International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction [5 ed.] 0367442698, 9780367442699

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“Cindy Weber’s International Relations Theory has always been both an impressive pedagogical tool and forward-thinking theoretically. Teaching it, I have found that the movie examples both make IR accessible to students and encourage them to engage; reading it, I have always learned something new. The new edition is no exception – it is groundbreaking theoretically, without peer pedagogically, engagingly written, and intellectually creative. I enthusiastically recommend its widespread use.” –Laura Sjoberg, Royal Holloway University of London, UK and University of Florida, USA “In this classic text, now in its fifth edition, Cynthia Weber’s approach to International Relations (IR) theory as and through myth, and her pairing of IR theories’ myths with film, continues to be as unique as it is important for the critical study of IR. The inclusion of a chapter on global LGBT theory and queer theory in this latest edition is a key addition that further highlights the originality of the text, but also speaks to its critical conceptual and political currency. No other IR textbook comes as close as International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction (5th edition) in enabling students to think critically about their world.” –Linea Cutter and François Debrix, Virginia Tech, USA “Cynthia Weber’s International Relations Theory is an imaginative and innovative disquisition on the narratives and myths that have structured the discipline of International Relations and its theoretical developments. With each chapter, Weber disrupts conventional ‘truths’ about the discipline and inspires us to see, understand and grapple with the complexities of international politics in novel and creative ways. An essential resource for students and scholars of international relations alike.” –Suwita Hani Randhawa, University of the West of England, UK “Weber’s textbook leads the field in delivering the cutting edge content and culturally relevant teaching materials that today’s students demand. Using popular films to illustrate IR theories is both appealing to students and pedagogically effective. Contributing both sophisticated and accessible analyses, this updated edition excels with a chapter on global queer theory and a companion website that is as good as it gets. What’s not to love?!” –V Spike Peterson, Professor of International Relations, University of Arizona, USA.

International Relations Theory

The fifth edition of this innovative textbook introduces students to the main theories in International Relations. It explains and analyzes each theory, allowing students to understand and critically engage with the myths and assumptions behind them. Each theory is illustrated using the example of a popular film. Key features of this textbook include:

• • • • •

Discussion of all the main theories: realism and neorealism, idealism and neoidealism, liberalism, constructivism, postmodernism, gender, globalization, neo-Marxism, modernization and development theory, environmentalism, anarchism, and queer theory. A new chapter focused on global LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans) theory and queer theory, Hillary Clinton’s policy myth that “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights,” and the film Love is Strange. Innovative use of narrative from films that students will be familiar with: Lord of the Flies, Independence Day, Wag the Dog, Fatal Attraction, The Truman Show, East Is East, Memento, WALL-E, The Hunger Games, and Love is Strange. An accessible and exciting writing style, boxed key concepts, and guides for further reading. A comprehensive Companion Website featuring a complete set of lectures for every major theory and film covered in the textbook, additional workshop and seminar exercises, slides to accompany each lecture, and an extensive bank of multiple-choice, short-answer, and essay questions and answers for every chapter.

This breakthrough textbook has been designed to unravel the complexities of international relations theory in a way that gives students a clearer idea of how the theories work, and of the myths associated with them.

Cynthia Weber is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, UK. She is the author of several books and numerous articles in the field of International Relations.

Praise for the previous edition Cindy Weber’s International Relations Theory is an extraordinarily au courant text in terms of both its theoretical attunement and its attention to genre. While many IR texts fail to heed the pedagogical value of incorporating innovations in visual technologies and culture, Weber’s does so with nuanced presentations and interpretations, which she articulates skillfully with the text’s theoretical treatments. It is an outstanding resource for courses in international relations/studies. Michael J. Shapiro, University of Hawai’i, Manoa, USA Cynthia Weber’s new edition is good news for all of us—teachers and students. She manages here to enliven IR theories by making us all think afresh about the stories we tell ourselves and each other about international politics, and to take a closer look at the lessons we imagine our favorite stories yield. Cynthia Enloe, author of Seriously! Investigating Crashes and Crises as If Women Mattered

International Relations Theory A Critical Introduction Fifth Edition

Cynthia Weber

Fifth edition published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Cynthia Weber The right of Cynthia Weber to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. First edition published by Routledge 2001 Fourth edition published by Routledge 2013 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Weber, Cynthia, author. Title: International relations theory : a critical introduction / Cynthia Weber. Description: Fifth edition. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020000638 (print) | LCCN 2020000639 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367442699 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367442712 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003008644 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: International relations–Philosophy. Classification: LCC JZ1305 .W43 2020 (print) | LCC JZ1305 (ebook) | DDC 327.101–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020000638 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020000639 ISBN: 978-0-367-44269-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-44271-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-00864-4 (ebk) Typeset in Times NR MT Pro by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd. Visit the companion website: https://routledgetextbooks.com/ textbooks/_author/weber-9780367442699

For Lyn and Charles Weber and for Bob DiClerico

Learning depends upon freeing the message from the constraints of the situation at hand. Roland Barthes

Contents

LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF TABLES LIST OF BOXES PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION

1 Introduction: culture, ideology, and the myth function in IR theory Culture Ideology The myth function in IR theory Why myths? Plan of the book Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1 Mythology as methodology Topic 2 Culture, form, and IR theory Topic 3 Thinking beyond film to other “other worlds” 2 Realism: is international anarchy the permissive cause of war? What does the myth say? Lord of the Flies The function of fear in Waltz’s anarchy myth Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1 Neorealism Topic 2 The uses of fear in IR theory

xiii xiv xvi xviii

1 3 4 6 7 8 10 10 11 12

15 19 24 31 33 33 34

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Contents

Topic 3 The predictive power of realism?—from the Cold War to the War on Terror Note on the US film of Lord of the Flies

36

3 Idealism: is there an international society? What does the myth say? Independence Day Fear and leadership in Independence Day Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1 Cooperation under anarchy Topic 2 Morality and ethics in IR Topic 3 The Arab Spring as an ideal(ist) moment of mass communication Media note Classroom activity

39

4 Constructivism: is anarchy what states make of it? What does the myth say? Wag the Dog Practice, seduction, and dead authorship Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1 Constructivism Topic 2 Postmodernism Topic 3 Practice theory and international relations

63

5 Gender: is gender a variable? What does the myth say? Fatal Attraction Placing feminism in IR? Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1 Feminism Topic 2 Masculinity Topic 3 Queer international relations

85

6 Globalization: are we at the end of history? What does the myth say? The Truman Show Liberalism’s internal contradiction, or is the end ever really the end? Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1 Globalization x

35

42 48 54 58 58 59 60 61 61

65 71 77 80 80 81 82

88 94 100 104 104 105 106

109 113 118 125 127 127

Contents

Topic 2 The uses of history Topic 3 Digital cultures, mediascapes, and surveillance Topic 4 Biopolitics, the liberal subject, and martial politics 7 Neo-: is Empire the new world order? What does the myth say? So what exactly is Empire? Memento Truth, ontology, and desire Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1 Imperial IR Topic 2 Memory in IR Topic 3 Disciplining resistance Topic 4 Liquid modernity 8 Modernization and development theory: is there a clash of civilizations? What does the myth say? East Is East Identity, desire, and culture Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1 Critiques of modernization and development theory Topic 2 Critiques of identity Topic 3 Difference is dangerous Topic 4 The politics of development aid: Making “Africa” Postscript 9 Environmentalism: is human-made climate change an inconvenient truth? What does the myth say? WALL-E It’s not easy being Gore’s shade of green Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1 Environmentalism and IR Topic 2 Green governmentality Topic 3 The Anthropocene 10 Anarchism: are we the 99 percent? What does the myth say? The Hunger Games

128 129 130

133 137 138 144 152 157 157 158 159 160

163 169 175 184 186 186 187 188 189 189

191 197 206 213 215 215 215 216

219 222 229

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Contents

Are we the 99 percent? Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1 Collective action, debt, and justice Topic 2 Libertarianism, diplomacy, and war Topic 3 New communisms 11 Global LGBT studies: are gay rights human rights, and are human rights gay rights? Queer IR theories What does the myth say? Love is Strange Love is regulated Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1 Postcolonial and Decolonial Queer IR Topic 2 Thinking with and beyond (US) romantic love 12 Conclusion: what does it all mean? How IR theory makes sense of the world Making sense of IR theory The politics of the popular Where does all of this leave us?

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238 240 240 241 242

245 250 256 263 271 272 272 274

277 278 283 286 288

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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INDEX

307

Figures

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.1 6.1 6.2 7.1 8.1 8.2

Democratically organized state and society Autocratically organized state and society How does Wilson enact the “domestic analogy”? How does Kegley enact the “domestic analogy”? How US leadership is extended in Independence Day Wendt’s constructivist bridge between neorealists and neoliberals The Hegelian dialectic The dialectical struggle in “The Truman Show” The dialectical logic of Empire Structural-functional model Political development timeline

46 46 47 48 57 67 114 123 143 166 166

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Tables

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4

5.5 5.6 5.7 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4

6.5

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Realism vs. neorealism 17 Causes of war for Waltz 21 Waltzian neorealism 23 How does Lord of the Flies represent hierarchy and anarchy? 25 What is typical and what is deviant in the two worlds of Lord of the Flies? 26 The locations of fear in Lord of the Flies 33 Idealism 40 What can realism explain and what can’t realism explain? 42 How do Waltz and Kegley differently characterize international politics? 44 The heroes in Independence Day 50 What do neorealists and neoliberals agree and disagree about? 66 Three stories of international anarchy 70 What seems to be typical and deviant in the world of Wag the Dog? 75 Reconsidering what is typical and deviant in the world of Wag the Dog 78 Advantages and disadvantages of the Wendtian compromise 80 What is feminism for Jones? 89 How have feminists made use of the gender variable? 90 How should feminists and nonfeminists use the gender 92 variable in the future? Jones’s characterization of feminism vs. Peterson’s 94 characterization of feminism The place of woman in Fatal Attraction 98 What is typical and what is deviant in the world of Fatal Attraction? 99 Gendered perspectives in Fatal Attraction and traditional IR theory 101 Neoliberal and historical materialist takes on globalization 111 Hegelian and Marxist understandings of history 115 Ideological challengers to liberalism 116 What is typical and deviant in the historical world of the 123 television program “The Truman Show”? What is typical and deviant in the posthistorical world 125 of the film The Truman Show?

Tables

7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 8.2 9.1 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 11.1 12.1 12.2 12.3

Marx’s vs. Hardt and Negri’s understanding of history Modernism vs. postmodernism What is typical and deviant in the world of Memento? Assumptions of political development What is typical and deviant in the world of East Is East? Gore’s idealist assumptions Differences in how IR theorists and anarchists value states and anarchy Three basic assumptions of anarchism Key concepts of (new) anarchism How to understand Katniss Everdeen Differences between global LGBT Studies and Queer IR How does IR theory make sense of the world? What is typical and deviant for IR theory? IR theory’s myth function

135 143 148 167 181 193 223 224 225 235 249 279 283 285

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Boxes

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7

What is culture? What is ideology? Examples of conscious and unconscious ideologies What is an IR myth? What is the myth function in IR theory? Three assumptions of the international anarchy myth Where does fear figure in Waltz’s myth as enacted in Lord of the Flies? What is typical in the world of Independence Day? What is deviant in the world of Independence Day? What’s wrong with rationalism? Three fundamental principles of constructivist social theory How does Wag the Dog make sense of the world? What would it mean for gender to be a variable? How does Fatal Attraction make sense of the world? The “wrong” questions feminism asks of traditional IR theory What Empire is and isn’t Who are the multitude? How Memento makes sense of the world How East Is East makes sense of the world The core premise of environmental/green theory What An Inconvenient Truth says and how it says it What An Inconvenient Truth does not say and how it does not say it How does the film WALL-E make sense of the world? What is typical in the world of WALL-E? What is deviant in the world of WALL-E? What must go without saying in order for Gore’s myth to appear to be true? 10.1 What is typical in the world of The Hunger Games 10.2 What is deviant in the world of The Hunger Games 10.3 What must go without saying for the myth “We are the 99 percent” to appear to be true

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3 5 5 6 7 16 29 51 53 67 69 74 87 97 102 138 142 148 178 194 200 201 209 210 211 212 232 232 239

Boxes

11.1 How are understandings of sexes, genders, and sexualities naturalized so they can inform IR theories and policies? 11.2 What is heteronormativity? 11.3 What is homonormativity? 11.4 Who is Clinton’s “the LGBT”? 11.5 Who is Clinton’s “LGBT in the shadows”? 11.6 How are Clinton’s “the LGBT” and “the LGBT in the shadows” internationalized? 11.7 How does the film make sense of the world? 11.8 Typical and deviant 12.1 Why pair IR theory with popular films?

251 251 252 259 261 262 265 265 287

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Preface to the fifth edition

This new edition has its origins in the 2009 International Studies Conference. There, in the lobby of a Time Square hotel, I met Laura Sjoberg for the first time. Laura and Ann Tickner had asked me if I might be writing a book that would be appropriate for a book series they were proposing. I had arranged to meet Laura to pitch her my book idea. Going into that meeting, I had two firmly held ideas: my proposed book would be perfect for this series, but it would be a hard sell to the series editors. It seems the editors agreed with me on the first point, but not the second. To my surprise, Laura, Ann, and the Oxford University Press series editor Angela Chnapko embraced and supported the project from start to finish. It took me 7 years to see the project through to publication, which finally appeared in 2016 as Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge. One of the things that gave Queer International Relations legitimacy amongst IR academics and policymakers was the fact that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had in a sense made the case for it in 2011. That’s when Clinton gave her famous “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights” speech. By elevating gay rights as human rights to a central component of the Obama Administration’s foreign policy, Clinton’s speech offered a clear example of how gender, sex, and sexuality were central issues in the study and conduct of international politics, which required Queer IR investigations and analyses. Of course, Clinton’s speech didn’t come out of nowhere. It was proceeded by decades of on-the-ground activist work by gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people and their allies to secure recognition and rights for what Clinton called “LGBTs” (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans people) and for other gender and sexually minoritized people. And it was rooted in academic arguments coming from what has come to be called Global LGBT Studies. Yet as welcome as Clinton’s championing of gay rights as human rights is, many people argue that it does not go far enough. This view is borne out by the empirical evidence which shows that Clinton’s “LGBTs” are a select and narrow slice of gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people. Indeed, as many activists and scholars have pointed out, Clinton’s “LGBT” is

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Preface to the fif th ed iti o n

typically a white, able-bodied, bourgeois, properly masculine, usually Christian, and almost always cisgendered Westerner. Because Clinton’s “LGBT” is so narrowly conceived, Clinton’s speech primarily helps to secure rights for who she calls “LGBTs,” but it doesn’t necessarily do the same for those gender and sexually minoritized people who do not fit Clinton’s implicit understanding of “the LGBT.” What this means is that Clinton’s speech gave us the IR myth that “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights,” without this myth being fully realized in practice. The argument this edition of International Relations Theory makes is this: As important as Global LGBT Studies are for IR (and my view is that they are vitally important), they cannot fully correct the shortcomings of Clinton’s myth because Global LGBT Studies is the intellectual tradition that generated these shortcomings. If we want to understand the limitations of Clinton’s call for gay rights as human rights, and if we want to correct some of these limitations, then we need to use a Queer International Relations perspective to do so. This is because the things a Global LGBT Studies perspective takes as its intellectual and political foundations are the very things a Queer IR perspective critically interrogates and reworks. What helps us see these shortcomings is the film Love is Strange, which traces how the lives of a New York City cis-gay couple fall apart when they exercise their gay right and human right to marry. Of course, a Queer IR perspective in and of itself is insufficient to tackle all of the issues Clinton’s speech raises. Critiques of Clinton’s myth need to be intersectional, meaning they need to take seriously how not just gender, sex, and sexuality function in international politics but how gender, sex, and sexuality are always part and parcel of power relations intertwined to differing effect around race, class, (settler)coloniality, religion, and (de)bility, for example. In this respect, IR scholars and practitioners need to utilize IR theories that do not just rightly call the discipline of IR to account for its foundational racism (Vitalis, 2015) but that also aim to bring into being postcolonial and decolonized IRs (pretty much everything Lily Ling ever wrote, as well as the work of Robbie Shilliam, Alexander Anievas, and Meera Sabaratnam, for example). This work is essential to Queer IR analyses, as Anna Agathangelou, Rahul Rao, Melanie Richter-Montpetit, Darcy Leigh, Razan Ghazzawi, Amira Abdelhamid, and may more Queer IR scholars teach us. All of their insights contributed to this edition. Like so much of my work, this new chapter and my broader work on Queer IR is as deeply rooted in the pathbreaking work of my long-ago PhD supervisor Rick Ashley as it is in queer theory. While Rick’s work on “statecraft as mancraft” is not made explicit in this new chapter, it is one of the primary intellectual foundations of the piece. Neither this chapter nor much else I’ve ever written would have been possible without Rick’s pathbreaking work. I also benefited from the careful reading of the new chapter by Darcy Leigh, Spike Peterson, and five anonymous referees. Darcy and Spike were supportive in other ways throughout, for which I am grateful. And, of course, the new work wouldn’t exist without the project’s initial support by Laura Sjoberg, Ann Tickner, and Angela Chnapko. But my biggest debt for this edition is owed to Laura Jung, who not only oversaw the revisions for the entire edition and its online materials, while writing new lectures and exams for the textbook’s complementary website; she also pushed me to rethink and clarify my framing of the new chapter, making it much stronger

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as a result. Consultations with her proved—as always—to be both delightful and insightful. All of these people were very patient with me, as intermittent periods of ill health and a debilitating accident stalled the completion of this edition for several years. My editor Rob Sorsby deserves recognition on this score, as does Anne-Marie Fortier, whose care, humor, and intellectual stimulation saw me through these difficult years. I thank them all. The person I’ve missed the most while finishing this new edition is my dear friend Lily Ling, who passed away in 2018. Lily and I met when we were both newly appointed to our first jobs. Throughout my entire professional life, I have benefited from Lily’s generous and innovative intellect. Her support of my Queer IR work was just one instance of her many kindnesses to me, for example, when she enthusiastically organized the US launch of the book at the New School on short notice. Lily was one of my most trusted readers and conversationalists. It was at times unbearable finishing the new chapter without her. I am lucky to have had her as a colleague and friend, and I will carry the personal, political, and intellectual lessons she taught me with me always. This one’s for you, Lily.

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Chapter

1

Introduction Culture, ideology, and the myth function in IR theory

Culture Ideology The myth function in IR theory Why myths? Plan of the book Suggestions for further thinking

3 4 6 7 8 10

1

Introduction

International politics is a huge field. It explores everything from wars to revolutions to global gender inequalities to demands for international human rights to international trade. To try to make sense of international politics, we often turn to International Relations (IR) theory. IR theory makes organizing generalizations about international politics. IR theory is a collection of stories about the world of international politics. And in telling stories about international politics, IR theory doesn’t just present what is going on in the world out there, but it also imposes its own vision of what the world out there looks like. We use IR theory to make sense of the world of international politics. But how do we make sense of IR theory? Of course, we can learn all the stories IR theory tells us about the world. We call these stories IR traditions and name them neorealism, neoidealism, historical materialism, constructivism, gender, globalization, neo-Marxism, modernization and development theory, environmentalism, anarchism, and global LGBT studies. But just learning the stories IR theory tells doesn’t tell us much about IR theory itself. It doesn’t tell us, for example, how IR theory works. What makes the stories IR theory tells about international politics so compelling? What makes the stories IR theory tells about the world of international politics appear to be true? My answer is that IR theory—a collection of stories about international politics—relies upon IR myths in order to appear to be true. What is an IR myth? An IR myth is an apparent truth, usually expressed in slogan form that an IR theory relies upon in order to appear to be true. IR myths, in other words, are the building blocks of IR theory, of the stories IR theory tells about the world of international politics. They are that part of the story that is so familiar to us that we take it for granted. And our taking IR myths for granted is necessary for IR theories to appear to be true. For example, think of the slogans “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war” and “there is an international society.” Such slogans are IR myths. Realists rely upon the knowledge that “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war” to explain why sovereign nation-states inevitably find themselves in conflict with one another and why balance of power politics is the key to managing such conflict. Idealists, in contrast, rely upon the knowledge that “there is an international society” in order for them to be able to tell their stories about progress among sovereign nation-states on a global scale to the point that conflict among them might be transcended. If we questioned these IR myths, then the stories told by IR traditions like realism and idealism would not necessarily appear to be true. Why do I refer to these building blocks of IR theory as IR myths? Is it because I believe that IR myths—like myths generally—are false? Absolutely not! IR myths may be true, and they may be false. The truth or falsity of an IR myth is not important for understanding how IR myths function as the building blocks of IR theory. So why call the building blocks of IR stories IR myths? I call them IR myths because of the “mythologizing function” or “myth function” they perform. It is the myth function of these building blocks of IR theory that makes the stories told by IR theory appear to be true. What is the myth function in IR theory? How do IR myths make an IR theory appear to be true? And why is it important for us to study the process by which IR myths make IR theories appear to be true?

2

Introduction

These are the questions I address in this chapter. I do so by considering IR theory’s relationship to three concepts—culture, ideology, and the myth function in IR theory.

Culture Raymond Williams, a pioneer in the field of cultural studies and cultural theory, noted of the term culture that it is “one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language” (Williams, 1983: 87). Williams has a point. Culture is one of those terms that everyone seems to understand, but no one seems to be able adequately to define. Often, when we think of culture, we think of traditional arrangements within particular states or societies. For example, we may say that there is something called US culture or UK culture. But this way of thinking about culture suggests that there is something stable, identifiable, and generalizable that we can point to as a culture. When we unpack a term like “US culture,” we find so many contradictions, incompatibilities, and complexities within it that the term itself seems to mean little. For example, how can we meaningfully make sense of the militia movement, the religious right, rugged individualism, and anticapitalism not to mention regional, rural, class, race, sexuality, and age “subcultures” collected under the one term “US culture?” Not very easily. For this reason, theorists who think about what culture is have tried to come up with less static and more open definitions of culture. These definitions focus on how culture is related to meaning rather than trying to pin culture to a particular place at a particular time, like the contemporary US (see Box 1.1). According to Stuart Hall, this is because “culture … is not so much a set of things—novels and paintings or TV programmes and comics—as a process, a set of practices,” what others have called “signifying practices” (Hall, 1997: 2; Storey, 2012: 2). For Hall, “culture is concerned with the production and the exchange of meanings—the ‘giving and taking of meaning’—between members of a society or group” (1997: 2). Or, as John Hartley defines it, culture is “The social production and reproduction of sense, meaning, and consciousness” (in O’Sullivan et al., 1994: 68). Culture has to do with how we make sense of the world and how we produce, reproduce, and circulate that sense.

Box 1.1  What is culture? “Culture is concerned with the production and exchange of meanings—the ‘giving and taking of meaning’—between members of a society or group” (Hall, 1997). “The social production and reproduction of sense, meaning, and consciousness” (John Hartley, in O’Sullivan et al., 1994). “An ensemble of stories we tell about ourselves” (Geertz, 1975).

3

Introduction

We circulate our sense about the world in many ways, and one of the ways we do this is through stories. This is why another cultural theorist, Clifford Geertz, described culture as “an ensemble of stories we tell about ourselves” (Geertz, 1975: 448). For Geertz, these stories are not always conscious. They can be composed of beliefs we consciously hold as well as of habits we unconsciously perform. Cultural stories are composed of both sense (consciousness) and common sense (unconsciousness). Common sense is what we know but don’t think about, what Roland Barthes described as “what-goes-without-saying” (Barthes, 1972: 11). Studying culture understood as “sense making,” “signifying practices,” or “an ensemble of stories, beliefs, and habits” means we have to pay attention to how meanings are made. We must think about how meaning making relies upon what is said and what goes without saying. And we must recognize that cultures aren’t just “there,” fully formed for us to study. Indeed, it may be impossible for us to identify “cultures” as objects of study at all. Studying culture means looking at how what we objectify as “culture” is made. And part of what makes culture and helps to distinguish some “cultures” from other “cultures” are cultural practices that produce, organize, and circulate meanings through stories told about the world. IR theory can be studied as a site of cultural practice. IR theory is “an ensemble of stories” told about the world it studies, which is the world of international politics. Studying IR theory as a site of cultural practice means being attentive to how IR theory makes sense of the world of international politics. We have to ask of IR theory: How do the stories it tells about the world of international politics become sense and common sense? And why do we take for granted the sense IR theory makes of our lives in relation to international politics? My answer to these questions is that IR theory relies upon IR myths in order to transform its culturally produced stories about the world into common sense about the world that we take for granted. But before we explore this process in detail, let me introduce another important concept that plays a part in this process. This concept is ideology.

Ideology Unlike the term culture, ideology is a term for which formal definitions confidently abound (see Box 1.2). The most common way ideology is defined is as “a fairly coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people understand their place in society, and provides a program for social and political action” (Ball and Dagger, 1995: 9). It is a ready-made set of meanings and interpretations that can help us to make sense of our world and tell us how to act in relation to our world. This way of defining ideology assumes that all ideologies are consciously held. And many are. Examples of “conscious ideologies” are liberalism, conservatism, socialism, feminism, ecologism, and even vegetarianism. Conscious ideologies are easily identifiable. We know what they are, and we can subscribe to them or reject them. While conscious ideologies like liberalism and conservatism are powerful because they can politically mobilize people and “raise consciousness” about political situations, another type of ideologies—“unconscious ideologies”—are

4

Introduction

Box 1.2  What is ideology? Conscious ideology: “a fairly coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people understand their place in society, and provides a program for social and political action” (Ball and Dagger, 1995). Unconscious ideology: ideology that is not formally named and that is therefore difficult to identify. It is the common sense foundation of our worldviews that is beyond debate.

arguably even more politically powerful. Unlike neatly packaged, easily identifiable, named ideologies, unconscious ideologies lack proper names. This makes us less likely to be able to identify them as ideologies. This is why they are also called “anonymous ideologies” (Barthes, 1972). An example of an unconscious ideology is “boys will be boys.” It would be difficult to attribute this ideology to anyone, in particular, both because no one person or one ideological tradition claims it as their own and because it appears to those who hold it to be “just the way things are” or the way things ought to be. In this sense, unconscious ideologies are “profoundly unconscious” (Althusser, 1969). We use them to help us make sense of our worlds, very often without realizing it. And because we don’t realize we hold unconscious ideologies or use them to make sense of our worlds, we very rarely interrogate them. We very rarely ask difficult questions about them that might upset them as common sense (see Box 1.3). If conscious ideologies are those ideologies packaged as programs for political action that we debate in the political arena, unconscious ideologies are the foundations of our ideological and political thinking that we place beyond debate. Unconscious ideologies, in other words, “go without saying.” We don’t like to have our unconscious ideologies—our common sense—articulated, much less questioned. When they are, our way of making sense of the world is potentially threatened. How is ideology related to culture? If culture is a site of meaning production, ideology is a site where meanings that are culturally produced are transformed into just the way things are or the way things ought to be. Some of this is done explicitly. For example, if you declare your allegiance to a particular named

Box 1.3  Examples of conscious and unconscious ideologies Conscious ideologies

Unconscious ideologies

Liberalism

Boys will be boys

Conservatism

America has a classless society

Socialism

English people are white

Feminism

Everyone I know is straight

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Introduction

conscious ideology like conservatism, you are declaring that conservatism really truly describes how the world is and how it ought to be. You are consciously transforming your cultural views about the world into the view of the world as it naturally is. But a lot of the transformation from the cultural to the ideological goes without saying because it employs anonymous, unconscious ideologies. In this respect, unconscious ideologies are akin to cultural habits. We enact them all the time without thinking about them. And, in the case of unconscious ideologies, these unconscious habits in our thinking transform what is cultural or produced into what appears to be natural or just the way things are (Barthes, 1972). It is this process of transforming meanings from cultural to natural that I want to explore in relation to IR theory and IR myths. And it is this process that is explained through the myth function in IR theory.

The myth function in IR theory IR theory is a site of cultural practice in which conscious and unconscious ideologies are circulated through stories that appear to be true. The stories we recognize and hold consciously we call IR traditions (like realism and idealism). The stories we don’t recognize as ideologies because we don’t have names for them and hold unconsciously I call IR myths (like “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war” and “there is an international society”) (see Box 1.4). While we debate the “truth” of IR stories organized into IR tradition, we rarely reflect on what makes these stories seem to make so much sense. In other words, we rarely consider how unconscious ideologies or IR myths function in these stories called IR traditions. Rather, we generally accept IR myths as forthright expressions of how the world works, and we allow these IR myths to function as the building blocks of IR traditions that narrate complicated explanations of how the world is and how it ought to be (see Box 1.5). If IR theory narrates a particular view of the world from the perspective of various IR traditions, an IR myth is what helps make a particular view of the world appear to be true. The myth function in IR theory is the transformation of what is particular, cultural, and ideological (like a story told by an IR tradition) into what appears to be universal, natural, and purely empirical. It is naturalizing meanings—making them into common sense—that are the products of cultural practices (Barthes, 1972). Put another way, the myth function in IR theory is making a “fact” out of an interpretation.

Box 1.4  What is an IR myth? An IR myth is an apparent truth, usually expressed as a slogan, that an IR theory or tradition (like realism or idealism) relies upon in order to appear to be true. Examples: “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war” and “there is an international society.”

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Introduction

Box 1.5 What is the myth function in IR theory? The myth function in IR theory is the transformation of what is particular, cultural, and ideological (like a story told by an IR tradition) into what appears to be universal, natural, and purely empirical. Cultural interpretation → Myth function → “Natural fact”

Why describe this process as the myth function in IR theory? Because this process of making what is cultural and disputed into what is natural and therefore goes without saying is the work or the function IR myths perform in IR theory. Analyzing how these transformations from cultural meanings into naturalized facts occur in our everyday encounters with IR theory is the purpose of this book. And by undertaking this analysis, we are not only examining the intersections of IR theory and everyday cultural practices, we are also analyzing the intersections of IR theory and political power. Why is this the case? Transforming the cultural into the natural is a highly political practice that depends upon all sorts of complex configurations of power. Precisely how power works to mythologize something cultural into something natural varies from context to context. But in a general sense, power works through myths by appearing to take the political out of the ideological. This is because something that appears to be natural and unalterable also appears to be apolitical. Yet these sorts of “natural facts” are arguably the most intensely political stories of all, not just because of what they say (what the specific myth is) but because of what they do (they remove themselves and the tradition they support from political debate). This is why Barthes refers to myths as “depoliticized speech” (Barthes, 1972). “Re-politicizing” IR theory and IR myths requires us to suspend our interest in the “truth” of IR theory (whether or not a specific theoretical interpretation is really right or wrong), so we can refocus our attention on how cultural configurations of power and ideology make a theory or story appear to be true.

Why myths? Why focus our attention on IR myths? Why disrupt our sacred IR stories by proclaiming them to be composed of myths? And why consider the myth function in IR theory? Is the point to rid IR theory of culture and ideology? Certainly not! Cultural practices will always mediate our encounters with the so-called “facts” of international politics. And ideologies will always force us to consider questions of truth. Asking questions about what makes IR theories function as if they were true is not the same thing as asking us to abandon our beloved myths. Nor does it amount to exposing IR myths as false because the truth or falsity of an IR myth can never be validated or invalidated. That’s part of what makes it so powerful. By asking questions about the myth function in IR theory, we will not lose our precious IR myths. Rather, these IR myths bound up in IR theories will lose some of their apparent truth. They will return to the realms of interpretation,

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Introduction

culture, and ideology and cease to make unopposed claims to a status as common sense, natural, or purely empirical. In other words, IR myths will return to the realm of the political where what they say and what they do can be analyzed and debated. By disrupting the apparent truth of IR myths, opportunities arise for new theories of IR to be written. Yet these, too, will be myths. So why bother interrogating the myth function in IR theory if we will never escape it? The answer to this question is in the question itself. Because we will never escape the myth function in IR theory, we had better interrogate it. We had better prepare ourselves to be the best critical readers of IR myths we possibly can be. Otherwise, we will just be repeating cherished stories about IR without grasping what makes these stories appear to be true, without appreciating what makes them function. We will be circulating a particular way of making sense of the world without knowing how to make sense of that sense. That would make us look pretty naive.

Plan of the book In the following chapters, we will interrogate the myth function in IR theory by addressing three aspects of everyday IR myths: 1

What does the myth say? Before we can analyze critically how a myth works (its function), we must first be familiar with what the myth says (its content). We will do four things to help us understand the content of each myth:

a b c d

2

8

select a classic IR or a contemporary global policy text that uses the myth situate the IR/global policy text in its particular IR tradition (like realism or idealism) summarize the text explore how the IR/global policy text makes use of the IR myth

For example, for the IR myth “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war,” we will do the following four things: select Kenneth Waltz’s texts Man, the State, and War and Theory of International Politics, situate them in relation to the IR traditions of realism and neorealism, summarize their main arguments, and explore how they use the IR myth “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war.” How does the myth function? If the myth function in IR theory is to succeed, it has to be invisible. We have to forget it is even taking place that cultural meanings are being transformed into common sense. And, in all of the IR myths explored in this book, the myth function in IR theory is extremely successful. But this presents us with a problem. How can we identify the myth function in IR theory? And how can we critically analyze the myth function in IR theory if IR theory does such a good job of explaining our world to us—to the point that we believe IR myths are true and the worlds they help to create are just the way things are?

Introduction

One answer is to think about IR theory in relation to “other worlds.” As critical readers of myths, we are more likely to recognize and be able to interrogate myths in worlds in which we do not live—other “cultures,” other times, other locations. But where can we find “other worlds” that are both different enough to our own so that we can critically read the myths in them and similar enough to our own so that we can identify with them enough for them to make sense to us? My answer is to look to popular films for these “other worlds.” Popular films provide us with ready-made, somewhat delimited “other worlds.” In the vast cinemascapes of popular culture, there is no shortage of worlds for us to view critically. Even if a film is set in our “culture,” in our sovereign nation-state, and in our times, the world the film presents is not “our” world, for we do not occupy this cinemascape. Yet because the film tries to depict our world, we usually understand this “other world” and identify with it. This gap between occupying a cinematic world and identifying with it enables us to critically read “other worlds” and the myths in them. Another reason for turning to popular films is because they are one of the narrative spaces of visual culture. They are a way in which stories get told in visual culture. Nicholas Mirzoeff argues that “visual culture used to be seen as a distraction from the serious business of text and history. It is now the locus of cultural and historical change” (1999: 31). If that is the case, we had better learn how to read visual culture and the transformative processes that occur within it. Accessing visual culture through popular films allows us to consider the connections between IR theory and our everyday lives. Using popular films in this way helps us to get a sense of the everyday connections between “the popular” and “the political.” We can see, for example, how IR myths become everyday IR myths—because they are circulated, received, and criticized in and through everyday, popular forms like films. Drawing upon these ideas, we will interrogate the myth function in IR theory by doing three things:

a b c

select a film that illustrates the myth function in a particular IR myth; summarize the film; and relate the film to the IR myth. Here we will ask two important questions:

• •

How does the film make sense of the world (Dyer, 1985)? What does the film say is typical and deviant in that world (Dyer, 1985)?

The popular films used to explore the myth function in IR theory are: Lord of the Flies, Independence Day, Wag the Dog, Fatal Attraction, The Truman Show, Memento, East is East, WALL-E, The Hunger Games, and Love is Strange. Lord of the Flies reconsiders the realist/neorealist myth “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war”; Independence Day looks at the idealist myth “there is an international society”; Wag the Dog offers insights into the constructivist myth “anarchy is what states make of it” and introduces us to the social constructivist/poststructuralist debate; Fatal

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3

Attraction illustrates and critiques the gender myth “gender is a variable” while exploring the gender/feminist debate; The Truman Show demonstrates how the neoliberal myth “it is the end of history” makes neoliberal theories of globalization function at the expense of historical materialist theories of globalization; Memento explores how the neo-Marxist myth “Empire is the new world order” selectively remembers the neo-Marxist/postmodernist debate; East is East questions the notion of “civilizations” upon which the myth “there is a clash of civilizations” depends; WALL-E explores just how convenient or inconvenient combating human-made climate change is, for whom, and with what environmental (and environmentalist) consequences; The Hunger Games reconsiders the new anarchist understanding of debt and its new myth “We are the 99 percent”; and Love is Strange queries whether homosexuals are really accepted as universally and unequivocally as Hillary Clinton’s myth “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights” suggests. What does this critical analysis of the myth function in IR theory tell us about IR theory culturally, ideologically, and popularly? This question will be considered in the conclusion by asking two questions that take us directly to the power politics of IR theory:

• •

How does IR theory make sense of the world? What does IR theory say is typical and deviant in that world?

These questions take us to the heart of how IR theory produces and circulates meanings about international politics. They also point to the relationships among the politics of IR theory, the politics of the popular, and the politics of storytelling.

Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1: Mythology as methodology Roland Barthes proposed semiology as a methodology for exploring the ideological function of myths in his book Mythologies. While his early work focused on exposing and putting right the “ideological abuse” hidden in myths (and especially in “bourgeois norms”), Barthes’ later work explored more complex ways of thinking about how meanings are pluralized through reading and writing. Reading Barthes’ early work on myths through his later writings, like S/Z, produces what Laura Kipnis calls a “postmodernized Barthes.” It is a postmodernized Barthes who Craig Saper constructs and deploys in his book Artificial Mythologies. It is a similarly postmodernized Barthes who informs my reading of IR myths. For a sense of how to apply some of these ideas to reading films, James Monaco’s chapter on signs and syntax is helpful.

Suggested reading Barthes, Roland (1972) “Myth Today,” in Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers. New York: The Noonday Press.

10

Introduction Barthes, Roland (1974) S/Z: An Essay, trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, pp. 3–16. Monaco, James (2000) “The Language of Film: Signs and Syntax,” in How to Read a Film. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 152–225. Saper, Craig (1997) “Introduction,” in Artificial Mythologies. See also the “Preface” by Laura Kipnis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Topic 2: Culture, form, and IR theory The conversation about “cultures” is an old one in international politics, especially in those variants of international studies that tend toward what might be called “area studies”—studies of particular regions of the world. Some very rigid ways of thinking about culture continue to be circulated in IR theory, especially in the wake of the end of the Cold War, as the work of Samuel Huntington illustrates (see Chapter 8). Another strain of discussions involves critical ways of thinking about culture, cultural forms, and their relationships to IR theory. Some of these have been ushered into the field of international studies. Thanks to critical ways of thinking about identity politics. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, for example, challenge IR theorists to change their conceptualizations of IR theory by “adding” a critical conception of culture to their work. Scholars working in a postcolonial tradition have challenged a culture of IR that treats race, racism, and coloniality as a (regrettable) byproduct of both scholarship and statecraft, with especially Robert Vitalis’s excavation of IR’s disciplinary origins in analyses of so-called “race relations” and colonial administration being groundbreaking in this regard (2015). Meera Sabaratnam (2011) has formulated specific methodological tools for crafting alternative—decolonized—cultures of IR. Another position, expressed by Roland Bleiker, is less concerned with revising the content of IR theory through the inclusion of critical considerations of culture than it is with thinking about how different cultural forms, like poetry, offer us ways not to “add” culture or cultural forms to IR theory but to move beyond the tired debates that traditional expressions of IR theory require. Following the lead of Michael Shapiro’s work that takes IR debates about culture beyond the nation-state and into cinematic states, Francois Debrix and Cynthia Weber (2003) carry the discussion of culture to transnational spaces while Jutta Weldes takes it out of this world altogether. For a general review of the turn to Pop IR, see Grayson et al. (2009), and for more methodological resources “after the aesthetic turn,” see Shapiro (2012).

Suggested reading Bleiker, Roland (1997) “Forget IR Theory,” Alternatives 22(1): 57–85. Debrix, Francois and Cynthia Weber (eds) (2003) Rituals of Mediation: International Politics and Social Meanings. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Grayson, Kyle, Matt Davies, and Simon Philpott (2009) “Pop Goes IR? Researching the Popular Culture—World Politics Continuum,” Politics 29(3): 155–163.

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Introduction Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds) (1996) The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Sabaratnam, Meera (2011) “IR in Dialogue… But Can We Change the Subjects? A Typology of Decolonising Strategies for the Study of World Politics,” Millennium 39(3): 781–803. Shapiro, Michael (1997) Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Shapiro, Michael (1999) Cinematic Political Thought: Narrating Race, Nation and Gender. New York: New York University Press. Shapiro, Michael (2012) Studies in TransDisciplinary Methods: After the Aesthetic Turn. London: Routledge. Shapiro, Michael (2019) The Cinematic Political: Film Composition as Political Theory. London: Routledge. Vitalis, Robert (1996) “White World Order,” in Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Weldes, Jutta (ed.) (2003) To Seek Out New Worlds: Exploring Links between Science Fiction and World Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Topic 3: Thinking beyond film to other “other worlds” IR literatures on popular films have proliferated since Shapiro’s groundbreaking work (see, e.g., Grayson, 2013; Harmon, 2019; Weber, 2006). But popular films are not the only “other worlds” that can be used to interrogate IR mythmaking. Indeed, popular culture offers a wide range of additional “other worlds”—from video games to television shows to architecture and design to art exhibitions to sporting events to photographs, poems, novels, and even travel writing. Like films, these works can offer us unique worlds that are close enough to our own to make sense to us, while different enough from our own to allow us to think critically about how the myths they produce and circulate make their worlds and our worlds function. Debbie Lisle’s work on contemporary travel writing in Lonely Planet guidebooks that construct myths about the colonial “other” (2006) and her work on war and tourism (2016) are cases in point. Mark Salter’s investigation of “the geopolitical imagination of video games” is another illustration. Salter thinks about how video games can be useful as we grapple with how contemporary geopolitics functions in relation to diplomacy. Kyle Grayson’s reading of the television show Breaking Bad, LHM Ling’s work on fairy tales, Mark Lacy’s examination of the security politics in design, and Tim Luke’s (2002) and Christine Sylvester’s (2009) numerous works on the international politics of the “world” of museums and art offer additional examples. For an excellent example of how visual politics more generally is taken up by IR scholars, see Roland Bleiker’s (2018) Visual Global Politics.

Suggested reading Bleiker, Roland (ed.) (2018) Visual Global Politics. London: Routledge.

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Introduction Grayson, Kyle (2013) “How to Read Paddington Bear: Liberalism and the Foreign Subject in A Bear Called Paddington,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15(3): 78–393. Grayson, Kyle (2017) “Capturing the Multiplicities of Resilience Through Popular Geopolitics: Aesthetics and Homo Resilio in Breaking Bad,” Political Geography 57: 24–33. Harman, Sophie (2019) Seeing Politics: Film, Visual Method, and International Relations. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP. Lacy, Mark (2008) “Designer Security: Control Society and MoMA’s SAFE: Design Takes on Risk,” Security Dialogue 39(2–3): 333–357. Ling, Lily H.M. (2014) Imagining World Politics: Sihar & Shenya, a Fable for Our Times. London: Routledge. Lisle, Debbie (2006) The Global Politics of Contemporary Travel Writing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lisle, Debbie (2016) Holidays in the Danger Zone: Entanglements of War and Tourism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Luke, Timothy W. (2002) Museum Politics: Power Plays at the Exhibition. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Salter, Mark B. (2011) “The Geographical Imaginations of Video Games: Diplomacy, Civilization, America’s Army and Grand Theft Auto IV,” Geopolitics 16(2): 359–388. Sylvester, Christine (2009) Art/Museums: International Relations Where We Least Expect It. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Pub. Weber, Cynthia (2006) Imagining America at War: Morality, Politics and Film. London: Routledge.

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Chapter

2

Realism Is international anarchy the permissive cause of war?

What does the myth say? 19 Lord of the Flies 24 The function of fear in Waltz’s anarchy myth 31 Suggestions for further thinking 33 Note on the US film of Lord of the Flies 36

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Realism

The claim that international politics is anarchical is almost universally embraced by IR theorists and practitioners (for an alternative view, see Chapters 7 and 10). This is in part because the myth of international anarchy seems so straightforwardly to describe what we know about international politics. First, the anarchy myth assumes that international politics is composed of sovereign nation-states and that these sovereign nation-states are beholden to no higher power. That is what it means to be sovereign—for a state to have absolute authority over its territory and people and to have independence internationally. In international theory, all states in international politics are assumed to be sovereign, even though there are debates about degrees and/or kinds of sovereignty (Jackson, 1990). And while some IR theorists consider sovereignty itself to be a myth (Bierstieker and Weber, 1996), most regard it as the primary fact of international political life. The second “fact” of international political life—and the second assumption of the anarchy myth—is that there is no world government. This is why sovereign nation-states are beholden to no higher power. There just is no higher power than that of a sovereign nation-state. Because there is no higher power that a state must obey, states are said to have international independence. This is so even if a state joins an international organization like the United Nations or NATO. This does not impinge upon a state’s sovereignty or international independence because state membership in these organizations is voluntary. So a state can quit an organization if it wants to. Combining the absence of world government with state sovereignty, many IR theorists conclude that international politics is anarchical. But this conclusion only makes sense if one more assumption is made. This third assumption has to do with the meaning of anarchy. As IR theorists read political theory, “anarchy” in political theory denotes a lack of order. We usually describe states experiencing civil wars as anarchical, for example. But in international theory, “anarchy” denotes a lack of an orderer—someone or something who/which self-consciously imposes order in a top-down way onto sovereign nation-states. So in international theory anarchy prevails even if there is order (like power balancing among sovereign nation-states or one hegemonic state being able to call most of the shots like the US does). These sorts of “order” are still considered to be anarchical because there is no world government (see Box 2.1). There are countless versions of the anarchy myth, each with a very different way of describing and mythologizing the “realities” of international anarchy. Yet of all of these anarchy myths (see Chapters 3, 4, and 10), the one that is the most well-known and the most widely accepted is Kenneth Waltz’s myth “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war,” a myth that dates back to 1954.

Box 2.1 Three assumptions of the international anarchy myth 1 International politics is composed of sovereign nation-states. 2 There is no world government which means there is no international orderer. 3 The absence of a world government or orderer by definition means that international politics is anarchical.

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Realism

Why is Waltz’s myth “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war” so influential? And why has it endured for nearly half a century? One reason is that Waltz’s myth does more than make anarchy the context in which sovereign nation-states carry out their day-to-day politics. In Waltz’s anarchy myth, international anarchy becomes the answer to the question that spawned IR theory as an academic discipline after World War I. That question is “Why do wars occur?” By causally linking international anarchy to war, Waltz did more to popularize the anarchy myth than any other IR theorist before him or since. Another reason has to do with the historical timing of Waltz’s myth. As a US academic writing during the Cold War, Waltz seemed to explain the constant disposition to go to war that existed between the US and the Soviet blocs. With no world government, cold war could (and often did) become hot war at any time. US policymakers had to plan accordingly by (they believed) increasing US defenses. And so Waltz’s myth persisted as accepted theoretical and diplomatic wisdom in the US until (at least) the end of the Cold War. Yet another reason is that Waltz’s anarchy myth has been theorized from the perspectives of both realism and new- or neorealism (see Table 2.1). Both realism and neorealism accept the three fundamental assumptions that make the anarchy myth function—first, that the world is composed of sovereign nation-states; second, that there is no world government which means there is no international orderer; and third, that the absence of world government or an international orderer by definition means that international politics is anarchical. From these three elements, realists and neorealists both predict that sovereign nation-states in a system of international anarchy will behave conflictually. While individual wars may be stopped from time to time, war itself cannot be transcended. But why? Realists and neorealists agree that the overriding goal of states in this environment of international anarchy is to survive. This is their overriding interest. And the only way that states can reasonably ensure their survival is to increase their power. Power protects states because states with less power might fear those with more power and therefore be less likely to attack them. Table 2.1  Realism vs. neorealism Interest of states

Realism survival

Neorealism survival

How to achieve survival

Increase power because world government is unachievable

Increase power because world government is unachievable

Human nature

Man is flawed and therefore prone to conflict. This explains why cooperation is never guaranteed and world government is unachievable

Man may or may not be flawed. Human nature is not essential to an explanation of conflict

Anarchy

The environment in which sovereign nation-states act

Describes the social relations among sovereign nation-states that causally explain why wars occur

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Realism

Additionally, realists and neorealists agree that there is no way out of international anarchy. It is unrealistic to think that a world government could be formed because states would never be secure enough—and therefore trusting enough—to give up their power to a world government. With all this in common, what do realists and neorealists disagree about? One thing they disagree about is the issue of human nature. Realists like Hans Morgenthau, for example, argue that the nature of man (and he meant the gender-exclusive term “man”; see Tickner, 1992: Chapter 2) is fundamentally flawed. In Morgenthau’s account, man may not be purely evil, but he is certainly tainted by original sin. And that means that pessimism about how man and groups of men (organized into sovereign nation-states) will behave is the only realistic way to approach international politics. At its root, then, international politics will remain anarchical and conflictual because of the nature of man (on other mobilizations of the nature of “man,” e.g., in global human rights policymaking, see Chapter 11). Neorealists, of whom Kenneth Waltz was the first, disagree. They argue that instead of looking to “natural” causes of conflict, we need to look to “social” ones instead. Following Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Waltz argues that the organization of social relations rather than the nature of man is what determines whether or not we have war. Why? Because good men behave badly in bad social organizations, and bad men can be stopped from behaving badly if they are in good social organizations. States go to war, then, because they are in a bad social organization. And Waltz calls that bad social organization international anarchy. “International anarchy is the permissive cause of war.” So, realists and neorealists differ on how they conceptualize international anarchy. For realists, it is just the environment in which sovereign nation-states act. For neorealists, international anarchy describes the social relations among sovereign nation-states that causally explain why wars occur. In this chapter, I will consider the myth “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war” and the specific uses Kenneth Waltz makes of this myth. I will do so by examining what have become two of the most famous books about IR theory, both authored by Waltz. In the first, Man, the State, and War (first published in 1954), Waltz makes his famous argument that “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war.” In the second, Theory of International Politics (1979), Waltz extends international anarchy from a cause of war into a systemic ordering principle of the international system, a move which gives birth to the tradition of neorealism. I will summarize the arguments Waltz makes in each of these books, relate his arguments to the myth “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war,” and reconsider the myth function of Waltz’s arguments about international anarchy through the film Lord of the Files. Lord of the Flies tells a story about moving from one type of order (hierarchy) into another (anarchy), suggesting that anarchy is what allows conflict to occur. As such, it illustrates the arguments Waltz makes in his two books. Yet Lord of the Flies also offers insights into what makes Waltz’s anarchy myth function by showing us how fear is both a crucial and an externalized component of Waltz’s anarchy myth (Ashley, 1989). Without fear, Waltz’s arguments fail to be persuasive. What would international politics be like if fear functioned differently than it does in Waltz’s myth? What would this mean for IR theory? These are the sorts of questions a functional analysis of Waltz’s work allows us to consider.

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What does the myth say? Why do wars occur? This is the question Kenneth Waltz asked himself in the early 1950s. Waltz’s question is as old as war itself, possibly because “to explain how peace can be more readily achieved requires an understanding of the causes of war” (Waltz, 1959: 2). By the time Waltz posed this question, many answers to it already existed. These answers fell into three categories (or as IR theorists came to define them, were found at the three “levels of analysis” or in the “three images”). These three categories/levels/images are: the individual, the state, and the state system. In Man, the State, and War, Waltz argued that the major causes of war are to be found at each of these levels of analysis, with none of them alone being sufficient to explain why wars do or do not occur. How did Waltz come to this conclusion? Waltz began by looking at the first category/level/image—man. For Waltz, as for so many other IR theorists, the term “man” denotes the individual level and particularly an interest in human nature, forgetting of course that not all individuals are men. The first image explanation of war goes like this: the locus of the important causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of man. War results from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity. … If these are the primary causes of war, then the elimination of war must come through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social readjustment. (Waltz, 1959: 16) This is the “men behaving badly” explanation of war. Man behaves badly because he is bad by nature. He acts unreasonably or he prioritizes selfish goals over communitarian goals, and this is why conflicts and wars occur. This is the sort of “natural man” realist IR scholars invoke to explain the recurrence and repetition of wars. But, as idealist IR theorists point out, men do not always behave badly (see Chapter 3). Some men seem to be good by nature—they act reasonably to pursue the common good. There is a fundamental goodness to man, and if that fundamental goodness could be universalized—if all men could access their fundamental goodness—then all men could behave well. Conflicts and wars could be averted altogether. In reviewing these pessimistic and optimistic descriptions of the nature of man, Waltz noted a couple of problems. First, he suggested that the “causal importance of human nature” is generally exaggerated by all human nature theorists. Can we really say that human nature alone causes war? Not for Waltz, for how can pessimists explain why wars don’t occur all the time and how can optimists explain why they occur some of the time? Human nature explanations of war don’t seem to account for variations in the presence or absence of war. And, anyway, don’t good men as well as bad men sometimes make war? Waltz concludes that human nature is too complex to be so directly and causally linked to war as the sole explanation for why wars occur (Waltz, 1959: 40). Second, this insufficiency of human nature to explain the presence or absence of war means that we must look to social and political institutions to supplement our understanding of why wars occur. For example, if human nature cannot be changed—whether it is always good or bad—then we cannot decrease

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the occurrence of war by trying to change it. All we can do is look to social and political institutions that do change and try to change them to decrease the likelihood of war. Conversely, if human nature can be changed, then we still need to look to social and political institutions because human nature would be changed through interactions with these institutions. All this leads Waltz to conclude that human nature itself is never sufficient to explain the presence or absence of war. It must be supplemented by an analysis of social and political institutions. This leads Waltz to investigate second level/image explanations of the causes of war. At the second level of analysis, Waltz asks whether the occurrence of wars can be explained by the internal organization of states and societies. Just as first image theorists argue that there are good and bad men, second image theorists argue that there are good and bad states, either because of their formal governmental arrangements (democratic vs. autocratic, e.g.; see Chapter 3) or their less formal social arrangements (who owns the means of production; see Chapter 6). Like first image analyses, second image theories claim that bad actors (this time states) make war, and good actors preserve the peace. But, as before, these sorts of explanations raise critical questions for Waltz. For example, if bad states make war, what will change bad states to good states (Waltz, 1959: 114)? Not surprisingly, there is no agreement among second image theorists on just what to do. Some suggest good states would be democratic, others say they should be monarchical, others still say socialist (Waltz, 1959: 120). And, Waltz suggests, even if second image theorists could agree on what a good state was, there is still no guarantee that a world of “good states” would be a peaceful world. Like “good men,” “good states” sometimes make war. Once again, Waltz concludes that this level of analysis is incomplete. This state level needs to be supplemented by the international level, for, as Waltz puts it, “the international political environment has much to do with the ways in which states behave” (Waltz, 1959: 122–123). And this leads Waltz to consider the third level of analysis or third image in his quest to understand why wars occur. Waltz summarizes the third image as follows: “With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire—conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur” (Waltz, 1959: 159). It is worth quoting a somewhat lengthy passage by Waltz in which he details the linkages between anarchy, state actions, and conflict. In anarchy there is no automatic harmony…. A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this view, imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist. (Waltz, 1959: 160) In a situation of international anarchy as Waltz describes it, no “supreme authority” like an international government can stop states forcefully pursuing their own interests. Waltz concludes that “war occurs because there is nothing to prevent it”

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(Waltz, 1959: 188). This is why Waltz describes international anarchy as “a permissive or underlying cause of war” (Waltz, 1959: 232). As a permissive cause of war, international anarchy is also the limit on states’ abilities to cooperate with one another. Because there is no one to enforce cooperation, states will act in their own self-interests rather than in the interests of the state system. Waltz elaborates this point with reference to the parable of the stag hunt, told by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Assume that five men who have acquired a rudimentary ability to speak and to understand each other happen to come together at a time when all of them suffer from hunger. The hunger of each will be satisfied by the fifth part of stag, so they “agree” to co-operate in a project to trap one. But also the hunger of any one of them will be satisfied by a hare, so, as a hare comes within reach, one of them grabs it. The defector obtains the means of satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape. His immediate interest prevails over consideration for his fellows. (Waltz, 1959: 167–168) So, for Waltz, international anarchy explains both why wars ultimately may occur and why there are limits on cooperation among states in the international system. Without a leader to punish a hunter who defected from the stag hunt or an international government to punish a rogue state, cooperation can never be guaranteed and conflict is always a serious possibility. Yet even though Waltz argues that only international anarchy has the power to explain why wars may occur, he stresses that individual and state-level factors still need to be considered when we think about why specific wars do occur. For Waltz, the first and second images constitute the immediate causes of war. If individuals and states do not pursue war-like policies or do not pursue selfish interests that could not also be understood as in the general interest of all states, then even though the third image of international anarchy permits the occurrence of war, there would be no war (Waltz, 1959: 238). Another way to put it is like this: if individuals and states have nothing to fear from one another, then they have no cause to fight wars with one another. Something in addition to international anarchy is always required to explain why we move from a situation in which wars may occur to a situation in which wars do occur. Overall, then, in Man, the State, and War, Waltz argues that all three images need to be considered together to determine whether or not wars will occur (see Table 2.2). Table 2.2  Causes of war for Waltz Location

Description

Type of cause

First image

Nature of man

Immediate

Second image

International organization of states and societies

Immediate

Third image

International anarchy

Permissive

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And because Waltz locates the immediate causes of war in either individual men or states understood as collective men, realists are able to embrace his myth “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war.” Theory of International Politics might be described as a book in which Waltz both builds upon and forgets much of what he wrote in Man, the State, and War. What Waltz builds upon is the weight which he gives to international anarchy in explaining international conflict. What he forgets is to include first and second image explanations in his analysis of why wars occur. In this later book, then, there are no serious discussions of individuals or of the internal arrangements of states and society. Sovereign nation-states are Waltz’s principal actors, but instead of the complexity they had in Man, the State, and War, Waltz now discusses them as (at worst) billiard balls that knock one another around or (at best) firms that freely compete with one another in the international system (Waltz, 1979: 91). To be fair to Waltz, Theory of International Politics is not meant to have the wide sweep of Man, the State, and War. Waltz claims that this later book is concerned only with elaborating the working of the international level. But, this later book is in some ways not just an extension of the earlier book. This is because instead of arguing that an understanding of the international requires an understanding of individual and state-level factors as he did in Man, the State, and War, Waltz elevates his third image of international anarchy into a principle that at times seems to be downright determinist. International anarchy has much more explanatory purchase in Theory of International Politics than it did in Man, the State, and War. International anarchy seems to dictate how states in the state system must behave, rather than suggest (as it did in his earlier book) how they might behave. This is because in Theory of International Politics, international anarchy becomes the structural ordering principle of international politics, from which all state behaviors seem to flow. As a result, Theory of International Politics marks a clear break between realism and neorealism. Without getting into too much dry detail, Waltz’s argument in Theory of International Politics (summarized in Table 2.3) is this: the behavior of actors in a system depends upon how they are organized. The two major forms of organization that matter for politics are hierarchy and anarchy. Hierarchy describes how politics is organized within states—with a clear center that has a monopoly on the legitimate uses of power and a distribution of labor among various branches of government. Anarchy describes how politics is organized globally, between states in the international system—with no clear center of power, significant power held by at least two states (or poles as they are called in IR theory), and each state functioning like every other state in international politics because there is no division of labor to speak of among states. Waltz argues that these different structures of hierarchy and anarchy—the different ways of organizing political power—result in different consequences for actors. Again, actors will behave differently depending upon how they are organized. So, for example, within a domestic, hierarchical organization, political processes can be specialized because there are different branches and levels of government, these various government sectors are all highly interdependent upon one another, and their overriding goal is to maximize the welfare of the citizens of their states. In contrast, within a global, anarchical organization, states cannot be specialized because there is just one state doing all the tasks. Therefore, rather

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Realism Table 2.3  Waltzian neorealism Structure Ordering principle

Formal differentiation

Distribution of power

Domestic

• Hierarchy • Centered

• Heterogeneous • Dissimilar

Monopoly

Global

• Anarchy • Decentered

Heterogeneous

Oligopoly

Consequences Political processes

Relationships

Goals

Domestic

Specialization

High interdependence

Maximize welfare

Global

• Imitation • Balancing

Low interdependence

Maximize security

than specializing, states in the state system imitate one another’s behaviors. They attempt to be as independent of other states as they can be, and they strive to maximize the international security of their state (Waltz, 1979: Chapter 5). What this means for the everyday practices of states is that domestically, states strive to make life as good as they can for their citizens. Quality of life issues prevail domestically, and, importantly, they can prevail because security issues are mostly solved within states. Certainly, crimes and sometimes rebellions occur, but there is a general agreement within a state as to where authority resides and therefore who can exercise power. With security issues muted within states, states can focus on welfare issues. In contrast, Waltz argues, security issues are never solved within the state system. Because there is no orderer—because international anarchy prevails— there is never anything or anyone to prevent conflicts from occurring. States are forced to look out for their own interests. The overriding interest of a state is to survive—to carry on being a state. And, Waltz argues, in a situation of structural anarchy, the best chance states have for surviving is to maximize their power. Sure, states could all give up their power to some world government and transform international anarchy into international hierarchy. Then states could cease to worry about security issues and focus on issues of international welfare. But, Waltz (who is often called a structural-, new-, or neo-realist) agrees with other realists that this is a utopian pipe dream. It isn’t going to happen. And, even if it did, then we’d be discussing what happens in hierarchical structures, whereas the point of Waltz’s Theory of International Politics is to elaborate what happens in anarchical structures. In international anarchy, because all states recognize that it is in their overriding self-interest to maximize their power, that’s what Waltz says they do. To do anything else is crazy because a state without enough power is a vulnerable state. And, anyway, it is too scary for states not to try to maximize their power. This is what Waltz calls the “security dilemma.” He argues that when one state sees

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another state trying to increase its power to increase its security, it gets scared, feels threatened, and recognizes that it too must increase its power. But, of course, that scares the other states, and basically there is this mad spiral in which all states are trying to have more power than all other states. According to Waltz, this competition for power among states is not always as dangerous as it at first sounds. It doesn’t have to lead to war, so long as no state has significantly more power than another state or coalition of states, so long as states in combination are in a stable “balance of power” arrangement. But power does not always balance out like this. Waltz argues that power is most likely to balance out in this way when there are only two poles—when there is a bipolar system. When there are more than two poles, things get trickier. Balances are harder to strike. Risks increase. Wars are more likely to occur. International anarchy remains the permissive cause of war (Waltz, 1979: Chapter 6). Overall, Waltz’s two books mythologize international anarchy as the permissive cause of war. The first book explicitly links anarchy to war, while the second book explains state behavior—whether conflictual or merely competitive—from the first principle of international anarchy. And both books reserve a place for fear as what either explains the immediate causes of war (men or states behaving badly) or the seemingly inevitable behaviors of states locked into a competition for power in international anarchy. The film Lord of the Flies cleverly plays with these themes of good and bad individuals, good and bad “states,” and differing forms of organization (hierarchy vs. anarchy). As such, it nicely illustrates many of the points Waltz makes in his two books. But, most importantly for our purposes, Lord of the Flies invites us to reconsider the use Waltz makes of fear in his analyses of international anarchy. In Man, the State, and War, states may fear one another because of the bad behavior of either ruling individuals or rogue states. Fear, in other words, is located in the first or second image. But by the time we get to Theory of International Politics, fear seems to be located in the third image—in international anarchy itself because it is anarchy that makes states behave as they do (to maximize their power), and it is consequently this behavior that leads other states to fear them. Lord of the Flies explores all of these locations of fear, while suggesting one more. Maybe fear is not something fixed in one or more levels of analysis. Maybe fear is not a consequence of state behavior in a system of structural anarchy. Instead, maybe fear is something that is actually missing in a situation of international anarchy, and because it is missing it must be invented and skillfully deployed. Put differently, maybe fear is the final supplement or addition to Waltz’s myth that “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war,” a supplement not necessarily found in any of his three images (Ashley, 1989).

Lord of the Flies The film Lord of the Flies is based on William Golding’s novel of the same name which was published in 1954, the same year Waltz’s Man, the State, and War was published. The 1963 British version of the film, directed by Peter Brook, was re-released in the British Classics video series in 1999. An American version of the film, directed by Harry Hook, was released in 1994. The American film version

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makes several critical deviations from Golding’s novel that present obstacles to rethinking Waltz’s anarchy myth through it (see “Note on the US film of Lord of the Flies” at the end of this chapter). In contrast, the British version follows Golding’s novel more closely and, it must be said, is simply a more powerful presentation of the story. It is for these reasons that I will focus my attention on the British 1963 version of the film. Lord of the Flies is set during World War II when the United Kingdom was being bombed by Germany. Because of the heavy bombing many English cities experienced, a mass exodus of British children was organized—some to the British countryside and others out of the UK altogether. Such is the plight of the British schoolboys (aged about 5–12) whom we encounter in the film. They are presumably being flown from war-torn Britain to Australia when their plane crashes on a remote, uninhabited Pacific island. No adults survive the crash. The opening photomontage and soundtrack depict the boys’ transition from life in England to life on the island. In it are seen and heard the sights and sounds of English school life—boys in a class photo, at their desks, in the dining hall, in chapel, playing cricket, and teachers organizing their activities and watching over them. Then, abruptly, the pace in which images and sounds are introduced quickens, and we see and hear missile launches, war planes, and bombing raids violently inserted into the montage. Finally, we see photos of the boys’ planned evacuation, their plane caught in a storm, a map of the Pacific, and the plane crashing near an island. The photomontage ends, and the action begins. This opening starkly introduces the two worlds of Lord of the Flies—the lost world of hierarchy from which the boys have just exited and the island world of anarchy they have just entered. Hierarchy is marked by rules, reason, and law and order, all of which are ensured (at least from the boys’ point of view) by the presence of grown-ups. Anarchy is unmarked as the film opens. The film is the story of how the boys behave in a situation of anarchy, in a world without adults (see Table 2.4). How Lord of the Flies makes sense of the world is by exploring what happens to boys when they move from one world (the world of school/home/nation-state) into another world (the lost island world). What these two worlds represent is a reversal of what the boys are accustomed to as typical and deviant. In the familiar world of school/home/nation-state, what is typical is hierarchy and what is deviant in that world is anarchy. But in the lost island world the boys now find themselves inhabiting, anarchy is typical and hierarchy is deviant (see Table 2.5). How will the boys cope in this deviant, new world of anarchy? Not surprisingly, the boys’ first coping strategy is an attempt to create hierarchy within anarchy. There may be no grown-ups on the island, but that does not mean there has to be an absence of civilized order. As one of the boys puts it, Table 2.4  How does Lord of the Flies represent hierarchy and anarchy? Hierarchy

Anarchy

Characterized by rules, reason, and law and order, all of which are guaranteed by the presence of adults

Characterized by the absence of guarantees to order or reason because of the absence of adults

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Realism Table 2.5  What is typical and what is deviant in the two worlds of Lord of the Flies? Familiar world

Island world

Typical

Hierarchy

Anarchy

Deviant

Anarchy

Hierarchy

“We’ve got to have rules and obey them. After all, we’re not savages. We’re English, and the English are best at everything. So we’ve got to do the right things.” The boys are not only all English. They are all English schoolboys. This means that even though the boys are from different schools (indicated by their different uniforms), they have an implicit if not explicit knowledge of social codes that can be mobilized to create and sustain organizing hierarchies. And this is precisely what the boys draw upon to establish their new order. The boys elect Ralph as their leader. Ralph is the boy who was responsible for bringing all the stranded boys on the island together by blowing into a conch shell as one would blow on a trumpet. The conch becomes the symbol of rules and rights. Whoever holds the conch at assembly has the right to speak and be heard. Jack, the leader of a group of choirboys from one school, is the only boy who could really challenge Ralph’s leadership. Ralph wisely gives Jack control over his choir, and Jack (who seems to be the only boy on the island in possession of a knife) decides that they will be hunters. Piggy, the voice of reason from the old world, is responsible for taking names and minding the little ones. These jobs suit Piggy for, as his name implies, he is physically unfit for much else. Life goes on rather blissfully for some time. Images of happy boys working together to build shelters, playing games and gathering fruit fill the screen. Jack’s boys amuse themselves by exploring the island and trying to kill wild boar. However they spend their time, all the boys agree that they have one overriding goal in common—to be rescued. They decide to build a fire on the mountain top which they will keep going so that a plane or a ship might see them. Jack volunteers his hunters for this job. The rules seem to be well in place, and everyone seems to be working within them for the common good. All proceeds well until one day a plane flies overhead, and Ralph and the other boys on the beach realize that the fire has gone out. Jack’s hunters are euphoric because they have killed their first wild boar. But because of their increased attention to their “need for meat,” they have neglected to uphold their part of the bargain—keeping the fire alight. Jack’s boys have shifted their priorities. The film represents this change both visually and musically. Visually, Jack appears increasingly warrior-like as the film proceeds—first with his knife, then his spear, and finally with his painted face. Musically, the peaceful, civilized music Jack’s choir sang as they first appeared gives way over the course of the film to a drummed, war-like rendition of their Latin song. In many scenes, a chant about hunting and killing unites Jack’s choir/hunters, and not their original song. It is not surprising that goals would diverge and agreements would be abandoned in the absence of an orderer. As Waltz would remind us, in a situation of structural anarchy, there is nothing or no one to enforce the rules or common goals. Yet, at this stage anyway, there is an orderer, and that orderer is Ralph.

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He was elected chief by the other boys. But his interests and those of Jack begin to conflict. Jack is interested in hunting, a skill that will help the boys survive on the island. This is his immediate reality and his immediate aim. In contrast, Ralph is more interested in the longer-term possibility of rescue because he does not believe that the boys can survive indefinitely on the island. As the film proceeds, this conflict of interests is exacerbated until the hierarchy of Ralph as elected chief breaks down because Jack directly challenges him. The challenge begins when Ralph tries to protect Piggy’s right to speak because Piggy is holding the conch. Jack: [interrupts Piggy] Shut up you fat slug. Ralph: Jack, let him speak. He’s got the conch! Jack: And you shut up you. Who are you anyway just sitting there telling people what to do? You can’t hunt, you can’t sing. Ralph: I’m chief. I was chosen. Jack: Why should choosing make any difference, telling people what to do? Ralph: The rules, you’re breaking the rules. Jack: Who cares! Ralph: Because the rules are the only thing we got. Jack: Bollocks to the rules. In this scene, Ralph is right. Indeed, he is too right for his own good. The rules are all the boys have of the hierarchy they attempt to create in this world without grown-ups. But because they don’t have any grown-ups—because they don’t have anyone whose authority is unchallenged because of their structural position— there is no way to enforce the rules. As Jack proves in this scene, the rules mean nothing without the power of enforcement. It isn’t long after this that the hierarchy which the boys have clung to unravels altogether. Jack leaves the group, going off on his own. He is eventually joined by Roger (a hunter) and then the rest of the hunters. Increasingly, the boys break up into two distinct societies on the island—those organized around the principle of rescue who work at keeping the fire going and those organized around the principle of survival who spend their time hunting wild boar. As time goes on, almost all of the boys join Jack’s “tribe.” He gives them food. He offers them protection. And things get even worse from this point. Not only are the boys divided over what goals to prioritize, but they end up in deadly conflict with one another. It seems to begin by humiliating Ralph and Piggy, underscoring their weakness by feeding them bananas when they have asked to share the meat of a kill. Then Jack and his boys steal Piggy’s glasses, thereby taking control over the ability to make fire and leaving Ralph and Piggy nothing immediate to offer the boys, apart from the fading possibility of rescue. When Ralph and Piggy go to Jack’s end of the island in an attempt to get Piggy’s glasses back, Jack and his tribe treat them badly by taunting them and threatening them. And then Roger intentionally pushes a rock over the cliff, killing Piggy (the voice of hierarchical reason) who is holding the conch (the symbol of rules and order). Ralph runs away, only to be eventually hunted down by Jack and his tribe. Jack’s tribe smoke Ralph out of the forest by setting it on fire. Ralph scrambles through the forest, pursued by Jack’s boys, as the hunting chants of Jack’s

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tribe grow louder and louder in Ralph’s head. Eventually, Ralph makes his way to the beach. He falls at the feet of a British naval officer, who has come to investigate the island because of the massive fire. The soundtrack falls silent, as Ralph and the boys pursuing him try to comprehend their situation. The camera focuses on the naval officer and his crew. The soundtrack plays again, this time a trumpet arrangement of the original choir music so sweetly sung by Jack’s boys earlier. Anarchy gives way to hierarchy. Order is restored. The stunned boys prepare to re-enter the world of enforceable hierarchy that they left so long ago. Lord of the Flies seems to make a pretty good case for Waltz’s myth that “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war” and that, in a world of structural anarchy, the necessary pursuit of survival in this self-help world may well lead to conflict. Whether one goes with Waltz’s thesis in Man, the State, and War, that an immediate cause of war like human nature (a first image problem) or bad social organization (a second image problem) is needed to supplement international anarchy or his thesis in Theory of International Politics, that the structure of anarchy is enough to explain why competition among actors will occur, thereby leading to the possibility of either balancing or war, Lord of the Flies seems to support Waltz’s myth that “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war.” The film takes us through five moves that support Waltz’s myth. First, there is the loss of hierarchy (no adults). Second, there is the attempt to reimpose hierarchy with rules and elections. Third, hierarchy fails because there is no one to enforce the rules. Fourth, conflict breaks out among the boys, resulting in a war between the two groups and the intentional killing of Piggy. Finally, anarchy ends with the reintroduction of adult authority. Even though this is where the film ends, we know that the behavior the boys exhibited on the island will not match their behavior in the world of adults. The music, if nothing else, confirms this. As compelling a case as this may be for Waltz’s thesis, there is a crucial move missing from the above list—a move that puts Waltz’s thesis about anarchy into doubt. For, as this missing move demonstrates, it is not just the lack of hierarchy that leads to conflict or that makes it possible. What is missing from this list and what is clearly illustrated in the film is the supplemental function of fear in Waltz’s anarchy myth. Without fear, the move from hierarchy to anarchy is not necessarily the move from the ability to prevent war to the inability to prevent war (see Box 2.2). As Lord of the Flies tells the story of the boys’ departure from hierarchy and their making sense of their lives in anarchy—marking anarchy first by cooperation and then by conflict—it also tells a parallel story about the boys’ increasing fear. Certainly, there is the fear of being on an uninhabited island in the aftermath of a plane crash without any adults. But in addition to this rational fear, the film introduces more and more irrational fear. Initially, this fear is something held by the little boys. One of them asks early on what the bigger boys are going to do about the “snake-thing.” Ralph: The snake-thing? Piggy: [into whose ear the little boy is speaking for Piggy to speak for him at the assembly] Now he says it was a beastie. Ralph: Beastie? [He and the other boys laugh] Piggy: A snake-thing, ever so big. He saw it. Ralph: When?

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Box 2.2  Where does fear figure in Waltz’s myth as enacted in Lord of the Flies? Loss of hierarchy (symbolized by lack of adults) Reestablishment of hierarchy with rules and election (symbolized by the conch shell) Fear becomes widespread among boys (symbolized by their belief in the beast) This is what goes without saying in Waltz’s myth Hierarchy fails (symbolized by Jack leaving the group and starting a rival group) Conflict occurs (Jack’s and Ralph’s groups fight/Piggy is killed) Anarchy ends (symbolized by the rescue of the boys and the reintroduction of adults)

Piggy: When he was hiding in the jungle in the dark. He says, “When the rain stopped, it turned into one of them things like ropes in the trees and hung in the branches.” He says, “Will it come back tonight?” The boys look scared. Ralph: But there isn’t a beastie. I tell you, there isn’t a beast. Jack: Ralph’s right, of course. There isn’t a snake-thing. But if there was, we’d hunt and kill it. In this scene, the beast is introduced by a little boy, and its existence is denied by both Ralph and Jack. But there is a critical difference between how Ralph and Jack deal with the existence of a beast. Ralph sticks firmly to the argument that there is no beast. Jack, in contrast, seems to agree with Ralph, yet he leaves open the possibility that there is a beast by saying that “if there was, we’d hunt and kill it.” Something that does not exist does not need to be hunted and killed. It is Jack, not a little boy, who next brings up the beast. He does so when he defends his hunters for their neglect of the fire when the plane passed overhead. He tells the boys at assembly: Jack: We’re hunters. And if there is a beast, it is my hunters who will protect you from it.

Jack leans down to a little boy, Percival, for whom Jack then speaks.

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Jack:

He says the beast comes out of the sea.

The boys look scared. Another boy: My daddy said they hadn’t found all the animals in the sea. My daddy said there are animals—what do you call them—that make ink and are hundreds of feet long and eat whales whole. Someone else shouts: A squid can’t come out of the water. Another boy: Maybe he means it’s some kind of ghost. Another boy: Maybe that’s what the beast is—some kind of ghost. Piggy: I don’t believe in no ghosts, ever. Jack: Who cares what you believe, fatty. [Laughter] Simon: Maybe there is a beast … What I mean is, maybe it’s only us. Someone: Nuts. Ralph: We should have left this ‘til daylight. We’re tired. We’ll have a vote—on ghosts I mean. And then we’ll go back to the shelters. Who thinks there may be ghosts? Almost all the boys raise their hands. While Jack is increasingly using the beast as a way to shift the boys’ priorities from being rescued on the island to surviving on the island, the fear of the beast has spread from just the little boys to almost all of the boys. And, as Jack realizes, encouraging the boys’ belief in and fear of the beast is a good way to challenge Ralph’s authority. It is after this meeting that Jack says bollocks to the rules, that the hierarchy the boys created on this anarchical island turns competitive rather than cooperative. Soon after this meeting, the twins Sam and Eric think they see the beast on a mountain top. They saw something swaying in the breeze. They say as they ran down the mountain, the beast followed them and nearly caught them. Jack:  We’ll hunt it. Jack, Ralph, and a group of bigger boys go to hunt the beast. The hunt lasts until after dark, when the boys arrive on the mountain top and see “the beast.” They run down the mountain screaming. The “truth” of the beast has now been established. It is only after the beast seems to move from fiction to fact that Jack gets fed up with Ralph’s rules about fires and rescue and leaves the group, to eventually be joined by his hunters and most of the other boys. One day, after Jack’s tribe has killed another wild boar, Jack cuts off the boar’s head and leaves it as a gift for the beast. As Jack and his tribe celebrate their kill late into the night, Simon (who said before that the beast could be us) climbs up the mountain and comes face to face with the beast, without fear. He discovers that “the beast” is a dead paratrooper hanging from a tree. This is why he appears to move. And his parachute is swaying in the breeze. This is what Sam and Eric saw. Simon descends the mountain in the dark. Jack’s tribe is celebrating wildly, chanting “kill the beast, cut his throat, and spill his blood.” They see something move in the brush. Someone says, “It’s the beast,” and the boys kill it. Of course, it is Simon.

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Simon must die because he is the one who has the knowledge that there is no beast, and without a beast it would be harder for Jack to make his claim to leadership against Ralph. For survival seems extremely urgent when there is a threat. Ralph is no threat. Piggy is no threat. The few little boys they look after are no threat. But the beast is a “real” threat. The beast is what is necessary to make a threat to survival seem real. And even killing Simon, whom Jack claims was the beast in disguise, is not enough to kill the beast. Jack makes this clear as his tribe prepares for another hunt. Jack: Tomorrow I’ll hunt again. Then we’ll leave another head for the beast. Some of you will stay and defend the gate. The beast may try to come in. Remember how he crawled. He came disguised. The beast may try and come, even though we gave him the head of our kill. So watch, and be careful. Boy: But didn’t we … Didn’t we … Jack: No, how could we kill it? Another boy: He told us. The beast was disguised. The beast—or the fear it represents—can never be killed because it is a necessary fear. It is necessary for Waltz’s anarchy myth to function.

The function of fear in Waltz’s anarchy myth Lord of the Flies not only illustrates the seeming truth of Waltz’s anarchy myth—“international anarchy is the permissive cause of war”—but it also shows us what makes Waltz’s myth function. As the film illustrates, anarchy alone is insufficient to cause or even allow for conflict. Anarchy requires fear to differentiate the behavior of those acting within it from their behavior within hierarchy. The absence of adults symbolizes the move from hierarchy to anarchy in the film. But hierarchy persists in the absence of adults until fear is introduced. Without fear, there is nothing in the film or in Waltz’s myth that suggests that anarchy would be conflictual rather than cooperative. As the film illustrates, fear can be found in any of Waltz’s three images. The way Golding’s novel is often read is as a testimony to the evilness of human nature that comes out in extreme situations. Man is by nature evil. The rules are all we’ve got. We had better cling to the rules to avoid behaving like beasts in a state of nature. This is one way to interpret Simon’s declaration that the beast may only be us. One can make the case that Jack, especially, is lured to some initial savage state of man. It is his increasing irrationality and how seductively he presents this irrationality as rational on the island that is the immediate cause of conflict among the boys. Read in this way, fear is a first image problem. But, of course, Golding’s story is an allegory of what is happening among sovereign nation-states during World War II. States, too, are behaving badly. Germany is taking over Europe and bombing the United Kingdom. Because there is no world government to mediate the Allied/Axis dispute, World War II occurs. Jack’s tribe can be read as a bad organization that spreads conflict rather than adhering to the initially agreed-upon goal of rescue through cooperative fire building. Because there is no adult to prevent disputes between Jack’s wild survivalists and Ralph’s rational rescue wannabes, Jack’s tribe and Ralph’s group come

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into conflict. This is a second image way of describing the location of fear. Either of these explanations follows from a reading of Waltz’s Man, the State, and War. In Theory of International Politics, Waltz no longer relies on his first and second images to supplement war. He suggests that anarchy itself is the location of fear. The structure of anarchy means states must compete for power in order to survive in this self-help system. The security dilemma is an attribute of international anarchy, according to Waltz. Because security questions can never be finally resolved in a situation of structural anarchy, competition is unavoidable and conflict is likely. So, on this third image reading of Lord of the Flies, the boys end up in deadly conflict with one another because fear is located in the insecurity of international anarchy itself. While each of these locations of fear at first seems to make a lot of sense, none of them can be persuasively upheld when we remember that prior to the introduction of the beast—the representation in the film of fear—the boys got on well (see Box 2.2). They did not at all seem like boys behaving badly because they were evil by nature, so the film fails to make the case for fear being located in the first image. Nor do they organize themselves badly into competitive and increasingly conflictual groups before they believe in the beast and vote it into existence. So a second image explanation of fear is also discredited. It is only after most of the boys embrace the fear of the beast that conflict occurs within anarchy. Anarchy itself, then, is never the location of fear. Anarchy does not create the fear that Waltz theorizes in Theory of International Politics. Rather, fear creates the effects that Waltz attributes to anarchy—prioritizing survival, self-help over cooperation, and either conflict or competitive balancing. According to the film, then, the source of fear is not internal to any of the three images—individuals, internal social and political organizations, or anarchy. So where is fear located? To think about this question, let’s re-examine Simon’s declaration that the beast may only be one of us. Simon is the one boy who knows the “truth” about the beast—that there is no beast, that the beast is but a dead paratrooper, and that the boys have nothing to fear except (as the old saying goes) fear itself. Simon recognizes that the boys are afraid, and he recognizes that the boys are probably just scaring one another. The boys in various ways invent the beast—by land, then by sea, and then by air—as something to fear. But the fear isn’t a fear of human nature or bad social and political organizations or international anarchy. The fear is the fear of fear itself. By inventing this fear among themselves and then deploying it against themselves, the boys bring about all the effects of international anarchy that Waltz predicts in his two books. But, crucially, before the boys embrace and deploy this fear, none of Waltz’s predictions about international anarchy are actualized. Fear, then, is the final supplement to Waltz’s theory. It is not a first image problem. It is not a second image problem. And, it is not (as so many IR theorists have been persuaded to believe) a third image problem systematically built into the structure of international anarchy. Fear is what is always missing from Waltz’s theory. But without adding fear, none of the competitive and potentially conflictual things Waltz predicts will occur in a system of structural anarchy do occur. Put differently, the ways in which Waltz deploys the myth “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war” make no sense without Waltz’s theories being supplemented by fear, a fear that is not a necessary attribute of any of his three images (see Table 2.6).

