International Organizations Revisited: Agency and Pathology in a Multipolar World 9781800731233

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS REVISITED

International Organizations Revisited Agency and Pathology in a Multipolar World

 Edited by

Dennis Dijkzeul and Dirk Salomons

berghahn NEW YORK • OXFORD www.berghahnbooks.com

First published in 2021 by Berghahn Books www.berghahnbooks.com

© 2021 Dennis Dijkzeul and Dirk Salomons

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission of the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Dijkzeul, Dennis, editor. | Salomons, Dirk, editor. Title: International Organizations Revisited: Agency and Pathology in a Multipolar World / edited by Dennis Dijkzeul and Dirk Salomons. Description: New York: Berghahn Books, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021020972 (print) | LCCN 2021020973 (ebook) | ISBN 9781800731226 (hardback) | ISBN 9781800731233 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: International agencies—Management. | International agencies—Decision making. | United Nations—Management. | United Nations—Decision making. Classification: LCC JZ4850 .I5845 2021 (print) | LCC JZ4850 (ebook) | DDC 341.2s—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021020972 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021020973

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-80073-122-6 hardback ISBN 978-1-80073-123-3 ebook

 CON TEN T S

List of Illustrations

vii

Preface

viii

List of Abbreviations

x

Introduction. International Organizations Revisited

1

Dennis Dijkzeul and Dirk Salomons

Part I. Decision-Making with National Governments

49

Chapter 1. Multilateral Diplomacy, Global Governance, and Networks of Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations

51

James P. Muldoon Jr. and JoAnn F. Aviel

Chapter 2. Financing as the UN’s Chronic Deficiency

77

Sandra Aviles and Romano Lasker

Chapter 3. Norm Setting at the United Nations: The Politics of Sustainable Human Development

113

Jacques Fomerand

Part II. Decision-Making within International Organizations

151

Chapter 4. Managing People at the United Nations: Squaring the Circle of Merit and Patronage

153

Dirk Salomons

Chapter 5. Fraud, Corruption, and the United Nations’ Culture Yves Beigbeder

191

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CONTENTS

Part III. Implementation and Evaluation

223

Chapter 6. The Program Approach and Its Lack of Participation

225

Dennis Dijkzeul

Chapter 7. How NGO Practices Mediate International Human Rights

267

Monika Krause

Chapter 8. Networked Diplomacy and Changing Polarity in World Politics: An Armenia-Turkey Normalization Attempt

285

Anna Ohanyan and Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan

Chapter 9. The Use and Limits of Civil Society for Postconflict State Democratization: Donor Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina Revisited

318

Kristie D. Evenson

Chapter 10. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan: Opportunity or Rhetorical Device?

342

Lucile Martin and Saeed Parto

Part IV. Conclusions

367

Chapter 11. Therapies and Conclusions: Toward a Better Understanding of the Management of International Organizations

