk information for governments, industry and the public to assist self defence in an attack and early identification of risks or specific threats. 97. Development of methods for data integrity checks for media and other mass information outlets. 98. SCADA vulnerability research to allow remote maintenance and access to systems without opening vulnerability to the system for attack . 99. Prevention of denial of service attacks and overwhelming of message systems such as emergency services. 100. Analysis of Al-Qaeda’s use of various mediums for communications to followers and the global public for transmission of messages, religious propaganda and threats

93 REFERENCES

’ Dr Sally Leivesley is Managing Director of Newrisk Limited, London. References cited withm the text may be supplemented through www.newrisk.com

’ CBRNE’ Weapons describe Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, extreme Explosives, Electronicidigital attacks, examples of which are provided in a paper, Nuclear Survival Criticalities, International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies, 29” Session: The Cultural Emergency Focus on Terrorism, 10-15 May 2003, “E. Majorana” Centre for Scientific Culture, World Scientific, Singapore, 2003, pp140-151 An example of the ongoing discussion between the scientific community and government on the role of science in counter terrorism research is the report of The Royal Society: Making the UK safer: detecting and decontaminating chemical and biological agents, Policy Document 06/04, April 2004, www.royalsoc.ac.uk. Rogo, A., Integral Protection in Madrid Metro: Operations, Security and Safety, ASIS Conference on International Security Management, 22-25 February, 2004 Madrid Spain. Unpublished observations on underground ventilation system training, A. Green and S. Leivesley, New South Wales State Rail 1999-2000 and unpublished research on an Australian above ground rail system to integrate catastrophic hazard management systems within train controls, S. Leivesley, 2002 S. Leivesley, Security of Critical Infrastructure: the nuclear industry, Alert, Journal of the Institute of Civil Defence and Disaster Studies, January 2003, pp5-6 describes the report of the Director of Civil Nuclear Security, October 200-March 2000 which describes a new procedure based on intelligence about the motives, intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries. It is designed to provide a definitive statement of the possible scale and methods of attack that could be faced at civil nuclear sites or when nuclear material is being transported. Information provided by Hazard Management Solutions, www. Hazard Management Solutions Limited on maritime risks covering Emergency Net News, March 2004 describing Maritime Threat Concerns Raised About Unexplained Scuba Divers At Several Locations; Maritime Threat Advisory including A diver, found dead, in the Hudson River near the Indian Point nuclear power plant (24 Feb 2004); 2. A diver, found dead, off John U. Lloyd State Park in Dania Beach, FL; 3. A diver, not located, but seen near a base in Honolulu Harbor 29 Feb 2004. Eurotunnel, The Channel Tunnel A Safety Case, 1994. loFailures in the risk analysis and response to the Channel Tunnel Fire are described in many reports including the official report of the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority, Inquiry into the Fire on Heavy (;loads Vehicle Shuttle 7529 on 18 November, 1996, May 1997. Seaman, J., Leivesley, S., and Hogg., C, Epidemiology of Disasters, Karger, Basel, 1984. S. Leivesley, Psychological Response to Disasters, in, J. Seaman et al, Epidemiology of Natural Disasters op.cit. Pp109-139. 13 Applications of the different risk dimensions to provide practical applications to business and emergency responders in: S. Leivesley, Global Business Continuity, Risk and Profit, Corporate Risk, 5;12, 1998, pp18-22; Business continuity under terrorist attack, World EOD Gazette, March 1998, 2:4,p.13-17. I4 R. Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda. Global Network of Terror, Hurst & Company, London, 2002. IsOsmium Tetroxide was identified as a focus of terrorist interest during arrests of persons in the United Kingdom in April 2004. This rare eaIth is an unusual but potentially powerful weapon for attacks which would be perpetrated in unusual ways. I6 Global leadership by international bodies such as the G8 was described in paper, Nuclear Survival Criticalities delivered to the 29“ Session, 2003, op.cit. S. Leivesley. ”BBC News data, 25 March, 2004. M. Ruthven, Suicide Attacks Implications and Approach, Weapons of Catastrophic Effect: Confronting the Threat, RUSI, 12-14 February 2003, Whitehall, London. I9 Sir John Stevens, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, London has made numerous public statements about the inevitability of an Al-Qaeda attack in the United Kingdom. These statements do not comment on the possible consequences of an attack but represent a process of alerting the public to the level of threat to the country.

’

FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM: PROSPECTS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST V. KRIVOKHIZHA The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, The Council of Federation, Moscow, Russia

As a student I happened to become acquainted with literature and memoirs on Russian terrorism of the 19" century. Historians consider that period to be the Russian Golden Age. In the context of terrorism, some realities of that prosperous time looked impressive and unexpected, especially from a student's fresh viewpoint. Now it is clear that the situation with terrorism is much the same. By its nature, the phenomenon of terrorism still consists, at first sight, of a combination of quite contradictory elements. The sphere of terrorism is like a pool in which a deep belief in one's own righteousness and an almost mystic trust in one's self to be a judge are allied with an instinct to kill and, quite often, with high moral motivation and principles. On the other hand, we can observe a readiness for self-sacrifice, a struggle between terrorist organizations and secret services and, simultaneously, the use of these same terrorist organizations by different state or political structures. They support organizations that are considered terrorist in one country and as freedom fighters and righteous opposition in another, etc. The scale of old time terrorism and contemporary terrorism (especially the technological aspect) varies. But, of course, almost every act of terror still produces a wide spectrum of feelings, the temptation to use fully or partly concomitant results (political, economic, financial, religious, cultural) or refrain from making a profit, and to cooperate with the victim state. Usually, it is also a mixture of provocative contradictions in people's minds as well as on official political levels. And that model of situation is regularly recurrent at these times. Let me give you a few brief illustrations. Having suppressed democracy in the ancient Hellenic city-states, Alexander the Great conquered the Persian Empire and, all of a sudden, discovered statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton in the ancient town of Susa. The statues of figures popular throughout Greece, who killed the tyrant of Athens, were taken off to Persia as a trophy of a previous war. As a gesture of honor, Alexander ordered the statues sent back to Athens. After the explosions in Madrid, a statement attributed to al-Qaida called for a halt to attacks on civilians in Spain until the new government in Madrid outlines its policy towards the Muslim world. The statement of the newly-elected socialist government regarding its intention to withdraw Spanish military troops from Iraq puzzled a few capitals on both sides of the Atlantic, but seems to have been accepted by terrorists as the right reading of the signal and adequate estimation of the situation. On the whole, the situation looks fairly clear. But, in fact, under a somewhat closer inspection, one inevitably faces a lot of so-called "gray areas": To start with, there was no known demand from the terrorists prior to the explosions. Among other things, it may indicate that the plan of attack was perfect because previously the socialist victory in the elections was, to some extent, unexpected: at least the question of cabinet members was open at that time. But the prevailing mood of public opinion, and the negative attitude of the socialists towards the Iraq war, was taken into consideration precisely. 94

95 Although a detailed analysis of the issue of the role of the mass media in the combat against today’s terrorism is beyond the scope of this paper, it is very important to keep in mind that there is a casual link between the coverage of terror, public opinion, domestic instability and plans of terrorism. For example, during the war against Iraq, there were more than 2 million visits to Al-Jazeera.net per day. The bombings in Madrid produced a lot of speculation that appeared on-line. But the authenticity of al-Qaida, despite a lot of references, could not be confirmed. As a matter of fact, the high priority of the topic of terrorism in mass media throughout the world, made politicians, as well as the public, ready for this programmed type of decision. It is one of the achievements of modem terrorism. In reality, the major stock market indexes of almost all the countries of the Atlantic community (Madrid General, Xetra DAX in Germany, FTSE 100 in Britain, Dow Jones, Stoxx 50 and Stoxx 600, Dutch AEX) dropped. In Europe, as in the USA, economists turned their eyes to the prospects for business activity, and not only in the tourist industry. France and Germany suspended certain Schengen regulations etc. In many aspects, the explosions in Madrid turned out to be a challenge to European integrity and Euro-Atlantic solidarity. And what is the difference between terrorism and international terrorism? There may be a lot of explanations. To my mind, the primary and most practical characteristic is the perception, by a group of countries, of any given radical organization as terrorists. Actually, it is also a crucial precondition for international cooperation. Contemporary terrorism has become an essential part of the strategy of a number of participants in international conflicts against the side that possesses warfare superiority. And that is important, as an asymmetric means of combat beyond the very temtory of military conflict, actually throughout the world against the interests of rival states or organizations. The examples of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kosovo, Chechnya, Palestine etc. prove the direct ties between military conflicts and terrorism, when a large number of highly-trained persons accustomed to violence are united, and the only form of existence for them is the constant participation in violent actions of different types. It is quite obvious that, after the military forces of one side are defeated, the continuation of quarrels may take the form of guerilla warfare and urban terrorism. That is why the restraint of predominantly military pressure during conflict situations may be another casual precondition to narrow the basis for a probable terror option in parallel with political, economic, social, religious and cultural instruments of influence and appeasement. To solve all the problems in the spheres of public life mentioned above is equal to changing the whole world drastically, which is impossible. But to destroy, or at least weaken, elements that are vital for terrorist activity is quite possible. Financial structures involved in sponsoring terrorism, or being used as channels of financial supply, have been identified over the years in almost all countries struggling with terrorism: among them Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, USA, Switzerland, etc. And this is only the tip of the iceberg. The sphere of finance is very delicate and for years attempts to cooperate in this field have mostly failed. But, on December llth,2003 in Mexico, a Convention concerning cooperation against corruption was signed and it may be considered as the first step in

96 the right direction, if only because the convention provides an opportunity to better control illegal financial traffic, parts of which are used by terrorists. Two more aspects of necessity for interstate cooperation: First, terrorist organizations today have created a world-wide network of funds, banks, companies and so on. The combination of terrorism with criminal activities like narco-business, illegal arms transfer, etc., has produced a phenomenon of global industry successfully incorporated into the world market. It means that such enterprises operate on many countries' territory and, on this basis, one may draw conclusions on the effectiveness of current intrastate cooperation to fight terrorism. Secondly, the real position may be more complicated and reveals a wide spectrum of attitudes toward terrorism other than just neutrality or the incapacity to cope with the problem effectively. The explanations may be different as well as political, social, historic and other reasons, but even in Europe, a few countries are traditionally known to sympathize with, or at least tolerate, radical movements and different types of organizations from foreign countries. Among the countries of that pattern of political culture, which traditionally grant asylum to outlaws from abroad, are Denmark, Holland and Great Britain, for instance. Moreover Britain is considered to be the country which, for centuries, produced the skill and experience to use foreign centers of opposition based on its territory to successfully solve problems abroad. So there are two ways to fight terrorism: by direct coercive means, and in combination with some "diplomatic" instruments if we are to speak about the rationality of interstate cooperation against international terrorism. Among the features of modem terrorism are its new forms of organization. During a long period of time, terrorist organizations took the form of integral hierarchical structures. More and more frequently, so-called "network" organizations of terrorist activity have been used recently. It is based on free, informal interaction of different "sub-systems'' (like guerrilla movements). Development of its horizontal ties allows the use of asymmetrical measures to fight them more subtly due to specific character of the place and time. In a case like that, the composition in members and persons supporting the terrorist organization indirectly turns out to be more diverse and terrorist attacks need not be planned and organized in a common center. With a common understanding of tasks concerning the enemy, different groups within the framework of the basic structure (that is, in fact, what Al-Qaida means) possess a free hand and independence. This is an important element of safety for such groups as well. Though almost every terrorist attack leaves an imprint of Al-Qaida, it is clear that, under such a loose form of cooperation, it is extremely difficult to confirm the responsibility of Al-Qaida (that is in the first place identified with Bin Laden) in different attacks. Again, the formulation of the information on the Al-Jazeera web site is extremely significant in this context. On March 18'h it published a statement saying: "Al-Qaida has called for a halt to attacks on civilians in Spain", because the new government in Madrid understands the reasons for the terrorist attacks and has already promised to withdraw Spanish forces and will not interfere in the policies of the Muslim world. At the same time, it mentioned that the authenticity of the statement could not be confirmed. The main task is to determine some reference-points that are crucial to the question of strengthening the basis of international cooperation to fight terrorism. Objective analysis of the difficulties that can impede cooperation is very important.

97 We can hardly expect positive results and real solidarity without overcoming these difficulties. Because of cultural and religious differences, and also judicial and ethical standards, terrorist attacks may be perceived in different ways. This fact also helps in understanding why there is still no universal method for fighting terrorism and no common definition of the term "terrorism". The definition of "international terrorism" should be coordinated with the understanding of "terrorism" as a whole and with the understanding of "state terrorism" (according to the experience of one country or another) in the legislation, which differs very much in different countries. That is why, for example, Irish organizations, that are considered terroristic in Great Britain, have funds in the USA; and French authorities have vainly tried to extradite persons from Great Britain that probably committed terrorist attacks in France. With situations like these in the European Union, within Europe, there is nothing strange that the imperfection or incompatibility of legal systems is boosted by political disagreements. For this reason, commanders of illegal Chechen terrorist organizations have money funds and may recruit soldiers in Europe and have access to the USA. On a whole, we can define a "terrorist act" as being an illegal, forcible action that is mostly meant to change one or another aspect of public or political life (for example, to change an official political course). And in the original, classical variant of meaning, "terror" should produce fear in society, horror that becomes a catalyst for the given processes. In countries where the influence of the church is remarkable, a religious factor may play an important role in forming the public's attitude to terror. On the other hand, terror never was a mass phenomenon, which is why its adherents, united in sects, may operate actively even in countries with low religious activity. We can also add that terror must not necessarily have ties with religion but, in cases where it happens, the fight is especially persistent and cruel. But it is very hard to define whether a terrorist attack was committed on a political or religious basis. Behind religious dogmatization, we can find political aims. For example, the idea of establishing Halifat in the Caucasus unites the financial support of Chechen separatists by Arab countries and the position of some European countries. Thus, the roots of Chechen separatism cannot be found in the Koran, and of course cannot have originated in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, traditions of Abraham's bloodline, but in mjuridizm and vahhabizm (supported, according to many experts, by the financial assistance of, for example, Saudi Arabia). But for many people it still looks like a religious-political movement, in the framework of Islam, under the slogan "sacred war" against crusaders. That is why even progress in the unification of legislation and the discovery of a common denominator to define the term "terrorism" do not mean that they can help to achieve a result. Different U.S. organizations have different definitions of "terrorism" according to their interests and field of operations. The CIA primarily outlines international participation to qualify terrorist acts as "international". The FBI talks about pressure on government, civilians or any other part of public life to obtain political or social goals. The definition of the US State Department is as follows: "it is premeditated, politically motivated violence of instate groups or secret agents of other countries against the country". Evidently, these nuances in definition do not hinder their activity and do not impinge on the coordination of their functions. One of the most interesting prospective fields for countering terrorism is the exchange of information. But in this field of cooperation not everything is clear and

98 evident. First of all, terrorist activity is deeply conspirational and also high professional today. To survive and work effectively, terrorists should recruit supporters in state organizations and especially in the secret services, police, etc. In connection with this apparently rather complicated situation, the problem of leaks arises in different aspects, because for instance, mutual positive exchanges of really important inside information depend not only on availability but also on a series of factors: The existence of "special" or at least real partner ties between countries, and we do not have many examples of this kind. Similarity of interests, because every country is mainly interested in the terrorist organizations that operate on its own territory and against its people. That is why the number of total concrete goals in the fight against terrorism is lower than the number of terrorist organizations. Some of them probably have links between each other but still it is extremely difficult for countries to unite their efforts in that direction. There is certain risk in revealing a source of information: the more powerful a terrorist organization is and the more effective its own system for collecting information - the more dangerous it is for state secret services. Incorrect interpretation of information: this poses a problem. After some correction of information, to hide its sources, doubt is cast on the information as a whole and on the expediency of cooperation. However exchange of information is useful, if only because you can see your own estimations and priorities critically. As international terrorism turns out to be a more and more complex phenomenon, the use of modem information technologies becomes essential. The feature of modem terrorism is connected with technical perfection, globalization, etc. Among new kinds of terrorism is cyber-terrorism, the main goal of which may not be political interests, but mostly economic ones. This circumstance once again outlines the difficulty of a correct definition of the term "terrorism". One really acute problem is the role of corruption and the damage it does to the joint struggle against terrorism and cooperation as a whole. It is presently not only a reality for modem Russia. We should determine the total usage of illegal sources from abroad by many financial institutes. And it is not only the problem of an imperfect legislature, but mostly the sphere of the execution of laws. Many countries would make serious changes if they realized that the crucial moment of the battle against terrorism is the destruction of its financial basis. Another extremely important sphere of cooperation is interaction in the fight against terrorists who use weapons of mass destruction. This problem has been discussed for 20 years and includes a large number of aspects: from the estimation of the probability of such terrorist attacks, their relative effectiveness and the cost of such attacks, to attempts to forecast what kind of WMD terrorists could use first and how to combat such a threat. Nowadays the view that terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction appears more realistic. The number of victims in the September 11th attacks is comparable with the use of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the motivation and limitations of international terrorism differ from domestic terrorism. Nuclear, chemical and bacteriological secrets are in the category of most classified. That is why there are certain limitations to the cooperation among the countries member of antiterrorist coalitions. It is well known that some Russian

99 experts are wary of Western initiatives in this field of cooperation, suspecting that it is not only an attempt to obtain some information but also an attempt to take control of scientific research and developments, over production industries, etc. Terrorism using weapon of mass destruction also includes so-called agro-bioterrorism, or purposeful damage to the agricultural sector to force an economic or financial crisis and raise social tension thereafter. It has some special features. In this way, between the perpetration of an attack and its results, a certain period of time may elapse. This makes it difficult to hamper sources and means of contamination of the ground, etc. Terrorism, causing large techno-genic catastrophes also has some special features. All this forms the sphere of special knowledge, decisions and options. A rather wide-spread system of bilateral and international instruments, and institutes of cooperation has been created. The World Health-protection Organization, engaged in finding the reasons for epidemics and in developing measures to fight them, has considerable experience. Specifically, this organization created systems to control epidemic situations, united in the global Alert and Response Network (ARN) and the Global Outbreak and Response Network (GOARN). In this connection the main task is, probably, not to create something new, but to adjust these mechanisms to cope with today’s challenges. It would be useful to organize interstate cooperation in the fight against terrorism, not only on the level of making global universal declarations and principles of legislature, but also on the level of the coordination of interregional efforts, for example, “Big 8”,League of Arab States, etc. Realizing the importance of coordinated multilateral efforts and universal solutions, it is necessary to underline that cooperation on a bilateral basis, carried out as a joint effort, looks more realistic from the viewpoint of today’s implementation.

100 UKRAINE AND PROBLEMS OF TERRORISM VALERY KUKHAR World Laboratory - Ukrainian Branch and National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine The period following September 11 is proof of the interdependence between national, regional and global security in modern civilization. As a result, not only have security priorities changed, but also the interpretation of the necessity for new approaches to security protection. Ukraine is a so-called "silent" state from the point of view of today's main terrorist targets. Also, Ukraine today has no reason or grounds for manifestations of a crisis that might induce terrorism in some areas of the state. But this present situation may change very quickly.

Ultraine is a frontier country between the Middle East and Europe, not far from the Balkan regions, the Caucasus and other "hot" spots of the world. Ukraine supported the joint antiterrorist coalition in Afghanistan and Iraq. We co-operate with the international community on anti-terrorist activities jointly with the UN, NATO and various regional organizations on a legal basis. This participation may mean that the Ukraine could become one of the new targets of terrorist actions, as demonstrated by the recent events in Spain.

101 The frontier position of Ukraine, with no "iron curtain" on its eastern border, allows the increased migration of populations from the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. There are numerous assigned risk objects on Ukrainian temtory: nuclear power plants, chemical plants, pipelines for gas, oil and chemicals, communications, etc. Besides the essential national systems, Ukraine is host to international pipelines used to transfer gas and oil from Russia and the Caspian region to Europe. We have started road construction for a trans-European highway network connecting Europe to Asia and Russia. Special attention to security is necessary for nuclear power plants, as the long-term consequences of an accident on a global scale were amply demonstrated by the Chernobyl catastrophe. All these factors produce growing anxiety about the possibility of terrorist acts occumng on Ukrainian national territory. And the growing numbers of terrorist actions in various countries over the last few months demonstrate the unpredictability of the near future. The problem of terrorism is considered to be among the government's top priorities. The first, and very serious problem of Ukraine is the permeability of the frontiers between FSU countries. This allows the illegal movement of human and natural resources, capital and illegal business - narcotics and weapons, for example. The absence of real borders in the Central Asia region gives free rein to the transfer of narcotics from Afghanistan to Russia and then on to Europe. The process of strengthening the Ukrainian borders is linked to unresolved problems regarding demarcations, delimitations and complicated negotiations with neighbouring countries extending over a long period of time. The new expansion of the European Union and NATO, with the application of strong measures along the western borders of Ukraine, has meant that the country has become an "accumulator" of migratory streams from the East that automatically increases the threat of the above-mentioned problems and creates grounds for terrorists. Our new Ukrainian Criminal Code has a special chapter on terrorist acts and a special "Law on the Fight against Terrorism". Our government has developed a "Programme of State Anti-terrorism Actions" for the years 2003-2006. The main objective of this Programme is to adapt national legislation to international criminal law in regards to this problem. In 1999, the President of Ukraine established a special anti-terrorist centre within the Security Service of the Ukraine. The "Law on the Fight against Terrorism" demands, first of all, the co-ordination of the Ukrainian executive agencies' actions for the prevention of terrorist acts and for the protection of those objects vital to the survival of the population. At government level, Ukraine acts in accordance with UN resolutions on the problem. The latest decision is the joint foundation of a virtual anti-terrorist centre with Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Ukraine collaborates with NATO and the EU on the Joint Plan of Action. Of course, Ukraine is a member of the Antiterrorist Organization of FSU countries. The first task of these various collaborative efforts is the determination of the channels of illegal migration, narcotics and weapons businesses. Ukraine has a special programme to block the financial assets of those persons connected to terrorists. Recently we have organized numerous training programmes devoted to the co-ordination of the various divisions involved in antiterrorist actions, e.g. - the physical security of the NPP, anti-terrorist actions in railway stations or metros. There are a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements aimed at collaboration in anti-terrorist actions, exchange of information, etc. Moreover, in the area of chemical and bioterrorism, we try to collaborate with other countries in order to obtain the necessary control and information on these current topics. In this

102 direction, in my opinion, it is very important to sign bilateral agreements with other states on the exchange of confidential information and collaboration between security services. These documents will open a door for early information about possible actions. But all the actions described above will not provide complete protection against terrorists, and the occurrences in other, less vulnerable and more prepared countries have shown the weaknesses of national security systems. The reality is more complicated. Obviously, terrorists try to learn all the details of a protection system and to discover its weakest areas. In real life, there are numerous instances of lack of coordination between various services in a society and, in addition, "background noise" complicated by internal extremism without real danger - for example, telephones calls to say that mines have been placed in railway stations or schools. Unfortunately, these cases are becoming more and more frequent in my country. The transition period in Ukraine, from the former power's hard regime to a democracy, has caused a certain loss of control over the safety of some objects. For example, in rural areas we see dilapidated storage facilities containing obsolete pesticides that no longer have a responsible owner. We need to revise and rebuild the old security systems of numerous chemical plants and industrial chemicals users. In my opinion, we have poor control over the security of the water supply network. Of course, the problem of control over vital networks, such as public transportation and water supply, is complicated in general. Today, we are confronted with the need to activate all our scientific and technical efforts to develop new techniques and procedures to control weapons, dangerous chemicals and biomaterials. We need new, modem, technical control installations for our borders and custom services, for public areas, etc., to protect materials in transit. To accomplish this, remote control detectors are very important tools. Of course, the information about new control techniques, security systems and other safety-related data cannot be made available to the general public, as terrorists could use this data. We must create a new regime of relationships with the mass media and the public, specialists in the communication of these topics and a new code of ethics. Basically, the same approach used by international and national organizations in relation to bioethics. In a new democratic climate and open society, we have to return to some degree of confidentiality and classification of data, based, of course, on the new vision. I am sure of the necessity of bilateral and multilateral agreements between special services for urgent assistance in the case of the detection of unknown substances or biomaterials in order to identify the substances, and to undertake the necessary safety measures, to inform on probable routes and destinations of illegal transfers. Of course, through agreements on the exchange of confidential information, it is possible to organize an interchange about new substances and materials including countermeasures, which could be used by terrorists. In my opinion, we must use the mechanisms of chemical and biological weapons conventions and increase mutual collaboration about these tools for cases of terrorism. Another problem for modem science and technology, scientists and designers, is the so-called "ethic of science". In many cases, new discoveries in pure science, and new successes in technology, yield both new improvements for life and new negative problems - sometimes dangerous for people. The best examples are agrochemicals, nuclear power, problems with genetically modified plants, etc. Each scientist must begin to think about the possible negative consequences of their research. Before

103 releasing new findings to the general public, the scientist should envisage all aspects of the question. Science can help by pinpointing new, potential breeding-grounds of terrorism. For example, today, computer science is a very powerful tool for understanding the very complicated interactions between bioactive substrates and biomolecules. With powerful computers we can predict, with some limitations of course, the weather on both a global and a regional level. I think that a similar approach could usefully be applied to the problem. It is possible to collect and combine all the known data on specific "hot-beds of terrorists", including their level and style of life, national and natural peculiarities, type of power and organization, cultural and religious principles, etc, On this basis, by stochastic modelling, it is possible to develop a type of "picture" of the general conditions that lead to terrorism. This model may be very useful in evaluating the situation of some groups of the population, or some regions presenting signs of a crisis that could lead to terrorist acts. The comparative analysis of such models could also give some insight into the necessary steps, actions and measures to improve a situation and prevent the rise of terrorism. In the last decade, we have seen the diffusion of "media-information terrorism". On both sides, terrorists and mass media depend upon one another, as one expert on terrorism mentioned. Terrorists have effectively learnt to use the natural willingness of the mass media to find the latest and most exclusive information to place before the public. The continuous flow of information about terrorist actions is used by the terrorists to engender an atmosphere of fear. On the other hand, this information induces negative feelings in the public towards specific groups of people or nations and, thereby, provokes nationalism. I understand the complexity of the information problem, but I believe that journalists and psychologists can solve the problem jointly and propose models for rules of conduct for information presentation. Mass media is well known as a powerful instrument for influencing people, and terrorists use it also. At the beginning of the 21'' century we came face to face with the very grave problem of terrorism, and we need a serious and primarily scientific analysis of the situation and scientifically based solutions.

SAFETY ASPECTS OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS

HILTMAR SCHUBERT Fraunhofer Institute ICT, Pfinztal, Germany ABSTRACT Asymmetric threats, as a new type of war, will in future increase the risk of large disasters, thus also endangering the human being by burdening the environment. We have observed, after the end of the “cold war”, a change of strategies from symmetrical conflicts between countries, which follow the Geneva Convention to a large extent, to asymmetric conflicts, which happen between governments and pressure groups, “people’s movements’’ andor groups who fight for or against religious/economic conditions or for independence. Contrary to symmetrical wars, where the end of a conflict is settled by some sort of peace agreement between governments, an asymmetrical conflict will last until the reasons become obsolete or until circumstances have changed. Sometimes such conflicts do not come to a final end, because no legal proponent is able to act for such groups. This paper describes the different threats of asymmetric conflicts to the environment including the safeguarding of the population. Preventive measures are of special importance in these areas of conflicts. INTRODUCTION After the end of the “cold war” period, one could observe local, regional or ethnical confrontations and clashes with different types of conflict patterns. From socalled symmetrical wars between forces of states or nations, largely regulated by the Geneva War Convention, there is currently a shift towards asymmetric conflicts, fought between governmental forces on one side and on the other, non-regular forces of ill-defined “people movements” or ethnical or social groups, who fight against or on behalf of religious ideas, economic reasons, for “liberation” or just against the paradigms of modern societies. There is a flowing transition between “normal” wars, independence fights, cultural clashes and simple terrorist attacks. These conflicts are also a special threat for peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions of the United Nations or NATO. Contrary to symmetrical wars, where the end of the battle could be clearly defined by formal statements such as a ceasefire agreement or a surrender statement followed by a peace agreement, an asymmetrical conflict typically could last for an indefinitely long period. Until the reasons of the conflict become obsolete or until circumstances have changed (such as the capture or defeat of all the aggressors), peace cannot be expected. Sometimes such conflicts do not end, because no legal representative is able to act on behalf of such groups. This paper describes the various threats of asymmetric conflicts to the environment and to human beings. Appropriate countenneasures for environmental protection, including the safeguarding the population, are discussed. Preventive measures are of special importance in these special war theatres as, for instance: Avoidance of assaults caused by explosives, chemical warfare and other means; 0 Safeguarding of energy, water and nutrition supply as well as the protection of traffic, communication and normal social life. 104

105 Not only new political and military capabilities including, for example, the socalled Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) have to be developed, but also strategies for conflict management, diplomatic actions, environmental protection and sustainable development. Enhanced requirements also affect the proper design of defence hardware including service life and reliability under severe environmental conditions. This paper will highlight an entire approach to asymmetric conflicts and some of the related technical questions from the European point of view.

THE OPPONENTS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS The attempt to define the large spectrum of opponents of asymmetric conflicts will meet large difficulties, because these definitions are strongly influenced by the political positions involved. For instance, there is no agreement in the United Nations about the definition of terrorism. The spectrum will range from terrorist to freedomfighter. But to fight against these groups, and to protect ourselves, we must know about their different aims and behaviour patterns. Being very much involved in the area of counter-terrorism my conclusion is: Do not fight only against the symptoms, but consider the reasons why we are increasingly confronted with this situation and draw conclusions. There may be some differences between the opinions of the “Old Europeans” and the Bush Regime. When considering terrorists, we can distinguish between the following categories: Militant terrorists These terrorists have a distinct aim. for instance to fight for “freedom” or independency and against foreign occupation of their country. Their methods include causing disasters, assaults, taking hostages, etc. All actions are aimed at convincing their counterparts to change their political attitude. Behind the actors there is usually a well-organized group with militant capabilities and, in most cases, supported by highly educated persons with special knowledge of our level of science. Besides these groups with very distinct aims, other organizations participate in worldwide actions to make their counterpart - national governments - insecure by terrorizing their people. Their motives are connected with religious background, antiglobalization or worldwide “imperialistic” economic or political influences. Militant terrorists look for high-visibility public effect, with as many victims as possible, in all their actions. We observe regional conflicts by militant groups against foreign occupants aimed at destabilizing their situation (Partisans during World War 11). A new version of this, to achieve this aim of political instability, is to attack their own people.

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Terror-“Free-riders’’ Motivated by militant terrorist actions, people who are against political situations in their country, want to destabilize existing circumstances. These are very often individuals who have a wrong-minded attitude or people who were unfairly treated by the authorities.

106 In most cases, they are loners or small action groups with little professional knowledge. Their actions may occur without warning, between false warnings, or with warning. The aim in all cases is an action creating as much publicity as possible. Militant Demonstration Groups Actions by such militant demonstration groups against security police, members of the occupying power and other authorities may be also dangerous for the environment. The aims of these groups are the destabilization of the current regime or the prevention of specific actions of their security organisation. Counter-measures against such demonstrations will be not discussed in this paper. These measures are, for instance, “Non-Lethal Weapons”, and should be used with great care to protect the environment. THE IMPACT OF THE ENVIRONMENT Explosions Since the invention of energetic materials, techniques have been developed using explosives for the destruction of places and people. These materials are relatively easy to transport, safe to handle and deliver a high amount of energy within a local area at a specific time. This is why energetic material will be used in most cases connected with asymmetric conflicts. Common high explosives detonate with a velocity of 5-9.000 m/s and create a high-pressure wave and heat-destroying capacity affecting the surroundings, depending on the size and shape, performance and confinement of the explosive charge. Improvised explosives like gun- or smokeless powders or similar materials are not generally easy to detonate, but can cause large disasters and injuries. These explosive materials will be placed in metallic containers. The ignition of these confined explosives will create great pressure and the subsequent explosion will cause pressure waves and fragments. The effect on objects depends on the distance, direction of the pressure wave and resistance of the structure. We must admit that militant terrorists have sufficient knowledge about the behaviour of energetic materials, how to handle and how to prepare explosive charges with the various possibilities of composition. Beside literature on the subject, there is also the internet where information on how to prepare explosives and recipes for terrorist usage can be found. We know also that there are scientists supporting the terrorists who have the same knowledge that we have. There are different sources for explosive materials: Military explosives as materials or in the munitions itself; Commercial explosives; Commercial substances suitable as explosives; Improvised explosives; Primary explosives; Powder trains (pyrotechnic materials for ignition of combustible material); Explosives used to disperse dangerous materials (toxic substances). To cause large disasters for terrorist purposes, combustible materials in large dispersion (by accident or by powder trains) can react with air to produce deflagration

107 or fast burning, also creating pressure waves and heat. (A typical example would be Sept. 1lth.) We also know from past experience, that in sabotage actions, combustible materials (both liquid and solid) are used in combination with powder trains, incendiaries and time fuses. Sometimes forest fires are initiated by criminal action. The best way to avoid these disasters is to prevent the transport of explosive materials to the scene of the crime. Detection of Explosive Materials and Charges Extensive R&D actions are known and workshops were organized in the past to fulfil the aim of detection as completely as possible. The following scenarios should be considered: 0 Control of luggage, people, transport units; 0 Search for terrorist bombs; 0 Discover suicide bombers. Beside trained dogs, a large number of technologies are known from the point of research. Examples are: X-ray systems, Neutron techniques, Neutron and gamma backscattering, Nuclear quadrupol resonance, including remote NQR, Sub-surface radars, Microwave scanners, Laser-induced spectroscopy, Acoustic sensors, etc. Only a few of these methods are commercially available, X-ray systems for instance. Experiments have shown that 100% screening is not possible and more R&D is necessary, especially for mobile sensors and sensors as a stand-off measure. Distribution of Chemical Toxic Agents The impact on the environment means the injury to human health and the infrastructure. The substances terrorists are likely to use are those we know from military training and application. But several factors limit the use of these agents by terrorists. These are the dangers of producing and storing these substances and problems of the dispersion of liquid droplets without military munitions. Beside these agents, there are also other substances produced by the chemical industry for commercial use, which are used in improvised systems by terrorists. These “soft” chemicals are irritants, choking agents, flammable industry gases, water-supply contaminants, asphyxiates, blister agents and pesticides. IdentiJication of agents, mitigation or prevention of hazards Information about identification and detailed acute hazards can be obtained from environmental protection agencies and safety data sheets. To mitigate or prevent hazards, medical management guidelines are available. The probability of usage of chemical warfare agents by terrorists will be much lower than the probability of usage of improvised agents, because in industrial countries they are available everywhere. Many emergency responders must be aware of the magnitude of the threat. Additional efforts by security experts are necessary to insure that these threats are identified, and that attacks are mitigated or prevented from occurring. The Threat of Bioterrorism In principle, food may be contaminated by pathogens and toxins, but the number of victims will be limited. A larger radius of action will be possible by airborne

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attacks. The formulation and production of those substances suitable for airborne distribution is difficult. For this distribution the pathogens and toxins must be suspended in formulations for storage and attack. A specific formulation is required for every technique of application. The materials will loose their virulence or toxicity during storage, transport and spraying which can take days or weeks. Also the distribution is difficult, because the material tends to clump. The exposure to environmental stresses (W light and exsiccation) will kill or inactivate the material. Based on these experiences, the probability of airborne attacks of pathogens and toxins by terrorists will be very low, also in the next years. Nevertheless a detection and surveying system of suspicious and unusual disease outbreaks should be established, which can also be used outside counter-terrorism. Environmental Impacts by Nuclear Materials Safety aspects and the impact on the environment of nuclear reactors, transportation of nuclear fuel and storage of high-level radioactive waste have been considered since nuclear energy has been produced, that means over the last 60 years. Protection against the misuse of nuclear materials was begun from the outset of nuclear technology and has increased as a consequence of terrorism, but the discussion of all these problems would exceed the frame of this paper. Security Assessment of Public Energy and Water Supplies Human existence depends essentially on energy and water supply. Therefore an interruption of this supply would cause the collapse of the infrastructure of cities or public centres, traffic, households etc. In addition, in many cases, environmental conditions would suffer from an energy and water supply interruption. Therefore the public can be blackmailed by such terrorist actions. The energy and water supply network is very sensitive to possible attacks because not all critical points can be safeguarded. A protection against such disasters may be a redundant supply, which would also be very helpful on other occasions (“America in the dark”). Securitv Assessment of Traffic. Transport and Public Agglomerations The aim of terrorists is to produce large effects, causing casualties andor great damage by explosives or other weapons systems. Therefore places for attack are places with a high accumulation of people, such as: Railway stations, shopping centres, theatres etc. or fast public transport units, which are very sensitive to attack; Airplanes, trains, buses etc. One countermeasure is the screening of people and their luggage. A typical example is the control at airports. These control units have been improved recently by networking different sensor systems. Terrorists have to transport their energetic or poisonous materials, weapons, or other items to the place of their attack. The ultimate aim is the prevention of a terrorist action. Therefore control of transport is very important. Because of the high volume of goods transported, screening must be accelerated by sophisticated control mechanisms capable of networking different sensor techniques; the old proven method using trained dogs is very helpful but will be insufficient in future.