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Realism Table 2.6  The locations of fear in Lord of the Flies Location

Description

Illustration

First image

Human nature

Jack and his followers’ increasing savagery

Second image

International organization of states and societies

Jack’s bad tribe against Ralph’s good tribe

Third image

International anarchy

Competitive, self-help system in which boys create security dilemma on island

None of Waltz’s images

Irrationally generated by the boys themselves and externalized

The beast

Since this is the case, then, it is important to look at how fear is characterized by Waltz. Waltz characterizes fear as something that always divides people, states and societies, and worlds. Even if fear leads to balancing among states (something that could not be illustrated in the film because Ralph’s group never had the power to compete with Jack’s group), this balancing is never a cooperative endeavor. It is always the result of fear. But there is absolutely nothing in either of Waltz’s books that ever makes the case for theorizing fear in this way. Fear simply is assumed to be divisive. What if fear functioned differently? What if fear united people for good rather than divided them for evil (or even benign) competition? International anarchy would not look the same. Anarchy would mean something very different in IR theory. Anarchy, however much it was supplemented by fear, would not be a permissive cause of war because war would not be the likely outcome of a fear that united people around a good cause (e.g., see Chapter 10). It is this fear functioning for cooperative ends that we find in the neoidealist myth about international anarchy. This is the myth we will explore in our next chapter.

Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1: Neorealism Waltz’s Theory of International Politics is widely regarded as the book that laid the theoretical foundation for the IR tradition of neorealism. There is an abundance of commentary on this subject. Some classic statements include Robert O. Keohane’s (1986) edited volume Neorealism and Its Critics. This book reproduces several chapters from Theory of International Politics and includes a wide array of criticisms of Waltz’s work, from institutionalist to critical theory to postmodern perspectives. More recently, Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little collaborated on a book that is not so much a critique of Waltz’s work as it is a critical extension of it. The authors make the case for a selective Waltzian neorealism, one that both drops some of Waltz’s ideas and supplements Waltz’s ideas with their own. Missing from these traditional critiques of neorealism are any

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sustained gender analyses of Waltz’s work. Christine Sylvester’s book Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era and J. Ann Tickner’s chapter in Gender and International Relations correct this oversight. A number of texts appraising the Eurocentrism, racism, and colonial mindset of neorealism (and mainstream IR theories more generally) have appeared since the early 2000s, including Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair’s Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations, Decolonizing International Relations edited by Branwen Gruffydd Jones, and Anna Agathangelou and Lily H. M. Ling’s “House of IR,” and Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam’s Race and Racism in International Relations.

Suggested reading Agathangelou, Anna M. and Lily H. M. Ling (2004) “The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism,” International Studies Review 6(4): 21–49. Anievas, Alexander, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam (eds) (2014) Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line. London: Routledge. Barkin, Samuel (2009) “Realism, Prediction and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Analysis 5(3): 233–246. Buzan, Barry, Charles Jones, and Richard Little (1993) The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism. New York: Columbia University Press. Chowdhry, Geeta and Sheila Nair (2002) Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class. London: Routledge. Jones, Branwen Gruffydd (ed.) (2006) Decolonizing International Relations. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Keohane, Robert O. (ed.) (1986) Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press. Marco, Cesa (2009) “Realist Visions of the End of the Cold War: Morgenthua, Aron and Waltz,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11(2): 171–191. Mearsheimer, John (2005a) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nye, Joseph S. (2005) The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sylvester, Christine (1994) Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, especially Chapter 3. Tickner, J. Ann (1992) Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. New York: Columbia University Press, especially Chapter 2.

Topic 2: The uses of fear in IR theory Richard Ashley’s (1989) engagement with Waltzian neorealism argues not only that “statecraft is mancraft” but that fear is a vital supplement to Waltz’s theory of international anarchy. Many of the themes initially expressed by Ashley are picked up on and applied more generally by David Campbell in his work on international

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security. It is also worth keeping in mind Ashley’s contributions when considering Hillary Clinton’s myth “gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights,” discussed in Chapter 11 on Global LGBT Rights. For not only is Ashley’s notion of statecraft as mancraft central to my Queer IR critique of Clinton’s myth (also see Weber, Queer International Relations). While Clinton’s myth functions by championing heteronormative love as normal love, the film Love is Strange demonstrates how fear functions to craft “LGBTs,” queer people and their love as (scarily) unacceptable.

Suggested reading Ashley, Richard K. (1989) “Living on Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War,” in J. D. Derian and M. Shapiro (eds) International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 259–321. Bleiker, Roland and Emma Hutchinson (2008) “Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics,” Review of International Studies 34(S1): 115–135. Campbell, David (1999) Writing Security, 2nd edition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Edkins, Jenny (2003) Trauma and the Politics of Memory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fierke, Karen (2004) “Trauma, Political Solipsism and War,” Review of International Studies 30(4): 471–491. Weber, Cynthia (2016) Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Topic 3: The predictive power of realism?— from the Cold War to the War on Terror One of the things that had enabled realists to argue that their theory was so robust during the Cold War was that it seemed to predict how the world functioned. Waltz’s understanding of bipolarity gave us a stable international environment in which to comprehend the world and, importantly for states, to plan foreign policy. This is why in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, John Mearsheimer famously wrote that we would soon miss the Cold War (1990). And many realists did. But what both Waltz and Mearsheimer neglected to mention was that realism is not actually that good at predicting events. While realism provided IR theorists with theoretical stability, it did not provide foreign policy makers with practical stability. This is because realism failed to predict the end of the Cold War, just as it failed to predict the so-called War on Terror. In part, this is because realism overlooks many of the activities of nonstate actors, from nongovernmental organizations to private security actors to international media, multinational corporations, and even criminal organizations (Krahmann, 2005). Needless to say, this goes some way to explaining why the first impulse of some realists and realist-oriented foreign policy makers after September 11, 2001 was to reinvision the very unpredictable War on Terror in the comforting terms of the predictable World War II (Weber, 2002), and they often

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did so—as François Debrix demonstrates—by reformulating realism into what he calls “tabloid realism” (2003, 2007). Where realists did make an important contribution to War on Terror theorizing, though, was in their analysis of how the Iraq War (see Mearsheimer, 2005)—one of the battlefields in the War on Terror—was not and should not have been a realist war. Rather, it was a neoconservative war, fought not on the grounds that it was in the US national interest but on the grounds that powerful states should use their military power to enforce their moral agendas internationally. This way of thinking comes out of not only the idealist tradition of international relations (which we will study in Chapter 3) but also from the political thought of Leo Strauss. For a summary and critique of Strauss’s thought as it was applied by the George W. Bush administration to the War on Terror, see Norton, 2005, 2007.

Suggested reading Debrix, François (2003) “Tabloid Realism and the Space of American Security Culture,” Geopolitics 8(3): 151–190. Debrix, François (2007) Tabloid Terror: War, Culture, and Geopolitics. London: Routledge. Krahmann, Elke (ed.) (2005) New Threats and New Actors in International Security. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mearsheimer, John J. (1990) “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” Atlantic Monthly 266(2): 35–50. Mearsheimer, John J. (2005) “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus NeoConservatism,” OpenDemocracy, May 19, 2005. Online at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp, downloaded April 15, 2013. Norton, Anne (2005) Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire. New Haven: Yale University Press. Norton, Anne (2007) “Anne Norton defines NeoCons,” http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=6dappb82loo, downloaded April 15, 2013. Weber, Cynthia (2002) “Flying Planes Can Be Dangerous,” Millennium 31(1): 129–147.

Note on the US film of Lord of the Flies If you can’t find the British version of Lord of the Flies, it is best to read William Golding’s novel (which is worth reading anyway) rather than turning to the 1994 American version of the film directed by Harry Hook. The American version makes many critical deviations from Golding’s book which change the motivations for the boys’ actions on the island and (most importantly for our purposes) which change the function of fear. First, the boys in the American version are all from the same American military academy. They already know one another, they have a preestablished social hierarchy and rigid military hierarchy, and they

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bring values like the importance of conflict and survival to the island rather than developing them on the island because of their changed circumstances. Second, a wounded adult (Captain Benson) survives the plane crash. His presence and his possible recovery mean that hierarchy may be guaranteed by an adult. This doesn’t happen because (bizarrely) Captain Benson rushes off in the middle of the night in a feverish state to take refuge in a cave. Some of the boys think he has died. But, as Simon discovers, it is Captain Benson who is “the monster.” Finally and most importantly, fear is not the motivation for the breakdown of the boys’ hierarchy and their entering into a savage anarchy. Jack leaves the group when Ralph criticizes him for letting the fire burn out. This is well before there is widespread fear of “the monster.”

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Chapter

3

Idealism Is there an international society?

What does the myth say? Independence Day Fear and leadership in Independence Day Suggestions for further thinking Media note Classroom activity

42 48 54 58 61 61

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If the myth “anarchy is the permissive cause of war” suggests that conflict is an inevitable aspect of international affairs so long as anarchy prevails, then the myth “there is an international society” offers some hope that the conflictual aspects of international anarchy—and possibly international anarchy itself—can be overcome. According to this myth, transforming international politics from conflictual to cooperative does not necessitate moving from anarchy to hierarchy—from an international system without an orderer to an international system with an orderer. Instead, all it requires is mediating or replacing anarchy with community. In other words, world government may not be the only way out of anarchy. International community—a formal or informal collective and cooperative set of social relationships among sovereign nation-states—may be an alternative to world government and an alternative to international anarchy. This way of thinking about international community is most commonly associated with the IR tradition of idealism (a subset of the larger tradition of liberalism; also see Chapter 10). Idealists believe that there is a basic goodness to people that can be corrupted by bad forms of organization (or, as Chapter 11 discusses, the wrong kind of love). These bad types of organization are found at the level of the state and society. It is these bad forms of organization that divide people and lead to misunderstandings among them (see Table 3.1). If people could only be organized in ways that allow them to really, truly, and honestly communicate with one another, then they could see what they have in common and unite around common standards of goodness, truth, beauty, and justice. Or (somewhat less optimistically) they could at least put into place rules and laws to temper conflict and facilitate cooperation. Either way, good organizations can lead to good changes in people, all of whom are basically good—have a good moral core—even if they occasionally behave badly. And good forms of organization are possible not only domestically but also internationally because even international social relations are marked much more by harmony (when there is pure communication) than by conflict. Idealism is arguably the founding tradition of international relations theory (Walker, 1993). Even so, its influence over IR scholars and practitioners has waned over the years. Idealism is seen to have failed to “make the world safe for democracy” as President Woodrow Wilson claimed it could during World War I, even when its principles were institutionalized into international organizations like the League of Nations and later the United Nations. Realism won most of the important intellectual debates during World War II and the Cold War. And when its usefulness was threatening to fade away, Kenneth Waltz reinvented it as neorealism in his Theory of International Politics, thereby providing IR theorists with a seemingly timeless account of the behavior of actors in a situation of structural anarchy (see Chapter 2). Table 3.1  Idealism

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Actors

Nature of actors

Humans

All morally good

States and societies

Good—if organized through pure communication Bad—if organized through impure communication

Idealism

However, as the Cold War thawed during the latter half of the 1980s and the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, Waltz’s timeless truths about competition, conflict, and balancing in a system of structural anarchy no longer rang true. The East-West rivalry was over, arms control agreements seemed to proliferate faster than armaments, democracy spread internationally, and human rights and humanitarian intervention were given practical and not just rhetorical emphasis by many sovereign nation-states. These were not outcomes Waltz or any other realist or neorealist anarchy theorist would have predicted. Sure, if international anarchy had been replaced by international hierarchy—by a world government—then maybe these cooperative practices could be accounted for. But international anarchy as realists and neorealists defined it persisted in the aftermath of the Cold War, and neither realist nor neorealist scholars could satisfactorily explain the cooperative behavior they observed, especially in the realm of international security. But while realist and neorealist scholars were stunned by some post-Cold War developments, neoidealist and (more broadly) neoliberal scholars were not. The basic international harmony of social and/or economic relations seemed to them to explain why we were suddenly experiencing a more cooperative international environment. One neoidealist scholar in particular—Charles Kegley—made the argument that the post-Cold War world looked very much like the world Woodrow Wilson envisioned decades before. Kegley first made this argument in his 1993 article “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies?: Realist Myths and the New International Realities.” He later clarified and crystallized it in his essay “The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics: An Introduction” (1995). In this chapter, I will explore how in both essays Kegley utilizes the myth “there is an international society” by “re-envisioning” Woodrow Wilson’s classical idealist outlook for the post-Cold War era (Debrix, 1999). The myth that “there is an international society” presumably functions through a domestic analogy—by drawing a parallel between what happens within states in their domestic relations and what happens among states in their international relations (on the domestic analogy, see Owens, 2015). For Kegley, this means that social relations and proper societies do not stop at the borders of sovereign nation-states. If we can have social spaces within states, there is nothing preventing us from also have social spaces among states. I will elaborate on Kegley’s use of the myth “there is an international society” by summarizing what Kegley’s essays say, relating it to the myth “there is an international society,” and reconsidering the myth function of Kegley’s arguments about post-Cold War international politics through the film Independence Day. Set in a post-Cold War world, Independence Day comically and upliftingly tells the story of an alien invasion of the earth—an invasion which has the effect of uniting humanity against the common enemy of the alien invaders. It demonstrates that, even in the absence of an orderer—in an anarchical world—states can set aside their differences, unite for the greater good, and overcome international anarchy. As such, it illustrates many of the basic tenets of neoidealism that Kegley claims epitomize this post-Cold War world. Yet in telling this story, the film raises the question “Is there anything ‘international’ about Kegley’s ‘international society’ or is it just an extension of one state’s domestic society?” If the answer is that it is just an extension of one state’s domestic society, then Kegley’s

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supposed domestic analogy does not draw a parallel between a domestic and an international space. Rather than a domestic analogy, it is simply a domestication of international space. In other words, Independence Day suggests that the supposed post-Cold War “international society” may just be an enlarged domestic society. And if that is the case, then there is not necessarily an international society because there is nothing collective or collaborative about one state domesticating international space.

What does the myth say? The most striking thing about Kegley’s two essays is that they never make an argument for the myth “there is an international society.” International society is simply assumed to exist. Its existence needs no defending. Arguments in defense of an international society simply go without saying. But if Kegley makes no argument for an international society and only mentions international society in passing in his essays, what makes his texts appropriate for illustrating this myth? The answer is that without assuming that an international society exists, the rest of Kegley’s arguments make no sense. In other words, the existence of an international society is vital to Kegley’s explanation of cooperation in a post-Cold War world. Kegley’s essays tell the story of post-Cold War cooperation not by focusing on the myth “there is an international society” but by focusing on the dueling traditions of realism and idealism. He acknowledges that during the Cold War, realist principles seemed to make sense. They explained things like “the lust for power, appetite for imperial expansion, struggle for hegemony, a superpower arms race, and obsession with national security” that marked “the conflict-ridden fifty-year system between 1939 and 1989” (Kegley, 1993: 133; 1995: 6). But then the Cold War ended. It was “the end of the world as we know it.” This led Kegley to wonder “whether it is time to revise, reconstruct, or, more boldly, reject orthodox realism” (Kegley, 1993: 134; 1995: 3). His answer is yes, for two reasons. One is that orthodox realism is at best incomplete because it cannot satisfactorily explain post-Cold War cooperation among states (Kegley, 1993: 134–135; 1995: 5–9; see Table 3.2). The other reason is that there is an existing tradition of international theory that better explains this cooperation, and this is an idealism or liberalism that has its roots in the ideas of Woodrow Wilson. Table 3.2  What can realism explain and what can’t realism explain? Realism can explain

Realism cannot explain

Cold War conflictual activities among sovereign nation-states, e.g.:

Post-Cold War realities of cooperation among sovereign nation-states, e.g.:

“lust for power” “appetite for imperial expansion” “struggle for hegemony” “superpower arms race” “obsession with national security”

“march of democracy” “increase in liberal free trade agreements” “renewed role of the United Nations” “proliferation of arms control agreements” “international humanitarianism”

Source: Kegley, 1993, 1995

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Kegley argues that the idealist worldview can be summed up in the following core principles: 1 2 3 4 5 6

Human nature is essentially “good” or altruistic, and people are therefore capable of mutual aid and collaboration. The fundamental human concern for the welfare of others makes progress possible (that is, the Enlightenment’s faith in the possibility of improving civilization was reaffirmed). Bad human behavior is the product not of evil people but of evil institutions and structural arrangements that motivate people to act selfishly and to harm others—including making war. War is not inevitable and its frequency can be reduced by eradicating the anarchical conditions that encourage it. War and injustice are international problems that require collective or multilateral rather than national efforts to eliminate them. International society must reorganize itself institutionally to eliminate the anarchy that makes problems such as war likely. (Kegley, 1995: 4)

Read together, these six principles illustrate a movement in idealist theorizing from the individual level to the state level to the international level. They begin by focusing on theories of human nature, then try to account for human behavior not because of human nature but because of institutional and structural arrangements (how institutions and structures are organized), finally concluding that international society can be rearranged so that bad behavior (this time of states as well as of individuals) can be lessened if not eliminated. These are the very same three levels of analysis that Waltz identified in his book Man, the State, and War. But Waltz and someone like Kegley have very different ways of thinking about these three images. Most importantly for our purposes is how they think about the third image, the international level. For Waltz, the international level is where anarchy is located. And because Waltz argues that anarchy is the permissive cause of war, then the international level is where war is located. In contrast, for Kegley, the international level is not where war is located. Violence and war are never finally located in any of the three images for Kegley. This is because war and conflict—bad behavior—can be eliminated if only political and social arrangements are better organized. In the place of anarchy at the international level, Kegley is keen to substitute “international society.” If organized properly, international society can “eliminate the anarchy that makes problems such as war possible” (Kegley, 1995: 4; see Table 3.3). This is precisely what Kegley implies is occurring in a post-Cold War era. He cites “the march of democracy” within states around the globe, increases in liberal free trade arrangements that assume trust and the benefit of all, strengthening of international law, the renewed role of international institutions like the United Nations to undertake collective security initiatives, the proliferation of arms control agreements, and international humanitarian responses to state human rights violations as evidence of the fulfillment of Wilson’s specific idealist predictions about what international politics would look like (Kegley, 1993: 135–138; 1995: 10–14).

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Idealism Table 3.3  How do Waltz and Kegley differently characterize international politics? Waltz

Kegley

International politics is anarchical, and anarchy is the permissive cause of war. Therefore, war and conflict are ultimately located at the international level and cannot be eliminated because anarchy cannot be eliminated.

International politics can be reorganized around international society rather than international anarchy, potentially eliminating problems like war and conflict without replacing international anarchy with international hierarchy (world government).

And so, to the six core principles that Woodrow Wilson embraced, Kegley offers a seventh, post-Cold War neoidealist principle: 7

This goal [of reorganizing international society so that it can eliminate the anarchy that makes problems such as war likely] is realistic because history suggests that global change and cooperation are not only possible but empirically pervasive. (Kegley, 1995: 4; my parentheses)

These post-Cold War developments are vitally important to Kegley. They seem to demonstrate empirically that neoidealism is a theory that describes things as they really are in the post-Cold War era, something idealism failed to do for its historical era. Even more importantly, they demonstrate that “the motives that animate the goals of state are not immutable. They can change” (Kegley, 1993: 135–137; 1995: 11; italics in original). Conflict is not an inevitability in international life. Kegley’s point is not to dispute that the Cold War was an era marked by conflict and the disposition of the Eastern and Western blocs to go to war with one another. That happened. He accepts that. But, he argues, now that the Cold War is over, states are behaving cooperatively. That means they changed from being conflictual toward one another to being cooperative toward one another. And, given the history of superpower conflict during the Cold War, this change is a very big deal. Why has the behavior of sovereign nation-states in a post-Cold War era become so cooperative? Before answering this question, let’s just remind ourselves that the answer is not because the international system changed from being anarchical to hierarchical. The answer is not that during the Cold War there was no world government and in the post-Cold War era there is a world government. There is still no world government. Waltz believed that cooperation around security issues could occur if anarchy gave way to hierarchy. How does Kegley explain post-Cold War cooperation in the absence of hierarchy—in the absences of an orderer? Part of Kegley’s answer is that these changes from conflictual to cooperative behavior among states follow from a change in the international organization of states. The Cold War bipolar world system of two opposed blocs locked into a deadly battle with one another has given way to a new form of international organization, and this begins to explain why cooperation is occurring. It was the

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bad organization of international politics during the Cold War that kept idealist (and now neoidealist) principles of cooperation from being realized. On this point, Kegley is not claiming that the end of the Cold War will mark the end of conflict altogether. He acknowledges, for example, that not all of Wilson’s ideas make sense for the post-Cold War era. For example, Wilson did not think through all the implications and uses to which self-determination (letting people decide for themselves how and by whom they would be governed) might be put, and this has led to a lot of bloodshed within and among states in a post-Cold War era (Kegley, 1993: 137). But what it does mean is that—while it will never be a perfect state of affairs—with the end of the Cold War, states are now engaged in restoring “a place for morality in foreign policy” (Kegley, 1993: 138). They are pursuing collective, cooperative interests that all states have always had in common—like peace, justice, and a better way of life. These are interests about welfare within and among states rather than warfare among states. And these moral goals that lead to a better way of life for people and states are as much in states’ individualistic national interests as they are in their collective interests (Kegley, 1993: 142). Because the world has been reorganized, they are realizable once again. But for idealism and neoidealism, moral progress among sovereign nationstates does not result merely from the reorganizing of relations among sovereign nation-states. If the world changed from a bipolar system to a differently organized system, this in itself would not necessarily account for increased cooperation. For even realists and neorealists like Waltz acknowledge these changes within anarchy. Something else is at work in Kegley’s argument, as it was in Wilson’s, that makes cooperation possible. That “something else” is an international society. For a neoidealist like Kegley, international society is the space in which moral progress occurs. But where does this international society come from? For any brand of idealist—including Kegley—it comes from drawing a domestic analogy. If there is society within states, then there can be (and in a post-Cold War world there is) society among states. To understand the importance of this domestic analogy to the myth “there is an international society,” let’s explore two aspects of it. First, how does a domestic society serve as a space in which moral progress can occur? Second, how is this society “transferred” from the domestic or state level to the international level? For a neoidealist, the sovereign nation-state is not just a political space. It is also a social space. Indeed, government is the formal institutional expression of social relations within a state. If the state is organized in a good way, then it can organize its domestic social relations so that moral progress can occur within it. What is a good form of state organization for a neoidealist, and how can this good form of state organization enable moral progress in its domestic society? For a neoidealist, the best form of governmental organization is democracy. Democracy is the best form of organization because it is the least restrictive on its people. It is the least repressive. It is the form of governance that most encourages freedom of expression among its people. Democracy is government by the people. So the voice of any democratic sovereign nation-state is really the collective voice of its people. This is important because, as all idealists believe, people are basically good. If they are free to express their goodness within their state, then this goodness moves up from the individual level (good people) to the state level (good state). Furthermore, good people within a democratic state have

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Figure 3.1  Democratically organized state and society

a good influence on others within that state—those citizens who are behaving badly. Moral progress occurs within democratic sovereign nation-states, then, because this good form of political and social organization means that citizens behaving well “enlighten” citizens behaving badly. Selfishness diminishes, as does the motivation to do harm to one’s fellow citizens, so long as people are free to express their internal goodness. And this purity of communication is something that the democratic state ensures (Figure 3.1). Of course, not all sovereign nation-states are democratic. Some of them are organized autocratically—with state authority flowing from unenlightened governmental elites onto its repressed people. Neoidealists believe that it is these sorts of autocratic governments that cause conflict in international politics. They are the ones that don’t work for the collective good because they don’t really know what the collective good is, as they are unenlightened by their good people. They tell their citizens what to do rather than listening to them and representing their moral interests (Figure 3.2). If only these autocratic sovereign nation-states could be reorganized internally to become democratic, then the good people within them could enlighten their wayward leaders. This is why Woodrow Wilson wanted to “make the world safe for democracy.” This answers the question “how does a domestic society serve as a space in which moral progress can occur?” What about the second question—“how is this society ‘transferred’ from the domestic or state level to the international level?”

Figure 3.2  Autocratically organized state and society

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Figure 3.3  How does Wilson enact the “domestic analogy”?

Neoidealists offer two answers to this second question. The classic answer— Wilson’s answer—is that by “making the world safe for democracy,” democratic states will have an influence on autocratic states (either through benevolent enlightenment or though fighting just wars against bad governments to liberate their good people), transform them into democratic states, and we will end up with an international society of democratic states. If democracy is a form of governance that expresses the will of the people and if all states are democratic, then the individual “domestic societies” within states become one big collective “international society” among states (Figure 3.3). Kegley accepts this answer and adds to it. He is excited about the international “march of democracy” in a post-Cold War era in part because democracies almost never wage war against each other (Kegley, 1995: 10). All this proves Wilson’s point that democratic states develop international social relationships among themselves that are cooperative rather than conflictual. In addition to this, though, Kegley stresses the influence of cross-border communication in connecting people within domestic spaces and lessening the separations among peoples. As Kegley puts it, People matter … public sentiment is captured instantaneously in our age of global communications knit together by cables, the airwaves, and the fax machine. The distinction between domestic and foreign affairs has broken down…. This also follows Wilson’s belief that lowering barriers between countries would be a barrier to warfare. (Kegley, 1995: 11) With all this communication among good people, domestic differences are giving way to common interests. Because the goodness of people is communicated, warfare (which is an outgrowth of an inability to communicate the goodness of people) is on the decline. In this international society—a society composed of

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Figure 3.4  How does Kegley enact the “domestic analogy”?

states but also primarily of the people within states—moral progress is occurring, as people de-emphasize warfare and reemphasize welfare (Figure 3.4; also see Chapter 10). This is how Kegley transfers social relations that occur within states to social relations that occur among states. By analogy to domestic society, “there is an international society.” It is this international society that, for Kegley, explains cooperation in the post-Cold War era. And it is Kegley’s myth of post-Cold War international society that is explored in the film Independence Day.

Independence Day The opening sequence of Independence Day sets the stage for an action/adventure story in which moral good triumphs over irredeemable evil. The camera’s first image is of the US flag flying on the moon. From the flag, the camera takes us to a plaque left by US astronauts inscribed with the words “We came in peace for all mankind.” The camera slowly zooms in on the word “peace.” Then the moon trembles. A shadow passes over the moon. We follow the shadow to the edge of the moon until a shot of the earth appears in center frame. Entering our frame from the top is an alien spacecraft. It is this spacecraft that is casting this long shadow over the moon. Cut to white. Cut to an exterior of the Research for Extraterrestrial Intelligence Institute in New Mexico. Cut to interior shot. A young man is practicing his putting inside the listening station. Hi-tech equipment fills the room. The man hears a signal that we know and he suspects is being emitted by aliens. In the background, we hear R.E.M. singing “It’s the end of the world as we know it, and I feel fine.” This action takes place on July 2. This opening sequence tells us a lot about the world of Independence Day and the struggles to come. The elements that the film will use to make sense of

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the world—humans vs. aliens, peace vs. conflict, and purity of communication vs. corrupted communication—are all evident in this sequence. Independence Day is not only a comically styled remake of an outer-space B movie, it is also the perfect script for telling Kegley’s neoidealist tale of international cooperation in a postCold War era. And, most importantly for our purposes, the film offers us clues— even in this opening sequence—as to how to rethink functionally the myth “there is an international society.” On the heels of this opening sequence, Independence Day introduces us to an ensemble cast and their various interlinking storylines. The film gives us not one hero, but at least four (all of whom happen to be male) and possibly many more (including some women). The four central heroes are President Bill Whitmore, David, Steve, and Russell. President Whitmore is a veteran fighter pilot from the Gulf War. He is young. He is liberal. And he is moral. His morality is testified to by his wife who reminds the president that he is a bad liar. “Stick to the truth,” she tells him. “That’s what you’re good at.” President Whitmore represents the incorruptibility of communication. He cannot tell a lie—or, really, he cannot tell a lie and get away with it. It is President Whitmore who will take the lead in organizing the world’s response to the alien invasion. We find our next hero, David, playing chess with his aging father in New York’s Central Park. David is a good son, and he was a good husband. Part of his story is that he has been divorced from the president’s assistant, Connie, for 4 years but he still honors his commitment to their marriage. A sign of this is that he still wears his wedding ring. David works as a computer troubleshooter for a satellite television company. He is also a committed environmentalist who, for example, rides a bike rather than drives a car and ensures that all his colleagues recycle their rubbish. It is David who, in trying to restore uninterrupted service to his TV station’s customers, discovers the alien signal hidden in the US satellites. At first, he is comforted to find that the signal is reducing itself and will disappear in 7 hours. But when he sees the alien spacecraft—now broken up into pieces assembled over the world’s major cities—he realizes that the signal he has found is an alien countdown to the destruction of humankind. He explains how the signal works in a conversation with his boss. David: It’s like chess. First you strategically position your pieces. Then when the timing’s right you strike. See. They’re positioning themselves all over the world using this one signal to synchronize their efforts. Then, in approximately six hours, the signal’s gonna disappear and the countdown’s gonna be over. Boss: And then what? David: Checkmate. David goes to Washington, DC so that he can warn his ex-wife and the president. David is a morally good man who understands the technical workings of impure/alien communication. It becomes his task to disable this corrupted alien communication. He does so by planting a virus in the alien computer, thereby disabling the alien forcefields around the alien ships that have protected them from attack.

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It is our next hero Steve, a pilot in the US military who dreams of flying the spaceshuttle for NASA, who flies himself and David in an alien craft into the belly of the alien mothership where David plants his virus and thereby disables the alien defensive shields. Steve is our man of courage and adventure who actively unites goodness of purpose (the president’s agenda) with technical know-how (David’s plan to plant the virus). While Steve (like President Whitmore) is our legitimate military hero, our final hero, Russell, is anything but legitimate. He is a drunken cropduster who fought in the “wrong war”—Vietnam. And he is a local laughing stock because he insists that 10 years earlier he was abducted by aliens. But Russell redeems himself when, fighting in the alien counteroffensive, he flies his plane with an undetachable live bomb into the body of the alien ship, destroying it. Russell, then, was always a good man who spoke the truth. He was just misunderstood (see Table 3.4). As this plot and presentation of characters demonstrate, Independence Day makes sense of the world by closely following a neoidealist script. What is typical of this world is that it is inhabited by morally good humans who, when properly understood through good communication, are able to lead good moral, peaceful lives. The humans we are introduced to are all US citizens. Part of their ability to express their goodness, the film hints, is because they are organized in a moral way, in a democratic sovereign nation-state. So, like neoidealism, the film makes

Table 3.4  The heroes in Independence Day

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Hero

What makes him heroic

US President Bill Whitmore

This president cannot tell a lie and therefore symbolizes the incorruptibility of communication. As such, he is able to conceive of a morally just plan to beat the aliens and to mobilize a moral society through pure communication.

David, the computer troubleshooter for a satellite television company

He is a morally good man who understands the technical workings of impure/alien communication well enough to disable them. He does this by planting a virus in the alien computer.

Steve, the US military fighter pilot

A man of courage and adventure who actively unites goodness of purpose (the president’s agenda) with technical know-how (David’s plan to plant the virus) by flying an alien craft into the mothership.

Russell, the Vietnam veteran who is now a drunken cropduster and who claims to have been abducted by aliens years ago

Russell sacrifices himself for his children and the rest of humanity by carrying out a suicide mission that destroys an alien ship. He proves that he is a good man who was always speaking the truth but who was just misunderstood.

Idealism

Box 3.1  What is typical in the world of Independence Day? • Good people do good deeds in good organizations. • Bad things follow from impaired communication. • Human beings are morally progressive.

sense of the world by assuming that good people do good things in good organizations. This is also what is typical of the world (Box 3.1). But then, just as in the aftermath of the Cold War, the world as we know it ends. In the historical Cold War script, evil (represented in the US view by the communist threat) is “defeated.” But in this cinematic post-Cold War, postcommunist script of Independence Day, a new evil is introduced. This new evil is the aliens. The aliens are not initially treated as if they are evil. Because the moral goodness of human beings is assumed by neoidealism and by the characters in the film, it is not surprising that the film begins by extending this presumption of moral goodness to the aliens. Early on, the president addresses the nation, saying, “The question of whether or not we are alone in the universe has been answered. Although it’s understandable that many of us feel a sense of hesitation or even fear, we must attempt to reserve judgment.” “To reserve judgment” here means to not assume the worst about the aliens but to assume the best about them until there is clear evidence to the contrary. Throughout, he resists the advice of the secretary of defense to attack the alien craft. Steve echoes this sentiment when he tells his girlfriend Jasmine, “I really don’t believe they (the aliens) flew over 90 billion light years to come down here and start a fight, to get rowdy.” These views are widespread throughout the government and among the public. Keeping in mind that firing guns into the air can be a sign of celebration in Los Angeles, a local newscaster tells his audience, “Once again the LAPD is asking Los Angelinos not to fire their guns at the visitor spacecraft. You may inadvertently trigger an inner-stellar war.” And throughout the US at least, some groups of people gather to “party” with the aliens. Because the aliens are assumed to be good by nature, the president authorizes an attempt to communicate with them—to express to the aliens that the earthlings mean them no harm. Communication itself is believed to be pure. Indeed, it is the president as we know who symbolizes the incorruptibility of communication. Not knowing how to communicate with the aliens, the government sends “Welcome Wagon”—a military plane with enormous light panels—up to greet the alien ship. The aliens fire on and destroy “Welcome Wagon,” just as the president learns from David that the alien signal is a countdown to an alien attack. The president’s bad decision to send up Welcome Wagon comes from having incomplete information. Communication was impaired, and bad things followed from that. The aliens proceed to destroy many major cities worldwide. The president and others (including David) flee on Air Force One. July 2 comes to an end. Even in the face of all of this alien destruction of the earth, in the president’s mind lingers the hope that the aliens’ bad behavior is not attributable to the aliens

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being evil creatures. Yes, the president orders a counterattack against the aliens on July 3, one that is justified even from a neoidealist point of view because it is defensive. Yet even when this counterattack with conventional weapons fails miserably, the president is still not persuaded by the secretary of defense to use nuclear weapons against the aliens. For while it is acceptable from a neoidealist perspective to defend oneself in the face of aggression, it is not acceptable to attempt to annihilate a species that could be morally progressive. The president must know for sure whether the aliens are morally good or bad. He gets his answer when Steve brings a live alien to Area 51, where the president and his entourage have assembled. An Area 51 scientist explains to the president that the aliens are very much like humans. Their bodies are frail like human bodies. But they lack vocal cords. They communicate through telepathy, through extrasensory perception. As a group of scientists are examining the live alien Steve has brought in, the alien “captures” one of them by first capturing his mind. He does this by looking into the scientist’s eyes. He then manipulates the scientist’s vocal cords to speak to the president and other onlookers. Alien: Release me. Release me. President: I know there is much we can learn from each another if we can negotiate a truce. We can find a way to co-exist. Can there be a peace between us? Alien: Peace. No peace. President: What is it you want us to do? Alien: Die. Die. Then the alien links up telepathically with the president. Military personnel shoot the alien, wounding it enough for it to release the tormented president. The president speaks again. President: I saw his thoughts. I saw what they’re planning to do. They’re like locusts. They’re moving from planet to planet, their whole civilization. After they’ve consumed every natural resource, they move on. And we’re next. A soldier shoots and kills the alien. President: Nuke ‘em. Let’s nuke the bastards. The president’s decision to “nuke the bastards” may seem like it veers from the neoidealist script into a more realist or neorealist one. Conflict marks the relationship between the humans and the aliens. The aliens want to annihilate the humans, and now the president wants to annihilate the aliens. Can this ever be justified in a neoidealist world? The answer is yes because the aliens are beyond the moral boundary of goodness and cannot be morally recuperated. It would not have been neoidealist for the president to just assume the aliens were bastards and to nuke them earlier, as the very realist secretary of defense advised him to do. But with all barriers to pure communication between the president and the alien removed

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Box 3.2  What is deviant in the world of Independence Day? • Bad aliens do bad deeds not because they are badly organized but because their communication is impaired and because they are morally corrupt. • Alien communication is corrupted and corrupting. • Aliens are not morally progressive.

through telepathy, the president knows for sure that the aliens are not morally progressive. They will not negotiate. They have done this before, to other species on other planets. The aliens are morally bad. They deserve to die. Defending the human species is a just cause. So is annihilating a morally unprogressive species. None of this contradicts the neoidealist principle that humans are morally good. For, as the president learns, there is nothing morally human about the aliens. And that is what matters to a neoidealist. The aliens, then, do not represent a departure from the neoidealist story. Rather, they represent what is deviant in a neoidealist world (Box 3.2). The nuclear option, of course, fails. The US military is unable to defeat the aliens. It is at this point that a new strategy is devised. And, of course, it is now July 4. First, David’s idea to plant a virus in the alien computer—to corrupt corrupted communication—is embraced by the president. If successful, David’s plan will mean that the defensive shields around the alien ships will be dismantled for about 30 seconds. If a counteroffensive were launched during that time, it would have a fair chance of success. Second, the president decides to coordinate such a counteroffensive worldwide. When the secretary of defense protests against this plan, the president fires him. The secretary of defense represents not only realism but also distorted and secretive human communication. For example, he kept Area 51 a secret from the president well after the aliens landed. His dismissal removes another barrier to a neoidealist success. There is a problem, however. How can a worldwide counterattack be coordinated? Earthly satellites are ineffective forms of communication because alien ships interfere with them. And, even if they could be used, since the aliens have already used them against the earthlings, any message sent by satellite would surely be intercepted. The US military ends up spreading the word of its counterattack using the purest, most basic, and most universal of all military languages— Morse code. Steve successfully flies the alien craft into the mothership. David successfully plants the virus in the mothership’s computer, thereby disabling the alien defenses. Russell has his sacrificial and redemptive moment of glory when he penetrates the alien ship and blows it up. And, as word of this success is transmitted via Morse code around the world, earthly successes spread against the alien ships. The message of Independence Day, then, is that international cooperation for a just cause leads to peace. Pure communication among humankind enables states to unite around such a just cause. And this just cause can be communicated, embraced, and implemented because “there is an international society.” Or is there?

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Fear and leadership in Independence Day On this first reading, Independence Day seems to support all of the core principles of neoidealism, leading to a domestic analogy that draws a parallel between domestic society and international society. The film supports the idea that the defining characteristic of humans is that they are morally good. And, to illustrate this point, human kindness abounds in Independence Day. For example, when the aliens start destroying cities worldwide, there is no looting, extortion of services, or reckless living for the moment. Everyone seems to be focused on helping one another. As Jasmine roams the ruins of Los Angles, she rescues everyone she comes across, never asking for anything in return. Never mind that resources like food, water, and gasoline have become scarce commodities. The post-apocalyptic world of Independence Day is a space in which people are at their moral best and behave well. In typical neoidealist fashion, this moral goodness is not confined to personal relationships among people. Good, cooperative behavior is observed at all levels of social interaction—the personal, the state, and the international. And, from a neoidealist standpoint, it is no surprise that the film’s action begins to unfold in a democratic space—in the sovereign nation-state of the US. The implication here is that all this moral behavior on the part of US citizens is able to be expressed because these citizens have lived in a democratically organized state and society. Would this post-Cold War plot have been different if the action unfolded in the former Yugoslavia? We can only imagine that it would be. So much of the cooperative action we see in the film is attributable to good people organized into good states and good societies. It is not a stretch, then, in either the film’s script or the script of neoidealism to invoke the domestic analogy. Because there are moral people organized into good (democratic) states and societies, then there can be an international society. For Woodrow Wilson, all that is required for this hope and belief to be realized is for the world to be made safe for democracy—for all sovereign nation-states to be transformed into democratic sovereign nation-states. This isn’t the plot of Independence Day. But Kegley’s way of moving from domestic society to international society is not only in the plot. It is the key to the human victory over the evil aliens. Kegley’s move is to argue that domestic society becomes “internationalized” through increased cross-border communications, which are assumed to be good and pure. And what does Independence Day give us but the purest form of cross-border communication available to militaries around the world—Morse code. Morse code unites the sovereign nation-states around the world into one just military mission against the evil aliens. The world is now safe from the aliens. “There is an international society.” What is important is that all of this cooperation in the post-Cold War era happens in the scripts of Independence Day and neoidealism not because the post-Cold War world has been transformed from anarchy to hierarchy—from the absence of an orderer to a world government. International cooperation is the outcome of the coordination of moral efforts by an international society. It is international society that mediates international anarchy in a neoidealist reading of Independence Day. It is international society that even promises to take us out of and keep us out of anarchy altogether.

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Independence Day supports many of these neoidealist core ideals and moves, but it would be a mistake to conclude that it supports all of them. In particular, it would be wrong to conclude that the film supports the myth “there is an international society.” For in addition to rehearsing many aspects of the neoidealist story, the film tells us what makes the myth “there is an international society” function. It does so by adding two vital elements to the neoidealist plot—fear and US leadership. Fear seems to play a starring role in both of our anarchy myths so far. In the myth “anarchy is the permissive cause of war,” fear functions to divide actors in a situation of structural anarchy. Fear leads to conflict. Fear is what makes that myth function. Fear helps the myth “there is an international society” function as well, but to different effect. In this alternative anarchy myth, fear functions to unite people. It is the fear of the aliens that makes humans recognize what they have in common and to draw upon this good moral core to act humanely toward one another. Even if we accept the film’s neoidealist proposition that fear brings out the best in people, we have to wonder what people—even democratically organized people—are like without fear. For example, what were all these good US citizens doing prior to the alien invasion? Because the film is set in the US in the recent past, most of us can judge for ourselves (by looking around US society or by thinking about its depictions in the worldwide media) if the good moral core of these characters might have been expressed prior to the alien invasion—the fear— that brought out the best in them. In my mind a prealien invasion US is not full of such widespread benevolent behavior, but of acts of racist prejudice and violence, selfish economic advancement, militia bombings, and school shootings. Without the fear that unites people around the necessary goal of human survival, maybe social interactions are not quite as cooperative as the film suggests that they are in the face of fear. And, of course, this raises the important questions: “Now that the aliens have been defeated and the fear is gone, will there be an international society?” “Will people remain ‘united’?” These questions raise serious challenges to a neoidealist reading of Independence Day. While the issue of fear makes us wonder if an international society will last in the aftermath of the defeat of the alien threat, the issue of US leadership makes us wonder if there was ever an international society at all. Think about it. Is there anything truly “international” about the “international society” we see in Independence Day? From the opening shot of the US flag waving on the moon until the end of the film in which the lightshow of alien spacecrafts falling from the sky becomes celebratory fireworks for the 4th of July, everything in this film is about how US leadership saves humanity from the aliens. It isn’t that the world has united around one cause and collectively decides what to do. Rather, it is the US president who makes all the key decisions for the entire planet! And, according to the script of Independence Day, this is precisely what the world is wanting and waiting for, as is made clear in an exchange between two British soldiers when they receive the Morse code message from the US military. First British Soldier:  It’s from the Americans. They want to organize a counter-offensive. Second British Soldier: It’s about bloody time.

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This isn’t a dialogue about equal partners in an international community entering into mutually cooperative relationships. It is a dialogue that suggests a hierarchical relationship between the US leader and the British follower. In Independence Day, “international society” is never more than a global extension of US domestic society. This could not have been made more clear than it was in the president’s speech to US pilots prior to their successful counteroffensive. President: In less than an hour, aircraft from here will join others from around the world. And you will be launching the largest aerial battle in the history of mankind. Mankind … that word should have new meaning for all of us today. We can’t be consumed by our petty differences any more. We will be united in our common interest. Perhaps it’s fate that today is the fourth of July. And you will once again be fighting for our freedom. Not from tyranny, oppression, or persecution but from annihilation. We’re fighting for our right to live, to exist. And should we win the day, the fourth of July will no longer be known as an American holiday, but as the day the world declared in one voice, “We will not go quietly into the night. We will not vanish without a fight. We’re going to live on. We’re going to survive. Today, we celebrate our Independence Day.” In this speech, the president declares that the US is part of a wider human community—mankind. Mankind must no longer be a divided community. It must be what it really is—an international community. It must speak in “one voice” and fight as one unit if it is going to defeat the aliens. And this is what the film suggests occurs. But there are a couple of troubling turns in the film that make us wonder if what the president “says” is the same thing as what his speech and the film more generally “do.” One of these troubling turns, as I’ve already mentioned, is that it is the US president who makes all the decisions for “mankind.” It is the US government that takes action. It is the US military that unites the state militaries of the world through the pure communication of Morse code. It is always the US government that is acting on behalf of mankind—on behalf of the community of humans. This may all be expected. If the US is indeed the most powerful state on earth, then it makes sense that it would have the necessary influence to coordinate global militaries. It would make sense that it would take the lead. The problem is, however, in taking the lead the US confuses its leadership and the extension of its domestic influence internationally with an international society. The president’s speech, for example, suggests that the US mission is a mission for all of mankind. This is the same move we found in the opening sequence—with the US flag flying on the moon and the plaque left there by the US astronauts. It reads, “We came in peace for all mankind.” It is an old habit for the US to imagine (or at least to say) that its acts are acts on behalf of the whole of humanity. The US acting on behalf of the whole of humanity wouldn’t be inconsistent with neoidealism if this US leadership was the first step toward an end to all domestic differences and toward a truly international society. But that isn’t how things work out in Independence Day. For instead of erasing all domestic boundaries, one domestic boundary remains intact in the film. It is that of the US. Let’s return to the president’s speech. He declares,

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Figure 3.5  How US leadership is extended in Independence Day

And should we win the day, the 4th of July will no longer be known as an American holiday, but as the day the world declared in one voice, “We will not go quietly into the night. We will not vanish without a fight. We’re going to live on. We’re going to survive. Today, we celebrate our Independence Day.” What the president is doing here is extending what is uniquely North American to the whole world. That doesn’t mean the US ceases to exist as a distinct political and social space. It means instead that US values, ideals—even holidays—are extended internationally (Figure 3.5). In Independence Day, there is no international society. There appears to be an international society because US domestic society is extended globally. But this extension of US leadership and US society does not meet the neoidealist terms of what an international society is—a formal or informal collective and cooperative set of social relationships among sovereign nation-states. Collective means more than one state must make the decisions. Cooperative means no one state is the leader with all the other states being the followers. Independence Day encourages us to mistake its combinations of fear and US leadership for an international society that mediates (if not overcomes) international anarchy and ensures moral cooperation. But the world of Independence Day is not the world of an international society. It is a world in which the US is the leader, the worldwide hegemon. The US is the orderer of international life. Anarchy is not replaced by international community. In this film, anarchy is mediated or replaced by hierarchy—by the US as the orderer of international life, even though all the rhetoric that accompanies the action is neoidealist. Might the same series of moves be found in Kegley’s neoidealism? Kegley attributes post-Cold War cooperation to a reorganized international society—one in which increased cross-border communication has led to commonly shared and expressed moral values resulting in more cooperative and moral international behavior among states. But for Kegley’s explanation of post-Cold War international cooperation to ring true, it must remain silent on the issues of the unifying effects of fear and, more importantly, on the role of US leadership. It must not acknowledge that the post-Cold War world may be less “anarchical” in the ways that someone like Waltz would think about it not because “there is an international society” but because there is global US leadership. If so, Kegley’s neoidealism does not perform a domestic analogy between a domestic society and an international society. It confuses the extension of one state’s domestic society with an international society. Yet the evidence Kegley presents as evidence of a better organized international society in a post-Cold War world is the very same evidence others would offer to prove that the US is the undisputed post-Cold War global leader. By leaving US

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leadership so woefully neglected, we are left to wonder if “there is an international society” that leads to cooperation in the post-Cold War anarchical world and maybe even replaces this anarchy or if, alternatively, post-Cold War cooperation results from the unopposed global spread of US influence. Put differently, might US post-Cold War leadership be so strong that Kegley mistakes it for an international society? If this is the case, Kegley comes by this confusion/exclusion honestly. It is the same one Woodrow Wilson made in the aftermath of World War I—another postconflict era in which the US emerged as a world leader (if not the world leader). And maybe that is what explains why Wilson’s idealist program seemed to fail and Kegley’s neoidealist program (at least in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War) seems to succeed. Overall, though, it is only by leaving unaddressed the presumably unifying function of fear and the question of US global leadership in a post-Cold War era that Kegley’s myth “there is an international society” (and the international effects it promises) appears to be true.

Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1: Cooperation under anarchy The idealist and neoidealist stories of how international society mediates or even supersedes the effects of international anarchy are not the only IR stories about cooperation in relation to international anarchy. Other stories about the relationships between anarchy and cooperation abound. They are found in the so-called “English School” tradition, in neorealism, and in neoliberal institutionalism. For example, Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society (1987) contributes to the anarchy/ cooperation debate from the perspective of the misnamed English School (misnamed because its key figures were Welsh and Australian in addition to English and because the cornerstone of this tradition is arguably the writings of the Dutch legalist Hugo Grotius; also see Adam Watson et al., 2001). Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony is an early important contribution from the neoliberal institutionalism position (also see Keohane and Nye, 2001), while Stephen Krasner’s edited collection International Regimes carries on the debate about international cooperation under anarchy by bringing together theorists from neorealist and neoliberal perspectives. Errol Henderson (2013) argues that in classical IR theories, the possibility of cooperation is always premised on racialized dualisms in which overcoming anarchy is understood as overcoming barbarism. And, of course, as Chapter 10 illustrates, if we move away from standard IR treatments of anarchy to “new anarchist” ideas about anarchy that come from the tradition of Anarchism, a whole new array of possibilities for cooperation under anarchy open up (Graeber, 2011).

Suggested reading Bull, Hedley (1987) The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan. Graeber, David (2011) Debt: The First 5000 Years. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House.

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Idealism Henderson, Errol A. (2013) “Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism in International Relations Theory,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26(1): 71–92. Keohane, Robert O.(1984) After Hegemony. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2001) Power and Interdependence, 3rd edition. New York: Longman. Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.) (1983) International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Watson, Adam, Barry Buzan, Andrew Hurrell, Stefano Guzzinni, Iver B. Neumann, and Martha Finnemore (2001) “Forum on the English School,” Review of International Studies 27(3): 465–513.

Topic 2: Morality and ethics in IR While we often associate ethics and morality with the tradition of idealism, this is a bit of a problem for a couple of reasons. First, idealism is more complicated than I have presented it here, as there are lots of variants within it. For example, there is the cosmopolitan thought of someone like Charles Beitz (1999) and the communitarianism illustrated by Michael Waltzer (2000). Second, morality and ethics actually inform all IR traditions in one way or another, as the collection by Terry Nardin and David Mapel (1993) evidences. Finally, as the discipline of IR becomes more interdisciplinary, it is useful to bring discussions about the politics of moralizing more generally to bear on contemporary international life, as do Jane Bennett and Michael Shapiro (2002) in their collection. Also see Richard Shapcott’s volume on International Ethics (2010). Siba Grovogui (2002) and Robbie Shilliam (2011) write about the Eurocentric production of (international) moral orders.

Suggested reading Beitz, Charles(1999) Political Theory and International Relations, revised edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bennett, Jane and Michael J. Shapiro (2002) The Politics of Moralizing. New York: Routledge. Grovogui, Siba N. (2002) “Regimes of Sovereignty: International Morality and the African Condition,” European Journal of International Relations 8(3): 315–338. Nardin, Terry and David Mapel (eds) (1993) Traditions of International Ethics, revised edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shapcott, Richard (2010) International Ethics: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity. Shilliam, Robbie (2011) “Decolonising the Grounds of Ethical Inquiry: A Dialogue between Kant, Foucault and Glissant,” Millennium 39(3): 649–665. Waltzer, Michael (2000) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd edition. New York: Basic Books.

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Topic 3: The Arab Spring as an ideal(ist) moment of mass communication In 2011, mass uprisings against undemocratic regimes in the Middle East came to be known as “the Arab Spring.” Citizens in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya overthrew their rulers in favor of (the hope of) replacing them with more democratic representatives. While there are many debates about the causes and consequences of the Arab Spring, one aspect of them bears mention from an idealist perspective—how Arab Spring activists used modern mass communications techniques to mobilize. This is important from an idealist perspective because, as we saw in this chapter, communication within and across borders is something idealists like Charles Kegley celebrate as both the foundation for and the evidence of an international society. Considered in light of the Arab Spring, some authors like Olivier Roy have argued that mass communication is a moderating influence on international anarchy because it promotes cooperation (Roy, 2012). Clay Shirky as well as Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain go further, arguing that the Web 2.0 Revolution which gave us Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube supports “citizen journalism” and can be credited with launching a number of democratic revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East. All of this fits with the idealist story that understands communication as among the tools required to hold governments to account domestically and which keeps unruly anarchy in check internationally (Albert et al., 2008). Yet not everyone agrees, for as Marc Lynch points out, there are limits to how much online revolutions can become on-the-ground revolutions (Lynch, 2011), and, as Amira Abdelhamid, Wesam Atta, and Mohamed Nagy remind us, counter-revolutionary repression inevitably closes down all channels of mass communication (2017). How much technology—and communications technology in particular—will revolutionize the world and “make it safe for democracy” will long be debated. As you consider these debates, you would be wise to consider the idealist assumptions that underlie them.

Suggested reading Abdelhamid, Amira, Wesam Atta, and Mohamed Nagy (2017) “Besieged Universities: A Report on the Rights and Freedoms of Students in Egyptian Universities from the Academic Years 2013–2014 to 2015–2016.” [online] Oslo: Norwegian Students’ and Academics’ International Assistance Fund (SAIH). Available at: https://saih.no/assets/ docs/Besieged-Universities-SAIH-report-2017.pdf [Accessed 28 June 2019]. Albert, Mathias, Oliver Kessler, and Stephan Stetter (2008) “On Order and Conflict: International Relations and the ‘Communicative Turn,” Review of International Studies 34: 43–44. Howard, Philip N. and Muzammil M. Hussain (2013) Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring. New York: Oxford University Press USA. Lynch, Marc (2011) “After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State,” Reflections 9(2): 301–310.

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Idealism Roy, Olivier (2012) “The Transformation of the Arab World,” Journal of Democracy 23: 5–18. Shirky, Clay (2011) “The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change,” Foreign Affairs 90: 28–41.

Media note Tim Burton’s Mars Attacks! counterposes the sanctimoniousness of Independence Day with sarcasm. Instead of tempting viewers to embrace a neoidealist script in which “there is an international society,” it shows aliens with a sense of humor playing with the language of neoidealism to hilarious (if disastrous) effect.

Classroom activity An interesting teaching exercise would be to give a lecture (or reading assignment) on neoidealism to a class. Then divide the students into two groups—with one group viewing Independence Day and the other Mars Attacks! Have each group come up with a report or short essay on what they think about the myth “there is an international society” in the context of neoidealism based on their viewing of their specific film. Then assemble the class as a whole and have them present their views to each other. A follow-up discussion and/or lecture on the influences of cultural mediations for mythologizing international relations “truths” might offer an interesting conclusion to this teaching exercise.

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Chapter

4

Constructivism Is anarchy what states make of it?

What does the myth say? Wag the Dog Practice, seduction, and dead authorship Suggestions for further thinking

65 71 77 80

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Our third and final mainstream anarchy myth is “anarchy is what states make of it” (for a nonmainstream anarchy myth, see Chapter 10). It proposes a way out of the dilemmas faced by IR scholars thinking about the effects of international anarchy deterministically. If the myth “anarchy is the permissive cause of war” suggests that anarchy means international politics is likely to be conflictual and the myth “there is an international society” suggests that, mediated by international society, anarchy should be cooperative, then this new myth holds that the effects of international anarchy are not quite so predictable as either of these first two anarchy myths suggest. Anarchy is neither necessarily conflictual nor cooperative. There is no “nature” to international anarchy. “Anarchy is what states make of it.” If states behave conflictually toward one another, then it appears that the “nature” of international anarchy is conflictual. If states behave cooperatively toward one another, then it appears that the “nature” of international anarchy is cooperative. It is what states do that we must focus on to understand conflict and cooperation in international politics, according to this myth, rather than focusing on the supposed “nature” of international anarchy. States determine the “nature” of international anarchy. And, most importantly, what states do depends upon what states’ identities and interests are, and identities and interests change. The myth “anarchy is what states make of it” is associated with a branch of the constructivist tradition of IR theory. Constructivism argues that identities and interests in international politics are not stable—they have no pregiven nature. This is as true for the identity of the sovereign nation-state as it is for the identity of international anarchy. The important thing is to look at how identities and interests are constructed—how they are made or produced in and through specific international interactions (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1994). Constructivism is among the most influential IR traditions of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Walt, 1998). This is in part because what it says seems to be just common sense. We know from our own individual experiences that today we are not exactly who we were yesterday, and we are unlikely to be exactly the same tomorrow. Our identities—who we are—change, as do our interests—what is important to us. Constructivism is also so influential because its myth “anarchy is what states make of it” seems to “build a bridge” between neorealist “truths” and neoliberal/neoidealist “truths.” There is something for everyone in constructivism. It provides the answers to all our IR problems. The success of constructivism, however, depends upon an important move. The myth “anarchy is what states make of it” means that states decide what anarchy will be like—conflictual or cooperative. By making the state the key decision-maker of the “nature” of international anarchy, constructivism contradicts its own argument that identities and interests are always in flux. It allows that the interests of states, conflictual or cooperative, change. But by making the character of international anarchy dependent upon what states decide to make it, constructivism produces the identity of the state as decision-maker, and this identity cannot be changed. If the identity of the state as decision-maker in anarchy were questioned (as it is in some myths about globalization, empire, and new anarchisms; see Chapters 6, 7, and 10), the constructivist myth “anarchy is what states make of it” would not function. The myth “anarchy is what states make of it” was proposed by one of the leading constructivist IR theorists of the 1990s and 2000s, Alexander Wendt, in

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his 1992 essay “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” In this chapter, I will summarize the argument Wendt makes in support of his myth and focus explicitly on how Wendt stabilizes the decision-making character of the state to functionally guarantee the “truth” of his myth. I will turn to the film Wag the Dog as my interpretive guide for a functional critique of Wendt’s myth. Wag the Dog is a comic film about producing a phony war to distract the US public’s attention from the troubles of its president. As such, the film illustrates how the producing function of identities and interests works. Production works by not letting people see the moves behind the scenes that make what is produced— whether that is a phony war or an IR myth—appear to be true. Production, in other words, works through seduction—through “withholding something from the visible” (Baudrillard, 1987: 21), even though there may be nothing to see. The neorealist anarchy myth is a seductive myth. With its emphasis on the structure of international anarchy, it seems to withhold from view the authors of this structure of international anarchy. Seduced by neorealism, Wendt asks the obvious question, “who is the author of international anarchy?” And he gives us his answer: socially constructed states. But, as the film Wag the Dog implies, maybe asking “who is the author?” is the wrong question. Maybe a more interesting question is “how do practices work to make us believe there is an author of international anarchy?”

What does the myth say? In his 1992 essay “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” Alexander Wendt takes as his point of departure the classic dispute between realists and idealists—updated as neorealists and neoliberals—over the behavior of states in international politics. Must state behavior be conflictual, as neorealists argue, or might it become increasingly cooperative, as neoliberals hope? A lot of how you think about state behavior, Wendt tells us, depends upon how you think about the “nature of international anarchy.” Is it a structure that puts constraints on state behavior so that competition and conflict are guaranteed and much cooperation is ruled out (Waltz, 1979; see Chapter 2) or is it a place in which processes of learning take place among states in their everyday interactions so that more cooperative institutions and behaviors result (Kegley, 1993; see Chapter 3)? Wendt claims that the debate about international anarchy boils down to a debate about which of these two aspects of anarchy theorists decide to stress—structure or process. Yet, however, much neorealist and neoliberal scholars divide on the issue of structure vs. process, they share three things in common. Wendt claims that all of these theorists agree that (1) states are the dominant actors in international politics; (2) rationalism is the theoretical disposition through which they explain international state interactions; and (3) security is defined in “self-interested” terms (Wendt, 1992: 130; see Table 4.1). While Wendt doesn’t seem to find any problems with the state-centricism of these traditions, he does have worries about their rationalism and the very different ways in which they think about self-interest. Wendt worries that the neorealist and neoliberal commitment to rationalism restricts how theorists can think about international change. He suggests that “rationalism offers a fundamentally behavioral conception of both process and

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Constructivism Table 4.1  What do neorealists and neoliberals agree and disagree about? Agree

Disagree

1  S  tates are the dominant actors in international politics

Whether to emphasize structure (as neorealists like Waltz do) or process (as neoliberals like Kegley do) when explaining state interactions in international anarchy

2  R  ationalism is the theoretical disposition through which international state interactions are explained 3  Security is defined in “self-interested” terms

institutions: they change behavior but not identities and interests” (Wendt, 1992: 129–130). The problem with rationalism, then, is that it takes the identities and interests of states as given, thereby welcoming questions about changes in state behavior but not being open to questions about changes in state identities and interests. This is a problem for Wendt because it restricts how IR theorists are able to think about the notion of “self-interest.” Neorealists think of self-interest in terms of “self-help.” As we saw in the Waltzian myth “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war,” self-help defines the behavior of states in a system of structural anarchy—one in which there is no orderer. Self-help flows from the structural arrangement of international politics. According to Waltz, it is not an institution that can be changed. Therefore, states cannot learn to overcome the limits of international anarchy—the deterministic structure of anarchy that makes states look out for themselves in order to survive. All they can learn to do is to adjust to these limits of anarchy. As Wendt puts it, in this system “only simple learning or behavioral adaptation is possible; the complex learning involved in redefinitions of identity and interest is not” (Wendt, 1992: 130). This limit to state learning is imposed by thinking about international anarchy in neorealist terms which are also rationalist terms. Wendt suggests that these limits on thinking about changes in state learning are found in “weak” liberal arguments as well because such liberals “concede to neorealists the causal powers of anarchical structure,” even while they argue that processes of learning can take place within neorealist-defined anarchy. But other liberals—who he terms “strong liberals”—want to move away from simple learning to complex learning, from thinking only about changes in state behavior to theorizing changes in state identities and interests. Wendt’s sympathies lie with these “strong liberals.” Yet he laments that because of their commitment to rationalism, “neoliberals lack a systematic theory of how such changes occur and thus must privilege realist insights about structure while advancing their own insights about process” (Wendt, 1992: 131; see Box 4.1). If only there were a theory that would allow them to take structure seriously while recognizing that “transformations of identity and interest through process are transformations of structure” (Wendt, 1992: 131). And, guess what? There is such a theory—Wendtian constructivism (Wendt, 1992: 131–132). Constructivism might not only offer neoliberals the theory of change they need to be able to privilege process over structure, but because it takes structure seriously it might also be able to “build a bridge” between neorealism and

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Box 4.1  What’s wrong with rationalism? 1 Rationalism takes the identities and interests of states as given because it only recognizes changes in states’ behavior but not in states themselves (i.e., their identities and interests). 2 Rationalism also takes the identities of and the interests generated from international anarchy as given. For rationalists, neither the structure of international anarchy nor the self-help system it is said to produce can be changed. 3 Overall, rationalism limits theoretical understandings of change in agents and structures because it only examines changes in behavior and excludes an examination of changes in identities and interests.

neoliberalism (Wendt, 1992: 132; 1994). And if that can be done, then may be we won’t have to choose between defining the character of international anarchy as either predominately conflictual or predominately cooperative any longer. But to get to this place, we have to recognize that the character of international anarchy is not pregiven but the outcome of state interactions and that self-help is not an immutable feature of international anarchy. Wendt puts it like this: “There is no ‘logic’ of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it” (italics in original; Wendt, 1992: 132). How does Wendt make his argument that there is no logic of anarchy and that self-help is an institution that can be changed rather than one that determines the behavior of states? He does so by challenging the neorealist logic of anarchy, a logic that makes self-help an unalterable aspect of international anarchy that leads to competition and conflict. And he does this by reclaiming a place for practice in international politics (see Figure 4.1). Wendt argues that, whatever one may think of Waltz’s overall argument in Man, the State and War (1954), this early attempt by Waltz to understand international anarchy left a place for state practice that was written out of Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979). In Waltz’s early book, international anarchy is what

Figure 4.1  Wendt’s constructivist bridge between neorealists and neoliberals

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allowed wars to occur, but something else always had to happen—some first or second image practice by states. But in the later book, international anarchy became a structural principle that made states behave competitively and often conflictually, making first and second image explanations of war seem unnecessary (Wendt, 1992: 133–134; see Chapter 2). According to Wendt, the place of practice can and must be reclaimed within this “neorealist description of the contemporary state system as a competitive, self-help world” (Wendt, 1992: 134). And, if practice is recovered, we can accept this description of the world without accepting its explanation of competitive and conflictual state behavior as a necessary structural outcome. Put differently, by restoring an emphasis on practice among states, Wendt believes he will be able to recover process among states—processes that may transform international anarchy from being either necessarily conflictual (for neorealists) or cooperative (for neoliberals) into “what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992: 134). How Wendt recovers practice and process within this neorealist description of international politics is by arguing that there are at least two structures that explain state behavior in international politics. The first, which has been Wendt’s focus so far, is international anarchy. The second is “the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system” (Wendt, 1992: 138). If we acknowledge only the first structure of international anarchy, we pretty much end up with Waltz’s neorealist explanation of international politics or, alternatively, a “weak liberal” argument that even within structural anarchy, some cooperative behavior is possible. If, however, we include the second intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests, then international anarchy is not necessarily either conflictual or cooperative. So, how does Wendt think about this intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests? Wendt takes the state as his point of departure. States are the fundamental actors in international politics. These state actors “acquire identities—relatively stable, role-specific understandings, and expectations about self” (Wendt, 1992: 135) through their relationships with other actors and the meaning structures in which they find themselves. “Identities are the basis of interests” which are once again constructed relationally (Wendt, 1992: 136). Moving from actors to identities to interests, we finally end up with institutions. “An institution is a relatively stable set or ‘structure’ of identities and interests” (Wendt, 1992: 136). “Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world works” (Wendt, 1992: 136). Wendt is not trying to make a “which came first” argument—identities or institutions. He is trying to say that identities, interests, and institutions all result from interactive, social processes and that they are “mutually constitutive” (Wendt, 1992: 137). We may think institutions are “already there” because we rely upon them to orient our behavior, but institutions are not pregiven. They are constituted through social interactions among identities. Similarly, identities are not pregiven either, but are formed through interactions with other identities and with collective social institutions. What does this mean for Wendt’s myth “anarchy is what states make of it”? It means that even if we accept the neorealist description of the world as an anarchical, self-help world, by supplementing this anarchical structure with the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests, then neither anarchy nor self-help are meaningful terms prior to the social interactions of states. Anarchy

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Box 4.2  Three fundamental principles of constructivist social theory 1 “People act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them”: SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE. 2 “The meanings in terms of which action is organized arise out of interaction”: SOCIAL PRACTICE. 3 “Identities [and interests] are produced in and through ‘situated activity’”: SOCIAL IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS.

and self-help only become meaningful once social interactions have taken place. And, because “people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them” (Wendt, 1992: 135), and because the objects of “anarchy” and “self-help” have no meaning prior to state interactions, we will only know if anarchy and self-help will lead to conflict or cooperation once we know what states do socially (Box 4.2). Taking these two structures together, what can we say about state behavior in a competitive, self-help anarchical system prior to social interaction? We cannot say it will be necessarily conflictual or cooperative. We can say, according to Wendt, that states will try to survive (Wendt, 1992: 139), but how they will achieve that survival is an open question. With all this in mind, Wendt invites us to think of an example in which two actors have no prior social contact, stumble upon one another, and both want to ensure their continued survival. His example is the arrival of aliens to earth. Wendt asks, “Would we assume, a priori, that we were about to be attacked if we are ever contacted by members of an alien civilization? I think not” (Wendt, 1992: 141–142). Yes, we’d be cautious, he argues, but we would probably not want to appear to be threatening to the aliens unless they were first threatening to us, as we would want “to avoid making an immediate enemy out of what may be a dangerous adversary” (Wendt, 1992: 142). We would read the aliens’ social signals before deciding whether we would behave conflictually or cooperatively. And, importantly, Wendt argues “we would not begin our relationship with the aliens in a security dilemma; security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature” (Wendt, 1992: 144). The same is true of sovereign states in their social interactions. On first meeting, two states (which Wendt refers to as “alter” and “ego”) have no reason to assume the worst of one another. Yes, they each want to survive and to preserve their own unique ways of being states—of organizing their systems of governance. But none of this suggests that they are in a “security dilemma” in which self-help principles prevail. States do not necessarily have to increase their power to increase their security because every other state poses a threat to them. “Social threats are constructed, not natural” (Wendt, 1992: 141). Prior to social interaction, there is no such thing as a social threat. It is identities that produce collective meanings like social threats, and “identities are produced in and through ‘situated activity’” (Wendt, 1992: 144). If, in this particular situated activity, the only prior interest states have is to survive, then this means that it is not a priori in a state’s interest to make a social

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Constructivism Table 4.2  Three stories of international anarchy Realism

Idealism

Constructivism

Actors

States

States

States

Goals

Survival

Survival

Survival

Actors’ behavior Increase power in anarchy to ensure survival

Promote social learning Unpredictable prior to through: social interaction

What mitigates state behavior?

International society

Self-help because

• institutions (e.g., UN) • ideas (e.g., democracy and liberal capitalism)

• no world government (anarchy) • cooperation among states unreliable

Logic of anarchy Conflictual

Intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests • if state identities and interests produced as competitive → competition • if state identities and interests produced as cooperative → cooperation

Cooperative

Anarchy is what states make of it

threat. A state (alter) may choose to make a social threat, or ego may interpret alter’s actions as threatening. But prior to social interaction, alter and ego are not in a security dilemma. Wanting to survive in no way guarantees that alter or ego will behave conflictually toward one another. Nor, of course, does their interest in survival guarantee they will cooperate. Anarchy is what alter and ego make of it (see Table 4.2). Additionally, Wendt adds, “If states find themselves in a self-help system, this is because their practices made it that way. Changing the practices will change the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes the system” (Wendt, 1992: 144). So even if alter and ego make anarchy conflictual by creating a self-help system, they can always escape this self-help system by changing the ways they think about and then act in this system. This is why Wendt argues “that the meaning in terms of which action is organized arise out of interactions” (Wendt, 1992: 140). And Wendt goes on to make this point explicitly, by illustrating how “identities and interests are transformed under anarchy: by the institution of sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation, and by intentional efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities” (Wendt, 1992: 133). But probably the most important move Wendt makes in his essay is not found in his critique of rationalism or in his critique of self-help. Rather, it is in his lack of a critique of state-centrism. He acknowledges that making the state the focus of

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his analysis may strike some theorists, especially postmodernists, as “depressingly familiar” (Wendt, 1992: 163). But, of course, it is only by keeping the state as the central decision-maker in his constructivist explanation of international politics that Wendt can conclude that “anarchy is what states make of it.” Wendt defends his state-centricism on the grounds that “the authorship of the human world” must not be forgotten. For to forget the author is to risk reifying the world—to make it an object that is already there that actors relate to rather than to recognize it as a “world of our making” (as another constructivist with a different take on constructivism, Nicholas Onuf, puts it: Onuf, 1989) (Wendt, 1992: 147). Wendt is critical of realists for reifying the structure of international anarchy. He puts it like this: “By denying or bracketing states’ collective authorship of their identities and interests … the realist-rationalist alliance denies or brackets the fact that competitive power politics help create the very ‘problem of order’ they are supposed to solve—that realism is a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Wendt, 1992: 148). But anarchy is not a problem external to states. It is produced through the “competitive identities and interests” states create through their everyday activities. “It is what states have made of themselves” (Wendt, 1992: 148). This is a strong argument for accepting the authorship of the state—for viewing anarchy as a product of state activities rather than as a self-help, competitive structure that traps states into behaving conflictually toward one another. The film Wag the Dog illustrates the moves in Wendt’s constructivist myth. It demonstrates how identities, interests, and institutions are intersubjectively constituted. And it seems to support Wendt’s point that reifying or forgetting the authorship of acts can have dangerous consequences—even leading to war (or the perception of war at least). Either way, real people die. Authorship, it seems to suggest, must be transparent for democratic institutions to operate properly. It must withhold nothing from view. It must not be seductive. Wag the Dog also makes us wonder if production/authorship can ever be effectively separated from seduction—if authorship can ever be transparent. If not, then we have to ask what the seduction of authorship does. Wendt’s answer, as we know, is that authorship reifies what authors supposedly make (like anarchy). Wag the Dog’s answer is more complicated. Its answer is this. Yes, seduction reifies production, not just of what authors supposedly make, but of authors themselves. And, this answer goes on, this reification of authorship is terribly clever because there is no guarantee that practices can reliably be traced to authors.

Wag the Dog Wag the Dog opens with a joke that appears on the screen. “Why does a dog wag its tail?” “Because a dog is smarter than its tail. If the tail were smarter, the tail would wag the dog.” The film then cuts to a less-than-slick television commercial, in which a couple of jockeys discuss why they will support the president in the upcoming election—they know it is unwise to “change horses in midstream.” Cut to exterior of the White House. Cut to interior of the White House. A man in a rumpled hat, raincoat, and

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suit has arrived. He looks ordinary enough (apart from the fact that he is Robert DeNiro). He makes his way into the bowels of the White House, into a safe room in which he is the focus of a crisis meeting. He is Conrad Brean or “Mr Fix-It,” as the president’s assistant Winifred refers to him. Conrad/Connie is briefed on the current crisis. A Firefly Girl (a fictional equivalent of a girl scout) has alleged sexual misconduct against the president while she was alone with the president in the Oval Office. The president’s campaign opponent, Senator Neal, already has word of the story and is ready to run a new campaign commercial. Connie and his team view the new spot in the crisis room. The spot pans a crowd of what we suppose are the president’s supporters, cheering. Underneath is a question that is spoken in a voiceover, “In the final days of the campaign, has the president changed his tune?” The commercial cuts to the exterior of the White House as we hear Maurice Chevalier singing “Thank Heaven for Little Girls.” The commercial cuts back and forth between this exterior shot and an interior shot of the president’s empty desk chair in the oval office. The voiceover continues, “The Presidency is about honor, it’s about principles, and it’s about integrity. This tune has got to change. On election day, vote Neal for president.” Mr Fix-It goes to work. The election is 11 days away. All he has to do is distract the public’s attention from this sexual crisis long enough to ensure the president is re-elected. How he decides to do this is by changing the story—by inventing something the US public will find more gripping than this sexual scandal. He decides to delay the president’s return from China and start a series of rumors about nonexistent weaponry and a nonexistent war to distract the public. He explains his plan to the president’s staff in a pretend dialogue between a staff member and a newspaper reporter. Connie: Whoever’s leaking that stuff to that geek at the Post lets it slip. Jees, I hope this won’t screw up the B3 program. What B3 program and why should it screw it up? Well, if the president decides to deploy the B3 before it’s fully tested … Deploy the B3 before it’s fully tested? Why? Why? The crisis? Winifred: [interrupting Connie’s imaginary dialogue] What crisis? Connie: Well, I’m workin’ on that. [Carrying on with his plan, Connie continues] At the same time, get General Scott of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and pour him on a plane right away to Seattle. He’s all flustered and nervous to talk to the Boeing people. Winifred: Right [to Connie]. Do it [to an assistant]. Assistant: But, but … Connie: But what? Assistant: But there isn’t a B3 bomber. Connie: Where did you go to school kid, Wellesley? Assistant: Dartmouth. Connie: Then show a little spunk. There is no B3 bomber. General Scott to the best of your knowledge is not in Seattle to talk to Boeing. Winifred: It won’t work, Connie. It won’t prove out.

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Connie: It doesn’t have to prove out. We’ve just gotta distract ‘em, just gotta distract ‘em. We’ve got less than two weeks until the election. Winifred: What in the world would do that? What in the world would do that? Connie: I’m workin’ on it. I’m working on it. What Connie comes up with is a way to “change the story, change the lead” by creating the “appearance of a war” between the US and Albania—a country about which (at the time this film was made prior to the war in Kosovo) the US public knew very little. He and Winifred fly to Hollywood to enlist the aid of film producer Stanley Motss because, as Conrad puts it, “War is showbusiness.” When it becomes clear to Stanley that Connie wants him to help with the “war,” Connie tries to explain to him what kind of help he has in mind. Stanley: Connie: Stanley: Connie: Stanley: Connie: Stanley: Connie:

And you want me to do what? We want you to produce. [expressing shock and disbelief] You want me to produce your war? It’s not a war. It’s a pageant. We need a theme, a song, some visuals. We need, you know, it’s a pageant. It’s like the Oscars. That’s why we came to you. I never won an Oscar. And that’s a damn shame you didn’t, but you produced the Oscars. [getting the idea] It’s a pageant. It’s “Miss America.” You’re Bert Parks.

After Connie has successfully pitched the idea of a US war with Albania to Stanley, Stanley and his team produce the war—its script revolving around Albanian terrorists trying to smuggle a nuclear bomb into the US via Canada in a suitcase, “news footage” of an “Albanian girl” escaping from rebels in Albania that is leaked to the press and run on all the news programs, choreographing the president’s return from China at which time he is given an offering of thanks by a small “Albanian girl and her grandmother,” not to mention a couple of songs and countless merchandizing tie-ins. And all of it is consumed by television viewers as real. And then, the “war” “ends.” Senator Neal, the president’s electoral opponent, announces on television that he has evidence from the CIA that the war is over. Stanley is upset. Stanley: [angry] He can’t end the war. He’s not producing this. Connie: [exasperated] The war’s over guys. Stanley: No! Connie: [now matter-of-factly] It’s over. I saw it on television. Stanley: No, the war isn’t over ‘til I say it’s over. This is my picture. This is not the CIA’s picture … Stanley then devises a scheme to keep productive control of “his picture” even though someone else ended “his” war. He tells Connie, “This is nothing. This is nothing. This is just ‘Act I: The War’. Now we really do need an ‘Act II’.” He continues to spin the war story, now taking place after the war has officially ended. He decides there is a US soldier trapped behind enemy lines who doesn’t know the war is over. He has been separated from his troop. US forces will now mobilize to rescue him. Proud of himself, Stanley tells Connie, “Bottom of the ninth (swings

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an imaginary baseball bat). Alright? Alright? They don’t know who they’re playing with. They don’t shut down our picture.” And so the show goes on, even when the US soldier they “cast” as the hero turns out to be a psychotic imprisoned for raping a nun, even when the hero’s return is delayed because the plane in which he, Connie, Stanley, and Winifred are traveling crashes, and even when the “hero” is killed by a shopkeeper because the hero is trying to rape the shopkeeper’s daughter. Stanley simply scripts a patriotic funeral for the returned hero. And the story holds long enough to ensure the president’s re-election. What does all of this tell us about the world of Wag the Dog? How does this film make sense of the world? What does it say is typical and deviant of that world? The world of Wag the Dog is a made-in-the-media world. TV shows and news broadcasters define reality, even to the extent that they make us believe that the US is at war with Albania. And because television is where reality happens, television is the only place reality can be transformed. For example, early in the film the CIA confronts Connie and Winifred with “the facts” that there is no evidence of a war in Albania or of any Albanian nuclear device in Canada. But this is not enough to “end the war.” The only way the war can be ended is the way it was started—on television. Connie articulates this when he declares the war is over because “I saw it on television.” It is through the medium of television that information and ideas are disseminated. And, more importantly, what this practice of dissemination does is construct and reconstruct identities, interests, and institutions in the world of Wag the Dog. Stanley is reconstructed from a Hollywood producer into a producer of a war with an interest in keeping “his” picture going until he can bring it to some poignant closure. The US public are constructed as patriots with an interest in beating the Albanians and securing the US borders. The institution of war is transformed from something that occurs in places like Albania, the US, and Canada into something that occurs in televisual spaces. All of these identities, interests, and institutions coconstruct one another. All this seems to illustrate the “inter-subjectively constituted structure of identities and interests” (Wendt, 1992: 136) of which Wendt writes (Box 4.3). And as the mediatic magic of war replaces both the upcoming Presidential election and the president’s alleged indiscretion with a Firefly Girl as the only tale in town, the film seems to invite us to take the notion of tales—and tails—as seriously as it does. What’s all this preoccupation with tales, tails, and wagging about anyway? One way to approach this question is by asking another: “what is typical and what is deviant in the world of Wag the Dog?” And seeking an answer to this question takes us back to the joke with which the film opened—“Why does a dog wag its tail? Because a dog is smarter than its tail. If the tail were smarter, it would wag the dog.” In light of this joke, the film’s title, and the film’s plot, it seems fair

Box 4.3  How does Wag the Dog make sense of the world? Reality is produced, circulated, and transformed through the media, especially television. It is through the media that identities, interests, and institutions appear to be constructed and reconstructed.

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Constructivism Table 4.3  What seems to be typical and deviant in the world of Wag the Dog? Typical

Deviant

For the tail (spin doctors and policy-makers) to wag the dog (the US public)

For the dog (the US public) to wag its tail (spin doctors and policy-makers)

to conclude that what is typical in the world of Wag the Dog is for the tail to wag the dog, and what is deviant is for a dog to wag its tail. All of this encourages us to ask “who is the dog and who is the tail?” It is this sort of question that Wendtian constructivism gives in to. One answer might be that the dog is the US public and the tail is the politicos of Washington who employed Connie, Stanley, and Winifred. Another might be that the media wag the politicos who wag the public. Either way, the US public is constructed as being wagged all the time—as that which is constructed. In contrast, the tail decides how the wagging will be performed. The tail (politicos/media) is the author of the tale (story) about the war (see Table 4.3). One might think of Wag the Dog as a clever parable of Wendt’s myth “anarchy is what states make of it,” rewritten as something like “war is what producers make of it.” Whichever way it is phrased, the moral is the same. And this moral is the very one Wendt evoked in his defense of a state-centric/actor-centric approach to understanding international politics. That defense was this: if we forget who the author of practices is, then we cannot hold that author accountable. We end up responding to identities, interests, and institutions as if they were authored by no one. In Wag the Dog, we respond to staged events like war as if they were real, which gives them some reality. And in international politics, we respond to “the logic of anarchy” and its accompanying self-help security dilemma as if they were real, thereby giving them some reality. Identities, interests, and institutions are, however, authored by someone, Wendt suggests. Authorship is always at the bottom of production. It is only by keeping the author in mind that we can hold the author accountable and, maybe even more importantly, recognize that we are the authors of our own lives. Anarchy is what states make of it. War is what producers make of it. Our lives are what we make of them. Wendt’s warnings about the dangers of reification are echoed in the film by Stanley, the Hollywood producer. Stanley asks Connie, “Where do movies come from if nobody produces them, Connie? Where do they come from?” Stanley asks this question because his tale about war, a hero’s triumphant return, and the hero’s patriotic funeral seem to come from nowhere. But Stanley knows they result from production, and he is the producer. Throughout the film, Stanley waxes philosophically about production. Producing is problem-solving: Stanley:

If you’ve got a problem, solve it. That’s producing.

Producing is heroic: Stanley:

Producing is being a samurai warrior. They pay you day in, day out for years so that one day when called upon you can respond, your training at its peak, and save the day.

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And producing is invisible: Stanley: Connie: Stanley:

Thinking ahead. Thinking ahead. That’s what producing is. It’s like being a plumber. Yes, like being a plumber. You do your job right, nobody should notice. But when you fuck up, everything gets full of shit.