369

Dennis Dijkzeul, Yves Beigbeder, and Dirk Salomons

Index

401

 ILLUSTRATI O N S

Figures 0.1. Growth of International Organizations

5

4.1. The Recruitment and Placement Process before 2001

172

4.2. The Simplified Recruitment and Placement Process

173

6.1. Stages of Program Management

228

6.2. The Relationship between Statutory Variables and Program Implementation

231

6.3. Internal Program Management at UNICEF

232

6.4. Contextual Model of Program Management

233

6.5. Different Forms of Evaluation during the Program Cycle

234

11.1. The Humanitarian System

380

11.2. The International Organization between Two Different Arenas

382

11.3. The Multiplication of Arenas

387

Tables 2.1. The Case for Focusing on Fragility

92

2.2. Investing in Fragility through a Variety of Instruments

99

6.1. Outline of Logical Framework for Program Design

237

6.2. Food Security and Program Management in South Sudan

245

8.1. Comparison of Evaluation Methods

310

10.1. Subsequent Resolutions to UNSCR 1325

346

 PREFACE

In 2003, Yves Beigbeder and Dennis Dijkzeul published Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology and Promise. The first two sentences of the preface read, “This book is born out of frustration. We were unhappy with the way international organizations were treated, or often left untreated, in the social sciences.” Much has changed in the study of international organizations (IOs) since then, and our level of frustration has declined, because scholarly attention to international organizations has become more sustained and more systematic. Yet, fierce criticism of their functioning has remained. Overall, their varying degrees of agency have become better established, but with agency also comes pathology. Originally, we considered issuing a second edition of Rethinking International Organizations, but too much had changed in both the world at large and the study of IOs. The former has become more multipolar and more unstable. The latter has become so broad that taking stock of IOs is as much an exercise in leaving out studies as it is incorporating insights from the main ones. Nevertheless, despite progress in the study of IOs, we still need to pay far more attention to IOs’ internal functioning, their implementation and evaluation, as well as the networks in which they operate. We decided to edit a new volume, especially focusing on these issues, and we are grateful to Yves Beigbeder for helping us conceptualize the project as we set out. We also invited new authors, who have shared their insights. We revisited the old, but from a new perspective. IOs still offer a great vantage point from which to criticize mainstream international relations, for example, when studying the hard and often slow implementation of IOs’ activities in networks. These networks link the international, national, and local levels and encompass a multitude of actors that—often simultaneously—both compete and cooperate with the IOs. The growth in the number of IO studies also means that it has become difficult to simultaneously consider the role of the media for IOs and the contributions of public and business administration to IO studies, as we did in Rethinking International Organizations. We leave these themes now to another book.

PREFACE

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All of the authors in this edited volume bridge both academia and practice. Many of us have worked for years in the United Nations or NGOs. We have attempted to strike a balance between an empirically based insider’s perspective and academic critique. As no author can have a complete overview of the broad areas addressed by IOs, ranging from diplomacy for peace to development projects on the ground, we decided to work together in this edited volume. In addition, two working students, Katharina Werner and Marius Heimlich, did superb work with data collection and editing. When we were working on this book, James P. Muldoon passed away. As Jim was only able to finish a first draft of his chapter, his close colleague JoAnn F. Aviel took over and finished the work. Originally, Leon Gordenker also planned to contribute to this volume, but he withdrew when he noticed that his health was declining. Since then, he too has passed on. Both Lee and Jim were eminent scholars who contributed greatly to the study of international organizations. We miss them very much and dedicate this book to their memory. Just like us, they hoped that this edited volume will contribute to a more vibrant and informed debate about the management and functioning of IOs, the challenges they face, and the societal issues they address. Dennis Dijkzeul, Bochum Dirk Salomons, New York

 ABBREVIATIO N S

ACABQ

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions AFP Agencies, Funds, and Programs AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ASG Assistant Secretary-General ATNP Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process AWN Afghan Women’s Network BGRRF Bishop Gassis Relief and Rescue Foundation BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa CA Citizen’s Assembly CAR Central African Republic CAR Conflict Analysis and Resolution CCI Centers for Civic Initiatives (NGO) CEDAW Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CEB Chief Executives Board for Coordination CF Civilitas Foundation COP Conference of the Parties COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019 CPC Committee for Program and Coordination CSO Civil Society Organization DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo ECLA Economic Commission for Latin America ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (United Nations) EPF Eurasia Partnership Foundation ESI European Stability Initiative EU European Union EUSR European Union Special Representative FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

ABBREVIATIONS

FBiH FUNDS G20 G7 G8 GC GDP GPG GOBI HDF HDR HIPC HIV/Aids IASC ICRC ICSAB ICSC IcSP ID IFI IFRC IGO IIC ILO IMF IMIS INFF INGO IO IR IT ITA JIU LDCs LFA LGBT LOTFA MDG MHA

Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina Future of the UN Development System Group of Twenty Group of Seven Group of Eight Global Compact Gross Domestic Product Global Public Good Growth Monitoring, Oral Rehydration, Breastfeeding, and Immunization Hrant Dink Foundation Human Development Report Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Inter-Agency Standing Committee International Committee of the Red Cross International Civil Service Advisory Board International Civil Service Commission Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace Investigations Division International Financial Institutions International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Intergovernmental Organization Independent Inquiry Committee International Labor Organization International Monetary Fund Integrated Management Information Service Integrated National Financing Framework International Nongovernmental Organization International Organizations International Relations Information Technology Independent Team of Advisers Joint Inspection Unit Least-Developed Countries Logical Framework Analysis Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Mary Help Association

xi

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ABBREVIATIONS

MICs Middle Income Countries MINUSCA Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (United Nations) MSF Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NAP National Action Plan NAPWA National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Nongovernmental Organization NIEO New International Economic Order NK Nagorno-Karabakh NWOW New Way of Working NYU New York University OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OFFP Oil-for-Food Program OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights OHR Office of the High Representative OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services OIP Office of the Iraq Program OOIP Objective Oriented Intervention Planning OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PJC Public Journalism Club POLNET Political, Peace, and Humanitarian Job Network PPP Private-Public Partnerships PR Personal Relations PRA Participatory Rural Appraisals RFA Reserve for Field Accommodation RS Republika Srpska RSC Regional Studies Center SDG Sustainable Development Goals SG Secretary-General SHD Sustainable Human Development SMAF Self-Reliance Mutual Accountability Framework TEPAV Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı / Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey TNC Transnational Corporation TRIPS Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights U5MR Under-Five Mortality Rate UIA Union of International Associations UK United Kingdom