109 An urgent task for research will be the screening of shipping containers. As I am informed, only 3-5% of the 16 million shipping containers entering the US per year are controlled. Here is a gap, which must be closed very soon. The problem is to control items by stand-off measurements.

CONCLUSION Asymmetric conflicts follow other rules than symmetrical wars. They are much more complicated in both technical and psychological respects. Therefore the consideration of the safety aspects of asymmetrical threats and their environmental impact requires an analysis of the motives and motions of terrorists as a prerequisite to estimate the specific dangers for setting priorities. This consideration also includes questions about why and how terrorists think. This intellectual approach avoids fighting only the symptoms and will help to remove the causes of terrorism. This approach will help us to avoid the danger of producing terrorists by fighting them. The “Old European”, who has a long, historical background dealing with the question “How much security is enough”, will act much more cautiously and with less emotion than the government of the USA. Because of previous bad experiences, the Europeans are very careful not to submerge a foreign country’s culture or thinking. The best way to protect the environment and people against illicit actions with dangerous materials is the control of transport by scientific methods of detection and the safeguard of all sensitive points of infrastructures and methods of redundant supply. September 11 was a terrible event and certainly, the USA has all our sympathy, but the older people in Europe experienced such events frequently during World War 11. This may be why we have a less emotional approach to this event. Consequently, you may understand why the US “National Strategy for Homeland Security” with such a huge budget raises our concern. The reason is not the money - the USA is a very rich country and can afford such expenses - the reason is the dramatic public effort, which influences the thinking of the people. My concern is a matter of mentality. Fighting for keedom and democracy in the world is a very honourable task, but should be balanced by maintaining liberal democracy for the country’s own people. The Europeans regard the USA as “God’s own free country”, and this should also endure for the future!

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM: HISTORY

LESSONS FROM

MARK WHEELIS University of California, Davis, USA Terrorism using chemical or biological weapons has a sparse history, despite the immense amount of attention the issue has received recently. In particular, the type of chemical and biological weapons terrorism of greatest concern today-use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) to cause mass casualties-has only been attempted a handful of times. NSTANCES OF TERRORIST USE OF CBW SINCE WWII For CW, only two serious attempts have occurred. In 1946, a group of Jewish holocaust survivors known as Avenging Israel's Blood (known also by its Hebrew acronym DIN), plotted to kill tens of thousands of German civilians by poisoning municipal water supplies, in retribution for civilian complicity in the holocaust. This plan proved technically and politically difficult, and they turned instead to a back-up plan that targeted Nazi war criminals. To this end, they infiltrated the bakery in a U S . prison camp near Nuremberg, Germany, and treated several thousand loaves of bread with arsenic. They successfully poisoned more than two thousand inmates, about 200 of whom were seriously enough ill to be hospitalized, but there were apparently no fatalities. More recently, in 1994 and 1995, the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo used nerve agents in several attacks in Japan. The most serious ones involved the release of sarin in Matsumoto (7 people killed and over 100 injured) and in the Tokyo subway at rush hour (12 killed and hundreds injured). The intent of the first attack was to disrupt a trial whose verdict was expected to go against A m ; the intent of the second was primarily to distract police from their investigation of A m . A secondary goal was to provoke an acapolypse that the sect predicted, in which the world would be consumed and only Aum members would survive. The first attack was successful in delaying the verdicts, as the judges were among the injured; the second achieved neither of its goals, and the police shut down Aum shortly afterwards. Although the results of the Tokyo subway attacks were devastating, they could have been much worse. Aum had destroyed its major sarin stockpile in anticipation of police raids, and when they decided, on short notice, to attack the subway, they could only make a small amount of quite impure agent. Had they used, rather than destroying, their much larger and more highly refined stockpile, the death toll would likely have been in the thousands. For BW also, only two serious efforts are known for certain. One series of attacks was by Aum Shinrikyo, the same Japanese sect that used Sarin in Matsumoto and Tokyo. Prior to its use of nerve agent, the Aum tried to release anthrax spores or Botulinum toxin in numerous locations in and around Tokyo, from 1991 to 1995. Their most serious attempt was the release of thousands of liters of an anthrax culture in aerosol form from the roof of their Tokyo headquarters, which was clearly intended to cause tens of thousands of fatalities. None of the attacks was successful. Aum failed to obtain lethal

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111 agents: their botulinum toxin preparation was harmless (probably they failed to isolate a toxigenic Clostridium botulinum), and their strain of Bacillus anthracis was an avirulent vaccine strain. They were also unable to prepare the botulinum toxin or anthrax spores in an effective weapons formulation, and they appear not to have been able to disseminate them in a way that would cause disease even if their agents had been lethal. For instance, the anthrax aerosol released from their Tokyo headquarters consisted of droplets far too large to be inhaled deeply into the respiratory tract, a necessary first step in anthrax infection of the lungs. A decade earlier, in 1984, another religious sect, this one led by Bagwan Shree Rajneesh, used Salmonella to attack The Dalles, Oregon (USA) - apparently without their leader's knowledge. The attack involved spreading the Salmonella culture on foods at restaurant salad bars, and was spectacularly successful. Public health authorities identified over 750 cases of salmonellosis, of whom 45 were hospitalized (none died). However, given the historical under-reporting of salmonellosis, it is likely that there were actually several thousand cases. The attack was a trial run to see if it would be possible to disrupt local elections sufficiently to affect the outcome. In the end, the intended attack at election time was not implemented because it became obvious that favorable election results were impossible in any case. In addition to these events, the 2001 release of anthrax spores through the U.S. mail, which killed 5 people and sickened another 16, may constitute a third instance of bioterrorism. Since the perpetrator and motive are unknown, it is not clear whether this was a criminal or terrorist act. The anthrax spore preparation used was of very high quality, equivalent to the best weaponized preparations of former offensive BW programs of any nation. The number of casualties was so low only because each anthrax letter was identified as containing anthrax, which caused most potential victims to be placed on prophylactic antibiotic treatment, greatly limiting the number of cases. Each letter also contained a macroscopically visible mass of powder, and the comers were taped shut. These precautions suggest that the intent was not to cause fatalities, but rather to provoke concern or to test a theory. The attacks are widely thought to be the work of a domestic individual who is a current or former employee of the U.S. biodefense program, or of a civilian contractor to it, with access to classified BW records. Whether criminal or terrorist, they are significant in that they hint at the potential should this level of expertise become available to terrorist groups interested in causing mass casualties. There is no doubt that the same quantity of this high-quality spore preparation could have caused hundreds, possibly thousands, of casualties had there been a serious intent to do so. There have also been a significant number of recent instances in which terrorist groups have been suspected of intending to use cyanide or ricin to mount an attack. It is unlikely that such agents in terrorist hands would achieve mass casualties; both agents have been rejected by state bioweapon programs because they make poor biological weapons in the gas or aerosol state. Nevertheless, they could indeed cause deaths, widespread terror, and substantial social disruption, and the evidence of terrorist intent to use them must be taken with the utmost seriousness.

112 LESSONS FROM THE HISTORICAL RECORD Given this very sparse record, it is audacious, bordering on recklessness, to attempt to draw any lessons. The sparseness itself, and the small number of resulting fatalities, would suggest that the threat is significantly less severe than commonly assessed. However, it could be dangerous to place much confidence in such a conclusion; the great amount of attention the threat has received, plus the large amount of technical information about the nature of the agents and about dissemination methods that has appeared in the press, probably have markedly increased the likelihood of future successful use of these weapons. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the extraordinary concern about bioterrorism that has characterized the last decade is misplaced. It has been sparked not by a rational threat analysis, but by worst-case scenarios that assume that terrorist groups are on the verge of developing the capability to deliver a military-style aerosol biological attack. There is no evidence that any terrorist group is within a decade of such a capability, and the failure of Aum to come even close to developing effective BW, despite their lavish funding (millions of dollars were spent on their weapons programs) and the high educational level of many of their members, is consistent with this. However, this assessment could change quite quickly if a terrorist group were able to recruit technical experts with knowledge comparable to that of the perpetrator of the anthrax letter attacks. This suggests that steps to prevent the terrorist recruitment of technical experts knowledgeable about weaponization and dissemination of BW agents is critically important. It further suggests that countries should be extremely cautious in incorporating into their bio-defense programs elements that will train additional personnel in offensive BW development. This difficulty in successfully weaponizing existing biological agents also suggests that the current anxiety about possible terrorist abuses of genetic engineering and cuttingedge biology is misplaced. There is no reason to prevent open dissemination of scientific and medical results because of concerns about terrorist misuse of the information. It may be that the information could be used by some countries that are attempting to develop a covert BW capability in contravention of the Biological Weapons Convention, so to the extent that such proliferation is considered a problem (and there is room for doubt that it is), some restrictions on publication of sensitive information may be indicated. But such restriction certainly is not indicated by the commonly stated concern about terrorist use of the information. In contrast to A m , the success of the Rajneesh in causing what were probably well over 1000 cases of salmonellosis by the simple expedient of contaminating salad bars with crude microbial cultures suggests a very different, and more disturbing scenario. The Rajneesh deliberately chose an agent with intrinsically low mortality; however, there are some lethal agents that could be disseminated by the same route, and the prospects for a successful mass-casualty attack by this route may be considerably higher than by the aerosol route. Probably the most effective measure countries could take would be to ban self-service restaurant facilities, as these are, by a large margin, the most vulnerable to such attack (food purchased in markets is commonly washed or cooked). The threat from chemical agents shows some similarities to the BW threat, but important differences. As with anthrax spores, the most accessible agents do not easily

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lend themselves to mass-casualty aerosol distribution, but some may be effectively distributed by food contamination, as demonstrated more than 50 years ago by DIN. Unlike their efforts to create effective bioweapons, Aum was able to develop an industrial-scale synthetic capability for sarin (and they succeeded in synthesizing smaller quantities of several other nerve agents). This success, in only two years of effort, suggests that a similar capability may be within the reach of other terrorist groups. Measures to prevent this should be a high priority, perhaps focusing on reducing access to the chemical equipment, protective gear, and chemical compounds necessary to produce significant quantities of nerve agents. Further reading: a good scholarly, but readable, account of the history of CB terrorism is Jonathan B. Tucker (editor), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press (Cambridge Massachusetts, and London), 2000.

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4.

CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, MEDIA INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION

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DANSE MACABRE: TERRORISM AND WESTERN MEDIA MICHAEL STUERMER Chief Correspondent DIE WELT, Berlin, Germany

I remember 9/11, early afternoon in Berlin. In the office, we always keep the TV screens turned on, especially for real time news. For a few minutes, what was happening on the screen looked like an action film in poor taste until I decided that it was reality TV, live from Downtown Manhattan. As a film, it would have been over the top, and soon forgotten. In reality, it was world history happening in front of our eyes. Suddenly, the in-between period, no longer Cold War and not yet the end of history, Fukuyama style, the decade of indecision was over and a new chapter of history was taking shape. Will future historians call it the age of terrorism, or the age of the clash of civilisations, or the war of the Arab succession, or the slow death of the Atlantic Alliance? We don’t know yet. It ultimately depends on our own actions. Perhaps it is just the age of spin and television, with some unwelcome real-life surprises thrown in from time to time. But before we proceed, imagine for a moment that on that fateful September morning TV networks, instead of reporting live to America and the world. would have, against their instinct, immediately self-censored the pictures, played down the impact and stated that America needed nothing more than allies around the globe. Later on, instead of declaring war on terrorism, the U.S. President, in the British manner, would have talked of an emergency and invited all and sundry to join America in a concerted effort, adding: “Who is not against us is for us”. That would have given the time to find out that the suicide terrorists aimed not only at America the protector, but also at some of the Arab regimes as America’s proteges. It would also have allowed to weigh very carefully NATO’s expressed willingness to join the fight after having invoked Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty. The guiding idea was that America was in deadly crisis but that U.S. forces were up to any challenge, allies had only nuisance value, and the clash of civilisations had dawned. A brief look at Clausewitz would have reminded policy makers that war should never be anything but the continuation of political intercourse by other means. Spin is not everything, but in today’s mass politics it is the instrument of choice to produce what subsequently passes for reality, in the arts as much as in politics. The medium is not the message. but it is the most potent carrier of a message which most of the medium-makers fail to understand. Everybody has seen the grisly Faludjah pictures of the four U.S. contractors that were ambushed and mutilated. Is it not strange that immediately a TV camera was at hand, filming, among other scenes, an Arab boy brandishing a poster “Faludjah graveyard of America”. The TV camera acted as a silent accomplice in the bloody drama and was certainly a beneficiary. Terror and the media - not only in the West but also more and more in the Arab world are in a danse macabre with each other. This strange relationship is not a superficial one but inherent in both apocalyptic global terror and the modern mass media, above all TV and the Internet, but also, for the longer term, the print media. But remember what Senator McCain said about the recent torture pictures from Abu Ghraib: “One picture says more than a thousand words”. Authentic or not, staged or honestly reported, pictures have an immediate emotional impact while words take longer to travel. And do not forget that the Ayatollah Khomeini staged the Iranian revolution with the help of mass produced little tapes thrown into a society ripe with Islamist upheaval against the Shah’s white revolution. ~

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Let me, for brevity’s sake, make half a dozen points that should explain in more detail what 1am trying to convey. 1. Apocalyptic terrorism, as opposed to the conventional variety, is asymmetric warfare aiming at more than the destruction of symbols and massive bloodshed. In fact it seeks political shock and long-term upheaval or a tactical U-Turn - the Madrid syndrome - in fact victory of the weak over the strong. Thus it qualifies as a privatized form of warfare, representing not a movement, a party, let alone a state, not even a failed one. Terrorism is, in fact, anti-state as the Saudis are learning to their chagrin and as many more Arab states, now hardly hiding their Schadenfreude at America’s humiliation, will soon come to realize. What works against the mighty Israelis and the even mightier U.S. will surely deliver victory over unpopular Arab regimes. There is a lot of future in the terror-business based on past performance, none greater than the Archduke’s murder in 1914 which unleashed the Great War and the attack on the WTC and the Pentagon in 2001 which, with little investment, brought a global recession, changed the course of U.S. policy, divided NATO allies and changed the global equation. 2. But the impact on dictatorships in control of the media tends to be limited. By contrast, open societies are highly complex and their vulnerability almost unlimited. The open society offers its enemies not only the weaponry but also the opportunities to destroy it. Moreover, the addiction to the mass media and the constant excitement that they engender do not invite an approach that could be described as cool, calm and collected.

3. What can be done? The answer seems simple, but it is not. Root causes are often cited in a collective homage to political correctness. But this is not only a vast and fairly unspecific programme but also unlikely to work in the short run, say the time of one generation of disaffected young men. And, by the way, what are root causes? Poverty? When you look at Bin Laden’s millions, my heart is not bleeding. Is it the Israeli-Arab conflict? Even without the Jewish State, the Arabs would have an ample supply of conflicts, both internal and external. Is it the absence of democratic freedoms? The terrorists are not complaining about suppression but about alienation, treachery of their rulers and their high living. We must be careful not to preach solutions that do not even work in the industrial democracies to a civilisation that is different in reality and in its own self-perception. The most likely interpretation is still that the war on America and the West is superimposed on a latent Arab civil war, especially in Saudi Arabia. Religion plays a role, but as a force multiplier rather than as the cause of causes. To grab oil and money, if you want to recruit young idealists to kill themselves, is not high sounding enough. There has never been such a thing as a religious war pure and simple. Religion was always mixed up with all kinds of more mundane motives - nothing new under the sun.

4. What strategy? Inform the population in time about risks and chances, without going over the top and creating panic. Control information as far as it is decently possible and make the media your partners and allies, handling an emergency without stifling free reporting. Don’t panic, create confidence. 5. You cannot work against the media but only with them. We are living in the age of 24/7 information, practically worldwide, real time. It is the media that define

119 what passes for reality in political and psychological terms. The media are not merely a mirror or a projection screen, much as presidents and CEOs would like to have it, but an autonomous dimension. Some parts of the media are part of a demand-driven market economy. Others are institutions like the church in olden times, with the right to levy their own taxes and spend them almost uncontrolled. The BBC is a case in point, so are the German public networks. Supervision is largely ineffective, and so is self-control. Vanity, fierce competition, eccentricity and sensationalism carry their rewards both materially and psychologically. 6. Terror has haunted societies before, and religion has mobilised disaffected masses. But this time around, no deja vu is on offer. The combination of global reach and local touch, the leverage offered by modern technology, from hijacking planes to detonating a dirty bomb, is truly infinite. The open society has, by definition, neither walls nor gates. Add to this the more ancient techniques of religious mobilisation and asymmetric warfare and you have a new equation between the terrorist and the modern state system. In this, the media have a key role to play not only as unwitting carriers of the terrorist message but also as the key means of communication and consensus in a free society. Deprive the terrorist as much as you can of the chance to get his message across. But when all is said and done, and terror strikes regardless, no message may be more important than the stiff upper lip approach.

PREPAREDNESS CHALLENGES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL

AMY E. SMITHSON, PHD, Senior Fellow, CSIS, Washington, USA In this day and age, downplaying the threat of terrorism is ill-advised. Although the number of terrorist acts has declined, the tenor of terrorism has become more ominous in the last decade or so as the number of attacks inflicting mass casualties has increased.’ The problem of terrorism can be divided into “before” and “after” categories. The before dimension revolves around understanding the causes of terrorism, estimating its risks, and putting policies and programs in place to address the root causes of terrorism and to prevent or mitigate attacks. The after dimension involves crafting appropriate mechanisms to respond once an attack has taken place. Those who respond daily to emergencies large and small - police, firefighters, paramedics, nurses, physicians, public health officials, and emergency managers - are among the best qualified to provide counsel about the policies, procedures, and technologies that would put them in the strongest position to contend with terrorist attacks. Whether the cause is manmade or natural, when disaster strikes, front-line responders will emphasize swift, coordinated, and effective efforts to save lives and limit damage to property and the overall well being of their community. In the event of a terrorist attack, state and national response assets will probably arrive on the scene at some point, but a terrorist attack first and foremost wreaks havoc with lives and property locally. Hence the saying, all emergencies are local. Responders who are there when an attack occurs may receive some help from neighboring jurisdictions in the early hours after the attack, but will otherwise be on their own for at least a day or two, perhaps longer, before significant national rescue and recovery assets can be mobilized and deployed. Thus, the existing capabilities, most common gaps in those capabilities, and the most prominent needs of local responders have to be well understood if policies and programs are to be put in place to enhance the ability of emergency personnel to perform their jobs well under the most trying of circumstances. Those very same factors need to be understood so that state and national governments can design their capabilities aptly and be able to weave them into the local response effort already underway. Finally, understanding the capabilities of local emergency responders will inform the manner in which the scientific community brings its considerable intellect, creativity and talent to bear on the problem of terrorism. FRONTLINE PREPAREDNESS MANTRAS Frontline responders assert certain canons with regard to the best route to terrorism preparedness. First, communities need to build from existing assets, not create special set-aside plans or response units that would swing into action only in the rarest of circumstances. Underlying tools of the terrorist trade are the uncertainties as to when or where they will strike and what type of weapons they will employ. Accordingly, one never knows who will be on duty in the patrol car, at the fire station, in the hospital emergency department, or in the laboratory when a suicide bomber approaches their assigned target, when a religious cult gone astray releases a nerve agent in a subway, or when citizens unknowingly inhale microscopic particles

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121 of disease that later cause them to suffer such nonspecific symptoms as fever, nausea, and aches.’ No matter who is on duty, they should recognize the possibility that terrorists could have caused the emergency they are facing. Moreover, they should respond armed with appropriate training and equipment. Unless and until all front-line responders are properly prepared for terrorism contingencies, they could themselves fall victim during an attack, widening the scope of harm. The potential for rescuers to become victims is particularly acute when terrorists employ unconventional weapons, such as radiation devices or toxic substances. To illustrate, unless physicians have uncommon diseases as part of their differential diagnosis, the initial citizens that trickle into hospitals with early symptoms of anthrax exposure are likely to go undiagnosed. Similarly, unless laboratory technicians have unusual diseases in mind that terrorists might employ when trying to decipher the culture they are examining, the onset of lifesaving prophylaxis for others who may have been exposed during the attack could be even further delayed. Also, in one infamous no-notice drill, mocking a poison gas release in New York City’s subways in June 1995, firefighters and police made several errors that, had the situation been genuine, would have cost many responders their lives.3 Moreover, terrorists have adopted the use of secondary explosive devices to take down emergency response personnel, thereby injuring more people, setting back rescue efforts, and amplifying the fear resonating from their a t t a ~ k . ~Thus, the objective for all nations contemplating preparedness is to train and equip properly all personnel across all response disciplines. Another tenet that emergency response personnel embrace is the importance of being prepared first and foremost for the most likely contingencies they will confront. If local responders cannot handle a twenty-car pileup on the highway, an accidental hazardous chemical spill at the local railway depot, or an outbreak of meningitis, it is unrealistic to expect them to tackle the necessary planning, training, and exercising activities associated with an unconventional terrorist attack that results in mass casualties. Put another way, the first goal of local, state, and national governments needs to be ensuring that local responders have basic emergency response plans and capabilities. Only when such capacities are in place and sustained should the focus switch to increasing preparedness for more calamitous events. Another phrase often heard among emergency response professionals is that the purchase of a lot of sophisticated response equipment, or “toys,” will be to no avail if personnel cannot employ the gear properly. Policy makers often focus on the equipment needs of front-line responders without full appreciation of the other crucial legs of effective disaster response preparedness. In other words, many of the most pressing disaster response deficiencies can be resolved by better plans and training rather than by fancy toys. To begin with, the best toys will not be brought out of the box in a timely and effective fashion if there is no plan for their use. Perhaps because a plan is thought of as just a sheaf of paper, planning always tends to get short shrift. Emergency response professionals are taught to use a combination of general guidance and onthe-spot planning for ordinary circumstances (e.g., heart attack victim, house fire). However, a terrorist attack could cause widespread harm and be classified as a mass casualty i n ~ i d e n t .In ~ those circumstances, a significant number of emergency assets from different response agencies would be called to the scene and their effectiveness, separately and together, will be less than ideal if they do not use common terminology and agreed disaster response plans and strategies. In a great many U.S. cities, a flexible “all-hazards’’ plan already exists that, with situational adjustments, can be

122 applied to various types of terrorist attacks. So, the good news is that communities around the world need not start fi-om scratch. Solid models exist for all-hazards response plans. Many U.S. cities have also drafted annexes to existing all-hazards plans to address the more demanding contingencies involved in responding to chemical, biological, and radiological attacks and to prioritize the improvements that they need to make to become better prepared for these types of disasters. Emergency personnel around the world could save time and resources and make tremendous preparedness strides by consulting these plans and annexes. An important step that communities can take to facilitate a prompt and organized response is to prepare contingency plans for major sites that terrorists might consider as attractive targets. To create such a plan, an emergency response team first surveys the location, whether it is a sporting arena, office building, civic auditorium, landmark, amusement or public park, zoo, shopping mall, or transportation center. They identify optimum area(s) at the site for rescuers to enter swiftly; to set up a command post; to gather, decontaminate and triage casualties, and to stage emergency equipment. The best routes to and from the closest trauma center and other hospitals are marked. At large indoor facilities, this team also scouts the ventilation system and obtains the telephone numbers for the site engineer or others who would be able to advise them on its operation. Then the emergency responders meet with the managers of the site to discuss the plans and ascertain what logistic support the facility might make available during an emergency. Some U.S. cities drew up contingency plans for their major sites long ago, with natural disasters, fires, or conventional bombings in mind.6 The other foundation of emergency response is practicing the use of plans and skills. Life-saving activities are difficult to execute under ordinary circumstances, much less under added duress amidst flames, toxic fumes, and the sounds of those suffering from the wounds. If emergency responders do not hold fairly frequent drills, they will not be familiar enough with their plans, and the skills they need to operate complicated equipment will atrophy. These exercises can come in the form of tabletop drills, where senior response officials practice making critical decisions, to full-up field exercises that involve the use of mock patients. Exercises should also be designed to incorporate the full spectrum of responsefrom on-scene rescue through hospital care. Unfortunately, and to the detriment of hospital and overall preparedness, field exercises often stop short of the hospital doors. Aside from sustaining key skills, exercises can be very important vehicles for emergency officials to identify response deficiencies and to instigate subsequent improvements in plans, training, and equipment. Another mantra of frontline responders is that equipment that sits on the shelf has little utility. To illustrate, an expensive detector that can only identify sarin is not nearly as useful as a user-friendly, inexpensive, multi-gas sensor that can identify a wide range of hazardous chemicals. Therefore, emergency response professionals would encourage the scientific community to concentrate on researching and developing items that responders can use in other emergencies, not just in response to terrorist attacks. Furthermore, cities and smaller towns often cannot afford to purchase and maintain specialized terrorism response equipment, but they may consider acquiring equipment that has broader applications.

123 MAJOR GAPS IN RESPONDER PREPAREDNESS FOR UNCONVENTIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS The aftermath of a terrorist attack involving unconventional weapons could present emergency response professionals with any number of problems, some perhaps insolvable. The following discussion is based on interviews with emergency response professionals of all disciplines in several dozen cities and communities across America. This narrative presents a generic picture of response challenges and shortcomings that individual jurisdictions identified, but does not raise each and every problem that could occur.* Nor does this narrative attempt to account in any detail for the variations in the effectiveness of an unconditional terrorist attack that could arise due to the size and sophistication of the weapon and its delivery system or the execution of an attack in an urban environment and in different weather conditions? Were terrorists to detonate a nuclear weapon, emergency response personnel at or near the site of the attack would likely be killed or incapacitated to the extent that they could not perform their duties. Able-bodied responders from nearby jurisdictions would probably not be allowed to deploy to the attack site, a literal ground zero, because they would receive life-threatening dosages of radiation. In short, civilianbased rescue and recovery efforts would probably not be attempted within the geographical area where the aftereffects of the attack were catastrophic. Moreover, emergency professionals in neighboring jurisdictions would have their hands fill trying to orchestrate efforts to shield their populations from possible downwind fallout and to provide healthcare for attack victims who managed to extract themselves from the hot and warm zones. Few hospitals are equipped or trained to handle patients exposed to high doses of radiation. A Hiroshima-sized 12.5 kiloton atomic bomb detonated in Washington, DC, would instantly kill 23,000 to 80,000 people within a 78 square kilometer area, whereas a 1 megaton hydrogen bomb would have a death toll of 570,000 to 1.9 million within an area of 190 square kilometers." If such attacks were to take place anywhere in the world, the consequences would place extreme pressures on the local, state, and national governments involved, necessitating the activation of continuity of government plans in some jurisdictions. For all intent and purposes, civilian emergency response professionals would look to military experts and assets to lead recovery efforts at the attack site, which may not be undertaken for a considerable period of time depending on the level of radioactivity." Were terrorists to detonate a radiological dispersal device, a so-called dirty bomb, emergency responders would not be sidelined, but they would be faced with considerable challenges. Of a huge number of commercial radiation sources used worldwide, the isotopes that would pose the most serious danger are: Americium-241, Californium-252, Cesium-137, Cobalt-60, Iridium-192, Plutonium-238, and Strontium-90. For example, if terrorists were to steal 10 curies of Americium-241, which is used to survey oil wells, and disperse it with one pound of TNT in Manhattan, first responders would need to evacuate everyone in the immediate area of the blast. Within thirty minutes, the area involved would be twenty square blocks, meaning tens of thousands of people to evacuate. Significant clean-up activities would be needed to avoid long-term radiation hazard, with the bill for cleaning, demolishing, and rebuilding the area possibly topping $50 billion." The first challenge for responders would be to determine that the attack incorporated a radioactive source because although the immediate explosive effects would be visible, the radiation hazard would not. Next, emergency responders would

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124 need to identify the type of radiation source(s) involved and define the perimeters of the hot and warm zones, as well as possible downwind dangers. The safe conduct of rescue efforts-extracting, decontaminating, and giving medical care to casualtie-would pose considerable challenges for local emergency response agencies, even if relatively few were injured. Once the news broke that a radioactive substance was involved in the explosion, authorities would need to begin a major campaign to quell additional public panic. In the geographic areas near the attack site, people will naturally want to evacuate, so crisis communications would have to focus on the comparative safety of staying indoors for a prescribed period of time. Law enforcement authorities will want to establish very firm perimeter controls at the attack site to reduce the chances of further harm, but local police may not be equipped or trained to collect forensic evidence under these circumstances. Depending on the severity of the hazard presented by the radiation source(s) involved, special national civilian emergency response or military units may have to take care of certain tasks. Local authorities will also want to have the country’s top radiation experts review and support their plans for environmental recovery efforts to invite maximum public confidence in the safety of returning to the attack site after remediation. Public confidence will also be key to the eventual economic recovery of the attack site. Depending on their state of preparedness, local rescuers are likely to encounter any number of difficulties should terrorists release toxic chemical substances - either classic warfare agents or hazardous industrial chemicals - in public venues. Toxic chemicals can overcome, incapacitate, and kill so quickly that lifesaving efforts must be mounted within minutes if catastrophe is to be averted. When Aum Shinrikyo released the nerve agent sarin on three Tokyo subway lines on 20 March 1995, the crisis peaked and subsided between 8am and noon that day. The death toll from the attack was t w e l ~ e . ’Thus, ~ local emergency authorities must recognize the nature of the attack and respond rapidly. Like Aum Shinrikyo, terrorists could attack in an enclosed space (e.g., a sporting arena), or they could opt for an open-air attack strategy. Were terrorists to release 1,000 kilograms of full-strength sarin on a clear, calm ni ht in a line source running through Washington, DC, 3,000 to 8,000 could perish. IF In a chemical attack, emergency call receivers and dispatchers will have an uphill battle getting accurate information from those dialing 9-1-1 so that they can inform response personnel sent to the scene that they need to take appropriate precautions (e.g., wear protective garments appropriate to the level and concentration of the toxic hazard). Absent such warnings, the first responders to the scene could become “blue canaries,” succumbing to toxic fumes and adding to the rescue burden. The incident commander will be challenged to evaluate the situation quickly, identify the exact type of chemical(s) involved or at the least the family of chemical(s) that are present, and set rescue priorities and strategies that balance the needs of victims against the need to protect the safety of rescue personnel. Amidst perhaps considerable suffering and chaos, the incident commander will struggle to establish a unified command post that can simultaneously update information about the status of multi-agency rescue efforts, analyze the effectiveness of those efforts and adjust them as necessary, serve as the link to a central Emergency Operations Center, and integrate incoming emergency personnel and assets into rescue and recovery efforts. To prevent public panic, authorities will need to provide accurate, uniform, and regular messages to the public about the nature of the attack and the rescue and recovery efforts underway, as well as the steps the public can take to reduce their risks

125 of harm (e.g., shelter-in-place). Law enforcement officials will have difficulties performing their traditional missionwstablishing perimeter control of the affected area and initiating a criminal investigatiomince regular patrol officers may not be appropriately equipped or trained for these conditions. To guard against further harm, Special Weapons And Tactics units or other specially trained officers will need to sweep the attack scene for indications of additional terrorist activity (e.g., snipers, secondary devices). Meteorological conditions may necessitate a need to protect citizens downwind of the attack site, but few citizens know how to shelter-in-place and evacuation attempts could quickly turn roads into parking lots. At the scene of the attack, firefighters will be challenged to swiftly decontaminate large numbers of people possibly exposed to the toxic chemical so that they can be given appropriate medical care. Paramedics and emergency medical technicians may not have the appropriate protective gear or training to operate in a “warm” zone and can expect difficulties in triaging casualties and providing antidotes to those most severely exposed. Hospitals may be overrun with citizens who are possibly contaminated and frightened, compelling them to “lockdown” to protect the facility and impeding the provision of advanced medical care. Hospitals may lack the appropriate personal protective equipment, key supplies (e.g., antidotes, respirators), and training to decontaminate and treat chemical casualties. Furthermore, depending on the chemical(s) employed in the attack, special precautions may need to be taken with remains, and should the casualty toll exceed local morgue capacity, emergency managers will need to import ad-hoc capacity (e.g., refrigerated trucks). Just as they believe the crisis is beginning to subside, emergency managers will be hit with a need to coordinate the huge influx of post-crisis assistance, namely donations and incoming response teams that arrive after the attack victims have been transported to hospitals. Emergency managers will need to organize appropriate support services to the families of victims and, for the community as a whole, try to restore a sense of normalcy as quickly as possible (e.g., decontaminating the attack area promptly). For the future well-being of the emergency response personnel that participated in rescue and recovery efforts, appropriate counseling services should also be provided and steps should be taken to recognize the efforts of the emergency response agencies, restock key supplies, capture the requisite lessons learned from the event and institute necessary improvements of response capabilities, anf return to a routine footing as soon as possible. Even for jurisdictions that have a well-trained and equipped hazardous materials response team, which would be a critical response asset in the aftermath of a chemical disaster, these and other challenges are likely to frustrate those responding to the scene of a chemical terrorist attack. Absent an announcement by terrorists that an attack has been executed, emergency response officials may not even realize that their community has been the target of bio-terrorists. Depending on which agent the terrorists employ, the symptoms of infection may not begin to surface for several days and can be so generic that if the attack occurs during winter, emergency officials may at first think that influenza has struck harder than expected. Thus, the first major obstacle confronting emergency response personnel in the event of a biological terrorist attack is identifying the nature of the attack via existing disease surveillance capabilities. News of a biological attack could present emergency officials with a groundswell of panic not just among the public, but also among the ranks of response professionals who, like their fellow citizens, are unlikely to have been trained in the isolation precautions that can be taken to prevent infection, even when the disease involved is contagious. Emergency response officials will need to initiate an

126 immediate, concise, clear, and continual public education campaign to quell public fear and to inform the public of the steps they can take to protect their health and wellbeing and of the services that the community can provide during the outbreak. Hospitals will face incredible demands for healthcare services from the symptomatic and the scared alike, can be expected to run out of supplies within a day or two, will soon overtax their staffs with requests to work extra shifts, and could well collapse under the deluge of patients at their doorsteps. To make room for those falling ill with the disease, hospitals will try to shift patients elsewhere, a task rarely attempted and fraught with logistical and legal complications, and take other steps to expand surge capacity to provide healthcare (e.g., neighborhood patient screening and prophylaxis centers). Various complications will ensue as the burden of patients so outstrips the number of available healthcare providers, not to mention available medical treatments (e.g., antibiotics, vaccines) and equipment (e.g., respirators, isolation capacity). If a contagious disease is involved, emergency response officials need to prepare for successive waves of the disease to erupt as they try various policies (e.g., quarantine, vaccination) to disrupt the spread of the disease. Once the epidemic subsides, emergency response officials will have difficulty persuading nonresidents that their community is again safe for business and pleasure activities. The experiences related to the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ( S A R S ) , which began in southern China in mid-November 2002 and spread to 29 countries, illustrate the type of difficulties that can be encountered. The cities hit hardest by S A R S , namely Hong Kong, Singapore, Taipei City, and Toronto, instituted a cascade of increasingly restrictive policies and procedures to quash the disease, which caused 908 deaths worldwide.” Many view the S A R S experience, which caused tremendous hardship in the cities afflicted, as mild compared with the adversity that terrorists wielding a virulent contagious disease could inflict. For example, the exercise “Dark Winter” simulated smallpox attacks in three U.S. cities. Vaccine needs quickly outstripped vaccine supplies, and the exercise concluded with a projected three million cases and one million deaths.‘6 CLOSING OBSERVATIONS The bad news, of course, is that most emergency response personnel are not really prepared to confront the dire contingencies related to an unconventional terrorist attack. The good news is that no matter how well or poorly equipped and trained they may be, emergency professionals will do their utmost to help their fellow citizens in times of danger and duress. Moreover, emergency response professionals in some jurisdictions have already devised sound recommendations to improve their preparedness to contend with the unthinkable. To improve front-line disaster preparedness, emergency response professionals provide the following general recommendations, which cross disciplines and can readily cross cultures: Articulate and share lessons learned and best practices for unconventional disaster response, which will help professionals elsewhere to learn from the disaster and adjust their policies, procedures, and programs to benefit from hard-earned experience; Establish professional standards and institutionalize training for unconventional disaster preparedness across all response disciplines;

127 Emphasize hospital preparedness via, among other things, the creation of regional hospital plans so that heroic rescue efforts at the scene can be followed by advanced medical care; Enhance disease surveillance capabilities so that disease outbreaks can be detected in time to take life-saving intervention; As part of a preparedness effort, design plans and programs to sustain preparedness (e.g., equipment maintenance, exercises); 0 Establish national stockpiles of key supplies (e.g., vaccines) and national surge capacities for critical functions (e.g., Urban Search and Rescue Teams, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, Disaster Mortuary Teams); 0 Ensure that the principal investments in enhancing preparedness capabilities occur at the local level, which will bear the brunt of any attacks; Task the scientific community to devise solutions to pressing technical problems, such as developing new classes of anti-microbials and finding a faster, less expensive manner to decontaminate large areas. Were such guidance heeded, responders around the world would make significant strides toward being able to handle manmade or natural disasters in the future. REFERENCES I The more ruthless breed of terrorists that emerged in the 1990s upped the ante from kidnapping an ambassador to taking an entire embassy hostage, from pipe bombs to truck bombs, and from hijacking an aircraft to using an airliner as a missile. The number of attacks decreased, but the death tolls from individual terrorist acts increased. Among other sources, these trends are tracked carefully by the RAND-St. Andrews terrorism database, which dates to 1968, and by the U.S. Department of State’s annual report entitled Patterns of Global Terrorism. For explanations of the new trends in terrorism, see Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism, Trends, and Prospects,” in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Brian M. Jenkins (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999); Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York Columbia University Press, 1998) or, very briefly, “The New Terrorism: Coming Soon to a City Near You,” Economist, 15 August 1998, 17-9 and Jose Vegar, “Terrorism’s New Breed,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54, no. 2 (MarcWApnl 1998): 50-5. * Suicide bombings have been common in South Asia and the Middle East, Aum Shinrikyo released poison gas on three Tokyo subway lines, and an unknown individual or group mailed anthrax-laced letters to prominent U S . media and political figures in the fall of 2001. For an overview of the suicide bombing threat, see htlp://www.ianes.comkecuritviinternationalsecuritv/news/usscole/iirOOI020 1 n.shtml. On Aum Shinrikyo, see Chapter 3 of Amy E. Smithson and Leslee-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorist Threat and the LIS. Response (Henry L. Stimson Center: Washington, DC, October 2000): 71-1 11. On the anthrax letter attacks, Ronald M. Atlas, “BIOTERRORISM: From Threat to Reality,” Annual Review of Microbiology 56, no. 1 (2002): 178-82. The major mistakes made by New York City’s Finest and Bravest involved failure to wear selfcontained breathing apparatus and the setting up of an on-site command post on the ventilation grates connected to the subway tunnels, therefore in direct proximity to the toxic threat in the “hot” zone. Officiators assessing the performance of responders declared many of them “dead.” In addition to interviewing several individuals who participated in this drill, the author viewed the videotape of this exercise, which was staged at the subway station at East 14” Street and 1‘’ Avenue. She also possesses a copy of the draft report of the drill. A final copy was never released because the controversial drill revealed response shortcomings of a serious nature. For example, on 16 January 1997, two bombs shook the Northside Family Planning Services clinic in Atlanta, Georgia. The secondary device, which exploded 67 minutes after the initial bomb, was loaded with shrapnel and aimed to kill and injure. Kathy Scruggs and Scott Marshall, “Clinic Bombers Had Dual Purpose: Initial Findings Reveal One Bomb Was Meant for Property Loss, the Other for Loss of Life,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 22 January 1997.