But it is this last aspect of production—its invisibility—that makes it so problematic both for Stanley and for Wendt. According to Stanley, production only truly functions when it is seductive—when it withholds its own acts of production from view. For production to work, nobody should notice. While Stanley knows this about production and producers, it is also what bothers him about production. He has never won an Oscar because, as he tells Connie, “There is no Oscar for producing.” Producing is never recognized. It is always invisible. So when his “patriotic pageant” is winding up, he quarrels with Connie because he finally wants proper recognition for the work he has done. Connie: Stanley:

You can’t do it. [angrily] Don’t you tell me that. Don’t you ever tell me that. I’m the producer of this show. [looks out the window at the set where the patriotic funeral of the returned war hero is being shot] Look at that. That is a complete fucking fraud, and it looks one hundred percent real. [contemplatively, softly] It’s the best work I’ve ever done in my whole life, because it’s so honest … [insistently] I tell you, for once in my life I will not be pissed on. I want … I want the credit. I want the credit.

Stanley knows that if he is allowed to have “the credit,” the whole picture will fall apart. He just doesn’t want to accept what he knows about production when it comes to credit. He knows production is only revealed when there is a problem. When there is no problem, production and the producer are out of sight. And because they are out of sight, we long for them. We want to see the processes of production and the producer who is pulling all the strings. But, as Wag the Dog makes explicit, the deal is that we can have our entertaining movie only if we suspend our interest in the processes of production and in the producer. In this sense, production is always tied to seduction. That’s the deal. The story/film/tale teases us into wanting what we cannot see—what is seductively withheld from the visible—while at the same time it promises not to show us too much. For if we knew about all the special effects and all the dramas behind the drama, we would lose interest in the drama itself. That’s why it is so hard to be a producer—because the deal is that you can never take the credit. If you do, the audience will be disillusioned with your production, so any “credit” for that job well done will dissolve. What Stanley knows about production is the same thing Wendt knows. Just as the invisibility of Stanley’s role as producer guarantees that his tale about war appears to be true, the invisibility of the state’s role as producer guarantees that neorealism’s tale about international anarchy appears to be true. By “exposing” states as the producers/decision-makers who make international anarchy, Wendt ensures that the neorealist anarchy tale ceases to function as if no one authored it.

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Stanley and Wendt both implicitly understand that production is tied to seduction. But neither of them seems to know that seduction doesn’t necessarily conceal an author. Seduction doesn’t just tease us into wanting what we cannot see. It convinces us that there is something there to see. It fools us not only about what might be a “real” or a “false” tale. The tale itself tricks us into thinking that there is an author of the tale. For Wendt, as for the film Wag the Dog, asking “who is the author?” is an important question to guard against the evils of reification. And for Wendt at least, it is a necessary question. For it is by asking the question of authorship that Wendt gets us out of the neorealist anarchy myth by emphasizing state practices in the production of international anarchy. But I wonder if this is where the constructivist emphasis on practice should be placed. Because the film raises another question: “Does the tail wag the dog or does the tale wag the tail that appears to wag the dog?” Put differently, “Is anarchy what states make of it or do practices (which Wendt does not consider) make states that appear to make anarchy?”

Practice, seduction, and dead authorship Wendt’s myth “anarchy is what states make of it” gets us out of the neorealist anarchy myth in which international anarchy determines that states will compete to ensure their survival relying upon self-help logics. Wendt gets us here by emphasizing practice in international politics—specifically, how the practices of socially constructed states make international anarchy into what it is, whatever that may be. So Wendt emphasizes practice by emphasizing what states do. In this sense, Wendt’s socially constructed states are the tails that wag international anarchy. They are the authors of anarchy. But there are other practices that Wendt ignores, and these are the practices that construct states themselves as decision-makers who then go on to make international anarchy. This second set of practices concerns tales/stories rather than tails/ actors. On this reading, tales or stories construct states as tails/authors who then wag/make anarchy. It is only by excluding this second set of practices—the practices that construct states as decision-makers or producers of international anarchy—that Wendt can claim states as the authors of anarchy. Put differently, the tale/story must go without saying for Wendt’s own constructivist tale “anarchy is what states make of it” to function. But in the mediatic world of Wag the Dog and in the Wendtian world of constructivism, the tale/story is a bunch of practices that no one ultimately controls. Think about it. Ask yourself the question “who is the ultimate decision-maker in the film?” Several answers present themselves. The answer is not Stanley. If for no other reason, we know this because when Stanley refuses to let the picture roll without credits—when he makes it clear he cannot abide by the agreement that he can never tell anyone about what he has done—Connie authorizes the government thugs to kill him. So does that make Connie the author/decision-maker? He certainly seems to be the “real” producer. He is the one who came up with the story. He is the one

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Constructivism Table 4.4  Reconsidering what is typical and deviant in the world of Wag the Dog Typical

Deviant

For the tale (mediatic practices) to wag the tail (producers/spin doctors/ policy-makers) so that it appears that the tail (producers) wags the dog (US public)

Either: • For the dog (US public) to wag its tail (producers/spin doctors/policy-makers) or • For the tail (producers/spin doctors/ policy-makers) to “really” wag the dog (US public) without being wagged by the tale (mediatic practices) itself

who initially organized it. He just delegated some of this authority to Stanley. So maybe Mr Fix-It is the real center of decision-making power in the film. Except this answer doesn’t hold up because we know that just as Connie delegated decision-making responsibility to Stanley, the president delegated decision-making authority to Connie. So is the president the ultimate decision-maker in the world of Wag the Dog? Some might answer yes. I would answer no. My answer is there is not necessarily a decision-maker behind the scenes. And this answer comes from thinking once again about how the film makes sense of the world. As I mentioned before, the film makes sense of the world through the media. It is the circulation of ideas/stories/tales through the media that constructs reality and tells us what to think. And, throughout the film, the president, Connie, and Stanley are always responding to the mediatic presentation of events, trying to come up with problem-solving solutions to them. But trying to solve a problem—what Stanley calls producing—is only a response. It means that production is driven by practices—by the mediatic representation of the tale. The tail/producer, then, doesn’t wag the dog/public. The tale/practice wags the tail/producer so that it appears that the tail/producer wags the dog/ public (Table 4.4). Consider these examples. The president needs to bring in Connie to fend off a political crisis before the election because the news media will run the story of his alleged sexual misconduct with the Firefly Girl the next morning. The tale/ story drives the president’s decision to employ Connie. Connie understands that tales—not tails—wag dogs. And so he invents another tale to rival the tale of the president’s alleged sexual misconduct. His tale is a US war with Albania. Senator Neal, appreciating how tales are wagging tales now, intervenes to put a stop to his electoral opponent’s strategy. He doesn’t do this by saying “there is no war,” even though he clearly has the “evidence on the ground” that there is no war because he has been consulting with the CIA. No, he recognizes that it would be political suicide to speak the “truth” that there is only a mediatic war. So he spins another tale to the tale to the tale—that the war is about to end. By ending the war on television, Senator Neal ends the war. Never mind that Stanley insists this is his war and no one else can end it. The war is over because what happens on television is real.

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Examples like these abound in the film. Indeed, the whole film is framed from beginning to end through the media. The film opens with a campaign commercial supporting the president, and it ends with the following television special report: A group calling itself Albania Unite has claimed responsibility for this morning’s bombing of the village of Close, Albania. The president could not be reached for comment, but General William Scott of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said he has no doubt we’ll be sending planes and troops back in to finish the job. What do these two media bookends tell us about the mediatic world of Wag the Dog? Obviously, beginning and ending a film with television spots testifies to the importance of mediatic practices in the world of Wag the Dog. But it does more than this. There is a movement depicted in the film from thinking that you can reliably trace the authorship of mediatic events back to an author to knowing that you cannot. The opening campaign spot seems easy enough to trace. It is an advertisement for the president paid for by the campaign to reelect the president. But what about the final special news bulletin? Who authored that? It wasn’t Stanley because Stanley is dead. It is unlikely to be either Connie or the president because Connie’s job was over when the president’s reelection was assured, and that occurred before this special report. So who is the author? Is it the media itself? Maybe in part but never entirely, because as the world of Wag the Dog showed us, the media are always responding to stories/tales. So, as the film ends, we are left with the tale still spinning and no one onto whom we can pin the tale/tail, so to speak. Authorship is unreliable. We’ll keep searching for authors because the seductive practices of production make us believe that we might find them one day. But no amount of wanting authors to be findable or authorship to be more reliable will make it that way. Authorship cannot be guaranteed. In the end, we only have a tale—a bunch of practices that gave us not only the illusion of a war but the illusion of an author/producer/decision-maker behind the war. What does this all mean for Wendt’s constructivist myth “anarchy is what states make of it”? It means that however well-intentioned Wendt is in trying to give us an escape from some reified “logic of anarchy,” he only succeeds at getting us out of some deterministic conflict/cooperation debate by determining the character of the state. In other words, Wendt only manages to escape the reification of international anarchy by reifying the state as decision-maker. Wendt can allow that states can change roles—from producers of conflict to producers of cooperation, for example, just as Stanley changed roles from producer of films to producer of a war. But Wendt cannot tell us how states get produced as producers. His constructivism draws the line of taking practice seriously under the state. States can make practices, but—however much he might claim to the contrary—Wendt’s constructivism does not allow states to be produced. They are already there. They have to be. They are the producers of anarchy. “Anarchy is what states make of it.”

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Constructivism Table 4.5  Advantages and disadvantages of the Wendtian compromise Advantages

Disadvantages

Can hold states accountable for their part in producing anarchy as either conflictual or cooperative

• Cannot escape reification because Wendt replaces a reified logic of anarchy with reified states • Misses the opportunity to restore a broad focus on process and practice in international politics because Wendt must exclude from consideration the practices that produce states as products of anarchy in order for his myth to function

Wendt’s constructivist myth “anarchy is what states make of it” is a comforting myth. It promises to free us from deterministic logics of anarchy. It claims to build a bridge between neorealists and neoliberals. And, most importantly, it answers the seductive question “who is the author of international anarchy?” and gives us an author—states. IR theorists want all of this. And that is why Wendtian constructivism has been so popular among IR theorists. By accepting these benefits of Wendtian constructivism, however, we are also accepting its liabilities. And constructivism has at least two major liabilities. First, it fails to deliver on its promise to take us beyond reification, because in order to escape a reified logic of anarchy, it reifies the state. Second, by reifying the state—by insisting on the state as the author/decision-maker of all tales—constructivism misses the opportunity to deliver on another of its promises, to restore a focus on process and practice in international politics (see Table 4.5). Wag the Dog suggests to us that it is a more interesting question to ask “how does an actor appear to be a decision-maker/producer/author?” than it is to ask the seductive question “who is the real decision-maker/producer/author?” This constructivist compromise does allow us to hold states accountable for any wagging of international anarchy they may be doing, but it prevents us from investigating practices that produce states as producers. With Wendtian constructivism, we think we understand how states as tails function in international politics. But, as Wag the Dog reminds us, wagging isn’t mostly about tails/states. It’s about tales/practices.

Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1: Constructivism Nicholas Onuf was the first to introduce the concept of constructivism into the IR theory debates. Onuf made his case for constructivism in his 1989 book World of Our Making. Since then, several theorists have adopted and adapted constructivism, in ways unanticipated by Onuf (as he suggests in his 1999 essay). Wendtian constructivism is the most well-known. In 1999, Wendt consolidated and clarified his position in his book Social Theory of International Politics. Others, like John Ruggie, have applied constructivism to readings of international politics. The Onuf school of constructivism has carried on apace. It is not surprising, then, to

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read in the pages of Foreign Policy that constructivism is a necessary tool in any IR theorist’s toolbox, an argument made by Stephen Walt. For as Emanuel Adler calls it, constructivism is now the “middle ground in world politics” (1997). For a broader discussion of these points, see Zehfuss (2002).

Suggested reading Adler, Emanuel (1997) “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 3(3): 319–363. Kublakova, V., Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, and Paul Kowert (eds) (1998) International Relations in a Constructed World. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (1989) World of Our Making. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (2002) “Worlds of Our Making: The Strange Career of Constructivism in IR,” in Donald J. Puchala (ed.) Visions of International Relations: Assessing an Academic Field. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 119–141. Ruggie, John G. (1998) Constructing the World Polity. London: Routledge. Walt, Stephen M. (1998) “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy(Spring): 29–46. Wendt, Alexander (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zehfuss, Maja (2002) Constructivism in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Topic 2: Postmodernism One of the things that makes constructivism so appealing to many IR theorists is that it is not postmodernism. Yet it was postmodernist arguments, introduced to IR theory in Richard Ashley’s path-breaking critique of neorealism and through a series of essays by R. B. J. Walker (many of which are collected in his book Inside/ Outside), which got IR scholars thinking about questions of identity and practice to begin with. While constructivist scholars turned to work like that of Anthony Giddens for their insights about international politics, poststructuralist scholars turned to the works of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, and Julia Kristeva, among others. There are long-running debates between constructivists and poststructuralists (both termed “reflectivists” by Robert Keohane) about identity, practice, and politics. While Wendt’s constructivist myth “anarchy is what states makes of it” arguably denaturalizes the logic of anarchy with its focus on state practice and thereby enables us to hold states accountable for their behaviors which produce either conflict or cooperation, poststructuralists criticize this sort of constructivism because it cannot interrogate the practices that produce states themselves. Some IR scholars have criticized poststructuralism for being apolitical because it does not identify actors and hold them accountable

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in traditional ways (as Wendtian constructivism does). Yet poststructuralists argue that it is precisely their insistence not to ever stop investigating how power is used to stabilize identities that makes their work political (see Edkins, 1999; George, 1994) and makes some constructivist work politically vacuous in contrast. As this discussion should make clear, it is a poststructuralist position that informs my critique of Wendt’s anarchy myth in this chapter. To use this chapter to highlight the differences between constructivist and poststructuralist approaches to states as the authors of international anarchy, a useful poststructuralist work to assign is Michel Foucault’s essay “What is an Author?” For more on postmodernism (especially in relation to its debates with neo-Marxism), see Chapter 7. For a problematization of postmodern and critical theory’s “lapses” into Eurocentrism, see Walter Mignolo’s (2002) article.

Suggested reading Ashley, Richard K. (1984) “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization 38(2): 225–286. Edkins, Jenny (1999) Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Foucault, Michel (1984) “What Is an Author?” in P. Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon, pp. 101–120. George, Jim (1994) Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Mignolo, Walter (2002) “The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 101(1): 57–96. Keohane, Robert O. (1988) “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly 32: 379–396. Walker, R. B. J. (1993) Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Topic 3: Practice theory and international relations One of the latest developments in constructivist international relations is a focus on “international practices.” Inspired by (or returning to) poststructuralist IR’s attention to textual practices and the work of social theorist Pierre Bourdieu, IR scholars Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot advocate a “practice turn” in IR. They suggest that there is much work to be gained in IR by paying attention to what practitioners of international relations “do,” by focusing on the “manifold practices” and “quotidian unfolding of international life, from multilateral diplomacy to finance trading through environmental negotiations” (2011: 3; see also Adler-Nissen, 2012). Their aim is to use this focus on “patterns of cooperative practices” to reinvigorate and enrich IR’s debates over power, security, trade, and finance, and organizations and institutions among other things.

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However, just as constructing the myth that “anarchy is what states make of it” allows Alexander Wendt to ignore the practices that construct states, “practice theory” overlooks how the practices these theorists identify constitute the state. This is because it limits its analysis to the practices of practitioners (state actors such a diplomats). In this way, they miss out on the ways that more seemingly mundane, everyday practices are an inescapable part of the making of world politics. This is precisely the argument that Cynthia Enloe’s seminal text Bananas, Beaches and Bases (1989; see also 1996) makes (also see Chapter 5 on gender). Enloe claims that the very practices that “practice theory” ignores—like the practices of diplomatic wives—may well be foundational to international politics. Somewhat differently, Vicki Squire makes similar arguments about everyday practices in her work on mobility and migration (Squire, 2010). And more broadly, Ted Hopf (2018) considers what makes change possible by considering “the relationship between going on in the world automatically and proceeding with conscious reflection.”

Suggested reading Adler, Emanuel and Vincent Pouliot (eds) (2011) International Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adler-Nissen, Rebecca (2012) Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR. London: Routledge. Enloe, Cynthia (1989) Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Enloe, Cynthia (1996) “Margins, Silences and Bottom Rungs: How to Overcome the Underestimation of Power in the Study of International Relations,” in S. Smith, K. Booth, and M. Zalewski (eds) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 186–202. Hopf, Ted (2018) “Change in International Practices,” European Journal of International Relations 24(3): 687–711. Squire, Vicki (ed.) (2010) The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity. New York: Routledge.

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5

Gender Is gender a variable?

What does the myth say? 88 Fatal Attraction 94 Placing feminism in IR? 100 Suggestions for further thinking 104

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What’s an IR scholar to do about feminism? This is a question that has troubled IR scholars for decades. While feminist debates engaged people in social and political spaces outside the discipline of IR, IR scholars did their best not to see the relevance of feminism for their own debates. That didn’t stop some feminists from rethinking key IR concepts like power through feminism (Carroll, 1972), but such contributions were largely ignored by IR scholars until the 1990s (Murphy, 1996; Pettman, 1998). It was only around that time, when feminist questions pushed their way onto the IR agenda through books, journals, and conferences, that feminism suddenly seemed attractive to IR scholars. And for a few years, IR’s affair with feminism flourished. Feminist essays were added to IR journals, feminist panels were added to IR conferences, and feminist jobs were added to IR departments. In the early 1990s, feminist questions—questions about the presumed gender neutrality of international politics from the standpoint of women—seemed to have been added to most aspects of IR. But IR’s affair with feminism did not always go smoothly. Even though IR scholars (mostly men) began to welcome feminist contributions (from mostly women) into their field and even though some men even proclaimed themselves to be feminists, many feminists (mostly female) were not always happy with the terms of this relationship. They kept pointing out to IR scholars (men and women) that feminist questions could not just be added to and stirred in with IR questions in ways that left the core of the discipline unchanged. They stressed that feminist questions changed the very terms in which IR was approached, understood, and studied. Furthermore, they pointed out that feminist questions were every bit as legitimate and important as IR’s classical approaches to war and peace. Needless to say, not everyone welcomed these feminist insights. While the era of dismissing feminists and feminist questions from IR debates without political risk had, for the time being, passed, surely feminists must realize that the point of feminist approaches to IR was to further IR’s core agenda of asking questions about war and peace and not to destabilize the very foundation from which such questions were asked? Sometimes feminists just went too far, it seemed to (mostly male) IR scholars, to the point that feminists seemed to be out of control altogether because they insisted on asking the wrong and the most uncomfortable sorts of questions. Certainly, (mostly male) IR scholars could still advise (mostly female) feminists on how to do feminism in a way that was compatible with IR and comfortable for IR scholars. And so they did (Keohane, 1989; Weber, 1994a). One effect of IR’s paternalistic engagements with feminists and feminist questions was to decrease the scope of feminist questions that IR scholars had to take seriously (Zalewski, 1993, 1995). Feminist questions, it seemed, should not be asked about everything all the time. There seemed to be a place and a time when feminist questions mattered and when feminists should be heard. Feminism deserved a “proper” place in IR debates, but it was (mostly male) IR scholars who placed feminism—who put and kept feminism in its place (Zalewski, 1999). But feminism rarely stayed in its place. And that troubled and sometimes even scared IR scholars. How could feminism more reliably be placed as a complement to IR questions? In 1996, a solution for placing feminism presented itself in the form of Adam Jones’s essay “Does ‘Gender’ Make the World Go Round? Feminist Critiques of International Relations.” Uniquely for a male IR scholar, Jones seems to argue

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that the problem with feminism isn’t that it is everywhere and has to be kept in its place. Rather, the problem with feminism is that it has limited its own contribution to the IR debates—the gender variable. By “the gender variable,” Jones does not mean some quantitative cause/effect quotient. Rather, the gender variable simply expresses what feminists study—or, as Jones argues, what feminists ought to study, which is gender. Jones’s use of the gender variable simultaneously expands and contracts feminist IR debates. On the one hand, it seems to open up IR by moving away from what Jones claims are narrow feminist questions about women and the feminine to broader gender questions about all genders. On the other hand, it makes feminism and feminists manageable because it places them within one reasonable realm—gender—and places gender itself within the confines of a variable. Now IR scholars can look at gender as a discrete set of relationships which they can explore qualitatively or quantitatively. And they can do so without forever having to answer feminist charges that they are just adding in gender to IR analyses. After all, it was feminists, Jones tells us, who gave us the gender variable. IR scholars are only putting it to proper use. Like our neoidealist myth “there is an international society” (Chapter 3), Jones’s myth “gender is a variable” is never defended by Jones. What is defended is the need to make feminist engagements with IR more balanced. And to do this, Jones argues, the gender variable must be made more inclusive, especially of the gendered positions of men and masculinities in international relations. In other words, if feminists want “women’s issues” and “feminine concerns” to be considered in IR, then (mostly male) IR scholars are right to insist that “men’s issues” and “masculine concerns” be given equal time. Yet in making this argument, the gender variable “itself” simply goes without saying. It is simply the basis upon which Jones makes his argument for its expansion. But is gender a variable? Gender appears to be a variable in Jones’s essay because its status as a variable is never questioned. But what would it mean for gender to be a variable? It would mean that gender can be placed and contained in some distinct thing called a variable. And, because gender could be so placed, the gender variable itself would be outside of gender (Box 5.1). All this makes Jones’s myth “gender is a variable” attractive to IR scholars because it seems to allow them to stand outside of gender while they analyze gender and the gendered relationships of international politics. Yet many feminists have resisted conceptualizations of gender as a variable precisely because they argue one is never outside of gender. Jones’s myth “gender is a variable” only functions so long as it can claim not just a gender-neutral status (equality to all genders) but a gender-free status (being outside of gender altogether). And here Jones runs

Box 5.1  What would it mean for gender to be a variable? 1 Gender could be placed and contained in some distinct thing called a variable. 2 This “gender variable” would itself be outside of gender. It would be free of gender.

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into a problem, because the effect of his use of the gender variable is to construct a gendered relationship between IR and feminism, a relationship in which feminism is once again placed in the stereotypical feminized position as irrational, unbalanced, and in need of male guidance. Left unchecked and unplaced, feminism threatens to destroy IR’s family romance about man, the state, and war. In this chapter, I will explore how Jones mythologizes the existence of gender as a variable by arguing that “the gender variable” should be more balanced. I will focus on how Jones characterizes feminism, assesses feminism’s contribution to the IR/gender debates, and argues for a more comprehensive notion of a gender variable which includes a focus on men and masculinities. Finally, I will reassess Jones’s myth “gender is a variable” through the film Fatal Attraction. Fatal Attraction, the 1987 classic horror thriller about a heterosexual affair gone wrong, in many ways parallels IR’s relationship with feminism. IR scholars are attracted to feminism just as Dan Gallager/Michael Douglas is attracted to Alex Forest/Glenn Close. But this attraction can be fatal to the classic family romance—in Dan Gallager’s case the heterosexual family; in IR’s case war and peace. It is only by placing the feminine Alex—by keeping her in her place—that Dan survives his fatal attraction to her. And it is only by presenting himself as outside of gender that Dan’s placement of Alex seems to be acceptable, so much so that audiences cheer at her demise. But what if neither Dan nor IR can stand outside of gender? Then the myth “gender is a variable” could no longer function because gender could not be isolated from how one sees the world, especially the world of gender.

What does the myth say? Jones’s essay begins with a common IR theme—that the classical tradition of international relations (realist-idealist debates that focus on questions of war and peace; see Chapters 2–4) is experiencing challenges from a number of alternative approaches to IR, including feminism (1996: 405). Jones’s project is to assess whether or not the feminist challenge to the classical tradition has made a contribution to our knowledge of IR. His conclusion is mixed. On the one hand, he credits feminism for its “seminal ‘discovery’ of … the gender variable in international relations” (1996: 407). On the other hand, however, Jones argues that “feminism’s standard equation of gender, an inclusive designation, with women/ femininity, a narrower and more restrictive one” unduly limits what the gender variable is and should be in IR (1996: 407). The gender variable, Jones argues, needs to be expanded to include other aspects of gender, notably men and masculinity (1996: 420–429). Jones spends his essay making his case for the need to expand the gender variable. If Jones is to argue convincingly that the gender variable needs to be expanded, however, he must demonstrate that feminism’s application of it is too restrictive. In making this case, Jones offers answers to three key questions: 1 2 3

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What is feminism? How have feminists made use of the gender variable in IR? How should feminists and other IR scholars apply the gender variable in future?

Gender Table 5.1  What is feminism for Jones? Subject of feminism

Women as historical and political actors

Epistemology of feminism

Grounded in the realm of women’s experiences

Normative agenda of feminism

1 Seek global transformations toward greater equality for women and the feminine because both are historically underprivileged, under-represented, and under-recognized 2 Equality for women and the feminine must overcome suppression of women by men as “an international ruling class”

What is feminism for Jones? Jones suggests that “few schools of criticism are as diverse and diffuse as feminism” (1996: 405). Even so, he identifies “three essential features of feminist theories,” while allowing that some postpositivist feminists might not accept all of these features (1996: 406; see Table 5.1). In terms of their subject of analysis, all feminist theories “focus on women as historical and political actors” (1996: 406). In terms of how they conduct their analyses, all feminists share “an epistemological foundation in the realm of women’s experience” (1996: 406). Finally, in terms of their normative outlook, all feminists contend that “women and the feminine constitute historically underprivileged, under-represented, and under-recognized social groups and ‘standpoints’; and this should change in the direction of greater equality” (1996: 406). Later in his essay, Jones adds a fourth point to his list of feminist features. He writes, “It is fair to say that a very common motif, one that almost deserves inclusion on a list of feminism’s defining features, is of men as an international ruling class, their internal squabbles secondary to the basic challenge of suppressing women” (1996: 408). What is wrong with feminism is also what, for Jones, is wrong with feminism’s application of the gender variable in IR. Feminism’s concern with women and the feminine makes it too narrow, and its research program is normatively based. It not only attempts to improve women’s lives, it seems to place the blame for the difficulties women face squarely on men (if Jones’s fourth point is taken into account). And all of this adds up to suspect scholarship because it means that feminism is driven by a normative agenda. And this has no place in proper scholarship, according to Jones. Allowing a quote from Sara Ruddick to speak for all feminists, Jones argues that “feminists are partisans for women” (Ruddick, 1989: 235, quoted in Jones, 1996). But Jones reminds us that “partisanship and scholarship do not always mix easily” (Jones, 1996: 407). To make his point that feminist IR scholarship’s partisanship makes its use of the gender variable unbalanced—because it includes positive analyses of women and femininity, but primarily negative, if any, analyses of men and masculinity—Jones offers a few examples of what he sees as feminist IR scholars’ use of the gender variable. These serve as his answer to question 2 above, “How have

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Gender Table 5.2  How have feminists made use of the gender variable? Topic/theme

Feminist argument

Contribution to IR?

Opposed dualisms

Male and masculine structures privilege men and exclude women. These structures must be supplemented “by incorporating the gender variable,” thereby creating more opportunities for women

No, because it blames men and masculinities for how the world is

Realist state

1 The state as either masculinist or male (radical feminist argument)

No, because it is an extreme and essentialist view of the state

2 “The personal is political” (liberal feminist argument)

Yes, and it should be added to the three other levels of analysis—individual, state, and international

Rational-actor model

Labels of Western-style rationality as a peculiarly male/masculinist phenomenon reflecting and perpetuating patriarchal power. Can be corrected with stereotypical “Mother Earth” essentialist ways of thinking about actors

No, because the argument boils down to men and masculinity are essentially bad, and women and femininity are essentially good

Realist conceptions of power and security

1 Expand the range of power relationships that realism considers

Yes, because gendered power relationships should be included in realism

2 Redefine power

No, because it sneaks in feminist normative agenda by adding in prescriptions about what power should be rather than descriptions of what power is

feminists made use of the gender variable in IR?” Jones’s answer is, restrictively (Table 5.2). Jones’s conclusion that “feminist attempts to come to grips with the gender variable remain limited, even radically constrained” (1996: 406) follows from his illustrations of how what he has characterized as feminism has engaged with realism, the privileged pillar of the classical tradition. Jones identifies four themes/topics on which feminists have critiqued realism: (1) opposed dualisms; (2) the realist assumption of the state; (3) the rational-actor model; and (4) realist conceptions

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of power and security. Jones suggests that feminists are not alone in criticizing realism on these topics. But “what is distinctive about the feminist orientation is the incorporation of the gender variable, and the exploration of its influence on women and (to a lesser extent) society as a whole” (1996: 409). So on the topic of opposed dualisms, when feminists critique realism for being “inextricably bound up with a hierarchical world order,” what feminists focus on is “the extent to which realist discourse perpetuates gender hierarchies along with hierarchies of class and state” (1996: 410). Notwithstanding postpositivist feminist critiques that examine realism’s construction of and construction through hierarchies, Jones places his emphasis here on liberal feminist engagements with realism because, as he argues, “there are signs that it [liberal feminism] may be staging a comeback as some of the more paradoxical and stifling aspects of postpositivism become evident” (1996: 410). What do liberal feminists say about realism and gender hierarchies? According to Jones, these feminists argue that “what is male/masculine is standard, universal, the measure by which everything other is judged” (1996: 410). This has the effect of privileging men and masculinities in politics, economics, and academics. And so liberal feminism “concentrates its efforts on supplementing classical frameworks by incorporating the gender variable” (1996: 410). In practice, this means opening up structures that have “ordinarily been a male preserve” to women (1996: 410). Turning to feminist analyses of the realist state, Jones (using the work of radical feminist Catherine MacKinnon) argues that feminists describe the state as either masculinist or male, which implies that the state cannot provide security for all of its citizens (Jones, 1996: 412; MacKinnon, 1989: 163). Jones dismisses feminists like MacKinnon for overstating their case (an argument, it should be added, made by many feminists as well). In contrast to radical feminism, Jones finds the liberal feminist argument that “the personal is political” so persuasive that he recommends that it should “supplement the triumvirate of ‘levels’ guiding classical analyses of international affairs [individual, state, international, or as Waltz puts it, man, the state, and war; see Chapter 2]” (1996: 413). Concerning the rational-actor model that realism relies upon, Jones argues that again “the distinctive feminist contribution here is the labeling of Westernstyle rationality as a peculiarly male/masculinist phenomenon reflecting and perpetuating patriarchal power” (1996: 413). All he sees feminists offering to counter it are stereotypical “Mother Earth” essentialist ways of thinking about actors. And so, Jones concludes that feminists claim all women are good and all men are bad. Finally, concerning realist conceptions of power and security, Jones claims that feminist contributions here take two forms. “They may seek to illuminate the power relationships that standard commentary has overlooked; or they may propose a radical redefinition of what actually constitutes ‘power’” (1996: 414). Jones approves of the former feminist way of engaging realist conceptions of power and security because, as Jones argues, they rightly draw attention to how the realist model that focuses exclusively on states or state elites “misses a wide range of power relationships that discriminate against women” (1996: 414). But he objects to feminist attempts to redefine power because he sees these as “more prescriptive than descriptive” (1996: 415), thus sneaking in feminism’s normative agenda once more. When these feminist critiques of realism are applied to questions of war and peace, Jones tells us, “the plight of embodied women is front and centre

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throughout, while the attention paid to the male/masculine realm amounts to little more than lip-service” (1996: 412). What all of this tells us is that feminists’ use of the gender variable has been biased from the start against men and masculinities. This is not surprising considering that feminism, as Jones characterizes it, is a tradition that makes a gender-biased argument for a more femininely and womenly engendered world from the beginning. Feminism is unbalanced, even irrational, because of its normative, prescriptive agenda. So, if this is the problem, how can it be corrected? How should feminists and other IR scholars apply the gender variable in future? Jones’s answer is to offer “more balanced and fertile theories of the gender variable’s operation in international relations” (1996: 423) by supplementing the partiality of feminist gender analysis with an analysis of gender focused on men and masculinities. He puts it like this: “My suggestions are feminist-grounded in that they seek to apply a core feminist methodology—isolation of the gender dimension of an issue or phenomenon. But they move beyond presently existing feminist approaches by directing the analytical beam equally toward the gender that is, so far by definition, under-represented in feminist commentary” (1996: 424). Jones argues that his focus on men and masculinities is “a necessary first step towards synthesis: a blending of gendered perspectives that will allow the gender variable and its operations to be examined in more multi-dimensional terms” (1996: 424). Jones offers a list of “issue-areas and phenomena that could help generate real-world research agendas” for his more multidimensionally conceived notion of gender in IR. These include mostly “public” topics—like how men are displaced as refugees during war, how men are the victims of murder and suicide more than women, and how state violence including torture and incarceration overwhelmingly affects men rather than women. They also include a couple of “private” topics like men taking risky and/or badly paying jobs to support their families and being the victims of ethnic attacks (1996: 424–429; see Table 5.3). Overall, Jones’s point is that men suffer disproportionately to women in international relations, and feminism occludes the gendered suffering of men because of its biased research focus on women and the feminine. Feminism’s contribution of the gender variable is a good one, but it has been badly applied to investigations of IR because feminist prescriptions about how the world should be for women detract attention from how the world is for men. Table 5.3  How should feminists and nonfeminists use the gender variable in the future? Public issues and phenomena concerning men to be included

Private issues and phenomena concerning men to be included

1 Men as displaced war refugees

1 Men taking badly paid and/or dangerous jobs to provide for families

2 Men as victims of murder and suicides

2 Men becoming political victims because of ethnic conflicts

3 Men as victims of state violence, including torture and incarceration

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The merits of Jones’s argument—not to mention the (in)accuracy with which he characterizes feminism—are hotly debated, a point I will come back to later (see Carver et al., 1998; Jones, 1998; Zalewski, 1999). Yet, however, right or wrong Jones’s argument about feminism’s uses of the gender variable may be, all Jones’s points assume the myth “gender is a variable.” Writing of the gender variable, Jones suggests that gender can be “isolated” (1996: 410, 424, 424), “incorporated” (1996: 420), “blended” (1996: 424), “balanced” (1996: 423), and “broadened” (1996: 406, 407, 429). In other words, gender is a discrete phenomenon that can be placed in IR. And it is those aspects of feminist IR scholarship which Jones can “add” to IR—like the feminist emphasis on personal politics or feminist attempts to expand the range of power relationships that realism should consider—that Jones credits as genuine contributions to the world of understanding gender relations in international relations. These have a place in IR scholarship, unlike feminist attempts to disturb structures of realism and rationality or to redefine power, according to Jones (see Table 5.2). Because some feminist insights can be added to/placed within IR scholarship, then “the gender variable” can also be added. It can be expanded to include aspects of gendered international politics that Jones claims feminists ritually neglect. All of this is consistent with Jones’s myth that “gender is a variable.” That feminism has unduly restricted the place of gender in IR does not detract from Jones’s myth that “gender is a variable.” All it means is that the gender variable’s placement and place must be reconsidered in view of gender studies of men and masculinities. What if “placing” gender is not as easy as Jones suggests? What if gender is not something to be placed or added to but something through which the world is viewed? If gender is a way of seeing the world—a worldview—then it cannot be a variable, because a variable is something that is placed in a world. And it is as a worldview that feminist and gender scholars regularly describe gender. For example, consider the definition of one feminist, V. Spike Peterson that Jones includes in his essay. Even though Jones quotes Peterson as evidence of his myth “gender is a variable,” Peterson instead writes of gender as a worldview. Feminist scholarship, both deconstructive and reconstructive, takes seriously the following two insights: first, that gender is socially constructed, producing subjective identities through which we see and know the world, and, second, that the world is pervasively shaped by gendered meanings. That is, we do not experience or “know” the world as abstract “humans” but as embodied, gendered beings. As long as that is the case, accurate understanding of agents—as knowable and as knowers—requires attention to the effects of our “gendered states.” (my italics; Peterson, quoted in Jones, 1996: 406). Peterson’s discussion of feminist scholarship and its conceptualization of gender have nothing in common with Jones’s list of “essential feminist features” (see Table 5.4). Furthermore, she discusses gender not as something that can be placed but instead as something that helps us to place things—events, people, and ideas—that we encounter in our everyday world. If gender is a worldview, a perspective on the world, then no amount of arguing for the expansion of gender as a variable will make gender something that can be placed or, for that matter, kept in its place.

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Gender Table 5.4  Jones’s characterization of feminism vs. Peterson’s characterization of feminism Jones

Peterson

Feminism = normative program

Feminism = worldview

Characteristics of feminism: 1 Feminist subjects are women and the feminine 2 Feminist epistemology is grounded in women’s experiences 3 Feminist normative agenda is to promote women’s equality and to blame men and masculinity for global injustices

Characteristics of feminism: 1 Gender is socially constructed, producing subjective identities through which we see and know the world 2 The world is pervasively shaped by gendered meanings; therefore, we “know” the world as gendered beings

So why do IR scholars like Jones try so hard to “place” gender? Could it be that they fear that their own privileged perspectives on international politics and their own centralized questions might be displaced—if not replaced—by feminist ones? Put differently, if left unchecked, might disruptive and inappropriate feminist questions disturb IR’s traditional worldview, in which we see primarily “man, the state, and war”? The urgency to place gender—especially the feminine—and the question of whether gender can be placed are explored in the film Fatal Attraction. Fatal Attraction works hard to distinguish between good expressions of the feminine (mother/wife) and bad expressions of the feminine (vengeful lover) in order to leave undisturbed a worldview that makes us sympathetic to the plight of the male lead, a character who fears unbounded femininity. Yet to achieve these things, isn’t the film told from a gendered point of view? And if this is the case, then the film raises the more general question, “isn’t any ‘placing’ of gender always a gendered placing?” Put differently, “isn’t it impossible to stand outside of gender, especially when trying to put gender in its place?”

Fatal Attraction Fatal Attraction is a horror thriller in which what is at stake is the survival of the Gallager family, composed of Dan, his wife Beth, and their daughter, Ellen. The horror genre of the film is established from the very first frame. The credits and title of the film appear on a black background. No music plays. The background becomes the New York sky, and soon we see a very industrial skyline, unlike the typical New York cityscape filmgoers would recognize. Subdued city sounds are heard. As the camera takes us across the skyline to focus on the window of one apartment, the eerie city sounds are replaced by family sounds. We hear a children’s television program in which a woman and a small girl are conversing. Cut to interior of the apartment. Beth Gallager, in T-shirt and underwear, is rushing about the room picking things up and encouraging Dan to hurry. Beth and Dan are going out to a party connected to Dan’s work. Dan, also dressed in a shirt and underwear, is stretched

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out on a couch, listening to music through headphones while working on some papers. On an adjacent couch, daughter Ellen in pajamas and robe watches the television. The family dog rests its sleeping head on Ellen’s lap. The wife of another couple, who wants to know what Beth will wear to the party, rings. They coordinate outfits. Ellen plays with her mother’s makeup, and Beth cleans her up. Dan asks where his suit is, Beth tells him, and there he finds it freshly dry-cleaned. The contrast between what is outside the Gallager’s apartment and what is inside could not be more stark. Outside is danger, represented by scary sounds and eerie landscapes. Inside is the comfort and routine which comes with a traditional family arrangement. Everything outside is unsettling. Everything inside is safe and secure, made possible by Dan’s work outside the home and Beth’s work as a homemaker. Insecurity is quickly introduced into the Gallager family, however, through Alex Forest, a single woman whom Dan meets briefly at the party that evening and who, we learn later, lives in the eerie warehouse part of the city. We first see Alex when Dan’s friend, Jimmy, makes a pass at her. Alex gives him the coldest of looks. Jimmy says to Dan (who sees all this), “If looks could kill … [giggling],” foreshadowing the danger Alex embodies. Later, Dan and Alex meet by chance at the bar. They are surprised, a bit embarrassed, and they laugh nervously as they recognize one another. Dan: [laughing] No, I’m not sayin’ anything. I’m not even gonna look. Alex: [also laughing] Was it that bad? Dan: [still laughing] Well, let’s just say I was glad I wasn’t on the receiving end of that one. Alex: [lightly] I hate it when guys think they can come on like that. Dan: Ah, Jimmy’s ok. He’s just a little insecure like the rest of us. Dan begins this last comment looking straight ahead, but when he gets to the part about insecurity, he turns and looks right at Alex. The move is charming, even seductive, as revelations of male insecurity often are. Alex clearly finds Dan to be charming. Dan introduces himself, and Alex and Dan begin a conversation. Then Beth beckons Dan from the corner of the room. Dan: I have to go. Alex: Is that your wife? Dan: Yup. Alex: [coyly, making a joke of it] Better run along [giggles]. Dan and Beth leave. When they get home, Beth, undressing in the bedroom, says to Dan, “Aren’t you forgetting something?” Dan, like us, seems to take Beth’s words as a sexual advance. Beth then points to the dog who needs walking. When Dan returns, he finds his daughter Ellen in bed with Beth. Dan looks disappointed, and Beth, smiling, tells him, “It’s just for tonight, honey.” The price of domestic bliss is stereotypically spelled out for us, as it is for Dan, and that price is passion. The next morning, Beth and Ellen go off to the country to look at a house Beth is interested in. She has long wanted to move the family to the country. She and Ellen will be away for the night. Dan stays behind because he has a rare Saturday meeting. As it happens, Alex is also at the meeting. She is the editor of a

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publishing company Dan’s law firm is representing. Alex and Dan again by chance run into one another after their meeting. Caught in the rain and unable to get a taxi, Dan suggests they go get a drink together. They end up having dinner and discussing the possibility of taking the evening further. Alex: Where’s your wife? Dan: Where’s my wife [surprised by the question]? My wife is in the country visiting her parents for the weekend. Alex: And you’re here with a strange girl being a naughty boy. Dan: I don’t think having dinner with somebody is a crime. Alex: Not yet, anyway. Dan: Will it be? Alex: I don’t know. What do you think? Dan: I definitely think it’s gonna be up to you [laughing nervously]. Alex: We were attracted to one another at the party, that was obvious. You’re on your own for the night, that’s also obvious. We’re two adults…. Dan: [hardly able to get out the words] I’ll get the check. And so their passionate weekend begins. First we see the famous scene in which they have sex on top of Alex’s kitchen sink full of dirty dishes (and we think, Beth just uses her sink to clean the dishes). They move into the bedroom, and when they finally speak, Alex says “That was great.” And Dan keeps saying, more to himself than to her it seems, “Thank God. Thank God.” They go out dancing, return to Alex’s apartment, and have sex in the elevator. Dan spends the night. He returns home and learns that Beth won’t be home that night as expected. And so, with Alex’s persuasion, he spends the day with her, bringing the family dog with him. But as Dan goes to leave after dinner and sex, Alex asks him to stay. When he won’t, she slits her wrists and tells him she is sorry if she upset him. Dan stays to look after her. From this point on, the cool, collected, and careerist Alex turns increasingly weird. She starts by harassing Dan with phonecalls and visits, behavior which is not out of the question for someone who feels hurt and scorned and who wants to let Dan know their brief affair has left her pregnant. But then her behavior turns dangerous when Dan rejects her. Alex pours acid on Dan’s car, kidnaps his daughter for an afternoon, and, in a scene reminiscent of Hitchcock, boils his daughter’s bunny. In the film’s climax, the over-the-top Alex attacks Beth in the bathroom of the family home, only to be nearly drowned by Dan and finally shot and killed by Beth. The film’s closing shot is of the family photo of Dan, Beth, and Ellen. Family life for the Gallagers has finally been rescued. Even though it is Alex who is killed in the film, it is Dan who is portrayed as the film’s fearful victim. Indeed, Fatal Attraction—like any good horror film—is a paranoia picture, and the paranoia belongs to Dan. But, unlike classical horror films, Dan’s paranoia is not introduced into the plot in reaction to something Alex has done. It is something Dan has felt since he was a small child. The film discloses this early on. As Dan and Alex share an evening together during their weekend-long affair, they listen to the opera Madame Butterfly. They both agree that this is their favorite opera. And then Dan reminisces, “My father told me she was gonna kill herself. I was terrified.”

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While Dan’s confession foreshadows Alex’s suicide attempt and her ultimate suicidal gesture of attacking Beth which results in Alex’s death, it does more than this. It asks the question, “why was he terrified?” Terror seems like an unlikely response—even for a young boy—to the information his father has given him. Sad, sorry, upset, even relieved. But terrified? What did this boy have to fear? What does Dan have to fear now? And why—if the conclusion to this opera was so terrifying for young Dan—is it his favorite opera as an adult? As the film jumps from romance to suspense to horror, it answers these questions. What Dan fears is what the film stereotypes as unbounded female emotion—an irrationality that turns Dan into a victim of Alex’s vengeful anger when Dan tries to end their affair. But this unbounded female emotion also releases Dan’s passion, something the film shows him experiencing only with Alex and never with his wife Beth (Conlon, 1996). This makes his attraction to Alex understandable. Yet because of his affair with Alex, Dan’s family romance with Beth and Ellen is nearly shattered. For Dan, all of that is pretty scary. His attraction to Alex could be fatal to his sense of family. All of this points to how the film makes sense of the world (Box 5.2). The world of Fatal Attraction is a world in which there is no higher value than living in a secure heterosexual nuclear family. This legitimate family gives meaning to one’s life. This is the case as much for Alex as it is for Dan. For without a legitimate family (a marriage, a child), a woman like Alex is not valued. She is someone with whom a married man like Dan can have an affair and discard—or at least she should be and would be if she respected the implicit rules pertaining to affairs with married men. But Alex is not your typical woman. She is located outside of the reasonable limits of the heterosexual nuclear family—the only context in which reasonable behavior is portrayed in the film. Fatal Attraction works hard to present Alex as irrational. Never mind that Alex is a successful New York editor, a woman who controls her own life and her own body. None of this gives her life meaning because, the film tells us, legitimate meaning comes only from legitimate family. When Alex discovers she is pregnant with Dan’s child, her hopes for a legitimate family seem to compel her down the path of increasingly bizarre behavior. Remember the acid, boiled bunny, kidnapping, and attempted murder. Each irrational gesture has its basis in her lack of a legitimate place in a legitimate family. Woman on her own, the film tells us, is a mess. This is in contrast to how the film portrays both Beth and Dan. If Alex is irrational because she is a woman out of place, Beth is a reasonable woman struggling to hold onto her legitimate place in the heterosexual family. She is a good wife and a good mother. She seems to have no responsibilities beyond those created by the marriage and the marital home. She makes Dan’s life easy, and for this

Box 5.2  How does Fatal Attraction make sense of the world? By valuing the traditional heterosexual nuclear family. There is no higher value than living in a secure family. This legitimate family gives meaning to one’s life.

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Gender Table 5.5  The place of woman in Fatal Attraction Legitimate woman (Beth Gallager)

Illegitimate woman (Alex Forest)

Place

Within the heterosexual nuclear family

Outside the heterosexual nuclear family

Characteristics

Good wife Good mother

Independent personally and professionally. This independence is coded in the film as barrenness and failure

Behavior

Rational

Irrational

she is rewarded with legitimacy. By killing Alex, it is Beth who rescues her family (see Table 5.5). Dan, too, is a character in place. Forget his (irrational?) fear and attraction to a woman out of place. Dan is a rational man with a successful career as a lawyer and a traditional marriage. Even though he has an affair with Alex, he makes it clear from the beginning that this affair is not to interfere with his marriage. This is a reasonable position. And he falls back on “adult agreements” and “rules” whenever he finds it necessary to keep Alex in her place. As long as Alex seems to be safely in her place, Dan feels free to pursue his affair with her. We see this in a scene in which, shortly after their weekend together, Alex appears in Dan’s office to thank him for “not running away” when she slit her wrists and to invite him to the opera as a way of saying “thank you.” Dan refuses. Alex accepts this refusal, gets up to leave, and extends her hand for Dan to shake in good-bye. But Dan embraces her instead while (in the director’s cut of the film) Alex utters, wonderingly, “When does ‘no’ mean ‘no’?” It seems that “no” only means “no” when Dan fears he cannot keep Alex in her place. That fear of not being able to keep Alex in her place begins during their lovers’ weekend. Dan gushes on about his family life, explaining to Alex how lucky he is. Alex asks, “So what are you doing here?” Dan’s only reply is “Boy, you know how to ask the wrong thing.” This is illustrated in another scene, this time after Alex turns up at Dan’s apartment, meets his wife, and secures his unlisted phone number and new address. Afterwards, Alex (who Dan now knows is pregnant with his child) tells Dan, “I’m not gonna be ignored,” and she asks Dan “what are you so afraid of?” Dan gets increasingly agitated and casts Alex as hysterical. Dan: Alex: Dan: Alex:

You’re so sad, you know that, Alex. Don’t you ever pity me, you bastard. I’ll pity you. I’ll pity you because you’re sick. Why? Because I won’t allow you to treat me like some slut you can bang a couple of times and throw in the garbage?

Dan says nothing in reply. In contrasting Dan’s and Alex’s responses to their affair, the film tells us what is typical and deviant in the world of Fatal Attraction (Table 5.6). What is typical

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Gender Table 5.6  What is typical and what is deviant in the world of Fatal Attraction? Typical

Deviant

To respect the heterosexual nuclear family as the only legitimate and reasonable source of meaning

To disturb the heterosexual nuclear family through outside, irrational, and illegitimate influences

is for the heterosexual nuclear family to be respected as the only legitimate— and therefore reasonable—source of meaning. What is deviant is for this family romance to be disturbed by outside, irrational, and illegitimate forces—like a pregnant discarded mistress. This does not mean that a man like Dan cannot have the occasional affair. It does mean that whatever he does, his behavior must not pose a threat to his family life with Beth, Ellen, the dog, and that poor bunny. This point is emphasized in Dan’s confessional scene to Beth. Beth does not get angry when she learns that Dan had an affair with a woman he does not love. But she is irate when she learns that Dan has impregnated Alex because Alex’s illegitimate claim to a family with Dan now threatens Beth’s legitimate family. Dan’s mistake is not that he had an affair. His mistake is that he had an affair with Alex—a woman who does not respect reasonable limits, a woman who does not stay in her place, a woman who does not behave as Dan assumed she would. And for this viewers generally feel sorry for him. Poor Dan. Ok, he might not be the best guy in the world because he cheats on his wife. But this Alex woman is a maniac! The film tells us that femininity must be kept in its place. One way of placing femininity is by securing it within a traditional domestic setting through a traditional marriage. This is where we find Beth. The only other rational ways to place it, the film tells us, are either to ignore it (which Dan fails to do) or to kill it. And of course, the demanding, irrational Alex, as a woman out of place trying to weasel her way into the Gallagers’ traditional family, ends up dead. By concluding with the family photo, the film tells us that family life—what is traditional—can be rescued, so long as the feminine is kept in its place one way or another. Fatal Attraction is a popular, antifeminist response to feminism. Its message is that women like Alex—independent, demanding, and out of place—have gone too far. When woman and the feminine are out of place, all hell can break loose. And when it does, it is at the expense of things traditional (like the family) and of the traditional leaders of things traditional (men). Fatal Attraction also tells us that if we now have to take gender issues seriously—like those of a “liberated” woman like Alex Forest—then we had better not forget that gender is a problem for men like Dan Gallager as well. Put differently, if Alex’s “personal is political,” then so is Dan’s. Dan has a family to support. That can be boring and passionless sometimes, and, because of this, Dan seeks sexual excitement with Alex. But he is first and foremost a family man who wants his family life to be respected, unthreatened, and unchanged. Dan’s mistake is that he thinks he can “add” Alex/passion/unbounded feminine emotion to his life without changing it. Dan’s mistake is the same mistake IR makes with feminism. IR thinks it can “add” feminist and gender issues to IR without upsetting the core issues of the discipline of IR and how they are studied. Fatal Attraction is very clear about why Dan thinks he can get away with keeping

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Alex in her place. It is because the film is told from Dan’s point of view, made legitimate by the film’s coding of the traditional heterosexual nuclear family as the only legitimate source of meaning. We are introduced to events through Dan’s family. We follow Dan’s life. We sympathize with Dan’s character. Fatal Attraction is Dan’s story. Feminists would argue that, told from Dan’s point of view, Fatal Attraction is far from a gender-neutral tale. It is the tale of one man’s reaction to unbounded feminine emotion (the film’s symbolic equivalent for feminism) which he views as unbalanced and excessive. And his reaction is a reasonable one—and one with which we sympathize—because it is grounded in Dan’s (and many viewers’) respect for the traditional family. If you doubt this, recall that Alex has a very different story to tell about her affair with Dan, one that the film works hard to delegitimize. Because Fatal Attraction is only able to place Alex as the symbol of feminist excesses by telling its story from the point of view of Dan Gallager, the film raises the question, “Does IR theory tell its story about feminism and the gender variable from a particular point of view?” And, if so, “What is Jones’s point of view?”

Placing feminism in IR? Jones believes that “the gender variable” needs to be more balanced because it occludes objective consideration of issues concerning men and masculinities in international politics. Jones credits feminism for introducing gender issues into IR. But he faults feminists for restrictively analyzing gender in IR. Their normative focus on women and the feminine means that they either neglect or disparage men and the masculine. For Jones, feminism has a gendered perspective—women and the feminine. And that gendered perspective is what limits the contribution feminism could make to IR debates. By “adding” men and masculinities to the gender variable, Jones claims to be correcting feminism’s unbalanced perspective. If Jones’s myth “gender is a variable” (not to mention his claim that feminists’ use of the gender variable is unbalanced) is to function, it must be indebted to no particular gendered point of view. It must stand outside of gender and of any potentially gendered or genderable perspective. It must be neutral, a partisan for no one and nothing. It must be objective and non-normative. In other words, it must be all those things Jones accuses feminism of not being. Just as Fatal Attraction tells its story about placing gender from a particular perspective, however, so too does Jones. Of course, Jones tells the story of feminism and IR’s implicit need to place it in a variable from his own perspective. But what makes Jones’s perspective so compelling? What gives it meaning? What makes us think, “yeah, this guy has a point”? Just like Dan Gallager’s story, Adam Jones’s story is told in defense of a cherished tradition. For Dan, it is the traditional heterosexual nuclear family. For Jones, it is IR’s classical tradition of realist/idealist treatments of questions of war and peace. It is only because the classical tradition is the only place in which legitimate meaning is located that Jones’s story about feminism’s meaningless and unfair excesses makes sense. And it is only because feminism is taken to be full of excesses that it must be placed in “the gender variable” and replaced with what Jones sees as a more balanced gender variable—one balanced by attending to men and masculinities, by the way the world of IR really is, rather than how feminists wish it would be (see Table 5.7).

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Gender Table 5.7  Gendered perspectives in Fatal Attraction and traditional IR theory Fatal Attraction

Traditional IR theory

Point of view

Dan Gallager’s

Adam Jones’s

Perspective

Traditional—legitimate meaning is based on the legitimacy of the heterosexual nuclear family

Traditional—legitimate meaning is based on the legitimacy of the classic IR tradition’s treatment of questions of war and peace

How feminine/feminist “excesses” are managed

• added through an illegitimate affair • ignored • killed

• added through the ­“gender variable” • feminist work inconsistent with Jones’s characterization of the “gender variable” is ignored • feminine/feminist “gender variable” replaced by (killed off with) a more “balanced” gender variable that re-emphasizes men and masculinities

Jones is relatively up-front about his privileging of the classical tradition in IR as the standard against which any feminist “contributions” will be judged. His article opens by reminding us that “In the last two decades, the classical tradition in international relations has come under sustained attack” and he wants to evaluate the merits of the feminist attack (1996: 405). He couches the objective of his article in relation to the classical tradition: “This article seeks to provide an overview of some major contributions and features of feminist IR thinking, with particular attention to the problem of war and peace that has attracted adherents of the classical approach more than any other” (1996: 406). And then he evaluates feminism in terms of what it has “added to” the classical approach (1996: 408–420). What is so interesting in Jones’s article, though, is that the article itself refuses to recognize that “the classical approach” might not be a neutral point of view. It is like Dan’s view of the traditional family and an affair in relation to it. Any reasonable person would see things exactly as Dan sees them, the film suggests. Similarly, Jones seems to suggest that any reasonable person would see the classical tradition’s approach to questions of war and peace as just what IR is about. Consider our first three myths. All of them are firmly within the classical tradition, focusing as they do on questions of war and peace among sovereign nation-states in international anarchy. But none of these myths questions the classical tradition itself—the institutionalized context which makes questions of war and peace and mainstream approaches to investigating them meaningful. Yet that is exactly what feminism does. It questions the classical tradition itself. Like Alex Forest, it is not content to simply accept the “rules of the game” as already established by traditional social arrangements. Feminism, like Alex, asks of the classical tradition the “wrong questions,” like “what makes these questions and approaches meaningful?”; “how are these meanings related to one another

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Box 5.3  The “wrong” questions feminism asks of traditional IR theory 1 What makes traditional IR questions and approaches meaningful? 2 How are these meanings related to one another hierarchically? 3 How do these meanings enable us to make value judgements that help us to place people and things as legitimate or illegitimate? 4 What is traditional IR theory’s normative agenda, and how does it use gender to secure this agenda while appearing to be gender-neutral and gender-free? 5 Should normatively masculine understandings of the world be the only legitimate ways of seeing the world?

hierarchically?”; and “how do these meanings enable us to make value judgements that help us to place people and things as legitimate or illegitimate?” (see Box 5.3). These sorts of questions are dangerous to the classical approach to IR because they expose IR’s classical tradition as not (necessarily) value-neutral or as partisan for no one. And it is Jones who warns us that “partisanship and scholarship do not always mix easily” (1996: 407). Just as a feminist perspective has a normative agenda, feminists would argue, so does the classical approach. And that normative agenda, they would argue, is one that privileges subjects and sexualities that are constructed as “normal”—heterosexual married men would be one example; masculinist understandings of reason, another (for a discussion of normativity in global LGBT human rights regimes, see Chapter 11). And feminists go further than this. They ask, “Is this the way things should be?” “Should normatively masculine ways of understanding the world and judging the value of things in the world continue to be the only legitimate ways of seeing the world?” By posing these questions, feminists would argue, they are not ignoring men and masculinities but thinking about them critically. As such, they would argue, feminism provides a corrective to the tendency in IR to see only men and masculinities and see them in an unreflective light. Feminists have made a political choice to take a self-aware, “biased” view of the world to compensate and, it is to be hoped, transform traditional ways of seeing the world that occlude women and femininities as well as non-normative men and masculinities. At least they are open about their “partisanship,” they would argue, unlike proponents of the classical tradition. By being unapologetic about its normative claims and by suggesting that all traditions have normative claims (disclosed or undisclosed), feminism jeopardizes everything near and dear to the hearts of proponents of the classical tradition. They can no longer ignore feminism, because that would be “politically incorrect.” But they can still do their best not to take it seriously. How Dan refuses to take Alex seriously in the film is by caricaturing her as a stereotypical female hysteric. She is a nutcase. Unsurprisingly, Jones does the very same thing (if in milder terms) to IR feminists. He casts them as “unbalanced,” a nicer way of saying they are “irrational” (1996: 423). And, in the terms in which they must be understood from the perspective of the classical approach, they “are.” That, however, is one of feminism’s points. It is only because the classical tradition has a particular gendered point of view—one that necessarily sees most

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feminist questions as threatening and therefore stereotypes them as femininely unbalanced—that its proponents like Jones can “place” feminism at all. Recall Peterson’s description of feminism. For Peterson, feminism is a worldview that investigates how “gender is socially constructed, producing subjective identities through which we see and know the world” and “that the world is pervasively shaped by gendered meaning” (1996: 406). If one cannot know the world except from a gendered perspective, as feminists argue, then it is impossible for there to be either a gender-neutral or a gender-free standpoint from which to view the world. How Jones sees feminism—as unbalanced and in need of guidance from the classical tradition (guidance he provides)—betrays that Jones’s way of seeing the world, especially the world of gender, is itself traditionally gendered. If gender is not a place but a worldview, then it is not surprising that Dan Gallager cannot keep Alex Forest in her place outside the marital relationship any more than Adam Jones can keep feminism in its place inside a “gender variable” in its relationship with IR theory. Alex will not stay in her place because her “role” is a disruptive one in the Gallagers’ traditional family romance. It isn’t that Alex has anything against the traditional family. Clearly not, for she wants to have one herself with Dan. But once Dan crosses the line and invites her into his life, Dan cannot manage her as “a discrete relationship” (Jones, 1996: 423) that can be added to his life when he wants it and forgotten about when he doesn’t. For better and for worse, Alex changes everything about Dan’s familial relationships. Interestingly, it is not Dan but Beth (the good, antifeminist girl) who ultimately deals with Alex (the bad, feminist girl) and resecures the Gallagers’ traditional family. It’s similar for feminism and IR. IR’s attempts to place gender are doomed to fail because gender is not a discrete relationship which can be added to IR when (mostly male) IR scholars decide that they can control it and ignored when they decide that they can’t. Feminist questions are scary for IR scholars in the classical tradition because they don’t allow IR scholars to ignore their own normative—and gendered—perspectives. And for this, Jones gives them “the gender variable” as their “‘seminal’ discovery” (1996: 423)—a place within IR from which they can reasonably get on with the work of doing gender in IR. Jones’s move is a sort of proposal to IR feminists. You can join the classical tradition on legitimate terms and enter the traditional family as full, legitimate members, he seems to tell them, so long as you give up on your destabilizing behavior. Be Beth, a domesticated but happy antifeminist. Don’t be Alex, a “free” but unhappy (and ultimately dead) feminist. What irks feminists most about Jones’s “proposal” is that he claims it is “feminist-grounded” (1996: 424), when the only ground it protects is that of the classical tradition. Even so, feminists point out that Jones’s gendered moves to domesticate feminism in a variable all evidence what makes Jones’s myth “gender is a variable” function. Jones only recognizes the gendered claims of feminism—claims feminists never try to conceal. Jones, on the other hand, fails to recognize his own gendered claims—claims that give meaning to the classical tradition’s approach to feminist questions. And, of course, these must go without saying. Because if Jones’s own position (and that of the classical tradition) are themselves gendered, then Jones fails to offer a gender-neutral, much less gender-free, account of gender. Gender, it seems, has no place in IR theory—not because it is “unbalanced” and therefore out of bounds, but because it is something through which we see the world and therefore no “home” can hold it.

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Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1: Feminism The best way to get a sense of what feminism is and the impact it has had on IR theory and international politics is to read feminist IR theorists themselves. This approach also helps readers to stay focused on feminist questions about international politics rather than on disciplinary IR questions about feminism of the sort someone like Jones asks of feminism (Zalewski, 1995). Elshtain’s Women and War and Enloe’s Bananas, Beaches and Bases are the traditional starting places for an encounter with feminist IR theory. Accessibly written and full of illustrations, they provide lively introductions into the literature, as do a number of books that either look to IR theory more specifically (Peterson and Runyan, 2009; Sylvester, 1994; Tickner, 1992; Tickner and Sjoberg, 2011) or that provide collections of feminist IR writings (Grant and Newland, 1991; Peterson, 1992). Angela Davis (1981), Gayatri Spivak (1986, 1988), and Chandra Mohanty (1988) stage important interventions into the whiteness of feminist theorizing and activism. You might end up with a look at Tickner’s (2010) lament that mainstream IR theorists might never understand what feminists are talking about, or push ahead to more recent feminist IR writings by Synne Dyvik, Toni Haastrup, Marsha Henry, Laura J. Shepherd, and Lauren Wilcox.

Suggested reading Davis, Angela (1981) Women, Race and Class. New York: Random House. Dyvik, Synne (2017) Gendering Counterinsurgency: Performativity, Experience and Embodiment in the Afghan ‘Theatre of War’. London: Routledge. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987) Women and War. New York: Basic Books. Enloe, Cynthia (1989) Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Grant, Rebecca and Kathleen Newland (eds) (1991) Gender and International Relations. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Haastrup, Toni (2019) “Women, Peace and Security—the African Experience,” Political Insight 10(1): 9–11. Henry, Marsha (2007) “Gender, Security and Development,” Conflict, Security and Development 7(1): 61–84. Mohanty, Chandra (1988) “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” Feminist Review 30.1: 61–88. Peterson, V. Spike (ed.) (1992) Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Political Theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Peterson, V. Spike and Anne Sisson Runyan (2009) Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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Gender Shepherd, Laura J. (ed.) (2010) Gender Matters in Global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations. London: Routledge. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1986) “Imperialism and Sexual Difference,” Oxford Literary Review 8(1): 225–244. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1988) “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds). Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, pp. 271–313. Sylvester, Christine (1994) Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tickner, J. Ann (1992) Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. New York: Columbia University Press. Tickner, J. Ann (2010) “You May Never Understand: Prospects for Feminist Futures in International Relations,” Australian Feminist Law Journal 32: 9–20. Tickner, J. Ann and Laura Sjoberg (2011) Feminism and International Relations: Conversations about the Past, Present and Future. New York: Routledge. Wilcox, Lauren (2015) Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zalewski, Marysia (1995) “Well, What Is the Feminist Perspective on Bosnia?” International Affairs 71(2): 339–356.

Topic 2: Masculinity Feminists have long argued that their concern is not only with women (although that is a central focus of their research), but on how genders (femininity and masculinity) construct, constrain, and empower all gendered bodies. They are no strangers to works like Connell’s Masculinities and other classic texts of masculinity (as Carver et al. (1998) argue in their reply to Jones). Feminist IR scholars have not only argued that “gender is not a synonym for women” (Carver, 1996), but they have theoretically and empirically raised the “man” question in international relations (Parpart and Zalewski, 2008; Zalewski and Parpart, 1998) and explored what it means for IR for men to be in the feminist gaze (Carver, 2008). These arguments, written from a feminist perspective, increasingly have to contend with antifeminist concerns about an overbearing feminism erasing of the suffering of men, which have resurfaced in the online “manospheres” of the alt-right, so-called incel communities, and among some “men’s rights” activists (Ging, 2017). An important field within masculinities studies is transmasculinities. Although we have, by some accounts, reached a “transgender tipping point” (Steinmetz, 2014) in the visibility of trans people, transmasculinities still tend to drop out from theorizations of masculinity—especially if undertaken by cis and/or straight scholars (Halberstam, 1998). By contrast, there exists a rich(er) tradition of theorizing “female masculinity” within the queer community (Califia, 1997; Rubin, 1992). Yet even within this community, white affluent (cis) gays, lesbians, and bisexuals all too frequently sever ties with or even mobilize against trans people, articulating a stance Dean Spade (2004) has called “L-GB-fake-T” politics.

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Suggested reading Califia, Patrick (1997) “Manliness,” in S. Stryker and S. Whittle (eds) The Transgender Studies Reader. New York: Routledge, pp. 434–438. Carver, Terrell (1996) Gender is not a Synonym for Women. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Carver, Terrell (2008) “Men in the Feminist Gaze: What Does This Mean in IR?” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 37(1): 107–122. Carver, Terrell, Molly Cochran, and Judith Squires (1998) “Gendering Jones: Feminisms, IRs, and Masculinities,” Review of International Studies 24(2): 283–297. Connell, Raewyn W. (1995) Masculinities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ging, Debbie (2017) “Alphas, Betas, and Incels: Theorizing the Masculinities of the Manosphere,” Men and Masculinities 22(7): 638–657. Halberstam, Jack (1998) Female Masculinity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Parpart, Jane L. and Marysia Zalewski (eds) (2008) Rethinking the Man Question. London and New York: Zed Books. Rubin, Gayle (1992) “Of Catamites and Kings: Reflections on Butch, Gender and Boundaries,” in J. Nestle (ed.) The Persistent Desire: A Butch-Femme Reader. Boston, MA: Alyson Publications, pp. 446–482. Spade, Dean (2004) “Fighting to Win,” in M. B. Sycamore (ed.) That’s Revolting! Queer Strategies for Resisting Assimilation. Berkeley, CA: Soft Skull Press, pp. 31–38. Steinmetz, Katy (2014) “The Transgender Tipping Point.” [online] TIME. Available at: https://time.com/135480/transgender-tipping-point/ [Accessed 11 December 2019]. Zalewski, Marysia and Jane Parpart (eds) (1998) The “Man” Question in International Relations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Topic 3: Queer international relations Since at least 2003 queer studies have become “global queer studies.” This was led in part by Jasbir Puar’s queer analysis of the War on Terror and her introduction of terms like “homonationalism” and “pinkwashing” into international political debate (2003). It was also influenced by David Eng, Judith Halberstam, and José Esteban Muñoz’s (2005) international contextualization of the question “What’s queer about queer studies now?” in their special issue of Social Text. Yet it took a lot longer for international relations to “go queer.” This is not because there hasn’t been significant queer IR work produced by IR scholars since the 1990s (see Peterson, 1999; Weber, 1994b, 1994c, 1998b, 1998c, 1999). Rather, it may well be because the discipline of IR hasn’t known quite what to do with queer work. Yet because queer studies have been exploring questions of state and nation formation, war and peace, and international political economy—what many IR theorists see as the three pillars of the disciplinary content of IR—neglecting queer studies in IR just doesn’t make sense (see Weber, 2016 and the many other Global LGBT Studies and Queer IR Scholars cited in Chapter 11). Given how mainstream

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IR managed (and often still manages) to keep queer work out of the mainstream, it remains worth asking (to paraphrase Martin Wight), “Why is there no queer IR?” (Weber, 2015). A concern I had many years ago (Weber, 1998c) was that queer IR might be treated the way Jones treated feminist IR, this time by trying to place and manage queer IR through a “sexuality variable.” This has happened to some extent, although not as much as I anticipated. What else has been happening are two things. First, queer issues have been narrowed to “LGBT” (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans) issues, which themselves have been narrowed to discussions of the rights of LGBTs to romantic love. This is illustrated in Hillary Clinton’s “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights” speech, which is analyzed in detail in Chapter 11. But the second thing that has happened is that Queer IR work has exploded in and around IR (see, for example, the forum edited by Laura Sjoberg and Cynthia Weber on Queer IR). While Queer IR scholarship too often shares many of the limitations of IR theory in general (around issues of race, ability, class, state-centrism, Eurocentrism, etc.), Queer IR postcolonial and decolonial work is correcting many of these issues, making Queer IR work both a vital and challenging part of the IR canon (Camminga, 2018; Ghazzawi, 2017; Leigh, 2009, 2017; Manchanda, 2015; Rao, 2014, 2020; Richter-Montpetit, 2014, 2018). Whether or not the inclusion of Queer IR work into the discipline of IR will end up being a good thing for queer IR scholars remains to be seen (Weber, 2015), but it is certainly a phenomenon to be watched. And the feminist lessons from Jones’ “gender variable” offer lots of guidance for what to be on the lookout for.

Suggested reading Camminga, B. (2018) “‘The Stigma of Western Words’: Asylum Law, Transgender Identity and Sexual Orientation in South Africa,” Global Discourse 8: 452–469. Eng, David L., Judith Halberstam, and José Esteban Muñoz (2005) “What’s Queer About Queer Studies Now?,” special issue of Social Text 23(3–4): 84–85. Ghazzawi, Razan (2017) “Decolonizing Syria’s So-called ‘Queer Liberation.’” [online] Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/decolonising-syria-called-queer-liberation-170803110403979.html [Accessed 6 February 2019]. Leigh, Darcy (2009) “Colonialism, Gender and the Family in North America: For Gendered Analysis of Indigenous Struggles,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 9(1): 70–88. Leigh, Darcy (2017) “Queer Feminist International Relations: Uneasy Alliances, Productive Tensions,” Alternatif Politika, 9(3). Manchanda, Nivi (2015) “Queering the Pashtun: Afghan Sexuality in the Homonationalist Imaginary,” Third World Quarterly 36(1): 130–146. Peterson, V. Spike (1999) “Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 1(1): 34–65. Puar, Jasbir (2003) Terrorist Assemblages. Durham: Duke University Press. Rao, Rahul (2014) “The Locations of Homophobia,” London Review of International Law 2(2): 169–199.

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Gender Rao, Rahul (2020) Out of Time: The Queer Politics of Postcoloniality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Richter-Montpetit, Melanie (2014) “Beyond the Erotics of Orientalism. Lawfare, Torture and the Racial-Sexual Grammars of Legitimate Suffering,” Security Dialogue 45(1): 43–62. Richter-Montpetit, Melanie (2018) “Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex (in IR) but Were Afraid to Ask: The ‘Queer Turn’ in International Relations,” Millennium 46(2): 220–40. Sjoberg, Laura and Cynthia Weber (eds) (2014) “Forum on Queer International Relations,” International Studies Review 16(4): 596–622. Weber, Cynthia (1994b) “Shoring Up a Sea of Signs: How the Caribbean Basin Initiative Framed the US Invasion of Grenada,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12(5): 547–558. Weber, Cynthia (1994c) “Something’s Missing: Male Hysteria and the US Invasion of Panama,” Genders (19): 171. Weber, Cynthia (1998b) “Performative States,” Millennium 27(1): 77–95. Weber, Cynthia (1998c) “What’s so Queer About IR? Or Beware of the Sexuality Variable,” in Millennium Conference Paper, LSE. Weber, Cynthia (1999) Faking It: US Hegemony in a Post-Phallic Era. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Weber, Cynthia (2015) “Why Is There No Queer International Theory?” European Journal of International Relations 21(1): 27–51. Weber, Cynthia (2016) Queer International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Chapter

6

Globalization Are we at the end of history?

What does the myth say? The Truman Show Liberalism’s internal contradiction, or is the end ever really the end? Suggestions for further thinking

113 118 125 127

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It is appropriate that a book examining IR as a site of cultural practices imbued with conscious and unconscious ideologies should examine a myth that claims that ideological struggles are over. This is precisely what Francis Fukuyama claims in his famous 1989 essay “The End of History?” and later elaborates on in his book The End of History and the Last Man (1992). Fukuyama argues that liberal democracy as a system of governance has won an “unabashed victory” over other ideas to the point that liberalism is the only legitimate ideology left in the world. Not only are there no coherent ideological challengers to liberalism, liberalism itself is free of irrational internal contradictions which lead to the collapse of ideologies. Having no internal contradictions means that liberalism is a finished idea. For Fukuyama, all this marks “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and means that liberalism is “the final form of human government” (1989: 271). Because the history of the conflict of ideas in the form of ideological struggle is now over, all that remains to be done is to spread liberal ideology throughout the world as a material way of life, through social, political, and economic institutions. Fukuyama’s argument could not have been more timely. Published the summer before the Berlin Wall came down, Fukuyama’s essay appeared to have predicted the thawing Cold War’s final melting, a melting made possible by the absence of any credible rivals to liberalism. The supposed predictive power of Fukuyama’s myth was not the only thing that made it popular with IR scholars. If Fukuyama had predicted the end of the Cold War, mainstream IR scholars surely had not. Left bewildered and embarrassed, they looked around for something meaningful to say. Debating the insecurities of anarchy (Chapters 2–4), for example, just wasn’t as gripping as it used to be, now that the US was considered by most to be the uncontested global hegemon and world police officer. IR scholars and their traditional theories were beginning to look obsolete. But, thankfully, Fukuyama’s myth not only foretold the death of the classical Cold War strategic paradigm, it made possible an entirely new realm of research—the study of “globalization.” Globalization became the trendiest craze in IR theory at the turn of the century. What is globalization? That’s a good question, and one with which scholars in and out of IR have had difficulty grappling. Globalization has been described as “a term which can refer to anything from the Internet to a hamburger” (Strange, 1996: xiii). That’s because theorists disagree on just about everything regarding “globalization.” They disagree about when “globalization” started. Some date its beginning after World War II (Leyshon, 1997: 133), while others argue it is as old as capitalism itself (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 2). They disagree about what it expresses (economic, geographic, social, political, or cultural phenomena) and whether or not one or more of these phenomena should be emphasized over the others. And they disagree about whether “globalization” is a process, an ideology (“globalism”) or a “state of being” (“globality”) (Marchand, 2000: 219). Given all these disagreements, it is not surprising that one theorist described “globalization” as simply “a floating sign of many different problematics” (Ó Tuathail, 1998a: 85). Among these many problematics, two stand out. They are two traditions of international political economy—neoliberalism and historical materialism and their expressions of globalization (Table 6.1). Neoliberal expressions of globalization are based in classical liberal economic arguments that see international economic processes as harmonious realms in which economic exchange processes

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Globaliz ation Table 6.1  Neoliberal and historical materialist takes on globalization

Nature of international economic relations

Neoliberal

Historical materialist

Harmonious

Conflictual

Distribution of economic All who participate in goods economic processes benefit

Capitalist economic processes redistribute wealth so that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer

Relationship between politics and economics

Economics should drive politics. Why? Because harmonious, beneficial economic processes can “spill over” and create harmonious, beneficial political processes like democracy within and among sovereign nation-states

Economics does drive politics. Because economic processes are conflictual, this means that political processes are conflictual within and among sovereign nation-states

Take on globalization

Globalization is good because it spreads the economic, political, and cultural benefits of liberalism

Globalization is bad because it does not result in an equitable distribution of global wealth

Globalization’s place in history

It is the “end of history”

It is the capitalist stage of history. History ends at the next stage, when socialism or communism is realized

like free trade spread wealth and increase the quality of life for all who participate. And not only does liberal economics bring economic benefits, it brings political benefits as well, primarily through the spread of liberal democratic institutions in which liberty, freedom, and justice for all are to be guaranteed because the people hold political power. This is why classical liberals believe that economic processes should drive political processes. In an era of “globalization,” classical liberal principles become neoliberal expressions of “globalization,” in which three processes occur simultaneously and for the good of humankind—economic liberalization (like free trade), political democratization (power to the people), and cultural universalization (some would say the “Americanization” of the globe; see Strange, 1996). For neoliberals, “globalization” is about the benevolent spread of liberal economic, political, and cultural processes, institutions, and practices throughout the world. In contrast, historical materialist expressions of “globalization” have their roots in classical Marxism. For historical materialists, economic processes drive political and cultural processes. Unlike neoliberals, historical materialists regard

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international economic processes as conflictual, primarily between economic classes (owners and workers). These conflicts among economic classes are what lead to historical changes in institutions, ideas, and everyday life. History, therefore, is the history of the class struggle (as Marx put it), and history will not end until the class struggle ends. That can only happen when capitalism (our current global economic system) is transcended by communist economic, political, and cultural processes. Historical materialists generally agree with neoliberals that “globalization” is a process, ideology, and/or way of living that spreads capitalist ideas, institutions, and practices throughout the world. But historical materialists strongly disagree with neoliberals on two important points. First, they disagree with neoliberals in thinking that capitalist economics and liberal ideology are not themselves premised on contradictions. They are not the final, complete expressions of economics and politics that someone like Fukuyama claims they are because economic classes are still at odds with one another. Second, this means that liberalism is not the final stage of history. It is not “the end of history.” Rather, it is a step on the way to communism, the real end of history. As these criticisms make clear, historical materialists don’t disagree with Fukuyama that history will have an end. They simply disagree with Fukuyama that liberalism is “the end of history.” Neoliberal expressions of globalization are by far the most influential in IR theory and in policy circles. They seemed to be the most “historically accurate” in the wake of the post-Cold War collapse of socialist and communist states and ideologies. They clearly complemented post-Cold War theories of neoidealism (Chapter 3). And they informed policies that create regional free trade organizations like the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and which affect “global” institutions like the World Trade Organization. There are lots of problems with neoliberal and historical materialist expressions of “globalization,” but this is not the place to debate the shortcomings and merits of each (see Herod et al., 1998). Instead, my interest lies in what these debates and disagreements about “globalization” have to do with Fukuyama’s myth “it is the end of history.” Fukuyama’s myth cleared the ideological ground for neoliberal expressions of globalization to go virtually uncontested. By arguing that the history of ideological struggle was over and liberalism had won, Fukuyama put liberalism itself beyond debate in two important ways. First, because liberalism had “won” out over ideological challengers, this meant that any critiques of liberalism from “old leftist” ideological traditions like socialism and communism (as well as from the “old right” of fascism) were regarded as outdated and need not be taken seriously by IR scholars. Second, because liberalism was presented in Fukuyama’s work as a finished ideology, scholarly attention should be directed away from analysis focused on possible contradictions within liberalism and toward analysis of the global spread of neoliberal processes, institutions, and practices that follow from the “globalization” of liberal ideology. In this chapter, I will explore how Fukuyama’s myth “it is the end of history” makes liberalism the global stage on which international politics in an era of “globalization” unfolds. By Fukuyama’s own account, for his myth to function liberalism must be a finished ideology with no credible external rivals. In other words, liberalism must be free of contradictions, both internally and externally. Fukuyama makes the case that liberalism has no credible external ideological

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threats. But, in directing our attention toward the ideological challengers of liberalism, Fukuyama deflects our attention away from liberalism’s own internal contradiction—the contradiction between its creation of boundless desires within individuals for the good life and its failure to fully satisfy or control these desires. It is only by substituting economic consumption for personal satisfaction that liberalism defers and displaces individual encounters with what Fukuyama admits is “the empty core of liberalism” (1989: 281)—its inability to deliver a meaningful life. We see these processes of endless substitution, displacement, and deferral acted out in the 1998 film The Truman Show. Not only is Truman Burbank, the “on the air, unaware” star of a television program “The Truman Show,” offered a utopian world in which his material desires are met as a way to control his personal desires and keep him on the set that is his hometown of Seahaven. So, too, are Truman’s posthistorical viewers offered substitutes for their desires. In place of their desire for history, they are offered “The Truman Show”—a place where history as an ideological struggle between good (Truman) and evil (the show’s producer, Christof) is staged for them. But when Truman escapes Seahaven and “The Truman Show” ends, posthistorical liberalism’s ability to displace individual desires for history onto “The Truman Show” no longer functions. And this makes us wonder if Fukuyama’s promise that liberalism’s post-Cold War “triumph” over ideological challengers means that we are at “the end of history.” For, if we accept Fukuyama’s argument, liberalism may have dealt with ideological challengers. But, as The Truman Show suggests, it has not (and I would suggest, it cannot) resolve its own internal contradiction between creating and fulfilling desires, desires that propel Truman out of history and possibly lead his viewers back into history. To make sense of all of this, we need to examine Fukuyama’s claim that “it is the end of history.” I will do this by focusing on three questions: “What does Fukuyama mean by the end of history?”; “What does liberalism as a posthistorical ideology look like to Fukuyama?”; and “How does Fukuyama appear to resolve liberalism’s internal tension between creating unfulfillable desires and attempting to fulfill them so that his myth ‘it is the end of history’ appears to be true?”

What does the myth say? In his essay “The End of History?,” Fukuyama begins by reflecting that “something very fundamental has happened in world history” and this something is usually described as post-Cold War peace “breaking out in many regions of the world” (1989: 270). But Fukuyama laments that analyses of the end of the Cold War tend to be “superficial” because they lack a “conceptual framework for distinguishing between what is essential and what is contingent or accidental in world history” (1989: 270). Fukuyama takes as his task to investigate “a process that gives coherence and order to the daily headlines” and, he claims, this process is “an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism” (1989: 270). As Fukuyama puts it, “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human

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government” (1989: 271; my italics). But while the “victory of liberalism” is an ideological victory—in that no other ideas or ideologies pose a challenge to it—its victory “is as yet incomplete in the real or material world” (1989: 271). That is why we don’t see every state in the world practicing liberal political and economic principles. But Fukuyama argues that “there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run” (1989: 271; italics in original). In other words, it is only a matter of time until liberalism is “globalized” as both an unchallenged ideology and as a material way of life. How does Fukuyama make his argument? He does so by privileging a particular way of understanding history. History, for Fukuyama, is “a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle, and an end” (1989: 271). A dialectical process is a process through which the contradiction between a dominant truth (thesis) and its opposite (antithesis) are reconciled to produce a higher truth (synthesis). This higher truth or synthesis becomes the new thesis, which will necessarily be opposed by a new antithesis. This process continues until “all prior contradictions are resolved and all human needs are satisfied” (1989: 272). From this point onward, “there is no struggle or conflict over ‘large’ issues …; what remains is primarily economic activity” (1989: 272). And when we reach this point, history is over. This way of describing history draws upon Fredrick Hegel’s notion of dialectical history (see Figure 6.1). For Hegel, “history culminated in an absolute moment—a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious” (1989: 271). For Hegel, this moment arrived in 1806, when, after the French Revolution, “the basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon” (1989: 272). Now, as then, liberalism’s “theoretical truth is absolute and could not be improved upon” (1989: 274). All that remains to be done is to spatially extend liberal principles throughout the world (1989: 272). Many of us are familiar with this Hegelian way of thinking about history because Karl Marx borrowed Hegel’s dialectic to make his argument about how contradictions among economic classes would “drag history ahead” and culminate with the realization of communism. Marx was interested in material

Figure 6.1  The Hegelian dialectic

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Globaliz ation Table 6.2  Hegelian and Marxist understandings of history Hegel

Marx

Understanding of history

Dialectical

Dialectical

Nature of dialectic

Idealist

Materialist

What clashes in the dialectic?