ABBREVIATIONS

UN UNCED UNCTAD UNDP UNDS UNDT UNEG UNEP UNESCO UNFCCC UNFPA UNHCR UNICEF UNIDO UNITAR UNMBIH UNMIK UNOPS UNRCC UNRWA UNSCR US/USA USAID USSR WDR WEF WFP WHO WIPO WIR WPS WTO

xiii

United Nations United Nations Conference on Environment and Development United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Development Program United Nations Development System United Nations Dispute Tribunal United Nations Evaluation Group United Nations Environmental Program United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations Population Fund United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Industrial Development Organization United Nations Institute for Training and Research United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United Nations Office for Project Services United Nations Regional Cartographic Conferences United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East United Nations Security Council Resolution United States/United States of America United States Agency for International Development Union of Soviet Socialist Republics World Development Report World Economic Forum World Food Program World Health Organization World Intellectual Property Organization World Inequality Report Women, Peace, and Security World Trade Organization

= in tro duction

International Organizations Revisited Dennis Dijkzeul and Dirk Salomons

Introduction International organizations (IOs) are an essential part of world politics. There would have been no global interconnected community without the work of IOs. They set norms and standards, formulate and implement international law, alleviate suffering, assist failing states, contribute to resolving conflicts, and help ensure food security for millions. One could expand this list to double its length and still not cover all the crucial contributions that IOs make. Yet, they have their detractors. Not only is there criticism of the work they do, questions are also asked about the manner in which they conduct their affairs. For a long time, they invited more criticism than real scrutiny. But, fortunately, the management of IOs has attracted increasing attention since the 1990s. The number of studies that shed light on how they function is growing rapidly, so that empirical attention has become more sustained and theory development has gained pace. This volume brings together many disparate strands of criticism regarding IOs, describes the growing roles of IOs in world politics, and presents an empirical and theoretical overview of their management issues. The contributors to this book rethink the practice and theory of IOs. The book draws attention to the pathologies and potential therapies that are inherent to the concept of IOs. These organizations operate worldwide on almost all issues imaginable, from peacebuilding to setting technical standards, from promoting literacy to public sanitation. While they influence the lives of many people around the world, these organizations face profound management problems. Some shortcomings persist to such an extent that it is possible to speak about pathologies. Examples

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include excessive bureaucracy, slow action, humanitarian action that reignites war, failures to protect refugees, disruption of markets and dependency as byproducts of development cooperation and humanitarian action, as well as dissatisfaction or resistance by governments. Somalia, Afghanistan, and Syria have come to symbolize the most horrible failures of IOs in peacekeeping and diplomacy. Nevertheless, criticism of IOs sometimes lacks a sound basis, such as when it reflects insufficient knowledge of their actual functioning or is based on narrow, sometimes biased political concerns of particular groups. Some countries oppose outside “interference” within their borders and thus criticize IOs. Or they jockey for position to reap the benefits of IOs’ operations. When they lack control over IOs, states will complain about their “politicization” (Zürn and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2013), or they will simply use them as scapegoats, as the Trump administration did with the World Health Organization (WHO) during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Generally, the national interests of states or their elites, their alliances, and North-South differences, which are nowadays often reformulated as grievances in populist discourses, determine the degree and nature of the criticism. This introduction discusses what pathologies and therapies mean in the context of IOs and shows how their numbers have risen. By studying the scholarly attention given to these organizations, it also explains the paradox of fierce criticism and limited understanding of their functioning.1 In particular, this introduction examines why scholars of IOs have long swum against the mainstream of international relations (IR) research and how this has changed since the end of the Cold War. Next, it indicates the main research themes that will enhance our understanding of IOs. It ends with an overview of the contributions by the authors of this book.

Pathologies and Therapies Pathology is the science of causes and symptoms of diseases. Of course, a medical concept is not directly applicable to forms of social organization, but we use pathology to describe the situation in which the organization’s dysfunctional management (causes of disease) results in negative outcomes (symptoms of disease). In management terms, diseases would include inefficiency, waste of funds, duplication, overstaffing, slow decision-making processes, patronage, and fraud. The consequences of these diseases range from outright failure to damage to the public image, a decrease in interest from donors and other