128 The exact definition of a mass casualty incident will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The basic principle is that an incident will be declared a mass casualty incident when it exceeds the Emergency Medical Services capacities of the jurisdiction involved. In larger cities with multiple hospitals and a significant number of professional ambulance crews, a mass casualty incident might involve forty victims, whereas in a small town with a single, small hospital and only two volunteer ambulance crews, five victims might constitute a mass casualty incident. City officials are confident that these plans would serve well in an unconventional terrorist attack. Interviews with the author: Director, County Emergency Management (21 September 2000); Battalion Fire ChieDSpecial Operations Officer (25 May 2000); Emergency Management Specialist, Office of Emergency Management (9 May 2000); MMRS Coordinator, Fire Department (9 May 2000); District Fire Chief, EMS Division (2 March 2000); Deputy Fire Coordinator, Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Services (3 February 2000); Battalion Fire Chief (1 9 January 2000); Lieutenannazmat Operations, Fire Department (27 July 1999); Fire Chief (6 April 1999); Deputy Fire Chief (23 March 1999); Emergency Preparedness Director, Office of Emergency Services (9 February 1999). 7

For a more lengthy explanation of the chemical and biological attack response challenges, see chapter 6 of Amy E. Smithson, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US.Response (Henry L. Stimson Center: Washington, DC, October 2000), 201-76. For example, buildings would partially shelter people from exposure to chemical or biological agents, but in a nuclear attack buildings could well collapse and would provide materials for debris and fires that would cause injnry. Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (US. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, August 1993), 48. IDEstimate of the Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 53. ‘ I The half-life of Plutonium-239 is 24,000 years, of Uranium-238 is 4.5 billion years. A nuclear detonation could render the homh site uninhabitable. Half-life statistics from the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research’s “Fissile Material Basics” at: http:l/www .ieer.org/fctsheet/fm_basic.html. Charles D. Ferguson, Tasheen Kazi, and Judith Perera, Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Securiv Risks, Occasional Paper 11 (Center for Nonproliferation Studies: Monterey, January 2003), 16, 21. I 3 The Tokyo fire department received the first emergency call at 8:09am, with additional calls reporting problems at fifteen subway stations within the hour. Approximately five hundred patients swamped one nearby hospital, St. Luke’s International, within an hour. By noon, however, all critical patients were at the hospitals and physicians had standardized triage and treatment for patients. At 2pm, St. Luke’s discharged over 525 patients who had recovered Erom eye irritation symptoms. For a full-timeline of events, see Box 3.1 of Ataxia in Chapter 3, “Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo,” 93-4. l 4 This scenario employs a single aircraft with a very effective, line-source delivery over an area of 78 square kilometers. The same amount of sarin delivered on a sunny, clear day with a light breeze would result in 300 to 700 deaths. Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 54. Is For an overview of the SARS outbreak and recommendations flowing from it, see “Severe Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (SARS): A Report by the Secretariat,” number EBll3/33 (World Health Organization: Geneva, 27 November 2003). The Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a conference in midSeptember 2003 where officials who were on the front-lines battling the SARS outbreak in Taipei City, Hongkong, Singapore, and Toronto shared their experiences and recommendations. ‘6 Smallpox, which was eradicated worldwide in 1978, is lethal at least 30 percent of the cases. No treatment exists, and symptoms usually materialize between 9 to 17 days. The Dark Winter scenario involved attacks in Oklahoma City, Atlanta, and Philadelphia and an initial set of cases totaling fifty. Thirteen days later, the number of cases was estimated at 16,000. For the scenario script, see “Dark Winter: Biotenorism Exercise, Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense (Andrews Air Force Base: Maryland, 22-23 June 2001), which can be found online at: h~://www.houkins-biodefense.or~/DARK%2OW~TER.~df.

’*

PEOPLE: THE KEY ELEMENT IN DISASTER RESPONSE

GARY w. MCCONNELL’ Innovative Emergency Management, Atlanta, USA From mishaps at large public gatherings (e.g., crowd stampede at a sporting event) to the aftermath of hurricanes and tornadoes, public safety officials work diligently to blunt disaster when it does strike. Beyond dealing with Mother Nature and common criminal events, public safety agencies are increasingly focused on strengthening their capacity to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism. Organizers for the upcoming Olympic Games in Athens, for example, are spending well over $1 billion dollars on security, including 40,000 Greek police officers, 15,000 Greek soldiers, and chemical and biological weapons experts2 Emergencies come in all shapes and sizes, and, by definition, are unpredictable and often unexpected-but not unavoidable. Public safety officials, consequently, focus on three functional areas: planning, prevention, and response. Prevention is the ultimate goal of public safety officials, but well-executed plans and a coordinated response among different agencies and disciplines are crucial to mitigating disaster’s wrath. The most important element, however, is the people. Police officers, doctors, search and rescue personnel, fire fighters, and a variety of other public servants are the most critical asset in any emergency response. This paper will use a case study to illustrate a series of points about the importance of people in the emergency response equation, as well as various law enforcement and emergency management challenges that occur during major events. The case study is the 1996 summer Olympic Games, during which the author served as the chief of staff for Georgia’s State Olympic Law Enforcement Command. The paper concludes with a series of recommendations about how to improve disaster response. ENSURING PUBLIC SAFETY AT A GLOBAL EVENT: THE 1996 SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES The 1996 summer Olympic Games, awarded to the City of Atlanta, were the largest peacetime event to date in the State of Georgia. The mandate to ensure the protection of lives and property presented an unprecedented challenge to the public safety community throughout the state. Because such an event was unprecedented in the State of Georgia, many personnel were placed in jobs that they had never before performed. Many officials received specialized training for these unique duties, and the statutory authority of the participating agencies had to be addressed. As plans for the Games developed, the State of Georgia’s responsibilities expanded to include primary jurisdiction for over 50 percent of the Olympic venues and functions. Public safety encompassed not only law enforcement responsibilities, but also services such as medical and emergency management. The duty and responsibility to protect and serve the citizens of the state, the athletes, and millions of Olympic visitors from around the world was a tremendous undertaking for Georgia. Realizing the state’s enormous responsibility to ensure public safety during the Games, the Governor of Georgia created the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command

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130 (SOLEC)3. Through a consolidated approach, law enforcement and other public safety personnel were mobilized from over two dozen state agencies and placed under a single command. SOLEC grew to encompass over 5,700 state, federal and local officials, including law enforcement, military, health, emergency medical, mass care, traffic, emergency management and countless other services, along with accompanying resource^.^ Table 1 provides essential statistics regarding the 1996 Olympic Games and SOLEC. The unique organization allowed SOLEC to be both flexible and adaptable in responding to the dynamic public safety challenges presented during the Games. SOLEC’s integrated structure can be used as a model for public safety in the future. Table I : Overvie] f t h e 1996 Olympics and the Associated Public Safety Effort. 197 countries represented 10,744 athletes competed in 34 sports 5.3 million people visited Centennial Olympic Park 1996 Olympic 8,610,984 tickets sold for the 17 days of events Games 17 million people rode Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit system

issorted SOLEC Statistics

5,700 personnel: Georgia’s 4‘h largest agency 693 bomb or suspicious package incidents received and investigated 46 SOLEC personnel traveled 15,280 miles through 43 states in 84 days securing the Olympic Torch 24 miles of security fencing installed at venues 194,000 background checks conducted on staff, volunteers, and vendors

Planning The public safety planning efforts for the Centennial Olympic Games began soon after Atlanta was awarded the Games. Early efforts focused on the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies and the number of personnel needed to provide services. Subcommittees were formed to encourage interagency involvement in a variety of areas that required cooperation between agencies. A great deal of time was dedicated to defining the proper roles of the public and private sectors and debating the ability of each to provide those services. As roles and responsibilities were defined, new issues involving equipment, coordination, and budgets took precedence. In January 1996, all state public safety operations were organized under the single command of SOLEC, and the consolidated approach began to take shape. During the months immediately preceding the Games, public safety personnel participated in tabletop exercises to test operational plans. Special training courses were conducted to ensure that all personnel needing advanced skills would be prepared. During the final planning phase, three days of generic and venue-specific training was provided to SOLEC officers and support personnel. As the Games approached, plans were reviewed and updated by SOLEC to respond to changes made by the organizing committee and others involved. The flexible and adaptable structure of SOLEC

131 facilitated the implementation of these changes and helped officials best prepare for public safety and emergency response contingencies. Prevention SOLEC emphasized prevention as the most crucial “key to success” for public safety during the Games. The responsibility of the state and local government to provide public safety and prevent incidences extended beyond law enforcement to include health, fire, and medical personnel, among others. Prevention activities for law enforcement included: Safe, efficient movement of athletes and officials; Assessment, removal, or destruction of suspicious packages or devices; Access control and perimeter security at functions and venues; and, Assignment of intelligence officers to gather and evaluate information on groups and individuals that may pose threats. Prevention activities for other public safety services included: Distribution of over 160,000 child identification badges; Inspection of 2,194 food vendors; Inspection and screening of equine competitors entering and exiting the United States; Providing heat prevention tents along pedestrian corridors; Establishing “friendship centers” for people needing mental health services and medications; and, Pre-staging fire and Emergency Medical Services equipment at strategic locations in each Olympic community. For the first time in Georgia, all state agencies -with local and federal assistance developed a unified approach to protect lives and property. Local and federal assistance was critical for SOLEC to make this “the safest Olympics ever.” The overall prevention plan was designed to provide a seamless, uniform system of services in all Olympic venue areas. Response SOLEC’s structure and resources provide a unique capability to respond to both Olympic and non-Olympic challenges. The command structure encouraged decisions to be made at the lowest levels. Each venue and function commander prepared staffing and operational plans utilizing three threat levels. The first level, GREEN, was designated as normal operations with full staffing. The second level, YELLOW, designated a higher threat level with increased security measures and possible re-allocation of personnel. The third level, RED, reflected a real or perceived situation that could evolve into the endangerment of life or destruction of property associated with Olympic operations. A red-level threat called for highest alert and the reallocation of SOLEC personnel to best respond to the warning. Operational plans enabled each commander to designate personnel to respond to other venues or functions as necessary. These plans proved useful when SOLEC received requests for personnel to supplement local law enforcement, such as during the opening and closing ceremonies of the Games.

132 Three events challenged SOLEC operations: 1) Hurricane Bertha; 2) the care of 3,000 youth volunteers stranded in Atlanta; and, 3) the Centennial Park bombing. In each situation, SOLEC made an appropriate, timely response using the resources and expertise under its command. Because of SOLEC’s emphasis on planning and response, public safety personnel promptly responded to each of these three situations and effectively mitigated their potential impact and damage. Nine days before the opening ceremonies, Hurricane Bertha was predicted to make landfall along the Georgia coast5 SOLEC coordinated the evacuation of Olympic athletes and persons with special needs. Fortunately, within 24 hours of predicted landfall, Bertha changed course and avoided major destruction to the Savannah area and the Olympic yachting venue. SOLEC’s prompt response in implementing its emergency evacuation plans did, however, demonstrate the strength of the unified approach and efficiency of the public safety command. The day before Opening Ceremonies, approximately 3,000 young people arrived in Atlanta, some from as far away as Hawaii, with promises of employment and housing during the games. The private entity that had recruited these young people, many of whom were minors, provided no jobs or lodging. SOLEC coordinated resources to provide housing, food, and transportation for a quick return to their homes. On Saturday, July 27, at approximately 1:20 AM, a pipe bomb was detonated inside Centennial Olympic Park during an outdoor concert, resulting in two fatalities.6 Within 20 minutes of the explosion, SOLEC personnel evacuated approximately 60,000 visitors and secured the park as a crime scene and triage area for the injured. Within 32 minutes, Emergency Medical Services personnel, pre-staged in the Olympic Ring, transported 118 injured persons to area hospitals. SOLEC-affiliated personnel immediately provided crisis management and/or grief assistance to 73 victims. Thus, SOLEC’s multidisciplinary approach to public safety allowed for a transition from normal operations to respond to a theater-wide red-level threat within minutes. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SOLEC EXPERIENCE Overall, SOLEC proved to be both effective and efficient in planning, preventing and responding to incidences, and can be seen as a model for other public safety structures.’ SOLEC’s experiences offer the following lessons: Training and Planning Planning is a fundamental building block for developing an effective and integrated public safety organizational structure. Plans must be consistent and coordinated between all agencies and disciplines participating in the event. Training and planning exercise programs must be very broad-based for all disciplines, including public safety, public works, public health, emergency medical services, emergency management services, volunteer agencies, support staff, media, and elected and appointed officials. Moreover, adequate time should be allowed for all public safety participants to become familiar with and train with all technology. Reliance on new technologies should be carefully considered because of financial restraints and training time. Commanders who prepare operational plans are more confident in executing responsibilities, so it is important to solicit their active involvement at the

133 earliest stage of planning. Formal orientation and job specific training is important in preparing personnel for assignments. All personnel should attend formal training before assigned to duty. Tabletop exercises are critical to preparing command personnel for the challenges during events. All command personnel should participate in formal tabletop exercises to test and improve their knowledge of plans and responsibilities. Communications Clear lines of communications must be maintained and information must be shared and coordinated across all relevant disciplines and agencies, rather than stove-piped. The Incident Command System8 and terms of unified command must be understood across all disciplines. The U S . Department of Defense radio system worked well during the Games. For future events, close coordination with military personnel involved in special events planning regarding communications systems will be crucial. Alphanumeric pagers are an effective method of communicating short messages. Their use significantly reduces radio traffic. Finally, planning for communication networks should begin at least 24 months prior to an event. Plans should be ready for implementation a year before the event with infrastructure installation beginning at least six months prior to the event. Distribution of equipment should be completed in time to acclimate and train users and test reliability and serviceability. Unified Command Public safety command and control function can be complicated by many command centers. All public safety functions should operate under a single unified command structure. Public safety must have space for operational and administrative functions. This space must be secure and offer the necessary privacy. Camera surveillance systems, when properly installed and monitored, greatly assist law enforcement officers. Organizing committees should furnish necessary surveillance cameras for public safety operations.

Decision Making A good understanding of the decision making process is essential. First responders must understand how and why decisions are made, and they must also be trained to consider automatically the consequences and reactions that result from those decisions. Agencies must release command personnel early to allow them to develop and understand their roles and responsibilities. Empowering personnel at the lowest levels to make decisions allows for a quick and effective way of resolving routine situations. Public safety management should require first-line supervisors to be familiar with operations plans and encourage first-line decision-making.

Volunteer and Private Security Volunteers and private security staff are sometimes inconsistent and unreliable. They should not be relied upon for critical security assignments. When used in noncritical positions, they must be properly recruited, trained and compensated. While the use of public safety officers from throughout the world to assist private security is a viable concept, the participants must receive adequate support services (e.g., housing,

134 transportation, rewards). Supervision of these individuals is more effective when managed by other public safety personnel. Health and Medical Federal regulations for allotting b d s need to be clarified to support health and medical prevention at large events. Local, state, federal and private entities should work together in making all health and medical decisions (e.g., accreditation, security and legal jurisdiction issues). Information sharing needs to be open among and between event organizers and human services. Ideally, federal resources are available for specialized circumstances involving hazardous materials, disaster medical assistance, urban search and rescue, and other medical personnel. Financial commitments and deployment schedules should be obtained early to ensure federal support of large events. Unexpected health issues (e.g. mosquito infestation, etc.) should be considered during planning. Contingency plans should be developed to handle unusual circumstances. Health, medical, mass care, and shelter services expanded SOLEC’s capability for prevention and emergency responsehecovery. Public safety leaders and planners at special events should include personnel from such services in early planning. Intelligence and Intelligence Detail Teams Deploying plainclothes officers on intelligence details is an effective means of providing tactical intelligence, preempting criminal activity and providing a flexible source of law enforcement personnel to respond as needed. Plainclothes officers should have some type of discreet identification and be issued concealable equipment. Assigned clothing and equipment worn by intelligence detail officers enables them to be recognized as police by other public safety personnel. Statements to the Media Media access policies should be established and publicized prior to an event. A spokesperson should be designated as the official to make statements, and decisions should be made on when and how often statements will be made. The Public Assistance Liaisons program is a successful method of communication. This program should be enhanced by selection of experienced personnel and specialized training. Share the Credit and the Blame Whether things go well, plans are faulty, or mistakes occur in the execution of plans, there is enough credit and blame to go around for everyone. Success is more likely if the participating agencies and individuals approach the event as a team effort. In the end, the success of any task depends on the commitment of all the people involved in that task. Coordination of communication, personnel, and training is vital to a successful outcome in any emergency situation. Front line responders are among the most hardworking, dedicated and committed workers worldwide. Their ability to work together depends not only on a coordinated and integrated command structure, but also on the strength of their leadership and the trust of and for their fellow responders.

135 REFERENCES9

’ Gary W. McConnell served as Director of the Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) from 1991 to 2003 and has since been working as a homeland security consultant for Innovative Emergency Management, a national leader in crisis management preparedness. As GEMA’s director, he coordinated emergency response and recover efforts for disasters throughout the state of Georgia, including tomadoes, humcanes, and ice storms. McConnell drastically expanded GEMA’s role as the state’s lead emergency preparedness agency dealing with the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In 1996 he was appointed Chief of Staff for the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command, directing 29 state agencies and 5,000 law enforcement officers during the Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta. McConnell began his law enforcement career as a sheriffs deputy at the age of 19, and became Georgia’s youngest ever elected sheriffjust two years later. * Robert Hager, “Officials Work to Keep the Olympics Safe: Greece spending record $1.2 billion on security,” NBC News, 28 April 2004. SOLEC was a consolidated effort involving: Board of Pardons and Paroles, Board of Regents, Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, Department of Administrative Services, Department of Agriculture, Department of Children and Youth Services, Department of Community Affairs, Department of Corrections, Department of Defense, Department of Human Resources, Department of Labor, Department of Law, Department of Natural Resources, Department of Public Safety, Department of Revenue, Department of Transportation, Georgia Building Authority, Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Georgia Emergency Management Agency, Georgia Forestry Commission, Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council, Georgia Public Safety Training Center, Georgia Public Service Commission, Georgia World Congress Center Authority, Merit System of Personnel Administration, Office of Consumer Affairs, Office of Planning and Budget, Office of the Secretary of State and Stone Mountain Park Police. Coordination of logistics for this massive operation was a huge undertaking in and of itself, included housing, feeding, transporting, and equipping thousands of personnel. According to the US National Weather, Hurricane Bertha was a category I storm that produced a maximum of 100 knot winds when passed through the Caribbean, but Bertha was downgraded to a category 2 storm when it made landfall on the coast of North Carolina. Bertha caused eight deaths and $250 million in damage. For more detail, see: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1996bertha.html. Just before 1:OOam, a security guard had located an unattended bag and notified the bomb squad. At 1 :07am, an unidentified man called 91 1 and warned that an explosion would occur within thirty minutes. One minute later, the bomb squad had confirmed that the bag contained wires and a pipe, and an evacuation of Centennial Park was initiated. Downtown Atlanta was sealed at 2:00am, forty minutes after the explosion. A variety of details about the Centennial Park bombing can be found at:

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http:l/www.cnn.comlUS/9607/27/olympic.bomb.main/

’SOLEC won many plaudits for its efforts. As Georgia’s governor, Zell Miller, said at the time: “Success for the state was more than just gold medals. It was being able to provide a safe and enjoyable environment for the citizens of Georgia and all its visitors. Because of your individual dedication and desire to help achieve our goals, the 1996 Olympic Games were a very proud moment in our state’s history. I applaud your efforts as part of one of the finest law enforcement teams ever assembled for one event.” The Incident Command System was created in California in the 1970s as a way to manage multi-agency response to wildland fires. The system has since been adopted by fire services across America and is increasingly used by other response disciplines to codify lines of authority among agencies and jurisdictions. The Incident Command System is based on five functions: command, operations, planningiintelligence, logistics, and finance/administration.

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KEY ISSUES IN DISASTER RESPONSE: ENSURING CRITICAL SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT WORK WHEN NEEDED A.D. VICKERY' Assistant Chief of Operations and Homeland Security Seattle Fire Department, Seattle, U.S. To limit the morbidity and mortality after a terrorist attack, local first responders must be adequately prepared to mitigate the consequences of attacks. This effort must be based on a national strategy that utilizes common operational principles adjustable for local conditions. An integrated national and local response capability has several key elements. To begin with, local responders must have the capacity to respond to basic emergencies before their technical capabilities are increased to respond to dynamic and asymmetrical terrorist incidents. Furthermore, response personnel in all disciplines-law, fire, emergency medical services, hospital, public health, emergency managers, public works, skilled trade professionals, and elected officials-inust be properly trained and equipped. Failure to establish robust and consistent basic response capabilities in all disciplines bodes poorly for the ability of local responders to cope with the demands that a disaster will place on them. Equipment alone does not provide a response. An effective response entails trained professionals operating in a coordinated manner with a common set of prioritized objectives. This formula requires common terminology, unity of command, and sharing of functional responsibilities. In training academies, colleges, and universities, instructors need to train and nurture response leaders who can manage dynamic risks and engage resources before all the facts are known, if lives are to be saved. Response commanders need to be trained to make critical decisions when they only know between 40 to 50 percent of the situational data. To make decisions under such circumstances, a first responder in command must be able to: Evaluate the life hazard; Identify the immediate threat; Set rescue and life safety priorities; Establish a unified commandunity of command and common goals; Re-evaluate the plan and reinforce safety resources; Notify political authorities of the threat, progress, and resource needs; Initiate public information and confidence process; Re-evaluate progress and plan to sustain the effort andor triage situation. Making life-and-death decisions in life-threatening circumstances is one of the most excruciating challenges that any human can ever face. For that reason, frontline personnel need to practice these very skills regularly in drills and exercises that put them to the most realistic tests possible. In addition to command capacity, regularly scheduled drills and exercises should be held to assess all manner of response capabilities at the individual, unit, organizational, and community-widelevels.

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137 Training for Biological and Radiological Mayhem: TOPOFF 2 TOPOFF 2, shorthand for Top Officials 2, was the second in a series of national terrorism exercises, mandated by Congress, to identify vulnerabilities in the US domestic incident management capability. Federal, state, and local response organizations were presented with a combination of simulated terrorist threats and acts in the Chicago, Illinois, and Seattle, Washington metropolitan areas as well as a cyber-terrorist attack and threats against other locations. Held over a four-day period in mid-May 2003, TOPOFF 2 was the biggest, most comprehensive terrorism-response exercise ever held in the United States. To convey the size and complexity of this exercise, TOPOFF 2 involved forty-seven state and local emergency response agencies, forty-one federal departments and agencies, and, because the exercise locations were on the Canadian border, twentyone Canadian agencies.2 In the main parts of the exercise, a fictitious terrorist group released Y. pestis, which causes the contagious and virulent disease plague, in the Chicago area. Meanwhile, the Seattle component of the drill revolved around the simulated detonation of a radiological dispersion device in Seattle. The exercise tested seven major areas, with the principal findings of TOPOFF 2 as fol10ws:~ The homeland security threat advisory system was elevated to a “severe” or “red” alert to test the alerting mechanism. In addition to other test outcomes, local communities found that they were not able to relate or prepare for a “national alert” with any specificity of defensive actions. Several local and state jurisdictions declared emergencies or disasters and requested federal assistance during TOPOFF 2, eventually leading to presidential disaster declarations in two states. However, to the surprise and chagrin of some, TOPOFF 2 revealed that a large-scale bioterrorist attack did not qualify as a disaster under current statutes. The government agencies involved-the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human ServiceHeed to clarify their authorities, separately and when jointly operating, for success in genuine disasters. TOPOFF 2 offered an opportunity for the new Department of Homeland Security to test its capabilities, including the role of the “principal federal official” in disaster response. The designation and presence of a principal federal officer worked effectively to coordinate requested federal assets and focus on assistance to local government. The hypothetical plume from the Seattle radiological dispersal device was modeled to test data collection and coordination. A multitude of federal agencies conducted plume model activities, with varying degrees of accuracy. State and local agencies were also collecting data. This situation created confusion and hampered local decisions. The deployment and distribution of the national pharmaceutical stockpile was tested in Chicago, Illinois. While some aspects of the deployment went well, issues of prioritization for prophylaxis, logistics, secure distribution, and inconsistentjurisdictional priorities hampered utilization of this key asset. The scale of the simulated plague outbreak in the Chicago area seriously A total of sixty-four hospitals received tested hospital involvement. thousands of real and simulated patients during the exercise, which revealed a

138 lack of secure, robust, and redundant hospital system-wide communication as well as shortages in critical staff and supplies. 7) Possible exposure of first responders to a radiological hazard tested how to balance the rescue of victims against safety of responders in Seattle. The saving of life must remain the top priority of responders. On scene commanders were hampered by their reluctance to engage in rescue until all risks were identified, which resulted in avoidable casualties. TOPOFF 2 pointed to the importance of training risk-averse managers to be “risk managing leaders.” For Seattle, the greatest value of TOPOFF 2 was in the 15 months of exercise design, tabletop exercises, planning, and interdisciplinary interaction that preceded the exercise itself. The progressive steps of this planning process, which was initially limited to a core planning team, expanded in the six months prior to TOPOFF 2 to include workshops, seminars, a tabletop exercise, a command and control exercise, and an executive exercise. Some local planning activities were integrated, involving state, regional, and federal participants into the mix. As TOPOFF 2 began, 3,400 individuals were credentialed in Seattle as participants, rescuers, controllers, or observers. When the detonation of the radiological dispersal device was simulated on May 12‘h, responders assumed that roughly one kilogram of radiological materials of an unknown nature had been released, sending a plume over part of downtown Seattle and out over Puget Sound. The initial actions of the Seattle Fire Department’s incident commander involved assessing the size and nature of the event, structuring incident command, establishing control of walking wounded and the onlooking crowd, designating an initial hot-zone perimeter, setting up gross decontamination comdors for victims and responders, coordinating with other response agencies, and evaluating additional resource requirements. On-scene response activities, which involved hot-zone entry in level-A hazmat gear for detection of the hazard, built on the initial actions to encompass rescue activities, medical treatment, unified command, and consideration of secondary terrorist threats. Emergency medical services personnel confronted problems with the delayed triage of victims in the hot zone, the adequacy of the initial field decontamination, and the treatment of radiological versus trauma injuries. Some 150 individuals simulated various types of injuries, and just over 90 were transported to local hospitals. The force of the blast resulted in collapsed structures, which brought Seattle’s Urban Search and Rescue team into play. Media coverage of the on-scene response was ~ignificant.~ The Seattle Fire Department’s outlook for dealing with the media can be summarized as, “they will want to know, so the department had better tell them what is happening.” The initial three days of the exercise were driven by the actual decisions of the responders and focused on scene on life-safety, mass casualty incident management, hazmat evaluation and mitigation, technical rescue, crime scene control and evaluation, incident and unified command, and the integration of incoming state and federal assets. Personnel in the emergency operations center were engaged in various activities to support on-scene operations. The fourth day of the exercise was devoted to consideration of decontamination and rehabilitation of the attack site and other longer-term recovery issues, such as the public perception and the economic fallout. The exercise concluded

139 on day five with some initial critiques of the field operations and various city, county, state, and federal operations centers. Concluding Observations An exercise like TOPOFF 2 will reveal a mix of strengths and shortcomings in local, state, and federal response plans, equipment, training, and capabilities, which is why such exercises and drills are so important. Preparedness is not something that can be achieved overnight and declared “done.” Rather, disaster preparedness is a continual process of evaluation and improvement. Exercises are vital to that process, yet the overwhelming majority of US local jurisdictions and response organizations have not yet participated in any type of integrated terrorism drill or exercise with federal government agencie~.~ Along those lines, exercises and drills should be structured to measure individual, unit, and organizational response skills against a national or international standard of preparedness and performance. However, the lion’s share of the world’s nations currently lack standards of preparedness and performance for terrorism response. Unless and until such standards are established and routinely incorporated into the skills tests of emergency response professionals, preparedness and performance will be variable and, in all likelihood, less than ideal. Therefore, establishing such standards should be a matter of priority for individual practitioners in the various response disciplines, their professional associations and organizations, and policy makers worldwide who are concerned about terrorism preparedness and response capabilities. As various gaps in terrorism preparedness are identified, emergency response professionals must engage the scientific community as a partner in developing, testing, and improving equipment and techniques to save lives, protect property, and limit damage to the environment. These tools must be durable, user-friendly, reliable, inexpensive to maintain, require minimal training, and address a wide range of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats. For their part, policy-makers and scientists need to make sure that research and development programs power a significant effort to bring the reliability and accuracy of the laboratory onto the street. Terrorists have chosen to wage warfare against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support their leaders or to change policies the terrorists find objectionable. From the perspective of emergency responders, intent is not the key issue in response. Their objective, under the most trying of circumstances, is to bring order to chaos in a timely manner. REFERENCES

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Alan Dennis Vickery is the Assistant Chief of Operations and Homeland Security of the Seattle Fire Department. A 37-year veteran of the Seattle Fire Department, he has worked in both combat and administrative positions, covering the entire spectrum of fire service responsibilities. Since 1994, Vickery has been the Task Force Leader for Puget Sound Urban Search & Rescue Task Force, which deployed to several disasters, including the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Vickery holds a B.S. in Fire Command and Administration from the National Fire Academy and over a dozen specialized certifications. An international authority on numerous facets of public safety operations, Vickery has originated, written, and served as instructor of various courses. Chief Vickery serves as chair of the Homeland Security Department’s Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and is on several state, professional, and national boards and commissions, including the National Gilmore Commission.

140 The full list of participants can be found in Top Oflcials (TOPOFF) Exercise Series: TOPOFF 2, Afer Action Summary Report (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 19 December 2003): 55-8. For a more lengthy discussion of these points, see Ibid., 47-52. Among the many major media outlets covering the exercise was CNN. For examples of local print media coverage, see Christine Claridge and Warren King, “Emergency Drill Called ‘Real-life Scary,”’ Seattle Times (t 3 May 2003); Bob Young, “Critics Say Topoff Exercise Fell Short,” Seattle Times (16 May 2003). On the other hand, exercises between state and federal response agencies have occurred with some frequency. Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilitiesfor Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: 15 December2001): 18-19.

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Jody Westby

The Intersection of Information, Communication Technologies and Terrorism (Not available for publication)

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5.

CROSS-CULTURAL AND CROSSDISCIPLINARY TOOLS AND COUNTERMEASURES WORKING GROUP SESSION

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CROSS-CULTURAL AND CROSS-DISCIPLINARY TOOLS AND COUNTERMEASURES WORKING GROUP REPORT RON G MANLEY (CHAIR) Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (retired), Dorset, UK REINER K HUBER (CO-CHAIR) Universitat der Bundeswehr, Munich, Germany INTRODUCTION Despite national and international efforts to combat terrorism, the risk of a terrorist attack involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons (CBRN) is judged to remain high and is expected to remain so for the foreseeable future. International efforts are, therefore, currently focused on putting in place mechanisms to try and forestall such attacks and also on developing better ways of both dealing with them and minimising their impact. By their very nature, these are complex issues, and in order to make progress towards their resolution, a multinational and cross-disciplinary approach will be essential. The need for the former has been recognised in the recent UN Security Council Resolution on the action required by States to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CBRN) and their means of delivery (SCR1540/2004). Under this resolution, States are required to put in place domestic controls and adopt legislative measures, as appropriate, to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and their means of delivery and, in particular, to prevent these weapons and any related materials falling into the hands of non-state actors. The resolution also recognises that many countries may have only limited access to the expertise necessary to implement it and calls on those with the relevant expertise to provide assistance, where appropriate. A similar situation exists with respect to the development of mechanisms to deal with or minimise the impact of CBRN attacks. Many countries again lack access to the specialist expertise or technology necessary to deal with such attacks. In the following paragraphs, a number of issues that fall under the rubric of tools and countermeasures for dealing with the CBRN threat are discussed and some areas where the World Federation of Scientists (WFS) could make a contribution identified. CONTROLLING ACCESS TO CBRN MATERIALS In order to carry out a CBRN type attack, the terrorists must first obtain the necessary raw materials and transport them to the location of the planned attack. While the principal aim of international mechanisms, such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is to prevent proliferation and to restrict access to CBRN weapons and materials, they are not yet universally adhered to. In addition these treaties and other related treaties - such as The Rotterdam Convention and the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs - are primarily concerned with the actions of States and, therefore, not specifically designed to take account of the problem of nonstate actors. Responsibility for dealing with the problem of non-state actors falls, largely, on individual states and it is up to each of them to adopt the necessary legislation to deal with it. At present the adoption of the relevant legislation by

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146 individual states is very variable and this has been formally recognised by the passing of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). In order for such legislation to be effective, however, it will be necessary for companies, organisations and individuals who handle such materials to be made more aware of the danger of misappropriation of their products. Consideration of the danger of misappropriation or an attack against their assets will need to become part of their normal risk management practice. For this to happen, they will need to be provided with the relevant data and also with guidance on how to best to apply it. This is an area where international bodies, such as the WFS, with experts covering a broad range of science and technology, could fulfil a useful role. DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF CBRN MATERIALS As one component of their counter-terrorism efforts, many countries are developing a wide variety of chemical, physical and biological detectors (sensors) for specific uses, as envisaged within the context of their own individual social, technological, economic, and constitutional situations. There is a pressing need for overarching guidance on the most effective use of these technologies, once developed, by a much wider constituency of countries with very different situations. The WFS could contribute by convening a Working Group that would examine existing and forthcoming detector technologies, and recommend strategies for their effective use for prevention and response. Special consideration should be given to the highest priority needs - e.g., rapid chemical agent detection for first responders, or early bioagent detection prior to the onset of disease - to minimize loss of life, morbidity, or economic damage following a terrorist attack using these weapons. BUILDING RESILIENCE AGAINST A CBRN ATTACK Increasing the resilience of a normal commercial or public building to a nuclear attack would be difficult and, in most cases, not commercially viable. The situation with respect to a CBR attack, however, is different and the resilience of a building or facility to a terrorist attack, involving one of these materials, could be significantly increased by changes to its design and layout. The introduction of some of these changes to an existing building might have significant cost implementations. Others, however, may not, particularly, if the work is undertaken during general refurbishment of the building. Incorporating this type of change at the design stage would be particularly cost effective. The factors that would lead to increased resilience - including new technologies and materials - need to be identified, collated and the costbenefit analysis of incorporating them explored so as to enable building ownershsers to be able to make the appropriate value judgement. Ideally, resilience against a CBR terrorist attack should, like health and safety and fire prevention, be a design factor in all new commercial and public buildings and facilities. The specialist knowledge required to support such an approach is not currently available to the majority of architects and designers. There is scope for the development and dissemination of some basic guidance on this issue and this, again, is an area were the expertise available within the WFS could be put to good use.