Ideologies

Economic classes

economic forces of history. But this isn’t the way Hegel thought about dialectics. Hegel, in contrast to Marx, was interested not in the progress of material well-being first and foremost but in the progress of the idea. In Hegel’s dialectic, it is not economic classes that are in conflict; it is ideologies that are in conflict (see Table 6.2). For Hegel, ideology or consciousness about the world is what causes the world to change materially. As Fukuyama puts it, “consciousness will ultimately remake the material world in its own image” (1989: 274). For Fukuyama, ideological consciousness is “the real subject underlying the apparent jumble of current events in the history of ideology” (1989: 273). In other words, it is the triumph of liberalism that made the end of the Cold War possible, not, for example, the economic collapse of the former Soviet Union that made liberal consciousness possible. Yes, modern free market economics underwrites and helps to stabilize this liberal consciousness. And so Fukuyama claims the end of history is marked by “the universal homogenous state as liberal democracy in the political sphere combined with easy access to VCRs and stereos in the economic” (1989: 275). But underwriting and stabilizing should not be confused with causing something to happen. For Fukuyama, as for Hegel, ideological consciousness— not economic materiality—is the cause of change, not its effect (1989: 273). How can Fukuyama argue that liberalism’s “theoretical truth is absolute and could not be improved upon” (1989: 274) to the point that we are now at the end of history? He does so by posing a question: “Are there … any fundamental ‘contradictions’ in human life that cannot be resolved in the context of modern liberalism, that would be resolvable by an alternative political-economic structure?” (1989: 275). His answer is “no.” Fukuyama gets to this answer by considering the historical status of ideological challengers of liberalism in the 20th century—fascism and communism (see Table 6.3). He argues that “fascism was destroyed as a living ideology by World War II. This defeat,” he concedes, “of course, was on a very material level, but it amounted to a defeat of the idea as well” because no ideological movements based on fascism have survived long in the postwar era (1989: 275). Communism’s challenge to liberalism, Fukuyama argues, “was far more serious” (1989: 275). Communism claimed that liberalism could not resolve its own internal contradiction between capital and labor, between the owning class and the working class (1989: 275). Fukuyama claims that “classless society” has been achieved in the United States. By this, he does not mean that the gap between the rich and the poor is not growing, but that “the root causes of economic inequalities do not have to do with the underlying legal and social structure of our [US] society” (1989: 275–276). As a result, “the appeal of communism in the developed Western world … is lower today than any time since the end of the First World War” (1989: 276).

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Globaliz ation Table 6.3  Ideological challengers to liberalism Critique of liberalism

Why challenge fails

Fascism

Political weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of community of West = fundamental contradictions in liberal society

Destroyed as a living ideology both materially and ideologically by World War II

Communism

Liberal contradiction between capital and labor/owner and workers cannot be resolved

• State commitments to communism in China and the Soviet Union only rhetorical • Bourgeois consumerism embraced internationally • No state offers genuine communist alternative to liberalism

Religion

Liberal consumerism means core liberalism is hollow, meaningless

Offers no universalizable political alternative to liberalism

Nationalism

Offers no generalizable critique of liberalism. Only critical of some particular expressions of liberalism through specific nonrepresentative governments

Because it has no generalizable critique of liberalism, nationalism is not necessarily incompatible with liberal ideology

But what about the rest of the world? To make the argument that liberal consciousness pervades the West tells us nothing new. And Fukuyama recognizes this, arguing that “it is precisely in the non-European world that one is most struck by the occurrence of major ideological transformations” (1989: 276). He cites the example of Japan, a country that had liberal political and economic principles imposed on it after World War II. What is important in the Japanese case, according to Fukuyama, is “that the essential elements of economic and political liberalism have been so successfully grafted onto uniquely Japanese traditions and institutions,” thus ensuring their long-term survival (1989: 276). In the case of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) in Asia, the evidence is even more compelling because “political liberalism has been following economic liberalism” as a result of “the victory of the idea of the universal homogenous state” and not because of external imposition as in the case of Japan (1989: 277). Fukuyama even manages to cite communist China as an example of the triumph of liberalism because “Marxism and ideological principle have become virtually irrelevant as guides to policy, and that bourgeois consumerism has a real meaning in that country for the first time since the revolution” (1989: 278). As a result, “China can no longer act as a beacon for illiberal forces around the world” (1989: 278). But, of course, “it is the developments in the Soviet Union—the original ‘homeland of the world proletariat’—that have put the final nail in the coffin of the Marxist-Leninist alternative to liberal democracy” (1989: 278). The demise of the Soviet Union seals the triumph of liberalism for Fukuyama. As he puts it, since Gorbachev came to power there has been “a revolutionary assault on the most fundamental institutions and principles of Stalinism, and their replacement by

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other principles which do not amount to liberalism per se but whose only connecting thread is liberalism” (1989: 279; italics in original). And so communism joins fascism as a “dead” ideology. This does not mean that Fukuyama would describe the former Soviet Union as liberal or democratic, and he is clear that this is beside the point. For “at the end of history it is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society” (1989: 280). Concluding that fascism and communism are dead, Fukuyama looks around for alternative ideologies that might challenge liberalism in the future. He identifies two—religion and nationalism (see Table 6.3). Of religious fundamentalism, Fukuyama contends that while this may well be a response to “the emptiness at the core of liberalism,” it is unlikely to represent a political response. “Only Islam has offered a theocratic state as a political alternative to both liberalism and communism,” but because this has little appeal for non-Muslims, Fukuyama argues it lacks “universal significance” (1989: 281; for an alternative view, see Chapter 8). Nationalism, on the other hand, does not represent a clear “irreconcilable contradiction in the heart of liberalism” (1989: 281). And because nationalism is generally an ideology about independence from another group, people, or state, Fukuyama concludes that it does “not offer anything like a comprehensive agenda for socio-economic organization” (1989: 281–282). Having considered the ideologies past and future that could challenge liberalism, Fukuyama concludes that “the present world seems to confirm that the fundamental principles of socio-political organization have not advanced terribly far since 1806” (1989: 282). That doesn’t rule out the possibility of some “new ideology or previously unrecognized contradictions in liberal societies” to challenge liberalism, but none of these were apparent to Fukuyama at the time he wrote his essay (1989: 282). Assuming we have reached “the end of history,” Fukuyama asks what all this means for international relations. What will international politics look like in a “de-ideologized world”? (1989: 282). “The end of history” does not mark the end of material conflicts, only ideological conflicts. Conflicts will still rage in “the vast bulk of the Third World [which] remains very much mired in history” (1989: 282). But “international life for the part of the world that has reached the end of history is far more preoccupied with economics than with politics or strategy” (1989: 283). And so in the de-ideologized world, “we are far more likely to see the ‘Common Marketization’ of world politics” than we are to see the resurgence of large-scale conflict among sovereign nation-states, “international anarchy” notwithstanding (1989: 284). This does not mean that there will be no conflict among sovereign nation-states. This is likely between “historical states” and “posthistorical states” (1989: 285). Nor does this mean that Marxist-Leninism won’t try to stage an ideological comeback (see Chapter 7), but, as far as Fukuyama is concerned, it “is dead as a mobilizing ideology” so presents little threat for dragging us back into history (1989: 285). Overall, Fukuyama concludes that “the end of history” will be rather boring. If ideological struggles made us live risky, purposeful lives that called for “daring, courage, imagination, and idealism,” the “de-ideological” age of posthistory will be marked by “economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated

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consumer demands” (1989: 285–286). It will be “just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history” (1989: 286). All this seems to depress Fukuyama, for he writes, “I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed” (1989: 286). And he concludes by wondering if “centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again” (1989: 286). But, if it does, then Fukuyama cannot claim that liberalism’s post-Cold War “triumph” over all ideological challenges marks the end of history. It is easy to see how Fukuyama’s description of the post-Cold War era as “de-ideological,” low-conflict, and posthistorical set the stage for neoliberal expressions of globalization to become the “next big thing” in IR theory. Since ideological struggles, much less large-scale political conflict, were now a thing of the past, all that remained to be done was to explore the many ways in which liberalism was being spread worldwide in economic, political, and cultural forms. Or was there? Fukuyama supports his myth “it is the end of history” by making the case that there are no “living” ideological challengers to liberalism. While the “facts” of Fukuyama’s case have received a lot of attention and are hotly debated, what goes without saying in Fukuyama’s myth is that liberalism itself is free of internal contradictions. Fukuyama simply asserts this and leaves it up to fully expressed, coherent ideological rivals to make the case that he is wrong. Instead, he makes the case that they are wrong. But what happens if we look inside liberalism? What if we ignore the challenges posed by “alternative ideologies” like fascism, communism, religious fundamentalism, and nationalism and simply focus our attention on what makes liberalism itself function? If we do our attention is drawn away from liberalism’s would-be challengers to that unresolvable tension within liberalism—its creation of unfulfillable desires that (by definition) it can only fail to fulfill. By Fukuyama’s own admission, for his myth “it is the end of history” to function, liberalism must be free not only of external challengers but of internal contradictions as well. But liberalism’s relationship to the creation and fulfillment of desires always threatens to unravel not only liberalism’s promises for the good life but Fukuyama’s claim that “it is the end of history.” This tension is exquisitely explored in The Truman Show. The film is set in a posthistorical era, in which economic concerns and cultural nostalgia have replaced political and ideological struggles. What makes this posthistorical world function is the success of the television program, “The Truman Show” to stage history for its viewers and substitute viewers’ desires for historical and ideological engagement with their consumption of “The Truman Show.” But when Truman reaches his “end of history” by escaping Seahaven, his viewers are left with empty airtime that might represent “the empty core of liberalism” (1989: 281). And we may wonder if the ending of “The Truman Show” also marks the end of Fukuyama’s myth “it is the end of history.”

The Truman Show How’s it gonna end? That is the question that grips viewers of the 1998 film The Truman Show—not for the usual reasons about cinematic climaxes and suspense but because the film The Truman Show is about a television program called

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“The Truman Show.” Nothing terribly strange about that. But there is a twist. Truman Burbank/Jim Carrey, the star of “The Truman Show,” is the only person in the world who does not know that “The Truman Show” is a television show and that Seahaven Island where he has lived his entire life is an elaborate television set. And one day he is bound to find out. When he does, “The Truman Show” (at least in its current form) will end. How could anyone be so duped about the “reality” of his life? Easily! As Christof/Ed Harris, the “creator” of “The Truman Show” tells us in an interview, “We accept the reality of the world with which we’re presented. It’s as simple as that.” And for Truman Burbank, “The Truman Show” is the only reality he has ever known. From before his birth, Truman has been on television. His whole life—from the exciting to the mundane—has been recorded by hidden cameras (about 5000 cameras to be exact) and transmitted nonstop world-wide as “The Truman Show.” First placed in Truman’s birth-mother’s womb, cameras were later hidden throughout Seahaven—not only in streets and houses but also in buttons, vending machines, a pencil sharpener, and even Seahaven’s moon. By the time we meet the 30-year-old Truman, the entire island of Seahaven has been built as a television stage housed in an enormous dome, including a complete town, sea, and sky. It is so big, the film tells us, that like the Great Wall of China, it is the only other unnatural object visible from outer space. Not only is Truman’s “natural” environment unnatural, so too is his social environment. Everyone on the show has been cast into their roles, including Truman’s mother, wife, best friend, and an entire town of neighbors, acquaintances, and strangers who inhabit Seahaven. The television viewing audience knows that all of the people in Seahaven are playing roles in “The Truman Show”—all of them but Truman himself. But for Truman, he and everyone he meets and everything he encounters is real. The woman cast as Truman’s mother, for example, is the only mother Truman has ever known. Truman does not know that his was an unwanted pregnancy and that his birth coincided with a preset airtime for “The Truman Show,” making him the child selected as its star. Nor does Truman know that he is the first person in the world to have been legally adopted by a corporation—the corporation that broadcasts “The Truman Show.” Why go to these lengths to produce a television show? As Christof explains,

We’ve become bored with watching actors give us phoney emotions. We’re tired of pyrotechnics and special effects. While the world he inhabits is in some respects counterfeit, there’s nothing fake about Truman himself. No scripts, no cue cards…. It isn’t always Shakespeare but it’s genuine. It’s a life. And watching Truman’s life has glued viewers to their television sets for 30 years. As we learn from the television program “TruTalk,” a “forum for issues growing out of the show,” “One point seven billion were there for his birth. Two-hundred twenty countries tuned in for his first steps.” “The Truman Show” is a truly global phenomenon. To emphasize the impact “The Truman Show” has on its viewing public, the film cuts back and forth between action on “The Truman Show” and scenes of its viewing public. We see viewers in the busy Truman Bar, a theme bar packed with

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“Truman Show” paraphernalia and dotted with televisions that broadcast only “The Truman Show.” We see two elderly women clutching pillows with Truman’s grinning face on them engrossed in an episode of the show. We see a man who seems to do nothing but watch “The Truman Show” while lying in his bathtub. And we see two parking attendants glued to “The Truman Show” throughout their shifts. Why is “The Truman Show” so popular? What are audiences looking for in “The Truman Show,” and what do they find? Christof tells us that viewers find not only an escape from boredom but they find “the way the world should be.” This is Seahaven, the world Christof has created for Truman. Seahaven is nostalgically modeled after a 1950s’ American television show. Not only do the costumes and sets have a 1950s’ feel to them, but everyone on set seems to have a 1950s’ attitude. In this economically prosperous community, everyone is friendly and caring toward their neighbor, family life is stable, and crime is at a minimum if it exists at all. Seahaven, then, is a slice of the past made present. And because Truman lives his real life in Seahaven—his only real world—Seahaven is a living museum. Never dead or static, Seahaven is where the action is, even if that action is the tedious daily routines of an insurance salesperson. Seahaven is where living history takes place. Tuning into “The Truman Show” is like turning on history. Seahaven is where living history takes place not primarily because it is stylistically and attitudinally a throwback to the 1950s. As in Fukuyama’s explanation of history, Seahaven is a site of living history because it is a site of ideological struggle. This ideological struggle is between Truman and Christof. It is the final ideological struggle between liberalism and some form of totalitarian ideology (like communism or fascism). Truman represents liberalism; Christof, totalitarianism. Why is such a struggle necessary in the idyllic world of Seahaven? To put it differently, what could Truman possibly want that he cannot have in Seahaven? The simple answer is freedom. Once Truman realizes he is living in a controlled environment, he does what Fukuyama says one must do when in the grip of ideological struggle. He breaks out of his own boring daily routines and lives a risky, purposeful life that calls for “daring, courage, imagination, and idealism” (1989: 285–286). But how does Truman get to the point that he wants his freedom more than he wants the world of Seahaven in which Christof claims all of Truman’s needs are met? Truman gets there because not all of his desires are met. Christof admits that Truman’s desire to explore the world around him had to be controlled, for if Truman left the set, the show would be over. As Christof puts it, “As Truman grew up, we were forced to manufacture ways to keep him on the island.” And so Christof offers Truman a loving family, a secure job, and a friendly town to live in place of a life of adventure beyond Seahaven. Whenever Truman expresses a desire to leave Seahaven, this substitution of stability for adventure is activated. Truman’s mother shows him family albums and has him watch the television program “Show Me the Way to Go Home,” which celebrates the smalltown values of a place like Seahaven and which emotionally manipulates Truman to stay where he is. The struggle to control Truman’s desire, however, has not always been so easy. This is best illustrated in the film in a flashback in which Truman the college

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student falls for an “extra,” Lauren, which complicates Christof’s plans to have Truman marry Meryl, the character Christof has cast to be Truman’s future wife. Truman: Lauren:

I’m Truman. Yeah. I know. Look, Truman, I’m not allowed to talk to you. You know.

Truman notices that Lauren is wearing a pin that says “How’s it gonna end?” Truman: I like your pin. Was wondering that myself. Lauren: Mm. Truman: Would you wanna maybe, possibly … sometime go out for some pizza or something? Friday? Saturday? Sunday? Monday? Tuesday? … Lauren writes on a notepad “NOW.” Lauren:

If we don’t go now, it won’t happen. Do you understand? So what are you gonna do?

The cameras lose them for a while as they sneak out of the library. The cameras discover them going to the beach together. Cut to the beach. Lauren: Truman: Lauren: Truman:

We have so little time. They’re going to be here any minute. Who are they? They don’t want me talking to you. Then don’t talk.

Truman kisses Lauren. A car speeds onto the beach. Lauren: Truman: Lauren: Truman: Lauren: Truman:

They’re here. Truman. What do they want? Listen to me. Everyone knows about … everyone knows everything you do. ‘Cause they’re pretending, Truman. Do you … Do you understand? Everybody’s pretending. [looking perplexed] Lauren. No, no, no, ah, my name’s not Lauren. No, no. My name’s Sylvia. [confused] Sylvia?

A man gets out of the car claiming to be Lauren’s father. Lauren: Truman: Lauren:

He’s lying! Truman, please! Don’t listen to him! Everything I’ve told you is the truth! … This … it—it’s fake. It’s all for you. I don’t understand. And … and the sky and the sea, everything. It’s a set. It’s a show.

Father intervenes. Truman: I really would like to know what’s going on! Lauren’s Father: Schizophrenia. It’s episodes. … You forget it, forget everything. Lauren: Don’t do it! Don’t Truman! … Truman, he’s lying! Get out of here. Come and find me.

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But then Lauren’s father tells Truman that he is moving his family to Fiji, and he and Lauren exit in the car. Truman is left on the beach with Lauren’s/Sylvia’s forgotten sweater, which he keeps as a memento. In future episodes, we see Truman dreaming about Sylvia while looking at her sweater, trying to construct a composite of her face from pictures in women’s magazines, and expressing his desire to go to Fiji. All of this illustrates Christof’s bind. He must produce desires in Truman, like the desire for a heterosexual family, in order for the show to go on. Indeed, Christof boasts in an interview that he is determined to deliver to his viewers the first on-air conception. And in the world of Seahaven, for Truman to be involved in such a conception it must take place within the confines of a legitimate union. So Truman must marry. But what Christof cannot control is who Truman wants to marry. He wants Lauren/Sylvia. At this point, Truman doesn’t follow Sylvia off the set, in part because— despite Sylvia’s attempt to enlighten him—he doesn’t understand it is a set. And even if he did, Christof has instilled in Truman a fear of flying and a terror of water, the natural boundary around Seahaven Island. Truman’s terror of water was “produced” in the “episode” in which Truman’s father was drowned in a sailing accident for which Truman feels responsible. Not only does this make Truman give up sailing, he won’t take a ferry across the bay, nor will he even drive his car across the bridge. So what is Christof to do with Truman’s desire for Sylvia and the emotion that creates in Truman? Displace it, of course. Immediately after Lauren’s/Sylvia’s exit from the show, Truman’s mother is scripted with an illness, and Truman must remain in Seahaven to care for her. And in place of Lauren/Sylvia, Christof gives Truman Meryl, who Truman is encouraged to marry on the rebound. What does all of this tell us about the worlds of “The Truman Show” and The Truman Show? How do they make sense of their worlds, and what do they say is typical and deviant in those worlds? It is important to ask these questions for both the television program “The Truman Show” and for the film The Truman Show because the ability of each world to function is related to the smooth functioning of the other. Let’s start by answering these questions for the television program “The Truman Show.” “The Truman Show” makes sense of the world by celebrating history. While on the surface the show’s celebration of history is stylistically and attitudinally nostalgic, more fundamentally the show’s celebration of history is ideological. Or, to combine the two, “The Truman Show” is nostalgic for ideology. It celebrates the ideological struggle between good and evil, between an “on the air, unaware” Truman and his creator and controller Christof. Truman and Christof represent different ideological positions. Truman represents the desire for freedom and the right to make choices for his own life (a desire for liberalism fully expressed), and Christof represents the desire to maintain totalitarian control over Truman’s life and world. Truman’s and Christof’s ideological positions are locked in a dialectical contradiction (see Figure 6.2). What is typical in the world of “The Truman Show” is for Truman to be blissfully ignorant of his situation. A typical day is one in which Truman has yet to awaken to the ideological struggle for his freedom from Christof that awaits him. Such typical days are produced for Truman by Christof by containing Truman’s desires within the utopian world of Seahaven, usually by substituting the category

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Figure 6.2  The dialectical struggle in “The Truman Show”

of what Truman wants (a wife and a loving marriage, for example) for the specific thing/person Truman wants (Lauren/Sylvia). So Truman gets a wife, for example, but that wife is Meryl, not Sylvia. What is deviant in the world of “The Truman Show” is for Truman to become ideologically aware and to ultimately exit his prison, thereby exiting history. What leads to Truman’s ideological awakening is Christof’s inability to fulfill Truman’s desires. Loyal viewers (who seem to be everyone outside of Seahaven) know that Truman’s ideological awakening is imminent. Knowing this, they know the answer to the question “How’s it gonna end?” “The Truman Show” ends with Truman’s “unabashed victory” over Christof’s totalitarianism, a victory driven by Truman’s unfulfilled desires (Table 6.4). What about The Truman Show? How does it make sense of the world? What does it say is typical and deviant in that world? To answer these questions, we must look beyond the world of the television program “The Truman Show” and think about the relationship in the film between the television program and those who watch it. If “The Truman Show” the television program represents a nostalgia for ideology and is therefore the place where history takes place, what does this tell us about how the viewers of “The Truman Show” are positioned historically? It tells us that they are positioned in a posthistorical, de-ideological era. And, as Fukuyama tells us, that must mean these viewers live in a world in which liberal capitalist ideology has triumphed over all challengers. Table 6.4  What is typical and deviant in the historical world of the television program “The Truman Show”? Typical

Truman is unaware of his ideological struggle with Christof because his desires are contained within the utopian world of Seahaven

Deviant

Compelled by unfulfilled desires, Truman becomes ideologically aware and frees himself from Christof and from Seahaven

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Think about it. We never see any conflict—ideological or otherwise—in the world beyond “The Truman Show” that isn’t about “The Truman Show” itself. The only mention of politics and political struggle occurs when Sylvia (Truman’s true love) phones into the program “TruTalk” to berate Christof for his imprisonment of Truman. Beyond that, there is no politics in the film. It is “The Truman Show” that creates any sense of politics for its viewers as nothing else in the film can or does. If the world beyond Seahaven is the world of posthistory—free of ideological struggle and politics as they would be understood in an historical world—then this posthistorical world is also a place where desire cannot trouble this de-ideological world in the ways that Truman’s desire troubles and ultimately ends his ideological world. Put differently, there are no internal contradictions within the posthistorical, de-ideological world of the viewers that cannot be resolved from within liberal capitalism. From the point of view of someone like Fukuyama, this is because the viewers of “The Truman Show” are free, whereas Truman is a prisoner. That does not mean that we don’t see the viewers of “The Truman Show” expressing desire all the time. They do, and they do so in relation to the television program. In addition to expressing their desire for the world of “The Truman Show” by watching it, viewers of “The Truman Show” literally buy it. Everything on the show is for sale—not just the products the cast use (which are plugged in the show through product placement advertisements) but the clothes they wear and the homes in which they live. All this can be ordered from the Truman Catalog. For the viewers of “The Truman Show,” Truman is not just a character in a television program. Truman—or should we call him “Tru(e)man”—is a commodity. Like any commodity, he can be consumed. By consuming Truman, his viewers seem to be happy. Like Truman’s desires, then, the desires of the viewing audience of the show are encapsulated within the confines of the world of Seahaven. So long as these posthistorical viewers have an outlet for their “politics” and their “desires”—the ideologically nostalgic space of Seahaven and the economic ability to substitute the political ideology of “The Truman Show” with economic products from “The Truman Show”—then their desires for history as the history of ideological struggle are met. This is what is typical in the cinematic world of The Truman Show—for the televisual actions of “The Truman Show” to fill any nostalgic longings the viewers have for politics and ideology through their daily practices of consumption (either by watching “The Truman Show” or by purchasing products from it). Like Truman’s world in which desires are satisfied with substitutes (families, finances, and friends), the world of this viewing audience has their desires for history and ideology satisfied with consumable substitutes (viewing time and show memorabilia). What is deviant in the world of The Truman Show is for there to be no space—no Seahaven or Truman Burbank’s life or Truman Catalog—onto which viewers can safely project their desires for history and ideology (Table 6.5). And, of course, this is precisely where the film leaves us. When Truman exits history, his posthistorical viewers are left with nowhere to project their desires for history. Certainly, they can fill the empty airtime by changing channels (as the

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Globaliz ation Table 6.5  What is typical and deviant in the posthistorical world of the film The Truman Show? Typical

“The Truman Show” is the space in which its viewers consume history as the history of ideology (by watching the ideological struggle between Truman and Christof and by owning a piece of that history through the purchase of goods from “The Truman Show”)

Deviant

There is no space for viewers to safely project their desires for history and ideology because “The Truman Show” goes off the air permanently

parking attendants do in the film’s final scene), but where else will they find “real history” as the struggle of a genuine character in a genuine struggle with a genuine totalitarian in control? Nowhere. As Christof told us, that is why “The Truman Show” was staged in the first place and has had a growing audience ever since— because it is real. And that means there is no substitute for “The Truman Show.” All this has to make us wonder, “With Truman’s history over, might viewers’ desire for history now be fulfilled with a return to ideological struggle—not in the form of a televisual substitute but in less apparently mediated ways?” Or, to put it somewhat differently, “Is the end ever really the end?”

Liberalism’s internal contradiction, or is the end ever really the end? The Truman Show aptly displays an unresolvable contradiction within the ideology of liberalism. Liberalism forever attempts to fulfill the desires it creates for individuals by offering them substitutes. These substitutes are often (but not always) economic. Whether this is “the economic good life” in “The Truman Show” or the ability to consume “the ideological good life” for viewers of “The Truman Show,” these substitutions generally satisfy individuals for a while. But ultimately, they fail. The trick to making liberalism work—to making liberalism function—is to delay any sense of disappointment its subjects experience when economic desires fail to satisfy personal desires. Capitalism does a very good job in helping liberalism to succeed on this score because the message of capitalism is that economic enjoyment can equal personal fulfillment so long as one keeps on consuming. The Truman Show reminds us that these substitutions are not only necessary; more importantly, it reminds us that they are limited. There are limits to how happy Christof can keep Truman, no matter how hard he tries. And there are limits to how long Truman Burbank can keep his viewers satisfied. Yes, most of them cheer for his liberation from Christof. But when Truman achieves his “unabashed victory” over Christof, where does that leave his posthistorical viewers? It leaves them wallowing in the “emptiness at the core of liberalism” (Fukuyama, 1989: 281) searching for something to fill it (even if initially only by changing channels). What we don’t know—and what it seems no one can control—is what form attempts to fill this empty core will take.

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Leaving desires unfulfilled—whether they are for “The Truman Show” or for something else—is a problem for liberalism. In the film, a post-“Truman Show” era is a dangerous one, for it is one in which there is no safe space onto which Truman’s viewers can project their desire for something to fill the boredom of posthistory and “the empty core of liberalism” (1989: 281). This is dangerous because for liberalism to function as an ideology apparently free of internal contradictions, such a space must exist. What does this tell us about Fukuyama’s myth “it is the end of history”? It tells us that it only appears to be true so long as liberalism’s claim to be free of internal contradictions appears to be true. What our detour through the film The Truman Show tells us is that what it takes for liberalism to appear to be free of internal contradictions is the endless deferral of individual encounters with liberalism’s empty core. All this suggests that, instead of writing about “the end of history” in which liberalism is triumphant, maybe Fukuyama is writing instead about liberalism’s apparent triumph—one that depends on us knowing about but never experiencing its empty core. And Fukuyama’s own myth “it is the end of history”—a myth that he evidences by directing our attention away from liberalism’s internal contradiction and toward alternative ideological ­challenges—actually participates in liberalism’s process of deferring our encounter with liberalism’s empty core. What does all of this mean for international relations in an era of ­“globalization”? It means that those determined to study liberalism in a post-Cold War era might be better served by investigating not what alternative ideologies might crop up to challenge liberalism’s apparent global dominance but by asking questions like “in an era of ‘globalization,’ how will liberalism attempt to control and defer our encounter with its empty core?” Or, to put it somewhat differently, “how does liberalism now attempt to control our desires in ways that escape our notice?” As the protests against the World Trade Organization talks in Seattle in 1999 suggested, these are not unimportant questions. Protesters around the world (but especially in the industrialized West) offered something like a carnival of opposition to global capitalism (using art and performance art mixed with more traditional forms of demonstration), the very global capitalism that gave these protesters “the good life.” What they objected to was not only how global capitalism’s promise of the good life for some (Western industrialized states) comes at the expense of others (developing states) but also how empty liberalism’s offer of economic well-being in place of personal desire is (“the empty core of liberalism”). While the former point of protest is an old Marxist complaint, the latter one requires no alternative ideological challenger to bring it into focus. Examples like these remind us of the necessary oversights in Fukuyama’s myth “it is the end of history.” It is not just a coherent ideological challenger that can (in Fukuyama’s terms) drag us back into history. It is liberalism’s own internal contradiction—which makes us want total freedom but can offer us only economic freedom in its place—that creates historical and ideological struggle as well. And, even though Fukuyama chose not to focus on it when he wrote his essay in 1989, even he admits that this is a contradiction that has been at the core of liberalism from its creation.

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Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1: Globalization Even though IR theorists cannot agree about what globalization is, they do agree that it is vitally important to our understanding of contemporary international life. Globalization is not a concept that has implications only for what we consider to be the traditional international political economy debates (between liberalism, Marxism, and mercantilism). Globalization impacts upon what we regard as the traditional domain of “politics.” For example, IR theorists hotly debate what globalization does to the sovereign nation-state. Does the state “wither away” in an era of globalization, or do forms of state control simply change their form? What is the role of new technologies like the internet in the processes of state control/ state retreat? If the territorial state is a thing of the past because of globalization, what (if anything) is taking its place? Is the state being replaced by a truly global cosmopolitanism, for example? Or is globalization nothing more than the (not-so) benevolent spread of US hegemony? These questions defined the cutting edge of IR research at the beginning of the 21st century. Kofman and Youngs (2003) take up these debates about the state, while Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2010) situate globalization debates in relation to IR theory more generally. For an unabashed liberal defense of globalization, see Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2000). Reading this text in relation to more critical texts on globalization (Herod et al., 1998; Jameson and Miyoshi, 1998; Hay and Marsh, 2000) is a good way to spark debate. As powerful as globalization was in the 1990s and early 2000s, it met a global backlash from at least the 2000s onward, as national and global inequalities increased and as many nationalists demanded great sovereign control over domestic affairs. Right- and left-wing populisms that often have more nationalist than globalizing agendas have taken center-stage since, for example, the UK’s “Brexit” decision to leave the European Union in the 2016 referendum and the election of Donald Trump as US President. Understanding these movements as a response to globalization is an important element of contemporary international relations, as noted in the work of Weber (2017), Cox (2017), and Bajo-Rubio and Yan (2019).

Suggested reading Bajo-Rubio, Oscar and Ho-Don Yan (2019) “Globalization and Populism,” in F.-L. T. Yu and D. S. Kwan (eds) Contemporary Issues in International Political Economy. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 229–252. Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds) (2010) The Globalization of World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cox, Michael (2017) “The Rise of Populism and the Crisis of Globalisation: Brexit, Trump and Beyond,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 28: 9–17. Hay, Colin and David Marsh (eds) (2000) Demystifying Globalization. Boulder, CO: St. Martin’s Press.

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Globaliz ation Herod, Andrew, Gearóid Ó. Tuathail, and Susan M. Roberts (eds) (1998) An Unruly World? Globalization, Governance, and Geography. London: Routledge. Jameson, Fredric and Masao Miyoshi (eds) (1998) The Cultures of Globalization. Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press. Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) (2003) Globalization: Theory and Practice, 3rd edition. London: Continuum. Micklethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge (2000) The Future Perfect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalization. New York: Times Press. Weber, Cynthia (2017) “The Trump Presidency, Episode 1: Simulating Sovereignty,” Theory & Event 20(1): 132–142.

Topic 2: The uses of history History is another concept that we all seem to understand and accept as given. But, as Fukuyama’s myth “it is the end of history” demonstrates, even if we think we know what history is, we don’t necessarily grasp what history or histories do. How does history and temporality more generally function in narrative accounts of international politics? What work does history do in IR theory? How do critical understandings of history and temporality help us to better approach IR theory? Using a text like Ermarth’s (1992) as a general introduction to critical understandings of history is helpful in critically reading how classic IR theory texts (like Modelski, 1987 or Gilpin, 1983, for example) use history. Considering how history is used generally in IR theory, it is even possible to argue that IR theory debates are debates about history/temporality as much if not more than they are about geography/spatiality, concepts that have more often occupied critical IR theorists (Weber, 1998). Gurminder Bhambra (2007) has shown that common periodizations of global history are grounded in Eurocentrism and white supremacy, and has proposed alternative approaches to the uses of history. For more on the uses of history, see Chapter 7.

Suggested reading Bhambra, Gurminder K. (2007) Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ermarth, Elizabeth Deeds (1992) Sequel to History: Postmodernism and the Crisis of Representational Time. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gilpin, Robert (1983) War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Modelski, George (1987) Long Cycles in World Politics. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Weber, Cynthia (1998) “Reading Martin Wight’s ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’ as History,” Alternatives 23: 451–469.

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Topic 3: Digital cultures, mediascapes, and surveillance More than two decades have passed since The Truman Show was first made and screened (longer if you consider that the original concept and treatment for the film were developed in the early 1990s). In the intervening years, digital technologies have evolved to the point of becoming ubiquitous (Miller, 2011). Many of us not only carry cellphones in our pockets, we also use these phones as mobile televisions, mobile computers, mobile cameras, and mobile stores for online shopping. Our abilities to consume finally seem to be keeping up with our desires to consume. Might it be by digital mediation that we now attempt to fill the empty core of liberalism? With this in mind, it bears reflecting on what Truman’s world would look like in this updated digital world. Might a contemporary Truman be so tied to his cellphone and other digital technologies that he would not notice liberalism’s empty core? Might his virtual Fiji and virtual Sylvia fulfill him just as much as the real ones might? And if this were the case, what does this say about history? Does history happen online because living happens online? Of course, digital media do not only have the capacity to fulfill (or at least defer) our desires. They also have a darker side. For new technologies do not only provide us with goods and services; they also incessantly gather information about us—about our “likes,” about our purchases, about our whereabouts, indeed, about anything the state or private corporations deem it necessary to know about our on-line behavior (see Laura Poitra’s film about Edward Snowden interview and “Suggestions for Further Thinking, Topic 2” in Chapter 10). This data isn’t just being used to sell us products; it is increasingly used by national and foreign governments to circulate not just real news but “fake news” to sway referenda and elections. Consider, for example, the scandal around how Cambridge Analytica used Facebook to gather data about users and then target voters in the British EU referendum (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018). And think of how Russia interfered in the 2016 US election by hacking the emails of high-ranking figures in the Democratic Party and spreading “fake news” (Nakashima, 2016). Does this mean we should all try to live off-line instead? This raises another question—if life happens online, then what happens if our digital identity is erased? Do we cease to exist? When Sandra Bullock’s character Angela Bennett was erased in The Net (1995), she ceased to exist in any terms that her world could recognize. Fast forward to today’s world, and digital erasure seems even more ominous than it was then. All of this suggests that we need to think seriously about who we are, where we live, and how our history exists in globalized and re-nationalized worlds dominated by digital cultures, mediascapes, and surveillance technologies that govern our post-Truman worlds.

Suggested reading Cadwalladr, Carole and Emma Graham-Harrison (2018) “Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach,” The Guardian, 17: 22. Lyon, David (2007) Surveillance Studies: An Overview. London: Polity. Miller, Vincent (2011) Understanding Digital Culture. London: Sage.

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Globaliz ation Nakashima, Ellen (2016) “US Government Officially Accuses Russia of Hacking Campaign to Interfere with Elections,” The Washington Post, 7. Poitras, Laura’ film about Edward Snowden, interviewed by Glenn Greenwald, Part I at http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-edward-snowdeninterview-video; Part II at http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jul/08/edwardsnowden-video-interview. Shields, Bob (ed.) (1996) Cultures of the Internet: Virtual Spaces, Real Histories, Living Bodies. London: Sage.

Topic 4: Biopolitics, the liberal subject, and martial politics Fukuyama’s myth “it is the end of history” is based upon the assumption that economic liberalism, political democratization, and cultural universalization go hand-in-hand and that living in these systems will fulfill our desires. To facilitate this myth, neoliberalism has taken a step away from a traditional understanding of liberalism (with its concern for “natural freedoms and rights” like the rights to life and liberty) and replaced it with an overriding concern with what Michel Foucault calls the governance of populations (Foucault, 2003, 1980). Instead of focusing on (mere) individualism, neoliberalism’s “liberal subject” is what Foucault calls a “species subject” or a “biopolitical subject” who can be statistically and analytically distinguished from the general population in safe and dangerous populations. Biopolitics, as Foucault describes it, is about managing security risks by managing those identified as members of “risky populations.” This is done by managing how these risky populations live (managing their reproduction, sexuality, fertility, medicine, and health, for example) so that the overall life of the state and its valued populations thrive. Many IR theorists have applied Foucault’s ideas to international politics. Mark Duffield (2001, 2010) as well as Michael Dillon and Julian Reid (2001) popularized biopolitics within IR with their discussion of global governance, new wars, complex emergencies (2000, 2001, 2009), and the “revolution in military affairs” (2001). Others followed, like David Campbell with his work on the biopolitics of oil and Brad Evans (2013) with his work on “liberal terror.” Others still have argued that biopolitical thinking is too constraining a way to think about international life, as Barder and Debrix have suggested (2012). Philosophers and social theorists have also observed that the neoliberal turn toward biopolitical management of populations must not necessarily signal a complete break with traditional liberal values. Instead, we observe a partitioning of populations in which a small number is awarded the rights, economic means, and personal autonomy promised by liberalism, and the rest are consigned to precarity, exposure to violence, and death. Giorgio Agamben, mobilizing (fascist) German philosopher Carl Schmitt’s concept of the state of exception, brought to the fore the selectively death-bringing nature of biopolitical liberalism in a series of works centered around the figure of homo sacer, a construct hailing from ancient Roman law designating someone who may be killed but not sacrificed in a religious ceremony (1998; 2005; and more). Although Agamben’s blindness to the racialization of homines sacres in 20th- and 21st-century state violence, as well as his treatment of the Holocaust as the genocidal state of exception (to the exclusion

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of 400 years of slavery and 500 years of settler colonialism) par excellence have been criticized widely (Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2005; Owens, 2009), his work has served as a timely reminder that Foucaultian biopolitics was—and always has been—a double-edged sword. Contemporary theorizations of biopolitics in the liberal state (and world order) have been clear-sighted in their analysis of race and racialization in producing disposable subjects. Achille Mbembe (2003) coined the term “necropolitics” to designate the particular modality of lethality wielded in what he calls “the postcolony,” where exposure to death is both a fact of everyday life and limited to racialized subjects in (post)colonial states. Jasbir Puar (2017) uses “debility” to distinguish populations who are endemically worn out and weakened from poverty, the withdrawal of health care and other public services, overpolicing and incarceration from individuals who, by merit of (usually) whiteness, socioeconomic status, and nationality, can inhabit the subject position of the “disabled,” along with its access to care, “adjustments,” and political representation. And if life in the liberal state doesn’t kill directly, it might gradually entrap people in “slow death,” a form of life inclining toward death from exhaustion, overwork, and subsistence on low-quality nutrition (Berlant, 2007). As a result, Alison Howell suggests that rather than continuing to comprehend liberal states as ones where the use of violence is exceptional, we should place violence at their center and characterize their mode of politics as “martial”—one where violence against racialized, Indigenous, queer, and disabled subjects is the norm (2018).

Suggested reading Agamben, Giorgio (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Agamben, Giorgio (2005) State of Exception. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Barder, Alexander D. and Francois Debrix (2012) Beyond Biopolitics: Theory, Violence, and Horror in World Politics. London: Routledge. Berlant, Lauren (2007) “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency),” Critical Inquiry 33(4): 754–780. Campbell, David (2005) “The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire, and the Sports Utility Vehicle,” American Quarterly 57(3): 943–972. Dillon, Michael and Julian Reid (2000) “Global Governance, Liberal Peace and Complex Emergency,” Alternatives 25(1): 115–143. Dillon, Michael and Julian Reid (2001) “Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security and War,” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 30(1): 41–66. Dillon, Michael and Julian Reid (2009) The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live. London: Routledge. Duffleld, Mark (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. London: Zed. Duffield, Mark (2010) “The Liberal Way of Development and the Development-Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide,” Security Dialogue 41(1): 53–76.

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Globaliz ation Evans, Brad (2013) Liberal Terror. London: Routledge. Foucault, Michel (1980) The History of Sexuality, the Will to Knowledge, trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Random House. Foucault, Michel (2003) “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the College de France, 1975–76, translated by D. Macey. New York: Picador. Howell, Alison (2018) “Forget ‘Militarization’: Race, Disability and the ‘Martial Politics’ of the Police and of the University,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 20(2): 1–20. Mbembe, Achille (2003) “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15(1): 11–40. Puar, Jasbir (2017) The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

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NeoIs Empire the new world order?

What does the myth say? 137 So what exactly is Empire? 138 Memento 144 Truth, ontology, and desire 152 Suggestions for further thinking 157

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The end of history sure didn’t last long. As we noted in Chapter 6, a mere 10 years after Fukuyama’s pronouncement of “the end of history,” political discontent began to break out around the world, grabbing international attention with the 1999 Seattle protests at the World Trade Organization meetings. Few would contest the claim that Seattle marked the end of “the end of history.” But questions arise as to where this leaves us ideologically. Why were these protesters protesting? An answer suggested by our critical reading of Fukuyama’s myth is that the movements begun in Seattle were politics for politics’ sake. Bored by the end of history, wealthy, privileged Northerners protested against their own institutions as a way to fill in their own personal empty cores of liberalism. On this reading, antiglobalization protests expressed the internal contradictions inherent within liberalism. There are other ways to interpret the events of Seattle, however. Maybe Seattle marked not so much a new beginning to history caused by liberalism’s own contradictions as it did a reemergence of the sort of active political protest someone like Marx (see Chapters 6 and 10) might have predicted. Maybe Seattle was more about the contradictions within the logic of capitalism (the modern means of production and exchange in the global economy) than it was about liberal political guilt. Some on the left initially latched onto this idea. Seattle seemed to these folks like a vindication of their ideological position, for it revitalized the severely wounded if not dead ideology of Marxism for a post-Cold War world. This reading of Seattle was difficult to support, however, because it didn’t look at all like that which Marx had described. Seattle was not about the proletariat rising up against their unjust laboring conditions. Nor was it about the South rising up against the North. Instead, Seattle was about globally (guilty?) conscious Northerners creatively protesting how their own governments and Northernbased IGOs treated not just the South but also the environment and animals, for example. And because the Seattle protesters lacked any coherent group identity, their aims and targets were varied and unpredictable. They did not, for example, all seem to be protesting against the logic of capital as Marx described it, and they certainly did not seem to be protesting against the logic of capital as Marx described they would. This is not to say that the Seattle protests were not powerful displays of contemporary political movements. It is simply to say that it is difficult to use these protests to reinvigorate Marxism. In the months after Seattle, political commentators tended to rally around one of these two explanations—that Seattle was about (youthful) liberal political discontent or that Seattle marked the (nostalgic) re-emergence of the Marxist agenda. While the first position was generally too dismissive of Seattle, the second was too optimistic. And then along came a book called Empire. In the early fall of 2000, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri published a 478-page volume of heavy theory interspersed with emotive political “manifestos” that lent a coherence to leftist ideology which it had lacked since the end of the Cold War. Instantly selling out in shops, Empire became the most talked-about book of its times. For what Hardt and Negri accomplished in Empire was not just a revival of the left and an explanation for events like Seattle (which the book, in press at the time, seemed to predict). They managed to bring the leftist ideology of neo-Marxism into lively

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conversation with the contemporary postmodern world. They did this in two ways. First, they engaged events like those on the streets of Seattle as the ideological anomalies they were. What happened in such contemporary political protests wasn’t strictly liberal or Marxist. It was, they realized, something more complex. To explain this complexity they, second, incorporated the theoretical insights of postmodern political philosophers like Michel Foucault (1990) and Deleuze and Guattari (1987) into their discussion of leftist ideology. Until Empire, postmodernists and traditional leftists were very much at theoretical and political odds. In Empire, they seem to share similar agendas. The result was a new myth for a new millennium—“Empire is the new world order.” In a nutshell, their argument goes like this. Contemporary global political life is not an unwieldy, illogical mess. Rather, “there is world order” (2000: 3), and this world order is best described by the term Empire. Empire is the materialization—the tangible actualization—of political, social, and economic global processes of exploitation that repress what Hardt and Negri call “the multitude,” a sort of globalized, postmodern proletariat (see Table 7.1). Hardt and Negri’s myth appears to answer what might be the fundamental question that has plagued neo-Marxists since the collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989—how is it possible to have a (communist) revolution when there seems to be nothing (coherent) to rebel against and in an era in which rebellion itself seems to be so incoherent? By recasting the oppressor as Empire and the oppressed as the multitude, Hardt and Negri restore the basic binary upon which Marxism has long been based. And, importantly, they do so in an era of so-called globalization in which not only (former) global orderers like hegemonic sovereign nation-states but also (former) rebels like oppressed economic classes seem like the fractured, fluid, and foundationless identities that postmodernists have been describing for decades (see “Suggestions for further thinking” in Chapter 4). Empire is the term that unifies the fragmented nature of global political oppression into a coherent ontology/agency to be opposed— the new enemy of the (communist) left. And the multitude is the term that unifies fragmented, often localized resistance movements into a coherent global ontology/agency to challenge their new enemy, Empire, and thereby transform the nature of global politics. By applying this “ontological standpoint” (2000: 62) to their assessment of global politics, Hardt and Negri seem to both acknowledge and overcome the ontological issues postmodernists have long pointed to. They acknowledge postmodern Table 7.1  Marx’s vs. Hardt and Negri’s understanding of history Marx

Hardt and Negri

Understanding of history

Dialectical

Dialectical

Nature of dialectic

Materialist

Materialist

What clashes in the dialectic?

Economic classes

Globalized postmodern ontologies (Empire vs. the multitude)

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insights in part by recognizing contemporary global ontology/agency/identity (which are each slightly different things; see “Suggestions for further thinking” in Chapter 4) as fragmented, fluid, and foundationless. But then they seem to overcome the “proper ontological lack” (2000: 62) of contemporary global agents by unifying Empire and the multitude into proper, coherent agents. In so doing, Hardt and Negri claim to overcome the obstacles postmodern ontologies have posed to global resistance. What does that mean in practice? It means that now that the multitude know who they are as the multitude (the globally fragmented resistors of oppression who are unified in their purpose of resistance) and now that the multitude know whom they are resisting (the globally fragmented but unified in purpose new enemy called Empire), global resistance movements across the world become more meaningful (see, e.g., Chapter 10). The multitude’s efforts may not end in a communist utopia, as Marx predicted. But their actions can now be understood properly to be part of a global revolution that could lead to that end (which is the desired end for Hardt and Negri). All this is possible—or, really, actually happening—because postmodern ontology is no longer a problem to global resistance. But is the problem of ontology so easily dealt with? Is solving the problems of coherence and direction and even potentially “progress” that postmodernists have pointed to simply a matter of naming the multitude as coherent global resistors of Empire and of naming Empire as their new enemy? As we saw with Chapter 4’s myth “anarchy is what states make of it,” just because we may desire a coherent ontology/producer/author behind production (in that case, the state; in this case, global order and resistances to it), that doesn’t necessarily mean we can find one. And even if we do find one (like Hardt and Negri claim to find Empire and its global resistor, the multitude), this doesn’t mean that this ontology/producer/author is not experiencing “ontological lack,” or that it is as coherent or reliable as we wish it to be. Indeed, as we will see in Chapter 8, “ontological lack”—the impossibility of being a coherent identity—may be the only “identity” left in the so-called postmodern world (also see Chapter 10). As Chapter 11 will show, poststructuralist approaches like Queer IR theorize (queer) subjectivity as antinormative from a firmly anti-identitarian point of view—meaning that a subject need not be ontologically coherent to engage in resistance. And, if that is the case, then theorizing “ontological lack” out of existence is not the same as producing the truth about ontology. It is merely symptomatic of a desire to produce such a truth. What makes such a desire appear to be just the way things really are in contemporary global life? What, in Hardt and Negri’s case, makes their desire to produce a truth about ontology appear to be the truth? The 2000 film Memento takes the problems of ontological lack and the production of the truth head-on. Its hero is Leonard Shelby, a victim of a rare neurological disorder which allows him to retain his past memories but makes him incapable of creating new memories. The past memory that haunts Leonard is of his wife’s violent murder at the hands of an unknown intruder. Using a series of mementos like tattoos and photographs as substitutes for his short-term memory, Leonard pursues his wife’s murderer until he kills him, again and again and

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again (because of course Leonard cannot retain the new memory of having killed his wife’s killer). In telling its sad tale about a figure attempting to compensate for his ontological lack by producing truth tales that produce enemies, Memento engages questions such as “how are the ontologies of enemy and avenger produced?,” “why are these ontologies produced?,” and “what must go without saying in order for the production of such ontologies to appear to be true?” Reading Memento’s selective use of memory back onto Empire, we can ask yet another question, “what must Hardt and Negri necessarily exclude from their narration of Empire and the multitude in order for their myth ‘Empire is the new world order’ to appear to be true?” In this chapter, I will explore these questions by first asking three additional questions—(1) What is Empire? (2) What is the multitude? (3) What is the relationship between Empire and the multitude?

What does the myth say? “Empire is materializing before our very eyes” (2000: xi). This is the claim that Hardt and Negri make at the outset of their book Empire. What has enabled the materialization of Empire seems to be the end of colonization and the collapse of the Soviet bloc which in turn led to the “globalization of economic and cultural exchange” (2000: xi). So Empire is connected to globalization. But Hardt and Negri are interested in much more than the mere globalization of production and exchange. As their myth suggests, they want to understand what all this implies for world order. And so, in addition to the globalization of economic and cultural exchange noted by others, they have observed the emergence as well of “a global order, a new logic and structure of rule—in short, a new form of sovereignty” that they call Empire (2000: xi). “Empire is the political subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world” (2000: xi). It is the new sovereignty that has emerged in an era of globalization, at “the end of history.” As Hardt and Negri put it, “Empire exhausts historical time, suspends history, and summons the past and future within its own ethical order. In other words, Empire presents its order as permanent, eternal, and necessary” (2000: 11). These are enormous claims to make, especially when considered within the field of international politics. For Hardt and Negri are insisting that it is not sovereign nation-states alone or in some combination that rule the world but instead that this thing called Empire does. And this, of course, runs contrary to the declared wisdom of many traditional IR scholars from realists (Chapter 2) to Wendtian social constructivists (Chapter 4). Equally, Hardt and Negri imply that the whole anarchy problematic is silly. If Empire is what rules world politics—­ provides world order—then it doesn’t really matter that there is no formal world government (“international anarchy” as anarchy scholars define it: see Chapters 2–4; for a contrasting view of anarchy, see Chapter 10), for according to Hardt and Negri, there is a world orderer—a sovereign political subject who governs the world—and that world orderer is called Empire.

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So what exactly is Empire? Hardt and Negri have an awful lot to say about what Empire is and, just as importantly, about what Empire isn’t. Sometimes it seems that the more they explain Empire, the more confusing the concept becomes. For instance, perhaps somewhat misleadingly, Empire is not a successor of historical empires, and does not operate through imperialist policies of territorial expansion, colonization, and systems of racial stratification that these forms of rule rely on (E:\Volumes\NO NAME\Edited Files\25Barkawi and Laffey, 2002; Petras, 2001; Sharma and Sharma, 2003). Take a look at Box 7.1 which lists just a few of the things Hardt and Negri say about Empire. So, how do we make sense of all of this? The first thing to do is to recognize that what makes Empire both so difficult to grasp and such a powerful concept is its mixed character. On the one hand, some of the things Hardt and Negri attribute to Empire seem to have a certainty about them, things like “a political subject” or “a sovereign power.” These are the sorts of things about which we might say, “I’d recognize that if I saw it.” But, on the other hand, there seem to be just as many things about Empire that are elusive, things like it being “a virtual center” or “a nonplace.” These sorts of things are really hard to identify—to know them when we see them—because they are defined by their very inability to be pinned down.

Box 7.1  What Empire is and isn’t What Empire is

What Empire is not

• ”a single logic of rule” (2000: xii) • not reducible to the United States of America (2000: xiii-xiv) • the political subject that regulates global exchanges (2000: xi) • not imperialism (2000: xiv) • "the sovereign power that governs the world" (2000: xi) • "an order that effectively ­suspends ­history and thereby fixes the existing state of affairs for eternity" (2000: xiv) • "a virtual center" (2000: 58) • "a non-place" (2000: 190) • "a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule" (2000: xii) • a society of control constructed through biopower (2000: 25) • an "international disciplinary order" (2000: 261) • "force" presented "as being in the ­service of right and peace" (2000: 15) • the enemy of the multitude (2000: 45)

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This mixed character to the concept of Empire results from Hardt and Negri’s mixed theoretical debts. In addition to using the traditional language of international relations theory to explain their myth of world order, Hardt and Negri also rely upon postmodernism and neo-Marxism. What this means is that Hardt and Negri’s concept of Empire is so complex and (to some) contradictory because it fuses together three approaches to understanding the world—traditional IR theory, postmodernism, and neo-Marxism. What Hardt and Negri take from traditional IR theory are concepts like “world order,” “sovereignty,” and “political subjectivity,” concepts that seem to require no further explanation to students of IR. We understand what Hardt and Negri mean when they say that Empire is a form of world order, a form of sovereignty, a form of political subjectivity. Or at least we think we do. And then they twist the very concepts we thought we understood by combining them with postmodernism and neo-Marxism. They seem to postmodernize this new form of world order by turning to the work of Michel Foucault on biopower and to the work of Deleuze and Guattari on nomadism. World order cannot be understood simply as a clash among sovereign nation-states. States aren’t the only important actors in international politics any more. Rather, to understand this new world order, we need to examine not only how international order is created among states but also within states and within individuals. Foucauldian biopower is the concept that explains how individuals’ relationships to society, economics, and governance are constructed and reconstructed within themselves in relation to states and societies so that individuals, too, end up constructing the very orders that construct them. Put very simply, Foucault recognizes that relationships among states, societies, and populations have changed historically, from states at first subjecting populations to the sovereign authority of the state, to societies (usually within states) normalizing populations to behave in accordance with humanitarian norms of conduct, to individuals becoming self-disciplined once they have internalized the lessons (and power relations) circulated in and by states and societies. What this means for Hardt and Negri is that Empire is not something that has been imposed upon us from above (like a bad world government). Rather, Empire is something that an awful lot of us have had a hand in making (examples might be as trivial as buying a McDonald’s hamburger and thereby supporting globalization to Western citizens rallying around their national flags during Gulf War I). Because populations in the industrial West have been (self-)disciplined into being good consumers and good citizens, they have also helped to construct Empire as an “international disciplinary order” (2000: 261, italics in original). In trying to explain the location of Empire, Hardt and Negri turn to the work of postmodern philosophers Deleuze and Guattari on nomadism. Following Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari recognize that power is not located in any one place anymore; rather, it flows through states, societies, and international orders. Power relations, then, can no longer be described in territorial terms. We cannot say, for example, that the United States of America is where Empire is located, even though we can say that the USA is one of the points at and through which Empire is expressed. This is why Hardt and Negri describe Empire as having a “virtual center” rather than a true center. As a network of power relations, it is both everywhere and nowhere at the same time. So, even though Empire is very real for Hardt and Negri, it is not something we can ever pin down to one place.

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What this means is that the agency/ontology of Empire is postmodern. What does that mean, and how does that work? Well, postmodern agency/ontology—postmodern ways of being—differ from traditional agency/ontology in that instead of simply being there (knowing them when we see them), they appear to be foundationless, fluid, and fragmented (things we can’t really pin down). What does this mean for Empire? By being located everywhere and nowhere at the same time, Empire is foundationless. It is not, for example, confined within a particular territorial state or group of states. Being foundationless, the forces of Empire flow across boundaries rather than remaining restricted within them. They are more like what Manuel Castells refers to as global networks of informationalized flows than they are like traditional expressions of imperialism, for example (2000: 286). As such, Empire is fluid. And because Empire is located in so many different places in so many different ways all at the same time, Empire has a fractured identity. It isn’t any one thing. It is a lot of things taken in combination. So Hardt and Negri rely upon postmodernism for three specific intellectual debts—to explain how international order is constructed through biopower into an international disciplinary order, to explain the deterritorialized location of Empire, and to express the fragmentary agency/ontology of Empire. It is on this final debt to postmodernism—its ontological debt—that Hardt and Negri complicate things yet again. They do so by turning to neo-Marxism, the key theoretical foundation of their myth of Empire. Hardt and Negri want to preserve postmodern insights about ontology while insisting that Empire has a concrete character—the character of a world orderer. And so they twist and turn a few more times. For example, very much like (but not identical to) Marx’s explanation of the logic of capital, Hardt and Negri describe Empire as “a single logic of rule” (2000: xii). Describing something as “singular” seems to contradict everything postmodernism says about ontology/agency. Yet Hardt and Negri combine this claim with postmodern insights about agency/ ontology. They suggest that as a logic and not a place, Empire is empowered by “contingency, mobility, and flexibility” (2000: 200). That sounds very postmodern. But then they go on to argue that Empire is the logic that dominates the current international order. “Empire is the new world order.” And even though Empire cannot be located in any single state or group of states, as the logical orderer of the world it is “a political subject,” “a sovereign power,” and a (traditional) ontology. They then go on to describe the character of Empire as a ruler. Empire seems to be a benevolent ruler. It seems to mobilize power relations for good—for humanity, for right, and for justice. But, argue Hardt and Negri, the way Empire really rules the world is through exploitation; and those whom they claim are exploited (true to Marxism) are laborers. As Hardt and Negri put it, “Empire is the non-place of world production where labor is exploited” (2000: 210). So just as in capitalism where the rich get richer off the backs of the poor, in Empire the few benefit by exploiting “the multitude.” Empire’s exploitation is globally performed through political, social, and economic processes. It is through these processes of exploitation that we are able to see Empire that “Empire is materializing before our very eyes” (2000: xi). What is important here, however, is that we wouldn’t be able to recognize Empire—these global processes of exploitation—if we couldn’t identify the victims of Empire’s oppression. In other words, it is the material exploitation of the

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multitude by Empire that makes us aware of the global processes that cause this exploitation. This is one reason why Hardt and Negri claim that “the multitude call Empire into being” (2000: 43). The multitude call Empire into being not only through their oppression. More importantly for Hardt and Negri, they call Empire into being through their resistance to this oppression. Resistance to oppression is really what neo-Marxism is all about. And, indeed, it is what Empire is all about. Hardt and Negri’s myth of Empire is less about trying to explain the new world order than it is about striving to understand how resistance to that new world order is happening and how it can be made more effective (on resistance, also see Chapter 10). If that is the case, then why have Hardt and Negri gone to such lengths to expound their myth “Empire is the new world order”? Because, they argue, “The first question of political philosophy today is not if or even why there will be resistance and rebellion, but rather how to determine the enemy against which to rebel” (2000: 211; my italics). Put differently, in order to make resistance today meaningful, the multitude have to know who or what is to be resisted. In claiming that “Empire is the new world order,” Hardt and Negri are in effect also claiming that “Empire is the new world enemy” (2000: 57; my italics). Empire is the enemy of the multitude. Empire is what is to be resisted. Empire, then, may know itself to be at “the end of history.” But, in effect, the eternity of Empire can be—and needs to be—challenged by the multitude. As Hardt and Negri put it, “Our political task … is not simply to resist these processes [of Empire] but to reorganize them and redirect them toward new ends. The creative forces of the multitude that sustain Empire are also capable of autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political organization of global flows and exchanges” and, they claim, these struggles are already taking place (2000: xv). Linking up our discussions of the agency/ontology of Empire and the character of Empire, what we see in Hardt and Negri is that both postmodern and neo-Marxist accounts of agency/ontology are crucial to how they describe Empire. For Empire to be the enemy of the multitude, it has to “be”—it has to be an agent, an ontology “against which to rebel” (2000: 211). Otherwise, fear Hardt and Negri, Empire could not be opposed. But when we look at the contemporary world, we don’t see a traditional world orderer. There is no world government. There is no traditional imperial power. All we (might) see is fragmented, fluid, and foundationless Empire. But for Hardt and Negri, this fragmented, fluid, and foundationless Empire very much “is.” It is a singular logic, a new sovereign, a new world orderer. And so it can be opposed. But because it is now a singular sovereign ruler, Empire seems to be as modern as it is postmodern. Ok, so now we know a bit about what Empire is. What about the multitude? How do Hardt and Negri think about them? The multitude is a concept reminiscent of “the masses” in neo-Marxism. Without going into any detail, the multitude—like the masses—represent both exploited labor and (because they are fed up with being exploited) revolutionary potential. (As we will see in Chapter 10, the multitude are also a lot like what antiglobalization protesters call “the 99 percent.”) In Marxism, the masses are class-based. Hardt and Negri try to complicate the class-based character of the masses in their conception of the multitude. Referring to the multitude as a “new proletariat” (2000: 402), Hardt and Negri emphasize the indefinite identity of the

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multitude. The multitude is a postmodern agent/ontology. Like Empire, it is not territorially (or even merely class) based. It is fragmented, fluid, and foundationless. Like Empire, it can be composed of seemingly disjointed political elements. For example, global resistance movements under the names of Seattle, Chiapas, and the Intifada might all be part of the multitude (2000: 54–56). The disparateness of the multitude does not mean it is not a powerful agent in contemporary global politics; it just means that it is more difficult to identify the multitude as an agent, which can make political resistance to an enemy (Empire) more difficult. Global resistance is not impossible, however. Yes, Hardt and Negri claim that what has kept global movements of resistance from becoming unified across regions and movements and from making sense (and, they imply, making progress, i.e., breaking out of the seemingly eternal time of Empire) as a unified global axis of resistance is their fragmented agency/ontology (2000: 54–56). But they also claim that while political movements are of course distinctive and localized—and therefore, when examined as a global whole, seem to be fragmented, fluid, and foundationless—they share two things in common. First, they share the common enemy of Empire (2000: 57); and because they share this common enemy, second, they also share the common identity of the multitude (2000: 393–413; see Box 7.2). The only problem is that they just don’t always know this and therefore cannot always organize their resistances as effectively as they could (which is why intellectuals like Hardt and Negri had to write their book to explain it all). What we see here is that just as “the multitude call Empire into being,” Empire calls the multitude into being. The multitude call Empire into being as its enemy to be resisted in the form of an “international disciplinary order” and orderer. And it is only because the multitude—these fragmented resistance groups scattered around the world—have a common enemy in Empire that they know themselves to have a common identity, a common agency, a common ontology, to “be” the multitude. Who the multitude should be is a force for “counter-Empire” (2000: 207). As Hardt and Negri put it, “Globalization must be met with a counter-globalization, Empire with a counter-Empire” (2000: 207). “The multitude, in its will to be-against and its desire for liberation, must push through Empire to come out the other side” (2000: 218).

Box 7.2  Who are the multitude? “a new proletariat” (2000: 402) a unified (or at least, unifiable) global axis of resistance (2000: 54–56) those who share the common enemy of Empire (2000: 393–413) “counter-Empire” (2000: 207) “the real ontological referent of philosophy (and, I would add, history)” (2000: 48) contemporary militants (2000: 413) Source: Hardt and Negri, 2000

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Figure 7.1  The dialectical logic of Empire

In the end, what Empire leaves us with is not an unruly world composed of illogical, anarchic, and fragmented forces. Instead, we are left with a single logic (the logic of Empire) and a single contradiction (between Empire and the multitude). We are left, in other words, with a classic Marxist encounter between oppressor and oppressed. And even though Hardt and Negri reject such a reading, their characterization of this contemporary clash between Empire and counter-Empire slots in nicely to a traditional Marxist materialist dialectic (see Figure 7.1). The relationship between Empire and the multitude, then, is dialectical. Empire (thesis) is opposed to the multitude (antithesis), although Hardt and Negri would insist that this Empire/multitude clash is not dialectical because it is nonteleological (i.e., it is open-ended rather than having a determined endpoint like the realization of communism, 2000: 47, 48, 51) and because (they claim) their ontologies are postmodernized (Table 7.2). By unifying global forces of oppression into a single logic called Empire, by unifying fractured forces of resistance into a single global resistor called the multitude, and by placing oppressor/Empire and oppressed/the multitude into a neat opposition, Hardt and Negri claim to solve the problem of resistance in our contemporary postmodern era. “Ontological lack” is overcome because Hardt and Negri’s ontological standpoint identifies clear ontologies/agents—Empire and the multitude. Without ontological lack, resistance (like oppression) itself becomes “a political subject” (2000: 394), “a singularity that establishes a new place in the Table 7.2  Modernism vs. postmodernism Modernism

Postmodernism

Time

Progressive

Nonprogressive

Space

Bounded

Unbounded

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non-place of Empire” (2000: 395), and “the real ontological referent of philosophy” (and, I would add, of history) (2000: 48). The multitude becomes a kind of (communist) militant fighting not for phony justice (as Empire does) but for real justice. As Hardt and Negri put it, “This militancy makes resistance into counterpower and makes rebellion into a project of love” (2000: 413; italics in original). “This,” they conclude, “is the irrepressible lightness and joy of being communist” (2000: 413; italics in original).

Memento If ever there were a character who reveled in the joy of resistance and turned rebellion into a project of love, it is Leonard Shelby. We meet Leonard in the opening shot of Christopher Nolan’s 2000 film Memento (based on the short story Memento Mori by his brother Jonathan Nolan). Memento opens to the sound of a simple note followed by others quietly rippling in the background. Credits fade in and out. As the title appears, the music changes to an ominous chord. Fade in to a close-up of a hand holding a Polaroid picture. The photo vividly shows a blue-jacketed torso face-down amongst bloodsoaked white tiles. We see the photo from the point of view of the person holding it. As the camera lingers on the photo, its sharpness fades. The handshakes the Polaroid. The picture fades some more. This action is repeated until the Polaroid fades to white. The man holding the photo reaches inside his jacket for his camera and places the photo where the film exits the machine. We hear mechanical sounds as the Polaroid camera sucks up the photo, then flashes. Cut to a close-up of the photographer’s blood-splattered face. He is a white male in his 30s. Cut to quick montage close-ups of what he sees—blood running up the tiles, a bullet shell, blood-splashed glasses, and the head of the man in the blue jacket face down. Cut back to the photographer standing above the dead body. A gun leaps into his outstretched hand. He kneels down. The shell dances on the tiles, the bloodied glasses jump onto the dead man’s face, the dead man’s head sucks up its spilt blood. As the shell flies into the sparking gun, the victim—a middle-aged white male with a mustache—turns to face the gunman, screaming. We cannot make out what the victim says. The sound is “wrong.” All the sounds are wrong, except the music. For they, like the visuals in this opening sequence, are played backwards. Cut to a black-and-white extreme close-up of the photographer/gunman’s face in profile. As the camera moves up his face, we hear his thoughts in calm voice-over. “So where are you? You’re in some motel room. You wake up and you’re in some motel room.” The camera confirms this, showing us a room key, a closet, the gunman sitting on a bed, all in black and white. He continues, “It feels like maybe the first time you’ve been here, but perhaps you’ve been there a week, three months. It’s kinda hard to say. I don’t know. It’s just an anonymous room.” Cut to a color Polaroid of a smiling mustached white male in a blue jacket. Beneath his photo is the word “Teddy” and some numbers. The photo rests on a small counter. A hand from behind the counter turns the photo toward the

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gunman. “This guy,” he says to the gunman, tapping the photo with his finger, “he’s here alright.” The gunman turns around to see Teddy entering the hotel lobby. Teddy sees the gunman and greets him with a friendly, “Lenny.” Lenny/Leonard (dressed as he was in the opening color sequence) drives Teddy to an abandoned building out of town. In their conversation, it is revealed that Leonard has an as-yet-unexplained disability and that he is playing detective (Teddy playfully calls him “Sherlock”). All sorts of small things are unexplained in this scene, like why Leonard has two bloody scratches on his face (scratches he did not have in the previous black-and-white sequence). Inside the building, Leonard consults his Polaroid of Teddy, turning it over to reveal the words, “Don’t believe his lies. He is the one. Kill him.” In voiceover, we hear Leonard’s thoughts, “I’ve finally found him. How long have I been looking?” Leonard jumps Teddy, dragging him into a white tiled area of the building. He tells Teddy to beg his wife’s forgiveness before he kills him. Teddy protests. Teddy:

Leonard, you don’t know what’s going on. You don’t even know my name. Leonard: Teddy. Teddy: That’s ‘cause you read it off a fucking picture. You don’t know who you are. Leonard: I’m Leonard Shelby, I’m from San Francisco … Teddy: That’s who you were, that’s not what you’ve become. Leonard: Shut your mouth! Teddy: You wanna know, Lenny. Come on … Let’s go down to the basement…. Then you’ll know who you really are. Leonard looks confused, fearful. He takes aim at Teddy’s face. At this moment, the film has arrived at the final shot of the first color sequence. Teddy turns away and screams, “No,” as Leonard shoots him in the head. Cut to black. Fade into black-and-white sequence. Leonard is sitting on his motel bed, wearing boxers and a plaid shirt, just as in the previous black-and-white sequence. In his voiceover, we hear the beginnings of a long explanation, an explanation that begins where the last black-and-white scene finished. Leonard:

[voiceover] It’s just an anonymous room…. You know, you know who you are, and you know kinda all about yourself. But just for day to day stuff, notes are really useful.

Close-up of a tattoo on Leonard’s hand that reads, “Remember Sammy Jankis.” Leonard:

[voiceover] Sammy Jankis had the same problem. He really had no system. He wrote himself a ridiculous amount of notes but he’d get them all mixed up. You really do need a system if you’re gonna make it work.

Quick fade to color scene in which Leonard is writing on the back of a Polaroid, “He is the one. Kill him.” The scene continues. … This is how Memento opens.

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Needless to say, this is an unusual opening. First, unlike other films we’ve discussed, Memento’s opening has no clear ending (and, as we will discover, no clear beginning either). As I have related it here, it is composed of four sequences and the beginning of a fifth, three in color and two in black and white. My selection of four-plus sequences is arbitrary. I could have selected maybe three instead. But selecting just one would have been problematic. For if I selected just the first color sequence—what would traditionally be regarded as an opening sequence— we wouldn’t have enough information to go on to grasp what we need to know to analyze the film. This is because, in Memento, the ordering of sequences is as important as the content of sequences. Which leads us to the second difference between this film’s and other films’ openings. Opening sequences usually tell an audience everything they need to know to understand a film. For example, they introduce central themes and tensions, if not also central characters. Memento does some of this. It does introduce us to Leonard and Teddy. It does suggest that Leonard has a disability (although we don’t know what this is). And it does give us a murder to solve. But it does all of this with a twist. Instead of standing as a clarifying distillation of codes that we can revisit in our minds to make sense of the action as it unfolds, Memento’s opening sequence raises more questions than it answers. Who is Leonard Shelby? Who is Teddy? Why did Leonard kill Teddy? And why did Leonard photograph Teddy once he killed him? As such, Memento is a detective film. It isn’t a classic “whodunit” (we know Leonard did it) but a complex “why did he do it?” Who wants to know why he did it is the audience. The audience is Memento’s off-screen detective. The audience is trying to make sense of events as they unfold from the first color sequence. This is one of the things that makes Memento so compelling. We have to think throughout this film. But, typically, we don’t have to think alone. As in any detective film, the audience gets to puzzle through the story with the film’s on-screen detective. Memento’s detective is Leonard, whom Teddy refers to as “Sherlock” in the second color sequence. Since the film’s detective is the very guy who committed the murder, the audience presumes that Leonard knows why he murdered Teddy. All it has to do is hang around for Leonard to explain things to them. And explain Leonard does. Indeed, this is what happens in the black-andwhite sequences. First in voiceover and later in a long conversation to an anonymous telephone caller, Leonard answers the audience’s questions about the back story, providing Leonard’s motivation for murder. As Leonard tells it, “John G.” raped and murdered his wife and, in the process, injured Leonard. When Leonard finds John G., he will kill him. From the outset, then, the audience immediately identifies with and then relies upon Leonard. It identifies with Leonard as a detective because the audience is itself in the position of detective. And it relies upon Leonard as the seemingly all-knowing narrator of the story who will help the audience solve its puzzle. For the audience, then, Leonard’s sense of the world is the sense they most care about. Having a detective narrator with whom the audience identifies and upon whom it relies is a typical ploy in what is called the film noir genre. But, as Matt Zoller Seitz points out, “Memento is built around an amusing reversal of convention: where the typical film noir hero is a talkative wiseacre who thinks he knows more than he does, Leonard is a quiet cipher who knows he understands very little

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and is desperate to learn more” (2001). This is because, as Leonard explains to everyone he meets, he has a condition that makes him unable to make new memories. As he tells a motel clerk, Leonard: Clerk:

I have no short-term memory. I know who I am and all about myself, but since my injury I can’t make any new memories. Everything fades. That must suck. It’s all … backwards. Well, like … you gotta pretty good idea of what you’re gonna do next, but no idea what you just did. [laughs] I’m the exact opposite.

And, indeed, most people are. Most people depend upon their ability to make new memories in order to conduct their lives in a meaningful way. But Leonard is not most people. Leonard’s handicap does not prevent him from knowing who he was—he was Leonard Shelby from San Francisco who, he explains later, used to be an insurance investigator. But Leonard’s handicap does prevent him from knowing who he is—a man who not only wants to kill “John G.” but is a multiple murderer. Leonard has killed “John G.” over and over and over because each time he kills “John G.,” the memory of this act fades like a Polaroid developing in reverse. Leonard, then, is a sort of postmodern serial killer who doesn’t know he is killing serially because Leonard’s life has no seriality. Leonard lives outside of sequential historical time, in a time that seems to be eternal. To the extent that Leonard experiences time, he does so “backwards.” He has moments when he knows what he is going to do next, but he cannot hold on to the memories of what he has done since his injury. Leonard’s temporality is the film’s temporality. The film takes place outside of historical time, in a seemingly eternal posthistory, the time of Hardt and Negri’s Empire. Time is posthistorical because it is nonprogressive. For Hardt and Negri (as for Leonard), this is because time has been postmodernized. Contingency rather than progress best explains temporal relationships. Still, progress may be possible, but it is not necessarily going to occur. The film identifies with Leonard’s perspective and so tells its story just as Leonard experiences it—backwards. The first color sequence is completely backwards, playing the action and all the sound apart from the music in reverse. Indeed, Memento’s opening shot shows the audience exactly how Leonard’s memory works, for it is of a just-developed Polaroid, fading. Thereafter, the temporality of each color sequence is internally forward (showing events from beginning to end within any one sequence) but sequentially backward (showing us the last color sequence at the beginning of the film and the first at the end of the film). Not only does the film identify with Leonard’s sense of time. It also identifies with Leonard’s sense of space. Leonard could not live in a more deterritorialized space. Place has little relevance in Memento. The film looks like it takes place in California, but this is just a guess. And it doesn’t matter. The town doesn’t matter. The motel doesn’t matter. Even the abandoned building where Leonard murders Teddy doesn’t matter. The only place that does matter is the space of Leonard himself. He is the space that we follow throughout the film. But Leonard is as unbounded as the postmodern landscape he occupies, if not more so. Put differently, the physical limits of Leonard’s body do little to ground him as a single person, a coherent agent/ontology, a knowable place. The primary question

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Box 7.3  How Memento makes sense of the world Memento’s postmodern world is uncertain: • Temporally because there is no guaranteed progress through time. • Spatially because everything (even individuals) is unbounded.

raised by the film is not “Why did Leonard kill Teddy?” but “Who is Leonard Shelby, really?” As the film goes on, this question seems to be less and less reliably answered, especially by Leonard himself. So this is how the film makes sense of the world. The world is the postmodern temporal and spatial landscape that Hardt and Negri associate with Empire. This space is postmodern because the dual certainties of progress through time and boundedness in space are suspended, even at the most personal level of the individual (see Box 7.3). What is typical and deviant in this postmodern world of Memento? What is typical is for people to be able to make new memories and, in so doing, to hold on to a sense of themselves and thereby live their lives “forward” not “backward.” Living “forward” at least opens up the possibility of temporal progress, even though it does not guarantee it. What is deviant is for someone to be unable to make new memories and, therefore, have to re-create their sense of self and “progress” constantly. Such a person (Leonard) experiences time backwards, knowing what he is about to do but not knowing what he just did (see Table 7.3). It is only by supplementing his life with (1) an ordered and disciplined system of habit and conditioning; and (2) a motive to make it all work that Leonard is able to drag himself through his meaningless present. It is only, in other words, by applying a Foucauldian system of biopower to himself that Leonard passes himself off (to himself) as a functioning agent/ontology. Leonard’s system for reordering his world is postmodern not just because it relies upon biopower but also because it is an informationalized world. Leonard uses mementos—instant photography, notes, conceptual maps, and files—to orient himself. But Leonard’s most important messages are not tucked into his pockets or stuck upon walls. They are the tattoos poked beneath his skin. Having become “a walking text” (Hoberman, 2001), Leonard is himself a memento—a collection of scraps from the recent past, a collage of confused meanings he Table 7.3  What is typical and deviant in the world of Memento?

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Typical

Deviant

Time moves forward because people make new memories as they pass through time. This makes temporal progress possible and allows individuals to hold on to their senses of self

Time moves backward because people cannot make new memories as they pass through time. This makes temporal progress impossible and means individuals have to constantly re-create their senses of self

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forgets he has and, upon each (re)discovery of them, desperately tries to decode and (re)assemble. Leonard’s motive for reordering his world is a horrible injustice. As he tells it, this injustice is the rape and murder of his wife by John G., one of two men who broke into the family home, killed Leonard’s wife, and struck Leonard on the head (thus leading to his short-term memory loss). That is the last thing he remembers, his wife … dying. Up Leonard’s arm, onto his torso and thigh are tattooed “the facts” about John G.—white, male, drug dealer, etc. Across his upper chest are the words, “John G. raped and killed my wife.” It is this character—a vengeful “detective” who admits that the truth about his condition is that he doesn’t know anything—who guides the equally confused audience through the story. Put differently, the character who epitomizes ontological lack is the very character to whom the audience turns for its orientation. This gives Memento its drive, but also its humor. For even Leonard knows he is the “most unreliable of unreliable narrators” (Independent Focus, 2000). As he tells his unknown caller, “You don’t believe someone with this condition.” So why would the audience be gullible enough to believe Leonard? Why would the audience identify with and even trust a character as confused as Leonard to sort out their own confusion? The answer lies in another structural feature upon which the film relies, the splicing of black-and-white sequences with color sequences. Marking sequences with different colorings divides a filmic world into two—one imaginary and unreliable and the other real and reliable. Conventionally, it is the color world that is fantastical (not factual) and the blackand-white world that is real and reliable (just the facts). Memento seems to follow this convention. As we already know, the color sequences in Memento are confusing. Even though they constitute a complete story which answers the question, “why did Leonard kill Teddy?,” these sequences are not presented intelligibly to the audience. They do not seem to be composed of a comprehensible, structured narrative because they mirror Leonard’s “memory” by running backwards. What they represent is the postmodern world in which Leonard lives and acts but which is beyond his ability to understand rationally, at least as a series of acts. And yet it is Leonard’s understanding of events that compels the action in the color sequences. It is in these sequences that our (and Leonard’s) puzzle is introduced, is explored, and (we initially believe) will be solved. But Leonard’s “understanding” of his actions in the color sequences is grounded in his motivational fantasy. The color sequences are the sequences in which Leonard either acts on or is compelled to act on his fantasy to kill John G. Most audience members intuitively get this. They know they don’t understand what is going on in the color sequences, and they know Leonard doesn’t know what is going on in them either, apart from moment to moment or, really, memento to memento. So the color sequences do make the audience identify with Leonard as detectives, asking “What is going on?” and “Who is Leonard, really?” But they do not make the audience rely upon Leonard to be their all-knowing narrator because, clearly, Leonard doesn’t have much of a clue. It is in the black-and-white sequences that Leonard appears to have a clue, indeed, to have most of the clues. Unlike the color sequences that run backwards, all of the black-and-white sequences run forward. They form an absorbing

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narrative in which Leonard not only situates himself physically and mentally, but also situates the audience in relation to what’s going on in the color sequences. In these sequences, Leonard is generally in control. Even though he suffers from short-term memory loss and is forever asking questions (“Where am I?”), he has the ability to answer them persuasively based upon the evidence before him (“I’m in a motel room”). As such, these sequences are not part of the puzzle; they appear to be what we need to know to solve the puzzle. What Leonard seems to offer is a coherent past-to-present narrative of his old memories—memories of his wife, of her rape and murder, of having been an insurance investigator—that took place in historical time (past to present) and in real places (Leonard’s house, San Francisco). The audience devours these sequences as if they were reliable information because they are so comprehensible in contrast to the color sequences. Unlike the color sequences, what makes the black-and-white sequences make sense are three things—(1) Leonard’s certainty about “facts” and “past memories”; (2) a progressive, modernist narrative; and (3) a bounded, modern sense of space (with real places like San Francisco and especially the space of Leonard himself functioning as a meaningful [because meaning-making] agent). The primary device Leonard uses in the black-and-white sequences to guide the audience through the color sequences and to orient himself through his troublesome life is his narration of the story of Sammy Jankis. Sammy, Leonard tells us, also suffered from short-term memory loss. As the insurance investigator assigned to Sammy’s case, it was Leonard’s job to investigate Sammy’s claim. Was Sammy’s illness genuine? And, if so, was it caused by a physical injury or did it have a psychological cause? As Leonard tells the story, the time he spent with Sammy and his wife raised questions for him about Sammy’s condition. For example, Sammy could carry out complex tasks like giving his wife her insulin injections because he had learned these skills prior to the onset of his condition. But Sammy could not make any new memories. And, crucially for Leonard, Sammy could not even use routine and conditioning to help him reorder his new life. Physically, patients with short-term memory loss can learn new behaviors, relying upon instinct rather than memory (which is a wholly different part of the brain). When Sammy failed the instinct-based tests Leonard ordered, Leonard concluded that Sammy’s condition was mental and not physical. Physically, Sammy had the ability to create new memories. Psychologically, he did not. Sammy’s wife interpreted Leonard’s judgement about Sammy to mean that Sammy was faking his condition. So she devised her own test. As before, when she needed her insulin injection, she said to Sammy (whom she knew without doubt loved her and would never harm her), “Sammy, it’s time for my shot.” And, as before, Sammy rose from his chair, assembled the medication, and gave his wife her injection. A few minutes after receiving her injection, Sammy’s wife again told her husband, “Sammy, it’s time for my shot,” and again, without seeming to know he had just injected her, Sammy went through the same routine and injected his wife. Again she told Sammy, “It’s time for my shot,” and a third time, Sammy injected her. This time she went into a diabetic coma and died. Sammy, discovering his comatose wife, could not explain what had happened. Sammy passed this test—it showed he wasn’t faking his condition—but at the cost of his wife’s life.

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Throughout Memento, Leonard implores himself to remember Sammy Jankis. Indeed, “Remember Sammy Jankis” is the only tattoo on Leonard’s body that is not concealed by his clothing. It is this tattoo that leads Leonard to all his other tattoos. And just as Leonard tells everyone over and over about his condition, he explains his condition to them in relation to his account of Sammy Jankis. What matters to Leonard is not primarily the similarities between himself and Sammy—they both suffer from short-term memory loss—but their differences. Sammy’s condition was psychological; Leonard’s, physical. For while Sammy was not able to use instinct to create new behaviors, Leonard is. “Routine and discipline make my life possible,” he tells his nameless caller. And it appears that the reason why Sammy could not will himself to behave differently through instinct, routine, and self-discipline is, as Leonard puts it, “He didn’t have a reason to make it work. Me, yeah, I got a reason.” Leonard’s reason is to kill John G. So what we have here are two characters who suffer from ontological lack— Sammy Jankis and Leonard Shelby. Sammy ends up institutionalized because he has no system and, most importantly, no motivation to overcome his ontological lack—to function as a whole person. Leonard, on the other hand, does have a system (mementos) and a motivation (John G.). Indeed, how Leonard “overcomes” his ontological lack is precisely the same way that Hardt and Negri claim that the multitude overcomes its ontological lack. He constructs an enemy—John G. Being against his enemy is what coheres Leonard into a functioning ontology/agent. We know this both from Leonard’s mementos and from his voiceovers. As we already know, Leonard has tattooed across his torso, “John G. raped and killed my wife.” What is interesting about this tattoo is that, unlike all the others, it is inscribed in backward lettering that can only be deciphered when read in a mirror. Why is this tattoo backwards? It is this tattoo more than any other that reminds Leonard who he is because it reminds him who his enemy is. As Leonard explains in a voiceover near the end of the film, “We all need mirrors to remind ourselves who we are. I’m no different.” By informationally reordering their worlds, both Leonard and the multitude find themselves opposed to an enemy, and it is this enemy who “calls them into being.” The enemy for Leonard, of course, is John G. And the enemy for the multitude is Empire. Without John G. as a coherently constructed ontology who can be opposed, Leonard would not know who he is or what to do. His life would be as aimless and meaningless as that of Sammy Jankis. And without Empire as a coherently constructed ontology that can be opposed, so, too, would the resistances of the multitude seem to be aimless and meaningless (at least from the perspective of the modernist narrative of neo-Marxism). What makes Leonard’s myth about himself function—that he is on a romantic quest to secure justice for his wife—is precisely the same thing that makes the multitude’s romantic quest to secure global justice possible. It is that they have each (with a little help from their friends) constructed an enemy. Teddy, Natalie (the film’s femme fatale), and who knows who else help Leonard construct John G., and Hardt and Negri help the multitude construct Empire. Through the informational reordering of their worlds, then, both Leonard and the multitude seem to have achieved one of Hardt and Negri’s maxims.

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Speaking specifically about truth commissions (but, I would argue, capturing their general attitude toward truth in Empire), Hardt and Negri write, “Truth will not make us free, but taking control of the production of truth will” (2000: 156). The truth Leonard tells himself is that John G. exists. The truth the multitude tells itself is that Empire exists. In both cases, truth is what both constructs these fractured ontologies into coherent agents and liberates them by turning them into powerful forces of resistance. But is this “the truth”? Or is this just what Leonard and the multitude want to believe is true?

Truth, ontology, and desire When Memento’s backwards color sequences and forward black-and-white sequences catch up with one another in the film’s climax, answers emerge that put all truths in question. The color sequences indeed do answer the question “why did Leonard kill Teddy?” The reason that the audience suspects is, of course, that Teddy is really John G. And he is. His name is John Gammell. Only his mother calls him Teddy. And Teddy is Leonard’s John G. He is the man Leonard has been looking for throughout the color sequences. So Leonard is right when he tells himself in voiceover just before he kills Teddy, “I finally found him.” But there is a scary twist to Memento. What the color sequences also reveal is that Teddy is Leonard’s John G. because Leonard willfully constructed him as such. Leonard lied to himself in order to turn this John G. (Teddy) into his John G. Why? Because Teddy emerges as an alternative narrative voice in the film, a voice that throws everything Leonard believes into doubt. There are two things that Leonard firmly believes throughout the film— two things that allow Leonard to be Leonard. The first is that John G. raped and murdered his wife, and Leonard has to give his wife justice by killing John G. The second is that Leonard Shelby and Sammy Jankis are distinct individuals. Put differently, Leonard believes he knows who his enemy is and who he is. But when the dying Jimmy Grantz (the John G. Leonard kills at the end of the forward playing black-and-white sequences) calls Leonard “Sammy” and Teddy explains this to Leonard, the dual certainties Leonard relies upon to be Leonard start to unravel. Leonard: Teddy:

Leonard: Teddy: Leonard: Teddy: Leonard:

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[to Teddy, about Jimmy Grantz] He knew about Sammy. Why would I tell him about Sammy? You tell everyone about Sammy. … Great story. Gets better every time you tell it. So you lie to yourself to be happy. Nothing wrong with that—we all do. Who cares if there’s a few little things you’d rather not remember? What the fuck are you talking about? I dunno … your wife surviving the assault … her not believing about your condition … the doubt tearing her up inside … the insulin. That’s Sammy, not me! I told you about Sammy. … Like you’ve told yourself. Over and over. Conditioning yourself to believe. “Learning through repetition.” Sammy let his wife kill herself! Sammy ended up in an institution!

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Cut to Sammy sitting in an institution, then film splices in one or two frames of Leonard as Sammy, sitting in the same chair in the same institution. Leonard: Teddy:

… Sammy’s wife came to me and…. Sammy didn’t have a wife. It was your wife who had diabetes.

Cut to Leonard remembering giving his wife an insulin injection. Cut to Leonard shaking his head to reorder the memory. Cut back to the same scene, with Leonard giving his wife the injection, only this time Leonard is playfully pinching his wife with his fingers rather than poking her with a needle. Leonard: Teddy:

She wasn’t diabetic. You think I don’t know my own wife? … I guess I can only make you believe the things you want to be true, huh? Like ol’ Jimmy down there.

Teddy goes on to explain to Leonard that he helped Leonard kill the real John G. over a year ago, but even though Leonard has the Polaroid of this killing, he can’t remember it. And so Teddy finds him more and more John G.s to kill, to keep him happy. Jimmy Grantz was one of Leonard’s many John G.s. Teddy:

… I gave you a reason to live and you were more than happy to help. You lie to yourself! You don’t want the truth…. So you make up your own truth.

It is at this point that Leonard distracts Teddy long enough to write on the back of Teddy’s photo, “Don’t believe his lies” and writes another “fact” down to be tattooed onto his body—”Fact 6: Car License Number”—and then he copies the number from Teddy’s license plate onto his “fact sheet.” Leonard:

[in voiceover] You’re a John G.? Fine, then you can be my John G. Do I lie to make myself happy? In your case, Teddy … yes, I will.

Of course, Leonard doesn’t remember doing any of this. He doesn’t remember lying to himself about John G., about Teddy, about Sammy, or certainly about himself. And so Leonard begins his new quest to find and kill John G., not knowing that Teddy is his John G. As the temporal timelines of the black-and-white and color sequences converge, it is not only Leonard’s “truths” that unravel but the audience’s. For, against everyone’s advice, the audience believed Leonard and believed in Leonard. Indeed, the film’s director encouraged them to, by dividing the film into blackand-white sequences which normally would convey reliable information and color sequences which normally would not. What the audience learns at the film’s climax is that they can rely upon nothing that Leonard has told them, except that no one believes someone with his disability. The black-and-white sequences aren’t a narrative of “the truth” but a narrative of the truth as Leonard wishes it to be. It is a truth that allows Leonard to be Leonard—a coherent, functioning ontology/agent in the fluid, foundationless world he occupies. Leonard, then, is an ontology/agent caught somewhere between truth and desire. He desires to be a coherent agent. But the truth is more likely that he is fractured

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and fragmented. For, if we believe Teddy and the dying Jimmy Grantz, Leonard is at least partly Sammy, too. And, indeed, the director—with his cross-splicing of Leonard into Sammy—suggests to the audience that Teddy and Jimmy got this right. This doesn’t mean Teddy is any more of a reliable narrator than Leonard is, though. For Teddy keeps changing his story. One minute he is a cop, another a snitch, another a drug dealer. For all we know, he really could be the original John G. (but, then again, so could Leonard if it is true that he killed his wife). So the black-and-white sequences do not explain the color sequences. If anything, the color sequences explain the black-and-white sequences. They explain that we cannot trust all-knowing narrators because their will to be all-knowing is based upon desire and not (exclusively) truth. We cannot trust Leonard because he lies to himself to be happy. We cannot trust Teddy because he lies to Leonard. And we cannot even trust the film’s director because he misled us about the existence of a reliable narrator. However much we may want them, then, Memento offers us no reliable narrators and no reliable truths. What it does offer us is something more important. It offers us an explanation of how something appears to be true. And, in so doing, it tells us how Hardt and Negri’s myth “Empire is the new world order” appears to be true. In the first instance, the stories told in both Memento and Empire appear to be true because their narrators so desperately need them to be true, because “desire” wins out over “truth” in their ontological tales. In Memento, Leonard tells a tale of a tragic injustice—the rape and murder of his wife—that he needs to make right by killing his wife’s assailant. So Leonard constructs an enemy, John G., who he repeatedly tracks and kills. But Leonard’s story is not just the story of the loss of his wife. It is also the story of the loss of himself and the loss of his reason to exist. For, as Leonard tells it, John G. not only took Leonard’s wife from him, he took Leonard away from himself. By injuring Leonard so that he could no longer lay down short-term memories, Leonard ceased to function as a coherent identity who could make meaning and progress in history. John G. gives meaning to Leonard’s life as the enemy he must bring to justice. It is John G. who calls Leonard into existence, who fulfills Leonard’s desire to be a coherent ontology/agent. In Empire, it is Hardt and Negri who tell a tale of injustice—the injustice of Empire as a new world order that oppresses the multitude. And so they construct Empire as the enemy of the multitude. But, as in Leonard’s story, Hardt and Negri’s story is not just about the loss of global justice. It is also about the loss of the multitude itself as the maker of meaning in contemporary global political life. And if the multitude doesn’t make meaning, then resistance (and, indeed, communism itself) is not meaningful in this posthistorical era. And, of course, here is the irony—if communism isn’t meaningful, then surely communist intellectuals like Hardt and Negri aren’t meaningful either. In losing the resistive potential of the multitude, Hardt and Negri lose themselves. They cease to be making meaning and potential progress through contemporary history. By writing Empire—a terribly scattered, fractured, and contradictory set of propositions and ideas—into “being,” Hardt and Negri not only call the multitude into being. They call themselves into being. They, in other words, fulfill their desires to be relevant communist intellectuals.

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What we see here, then, is that Leonard’s desire to be a coherent ontology/ agent for himself and his strategy for becoming such an identity is strikingly similar to that of Hardt and Negri. Both construct an enemy. And this enemy is not only their reason to exist. It is what makes their very existence as relevant historical figures possible. If, however, Leonard’s ontology/agency and Hardt and Negri’s ontology/ agency are really grounded in their desire to be (relevant) rather than the truth of their being (relevant), then why does it appear to be true? How is it that their stories are so compelling, even a story by such an unreliable narrator as Leonard? The answer to this question is the very theme of Memento. It has to do with how memory functions. What Memento tells us is that we do not always remember things as they really are but rather as we wish they were. Leonard remembers John G. killing his wife, not himself killing his wife. He remembers Sammy Jankis as an aimless, psychologically damaged, baffled man whose wife could not accept him, not himself as such a man. And when Leonard’s memory is not enough to preserve the consistence of his story (and of himself), he lies to himself to be happy. I would not make the claim that there is any self-aware lying going on in Empire. But I would make the claim that Hardt and Negri remember things selectively for the same reason Leonard does—to preserve their relevance. Hardt and Negri’s investigations, like those of Leonard, lead them to “discover” Empire as a coherent ontology that can be opposed. But as they describe it, Hardt and Negri’s Empire might be just as incoherent and multiple as Leonard’s John G. Empire seems to be a moving and multiple target, one that counter-Empire is unlikely to succeed in overthrowing for some time, if ever. This means that the multitude, having been called into being by Empire, will exist as a relevant counterformation for a long time, thereby insuring Hardt and Negri’s continued relevance. What makes Hardt and Negri’s construction of an enemy into a coherent tale function is, just as in Leonard’s case, their selective memory of anything that might contradict this tale. For Leonard, Sammy Jankis is the figure who threatens to make his story unravel. For Hardt and Negri, it is postmodernists. Postmodernists didn’t just pose the problem of ontology—the idea that agents are fragmented, fluid, and foundationless. They additionally argued two things: (1) that the problem of ontology/agency is not one that can be solved, however much we might desire to solve it; and (2) that the problem of ontology/agency does not need to be solved. We can still have meaningful political resistance in the absence of the kind of coherence modernist narratives promise. Indeed, political resistance might make more sense if we appreciate it as fractured rather than as singular. In Empire, Hardt and Negri selectively recall what postmodernists have to say. They borrow Foucault’s notion of biopower to describe contemporary global life as an international disciplinary order, and they read Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of the nomad onto Empire to emphasize its decentered, deterritorialized character. But they (willfully?) forget that postmodernists never claim that “the problem of ontology” is a problem rather than merely the postmodern condition. They forget how postmodernists describe how political resistance takes place in a postmodern world—through fragmented, foundationless, and fluid struggles against fragmented, foundationless, and fluid sights of power. What this means is that postmodernists would never say they contributed anything to Hardt and Negri’s

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story about Empire and the multitude because, they would argue, “Empire” and “the multitude” don’t exist as the coherent ontologies/agents that Hardt and Negri describe and they needn’t exist as such in order for meaningful global resistances to objectionable uses of power to take place. This is what must go without saying in order for Hardt and Negri’s myth “Empire is the new world order” to appear to be true. These aspects of postmodernism are things that Hardt and Negri must not remember. For if they remembered them, the very task Hardt and Negri set for themselves and are celebrated for—to make resistance meaningful in our contemporary, postmodern world—would be irrelevant because, as postmodernists tell the story, resistance is already relevant. The story postmodernism has to tell about global politics, then, is as destabilizing to Hardt and Negri’s claim to be relevant contemporary intellectuals as the story Sammy Jankis has to tell is destabilizing to Leonard Shelby. It is only by either forgetting what postmodernism and Sammy have to say or by reordering the information forthcoming from the spaces of postmodernism and Sammy that Hardt and Negri’s and Leonard’s stories appear to be true. In fairness to Hardt and Negri (and to Leonard), we all do this. We all remember things selectively and will ourselves to forget what we don’t want to know. We all long to be historically relevant, even after our historical tasks (like Leonard’s murder of John G. or Marx’s critique of capital) have already been achieved. All ontologies/agents are, in other words, caught somewhere between “truth” and “desire.” The warning of Memento is that this makes us into unreliable narrators. Leonard is not an unreliable narrator (just) because he suffers from shortterm memory loss. He is an unreliable narrator because he refuses to examine all the evidence, specifically, the evidence about himself. It is because this is precisely what Teddy implores him to do that Teddy must die. Similarly, Hardt and Negri’s narration of Empire and the multitude seems unreliable because it refuses to entertain all the evidence. In particular, it refuses to investigate the two further claims postmodernism makes about contemporary ontologies and contemporary resistance—that while some singular sense of ontology is impossible, this does not mean that fractured, fragmented, and fluid resistances are meaningless. This is precisely what postmodernists implore Hardt and Negri to consider and why they remain at political odds with neo-Marxists. Overall, then, a willful not remembering and not knowing is indeed useful for constructing a coherent sense of self, for overcoming the loss of the (modern) subject. But in “overcoming” this loss, something else is lost. What is lost is the ability for critical reflection about selves. In Leonard’s case, this means he cannot investigate himself and the new “ethical order” which he produced. In Hardt and Negri’s case, this means they cannot (further) investigate the fragmentation, fluidity, and foundationlessness of Empire and the multitude, and of the counter-“ethical-order” which the multitude is producing. For example, by insisting on the ontological singularity of the multitude, Hardt and Negri make it impossible to further investigate the political and moral uniqueness of resistance movements like those in Seattle, and Chiapas. Furthermore, if the multitude is a singular ontology that resists Empire and if (as Hardt and Negri imply) all resistance to Empire is good, then how are we to understand resistances to Empire that even many on the left would disavow? How,

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in particular, are we to understand the events of September 11? Was this a case of counter-Empire resisting Empire? Or is it correct to think of these events as terrorism? These questions are beyond the scope of Empire because they are outside the bounds of the sort of critical self-reflection that would make Hardt and Negri more reliable narrators. Yet only a year after Empire’s publication, these were the very questions that dominated the discussions of international politics. And so, not surprisingly, the importance of Empire (and Empire) faded from relevance for many as the first commercial jet crashed into the World Trade Center. The myth “Empire is the new world order” seemed to offer too little by way of explanation of contemporary international events, either politically or ethically. And so, a new myth to describe this next new world order emerged—a myth that described a world ordered by “the war on terror.”

Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1: Imperial IR Hardt and Negri’s Empire not only introduced the myth “Empire is the new world order” into IR theory. It reignited debates about imperialism, the imperial, and the quasi-imperial in international politics. Does imperialism (still) exist? If so, in what form? What does this mean for states, sovereignty, and international order? Does Hardt and Negri’s description of Empire capture what the imperial now looks like in international politics? If so, how? If not, why not? These (among other issues) were taken up in a series of essays published in Millennium in 2002. The debate was kicked off by Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey and responded to in the next issue by three theorists with very different perspectives on international politics—a Marxist, a social theorist, and a postmodernist. Julian Reid (2006) then offered his own critique of “the return of imperialism” thesis. Quite independently of Hardt and Negri, work around the colonial past and present in global politics has exploded over the past decade. These wide-ranging interventions draw our attention to the constitutive character of empire and imperialism in a staggering number of fields, including class (Shilliam, 2018), citizenship (Bhambra, 2015), capitalism (Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015), and the discipline of IR (Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam, 2014; Vitalis, 2015). Rich contributions in international political theory have analyzed the formative influence of 19th-century imperial world views on liberal thinkers (Bell, 2016) and have sought to conceptualize global communities beyond empire (Agathangelou and Ling, 2009).

Suggested reading Agathangelou, Anna M. and L. H. M. Ling (2009) Transforming World Politics: From Empire to Multiple Worlds. London: Routledge. Anievas, Alexander and Kerem Nisancioglu (2015) How the West Came to Rule. London: Pluto Press. Anievas, Alexander, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam (eds) (2014) Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line. London: Routledge.

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NeoBarkawi, Tarak and Mark Laffey (2002) “Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations,” Millennium 31(1): 109–127. Bell, Duncan (2016) Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bhambra, Gurminder K. (2015) “Citizens and Others: The Constitution of Citizenship Through Exclusion,” Alternatives 40(2): 102–114. Callinicos, Alex (2002) “The Actuality of Imperialism,” Millennium 31(2): 319–326. Reid, Julian (2006) “The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: A Critique of the ‘Return of Imperialism’ Thesis in International Relations,” Third World Quarterly 26(2): 237–252. Shaw, Martin (2002) “Post-Imperial and Quasi-Imperial: State and Empire in the Global Era,” Millennium 31(2): 327–336. Shilliam, Robbie (2018) Race and the Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing. Vitalis, Robert (2015) White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Walker, R. B. J. (2002) “On the Immanence/Imminence of Empire,” Millennium 31(2): 337–345.

Topic 2: Memory in IR That memory and forgetting are political acts is not news to many social theorists. But actually investigating how memory and forgetting help us to construct orders—be these individual, national, or international—is rather new in IR theory. A lot of the work on memory in IR theory focuses on how to theorize trauma and how to understand and explain particular traumas in international politics. Of course, in the aftermath of September 11, how memory and forgetting about the events of that day participate in the construction of subjectivities from states to global networks has been much discussed. Paul Antze and Michael Lambek’s edited volume is a good place to start reading about memory and trauma in the wider context of culture and society. Jenny Edkin’s work brings these discussions to IR theory, not by working through classical texts on memory, but by applying her analysis to specific case studies like Vietnam, the Holocaust, Kosovo, and of course September 11 (see also Bell, 2006). Maja Zehfuss’s essay “Forget September 11” and Cynthia Weber’s essay “Flying Planes Can Be Dangerous” both ponder official Bush administration memories of September 11 and their consequences. A more recent edited collection by Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte considers instances of traumatization, memorialization, and forgetting in a wider global context, from Haiti to Lithuania (2013). A next step might be to consider the growing interest in emotion and international relations (see, e.g., Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008; Hutchison, 2016) as well as autobiographical and narrative approaches to IR theorizing (Inayatullah, 2011; Inayatullah and Dauphinee, 2016).

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Suggested reading Antze, Paul and Michael Lambek (eds) (1996) Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory. New York: Routledge. Bell, Duncan (ed.) (2006) Memory, Trauma and World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Bleiker, Roland and Emma Hutchison (2008) “Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics,” Review of International Studies 34(1): 115–135. Edkins, Jenny (2003) Trauma and the Memory of Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edkins, Jenny (2016) “Loss of a Loss: Ground Zero, Spring 2014,” in N. Inayatullah and E. Dauphinee (eds) Narrative Global Politics. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 97–103. Edkins, Jenny (2018) “Trauma and Memory,” in D. M. Dean (ed.) A Companion to Public History. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 431–440. Hutchison, Emma (2016) Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions After Trauma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inayatullah, Naeem (ed.) (2011) Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR. London: Routledge. Inayatullah, Naeem and Elizabeth Dauphinee (2016) Narrative Global Politics: Theory, History and the Personal in International Relations. London: Routledge. Resende, Erica and Dovile Budryte (eds) (2013) Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates. London: Routledge. Weber, Cynthia (2002) “Flying Planes Can Be Dangerous,” Millennium 31(1): 129–147. Zehfuss, Maja (2003) “Forget September 11,” Third World Quarterly 24(3): 513–528.

Topic 3: Disciplining resistance In Empire, Hardt and Negri construct an argument that Empire is the new world order. This Empire is an amorphous power that regulates global flows and acts as a sovereign governing the world. Against Empire, a multitude (akin to the “masses”) must be called forth in order to resist. But as discussed in this chapter, by calling Empire into being, this multitude is also constructed. More importantly, it is constructed as seeming fixed and unproblematic. However, as many IR authors have argued, dissent itself can be very situated and context-driven. Indeed, dissent can be subject to its own disciplining forces. Rather than a uniform, collective other, resistance movements are disciplined and normalized to their own orders and hierarchies, between groups but also within them. Lara Montesinos Coleman and Karen Tucker (2011, 2012) outline their call for a more situated study of resistance and its role in disciplining and therefore constituting subjects. Louiza Odysseos (2011) considers these issues in relation to Botswana’s Bushmen and their attempts to resist relocation by the Government

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of Botswana, while Anna Selmeczi (2010) sounds a note of caution for those who advocate “scaling up” from local resistance to global conflicts. Local and transnational resistance movements have proliferated in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, from the uprisings in the MENA region (Agathangelou and Soguk, 2013) to the antiracist and anticolonial activism of the Black Lives Matter movement (Cohen and Jackson, 2016). Selena Tramel (2018) traces the interlinkages of indigenous movements seeking climate justice and food sovereignty, while Gurminder Bhambra, Kerem Nisancioglu, and Dalia Gebrial collect voices and strategies from the movements to decolonize the university, from Cape Town to Oxford, in an edited volume (2018). Taking stock of the groundswell in global resistance, the 2018 Millennium Conference theme was “Revolution and Resistance in World Politics,” and featured panel discussions and round tables on the power of radical movements to affect lasting social and political change.

Suggested reading Agathangelou, Anna M. and Nevzat Soguk (eds) (2013) Arab Revolutions and World Transformations. London: Routledge. Bhambra, Gurminder K., Nisanciogl Kerem, and Dalia Gebrial (eds) (2018) Decolonizing the University. London: Pluto Press. Certo, Mia, Joseph Leigh, and Adrian Rogstad (2019) “Revolution and Resistance in World Politics,” special issue of Millennium 47(3): 323–512. Cohen, Cathy J. and Sarah J. Jackson (2016) “Ask a Feminist: A Conversation With Cathy J. Cohen on Black Lives Matter, Feminism, and Contemporary Activism,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 41(4): 775–792. Coleman, Lara Montesinos and Karen Tucker (2011) “Between Discipline and Dissent: Situated Resistance and Global Order,” Globalizations 8(4): 397–410. Coleman, Lara Montesinos and Karen Tucker (eds) (2012) Situating Global Resistance Between Discipline and Dissent. New York: Routledge. Odysseos, Louiza (2011) “Governing Dissent in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve: ‘Development’, Governmentality and Subjectification Amongst Botswana’s Bushmen,” Globalizations 8(4): 439–455. Selmeczi, Anna (2010) “Educating Resistance?” Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements 2(1): 309–314. Tramel, Salena (2018) “Convergence as Political Strategy: Social Justice Movements, Natural Resources and Climate Change,” Third World Quarterly 39(7): 1290–1307.

Topic 4: Liquid modernity In Empire, Hardt and Negri make a case for understanding the forces of Empire as flows, which is a very a postmodern idea (though not a completely new idea to IR; see Ó Tuathail, 1998). For, as postmodernists would have it, what is solid is associated with what is modern, and what is liquid is associated with what is postmodern.

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Zygmunt Bauman popularized these ideas in a series of books including Liquid Modernity (2000), Liquid Life (2005), Liquid Fear (2006), and Liquid Times (2007) (also see authors such as Manuel Castells for insight on “flows” [1999, 2010]). Baumann suggests that our current condition is one where we have shifted from producers to consumers—including consumers of fear. In this current condition, we continue to struggle to define ourselves and our place in the world in the face of radical uncertainty (fear). The challenge for contemporary politics, therefore, is not found in some uniform struggle of a multitude against an Empire as Hardt and Negri would have it, but in each individual’s struggle against radical uncertainty while faced with what appears to be a set of infinite-seeming choices enabled by our globalized way of living. How might Bauman’s ideas of what we might call “liquid globalization” make us rethink international politics? And what might they mean for us in an age of populisms that often direct individual fears for nationalists purposes (see Wodak, 2015)?

Suggested reading Bauman, Zygmunt (2000) Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bauman, Zygmunt (2005) Liquid Life. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bauman, Zygmunt (2006) Liquid Fear. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bauman, Zygmunt (2007) Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity Press. Castells, Manuel (1999) “Flows, Networks, and Identities: A Critical Theory of the Informational Society,” in M. Castells, R. Flecha, P. Freire, H. A. Giroux, D. Macedo and P. Willis (eds) Critical Education in the New Information Age. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 37–64. Castells, Manuel (2010) The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd edition. Chichester: WileyBlackwell Publishing. Ó Tuathail, Gearóid (1998) “Postmodern Geopolitics?” in S. Dalby and G. Ó Tuathail (eds) Rethinking Geopolitics. London: Routledge, pp. 16–38. Wodak, Ruth (2015) The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean. London: Sage.

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8

Modernization and development theory Is there a clash of civilizations?

What does the myth say? 169 East is East 175 Identity, desire, and culture 184 Suggestions for further thinking 186 Postscript189

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And so the world changed, again. On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four passenger jet-airliners and flew three of them into targets in New York City and Washington, DC—one each into the twin towers of the World Trade Center and another into the Pentagon. The fourth airliner (which some believed was targeting the White House) crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. Suddenly, US scholars and practitioners of international politics were again caught out by events. Hardt and Negri (Chapter 7) had indeed described the new world order as conflictual, but not in terms that were meaningful to most after September 11. And scholars and practitioners who had celebrated the end of ideology, the end of history, and the benevolent spread of Western (usually US) culture found themselves urgently returning to ideology and culture, albeit very differently. Liberalism, it seemed, had not won the hearts and minds of all the world’s population. And even though American intellectuals like Francis Fukuyama recognized that liberalism as the ideal form of political and social organization had not yet spread the world over (Chapter 6), he and other triumphalist liberals failed to predict how destabilizing illiberal individuals willing to martyr themselves for what they believed was a higher cause, a greater good, and a purer ideal than anything liberalism had to offer could be when they were unleashed in a direct attack against the mainland of the world’s only remaining superpower. One scholar had, it seemed, provocatively predicted dramatic conflicts between liberal and illiberal forces in a post-Cold War world. This was the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, in his 1993 essay “The Clash of Civilizations?” Unlike Fukuyama who expressed his vision of the post-Cold War world in terms of ideas, Huntington translated what some might regard as ideological disputes into what he claimed were cultural disputes. Boldly articulating what he claimed would be the “crucial, indeed a central, aspect” of what “global politics is likely to be in the coming years” (1993: 22), Huntington posited his clash of civilizations thesis. It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will be not primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (1993: 22) And so they seemed to be on September 11. Whether or not Huntington’s hypothesis accurately described the post-September 11 world, it was to his clash of civilizations thesis that a stunned world turned as it began to make sense of the terrorist attacks on America. This does not mean everyone embraced Huntington’s thesis. While American commentators like former Clinton administration Assistant Secretary of State James Rubins immediately translated the September 11 attack into civilizational terms, stating “This was an attack on civilisation. The World Trade Center is the centre of Western civilisation” (Rubins, 2001), cultural

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theorist Edward Said rejected Huntington’s thesis, referring to it as “the clash of ignorance” (Said, 2001: 1). Attempting to finesse the category “civilizations,” President George W. Bush strenuously argued that while it is justified to speak of “civilized” and “uncivilized” people and even states (nonterrorists = civilized; terrorists and their supporters = uncivilized), it is unjustified to make broader generalizations using these terms, especially as they apply to people of different religions or regions (Bush, 2001a, 2001b). Yet whether by endorsement, refutation, or refinement, Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis had to be engaged. What makes Huntington’s thesis so compelling—whether contextualized through the “war on terror” or considered more generally in terms of global political life—is that it stands as a contemporary response to “the problem of what to do about cultural difference” (Blaney and Inayatullah, 2002: 104). As David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah explain, Huntington’s problem is also IR’s problem. “Instead of accepting that cultural difference offers, not only problems, but also opportunities, IR theory assumes that difference is debilitating to the purpose of establishing order” (2002: 104). IR “solves” this problem by placing sameness within containable political units—sovereign nation-states—and relegating difference to spaces between them (Walker, 1993). Huntington accepts IR’s move, preserving as he does the centrality of states as “the most powerful actors in world affairs” (1993: 22). But then he supplements IR’s move with his own remapping of IR into larger units of similarity and difference—civilizations (Debrix, 2003). Both IR and Huntington conclude that sameness reduces instability whereas difference produces instability and that the best way to manage difference is either to assimilate it within the state or to expel it from the state. Grappling with the problem of cultural difference and its production of instability is nothing new for Huntington. He did not suddenly start thinking about this problem or even the possibility of categorizing the world through a hierarchy of cultural zones in the aftermath of the Cold War (see, e.g., Weiner and Huntington, 1987). Rather, this problem, the concepts Huntington developed to address it, and the solutions/dilemmas he outlined all figure in his work on the modernization and development of states, work that has preoccupied Huntington since the 1960s. The modernization and development tradition emerged during the Cold War as the West’s economic, political, social, and cultural response to the management of former colonial territories. The dilemma facing Western scholars and practitioners of international politics was twofold. First, they hoped to theorize ideas and then implement policies that would transform newly independent colonies into politically developed sovereign nation-states. But these theorists— the bulk of whom were from the US—were not interested in so-called “Third World states” achieving development according to just any model. Rather, the only acceptable model of development was through liberal processes of politics, economics, and socialization, and the only acceptable model of a fully developed state was a Western liberal capitalist so-called “First World state.” What this means—and this is the second point—is that the modernization and development tradition was consciously conceived as a Western (and predominately US) alternative to Marxist and neo-Marxist strategies of development espoused by so-called “Second World states” such as the then Soviet Union (see “Suggestions for further thinking”).

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Figure 8.1  Structural-functional model

As a specifically liberal and specifically US alternative to Soviet-style communism, the modernization and development literature traditionally grounded itself in (among other things) liberal economic theory and a version of Talcott Parsons’s sociological theory to explain how developing Third World states would naturally evolve into developed First World states. As we saw in Chapter 6, liberal economic theory offers a view of economic relations as naturally harmonious in which the distribution of economic prosperity is shared by all, albeit in different degrees. To share in economic benefits and to receive the promised “spillover” effect of legitimate political institutions like liberal capitalist democracy, Third World states need only avail themselves of the free market. In the classic statement of modernization and development theory by Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell (1978), such Third World states became like Talcott Parsons’s adaptive societies, themselves analogies to organisms in evolutionary biology. In Parsons’s structural-functionalist model, increased social stratification (i.e., distribution of tasks and its resulting social inequality) is necessary for progress. And what produces social stratification is the functional transformation of simple inputs into complex outputs. In Almond and Powell’s model, inputs are political demands, outputs are political policies, and the functional transformation of inputs into outputs occurs in the state through interest groups, political parties, bureaucracies, and the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. While Parsons measures the degree of movement of a society from traditional to modern by the complexity/differentiation of its stratification, so too do Almond and Powell measure the degree of movement from underdevelopment to development of Third World states (Figure 8.1). Overall, the modernization and development tradition promises that, under the right social, political, and economic conditions, difference will give way to social, political, economic, and cultural sameness, with Third World states modernizing and developing to become more like First World states (Figure 8.2). In so doing, it promises a better standard of living for people in Third World states, and

Figure 8.2  Political development timeline

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Moderniz ation and development theory Table 8.1  Assumptions of political development General assumptions 1

Change and development are easy

2

All good things go together

3

Radicalism and revolution are bad

4 Distributing power is more important than accumulating power (Packenham, 1973)

Assumptions Huntington rejects

2

All good things go together

4 Distributing power is more important than accumulating power

it promises an increasingly secure world for First World states (because the lives of Third World people will improve and because more states will become First World rather than Third World or Second World). The first wave of modernization and development theorists drew four general conclusions about the development process for all states (Table 8.1). First, change and development are easy. Second, all good things go together (like economic growth, economic equality, political stability, democracy, national independence, and autonomy). Third, radicalism and revolution are bad (because they are unnecessary for political development, following on from points one and two). And, finally, distributing power is more important than accumulating power (because democratic pluralism leads to stability) (Packenham, 1973). Samuel Huntington is not a first-wave modernization and development theorist. He is a modernization revisionist. What this means is that while he accepts the basic principles, values, and arguments of modernization and development theory, he has devoted himself to the refinement and correction of some of the ideas in this tradition. Huntington argues that the modernization and development tradition is too focused on development and insufficiently focused on political order. And it is for this reason that this tradition fails to recognize that development (transforming difference into identity) and political stability are often incompatible. As Huntington puts it, “It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder. If poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich” (1968: 41). What this means is that, for Huntington, addressing the question of political development also requires theorists and practitioners to address the question of order. For Huntington, establishing a legitimate public order in developing states should be privileged over protecting the political liberty of citizens even when that means supporting authoritarian, one-party governments. Democracy should be a secondary goal because, as he argues, “Authority has to exist before it can be limited” (1968: 8). Huntington’s contentions amount to a rejection of two of the core principles of the modernization and development tradition—all good things go together and distributing power is more important than accumulating power. In addition, what Huntington implies is that the modernization and development approach fails to solve either the problem of cultural difference or its resulting problem of political disorder. If, as most IR theorists believe, difference leads to instability, and if modernization and development strategies do

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not always (if ever) succeed in transforming difference into identity, then the problem of cultural difference and its inherent instability remains. Because few if any Third World states became or are becoming First World states, this means that the social, political, economic, and cultural differences of Third World states are not naturally adapting to the social, political, economic, and cultural identity of First World states. What’s more, while striving to become developed, many Third World states experience greater political instability. This has implications not only for the credibility of the modernization and development tradition (which provides unsatisfying recommendations for how newly independent states might achieve development). It also has implications for the order and security of international life. Huntington’s contribution to the modernization and development debate was to tackle this issue head-on, focusing on how order could be achieved within developing states when identity fails to universalize itself by assimilating difference, when Third World states (and cultures) persist in being different from First World states (and cultures). His clash of civilizations thesis pessimistically globalizes this problem by suggesting that cultural difference creates disorder not only nationally but internationally in a post-Cold War era. In the remainder of the chapter, I will explore what makes Huntington’s myth “there is a clash of civilizations” appear to be true. I will do so by analyzing Huntington’s (1993) essay “The Clash of Civilizations?” bearing in mind Huntington’s earlier responses to the question of cultural difference in order to pose the question “what must go without saying in order for Huntington’s myth ‘there is a clash of civilizations’ to appear to be true?” Huntington’s myth, like IR theory in general, assumes that sameness reduces disorder and difference produces disorder. But what if both sameness and difference produce both order and disorder? And what if the distinctions between identity and difference and between order and disorder cannot be so easily maintained as Huntington and IR theory suggest? These questions are raised by the 2000 British film East Is East (Miramax). East Is East tells the story of how the Khan family—a working-class biethnic, bireligious, and biracial family—struggles with the problem of cultural difference in a northern English suburb of Manchester in 1971. Conflict abounds in this family. Caught between their Pakistani father and their British mother, the Khan children appear to be the disputed fault line between Islamic and Western Christian cultures, where their father’s and mother’s differences meet. Yet it is also possible to read the Khan children not as emblematic of the clash of civilizations but instead as symbolizing a British multiculturalism emerging in the wake of postcolonial immigration, where cultural identities do not so much clash as they reshape and redefine one another. By suggesting that the Khan children represent emerging identities rather than clashing ones, East Is East directs us to look for the sources that motivate conflict in the Khan family elsewhere. Maybe, the film suggests, conflict is not located in the mere existence of cultural difference or even necessarily in attempts to transform cultural differences (biethnic children) into pure cultural identities (either Pakistani or British but not both). Maybe conflict is (also) located in identity itself, in the desire (as we saw in Chapter 7) to be a pure identity but the impossibility of achieving this desire. If this is the case, we have to ask what the implications of this might be for the

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identities that Huntington claims exist (civilizations) and their post-Cold War relations with one another (clashing).

What does the myth say? Just as modernization and development theory is interested in the evolution of former colonies from traditional societies to modern states, so, too, is Huntington’s post-Cold War clash of civilizations thesis preoccupied with evolutionary processes. These evolutionary processes are not those occurring within states but between them. The change that Huntington’s thesis claims to account for is “the evolution of conflict in the modern world” (1993: 22). The history of the modern international system until the end of the Cold War was marked by conflicts between princes, then nation-states, and then ideologies, all of which “were primarily conflicts within Western civilizations” (1993: 23). Huntington claims that, “With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations” (1993: 23). Huntington’s thesis poses three questions: (1) What are these civilizations of which he speaks?; (2) How precisely is world politics mapped onto civilizations?; and (3) Why will civilizations clash in a post-Cold War world? I will address each of these questions in turn. First to the definition of civilizations. Huntington defines a civilization as “a cultural entity” (1993: 23). A civilization is not just any cultural entity (nationalities and religions are not civilizations, for example). “A civilization is … the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species” (1993: 24). As we try to identify civilizations, Huntington tells us we must look to both “common objective elements” of a people, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and to the “subjective self-identification of people” (1993: 24). He gives us the following example. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. (1993: 24) In defining and identifying what civilizations are, Huntington does not claim that civilizations are discrete or unchanging. “Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and many include subcivilizations” (1993: 24). As a result of people redefining their identities, “the composition and boundaries of civilizations change” (1993: 24). And sometimes civilizations disappear altogether (1993: 24). Even so, Huntington insists, “Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real” (1993: 24). By positing civilizations as the “crucial, indeed a central aspect” (1993: 22) of contemporary global politics, Huntington recognizes that IR scholars will contest his claim, arguing that states—not civilizations—dominate global politics

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(see Chapters 2–4). And while, as noted earlier, Huntington appeases IR scholars with his view that “[n]ation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs” (1993: 22), he implies that states may not be the “principal actors in global affairs” (1993: 24), at least not over the long run. As he puts it, while states have been the world’s principal actors for only a few centuries, “[t]he broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations” (1993: 24–25). So that’s what civilizations are generally. How, then, do civilizations map onto the contemporary world of global politics? Mapping the world in terms of civilizations is not just a matter of grouping large numbers of people into this category. Lots of people may compose a civilization, “as with China (‘a civilization pretending to be a state’ as Lucian Pye put it)” (1993: 24). Or there can be very few people in a civilization, “such as the Anglophone Caribbean” (1993: 24). Nor is mapping the world in terms of civilizations the same as mapping it state by state. While, for Huntington, there are cases of a single state constituting a civilization (Japanese civilization, for example), “civilizations may include several nationstates, as is the case with Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations” (1993: 24). And states may include more than one civilization, like the “torn countries” of Turkey, Mexico, and Russia (1993: 42–45). Once he gets past all his qualifiers, Huntington claims that there are “seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilizations” (1993: 25). Huntington does not so much justify his categorization of these seven or eight groupings of states, religious identifications, and philosophical traditions into civilizations as he takes them as historical givens (with the exception of “African civilization,” which his qualification of “possibly” casts as “not-civilized-enough”). The existence of civilizations is one thing that goes without saying in Huntington’s myth. What he does justify is why these particular seven or eight civilizations will likely end up in conflict with one another now that the Cold War is over. His answer is twofold. First, Huntington tells us that the fault lines among these seven or eight civilizations have historically been where conflicts have occurred. Second, while the ideological struggles of the Cold War contained civilizational struggles, in the aftermath of the Cold War “[t]he Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe” and has had implications for relations between the West and other parts of the world as well (1993: 31). So where are these fault lines between civilizations? A primary one is in Europe which, Huntington tells us, has been culturally divided between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity and Islam since 1500. This cultural divide accounts for the different historical experiences and contemporary potentials of these civilizations. On the side of Western Christianity, there is a history of feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution, resulting in a present filled with economic prosperity and moving toward increasing economic and democratic consolidation. On the side of Orthodox Christianity and Islam, there is a significantly different history resulting in fewer economic advantages and a lesser chance of developing stable democratic systems. And along this fault line there is a history of conflict (1993: 29–31). Huntington recounts other historical fault lines between civilizations with their different historical experiences and different historical trajectories which

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either resulted in conflicts (as between Muslims and Hindus) (1993: 33) or which promise to result in conflict in the post-Cold War era (as between China and the US and Japan and the US) (1993: 34). But Huntington devotes the bulk of his attention to the fault line between the West and Islam. As Huntington argues, “Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years” in Europe, Turkey, and North Africa, with Islamic empires battling Christian empires through World War II (1993: 31). The end of World War II saw the retreat of Western colonialism, the appearance of Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism, Western dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and the increasingly oil-rich Arab states amassing wealth in money and sometimes armaments. During this period, clashes between Islam and the West mostly occurred in the Middle East and in North Africa, involving everything from all-out wars to the bombing and hostage-taking of Western targets. Writing in 1993, Huntington argued, “This warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another” (1993: 31). While Huntington recognizes that the Gulf War does not strictly support his “clash of civilizations thesis” (for it is an instance of infighting within what he calls one civilization, Islam), Huntington marks the aftermath of the Gulf War as a moment of consolidation of Islamic civilization, a moment that many post-September 11 commentators point to as one important factor in the events of September 11. He writes: The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West’s military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West’s overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. (1993: 32) And, he argues further, as economic and social developments in many Arab countries lead to the introduction of democratic practices, “[t]he principle beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces,” at least for the time being (1993: 32). Or, translated into the language of the modernization and development tradition, all good things do not go together. Huntington is careful not to argue that Islam’s only fault line is with the West. Instead, as Huntington describes it, Islam appears to have fault lines just about everywhere. “[A]long the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia, [v]iolence … occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders” (1993: 35). While Huntington writes in general terms about civilizations when he predicts “[t]he next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations” (1993: 39), and states that “[t]he central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in Kishore Mahbubani’s phrase, the conflict between ‘the West and the

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Rest’ and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values” (1993: 41), his primary focus remains firmly on the confrontation between Islam and the West. This is clear from his choice of expert quotes. Huntington first quotes the observations of Indian Muslim M. J. Akbar, who argues that “[t]he West’s next confrontation … is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin” (1993: 32). He next offers the observations of Bernard Lewis, a historian and scholar of Islam whose work is not only considered orientalist but informed the views of US neoconservatives planning the occupation of Iraq (Mahmood, 2009: 201; Said, 1984: 133). Lewis writes: We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historical reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. (Lewis, 1990: 24–28 quoted in Huntington, 1993: 32; my italics) With Lewis’s quote, we realize that it is from Lewis’s observations that Huntington got the phrase “clash of civilizations” to begin with. And while Huntington has generalized it beyond the clash between the West and Islam and has done so in work dating back to at least the 1980s (see Weiner and Huntington, 1987), it is now anchored firmly in the West vs. Islam clash in Lewis’s remarks and in Huntington’s. So, all this explains why Huntington focuses on his seven or eight civilizations rather than some others in his clash of civilizations thesis—because these civilizations have been and continue to be in conflict with one another. What remains to be explored is the question of why. Why do civilizations conflict with one another, and why should we be focusing on civilizations rather than just states as we try to understand post-Cold War conflict? Huntington has no shortage of answers to these questions, which is to be expected since his thesis seems to hinge on these issues. We already know Huntington’s general answer to these questions—post-Cold War ideologies no longer keep civilizational conflicts in check. But why do we have civilizational conflicts in the first place, and why specifically are they likely to be unchecked in the post-Cold War world? Huntington offers six specific responses to support his claim that future conflicts will be along cultural fault lines separating civilizations. First, he argues that “differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic,” and “[t]hey are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes” (1993: 25). This is because civilizations, as we saw earlier, “are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion” which leads people of different civilizations to have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. (1993: 25)

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Second, Huntington observes that “the world is becoming a smaller place” (1993: 25). This does not have the effect of turning the world into one big international society, as someone like Charles Kegley has argued (see Chapter 3). Rather, it has the effect of further dividing people into civilizations. “The interactions among people of different civilizations enhance the civilizations-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep in history” (1993: 26). Third, “the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities” as well as weakening their attachments to nation-states as a source of identity (1993: 26). In the place of local and national affiliations, people are increasingly returning to religion to fill this gap (1993: 26). Quoting George Weigel, Huntington claims that “the unsecularization of the world … is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth century,” which means that religion currently “provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations” (1993: 26). Fourth, “the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West” (1993: 26). On the one hand, with the West at the peak of its power, it (and especially the US) dominates international life not only politically but culturally, especially through popular culture, something that is often embraced by non-Western masses. On the other hand—and probably as a result—Huntington notes a movement among non-Western elites toward increasing “de-Westernization and indigenization,” like the “‘Asianization’ of Japan, … the ‘Hinduization’ of India, … and the ‘re-Islamization’ of the Middle East” (1993: 26–27). Fifth, “cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones” (1993: 27). This is because political and economic differences are about opinions or status which can change, whereas cultural differences are about identity. As Huntington explains, “In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was ‘Which side are you on?’ and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts about civilizations, the question is ‘What are you?’ That is a given that cannot be changed” (1993: 27). This is even more true in the case of religion than in the case of ethnicity, for “[a] person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim” (1993: 27). Finally, “economic regionalism is increasing” and “successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness” (1993: 27). This is because “economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization,” such as the European Community rooting itself in the Western Christian civilization (1993: 27). Overall, Huntington fully recognizes that “[a]s people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion” (1993: 29). This, combined with the end of ideologically based states, long-standing territorial disputes, and, “[m]ost importantly, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests” all “engender countering responses from other civilizations” (1993: 29 and 39–41).

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All of this has implications for the West. Because “the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between ‘the West and the Rest’” (1993: 48), Huntington sets out an agenda of short- and long-term policy recommendations for the West to follow. In the short term, his advice to the West is to consolidate its civilization, with Europe and North America wooing Eastern Europe and Latin America into its civilization and maintaining friendly ties with Russia and Japan. As the West consolidates itself, it should also take steps to defend itself against non-Western civilizations with which it is not friendly, by limiting their military might, exploiting differences among them, maintaining Western military capabilities, and promoting Western interests and values wherever possible. In other words, Huntington counsels the West to consolidate sameness/identity globally where it can while it guards itself against and divides difference wherever it finds it (1993: 48–49). Over the longer term, the West must be prepared to deal with modern, non-Western civilizations, civilizations that reject Western values and interests but which nonetheless command sufficient power to challenge the West economically and militarily. To deal with these civilizations, Huntington counsels, first, military and economic protection from them; second, a back-to-comparative-politics Western development of “a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations” and their interests, and finally “an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations” (1993: 49). All this is necessary, Huntington writes at the close of his article, because “[f]or the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the other” (1993: 49). Taken as a whole, Huntington’s attempt to confront the problem of cultural difference is firmly located within both traditional IR theory and within the modernization and development tradition. Read through IR theory, Huntington’s myth asks the very question at the center of IR theory—why do we have conflict, and where is conflict located? Recall, for example, that this was Kenneth Waltz’s question in Man, the State, and War (Chapter 2). And Huntington arrives at the very same answer as IR theory—we have conflict because we have differences, and these differences/conflicts are located between identities. For Huntington, identity is a civilization, and difference is located at the fault lines between civilizations. While it is differently nuanced (e.g., it does not get stuck in the levels of analysis problem), Huntington’s answer is no different to that of Waltz (identity = states; difference = anarchy between states) or Fukuyama (identity = ideology; difference = dialectical ideological clashes) or Hardt and Negri (identity = ontological singularities of “Empire” and “the multitude”; difference = clashes between them). Nor is it different from the logic implicit in Kegley’s myth “there is an international society” (Chapter 3), which accepts that difference leads to conflict and therefore attempts to remap the world as one big identity (international society). As we will see in Chapter 11, we even find this logic at work in global LGBT human rights advocacy and policymaking, which welcomes “the LBGT” into the fold of rights-holding subjects while fearfully guarding against the difference embodied by the figure of the “perverse” homosexual. Read through modernization and development theory, Huntington’s work tackles this tradition’s failure to solve the problem of cultural difference. The

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modernization and development tradition’s attempts to transform difference into identity through development efforts have been most successful at destabilizing Third World states internally. During the Cold War, Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis suggests, it was possible to contain Third World destabilizations— the destabilizations of difference—within Third World states. But now that the Cold War is over—now that ideology no longer maps the world and now that globalization (i.e., “the world is becoming a smaller place,” 1993: 25) means that the degree of stability of developing states increasingly affects the degree of stability of developed states and global markets—Third World instability is everywhere seeping out of its former political containers (nation-states), collecting into larger units that remap the global without the promise of containment (civilizations), and destabilizing the post-Cold War international order. For all of his qualifiers, Huntington’s conclusion about the problem of cultural difference is no less teleological than are those found in the modernization and development tradition. The only distinction is that while modernization and development theory promised that economic development and political stability could be achieved simultaneously by adapting Third World difference to First World identity because “all good things go together,” Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis promises the opposite. Noting how “processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world” (1993: 26) not only fail to deliver modernization and development but also fail to deliver political stability, Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis “ontologizes” global differences— making global differences themselves into identities called civilizations that are not reducible to one another—which promise only increasing global instability because of the inevitable clashes among them. Huntington is correct that his thesis is an improvement on modernization and development theories that denied non-Western civilizations any historical agency. Writing of the new post-Cold War realities as he sees them, Huntington claims, “In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history” (1993: 23). Yet the only agency Huntington allows non-Western civilizations is the destabilizing agency of difference. This is hardly something to boast about. Given all this, what must go without saying in order for Huntington’s myth to appear to be true is that difference is inherently destabilizing, or at least more destabilizing than identity. But is this necessarily the case? It is this question that is considered in the film East Is East.

East Is East East Is East (1999) is set in the working-class Manchester suburb of Salford in 1971 against the dual backdrops of the rise of racist nationalism in Britain and war between India and Pakistan over East Pakistan in the Asian subcontinent. Importantly, even though the film takes place during the Cold War, the Cold War plays no role in the film, through plot, characters, or motivation. What this allows is for the world of East Is East to be mapped not by ideology but by culture. And so it is. East Is East tells the story of the Khan family—Pakistani father George (Om Puri), white British mother Ella (Linda Bassett), and their seven biracial,

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biethnic children—Nazir, Abdul, Tariq, Saleem, Maneer, Meenah, and Sajid. The film introduces us to all of its major characters and defines the tensions over identity and difference within the Khan family in its title sequence and first postcredits series of scenes. The film opens in celebratory style. Before we see any action, we hear five drum beats from a marching band, followed by a distorted, twisted note that readies us for comedy. On this note, the screen cuts from black to an aerial view of a Salford street, lined with redbrick terrace houses. A procession led by a priest marches into view from the bottom of the scene as the up-beat marching music is joined by fast-paced, bouncy lyrics. So we waved our hands as we marched along, and the people smiled as we sang our song, and the world was safe as we listened to the band. And the banner man held a banner high. He was ten feet tall, and he touched the sky. I wish that I could be a banner man. With the camera now at street level, we see the priest, young girls in their white confirmation dresses, and boys in their Sunday suits carrying a 10-foot high banner, all leading the procession as it turns onto the Khan family’s street. Cut to a statue of Jesus mounted on a 6-foot cross, bobbing up and down as it is being carried. The camera pans down to reveal who is carrying it. It is a smiling teenage girl, Meenah, George and Ella’s only daughter. Behind her are her older teenage and 20-something brothers. Maneer and Saleem are carrying a statue of the virgin Mary holding the baby Jesus, and behind them are Tariq and Abdul each carrying small banners. Tariq is followed by his girlfriend Stella (who follows Tariq everywhere) and her friend Peggy (who follows Stella everywhere). In front of Meenah is their preteen brother Sajid (who is eternally dressed in a drab green parka with a fur-lined hood). While his older brothers whisper to one another “Check out the nurses,” Sajid gleefully tosses about crêpe-paper petals, as Annie, a woman who works with Ella and George, walks beside him. They are all well back in the procession. It is Whit Week, and this is the Whitsun parade. Suddenly a frantic Ella enters the scene. Finding Annie, she urgently tells her friend that George is back early from mosque. Cut to George standing on his street, smiling as the parade advances toward him. Annie turns to the kids. “Red alert. Red alert. Red alert.” All the kids—still carrying their Catholic statues and banners and Sajid still throwing his petals—plus Stella and Peggy exit the procession just as it is about to turn the corner. Cut to aerial view. We see the kids running down a back alley while Ella rushes down the main road to join her husband. As the camera returns to ground level, we see George and Ella watching the procession now absent of Khan children. George is unaware that his children were ever part of the procession, and an anxious Ella is determined to keep it that way. George waves a greeting to Annie while Ella watches her kids slip behind George’s back down the alley. As the procession turns off the Khan family road, the children once again join it. This is the end of the title sequence.

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Cut to the interior of the Khan house. The camera situates the action with its opening shot of a wall containing the family portraits, with George and Ella in the middle surrounded by their seven children. Preparations are underway for a special event. Downstairs, as the children playfully torment one another, Ella, dressed in her best clothes, brushes the hair of complaining Meenah while Saleem fusses with Meenah’s sari. Ella hurries Maneer through his kettle-filled zinc tub bath and scolds Sajid, who wears a fancy waistcoat over his parka, for scratching his head. Upstairs, the atmosphere is solemn. Abdul, Tariq, and George help to prepare eldest son Nazir for the occasion. It is Nazir’s wedding day. Abdul helps Nazir with his coat. George paints Nazir’s eyes, adjusts his turban, and places a veil of gold tinsel over his face as is the tradition for a Muslim groom. He tells Nazir, “Son, today you making me very proud.” Then George straps a watch with Nazir’s name in Arabic to Nazir’s wrist and leads his son down the stairs, where he presents Nazir to the family, saying to the stunned faces, “Ella, your son.” Outside, the wedding party crowds into a minibus while Enoch Powell supporter Mr. Moorhouse (the grandfather of Tariq’s girlfriend Stella and Sajid’s friend Ernest who has a crush on Meenah) quips, “Look at that, a piccaninny’s fuckin’ picnic.” Cut to interior of mosque. People assembled for the wedding are cheerful and noisy as they await the ceremony. Nazir and his family take their places at the front of the hall, with veiled Nazir facing the crowd. A hush breaks across the room as the veiled bride is led in by her parents. They join the groom and his family. The bride’s mother removes the veil from her daughter’s face. At George’s signal, Abdul lifts Nazir’s veil. Bride and groom see one another for the first time. Both are beautiful. The bride smiles cautiously, as Nazir looks increasingly nervous. The ceremony begins. But Nazir raises his hand and stands. George: Nazir: George: Nazir: George:

You alright, son. [sorrowfully] I can’t do this, Dad. Nazir … [insisting] No, I can’t. [urging] … everything ok.

Nazir rushes down the aisle toward exit. George: [angry] Nazir, don’t do this. Nazir! Ella: [worried as she rushes after her son who leaves the hall] Nazir. Everyone is stunned. Cut to interior of Khan house. The camera focuses on Nazir’s photo on the wall of family portraits, as it fades to an empty space. Cut to interior of mosque. George is consulting the Mullah. George: [speaking of Nazir] Why he wants to do this thing to me, bring a shame on my family. I no understand. No understand. [pause] Maybe I should have take family to Bradford long time ago. More Pakistanis there. No this problem. Mullah: [addressing George by his Pakistani name] It will always be difficult for you, Zaheer. They’re different.

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This is the end of the first sequence. The rest of the action takes place 6 months later. What do these two sequences tell us about how the film makes sense of identity and difference? How are identity and difference characterized, and where are they located? Because the film maps the world not through Cold War ideology but through culture, it would come as no surprise to Huntington that the film casts identity and difference in national and religious terms. Nationally, we have British identities and Pakistani identities. From an extreme British nationalist perspective (symbolized by Enoch Powell and characterized by Mr. Moorhouse), Britishness is identity and everything else (including Pakistaniness) is difference. From an extreme traditional Pakistani perspective (a position George flirts with and increasingly gravitates toward in the course of the film), identity is Pakistaniness and difference is Britishness. Each national position has a dominant religious position, with Britishness introduced through Western Christianity in the title sequence and Pakistaniness introduced through Islam in the first sequence. Because they are cast in national and religious terms, identities are located within spaces like nation-states and what Huntington would call civilizations. And because Huntington’s civilizations defy Waltz’s “levels of analysis” problem by being simultaneously located at the individual, the state, and the international level, it is not surprising that we also find these identities located within the families of Salford and differences located between them. According to the heads of their households, the Moorhouse family is British and belongs to Western Christianity; the Khan family is Pakistani and belongs to Islam. Each clash with the other, with Mr. Moorhouse, on the one hand, campaigning for the relocation and repatriation of immigrants like George, and George, on the other, running “George’s English Chippy” shop down the road from the Moorhouse home while raising his children as Muslims. All of this seems to support Huntington’s thesis “there is a clash of civilizations,” with two of the world’s major civilizations clashing in Salford as the world becomes a smaller place (Huntington, 1993: 35; in the film through postcolonial immigration rather than as in Huntington’s myth through globalization, although some might argue that the first is the necessary precursor to the second) and two civilizations (Islam and Hinduism) at war with one another in Asia over the secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan. This is one way to understand how the film makes sense of the world. It claims that civilizations/identities are best kept apart (via repatriation or, as George wishes, by clustering cultures in segregated communities like Bradford which the film refers to as “Bradistan”) because when civilizations meet, the differences between them cause conflict (see Box 8.1).

Box 8.1  How East Is East makes sense of the world 1 George/Islam and Ella/Western Christianity clash over their bicultural children who represent the fault lines between these civilizations; or 2 The Khan children do not represent the fault lines between Western Christianity and Islam but foreshadow the multicultural Britain emerging in the postcolonial era.

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Of course things aren’t quite that simple, however. On the one hand, Salford represents the increasing difficulty of keeping different identities apart, while the Moorhouse family and especially the Khan family represent the impossibility of this. Yes, families of different identities do constitute Salford, but individuals of different identities increasingly constitute these families. For example, while the Moorhouse family is led by its ultranationalist Grandad, granddaughter Stella has a Pakistani boyfriend, and grandson Ernest not only has a Pakistani best friend, he also greets his friend’s father as if Ernest himself were Muslim, with “Salaam-alacum, Mr. Khan” to which George replies “Waalacum-salaam.” In the Khan family, George represents Islam/Pakistan, Ella represents Western Christianity/Britain, and their seven children represent another fault line where these two civilizations clash. At first, this, too, suggests that Huntington got it right because the question that preoccupies each Khan child is the urgent question Huntington identifies for a world mapped by civilizations, “Who am I?” Caught between two civilizations and therefore between two identities, the Khan children struggle to answer this question because neither their father’s nor their mother’s answer precisely maps onto any of them. They represent, in Huntington’s terms, the ease with which one might simultaneously claim two nationalities but the difficulty of being “half-Catholic and half-Muslim” (Huntington, 1993: 27). Or, to put it in the terms of the film’s opening song, they represent how the fulfillment of their desire to “be a banner man”—to be an identity—always seems to elude them. And yet all of the Khan children are scripted as strong, if stereotypical, characters. Young Sajid cocoons himself from the struggles facing his elder siblings with his parka and his age. For example, when asked by a Pakistani woman how old he is, Sajid replies, “Not old enough to get married, so don’t ask me.” Meenah is a tomboy. Saleem is an art student passing as an engineering student to his father but out to his mother. Maneer, nicknamed Gandhi by his siblings, follows Islamic traditions more closely than the others, although even he took part in the opening Catholic procession. Tariq/Tony is the clubber who fancies himself a bit of a playboy and certainly not a “Paki.” Abdul is the most independent of the children remaining at home, negotiating racism in the workplace and attempting to respect his mother and his father at home so he can hold on to his family. And Nazir, who refused to marry in the first scene, turns up later as a gay hairdresser working in his boyfriend’s fancy salon. What this suggests is that the Khan children have strong personalities, but none of their personalities is reducible to the “civilizational” choices available to them. And, indeed, the Khan children do not want to choose a civilizational identity. They don’t think of themselves as either Pakistani or British, as either Catholic or Muslim, much less as belonging to the broader grouping of civilization. In this sense, the Khan children represent less Huntington’s fault line between civilizations than they foreshadow the present multicultural Britain.

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This, then, is an alternative way of reading how the film makes sense of the world. The film suggests that the world is a multicultural place with “culture,” defined in national and religious terms, spilling out of its prior boundaries and mixing in and across nations, families, and individuals, not so much creating conflict as it is redefining identity. Even so, the film does (as we will see) depict conflict, and this conflict is located primarily around the Khan children. What, then, do the Khan children represent? Are they fault lines between civilizations or are they multicultural sites in the Britain emerging from the 1970s? Or, put differently, which depiction of the world is correct? For the Khan children to represent fault lines between civilizations, their bifurcated cultural identities must motivate the conflict in the film. For the Khan children to represent an emerging multicultural Britain, their cultural identities still might well be sources of conflict, but the conflict that motivates the film’s action would be located elsewhere. And if it is, then Huntington’s thesis “there is a clash of civilizations” fails to function. So, where is the motivation for the conflict in East Is East located? As I have already suggested, conflict is located at some fault line, and at first this fault line appears to be between identities where differences meet. But as a second look at the film reveals, this fault line need not be located between identities. It can also be located within identities. We see it within the Pakistani state, a territorially discontinuous, artificial entity resulting from India’s partitioning into Hindu and Muslim communities, now at war with itself. We see it within the British state, a former empire faced with absorbing its colonial subjects as citizens. We see it within the Khan family, in its inability to be either Muslim or Christian, traditional or modern, Pakistani or British, black or white. We see it within the Khan children, a bunch of pork-eating, mosque-educated fans of Bollywood and English football. And we see it within George Khan himself. Indeed, in East Is East, it is George Khan who is having the central identity crisis, with all the other identity crises either mirrored (Britain, Pakistan) or provoked (his kids) by him. George has good reason to be in crisis about his identity. George/Zaheer/ Ghingus to his kids is a self-made, modernized, Westernized Pakistani immigrant living in the predominately white working-class British suburbs with Ella and their seven children while his traditional Pakistani Muslim first wife, to whom he is still married, lives in Pakistan. Even though “first wife” lives in Pakistan (and “second wife” is determined to keep her there), this does not mean that George has managed to keep his Pakistani and British-Pakistani lives from mixing. Unlike his tea which George enjoys in half cups, his complex relationships to people, nations, and religions refuse to be taken in halves, defying this simple trick of spatial separation. For, as the opening sequences establish, George’s identity is daily disputed around nation through local and national racist repatriation campaigns (which double for Britain’s own postcolonial identity crisis) and through Pakistan’s war with India (which doubles George’s double Pakistani identity—“pure” Pakistani and British-Pakistani). And George’s crisis of religious (not to mention generational and gender) identity constantly crops up through his kids. It is not contained by his eldest son’s refusal of his Muslim bride. Six months later, when the action resumes, the Mullah discovers to George’s embarrassment that, due to some oversight, Sajid was never circumcised. To reclaim his honor in the eyes of his religious community, George insists (and Ella agrees, although she later regrets this) that

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Sajid be “de-hooded.” But even this procedure provokes George’s anxieties when George discovers that Sajid’s surgeon is a doctor of Indian origin. With this, George has had enough. Despairing, he again consults the Mullah about his family. George: Just ‘cause they mam English no mean they not good Pakistani. I know people think this thing. Mullah: Zaheer, until your sons join the community fully, they will be a worry to you. Lack of total integration into any community—the lack of a unified, community-based identity—is precisely George’s problem. As a good father concerned about his children, George plots with the Mullah about how to protect his kids from this terrible predicament. The answer—Muslim marriages. George agrees in principle to marry Abdul and Tariq to the daughters of a Bradford Pakistani, Mr. Shah. When George lets it slip to Ella that he has arranged the marriages without informing the boys, Ella is angry and demands that George tell them. But George warns Ella to stay out of his business. Ella: They have a right to know, George. George: What you mean right? Pakistani believe if father ask son marry, son follow father instruction. I should have sent all bloody kids to Pakistan when young, other wife teach them bloody respect. Here, George is clear. He is a Pakistani father to Pakistani children from whom he demands respect for his traditions, or at least these are his desires. And while the apparent realization of these desires is something Ella and the kids generally offer him, marriage without consent is going too far, especially in light of the family’s history with Nazir. All this gives indications of what the film says is typical and deviant in the world of East Is East (see Table 8.2). What is typical is for George’s values and Ella’s values to respectfully coexist within the Khan family, even if in this patriarchal 1970s’ household, Ella’s values and the children’s respect for them must be concealed. What is deviant is for George to force his children to become fully integrated into his longed-for cultural identity, even if he believes it is for their own good. This suggests that there is no “clash of civilizations” in the film. George and Ella never compete over the civilizational identities of their children. Ella Table 8.2  What is typical and deviant in the world of East Is East? Typical

Deviant

For George’s values and Ella’s values to respectfully coexist within the Khan family, even if in this patriarchal 1970s household, Ella’s values and the children’s respect for them must be concealed

For George to force his children to become fully integrated into his culture

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respects George’s wishes when it comes to religious matters, and so do the children (although, like other children, they don’t necessarily enjoy themselves in the process or take either their father’s or their mother’s religion seriously). And while Ella certainly exposes the children to Western Christianity, she does not, cannot, and (we are led to believe) would not insist that the children define themselves through her “civilizational identity.” For Ella recognizes that her children embody new, distinct identities. They are the full cups of tea that George only ever takes as halves. The conflict in East Is East, then, occurs not because differences cannot peacefully and respectfully coexist (as they have for the past 25 years of the Khan marriage). Conflict seems to exist because George insists on transforming difference (first his bicultural children and later his English wife) into identity (Pakistani Muslims fully integrated into that community). It is only at this point that his children and his wife lose respect for him and his culture. When the boys find out about their arranged marriages, Tariq breaks into the wedding chest, angrily destroys the apparel, and crushes the watches with his and Abdul’s names in Arabic. George discovers the scene as Maneer is trying to return the damaged items to the chest. When Maneer refuses to tell George who is responsible for the mess, George drags him to the shop where Ella is and beats him. Ella intervenes. George: [to Maneer] I not finished with you yet, Mr! (to Ella) You just same as you bloody kid. I your husband. You should agreeing with me like proper Muslim wife. Ella: Yeah, right, I’m a Muslim wife when it suits you. I’ll stop being a Muslim wife at 5:30 when the shop wants opening, or one of your relatives wants help at the home office. Don’t make me bleeding laugh, George. George: I tell, don’t starting, ‘cause I fix you, like I fix your baster kids! You all pucking trouble with me. Ella: They’re only trouble because you don’t listen to them, you never have. George: You married me 25 years and know nothing. [very angry] I warning Ella, you not talk to me like this. Ella: Yeah, you’re right, 25 years I’ve been married to you, George. I’ve sweated me guts out in your bastard shop and given you seven kids as well. And I’ll tell you this for nothing, I’m not gonna stand by and watch you crush ‘em one by one because of your pig bloody ignorance. At this point, George turns on Ella, beating her. All this still seems to suggest that Huntington got it right. For in his work on modernization and development theory, Huntington argued that difference alone does not cause instability. What causes instability are attempts to transform difference into identity. His solution for the modernization and development tradition was first to recognize this and second to support sometimes authoritarian Third World governments to ensure stability during the transition to development. This is precisely the logic that George follows. When faced with resistance as he tries to transform difference into identity, George becomes increasingly authoritarian in order to retain order within his family. Because Huntington learned

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this in his early work, in his later work on the clash of civilizations he counsels that identity should stop trying to transform difference. For Huntington, identity is the West and difference is the Rest. Rather than transform difference into identity, Huntington urges separation, segregation, and securitization. All this is necessary because, as we saw earlier, Huntington elevates difference itself into the central source of instability in a world mapped by civilizations. Therefore, the best approach identity (the West) can take in relation to difference (the Rest) is to steer clear of it. In East Is East, it is the Rest (Islam) that is trying to secure itself from the West (Western Christianity). But, from Huntington’s perspective, because George cannot separate, segregate, and thereby secure his family’s Islamic identity from the pervasive West Christian civilization in which it exists, conflict is inevitable. Difference leads to disorder. This is not primarily because, as George tells himself, the family live in a Western Christian environment (Salford) rather than a more Pakistani one (Bradford/Bradistan/Pakistan). Rather, it is because George’s children, George’s wife, and indeed George himself bring difference (the West) into the identity for which George strives (Islam). All this makes me wonder, is it ever possible to separate, segregate, and secure identity from its fault lines? And, even if it were possible, is it necessary? By demonstrating that differences can peacefully and respectively coexist within the Khan family (before marriages are forced upon the children) and within the younger generation of the Salford community (the Khan and Moorhouse children), East Is East suggests that Huntington got it wrong. It is not (always) necessary to separate, segregate, and secure identity from difference. In so doing, the film exposes one of the things that must go without saying in order for Huntington’s myth to appear to be true—Huntington’s truth that difference in and of itself produces instability. The film also raises the question whether, as Huntington also claims, the move from difference to identity causes instability. While this might indeed be the case at times, East Is East points out that instability and conflict are not always generated from either the mere existence of difference or its transformation to identity. Instability and conflict can be located firmly within identity, in the desire to be a unified identity, and in the impossibility of ever achieving that desire. This is George’s impossible desire, and it is exposed when Tariq confronts him about his wedding. George: I warning you, Mr! I not bringing you up to give me no respect. Pakistani son always shows respect. Tariq: Dad, I’m not Pakistani. I was born here. I speak English, not Urdu. George: Son, you not understand ‘cause you not listen to me. I trying to show you good way to live. You not English. English people never accepting you. In Islam, everyone equal see, no black man, or white man. Only Muslim. It special community. Tariq: I’m not saying it’s not, Dad, I just think I’ve got a right to choose who I get married to. George: You want bloody English girl? They not good. They go with other men, drink alcohol, no look after. Tariq: [angry] Well, if English women are so bad, why did you marry me mam? George takes a knife to Tariq’s throat.

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George: Baster! I tell you no go too far with me. You do what I tell you, understand! Hah? Understand? Tariq: [afraid] Yeah right Dad. I understand. I understand. I’ll do what you want. I’ll get married to a Pakistani. [defiantly] And you know what I’ll do then? I’ll marry a fucking English woman as well. Just like me dad! By naming the differences within his father’s identity, Tariq locates the fundamental fault line in the film, the fault line within his father’s identity. In so doing, the film suggests that it is not possible to separate, segregate, and secure identity from its fault lines because sometimes these fault lines are located within identity rather than between identities. It is the fault line within George’s identity that is the location and the motivation for the conflict in the film. It provides George with an identity crisis, instills in him the desire to be a unified identity, and confronts him with his inability to achieve this desire. George’s desire to be a unified identity creates conflict and violence because in failing to be an identity himself, he first attempts to help his children and then demands that his children and his wife become the identities he wants (them) to be. This move, of course, fails. It fails not only because it meets the resistance of his family (in a comic sequence that turns violent at the close of the film, George’s authority in the household passes to Abdul when Abdul literally de-hoods Sajid while stopping his father again beating his mother). It fails because there is no such thing as a singular, unified identity. Identity is itself conflictual. Being an identity is about managing and interpreting differences within so-called identities like selves, states, and civilizations as much as it is about managing and interpreting differences between them. This is the crucial point that Huntington’s myth “there is a clash of civilizations” misses. Unsurprisingly, it is the same point IR theory misses. For by beginning from the assumption that difference produces instability and identity produces stability, Huntington’s myth and traditional IR theory turn blind eyes toward the possibility that identity—and, indeed, the impossible quest to be an identity—also produces instability. This is the crucial point that must go without saying in order for Huntington’s myth “there is a clash of civilizations” to appear to be true.

Identity, desire, and culture Why do we wish that identity were coterminous with culture? This is the question posed both by Huntington’s myth and by the film East Is East. In each case, the answer lies in the politics of security. If identity were coterminous with Huntington’s idea of culture—if my empirical existence (“being” me) mapped precisely onto some stagnate set of collective normative values embedded in my history, customs, and religion (“being” from my culture), then answering the question, “Who am I?” would be easy. And by knowing who I am, I would also know who I am not. For example, if I answer the question, “Who am I?” with the answer, “I am Islamic,” then my answer is also, “and I am not Western or Japanese or Hindu or ….” This is precisely what Huntington’s construction of civilizations as cultural identities offers contemporary subjects grappling with questions of identity.

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While East Is East rejects Huntington’s construction of civilizational identities by complicating the notion of culture—by both multiplying culture (“being” simultaneously from Western Christian and Islamic cultures) and thereby allowing for the birth of new cultural identities (“being” multicultural)—the film still enables contemporary subjects to answer questions of identity with reference to culture. For some people, the answer will still be “I am a singular identity,” whereas for others (like the Khan children) the answer will be “I am a multiple identity.” But either way, identity is secured with reference to culture because, as we all should know by now, “being” multicultural is the new identity of many individuals in the era of globalization. All of this is terribly reassuring. For culture and multiculturalism not only provide individuals with identities. They provide individuals with security, not only personally but also politically. Why? Because cultural identities that ground individuals are easily collectivized so that they can also ground states and civilizations, whether they are singular or multiple. So, for example, East Is East explores how a state like post-World War II Britain identified itself by “being” one culture, and how in the late 1990s to the early 2000s Britain increasingly identified itself by “being” multicultural (Fortier, 2008). Because Britain officially claimed a multiple cultural identity as its answer to the question, “Who am I?,” Britain translated its problem of cultural difference into the cultural source of its secure identity. Britain was multicultural. Multiculturalism was the new singular identity to which Britain officially referred. Huntington’s myth “there is a clash of civilizations” also attempts to secure collective identities through claims to cultural identities. His identities are single-culture civilizations that provide the highest level of meaningful identifications not only to individuals but also to states. So, for example, while not every individual in the late 1990s to the early 2000s multicultural state of Britain would identify as Western, the British multicultural state as a collective identity did and still does identify as Western. In this way, cultural differences among people within states—even when they were celebrated as the cultural foundations of the state—were rendered less meaningful in Huntington’s civilizational terms. But, for Huntington, this can only be a good thing, for it seems to solve the problem of cultural difference within states and civilizations, and it seems to locate worrying cultural differences that can make the identities of states insecure, not within states but between civilizations. For example, when British-born Muslims fought against British forces on the side of the Taliban in Afghanistan after September 11, these individuals were read in civilizational terms (as the “disturbing difference” of Islam) rather than in national terms (as the “disturbing difference” in British multiculturalism). So, equating identity to culture is a contemporary response to the problem of cultural difference which seems to provide individuals, states, and civilizations with internal security and which banishes the insecurity of difference outside these secure identities. Yet while this is the desired solution to the problem of cultural difference, this does not mean it is always a successful solution. Indeed, a disturbing irony of Huntington’s attempt to solve the problem of cultural difference for the West/US—thereby securing the realm of international politics in a post-Cold War era—is that it has had precisely the opposite effect. In the wake of September 11, Huntington’s civilizational discourse was appropriated by all sides

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to justify why the immutable cultural differences embodied by their uncivilized enemy left them no alternative but violence. The result was that the world was a far less secure place. This is not to say that the insecurity sparked by the events of September 11 can be pinned on Huntington’s thesis; but it is to say that much of the insecurity emanating from “civilizational consciousness” in its aftermath can be. For even though Huntington’s thesis got lots of academic attention upon its publication in 1993, it was only after September 11 when media, government, and scholarly commentators publicly debated his thesis that “civilizational consciousness” seeped into popular imaginaries. With people’s global terms of reference so unhinged by September 11, it is not surprising that many of them turned to a thesis that promised to equate identity with culture and thereby resecure their personal, national, and international boundaries. At that particular historical moment, the desire for identity to be coterminous with culture proved to be a very strong desire indeed. But as the trauma of September 11 gives way to critical reflection, there is an increasing recognition by some that the desire to be an identity and the corresponding desire to mark oneself off from difference is unattainable. Whether embodied by the rise of the New Right within Western multicultural states like Britain and the US or by the rise of fundamentalisms that fracture Huntington’s civilizational categories of Islam and Western Christianity, we are reminded that “being” an identity— whether as an individual, a state, or a civilization—is not as easy as Huntington suggests. This is because identity is as contentious, unstable, and conflictual as difference. In other words, both identity (and its impossibility) and difference (and its impossibility) produce stability and instability, order and disorder.

Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1: Critiques of modernization and development theory It should be clear even from this very brief discussion of the modernization and development tradition that it reflects not only the liberal ideological beliefs of US political and economic theory but also a specific rendering of what is historically possible. According to this rendering, what was historically possible for Third World states attempting to become developed in the early years of the Cold War and remains historically possible for them today is what was historically possible for the US when it was developing. Such a view relies upon what Louis Hartz (1955) calls an exceptionalist view of US political history—one that generalizes the US historical experience to other nations, even though US history bears little resemblance to that of the rest of the world. In the case of modernization and development, the US generalizes its history of “development” to that of the newly independent states, even though the US “developed” politically, economically, and socially when capitalism was dawning and not when it had to—like later former colonies—compete in a globalized capitalist marketplace with states who have dominated that marketplace for over a hundred years. These are precisely the sorts of critiques that Marxists and neo-Marxists such as André Gunder Frank, Cardoso and Faletto, and Immanuel Wallerstein have put forward. Yet as we saw in Chapter 7 on Hardt and Negri’s Empire, in their desire to oppose liberal ideologies and liberal capitalist readings of history, Marxists and neo-Marxists

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often repeat Huntington’s move of constructing collective ontologies out of disparate forces. For Hardt and Negri, these collective ontologies are “Empire” and “the multitude.” Another good example is Wallerstein’s work which constructs the collective ontologies of core, periphery, and semiperiphery. The critique of what is historically possible, especially concerning neoliberal economics, is also most recently echoed and replayed to a degree in David Harvey’s The New Imperialism (2005) and Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (2007), in which she argues that the US political and economic system is delivered forcefully on states recovering from disasters.

Suggested reading Cardoso, F. and E. Faletto (1979) Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Frank, André Gunder (1969) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press. Hartz, Louis (1955) The Liberal Tradition in America. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Harvey, David (2005) The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Klein, Naomi (2007) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan Books. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974) The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1995) Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilisation. London: Verso, especially pp. 68 and 71–72. Wallerstein, Immanuel (2002) “Revolts Against the System,” New Left Review 18: 29–39.

Topic 2: Critiques of identity With the rise of postmodernism, identity and difference have been the subjects of what Jacques Derrida terms “deconstruction.” Yet identity remains a difficult category to displace, as Stuart Hall explains. And so there is no shortage of literature debating the necessities and impossibilities of identity. In the light of Huntington’s myth, a good way to focus these debates would be around the questions of postcolonial identity (Homi Bhabha), racial identity (Frantz Fanon), and multicultural identity (Slavoj Zizek). You might combine this reading with questions around gender and queer identities (see Chapters 5 and 11).

Suggested reading Bhabha, Homi K. (1990) “Interrogating Identity: The Post Colonial Prerogative,” in D. T. Goldberg (ed.) Anatomy of Racism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 118–209. Derrida, Jacques (1991) “Différence,” in P. Kampuf (ed.) A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds. Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 60–67.

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Topic 3: Difference is dangerous One of the assumptions inherent in Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis is that difference is dangerous. The implicit (and sometimes explicit) goal of modernization and development theories is to reduce difference by bringing about economic liberalism, political democratization, and cultural universalization. This is important for Huntington because the most serious challenge to “Western civilization” is what he defines as non-Western, whether that’s Confucian or Islamic. But what Huntington fails to account for are the divisions and differences within “civilizations,” within states and within individuals. Take states that define themselves as “multicultural,” for example, such as the US with its myth as the world’s cultural “melting pot.” Even though the ideal image of the US is one in which all differences melt away into this melting pot, the US nevertheless contains “unmeltable” ethnicities (Novak, 1996) and “unmeltable Americans” (Weber, 2011). This is because some individual differences are deemed to be “too different” to safely melt into the US American ideal of itself, even when these differences are borne by US citizens who define themselves as American and who support the US state. If states have “unmeltables,” so too will “civilizations.” And that means that the myth that difference is dangerous not only supports modernization and development goals; it means it can also call them into question (Fortier, 2010; Parekh, 2002). Lily H. M. Ling’s Postcolonial International Relations (2002) is an attempt to move beyond the paradigm of the clash of civilizations to appreciate the interprenetation of cultures and their capacity to inform and transform one another.

Suggested reading Fortier, Anne-Marie (2010) “Proximity by Design?: Affective Citizenship and the Management of Unease,” Citizenship Studies 14(1): 17–30. Ling, Lily H. M. (2002) Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Novak, Michael (1996) Unmeltable Ethnics: Politics and Culture in American Life. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Parekh, Bhikhu (2002) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press. Cynthia, Weber (2011) ‘I am an American’: Filming the Fear of Difference. Bristol: Intellect Books, and Chicago: University of Chicago Press. To view the films about “different” US Americans featured in this book, see http://www.iamanamericanproject.com.

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Topic 4: The politics of development aid: Making “Africa” In July 1985, following on from the success of the release of the “Do They Know it’s Christmas?” celebrity single by Band-Aid, massive Live Aid concerts were held simultaneously in London and New York (with spin-offs in Australia and Germany) to raise awareness and relief funds for those suffering through the Ethiopian famine. Broadcast to almost two billion people across the globe, Live Aid used celebrity musicians to inspire charitable giving (but mostly listening). The concerts were then hailed as a huge success for raising awareness of the plight of Africans. But who are “Africans” and what kinds of “Africans” did Live Aid construct? Live Aid employed a very reductive understanding of Africa. Its Africa was not a continent filled with diversity and life but a “country” beset with intractable problems and death. Live Aid was not the only campaign to do this. Bono’s RED campaign (which targets HIV/AIDS in “Africa” as well as poverty, famine, and violence which together have often come to define “Africa” for many in the “West”) employs similar moves (see Richie and Ponte, 2011). What we have here are illustrations of what Lisa Richie and Stefano Ponte call “brand aid” and what Nathan Farrell calls “philanthrocapitalism” (2012)—a sense that what development needs is for the “West” to carry on consuming in order to help “Africa,” while “Africans” themselves are scripted as passive and dependent victims of all manner of crises. A fun-spirited but trenchant critique of this construction is presented by Radi-Aid (2012) in their video “Africa for Norway.” In it, active Africans unite to help Norway by sending the Norwegian people radiators to keep them warm. For in this parody of aid campaigns, Africans feel sorry for long-suffering Norwegians who put up with endless cold weather and need Africa’s help to live comfortable lives.