147 PREVENTIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST CBRN TERRORISM Preventive Operations against CBRN terrorism are either proactive or reactive. Proactive preventive operations, such as monitoring and surveillance, directed at terrorists and their infrastructure (including sympathisers and supportershuppliers), can play a major role in the global efforts to combat the problem of terrorism. In the case of CBRN threats, such operations - whether overt or covert, police or military are likely to be highly cost-effective, at least in the short term, compared to building up passive defence measures, damage control and repair capabilities on a large scale. The downside of such an approach is that it may often lead to the infringement of civil and legal rights and lead to political and ethical controversy. One way to minimise this problem would be to develop and put in place appropriate international agreements and legal codes to govern this type of preventive operation. Resources for developing compatible information and command and control systems for preventive operations are limited. Therefore, existing systems operated for other purposes, such as traffic control systems, toll collection, ozone sensor systems, for example, should be incorporated to the greatest extent possible. A continuous analysis of observations and data on the terrorist scene using appropriate techniques, such as data mining, social network analysis and media monitoring, is essential, as is operational research and analysis to explore terrorist behaviour and adaptive counter-strategies. An interagency and international institutional framework is essential to assure unity of effort and command. The development of guidance in the most effective use of preventive techniques, while at the same time minimising the impact on personal freedom, requires input from a broad spectrum of physical and social scientists. Such a task is, therefore, ideally appropriate for consideration by a WFS monitoring panel. As is the case for proactive operations, reactive preventive operations in response to a CBRN attack, or the threat of such an attack, presents civil authorities (both at national and international levels) with significant issues with regards to the curtailment of legal and civil rights, for example, in relation to the control of movement into and out of a contaminated area, the quarantining of individuals, the enforcement of treatment and decontamination regimes and the denial of treatment where necessary or justified by circumstance. In order to mitigate the effect on the general population, of the decisions made in response to a CBRN attack, or the threat of such an attack, a WFS panel should be asked to review and make suggestions as to the best practice options available to public authorities for responding to a CBRN attack and provide simple - but clearly scientifically based - explanations, for the public, of those best practice options. SMALLPOX The eradication of smallpox by the WHO in 1978 was one of the greatest triumphs of science and medicine. It has saved countless lives and prevented untold suffering in the underdeveloped world, and saved billions of dollars in vaccination costs in the developed world. Recent concerns, however, about the possibility of smallpox being used as a terrorist bioweapon have raised the spectre of a reemergence of this fearsome disease - especially threatening if a multi-focus outbreak were caused by a deliberate act. This could be a public health disaster of unparalleled magnitude. Despite the low probability of a re-emergence of smallpox, the immense consequences force us to take the possibility with the utmost seriousness.

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Several countries are developing plans and vaccine stockpiles to protect their citizens in case of a re-emergence of smallpox, but most do not have the resources to develop this capability. It is clearly in the interest of every nation of the world, both collectively and individually, to insure that smallpox could be rapidly contained and eradicated if it emerged anywhere in the world. To that end, the WFS could convene a Working Group to develop the outline of a plan for the global containment and eradication of smallpox, should it ever re-emerge, for the consideration of the international community, individual states, and international health organizations, such as the WHO. Such an outline would include plans for regional vaccine stockpiles, recommendations on the need for new vaccines and anti-viral drugs, strategies for case finding, plans for training of core vaccination personnel and for rapid training of a large number of additional personnel if needed, details of quarantine procedures and other public health procedures as might be necessary, etc. SECURING WEAPONS-USABLE URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM The essence of tens of thousands nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, continues to exist across the globe. Ensuring the safety and security of this material requires the expenditure of large amounts of money and poses a particular problem for the Russian Federation and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Only some 22% of the nuclear material potentially vulnerable to theft has so far been secured. The G-8 has agreed to contribute $20 billion to the solution of this problem and other related hazards, such as chemical weapons. Contributions, however, have lagged and the large aid program of the United States has been stalled while awaiting these collective funds. The WFS should use its influence to call upon the leaders of the G-8 to fulfil their pledges and to spend these funds in the Russian Federation, primarily on Russian workers, with close monitoring to ensure effective implementation. Since terrorist weapons are most readily made of HEU, one solution to this problem and a priority task would be the initial blending down of the HEU. At the end of 2003, 201 tons of weapon HEU has been blended down to 4.4% U-235 for use in power reactors - of the approximately 1200 tons of HEU estimated to have been possessed by the Russian Federation at the start of the program in 1993. This is a profitable program for the Russian Federation, but the market for power reactor fuel limits the rate of disposal. A total of 500 tons is planned to be disposed of by this means, by 2013. An initial loan from the G-8 for the accelerated initial blending to 19.9% U-235 could remove from the weapon stockpile at least 150 tons of HEU per year, thus eliminating this source of terrorist weapons in 3 to 5 years. This effort should be accompanied by implementation of a G-8 sponsored program to consolidate weapon-usable plutonium at fewer and more secure sites in Russia. INFORMING THE GENERAL PUBLIC ON CBRN ISSUES At present, much of the information available to the general public on these weapons and their potential effects is inaccurate, confusing and contradictory. There is a serious deficiency in the provision of authoritative, credible and accessible scientific information that can be utilised by government agencies, media, first responders and the general public. The WFS with its broad based membership, innate ability to communicate across international borders and ability to provide accurate,

149

reliable and credible information should be encouraged, therefore, wherever appropriate, to support the provision of better and more reasoned information on the CBRN threat and aid its dissemination. A comprehensive WFS strategy covering the full spectrum of scientific information - social, environmental, biological and physical sciences - should be implemented in the near future in order to educate properly the public, practitioners, and decision makers alike. Efforts should be focused on those areas of expertise that are of particular concern in anti-terrorism. These areas include: causes, effects and recommended responses to CBRN events. This material, and data on the likely social impact of such episodes should be transmitted to target audiences, e.g., the interested scientific community at large, first responders and practitioners, decision makers, educators and the media. The emphasis needs to be on the expression of clear, unambiguous and authoritative material. This would best be prepared in the first instance on a WFS database and made available via the web. A further communication strategy, with targeted audiences of leaders and opinion formers, should be developed at a subsequent stage. RECOMMENDATION It is recommended that the WFS establish a permanent monitoring panel with a multicultural and broad based scientific membership - to include both the social and physical sciences - and mandate it to address the issues raised in this report and in other Working Group reports of this session. In practical terms the panel would form a number of ad-hoc sub groups, each focused on a specific issue or area. Much of the work of these ad-hoc groups could be undertaken by electronic means with an annual or semi-annual meeting of the panel to discuss the product of their work. The envisaged output would be a series of documents or essays providing clear guidance to the general public, national governments and international organisations on these issues that could be distributed by the WFS by both electronic and hardcopy means.

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6.

CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES TO QUANTIFICATION OF RISK WORKING GROUP SESSION

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CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES TO QUANTIFICATION OF RISK WORKING GROUP REPORT Working Group Participants: Professor Richard Wilson (Harvard University, USA): Chair Professor Charles Penn (Health Protection Agency, UK): Co-chair Professor John Adams (University College London, UK) Dr Olivia Bosch (International Institute for Strategic Studies, UK) Professor Robert Clark (University of Arizona, USA) Professor Axel Lehmann (Universitat der Bundeswehr, Germany) Professor Margaret Petersen (University of Arizona, USA) Dr William Sprigg (University of Arizona, USA) Dr Henning Wegener (Ambassador (ret.), Germany) INTRODUCTION This report comprises a summary of the discussion of the Working Group that considered cross disciplinary challenges to quantification of risk. Two key principles guided the Group’s discussion: (i) that the purpose of quantification of risk is to aid and inform decision making (priorities, resources, specific actions), and (ii) that we should seek to apply wherever possible existing methodologies and expertise, with appropriate modification to allow for new influences arising from the additional threat from terrorism. The necessity for risk quantification derives from finite resources on one hand, and a desire to preserve quality of life (including choice and freedom) on the other. Quantification of risk is only one part of an activity that needs to include estimation of the full cost of our responses to these risks. The overall goal is to develop meaningful quantification of all aspects of risk, of benefits, and of costs, so that decisions can be made (collective and individual) on a properly informed basis, and to avoid an exaggerated reaction through fear and misunderstanding. The most important issue is an attempt to quantify the probability of occurrence of different types of terrorist attacks (type, time and place). By the nature of the issue, it is hard to quantify, but unless attempts to do so are continually made, the importance of this will be swamped by the details arising from the more easily analysed aspects of the problem such as consequence assessments. We must avoid being the drunk who looks for his keys under the lamp post even though he dropped them a quarter of a mile away. The Group considered aspects of risk classification and definition only as an aid to discussion. Most of the discussion centred on identifying aspects of risk for which quantification is appropriate, leading to specific recommendations for development of quantification methods and for effective communication of understanding of risk and its acceptability. CLASSIFICATIONS OF RISK The value of classifications should be considered as an aid to understanding and to decision making, rather than an end in its own right. The classification of risk is also closely related to the aggregation of individual events into analysable groups (discussed below). For the purpose of this discussion, the Group considered two aspects of risk classification. First, a classification appropriate to dissect the various

153

154 aspects of risk classification. First, a classification appropriate to dissect the various manifestations of risk associated with the use of smallpox as a terrorist weapon, might be a distinction between directly perceived (evident) risks, risks that need to be quantified and defined through science, and risks that cannot be quantified (uncertainties, or virtual risks):

Likely temporal and spatial spread of Perceived through science

Caring for a smallpox patient

directly

Likelihood of smallpox reemergence

Across this classification can been laid a consideration of how the risk is quantified, which may be by use of: (i) historical data, (ii) new methodology, (iii) by analogy. These two considerations are not mutually exclusive, as the following table illustrates:

Evident Perceived through science Uncertain

Historical data

New Methodology

Analogy

U t-

+

+

??

?

+

An important distinction needs to be made between the estimated (quantified) risk, based on expert knowledge, method and data, and a perception of risk which is often based on no more that instinct or ‘gut reaction’. In this report the former (formally estimated) risk is described as objective risk, and the latter as perceived risk. CALCULATION OF RISK Actuarial consequence assessment We have good methodologies, and a track record, of formal risk assessment in a range of structures or environments (for example industrial complexes, nuclear

155 installations, chemical exposures). These methods allow us to put a [probability adjusted] value on the consequence of an event, There are some sectors, however, where greater attention is needed, such as the electrical, food and water distribution systems, and IT based communications systems. The additional complexity from networked infrastructures, with high connectivity and interdependencies, is considered further below. New risks, arising from new technologies, need to be assessed as they arise. These include impact of new molecular biology (genetic engineering), advances in engineering (miniaturisation, nanotechnology), information and communications technology, and new knowledge in human genetics and pharmacology. Any denial that a risk exists can be a bamer to the development of effective controls and response plans. This is particularly the case for high consequence, low probability events. The introduction of terrorism may change the previously estimated probability, and previously downplayed vulnerabilities need to be revisited. Probabilities can be temporal. A potential gap in current thinking may be the lack of allowance for such changes though revisions to existing assessments, or building temporal influences into existing calculations. The probability of a given type of attack can change with time. With the newer technologies, the probability can increase with time (e.g. miniaturisation leading to development of suitcase nuclear bombs), or decrease where new preventative technologies can be deployed. Probability of events One area that presents a particular difficulty for quantification is in estimating the likelihood of any one event occurring. That is, how to quantify in a meaningful way truly uncertain events (such as the likelihood of certain terrorist acts taking place). Our only current approach is to develop scenarios, based on experience and imagination, which we can then use as a basis for quantitative assessment of consequence. We cannot currently quantify the risk of any individual scenario becoming a reality. There is a need to develop methods for quantifying relative probabilities that build on more certain data (terrorists motivations, or access to technology or material may predispose for or against certain type of event). The group discussed two solutions to this challenge. First, the aggregation of scenarios with a common theme (e.g., response type, training, etc.) so that we can assess, in a more general way, the consequences and controls of an event type that is likely to happen (somewhere, sometime). Thus, we can assess a problem starting from a position where p is close to 1. The diagram below illustrates this concept. For example, the consequence of a catastrophic explosion or fire can be considered independently of the cause, and controls and response measures planned accordingly. Similarly, the impact of infectious disease outbreaks is similar whether of natural or deliberate origin. Conversely, there are aspects of counterterrorism that can be considered independently from the event type. An additional value in this approach comes from identifying common response measures that cost effectively improve our resilience (e.g. strengthening health services will have benefits well beyond those that apply only to protection ffom bioterrorism).

156 Controls, response measures and resources planned on basis of common features within each group

Controls, response measures and resources that as specific for counterterrorism, independent of the event type Second, some scenarios, currently downplayed as unquantifiable, can be quantified as bounded values. For example, in existing chemical and radiological risk assessments, the assumption is made of low dose linearity. While some scientists believe that this is a real representation of risk, even those who disagree accept that it is a reasonable upper bound. This is particularly crucial in the continual attempt to quantify the probability of different types of terrorist attack. Possible methods for analysing the problem include questioning former terrorists, and those in societies which are closer to those harbouring terrorists (closer for example than the societies from which the Working Group members are drawn). Others include study of possible psychological factors that may influence terrorists’ motives. Good (shared) intelligence data, combined with good technical assessments, should enable an estimation of the time and resources required to mount a certain kind of attack, leading to an ‘earliest likely’ time. A well developed understanding of terrorists’ motivation is key to this assessment, as it may be an indicator of the more likely types of attack, based on an estimate of their consequences. The following diagram illustrates the data types that can be estimated in undertaking these assessments:

157

Perception Perceived risk may be very much higher (or lower) than the objective risk. The cost of this gap may be very high - as was the case at the start of the year 2000 where the perceived risk of IT failure was high, with potentially high consequence. This perception contributed to the massive cost incurred before the [anticipated] event. We need to gain a better understanding of this gap. This is a major issue in the context of terrorism, as a heightened perception (and low acceptance) of risk associated with terrorism, means that events of relatively low physical (actuarial) consequence may nevertheless have a very high impact (e.g., anthrax mail). This also links to the subject of values (see below) where a disproportionate response, based on exaggerated perception of risk, may corrupt or undermine important values. Thirty years ago it was widely believed that as you inform people, their perception of risk should move closer to the ‘actual’ (or objective) risk calculated by experts. The evidence is that this does not happen. The Group considered that much could be learnt from the field of marketing, where the strategy is based on a quantifiable understanding of customer perceptions. These data are then used as the basis for a marketing plan, in which the seller seeks to modify the customer’s perception. Timescales may also be important in perception - events a long way off are often perceived as of lower risk (global warming, expansion of the sun). Conversely, events with a delayed impact (biological agents) have a greater impact on perception than immediate events (explosion) -you are either hit or not, but at least you know! Other paradoxes in risk perception that should be revisited to determine whether they can illuminate our assessment of terrorist risk include: (i) A sense of control over a risk may lead to a greater acceptance of that risk, yet major risks with no control (asteroid impact) lead to fatalistic acceptance.

158 (ii) Statistical data on risk are not necessarily relevant, or match perceptions (e.g., highest probability of death is when in bed asleep, yet this does not translate into a fear of sleep). There is a need to distinguish between the perception of risk, and the acceptance of risk (high acceptance does not equate with low perception). Along with these, we need to develop methods to understand and quantify why risks associated with terrorism are perceived to be so much greater that other risks, that are much more readily accepted by the public. (In almost every case, including 9/11, casualties from terrorism are generally less than annual accident rates or natural disasters). These considerations led the Group to conclude that methods are needed to quantify perceptions of risk in a meaningful way, and that there is a need to identify methods that can be used to relate these values to those obtained through objective assessments. Connectivitv. linkape and infrastructure The Group considered three important aspects arising from the interconnectivity and interdependency in infrastructures and systems: 1. Some vulnerabilities may arise from the complexity of infrastructure (e.g., connectivity of IT systems). Our ability to quantify risk, and indeed to mount effective operational prevention and response, may be compromised by a lack of knowledge of our own systems (this was evident in the response to the UK foot and mouth outbreak, where a lack of knowledge of the extent of animal movement exacerbated the outbreak early on). An important objective must be to ensure that those who need it have sufficient knowledge of our infrastructures and systems (and their interconnectivity), so as to properly assess vulnerabilities and consequences. This includes an understanding of core systems on which a society is excessively dependent (energy, e.g., electricity grids, fuel distribution systems, transport networks, food and water distribution, communications). 2. We need to allow for the fact that the act of risk assessment, risk management and communication may itself influence the risk (or change the terrorists’ choices of action). An illustration of this phenomenon comes from the introduction of improved brake systems on cars, which did not lead to the expected decrease in accidents because safer brakes were counteracted by riskier driving. Within a risk, addressing high vulnerabilities may lead the terrorist to focus on lesser ones. Across risks, effective management of risks may have a deterrent effect (a positive outcome) leading to redirection of terrorist action to other events. 3. A further extension of the linkage of events is an ability to quantify the likelihood, and consequences, of linked (synchronous) attacks. What tools or data do we have to determine which events might occur together, and which new consequences (or altered risk calculations) will arise from such synchrony? (E.g., hitting a fire station at the same time as an urban explosion, an attack on vaccine stockpile at the same time as a bioterrorist attack, or disruption to communications coincident with a chemical attack in a subway). This is not now an unprecedented concept. 9/11, and the Madrid rail attacks, are examples of synchronised multiple attacks. Inherent in these considerations is a vital need to understand how the

159 actions of terrorists change our traditional approaches to risk assessment conventionally independent events (with compounded probabilities) may become linked. Value consequence Risk benefit analyses may have different outcomes when applied to collective vs individual needs. Classical examples of this include the trade-off between benefits of vaccination and vaccine adverse events. When applied to the subject of terrorism, the issue is one of balance between security, and freedom or stability. We need to be able to quantify the risk of harm to societal values (such as freedom, economy, etc.) using comparable metrics to the quantification of both the actuarial and perceived impact of terrorism, so that a risk benefit analysis on controls and countermeasures can be undertaken. In addressing this issue, that different sectors of society (both nationally and globally) will have very different values, will introduce a level of complexity and contention. The Group recognised that this is a difficult area to cover in a meaningful and rigorous (scientifically valid) way. However the interrelationships between consequence, response, perception and values are such that an objective riskhosthenefit analysis needs to allow for all of these. Quantifying values presents a new challenge, as there are no recognised metrics for such (largely emotional) factors. Nevertheless, if choices are to be made between increased security, which may carry costs in freedom and privacy on the one hand, and acceptance of risk on the other, methods must be developed that help such choice on as well informed and as objective a basis as possible. Values are also likely to be a key driver of terrorist motivation, and the same tools that will help evaluate the impact of terrorism on values will be useful in understanding (and quantifying) terrorist motivation.

160 Summa Risk Area

Actuarial consequence assessment

table of aspects t Current position Good data and history in some environments, less in others

Probability of events, and definition of boundaries

Poorly quantified on an individual event basis

Perception of risk

Poorly mderstood, and lot quantified. hportance of ierception of isk in driving iehaviour is well recognised

Connectivity, linkage and infrastructure

[ndustrial systems have :valved to be iighly complex, with high levels If nterdependency. [n many cases hese are not well understood 4cknowledged n principle, as he trade-off Jetween security ind freedom

Value consequence

‘terrorist risk that n8 1 to be quantified: Feasibility Recommendations

Tools, methods and data are generally available for effective quantification Achievable with new approaches Key to quantifying probability of individual events is the motivation of terrorists, for which methodology and metrics are poorly developed

Conventional risk quantification methods not applicable. Other disciplines (such as marketing) have tools for measurement of perception Requires more complex methods, and broader thinking, but should be achievable

Likely to be exceptionally difficult, as requires new methods and metrics, and needs to cope with extremely diverse values in different social groups

Gaps need to be filled (e.g., power food and water distribution, IT networks)

1. Risk analysis, management and communication should be done on aggregated events, which have a collective probability of occurrence closer to 1. 2. More attention is needed on methods for quantifying risk of terrorist events, including the influence of motivation

Higher priority needs to be ziven to developing methods for quantifica 3f perceived risk, alonj :he [expert] objective r 3ssessments

bowledge of the exte nterconnectivity in nfiastructures and sysi ieeds to be improved

The feasibility o f leveloping new, effect nethods be considered

161 COMMUNICATION OF UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK An individual’s response to risk depends on their perception of the risk, reward, the level of choice they have, control over the situation, and the intent in the source of risk. In this context, terrorist acts score very low (control, choice, malign intent) leading to low tolerance of risk. In considering how best to communicate to the public a better understanding of risk and its acceptability, the group has identified the following key principles: 1. TRUST is critical. Data indicate that the public have a very low level of trust in Govemment/establishment scientists. Existing polls show higher levels of public trust in first responders, and in scientists who are independent, or aligned with advocacy groups (such as Greenpeace). Communication will be most effective when made from a position of [high] trust’. 2. Openness and transparency is important, but there is a [potential] conflict with the need to protect vulnerabilities [security]. Adopt the principle of explaining what is being withheld, and why, where full transparency is considered inappropriate. 3. Communication should be based on quantification of risk where possible, but this must be communicated in an open and meaningful way. The limits of quantijkation should be evident, and the language should be one that can be understood. Should take into account public perceptions and values. The principles of 4. communication are no different for a terrorist risk than for any other form of risk, but since terrorism (by definition) is attacking our values and playing on our perceptions [fears], the emphasis in the message needs to be adjusted accordingly. 5 . Risk should be communicated in the context of a broadly based risk, cost & benefit analysis, so that choices (collective and individual) can be made on an informed basis. Cost of both risks and responses to them need to be considered in monetary and value terms. 6. Communications should be targeted to the audience. Different audiences will include public (and within them different cultural and social groups, first responders, policy advisors, politicians, media). First responders are more likely to act on the advice of experts (objective risk), while the public are more likely to act on their own perceptions of risk. Communication is necessary on two timescales. First, before any incident, the public and public agencies need to be informed of what is known. Second, in the event of an incident, any first responder or other involved party needs to know which experts are willing to be consulted on a real-time basis.

RECOMMENDATIONS The following are the key recommendations from the Working Group. These recommendations follow the guiding principle that existing methodologies should be used and built upon: I As Abraham Lincoln wrote to Alexander McLure, “the trust of the people, if lost, is very hard to regain”.

162 A group or panel should be established, with the support of WFS, to develop a strategic plan to advance risk science so as to strengthen security. The work of this group should include: a) To publish an authoritative guide to existing methodologies, that should continue to be used as the basis for risk quantification. b) Analysis of a range of recent historical case studies, so that key lessons can be collated and communicated. This should include a review of risk methodologies used (or not used) in these cases. Scope requirements for better methodologies for quantifying the c) impact and influence of terrorist motivation, and for perception of risk. d) To identify the gaps in our current level of risk assessment, particularly in the area of previously downplayed risks, impact and subversion of new technologies, and interconnected infrastructures. e) To propose methods for quantifying values such as freedom and national economy, governance and stability. The concept of grouping events so as to allow effective risk management 2) at a level of greater certainty of risk (and therefore also of benefit) should be developed, communicated and adopted. 3) To adopt the six principles for effective communication described herein, these being: a) Communication will be most effective when made from a position of [high] trust. b) Openness and transparency is important. Adopt the principle of explaining what is being withheld, and why, where full transparency is considered inappropriate. c) Communication should be based on quantification of risk where possible. The limits of quantification should be evident, and the language should be one that can be understood. d) Should take into account public perceptions and values. e) Risk should be communicated in the context of a broadly based risk cost & benefit analysis, so that choices (collective and individual) can be made on an informed basis. Communications should be targeted to the audience. f) An international directory should be established of experts (across a range 4) of disciplines) who can be consulted in real time, should emergencies arise or be forecast. Finally, the Working Group recommends that for hture meetings invitations should be extended to younger students, so as to further broaden the basis for discussion, and to encourage future generations of scientists to engage in consideration of planetary emergencies. 1)

SCIENCE AND TERRORISM: CHALLENGES TO THE QUANTIFICATION OF THE RISKS OF TERRORISM

JOHN ADAMS University College London, London, U.K. On starting this paper, I typed "risk" into Google and got 47.7 million hits. Sampling a small fraction of the millions of websites on which the word is found will reveal that it means different things to different people. Many arguments could be eliminated Erom this literature if people were to be clear about the type of risk under discussion. Figure 1 presents a typology that I have found useful in clearing away some unnecessary arguments. Directly perceptible risks are managed using judgment - a combination of instinct, intuition and experience. We duck if we see something about to hit us and we do not undertake a formal probabilistic risk assessment before we cross the road. Other risks are perceived with the help of science. Physicists, chemists, biologsts, doctors, engmeers, statisticians, actuaries, epidemiologists have all helped us to see, and manage, risks that are invisible to the naked eye. There is a third much larger and more difficult category. Over 80 years ago Frank Knight in his classic work Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, distinguished between "risk" -when you know the odds, and "uncertainty" - when you don't. This latter category might be termed virtual risk. Terrorist threats fall into all three circles. Passengers on the London underground, urged to look out for suspect bags, and airport security personnel conducting finger-searches of passengers' luggage rely on direct perception. Science provides sensitive scanners, surveillance devices and passenger profiles to assist the separation of terrorists from the millions of innocent people with whom they mingle. But the greatest and most difficult threats of terrorism lie in the virtual circle; here we are in the realm of competing unconfirmable hypotheses. Figure I

Three kinds o f risk e g cholera need a microscopeto see it and a Perceived SClentlfiC training mde@ to through

directly

e.g. climbing a trce. nding a bike, driving car

Scientists don't know or cannot agree: e.g. BSE/VCID, global wamung, low-level radiation, VirtUal pesticide residues, HRT, mobile phones, passive smoking, stock market

Virtual risks are socially or culturally constructed - when science cannot settle an argument, people are liberated to argue from pre-established beliefs, convictions

163

164 and prejudices. They may, or may not be real, but beliefs about them have real consequences. And, as with directly perceptible risks, when dealing with them we are forced to fall back on judgment. When virtual risks get mistaken for risks about which science has clear and usehl advice to offer, much confusion results. Pretending we know the odds when we don't generates fruitless, often acrimonious, debate. MANAGING RISK Let us first look (Figure 2) at the management of directly perceptible risk. The model postulates that: Everyone has a propensity to take risks; This propensity varies from one individual to another; This propensity is influenced by the perceived rewards of risk taking; Perceptions of risk are influenced by experience of accident losses - one's own and others'; Individual risk-taking decisions represent a balancing act in which perceptions of risk are weighed against propensity to take risks; and Accident losses are, by definition, a consequence of takmg risks - to take a risk is to do something that has a probability of an adverse outcome - the more risks people take, the greater, on average, will be both the rewards they gain and the losses they incur. After an accident it is often observed, in head-shaking tones, that the person responsible did not understand the risk. But if one accepts the above definition of risk, it is possible to conclude that they did understand the risk - and their number came up. They were unlucky. Figure 2

The risk thermostat Money, power love, glory, food, sex, rushes of adrenaline, control ...

Money, health, life, status, self-esteem, embarrassment, jail, loss of control

Figure 2 describes risk management as a form of cost-benefit analysis without the $ signs. Certainly money can be a significant reward, and accidents can lead to its loss. But the "rewards" and "accidents" boxes are full of many other incommensurable variables. Control and loss of control are highlighted because they create particular difficulties. Consider the case of mobile phones. The risk associated with using a handset is contested but, according to the available literature', would appear to range

165 from tiny to non-existent. Measured in terms of radiation exposure, the risk associated with the base stations - unless one is up the mast with one's ear to the transmitter - is orders of magnitude less. Yet people are queuing up around the world in their billions to take the first, voluntary, risk, while almost all the opposition is focussed on the base stations, which are seen as impositions. What kills you matters. To the people living close to them, chemical plants and nuclear reactors are resented as imposed risks - unless you work there, in which case the risk is voluntary and usually perceived as much lower. But these are benign impositions - no one assumes the plant operators want to murder their neighbours. Terrorist threats are malignly imposed risks and their evil intent amplifies the perceived risk still further. The 191 people killed by the Madrid bombers on 11 March 2004 is equivalent to the number killed in road accidents in Spain every 12 or 13 days. The grief of families and friends one might suppose is similar in both cases. The latter tragedies usually merit only a few column inches in the local press. The former evoked three days of national mourning in Spain and a 3 minute silence all over Europe. Other examples: In the 25 "busiest" years of "the troubles" in Northern Ireland twice as many people died in road accidents as were killed by terrorists. Most people in England have never seen a report on television or in the press about a road accident in Northern Ireland. In Israel between 27 September 2000 and 26 September 2003, 622 civilian Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorists. The annual road death toll over this period was about 550. In the first half of October 2002, two people per day were killed in Washington and its suburbs. They were killed suddenly and without warning by a stranger they had never met. There was no discernible pattern in their age, sex or ethnicity. Their families and fnends grieved, but otherwise their fates attracted virtually no media attention. They were victims of road accidents. Over the same period, someone was killed every other day by the Washington Sniper. Again there was no discernible pattern amongst the victims chosen by the anonymous killer. Their fates attracted massive media coverage all around the world and led, far beyond the vicinity of their occurrence, to extraordinary changes in behaviour ranging from a massive policing operation to people jogging to their cars in zigzag patterns with their groceries in supermarket car parks. In 2003, worldwide, 23 Americans were killed by acts of terrorism (compared with 25 in 2002 and about 2800 in 2001). In each of these years about 42000 were killed on American highways. Figure 3 suggests the way in which acceptance of a given actuarial level of risk is likely to vary with the perceived level of control an individual can exercise over it and, in the case of imposed risks, with the perceived motives of the imposer. .

166 Figure 3 AmplEfication ofperceived risk

F ;k Amp1 cation

However, malign intent alone cannot account for the enormous resources devoted to countering the terrorist threat. In 2002 in the United States, 16,110 people were murdered, a statistic that evoked much less official concern than the threat of terrorism - a phenomenon to which I return below. VIRTUAL RISK AND PERCEPTUAL FILTERS At the time of Britain's BSE inquiry in 1998, Stanley Prusiner who was awarded a Noble Prize for the discovery of prions, when asked whether he had changed his diet since learning about BSE said: "I have worked in this field for 25 years ... did I go out and eat lamb chops, did I go out and eat lamb brain, sheep brain? The answer was 'no', but it was not based on scientific criteria, it was based on just emotion. ... At a scientific level I cannot give you a scientific basis for choosing or not choosing beef, because we do not know the answers." The fact that Prusiner had been trying and failing for many years to establish the reality of this risk was reason enough for me to place it a long way down my personal list of things to worry about. Perhaps I like steak more than Prusiner? Perhaps he is more alarmed about the potential damage that would result should the hypothesis linking BSE to vCJD be confirmed. The less conclusive the science, the more influential become the perceptual filters through which evidence about the rewards and risks must pass (Figure 4).2

167 Figure 4. The Risk Thermostat with Perceptual Filters

Figure 5 presents, in cartoon form, a typology filters. - of perceptual . . Hierarchists are committed to the idea that the management of risk is the job of authority - appropriately assisted by expert advisers. They often cloak their deliberations in secrecy or technical mumbo-jumbo because the ignorant lay public cannot be relied upon to interpret the evidence correctly or use it responsibly. They are extremely uncomfortable in the presence of virtual risk, because they are, supposedly, in charge of events; unpredictability makes them nervous. Individualists scorn authority as the "nanny state" and argue that decisions about whether to wear seat belts, drink, smoke or eat beef should be left to individuals and settled in the market. If science cannot settle the issue they advocate publishing everything that is known and letting the shopper decide. They are gamblers and optimistic pragmatists - if you cannot prove it's dangerous, assume it's safe. Egalitarians focus on the importance of trust; risk management should be a consensual activity; consensus building requires openness and transparency. They are advocates of the precautionary principle - if you cannot prove it's safe, assume it's dangerous. Fatalists (most of us most of the time) take whatever comes along. We buy lottery tickets and duck if we see something about to hit us. Oue sera, sera. (see endnoie 1 for more on this theme)

-

Fimre 5

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168 These caricatures can be found in recognizable form in numerous debates about risk. Britain's Health and Safety Executive, for example, is a statutory Hierarchist charged with making and enforcing rules relating to health and safety at work. It is routinely under attack from individualist leaders of industry for its bureaucratic strangling of free enterprise, and from consumer protection groups and environmental NGOs for not providing the public with enough protection. The military recognize them3. Armies, navies and air forces are inherently hierarchical institutions. In the top right-hand comer can be found Eisenhower and the General Staff concerned with discipline and logistical efficiency. Down the lower lefthand comer we find the individualistic mavericks of military history - the Nelsons, Pattons and Montgomerys - routinely at odds with the hierarchy, but rewarded with heroic status by history when their brilliance is accompanied by good luck - Napoleon famously preferred lucky generals. The fatalist comer has by far the greatest number of occupants; here we find the conscripts, the poor bloody infantry, the refugees and the civilian flotsam and jetsam of war. Finally the Egalitarians. As their label suggests, they are motivated by a communitarian ethic that places a high value on justice and fairness. Here we find conscientious objectors and freedom fighters - and terrorists. POLICING IN A HYPERMOBILE WORLD We now live in a hypermobile world in which unprecedented numbers of people routinely cross historic jurisdictional boundaries. Five characteristics of such a world that are relevant to a discussion of terrorism are: social polarization, anonymity, lowtrust, paranoia and fatalism4. In societies where few people know their neighbours, or the people they pass in the street, the strained relations between haves and have-nots generate more crime or fear of crime. Policing becomes more Orwellian. Orwellian is the only adjective that can be applied to the vision of the UK Department of Trade and Industry's Foresight Directorate. The Directorate's consultation document entitled "Just Around the Comer" surveys the potential for new technology to "create new opportunities for crime and crime prevention." It concludes with two scenarios. The first, "TECHies" (Teleworking Executives Co-Habiting) is the Directorate's optimistic scenario, in which advances in crimeprevention technology out-pace advances in crime-promotion technology. It might best be described as 1984 with a Brave New World gloss - but which appears oblivious to Huxley's satirical intent. It depicts a world in which identity theft is kept in check by all-pervasive surveillance technology, DNA fingerprinting, odour detectors and probabilistic profile matching. The second "socially exclusive" scenario is less cheerful - 1984 without the gloss: most people live in walled estates and don't venture out much because "all public space is potentially hostile." With the rising tide of refugees and the destruction of the World Trade Center by terrorists, the Foresight Directorate's grim vision is acquiring a global reach. Gated communities are being superseded by gated nations. This high-tech policing, decried by civil libertarians, is an inescapable cost of hypermobility. The alternative is ineffectual policing. If terrorists and criminals avail themselves of modem means of mobility - physical and electronic - and the forces of law and order do not keep pace, the latter become impotent. Low-trust, and its partner paranoia, foster an attitude toward Big Brother that is at best ambivalent. We are fearful of the lurking, anonymous suicide bomber,

169 yet resentful of the FBI reading our emails and having access to our library borrowing records. Hypermobility generates fatalism. As we spread ourselves ever wider and thinner in our social and economic activities, the geographical scope of political authority must expand in order to keep pace with the growing size of the problems that require governing, or government becomes impotent. Political authority migrates up the hierarchy from Town Hall to Whitehall, to Brussels and ultimately to completely unaccountable institutions like the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. Individuals have diminishing influence over the decisions that govern their lives. Fewer bother to vote. Fatalism can generate very different kinds of behaviour. The apathy of the nonvoter in the affluent West might be called comfortable fatalism. There is a less comfortable form. The conditions of life for most displaced and dispossessed refugees render them fatalistic - but also resentful. Here we find potential recruits to terrorist causes. In terms of the typology presented in Figure 5 we can find involvement in terrorism in each of the other quadrants. There are state sponsors of terrorism (Hierarchists) and cynical entrepreneurs who deal in contraband arms (Individualists). But it is the ideologically driven inhabitants of the Egalitarian quadrant who provide most of the leaders, planners and foot-soldiers of terrorist movements. They are not, characteristically, the most deprived and disadvantaged of those they claim to represent, but identify strongly with the injustices suffered by their fatalistic constituents. A faith that can offer the rewards of martyrdom to those who sacrifice their lives for a cause that promises to right grievous wrongs provides them with a potent means of empowering the downtrodden fatalistic majority. TERRORIST TARGETS Until recently terrorists could be relied upon to choose iconic targets. But as these have become better protected, they have begun conferring iconic status on more mundane targets - such as bars in Bali and commuter trains in Spain. This makes the selection of victims more random, as in road accidents, or murder. If random acts of terror continue, or increase, might we become more fatalistic about them, and begin to treat them with the same indifference with which, as a society, we react to road accidents? The contrast between the response of Britons who have lived through the blitz and many years of the threat of the IRA,and that of more anxious Americans who are new to such threats - with their draconian suppression of traditional human rights at Guantanamo Bay and with the Patriot Act - provides some support for the hypothesis. Terrorism confronts target governments with the challenge of devising a proportionate response, Risk aversion is not cost free. The Patriot Act, the U S . Department of Justice proclaims “has played a key part in a number of successful operations to protect innocent Americans from the deadly plans of terrorists dedicated to destroymg America and our way of life.” But as the American Civil Liberties Union observes “Many parts of this sweeping legislation take away checks on law enforcement and threaten the very rights and freedoms that we are struggling to protect. For example, without a warrant and without probable cause, the FBI now has the power to access your most private medical records, your library records, and your student records... and can prevent anyone from telling you it was done.”5

170 The contrast referred to above between the response of the American Government to terrorists, and to other killers, such as motorists and murders who claim far more victims, would appear, at least in part, to be explained by the threat that terrorists pose to the social order - and to those who purport to maintain it. Murderers and careless drivers are not seen as threats to the ability of the government (the Hierarchy) to govern. TERRORISM: CAN THE RISKS BE QUANTIFIED? Risk is commonly defined in the literature on quantitative risk assessment as the product of the probable frequency of a particular event and the magnitude of its consequences, sometimes discounted by economists to allow for the distance in time before which the event is thought likely to happen. This is the approach with which companies who offer insurance against damage inflicted by terrorists are currently struggling. They are responding to the enormous uncertainties inherent in the task by charging greatly increased premiums, capping their liability or withdrawing from the market. But the insurance industry’s task is easy compared to the challenge of quantifying all the other non-monetizable risks - social, political, macro-economic, military, religious - embodied in the word terrorism. Risk is inherently subjective. It is a word that refers to the future, and that exists only in the imagination. Terrorism is, above all, a virtual risk. It comes with no adequate actuarial databases to assist the process of estimating the frequency of its future occurrence, and no agreed set of units by which its imagined consequences might be measured. Can the risks of terrorism be quantified? No. TERRORISM AND THE ROLE OF SCIENCE Peter Medawar in The Art of the Soluble observed: “gpolitics is the art of thepossible, research is the art of the soluble. Both are immensely practical minded aflairs. Good scientists study the most important problems they think they can solve (my italics). It is, after all, their professional business to solve problems, not merely to grapple with them.“ For both politicians and scientists, terrorism would appear destined to remain in the grappling category. Our terrorists are their freedom fighters, and they also employ scientists. Terrorism is a reflexive phenomenon whose future course will depend on vast numbers of interactions, and reactions, in a complex web that, in a hypermobile world, contains all the world’s people, who view terrorism and its threats - and promises -through a variety of incompatible perceptual filters. REFERENCES I A. Burgess (2004) Cellular Phones, Public Fears, and a Culture of Precaution. Cambridge UP. ’For more on this theme see J Adam, Risk, UCL Press 1995,and Risky Business, Adam Smith Institute, 1999;on line at http://www.adamsmith.org/oolicviDublications/pdf-~les/risk~-business.~df Available on request: a PDF file ofa Powerpoint presentation - Does the Royal Navy have enough accidents? The Modem Warship - management of safety in war and peace International Conference, London 24 - 26 November 1999. Hypermobility for Royal Society for the Arts httu://www.rsa.org.uWacrobat/hyuermobilitv.udf http://www.aclu.orgiSafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12126&c=207

COUNTER-TERRORISM POST MADRID SHARING AND UNSCR 1540

2004: INFORMATION

OLIVIA BOSCH Royal Institute of International Affairs, UK This chapter will explore the roles played by the intelligence community and the law enforcement agencies in predicting and preventing terrorism and, when this fails, in mitigating terrorism’s effects. Issues of information acquisition, sharing and analysis underpin risk assessment and mitigation, and much of this information is intelligence-based. The nature of intelligence, and the impact of pressures to share this information internationally and with recipients who are not solely governmental, raise new issues of information accountability for the intelligence community and responsibility for the recipients. The inner workings of law enforcement and intelligence agencies in their dealings with national security issues such as terrorism have increasingly become the subject of public attention since the terrorist attacks in the U S . on 11 September 2001. Some of their work was exposed in recent public inquiries such as the U.K. parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs report on the Decision to Go to War in Iraq, the U.K. Hutton Inquiry and, in the US, the proceedings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission). Following the terrorist attacks on Madrid’s commuter railway system on 11 March 2004, the emergency meeting of the European Union Justice and Home Affairs Ministers on 19 March, and the subsequent EU summit on the 25-26 March, reaffirmed the need to implement counter-terrorism measures that had been agreed some time earlier and also recommended new areas of counter-terrorist cooperation. These inquiries and meetings, and arrests of persons alleged to have trafficked or been in possession of WMD related materials, also highlighted growing governmental concern about the potential convergence between ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD)’ capabilities and their potential use by terrorists. This is not a new concern per se2 but came to the fore again prior to the war in Iraq during March and April 2003. The U.S. Administration has already announced in December 2002 the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and on 31 May 2003 the international Proliferation Security Initiative, both of which involve interdiction as a main counter-proliferation strategy. In a similar vein, the UN Security Council has now passed Resolution 1540, on 28 April 2004, committing all member States to prevent the proliferation of WMD and related materials, and their means of delivery to non-state actors, particularly for terrorist purpose^.^ Some implications of the resolution’s implementation will be examined in this chapter. Many of the approaches by the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to predicting security and terrorist incidents and dealing with their aftermath have been studied and practiced for decades4 and remain unchanged. There is value in understanding the historical dimensions of this study and practice as a baseline from which to consider possible future changes. The EU reaffirmation of the need to implement earlier counter-terrorism measures, especially those introduced following the attacks in the U S . on 11 September 2001, indicates the importance of addressing non-implementation issues, as they may be as, if not more, important than the creation of new or reactionary legislation of the kind that often follows a crisis to demonstrate that political action has been taken.