Suggested reading Aid, Band (1984) “Do They Know It’s Christmas?,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjQzJAKxTrE and the follow-up, Band Aid 20 (2004), http://www.live8live.com/bat/. Farrell, Nathan (2012) “Celebrity Politics: Bono, Product (RED) and the Legitimising of Philanthrocapitalism,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 14(3): 392–406. Radi-Aid (2012) “Africa for Norway,” http://www.africafornorway.no/. Richie, Lisa Ann and Stefano Ponte (2011) Brand Aid: Shopping Well to Save the World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Postscript Samuel P. Huntington is not only concerned with “the problem of cultural difference” between states and civilizations but also with “the problem of cultural difference” within states. In particular, Huntington’s most recent obsession is with the cultural differences within the United States, specifically between “black-and-white American natives” (Huntington, 2004: 32) whose core language

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is English and whose core culture is “Anglo-Protestant” (2004: 32) and predominantly Catholic, non-Anglo-Hispanics. As Huntington so alarmingly puts it, “In this new era [now], the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America’s traditional identity comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin America, especially from Mexico, and the fertility rates of these immigrants compared to black and white American natives” (2004: 32). Not only does Huntington’s construction of the United States erase (among others) native Americans and replace them with Anglo-Protestants, it also casts Mexican immigration as the newest threat to US national/cultural security. This is because, from Huntington’s point of view, a large number of Mexican immigrants are not only coming to the United States; they are failing to integrate into US culture. And thus in a move that precurses subsequent far-right rhetoric of a “great replacement,” Huntington warns us that “in the long run, numbers are power, particularly in a multicultural society, a political democracy, and a consumer economy” (2004: 44). Many have pointed out that Huntington’s construction of the threat of Mexican immigration to the US seems to be in stark contrast with what he wrote about the so-called “clash of civilizations.” The Guardian reporter Dan Glaister goes so far as to wonder if Huntington “even bother[ed] to reread The Clash of Civilizations before embarking on his latest tome.” In the earlier book, he concluded, somewhat perplexingly, that “the cultural distance between Mexico and the United States is far less than that between Turkey and Europe,” and that “Mexico has attempted to redefine itself from a Latin American to a North American identity” (March 15, 2004). All this leads Glaister to conclude that “Either a lot has changed in Huntington’s mind in the intervening eight years, or in searching for new sport he simply chose not to worry too much about the detail” (March 15, 2004). Yet considered through Huntington’s ongoing preoccupation with “the problem of cultural difference,” how this might threaten the security of the sovereign nation-state (particularly the US), and how culturally complex states complicate and compromise Huntington’s desire for state identity to be coterminous with cultural identity, it is not that difficult to square Huntington’s myth “there is a clash of civilizations” with his newly emerging myth that “unintegrated Mexican immigrants are the new threat to US culture.” This is not only the case because Huntington’s clash of civilizations myth is full of hedges about what civilizations are, where their boundaries lie, and how these boundaries and identities shift. More importantly, it is because (as we saw) Huntington’s larger project has always been about protecting the US from cultural difference. His clash of civilizations thesis might be regarded as a traditionally cast “international” expression of how to cope with this problem, while his emerging myth about the threat of unintegrated Mexican immigrants in the US is a more “domestically” inflected expression of how to cope with this same problem. When teaching Huntington’s work, then, it is important not to jump to the conclusion that his 1993 and 2004 essays are opposed to one another but rather to bring out the ways in which they complement Huntington’s larger project and his underlying desire to yet again equate identity with stability and difference with instability.

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9

Environmentalism Is human-made climate change an inconvenient truth?

What does the myth say? WALL-E It’s not easy being Gore’s shade of green Suggestions for further thinking

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Fast forward to 2006. While the so-called war on terror rages on, the “war” on human-made climate change heats up. This war has a different kind of urgency than the war on terror. For if the war on terror might pit civilization against civilization (as Samuel Huntington controversially claimed—see Chapter 8), humanmade climate change resulting mainly from excessive carbon dioxide emissions threatens every civilization on earth because it threatens the earth’s ability to support human life itself. As former US Vice President Al Gore, Jr. puts it, “[The Earth] is our only home. And that is what is at stake. Our ability to live on planet Earth—to have a future as a civilization” (Gore, 2006: 298). These are among the claims Gore makes in his 2006 documentary film and accompanying book An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It. According to Gore, the urgency of addressing human-made climate change is both strategic and moral. Strategically, Gore claims that “the environment is becoming a matter of national security—an issue that directly and imminently menaces the interests of the state or the welfare of the people” (1989). This environmental-strategic danger means that “a new moral courage to choose higher values in the conduct of human affairs” is required. Now, we are called upon to choose strategic values like “cooperation over conflict” and environmental values like “efficiency and conservation” (1989). Gore tells us that by embracing this strategic and moral urgency, [t]he climate crisis … offers us the chance to experience what very few generations in history have had the privilege of knowing: a generational mission; the exhilaration of a compelling moral purpose; a shared and unifying cause; the thrill of being forced by circumstances to put aside the pettiness and conflict that so often stifle the restless human need for transcendence; the opportunity to rise. (2006: 10) All that sounds pretty good. Indeed, it sounds so good that it is actually quite difficult not to get swept up by the warm embrace of Gore’s global environmental movement. For who wouldn’t want to transcend the day-to-day pettiness of global political life and become part of planetary solutions rather than planetary problems? And who wouldn’t want to do this in the knowledge that what we were doing was morally enlightened and enlightening—for the planet, for future generations, and for ourselves? It is not surprising, then, that Gore’s project is spawning a new generation of eco-warriors fighting to keep “earth in the balance” (Gore, 1992). Nor is it surprising that domestically, Gore’s popularity led many Democrats to urge Gore to be their 2008 Presidential candidate and that internationally, Gore’s work earned him a share of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize because it focused “on the processes and decisions that appear to be necessary to protect the world’s future climate, and thereby reduce the future threat to the security of mankind” (Norwegian Nobel Peace Committee, quoted in Gibbs and Lyall, 2007). Given Gore’s emphasis on cooperation and morality as a way to achieve human security, it is pretty easy to make the case that Gore is a typical idealist (see Chapter 3). For without explicitly saying so, Gore seems to embrace all of the core

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principles of idealism. He seems to believe in the goodness of human nature, the possibility of progress through enlightenment/learning, the idea that bad things happen because people either don’t have good enough information or they are badly organized or both, that conflict is not inevitable, that collective action can redress injustices and avoid conflict, and that the reorganization of international society is what will contribute most to the solving of global problems (Kegley, 1995: 4). All of these ideas are implied in Gore’s writings, film, and political projects on environmentalism and climate change. Even so, Gore is not a typical idealist. For while he may embrace the core principles of idealism, he does so with a difference. For example, Gore seems to accept that international society can moderate conflict. But unlike typical idealists, the conflict Gore is most interested in is not state-to-state or even humanto-human conflict but the conflict between humans and the earth that interferes with the earth’s ability to sustain life. For Gore, then, international society should not address itself only to traditional security problems like conflict among peoples and wars among states but must also urgently address itself to the new environmental security problem of tackling the planetary issue of human-made climate change, an issue that figures very differently, if at all, on traditional idealist agendas. By redefining traditional idealist security issues to include—and indeed to be dominated by—environmental issues, Gore shifts how idealists ought to think about global governance. Yes, there is still an important place for international society, for increasing communication, and for learning and progress. But this must be accompanied by a commitment to “greening” the planet, so much so that the “preservation of the earth [becomes] our new organizing principle” (1992: 295). And this means that traditional idealist governance strategies must be reconfigured as nonconventional “green governance” (Dobson and Bell, 2006; Eckersley, 1995, 2004; Luke, 1997). As Matthew Paterson explains, “environmentalist” or “green” projects and governance strategies like Gore’s cross, recombine, and exceed traditional categories of IR theory (Paterson, 1996). To come to grips with Gore and his project, then, one must come to grips not only with idealism but also with environmental/ green theory. So what is environmental/green theory and politics? Table 9.1  Gore’s idealist assumptions Assumptions typical of idealism

Assumptions atypical of idealism

• Humans are good by nature • Progress is possible • Bad things happen because of bad organization • Conflict is not inevitable • Collective action can redress injustice and avoid conflict • International society can solve global problems

• Human-environmental conflict is more urgent than human-human conflict at this moment in history • International society must address itself to the new environmental security problem of tackling human-made climate change • The preservation of the planet must become our new organizing principle

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Like any theoretical or political perspective, there are a variety of environmental/green positions and lots of heated debates among them. Yet they seem to share at least one core premise—that our received wisdom about the relationship between nature (the natural environment) and culture (the human environment) must be questioned. Whether we turn to Plato or Old Testament Christians or modern industrialists or Marxists, all these nonenvironmentalists/greens espouse the view that nature is a resource that the human species (culture) should tame. This is done in a variety of ways, like enclosing/privatizing nature, extracting fossil fuels from nature, and “developing” nature. Whatever the means, the end is always the same—for humans (culture) to dominate nature and bend it to their will so that nature can provide for human needs and wants. Environmental/green theory begins from the position that such a view of the nature/culture relationship is at best outdated and at worst morally wrong. While this view might have made sense before the world became so densely populated, before human demands for clean land, water, and air were in danger of exceeding the earth’s capacity to provide them, and before the earth’s ability to naturally recycle poisonous by-products of industrialization became oversaturated, this view is no longer legitimate because it does not make sense of the world in which we currently live. Now we have to worry about all manner of environmental dangers—holes in the ozone layer, shortages of safe water and air, rising temperatures, rising sea levels, the extinction of a vast array of species resulting in the earth’s decreased biodiversity, and ultimately the inability of the planet to sustain life. Environmental/green theorists argue that more than anything else, what causes these dangers is how humans (culture) use nature. Starkly put, the way humans use nature is killing humans, other species, and the planet in general. So to make the world safe for current and future generations, what is required is a change in the human-nature relationship (see Box 9.1). What might make an environmentally positive change in the human-nature relationship possible? Matthew Paterson argues that such a change can be brought about by combining green theory and IR theory. Specifically, what is called for are three things—a new understanding of ontology (being), a new understanding of global

Box 9.1  The core premise of environmental/green theory What is the core premise of environmental/green theory and the foundation for environmental/green political action? Our received wisdom about the relationship between nature and culture (that humans should dominate nature and extract from it whatever humans want and need) must be questioned. Why is this the case? Because the current human/nature relationship is literally killing humans, other species, and the planet as a whole.

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limits, and a new global order. Green theory provides the first two of these three elements; IR theory provides the final of these three elements. So what do these elements mean, and how might they combine to change the human-nature relationship in ways that are environmentally beneficial and strategically safe? Ontologically, environmental/green theory claims that we need to move away from an “anthropocentric” (i.e., human-centered) understanding of the world to an “ecocentric” (i.e., environmentally centered) understanding of the world. This is necessary because anthropocentrism only values the human species and is therefore only concerned with the survival of the human species. Ecocentrism, in contrast, values ecosystems in and for themselves, which results in a valuing of all living things rather than just the human species. As such, ecocentrism generally refuses the traditional division of nature and culture, recognizing that humans are part of nature, not above nature (Bennett and Chaloupka, 1993). Ecocentrism therefore understands that the fate of humans is intrinsically linked to the fate of the natural environment. For Paterson, this shift in ontology must be accompanied by a new understanding of global environmental limits. The argument here is that planet earth has a finite capacity to sustain humans and that the earth is in danger of exceeding its limited capacity. What pushes the earth to its limits are two things—the exponential growth of human populations that fuels an exponential growth in industrialization and its by-products (resource depletion, pollution) coupled with the near saturation of the earth’s capacity to naturally recycle pollution. Environmental/green theorists are well aware that as early as the 18th-century predictions that population growth would lead to famine, disease, and social and political unrest have been made yet have not come to pass (Malthus, 1798). Yet they argue that when we add widespread industrialization into this mix of population growth and scarcity, we have to take seriously the limits-to-growth argument, popularized by Meadows and her colleagues in the 1970s (Meadows et al., 1972). While some debate whether or not Meadows and her colleagues were wrong about the details of when the earth would reach its limits (Turner, 2008), Meadows and her colleagues insist that the underlying logic of the limits-to-growth argument is sound and that to ignore it is to miss the opportunity to save the planet and thus save ourselves from extinction. Saving the planet and ourselves on this planet will, however, require more than just an environmental/green theorization of ontology and a renewed appreciation of the limits to environmental growth. It will also require specific actions on the part of humans—the implementation of an environmental/green politics (Paterson, 2005: 237). And this raises the question, “What governance arrangement might best facilitate the implementation of an environmental/green politics?” Paterson claims the answer is to be found in turning to IR theory as a guide to creating a new global order. For Paterson, this new global order needs to be one that is far more decentralized than the current states system and gives less power to states (Paterson, 2005: 237). We get an idea of the kind of new global order environmentalists/greens have in mind through their slogan “Think Globally, Act Locally.” What this expression conveys is that local action has global effects, and these effects are not necessarily governed by states (Paterson, 2005: 238–250) or, I would add, by an overarching international community.

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Overall, Paterson claims that this combination of environmental/green theory and politics with IR theory provides “an explanation of the destruction of the rest of nature by human societies, and a normative foundation for resisting this destruction and creating sustainable societies” (2005: 236). Gore’s understanding of and responses to the planetary emergency of human-made climate change embrace all three of Paterson’s key points about environmental/green theory and politics. Gore accepts that they must rethink their relationship to nature and embrace the fact that humans do not stand above nature but are a part of it. Gore agrees that the earth’s capacity to absorb the by-products of industrialization is limited and that exceeding these limits is what has created the current planetary emergency. And he embraces the environmental/green political agenda to “Think Globally, Act Locally” as a way to address this planetary emergency. The result is a hoped-for reordering of international governance as Gore’s specific brand of “green governance,” which embodies an idealist-inflected moral commitment to “green the earth” and to make the “preservation of the earth … our new organizing principle” (1992: 295) without necessarily having to radically restructure either the state system or international society. Gore’s work has brought the debate about human-made climate change to the attention of individuals and state leaders across the globe, more than a decade before protest movements like Extinction Rebellion and Fridays for Future led to a global resurgence in climate activism. In so doing, it has reignited the debate about whether or not human-made climate change is scientifically true, leading to discussions about whether or not Gore’s proposals to rescue the planet must be urgently implemented or whether or not, if his diagnosis of environmental problems is alarmist to the extreme, his solutions are therefore too costly and ultimately unnecessary (Horner, 2007). These sorts of questions about Gore’s myth go to the truth or falsity of his myth. But what concerns us here is not whether or not Gore’s myth is true but what makes it appear to be true. So maybe we can get out of this “true/false” debate by shifting the terms of this debate. One way to do this is to leave aside questions about the scientific truth or falsity of human-made climate change and focus on a different part of Gore’s myth—the part about convenience and inconvenience. For even if we assume human-made climate change is true, we still have to ask ourselves if it is inconvenient, particularly in the terms in which Gore describes it. If we choose to interrogate the presumed inconvenience of human-made climate change rather than its truth or falsity, a whole new range of questions emerges. For example, we can ask not just whether or not human-made climate change and Gore’s solutions to it are inconvenient, but precisely for whom they might be inconvenient. Could it be that human-made climate change and specifically Gore’s solutions to it are actually convenient for some while inconvenient for others? If that is the case, then what is it that makes Gore’s myth “human-made climate change is an inconvenient truth” appear to be true for everyone everywhere? Might it have something to do with Gore’s combination of environmental/green theory and politics and some additional idealist assumptions that are too often left uninterrogated, assumptions that have less to do with strategic and moral agendas than they do with economic agendas? Might it be that the idealist economic assumption (often called a neoliberal economic assumption, see Chapter 6)

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that international economic relations are harmonious has spilled over into Gore’s understanding of the relationship between culture and nature, humans and the environment? Or, as stated through liberal modernization and development theory (see Chapter 8), might it be that Gore is convinced that “all good things go together,” including sustainable economic growth and a healthy environment, as sustainable development theory holds (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987)? All of this might be fine if sustainable development were unquestionably sustainable in environmentally healthy ways. But is economic development sustainable? Or does Gore’s brand of sustainable economic development jeopardize not only the fate of the earth but also the fate of humankind to inhabit the earth? These questions are raised by the 2008 Pixar animated film WALL-E. WALL-E takes place in an environmentally postapocalyptic world in which the earth has been abandoned by humans because toxins and garbage made the planet uninhabitable. This abandonment of the earth was meant to be temporary, lasting some 5 years while machines like WALL-E (an acronym for Waste Allocation Load Lifter Earth-Class) cleaned up the garbage and made earth inhabitable again. But some 700 years later, WALL-E is still clearing up the trash, and humans are still living on spaceships awaiting their return to earth. WALL-E’s depiction of the earth’s future supports Gore’s idea that human-made climate change is a planetary emergency. But it also tells us something else about Gore’s myth. It tells us what must go without saying in order for Gore’s myth to appear to be true. It does this by exploring the relationships humans have to economic consumption and economic governance, and it raises the question whether or not “sustainable economic development” can sustain both healthy economic growth and a healthy planet.

What does the myth say? The 2006 documentary film and accompanying book An Inconvenient Truth are Gore’s best-known statements about global climate change. But as Gore has pointed out, long before this film came into being, he had been taking his message around the world to anyone who would listen in the form of a one-man travelling slideshow. When Gore’s act caught the attention of Hollywood Director David Guggenheim, this little slideshow became the documentary film An Inconvenient Truth. Since then, this documentary has done more to popularize Gore’s myth “human-made climate change is an inconvenient truth” than the rest of his work put together. An Inconvenient Truth is a highly intimate film. What is so effective about this intimacy is that it is not just about Al Gore, Jr.’s relationship to his family, to his country, and to the environment. It is about each individual viewer’s moral relationship to the earth. These ideas are established in the film’s opening sequence. The film opens to the sound of a quiet chorus of notes rising, reminiscent of a low buzzing you might hear in a forest or the low hum of traffic. Somewhere in this sound is the suggestion that something is wrong. As we see the first image—a close-up of a leafy green tree—we hear a piano strike a clear note, twice. As the

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camera pans left from this tree in the foreground to a river in the background, we hear Gore’s voiceover, which is punctuated by more single piano notes. Gore: You look at that river gently flowing by. You notice the leaves rustling with the wind. You hear the birds. You hear the tree frogs. In the distance, you hear a cow. You feel the grass. The mud gives a little bit on the river bank. It’s quiet. It’s peaceful. And all the sudden, it’s a gearshift inside you. And it’s like taking a deep breath and going [Gore deeply inhales, then exhales, saying] “Oh, yea, I forgot about this.” Cut to a close-up of Gore’s laptop. On the laptop screen is a picture of the earth shot from the moon. As this slide fills the cinema screen, we realize that this is the first image in Gore’s slideshow. Cut to shots of different crowds across the globe listening to Gore’s presentation. These images are interspersed with shots of Gore traveling from one destination to another. Finally, Gore introduces himself. Gore: I am Al Gore. I used to be the next President of the United States. [The crowd laughs. Gore continues, deadpan.] I don’t find that particularly funny. As the montage of Gore’s traveling show continues, Gore tells us in voiceover, “I’ve been telling this story for a long time, and I feel as if I’ve failed to get the message across.” Gore’s confession of failure is narrated over a series of images that evidence global warming—melting snow, rain-starved soil, and polluting factories. Cut to Gore working with footage from Hurricane Katrina. Gore: [voiceover] There are good people who are in politics in both parties who hold this at arm’s length because if they acknowledge it and recognize it, then the moral imperative to make big changes is inescapable. We see one final shot of Gore on the road, looking out the window of the backseat of a car as it rolls through a gray city littered with skyscrapers. The title of the film appears on the window. This is the end of the opening sequence. This opening sequence provides us with all of the core elements of An Inconvenient Truth. It establishes our main character Al Gore, Jr. as a flawed, folkie hero wandering in the wilderness of postparty political life desperate to beat the overwhelming odds stacked against him in his quest to communicate the moral urgency of his mission—that human-made climate change is a planetary emergency and that it is a problem we can solve. It establishes the film’s tone as a mix of gravity and levity by intercutting heavy facts with well-placed jokes. And it offers us a glimpse of the mesmerizing graphics that our hero will mobilize to achieve his mission. The rest of the film cuts between some of Gore’s most personal experiences— the near death of his son Albert, the death of his only sibling Nancy—and some of the most “inconvenient truths” about the earth’s climate crisis, all the while exploring how these personal tragedies inspired Gore to take on the environmental crisis as a moral issue. Along the way, Gore briefly discusses the environmental crisis as a strategic and economic issue as well. For example, as Gore uses graphics to demonstrate the global flooding that would occur if Greenland’s glaciers melted, he shows one such slide of New York City.

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Gore: After the horrible events of September 11, we said never again. But this is what would happen to Manhattan [slide shows flood waters rising]. … The area where the World Trade Center memorial is to be located would be under water. Is it possible that we should prepare against other threats besides terrorists? Maybe we should be concerned about other problems as well. Turning to economics, Gore mocks an image that has been used to suggest that economic and environmental issues are in conflict—a cartoon-like drawing of weighing scales with gold bars presenting economic wealth on one side and the whole planet representing environmental concerns on the other. The images suggest that we have to choose between making money or protecting the environment. Gore: I think this is a false choice for two reasons. Number one, if we don’t have a planet, … [laughter of crowd, affirming to Gore that he doesn’t need to finish this sentence]. The other reason is that if we do the right thing, then we’re gonna create a lot of wealth and we’re gonna create a lot of jobs because doing the right thing moves us forward. Gore never explains what “the right thing” is, what it means to “move us forward” or how “doing the right thing moves us forward.” Rather than burdening its viewers with the ways Gore solves difficult political dilemmas about economics and the environment, the film instead just keeps hammering home Gore’s moral message based upon scientific fact. Gore: Ultimately, this is really not a political issue so much as a moral issue. If we allow [temperatures to rise because of CO2 emissions], it is deeply unethical. This “we” is then translated into individual US American “me’s” who need to affect this solution. Gore: Each one of us is a cause of global warming, but each of us can make choices to change that, with the things we buy, the electricity we use, the cars we drive. We can make choices to bring our individual carbon emissions to zero. The solutions are in our hands. We just have to have the determination to make them happen. Are we going to be left behind as the rest of the world moves forward? The film ends with a look back at the opening river sequence. Gore: Future generations may well have occasion to ask themselves—what were our parents thinking? Why didn’t they wake up when they had a chance? We have to hear that question from them now. Fade to black. Cue Melissa Ethridge singing her Oscar-winning song, “I Need to Wake Up,” as tips for how individuals can solve the environmental crisis are interspersed with the final credits.

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Part of what made An Inconvenient Truth so popular was what it said and how it said it. What the film said is not only that “human-made climate change is an inconvenient truth.” It also stressed that because global warming is largely a human-made problem, it can be solved by human action. How it said this, of course, was by using the documentary film form. And this was an incredibly smart move. For unlike environmental disaster dramas like The Day After Tomorrow, for example, which viewers could easily dismiss as over-the-top, this film was about a morally motivated, Harvard-educated former US Vice President (and almost President) doing what he was already doing—telling the truth as he saw it about human-made climate change. Yes, the film recalled some moments in Gore’s life to dramatic effect, but for the most part this was a talking-head documentary, with Gore as about the most credible talking head one could find on this subject. And so documentary—which in film studies is defined as a “creative treatment of actuality” (Grierson quoted in Rabiger, 1998: 3)—was the perfect form to call upon to circulate Gore’s message. It makes the message appear to be honest, intellectual, and interesting all at the same time. Having said this, Gore’s documentary is at its best as a “creative treatment of actuality” with respect to what the film does not say and how it does not say it. What the film does not say are any of the more controversial ideas about human-made climate change and its convenience or inconvenience which are found in Gore’s other writings on global warming. And how the film does not say these things is by editing them out of Gore’s presentation in An Inconvenient Truth so that viewers are never burdened by details or policy recommendations or any troubling contradictions in Gore’s argument that cannot be smoothed over by a joke, a cartoon, or a cool graphic. Yet there is so much more to Gore’s position on global warming that is a less “creative treatment of the truth.” And because An Inconvenient Truth is a gloss of Gore’s earlier ideas without contributing a single new idea to Gore’s opus on global warming, it is important to take a look back at his earlier work to appreciate just how clever it was not to mention this stuff in too much detail in the film (see Boxes 9.2 and 9.3). Aside from An Inconvenient Truth, Gore’s most important works on global climate change are his influential Washington Post editorial entitled “Earth’s Fate is the Number One National Security Issue” and his 1992 book Earth in the Balance: Forging a New Common Purpose. Gore’s (1989) editorial “Earth’s Fate is the Number One National Security Issue” was written a few months after the Berlin Wall came down, which marked the symbolic end to the Cold War and which opened up a space for new strategic thinking about global politics. Gore seized this moment to suggest a new security agenda.

Box 9.2  What An Inconvenient Truth says and how it says it What the film says: Human-made climate change is an inconvenient truth that can be solved by humans because it is a human-made problem. How the film says it: By using the “factual” documentary film form.

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Box 9.3  What An Inconvenient Truth does not say and how it does not say it What the film does not say: Any controversial details, policy recommendations, or troubling contradictions in Gore’s argument. How the film does not say it: By glossing these aspects of Gore’s argument that appear in his earlier work on the environment.

Criticizing President George Bush, Sr. for his lack of vision about the future of global security, Gore argued that just because the Soviet Bloc no longer threatened the US as it had in the past, this did not mean that US security was assured. For, as the title of Gore’s essay puts it, environmental issues are now the US’s number one security issue. Chiding Bush, Sr. for his neglect of environmental issues, Gore states: This indifference must end. As a nation and a government, we must see that America’s future is inextricably tied to the fate of the globe. In effect, the environment is becoming a matter of national security—an issue that directly and imminently menaces the interests of the state and the welfare of the people. (1989) Gore explains that he does not mean to overstate this “national-security analogy,” noting that military threats have been and continue to be real. “And yet, there is strong evidence the new enemy [of environmental crisis] is at least as real as the old” (1989). He makes a strong argument for using the language of national security to argue his case. As he puts it, When nations perceive that they are threatened at the strategic level, they may be induced to think of drastic responses, involving sharp discontinuities from everyday approaches to policy. In military terms, this is the point when the United States begins to think of invoking nuclear weapons. The global environment crisis may demand responses that are comparatively radical. (1989) Gore spends the rest of his editorial outlining what this radical response should be. But before he does this, he draws a clear distinction between typical “radical” proposals to the environmental crisis and his own. Specifically, Gore makes it clear that he does not agree with “radical” analyses that tell us that “the notion of environmental sustainable development at present may be an oxymoron,” that “we face a choice between economic growth in the near term and massive environmental disorder as the subsequent penalty,” and that we should give in to “simplistic demands that development, or technology itself, must be stopped for the problem to be solved” (1989). Quite the contrary. Yes, Gore concedes that “The tension between the imperatives of growth and the imperative of environmental

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management represents a supreme test for modern industrial civilization and an extreme demand upon technology” (1989). But that does not lead Gore to conclude that economic growth should be sacrificed in the name of saving the environment. Rather, Gore argues that this problem “will call for the environmental equivalent of the Strategic Defense Initiative [i.e., President Ronald Regan’s ‘Star Wars’ Missile Defense Initiative]: a Strategic Environment Initiative” (1989). Rather than sacrifice economic development to environmental management, Gore’s Strategic Environment Initiative (SEI) seeks to apply innovative and increasingly efficient new technologies to every major sector of the economy as a way to make economic development and environmental protection simultaneously achievable goals (1989). Gore outlines three planks in his SEI platform. The first is an “Energy SEI” that “should focus on producing energy for development without compromising the environment” by encouraging conservation and developing new solar, biomass, and nuclear power sources. The second is a “second green revolution, to address the needs of the Third World’s poor” by developing new technologies of agricultural production and reorganizing the international financing of Third World development. The third is a “Transportation SEI” that improves mileage standards in US vehicles, looks to develop alternative fuels, and in the longer term restructures the US transportation system to emphasize public transportation over personal vehicles (1989). Overall, Gore argues that: we must transform ourselves… . The solutions we seek will be found in a new faith in the future of life on earth after our own, a faith in the future which justifies sacrifices in the present, a new moral courage to choose higher values in the conduct of human affairs, and a new reverence for absolute principles that can serve as guiding stars for the future course of our species and our place within creation. (1989) Strategically, morally, and economically, then, Gore makes a strong case for US policymakers to prioritize the global environmental crisis just as much as they would any other strategic issue. Gore makes this case strategically by elevating the environmental crisis to the status of America’s new post-Cold War enemy, morally by elevating his SEI strategic response to the environmental crisis to a set of absolute principles that requires moral courage to follow, and economically by promising that his SEI will achieve environmental protection without sacrificing economic growth. Gore’s (1992) book Earth in the Balance carries on with this agenda. But instead of directing his message primarily to politicians and policymakers (as a Washington Post editorial does), Gore now directs his message to a broader US public. In so doing, Gore begins by “forging a new common purpose” on the environment. Gore does this by striking a personal tone in this book, foreshadowing things we will see in An Inconvenient Truth about what growing up on a farm in Tennessee taught him about caring for the environment, what his son Albert’s near death taught him about the value of life, and what we owe to future generations. As in An Inconvenient Truth, these personal stories are mobilized to encourage each of us to “take a greater personal responsibility for this deteriorating global

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environment” (1992: 12). How we can do this is by taking “a hard look at the habits of mind and action that reflect—and have led to—this grave crisis” (1992: 12). By arguing that it is the little, everyday things that individuals do that have created this planetary emergency, Gore widens responsibility for solving the environmental crisis from just states and state leaders to individuals. Gore does this because he recognizes that “forging a new common purpose” about the environment will require winning the hearts and minds of individuals as much as (or even more than) those of states and state leaders. For if Gore can mobilize the US public to “go green,” then the US public can put pressure on the US government to introduce and implement environmental/green policies. For such a mobilization to be effective, though, it cannot be posed in the combative, strategic language of Gore’s (1989) editorial. For by 1992, global cooperation via “globalization” (see Chapter 6) defined the terms of national and international debate. And so in Earth in the Balance, Gore’s assessment of the environmental crisis as a “new enemy” that must be tamed by a Strategic Environmental Initiative fades to the background, making way for Gore’s more cooperative proposal of a Global Marshall Plan. Like Gore’s Strategic Environmental Initiative which recasts President Regan’s Strategic Defense Initiative in environmental terms, Gore’s Global Marshall Plan recasts the US-led post-World War II Marshall Plan in environmental terms. The original Marshall Plan was a US-led initiative to revitalize economically devastated Europe by restructuring European national economies so that economic development and free trade would flourish throughout the region. Gore argues that “something like the Marshall Plan—a Global Marshall Plan, if you will—is now urgently needed” (1992: 297). He continues: The scope and complexity of this plan will far exceed those of the original; what’s required now is a plan that combines large-scale, long-term, carefully targeted financial aid to developing nations, massive efforts to design and then transfer to poor nations the new technologies needed for sustained economic progress, a worldwide program to stabilize world populations, and binding commitments by the industrial nations to accelerate their own transition to an environmentally responsible pattern of life. (1992: 297) While Gore is absolutely clear that he wants to make “the preservation of the earth … our new organizing principle” (1992: 295), it isn’t immediately clear how reworking an economic plan like the Marshall Plan into a Global Marshall Plan would in any way help to achieve this goal. But this becomes clearer when we remember the history of the original Marshall Plan. For it wasn’t just about the US benevolently helping Europe to recover economically after World War II. The US led this European economic recovery because it believed this was the best way to keep Europe from falling into Soviet control and turning to communism (recall the goals of modernization and development theory, Chapter 8). So the original Marshall Plan used economic strategies to achieve military and ideological goals. Similarly, Gore hopes to use a Global Marshall Plan with its environmental strategy to achieve a wide range of goals. For what Gore argues is that a US-led Global Marshall Plan would not just bring economic development to the

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Third World. In so doing, it would also make democracy and capitalism the foundations for “sustainable societies” in the Third World—politically, economically, and environmentally. Gore outlines six strategic goals that his Global Marshall Plan hopes to achieve: 1 2 3 4 5 6

the stabilizing of the world’s population; the rapid creation and development of environmentally appropriate technologies; a comprehensive and ubiquitous change in the economic “rules of the game” by which we measure the impact of our decisions on the environment; the negotiation and approval of a new generation of international agreements; the establishment of a cooperative plan for educating the world’s citizens about our global environment; and the establishment, especially in the developing world—of social and political conditions most conducive to the emergence of sustainable societies. (1992: 305–307)

As you can see, many of these goals are identical to those Gore first proposed in his 1989 editorial. Indeed, as Gore makes clear in his book, his second goal about “the rapid creation and development of environmentally appropriate technologies” is actually his original Strategic Economic Initiative. What we have in Earth in the Balance, then, is everything we already had in Gore’s (1989) editorial. The only real difference between the editorial and this book is that the book both fleshes out Gore’s ideas in more detail and broadens responsibility for solving environmental problems from states and state leaders to individuals as well. As such, it is the perfect precursor to An Inconvenient Truth, which emphasizes what individuals (and particularly what individual US citizens) can do to curb human-made climate change. Effectively, then, An Inconvenient Truth was designed to finally “forge a new common purpose” on the environment by implementing Strategic Goal Number Five of Gore’s Global Marshall Plan—“the establishment of a cooperative plan for educating the world’s citizens about our global environment” (1992: 306), starting primarily with the US public. The similarities between Gore’s three major works on human-made climate change are striking. But what is also striking is how An Inconvenient Truth omits all of Gore’s sometimes less interesting and sometimes more controversial claims— not because Gore has changed his position on these issues but because they function in An Inconvenient Truth as assumptions upon which his myth “human-made climate change is an inconvenient truth” is based. None of the detailed arguments that burden us in either Gore’s (1989) editorial or in Earth in the Balance reappear in this work. Nowhere are we asked to think about how to mobilize economic development so that democracy and capitalism can become the basis of sustainable economic development. Nowhere are we hit over the head with policy recommendations for either an SEI or a Global Marshall Plan. And nowhere are we reminded that submitting to Gore’s brand of “Green Governance” is a way of achieving the US national interest. Instead, all we have to do is focus on the

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“inconvenient truth” of human-made global warming and grab hold of the idea that we can solve this problem if we act now. Taken together, Gore’s film and writings on the environmental crisis make a pretty good case for Gore’s myth “human-made climate change is an inconvenient truth.” They do so by slickly presenting scientific evidence to support his claim that human-made climate change has created a planetary problem and by methodically laying out plans to solve this problem—through a Strategic Environmental Initiative, a Global Marshall Plan, and by reductions in individual CO2 emissions. So all of this supports the “truth” of Gore’s claim that humanmade climate change exists. Even if we bracket these issues and look instead at the second part of Gore’s myth—about how human-made climate change is “an inconvenient truth”—we again find strong evidence for this in Gore’s work. For it is a pretty persuasive case for inconvenience that there will be no human winners if climate change happens on the catastrophic scale Gore suggests it could because the earth will not be able to sustain any human life. This makes human-made climate change inconvenient for everyone. It also explains why Gore makes the case that it is necessary for rich industrial states and individuals in these states to take the lead to reverse the potentially catastrophic effects of human-made climate change by helping the “Third World” to become more stable politically by adopting democracy, and more stable economically through a technology-led “second green revolution,” a revolution that will spark not only economic development but also (Gore tells us) agricultural efficiencies, population decreases, and overall environmentally sustainable societies. This is what industrialized states can do. In the meantime, the citizens of these states can erase their carbon footprints altogether by bringing their own CO2 emissions down to zero and mobilizing public opinion to ensure that their states “go green.” Gore’s plan for green governance, then, offers clear directives to states and to citizens about precisely how they ought to behave in order to solve the climate crisis. In these ways, Gore’s underlying idealist assumptions about cooperation around a common moral purpose that might even decrease conflict and enhance peace and stability all seem to be achievable. They don’t require a world government, nor do they necessarily require a new international society. Rather, all that is required are states and citizens (especially the US state and its citizens) with the political will to assume global leadership on environmental issues so that we can all then solve this planetary crisis together. And all of this can be accomplished without sacrificing economic growth for environmental protection. It is this last point that is the underlying “feel-good factor” of Gore’s analysis of the global environmental crisis—that having a healthy planet is not at odds with having healthy and sustained economic development. If this is the case, though, then doesn’t this call into question the “inconvenience” part of Gore’s myth? For isn’t it terribly convenient especially for the US state and its citizens that all good economic and environmental things go together? For while Gore might be asking the US state and US citizens to “go green” and to help lead others across the world into doing the same, this may not inconvenience the US much at all. For while the US may have to fork out more money in aid and US citizens may have to drive hybrid-powered vehicles, for example, the US state does not have to forfeit

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its global power which is based largely upon its economic power and US citizens do not have to forfeit their modern conveniences. Indeed, thanks to ever-improving technologies, efficiencies will just keep increasing and life it seems will keep getting easier. The driving force behind our future political, economic, and environmental “good life” is economic growth. So long as US consumers continue to increase their consumption (albeit by making incrementally “greener” choices), then there will be no contradiction between sustainable economic development and a healthy sustainable environment. Or will there? The film WALL-E takes a different stand than does Gore on the relationship between economics and environmental protection. It does this not by focusing so much on states and citizens (because in the environmentally postapocalyptic world of WALL-E, there no longer seem to be any states or citizens). Rather, it does so by looking at an actor very much neglected in Gore’s economic and environmental analysis—the global corporation. In so doing, WALL-E suggests to us what must go without saying in order for Gore’s myth “human-made climate change is an inconvenient truth” to appear to be true.

WALL-E The 2008 animated Pixar film WALL-E is a film about the future that takes as its central theme a nostalgia for the past. Set some 800 years in the future, what WALLE is nostalgic for is the present we are currently living. For this is a time when humans lived on the earth and engaged in genuine loving relationships. The film’s title character WALL-E (short for Waste Allocation Life Loader EarthClass) is a small, mobile robot who is particularly nostalgic for love, a concept this binocular-eyed, tractor-treaded trash compactor learned about from endlessly watching the 1969 film Hello, Dolly! Two songs from Hello, Dolly! structure WALL-E’s world, as well as the film WALL-E—“Put on Your Sunday Clothes” and “It Only Takes a Moment.” The film’s opening sequence begins with the lyrics of “Put on Your Sunday Clothes,” which in Hello, Dolly! is a song about New York City that shop clerk Cornelius sings to his fellow clerk, Barnaby. Cornelius: Out there. There’s a world outside of Yonkers. Way out there beyond this hick town, Barnaby. There’s a slick town, Barnaby. As this song plays, animated scenes of outer space appear. We see stars, moons, and galaxies. As the song’s second stanza plays, the camera pans down from space to a shot of the earth. The camera passes through a dense ring of trash orbiting the earth (old satellites, space stations, and telescopes). Once the camera enters the earth’s atmosphere, we see the East Coast of the US. The camera zooms in on New York City. Cornelius: Out there. Full of shine and full of sparkle. Close your eyes and see it glisten, Barnaby. Listen, Barnaby…. In a long-shot, we see the giant skyscrapers that epitomize New York City. But as the camera shoots these in close-up, we realize that these skyscrapers are

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crumbling and abandoned. And what shines and sparkles in this New York City are even taller skyscraper-like piles of trash. We hear the wind echo through this mass of empty buildings and dense rubbish piles. The camera shifts position, giving us an overhead shot of a small robot—WALL-E—maneuvering across dirt pathways through the debris. The music continues. Cornelius:  Put on your Sunday clothes, There’s lots of world out there…. But now the music has a metallic twang to it. Instead of being played as a clear, unsituated opening track, this music is coming from WALL-E’s built-in playback device. The camera follows WALL-E as he selects treasure from trash, crushes rubbish in his “belly,” and assembles his belly-made blocks of junk into enormous stacks that look like the abandoned buildings of the New York City skyline. All the while he is accompanied by his pet cockroach, the only sign of life on earth. As the sun begins to fade, WALL-E heads home across the waste-scape that is now New York City—enormous deserted stores, parking lots, gas stations, and banks. All of these are branded with the same company label—Buy N Large, a kind of Walmart on steroids due to the size and reach of this corporation. Buy N Large is not just a global corporation; it extends beyond planet earth and into other galaxies. For not only does the company have lunar ambitions, as illustrated by its sign on the moon reading “Buy N Large Outlet Coming Soon.” The company has intergalactic ambitions. We learn of these from a commercial broadcast on a motion-activated billboard WALL-E passes. Commercial: [voiceover] Too much trash in your face? We’ll clean it up while you’re in space. BnL StarLiners leaving each day. We’ll clean up the mess while you’re away. Cut to holographic images of humans on board spaceships that resemble current-day ocean cruise liners while the voiceover expounds upon the pleasures of Starcruising. Cut to Shelby Forthright, the CEO of Buy N Large: Because at BnL, space is the final FUN-tier! This commercial explains why we don’t see any people in WALL-E’s world, for humans who could afford a BnL StarCruise abandoned the earth and its moon because of the excesses of trash and pollution, while the rest of the human species and every other species (apart from cockroaches) presumably died out. Another billboard tells us that a battalion of WALL-E robots stayed behind, operating under their programmed directive of “working to dig you [humans] out.” As WALL-E wanders through the rubble, we see the remains of other WALL-Es that have long since ceased functioning. The WALL-E we meet in this opening sequence is the last working robot on earth. But WALL-E isn’t all work and no play. Over the past 700 years he has developed a personality which makes him curious about the earth, and nostalgic for what he understands to be human relationships. These traits were developed through his contact with the treasures and trash left on earth and with his Hello, Dolly! videotape.

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Humming “Put on your Sunday Clothes,” WALL-E enters his home (a Buy N Large container), puts on a videotape of Hello, Dolly!, and adds treasures to his collection—a hubcap, a spoon/fork, and a cigarette lighter. On most items the Buy N Large label is still visible. In the background, the video plays “It Only Takes a Moment,” a love song between Cornelius and his love interest Mrs. Molloy. Cornelius: And that is all that love’s about. Mrs. Molloy: And we’ll recall as time runs out. Both: That it only took a moment to be loved your whole life long. As they sing, Cornelius and Mrs. Molloy join hands. An emotional WALL-E imitates this gesture by linking his “hands” together. He then finishes organizing his stuff, closes his container to protect himself from one of earth’s many sudden violent storms, and settles onto a shelf to await the next day’s sunlight that will recharge his energy supply. The screen fades to black. This is the end of the opening sequence. As in the opening sequence of An Inconvenient Truth, the opening sequence of WALL-E introduces the core elements of the film. It establishes our main character WALL-E as a lonely, nostalgic, curious, and persistent robot who is wandering in the wilderness of environmentally postapocalyptic earth relentlessly working against overwhelming odds to achieve his environmental mission—cleaning up the mess humans have left behind. It establishes the film’s tone as a mix of gravity and levity by intercutting shots of earth’s bleak environment with the humorous antics of this little robot trying to make sense of his world. And it offers us a glimpse of how the plot will unfold thanks to WALL-E’s reaction to the music from Hello, Dolly! This little robot whose glitch was to develop a personality is destined to leave behind his daily routine and set off across the universe in search of love, which he will find with another robot EVE (short for Extra-terrestrial Vegetation Evaluator). Or, as one of the taglines of the film puts it, “After 700 years of doing what he was built for, he’ll discover what he’s meant for” (http:// www.imdb.com/title/tt0910970/taglines). In a lot of ways, WALL-E seems to be an automated Al Gore, Jr.—another guy on a mission who seems to have developed a personality after an apocalypse (this time political), who has since devoted himself to his against-the-odds environmental mission, and who after decades of performing the public service he was built for (following in the footsteps of his politician father) discovers what he’s meant for. Also like WALL-E, Gore is out to promote “love,” but unlike WALL-E this love is less a love for himself than it is a love by all human beings for earth’s natural environment. Gore casts this love relationship in the same nostalgic terms as does WALL-E. Gore isn’t inspired by the lost love relationships depicted in an old 1969 film, but he is inspired by the river that runs through his childhood and that river’s representation of the natural environment as it is now but is in jeopardy of not being in the future if the human-nature relationship is not urgently reevaluated. And so just as WALL-E begins and ends with songs from Hello, Dolly!, An Inconvenient Truth begins and ends with shots of this Tennessee river and Gore’s monologue about how we humans have taken the existence of a nurturing nature

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for granted and how we need to stop doing that before it disappears forever and life on earth becomes unsustainable. By the time we enter the world of WALL-E, though, this balanced relationship between humans and their environment seems to have disappeared forever. This is part of how the film makes sense of the world—by suggesting that the inconvenient truth of human-made climate change created an environmental catastrophe so severe that the earth could no longer support life. It is because of this that rich humans who could afford a Buy N Large StarCruise were evacuated from the earth to live on spaceships while machines like WALL-E remained on earth to try to clean up the mess. This, the film tells us, has been the normal state of affairs for the past 700 years. Another element in how the film makes sense of the world is in its claim that what has been lost with the earth’s ability to sustain human life has also been the ability for humans to sustain meaningful relationships, either with the earth itself or with one another. That humans have no meaningful relationship with the earth any more is evidenced in the film not just by the absence of humans living on earth but by how the space-dwelling humans think about earth. Or, to put a finer point on it, how they don’t think about earth (see Box 9.4). For example, to the Captain of the spaceship Axiom (the place where WALL-E travels in pursuit of EVE and encounters the humans who left earth), earth is little more than a round ball that he can fly his toy spaceship around. Earth only begins to become meaningful for him when he has the ship’s computer analyze some debris that rubbed off of WALL-E. The computer identifies this debris as “earth,” which leads the Captain to ask a series of questions about earth and what goes on there. This leader of the hovering human race has so little knowledge of the earth that when the computer tells him facts about earthly food and farming, he concludes that pizza comes from pizza plants. It’s not surprising that space-dwelling humans have little awareness of earth, for they have little awareness of anything beyond their daily diet of Buy N Largefed messages and meals. Space-bound for some 700 years, human bodies have lost so much bone density and have become so big with excess fat that humans no longer walk from place to place. Instead, they move about on floating electronic hover-chairs, sipping liquidized Buy N Large lunches from supersized cups, chatting with “friends” who appear on holographic screens mounted inches from their faces, and responding to ubiquitous Buy N Large advertisements suggesting what they should eat, wear, and do next. Daily chores are performed for them by a range of roving robots, each of which follows their specific BnL-programmed directive—PR-T gives humans makeovers and flattery, MO cleans up any “foreign contaminants,” and AUTO pilots the spaceship. It is these command relationships with robots that constitute the bulk of daily human engagements.

Box 9.4  How does the film WALL-E make sense of the world? • By suggesting that the inconvenient truth of human-made climate change created an environmental catastrophe so severe that the earth could no longer support life. • By claiming that what has been lost with the earth’s ability to sustain human life is the ability for humans to sustain meaningful relationships, either with the earth or with one another.

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Box 9.5  What is typical in the world of WALL-E? What is typical is for humans to have abandoned inconvenient earth to machines like WALL-E and opted to live instead in hyperconvenient corporatized space where human consumption can carry on uninterrupted.

Space-bound humans have become so individualized, technologized, and corporatized that they are oblivious to their immediate surroundings. The descendants of the hyperconsumers who abandoned earth once they’d shopped it till it dropped, they embody the logical outcome of humankind’s estrangement from the earth, of humankind’s loss of love for nature. For as the name of their Buy N Large spacecraft home “Axiom” suggests, for these hovering humans consuming is the self-evident truth that structures their lives. And this axiom leaves no room for an awareness of anything else, much less a nostalgia for an overshopped earth. Like the robots who care for them, humans, too, seem to be programmed with one specific directive—consume. What is typical in the world of WALL-E, then, is for humans to have abandoned inconvenient earth to machines like WALL-E and opted to live instead in hyperconvenient corporatized space where human consumption can carry on uninterrupted (see Box 9.5). This was an easy transition for 28th-century humans to make, because outer space was merely an extension of their “natural” environment—the administrative space of the Buy N Large corporation. As such, it matters not one iota to these 28th-century hovering humans whether they are on earth or the earth’s moon or in a BnL StarCruiser, so long as they can carry out their BnL directive to consume. This day-to-day routine is interrupted by WALL-E. The action begins on earth, where WALL-E presents EVE (whose directive is to seek out vegetation on earth) with a plant he found in an old refrigerator. When EVE cocoons the plant inside her, all of her functions, apart from her retrieval beacon that tells the Axiom she has successfully accomplished her directive, shut down. When a spaceship returns to collect EVE, WALL-E follows EVE to the Axiom. After a series of adventures, EVE eventually delivers the plant to the ship’s Captain, who reads up on what he is supposed to do in such an event. What he learns is that the plant is evidence that life is again sustainable on earth and that he is to initiate Operation Recolonize, which will return humans to earth. But when the Captain attempts to implement this initiative, he is stopped by AUTO (the ship’s autopilot). AUTO reveals to the Captain that a top secret directive given by the BnL CEO directly to AUTO has overridden the Captain’s orders. BnL CEO: Bad news. Operation Cleanup failed. Rising toxicity levels made life on earth unsustainable. Rather than try to fix this problem, it’s just easier to stay in space. He then directs AUTO to assume full autopilot, meaning that the Captain has no authority to return the spaceship to earth. But by now the Captain has become enchanted with earth. The computer images he saw on the ship’s computer excited him.

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Box 9.6  What is deviant in the world of WALL-E? What is deviant is for humans to overthrow the directive of the Buy N Large corporation and return to inconvenient earth to try to live there again.

The plant EVE presented to him activated his sense of responsibility for the care of life on earth. And his review of video images taken by WALL-E of the earth as it is now convinced him that all the earth needs is for humans to look after it for it to flourish. And so the Captain eventually succeeds in standing up to AUTO (figuratively and literally), defying the BnL top secret directive, and returning the StarCruiser to earth. The Captain’s actions illustrate what is deviant in the world of WALL-E—for humans to return to inconvenient earth to try to live there again (see Box 9.6). This is deviant because it requires humans to give up convenient corporate life by defying the top secret BnL directive for them to stay in space where they can follow their individual directives to consume. In so doing, what becomes possible is for humans to restore their relationships with one another. In other words, it allows humans to restore their humanity. And it is these fully human humans who begin to take responsibility for themselves and, crucially, for the earth. The film ends with the Captain placing the plant EVE gave him into the New York City soil of earth while explaining to the children what he is doing. Captain: This is called farming. You kids are gonna grow all kinds of plants— vegetable plants, pizza plants. Awe, it’s good to be home! In the closing credits sequence, a series of hieroglyphic-like images created by the formerly space-bound humans tell us that this human-robot interaction has resulted in two tales of happily-ever-after. One, of course, is about the love shared by WALL-E and EVE. The other is about the love humans have finally shown for their natural environment, which results in an environmental rebirth of the planet. This is symbolized by that original, fragile little plant having grown strong roots and sprouted into a flourishing tree. To erase any doubt as to the success of the human rehabitation of the earth, the lyrics to Peter Gabriel’s song “Down to Earth” are sung over the closing credits. Peter Gabriel: Do you feel you’ve been tricked by the future you picked? Well, come on down…. We’re coming down to the ground. There’s no better place to go. We’ve got snow on the mountains. We’ve got rivers down below. Of course, this is a terribly unrealistic ending for a film about an earthly environmental apocalypse. The toxicity, the garbage, the sudden violent storms on earth, and the lack of human understanding about the earth and about humans’ place on earth all suggest that these humans would likely die quick deaths if they stayed on earth. What is more likely is that humans would return to space again and resume their “normal” lives. And if by some miracle humans did somehow manage to live on earth again, they would most likely just reproduce their corporatized

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Box 9.7  What must go without saying in order for Gore’s myth to appear to be true? That human-made climate change is not necessarily inconvenient for (particularly US-based) global corporations because Gore’s solutions to the problem of global warming do not require corporations to sacrifice economic growth to some presumed “environmental sustainability.”

relationship to the earth thanks to their ignorance of “nature” (including their own biology) and their dependence on corporate service (like the production of industrialized food symbolized in the cultivation of “pizza plants”). But this is an animated film with a “general audience” rating, so this sort of ending is not unexpected. Yet regardless of how unrealistic the ending is, this film is instructive for us as we consider what must go without saying in order for Gore’s myth “human-made climate change is an inconvenient truth” to appear to be true (see Box 9.7). For however much the film seems to realize Gore’s goal of having humans reconsider their relationship to their natural environment and make “the preservation of the earth … our central organizing principle” (albeit through very different practices of preservation rooted in different nostalgias; 1992: 285), the film does a lot of things that Gore takes great pains not to do. In particular, the film introduces a central character who is almost absent in Gore’s work on the environment. This is the Buy N Large corporation, which stands in for US-based multinational corporations. And what the film tells us is that for better or worse, human life took the form it did because of how the Buy N Large corporation directed that life. For as a global corporation, Buy N Large ended up becoming a global governance structure, with its CEO acting as a sort of planetary President governing through a series of sometimes explicit and other times subliminal directives. Robots were directed to care for humans. Humans were directed to consume. And although this is never explicitly stated, it is pretty clear that the Buy N Large corporation itself was directed to do what corporations the world over are directed to do—make a profit. All human activity, then, is derivative of the corporate profit motive. And so to change human activity, it is vital to either change how corporations function or to overthrow them by ignoring their directives. It is only when the Captain finds the power to overthrow the BnL corporation that humans are positioned to refigure their relationships with nature. Without this, the convenient life of human consumption would carry on endlessly. Crucially, when we look at Gore’s myth “human-made climate change is an inconvenient truth” and the national and individual solutions to this planetary crisis that Gore proposes, there is never any suggestion that such a rebellion against how corporations subtly and not so subtly direct us is required. Quite to the contrary, because of Gore’s deep-seated beliefs in liberal economic principles such as the harmony of international economic relations and his deeply held conviction that “all good things go together” including economic growth and environmental sustainability, corporations are never asked to rethink their directives to make a

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profit and consumers are never asked to rethink their directive to shop. Yes, both are asked to make more environmentally friendly choices (1992: 342–343). For consumers, this means buying environmentally friendly products. And for corporations, this means developing new technologies that will result in more environmentally friendly products, taking a public concern for the environment into account as they make production choices, and abiding by national and international laws designed to protect the environment. Is this enough? Can the margin of environmental protection Gore seeks to achieve through such a convenient conversion to environmentalism be realized without a much more thorough restructuring of international economic relations that includes a drastic reconsideration of the corporate directive to make a profit at a cost to the environment? The answers to these questions depend on whether or not one adheres to neoliberal economic principles (see Chapters 6 and 10) and where one stands in relation to debates about how much faith one can reasonably place in technology (Lacy, 2005). But regardless of how you might position yourself, one thing is clear—there is nothing very inconvenient about Gore’s solution to the planetary emergency of human-made climate change, either for US-based global corporations that continue to make a profit, for the US state that claims its global power based upon this economic power, or for US citizens who now have a whole new range of “environmental” consumer options to select from as they carry on with their corporate, national, and now environmental directive to consume.

It’s not easy being Gore’s shade of green Gore’s environmentalism—like the Axiom spaceship in WALL-E—relies upon a couple of self-evident truths—that the planet must be saved from environmental disaster and that to do this the universally accepted principle of corporate profit built upon individual consumption need not be seriously interrogated. As we have seen, Gore’s axioms come from Gore’s unique mixture of environmental/green theory and idealist/liberal economic theory. In light of this strange mix of theory and political problem-solving, it is worth asking one last question: “Just how green is Gore?” If we return to our earlier discussion of environmental/green theory and politics, we will recall that Matthew Paterson identified a core belief in the need to question the human/culture relationship as what all environmentalists/greens agree on. And Paterson went on to claim that the best way to do this was to change how we think about ontology (from “anthropocentric” to “ecocentric”), accept that there are very real consequences to exceeding global environmental limits, and reorganize the global order so that it is more environmentally friendly (e.g., “Think Globally, Act Locally”; Paterson, 2005). As I suggested earlier, it seems that Gore accepts all of these environmental/ green principles and modes of action. Yet as our rereading of Gore’s myth through the film WALL-E points out, there may be limits to Gore’s environmentalism, particularly when it comes to what Gore expects of (particularly US-based) global corporations.

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Yes, Gore believes that it is necessary to question the human-culture relationship, and he does this in every one of his environmental works by explicitly arguing that humans are part of nature rather than somehow separate and above nature. And so Gore urges particularly states and their citizens to act with this new knowledge in mind. This does not mean that Gore lets global corporations off the hook here. But Gore does not expect global corporations to rethink their relationship to nature to the point that it might interfere with economic growth born out of the corporate directive to make profit. This understanding of the corporation-nature relationship might well influence our understanding of Gore as “ecocentric.” For because of his protection of business interests and economic growth, the “eco” in Gore’s “ecocentrism” may stand as much if not more for “economics” as it does for “ecology” (see Luke, 1997, 1998, 2008). Moving on to Paterson’s next point, it might mean that economic growth is where Gore draws his environmental limit, for he steadfastly objects to any claims that economic growth and sustainability of a healthy planet are ever at odds. This reading is consistent with Gore’s proposals to solve the planetary emergency on global warming by making “the preservation of the earth … our new organizing principle” (1992: 295). For, as we’ve seen, the preservation of the earth must always be accompanied not just by a preservation of economic activity but by increased economic growth. None of this is to say that Gore is wrong to suggest that we ought to address human-made climate change by, in part, lowering our CO2 emissions as a way to reduce global warming and trying to restore earth to its balance, nor is it to detract from Gore’s achievement of persuading millions more people to take global climate change seriously. Rather, all of this is to say that if the burden for achieving environmentally friendly changes falls to states and individuals, with both persuaded by Gore that the greatest contribution corporations need to make to these efforts is providing new technologies, then we may come nowhere near solving this presumed problem. For example, not only are most of the new technologies Gore wants corporations to provide not yet viable; they could well have unintended, environmentally devastating side-effects (an example is the way in which the turn to biofuels is creating its own climate crisis, not to mention global food crisis). Such technological solutions could well turn out to be too little too late if not the wrong “solutions” altogether, when an urgent rethinking of the relationship between economic growth and environmental sustainability could have a far greater, more immediate impact. In all these respects, Gore may not be as green as he at first appeared to be. Instead, Gore’s myth about human-made climate change and his solutions to it might, as Timothy W. Luke puts it, at best “green-wrap corporate technocracy with renewed institutional legitimacy that ‘greenwashes’ an unsustainable economic status quo in the refreshing, but not cleansing, waters of sustainable development” (Luke, 2008: 1811). In so doing, environmentalism gives way to more highly held economic principles. All of this seems to suggest that for Gore, environmentalism is neoliberal economics by other means. As such, this is the “inconvenient truth” behind Gore’s myth and Gore’s solutions that must go without saying in order for Gore’s myth to appear to be true.

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Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1: Environmentalism and IR How should International Relations approach environmental issues? Is the environment a security issue (Dalby, 2007; Deudney, 1990; Lacy, 2005), an economic issue (Dalby and Paterson, 2009; Luke, 2008; Newell and Paterson, 2010), and/ or a moral/ethical issue (Bennett and Chaloupka, 1993; Jamieson, 2008)? How do our cultural representations of the environment encourage us to think of global environmental issues one way or another (Evans, 2006)? Would we gain new insights into these issues if we were to tell a story about nature in the absence of humans (Weisman, 2007)? The readings below explore these questions from a variety of perspectives.

Suggested reading Bennett, Jane and William Chaloupka (1993) In the Nature of Things: Language, Politics and the Environment. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Dalby, Simon (2007) “Ecology, Security, and Change in the Anthropocene,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 8(2): 155–164. Dalby, Simon and Matthew Paterson (2009) “Over a Barrel: Cultural Political Economy and Oil Imperialism,” in F. Debrix and M. Lacy (eds) The Geopolitics of American Insecurity: Terror, Power, and Foreign Policy. London: Routledge, pp. 181–196. Deudney, Daniel (1990) “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” Millennium 19(3): 461–467. Evans, Kate (2006) Funny Weather. Brighton: Myriad Editions. Jamieson, Dale (2008) Ethics and the Environment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lacy, Mark (2005) Security and Climate Change: International Relations and the Limits of Realism. London: Routledge. Luke, Timothy W. (2008) “The Politics of True Convenience or Inconvenient Truth: Struggles Over How to Sustain Capitalism, Democracy, and Ecology in the 21st Century,” Environment and Planning A 40: 1811–1824. Weisman, Alan (2007) The World Without Us. New York: Thomas Dunne Books. Newell, Peter and Matthew Paterson (2010) Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Topic 2: Green governmentality How environmental concerns affect issues of national and global governance is an issue of “green governance.” This can be understood from the perspective of Michel Foucault’s notion of “governmentality” (Foucault, 1979/1986; also see Luke, 1997), which is about how individuals might become so self-disciplined

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in environmental/green strategies that their new habits of green living not only become normal for them, but also these habits change how our everyday political/environmental relationships are organized so that we are “green enough” (as in Gore’s shade of green) but not so green that our environmental activities threaten to disrupt neoliberal capitalism (Levy and Newell, 2005; Weber, 2009). Alternatively, green governance might concern more formal changes to structures of governance, be these national systems of governance such as democracy or how sovereign states interact internationally (Dobson and Bell, 2006; Eckersley, 2004).

Suggested reading Cynthia, Weber (2009) Will Potter: “I am an American,” four-minute film posted on the web at http://iamanamericanproject.com/project%20page.html. Dobson, Andrew and Derek Bell (2006) Environmental Citizenship. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Eckersley, Robyn (2004) The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Foucault, Michel (1979/1986) “Governmentality,” Ideology and Consciousness 6: 5–21. Levy, David L. and Peter Newell (eds.) (2005) The Business of Global Environmental Governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Luke, Tim (1997) Ecocritique: Contesting the Politics of Nature, Economy, and Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Topic 3: The Anthropocene A recent line of thought to emerge in connection with environmentalism and politics is that of the Anthropocene. Originating in geology, the argument is that due to human activity on earth we are exiting the geological epoch of the Holocene (our current geological era that dates from the last glacial period, approximately 11,500 years ago) and entering the Anthropocene (Steffen et al., 2007). In the Anthropocene, the global impact of humans on the planet results in an unprecedented transformation of the earth’s landscapes and ecosystem, and this transformation is irreversible. So, for example, even if humans were to disappear from the earth tomorrow, our cities and their impacts on the environment would remain a part of the landscape indefinitely (as depicted in Wall-E). The Anthropocene perspective further argues, like classical environmentalism, that this transformation poses the greatest threat to the planet. However, unlike other streams of environmentalism with ecoapocalyptic visions of the future, the Anthropocene perspective argues that we can work as part of nature to find solutions to the threats we have created. It argues that “nature is us” and that we do have a home on the earth (Schwägerl, 2012). So even though the world as we know it has ended, as Tim Morton suggests (2013), we can and indeed must reinvent the way we think and the way we live. We must think with nature rather than considering ourselves as a distinct and special category. This approach, however, may risk essentializing humans and nature more than might be helpful. But it also opens up new avenues of human political engagement

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with the environment, as protest movements like Extinction Rebellion (2019) and Fridays for Future (Kühne, 2019) evidence.

Suggested reading Christian, Schwägerl (2012) “Riding the Anthropocene,” short video posted on the web at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6We2J422yow&feature=player_embedded. Extinction Rebellion (2019) This Is Not a Drill. An Extinction Rebellion Handbook. London: Penguin Random House. Kühne, Rainer W. (2019) “Climate Change: The Science Behind Greta Thunberg and Fridays for Future.” [online] OSF Reprints. Available at: https://osf.io/2n6kj [Accessed 16 December 2019]. Morton, Tim (2013) Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Steffen, Will, Paul J. Crutzen, and John R. McNeill Ambio (2007) “The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?” Sciences Module 36(8): 614–621. “Welcome to the Anthroposcene,” short video posted on the web at: http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=fvgG-pxlobk&feature=player_embedded.

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10

Anarchism Are we the 99 percent?

What does the myth say? 222 The Hunger Games229 Are we the 99 percent? 238 Suggestions for further thinking 240

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After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the environmental agenda underwent a period of decline. While it didn’t stop being cool to go green and it didn’t stop being convenient to go Al Gore’s shade of neoliberal environmentalist green, environmental policies were eschewed by many states’ leaders because, in the absence of mass environmental movements, their environmental debts to future generations seemed less pressing than their economic debts to present populations. And when you think about what was going on, it’s not hard to understand why. Deregulated US banks lost trillions of their depositors’ funds when their gambles on derivatives and subprime mortgages didn’t pay off. Banks went bust or restricted their lending, even though governments bailed them out. So loans dried up, businesses closed, economic growth declined, and unemployment soared. Unemployed workers couldn’t pay their bills. Graduating students couldn’t find work and pay off their student loans. And all the while taxes and inflation rose while incomes dropped. All of this exacerbated the gap between the rich and the poor, with the rich getting super-rich, the poor getting super-poor, and many in the so-called squeezed middle having to give up their middle-class lifestyles. To add insult to injury, the same governments who bailed out banks cut social welfare programs and gutted pensions for public employees, while sometimes cutting taxes for the rich. Because the US dollar is the international currency of global politics and because banking is a global rather than a national business, what started as a mainly US problem quickly became an international problem. So what happened in the US repeated itself in many countries around the world and especially in the postindustrialized states of Europe and North America, which is why many refer to the crisis as the North Atlantic Financial Crisis, not the Global Financial Crisis. But whatever you call it, it was a mess, and its repercussions were felt the world over. It’s no wonder, then, that economically struggling citizens got fed up with their governments and with the economic elites who benefited from government policies. By 2011, a lot of ordinary people around the world had had enough. Some interesting new forms of protests/movements/direct actions by the economically disaffected began to emerge around the globe. Certainly, the so-called “antiglobalization” movement1 had been staging protests and direct actions against neoliberal globalization policies since the 1999 Battle in Seattle (see Chapter 7). But two things were new about the 2011 movements. First, street-level economic protests and direct actions spilled over from something only hardcore activists did into something everyday citizens were doing, sometimes with spectacular results. Second, these protests and direct actions were spreading like wildfire from the Middle East to Europe to North America. This is how Occupy Wall Street (OWS) was born on September 17, 2011. Inspired by the Arab Spring, the Spanish indignados and the Greek economic protesters, and organized and branded by the Canadian activist group Ad Busters, a small group of protesters marched on Wall Street and occupied nearby Zuccotti Park. Renaming the park Liberty Square, activists not only demanded political and economic solutions for everyday people affected by the Global Financial Crisis, they also used the public space of the square as other Occupy movements

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around the world were using their squares—to experiment with horizontal rather than hierarchical forms of economic and political practices that they claimed could actually address the needs of ordinary people. These ranged from creating economies based on the principles of “baseline communism” (where one gives according to their abilities and takes according to their needs; see Graeber, 2011a) to systems of governance based on the political principles of direct democracy (a form of governance that functions on the principles of universal consent rather than through the appointing of political representatives). What made OWS different from the Occupy movements that preceded it were two things—location and branding. Since it was happening near Wall Street, it eventually grabbed international attention. And what helped it keep this international attention and spread its message was how Ad Busters branded its message through the slogan, “We are the 99 percent.” Why this slogan? Where did it come from, and what does it mean? To understand what the 99 percent refers to, you have to understand what the missing 1 percent (of a total 100 percent) refers to. Gordon Gekko (Michael Douglas)—the insider trading antihero of the 1986 blockbuster Wall Street— explains this to his protégé Bud Fox (Charlie Sheen). Speaking about the US, Gekko explains, The richest one percent of this country owns half our country’s wealth, five trillion dollars. One third of that comes from hard work, two thirds comes from inheritance, interest on interest accumulating to widows and idiot sons and what I do, stock and real estate speculation. It’s bullshit. You got ninety percent of the American public out there with little or no net worth. I create nothing. I own. We make the rules, pal. The news, war, peace, famine, upheaval, the price per paperclip … Now you’re not naive enough to think we’re living in a democracy, are you Buddy? It’s the free market … Stick around pal, I’ve still got a lot to teach you. (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094291/ quotes, downloaded August 29, 2012) What Gekko teaches Buddy is “Greed is good.” Good economically for the 1 percent that is. But what the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (re)taught everyone else is that the economic greed of the 1 percent hasn’t been good for everyone else because—contrary to what Republican US President Ronald Reagan promised US citizens in the 1980s—wealth doesn’t “trickle down” from the rich to the poor. The rich just get richer, and more powerful. This is the sentiment captured in the expression, “We are the 99 percent.” As David Graeber, the anthropologist and “antiglobalization” activist who claims to have coined this expression, explains about his thinking behind suggesting it as the mantra for OWS, “If 1 percent of the population have ended up with all the benefits of the last 10 years of economic growth, [including] control of wealth [and owning] the politicians … why not just say we’re everybody else?” (Graeber, 2011b). By saying they were everybody else—the 99 percent—Ad Busters gave OWS a mantra, the language through which everyday people expressed their distance from and dissatisfaction with political and economic elites. And this mantra—“We

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are the 99 percent”—became a myth that united disparate types of economically disaffected people into one presumably unified identity, very much like how Hardt and Negri describe “the multitude” (see Chapter 7). But were “the 99 percent” united? Was there enough coherence or collective agreement among them to say “the 99 percent” existed? If not, then what makes the myth “We are the 99 percent” appear to be true? I want to explore these questions and their significance by turning to some likely and unlikely sources. The likely source is the philosophical tradition from which the myth “We are the 99 percent” seems to spring, which is an anarchism that “emerges directly from the libertarian tradition” (Graeber, 2002). I will explain how anarchism and libertarianism gave us the myth “We are the 99 percent” in the context of OWS and in the context of Graeber’s recent work on debt. The unlikely sources are the 2012 Hollywood blockbuster The Hunger Games (2008) and the two further novels in Suzanne Collins’s Hunger Games trilogy, Catching Fire (2009) and Mockingjay (2010). I will use The Hunger Games trilogy to illustrate Graeber’s myth “We are the 99 percent” and what must go without saying in order for the myth to appear to be true. What I will suggest is that Graeber’s academic work and political activism as well as The Hunger Games trilogy figure “the 99 percent” as a constituency of people who have come to understand that their obligation to pay their debts is rooted in state violence and that this state of affairs is unacceptable. This leads both Graeber and the heroine of The Hunger Games, Katniss Everdeen, to take on the myth “We should all pay our debts.” But does rejecting the myth “We should all pay our debts” mean “We are the 99 percent”? And even if it does, does it mean that “the 99 percent” question their obligations to pay their debts for the same ideological, political, and moral reasons? If not, then not only is the myth “We are the 99 percent” not necessarily unifying, but its celebration may well tell us some unexpected things about the OWS movement and its relationship to the Global Financial Crisis.

What does the myth say? To explain what the myth “We are the 99 percent” says, it’s important to look at where it came from. Yes, it came from Ad Busters in their campaign to advertise the OWS action, and the expression itself is credited to David Graeber. But the ideas that were celebrated at OWS—that different kinds of politically and economically disaffected peoples could unite and create horizontal political and economic systems that would benefit and constitute “the 99 percent”—have their roots in the philosophical tradition of anarchism. For anarchism is the philosophical tradition that informs Graeber’s academic and activist practices. You may be thinking “I know what anarchism is because I read about it in Chapters 2–4 of this book.” That would be to get the wrong end of the stick. Because what IR scholars mean by anarchy and how they approach international anarchy is very different from what political philosophers mean by anarchism and how anarchists approach anarchy. Let’s begin by recalling how IR scholars think about anarchy. In Chapter 2, I explained the three fundamental assumptions of what I called the international anarchy myth. These three assumptions are:

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1 2 3

International politics is composed of sovereign nation-states. There is no world government which means there is no international orderer. The absence of a world government or orderer by definition means that international politics is anarchical.

Two further assumptions lurking in the international anarchy myth are that (1) international anarchy is a problem because (2) arrangements of anarchy like those we have in either civil wars (philosopher Thomas Hobbes’s example) or international politics (IR theorists’ example) are less secure than arrangements of hierarchy like those we have within (e.g., governments) and among (e.g., world governments) stable sovereign nation-states. So, states and world states that are hierarchical are good; national and international anarchy that is horizontal is bad. It doesn’t matter if you are a realist like Kenneth Waltz or an idealist like Charles Kegley or a social constructivist like Alexander Wendt, it is always the same: hierarchy good; anarchy bad. The only differences among these IR theorists is how they approach the problem of anarchy. Realists like Waltz suggest we manage it through the balance of power politics (Chapter 2). Idealists like Kegley suggest we overcome it by celebrating an international community among states (Chapter 3). Social constructivists like Wendt oscillate between these two options because as Wendt argues, “Anarchy is what states make of it” (Chapter 4).2 Anarchists themselves could not disagree more with IR scholars about the nature and effects of anarchy. Because for anarchists, states are bad and anarchy is good (see Table 10.1). That’s not because anarchists like chaos and uncertainty and violence or because they believe living in a Hobbesian state of nature where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1651/2008: 37) is better than living in a secure environment in which the good life can be pursued. It’s because anarchists reject Hobbes’s reading of anarchy first and foremost (Graeber, 2004). Only then do they go on to dismiss how IR theorists (mis)read Hobbes and how IR theorists project their (mis)reading of a state of nature onto international politics. So if anarchy isn’t a Hobbesian state of nature, then what is anarchy? And how does it come out of the philosophical tradition of anarchism? Let’s start with anarchism and work our way back to anarchy. Graeber offers several definitions of anarchism. Here is a sample. “Anarchism is the commitment to the idea that it would be possible to have a society based on principles of self-organization, voluntary association and mutual aid” (Graeber, 2006). Table 10.1  Differences in how IR theorists and anarchists value states and anarchy State

Anarchy

IR theorists

Good

Bad

Anarchists

Bad

Good

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Anarchism is “democracy without the government” or “direct democracy” (Graeber, 2006). “Anarchism is much more than simply grassroots democracy: It ultimately aims to eliminate all social relations, from wage labour to patriarchy, that can only be maintained by the systematic threat of force” (Graeber, 2011c). Anarchism is “acting as if you are already free” (Graeber, 2006). Let’s break all of this down, starting with what Graeber’s definitions of anarchism tell us about what anarchy is. Anarchy is the absence of an orderer (the absence of formal government or leadership), not the absence of order. IR theorists and anarchists like Graeber agree on this. But this is where the agreement ends. For IR theorists see anarchy as a liability, while anarchists see it as a benefit. This is because anarchists argue that it is the very absence of governments and leaders that provides the absolute freedom in which individuals can govern themselves consensually and ethically. What this means is that, for anarchists, anarchy is not what prevents the pursuit of the good life; anarchy is what enables the pursuit of the good life. Believing that consensual and ethical governance without government and leaders is possible requires anarchists to hold three basic assumptions—about liberty, human capacities for self-organization, and power (see Table 10.2). The anarchist assumption about liberty holds that expanding the realm of individual liberty is both desirable and possible. This anarchist assumption is actually the core assumption of libertarianism, which expresses a general “desire to expand the realm of individual liberty” (Bull and Dagger, 1999: 283). So anarchism is a type of libertarianism, and it is a type of libertarianism that wants to do away with the state altogether. Part of the reason anarchists want to do away with the state altogether is because of their assumptions about human capacities for self-organization and about power. Anarchists argue that “human beings are, under ordinary circumstances, about as reasonable and decent as they are allowed to be, and can organize themselves and their communities without needing to be told how” (Graeber, 2012: 2). They also believe that “power corrupts” (Graeber, 2012: 2). Because power corrupts, because the state is the political embodiment of corrupt power, and because allowing people to exercise their absolute liberty is the best way to achieve the good life, anarchists not only see the state as unnecessary; Table 10.2  Three basic assumptions of anarchism

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Assumption about

Explanation

Liberty

Expanding the realm of individual liberty is both desirable and possible

Human capacity for self-organization

Human beings are, under ordinary circumstances, about as reasonable and decent as they are allowed to be, and can organize themselves and their communities without needing to be told how (Graeber, 2012: 2)

Power

Power corrupts (Graeber, 2012: 2)

Anarchism

they see it as illegitimate and immoral (Bull and Dagger, 1999: 283). For the state can provide no good answer to the fundamental question anarchists ask about the relationship between authority and morality, which is, “Why should a person be expected to obey the authority of the state, for that reason alone, if he is himself prepared to follow the dictates of a morality that recognises the integrity of other persons?” (Barry, 2000: 78; italics in original). So while traditional libertarians protest to the state and its democratic representatives for things like increased security and freer markets which they believe will expand their realm of liberty, anarchists take direct action against the state by reinventing democracy itself. Anarchists do this because they firmly believe that “the system is not going to save us; we have to save ourselves” (Graeber, 2011d). Graeber uses anarchist assumptions to further apply anarchist principles in everyday life—individually, nationally, and globally. I say “further apply anarchist principles to everyday life” because Graeber’s view is that most of us “are probably already anarchists” because we don’t need to be threatened by some authority (e.g., the state, the police) in order to reasonably treat one another with dignity and respect (Graeber, 2012: 2). Further applying anarchist principles in everyday life is what Graeber’s involvement in the “antiglobalization” and OWS movements has been about. These movements not only illustrate anarchist principles at work; they illustrate how traditional thinking about anarchism in political philosophy—which usually only considers anarchist practices within states— needs to be broadened into what Graeber calls “new anarchism” (Graeber, 2002). This is because anarchist ideas and actions are not just individual and national, but they are also global. However, broad the scope of Graeber’s brand of anarchism, it is usually practiced through small-scale, intimate, and immediate actions. This can be seen in the anarchist principles Graeber discusses in his written work, like horizontal direct democracies, utopian prefigurations, and ethical common decency (see Table 10.3). What these terms describe are how new types of organizations can be built upon small acts of kindness. Table 10.3  Key concepts of (new) anarchism Concept

Definition

Horizontal direct democracies

Leaderless, self-organizing structures like the “General Assemblies” that were popularized by OWS, in which decisions are made collectively and consensually

Utopian prefigurations

Enacting the anarchist belief that “another world is possible” by taking direct action to live that other world now through peaceful means, rather than taking on the state through any violent resistance (Graeber, 2002: 72)

Ethical common decency

“Having the courage to take the simple principles of common decency that we all live by, and to follow them to their logical conclusion” (Graeber, 2012: 2). Taken to its extreme, it means we need to fundamentally rethink how we ought to behave toward one another in terms of what we each of us really owes to one another (Graeber, 2011a)

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Take the idea of horizontal direct democracies. This refers to sometimes tiny and sometimes large groups of people self-organizing to create leaderless organizations in which decisions are made collectively and consensually. Horizontal direct democracies can be something as small as a group of neighbors deciding how to organize a block party to something as large as the leaderless OWS “General Assembly” attended by thousands of people in Washington Square Park in 2011 who were collectively trying to figure out how to “occupy together.” Or take the idea of utopian prefiguration. As its name says—and as we saw with idealism (Chapter 3)—this idea of prefiguration is utopian or idealistic. But more than just being utopian, prefiguration is about making better futures (utopian futures) by enacting them now. So prefiguration is to prefigure—to figure in advance—the better future you desire by trying to live it in the present, before it actually exists. This is how anarchists put into practice their beliefs that “another world is possible” and “another world is present” (Graeber, 2011a). For example, implementing direct democracy as part of OWS was about living the utopian ideal of direct democracy in Zuccotti Park/Liberty Square, even though the US state operates on principles of representative democracy. Or take the anarchist idea of living one’s life through the concept of ethical common decency. This is about “having the courage to take the simple principles of common decency that we all live by, and to follow them to their logical conclusion” (Graeber, 2012: 2). Ethical common decency can be practiced by doing something as seemingly trivial as not jumping ahead in the line when getting onto a bus (Graeber, 2012: 2). But taken to its logical conclusion, this little idea has huge implications. For it requires us to fundamentally rethink how we ought to behave toward one another in terms of what each of us really owes to one another (Graeber, 2011a). To figure out what we really owe one another, we need to do two things. The first is to reconsider what “owing” means by rethinking the concept of “debt” and the financial, political, and moral relationships it suggests we ought to live by. Once we’ve done that, we secondly need to ask ourselves some potentially life-changing questions: Do we accept conventional understandings of debt? Do we want to live our lives through the relationships these understandings of debt prescribe for us? And if not, how might we prefigure another possible world based upon alternative understandings of debt and relationships of debt? Rethinking debt and what it means for our everyday lives is the subject of Graeber’s 2011 book Debt: The first 5000 years. What makes this book important for our purposes is not only that it prefigures what debt and indebtedness mean, but it also prefigures “the 99 percent” as those who are both questioning what indebtedness means and how indebtedness ought to be lived. So what is debt, where does it come from, and how does it structure our lives? According to Graeber, “a debt is the obligation to pay a certain sum of money” (Graeber, 2011a: 13). So a debt is a type of obligation. But it isn’t just any type of obligation. It is a quantifiable obligation—one that we can calculate. And how we calculate a debt is in sums of money. Let’s say you borrow $1000 from a bank to buy a used car. Adding up the loan and the interest on the loan over the term of the loan, we can calculate exactly what your debt is to the bank. Very simple; very straightforward; and often very beneficial, for borrowers and lenders.