171

172

INTELLIGENCE Assessing where future security problems might occur and communicating such concerns to policy makers are among the main roles of the intelligence community. Intelligence services collect and analyse information about threats, risks and the intentions of real or perceived adversaries, including but not exclusively their military forces and weapons technologies. Intelligence is also defined as a process by which information is systematically made available to government officials in a suitable form to meet their needs.5 By definition, adequate information about these threats is hard to obtain, as has been demonstrated by the difficulty Western intelligence agencies experienced in penetrating or gaining information about the inner circle of the former regime in Iraq, particularly with respect to its intentions regarding WMD. Reliable information is also difficult to obtain if the adversaries themselves are not sure of their intentions, though that indecision itself might be informative. Intelligence information does not have the scientific accuracy that can be verified through repeated experiments. An assessment of an adversary’s intentions and capabilities often rests on an assemblage of fragmentary and varied evidence. By definition, information that relies only on one (the so-called single-) source is unlikely to be strictly verifiable even though it may be the most intelligence-rich. In the absence of sufficient data to give a completely coherent picture, a range of possible intentions and capabilities rather than a definitive interpretation might be presented if not prescribed. Customarily, this range necessarily includes a worse case scenario. The way information is shared and processed even within the intelligence community is also affected by varying national cultures and government agency organisational structures6 As a simplified example, in the UK, intelligence assessments are the result of accumulated consensus views, amved at jointly between the various agencies and coordinated in the Cabinet Office, whereas in the U.S. multiple assessments are made with competition between agencies resulting in one of them becoming the final product.’ The intelligence services do not make policy decisions about what is done with the intelligence they provide. There is, however, the temptation to tailor analyses to accommodate what policy makers want to hear. The nature of the topics they study and assess is political, however hard intelligence agencies might try to be apolitical. It is also the case that policy makers may disregard what is produced even if it turns out to be correct, for a number of reasons. These may include perceptions based on information not derived from the intelligence community, for example, preconceived prejudices, belief that the intelligence community product is biased, or possession of information only available to officials at the highest level of government. Regarding the war in Iraq, in the absence of hard information about the former regime’s WMD intentions and capabilities, and in light of the former regime’s defiant behaviour and non-compliance witn UN Security Council resolutions (under Chapter VII) in the runup to the March 2003 conflict, the U S . and U.K. governments made the judgement call to go to war in part because they could not risk the worse-case scenario: that Iraq both possessed and would further develop its WMD capability, and that such capabilities would be made available to terrorists. The difficulties faced by the intelligence community in making their assessments can be seen to be similar to those faced or experienced by, for example, investigative journalists who also have to analyse piecemeal and not easily accessible information and come up with the most likely or plausible scenario, and by scientists in search of new physical particles, new planets and other elusive targets, though in

173 the latter case, dealing with inanimate objects means there is no interactive feedback to make the process of assessment even more difficuk8 INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES When attempts to forestall terrorism fail, intelligence and other information have to serve very different purposes. It has to aid efforts by the emergency services to mitigate the effects of an attack and restore daily services, and by the law enforcement agencies to maintain public law and order. It also has to meet public information demands. However much the public is informed of an imminent threat: public reactions and expectations are likely to differ from those of the intelligence community. These public concerns, and the possibility of overreaction or perceived irrational reactions, must be taken into account by the emergency services and law enforcement agencies when plans are made to deal with a possible terrorist incident. Knowledge of an imminent, or even potential terrorist attack might, for example, induce reactions such as hoarding, and these are like to vary according to cultural expectations of normality or quality of service. For example, anticipation of disruption of computer systems by the Year 2000 (YZK) roll-over problem at the turn of the century prompted some in the U.S. to buy generators, and hoard money and food. In some developing countries, however, the public did very little, as electricity outages, and similar disruptions occur frequently and thus YZK-induced outages would not have been out of the ordinary. In both cases, public reactions varied widely within a broad range of what might have been expected. Another example exemplifying the difficulty of sharing intelligence became evident during the inquiry of the U.S. 9/11 Commission, when it emerged that law enforcement and the intelligence community had each had information about some of the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks before they took place, but had not shared it. While the Commission is expected to produce a final report by the end of July 2004, it was suggested preliminarily that this information, disaggregated, was deemed not to have had sufficient detail or value to share or act upon. Evidence gathered by the law enforcement agencies for use in any resultant prosecution, unlike intelligence, has to be exacting or solid enough to stand up in court. Since intelligence is not, primarily, gathered for the purpose of prosecuting cases, there is an inherent tension between the requirements of law enforcement agencies after the fact, and intelligence agencies before. Terrorism prosecutions do not invariably take place, and still more rarely rely on intelligence for evidence. But information acquired during the preparation of cases can still usefully be fed back to other agencies to enhance future assessments, based on a balance of probabilities, and fill some intelligence gaps. An iterative process of data feedback after crises helps to build a longer term strategic picture of a possible adversary or problem. Some information, conversely, may have short term or tactical value. How this information is shared between the intelligence community and the law enforcement agencies, however, depends on processes and structures in place, which vary among states. Ordinary intelligence on some topics, such as international drug cartels, may be of common interest to several agencies and, while it could often be too vague to be introduced as trial evidence, or even have operational value, its dissemination is likely to be helpful for strategic planning. There is another type of information sharing which, being mandatory, potentially draws away resources from investigating or averting incidents. This is

174 known as exculpatory dissemination and is the requirement that intelligence agencies produce any information that may be relevant and helpful to a defence counsel. It places intelligence agencies in the awkward position of having to provide information, that if not ‘sanitised’, risks disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, but if sanitised may not be acceptable as evidence and thus the prosecution has to be dropped. Knowing this, defence counsels have an incentive to seek ways to include classified information in their defence. In increasingly litigious societies, pressure for the intelligence community routinely to identify and disseminate case-oriented tactical intelligence relevant to federal investigations means there is a risk that they will adopt time-consuming law enforcement procedures for maintaining detailed records for use in court, a process that in turn might erode the distinction between the communities,” and draws away resources from other intelligence activities. CHALLENGES TO INFORMATION SHARING AND ACQUISITION The ‘information age’ provides new challenges to intelligence agencies to leverage or become up to date with the processes of information collection, analysis and transmission that are already in use in the private sector, and which have effectively led to competition from the private sector in the provision of data to policy makers.” These new processes include means of sifting out the key information from the data deluge for conducting risk analysis, and the major terrorist screening and identities database projects now being established aim to facilitate this. The desire to collect more or all information about any particular issue might on the surface appear helpful to prevention efforts, but alone it is not a substitute for good analysis.12Issues still to be dealt with also include report standardisation and data protection and privacy requirement^,'^ which become even more complicated when information is to be shared internationally with countries that have different perspectives on data protection and privacy. With security threats increasingly operating in both international and domestic arenas, pressures for information sharing at the international level have increased. The March 2004 EU meetings and summit called for an EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to facilitate the flow of information between European countries on issues regarding terrorism. Each country’s concerns about national means and methods are an expected hindrance to this flow, but experience in other international forums suggests that access to compartmentalised data and open source material and imagery, and sharing of data analysis can together go some way to improve cooperation in a multinational entityI4 such as the EU. Increased sharing of information between the law enforcement and the intelligence communities has also been prompted in the U.S. by measures in the September 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6) and accompanying MOU on the Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism. These called for the establishment of a Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency effort administered by the FBI, where several watch lists would be consolidated into a single terrorist screening database. A consolidated list was initiated by the July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, which stated that the list would be “fully accessible to all law enforcement officers and the intelligence c o t n t n ~ n i t y ” In . ~ ~this case it would appear that sharing means equal access. Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, there has also been reconsideration at least in the U.S. of the role of human intelligence (HUMINT) as a source of information not easily captured by the technical means upon which the U.S. has

175 become reliant. Additionally, criminals and other adversaries have increasingly found creative means to evade national technical means.I6 UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 (2004): WMD NONPROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM The judiciaries and decision-makers of governments have required training about new technological developments to understand and handle legal cases increasingly involving more technologically complex aspects. This requirement is likely to increase following new pressure for states to legislate against activities that might assist proliferation of WMD to non-state actors, set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). This resolution decided that all States must refrain from supporting non-state actorsI7 who attempt to acquire, use or transport weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, or related WMD materials, particularly for terrorist purposes. In accordance with national procedures, States are to adopt and enforce domestic laws and other controls prohibiting non-state actors from making, acquiring and conducting other activities to obtain or use WMD. The resolution is binding on all States in accordance with Article 25 of the UN Charter. As the resolution also comes under Chapter VII of the Charter, this means that obligations are legally binding, and it sets out non-military and military avenues of enforcement in its Articles 41 and 42. Though there are no specific enforcement mechanisms in UNSCR 1540, Articles 9 and 10 call for states to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation of WMD, and, “in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking” in WMD, their means of delivery and related materials. These potential actions can be seen to complement the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) of May 2003, which focuses on the more proactive practical steps of interdiction of WMD and related materials at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI was reinforced in September 2003 and, in February 2004, the U.S. Administration called for PSI participants and additional nations to use Interpol and other law enforcement mechanisms to pursue proliferators. The main value of Resolution 1540 (2004) is in closing the gap that the longstanding WMD treaties have not been able to address: concerns about WMD and related materials being obtained by non-state actors for terrorist purposes. The resolution also sets a norm and a legally binding international standard against which non-state violators can be held to account. Being universally binding, there is an implication that the resolution imposes on States a requirement to adopt new national legislation in an area where there has been no negotiation and which might be viewed as placing an additional burden on already scarce resources. Intelligence information which was compartmentalised previously with respect to non-state actors who might be regarded as potential terrorists on the one hand, and the technologies associated with Wh4D related materials and delivery means on the other, now need to be brought together and also considered for use in international contexts. The resolution does not, however, interfere with or replace existing obligations under WMD treaties, but calls upon States “to develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws”. This may require companies and other entities to take additional measures to those they already have in place to comply with existing WMD treaties and export control regimes, while companies exporting materials at volumes below existing negotiated thresholds need to become aware of the new resolution and the new requirements that

176 are likely under the new domestic legislation. Failing and weak states that may be conduits for illegal goods, including materials related to WMD, are now required to adopt national legislation to criminalise any activities associated with the proliferation of WMD to non-state entities. The technological, political and security dimensions of these issues require continued vigilance by the intelligence community but now other sectors of society must also contribute to this role. The UN resolution provides an avenue to facilitate the sharing of relevant information not only between law enforcement and the intelligence community but also between them and a much wider range of entities in the private and public sectors. Efforts to implement the resolution would also complement many other initiatives already proposed. These include not only proposals from the March EU meetings and summit regarding intelligence sharing and analysis and the role of the new EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, but also earlier measures set out by the post-9/11 UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and related UN resolutions and by the Proliferation Security Initiative. How the many related initiatives interact, and how the accompanying intelligence requirements and information sharing across a wider range of actors will be met responsibly, remains to be seen and further developed.

REFERENCES I WMD is used as short-hand for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capabilities, whether tactical or strategic. Richard A. Falkenrath, ‘Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism’, Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998),pp. 43-65;Bruce Hoffman, ‘Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses’, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4,No. 3 (Spring-Summer 1997),pp. 45-53 at URL ~http://cns.miis.edulpubs/npr/vol04/43~offma43.pdB; Brad Roberts (ed.), Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997). UN Security Council, UNSCR 1540 (2004), “on-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’, at URL ~http://www.un.orglDocs/sc/unsc~resolutionsO4.h~~. AbramN. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World oflntelligence, 31d edn. (Washington, D. C.: Brassey’s, Inc, 2002); Michael Herman, IntelZigence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University PressRoyal Institute of International Affairs, 1996); Shulsky, Silent Warfare, p. 1. Roy Godson (ed.), Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., USSR, U.K. and the Third World (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1988). Pauline Neville-Jones (former Chairman, U.K. Joint Intelligence Committee), U.K. Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on the Decision to Go to War in Iraq, Examination of Witness, 18 June 2003, Q351-352, at URL ~http://www.publications.parliament.ukipalc~OO203/c~elect/cmfa8 13/30618p03.htm>. The author thanks John Adams for this latter point; he is author of Risk (London: Routledge (imprint of Taylor &Francis Books, Ltd), 1995). Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘MI5 chief goes online to detail terror threat’, The Guardian (London), 1 May 2004,p. 11. lo Stewart A. Baker, ‘Should Spies be Cops?’ Foreign Policy, No. 97 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 44-46. I ’ Shulsky, Silent Warfare, p. 7. Dafna Linzer, ‘U.S. Intelligence Gathering Reviewed’, Associated Press, 13 September 2001. ” Privacy issues were raised with the aborted ‘Terrorism (originally Total) Information Awareness’ (TIA) program proposed by the U S . Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. TIA was designed to help national security analysts track and prevent terrorist attacks by examining patterns in email and a large range of financial, medical, intelligence and other automated databases. Privacy advocates criticised the program for its potential use “on American citizens without the due process given more conventional surveillance technologies”, see Matthew French, ‘DARF’A ignored privacy issues’,

’

177 FCW.COM (Federal Computer Week online) (December 30, 2003), at URL ~http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/1229/web-dodig12-30-03.asp> and for the countervailing perspective see Matthew French, ‘Researchers still defending terror program’, FCW.COM (September 30,2003), at URL ~http://www.fcw.com/fcw/~icles/2003/0929/web-tia-09-30-03 .asp>. Extensive data mining is conducted by many U.S. government programs, as well as by industry, and future counter-terrorist programmes will aim to avoid the controversy of TIA; see William J. Krouse, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL32366 (April 21, 1.pdP. 2004), at URL < http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/3282 l 4 Tim McCarthy, ‘Intelligence in arms control and disarmament’, in Trevor Findlay (ed.), Verification Yearbook 2000 (London: VERTIC, ZOOO), p. 261. Is William J. Krouse, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL32366 (April 2 1, 2004), p. CRS-2. l6 Clifford Beal and Andrew Koch, ‘Chronic HUMINT underfunding blamed for security failures’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 12 (19 September 2001), p. 4; ‘Bin Laden’s telecommunications network outperforms US’, Agence France Press, 14 February 2001. ” According to Falkenrath, ‘non-state actors’ include “traditional, familiar terrorist organisations; paramilitary guerrilla groups fighting for control of territory; cults and other religious organisations; militias or other geographically fixed paramilitary groups; organised-crime syndicates; mercenary groups; breakaway units of a state’s military, intelligence or security services; corrupt multinational corporations; and lone individuals”, p. 62, fn. 4.

QUANTIFYING TERRORISM: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGE. FROM PRECISE TO SPECULATIVE, FROM OBJECTIVE TO SUBJECTIVE: WHERE DOES THE RISK OF TERRORISM BELONG? RICHARD WILSON Department of Physics, Harvard University, Boston, USA

In all interdisciplinary activities it is especially important to be sure that we are talking about the same subject. That is one reason why scientists insist on precise definitions and careful use of units. The problem starts even with the word ‘‘Risk”. Crouch and Wilson argue that a risk can exist independently of the estimate of the risk and of the perception of the risk. It is what might happen. It is this “true” risk that I wish, and I hope that society wishes, to reduce as we go forward. The estimate of the risk by experts or layman is distinct from this. It may or may not be close to the “true” risk. So also is the perception of the risk that brings in more elements for discussion. We also argue that both the risk estimate and the risk perception of an expert are more likely to approach the true risk than the estimate or perception of a layman. But a layman often is the person making the decisions, so this puts an obligation and duty on the expert to explain his estimate and his perception in a clear way - or his perception may have no use whatsoever. But inversely it puts an extraordinary obligation on the decision maker to understand the way the risk is calculated, and its uncertainties, as much as he can. In this, many disciplines can add their insights. When terrorism is involved, these obligations dominate the discussion. I suggest that it is this last endeavor that should occupy our minds during much of this seminar. Crouch and Wilson discussed uses of the word “Risk” without being so bold as to define the word. Their use, and the use here, is close to the second meaning in the Oxford English Dictionary: “the chance of hazard or loss”. They go further. They assume that “risk”, although changing with time and place, and changing also with available information and as events unfold, is a quantity that exists independently of the estimate or perception and that many risks are only perceived dimly. I make a further assumption that the assessment and perception of an “expert” risk assessor is likely to be closer to the real risk than the assessment or perception of an inexpert or “layman”. Risks are objective. It is what might happen. I call it objective, in the sense that there exists a real world out there, and we can observe it. A risk estimate is what we calculate may happen, and is conditional on the data available. It is also objective in the sense that any observer with the same set of information will calculate the same number. In some cases risk estimates can be very precise. The risk that my opponent has picked, four aces as the first four cards in a shuffled pack, can be calculated precisely. The estimate is very close to the true risk and so is the expert’s perception. Although a layman may not be able to figure out how to calculate it, he usually has no difficulty accepting the calculation of the expert, and his perception may also be close, although even here there is a $30 billion industry catering to those people who think that they can “beat the odds”. The chances of astronomical occurrences can also be calculated very well. But the risk as calculated (assessed), or merely perceived without calculation, by different individuals may differ because of different available information. Risks of railroad accidents can also be calculated quite well, although here the knowledge of an

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expert in railroad statistics, and what they mean, can influence perception greatly. For example, the accidents when rails broke and bent at Hatfield and Potters Bar influenced my perception - for a while I thought that British railroads were more dangerous than those in the rest of Europe. But at the PSAMS 6 meeting in Puerto Rico in 2002, there was a paper showing that when all the statistical data are used, the opposite is true. British railroads are safer! I argue therefore that the risk exists; objective risk estimates are possible (anyone with the same information will get the same answer); but perception is subjective. The estimation of the risk of failure of a dam in a reservoir is more difficult. The failure can have serious consequences. The dam above western Los Angles gave way after 3 hours; but the small leak it started out as gave all but half a dozen people a chance to get out. Calculation of any risk necessitates a model of which perhaps the simplest is “next year will be like last year”. Even then the calculation of the probability of a dam failure may need a knowledge of the historical data and can be conditional. Consideration of a terrorist makes it more complicated still. He might destroy such a dam and it might then fail far faster than the three hours and kill many people. The risk of this happening demands a quantity we do not know - the probability of attack by a saboteur or terrorist. Some of the more important risks in life are far less well calculated. The risk of death or disease by exposure to low levels of radiation, arsenic in drinking water, or air pollution, all depend on what happens at low doses. The calculation, even by an expert, involves assumptions, and experts disagree on the right ones. This difference is an uncertainty in the risk estimate. However, if an expert accepts another expert’s assumptions he will make the same risk estimate. Of course, from my point of view, “MY” opinion is the correct one. I am willing, however, as a gesture, to think about yours, but his opinion is out of the question! Even the perception of the expert has considerable subjective elements, and the risk as perceived by a layman is even more subjective. I emphasize the above distinctions because they have been ignored and even denied by some social scientists. However, I believe that these distinctions become especially important when it comes to decisions on reducing risks. On this point I have always insisted that a comparison of risks can be very helpful in pointing out that the risks of some technologies have common uncertainties, and that calculating them separately, and presenting them one by one to a decision maker can lead to less optimal decisions. Engineers, and other physical scientists have made major strides in the last 30 years in understanding how to assess risks. These strides have been reflected in their ability to make life ever safer. But in the understanding of the perception of risks, other disciplines than the engineering and physical sciences have always been involved. Why do people perceive that some risks are bigger than the number that assessors state? Why do people ignore some risks that a risk assessor insists exist? I particularly like the work on perception of risks by Tversky, whose associate Kahneman won the Nobel prize in economics for showing that people are consistently illogical in their perception of risks, and Aaron Wildavsky who in his book “Zero risk is the biggest risk of all” explained the dangers of believing that zero risk is possible. I believe that this is crucial in explaining safety and its inverse, risk, to the general public. Important too is the work by Kasperson and Slovic on “Social Amplification of Risk”. But this work still has not answered my

180 questions of 30 years ago on whether and how these perceptions may be influenced for them to come closer to the true risk, so that decisions made about risky situations may be better informed. That is an aim I consider to be desirable although I freely admit that not all people do consider it to be desirable. Crouch and Wilson considered it to be the duty of a Risk Assessor to provide his best estimate of risk when he is asked, together with all the uncertainties. He or she must not use (or imply) the phrase that is so common when a scientist or anyone else testifies at a Congressional committee “give me $1,000,000 a year for 5 years and I will have the answer for you.” He must give the answer when asked. It is then clear that a statement of uncertainty is crucial to any useful discussion of risk. When the uncertainty is moderate and easily quantified, it can be included by stating a range of numbers. But large uncertainties are best pulled out and separately stated. I, for example, have learned to separate the uncertainty of “low dose extrapolation” of the effects of substances on people. I state separately the risk number from using Taylor’s theorem - “low dose linearity”, and from using a threshold below which there is no effect - “zero”. Although there is heated argument about which of these is correct, and I have my personal opinion, (which is obviously the right one!), as a risk assessor I must state both in any report to a decision maker. Yet politicians often ask for a definite inclusive answer - which they can blame on the risk assessor if anything goes wrong. It is tempting to provide a definite answer and even slant the uncertainties in the direction the politician prefers. We all do this at times, but in doing so the assessor fails his profession. Most of the estimates of risk in society have not included sabotage or terrorism - a fact that I have decried for 25 years. I have been concerned particularly for energy facilities which I have always felt are vulnerable. How should we include the sabotage or terrorism in the assessments? How does this affect the difference between risk perception and the risk assessment and the “true” risk? What disciplines should be brought to bear? In this the most difficult point is to define what we mean by a terrorist. This I discussed at the Seminar on Global Emergencies in August 2002 in Erice and I will not repeat the discussion here. But the difference between the perception of a risk and the “true” risk is clearly larger for a terrorist act than for a natural disaster. What is the difference between an act of “Terrorism” and a hurricane? From the point of view of those who are killed, I suggest there is objectively little or no difference. From the subjective point of view of a survivor, there seems to be a large difference. Is the difference due to predictability, target selection, damage estimates, historical information, all or none of these? This subject needs extensive exploration, and several groups have begun this. The results are necessary for a proper allocation of resources. I argue that it is sensible to adopt a scenario and “event tree” approach to the calculation. This was pioneered in the Reactor Safety Study (Rasmussen report) in 1975. Over the 29 years since event tree analysis was formally introduced, there has been considerable progress in quantifying the risk - and the main uncertainty is still the last one in the chain - “what is the effect of radiation at low doses?” Sabotage was always considered to some extent. What can a saboteur do? In a discussion with Professor Norman Rasmussenjust after the accident at Three Mile Island, he stated (and I agreed) “there is nothing a saboteur can do, that these clowns did not do on their own.” In this technology, the primary action a saboteur can take is to increase the probability of one of the steps in the event tree. This will not, in itself, cause a major accident with attendant

181 casualties. The other steps will stop the accident. In the language of the analyst: he looks for the “low probability, high consequence” accident scenario and makes it more probable but not certain. One task for someone combating terrorism is, therefore, to examine the accident analyses that have already been performed to look for places where a saboteur might have an effect and to stop him. The example of accidents in nuclear power reactors is instructive. The technology was set up with what the old AEC called: “defense in depth”. One imagines the “maximum credible accident”, or set of accidents, and engineers a safety system to prevent any adverse consequences. Then a containment vessel contains any released radioactivity and the plant is placed in a less populated area. Attempts are made to ensure that each of these steps is statistically independent of the others so that probabilities of failure multiply. In the traditional event tree approach, one tries to break down the problem into separable parts so that each is statistically independent. Then the probabilities multiply, and if reasonably small, the overall probability is negligible. This works quite well for nuclear power plant accidents, and coupling between the separate parts (common mode failures) can be identified and highlighted. But a saboteur can couple otherwise independent events. In my lecture notes of 28 years ago, I suggested a saboteur who is intelligent and has patience. He takes the MIT course on reactor safety and joins a power company. He knows the weak points. He smuggles two bombs, and plants one on the reactor coolant hot leg setting a “double-ended guillotine break”. Then he personally disables the ECCS system, and sets the bomb off. Escaping the plant in the general panic as the meltdown occurs, he sets another bomb by the side of the containment and opens a hole for the gases to escape. All done at a time when the wind is blowing toward a major city. This scenario, of course, is fanciful. But I was restrained in my supposition. I had not anticipated a group of saboteurs. Then it would be possible. To that extent, 9/11 was a big surprise to me. In the last 25 years, plant security has improved. Looking for places where a terrorist could destroy the plant is done by analysis: Stopping the terrorists is mainly by screening employees, and by physical barriers and guards at the plant perimeter. In a recent “score sheet” by a citizens group, nuclear power stations scored an A for protection against terror attacks, and the next highest grade was B (aircraft passenger safety). In other technologies where an event tree analysis has been used - chemical plants, LNG facilities, and now high level nuclear waste repositories - the technology does not enable such a “simple” analysis procedure but forces many, much more complex, scenarios and the implications for a decision maker are correspondingly far less certain. Nonetheless, the principle is the same: one can, and should, look for high consequence, low probability scenarios. I presented at the Seminar on Planetary Emergencies in August 2002, a discussion of an “event tree” approach to a terrorist risk. I saw three main items which, after criticism from my wife’s brother-in-law, I now expand to four, viz: 1. The probability that a person becomes a terrorist. This Ahmad Kamal discussed. It is most important but not discussed much by the present US administration. 2. The probability that a terrorist gains access to appropriate weapons particularly Weapons of Mass Destruction. A r m s Control Committees discuss this extensively. 3. The probability that a terrorist gains access to sensitive societal facilities. The

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Bush administration, especially John Ashcroft, emphasize this. But this step has a major impact on human liberties, and almost certainly has an adverse effect (positive feedback) on step 1. The conditional probability that a terrorist will succeed in causing the terrible 4 consequence given the above. It is this 4'h item that is calculated by the previous accident analysis reports. This is a conditional probability. The above 4 steps are more obviously coupled. A terrorist will, all else being equal, choose a badly protected societal site to attack where the probability of a severe consequence, conditional on an initiating event, is the greatest. Moreover all things are not equal. All the previous nuclear power safety discussions are in (4). It is likely that a terrorist will also tend to choose a site to make a statement. In 9/11 terrorists attacked the Pentagon, a symbol of American military power, and the World Trade Center, a symbol of American economic power. I believe that more casualties could have been caused by attacking other sites, but that does not seem to have been the motive. It is at once clear that the disciplines of an engineer or physical scientist at once become inadequate. They are not replaced but are merely incomplete. Some risk assessors view the risks of terrorism more objectively than I. But I perceive the risks of terrorism as very subjective. If I subsume the fnst three factors into one, there is the risk that a person or persons will attempt a particular act of terrorism. On this, I have little more to say than other intelligent people, although I may have said it more often. But the fourth is the conditional probability of a consequence of a terrorist act. This fourth factor I perceive as moderately objective. Alas, this perception of mine, limited to a conditional probability though it is, has not penetrated to the body politic to the extent that I would wish. I urge therefore a continual reexamination of our society and in our analyses a search for the high consequence low probability event. When I first raised this two years ago, I was thinking primarily of engineering and physical systems. But SARS has made very clear that one of the important, and most readily adopted, methods of coping with potential biological terrorism threats is to be ready to look for, and combat, emerging new diseases: S A R S , Lassa Fever and Ebola Virus. Technology could help in this. I am delighted that Dr Barry Bloom, the Dean of Harvard School of Public Health, has reached the same conclusion. But engineering approaches can help even here. For example, we wish to locate and isolate infected people. Diseases like SARS show themselves by an increase in temperature. Technology now exists for rapid (1 minute) measurement of the temperature of the temporal artery which artery shows temperature rises a few hours before a thermometer in the mouth or rectum. This is cheap and rapid and could be done at all ports of entry as the passport is being examined. A group of my freshman students decided they would logically consider such an issue. After the anthrax scare, in September 2001 there was a public concern about smallpox, and a demand for vaccination of everyone again. But vaccination carries a small, but non-zero, risk of illness and even death. Should everyone be vaccinated? Should some people be vaccinated? If so who? There are enough data for this to be an easily evaluated problem. For a physical scientist, the major unknown is the likelihood of a terrorist attack. But over a wide range of this unknown, the answer turned out to be the same. Vaccinate at least 70% of hospital staff; some truck drivers and some administrators. Of course those in other disciplines may narrow down the estimate of the

183 likelihood (risk) of a terrorist attack. But all too little of our technological society is protected as much as is easily possible. Even the engineers are slow to use the analytical tools available. Some Professors at MIT still refuse to use Risk Analysis tools and resort to agreed “standards” and “Engineering Judgment”. There have been quantitative studies of the difference in safety between a sole reliance on these old fashioned engineering approaches, and using “Risk Informed” approaches which show the superiority of the latter. One such study for a nuclear power plant suggested a reduction in the already small overall accident probability of a factor of 30. My fundamental conclusion is that all public agencies should reexamine their assessments of risk, whether those made formally or merely informally, and make sure that the low probability - high consequence event or scenario is included and its consequences reduced as much as possible. I particularly thank my friend, colleague and co-author Dr E.A.C. Crouch for helping me to get definitions straight.

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7. CROSS-CULTURAL AND CROSSDISCIPLINARY COMMUNITY RESPONSE WORKING GROUP SESSION

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REPORT OF THE CROSS-CULTURAL AND CROSS DISCIPLINARY COMMUNITY RESPONSE WORKING GROUP

AMY E. SMITHSON, Chair CSIS, Washington, USA DEFINITIONS, OVERARCHING CONCEPTS, AND GENERAL STATEMENTS Preparedness and emergency response capabilities are important for every nation for the simple reason that every nation will inevitably suffer natural and manmade disasters. Preparations undertaken to improve capabilities to respond to terrorism will also benefit everyday emergency response capacities, and thereby mitigate suffering and improve the quality of life for citizens worldwide. A “first responder” is someone who is trained in a systems response to emergency and is part of a coordinated response activity; secondary responders provide key skilled support to primary response personnel. For example, first responders could include firefighters, public safety, emergency medical services, hospitals, public health, and emergency managers. Secondary responders might include public works, individuals skilled in operating heavy lift equipment, communications specialists, private-public sector partners, and organized volunteer groups (e.g., Red Crescent, Red Cross). Untrained citizens are not first responders. While citizens may wish to help in the aftermath of a disaster, doing so may put their safety at risk and may inhibit an effective rescue and recovery effort by trained emergency response professionals. In the event of a terrorist attack or a mass casualty incident, emergency response personnel will aid all victims with equal skill and compassion, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, class, religion, gender, or age. First responders nearest to the scene will do their utmost to help their fellow citizens, but an attack, major accident, or natural disaster could overwhelm local response assets. In such circumstances, local responders will coordinate with neighboring jurisdictions, regional and state authorities, as well as with their federal government to request additional response and recovery resources. Responders would be well-advised to take the initiative to educate themselves about the unique federal assets that may be available to assist them following an unconventional terrorist attack (e.g., nuclear materials specialists, medical teams with specialized expertise in chemical casualty care, decontamination teams). Long before disaster strikes, local, regional, state, and federal authorities should work together to construct plans to integrate such assets into the disaster response and practice those plans on a regular basis. As helpful as these unique assets may be, local responders should not succumb to over-reliance on federal assets. Experience has shown, time and again, that several days may pass before federal assets can be mobilized and deployed. Therefore, the emphasis in preparedness must remain at the local level, if lives are to be saved. Policymakers and the public need to make decisions regarding public policy and their personal well-being based on facts. Unless these key audiences receive unbiased facts, their decisions will be poorly informed and perhaps unnecessarily stressful, slow, and erroneous. Scientists have a role and responsibility to participate in a process that will

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educate policymakers and the public about terrorist threats, existing response capabilities, and recommendations to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. Credible, knowledgeable, experienced scientists and engineers with appropriate expertise and media training need to participate in this educational process-before, during, and after events. The working group made the following general recommendations regarding steps that could be taken to improve prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities worldwide. To begin with, being better prepared to respond to attacks is a constructive and worthy goal, but alone is clearly insufficient to address the problem of terrorism. Prevention of terrorist attacks is of paramount importance. Therefore, among other countermeasures, an active effort is needed to get at the roots of terrorism, to promote dialogue, to overcome a lack of understanding of cultural differences that often give rise to terrorism in the first place, and to craft a cross-cultural plan to overcome the scourge of terrorism. To reduce the loss of life and damage to property during and after emergencies, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other mass casualty events, common international guidelines should be developed to establish core competencies of emergency prevention, preparedness, and response across all disciplines. These guidelines would ideally include: 0 Professional standards; Codes and regulations; 0 Planning; 0 Education, training, exercising, and evaluation; 0 A clear, coherent systems approach to incident management; and, 0 A basic level of interoperable equipment. The planning process must include a recovery plan, and the entire enterprise should incorporate procedures for evaluation, assessment, and improvement of existing capabilities over the near-, mid-, and long-term. Because of the possibility of industrial accidents and the threat of terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials, emergency responders of all disciplines should receive basic, standardized education and training in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials response. Local response agencies should actively seek and foster relationships with local and regional private sector organizations--corporate partners, community services, volunteers, and nongovernmental groups (e.g., churches, Red Cross), and labor organizations (e.g., skilled trades)-to identify and incorporate additional response assets for a fully integrated prevention, response, and recovery capability. Plans, procedures, and training must be in place to recover and identify bodies and remains, observing respect for religious and cultural beliefs. Forensic techniques utilizing DNA can accomplish this task with maximum accuracy. The recovery plans should ensure that personnel and procedures are ready to educate families about the need to provide certain materials for identification purposes, particularly about the possibility that significant delays might be encountered in identification of remains and to expect a certain amount of delay in obtaining remains for burial given the extraordinary circumstances present. This process should involve faceto-face counseling activities, supported by clear and compassionate written materials.