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So how would Graeber want us to think about your debt? Would he see it as beneficial to you? Not really. The first thing Graeber would point out is that your debt is a debt because it is quantifiable, which makes it “simple, cold, and impersonal” (Graeber, 2011a: 13). This is because debts are exchange relationships that allow us to use loaned money to purchase goods or services, on the promise that we’ll pay the money back. So, when you go to the bank to get your loan, the loan officer will ask you about your ability to pay off your loan, but they won’t expect you to tell them that you need the car to get to classes and your job and to travel to your low-income elderly parents on weekends to care for them because their state-sponsored in-home support only covers them during weekdays. Loan officers don’t need to know these things because they are not calculating “the human effects” (Graeber, 2011a: 13) of what it means for you to have a car; they are just calculating what you owe the bank, your ability to pay the bank back, and what the bank will get in collateral if you don’t pay off your debt. Graeber would then point to how we have been taught to think and feel about debt itself. Most people overwhelmingly believe that paying our debts is not just a financial obligation, but it is a moral one as well. Graeber, who is an anthropologist, devotes most of his 534-page book to tracing how ordinary people have come to hold these views so strongly that the idea that “We must all pay our debts” has become a working myth that organizes much of how we interact with one another (Graeber, 2011a: 2). And for Graeber, this is a very bad thing indeed. Why? One reason is because debts calculate obligations only in terms of money, and money has the capacity “to turn morality into a matter of impersonal arithmetic, and by doing so, to justify things that would otherwise seem outrageous and obscene” (Graeber, 2011a: 14). How might that work? Let’s return to that car you just bought. Let’s suppose you start missing your loan payments for reasons beyond your control (gas and tuition prices go up or you have to cut back your hours at work so you can care for your parents one extra day a week because the state has cut back its support). Now you can’t pay off your debt. And because you can’t pay, it’s very likely that you (and those around you) will understand your failing not just as financial but also as moral. That, Graeber argues, is what most of us think. What most of us generally don’t think is that it would be morally wrong for the bank to repossess your car now that you can’t pay for it. Never mind that repossessing your car would put your education, your employment, and your ability to care for your parents in jeopardy. It doesn’t even matter that your inability to repay your debt is not your fault because “money is money, and a deal is a deal” (Graeber, 2011a: 14). Except a deal is not always a deal, at least not for everyone. What history shows us is that “debts between equals are not the same as debts between people who are not equals” (Graeber quoted in Johnson, 2012). As Graeber explains, Debts between either poor people or rich people, that they have with each other, can be renegotiated or forgiven. People can be extraordinarily generous, understanding, forgiving when dealing with others like themselves. But debts between social classes, between the rich and the poor, suddenly become a matter of absolute morality … it’s a very, very old pattern. (Graeber quoted in Johnson, 2012)

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So, as a relatively poor person who doesn’t pay your debt to a relatively rich bank, you are seen as morally failing. But if you borrowed the money to buy your car from, say, an equally poor friend who has a bit of extra cash on hand, then it is much more likely that you and your friend would have figured out a financial arrangement that would work for both of you (you’d pay when and if you could or you’d work off the loan by sharing the car with your friend). There would be no moral strings attached. You’d come to an arrangement because debts between friends are never really worked out as pure calculations, for two reasons. One is that friends are those with whom we share the information loan officers don’t care about—the human side of why you need a car and the human costs to you and your loved one of losing that car. The other reason is that we share these bits of information that don’t fit into any calculations of debt with our friends because friendships themselves are incalculable. Indeed, if our friendships ever became purely calculable—if our friends reduced everything between us to money and didn’t value our human side because they only cared whether or not we’d pay them back—we probably wouldn’t think of them as friendships. For, after all, money is just money, debts are just debts, and both are transferable and exchangeable. But genuine friendships are premised on incalculable obligations—social bonds that make friends and friendships irreducible, irreplaceable, and enduring. We exercise these incalculable social bonds not just with friends and family but also with complete strangers, when we act toward them out of ethical common decency. Graeber’s banal example was waiting our turn to get on the bus. Extending ethical common decency to its logical conclusion means that in our everyday social relationships, we help people in need as best we can. Graeber calls this way of living practicing “baseline communism”—whereby each of us takes from others according to our needs and gives to others according to our abilities (Graeber, 2011a: 97–99). Practicing baseline communism prefigures a world in which debt as we value it and indebtedness as we practice it can be/is being rearranged. And Graeber thinks debt and indebtedness should be rearranged! This is not only because debt removes all human obligation from social interactions we think of as debts. It is also because as “the obligation to pay a certain sum of money” (Graeber, 2011a: 13), “debt is the perversion of a promise.” For debt is primarily “a promise corrupted by both math and violence” (Graeber, 2011a: 391). We’ve covered the math of debt. But where is the violence in debt? There are at least two ways that violence can be part of debt. One way affects people who cannot repay their debts. If you can’t repay your debt, then you can lose everything—your car, your job, your parents, and your moral standing in the community. And that does violence to you by restricting your liberty. A second way violence can be a part of debt affects people who cannot stop repaying their debts. For if you have to continuously service a debt that can never be repaid in full, you are forever in debt. And being in debt like this keeps you in debt bondage, which means you are never truly free. It is this second form of debt that Graeber discusses at length in his book (2011a). He argues that debt bondage has its roots in how imperial states transformed foreign territories into colonies. States generally sought colonies because they needed markets and military outposts. But acquiring and maintaining

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colonies was a costly business. So once a state conquered a new territory, it not only turned a colony into a cog in its empire, supplying the conquering state with economic wealth and military power, but it also made colonies pay taxes— never-ending debts—for the privilege of first being conquered and then being “secured” and “improved” by the conquering state. Taxes, then, have their origins in the violent transformation of territories into colonies. According to Graeber, this violent history lingers in contemporary creditor-debtor relationships. And it calls into question the justice and morality of honoring debts. Indeed, Graeber argues that we should forgive debts—have what he calls a “debt jubilee” (Graeber, 2011a: 390)—as a step toward escaping the debt bondage of forever servicing debts that can never be repaid because imperial states will never allow them to be repaid in full. But to achieve something like a debt jubilee, we will have to change how we think about debt and indebtedness. And that means we’ll have to debunk the common-sense idea that “We must all pay our debts” (Graeber, 2012a: 2), because this seemingly moral myth is not moral at all. It is rooted in state violence. No film makes this point better than The Hunger Games. And no character fights harder to debunk this myth than its heroine Katniss Everdeen.

The Hunger Games The Hunger Games opens with a soft, gentle note fading up. A melodious harp with a calming rhythm joins in. White text fades up onto a black screen, appearing to leap off the screen, before fading to black. “From the Treaty of Treason,” the words read. The text from the Treaty appears, sentence by sentence, in the same manner:

In penance for their uprising, each district shall offer up a male and female between the ages of 12 and 18 at a public “Reaping.” These Tributes shall be delivered to the custody of The Capitol. And then transferred to a public arena where they will Fight to the Death, until a lone victor remains. Henceforth and forevermore this pageant shall be known as The Hunger Games. As “Fight to the Death” appears on screen, the music turns ominous, foreboding. The harp recedes. The only words left on the screen are “The Hunger Games.” Cue the voiceover of Seneca Crane (Wes Bentley), the Gamemaker of the annual Hunger Games. “I think it’s our tradition. It comes out of a particularly painful part of our history.” As he speaks, the film cuts to a slick television sound stage, where Crane is being interviewed by the famous Capitol presenter Ceasar Flickerman (Stanley Tucci). The interview is broadcast throughout Panem, a futuristic version of the ancient Roman Republic, which is composed of the Capitol (Imperial Center) and 13 Districts (colonies) under the Capitol’s control. As the camera moves from shot to countershot of these two well-dressed, wellgroomed men, Crane continues:

But it’s been the way we’ve been able to heal. At first it was a reminder of the rebellion. It was a price The Districts had to pay. But I think it has grown from that. I think it’s something that knits us all together. 229

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The studio audience erupts into applause. Flickerman continues the interview. “This is your third year as Gamemaker. What defines your personal signature?” Crane draws in breath, readying himself to answer. Just as we expect him to speak, cue an off-screen scream. This, the film suggests, is Crane’s personal signature. Cut to a steady long shot of a mountainous rural landscape. It is a poor mining village, peppered with unpainted gray wood buildings and dilapidated steel-wheeled wagons. In the corner of the frame is the title “District 12.” This is the source of the continuing scream. Cut to wobbly handheld interior shots of two girls, 16-year-old Katniss Everdeen (Jennifer Lawrence) and her little sister Prim (Willow Shields). Prim has just awoken from a nightmare. It is the morning of the Reaping, and 12-yearold Prim is now eligible for selection as a District 12 representative in the Hunger Games. “It was me,” Prim tells Katniss, who holds her and strokes her hair. “Oh, I know. But it’s not,” Katniss says soothingly. “They’re not going to pick you.” After comforting her sister, Katniss slips through the electrified District 12 boundary fence, recovers her hidden bow and arrow, and hunts. There she meets Gale (Liam Hemsworth), her 18-year-old male friend, confidant and hunting partner. The film cuts between scenes of preparations for the Reaping in the town square and scenes of the two friends in the woods fantasizing about ways to foil the Hunger Games and escape the Capitol’s control. TV cameras are positioned outside the Hall of Justice to capture the drama of the Reaping, while Gale wonders, “What if no one watched the Games on TV?” The Capitol’s military force—the Peacekeepers—flood the town and patrol the area in hovercrafts while Gale suggests he and Katniss escape into the wilderness. Katniss laughs off Gale’s delusions. For even though Katniss defies the Capitol’s authority by illegally crossing the District’s boundary, hunting in the woods, and trading her kills on the black market, she understands that what is typical in the world of The Hunger Games is for the Capitol of Panem to rule absolutely over its residents and to rule most harshly over the poor, powerless residents in the Districts. The Capitol takes District resources, restricts the movements of District residents with Peacekeepers and fortified fences, and decides who among its subjects will live and die. Katniss realizes there is no escape from the Capitol’s control or from its Hunger Games. She knows that this year, like every year since the end of the Rebellion, the Capitol will select one boy and one girl from each District who will fight to the death in an isolated arena before a live television audience to entertain the residents of Panem and to remind every subject of Panem of the absolute power of the Capitol. But the Hunger Games do more than just demonstrate the absolute sovereign authority of the Capitol over the Districts. These games structure the relationship between the Capitol and the Districts as relations between a creditor (the Capitol) and its debtors (the Districts). What the Capitol has loaned residents of the Districts is their lives, having spared them from annihilation when the Capitol put down their Rebellion. In his Reaping Day address, Panem’s President Snow makes this relationship explicit. As the film cuts between the President’s speech and the heavily guarded, terrified children and parents of District 12, President Snow reminds his literally captive audience of their dark past during the Rebellion and their

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present-day “freedoms.” “But freedom has a cost,” the President insists. That cost is the Hunger Games. The Hunger Games is the mechanism through which the residents of the Districts annually service their eternal debt to the Capitol for letting them live. Why are the Hunger Games a debt and not just a general form of penance the Districts enact to express their remorse for the Rebellion? Because it is through the Hunger Games that the Districts’ obligation to show penance is converted into a precise, “simple, cold, and impersonal” formula for repayment (Graeber, 2011a: 13). According to this formula, what is exchanged is not money but life and death. President Snow contextualizes the obligation of the Districts to service their debt in political terms, speaking of the horrors of civil war that the Rebellion brought upon Panem. Yet there are moral overtones in what the President is saying. As he sums it up, the Hunger Games is not only “how we remember our history.” It is, the President reminds his subjects, “how we safeguard our future.” The Games safeguard the future of Panem by reminding its residents of the costs of the Rebellion—civil war, famine, hunger, and death. According to the Capitol’s logic, it would be immoral for the Districts to refuse to own up to these costs—to service their debts by refusing to participate in the Hunger Games—because this renewed act of rebellion could plunge Panem back into civil war. This is why “we must all pay our debts” (Graeber, 2011a: 2) and especially why the weak and the poor Districts must pay their debts to the rich and the strong Capitol (Graeber quoted in Johnson, 2012). By converting the Districts’ promise to do penance for the Rebellion into a debt to the Capitol that the Districts must service annually, the Hunger Games “turn morality into a matter of impersonal arithmetic, and by doing so, … justif[ies] things that would otherwise seem outrageous and obscene” (Graeber, 2011a: 14). The first outrageous and obscene thing the Hunger Games justifies is the conversion of District children into the only form of currency acceptable to the Capitol for debt servicing. The second outrageous and obscene thing the Hunger Games justifies is forcing District children to fight to the death on live television “to safeguard [Panem’s] future.” All of this is made possible by the Capitol’s military and economic power over the Districts and the Capitol’s translation of its power into a creditor-debtor relationship in which residents of the Districts literally owe the Capitol their lives. In this way, debt—“a promise corrupted by both math and violence” (Graeber, 2011a: 391)—perverts the Districts’ promise to do penance for the Rebellion. It’s no wonder that Katniss and Gale dream of escaping this nightmare, symbolized by Prim’s shrill scream. What is typical in the world of The Hunger Games, then, is for the annual pageant of the Hunger Games to structure Capitol-District relations as creditor-debtor relations, in which the Districts have a moral obligation to pay their debt for their failed Rebellion to the Capitol with the lives of their children (see Box 10.1). It isn’t hard to see from how I’ve described the world of The Hunger Games that this world functions as the polar opposite to how David Graeber describes anarchism. There is nothing collective or cooperative or everyday communist about Panem, and there is nothing horizontal or democratic or free about it either. It functions according to a form of hierarchy in the extreme, in which a dictatorial government uses its absolute power to legitimate its tyrannical rule over its subjects to insure its own political security from the Districts, while it extracts

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Box 10.1  What is typical in the world of The Hunger Games The annual pageant of the Hunger Games structures Capitol-District relations as creditor-debtor relations, in which the Districts have a moral obligation to pay their debt for their failed Rebellion to the Capitol with the lives of their children.

economic wealth from the Districts to further secure and satisfy its power. Its master move is to merge the violence of the Republic of Panem with the debt owed to it by the Districts into a spectacular television show of its absolute authority called the Hunger Games. All of this illustrates what Graeber claims is wrong with sovereign states— they are hierarchical, their power corrupts social and economic relations, and they morally legitimate violence. The Hunger Games, then, is an excellent illustration of the reasons why Graeber argues it is vital that we debunk the myth “We must all pay our debts,” for the film shows us explicitly how state power becomes state violence and how state violence creates and sustains immoral debts. Given this, how can we use The Hunger Games to explore the ideals of anarchism and consider the myth “We are the 99 percent” and what makes this myth appear to be true? If we change our perspective on the film—from looking at it through the lens of what is typical in the world of The Hunger Games to what is deviant in this world—then the film becomes a helpful guide for considering these questions. So, what is deviant in the world of The Hunger Games? What is deviant in the world of The Hunger Games is for the creditor-debtor relationship established in the Treaty of Treason and enacted yearly through the Hunger Games to be opposed or reinterpreted. The plot of The Hunger Games is about the movement from what is typical in this world to what is deviant in this world (see Box 10.2). The character who drives this movement is Katniss Everdeen. And what drives Katniss Everdeen is her desire for liberty. Katniss wants two forms of liberty—liberty from the tyranny of the Capitol and liberty from the perverse debts the Capitol places upon her, her family, and the Districts. So who is Katniss Everdeen, and what shapes her desire for liberty? Katniss is a teenager who, since the death of her father in a mine explosion (for which she blames the Capitol) and the subsequent withdrawal of her mother into depression, has been both mother and father to her little sister Prim. Using the hunting skills her father taught her, Katniss is also the family’s provider. Katniss’s obligation to keep her family alive—especially her little sister—drives her to break the laws of

Box 10.2  What is deviant in the world of The Hunger Games For the creditor-debtor relationship established in the Treaty of Treason and enacted yearly through the Hunger Games to be opposed or reinterpreted.

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the Capitol, albeit in small ways (by illegally passing through the border fence into the wilderness, owning a bow and arrows, hunting in the woods, and bartering her kills for supplies). Katniss, then, seems a lot like an anarchist. For she is “acting as if [she were] already free” (Graeber, 2006) by taking liberties with the Capitol’s laws and rebelling against the poverty these laws impose upon her and her family. Katniss also practices the anarchist “principles of self-organizing, voluntary association and mutual aid” (Graeber, 2006) through her relationship with Gale, as they hunt together as a minileaderless, consensual unit that works for the mutual benefit of themselves and their families. In these ways, Katniss seems to embody Graeber’s claim that most of us are already anarchists because we don’t need to be threatened by some authority in order to reasonably treat one another with dignity and respect (Graeber, 2012: 2). On the morning of the Reaping, Katniss’s apparent anarchism moves into a higher register. What propels her is the total loss of her liberty to the Capitol, when she becomes District 12’s first ever volunteer for the Hunger Games. Katniss doesn’t volunteer for the Games because she wants to act out some grand ideals about liberty vs. totalitarianism. Rather, Katniss puts herself forward as the female Tribute from District 12 because—against all the odds—her sister Prim has been selected as Tribute. By volunteering, Katniss saves Prim, at the cost of her own freedom and possibly her own life. Yet Katniss has no choice but to act as she does, for she is caught between her obligation to protect her sister on the one hand and the Capitol’s demand that District 12 pay its debt on the other. Katniss is joined as Tribute by Peeta Mellark (Josh Hutcherson), the baker’s son who has secretly been in love with Katniss since they were young children. After several televised interviews and some short training sessions, Katniss, Peeta, and 22 more Tributes are let loose in the Arena—a super-hi-tech, futuristic Roman Colosseum of sorts—where they must fight to the death until only one child is left standing. This lone victor will be rewarded with a life of relative luxury and liberty forever afterwards. Katniss’s sole goal in the Arena—like that of every other Tribute—is to survive. But surviving in the Arena isn’t that straightforward. Even though Katniss is fit, skilled with a bow and arrow, and comfortable in the wilderness, she struggles to survive for two reasons. One reason is that far from the Arena being an anarchical realm absent of governance or government like the island where the boys in Lord of the Flies were marooned (see Chapter 2), the Arena is a highly managed sound stage, directed by the Gamemaker who is answerable to the President, very much like The Truman Show (see Chapter 6). As such, it is extreme hierarchy not anarchy that reigns in the Arena, in which Tributes have to be mindful of what the Capitol expects of them in order to survive. The second thing that distinguishes the Arena from an anarchical environment and that initially plays to Katniss’s disadvantage is that a Tribute’s survival is also down to their ability to gain sponsors, who parachute lifesaving care packages to them in the Arena. Without these gifts—of medicine, food, water, and weapons—a Tribute’s chances of survival are close to nil. The problem for Katniss is that while she is skilled at hunting and tracking, she is unskilled at making meaningful social relationships. And it is meaningful

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social relationships that will enable her to win sponsors and make strategic alliances in the Arena. Why Katniss is socially awkward is because she abhors being in debt. This is not a surprising attribute for a child raised in a poor District of Panem, who faces the prospect of becoming payment for their District’s debt each year. It is quite rational, then, for Katniss to equate debt with the violent loss of liberty. What this means is that Katniss understands debt in the same way that Graeber describes debt—as an obligation “corrupted by both math and violence” (2011a: 391). Katniss has learned this lesson so well that she practices debt avoidance to the extreme. For Katniss sees debt relationships not just in financial or political relationships but in social relationships as well. This is because Katniss has a (nearly) fatal flaw—she confuses social obligations with calculable debts. And because Katniss hates being in debt—hates owing anyone anything because of how debt impinges upon her liberty and because of the violent dangers of owing— Katniss fails to bond with people outside her family (unless she can write them into a family role—Gale as a kind of brother; Rue who she meets in the Arena as a little sister). For Katniss treats incalculable friendships as if they were purely calculable debts, and because genuine friendships are not premised on calculable obligations, Katniss has no genuine friends. So Katniss is a character who craves liberty, and she expresses this craving by seeking freedom from debt because it is only by being debt-free that Katniss can be at liberty to protect her family. The Hunger Games is littered with examples of Katniss’s aversion to debt relationships. The most important illustrations involve Peeta. Peeta first expressed his affection for Katniss by giving her bread just after Katniss’s father was killed and her family was starving. This bread made the difference between life and death for the Everdeens and was something for which Katniss should have been grateful. But this is not how Katniss processed this act of kindness by Peeta. In the book, Katniss remembers this childhood incident like this: “I feel like I owe him something, and I hate owing people” (Collins, 2008a: 39). Part of why Peeta’s gift troubled Katniss so much was that she did not know how to repay it, both because it was the first gift anyone had ever given to her and because the gift was so significant. It was the gift of life. Again, quoting from the book, Katniss puts her feelings like this: “It’s the first gift that’s always the hardest to pay back” (Collins, 2008a: 356). But, of course, the first gift is only the hardest to pay back if you misunderstand social obligations so thoroughly that you believe a gift is something that you have to pay back. You only make this mistake if you view all exchange relationships—even the good-hearted social exchange of gifts—as debts that corrupt social obligations with math and violence, rather than as gestures that bind people together because they are the basis of ethical common decency. Peeta’s gift, then, was just an illustration of what Graeber calls “baseline communism”— giving according to our abilities and taking according to our needs (Graeber, 2011a: 97–99). Because Katniss confuses social obligations with calculable debts to be repaid in kind, she fails to realize that social relationships are—and should be— what (can) temper life’s hardships. She fails to grasp, in other words, that living with

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social obligations is not the same as living with debts anchored in state violence and brutal mathematics. This is why things never “add up” for Katniss when she considers Peeta’s kindnesses toward her and why Katniss is always trying to calculate what her debt to Peeta is and how she can repay it. But social debts are not calculable, and by trying to calculate and repay her social debts, Katniss risks becoming friendless and antisocial. What drives the plot of The Hunger Games trilogy, I want to suggest, is Katniss’s struggle to come to grips with the fact that social obligations and calculable debts are not the same thing. Social obligations, Katniss learns, can actually be the means by which the violence inherent in “simple, cold, and impersonal” (Graeber, 2011a: 13) debts can be mitigated if not done away with altogether. Through her struggle to grasp the difference between social obligations and calculable debts, Katniss grasps one of the central tenets of anarchism—“Another world is possible; Another world is present” (Graeber, 2011a). This is because social relationships—when understood in and of themselves and not as perversions of calculable debts based in state violence—prefigure a world in which all those things Graeber claims are possible under anarchism can be achieved. These are horizontal forms of democratic governance, ethical human decency, and baseline communism (Graeber, 2011a). What Katniss learns, then, is that social relationships are the key to true liberty. They are not debts that restrict liberty. At first, Katniss enacts her lack of knowledge about social relationships in the Arena. Even though Peeta publicly declares his love for Katniss and does everything he can to spare her life in the Games, Katniss does not trust him. This is in part because only one of them can survive the Games and in part because Katniss does not want to be in debt to Peeta. But for dramatic effect, Gamemaker Crane changes the rules of the Games midstream, announcing that if the last two living Tributes are a boy and a girl from the same District, both of their lives will be spared. At this point, Katniss and Peeta team up, play up their mutual love for one another (even though Katniss’s affection for Peeta comes and goes), and finish off the rest of the Tributes. This should mark the end of the Games, with them both being declared victors. But then Crane announces that the new rule has been revoked and there can only be one winner. Either Katniss or Peeta must die. Table 10.4  How to understand Katniss Everdeen What is Katniss Everdeen’s (nearly) fatal flaw?

Katniss confuses social obligations with calculable debts. This causes her to act as if she believes that living with social, nonfamilial obligations is the same thing as living with debts that are anchored in state violence and brutal mathematics

How does Katniss Everdeen overcome her flaw?

Katniss learns that social relationships are the key to true liberty, not debts that restrict liberty

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Peeta says to Katniss: “Go ahead. One of us should go home. One of us has to die. They have to have their victor.” Katniss:

No, they don’t. Why should they? Katniss gestures to some poison berries in her hand, which will kill whoever eats them. Peeta: No, don’t! Katniss: Trust me. Trust me. Katniss gives some of the berries to Peeta. Peeta: Together. Katniss: Together. Peeta: Okay. As Katniss and Peeta count to three, readying themselves to go through with their suicide pact, we hear an announcement. Announcer: STOP! Ladies and gentlemen. May I present the winners of the 74th annual Hunger Games. Katniss and Peeta embrace. They are airlifted out of the Arena as joint victors. So what are we to make of Katniss’s gesture—her plan to die with Peeta or to force Crane’s hand to allow her and Peeta to live? Maybe Katniss is finally repaying her debt to Peeta for saving her life by giving her bread all those years ago. But Katniss already saved Peeta’s life when she nursed him back to health from a sword wound during the Games, so at this point she has no debt to repay. Or maybe Katniss’s gesture was made out of love for Peeta. This is what she suggests in her post-Games interview saying, “I couldn’t imagine life without him [Peeta].” Whatever her motivation, Katniss frames the mutual suicide pact as a gesture designed to deny the Capitol and the Panem television audience what the Games always give them—a lone victor. What Katniss is doing, then, is singlehandedly changing the rules of the Hunger Games in defiance of the Capitol. This sounds an awful lot like what an anarchist would do and has enormous implications for how Panem is ruled, how Panem conceives of creditor-debtor relationships, and how a growing number of the subjects of Panem think about debt. So how does all that work? Well, by forcing Crane’s hand to allow two victors, Katniss is taking direct action against the Capitol and its Hunger Games because she understands that “the system is not going to save [her and Peeta]; [they] have to save [themselves]” (Graeber, 2011d). Katniss’s direct action questions the absolute power of the Capitol to decide who lives and who dies in Panem. This power has always been held by Panem’s President; but at that moment in the Games, it is held by a 16-yearold girl from District 12. Katniss is able to hold this power (albeit momentarily) because by questioning the political authority of the Capitol to set the rules of the Hunger Games, Katniss is simultaneously questioning the moral judgment of the Capitol. Specifically, Katniss questions the moral judgment of the Capitol to allow two seemingly star-crossed lovers (Katniss and Peeta) to die for their love. By doing this, she raises what anarchists see as a fundamental question about how authority and morality are related. That question is this: “Why should a person be expected to obey the authority of the state [in this case, the Republic], for that reason alone

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[i.e., just because the Republic has the authority to make a person obey], if he is himself prepared to follow the dictates of a morality that recognizes the integrity of other persons?” (Barry, 2000: 78; italics in original). This is an especially potent question under the circumstances, since Katniss’s individual morality seems to viewers of the film and—more importantly—to television viewers in Panem to trump the Capitol’s morality. And because the Capitol’s moral judgment is about whether or not Katniss and Peeta should live or die, it is actually a moral judgment about how debtors should pay creditors. Katniss’s gesture, then, raises all sorts of questions about creditor-debtor relationships—like what owing really means, who ought to be repaid and how, and whether or not it is actually the case that “We should all pay our debts.” By “[h]aving the courage to take the simple principles of common decency that we all live by, and to follow them to their logical conclusion” (Graeber, 2012: 2), Katniss foregrounds “the human effects of debt” (Graeber, 2011a: 13) on her, on Peeta, and on the Districts more broadly. It is these human effects of debt that must go without saying in order for the myth “We must all pay our debts” to appear to be a “simple, cold and impersonal truth” (Graeber, 2011a: 13). Through her gesture, Katniss sets in motion a course of events that put in jeopardy the creditor-debtor relationship that holds the Districts captive to the Capitol. It takes two more books and two more films before the Capitol is overthrown, before the equally brutal rebel President Coin from District 13 is assassinated by Katniss, and before the Hunger Games are suspended. But it is her gesture of defiance—acting as if she were free to determine whether or not she and Peeta should live or die rather than ceding that power to the Capitol—that propels Katniss to become the symbol of liberty for the Districts and a symbol of defiance against the morality of the creditor-debtor relationships that have structured Panem since the end of the Rebellion. All of this is made possible because Katniss’s gesture prefigures the residents of the Districts as a sort of unified 99 percent—a constituency of people who have come to understand that the Capitol’s demand of them that they annually pay penance for the Rebellion through the Hunger Games is not their moral obligation. Instead, it is an immoral debt imposed upon them by the violent Capitol. Thanks to Katniss’s gesture, these residents come to reject the myth the Capitol imposes upon them—“We must all pay our debts.” In this way, The Hunger Games establishes the myth “We are the 99 percent,” in symbolically similar terms to those Graeber and other OWS activists use to explain OWS. This is because the residents of the Districts—like the OWS occupiers—emerge as those who are both questioning what indebtedness means and how indebtedness ought to be lived. They do this (eventually) by embracing a final anarchist ideal—that anarchy enables the pursuit of the good life because it is free of the state’s authority to violently dictate what we owe to each other, thus making ethical social relations possible. Katniss’s anarchical gesture, then, is what leads the Districts as the 99 percent to prefigure and refigure their debt bondage to the Capitol and to seek the absolute freedom in which they can govern themselves consensually and ethically. That’s one way to read The Hunger Games. But there is another way to read this film and this trilogy. This alternative reading suggests what must go without saying in order for the myth “We are the 99 percent” to appear to be true.

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Are we the 99 percent? The reading of The Hunger Games I’ve just provided suggests that Katniss Everdeen is an anarchist heroine who moves from being a minor to a major anarchist by rebelling against corrupt power and the violent debt bondage it immorally imposes upon the subjects of Panem. Katniss’s undying commitment is always to liberty. Her personal journey toward liberty is rooted in her private struggle to meet her obligations to her family. This personal journey becomes a very public battle between her and the Capitol, President Snow, and finally rebel President Coin. The public contexts in which Katniss’s battle is staged are first the Reaping, then the Hunger Games, and then through Katniss’s elevation to Mockingjay (the symbolic face of the Rebellion in book three of the trilogy). All of this supports a libertarian reading of The Hunger Games, where libertarianism is at its core a “desire to expand the realm of individual liberty” (Bull and Dagger, 1999: 283). It also supports an anarchist reading of The Hunger Games. For, as Graeber argues, anarchism is the heart of libertarianism (Graeber, 2002: 62). But is David Graeber’s brand of anarchism at the heart of The Hunger Games’ libertarianism, or is there another kind of anarchism occupying this libertarian heart? Graeber’s brand of anarchism is a kind of communitarian anarchism— coming out of a communitarian libertarianism—which supports abolishing the state so that communal self-administration can ensure political, social, and economic equality for all. But there are other types of anarchism as well. For example, individualist anarchism—coming out of an individualistic libertarianism—also supports abolishing the state, but it does so because it wants to ensure that there are no external constraints over an individual’s political, economic, or social liberty. These two anarchisms espouse different political, economic, and moral beliefs to one another, with communitarian anarchists striving for what they define as the common good and individualist anarchists striving instead for what they define as their own personal, individual self-interest. If communitarian anarchism is the libertarian core of The Hunger Games, then the trilogy is a story about Katniss Everdeen striving for the collective good of the Districts (the 99 percent) against the Capitol (the 1 percent). But if individualist anarchism is the libertarian core of The Hunger Games, then the trilogy is a story about Katniss Everdeen striving for her individual freedom against the Capitol. Thinking about the Districts as the 99 percent and the Capitol as the 1 percent is just convenient or contingent in relation to Katniss’s quest, because achieving the collective good for the 99 percent is not her individual goal. So which is it? Is Katniss a communitarian anarchist or an individualist anarchist? That is a tricky question to answer because, in some ways, the answer is, “She’s both.” Katniss does seem to care about the Districts and their liberty. She cares so much about ending the Hunger Games that she assassinates rebel President Coin in book three when President Coin decides to maintain the creditor-debtor relationships of Panem, albeit in reverse, by making the children of the defeated Capitol fight to the death in the Hunger Games. This is partly because Katniss, like Graeber (2011a: 390), seems to prefer a debt jubilee to any ongoing form of creditor-debtor relationships in the Republic.

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And yet at every turn what motivates Katniss’s desire for liberty is her wish to achieve her personal goal—to fulfill her obligations to her family by keeping them alive. This is why she enters the Hunger Games. This is why she allows herself to become the Mockingjay for the Rebellion. And this is why Katniss assassinates President Coin—because Coin deliberately kills her own forces for political gain, including Katniss’s now grown-up little sister Prim. Even Katniss’s choice of Peeta rather than Gale as her life partner at the end of book three can be read not just as a matter of love but as a rejection of a collectivist, public-facing agenda. For all Peeta wants to do is exactly what Katniss wants to do—lead a good, quiet, private life back in District 12, while Gale wants to fight the Rebellion. What is clear throughout the trilogy, then, is that Katniss never wants to be a vehicle for collective political action. She doesn’t want to be in the Hunger Games or to be used by President Snow for his political purposes after the Games. She doesn’t want to be the Mockingjay or be used by President Coin for her political purposes. She doesn’t even want a life partner who is committed to the collectivist project of rebellion. Rather, every time Katniss enters the public political arena, it is only because she believes this is the best way she can advance her private, individual agenda of meeting her obligations to her family. Yes, Katniss does rethink what debt and owing mean, and all of this has the effect of setting in motion a course of events that had Republic-wide implications for Panem. But this does not necessarily mean that Katniss is a collectivist anarchist who is fighting for the public (the Districts) or fighting to constitute the Districts as a new kind of public (the 99 percent). It might merely be the case that Katniss was forced to struggle in public to fulfill her private individualist anarchist desire for personal liberty. If this is what Katniss is doing, then her personal story is not about constituting collectivist anarchist solutions to the debt bondage that binds together all subjects in the Districts. It is about constituting an individualist anarchist solution to her and her family’s debt bondage. All this points to what must go without saying in order for the myth “We are the 99 percent” to appear to be true for The Hunger Games—that just because a person battles for their private liberties in public does not mean they are battling for the public or are constituting a new public like the 99 percent (see Box 10.3). What makes the myth “We are the 99 percent” appear to be true for The Hunger Games are the same things that made it appear to be true for Occupy Wall Street, especially when OWS, like the District’s Revolution, “caught fire” and went populist. Certainly, many collectivist anarchists were involved in the planning and staging of the initial occupation of Zuccotti Park/Liberty Square. Yet as

Box 10.3  What must go without saying for the myth “We are the 99 percent” to appear to be true Just because a person battles for their private liberties in public does not mean they are battling for the public or are constituting a new public like the 99 percent.

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the movement grew, those who joined it often had only personal motivations for being there. They wanted their debt to be forgiven, they wanted their individual liberty to be restored, they wanted their country to dominate global political and financial affairs so that they could live the good life. And while many US citizens who embraced the myth “We are the 99 percent” did so in the name of a collective national or even international good life, many more seemed to embrace it as their means to achieve their own individual good life. This is why extreme individualist anarchists like Tea Party supporters, for example, were sometimes as enthusiastic about OWS as were Graeberian-type collectivist anarchists who sparked the OWS movement. Some of them were equally enthusiastic about Katniss Everdeen as a libertarian heroine they could identify with (Grant, 2012; Steigerwald, 2012). But their anarchism had nothing to do with Graeber’s, for it was not based upon using ethical common decency and baseline communism to strive for horizontal direct democracy. What this means, then, is that whether in the context of OWS or the context of The Hunger Games, it is important to understand that individualist anarchists are not collectivist anarchists, even if their individual actions may have some collective political and economic effects. Why is it so easy to confuse individualist anarchists with collectivist anarchists? Because “anarchism is not really an ideology, but rather the point of intersection of several ideologies” (Miller, 1984: 3). That means anarchism and the myth “We are the 99 percent” are quite empty ideologically and politically. That is what can make them appealing (as the OWS movement or Katniss Everdeen were to many) but also disappointing (if the ideology and politics that fill in anarchism are not ones you support). Yet whatever one’s ideological or political dispositions, anarchism is instructive— especially as we think about what owing means and how relations of debt should be structured in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. This is because anarchism demands that we take a stand on a fundamental question. That question is this: Are we all in this together (as collective anarchists would contend) or are we in this for ourselves (as individualist anarchists would have it)? How we answer this question goes some way toward defining our ideology, our politics, and our morality, whether we are individual characters caught up in national and international events as Katniss Everdeen was or political/economic/ social movements like OWS.

Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1: Collective action, debt, and justice Not all collectivist anarchists—not even all those who were central to OWS—hold the same views on what debt is and whether or not debt should be forgiven. While David Graeber’s ideas about debt lead him to argue for a debt jubilee, other collectivist anarchists like those associated with Anonymous—an ever changing collective of hacktivists (internet hackers who claim to be social justice activists) who keep their identities secret—make very different arguments about debt. Inspired by the graphic-novel-turned-feature-film V for Vendetta, Anonymous takes as its slogan “We are Anonymous. We are Legion. We do not forgive. We do not forget. Expect us.”

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Whether under the banner of “the 99 percent” or of Anonymous, individuals associated with these groups claim to be undertaking collective action in the name of not only redressing debt—albeit in sometimes very different ways—but in the name of crusading for justice. But is debt—and the abstract monetary calculations that make debt possible—always unjust? Isn’t it the case that justice is also incredibly abstract? And if this is the case, then this leads us to the concern raised by Benjamin Kunkel in his review of Graeber’s book, that “there is no reason in principle why money and debt must serve injustice rather than justice.” But, Kunkel continues, “So long as we still resort to markets and banks, the words of (the socialist) George Bernard Shaw are worth keeping in mind: ‘The universal regard for money is the one hopeful fact in our civilisation … It is only when it is cheapened to worthlessness for some, and made impossibly dear to others, that it becomes a curse … Money is the counter that enables life to be distributed socially … The first duty of every citizen is to insist on having money on reasonable terms’” (Kunkel, 2012). The following works offer some insights into these very different ways to think about collective action, debt, and justice.

Suggested reading Kunkel, Benjamin (2012) “Forgive Us Our Debts,” London Review of Books 34(9): 23–29, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n09/benjamin-kunkel/forgive-us-our-debts (downloaded January 2013). Moore, Alan (2000) V is for Vendetta, illustrated by David Lloyd. London: Titan Books. V is for Vendetta (2005) Directed by James McTeigue. Warner Brothers.

Topic 2: Libertarianism, diplomacy, and war By pulling together sometimes contradictory ideas from different theoretical traditions—baseline communism from Marxism, utopian prefiguration from various idealisms, the valorizing of liberty as the highest political, economic, and moral goal from libertarianism—David Graeber filled in the empty space of anarchy. He filled it in in a way that promotes his politics and the new politics of occupation. But in so doing, Graeber did what every other anarchist does when they fill in this space; he crowded out alternative understandings of what anarchism could mean and therefore limited the range of questions anarchism can ask. Not only are there are considerable risks in romanticizing the collectivist politics espoused by Graeber and OWS, as Miranda Joseph points out (2002). But foremost among the questions Graeber’s libertarian communitarian anarchist eschews is this one: Can there be such a thing as too much liberty? While our gut feeling might be to answer “Of course not!” to this question, things get complicated when we move from abstractions to practical examples. Consider the question of liberty in relation to the free flow of information. Think specifically about the whistleblower website WikiLeaks’ release of classified US diplomatic cables and about US Army soldier Chelsea Manning’s release of classified footage showing US drone attacks on civilians in Afghanistan. These cases raise important questions, like: What are and should be the relationships

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between security, cybersecurity, and diplomacy? Is diplomacy facilitated by the unconditional flow of all information, or should some secrets remain secret? Who should decide what information should be restricted—states, citizens of states, citizens of the world, and Anonymous? If states should decide, can we trust them to defend the distinction between the whistleblower and the traitor? Moving from the case of Chelsea Manning to the case of Edward Snowden—the security analyst who disclosed the National Security Administration’s Prism program’s widespread electronic surveillance on US citizens—should we accept President Obama’s rejection of Snowden as a patriot? The works below engage these questions and propel us to consider not only the broad question of whether or not liberty ought to have limits, but also the more specific question of whether or not anarchism should be limited by Graeber’s attempt to fill it in.

Suggested reading Derian, James Der and Ron Deibert (2010) “Wikileaks: The erasure of the nation state, asymmetrical cyber-warfare, and the shape of revolutions to come,” a podcast interview conducted by Chris Lydon, Brown University, December 18, http://www.sciy.org/2010/12/18/ wikileaks-the-erasure-of-the-nation-state-asymmetrical-cyber-warfare-and-the-shape-ofrevolutions-to-come/, downloaded January 2013. Goodman, Amy (2012) “Bradley Manning’s Long Quest for Justice,” The Guardian, December 13, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/13/bradley-manning-wikileaks-whistleblower, downloaded January 2013. Joseph, Miranda (2002) Against the Romance of Community. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Leigh, David and Luke Harding (2011) WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy. London: Guardian Books. Also see a video interview with one of the authors at http:// www.guardianbookshop.co.uk/BerteShopWeb/viewProduct.do?ISBN=9780852652398, downloaded January 2013. President Obama’s comments on Snowden’s patriotism, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= Bxmv8aArTJk. WikiLeaks website, http://wikileaks.org.

Topic 3: New communisms David Graeber’s ideas about “baseline communism” are situated as much in Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto as they are in recent debates about “new communisms” or “soft communisms.” These brands of communism all depart from the way communism was imposed by totalitarian governments like the former Soviet Union to try to think about how communism—in newer and softer forms like those Graeber utilizes—might be useful and practicable in our contemporary lives. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s ideas in Chapter 7 about Empire and the multitude are illustrations of this new, soft communism. Other illustrations can be seen in Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Zizek’s edited collection The Idea of Communism. In that volume, the editors and their contributors (Alain Badiou, Susan Buck-Morss, Terry Eagleton, Peter Hallward, Antonio Negri, Jacques

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Rancière, and Alberto Toscano) ponder the usefulness of applying the term “communism” to new forms of radical politics, especially in light of the historical failure of communism to achieve its promises in the former Soviet Bloc and elsewhere. Jodi Dean picks up on these themes in her book The Communist Horizon. Described in its publicity materials as “offer[ing] nothing less than a manifesto for a new collective politics,” The Communist Horizon applies her analysis of new communism to the Occupy movement. Queer scholars have also explored a new form of communist politics, based on a critical perspective of both the capitalist system and structures of homophobia and heterocentricity. Peter Drucker’s Warped: Gay Normality and Queer AntiCapitalism (2015) explores gender transgression through a historical materialist framework and suggests a new queer politics for today. There have been several terms for this blossoming fusion of queer critique and communist politics: Holly Lewis has proposed it as a “politics of everybody,” while Peter Frase and Kate Doyle Griffiths have dubbed the tendency “weird socialism” (2015). Nathaniel Dickson and Jules Joanne Gleeson have called their communist approach to transgender liberation “a politics of reassociation” (2019).

Suggested reading Dean, Jodi (2012) The Communist Horizon. London: Verso. Dickson, Nathaniel and Jules Joanne Gleeson (2019) “The Future of Trans Politics,” Verso Books Blog, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4269-the-future-of-trans-politics, downloaded October 16, 2019. Douzinas, Costas and Slavoj Zizek (eds) (2010) The Idea of Communism. London: Verso. Drucker, Peter (2015) Warped: Gay Normality and Queer Anti-Capitalism. London: Historical Materialism. Graeber, David (2010) “We are Already Communists,” YouTube talk by David Graeber, Part I at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IcK7rkajHKE; Part 2 at http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=zvhiCEEcLy4 (downloaded January 2013). Griffiths, Kate Doyle (2018) “Interview: Normie Socialism or Communist Transgression?” Red Wedge website, www.redwedgemagazine.com/online-issue/normie-socialism-or-communist-transgression-red-wedge-interviews-kate-doyle-griffiths, downloaded October 19, 2019. Lewis, Holly (2016) The Politics of Everybody: Feminism, Queer Theory and Marxism at the Intersection. London: Zed Books.

Notes

1



2

I put “antiglobalization” in inverted commas because this is the term the mainstream media used to identify activists like David Graeber who contest neoliberal practices of globalization. But Graeber rejects this term, explaining, “If one takes globalization to mean the effacement of borders and the free movement of people, possessions, and ideas, then it’s pretty clear ... that the majority of groups involved in [what gets wrongly called the ‘anti-globalization’ movement]—the most radical ones in particular—are far more supportive of globalization in general than are the IMF and WTO.” See Graeber (2002: 63). Ultimately, Wendt believes world government is inevitable. See Wendt (2003).

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11

Global LGBT studies Are gay rights human rights, and are human rights gay rights?

Queer IR Theories 250 What does the myth say? 256 Love is Strange263 Love is Regulated 271 Suggestions for further thinking 272

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If the slogan of Occupy Wall Street that rang around the world was “We are the 99 percent,” then the slogan of many contemporary LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans) global movements is “Gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights.” These were the words spoken by then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the United Nations on Human Rights Day in 2011 (Clinton, 2011). For some, Clinton’s declaration was embraced as the culmination of personal, social, and national battles for recognition, rights, and respect that had been waged by gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people for decades. Even though these battles took place in a number of states in relation to specific social, cultural, and political dynamics and with coalitions of people working across international borders, they were rarely thought of as international issues, least of all by global elites. Clinton’s declaration changed that. Among the things that makes Clinton’s case for gay rights as human rights so compelling is how she justifies it in relation to the 1947 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). While this Declaration makes no mention of gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people, Clinton argues that this is an insufficient fact to make the claim that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered people across the globe—who Clinton refers to as LGBTs—do not and should not have human rights. This is because throughout history many groups now recognized as legitimate minorities with the right to have rights also received no mention in the UDHR. These legitimate minorities include indigenous people, children, and people with disabilities (2011: 2). Clinton continues, “Yet in the past 60 years, we have come to recognize that members of these groups are entitled to the full measure of dignity and rights, because, like all people, they share a common humanity” (2011: 2). It is Clinton’s belief that the LGBT deserves this same recognition that allows her to articulate her myth gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights. Her belief is based not in the idea that the LGBT deserves “special rights” (Clinton, 2011: 2) but in her belief that the LGBT shares our common humanity. As she puts it, “Like being a woman, like being a racial, religious, tribal, or ethnic minority, being LGBT does not make you less human. And that is why gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights” (2011: 2). As should be apparent to any student of International Relations (IR), Clinton’s speech is very Kantian (see Chapter 3). It embraces Kant’s idea that there is such a thing as a universal human who shares a common humanity. And it casts the LGBT as just another human being who is part of our common humanity. These explicitly Kantian moves make it tempting to analyze Clinton’s speech and the myth it circulates through a Kantian lens. To do so would not be incorrect, but it would be incomplete. This is because Clinton’s speech does more than rely upon Kant’s idea of a universal human community and the UDHR’s embrace of this ideal to justify her myth. Just as importantly, Clinton’s speech finds its coherence and legitimacy in one simple idea – love. More specifically, what gives coherence and structure to Clinton’s speech is the idea that homosexual love—not just heterosexual love—is normal love. Even though many IR scholars are not well versed in how to think about and analyze homosexuality and its relation to normality and abnormality in international politics, there are vast IR literatures that can help us do just that. Two of these are what have been called Global LGBT Studies and Queer IR.

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Both Global LGBT Studies and Queer IR recognize that traditionally, many societies (but particularly Western liberal ones) tend to regard heterosexuality as “normal” and homosexuality and transgender persons as “perverse.” This traditional understanding casts the intimate relationships between consenting adult gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people as abnormal. This has serious implications not only for how these people are able to live their lives; because they are viewed as aberrant and abnormal, gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people are not always accorded the same rights as “normal people.” Global LGBT Studies and Queer IR both take issue with this state of affairs and aim to change it. While Global LGBT Studies and Queer IR scholars form alliances around a variety of political and disciplinary issues, they do so from very different academic positions, each of which has a very different way of thinking about homosexuality and its relation to normality and perversion. Global LGBT Studies seeks to expand the realm of what individuals, societies, and states regard as “normal love” in order to redress the exclusion of and discrimination against what it regards as a more or less coherent group of people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or trans. This Global LGBT Studies position makes two important moves. First, it accepts the idea that there is something called “normal love,” which it champions rather than critiques. Among the things it fails to critique is how “normal love” is always understood as against “perverse love,” as if these terms were in binary opposition to one another. This makes it more difficult for Global LGBT scholars to appreciate how the categories of “normal love” and “perverse love” overlap, intersect, and complicate one another, in ways that never fully filter the prejudicial perception of “perversion” out of the realm of “normality,” even as the realm of “normal love” expands. Second, Global LGBT Studies takes as given people and groups of people who are identified or who self-identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or trans. It does so without fully interrogating how these sexuality and gender-identity categories came into existence and are themselves politically exclusionary around not just sexuality and gender orientation but also around things like race, class, ability, and gender more widely. This means Global LGBT Studies has a (sometimes unintentional) tendency to reserve the expansion and recognition of “normal love” to only those gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding persons who fit into the far narrower categories of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or trans, and who are the political constituency on whose behalf Global LGBT Studies act politically in the world. Because Global LGBT Studies champions Clinton’s LGBT, it also embraces Clinton’s myth that “gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights.” This is because Clinton’s position is fully in line with the Global LGBT Studies agenda of expanding the realm of “normal love” to include the LGBT. Crucially, it is the compatibility of the Global LGBT Studies position and Clinton’s position that begin to reveal the limitations of both. Because Global LGBT Studies reserves “normal love” to the feelings and practices of adult consenting heterosexuals and of particular kinds of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans people, it polices the boundary between “normal loving people” and “perverts.” That’s important because by policing the boundary between

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“normal loving people” and “perverts,” Global LGBT Studies also polices the boundary between who deserves to be fully included within social and political institutions from the family to the nation to the international community and who does not deserve to be included. As we will see later in this chapter, this is Clinton’s position as well. And it is a position that puts in jeopardy Clinton’s myth “gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights.” How so? By dividing adult consenting gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people into the “normal loving people” who deserve inclusion and the “perverts” who don’t, Clinton’s myth at best makes it unclear whether or not all of these gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people deserve human rights. At worst, Clinton’s myth suggests that some of them do deserve human rights, and some don’t. Whether or not this is what Clinton intended is unclear. Giving her the benefit of the doubt, we can call it a blind spot of her myth. And all such blind spots need to be analyzed and interrogated so they can be corrected. Which takes us directly to the problem with a Global LGBT Studies analysis of Clinton’s myth. Because Clinton’s myth is completely compatible with a Global LGBT Studies perspective, Global LGBT Studies cannot interrogate Clinton’s blind spot because it shares the very same blind spot. Indeed, it is Global LGBT Studies (and LGBT Studies more widely) that is the intellectual and political foundation of Clinton’s myth. This makes Global LGBT Studies the least likely perspective to provide a critical lens on Clinton’s myth that would expose and correct its blind spot(s). Queer IR provides this critical lens. Like Queer Studies more generally, Queer IR emerged as a critique of (Global) LGBT Studies. That Queer IR critique involved rejecting the two key moves made by Global LGBT Studies. Queer IR neither defends “normal love” nor opposes it to “perverse love” between consenting adults. And Queer IR rejects the idea that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans people and communities preexist all manner of political mobilizations that make them appear as if they always, already existed, often in opposition to the most vulnerable gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people (e.g., trans people, people of color, and especially trans women of color). This means that Queer IR is less concerned with how gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people might fit into the expanded norms grounded in heterosexual love. Instead, Queer IR is more concerned with critically analyzing how norms of inclusion always draw the line at what cannot be made to fit into or what will not be made to fit into social, cultural, and political understandings of “normal love,” however narrowly or widely “normal love” is defined and enacted. (See Table 11.1. Also see Richter-Montpetit, 2018 for an excellent elaboration of the differences between Global LGBT Studies and Queer IR.) To undertake this analysis, Queer IR theories must take seriously the messy combinations and mobilizations of sexes, genders, and sexualities as they are entangled with other presumed identity categories (like race, class, (dis)ability, and religion) that make IR theories and policies function. It is these Queer IR theories that will enable us to unpack and critically interrogate the assumptions about homosexuality as normal love that make Clinton’s myth gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights appear to be true.

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G l o b a l L G BT s t u d i e s Table 11.1  Differences between global LGBT Studies and Queer IR Global LGBT Studies

Queer IR

Position on Love

Accepts and expands “normal love,” opposes it to “perverse love,” and polices the boundary between the two

Neither accepts “normal love” nor opposes it to “perverse love” but interrogates how the categories of “normal love” and “perverse love” overlap, intersect, and complicate one another, in ways that never fully filter the prejudicial perception of “perversion” out of the realm of “normality,” even as the realm of “normal love” expands

View of identities

Identities like lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and LGBT more widely exist as such

Identities are the ever-changing political effects of all sorts of political maneuvers. Any claim that identities are stable or preexist is a political claim that benefits some and harms others

Aim

To defend LGBT individuals and communities against exclusion and discrimination by expanding the realm of “normal love”

To critically analyze how norms of inclusion always draw the line at what cannot be made to fit into or what will not be made to fit into social, cultural, and political understandings of “normal love”

What also helps us unpack and critically interrogate these assumptions is the 2014 film Love is Strange. Love is Strange is the story of a long-time New York couple—Ben and George—who, as they reach their golden years, decide to marry. This couple is normative in every way. They are white, cis-gendered, middle-class, and Western, while one is Christian and the other is (at least) tolerant of Christianity. All that distinguishes them (apart from their age and what that means for their declining abilities) is that they are a same-sex couple. What their story suggests is that US Americans living in large urban areas like New York City have gotten used to and (largely) accept some gender nonconforming people as ordinary human beings—especially white, cis, and male couples who identify as gay. But Ben and George’s story raises these questions: While gay rights are, should be and must be human rights, are all human rights actually gay rights? Put differently, do all LGBTs, gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people have the right to have rights, even in seemingly enlightened New York City? If not, why not? Ben and George’s story is a story about the mixed realization of LGBT rights for even the most privileged gay men. Analyzing it through Global LGBT Studies can tell us a lot about their love, and we should never ignore the lessons these literatures offer. But I want to suggest that it won’t tell us enough about how and why this love—even in the context of an American city that increasingly regards it as “normal love”—is not accompanied by the recognition, respect, and full range of rights promised to LGBT couples by Clinton’s myth “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights.” To find out what must go without saying in order for Clinton’s myth to appear to be true, we need to push beyond the limitations

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of a Global LGBT approach to rights. This is something a Queer IR analysis of Clinton’s speech enables. If a Queer IR analysis of Clinton’s speech explains how her myth “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights” uses specific understandings of love to make it appear to be true, it is the wrinkles in Ben and George’s love story that reveal what must go without saying in order for Clinton’s myth to continue to function. In the remainder of this chapter, I will explain the specific analytical moves Queer IR theories make in more detail. I will then use these Queer IR analytical moves to analyze what makes Clinton’s myth appear to be true. Finally, I will rethink this myth through the film Love is Strange. What I will suggest is that not all human rights are gay rights because not all queer love is regarded as the right kind of love.

Queer IR theories The term “queer” is hotly debated and has many meanings. One thing Queer IR theorists tend to agree on is that queer does not refer to an identity, even though it is often mischaracterized as one. Queer instead refers to that which confounds identities that are nevertheless attached to people because of the specific ways they perform sex, gender, and sexuality, and how those performances are read through other intersecting presumed identities like race, religion, national origin, (dis)ability, and class, for example. What interests Queer IR scholars is how power is mobilized and resisted to make someone appear to be a coherent or incoherent identity, how power is mobilized and resisted to make someone appear to be normal or not normal, and how all of this works at every scale from the intimate to the international. And among the things they analyze is how we think about how love, desire, sexual acts, and subjectivities connect intimate, familial, national, and international relations. Queer IR theories are able to critically interrogate how the formulation of particular kinds of love, desire, sexual acts, and subjectivities work at all of these scales by focusing on four interconnected moves. These moves (1) characterize sex, gender, and sexuality as normal or perverse, (2) institutionalize these understandings, (3) transform these characterizations into sexed, gendered, and sexualized characters; and (4) make abstract normal and perverse sexed, gendered, and sexualized characters correspond to specific local, national, and international normal and perverse characters (see Box 11.1). The first move is to think of sexes, genders, and sexualities as characteristics that are fixed and knowable and then to determine the precise character of sexes, genders, and sexualities as normal or perverse through seemingly scientific techniques. These characterizations take place around a variety of sexes, genders, and sexualities. The illustration I use here is how they function around male heterosexuality and male homosexuality. Michel Foucault (1980) puts these issues in historical context. As he explains, 19th-century scientific expertise was drawn upon to make these determinations in relation to male heterosexuality and male homosexuality. While there was divergent scientific opinion on these matters, the most influential biologists and psychologists of the day characterized heterosexuality as normal and homosexuality

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Box 11.1  How are understandings of sexes, genders, and sexualities naturalized so they can inform IR theories and policies? 1 Sexed, gendered, and sexualized characterizations are described as normal or perverse. 2 Heteronormativity and homonormativity embed understandings of sexed, gendered, and sexualized characterizations as normal or perverse. 3 Sexed, gendered, and sexualized characterizations are transformed into sexed, gendered, and sexualized characters. 4 Abstract normal and perverse sexed, gendered, and sexualized characters are made to correspond to specific normal and perverse characters at every scale from the intimate to the international.

as perverse. This was not just because heterosexuality seemed to be the more frequent practice of sexuality. It was also because theories about normal biological and psychological development equated “healthy heterosexuality” with culturally stereotypical white, cis-gendered, bourgeois, able-bodied, mature, Christian, and Western masculinized subjects. And it equated “unhealthy homosexuality” with culturally stereotypical, racially darkened, underclass, gender-variant or gender nonconforming, immature, debilitated, often non-Christian, and often non-Western feminized subjects (Finley, 2011; Foucault, 1980; Gibson, 1997; Hoad, 2000; Massad, 2008; McClintock, 1995; Somerville, 2000; Stoler, 1995). This seemed to cement the character of heterosexuality as normal and the character of homosexuality as perverse, with many of these understandings persisting to the present day. What helps to cement these understandings is how these characterizations of heterosexuality and homosexuality are embedded in institutional understandings of “sexualized character.” This is the second way that understandings of sexes, genders, and particularly sexualities are naturalized. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner suggest that what made and continues to make heterosexuality appear to be natural and normal is what they call “heteronormativity” (see Box 11.2). Heteronormativity is “the institutions, structures of understanding and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent—that is, organized as a sexuality—but also privileged” (Berlant and Warner, 1998: 548). In other words, heteronormativity is what makes it appear as if there is one coherent set of normal, valued sexualized practices that are always and only “heterosexual,” as opposed to all other abnormal, perverse, and inferior sexualized practices, including what gets called “homosexuality.”

Box 11.2  What is heteronormativity? Heteronormativity refers to institutions, structures, and understandings that make it appear as if certain sexualized practices known as “heterosexual” are normal and valued, while all other sexualized practices, including homosexuality, are cast as abnormal, perverse, and inferior.

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Scientific expertise is only part of what makes heterosexuality appear to be a coherent set of sexual practices that form “the normal sexualized character.” But Berlant and Warner suggest that heterosexuality came to be understood as natural and normal because of wider understandings they call heteronormativity that are consciously and unconsciously dispersed throughout societies and put into practice by individuals as well as by social and cultural institutions. How is heterosexuality institutionalized as natural and normal through heteronormativity? Berlant and Warner’s answer is that these institutionalizations occur through the ways we consciously and unconsciously think about and practice heterosexuality as the right way to practice our sexuality. As they suggest, we institutionalize heterosexuality as the right kind of sexuality in all sorts of formal and informal ways. We do this, for example, in the ways we use heterosexuality as our basis to tell our stories about and put into practice the right ways to live our lives and the right way to love in our lives. These stories and practices generally understand the right way to live and love as involving coupling up with someone of the opposite sex, as defining marriage as between a man and a woman, as recognizing heterosexual marriage as the biological and moral engine that produces children, and as recognizing heterosexual marriage as that which insures not just the morality of our family but also the morality of our society, our culture, and even our nation (Peterson, 1999; Puar, 2007). Of course, these days a lot of people—regardless of how they define or practice their own sexuality—believe that same-sex couples can also practice the right way to live and love. If same-sex people are in monogamous couples, if they marry, and if they raise children together, then they, too, are often regarded as insuring the morality of the family, society, culture, and nation. Because heteronormativity understands all non-normative heterosexual practices as outside of normality, heteronormativity alone cannot explain why these types of same-sex couples are sometimes also seen as normal. Lisa Duggan (2003) argues that another institutional arrangement of understandings—what she calls “homonormativity”—is what accounts for expanding our understanding of “the normal sexualized character” to include these particular practices of homosexuality (see Box 11.3). Duggan defines homonormativity as “a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption” (2003: 50). Let me unpack this definition.

Box 11.3  What is homonormativity? “A politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption” (Duggan, 2003: 50).

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In her analysis of what she calls “Equality, Inc.,” Duggan explains how liberal understandings of tolerance were seized upon by liberal and right-of-center US gays and lesbians to gain equality for gays and lesbians whose moral, political, and economic ideas were consistent with heteronormativity. As Duggan explains it, just as heteronormativity understands the monogamous, married, and child-rearing couple as expressing “the normal sexualized character” because they understand and live their sexuality in the right way, homonormativity understandings same-sex couples in exactly the same way. This is because—as they are described by heteronormativity and homonormativity—domesticated opposite-sex and same-sex couples want the same thing. What they want is to express the right way to live and love by ensuring the productivity and longevity of the family, the society, the culture, and the nation. It is because opposite-sex and same-sex couples want the same things that Duggan argues there is no political difference between these kinds of couples. The only difference between them, argues Duggan, is that homonormative couples are composed of people of the same sex rather than of the opposite sex. Bringing these kinds of same-sex couples into liberal societies like those in the US, then, does not require meaningful change to liberal democratic capitalism. It just requires that US and other nationally and internationally practiced liberalisms expand their understandings of “the normal sexualized character” to include how sexuality is practiced by these kinds of same-sex couples. And because liberalism is a theory that has been expanding its definition of “the human” throughout its history (from white men to white women to racially darkened people, for example), it is quite easy for liberalisms to expand to include these kinds of same-sex couples as well. Once this is accomplished, homonormativity institutionalizes an understanding of these kinds of same-sex couples as also normal, without ever challenging either the modern Western ideal of what is normal (white, Christian, cis-gendered, able-bodied, and bourgeois) or the idea (and ideal) that opposite-sex couples are just normal, in what they do and in what they want for themselves, their families, their societies, their cultures, and their nations. Homonormativity also fails to challenge how the normal opposite-sex couple remains the standard by which all other people—in couples or not in couples—are judged because the normal opposite-sex couple is understood to best basis for “the normal family.” This is in part why Duggan refers to homonormativity as a “depoliticized gay culture.” For by only demanding equality with opposite-sex couples, every other political demand made by gender variant, nongender conforming, and gender expanding people (including but not confined to this particular kind of samesex couple) drops away. All that seems to matter is that these kinds of same-sex couples (who are predominantly white, male, Christian, cis-gendered, able-bodied, and well-off) are allowed to model normal opposite-sex couples by serving the family by marrying, serving the economy by consuming for their families, and serving the country by joining the military (Duggan, 2003). In the end, what heteronormativity and homonormativity leave us with are institutions that support an expanded understanding of “the normal sexual character.” That expanded understanding includes all manner of normal heterosexual practices but only one kind of normal homosexual sexual practice (the one practiced by the normal loving, monogamous, domesticated, and child-rearing samesex couple that takes the normal opposite-sex couple as its model).

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This leads us nicely into the third move that explains how understandings of sexes, genders, and sexualities are naturalized. This move is to transform sexed, gendered, and sexualized characterizations into sexed, gendered, and sexualized characters. As it works in modern Western discourses about sexuality, this move reimagines practices of sexuality as being performed almost exclusively by particular kinds of practitioners of sexuality. This makes sexuality less something a person does (e.g., have sex with someone of the opposite sex or have sex with someone of the same sex); it makes sexuality something one is (a “heterosexual” or a “homosexual,” for example). In this way, sexuality is transformed from just a practice into an essential element of one’s character (Foucault, 1980; also see Butler, 1999). Once sexuality became understood as an essential element of one’s character, it became possible to identify people as “heterosexuals” vs. “homosexuals.” This may not seem like a very controversial thing to do. For these days we are very familiar with the idea that some people are heterosexuals and other people are homosexuals. Yet it wasn’t until the late 1800s that the sexualized character “the homosexual” came into being. Indeed, it was such a new idea then that Michel Foucault describes it as “the birth of the homosexual” (1980: 42–43). Not only that, Foucault argues that once it became possible to identify “heterosexuals” vs. “homosexuals,” it also became possible to divide people up into “populations,” biological “strains,” and even “species” called “heterosexuals” and “homosexuals” (1980: 42–43). This, Foucault argues, is how “the homosexual” was born as a “new alien strain” who was understood as a biological, psychological, and moral perversion of normal heterosexuality (Foucault, 1980: 42–43). Thanks to scientific and moral understandings of the day, the sexualized character of “the homosexual” was not just born; its meaning was frozen as always having been and always going to be associated with perversion. When Foucault made these observations, what Berlant and Warner would go on to call heteronormativity was the only existing legitimate Western institutional arrangement for describing and embedding understandings of normal sexualities vs. perverse sexualities. And, as Foucault suggested, these institutional arrangements regarded all “homosexuals” as perverse. Foucault did not live long enough to witness the rise of what Duggan calls homonormativity. Had he done so, he would have seen how “the normal sexualized character” was expanded to include additional “normal sexualized characters.” For as homonormativity took root, it allowed for “the homosexual” to be regarded not as “an alien strain” who would forever be understood as a perversion of heterosexuality. On the contrary, “the homosexual” could also be seen as normal. But there is a big homonormative condition here. That condition is that this new “normal homosexual” subject practice their homosexuality as part of a normal loving, monogamous, domesticated, and child-rearing same-sex couple. What this means is that those “homosexuals” who do not belong to or aspire to belong to such a couple may still be understood as “perverse homosexuals.” What it also means is that it is still possible to identify and divide people, populations, strains, and species into normal vs. perverse. But what divides them into normal vs. perverse is no longer their heterosexuality vs. homosexuality. It is their acceptance or rejection of the normal loving, monogamous, domesticated, and child-rearing couple as their model of sexual practice and/or sexual identity. If they accept this model, they are “normal.” If they reject this model, they are “perverse.”

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The fourth and final move connects these “normal” or “perverse” sexualized characters to “normal” or “perverse” international characters. Who are these “normal” or “perverse” international characters, and where do they come from? Just as the socially and culturally informed natural sciences generate and institutionalize understandings of sexualized characters, so too do socially and culturally informed social sciences like IR generate and institutionalize international characters. How they do this is, first, by deciding what “normal” vs. “perverse” international politics is or ought to look like. Second, they transfer the character of “normal international politics” onto “normal international political characters” and the character of “perverse international politics” onto “perverse international political characters.” For example, if modern Western IR theorists understand international order among sovereign nation-states as their desired norm (even if they don’t necessarily always believe it can be accomplished), then disorder or anarchy is what they regard as a perversion of this norm (see Chapters 2–5). Anything that gets in the way of establishing or progressing “normal international order,” then, is seen as “perverse.” This can include everything from the problems of underdevelopment to the problems of uncontrolled im/migration to the problems of terrorism. Once things like underdevelopment, im/migration, and terrorism are established as problems for “normal international order,” then particular characters become associated with these problematic areas. For example, “the underdeveloped” or (worse) “the undevelopable” are established as “perverse international characters,” who threaten the establishment and progress of modernization and development on a global scale (see Chapter 8). These “perverse international characters” are understood as inferior opposites to “normal developed international characters,” who in modern Western theories are the progressive agents of modernization and development (Weber, 2016). For example, Queer IR theorists trace how “normal” vs. “perverse” understandings of loving, intimate relationships and configurations of the family inform international theories and policies (Peterson, 1999, 2014a, 2014b, 2017a; Weber, 2016). One of the best illustrations of this move, as we will see in the next section, is how “the normal loving couple” as the basis of “the normal loving family” is foundational to Clinton’s claim that gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights. Before we proceed to this argument, though, let’s pause to think about what the four moves Queer IR identifies do when considered together. Reading them together, what should strike you are a few things. One striking thing is that all of these moves operate according to a binary logic. The dominant binary logic is to oppose what is normal to what is perverse. This binary logic functions like all binary logics. It makes you choose a side, and it makes us choose which category to put a person or a kind of love, desire, or sex act into. This is because binary logics function according to the logic of the either/or. This means that a person or a thing is either normal or perverse, but never (also) normal and perverse in the same register. Second, these moves always value the normal over the perverse. This is why they value heterosexual love as the right kind of love and—until recently—devalued all homosexual love as the wrong kind of love.

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Yet, third, we also see that how kinds of love and desire are valued has (begun to) change. This is because the normal can expand to include what had been regarded as perverse. This is what made homonormativity possible—because it sits comfortably alongside and does not contest the ideal of heteronormativity. But just because the normal can expand, this does not mean it expands to include everyone or everything. Rather, there are limits to what is incorporable within the new normal. One limit is the age-old limit modern Westerners still too often put on “the normal”—defining it as white, Western, usually Christian, able-bodied, bourgeois, and properly masculine. The other limit is how perverse homosexuality and the perverse homosexual are constituted against both the normal Westerner and against homosexual practices and homosexual people who do not (fully) accord with homonormativity. These are what the new normal remains opposed to. Global LGBT Studies tends to embrace and celebrate this new normal of homonormativity, because it does improve the lives and livelihoods of some gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people. But because this new normal naturalizes many gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people as perverse, it is still criticized by both Global LGBT Studies and by Queer IR. The Global LGBT Studies response tends to call for a further broadening of “normal love” and the new normal. Yet this response neither acknowledges nor critiques how stuck homonormativity is in its processes of naturalization and its either/or logics. Queer IR takes a different approach. It emphasizes how processes of naturalization and the either/or logics that structure them not only fail to help many gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people. Queer IR also demonstrates how these moves are widely used in IR theory and policy. For example, Queer IR allows us to see how Global LGBT Studies tends to embrace and enact each of these moves. That’s important for two reasons. First, Clinton uses every one of them to make her myth “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights” appear to be true. And second, if we want to critically interrogate Clinton’s myth, we need to rely more on Queer IR theories than on Global LGBT Studies theories.

What does the myth say? Clinton’s myth “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights” follows from the UDHR’s Kantian assertion that there is an “immutable truth, that all persons are created free and equal in dignity and rights” (Clinton, 2011: 6). But what allows Clinton to expand the idea of a universal humanity to include the LGBT is her reliance on the four dominant moves that Queer IR identifies as among the ways that sexes, genders and sexualities are naturalized (see Box 11.1). Even though Clinton’s speech is centered on LGBTs, I focus particularly on Clinton’s treatment of homosexuality and the homosexual. I do so because— as many others have argued—Clinton’s LGBT seems to include bisexuality and the bisexual as well as trans people only in name but not in substance (e.g., Agathangelou, 2013; Spade, 2013; on bisexuality more broadly, see Hemmings, 2002). Even lesbianism and the lesbian generally drop out of consideration in Clinton’s speech. This is in part because Clinton uses the terms LGBT and gay interchangeably, which effectively emphasizes male homosexuality and the male

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homosexual. This is most evident in her myth itself, which declares that “gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights.” It is also worth noting that while Clinton attempts to speak for a global audience and a global LGBT, her own position as then US Secretary of State means she comes to these debates from a white, Western, settler-colonialist perspective. This has the effect of crowding out queer understandings coming both from long histories of queer activist practices outside the US and from rich academic literatures at the intersections of queer theory and race/racism, de/postcolonial theory, indigenous theory, and non-Western queer IR theory more broadly (Ferguson, 2004; Dhawan et al., 2015; Driskill, 2010; El-Tayeb, 2012; Engel, 2002; Khanna, 2016; Smith, 2010). So—what are the four major moves Clinton makes, and how specifically does Clinton make each of these four moves? The first move is to determine the character of sexes, genders and sexualities. With respect to homosexuality, Clinton does this by acknowledging the long-held Western idea that homosexuality is perverse. This view, Clinton acknowledges, remains rooted in the values of some religions and cultures. Clinton argues, however, that these ways of thinking are not only outdated (2011: 2, 6); they are at odds with what religious and cultural values are actually for, which Clinton implies is to help all of us to be more fully human. Because of this, Clinton explains, “Rarely are cultural and religious traditions and teachings actually in conflict with the protection of human rights. Indeed, our religion and our culture are sources of compassion and inspiration toward our fellow human beings” (2011: 3). For Clinton, of course, these fellow human beings include the LGBT. She goes on to claim that among the values that religions and cultures teach us is how to practice love through our families and by caring for others. “And caring for others,” Clinton says, “is an expression of what it means to be fully human. It is because the human experience is universal that human rights are universal and cut across all religions and cultures” (2011: 3). What Clinton does in these passages is acknowledge the long-held idea that homosexuality is perverse only so she can delegitimize this idea as a valid religious, cultural and political expression of the character of homosexuality. Sweeping aside these understandings of the character of homosexuality as perverse, Clinton replaces them with an understanding of the character of homosexuality as normal. She achieves this by suggesting that homosexuality is just another expression of how people practice love through their families and by caring for others. It is by delegitimizing homosexuality as perverse love and by re-characterizing homosexuality as just another kind of normal love that Clinton attempts to legitimize and naturalize the character of homosexuality as normal. This, then, is how Clinton specifically performs the first move of determining the character of homosexuality. What makes Clinton’s characterization of homosexuality as normal intelligible and potentially persuasive to her audience is the fact that this understanding of homosexuality has already been embedded in homonormative institutional understandings of “the normal sexualized character.” It is by expressing her understanding of normal homosexuality in ways that are compatible with homonormativity (see Box 11.3) that Clinton naturalizes the character of homosexuality as normal. This is her second major move. Of course, Clinton never mentions the term homonormativity in her speech. Yet everything she says and does in her speech is compatible with homonormativity.

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Clinton’s master move is to take the heteronormative couple as her model of normal love, and to expand this model to include the homonormative couple by suggesting that what this homonormative couple wants is exactly (and only) what the heteronormative couple wants—to serve their family, their economy and their nation. And the primary ways Clinton embeds normal homosexuality in homonormativity is in how she speaks about love. Let me explain each of these in more detail. Addressing the presumptively heteronormative members of her audience, Clinton tells them, “We need to ask ourselves, ‘How would it feel if it were a crime to love the person I love? How would it feel to be discriminated against for something about myself that I cannot change?” (2011: 4). By posing these questions, Clinton takes as given the idea that her audience will understand (their) heteronormative love—the love between the monogamous, married, child-rearing, domesticated, opposite-sex couple—as normal love. Their love is natural love because they cannot control or change who they love. And their love is normal love because it is both part of “the human experience” (as Clinton noted earlier; 2011: 3) and because it is heteronormative. These facts seem to be so apparently self-evident to Clinton’s heteronormative audience members that they mostly go without saying. What has to be said explicitly by Clinton is that equally monogamous, (legally or informally) married, child-rearing, domesticated, same-sex couples deserve to have their love recognized as natural and normal, too. Their love is natural, Clinton implies, because members of same-sex couples cannot control or change who they love. And their love is normal love because it is part of the same “human experience” as is the love between opposite-sex couples. These are among the ways Clinton expands the notion of normal love to include the love between members of homonormative couples. Clinton embeds this idea further when she goes on to spell out the ways in which the normal love of those in homonormative couples is not only compatible with heteronormative love. It is also compatible with what heteronormative couples want—for their families, their societies, and their nations. One of Clinton’s strongest arguments is that the LGBT embraces the same (neo)liberal economic values as do those in heteronormative couples. Describing LGBTs as “our family, our friends, and our neighbors,” Clinton emphasizes how LGBTs are productive citizens in their communities. LGBTs benefit the family and society by being “doctors and teachers, farmers and bankers, soldiers and athletes” (Clinton, 2011: 2). And they benefit the economy more generally because they are “entrepreneurs who happen to be gay” (Clinton, 2011: 3). Taking up the economic language of costs and benefits, Clinton makes the case for protecting these “entrepreneurial gays”: Now, some worry that protecting the human rights of the LGBT community is a luxury that only wealthy nations can afford. But in fact, in all countries, there are costs to not protecting these rights, in both gay and straight lives lost to disease and violence, and the silencing of voices and views that would strengthen communities, in ideas never pursued by entrepreneurs who happen to be gay. Costs are incurred whenever any group is treated as lesser or the other [sic], whether they are women, racial, or religious minorities, or the LGBT. (2011, 3)

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This language of costs and benefits is precisely the language that the World Bank has taken up to argue on behalf of development schemes that economically benefit from protecting and promoting “the LGBT” (Badgett et al., 2014; Bedford 2005, 2009; Lind, 2010, 2014). It is because the LGBT benefits the nation just like the heteronormative person benefits the nation that Clinton suggests the LGBT has the right to have rights. While these rights include the right to be economically productive for the nation—to be “the gay entrepreneur”—they also include two more rights. These are the right to be protective of the nation (e.g., join the military or be a police officer) and the right to be reproductive for the nation (e.g., have and/ or raise children). Taken together, Clinton’s points about the normal loving LGBT couple and its (re)productive capacities for the family, society, culture, and nation not only illustrate how the homonormative LGBT couple models itself in every way on the heteronormative couple. These points also affirm how the normal sexualized character of the LGBT is (therefore) compatible with and in no way challenging of heteronormativity. For the homonormative LGBT wants precisely what the heteronormative couple wants and nothing else. It has no other desires or political demands, it seems, other than to serve the family, the society, the culture, and the nation. That, in large part, is what makes it possible for Clinton to claim that—for this LGBT—gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights. Indeed, it is because Clinton so successfully homonormativizes the character of (particularly) homosexuality that she can perform her third major move. That move is to transform the normal sexualized characterization of homosexuality into very specific sexualized characters. These normal sexualized characters are the LGBT as the human rights holder. Clinton does this by reimagining practices of sexuality as being performed almost exclusively by particular kinds of practitioners of sexuality. This transforms sexuality into an essential element of one’s character, as opposed to a particular practice of sexuality. Who are these sexualized characters in Clinton’s speech? It comes as no surprise that the LGBT as the human rights holder represents the normal sexualized character in Clinton’s speech (see Box 11.4). It probably also comes as no surprise that this normal sexualized LGBT is closest to (but not always exactly the same) as the normal human being found in modern

Box 11.4  Who is Clinton’s “the LGBT”? A sexualized character who is part of a “normal loving homonormative couple" and does four things: 1 Takes “the normal loving monogamous heteronormative couple” as its model. 2 Never contests the normal Westerner as the ideal model for normality. 3 Has no historical relationships to LGBT people who resisted or opposed heteronormativity. 4 Desires exactly what the model “heteronormative couple” wants and nothing more/else.

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Western theory. What might be a little more surprising is how Clinton’s speech also constructs another sexualized character—a character I call “the LGBT in the shadows” (see Box 11.5). The primary thing that distinguishes the LGBT from the LGBT in the shadows is love. What makes up the essential character of the LGBT is normal love, but what makes up the essential character of the LGBT in the shadows is perverse homosexual sex. Clinton employs the LGBT in the shadows as that sexualized character who demonstrates the risks to the family, culture, society, and nation of not expanding the definition of the human rights holder to the LGBT. Clinton’s suggestion that homosexuality should be understood as normal love rather than perverse sex, and Clinton’s institutionalization of this understanding in relation to homonormativity go a long way in allowing her to construct the essential character of the LGBT as about normal love. A few more moves solidify these ideas. First, while Clinton discussed homosexuality as another kind of normal love in her speech, she never uses the term homosexual. This seems to be because the “cringeworthy” term homosexual (Peters, 2014) conjures up notions of perverse homosexuality—which seems to be more about the practice of perverse sex than it is about the practice of normal love. So, because the homosexual is a perverse sexualized character who is at odds with Clinton’s painstaking articulation of the LGBT as just another normal sexualized character, the homosexual gets no mention in Clinton’s speech. What also gets no mention in Clinton’s speech is that the history of the LGBT and the history of Clinton’s LGBT are very different. Historically, LGBT people were people who at least questioned if not stood outside of heteronormativity, both because of who they loved and how they loved. Clinton’s LGBT, in contrast, never questions heteronormativity because it continues to take the normal Westerner (as white, Christian, cis-gendered, able-bodied, and bourgeois) and the normal, loving, monogamous, and heteronormative couple as its models. All this suggests that Clinton’s substitution of the derogatory term “the homosexual” for the presumptively neutral term “the LGBT” is not actually neutral. For by erasing the resistive political history of gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people, Clinton not only encourages her audience to think that her LGBT was and always will be compatible with heteronormativity; she (again) encourages her audience to believe that her LGBT only wants and always only wanted what heteronormative people want and wanted. It is this LGBT for whom gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights. That doesn’t mean that there aren’t still lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans people who don’t fit Clinton’s ideal of the LGBT. Clinton acknowledges some of these people in her speech. But she does so for one purpose and one purpose only—to remind people of how dangerous other kinds of gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people can be to the public. They appear in her speech as the LGBT in the shadows (see Box 11.5). Consider, for example, how this sexualized character emerges in this passage of Clinton’s speech. She states, “Former President Mogae of Botswana pointed out recently that for as long as LGBT people are kept in the shadows, there cannot be an effective public health program to tackle HIV and AIDS” (2011: 3). In this passage, Clinton plays upon a long-held (and incorrect) association of the homosexual and the HIV/AIDS-infected person. While HIV can be contracted in

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Box 11.5  Who is Clinton’s “LGBT in the shadows”? A sexualized character who stands outside the bounds of reasonable practices of sex and sexuality as defined by heteronormativity and homonormativity. This makes “the LGBT in the shadows” more like “the perverse homosexual” who embodies “dangerous sex” than like Clinton’s homonormative “LGBT” who embodies “normal love.”

a number of ways (including intravenous drug use and unprotected sex between members of all sexes), it extracted an especially high death toll among gay male communities in the 1980s. In the United States, the Reagan administration and the religious right interpreted this to be a result of these communities’ inherent sinfulness (and hence deservingness of divine punishment through HIV/AIDS). Therefore, while homosexuals were severely affected by HIV/AIDS, it is problematic and reductionist to naturalize this association. Clinton does precisely that when she uses this association to construct the LGBT in the shadows as a carrier of disease and death who is a threat to global public health when left unregulated. What Clinton’s discussion does is invent the LGBT in the shadows as that sexualized character who is morally, medically, and socially beyond the bounds of reasonable practices of sex and sexuality, as understood through heteronormativity and homonormativity. They are those sexualized characters who embody perverse homosexuality because they practice perverse sex. They are, in other words, the perverse homosexuals all over again, just updated and repackaged as shadowy rather than explicitly perverse sexualized characters. Because Clinton’s speech constructs the LGBT in the shadows in this way, the idea that homosexuality is unsafe because of unregulated and undomesticated perverse sexual practices creeps into it. Indeed, perverse homosexuality and the perverse homosexual are the haunting anchors of a social and national history— the only history of the LGBT referenced in Clinton’s speech—that no nation wants to (re)visit or (re)live. As such, these perverse, wrongly living and wrongly loving homosexuals who love homosexual sex more than they love their nation are crucial to Clinton’s ability to champion the properly loving LGBT as the normal homosexual who holds the promise of a brighter, happier future. By sneaking this specific understanding of the homosexual into her speech, then, Clinton not only retains the perverse homosexual who practices perverse homosexuality as a haunting historical and social figure. She also deploys this figure in two additional ways. First, she deploys it as her trump card to make her case for why the LGBT as the normal homosexual holds the promise of better social and national relations. Second, she evokes it as the specter of the costs of not recognizing gay rights as human rights. This leads us to Clinton’s fourth and final move. This move is to connect the normal and perverse sexualized characters of the LGBT and the LGBT in the shadows to normal and perverse international characters (see Box 11.6). As we saw above, normal international characters are those who (from Clinton’s point of view) help to establish and/or progress normal international order. Those who threaten this project are perverse international characters.

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Box 11.6  How are Clinton’s “the LGBT” and “the LGBT in the shadows” internationalized? Clinton’s “LGBT” is that normal sexualized character who stands for and within the “normal international order” which believes in the universalization of “gay rights as human rights and human rights as gay rights.” Clinton’s “LGBT in the shadows” is that perverse sexualized character whose unregulated “dangerous foreignness” is an anarchical force that threatens the “normal international order” and must be tamed by universalizing “gay rights as human rights and human rights as gay rights.”

Perverse international characters embody anarchy because they embody dangerous foreignness. Clinton’s LGBT is that normal sexualized character who stands for the establishment of the progressive international order Clinton envisions. In that order, gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights. Clinton’s LGBT in the shadows is that perverse sexualized character who stands in the way of Clinton’s vision. This is because the LGBT in the shadows embodies not just threatening perverse homosexuality. It is also arguably because Clinton’s LGBT in the shadows embodies dangerous foreignness. For, quite strikingly, the LGBT in the shadows is a sexualized character who takes shape in Clinton’s discussions of a problem Clinton locates outside of the US (and the West). For Clinton’s LGBT in the shadows does not seem to lurk everywhere (anymore); it seems to lurk specifically in those (usually non-Western) countries that do not recognize gay rights as human rights. Clinton’s placement of the LGBT in the shadows in Botswana, an African and “global South” country, also brings into stark relief the implicit construction of Kantian universal humanity (and “the LGBT” who has now been welcomed into it) as white, and its outside as racially darkened. It is the dangerously perverse foreignness of the LGBT in the shadows which goes unregulated by foreign states that do not recognize gay rights as human rights that is a threat to the Obama administration’s progressive understanding of normal international order, which includes the universal implementation of policies that acknowledge gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights. This is why, as Clinton puts it, “The Obama Administration defends the human rights of LGBT people as part of our comprehensive human rights policy and as a priority of our foreign policy” (2011: 5). Considering these four moves together, you should notice that they rely upon and replicate exactly the moves noted by Queer IR theory—they place the normal vs. the perverse in a binary logic, they value the normal over the perverse, and while they expand the right way to live and love from heteronormativity to homonormativity, they preserve a limit on what is perverse. For Clinton, this is the LGBT in the shadows who practices unregulated, perverse homosexuality. These moves function at all levels—from the intimate to the international—to make Clinton’s case for gay rights as human rights and human rights as gay rights. From a Queer IR perspective, Clinton’s case is very normative in its reliance on the normal Westerner and homonormativity. But there is also something

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strange about how Clinton so neatly opposes the normal loving LGBT to the perverse LGBT in the shadows. This strangeness is not just in the very questionable ways Clinton uses sex, gender, and sexuality to intersect with race, class, religion (disability), and geopolitical location to construe these sexualized characters. It is also in the very either/or logic that underpins Clinton’s homonormative argument. It is this either/or logic that the film Love is Strange asks us to think about again in the context of homonormativity.

Love is Strange Love is Strange is not a flashy film. Rather, it is the antithesis of some of the blockbuster films we have looked at in this book. Its pace is slow. Its story is nuanced to the point of being dull. Its use of art house shots—especially of its sun-strewn finale—are held too long, to the point that they feel overdone. It is a film that wears its affect on its sleeve in its cinematography, its soundtrack, and its dialogue. Yet all these things perfectly complement its story. They accentuate the ordinariness of its central characters, our hope in the future of love, and the value we place on long-term relationships with all of their problems. Together, these elements seem to elevate the film’s protagonists Ben (John Lithgow) and George (Alfred Molina) into universal characters. They seem to be so exemplary of the ordinary long-term couple that reviewer after reviewer remarked that Love is Strange is a universal story about any couple and a couple’s relationship to family. This may also explain why the film won in the Best Grownup Love Story category at the American Association of Retired Persons Movies for Grownups Awards (http:// www.imdb.com/title/tt2639344/awards?ref_=tt_awd). The film tells the story of Ben and George, an aging, white, professional, cis-gendered, and gay couple who live in contemporary New York City. After 39 years together, they decide to get married. The film charts the unexpected crisis that ensues from this decision, as well as the support of family, friends, and strangers that helps to see the couple through this crisis. The ordinariness of the couple is established in the film’s opening sequence. To a soundtrack of piano music, the film opens with a shot of intertwined legs at the end of a bed. This is an early morning shot of Ben and George. As the couple rise, they go through their mundane morning routines and partake in some mild bickering, while others prepare their flat for a special event. For this is Ben and George’s wedding day. If the wedding scene emphasizes the legal equality Ben and George have as a same-sex couple to marry in New York, the afterparty elevates Ben and George from just another ordinary couple into an extraordinary one. This happens when Kate, the wife of Ben’s nephew Elliot, makes a speech about love. Kate recounts how Elliot, her then husband-to-be, wanted her to meet his Uncle Ben. Kate—So I understood (oh my, I’m gonna cry) I understood that he was proposing to me because you guys—your love, your dedication, your commitment to each other—are an example to be followed. May this love, may this marriage—last forever and beyond. To Ben and George.

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The film cuts from the party to George back at work, conducting a children’s choir at a Catholic church school. Cut to George across the desk from his boss. With reluctance and remorse, George’s boss has summoned George to fire him. The grounds for his firing is his marriage to Ben. The scene begins with George’s boss reading from a document. Boss:

…respect ecclesiastic authority, not take a position contrary to the Catholic church George: Are you going to read me the whole witness statement, Father? Boss: The Christian witness statement, George. You signed it when you took this job. George: How long have we known each other, Father? Boss: Doesn’t answer. Just sighs. George: 12 years, 12 years. Boss: You have to understand. George: (increasingly angry) Understand what? Boss: That day, when you announced you were getting married…. George: You’ve all known this whole time that Ben and I have been living together. Boss: Word got out to the archdiocese. Then someone showed pictures to the Bishop of you and Ben in Petra [honeymoon place]. On Facebook of all places. George: I wouldn’t have done anything any differently. Boss: I’m not saying you should have, George. But the Bishop wasn’t happy. He then fires George, effective immediately. Before George departs, George’s boss invites George to pray. Boss: It’s important that you don’t question your faith. George: Thank you very much, Father. I still believe in Jesus Christ as my savior. That won’t change. But at this moment, I think I’d like to pray on my own. Losing George’s job puts the couple in crisis, in part because Ben is an “undiscovered artist” who contributes little or nothing to their finances. It leaves them both without health insurance, without an income, and unable to afford their flat. The good news is that they’ve found a buyer for their flat. The (further) bad news is that they have nowhere to live until they find a rent-controlled place they can afford. All of this is revealed in the next scene, in which Ben and George ask blood relations and chosen family to take them in. They don’t want to live out of the city with the only family who can take them both in. This means that their only choice is to live separately until their situation is resolved, as no one in the city can accommodate the two of them. Ben is taken in by Elliot and Kate who live in Brooklyn, where he shares a room with their son Joey. George lives with a young gay couple in their building, sleeping on the sofa of their living room. A sad piano sonata plays as this decision is made. This is the end of the opening set of scenes. What these scenes tell us is how the film makes sense of the world and what it says is typical and deviant in that world. How does the film make sense of the world (see Box 11.7)? The film suggests that the loving couple is the fundamental formation that allows one to cope in the world. All of this happens in small and big ways— through small intimacies and routines of care like those Ben and George perform

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Box 11.7  How does the film make sense of the world? The film suggests that the loving couple is the fundamental formation that allows one to cope in the world because it is harder to live as happily apart from the person you love.

on the morning of their wedding, through their economic interdependence that has sustained them as a couple and now threatens to tear their home apart, and through family and kinship circles that support Ben and George in their time of crisis. The loving couple may not be perfect. Couples have petty arguments, and they hold grudges against one another. But as hard as it can be to live as a couple, the film suggests that it is harder to live as happily apart from the person you love. By centering the loving couple as fundamental to happiness, the film suggests that the loving couple should be supported and defended in the face of hardship. The hardship faced by Ben and George is their loss of economic means and healthcare because their marriage led to the loss of George’s job. The world of Love is Strange makes sense in these terms only because of how it casts what is typical and deviant in this world (see Box 11.8). What the film says is typical is not just to support and defend the loving couple. What is typical is to support and defend any loving couple, no matter their sexuality. What is typical, then, is to regard homosexuality as just as normal as heterosexuality, so that a marriage between two loving homosexual men who have been in a relationship for 39 years is as normal as any heterosexual marriage. What is deviant in the world of Love is Strange is for institutions to hold outdated ideas about the homosexual and about homosexuality that view them as perverse rather than as normal. It is also deviant for such outdated ideas to limit what rights extend to the same-sex loving couple—not just the legal right to marry (which is not at issue in this film) but also the moral right to exercise this legal right. It is because Ben and George openly exercise this moral right that the Bishop demands George be fired. As we reflect on these opening scenes, what we notice is that they do not just tell us how the film makes sense of the world and how the film establishes what is typical and deviant in that world. What we also notice is how the film makes the

Box 11.8  Typical and deviant The film suggests that it is typical to regard homosexuality as just as normal as heterosexuality. This means that a marriage between two loving homosexual men who have been in a relationship for 39 years is as normal as any heterosexual marriage. By contrast, the film casts as deviant those institutions that hold outdated ideas about the homosexual and about homosexuality, for instance, by characterizing homosexuality and homosexuals as perverse rather than as normal. It also suggests it is deviant for these ideas to limit what rights extend to the samesex loving couple.

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same moves in relation to sex, gender, and sexuality that Queer IR theory analyzes and that appear in Clinton’s speech (see Box 11.1). The film characterizes heterosexuality as well as homosexuality as normal. The film points to how institutional understandings of heteronormativity are embedded in some institutions like the Catholic church, while homonormative understandings are institutionalizing themselves in the state of New York (which only recently allowed same-sex marriage) and the liberal New York City family that treats Ben and George just like any other loving couple. This movement from less acceptable heteronormativity to what the film casts as more progressive homonormativity is what allows Ben and George—two men in a same-sex marriage—to be increasingly read as normal characters. That the Bishop reads them as perverse, the film suggests, is because he is out of sync with the times. The Bishop, through his dogmatic attachment to what the film depicts as an out-of-date interpretation of Catholicism, is a kind of “dangerous foreignness”—not as an “LGBT in the shadows” as it is in Clinton’s speech but as a figure who keeps the LGBT from having the right to have rights in ways that are unacceptable according to contemporary standards of who should be considered “normal.” This is dangerous in and of itself, according to Clinton’s myth, because it can drive the LGBT into the shadows (i.e., toward the unregulated practice of the wrong kind of love). Because the film’s early scenes duplicate the same moves Clinton makes in her speech, it at first appears as if they follow the same logic and fully support the same myth. They, too, seem to operate according to a binary logic that opposes the normal to the perverse. People may disagree about which side of the binary Ben and George belong on—their family see them as normal; the Bishop sees them as perverse. But nevertheless, each person and institution places them on one side or the other of the normal vs. perverse binary. Second, the normal is always valued over the perverse. When George marries Ben and is re-characterized as perverse by the Bishop, we suspect the Bishop’s reading of George as morally perverse and firing him has as much to do with George practicing the wrong kind of love as it has to do with George publicly contradicting church doctrine. It is because Ben and George’s family has expanded their notion of the right kind of love to include the loving same-sex couple that Ben and George are embraced as normal. That Ben and George are also read as white, Western, professional, (presumptively) Christian, cis-men solidifies their reading as normal. As with Clinton’s myth, the film suggests those who are truly enlightened—Ben and George’s family rather than the Bishop—are morally progressive around sexuality, even if they remain less progressive around things like race, class, and (dis)ability. That does not mean that Ben and George’s family would see all gay men or their sexual practices as normal. Just like Clinton, they would have a limit, and that limit is at those practices and people characterized by engaging in the wrong kind of love. The wrong kind of love is, once again, the unregulated love of perverse homosexuality and the perverse homosexual. This perverse character is akin to Clinton’s “LGBT in the shadows.” In all of these ways, “Love is Strange” illustrates how Clinton’s myth gay right are human rights and human rights are gay rights functions and why Ben and George—two normal, loving human beings who happen to be in a same-sex marriage—require human rights as gay rights to protect them against financial, medical, and moral injustices.

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Except the film doesn’t end after these opening scenes. It’s just getting started. And what comes next challenges both the either/or binary logic of Clinton’s myth and the progressive, enlightened morality it seems to guarantee. Let’s start with the logic. Both Clinton’s myth and the film up to this point maintain that while we may disagree about whether the loving same-sex couple is normal or perverse, both also maintain that people or institutions have to choose one characterization of this couple or the other. This is how the either/or logic of the binary works: you characterize this couple as normal (like their family does) or you characterize this couple as perverse (like the Bishop does). Whatever your view, you have to choose either one characterization or another. You have to choose normal or perverse. You can’t have it both ways. What I want to argue is that Love is Strange refuses this binary either/or logic. In so doing, it shows that it isn’t as easy as it seems for the homosexual and homosexuality to be unconditionally accepted as normal, even within Western normality and homonormativity. This is because even the morally enlightened, liberal members of Ben and George’s family sometimes characterize them as perverse, at the very same time that they accept them as normal. Put differently, the either/ or logic that grounds Clinton’s speech is challenged by the and/or logic of Love is Strange. This means that the loving couple in Clinton’s speech is either normal or perverse, while the loving couple in the film is both normal and perverse and normal or perverse at the same time. To make that less abstract, let’s consider another key scene in the film. Ben has come to live with his nephew Elliot and Elliot’s wife and son, Kate and Joey. We find Ben on the rooftop of the family home, painting a portrait of Joey’s friend Vlad. Joey and Vlad are maybe 14 or 15 years old. Vlad poses fully dressed, smiling, and holding his ever-present skateboard. The scene unfolds when Joey enters the rooftop. Joey: (angrily) What the fuck, Vlad! Vlad: (calm) I’m posing for your Uncle’s new masterpiece. Joey: That’s so gay. Ben: People have been modeling for painters for centuries now, Joe. All kinds of people. Vlad: He doesn’t mean homosexual, Uncle Ben. He just means stupid. Ben: Don’t worry, Vlad. Joey and I understand each other. Joey: (to Uncle Ben) You aren’t even a good artist anyway. Ben: Joey. Joey: What? (angry) Ben: I know you don’t mean that. Joey: Yeah, I do. If you were, you wouldn’t be sleeping in a bunk bed in your nephew’s house. Shortly afterwards, Ben descends into the main house to find Kate. Ben: Joey got very upset. He called Vlad gay, in quite an offensive fashion. Kate: Kids have expanded the meaning of gay beyond sexual orientation so… don’t get offended. Ben: I didn’t. I guess it just means stupid now.

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Kate: Yes, yes, I think that you’re right. Ben: I don’t know if Joey felt left out or…I don’t know what in the world was going through his mind. Kate: Well, he’s a teenager, and, ah, is it really appropriate to be using Joey’s friend as a model? Kate says this as she leaves the room. She keeps “humming and hawing” as she walks away, toward the camera, making her whole body into an uncomfortable question. Ben turns to watch her leave. His expression is one of shock. The scene ends with Ben slumping back into his chair, still trying to make sense of what just happened. This is followed by a scene in which Kate calls Mindy, Elliot’s sister, to see if she will take Ben and George in if they don’t find a place to live in the city. Ben interrupts the conversation. Ben: I wanted to talk to you about…earlier. Kate: It’s not. No. It’s fine. Ben: You sure? Kate: Yes, I’m talking to Mindy. She wants to know when you’re going to visit her in Poughkeepsie. Ben: (Releases big sigh) Well, send her my love. (Then to Kate) We can talk tomorrow. Ben leaves the room, looking even more troubled than before, as he seems to have understood two things from this conversation. One is Kate will not speak to him about what happened on the roof (indeed, we never see them speak of it again). And the other is that his welcome in Kate’s home is coming to an end. In another scene, George shows up unexpectedly at Kate and Elliot’s home late one evening. He is overcome with anguish because of his separation from Ben. In this intimate scene, George wordlessly enters the flat and sobs into Ben’s arms. “I’m sorry,” he finally chokes out, as Ben comforts him, replying “Don’t be silly.” Elliot and Kate both witness this reunion. Elliot uncomfortably shifts from foot to foot, all too aware of how his presence encroaches on what should be a private moment between his uncles. In contrast, Kate stares wide-eyed at the couple, whether with shock or wonder or envy we don’t know. It is Elliot who asks Joey to spend the night on the sofa, so his uncles can be together in Joey’s room for the night. This is the only night of their separation that Ben and George spend together. It is worth noting that all of the key scenes I’ve recounted here involve Kate. She is the one who asks if Ben should be painting Vlad. She is the one who can’t process George’s overwhelming grief in separation. She is presumably at least partly responsible for making Ben share a room with Joey. Yet recall the earlier scene in which Kate made her celebratory speech at Ben and George’s wedding party. It was Kate who told Elliot’s story of how Ben and George’s love was an example to them all. It was with this love as her ideal that Kate married Elliot, who is portrayed as a ghost-like figure in their marriage and in their marriage bed. It could be envy that turns Kate toward subtle homophobic

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behavior toward Ben and George. It could be something else. Whatever the motivation, the point is that Kate’s homophobia is directed at the same people who she also accepts as an example to us all of the loving couple. As an exemplary loving couple, Ben and George are normal for Kate, not perverse. They are not Clinton’s LGBT in the shadows because they love in the right way, the best of ways. But at the same time, Kate seems to regard Ben and George as perverse because their regulated right way to love merely accompanies but never fully replaces Kate’s idea of an unregulated, perverse way to love that she attaches to homosexuality and homosexuals. This is the case even though Kate is otherwise depicted as an enlightened, morally progressive person. It is this suspicion of perversion—the stereotype of the homosexual as a predatory pedophile—that Kate cannot detach from Ben. This, I would argue, is what is revealed in Kate’s comment to Ben, “Is it really appropriate to be using Joey’s friend as a model?” Other scenes suggest Ben and George aren’t treated by the family as a normal loving couple. For example, the metaphorical elephant in the room in the film is the question: If Ben and George were an opposite sex couple who lost their home, would they be housed in separate places by their family? I find this hard to imagine. Yes, New York City living spaces are small. But the scene in which George comes to Brooklyn and spends the night with Ben while Joey sleeps on the sofa tells us that there is another way to configure the space in this home that allows the family to accommodate Ben and George for a temporary period. It’s not an ideal solution, especially for Joey. But it’s possible. Yet it is never offered. Taken together, what scenes like these underscore is that Ben and George’s blood family do not treat them like just any other normal loving couple. With the odd homophobic comment or with the absurd decision to house them separately, the blood family treat Ben and George like a not-quite-normal loving couple. Scenes like these also underscore the conditionality of homonormativity and the limits of its institutionalization within not just the Bishop’s interpretation of the Catholic church but in the liberal progressive NYC family. This conditionality of homonormativity is also made explicitly through the film’s characters who do not necessarily read as white. How this works is like this: the less white a character seems to be, the more conservative and supportive of conservative institutions that character appears in the film. We see this with Ben and George. Ben’s whiteness is never in question, so it is Ben who is portrayed as the more radical of the two—a nonconforming artist who was not always monogamous. George, on the other hand, reads as a white Londoner, but he has an Hispanic surname. This is arguably why the film supplements George’s presumptive whiteness and the other things that make him homonormative (class, religion, marriage, etc.) with his formal affiliation to Christianity and with a faith that is unshaken even after he is fired. The film doesn’t do this with free-spirited Ben, who goes to the movies when George goes to church. The film’s characters who do not read as white or presumptively white have to work even harder to be accepted as good gays. We see this with the Hispanic couple who put George up. The film homonormativizes this young couple who selfishly party all night long in what is effectively George’s bedroom by placing them within another institution that ticks a homonormative box because it is seen to be

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protective of the nation—the New York Police Department (NYPD). Similarly, Doreen—the black female friend of this Hispanic couple who we suspect might be (but can’t be sure is) a lesbian—is also a member of the NYPD. While policing by the NYPD is some of the most contentious in the US, this is glossed over in the film, allowing “good police officers” to be cast as “good gays.” All of this suggests that the further a character strays from the white, Western, and cis-male ideal of “the good gay,” the more they must institutionally and apolitically align themselves with homonormative institutions. For all of these reasons, it comes as little surprise that it is not Ben and George’s blood and chosen family who get them out of their crisis. It is a white, presumptively cis-gay man who meets George at one of his host’s parties who does this. He offers Ben and George his rent-controlled flat, while he goes off to work in Mexico. But this happy ending for Ben and George comes too late. The evening they celebrate their good fortune, Ben dies. His weak heart—which was diagnosed earlier in the film when he had a fall but which was not treated because of the couple’s lack of health insurance—is his demise. The film ends with a visit from Joey to his Uncle George. As a possible recompense for his outburst at his Uncle Ben when he painted Joey’s friend Vlad, Joey gives Vlad’s half-painted portrait to George. This signals Joey no longer thinks of Uncle Ben as a kind of gay that means stupid. Instead, he sees Ben and George as his father Elliot sees them—as exemplary of an ideal kind of love. This is reinforced when Joey cries in the stairway before exiting the building to meet a girl he greets with a kiss. Together, the pair skateboard down an empty, sunlit NYC street. This overly romanticized celebration of the future of love does more than put its hope in a maturing youth who laments ever seeing perversion in his normal loving uncle. It brings homonormative closure to Ben’s character in another way. For it was Ben who advised Joey to take a risk on love. So it is in Ben and his idealized understanding of love that the film places its hope for future generations. This, the film suggests, is child rearing at its best. It is not surprising that Love is Strange would end on such a happy homonormative note, especially given the film’s release date in 2014. This was a time when same-sex marriage had been legalized in some cities and states in the US, a position that was embedded in US federal law by the Supreme Court in 2015. But it is disappointing. By having Joey—the character who stands for the future of love itself—accept his uncles’ love as not just fully normal but as his guiding influence, the film places its hope in both youthful love and the either/or logic of the right kind of love vs. the wrong kind of love. It tells us that the right kind of love can be homonormative, just as it can be heteronormative. And it tells us that just as the homonormative loving couple (Ben and George) can exemplify the right kind of love, the heteronormative couple (Joey’s parents) can be anything but exemplary (because of Kate’s homophobia and the couple’s apparently sexless if not loveless marriage). In making these final moves, the film returns to the idealism of its opening scenes which, as we noted early, is the very same idealism found in Clinton’s speech. That’s a shame, because it is the middle scenes of the film that tell us too much about Clinton’s myth. For in these middle scenes, the strangeness of love that exceeds and contradicts binary logics—in 2014 NYC that celebrates same-sex

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marriage and at the same time fails to protect same-sex partners with job or housing security and in the accepting and yet still homophobic family—gestures toward what must go without saying in order for Clinton’s myth to appear to be true. What Love is Strange tells us is that the happy homonormativity of its ending is rarely achieved, and when it is achieved, it is likely to be fleeting. This is because the logic of homonormativity is not either/or; it is and/or. In other words, homonormativity does not just oppose the right way to love to the wrong way to love. It maintains that the wrong way to love—perverse love—is always at least latent, even within the normal loving same-sex couple. Sure, the film tells us that Elliot and Kate’s heteronormativity marriage is not a model that Joey wants to follow. But the film never depicts this relationship as anything but normal. The same can’t be said for how the film depicts Ben and George’s homonormative marriage. Reading this understanding of homonormativity back onto Clinton’s speech, what this suggests is that homonormativity’s characterization of the perverse homosexual is not containable within the character of the LGBT in the shadows; rather, perverse homosexuality always lurks within homosexuality itself, even when it is homonormativized. This means that perverse homosexuality does not stand in opposition to homonormativity as its constitutive outside; rather, perverse homosexuality also permeates homonormativity as its constitutive inside as well. This is what must go without saying in order for Clinton’s myth gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay right to appear to be true. This is also, in a nutshell, homonormativity’s rationale for regulating love, desire, sexual acts, and subjects.

Love is regulated What are the implications of this Queer IR reading of Love is Strange for Clinton’s myth? This Queer IR reading does not suggest that Clinton’s myth shouldn’t embrace gay rights as human rights and human rights as gay rights, in spite of the many critiques of human rights and identity politics (for discussion, see Weber, 2016: Chapter 5). Rather, the most important implication of this Queer IR reading of Clinton’s myth is to suggest this: the achievement and protection of human rights for gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people requires us to acknowledge, articulate, and challenge what must go without saying in Clinton’s myth—that homonormativity does not characterize the homosexual and other gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people as normal vs. perverse; homonormativity characterizes them as normal and/or perverse. What homonormativity suggests will keep the homosexual and others as normal as possible is their regulation. Arguing for the regulation of, for example, homosexuality and the homosexual seems to be a big step away from arguments for the eradication of homosexuality and the homosexual. My argument is that they are not as different to one another as we might think.

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This is because embracing the idea that the homosexual, for example, has perverse tendencies lurking within it is used by some to justify its regulation and by others to justify its elimination. These justifications for regulation and elimination are on a continuum from bad to worse. They run, for example, from chastising the homosexual’s presumed latent pedophilia (as Kate does) to political, social, and religious institutions regulating sex for homosexual couples within marriage just as it does for heterosexual couples (sometimes by promoting same-sex marriage) to attempting to convert homosexuals into heterosexuals (a movement that is on the rise again, as depicted in the 2018 films The Miseducation of Cameron Post and Boy Erased) to failing to accord homosexuals the same rights as heterosexuals (as in US laws that allow discrimination in employment and housing against homosexuals) to criminalizing homosexuality (often as a result of the legacy of British colonial antihomosexuality laws) to punishing homosexuals with the death penalty (which was legal in 12 nation-states in 2019). The degrees of overt violence from regulation to eradication are very different, but the idea that justifies them all is that the homosexual and other gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people are always (potentially still) perverse. And the perversion assumption remains attached to these people because of the sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit assumption that (unregulated) homosexuality and gender expression embody or lead to the wrong kind of love. That is the argument from heteronormativity that goes without saying in homonormativity. It is vital that we make this argument explicit. For it is this argument and arguments like it that justify the rise of a variety of homophobic, biphobic, and transphobic practices in the contemporary world. To my mind, the attitudes and crimes against gender variant, gender non-conforming, and gender expanding people are not occurring just as a backlash against the promotion or uptake of homonormativity (as we saw, e.g., in President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence’s USA). They are also happening because homonormativity’s “and/ or” logic characterizes the homosexual as not just normal but also at the same time (potentially) perverse. To increase the likelihood that gender variant, gender nonconforming, and gender expanding people will be guaranteed the right to have rights and the right to exercise their rights just like anyone else, this logic must be recognized and refused at every scale. Because Clinton’s myth gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights does not challenge this underlying logic of homonormativity, her myth appears to be true. What I’ve suggested here is that this is one important reason why Clinton’s myth is not acted upon in the world as the universal truth she proclaims it to be.

Suggestions for further thinking Topic 1: Postcolonial and Decolonial Queer IR Since the early 2000s, there has been increasing engagement by IR scholars with issues of “race,” racism, and colonialism. While the discipline had largely failed to reckon with and reflect on its “deeply compromised historical lineage” up until this point (Bell, 2013), numerous interventions have since appeared regarding both racism in the history of international thought, and how “race” and racialization

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shape international politics (see Capan, 2017; Rutazibwa, 2016; Zondi, 2018; as well as other cited works throughout this book). While the disciplinary formation of Queer IR and Global LGBT studies does not mirror this development exactly—not least because it is difficult to speak of disciplinary “consolidation” in these fields due to their varied locations within the academy—both fields have certainly faced similar problems of erasure of black, POC, and Indigenous voices and a dominance of white, Western, and settler perspectives (Blackwell, Briggs and Chiu, 2015; Driskill, 2010; Smith and Kauanui, 2008). Yet this dominance does not mean Queer IR (or Global LGBT Studies) is a white, Western (sub)discipline—quite the contrary. Melanie RichterMontpetit (2018) points out that the antiessentialism of queer theory is rooted not only in poststructuralism but also has intellectual forebears in Black Lesbian and Women of Color theorizing—the Combahee River Collective Statement (1974) is a case in point. Further, a number of scholars have contested the view, expressed most famously by Joseph Massad, that “gay” and “lesbian” are quintessentially Western subject positions which have been materialized in postcolonial, Arab states by an orientalist formation he calls the “gay international” (2002). Instead, scholars like Momin Rahman (2010) and Sahar Amer (2012) argue that there are a number of strategic, affective, and historical reasons why gender nonconformining individuals in postcolonial and so-called “Global South” states might identify as gay or lesbian—or why they might in fact invoke different communities and terminologies. It may be interesting to discuss Massad’s claim of a “gay international” alongside the work of Rahul Rao on what he calls “gay conditionality” (2012). While Massad appears to suggest that modernity and human rights claims of sexual subjectivities are inevitably the property of Western liberal states, Rao investigates how Western states enact foreign policies based on these exact assumptions. Importantly, he troubles the all-too-easy alignment between modernity, progressive stances on sexuality, and the West and asks what the implications are for queer transnational solidarity.

Suggested reading Amer, Sahar (2012) “Naming to Empower: Lesbianism in the Arab Islamicate World Today,” Journal of Lesbian Studies 16(4): 381–397. Bell, Duncan (2013) “Race and International Relations: Introduction,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26(1): 1–4. Blackwell, Maylei, Laura Briggs, and Mignonette Chiu (2015) “Transnational Feminisms Roundtable,” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 36(3): 1–24. Capan, Zeynep Gulsah (2017) “Decolonising International Relations?” Third World Quarterly 38(1): 1–15. Combahee River Collective (1983) “The Combahee River Collective Statement,” in Barbara Smith (ed.) Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, pp. 272–282. Driskill, Qwo-Li (2010) “Doubleweaving Two-Spirit Critiques: Building Alliances between Native and Queer Studies,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 16(1–2): 69–92.

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G l o b a l L G BT s t u d i e s Massad, Joseph Andoni (2002) “Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World,” Public Culture 14(2): 361–385. Rahman, Momin (2010) “Queer as Intersectionality: Theorizing Gay Muslim Identities,” Sociology 44(5): 944–961. Rao, Rahul (2012) “On ‘Gay Conditionality’, Imperial Power and Queer Liberation,” [Online] Kafila. Available at: https://kafila.online/2012/01/01/on-gay-conditionalityimperial-power-and-queer-liberation-rahul-rao/ [Accessed 12 December 2019]. Rutazibwa, Olivia Umurerwa (2016) “From the Everyday to IR: In Defence of the Strategic Use of the R-Word,” Postcolonial Studies 19(2): 191–200. Smith, Andrea and J. Kēhaulani Kauanui (2008) “Native Feminisms Engage American Studies,” American Quarterly 60(2): 241–249. Zondi, Siphamandla (2018) “Decolonising International Relations and Its Theory: A Critical Conceptual Meditation,” Politikon 45(1): 16–31.

Topic 2: Thinking with and beyond (US) romantic love Classic Queer Studies texts have always thought with and beyond notions of romantic love that are foundational to Hillary Clinton’s formulation of “gay rights as human rights and human rights as gay rights.” We, of course, see this in the writing of Michel Foucault (1980), and we saw this in the work of Lauren Berlant and Daniel Warner (1998) in their formulation of “heteronormativity,” and we saw it in Lisa Duggan’s (2003) formulation of “homonormativity.” Like Clinton, many of these US-based scholars have been most preoccupied with (critiques of) samesex marriage and its legalization. How what Myrl Beam (2018) calls the “love pivot” functions to regulate and restrict sexual and gender minoritized people and their activist aspirations is a case in point. Beam’s analysis explores the celebratory #lovewins campaign that erupted when same-sex marriage rights were enshrined in US federal law. Yet Queer Studies has long tried to reach beyond a US-centric focus. For example, when David Eng, Jack Halberstam, and Jose Muñoz (2005) asked “What’s queer about queer studies now?,” one of their answers was that Queer Studies had become Transnational and/or Global Queer Studies. And formulations of love and other queer intimacies were central to this shift, as, for example, Jasbir Puar’s (2007) reworking of Duggan’s homonormativity into the concept of homonationalism and Gayatri Gopinath’s (2005) tracking of impossible desires around queer intimacies and diasporas demonstrates. IR scholars were also crucial to this move. V. Spike Peterson’s (2017b, 2018; see also interview by Elena Barabantseva and Aoileann Ní Mhurchú, 2018) work on love, families, and queer intimacies has been pathbreaking in this respect. And the work of later generations of Queer IR scholars like Anna Agathangelou (2004) and Melanie RichterMontpetit (2018) embed and further these insights. What all these IR scholars also do is widen considerations of what love means and what love can do in global politics, far beyond what Clinton imagines. An excellent illustration of this is how Sabiha Allouche (2019) considers how “intersectarian love” functions as “a counter-discourse that threatens the masculinist foundations of the Lebanese state” in post-Civil War Lebanon.

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Suggested reading Agathangelou, Anna M. (2004) The Global Political Economy of Sex: Desire, Violence, and Insecurity in Mediterranean Nation States. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Allouche, Sabiha (2019) “Queering Heterosexual (Intersectarian) Love in Lebanon,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 51(4): 547–565. Beam, Myrl (2018) “What’s Love Got to Do With It?: Queer Politics and the ‘Love Pivot,’” in J. N. DeFilippis, M. W. Yarbrough and A. Jones (eds) Queer Activism After Marriage Equality. London: Routledge, pp. 53–60. Berlant, Lauren and Michael Warner (1998) “Sex in Public,” Critical Inquiry 24(2): 547–566. Duggan, Lisa (2003) The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy. Boston, MA: Beacon. Eng, David L., Judith Halberstam, and José Esteban Muñoz (2005) “What’s Queer About Queer Studies Now?,” special issue of Social Text 23(3–4): 84–85. Foucault, Michel (1980) The History of Sexuality, the Will to Knowledge, trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Random House. Puar, Jasbir (2007). Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Gopinath, Gayatri (2005) Impossible Desires: Queer Diasporas and South Asian Public Cultures. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Peterson, V. Spike (2017b) “Rethinking, Returning, Reflecting,” Alternatif Politika/The Journal of Alternative Politics 9(3): 325–342. Peterson, V. Spike (2018) “Intimacy, Informalization and Intersecting Inequalities: Tracing the Linkages,” Labour & Industry: A Journal of the Social and Economic Relations of Work 28(2): 130–145. Peterson, V. Spike, Elena Barabantseva, and Aoileann Ní Mhurchú (2018) “On Intimacy, Geopolitics and Discipline: Elena Barabantseva and Aoileann Ní Mhurchú in Conversation With V. Spike Peterson,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 20(2): 258–271. Richter-Montpetit, Melanie (2018) “Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex (in IR) but Were Afraid to Ask: The ‘Queer Turn’ in International Relations,” Millennium 46(2): 220–240.

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12

Conclusion What does it all mean?

How IR theory makes sense of the world Making sense of IR theory The politics of the popular Where does all of this leave us?

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So far, we have concerned ourselves with how meanings are produced, mythologized, circulated, and contested in, through, and as culture, ideology, and IR theory. We’ve done this by thinking broadly about culture and ideology and then using what we have learned about these concepts to consider what makes some of the stories IR theory tells about the world appear to be true. How we have done this is by focusing on what I have called IR myths, apparent truths upon which IR traditions rely in order to appear to be true. And we have considered the relationships among IR theory, IR traditions, and IR myths by consulting not only classic statements in the IR literature but also popular ideas about international politics and everyday life found in popular films. This is what we have done. But why have we done it? What is at stake in this exercise of rethinking IR theory through culture, ideology, mythology, and popular film? What does it all mean? I will address these questions by raising two more: how does IR theory make sense of the world?; and what does IR theory say is typical and deviant in that world? Addressing these questions will allow me to consider how our IR myths work not only individually but also together. And this will lead us to a discussion of the politics of IR theory, of “the popular,” and of storytelling generally.

How IR theory makes sense of the world Up to this point, we have analyzed how IR theory makes sense of the world by asking questions about the stories told through individual IR myths. But what if we take our questions about sense-making and storytelling and apply them to IR theory as a whole? Then we will get an idea of how our individual IR myths work together—not only as a set of individual stories about international politics but also as a general framework for storytelling. To do this, let’s return to those two questions that have guided us through our individual myths and recast them for IR theory generally: 1 2

How does IR theory make sense of the world? What does IR theory say is typical and deviant in that world?

Mainstream IR theory (represented by realism, idealism, and Wendtian constructivism) makes sense of the world by focusing on specific actors, contexts, and interactions. As our first three myths tell us, the actors that matter in international politics are sovereign nation-states. According to realist, idealist, and constructivist myths, sovereign nation-states may just exist (as they seem to for realists and idealists) or their identities and interests may be the effects of practices (as constructivists claim). But in mainstream IR theory, both claims amount to the same thing. States are the fundamental actors in international politics, and all analysis of important events must begin and end with states. The context in which states interact for mainstream IR theorists is not “international politics” broadly defined but the tightly theorized realm of international anarchy. All mainstream IR theorists agree on the importance of international anarchy for understanding international politics. Debates and disagreements about the nature of anarchy (what it is “really” like) and the effects of anarchy

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Sovereign nation-states

Context

International anarchy

Interactions

Practices of states and statespeople to confront and possibly resolve questions of war and peace

(what anarchy makes states do) only serve to underscore the importance which mainstream IR theorists attach to anarchy. Finally, mainstream IR theorists concern themselves with sovereign nationstates in a situation of international anarchy because they are worried about a specific set of international interactions. These international interactions are found in what is often called the world of “high politics,” a world that focuses on diplomatic practices, on wars among sovereign nation-states, and increasingly on international economic issues like globalization. Other international interactions pale in comparison to the “serious” questions of war and peace and the “serious” activities undertaken by statespeople to confront and possibly resolve these issues (see Table 12.1). As we read through the concerns and considerations of mainstream IR theory, we quickly notice that Jones’s, Fukuyama’s, Huntington’s, Gore’s, and Clinton’s myths also meet all of these criteria. While this might at first strike us as surprising, it shouldn’t. Let us consider each of these authors in turn. Jones is in some ways the least straightforward mainstream mythologizer, for his myth “gender is a variable” seems to honor and expand the place of gender studies in IR theory. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 5, the effect of Jones’s myth is to protect the classical tradition of IR theory from feminist challenges. In so doing, it enables mainstream IR theory to carry on making myths about sovereign nationstates, anarchy, and diplomatic practice. In Fukuyama’s case, his myth “it is the end of history” not only describes the “triumph” of liberal capitalism in an era of so-called globalization. It also seeks to explain questions of war and peace. So it divides the anarchical world of international politics in two—liberal sovereign nation-states in posthistory and notyet-liberal sovereign nation-states in history. And then it claims wars will occur between liberal and not-yet liberal states as well as among not-yet-liberal states, until the ideal of liberalism manifests itself in all states. So, even though he got there differently, Fukuyama fits in with mainstream IR concerns. Similarly, so too does Huntington. Like Fukuyama, Huntington relies not on realism or idealism or some supposed bridge between them to describe contemporary conflict. He instead goes back to the tenets of modernization and development theory. But remember that modernization and development theory’s roots are in fighting the Cold War. Security has always been a hidden agenda of this tradition. All Huntington’s work has done and continues to do is accentuate the security agenda of modernization and development theory. And so sovereign nation-states, anarchy, and states at war in anarchy are of as much concern to Huntington as they are to Waltz, Kegley, and Wendt. Even Al Gore’s myth “human-made climate change is an inconvenient truth” fits easily within traditional IR theory concerns. For while it appears that Gore’s

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concerns about the clash between humans and the environment (“culture” and “nature”) transcend the petty policies of everyday international politics, in fact Gore’s claims rest upon traditional idealist strategic understandings of cooperation and conflict among states and individuals in an anarchic international order and upon idealist economic understandings that “all good things go together,” like economic growth and environmental sustainability. While Hillary Clinton’s myth “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights” appears to be only about love and welcoming “the LGBT” into the realm of human-rights-holding subjects, upon closer inspection this myth is also concerned with security questions and relations between sovereign states. Recall that the norm of international order relies on the circulation of “normal” international sexualized characters, while anarchy is imagined as a proliferation of “perverse” international characters. Clinton’s call to bring the LGBT “out of the shadows” is an international public policy recommendation for the maintenance of security between sovereign states. Of the theorists we considered, it is only Hardt and Negri as well as Graeber who examine war and peace in a nontraditional way. Hardt and Negri make three nontraditional claims. First, sovereign nation-states matter less than the logic of Empire. Second, Empire is not just the new world order; it is the new world orderer. So anarchy myths are beside the point. And, third, this means that explanations of war and peace among sovereign nation-states in a situation of international anarchy are trivial compared with explanations of the logic of Empire and the multitude’s resistances to it. What this discussion suggests is that one would be hard pressed to find an IR theorist who does not take seriously questions of war and peace or of conflict more generally. But it also suggests that it is not hard to find IR theorists who contest the terms in which these questions are asked. One of the reasons for this is that, as mainstream IR theorists tell their stories about international politics and construct a template through which all “serious” stories about IR theory must be told (must focus on states, anarchy, and diplomatic practice), they are (as we have seen in our individual IR myths) proscribing what is typical and deviant in the world of international politics and in the culture of IR theory. While mainstream IR theorists are happy to discuss what is typical and deviant in their world of international politics, they are less comfortable with interrogating the mainstream (dominant) culture of IR theory. So, for example, following from how IR theorists make sense of the world (through states, anarchy, and diplomatic practice), IR theorists come up with some compelling “truths” about the world of international politics. What is typical and deviant in this world in some ways depends upon which tradition of IR theory one subscribes to (realism, idealism, and constructivism). For realists, the harsh realities of international life mean we will never overcome conflict among sovereign nation-states because we will never escape international anarchy (Chapter 2). Or, in Huntington’s terms, we will never solve the problem of security under anarchy in relation to development among clashing civilizations (Chapter 8). For idealists, we might escape conflict either by moving out of international anarchy into an international hierarchy led by a world government, or we may escape conflict by mitigating state behavior through an international society (Chapter 3). Or, in Fukuyama’s terms, we will escape the conflicts of anarchy when

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all sovereign nation-states become liberal, posthistorical states (Chapter 6). For constructivists, international outcomes are unclear. They will be conflictual (as realists claim) or cooperative (as idealists claim) depending upon what states make of anarchy (Chapter 4). For Global LGBT Studies (Chapter 11), extending the international human rights framework to “normal” LGBT subjects will encourage the circulation of “normal” international characters and thus help stabilize an international order, while preventing the circulation of “perverse” international characters and a descent into anarchy. Yet while mainstream IR theorists cannot agree on what is typical and deviant within their general framework of states, anarchy, and diplomatic practice, critics of mainstream IR theory have no trouble showing what their general theoretical framework for analysis makes typical and deviant for IR theory. Not only does mainstream IR theory unduly confine analysis of international politics to questions about states, anarchy, and diplomatic/policy practices. In so doing, it is also typically ethnocentric, racist, classist, and sexist. The North American centrism of mainstream IR theory begins with the nationalities of its authors, all of whom are North American, and this tells us something about which authors matter in the discipline of international relations (they are predominantly male, all are middle or upper class, and all but one is white). But, of course, an author’s own subject position does not doom him or her to write from that position alone. Yet we find ethnocentric and other biases reproduced in our individual IR myths. Kegley’s myth “there is an international society” is among the examples of ethnocentrism, for in this myth Kegley seems to mistake post-Cold War US hegemony for an international society (Chapter 3). More boldly, Al Gore’s idealist-infected environmental myth is grounded upon arguments that justify environmental behavior for US Americans because these behaviors are in the US’s strategic and economic national interest (Chapter 9). Fukuyama’s myth is another example. The liberalism that he so staunchly defends and supports the spread of globally is an Anglo-American-centric ideology, the power politics of which is never discussed (Chapter 6). And, of course, however much Huntington claims to give agency to “the rest” of the world, his “clash of civilizations” myth reads “the rest” primarily as a problem for “the West.” Race is another concept that seems to drop out of traditional IR theory. It seems to be assumed that the world of IR theory and international politics, like the world of most of the authors of our IR myths, is a white world. And white is taken as a nonrace, as beyond race (Dyer, 1997). This may explain why few of our myths explicitly address race. Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama (our one nonwhite theorist) both bring race into play in their theories, but they do so in ways that preserve the centrality of white cultures at the expense of nonwhite ones (Ling, 2000; Said, 2001). The Kantian notion of the universal human, which Clinton mobilizes for her myth “gay rights are human rights,” is steeped in racialized assumptions as it circumscribes who counts as fully human to white, Western subjects. This Kantian, implicit racialization-as-white of universal humanity is perpetuated by Clinton, who relies on it to distinguish between “normal” and “perverse” LGBTs. Class is another of those concepts which sits uncomfortably in relation to mainstream IR theory. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, all of our authors writing in defense of mainstream IR theory are North American (and all

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but one is the US). Second, and relatedly, class has never been a concept that has been terribly well interrogated in the US. Most US citizens of whatever economic or social group would call themselves “middle class.” Because of this, class often drops out of every day and academic analyses. It is no exception in our mainstream IR myths. Nowhere is there any consideration of either economic or social classes (or even categories) within states, nor is there an analysis of classes of states (see Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, 1989). Worse still, myths like Fukuyama’s myth “it is the end of history” with its positive spin on globalization obscure class relations within and among sovereign nation-states, making any analysis of them all the more difficult (Chapter 6). If class is not considered in IR theory, then analysis of the power relations that keep some people, groups, and states “upper class” in international politics (like being “great powers” or a hegemon) and other states in a “lower class” of international politics (like “third world” or “postcolonial” states) will not find its way into core IR myths. It is only Hardt and Negri’s myth of Empire (written from a nonmainstream, neo-Marxist perspective) and Graeber’s myth of the 99 percent (written from a new anarchist perspective) that give any serious consideration to class. Finally, mainstream IR theory is gendered, and its gender is primarily masculine. Jones’s lament aside (Chapter 5), and Clinton’s address of “the LGBT” being no exception (Chapter 11), IR theory has traditionally taken masculinely engendered bodies and activities to be its objects of analysis, whether those gendered bodies/activities are (borrowing the title from Waltz’s book) men, states, or war. Whether looking to realism or idealism, the theories of “human” nature that IR theorists draw upon as building blocks of their theories about individuals, states, and their interactions are theories about the “nature” of man (Chapter 2). As a result, not only are individuals gendered in IR theory. So too do we find “gendered states” (Peterson, 1992) and gendered activities like war (masculine) and peace (feminine) (Elshtain, 1987). And, as a reading of Jones’s myth through Fatal Attraction highlights, when relationships among gendered bodies are considered by mainstream IR theorists, they seem to be exclusively heterosexual (Peterson, 1999; Weber, 1999). Taken together, mainstream IR theory makes sense of the world by focusing on states, anarchy, and diplomatic practice in ways that draw upon a particularly biased way of thinking about place, race, class, sex, and sexuality. All of this is typical of mainstream IR theory. And if this is what is typical of mainstream IR theory, then it is easy to see how theories of international politics that defy and/or question the terms in which IR theory tells its stories about the world are labeled deviant. How Jones does this in relation to feminist IR theory is the most elaborated example in this text (Chapter 5). Other examples are how constructivism constructs poststructuralism as deviant (Chapter 4), how liberal theories of globalization construct historical materialism as deviant (Chapter 6) (see Table 12.2), how Global LGBT Studies positions itself in relation to Queer IR (Chapter 11), and how traditional IR theories about anarchy (Chapters 2–4) make anarchism deviant (Chapter 10). This is not to suggest that feminism, poststructuralism, historical materialism, queer theory, and anarchism are free of any bias. These alternative perspectives on international politics depend upon their own mythologized understandings of the world, and their myths often employ the same or similar

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Conclusion Table 12.2  What is typical and deviant for IR theory? Typical

Deviant

• • • • •

To defy or question the terms in which IR theory tells stories about international politics

North-American centric Racist Classist Masculinist Hetero-/homonormative

types of exclusions that mainstream IR theory does. For example, as we saw in Chapter 7, Hardt and Negri’s myth “Empire is the new world order” must exclude by selectively remembering what postmodern theorists say about ontology/ agency and resistance in order to appear to be true. And in Chapter 10, we saw how Graeber’s myth “We are the 99 percent” must equate battling for individual liberties in public with constituting a new public like the 99 percent in order to appear to be true. The point, however, is that these alternative perspectives make some of the same “mistakes” as traditional IR theory in different ways—ways which challenge the postulates for storytelling found in mainstream IR theory. It is for this reason—and not because they are themselves “true stories”—that these alternative takes on international politics are “deviant” from the perspective of traditional IR theory.

Making sense of IR theory If this is how IR theory makes sense of the world—both the world of international politics and the world of IR theory—then how do we make sense of IR theory? What does all of this tell us about how IR theory relates to culture, ideology, mythology, and popular media like film? And, most crucially, where is the politics in all of this? The argument put forward in this book is that IR theory is a site of cultural practice. It is a place where stories that make sense of our world are spun, where signifying practices about international politics take place, where meanings about international life are produced, reproduced, and exchanged. We have seen all of this illustrated in our IR myths. Each of them makes sense of the world by telling a particular story about international politics. When we read these myths together (as we did in the last section), we find that IR theory is a site of cultural practice not only because it provides us with “an ensemble of stories” we tell about international politics (Geertz, 1975: 448). What is more important is that IR theory is a site of cultural practice because it provides a framework for storytelling itself. Culturally, IR theory tells us not only what makes sense in the world of international politics out there, but also which stories in the realm of international theory we should take seriously in classrooms, at conferences, and in policy meetings. What this means is that how IR theory makes sense of the world through the stories it tells about international politics (either via specific myths like “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war” or through broader traditions like

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realism) is already indebted to the template for storytelling that these IR myths and IR theories depend upon in order to appear to be meaningful, serious, and important. This has unsettling implications for mainstream IR theory. For what it means is that we cannot understand international politics by adopting an IR tradition as our guide or by memorizing IR’s sacred myths. This is because IR traditions and myths are both products of and productive of IR theory as a cultural site where “giving and taking of meaning” (Hall, 1997: 2) about international politics and about IR theory itself occurs. In other words, IR theory as a model for storytelling (which is often posited a singular ‘truth’; see Tagma and Lenze, 2020) has already restricted what international politics can mean as it is narrated by IR traditions and IR myths. When we investigate IR theory as a site of culture, we find ideological practices at work. Reading our IR myths together as we did in the last section, we quickly spotted several named ideologies at work—ethnocentrism, racism, classism, sexism, and hetero-/homonormativity. These are the sorts of ideologies for which we have long been trained to look. But another purpose of this text has been to demonstrate how ideologies work in less familiar ways that are more difficult to identify. They work, for example, through not only what we can name and say (conscious ideologies) but also through what we cannot name and what goes without saying (unconscious ideologies; Barthes, 1972: 11). And, arguably, it is unconscious ideologies that are the most powerful. Since they are so difficult to identify, they are all the more difficult to examine critically. When they crop up in IR theory, I call these unconscious or unnamed ideologies IR myths. They are apparent truths, usually expressed as a slogan, that an IR theory or tradition relies upon in order to appear to be true. They seem to be so true, so right on, and so correct about the world of international politics that, to those adhering to the tradition that employs them, IR myths describe just the way things are. For a realist, international anarchy is the permissive cause of war. For an idealist, there is an international society. For a Wendtian constructivist, anarchy is what states make of it. And so on. But, as I have tried to point out, international politics is a lot more complicated than this. So how do IR traditions still get away with relying upon so many ideological positions as if they were not ideological positions but factually described the world as it is? They get away with it because, as I have suggested, these ideological positions are mythologized. They are transformed from what is seen to be “cultural” and constructed into what is taken to be natural and therefore goes without saying. IR myths become habitual ways of thinking about the world of international politics. We traced how the myth function in IR theory works by examining our individual IR myths. Ideologies are mythologized in IR theory by making sure that what must go without saying in order for a myth to appear to be true is either deferred or displaced. Deferral means that the knowledge about the myth as a myth is delayed so much that we never receive it. Displacement means that the knowledge about a myth as a myth is placed beyond the bounds of our consideration. Some myths defer knowledge (we must never know that liberalism’s empty core contradicts our desire for the good life or that fear is what makes us believe either in international anarchy as the permissive cause of war or in international society as that which will unify us in cooperation). Other myths work through displacement (“authors” must be placed behind productive practices so that authors

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appear to be the producers of these practices, and gender must be placed within a variable so that feminist concerns can be placed outside the bounds of the discipline of IR). And, more often than not, deferral and displacement work together, even if one of them dominates. This is what we see happening in the individual stories we read about IR theory. But what about IR theory as a whole? Is there a myth function to IR theory itself, greater than the sum of its individual IR myths? And, if so, how does it work? What does it defer or displace? Just as individual IR myths tend to work at the level of stories, IR theory more generally works at the level of framing those stories. As a site of cultural practices, IR theory provides not just the stories about international politics but the framework which makes these stories meaningful, serious, and important. And it is this grid, this support, this basis for storytelling that goes without saying in IR theory itself—that it is reasonable, rational, and objective to narrate stories about IR theory which focus almost exclusively on sovereign nation-states in perilous anarchy and the “high political” practices to which their interactions give rise. This is the “Truth” of IR theory that makes other IR “truths” possible. And, like any truth, this one may not be as true as it appears to be. For, as we have already seen, this premise for storytelling is indebted to numerous ideological positions, some of which are named and others of which are more difficult to name. So, somewhere along the line, IR theory itself underwent (and is always really undergoing) a mythologizing function so that its framework for analysis appears to be natural, neutral, and commonsensical rather than cultural, ideological, and in need of critical analysis. What does this mean, then, that IR theory itself defers or displaces? Simple. It defers and displaces any knowledge that its stories and most importantly its framework for telling stories is mythologized. IR theory defers and displaces the myth function itself. How does it do this? IR theory does this by placing critical examinations of IR theory beyond the bounds of meaningful, serious, and important IR theory. This should not surprise us. For indeed, if IR theory did not do this, it could not function. Its myth function—both in terms of the specific stories it tells and in terms of its template for telling these stories—might be exposed. While exposing the myth function in IR theory would not put an end to it (for we never escape culture and ideology), it may temporarily disrupt it. And if IR theory’s myth function is disrupted, then this might open up new possibilities for uncharted stories about international politics to be told. This would be a terrible threat to traditional IR theory.

Table 12.3  IR theory’s myth function What IR theory defers

How IR theory defers it

IR theory defers the myth function itself

How it defers the myth function is by (dis)placing criticism of IR theory beyond the bounds of IR theory. Critique of IR theory does not count as serious IR theory itself

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The politics of the popular If exploring the myth function in IR theory is such a serious undertaking, then why have I carried it out by reading IR theory through a medium that lacks the status of serious—popular film? Hopefully, reading IR theory through popular film is more interesting and entertaining than it otherwise would be. And, for some, that might be reason enough for using films. But there are more important and indeed extremely serious reasons for using popular films (or other popular media that tell stories). One reason for rethinking IR theory through popular film is that films bring the story aspects of IR theory into relief. We are accustomed to viewing films as narratives about specific worlds. We are less accustomed to viewing IR theory in this way. But, by pairing IR traditions and IR myths with a popular film, the drama, story points, flow, links, lapses, and effects of action are all easier to see. Another reason for pairing IR theories with popular films is that popular films present all this drama and trauma to us in contained spatial and temporal locations. They offer up worlds to us that are familiar enough for us to relate to (like 1980s’ New York City in Fatal Attraction or 1990s’ Los Angeles in Wag the Dog) without actually being in those places. This is another reason why we can relate to popular films and relate them back to IR theory. So, selecting popular films as a medium through which to revisit IR theory makes sense in part because popular films enable us to access what IR theory says, how it plots its story, and how all this together gives us a particular vision of the world. In effect, then, using popular film to help us think about IR theory seems to work because of some of the similarities between how films tell stories and how IR theory tells stories. Even when we read IR theory through popular film, however, we assume that the kinds of stories told by IR theory and those told by popular film differ in important ways. The stories IR theory tells are supposedly “true” stories. In contrast, popular films offer us stories that we know to be fictional. This is why the stories told in IR theory are taken seriously, whereas those in popular film are so often regarded as frivolous. We assume that popular films offer us escapes from reality, whereas IR theory confronts us with the hard facts about the world. And so, like mainstream IR theorists, we generally place IR theory in the realm of “high culture” and “high politics” while we place popular film in the realm of “low culture” and “low politics.” It might be fun to see how the realities of international life are dramatized in popular films, but, as mainstream IR theorists warn us, we should guard against taking these dramatizations too seriously. They are not part of the “cut and thrust” of international politics or of IR theory. Or are they? Each of the IR myths we have looked at is paired with a popular film. In some cases this is because the film plays out the plot of an IR theory (as in the cases of Lord of the Flies and Independence Day). But while parallel plots might be one reason for the pairing of films and myths in some cases, in every case films and myths are paired because they produce and circulate the same myth. The myth we find about anarchy in Waltz’s books Man, the State, and War and Theory of International Politics is the same myth we find in the film Lord of the Flies. The myth we find about the author function in Wendt’s essay “Anarchy is What States

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Make of it” is the same myth we find in the film Wag the Dog. The myth we find in Fukuyama’s essay “The End of History?” is the same myth we find in the film The Truman Show. And on and on. If the same myths are at play in shallow popular films as we find in serious IR theory, then what does this mean for each of these mythologized sites and the relationship between them? Are films more serious than we at first thought? Is IR theory more trivial than we dared to imagine? Does this pairing of the “popular” and the “serious” transform them both? If so, where do we now locate “high culture” and “high politics” and “low culture” and “low politics”? Pairing “serious” IR theory with “superficial” popular films suggests that IR theory may not be located in the realm of “truth” and “reality” any more than popular films are. Maybe IR theory is just a bunch of stories that, like popular films, mixes and mythologizes fact and fiction. And since the stories and myths we find in IR theory are often the same ones we find in popular films, then this pairing of IR theory and film shows that the meanings IR theory uses to make sense of the world are not only produced and circulated in traditional academic “high cultural” realms but in popular “low cultural” locations as well. If the work of propagating and circulating IR myths occurs in popular films as well as in IR theories, then neglecting this realm of “low politics” in our attempts to come to grips with how the world works would be a mistake. We must interrogate IR theory as a site of cultural practice wherever it occurs—in classic IR texts, in classrooms, and in more popular sites of culture like film, literature, art, and television. Maybe popular films do a lot more political work than we at first credited them with doing. Not only do they illustrate (and sometimes overtly critique) the stories found in IR myths by circulating similar (or different) myths. Popular films tell us “too much” about IR theory. They also tell us how IR myths function. They do this by showing us what must go without saying in order for a myth to appear to be true. And, most importantly, popular films dramatize for us how what must go without saying is kept in the place of nonknowledge through strategies of deferral and displacement. That’s a heck of a lot of work for a frivolous medium to do! But if popular films do a lot of serious political work by de-mythologizing and re-politicizing IR myths (Barthes, 1972), then why are investigations of popular films so often relegated to the nether regions of the negligible by IR theorists—to

Box 12.1  Why pair IR theory with popular films? 1 Films bring IR theory’s story points into relief. 2 Films offer us contained, nearly parallel worlds in which to critically rethink IR theory. 3 IR myths and popular films produce and circulate similar myths. Therefore, we must analyze the popular in order to understand IR myths and international politics. 4 Pairing popular films with serious IR theory exposes IR theory as a mythologized mix of fact and fiction. 5 Popular films dramatize the myth function of IR theory and how what must go without saying is deferred and displaced.

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“mere” cultural studies or film theory which they take to be superficial and therefore unimportant? One answer might be that IR theorists simply do not yet appreciate how the popular functions politically in relation to international politics and international theory. Because they don’t appreciate it, they don’t take it seriously. For this reason, these sorts of IR theorists simply ignore popular cultural phenomena. A more cynical answer might be that IR theorists do recognize how the popular functions politically in relation to international politics and international theory. They sense how the popular might function resistively and disruptively in relation to cherished IR traditions and the IR myths that make them appear to be true. And they recognize that taking the popular seriously might challenge the very framework through which IR theory tells its stories about international politics. For this reason, these sorts of IR theorists might work to defer a widespread appreciation of what the popular might do to IR theory, and they might work to replace the popular in the realm of the frivolous, before the popular displaces IR theory from the realm of the serious. And, of course, there is a third reason why IR theorists might not take the political power of the popular seriously. They might be so taken in by their own mythologized ways of viewing the relationship between the political and the popular that they can no longer imagine this relationship differently. This is why, for these theorists, the popular belongs in a different realm than the political. Whether by neglect, by design, or by displacement, the politics of the popular is among the most undervalued and therefore underanalyzed aspects of international politics. And this is a grave oversight for both mainstream and critical IR theorists. For the popular poses a significant challenge to IR’s cherished cultural practices.

Where does all of this leave us? So, where does all of this leave us? It is to be hoped that it leaves us knowing “too much” about IR theory and IR myths—not because of what they say but because of what they do culturally and politically. Indeed, thinking about IR theory as a site of cultural practice through formal, academic cultural practices such as writing IR theories and myths and through less formal cultural practices like popular films has demonstrated that all cultural sites are powerful arenas in which political struggles take place. And, maybe what is most important, is that this way of rethinking IR theory has helped us to rethink the relationship between culture and politics. Culture is not opposed to politics. Culture is political and politics is cultural. What this means is that the cultural stories all of us tell—whether in film, in IR theory, or in everyday life—are political. Knowing how stories function—what makes them appear to be true—gives us the means to both critique and create politically powerful stories.

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Index

Note: Page numbers in italics indicates figures, bold indicates tables and with “n” indicates endnotes in the text. 9/11 attacks see September 11 attack Abdelhamid, A. 60 abuse see ideological abuse acquire identities 68; see also identities Ad Busters 220–222 Adler, E. 81–82 After Hegemony (Keohane) 58 Agathangelou, A. 34, 274 aid, development see development aid Akbar, M. J. 172 Allouche, S. 274 Almond, G. 166 Amer, S. 273 analysis see levels of analysis Anarchical Society, The (Bull) 58 anarchy/anarchism 22, 25, 25–26, 64, 219–243; basic assumptions of 224; collective action 240–241; concepts of 225; cooperation 58; debt 240–241; justice 240–241; myths 222–229; overview 220–222; states and 223; structural 66 anarchy myths 40, 55, 64, 222–229, 279–280; function of fear 18, 31–33; international 16–17, 222–223; neorealist 65, 77; no world government 16; realism and new- or neorealism 17; supplemental function of fear 28; see also international anarchy; myth(s)

Anglo-Protestant 190 Anievas, A. 34 Anonymous 240–241 anonymous ideologies 5; see also unconscious ideologies Anthropocene 216–217 antiglobalization 134, 141, 220–221, 225, 243n1; see also globalization Antze, P. 158 apparent truth 2, 7–8, 278, 284 Arab nationalism 171 Arab Spring 60, 220 area studies 11 Artificial Mythologies (Saper) 10 Ashley, R. 34–35, 81 Asianization 173 Atta, W. 60 authorship 77–80 autocratically organized state and society 46 Bajo-Rubio, O. 127 balance of power 2, 24, 223 Bananas, Beaches and Bases (Enloe) 83, 104 Barder, A. D. 130 Barkawi, T. 157 Barthes, R. 4, 10 baseline communism 221, 228, 234–235, 240–242; see also communisms; new communisms Battle in Seattle (1999) 220 Baudrillard, J. 81 Bauman, Z. 161

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Index Baylis, J. 127 Beam, M. 274 Beitz, C. 59 Bennett, J. 59 Berlant, L. 251–252, 274 Bhambra, G. 128, 160 biopolitics 130–131 biopower 139–140, 148, 155 Black Lives Matter movement 160 Blaney, D. 165 Bleiker, R. 11, 12 Bourdieu, P. 82 Breaking Bad (Grayson) 12 Brook, P. 24 Budryte, D. 158 Bull, H. 58 Bullock, S. 129 Burton, T. 61 Bush, G. W. 36, 165 Buzan, B. 33 Campbell, D. 34, 130 Cardoso, F. 186 Castells, M. 140 Catching Fire 222 causes of war 21 China 72–73, 116, 171 Chowdhry, G. 34 Christianity 170, 178, 182–183, 186, 249, 269 citizen journalism 60 civilizations: clash of 164–165, 168–172, 175, 178, 180–181, 183–185, 188, 190, 281; conflicts about 173; cultural identities 184–185; defined 169; differences within 188; fault lines 170, 174, 179–180; mapping 170, 179, 183; myth 10; non-Western 169, 172, 174–175; thesis 164–165, 169, 172, 175; types 170 classless society 115 classroom activity 61 climate change 192; environmentalism and 193; global 197, 200, 214; see also human-made climate change Clinton, H. 10, 35, 107, 246, 256–262, 264–266, 274; see also “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights” Close, G. 88 Cold War 11, 35–36, 40–41, 44, 51, 110, 165, 175 Coleman, L. M. 159

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collective action 193, 240–241 ‘Common Marketization’ 117 common sense 4–6, 8, 64 communication: corrupted 49; crossborder 47, 54; impure/alien 49; incorruptibility of 49, 51; ineffective forms of 53; purity of 46, 49, 53, 56; technology 60 communisms: baseline 221, 228, 234– 235, 240–242; fascism and 115, 117; liberalism 115, 116, 117; new 242–243; realization 114, 143; socialism and 112; US alternative to Soviet-style 166 Communist Horizon, The (Dean) 243 Communist Manifesto (Marx) 242 communitarian anarchism 238; see also anarchy/anarchism communitarian libertarianism 238 competitive identities 71; see also identities Connell, R. W. 105 conscious ideologies 4–6, 110 conservatism 4, 6 constructivism 63–83; authorship 77–80; concept of 80; international relations 82–83; IR traditions 64; myths 65–71; overview 64–65; practice 77–80; practice theory 82–83; seduction 77–80; Wag the Dog 71–77 constructivist myth 9, 64, 71, 79–81 constructivist social theory, principles 69 corrupted communication 49; see also communication Cox, M. 127 cultural universalization 111, 130, 188 culture(s) 3–4, 11; digital 129; form 11; in international politics 11; IR theory 11; modernization and development theory 184–186; United States 3, 189–190; visual 9 Davis, A. 104 Day After Tomorrow, The 200 Dean, J. 243 Debrix, F. 11, 36, 130 debt 240–241; affects 228; anarchist understanding of 10; baseline communism 228; bondage 228–229, 237–239; defined 226, 234; immoral 237; indebtedness 228–229; jubilee 229, 238, 240; postmodernism 140; quantifiable 227 Debt: The first 5000 years (Graeber) 226

Index decolonial Queer IR 272–273 Deleuze, G. 135, 139, 155 democracy 45–47, 167, 224; see also political democratization democratically organized state and society 46 depoliticized speech 7 Derrida, J. 81, 187 desire 152–157, 184–186 development aid 189 development theory see modernization and development theory dialectic: contradiction 122; Hegelian 114, 114–115; history 114; logic of Empire 143; process 114; traditional Marxist materialist 143; in The Truman Show 123 difference as dangerous 188 digital cultures 129; see also culture(s) Dillon, M. 130 diplomacy 241–242 direct democracy 224 disciplining resistance 159–160 documentary 192, 197, 200 domestic analogy 41–42, 45, 47, 48, 54, 57 domestic society 41–42, 45–48, 54, 56–57; see also international society Douglas, M. 88 Douzinas, C. 242 Drucker, P. 243 Duffield, M. 130 Duggan, L. 252–253 Dyvik, S. 104 Earth 192 Earth in the Balance (Gore) 200–202, 204 East Is East 9–10, 168, 175–184, 181 ecocentrism 195, 214 ecologism 4 economic liberalism 130, 188 economic liberalization 111 economic modernization 173, 175 economic regionalism 173 Edkin, J. 158 Elshtain, J. B. 104 Empire 134–161; agency/ontology of 140–141; described 138–144; dialectical logic of 143; as fluid 140; globalization 137; history 135; myths 137; oppression 140–141 Empire (Hardt and Negri) 134–137, 154–155, 157, 160 empty core of liberalism 113, 126, 129

end of history 10, 110–118, 126, 128, 130, 134, 137 End of History and the Last Man, The (Fukuyama) 110 Eng, D. 106, 274 English School 25–26, 58 Enloe, C. 83 entrepreneurial gays 258; see also gay environmental/green theory 194–195 environmentalism 191–217; IR and 215; myths 197–206; overview 192–197 Ermarth, E. D. 128 Facebook 60, 129 facts 7, 74, 118, 149–150, 173, 198, 209, 286; see also natural facts Faletto, E. 186 Fatal Attraction (film) 9–10, 88, 94–100, 98, 99, 101 fear in IR theory 34–35 female masculinity 105 feminism/feminine 88–89, 89, 100–104; characterization 93–94, 94; concerns 87, 89; in IR 100–103; traditional IR theory 102; unbalanced 92 feminist: argument 90; commentary 92; gender variable 92; methodology 92; opposed dualisms 90–91; questions 86; rational-actor model 90–91; realist assumption of the state 90–91; realist conceptions 90–91; scholarship 93; themes/topics on 90–91 Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era (Sylvester) 34 films 9–12, 25–28, 31–32, 36–37, 265 First World states 166–168 Forest, A. 88 Foucault, M. 81–82, 130, 135, 139, 250, 254, 274 Frank, A. G. 186 French Revolution 114, 170 Fukuyama, F. 110, 112–114, 117–118, 128, 130–131, 164 gay 273; conditionality 273; entrepreneurial 258; international 273; rights 107, 274; see also lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) “gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights” 10, 107, 246–250, 255–257, 259, 260, 262, 271–272, 280–281

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Index Gebrial, D. 160 Geertz, C. 4 Gekko, G. 221 gender 85–107, 251; balanced 93; blended 93; broadened 93; conceptualization of 93; feminism in IR 100–103, 104; incorporated 93; isolated 93; masculinity 105; myths 88–94; overview 86–88; queer identities 187; queer international relations 106–107; variable 87–88 Germany 25, 31 Giddens, A. 81 Global Financial Crisis (2008) 160, 220–221 globalization 109–131; biopolitics 130–131; classical liberal principles 111; digital cultures 129; Empire 137; historical materialist expressions of 111–112; history 128; liberal subject 130–131; liquid 161; martial politics 130–131; materialist 111; mediascapes 129; myths 113–118; neoliberal expressions of 110–112, 111; overview 110–113; surveillance 129 Global LGBT rights/studies 35, 174, 245–274; myths 256–263; Queer IR and 249, 250–256; see also special rights Global Marshall Plan 203–204 global queer studies 106; see also Queer IR Golding, W. 24–25 Gopinath, G. 274 Gore, A. 192–193, 193, 196–214 Graeber, D. 221–222, 226–229, 238–239, 241 Grayson, K. 11–12 Great Britain 25, 31, 175, 178–180, 185–186 green governance 193, 196, 204–205, 215–216 green governmentality 215–216 green theory see environmental/green theory Grovogui, S. 59 Guattari, F. 135, 139, 155 Guggenheim, D. 197 Gulf War 49, 171 Haastrup, T. 104 Halberstam, J. 106, 274 Hall, S. 3, 187

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Hardt, M. 134–144, 135, 154–155, 157, 159–161, 164, 186–187, 222, 242 Hartz, L. 186 Harvey, D. 187 Hegel, F. 114, 114–115, 115 Hello, Dolly! (music) 206–208 Henderson, E. 58 Henry, M. 104 heteronormative love 258 heteronormativity 251–253, 274 heterosexuality 247, 250–252, 254, 265–266 heterosexuals 247, 254, 272 hierarchy 22, 25, 25, 26, 44, 57, 165, 172, 223, 231 Hinduization 173 historical states 117 HIV/AIDS 261 homonationalism 106, 274 homonormative LGBT couple models 259 homonormativity 252, 260, 274 homosexuals 254, 256–257, 260 Hook, H. 24 Hopf, T. 83 Howard, P. 60 human behavior 43 human-made climate change 10; address 214; convenience 200; curb 204; environmental security problem 193; inconvenience 196, 200, 204–206, 212, 279; planetary emergency 196–198, 205, 213; scientific truth or falsity of 196; urgency of addressing 192; see also climate change human-nature relationship 43, 194–195, 208 Hunger Games, The (film) 9–10, 222, 229–240 Huntington, S. 11, 164–175, 187, 188–190 Hussain, M. 60 idealism 2, 39–61, 40; myths 42–48; overview 40–42; principles 43; see also neoidealism identities 68, 70–71, 184–186; acquire 68; critiques of 187; gender and queer 187; multicultural 186; see also competitive identities ideological abuse 10 ideological challengers to liberalism 116 ideological conflicts 117, 173 ideological consciousness 115 ideological victory 114

Index ideologies 4–6; anonymous 5; conscious 4–5, 4–6, 110; defined 4; legitimate 110; unconscious 4–5, 110 imperial IR 157 Inayatullah, N. 165 Inconvenient Truth, An (Gore) 192, 197–198, 200–201, 204 Independence Day 9, 41–42, 48–58, 50 India 173 individualist anarchism 238 individualistic libertarianism 238 Industrial Revolution 170 institutions 68; conservative 269; cooperative 65; democratic 71, 111; economic 110; fundamental 116; global 112; heteronormativity 266; homonormative 270; self-help and power politics 67; social and political 19–20, 110, 166, 248, 272 international anarchy 2, 8, 16–37, 70, 222–223; assumptions 16; bad social organization 18, 32; conflictual aspects of 40; constructivists 80; cooperation in 58; effects 64; fear 34; of Independence Day 54, 57; international hierarchy 23, 41; IR myths 6, 8; limits of 66; myth 16–17, 28; nature of 64–65; permissive cause of war 21–22, 24, 28, 31, 66; realists and neorealists 18, 66, 68; realities 16; security issues 23; self-help 67, 77; social organization 18; social relations 18; structure of 65, 71 international community 40, 56–57, 195, 248 international currency 220 international disciplinary order 139 International Ethics (Shapcott) 59 international harmony 41 international hierarchy 41 international politics 2, 4, 77; analysis of 281; anarchical 16–18, 223, 279; characterization 44; classes of 282; conflict in 46, 64; cultures in 11, 280; defined 17; economy 106, 110, 127; environment 20; facts of 7; gendered relationships of 87; gender neutrality of 86; men and masculinities in 100; neorealist explanation of 68; normality and abnormality in 246; normal vs. perverse 255; post-Cold War 41, 45; practice in 67, 80; quasiimperial in 157; realm of 185; sovereign nation-states 16, 223, 278; structural

arrangement of 66; traumas in 158; US scholars and practitioners of 164 international practices 82 International Regimes (Krasner) 58 international relations (IR) myths: apparent truth of 7–8, 278; defined 2, 6; individual 278, 280–281, 284– 285; international politics 2, 284; international relations theory 4, 7, 139, 284, 286, 288; IR traditions 6; as myth function 2–3, 6–7; re-politicizing 7, 287 international relations (IR) theory 283, 82–83, 106–107, 278–283, 279; approaches 86; classical tradition of 88; culture 11; environmentalism and 215; ethics in 59; fear in 34–35; feminism 100–104; gender variable in 88, 92; imperial 157; international politics 2; memory in 158; morality 59; overview 2; popular films 286–288; sense of 283–285; traditions 6, 64 international society 42–43, 45, 47–48; see also domestic society intersectarian love 274 Iraq War 36 Islam 170–172 Islamic fundamentalism 171 Japan 116, 173 Jones, A. 86–93, 100–102 Jones, C. 33 Jones, G. 34 Joseph, M. 241 justice 240–241 Kegley, C. 41–45, 44, 47–49, 57–58, 60, 173, 223 Keohane, R. O. 33, 58 Kipnis, L. 10 Klein, N. 187 Kofman, E. 127 Krasner, S. 58 Kratochwil, F. 11 Kristeva, J. 81 Lacy, M. 12 Laffey, M. 157 Lambek, M. 158 Lapid, Y. 11 League of Nations 40 legitimate ideology 110; see also ideologies legitimate violence 232; see also violence

3 11

Index lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) 246; common humanity 246; gay interchangeably and 256; global movements 246; homosexual 261; issues 107; (neo)liberal economic values 258; normal sexualized character 262; rights of 107, 249–250; sexualized character 261; see also global LGBT rights levels of analysis 19, 24, 43, 174, 178 Lewis, B. 172 L-GB-fake-T politics 105 liberalism 116; communisms 115, 116, 117; economic 130; empty core of 113, 126, 129; internal contradiction 125–126 liberal subject 130–131 libertarianism 222, 224, 238, 241–242 limits to growth 195 Ling, L. H. M. 34 Liquid Fear (Bauman) 161 liquid globalization 161; see also globalization Liquid Life (Bauman) 161 liquid modernity 160–161 Liquid Modernity (Bauman) 161 Liquid Times (Bauman) 161 Lisle, D. 12 Little, R. 33 Live Aid 189 Lonely Planet (Lisle) 12 Lord of the Flies (Golding) 9, 18, 24–31, 25, 26, 33, 36–37 love: heteronormative 258; intersectarian 274; normal 258; pivot 274; regulated 271–272; romantic 274 Love is Strange (film) 9–10, 35, 249, 263–271 Luke, T. 12 Lynch, M. 60 Mahbubani, K. 171 Man, the State, and War (Waltz) 8, 18–19, 21–22, 24, 28, 32, 43, 67, 174, 286 Manchanda, N. 34 manospheres 105 Mapel, D. 59 Mars Attacks! (Burton) 61 martial politics 130–131 Marx, K. 114–115, 115, 134, 135, 136, 242 masculine concerns 87; see also men’s issues Masculinities (Connell) 105

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masculinity 88–89, 105; see also female masculinity Massad, J. 273 mass communication 60; see also communication Mbembe, A. 131 Meadows, D. H. 195 Mearsheimer, J. 35 media note 61 mediascapes 129 Memento 9–10, 136–137, 144–157, 148 memory in IR 158 men’s issues 87; see also masculine concerns Micklethwait, J. 127 Mignolo, W. 82 Millennium Conference (2018) 160 Mirzoeff, N. 9 Mockingjay 222 modernism vs. postmodernism 143 modernization and development theory 163–190; critiques of 186–187; culture 184–186; desire 184–186; economic 173; identity 184–186; improvement on 175; language of 171; myths 169–175; overview 164–169 Mohanty, C. 104 Monaco, J. 10 morality 59, 192, 225, 229, 236–237, 240, 252 Morgenthau, H. 18 multicultural identity 187; see also identities multiculturalism 168, 185 multitude 142–143 Muñoz, J. E. 106, 274 myth(s) 2, 4, 6–9, 29, 40; about colonial other 12; anarchy 16, 31–33, 40, 55, 64, 222–229, 279–280; constructivism/ constructivist 9, 64–71, 79–81, 278; depoliticized speech 7; Empire 137; environmentalism 197–206; films 287; genders 88–94; globalization 113–118; global LGBT rights/studies 256–263; idealism 42–48; ideological function of 10; individual 278, 281, 285; modernization and development theory 169–175; neorealist anarchy 65; realism 19–24; reason 7–8; sacred 284; seductive 65; stories and 287; see also anarchy myths; international relations (IR) myths

Index Mythologies (Barthes) 10 mythology as methodology 10–11 Nagy, M. 60 Nair, S. 34 Nardin, T. 59 natural facts 7 nature/culture relationship 194 Negri, A. 134–144, 135, 154–155, 157, 159–161, 164, 186–187, 222, 242 neoidealism 2, 41, 44–45, 50–51, 54, 56–57, 61, 112 neoliberalism/neoliberals 65–67, 66, 67, 110, 130 neo-Marxism 134–135, 139, 141, 186 neorealism 17, 17–18, 22, 23, 33–34, 40, 58, 65–66 Neorealism and its Critics (Keohane) 33 neorealists 65–66, 66, 67 Net, The (Bullock) 129 new communisms 242–243; see also communisms New Imperialism, The (Harvey) 187 newly industrialized countries (NIC) 116 New York City 164, 198, 206–207, 211, 249, 263, 266, 269, 286 ninety-nine (99) percent 221–222, 238–241, 246, 282–283 Nisancioglu, K. 160 nonfeminists 92; see also feminist normal love 258 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 112 North Atlantic Financial Crisis 220 Occupy Wall Street (OWS) 220–222, 226, 240–241, 243, 246 Odysseos, L. 159 ontological lack 136 ontological standpoint 135 ontology 152–157 Onuf, N. 80 opposed dualisms 90–91 opposite-sex couple 253, 258 organization: bad types of 40; democracy 45; good forms of 40; socio-economic 117; see also institutions Orthodox Christianity 170; see also Christianity Owens, P. 127 Paterson, M. 194–196 Pennsylvania 164

Persian Gulf 171 Peterson, V. S. 93, 274 pinkwashing 106 politics see specific politics political democratization 111, 130, 188; see also international politics political development 166, 167, 167 political resistance 142, 155 political subjectivity 139 popular culture 9, 12, 173 postcolonial Queer IR 272–273; see also decolonial Queer IR posthistorical states 117 postmodern agency/ontology 140 postmodernism 81–82, 139, 140, 143 postscript 189–190 Pouliot, V. 82 Powell, B. 166 practice theory 82–83 Puar, J. 106, 131, 274 Queer IR 106–107, 246–247, 250–256; see also Global LGBT rights/studies race relations 11 Rahman, M. 273 raise consciousness 4 rational-actor model 90–91 rationalism 65–67, 70 Reagan, R. 221 realism 15–37, 40, 42; anarchy myth 31–33; fear in IR theory 34–35; myths 19–24; neorealism vs. 17, 33–34; overview 16–18; predictive power of 35–36 realist conceptions 90–91 Reid, J. 130, 157 re-Islamization 173 Resende, E. 158 Richter-Montpetit, M. 274 romantic love 274 Rousseau, J.-J. 18, 21 Roy, O. 60 Ruddick, S. 89 Sabaratnam, M. 11 Salter, M. 12 same-sex couples 258 Saper, C. 10 Schmitt, C. 130 Second World states 165, 168 security 23, 34–35, 41, 65, 69 seduction 71, 76–80

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Index seductive myth 65; see also myth(s) self-interested 65–66 selfishness 19, 46 Selmeczi, A. 160 September 11 attack 35, 157–159, 164, 171, 185–186, 199 sexes 248, 250–251, 254, 256–257, 261; see also gender sexuality: gender-identity and 247; gender orientation and 247; naturalized 251; as normal or perverse 250; samesex couples 253; sex and 260–261; transformation 254; variable 107 Shapcott, R. 59 Shapiro, M. 11, 59 Shepherd, L. J. 104 Shilliam, R. 34, 59 Shirky, C. 60 Shock Doctrine, The (Klein) 187 situated activity 69 Smith, S. 127 socialism 112, 243; weird 243 Social Theory of International Politics (Wendt) 80 socio-economic organization 117 soft communism see new communisms sovereign nation-states 2, 16–18, 22, 31, 40–46, 54, 101, 117, 135, 137, 139, 165, 223, 255, 278–282, 285 Soviet-style communism 166 Soviet Union 116–117 Spade, D. 105 special rights 246 Spivak, G. 104 Squire, V. 83 standpoint of women 86 state violence 92, 130, 222, 229, 232, 235; see also violence storytelling politics 10, 278, 283–285 Strategic Environment Initiative (SEI) 202, 203, 205 strong liberals 66; see also weak liberal structural anarchy 66 structural-functional model 166 subcultures 3 surveillance 129–130 sustainable development 197, 201, 214 Sylvester, C. 12, 34 Tea Party 240 technology 60, 201–202, 205, 213 Theory of International Politics (Waltz) 18, 22–24, 28, 32, 33, 40, 67, 80, 286

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Third World states 167–168, 175 Tickner, J. A. 34, 104 Tramel, S. 160 transgender: liberation 243; people 246–247; tipping point 105 transmasculinities 105; see also masculinity Truman Show, The (film) 9–10, 113, 118–126, 123, 123, 125, 129 Trump, D. 127 truth 152–157 Tucker, K. 159 Twitter 60 unabashed victory 110 unconscious ideologies 4–5, 110; see also ideologies United Nations 40, 43 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 246, 256 United States 261; army 171; astronauts 48, 56; banks 220; citizens 54–55, 188, 205–206, 213, 221, 240, 242, 282; classless society 115; culture 3, 189–190; dollar 220; election 129; Empire 139; federal law 270, 274; gays and lesbians 253; Independence Day 57; leadership 55–57, 57; liberal ideological beliefs 186; Lord of the Flies 36–37; Mexican immigrants 190; military 53, 55–56, 73–74; mission 56; national/cultural security 190; neoconservatives 172; pilots 56; policymakers 117, 202; political history 186; post-Cold War 58; public 74–75, 202–204; satellites 49; Secretary of State 257; transportation system 202 universal significance 117 V for Vendetta (film) 240 violence: conflict and 184; debt 228, 235; exposure to 130; legitimate 232; overt 272; against racialized 131; racist prejudice and 55; state 92, 130, 222, 229, 232, 235; war and 43 visual culture 9; see also culture(s) Visual Global Politics (Bleiker) 12 Vitalis, R. 11 Wag the Dog (film) 9, 65, 71–79, 75, 78 Walker, R. B. J. 81 WALL-E 9–10, 206–213 Wallerstein, I. 186

Index Wall Street 220–221 Walt, S. 81 Waltz, K. 8, 16–38, 21, 40–45, 44, 57, 59, 66–68, 91, 174, 178, 223, 279, 286 Waltzer, M. 59 war 43, 241–242; causes of 21, 21–22, 24, 28, 31, 66; on terror rages 192; urgency 192 Warner, D. 274 Warner, M. 251–252 War on Terror 35–36, 106 Warped: Gay Normality and Queer AntiCapitalism (Drucker) 243 Washington 164 weak liberal 68; see also strong liberals Web 2.0 Revolution 60 Weber, C. 11, 127 Weigel, G. 173 weird socialism 243 Weldes, J. 11 Wendt, A. 64–71, 67, 77, 80–83, 223 Wendtian compromise 80 Western Christianity 170, 178–179, 182–183; see also Christianity

Whitmore, B. 49 WikiLeaks 241 Wilcox, L. 104 Williams, R. 3 Wilson, W. 40–42, 44–47 women: experience 89; issues 87; standpoint 86, 89; see also feminism/ feminine Women and War (Elshtain) 104 Wooldridge, A. 127 World of Our Making (Onuf) 80 World Trade Center 164 World Trade Center Memorial 199 World Trade Organization 126, 134 World War I 17, 40 World War II 25, 31, 35, 40, 110, 116, 171, 203 Yan, H.-D. 127 Youngs, G. 127 YouTube 60 Zehfuss, M. 81, 158 Zizek, S. 242

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