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R&D Needs and Proposals The working group made a series of proposals related to the preparedness, response, and recovery needs of emergency response professionals. In some instances, basic and translational capabilities may have been established for military or industrial uses. Some technologies may be adapted to civilian response uses. However, in the instances where technology transfer is not possible, the scientific community should consider the following R&D proposals to be those most urgently needed. Preparedness and Resuonse Issues: Exercises and Training. Regular and realistic exercises are central to measuring responder preparedness across all disciplines.

Associated R&D Proposal Technologies (e.g., virtual reality, simulation) need to be adapted and developed to enhance exercises so that they approach the intensity and conditions of actual events to provide a more realistic training environment at a reasonable cost. These training technologies have to be adaptable to local circumstances-such as the most likely natural and manmade events, taking into account local resources. Training activities need to be electronically recorded and put into a centralized, indexed, secure and secure-access, multilingual database so that responders of all disciplines can tap into that database to learn long-distance from the experiences of their contemporaries worldwide. Multidimensional Hazards Analysis. Beyond establishing and sustaining core competencies in emergency response preparedness and response, additional capabilities should be based on a hazards analysis. Associated R&D Proposal Therefore, a hazards analysis needs to be performed for all levels of political jurisdiction-locally, regionally, state-wide, nationally, and internationally-to inform preparedness and response efforts. That hazard analysis should also cover the full scope of and the likelihoodprobability of natural hazards and manmade events (e.g., industrial accidents, terrorist attacks of various types). This analysis will also inform an open policy debate about how to invest preparedness and response resources. Response Issues: Integrated Communications Systems. Despite a global communications network, current communications systems are neither robust nor accessible enough to function reliably in a disaster. Communications failures are the Achilles heel of all disasters and therefore should be a priority item for preparedness improvements. The communications shortcomings are particularly acute in the healthcare and public health sectors, which have received fewer communications resources over the years. Ideally, reliable, secure, and inexpensive communications would network all healthcare assets-hospitals, prehospital emergency services, public health departments, and other key medical assets (e.g., poison control centers)-and also link them to public safety response agencies. As a bare minimum, responders of all disciplines need to have redundant communications

190 systems in place, which can be as elementary as the use of runners, cellular telephones, ham radio operators, and satellite/GPS.

Associated R&D Proposal Research is needed to improve existing wireless communications platforms, taking into account the specialized communications needs of all emergency response disciplines-from public safety to the healthcare and public health communities. Patient Decontamination. After terrorist attacks or industrial accidents, hospital systems will be severely challenged to provide advanced medical care to patients contaminated with chemical and radiological substances. Associated R&D Proposal Research is needed to develop decontamination materials that mitigate a wide range of threats and are appropriate for field use and at hospitals for critically injured patients without requiring significant delays in patient care. These new decontamination materials should mitigate, but ideally eliminate secondary exposure. Mass Prophylaxis. Mass prophylaxis-medical intervention to protect individuals potentially exposed to chemical, biological, or radiological hazards-poses a myriad of ethical, legal, social, and political challenges that demand multidisciplinary and crosscultural study, followed by the development of new mass prophylaxis approaches. Associated R&D Proposals In the near term, better systems are needed to manage and access medical treatments. Long-term research needs to focus on strategies and goals that transcend the current focus on individual chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents and materials so that multipurpose screening, diagnostics, and treatment options can be developed. Better antibiotics, antivirals, and antidotes are needed for natural and deliberate health threats. Furthermore, research is required to determine how to access medical products and services in near-real time so that the capability to scale-up prophylaxes on demand, tailored to the size of the event, can be developed. This scale-up activity runs the gamut from turnkey production of medications and storage strategies to the provision of medications and services on site. Personal Protective Equipment. Current respiratory protection is loosely fitted or is custom fitted and can only be used by a single responder. These types of masks either are not sufficiently effective or require considerable training for proper use. Furthermore, existing personal protective clothing is expensive, bulky, heavy, and often impedes the performance of professional duties. Associated R&D Proposals New respiratory protection needs to be developed that is easily accessible to response personnel who do not ordinarily don such gear (e.g., hospital staff). The focus should be on disposable, highly reliable barrier technologies that do not have to be custom fitted and will protect against a range of challenges (e.g., viruses, toxic chemicals).

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Research is needed to develop lightweight, inexpensive, reliable, disposable protective clothing for all response disciplines that allows responders to perform their professional duties in the face of a broad range of chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive challenges. This fabric will probably have applications beyond first responders, for example, use in the filtration systems of buildings. Real-time, Smart Tracking of Victims and Responders. In terrorist attacks and mass casualty events, emergency responders need devices to affix to individual victims to help with: Triage; Tracking; a Notification of families and the public, as appropriate; 0 Healthcare delivery; and, Post-event assistance and follow-up. Similarly, in a major disaster response, incident commanders will be handicapped in their abilities to manage and direct response personnel until they can monitor the whereabouts of hundreds of responders on site and in the vicinity of the disaster site (e.g., in staging areas). Associated R&D Proposals Research is needed to translate existing technologies and communications and information systems into one device that can perform all of these tasks and be connected with communications and computerized analysis systems to enable: a More rapid and efficient patient care; Overall incident management with better integration of incoming multidisciplinary response assets; Reduction of response and recovery costs; Reconstruction of the event for forensic purposes; and, Post-event analysis of response activities to learn lessons and enhance future response and prevention efforts. Tracking devices are also needed for emergency responders so that incident commanders can identify responders’ specific locations-altitude and distance-n site to better utilize and allocate response assets safely. Smart, Multijhceted Incident Management Systems. One of the major challenges of disaster management is to be able to coordinate all of the data from various facets-such as victim updates, staging status, level of contamination, weather conditions, existing social and healthcare infrastructures, and other associated events-f the disaster scene so that effective, timely, reliable, and secure communications can be achieved. Associated R&D Proposal Research is needed to develop technologies that can seamlessly integrate all of this data for the central incident decision-makers at various command centers. The incident commander(s) will employ this data to measure the extent and rate of spread o f the event, to adjust response and recovery activities, to enable faster turn-around of services, and to inform policymakers. The chief spokesperson will employ this data for regular press

192 updates, as well as notification of major event status changes outside of the regular press conference cycle.

Detection of Hazards. Most of the current detectors require responders to enter the hazard area to determine the nature and level of threat. First responders need broadspectrum, affordable, inexpensive to maintain, durable, user-friendly, accurate, reliable, and real-time detection of specific threats and environments that require minimal training and can be integrated into autonomous information and assessment systems. Associated R@ Proposals Hand-held and fixed-site stand-off detectors should be developed for chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive threats. Novel technologies and systems engineering should be applied to develop a new generation of detectors capable of: 1) Identifying hazards and the other relevant environmental data, and, 2) Establishing the extent and likely progression of the event. Thus armed, appropriate decisions can be taken to: Ensure responder safety; Enable intervention in the earliest stages of natural, industrial, or terrorist events; and, Adjust response and recovery resources for maximum effectiveness. In addition, a different class of detectors is needed to monitor and track secondary exposures (e.g., cross-contamination,infection through populations, secondary explosive devices) in order to protect first responders and facilitate the enactment of appropriate containment measures. To bring the accuracy of the laboratory to the disaster site, research is also needed to determine effective placement of detection and monitoring technologies and to facilitate rapid, accurate, and interdisciplinary data interpretation and analysis. These new integrated detection systems can be manual or automated, and should be able to feed information to first responders, to policy makers, and the public, as appropriate. The information provided should be applicable to different communities and cultures. Research must also address how to take advantage of modem global communications systems to enable real-time access to the most appropriate expertise and assessment systems, regardless of geographical location. Recovery Issues: Site Decontamination. In the event of a radiological, biological, or chemical attack or accident, decontamination of the site(s) will pose multidimensional challenges (e.g., financial, social, legal). Plans, procedures, technologies, and dedicated spokespersons are needed to be in place prior to an attack to facilitate the most rapid, safe, and acceptable recovery possible. First, scientists are needed to help resolve two serious technical/social challenges associated with decontamination: 1) How clean is clean enough? and, 2) How clean is safe? Furthermore, a new generation of inexpensive, portable, and fixed decontamination technologies and methodologies are needed for people and for the environment. These

193 technologies must be operable in multiple environments and under variable conditions. Research is also needed to establish: The potential long-term health and environmental impacts during the event and following decontamination; Better risk assessment and risk communication tools; Systems for post-decontamination monitoring of humans and the environment; and, Post-remediation study of human behavior and risk perception. This research is critical to facilitating long-term social, environmental, and economic recovery of attack site(s) and to understanding economic and human costbenefit issues across cultures.

THE GLOBAL EMERGENCY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO RISK A.R. GREEN School of Safety Science The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia ABSTRACT Industry is well used to dealing with and managing risk from multiple threats and has a history of catastrophic events whose consequences often transcend the immediate physical event. In the current global emergency, can the experiences of Industry be used to design controls and mitigation techniques against the modern emergent threats of CBRN and cyber terrorism? While current risk paradigms are not well suited to the assessment of these new threats, the development of a new risk framework has shown the necessary attributes to quantify catastrophic risk. The implications to the global emergency are that risk assessment tools can be developed for threat analysis and for emergency responders from CBRN terrorism. The challenge is to provide a system that can adapt within the time frames of a change in threat. Part of this challenge is to harness sensor and monitoring technologies and integrate into a computer network required for analysis of the risk. Another challenge is communicating catastrophic risk. This can be assisted by the development of new risk tools. Perception and subjectivity play a significant role in failure of risk communication. Tools that allow testing of perception and subjectivity would be particularly valuable. Risk systems that can demonstrate the benefit of alternative approaches to control are more likely to be adopted by industry. Recommendation 1: Create multidisciplinary teams involving Industry and Governments to understand the interdependencies of industrial, governmental and societal systems against a broad spectrum of consequences of CBRN terrorism and to foster debate on the appropriateness of alternative control methods and systems. Recommendation 2: Create the environment to harness international scientific and technology research and knowledge to develop integrated tools for assessment of risk that allows quick global deployment across Industry and Governments. Recommendation 3: Create the environment for industry to harness international scientific and technology research to develop new methods of control and mitigation. While many governments have incentive schemes for collaboration, they are often insular and do not address many cross-cultural problems that are a root cause of terrorism. Recornmendation 4: Develop new methods of rapid detection for releases of materials. The challenge is to provide methods for testing air and surface for contamination that are accurate with untrained testers and to provide feedback into computer networks for risk assessment. Recommendation 5: Develop international standards for openness in communication and transparency for governments and industry that protect national sensitivities and encourage scientific global collaboration to respond to the terrorist risk over the longer term.

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195 BACKGROUND The release of energy in a system to cause catastrophe including terrorism is not new. Industry is well used to dealing with and managing risk from multiple threats and has a history of catastrophic events whose consequences often transcend the immediate physical event. Some examples of catastrophe include: Longford, Australia, 1997': Brittle failure of gas cooling plant resulted in loss of the facility and disruption to the Victorian gas supply over the next two weeks leading to serious economic losses in Victoria. Moura No 4 Mine, Australia 19862 : Collapse of the roof leading to a hybrid methane coal dust explosion. 11 people died and the mine became uneconomic due to isolation of part of the coal reserves. The industry failed to take account of recommendations in 1990, and in 1994 there was an explosion at Moura No 2 Mine which involved the overlying coal seam, killing 123. The Daegu rail tunnel fire, 20034: An arsonist ignited a train and a second train pulled into the station beside the first. The resulting fire claimed about 200 lives. Apart from the material fire properties and the difficulty in evacuating, one root cause was procedural controls that did not recognise the strong hierarchical structure of Korean society and dependence on authority, exacerbating the difficulties of the driver in assessing and responding to the situation. TWA 800 in 1996': The aircraft exploded just after takeoff from JFK in New York, killing all on board. TWA went bankrupt. The NTSB attributed the cause to faulty wiring in the main fuel tank with a virtually empty tank containing an explosive atmosphere. This was the same condition that blew the top off an aircraft years earlier6. The recommendations from the earlier incident were never taken up. While Industry has learnt from these types of events, at the time it was a failure to account for interdependencies within the risk management process that lead to a failure to recognise the exposure of the organisation or organisations prior to impact and for which they had no control. In the current global emergency, can the experiences of Industry be used to design controls and mitigation techniques against the modem emergent threats of CBRN and cyber terrorism? The failure by Industry to prevent catastrophic outcomes in the past indicates a failing in current risk assessment methods but the knowledge of why they fail allows an alternative framework to be constructed which can assist industry and governments against many of the multiple threats that threaten them and to specifically assist in the current emergent threats. This paper explores how the risk experiences of industry, their successes and their failings can be utilised in the current global emergency. These experiences by themselves are not enough, but when co-joined with scientific and technological resources on a global scale, then there is a possible way forward to counter these emergent threats.

196 IMPROVED RISK ASSESSMENT In order to develop better risk assessment systems that are necessary for counter terrorism, firstly there is a need to understand what is wrong with current systems and secondly how modern science and technology can be harnessed to develop a new system. Consider the risk of a tsunami that is caused by a high energy impact such as an earthquake, underwater mudslide or meteorite impact. A high energy wave spreads from the epicenter with a magnitude that is dependent on the inherent strength of the initiating event. As it spreads across the ocean, the energy is dissipated by the presence of islands, underwater obstacles that cause reflections and deflection in the wave. As it approaches the shoreline, the wave deepens until it hits the shore. Historically tsunamis are measured by the size of the run-up over the shore from geological disturbances. For example, over the last 4000 years, large tsunami with run-ups exceeding 30 m in height swamping the NSW coast of Australia have occurred about every 600 years7 - a rare event that is considered episodic. Controls on land ahead of this size of tsunami are very limited but smaller ones can be dealt with by design controls in relation to proximity of buildings to the shoreline, evacuation and warning systems that include sensor and monitoring systems that require international cooperation to operate effectively, e.g. The Tsunami Warning Centers for the Pacific rim countries. The central problem is one of frequency domains. The frequency of a large tsunami is very low whereas the consequences are very high, but when and where or how strong the wave will be cannot be predicted. So there is a tendency that if it happens, it occurs at too low a frequency to worry about: “we can’t move whole cities”. In Figure 1, current risk assessment methods are based on a definition of risk that uses both the frequency of an event and its consequences to make decisions on the level of control. The problem with this framework is that infrequent, potentially high consequence events are not well treated and tend to be grossly inaccurate. Estimations of both frequency and consequence of rare events almost always rely on perception rather than hard data since, if suitable data from comparable events exists at all, there is unlikely to be a large enough database to conduct meaningful statistical analysis. Firstly, the full range of controls whose failure might affect the occurrence of the event or the magnitude of the consequence is not taken into proper account. While engineered control systems and component failure rates are reasonably well understood, human, environmental, economic and other factors are harder to quantify. These factors, which can make a major contribution to the success or failure of the control system, are often not considered in the system design or risk assessment. Secondly, relationships between controls and common factors that influence their effectiveness are not conscientiously evaluated. Failures associated with these related controls or common factors can lead to escalating control failures with catastrophic consequences. The result of this lack of awareness of controlling factors and their interactions is a bias in the perception of frequency and consequence, leading to a relaxed attitude to the importance of comprehensive control. When infrequent events occur there are often inadequate controls in place to avoid total loss of the system.

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Figure I The Current Risk Assessment Framework. Thirdly, the process of evaluating the likelihood averages the time line and ignores the small timescales that are often associated with interactions in the system being studied. As a result important couplings that can lead to catastrophic outcomes are lost. In order to develop a better risk system, the characteristics of the risk system have to be incorporated in the solution: The actual instantaneous state of the system being considered is unknown. It is only known once an observation of the system is made in some way. Even then some parts of the system may not have been observed. In order to measure the risk, some predictive value is needed that changes as the inherent risk changes, and changes as the controls acting on consequence states change, The measurement must be sensitive enough to pick up the changes at small and large timescales or locations and The system has to be tractable in terms of a solution. An advanced risk framework incorporating these features (Figure 2 ) , is being developed that is based on the assumption that consequences are caused by the interaction of factors'. The inherent energy gives a spectrum of consequences where all controls are treated as being off. The only factors operating are those that influence the inherent energy available. In the case of a tsunami, this uncontrolled state reflects the distribution of sizes of the initiating event and the environment from that event to the shoreline. As factors that influence the inherent energy change, the underlying uncontrolled spectrum changes, and as the factors that influence the control states change so to does the controlled spectrum change. Any calculation to measure risk therefore has two components: that with no control compared to that with control. The difference between the two is measured by the change in

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the spectrum of consequences. This allows in principle a design of a system that can be influenced by instantaneous changes in factors. If you integrate this system over time, you arrive at the expected consequences, that is the average time spent in each consequence state. This average time is also a measure of risk. The two are equivalent as the integrated time step tends towards zero, but if long intervals are used in the integration then the same problem as in the current approach occurs. The fact that the instantaneous risk is not directly discernable suggests that the system should be treated as a quantised statistical system, but doing this rigorously complicates the process and may not be justified until we know more about the behaviour properties of the system. Making the problem tractable requires a solution in real time (or as close to real time as one can get) so that it is sufficiently responsive to these factor changes to allow appropriate mitigation. A balance must be struck to avoid creating a long computing time. In Figure 2, consequences are considered quantised and the controls are defined by the control failure required to cause that particular consequence. A given consequence may have multiple controls and a single control might affect more than one consequence. The risk of a particular consequence is defined as the normalised time spent in the consequence state. This gives a measure of the effectiveness of control in the system as a whole and defines the uncontrolled state. The controls and their influencing factors define the expected failure for each consequence and hence the risk. Decisions are made directly on the controls or control influencing factors to enhance management of the risk This definition avoids the need to find information on the frequency of events, concentrating instead on the probability of control failure, for which information is more readily available, and which can be characterised more easily. In this framework, event frequency is an output of the assessment of risk, and decisions on controls are made on the basis of increasing control effectiveness. Controls taken into consideration are comprehensive, and interacting factors are included within the analysis. Another advantage of this framework is that alternative control regimes can be evaluated as the change across the entire consequence spectrum is directly seen as a change in frequency of undesired events. This overcomes some of the perception associated with assessing risks of infrequent events. Perception problems will occur but are likely to be relegated to the importance of influencing factors. Subjective values for these factors can be tested from their magnitude of impact on the whole system risk. A further advantage is the ability to define performance standards for control of an organisation’s risks. This has many advantages such as improved transparency and better governance. In the example of the tsunami, focusing on controls shows that an event can be monitored and that timelines are very limited for taking precautions. It demonstrates the importance of controls being planned and in place ahead of time, e.g. building codes in potentially exposed areas. It also shows that by depicting scenarios of different strengths, you can understand which factors are important for control and when controls will fail. A wave of 30m for example on the Sydney basin is different from one that is lOOm in height. The cliffs would protect high areas in the former case but would be swamped in the latter. This can be demonstrated from vulnerability modeling, and such techniques allow planning for the best locations for survival, where structures have to be

199 strengthened, and identify the critical structures that have to survive any event or be moved to a safer location.

c

kure 2 An Advanced Risk Framework For Catastrophic Risks. From a terrorism perspective, can the same devastation be caused by 1, 5 10, 50 nuclear weapons - what is the uncontrolled state? How would current controls hold for different initiating strengths? What warnings and cues would be present? How can Science and Technology assist in defining the Risk? Because this framework is based on controls to achieve objectives and from the perspective of the global threat, alternative objectives can be developed for terrorism, cultural and political differences within society and across national boundaries. Studies of such differences and the common controls currently used would allow an understanding of control failure and the strategies required to mitigate clashes between cultures and political systems. Although the risk system outlined above is not fully developed, the implications to the global emergency are that CRBN vulnerability models can be routinely incorporated into this risk framework. The other implication of the framework is the ability to provide a tool for emergency responders. The challenge is to provide a system with responsiveness to change within the time frames of threat becoming reality. Part of this challenge is to harness sensor and monitoring technologies as part of the infrastructure system for risk. Another is the computer network required for analysis of the risk.

200 HARNESSMG GLOBAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Figure 3 shows how science and technology can be used to develop a risk network that allows development of suitable control strategies that can be developed as a threat emerges and develops. Global terrorist events follow an event timeline whose antecedents are often evident 3-4 years ahead of the actual occurrence of a threat. These cues can be picked up by intelligence and the use of sensor technology, which may be automatic or require some manual assessment. Similarly once a terrorist event occurs, the intelligence and sensors in the environment can still give information that may mitigate the incident in some way. The larger the area, the greater the need for a sensor network and a communication network that links sensors output as it is required by responders to the threat, or by a risk network which continually updates risk assessment of threat and control. In order to assess the information and calculating a risk, a suitable computer platform is required that acts independently but is still coordinated. Computer agents have the correct characteristics, being autonomous, and they overcome some of the intractable problems and present risks in terms of current information, even though certain calculations can take a long time (such as scenario outcomes), but they still have to be linked properly. Risk can be defined on the objectives of systems, uncontrolled states, interdependencies, the controlled state and threshold controls. The controls can be passive controls designed into system or active controls that can be automatic or manual. The output from the risk assessment is in a form required for decision bv, the various stakeholders and resuonders.

Figure 3 Harnessing Science and Technology

201 The benefit of this type of structure is that the risk can be kept current as information is found or changes. The assessment can be made semi-automatic with utilisation of state of the art programs for any specific agent, eg. vulnerability of one building or area infrastructure. The individual agents can be updated independently as new processes are developed, and more agents can be added as the type of threat changes or as a larger network is developed. The challenge is in the design of computer risk, sensor and communications networks. This will require the development of seamless standards and protocols across different industry groups, government and their agencies. CHANGING INDUSTRIAL RISK MANAGEMENT Industry preparedness across sectors for catastrophic risk has improved over the last decade due to two strong drivers for this improvement. The first was due to the convergence of requirements for corporate governance, quality assurance and business continuity through the development of common standardsg. A risk assessment is always conducted with some particular end in mind. Different approaches have lead to the development of a number of different risk paradigms, each providing a model upon which the assessment process can be based. The most common paradigms are: Causation-Foreseeability-PreventabilityThe rule of law: Reasonableness. Encompasses all paradigms. Insurance based risk management: judgement based on empirical history, for financial or engineering-based outcomes. Asset based risk management: bottom-up analysis using FMECA, HazOp or QRA techniques examining limited scenarios. Provides relatively intense scrutiny of engineering systems with focussed and specific solutions. Threats and vulnerabilities: identifies areas of general strategic concern. Risk as variance: considers risk of gain and risk of loss (pure risk and speculative risk), allowing statistical tools to be used to advantage. Best practice: looks at “best practice” risk management, focussing on cost-effective controls. Simulation: repeated computer simulations of scenarios (“what if’) using Monte Carlo techniques and deterministic models. Culture: paradigm based on culture-based risk acceptance. None of the above paradigms are entirely satisfactory for multiple threats in complex systems that lead to catastrophic impacts, and requires a change to the definition of risk and the way in which risk is assessed. Common definitions imply that there are four aspects involved in a consideration of risk - a time scale, scenarios, the relevant consequences, and the corresponding likelihoods”. In some frameworks, risk assessment and risk management were separated in order that the assessment would appear more objective’I . Newer frameworks’* depicted stakeholder participation as the central activity, stressing the role of risk communication and consultation in favour of risk assessment.

202 A different view of risk is taken if events are seen as episodic rather than chronic, and whether protection is required for the individual or populations. Fire and explosion, like natural hazards, tend to be seen as an episodic event that affects a p~pulation’~. The framework also differs depending on whether the focus is on the hazard or the r e ~ e p t o r ’ ~ . One of the early applications of formal risk analysis was in the chemical processing industries where a physical threat is the cause of many disasters. A typical framework only addresses the technical environment with limited behavioural and natural environment and without taking account of the broader operating and strategic environmentsi5. As the result of an extensive study of catastrophes across many industries, Green and LeivesleyI6 observed that traditional methods of risk assessment did not account for the causal factors and interrelationships that lead to catastrophic outcomes and proposed an alternative definition of risk in terms of the inherent energy to move a system away from it’s functional objectives. For example, in the Coode Island Fire, M e l b ~ u r n e ’ ~in, which the total storage facility was lost, the extensive damage across the site was due to failure in design, inspite of being designed to the standards of the time: the use of non frangible lids on storage tanks containing toxic materials failed to recognise the damage that can be caused by missiles and loss of containment of flammables that escalated the fire spread and damage; the siting of multiple tanks within a bund which lead to fire spread to those tanks and increased radiation load on neigbouring tanks that aided fire spread. Clearly interconnectedness of systems are important if catastropohic incidents are to be controlled. Coode Island also gives another example of lack of consideration of the interconectivity of systems. The layout of both the site and neighbouring sites did not allow access under degraded conditions. As a result emergency responders failed to contain the incident. The poor knowledge of behaviour of toxic vapours put many of the emergency responders at risk. About 50% of the responding Police and Fire Brigade had symptoms of acute exposure followng this fire”. Green and Leivesley stress the need to identify all influential factors and their interactions with both the inherent energy and with the control system. Major catastrophes tended to be excused as “exceptions” in the risk assessment, since the traditional design of the systems had left an adequate margin of safety for the scenarios considered in the design calculations. However the risk assessments control general events, but not high energy impacts, and consequently the controls did not manage to protect the public when an uncalculated combination of factors occurred. The steps shown in Table 1 are more suitable than traditional methods for risk assessment in catastrophic systems. The steps address inherent risk and long term consequences. One of the problems of traditional systems that use the ALARP (as low as reasonably practical) approach is that the full potential risk of the system must be evaluated, and this is rarely done. Traditional methods rely on tacit levels based on agreed criteria. The second strong driver for the improvement in Industry preparedness particularly in large organisations (that subsequently flowed through into smaller industries) was the recognition and successful control of the global Y2K threat. In the same way that catastrophic accidents show the importance of

203 interconnectedness at a local level, Y2K demonstrated the importance of strategic global interconnectedness of systems. Define risk in terms of inherent potential in the absence of control systems Existing or new controls include controls on failures Step 2 Identify relating to human factors controls Step 3 Identify the The new method, which relies on the loss expected in the uncontrolled state due to the presence of consequences and time dimension loss factors that enhances the inherent potential in the system, shows that the expected loss is dependent on time spent in controlled states, and thus the risk profile is measured. The methodology naturally takes account of the human Step 4 Identify decisions that can nullify the anticipated controls, and does human impact away with a subjective judgement for risk and can take factors account of modern society’s requirements for good corporate governance. Step 5 Identify the All foreseeable hazards are used. Hazard impacts are defined by using the inherent potential of the system, rather impacts than limiting the definition to the ALARP format. The severity x likelihood formula is replaced by a multidimensional consequence analysis incorporating human factor failures and engineering failures. Step 6 Assess the The adequacy of proposed controls is assessed together with controls the human factors that lead to degradation of controls. Step 7 Include the The buffer that has existed between the design risk and the post event operational risk following commissioning is rapidly being consequences removed by the courts, with consequences for directors and mangers which may be defined in the near future in terms of “corporate killing”

Step 1 Define risk

I

Table 1 The processs for quantyifying risk management There are lessons that can be learnt from Industry and applied to terrorism: learning from past mistakes within a risk assessment framework that has been driven by Governance, duty of care and transparency as a means of improving systems. Improving counter-terrorism measures may not in essence be different from risk management in industry. There may also be an advantage in emergency response, because if similar risk assessment methods are used for extreme risks in industry and in counter terrorism, there are many benefits. It is important that the lessons from Y2K are relearned but in the light of the behaviour of terrorist groups and the systems that are vulnerable. Y2K had an immovable deadline, and where many of the interdependencies across sectors had to be analysed if the threat was to be averted. But the analysis was essentially static as the individual processors had to be found and modified. Eventually automatic processes of correction were developed that assisted smaller companies with limited resources. The development of counter measures against terrorism require analysis of dynamic systems where deception is an integral part of the strategy. There is an

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urgent need for automatic processes that can respond in real time or as close to it as possible. Y2K also highlighted the benefits of harnessing governmental and business requirements on a global scale. Since 2000 it has led to the development of an all hazards approach to risk, and the adoption of more transparent processes and structure. While the tools are not there for catastrophic risk, the structures and multidisciplinary teams can be harnessed in this global challenge. Another challenge is communicating catastrophic risk to industry and workers. Perception plays a significant part in why risk communication fails, and the development of new risk tools can assist. In the new framework, perception of risk no longer occurs at the top level of assessment and potentially overcomes this problem. Although perception is still there in dealing with individual factors, their impact on controls can be tested. Industry is often pragmatic in adoption of controls where it sees a benefit in meeting its objectives. Risk systems which can demonstrate the benefit of alternative approaches to traditional methods are more likely to be adopted and used by industry. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Through the use of our understanding of RISK CONTROLS and CATASTROPHIC IMPACT EVENTS in Industry we can design much stronger counter terrorism measures. But this requires a psychological crossing of disciplinary boundaries, bringing together science in industry, science research and technical applications. The needs of emergency responders, defence forces, and, in strategic risk management by countries planning counter-terrorism measures to meet the global emergency of A1 Qaeda and other global groups, requires a new approach to risk modelling and design of controls for counter terrorism. Recommendation 1: Formation of multidisciplinary teams across Industry and Government teams to understand the interdependencies of industrial, governmental systems against a broad spectrum of consequences of CBRN terrorism. The objective is to assist in defining the end states and initiate discussion on appropriateness of controls methods and systems. Recommendation 2: Create the environment to harness scientific and technology research and knowledge at a global level, to develop integrated tools for assessment of risk that allows quick global deployment across industry and Governments. Recommendation 3 : Create the environment for industry to harness the scientific and technological research to develop new methods of control and mitigation. While many governments have incentive schemes for such endeavours, they are often insular and do not address many cross-cultural problems. A global system is required that can address some of the cross cultural causes of terrorism and development of control. Recommendation 4: Develop cross cultural and multidisciplinary teams that can investigate objectively why common control fails when different ideologies clash. If you can prevent the growth of groups, and stem recruitment from groups, then it is a more effective solution in the longer term, an application of the hierarchy of controls.

205 Recommendation 5 : Develop International standards for openness in communication and transparency for governments and industry. These are complex issues that are difficult to communicate. Adoption of transparency by business and governments can go a long way to overcome the perception of injustice by groups around the world. While this might not stop terrorism per se, it might alienate state and popular support for terrorism.

REFERENCES I The Esso Longford Gas Plant Accident, Report of the Longford Royal Commission, June 1999, Victorian State Government.

’ Report On An Accident At Moura No. 4 Underground Mine On Wednesday, 16th July, 1986, Warden’s Inquiry, Warden’s Court of Queensland Report On An Accident At Moura No. 2 Underground Mine On Sunday 7’h August 1994, Warden’s Inquiry, Warden’s Court of Queensland The Daegu Rail Disaster, Dr. Sam Roh, Personal Communication, February 2004

’ The NTSB report

into TWA 800 explosion on 171h July 1996 found that an explosion had occurred in the central fuel tank and was most likely due to faulty wiring short circuiting. An explosion in the central fuel tank of a Philippine Airline 737 occurred on 1 l t h May 1990 while being pushed hack. The cause was attributed to faulty wiring.

’Bryant, E.A. 2001 Tsunami: The underrated hazard. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 320p A.R.Green, S. Leivesley, Risk Failures in Engineering: A New Understanding in Catastrophic Risk, Submitted to J. Risk research, 2002 The process has led to the development of a performance framework for risk epitomised by ASNZ4630, 1999, Australian Standards Association, where common characteristics include the context, criteria for acceptability. wide-spread consultation and an on-going process of monitoring and review, lo Beer, T. and F. Ziolkowski (1995): Envirorrtnental Risk Assessment: an Australian perspective, Report 102, Supervising Scientist, Barton, ACT define risk as “the union of a set of likelihoods and a set of consequences of the scenarios under consideration.

Paustenbach, D.J. (1995): The practice of health risk assessment in the United States (19751995): how the US and other countries can benefit from that experience, Human and Ecological Rzsk Assessment, 1, 29-79. stated that the risk manager was unable to separate the scientific interpretation from other contexts due to many assessments being laden with value judgments and the subjective views. ‘I

l 2 PreSidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management and Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Regulatory Decision Making, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 1997. l 3 An example of a framework with which to evaluate the risk of natural hazards is that used by Geosciences Australia ( Granger, K., Jones, T., Leiba, M and G. Scott (1999): Community Risk in Cairns, a multi-hazard risk assessment, Australian Geological Survey Organisation, Canberra). In this case risk is seen as a function of the hazard, the probability of occurrence, and exposure - the elements at risk and their vulnerability. I 4 An example of the focus on the receptor was developed for the study of the processes involved in societal response to global environmental risk and illustrates the links between risk and sustainability.

Is The methodology used by the chemical industry (F.P. Lees, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2”d Edition, Butterworth - Heinemann, 1996, ISBN 0 7506 1547 8) and other

206 engineering approaches (Peacock, R et a1 Fire Safety of Passenger Trains; Phase 11: Application of Fire Hazard Analysis Techniques, Building and Fire Research Laboratory, NIST, USA Dec 2002) use simulation of the physical threat to evaluate the spread an impact. More recently groups such as IMO have started to look at some of the broader interactions but even these tend to be centralised on the technical system. A.R.Green, S. Leivesley, Limitations of Risk Assessment Methodologies for Fire in Transport Tunnel Systems, Proc. 5' AOSFST, Newcastle Australia, 2001, Fire Science and Technology, Ed. M.A.Delichatsios, B.Z. Dlugogorski, E.M. Kennedy , Dec 2001 About 70% of liquid chemicals through the Port of Melbourne went through Coode Island. On 21-2 August, 1991, fire broke out at a liquid tank storage facilities, destroying or severely damagmg 27 tanks. The event provoked a review of the facilities, leading to proposals for its transfer from metropolitan Melbourne. Six years afterwards a new site was not agreed, but in the meantime improved safety measure had lessened anxiety about future risks. Health Surveillance Results on Officers of the Melbourne Fire Brigade following exposure at Coode Island, J.A.Bisby, March 6, 1992

TOPOFF 2: APPRECIATING THE IMPORTANCE OF DISASTER DRILLS LESLEE STEIN-SPENCER,R.N., M.S. Chief, Division of Emergency Medical Services and Highway Safety, Illinois Department of Public Health, USA

OVERVIEW Say the words “disaster drill” and the most likely images to come to mind involve a huge chaotic scene filled with mock victims, police officers, firefighters and paramedics. Emergency personnel may be practicing their roles and skills for natural disasters, such as floods and tornadoes, or in light of today’s changing world, terrorist attacks. The paper, given from the perspective of one of the central public health officials involved in the planning and execution of a major US. terrorism preparedness drill, addresses the necessity of changing the traditional scope of disaster drills so that they include public health entities and entire hospital staffs. TOPOFF 2 was a major disaster drill that highlighted the role of public health and hospitals. If the lessons from this drill are properly absorbed, then the traditional vision of what should constitute emergency preparedness will be forever changed. Already, TOPOFF 2 has propelled the state of Illinois to alter the way that drills are planned, developed, and implemented to include the full scope of entities that are necessary to protect the lives of all its citizens. TOPOFF 2, so named because it was the congressionally mandated national terrorism drill to involve “top officials,” was designed to improve the nation’s domestic incident management capability by exercising, as well as validating, plans, policies, procedures, systems and facilities at the federal, state and local levels. The exercise allowed hundreds of law enforcement officials, firefighters, medical and public health personnel, and other state and federal agencies to look at ways to reduce the vulnerability and mitigate the damage from a terrorist attack.’ TOPOFF 2 was intended to assess U.S. readiness to deal with multiple terrorist attacks. One of the major objectives of T2 was to increase coordination, response and communication in an incident involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to build a sustainable systematic national exercise program to support domestic preparedness objectives. The cost of the exercise was $16 million. TOPOFF 2 was designed as an “open” exercise in which participants were introduced to the scenario approximately a year before through drills and planning meetings. The purpose of the open exercise design is to enhance the learning and preparedness value of the simulated disaster through a building-block approach and to enable participants to develop and strengthen relationships in the local, state, and federal communities. In such a simulation, participants are expected to work together to resolve issues, make decisions, and detail expected actions. Among the senior officials who participated in TOPOFF 2 were elected officials (e.g., governors, mayors) and various non-elected officials at the helm of homeland security at the state and national level. The disciplines involved included police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), hospitals, state police, National Guard, public health, and multiple federal state and local agencies.

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208 TOPOFF 2 was a multi-agency crisis and consequence management exercise. The exercise assessed the national crisis and consequence management capabilities through federal, state and local responses to a challenging series of integrated and geographically dispersed simulated terrorist threats and acts. The state of Illinois hosted the bioterrorism component of TOPOFF 2, while Seattle, Washington, hosted the radiological dispersal device component. The Canadian government also participated, with the goal of improving U.S. and Canadian capabilities to respond in partnership to the crisis and consequence management issues of a cross-border WMD terrorist incident. THE TOPOFF 2 SCENARIO IN ILLINOIS AND CHICAGO

On May 10,2003, the fictitious foreign terrorist organization GLODO entered three public venues in Chicago and released pneumonic plague.3 The hypothetical releases took place at O’Hare International Airport, Union Station, and the United Center, an arena where the Chicago Blackhawks were playing hockey against the Vancouver Canucks. Thousands of people were infected at each site. GLODO shuck again on May 12, 2003, detonating a radiological dispersal device in Seattle. The consequences of the Seattle attack were visible from the outset because the explosion “killed” many individuals, “injured” a larger number, and supposedly scattered radioactive materials around the bomb site and over a broad area downwind. In Chicago, the first signs of the attacks did not materialize until the evening of May 12‘h,when patients began presenting at an Illinois hospital in the western suburbs. The Illinois Department of Public Health had multiple objectives for TOPOFF 2, including: Testing its ability to employ analytical and surveillance/epidemiological measures to identify a suspected biological agent and determine its impact on a specific geographic area; Assessing the ability of the state laboratory to confirm the diagnosis and provide technical assistance; Utilizing the Strategic National Stockpile;’ Coordinating legal authorities to provide a review of state and local laws; Bringing the Illinois Operation Headquarters and Notification Office to operational level; Working with the hospitals through the activation of the State Medical Disaster Plan for monitoring of medical resources to support a statewide response; Providing hospitals with the opportunity to test their ability to detect and report clusters of unknown illnesses; and, Implementing surveillance measures to identify a suspected biological agent. In several of these areas, the Department was stretching existing capacities to test new policies and capabilities designed to address the more rigorous demands that would accompany a pandemic. Participants for Illinois and Chicago included the Illinois Department of Public Health and five local health departments, the Illinois Emergency Management Office and five local emergency management offices, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the U S . Public Health Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local

209 law enforcement agencies, multiple fire departments, the Mayor of Chicago, and the Governor of Illinois. All hospitals in Illinois participated in the communications portion of the exercise. Sixty-two hospitals actively participated in the epidemiological aspect of the drill by “treating” mock patients, while 120 hospitals received “paper” patients6 Many specialty hospitals (e.g., pediatrics, psychiatric, ventilator), as well as Veterans Administration hospitals, had never before participated in a drill of this size. From the evening of May 12ththrough May 14‘h,Illinois hospitals received patients complaining of fever, chills and abdominal pain. Some were also coughing up blood. Hospitals “treated” more than 3,000 attack victims, overwhelming some of them beyond capacity. The victims came by ambulance, walked in, or were presented on paper. On the afternoon of May 13‘h,pneumonic plague was confirmed, and the Illinois Director of Public Health requested deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile. Throughout the exercise, the Illinois Department of Public Health sent regular memoranda updating the number of victims and confirming the diagnosis of plague to local health departments, hospital emergency departments, infectious disease physicians, hospital infection control practitioners, and hospital laboratories. The Illinois Operations Headquarters and Notification Office served as the emergency operations center for public health, opening on the evening of May 12‘h. Housed away from the public health offices and operated by senior and designated program staff during a state declared disaster, the Illinois Operations Headquarters and Notification Office was modeled after the State Emergency Operations Center7 and employs the Incident Command System.* The Director of Public Health activated Illinois’ State Medical Disaster Plan on Tuesday, May 13th. The staff from the Division of Emergency Medical Services notified the lead hospital in each of the eleven EMS regions of the activation. An activation triggers all hospitals to report on the availability of: 1) beds; 2) ventilators (pediatric and adult); 3) negative air pressure rooms; 4) isolation beds; 5) monitored beds; and, 6) number of blood units. Updates were requested twice a day, and all requested information was received in approximately two to three hours. Before TOPOFF 2 began, healthcare facilities throughout Illinois had at least 6,000 beds available, along with approximately 900 ventilators, 300 negative air pressure rooms, and 450 isolation rooms. The number of victims involved soon exceeded this capacity. Over the three-day period of TOPOFF 2, GLODO’s release of plague resulted in 5,349 ill and 1,521 dead in Illinois. Thousands of emergency personnel and mock victims participated. Was all the planning, preparation, and effort required to execute TOPOFF 2 worth it? The only answer is: absolutely. The experiences, collaboration and lessons learned, significantly strengthened preparedness capabilities throughout the state of Illinois. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ILLINOIS COMPONENTS OF TOPOFF 2 As with any exercise involving different response agencies, the lessons learned will vary from agency to agency and even from individual to individual. The lessons emerging from such an exercise can be categorized into the proverbial “The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly.”’ The following discussion categorizes lessons in this fashion and

210 stipulates those learned by the state health department, local health departments and hospitals. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH

A major “good” to emerge from TOPOFF 2 was a significant increase in awareness of the implications of a terrorist attack. TOPOFF 2 demonstrated the critical role of health services in emergency response, as well as the importance of close working relationships between counter-terrorist and consequence management officials. However, the best outcome of the exercise was the new and improved relationships that were established with the participating agencies and healthcare providers at the local, state and federal levels. Because participants were introduced to the disaster scenario a year in advance, TOPOFF 2 gave the Department of Public Health time to plan and meet with local response agencies, other state response agencies and federal partners. For the most part, collaboration was excellent. The Department assembled a legal team fiom various local agencies, including the state’s attorney’s ofice, to review current laws and regulations and identify gaps and areas of weakness. The Department tested its new operations center and the ability of the Department as a whole to analyze and make decisions on the containment and treatment of a public health emergency. In addition, the Department tested its Strategic National Stockpile plan for receiving and distributing drugs, implemented its revised State Medical Disaster Plan, and activated its Rapid Response Team for surveillance and its Illinois Medical Emergency Response Teams for on-scene medical care. Perhaps not surprisingly, the “bad” list features communications, which remain the major problem. To begin with, there were too many command centers. The Joint Operations Center and the Joint Information Center added another layer of complexity to communications. Multiple operation centers at the local, state and federal level impeded the ability to make sure that everyone had the information that was needed. At the Illinois Operations Headquarters and Notification Office, the large datafilled broadcast faxes that needed to be sent to numerous locations took a long time to get transmitted to all hospitals and agencies. In addition, the medical section at this center was insufficiently staffed. Another “bad” that seeped into the exercise were the personal agendas that were often interjected into the master event list, disrupting the course of the drill. The length of planning time for TOPOFF 2 allowed power struggles to develop between and among agencies. Finally, the long-lead time before the exercise meant that too much information about the drill had leaked to the media. One “bad” issue that remained unresolved after the conclusion of the exercise was who should receive prophylaxis. The debate revolved around whether political officials or medical and public health officials would make the determination about who should receive prophylaxis. The medical and public health community felt priority should be given to those exposed or at high risk for exposure. Political officials aligned themselves with the views of the first responder community, who argued that all of their members should receive prophylaxis. Moreover, the first responders defined “family member” as all individuals residing within the primary residence of a first responder. Chicago

21 1 employs 13,500 police personnel, 5,000 fire personnel, 800 staff from the 9-1-1 emergency call center, and 350 public health personnel. Using this “family member” definition, it was estimated that 3.5 times the first responder employee population-a total of nearly 70,000 people-would have needed a 10-day supply of medication. If this approach were taken in an actual outbreak, the supply of medication would not be sufficient to treat the victims who needed it most. As for the “ugly”, the clear winner was the need to coordinate with several federal operations centers. This requirement placed a burden on state and local staffers, who were on the receiving end of duplicative phone calls asking for the same information. Clearly, information given to one federal agency was not regularly shared with others. Also, the TOPOFF 2 scenario was, at times, unrealistic, especially given the timecompressed activities. LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS Under the overall heading of “good”, the planning process for TOPOFF 2 was instrumental in getting representatives from the local health departments to the table with other agencies in their community. This process opened dialogue between local public health, hospitals, and the first responder community, and improved dialogue between the state and local health departments. The Illinois Department of Public Health hosted routine conference calls that helped keep the local health departments engaged in the decision process. Although the local health departments were very pleased that their epidemiology and surveillance staffers participated in TOPOFF 2, they argued that the capabilities were not strenuously tested. TOPOFF 2 gave local health departments an opportunity to assess their Strategic National Stockpile preparedness and implement their plans for distribution. The experience also presented multiple legal dilemmas. Among those still under review are appropriate policies and procedures for isolation of infected victims, inter- and intrastate quarantine, emergency licensure and credentialing of volunteers, liability and compensation for workers, and caring for families of first responders. TOPOFF 2 also demonstrated the importance for local public health officials to interact with public safety representatives,the medical community and the media. Under the heading of “bad”, the local communicable disease staffers were fixstrated at times because the planning and conduct of the exercise lacked a public healthkommunicable disease emphasis. Given the nature of the exercise-a hypothetical release of a communicable disease-this was baffling. Local public health staffers were sometimes confused as to whether the Department of Justice or the State of Illinois, which had competing priorities, had the lead planning role. Even more confusing for some locals was the conspicuous absence of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the planning process. Communicationswere problematic at the local level. The command structure at all of the state and other emergency operations centers hindered communications. Staff was spread thin between all of the centers. Counties generally did not communicate with each other during the event, so a need to improve regional coordination was identified. The local health departments received massive amounts of information through the Health Alert Network, but at times the order of alerts was unclear. Different information was

212 sometimes sent to hospitals and to the health departments, and variance in the times in which different agencies agreed to participate added another layer of complexity to communications. Despite their positive views about participating in the exercise, TOPOFF 2 did not test the sweillance and epidemiology capacity of local health departments. Local staffers were not given an opportunity to analyze or disseminate data, and no time was allotted for contact follow-up. Local public health officials also critiqued the data collection and dissemination process. For example, the form used for the “unidentified respiratory illness cluster” was too long and resource intensive, which would not be useful in a real outbreak situation. One ‘‘ugly” that came to light was that local public health departments received conflicting information about the number of victims and the number of deaths. Moreover, there appeared to be confusion as to what office the hospitals should report the number of cases they received. However, the biggest concern voiced at the local public health department level mirrored that raised at the state level. Local public health officials recommended prophylaxis on the basis of exposure and epidemiology, regardless of political concerns. They also favored statewide uniformity on who would receive the prophylaxis and the development of guidelines before an outbreak outlining targeted prophylaxis versus mass prophylaxis. THE HOSPITALS TOPOFF 2 provided hospitals with a unique opportunity to drill beyond the emergency department, which is the principal unit involved in most mass casualty incident exercises. Therefore, a major benefit of TOPOFF 2 was that the planning and implementation of the exercise involved entire hospitals, educating personnel at all levels on disaster plans and biological agents. Units in the hospital such as pharmacy, laboratory, infectious disease, public information and security were brought to the planning table. Hospital administrators realized that a disaster affects more than just the emergency department. Recognizing and understanding the importance of an organized plan res onse plan, many hospitals implemented the Hospital Incident Command System.” The overall impact was that hospitals felt better prepared to handle a biological event. TOPOFF 2 also allowed hospitals to work with outside agencies for the first time, including local health departments and offices of emergency management. The successes noted were attributed mostly to the fact that TOPOFF 2 played out over days, not just hours. Along with the “good” a few “bad” lessons emerged for the hospitals. Inter- and internal hospital communications proved problematic. Some hospitals that are located in more than one county were bombarded with multiple calls from multiple agencies requesting information. Hospitals using e-mail to communicate with other hospital units found that those units were busy and never read the e-mails. Faxes often remained on the fax machine because no one was assigned to watch for incoming faxes. Finally, in the category of “ugly”, hospitals busy with real patients did not want to receive the TOPOFF 2 victims and therefore did not participate at a level that would truly test their capabilities. TOPOFF 2 was very costly for hospitals, which received minimal

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reimbursement for participating. Had a more generous reimbursement formula been used, hospital participation might have been higher. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS All participants learned numerous lessons. Many policies and plans were implemented for the first time. Some areas to be addressed by the health departments include the need to: Establish a practice of numbering faxes that are distributed; 0 Use ancillary staff at the Illinois Operations Headquarters and Notification Office for messaging; Develop state protocols for responding to different biological agents; 0 Designate one person to watch television and scan the internet for updated information; Utilize electronic reporting at the state level; Improve coordination and communications;and, Develop a multidisciplinary team to build consensus on prophylaxis recommendations. The hospitals played a major role in both the planning and execution of TOPOFF 2, resulting in numerous lessons learned and best practices. TOPOFF 2 compelled exercise participants to pinpoint areas in need of improvement. For example, the exercise overwhelmed hospital isolation room and morgue capacities, indicating a need to create plans to expand those capacities on short-notice. Since multiple hospitals rely on the same nursing agencies for extra staff, alternate plans need to be crafted to fill key personnel shortcomings during a disaster. Hospitals need to establish “lockdown” policies, computerize disaster report forms. To improve communications, hospitals need to find an alternative to Nextel telephones, which proved problematic because conversations could not be heard above the background noise in the hospital. Moreover, hospitals need to computerize disaster report forms, utilize runners to deliver important information and memos to various areas of the hospital, and dedicate a 24/7 facsimile machine for emergency notifications and that is equipped with an alarm system to notify staff when a fax has been received. Hospital officials also need to resolve where to put contaminated victims requiring extra precautions, designate an area for non-critical victims to prevent emergency departments from becoming overwhelmed, and find out where to obtain more ventilators, since too few were available during the exercise. Hospitals also need to ensure that Personnel Protective Equipment is available to all hospital staff. More than anything else, perhaps, TOPOFF 2 underscored how crucial it is for all hospital staff to be trained in disaster preparedness. Officials in Illinois consider the five days of TOPOFF 2 to be an overwhelming success. The definition of “first responder” is no longer just defined as police and fire but now includes police, fire, EMS, hospitals and public health officials. The only way to make the nation’s response system stronger is to first identify where strengths as well as weaknesses exist, and TOPOFF 2 allowed state officials to do just that. The exercise provided an opportunity to examine domestic incident management and allowed a critical review of communication and coordination issues post the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks during the fall of 2001. The results and findings of TOPOFF 2 allowed all

214 agencies and organizations at all levels to both identify issues and problems and subsequently develop solutions. Given the opportunity, every jurisdiction should take advantage of participating in this type of an exercise. Not only did it give Illinois the opportunity to validate plans and procedures, but also more important it provided a bridge to cross the “great divide”bringing together health and medical with legal, law enforcement, fire, EMS, and OEM to forge non-traditional partnerships. No longer will any disaster planning or disaster response be handled in an isolated or separate fashion, but as a partnership with a common goal: protecting lives.

REFERENCES

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The first TOPOFF exercise, held in May 2000, was a single no-notice, full-scale exercise coordinated by the Department of Justice and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The original TOPOFF involved a simulated release of plague in Denver, Colorado, a mock release of a mustard gas in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and associated tests of various local, state, and national response elements. For a timeline of the drill, see: http://www.disasterrelief.org/Disasters/000521topoffiimeline/The after action report for TOPOFF 2000 can be found at: www.nrt.org/production/nrt/home.nsf/resources/F’ublications/To focus on the communications aspects of the drill, see A.G. Arnold et al., AnaIysis of Communications Effectiveness f o r First Responders during TopoffZOOO, doc. No. JWR-00-016 (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Rockville, MD: 16 October 2000). * The Office for Domestic Preparedness in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the U.S. Department of State co-sponsored TOPOFF 2. The third TOPOFF exercise is slated to occur in April 2005, involving responders in the states of New Jersey and Connecticut. For more, see: www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press~release/press~release~O386.~1 Plague is caused by Yersiniapestis. For an account of the natural outbreaks of this disease, its potential as an agent of warfare, the epidemiology of plague, its incidence, pathogenesis, clinical manifestations, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention, see Thomas W. McGovern and Arthur M. Friedlander, “Plague,” in Brig. Gen. Russ Zajtchuk and Ronald F. Bellamy, eds., Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects ofChemica1 and Biological Wa$are (Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Washington, DC: 1997): 479-502. For more on the Seattle component of TOPOFF 2, which involved 150 fake injuries and 92 patients sent to local hospitals, see Christine Claridge and Warren King, “Emergency Drill Called ‘Real-life Scary,”’ Seattle Times (13 May 2003) and Bob Young, “Critics Say Topoff Exercise Fell Short,” Seattle Times (16 May 2003). The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is “a national repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, IV administration, airway maintenance supplies, and medical/surgxal items. The SNS is designed to supplement and re-supply state and local public health agencies in the event of a national emergency anywhere and at anytime within the U.S. or its territories.” The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Department of Health and Human Services jointly manage the SNS. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Strategic National Stockpile,” 11 August 2003, www.bt.cdc.gov. So-called paper patients were used to allow hospitals to participate and test certain capabilities without overtaxing them. Instead of receiving real patients complaining of hypothetical symptoms, hospitals were faxed on paper the details of patient symptoms and subsequently performed certain tasks. The Emergency Operations Center directs the state’s disaster response efforts, including natural disasters and acts of terrorism. Tornadoes and floods are two relatively common natural disasters

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215 in the state of Illinois. In 2003 Illinois received a $9.3 million grant to build a new, technologically advanced State Emergency Operations Center, which is scheduled to open in 2005. The Center will house the State Incident Response Center, the State Terrorism Intelligence Center, the Illinois Terrorism Task Force, the Radiological Emergency Assessment Center, the state's 24-hour telecommunications center, and officials from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. See Illinois Emergency Management Agency, www.state.il.us/iema. 'The Incident Command System (ICS) was created in the early 1970s in California as a way to coordinate multiple agency responses to wildland fires. Since then, ICS has been adopted as the national standard for disaster response. ICS is structured on five functions: Command, Operations, Planninghtelligence, Logistics, and Finance/Administration. Command is the top on-the-scene authority, overseeing the execution of tasks of the other four functional units. Operations directs the tactical front-line response efforts. Planninghtelligence manages the collection, analysis and dissemination of information. Logstics handles all equipment, facility, staffing and material resource needs. Finance/Administration manages the monetary, costanalysis and administrative details. This phrase has entered the popular lexicon courtesy of the last of Sergio Leone's spaghetti westerns trilogy, which bears this title. This 1966 epic, brutal film starred Clint Eastwood, among others. I0 Hospital Incident Command System, 3rd.ed., vol. I (San Mateo County Health Services Agency, Emergency Medical Services, CA: June 1998).

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8. CROSS-CULTURAL EVALUATION OF SOCIETAL RESPONSE WORKING GROUP SESSION

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REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON CROSS-CULTURAL EVALUATION OF SOCIETAL RESPONSE AHMAD KAMAL, Chairman United Nations Institute for Training and Research A. Terrorism, which has existed for a long time, is now certain to occupy the global center stage because of its new intensified forms. It is threatening the planet and its political, economic, and social stability. It would, therefore, be desirable to give some greater focus to the efforts of the World Federation of Scientists in its consideration of the problems of Terrorism as a Planetary Emergency.

B. Efforts to contain this global threat have so far been largely ineffective. In fact, the threat has been growing. This may be because the containment of terrorism appears to be currently outside the capability of governments and world institutions. Even a basic understanding of what motivates terrorists, or why terrorism is spreading is mostly speculative. C. In times of crisis, governments have a tendency to focus on short-term countermeasures, which are kequently confrontational. In the current context, short-term counter-measures carry the grave consequence of degenerating into a clash of civilizations and cultures, resulting in the alienation of all those moderate elements of society that are natural allies in facing this common threat. Many of these moderate elements are already being subjected to intense internal debate in their respective societies. D. These short-term counter-measures show little sign of success in stemming the threats that confi-ont the world. It is incumbent on the scientific community to address the problem within a longer time frame that would seek out more consensual solutions, with a promise of greater durability.

E. Part of the responsibility for the current situation arises from poor governance, the shortage of political and economic opportunities, the lack of due attention to education, the denial of civil liberties, and the absence of gender equity. Addressing these factors could go a long way towards mitigating conflict-generating frustrations and despair. F. Military operations achieve only tactical, not strategic, responses to these problems. Continued reliance on them only generates more varied and insidious forms of terrorism and broadens its popular support. Top-heavy actions provoke deep and spiraling resentments and antagonisms that multiply the very risks that were meant to be avoided. G. Study after study show that the majority of people in all the countries situated on the current fault lines of the conflict deeply aspire to meaningful participation in government and political decision making, better educational opportunities, wider

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220 economic choices, and improved standards of living. These aspirations, however, can only be realized if personal security and cultural identity are ensured. H. A perception among some of the peoples caught up in the current scourge of transnational terrorism is that the core problem stems from the policies in the Middle East. It would appear that the roots of the problem spread far wider. Cultural and religious intolerance within and between peoples forecloses the search for common understanding and compromise. Resource conflicts over water, oil, and land, create even more intractable divisions.

In the light of the above, the Working Group would like to make the following specific recommendations: 1. Given the fact that the current allocation of resources is almost exclusively directed towards tools and counter-measures, it is imperative that substantial funds be channeled into activities aimed at facilitating cross-cultural understanding. Among the concrete activities which will have to be undertaken and duly funded would be; a. Coordination between the statistical database of terrorist incidents and their typology, to be used as a cross-cultural reference for further discussions; b. Specific studies on the inter-ethnic conflicts which are generating violence and terrorism in different parts of the world; c. The role being played by religious intolerance in creating divides which forestall the possibilities of negotiated settlements; d. Studies of successes and failures, including best practice scenarios; and e. An analysis of the vicious cycle between actions and responses, and the unintended consequences of planned future actions. 2. One important tool for addressing concrete topics in ways directly relevant to current conflicts is to initiate a series of intensive and extended seminars and “rencontres” in a neutral and relaxed setting, as in Erice. 3. Another concrete and essential objective is to strengthen and empower moderate elements by encouraging Non-Governmental Organisations and Universities to fund and sponsor network creating activities that enable these moderate elements to become feasible alternatives to extremist cells.

4. Since the traditional schooling system in many parts of the world is geared towards a narrow learning of single subjects, governments and civil society must ensure a wider and more balanced curriculum, with strong scientific content, better suited to expanding future opportunities in the real world. This might require providing alternative sources for the health and social services that many of these schools currently provide. A key component of any modem educational system also includes competence in handling information technology as an instrument for building up a knowledge base, creating a better appreciation of

22 1 human rights and tolerance, and avoiding the pitfalls of prejudice and bias. The integration of this technology into educational systems would go a long way towards creating better understanding and exchanges.

5. The political, economic and social conditions of many states are exceptionally degraded. This increases the risk of their turning into failed states. An early warning system, which involves the scientific monitoring of risk factors, needs to be established so that the deteriorating situations in these states can be identified before they reach the point of no return. With due attention, and the allocation of adequate resources for remedial actions, this danger can be greatly lessened. An early investment would invariably be much more cost-effective than addressing the problem after the critical point of no return is passed.

6. There is a tendency to over-generalize and lump into stereotypes problems that may be eminently dissimilar. These dissimilarities may relate to markedly different organizations, movements, peoples or countries. Particular care must also be taken not to confound problems of deterring hostile states with those aimed at combating trans-national networks.

7. All these above activities would be undertaken by a Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism, consisting of a representative and scholarly group of scientists who, by their very rigor, would be able to apply their intellectual capability and flexibility of mind to produce consensus solutions that can mitigate the risk factors. For best results, this Group should be kept rather limited in size so that it can effectively advise the World Federation of Scientists on possible actionable solutions.

8. The challenge for this Permanent Monitoring Panel would be to apply scientific rigor to an analysis of the problems of, (a) the tools and counter-measures, (b) the underlying motivations, and above all (c) the serious cultural divides that are being created. Solutions could then be developed for immediate or longer-term mitigation, to be considered by governments and global institutions, and for subsequent implementation. 9. The multi-cultural group of scientists would obviously have to be drawn from different schools of thought on the subject so that all points of view are adequately represented and considered. This would be a critically important element in ensuring that a wide and impartial outcome is obtained. While a geographical and cultural balance is essential, the scientists and scholars themselves would also need to have profiles of established respectability and credibility in their respective countries, so that any outcomes that may emerge are given the best possible chances of being applied to reducing the risk of terrorism. 10. The output of the Permanent Monitoring Panel would be communicated by the World Federation of Scientists to policy makers in governments around the world, the United Nations and other regional organisations, religious leaders, and to public opinion through the media.

TRENDS IN SUICIDE TERRORISM: SENSE AM) NONSENSE SCOTT ATRAN Director of Research, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France Adjunct Professor of Psychology, Anthropology, and Natural Resources, University of Michigan, USA The past three years saw more suicide attacks than the last quarter century. Most of these were religiously motivated. While most Westerners imagine a tightly coordinated transnational terrorist organization headed by al-Qaeda, it seems more likely that nations under attack face a set of largely autonomous groups and cells pursuing their own regional aims. Repeated suicide actions show that massive counterforce alone does not diminish the frequency or intensity of suicide attack. Like pounding mercury with a hammer, this sort of top-heavy counterstrategy only seems to generate more varied and insidious forms of suicide terrorism. Even with many top al-Qaeda leaders now dead or in custody, the transnational Jihadist fraternity is transforming into a hydra-headed network more difficult to fight than before. Poverty and lack of education per se are not root causes of suicide terrorism. And Muslims who have expressed support for martyr actions and trust in Osama Bin Laden or the late Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin do not as a rule hate democratic freedoms or Western culture, although many despise American foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. Rising aspirations followed by dwindling expectations - especially regarding civil liberties - are critical factors in generating support for suicide terrorism. The United States, Israel, Russia and other nations on the frontline in the war on terror need to realize that military and counterinsurgencyactions are tactical, not strategic responses to suicide terrorism, the most politically destabilizing and psychologically devastating form of terrorism. When these nations back oppressive and unpopular governments (even those deemed "partners in the war on terror") this only generates popular resentment and support for terrorism against those governments and their backers. To attract potential recruits away from Jihadist martyrdom - suicide terrorism's most virulent strain - and to dry up its popular support, requires addressing basic grievances before a downward spiral sets in where core meaning in life is sought, and found, in religious networks that sanctify vengeance at any cost against stronger powers, even if it kills the avenger. GROWING THREAT OF SUICIDE TERRORISM Suicide attacks have become more prevalent globally, gaining in strategic importance with disruptive effects that cascade upon the political, economic and social routines of national life and international relations. The first major contemporary suicide attack was the December 1981 bombing of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, probably by Iranian agents, that left 27 dead and more than 100 injured. From 1980 to 2001, political scientist Robert Pape observed that 188 suicide attacks took place, most for non-religious motives.' According to an August 2003 congressional report "Terrorists and Suicide Attacks", this represented only three percent of terrorist attacks worldwide during this time period but accounted for nearly half of all deaths.'

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223 The history of suicide bombings since the early 1980s demonstrates how such attacks have generally achieved attackers' near-term strategic goals, such as forcing withdrawal from areas subject to attack, causing destabilization, and demonstrating vulnerability by radically upsetting life routines. In Lebanon, Hizbollah ("Party of God") initiated the first systematic contemporary suicide attack campaign in 1983, killing hundreds of U S . and French soldiers in coordinated truck bombings, compelling the United States and France to withdraw their remaining forces. Hizbollah had dramatically lessened its strategic reliance on suicide bombing by 1992, when it decided to participate in parliamentary elections and become a "mainstream" political party, and after achieving its main objective of forcing Israel to abandon most of the temtorial and political gains made during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad used suicide attacks to effectively derail the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement that was designed to serve as the foundation of a peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. In Sri Lanka, Tamil Eelam ("Tamil Homeland") only recently suspended its suicide squads of Tamil Tigers after wresting control of Tamil areas from the Sinhalese-dominated government and forcing official recognition of some measure of Tamil autonomy. Suicide bombings by al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia in spring 2003 accompanied a drastic reduction in the U.S. military and civilian presence in the country. Of course, the September 11 attacks themselves were suicide attacks. Newer trends since the start of the millennium pose distinct challenges, making the threat posed by suicide terrorism not only more prominent in recent years but also more frequently religiously motivated. From 2000 to 2003, more than 300 suicide attacks killed more than 5,300 people in 17 countries and wounded many thousands more (Table 1). At least 70 percent of these attacks were religiously motivated, with more than 100 attacks by al-Qaeda or affiliates acting in al-Qaeda's name (Table 2). Even more ominous, Islamic Jihadi groups are now networked in ways that permit "swarming" by actors contracted from different groups who home in from scattered locations on multiple targets and then disperse, only to form new swarms. Multiple coordinated suicide attacks across countries and even continents is the adaptive hallmark of al-Qaeda's continued global ~ e b - m a k i n g The . ~ war in Iraq has energized so many disparate groups that the Jihadist network is better prepared than ever to carry on without bin Laden.' The International Institute of Strategic Studies in London reports that: "The counter-terrorism effort has perversely impelled an already highly decentralized and evasive transnational terrorist network to become more 'virtual' and protean and, therefore, harder to identify and neutralize."6 Each country in which suicide attack has occurred has seen people become more suspicious and afraid of one another. Emboldened by the strategic successes of suicidesponsoring terrorist organizations in upsetting the long-term political calculations and daily living routines of its foes, and by increasing support and recruitment among Muslim populations angered by U S . actions in Iraq, Jihadi groups believe they are proving able to mount a lengthy and costly war of attrition. Even U.S. Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld himself lamented "The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' cost of million^."^ The longer this war of attrition lasts, the greater the long-term strategic risk of radicalizing Muslim sentiment against the United States, of undermining the United

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States' international alliances, and of causing serious and sustained discontent among the American people. A White House panel reported in October 2003 that Muslim hostility toward the United States "has reached shocking levels" and is growing steadily.8 In April 2004, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak warned: "There is hatred of the Americans like never before in the region."' Margaret Tutwiler, U S . Undersecretary of State for diplomacy, bemoaned to a Congressional committee in February 2004 that: "It will take us many years of hard, focused work" to restore U.S. credibility, even among traditional allies." Most Americans today feel no safer from terrorism, more distrustful of many longstanding allies, and increasingly anxious about the future. A survey released in early spring 2004 by the nonpartisan Council for Excellence in Government found that fewer than half of all Americans think the country is safer than it was on 9/11, and more than three- uarters expect the U.S. to be the target of a major terrorist attack in the near future. There is good reason to be anxious. One distinct pattern in the litany of terrorist atrocities is that there has been an increasing interest in well-planned attacks designed to net the highest numbers of civilian casualties. Charting data from the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Robert Axelrod, a political scientist at the University of Michigan, observes that a very few terrorist attacks account for a very large percentage of all casualties (Figure 1). Not only does this trend call for anticipating attacks with ever broader political, economic and social effects, it also seems to point to an eventual suicide attack using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Although that may take some time to effectively plan, long-term planning has proven to be al-Qaeda's hallmark. "God has ordered us to build nuclear weapons," proclaimed Fazlur Rahman Khalil of Pakistan's Harkat ul-Mujahideen on the CBS television news show 60 Minutes IZ. A subsequent suicide attack on India's Parliament in December 200 1 by Jaish-eMuhammed, a Pakistani splinter group of the al-Qaeda affiliate that Khalil heads, perhaps brought nuclear war closer than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis." Imagine what these people could do with the non-conventional weapons they actively seek. In sum, terrorists are becoming increasingly effective by using suicide attacks and the trend points to a catastrophic unconventional terrorist attack that could make the March 11 Madrid or September 11 New York and Washington attacks pale in comparison. The US. strategic response relies on overwhelming military force to crush evolving Jihadist swarms, but this inflexible and maladaptive strategy only propagates leaner and meaner mutations of suicide networks and cells.

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SUICIDE TERROR TODAY Repeated suicide actions in the disputed regions of Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and now in US.-occupied Iraq, show that military action has not stopped, or even reliably diminished, the incidence of suicide attacks. For example, from 1993 through 2003, 31 1 Palestinian suicide attackers launched themselves against Israeli targets. In the first 7 years of suicide bombing, 70 percent (43 of 61 attempts) were successful in killing other people. From the start of the Second Intifada in September 2000 through 2003, however, while the success rate declined to 52 percent, the number of attacks increased from 61 to 250, with 129 of those successful (up from 43).14

225 The trend is even more alarming in Iraq and elsewhere. On May 1,2003, President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq and "one victory in the war on terror that began on 9/1 L " ' ~Cofer Black, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism, declared soon thereafter that al-Qaeda had to "put up or shut up.. . They had failed. It proves the global war on terrorism is effective.'''6 Within just two weeks, a wave of Jihadist suicide bombings hit Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Israel and Chechnya. Collectively, these attacks were more numerous and widespread than any in the preceding 12 months. In October 2003, five full months after major military operations had been declared over, Iraq suffered its worst spate of suicide bombings to date. White House claims that such attacks only confirmed the "desperation"" of terrorists in the face of increasing U.S. progress in the war on terrorism, provided little evidence that the military response was working and were ridiculed by Arab commentators. A November 2003 suicide attack on Italian forces in southern Iraq convinced several countries not to participate in the military occupation, and spurred the United States to accelerate its timetable for transferring authority to Iraqis. Outside Iraq, suicide bombings in Turkey by self-declared friends of al-Qaeda, also in November, sought to undermine the best example of nonsectarian and democratic rule in the Muslim world, and extended the strategic threat to NATO's underbelly. In December 2003, renewed attacks by Chechnya's "black widows" (women allowed by militant Islamic leaders to become martyrs, usually because of what Russian soldiers have done to their husbands, fathers and brothers) brought terror to Russian civilians. During the year-end holidays, alerts for al-Qaeda suicide skyjackings brought continuous air patrols and surface-to-air missiles to major US. cities and caused cancellations of several international flights. Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf barely escaped assassination on Christmas Day when two suicide truck bombers from Jaish-eMuhammed rammed his motorcade. And all of this occurred despite the fact that State Department funding for counterstrategies to combat terrorism overseas increased 133 percent from September 11, 2001, through fiscal year 2003, according to the final U.S. Federal Interagency report on Combating Terrorism." Including the Iraq theater (originally billed as a war of necessity to deny weapons of mass destruction from al-Qaeda and its associates), U.S. Department of Defense budget increases and emergency supplemental measures, the bill for foreign operations in the war on terrorism into 2004 exceeds $200 billion. Yet the incidence and impact of suicide terrorism have not declined. Of course, not all of this "hard power" spending on terrorism is wasted, but the nearly exclusive reliance on military might has not stifled the martyr's appeal or stalled the threat. In fact, 2003 witnessed more suicide attacks (98) than any year in contemporary history. A plurality (33) occurred in Iraq, now plagued with suicide terror for the first time since the thirteenth century hashasheen ("assassins") slaughtered fellow Muslims and Crusaders to purify Islamic lands (it took the Mongols to stop them) (Table 1). In the fEst four months of 2004, 59 suicide attackers killed nearly 800 people and wounded thousands. There were first-time suicide attacks in Uzbekistan (by female bombers) and in Western Europe (the "no-surrender'' suicide explosion by the cornered plotters of the Madrid train bombings) (Table 3). In Iraq alone (which has so far been budgeted nearly $200 billion as part of the "War on Terror"), 30 suicide bombers killed nearly 600 people

226 - a greater number by far than in any single country for any comparable period since the attacks of September 11. Even a casual glance at media outlets and websites sympathetic

to al-Qaeda reveals a proliferating Jihadist fi-aternity that is not deterred by Saddam’s capture, but rather, takes heart from the fall of Iraq’s secularist tyrant.*’ In short, the record clearly demonstrates that military actions against terrorism and its purported sponsors have not come close to squelching suicide terror. At a minimum, an effective strategy for combating suicide terrorism requires a layered approach that works on three levels in a coordinated way: A last line of defense involves the attempt to protect sensitive populations and installations from attack. Mostly through development and use of scientific technology, efforts are made to block suicide terrorists from hitting their targets or to lessen (through preparation) the effects of an attack that has not been prevented. A middle line of defense involves preemptively penetrating and destroying terror organizations and networks, mostly through a combination of intelligence and military action. A first line of defense involves understanding and acting on the root causes of terrorism so as to drastically reduce the receptivity of potential recruits to the message and methods of terror-sponsoring organizations, mostly through political, economic, and social action programs. Billions upon billions of dollars have been targeted on countermeasures associated with the last and middle lines of defense (protection, mitigation, preemption). These measures may have helped to thwart a steep rise in suicide attacks; however, they have produced no appreciable decline of suicide terrorism. Unfortunately, the same U.S. Federal Interagency report on Combating Terrorism that documents the significant increase in funding for combating terrorism, and reviews plans and activities by dozens of civil and military agencies, reveals scant evidence of serious effort or funding to understand why individuals become, or to prevent individuals from becoming, terrorists in the first place. Even more serious than the scarce interest and funding on this score thus far, however, is the fact that current U.S. policies that do attempt to address the underlying factors of suicide terrorism are woefully misguided. The record suggests that addressing these root causes might provide a more promising approach. MISCONCEIVING ROOT CAUSES A common notion in the US. administration and media spin on the war against terrorism is that suicide attackers are evil, deluded or homicidal misfits who thrive in poverty, ignorance and anarchy. This portrayal lends a sense of hopelessness to any attempt to address root causes because some individuals will always be desperate or deranged enough to conduct suicide attacks. But as logical as the poverty-breedsterrorism argument may seem, study after study shows that suicide attackers and their supporters are rarely ignorant or impoverished. Nor are they crazed, cowardly, apathetic or asocial. The common misconception underestimates the central role that organizational factors play in the appeal of terrorist networks. A better understanding of such causes reveals that the challenge is actually manageable: the key is not to profile and target the

227 most despairing or deranged individual but to understand and undermine the organizational and institutional appeal of terrorists' motivations and networks. The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism highlights the "War of Ideas" and "War on Poverty" as adjunct programs to reduce terrorism's pool of support and recruitment." The war of ideas is based on the premise that terrorists and their supporters "hate our freedoms," a sentiment Bush has expressed both with regard to al-Qaeda and to the Iraqi resistance." Yet survey data reliably show that most Muslims who support suicide terrorism and trust Osama bin Laden favor elected government, personal liberty, educational opportunity, and economic choice.23Mark Tessler, who coordinates longterm surveys of Muslim societies from the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research, finds that Arab attitudes toward American culture are most favorable among young adults-the same population that terrorist recruiters single out-regardless of their religious ~rientation.'~Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinan Center for Survey and Policy Research, consistently finds that a majority of Palestinians has a favorable impression of U.S. (and Israeli) forms of government, education, economy, and even literature and art, even though nearly three-fourths of the population supports suicide attack.25 In sum, there is no evidence that most people who support suicide actions hate Americans' internal cultural freedoms (cf. Table 4 on Algerian attitudes), but rather, every indication that they oppose U.S. foreign policies, particularly regarding the Middle East. After the 1996 suicide attack against US. military housing at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, a Defense Department Science Board report stated: "Historical data show a strong correlation between U S . involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States."26US. intervention in Iraq is but the most recent example. A United Nations report indicated that as soon as the United States began building u for the Iraq invasion, al-Qaeda recruitment had picked up in 30 to 40 countries." Recruiters for groups sponsoring terrorist acts were telling researchers that volunteers were beating down the doors to join. Similarly, the war on poverty is based on the premise that impoverishment, lack of education, and social estrangement spawn terrorism. Economist Gary Becker's theory that the greater the amount of human capital (including income and education) a person accumulates, the less likely that person is to commit a crime." The theory is that the greater a person's human capital, the more that person is aware of losing out on substantial future gains if captured or killed. Similar thinking applies to suicide terror: the less promising one's future, the more likely one's choice to end life. Almost all current U.S. foreign aid programs related to terrorism pivot on such assumptions, now generally accepted by the mainstream of both U.S. political parties, but although the theory has proven useful in combating blue-collar crime, no evidence indicates its bearing on terror. Studies by Princeton economist Alan Krueger and others find no correlation between a nation's per capita income and terrori~m?~ but do find a correlation between a lack of civil liberties, defined by Freedom House,30and terrorism. A recent National Research Council report, Discouraging Terrorism, finds: "Terrorism and its supporting audiences appear to be fostered by policies of extreme political repression and discouraged by policies of incorporating both dissident and moderate groups responsibly into civil society and the political proces~."~' U.S. backing of weak, failed, and corrupt states generates animosity and terrorism against the U.S. There seems to be a direct

228 correlation between U.S. military aid to politically corroded or ethnically divided states,32 human rights abuses by those regimes,33and rise in terrorism,34as initially moderate opposition is pushed into common cause with more radical elements. Despite these realities, the meager U.S. monies available for nonmilitary foreign aid are far too concentrated in poverty reduction and literacy enhancement. In fact, in Pakistan, literacy and dislike for the United States have increased nonetheless while the number of Islamist madrassa schools grew from 3,000 to nearly 40,000 since 1978. According to the U.S. State Department report, September I 1 One Year Later, development aid is based "on the belief that poverty provides a breeding ground for ~ ~ Bush terrorism. The terrorist attacks of September 11 reaffirmed this c o n ~ i c t i o n , "and declared at a UN conference on poor nations in Monterrey, Mexico: "We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror."36Yet study after study demonstrates that suicide terrorists and their supporters are not abjectly poor, illiterate, or socially estranged.37 Another misconception that implicitly drives current national security policy is that suicide terrorists have no rational political agenda and are not sane. According to General Wesley Clark, unlike nineteenth-century Russian terrorists who wanted to depose the czar, current Islamic terrorists are simply retrograde and nihilist: "They want the destruction of Western civilization and the return to seventh-century Islam."38Senator John Warner testified that a new security doctrine of preemption was necessary because "those who would commit suicide in their assaults on the free world are not rational."39 According to Vice President Dick Cheney, the September 11 plotters and other likeminded terrorists "have no sense of morality."40 In truth, suicide terrorists on the whole have no appreciable psychopathology and are often wholly committed to what they believe to be devout moral principles. A report on The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism used by the Central and Defense Intelligence Agencies (CIA and DIA) finds "no psychological attribute or personality distinctive of terrorist^."^' Recruits are generally well adjusted in their families and liked by peers, and often more educated and economically better off than their surrounding population. Researchers Base1 Saleh and Claude Berrebi independently find that the majority of Palestinian suicide bombers have a college education (versus 15 percent of the population of comparable age) and that less than 15 percent come from poor families (although about one-third of the population lives in poverty). DIA sources who have interrogated al-Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo note that Saudi-born operatives, especially those in leadership positions, are often "educated above reasonable employment level, a surprising number have graduate degrees and come from high-status families."42The general pattern was captured in a Singapore Parliamentary report on prisoners from Jemaah Islamiyah, an ally of al-Qaeda: "These men were not ignorant, destitute or disenfranchised. Like many of their counterparts in militant Islamic organizations in the region, they held normal, respectable jobs. Most detainees regarded religion as their most important personal value."43 Except for being mostly young unattached males, suicide attackers differ from members of violent racist organizations to whom they are often compared, such as American white supremacist groups.44 Overall, suicide terrorists exhibit no socially dysfunctional attributes (fatherless, friendless, jobless) or suicidal symptoms. Inconsistent with economic theories of criminal behavior, they do not kill themselves simply out of

229

hopelessness or a sense of having nothing to lose. Muslim clerics countenance killing oneself for martyrdom in the name of God but curse personal suicide. "He who commits suicide kills himself for his own benefit," warned Sheikh Yussuf Al-Qaradhawi (a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood), but "he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation.. . the Mujahed is full of hope."45 Another reason that personal despair or derangement may not be a significant factor in suicide terrorism is that the cultures of the Middle East, Africa and Asia where it thrives tend to be less 'individualistic" than our own, more attuned to the environmental and organizational relationships that shape behavior, and less tolerant of individuals acting independently from a group context.46Terrorists in these societies also would be more likely to be seeking a group, or collective, sense of belonging and justification for their actions. A group struggling to gain power and resources against materially better-endowed enemies must attract able and committed recruits-not loners-who are willing to give up their lives for a cause. At the same time, the group must prevent uncommitted elements in the population from simply free-riding on the backs of committed fighters, that is, sharing in the fighters' rewards and success without taking the risks or paying the costs of fighting. Insurgent groups manage this by offering potential recruits the promise of great future rewards instead of immediate gain, such as freedom for future generations or eternal bliss in Paradise. Only individuals committed to delayed gratification are then liable to volunteer. Insurgent groups also tend to seek out individuals with better education and economic prospects, because they view a person who invests resources in education and training for a better economic future as signaling willingness to sacrifice today's satisfactions for tomorrow's rewards and able to realize commitments. For this reason, relative level of education and economic status is often higher among insurgent groups that recruit primarily on the basis of promises for the future than among traditional armies that rely more on short-term incentives?' RELATIVE DEPRIVATIONAND RELIGIOUS REDEMPTION The connection between suicide and terrorists and religion might be explained by the role that religious ethnic groups can play. Ethnic groups offer a good foundation for sustaining resource-deficient insurgencies because they provide a social structure that can underpin the maintenance of reputations and the efficient gathering of information about recruits. But ethnicity alone may not be enough; religion may also be needed to cement commitment. A comparison of ethnic Palestinians with ethnic Bosnian Muslims (matched for age, income, education, exposure to violence, etc.) shows the Palestinians much more liable to use religious sentiments to confidently express of hope for the future by willingness to die for the group, whereas the Bosnians do not express religious sentiments, hope or willingness to die.48Martyrdom, which involves "pure" commitment to promise over payoff, and unconditional sacrifice for fictive "brothers," will more likely endure in religious ethnic groups. None of this denies that popular support for terrorism is sustained, in part, by economic factors, such as explosive population growth and underemployment, coupled with the failure of rigidly authoritarian governments to provide youth outlets for political and economic advancement. Middle Eastern and more broadly most Muslim societies,

230 whose populations double within one generation or less, have age pyramids with broad bases: each younger age group is substantially larger (more people) than the next older. Even with states that allowed for a modicum of political expression or economic employment, society's structure of opportunities can have trouble keeping pace with population. Regional governments are increasingly unable to provide these opportunities, enhancing the attractiveness of religious organizations that are able to recruit tomorrow's suicide terrorists. Weak and increasingly corrupt and corroded nationalist regimes in Muslim countries have sought to eliminate all secular opposition. To subdue popular discontent in the post-colonial era, the Ba'athist socialist dictators of Syria and Iraq, the authoritarian prime ministers of Pakistan and Malaysia, the monarchs of Morocco and Jordan, and the imperial presidents of Egypt, Algeria, the Philippines and Indonesia, all initially supported militant Islamic groups. To maintain their bloated bureaucracies and armies, these "failed states" - all poor imitations of Western models with no organic history in the Arab and Muslim world - readily delegated responsibility for the social welfare of their peoples to activist Islamic groups eager to take charge. These groups provided schooling and health services more efficiently and extensively than governments were able to, offering a "desecularized"path to fulfill modernity's universal mission to improve humanity. When radical Islam finally vented political aspirations beginning with the 1965 "Islamic Manifesto," Milestones, written in prison by the Muslim Brotherhood's Sayyid Qutb just before he was hanged for sedition by Egyptian leader Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser - popular support proved too deep and widespread to extinguish. Although the process of rising aspirations followed by dwindling expectations that generates terror can be identified, disentangling the relative significance of political and economic factors in the Muslim world is difficult and perhaps even impossible. During the 1990s, momentous political developments in Algeria (multiparty elections, including Islamic groups in 1992), Palestine (Oslo Peace Accords in 1993), Chechnya (dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of communist control), Indonesia (Suharto's resignation in 1998 and the end of dictatorship), and elsewhere fanned rising aspirations among Muslim peoples for political freedom and economic advancement. In each case, economic stagnation or decline followed as political aspirations were thwarted (the Algerian Army cancelled elections, the Israel-Palestine Camp David negotiations broke down, Russia cracked down on Chechnya's bid for autonomy, and Suharto army loyalists and paramilitary groups fomented interethnic strife and political disaccord). Support and recruitment for suicide terrorism occur not under conditions of political repression, poverty, and unemployment or illiteracy as such, but when converging political, economic, and social trends produce diminishing opportunities relative to expectations, thus generating frustrations that radical organizations can exploit. For this purpose, relative deprivation is more significant than absolute deprivation. Unlike poorer, less educated elements of their societies - or equally educated, well-off members of our society - many educated, middle-class Muslims increasingly experience frustration with life as their potential opportunities are less attractive than their prior expectations. Frustrated with their future, the appeal of routine national life declines and suicide terrorism gives some perceived purpose to act altruistically, in the potential terrorist's mind, for the welfare of a future generation.

231 Revolutionary terror imprints itself into history when corrupt and corroded societies choke rising aspirations into explosive frustration. ORGANIZATIONAND THE BANALITY OF EVIL This frustrating confluence of circumstances helps to account for terrorism's popular support and endurance but not the original spark that ignites people's passions and minds. Most people in the world who suffer stifling, even murderous, oppression do not become terrorists. As with nearly all creators and leaders of history's terrorist movements, those who conceive of using suicide terrorism in the first place belong mostly to an intellectual elite possessing sufficient material means for personal advancement but who choose a life of struggle and sacrifice for themselves and who often require even greater commitment from their followers. Their motivations are not personal comfort or immediate material gain. Rather, their motivation is religious or ideological conviction and zeal, whose founding assumptions, like those of any religion, cannot be rationally scrutinized, and for which they inspire others to believe in and die. But arational motivations don't preclude rational actions. Sponsors of martyrdom are not irrational. Using religious sentiments for political or economic purposes can be eminently rational, as when martyrdom or missionary actions gain recognition, recruits, and power in order to increase political "market share"49(to gain in the competition for political influence in a regional context, within the larger Muslim community, or with the rest of the world). Dwindling returns on individuals' future prospects in life translate into higher levels of recruitment and prompt returns for terrorist groups and leaders. This degree of manipulation usually works only if the manipulators themselves make costly, hard-to-fake commitments, however. Through indoctrination of recruits into relatively small and closeted cellsemotionally tight knit brotherhoods-terror organizations create a family of cellmates who are just as willing to sacrifice for one another as a parent for a child. Consider the "Oath to Jihad" taken by recruits to Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, a Pakistani affiliate of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders, the umbrella organization formed by Osama Bin Laden in 1998. The oath affirms that by their sacrifice members help secure the future of their family of fictive kin: "Each [martyr] has a special laceamong them are brothers, just as there are sons and those even more dear."59These culturally contrived cell loyalties mimic and (at least temporarily) override genetically based fidelities to kin while securing belief in sacrifice to a larger group cause. The mechanism of manipulation resembles that of the U.S. army (and probably most armies), which trains soldiers in small groups of committed buddies who then grow willing to sacrifice for one another, and only derivatively for glory or country (motherland, fatherland). Key to intercepting that commitment before it solidifies is grasping how, like the best commercial advertisers but to ghastlier effect, charismatic leaders of terrorist groups turn ordinary desires for kinship and religion into cravings for the mission they are pitching, to the benefit of the manipulating organization rather than the individual manipulated. Therefore, understanding and parrying suicide terrorism requires concentrating more on the organizational structure, indoctrination methods, and ideological appeal of recruiting organizations than on personality attributes of the

232 individuals recruited. No doubt individual predispositions render some more susceptible to social factors that leaders use to persuade recruits to die for their cause. But monthssometimes years-f intense indoctrination can lead to blind obedience no matter who the individ~al.~' Part of the answer to what leads a normal person to suicide terror may lie in philosopher Hannah Arendt's notion of the "banality of evil," which she used to describe the recruitment of mostly ordinary Germans, not sadistic lunatics, to man Nazi extermination camps.52 In the early 1960s, psychologist Stanley Milgram tested her thesis. He recruited Yale students and other US. adults to supposedly help others learn better. When the learner, hidden by a screen, failed to memorize arbitrary word pairs fast enough, the helper was instructed to administer an electric shock, and to increase voltage with each erroneous answer (which the learner, actually an actor, deliberately got wrong). Most helpers complied with instructions to give potentially lethal shocks (labeled as 450 volts, but in fact 0) despite victims' screams and pleas. This experiment showed how situations can be staged to elicit blind obedience to authority, and more generally that manipulation of context can trump individual personality and psychology to generate apparently extreme behaviors in ordinary people.53 Social psychologists have long documented what they call "the fundamental attribution error," the tendency for people to explain human behavior in terms of individual personality traits, even when significant situational factors in the larger society are at work. This attribution error leads many in the West to focus on the individual suicide terrorists rather than the organizational environment that produces them. If told that someone has been ordered to give a speech supporting a particular political candidate, for example, most people in Western society will still think that the speaker believes what he is saying. This interpretation bias seems to be especially prevalent in individualistic cultures, such as those of the United States and Western Europe, as opposed to collectivist cultures, such as Africa and Asia. Portrayals by the U.S. government and media of suicide bombers as deranged cutthroats may also suffer from a fundamental attribution error: no instance has yet occurred of religious or political suicide terrorism resulting from the lone action of a mentally unstable bomber (e.g., a suicidal Unabomber) or someone acting entirely under his own authority and responsibility (e.g., a suicidal Timothy McVeigh). The key is the organization, not the individual. For organizations that sponsor suicide attack to thrive--or even survive-against much stronger military foes, they need strong community support. Yet the reasons for that communal support can differ among people. Among Palestinians, perceptions of historical injustice combine with personal loss and humiliation at the hands of their Israeli occupiers to nurture individual martyrs and general popular support for martyr actions. Palestinian economist Base1 Saleh observes that a majority of Palestinian suicide bombers had prior histories of arrest or injury by Israel's army, and many of the youngest suicide shooters had family members or close friends with such a hist01-y.~~ Khalil Shikaki, a psychologist and Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, has preliminary survey data suggesting that popular support for suicide actions may be positively correlated with the number of Israeli checkpoints that Palestinians have to regularly pass through to go about their daily business and the time needed to pass through them (this can involve spending hours at each of several checkpoints, any of which can be arbitrarily closed down any time to prevent through passage). Humiliation

233 and revenge are the most consistent sentiments expressed by not just recruits but also their supporters, though expressed more as community grievances than as personal ones.5 5 Although individual grievances generate support for terrorists and motivate some people to become recruits, debriefings with captured al-Qaeda operatives at Guantinamo and with Jemaah Islamiyah prisoners in Singapore suggest that recruitment to these organizations is more ideologically driven than grievance-driven. Detainees evince little history of personal hardship but frequently cite relatives or respected community members who participated in earlier jihads, or close peers presently engaged, as influencing decisions to join the fight.56 Of course, ideology and grievance are not mutually exclusive. Jessica Stern's interviews with jihadists and their supporters in Kashmir reveal that both abound. Despite numerous studies of individual behavior that show situation to be a much better predictor than personality in group contexts, Americans overwhelmingly believe that personal decision, success, and failure depend on individual choice, responsibility, and personality. This perception is plausibly one reason many Americans tend to think of terrorists as homicidal maniacs. "If we have to, we just mow the whole place down," said Senator Trent Lott, exasperated with the situation in Iraq. "You're dealing with insane suicide bombers who are killing our people, and we need to be very aggressive in taking As Timothy Spangler, chairman of Republicans Abroad (a group of them Americans living overseas that helps the Republican Party develop policy) recently put it, "We know what the causes of terrorism areterrorists.. . It's ultimately about individuals taking individual decisions to kill people."58According to last year's Pew survey, most of the world disagrees.59Although we cannot do much about personality traits, whether biologically influenced or not, we presumably can think of nonmilitary ways to make terrorist groups less attractive and undermine their effectiveness with recruits. That holds the key to defeating terrorism. SOFT POWER COUNTERSTRATEGY Whatever the basis of community support for organizations that sponsor terrorism, that support needs to be the prime long-term focus of attention by U.S. policymakers and others who are interested in combating the threat they pose. For without community support, terrorist organizations that depend for information, recruitment and survival on dense networks of ethnic and religious ties and can no more thrive than fish out of water. No evidence (historical or otherwise) indicates that popular support for suicide terrorism will evaporate, or that individuals will cease to be persuaded by terrorists' groups promises of future rewards, without complicity in tackling at least some fimdamental goals that suicide attackers and supporting communities share, such as denying support to discredited governments and going full press on ending the conflict in the Palestinian territories, whose daily images of violence engender global Muslim resentment.60 Republicans and Democrats alike clamor for the allocation of billions of dollars to protect innumerable targets from suicide attackers. Guarding sensitive installations is a last line of defense, however, and probably the easiest line to breach because of the abundance of vulnerable targets and would-be attackers.

234 Preempting and preventing terrorism requires that U.S policymakers make a concerted effort to understand the background conditions as well as the recruitment processes that inspire people to take their own lives in the name of a greater cause. Current political and economic conditions that policymakers currently monitor are important although not necessarily determinant. Rather, what likely matters more is the promise of redeeming real or imagined historical grievances through a religious (or transcendent ideological) mission that empowers the militarily weak with unexpected force against enemies materially much stronger. This was as true for Jewish Zealots who sacrificed themselves to kill Romans two millennia ago as it is for modem Jihadists. Identifying sacred values in different cultures and how they compete for people’s affections is surely a first step in learning how to prevent those values from spiraling into mortal conflict between societies. All religions, and many quasi-religious ideologies that make claims about laws of history or universal missions to reform humanity, are based on sacred values.61Such values are linked to emotions that underpin feelings of cultural identity and trust. These emotion-laden sentiments are amplified into moral obligations to strike out against perceived opponents no matter the cost when conditions of relative deprivation get to a point where suicide terrorists actively seek alternatives because of lack of political and economic opportunity. Such sentiments are characteristic of apparently arational, emotionally-driven commitments, including heartfelt romantic love and uncontrollable vengeance, which may have emerged under natural selection’s influence, to override rational calculations based on seemin ly impossible or very long odds of achieving individual goals, such as lasting security.6’ In religiously-inspired suicide terrorism, these sentiments, again, are manipulated by organizational leaders, recruiters and trainers, mostly for the organization’s benefit at the expense of the individual. Such manipulation is an extreme form of a common practice, where society’s ruling management demands readiness-todie from its own members - and occasional execution of this demand - as a demonstration of faith in society. In times of crisis, every society routinely calls upon some of its own people to sacrifice their lives for the general good of the body-politic. For militant Jihadists, crisis is constant and unabating, and extreme sacrifice is necessary as long as there are non-believers (kuffaa.)in the world. Policy may head off this downward spiral towards mortal conflict between incommensurable moral views of the world by helping to provide political and economic opportunity for some. But once that spiral starts for others, the task becomes much more difficult. Once values become sacred, negotiated tradeoffs based on balancing costs and benefits become taboo - much as selling off one’s child or selling out one’s country is taboo, no matter what the payoff is - and offers of compromise or exchange are met with moral outrage. Counting on military pressure, the economic power of globalization, or the Westem media’s powers of persuasion to get others to give up such values is probably a vain hope. Policymakers from nations that fight sacred terror and hope to defeat it need to circumscribe the point at which commitment becomes absolute and non-negotiable and seek to reach people before they come to it. Traditional top-heavy approaches, such as strategic bombardment, invasion, occupation, and other massive forms of coercion, cannot eliminate tactically innovative and elusive Jihadist swarms nor suppress their popular support. According to a survey by the Pew Research Center released in March 2004, nearly half of Pakistanis and

235 substantial majorities of people in supposedly moderate Muslim countries, such as Morocco and Jordan, now support suicide bombings as a way of counterin the application of military might by the United States in Iraq and by Israel in Palestine. Regarding the Palestine/Israel conflict, polls by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre indicate that increased coercive measures by Israeli forces during the Second Intifada (fall 2000 - fall 2003) are positively correlated with Palestinian popular support for attacks. Support for suicide attack, in turn,directly correlates with (Tables 5 and 6):64 Increased support for the principal radical Islamic groups, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,65 Decreased popular support for the multiparty, non-sectarian Palestinian Authority and its President, Yasser Arafat, 66 Decreased optimism for the future, and decreased Palestinian readiness to follow the peace process toward a negotiated political solution. Pinpoint responses may not be the answer either.67Kathleen Carley, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, has used intelligence reports and sophisticated computer modeling to monitor the changes in jihadist networks, including the cell responsible for the suicide bombing of the American embassy in Tanzania. She found that eliminating the "central actors" - that is, cell members who have the most ties to other cell members and to other groups - has actually spurred terrorists to adapt more quickly, and has been less effective in the long run than eliminated less-central foot soldiers (Figure 2). Thus, targeted assassinations of known leaders (a favorite Israeli tactic) may be counterproductive,68in addition to causing public revulsion. Rather than focusing on hard power as a last defense, the first line of defense should be convincing Muslim communities to stop supporting religious schools and charities that feed terrorist networks. For example, just a small percentage of what the U.S. spends on often ineffective counterinsurgency aid to unpopular governments can help to train teachers and administrators, build schools and dormitories, furnish books and computers, provide fellowships and stipends, and fund local invitations for all willing parties to discuss and debate. Radical Islamic and other terrorist groups often provide more and better educational, medical, and social welfare services than governments do; so democratic nations that fight terrorism must discretely help others in these societies to compete with - rather than attempt to crush - such programs for the bodies, minds and hearts of people. Clearly, shows of military strength are not the way to end the growing menace of suicide terrorism: witness the failure of Israel's and Russia's coercive efforts to end strings of Palestinian and Chechnyan suicide bombings. Rather, those nations most threatened by suicide terrorism, in particular the world's democracies, must show people the aspects of democratic cultures they most respect. These nations should promote democracy, but must be ready to accept "democracy's paradox": if people choose representatives whom America and its democratic allies don't like, or who have different values or ways of doing things, still voters' decisions must be accepted as long as this does not generate violence. Democratic self-determinationin Palestine, Kashmir and Iraq - or for that matter, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia - will more likely reduce terrorism than more military and counterinsurgency aid. At the same time, America and its allies need to establish an intense dialogue with Muslim religious and community

w

236 leaders to reconcile Islamic custom and religious law (shuri 'a) with internationally recognized standards for crime and punishment and human rights. To address the problem of relative deprivation, the U.S. and its allies should promote economic choice. But people must be allowed to pick and chose those goods and values that they desire, and must not be forced to privatize their traditional ways of trading and doing business any more than they should be forced to collectivize, neither should they be made to accept goods and values that they may not want in the name of "free markets" or "globalization." Most important, America and its allies should actively seek to redress the denial of civil liberties, by withdrawing military and political support from those of its "partners in the war on terror"69who persistently infringe on human rights and deny political expression to their people, and by encouraging moderates to constructively argue for and against alternative visions for their societies. Candor and debate with open dissent instill confidence, but propaganda and manipulative public relations breed disaffection and distrust. As any good scientist or businessman knows, people who acknowledge errors can correct them to perform better, and in performing better they are better able to recognize and correct their errors. Of course, the U.S. can't just unilaterally pull out of places that would then be threatened with collapse or hostile takeover. But long-term planning must not allow America and its allies to become embroiled in maintaining brutal and repressive regimes whose practices generate popular resentment and terrorism. In addition, because it is the main target and foe of suicide attacks by Jihadists, the United States must work in concert with the international community to address the historical and personal grievances - whether perceived or actual - of people who have been denied the opportunity and power to realize their hopes and aspirations for personal security, collective peace, environmental sustainability and cultural fulfillment. The festering conflicts and killing fields of IsraeUPalestine, PakistadKashmidIndia, RussidChechnya, the Western Sahara, Mindanao, The Moluccas, or Bosnia a should be as much of a concern and a prod to action as the current state of the world economy. Finally, the United States has to stop insisting on planetary rights of interference in the belief that our vision of civilization is humanity's last great hope or that U.S. national security depends on the world accepting "a single sustainable model of national success.. . right and true for every person, in every society."70"America is a nation with a mission," proclaimed President Bush in his 2004 State of the Union address. Yet a key lesson of the Vietnam War, according to former defense secretary Robert McNamara, was the error in thinking "we're on a mission. We weren't then and we aren't today. And we shouldn't act unilaterally militarily under any circumstances. We don't have the Godgiven right to shape every nation to our own image."7' The new National Security Strategy of the United States frames America's new global mission in words the President first used at Washington's National Cathedral three days after 9/11: "our responsibility to history is.. . to rid the world of evil." Of course, exorcising the world's evil - or even all forms of terrorism - is as much an impossible mission as forever ending injustice (or earthquakes). More seriously, this publicized mission that pits America's moral world of Good against the Jihadist world of Evil directly parallels the Jihadist division of the world between "The House of Islam" (Dar al-Islam) and "The House of War" ( o a r al-Harb), and feeds Jihadism's religious conviction and zeal as well its power to persuade recruits. This does the US. and its allies no good.

237 Clearly, none of this necessitates negotiating with terrorist groups that sponsor martyrs in the pursuit of goals such as al-Qaeda's quest to replace the Western-inspired system of nation-states with a global caliphate. Osama bin Laden and others affiliated with the mission of the World Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders seek no compromise, and will probably fight with hard power to the death. For these groups and already committed individuals, using hard power is necessary. The tens of millions of people who sympathize with bin Laden, however, are likely open to the promise of soft-power'* alternatives that most Muslims seem to favor-elected government, freedom of expression, educational opportunity, economic choice. The historical precondition for such opportunity, as well as the popular legitimacy of any form of governance, to be effective, however, is to ensure that potential recruits in the Arab and Muslim world feel secure about their personal safety as well as their cultural heritage. Although such soft-power efforts may demand more patience than governments under attack, or being pressured to reform typically politically tolerate in times of crisis, forbearance is necessary to avoid increasingly catastrophic devastation to the United States, to its democratic allies, and to the future hopes of peoples who aspire to soft empowerment from a free world.

EPILOGUE "Civilization is intermittent. ' I - Menahem Begin To capture the hearts and souls of people around them, terrorist groups provoke their enemies into committing atrocities. Two millennia ago, the first Jewish Revolt against Roman occupation began with youths throwing stones, and Roman commanders telling their soldiers to sheathe their swords and defend themselves with wooden staves. The Jewish Zealots and Sicarii ("daggers") upped the ante - much as Hamas would do later against Israelis and Iraqi insurgents increasingly do against America's coalition attacking Roman soldiers and their Greek underlings in self-sacrificial acts during public ceremonies. The Sicarii, who claimed to be freedom fighters but whom the Romans deemed terrorists, modeled their mission on Samson, who centuries before had brought down on himself a Philistine temple to help Israel. The Jewish revolt ended with collective suicide of perhaps hundreds of Sicarii warriors and their families at the desert-fortress of Masada in 73 A.D. But that was hardly the end of the story. This "heroic" death inspired two subsequent revolts, ending with Rome expelling all Jews from Judea, including many Christians who still considered themselves Jews. Judea became "Palaestina," renamed for the Philistines. The Jewish Diaspora spread a universalizing faith to the far comers of the world, eventually converting the Roman emperor Constantine and the Arabian chieftan Mohammed to monotheism. Ever since the Enlightenment, the modem world's major movements - the big "isms" of recent history - have been on a mission to invent "humanity" by saving it and making it their own. Modernism is the industrial legacy of monotheism (however atheist in appearance), secularized and scientifically applied. No non-monotheistic society (save Buddhism perhaps) ever considered that all people are, or should be, essentially of a kind. To many in our society, the 20th-century demise of colonialism, anarchism, fascism and

238 communism left history's playing field wide open to what Lincoln besought as "the last great hope of mankind," our society's ideal of democratic liberalism (though Lincoln, like Jefferson, foresaw that the U S . would "meanly lose" this hope if advanced by the sword).73 Even after 9/11, there is scant recognition that unforseen events of history perpetually transform or destroy the best laid plans for historical engineering. Yet the catastrophic wars and revolutions of the modem era teach us that the more uncompromising the design and the more self-assured the designer, the harder both will fall. If we take an evolutionary perspective on history, which frames success and failure in terms of the growth or decline of traits over populations (and, eventually, in terms of the growth or decline of populations themselves), then current U.S. (or Israeli) antiterrorism policies do not seem adaptive. Support for the U.S. (and Israel) is declining in the world as support for terrorism increases. Moreover, U.S. (and Israeli) procedures to combat terror are often predictable and reactive. Even the "new" security strategy of preemption is preponderantly about maintaining U S . preponderance (the global status quo) using traditional military means and other Great Power tactics. By contrast, terrorist stratagems are increasingly innovative and proactive. Perhaps more important, increasingly many people in the world perceive the terrorists' anti-American agenda to be turning the tide of history. Such perceptions invariably act upon the future in unpredictable ways that make it folly and hazardous to believe in the constancy "clashing civilization^,"^^ the inevitability of the world's globalization ("Americanization" for some),75an overriding "logic of human destiny,"76or some guiding spirit that ultimately causes "the end of history" and political struggle in a "fully rational" (secular, democratic, economically liberal) Whatever the final outcome, the more fixed that religious fundamentalisms become in their own messianic mission to "desecularize" modernity,'* the more likely they, too, will miserably fail. The most extreme Jihadists sway between calls for their own Masada and a Holocaust for non-believers. Whereas some saw resistance to the Israeli attack on Jenin in spring 2002 as the "Palestinian M a ~ a d a , others, " ~ ~ like Islamic Jihad leader Dr. Ramadan Abdallah Shalah, declaimed: "We are not creating a Palestinian Masada, but a Palestinian Karbala'a [speaking of the battle of Karbala'a in AD 680, which established "martyrdom" in Shi'ite tradition], which will hasten the second Jewish Masada ... until the Zionist entity ceases to exist."" For Abu Shihab al-Kandahari, in his Fatwah issued in the name of al-Qaeda: "Nuclear warfare is the solution for destroying America."" Defend against Jihadism we must, and help it to bum itself out. But let's not add life to its forlorn mission by unrelentingly muscling others with our own.

239 Table 1. Incidences of suicide attack worldwide, 2000-2003. *

Country

I Suicide attacks per year per country I

I

I

I

Total No. of in all attacks

215

84

5354 I

*al-Qaeda attacks I ** Involving al-Qaeda associates ***LTTE attacks (Tamil Tigers)

I

1

* Note: This is the author's compilation, originally published as supporting online material in S. Atran, "Individual Factors in Suicide Terrorism," Science, vol. 304, April 2,2004, pp. 47-49, htt~:llwww.sciencemaa.org/cgi/content/fu~~30415667147~C 1.

I

240 Table 2. attack bby al-Qqaeda and asssociated organizations, 2000-2003 Countr Yemen

911 1 attacks

2002 Jaish-e-Muhammed

I

10

1

49

KashmidJammu incl. India Parliament in Delhi 2002 2003 Tunisia

I Morocco

Salafia Jihadi MILF or Abu Sayyaf

2002

38

1

16

2003

5

44

2002

1

3

1

5

1

202 13

Philippines

Taliban Jemaah Islamiyah (Bali nightclub attack) (Jakarta Maniott Hotel attack)

Afghanistan 2003 Indonesia 2002 2003

1

I

24 1 Table 3. Suicide attacks January 1 -April 30,2004.*

Country

No. of attackers

*Note: unlike Table 1, compilation here is by number of attackers rather than by number of incidents.

242

Table 4. Representative national poll of 1282 Algerians (spring 2002). The dependent variable is a composite index of four items asking about American people, culture, policy, and 9/11. Results show "anti-Americanism" linked to: discontent with the domestic political and economic situation, distrust of Europe, unhappiness, and desires for a stronger relationship between Islam and politics. "Anti-Americanism" is not reliably related to opposition to democracy, commitment to religion, strict versus liberal interpretation of Islam, and all demographic attributes (gender, age, education, social class, income).

Islam: prohibits men/women in university

-5.053E-02

,038

-.072

-1.344

,180

gender age education social class income

2.246E-02 -2.096E-02 -4.664E-02 -8.268E-03 2.043E-02

,113 ,052 .026 ,058 ,027

,012 -.023 -.lo4

,199 -.404 -1.794 -.142 ,770

843 . ,687 ,074 ,887 .442

-.008

,040

* Dependent Variable: Strong anti-American / anti-Western sentiment and approval of 9/11 (factor scores). Source: Mark Tessler, Director, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.

243 Table 5. Polls by Jerusalem Media & Communication Center of Palestinian opinion (December 1996 - October 2003) concerning: suicide attack (favorable or strongly favorable), optimism about the future (optimistic or strongly optimistic), the peace process (supportive or strongly supportive), evaluation of the Palestinian Authority (good or very good), political or religious faction most trusted (PA President Yasser Arafat, Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin), political party or faction currently best able to help achieve goals (Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). Figures represent percentages.

JMCC polls available at http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results.html

244

Table 6. Correlations among items in JMCC polls of Palestinian opinion (December 1996 - October 2003): suicide attack (favorable or strongly favorable), optimism about the future (optimistic or strongly optimistic), the peace process (supportive or strongly supportive), evaluation of the Palestinian Authority, political or religious faction most trusted (PA President Yasser Arafat, Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin), political party or faction currently best able to help achieve goals (Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine).

Correlation Matrix suicideattack suicide attack

optimism

Peace

PA

Arafat

Yaseen

HAMAS

FATAH

PU

PFLP

optimism Peace PA Arafat Yaseen FATAH

HAMAS PLI PFLP

I

.866 ,520

I

-.a91 -.564

I

1

-.946

I -.725 1

1

-.300 -.144

I

-.931 -.443

I

1

,857 ,001

I

1

-.704 -.588

I 1

,894

,286

I 1.000 I ,141 1 ,141 1 1.000

Regression analyses on the JMCC poll results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that Palestinians' optimism about the future (r = 39, F = 41.99, p