INTRODUCTION

3

stakeholders, lessening legitimacy, unfulfilled mandates, unresolved societal problems, the set-up or involvement of alternative organizations, and declining organizations (that somehow never really die) (Strange 1998). However, if one attempts to identify the causes of diseases, one should be careful not to blame the patient too fast. Yes, the patient plays a critical role, but what about environmental factors? Can the patient autonomously influence these factors? In other words, to what extent are IOs responsible for the outcomes of their activities? Do other actors also bear responsibility? Traditionally, the state is seen as the main actor in international affairs, which raises the question of how states and IOs interact with each other. A related problem is that some supposed therapies—curative treatments of disease—do not work well. Reforms of IOs have often shown disappointing or counterproductive results. Simultaneously, addressing the societal problems that these organizations have to confront, varying from climate change to war crimes and gender issues, can be obstructed by a lack of international policy consensus, absence of financial resources and technological tools, or an inability to address them comprehensively due to their being too large or too politicized. To what extent can IOs manage deeply politicized issues? Can they combine political and managerial logics? Given the questions raised above, the contributors to this book have attempted to identify explanations and actions that offer promise for better therapies of organizational ailments and pathologies. Ultimately, identifying and proposing promising therapies should be based on a better understanding of these organizations, their shortcomings and strengths, as well as their differences. This will also help to identify promising external trends and internal actions that can foster a stronger functioning of these organizations.

IGOs, NGOs, and Other Distinctions Knowing that patients differ can assist in providing better therapies. This is important because the types and definitions of IOs vary widely.2 Sometimes, the term “international organizations” is used to include multinational corporations, bilateral organizations, multilateral organizations, regional bodies, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Other times, only United Nations (UN) organizations are covered by this term. While recognizing that some authors who talk about IOs actually limit themselves to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), most also include international NGOs that often interface and interact with UN

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organizations. In fact, IGOs of the UN system and INGOs usually address the same societal issues. IGOs are international public organizations with a public purpose. NGOs are private organizations with a public purpose. And as Reinalda (2009: 5) points out, IGOs and NGOs have coevolved over the last two hundred years. They often operate in networks for policymaking, norm setting, advocacy, implementation, and evaluation. Hence, we prefer to study them together. Still, IGOs and NGOs differ in international legal status, types of activities, membership, financing, mandates, and so on. The number and scope of these different IOs have been increasing, especially since World War II. NGOs possess different international legitimacy than IGOs, as they do not represent states. The growing roles of NGOs in international relations, their independence of spirit, and their occasionally close or competitive relationships with each other, IGOs, and states make them worthy subjects of study. IOs carry out advocacy tasks and often function as forums for information exchange and debate (Keck and Sikkink 1998). UN organizations are also set up as arenas to negotiate binding or nonbinding international rules and standards (Dijkzeul 1997: 28). Importantly, over time, many IOs have become operational and now assist actors predominantly in Southern countries, but in the case of human rights or environmental protection, they can in principle be active all over the world. They then provide goods or services in addition to their other tasks (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001: 5). The more operational an IO becomes in different countries, the more management challenges it faces. Obviously, IOs then need to establish themselves outside such IO capitals as New York, Brussels, Geneva, or Nairobi. They need to be accredited by host governments, to become more dependent on donor governments or funding by the general public, and to interact with other IGO and NGOs as well as an array of local actors, which can vary from women’s groups to war criminals and from religious or traditional leaders to multinational companies or intelligence agencies. In addition, most IOs diversify over time. For instance, already in its early years, UNICEF expanded from humanitarian relief to development, and MSF has added HIV/AIDS treatment to its emergency response mandate, even going so far as to wield a campaign to make pharmaceuticals affordable. Through all their activities, international organizations—both NGOs and IGOs—play both a regulative and a constitutive role in international relations as they “define shared international tasks (like ‘development’), create and define new categories of actors (like ‘refugee’), create new interests for actors (like ‘promoting human rights’), and transfer models of political organization around the world (like markets and democracy)”



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Figure 0.1.  Growth of International Organizations (1951–2020). Source: Union of International Associations 2020–2021.

(Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). In sum, both IGOs and NGOs have a public purpose: they both address—and often help define—cross-border societal problems. Many of these problems are international collective action problems; states and IOs will at best create suboptimal solutions when they go it alone.

Numbers Just like states, the first IOs originated in Europe: they were intended to address collective action problems that states alone could not address, such as governing the transport and navigation issues of the Rhine (Archer 1983: 12). Since the late nineteenth century, their numbers have swelled. Most IOs have originated in Northern, industrialized countries, but over the last decades countries from the Global South have been catching up. International NGOs have always been far more numerous than IGOs, and their numbers have with some temporary setbacks continued to increase rapidly. Their current number is estimated at some ten thousand. The number of IGOs peaked in 1985 at 378 and decreased until 2002 to 232. From 2003 to 2009, the number of IGOs varied between 238 and 247. From 2010 on, the number constantly increased from 241 to 289 in 2020, which marks its highest level in 29 years (Union of International Associations 2020). Although the growing number of IOs is only a rough yardstick to assess their roles in society, as it may be a sign of

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fragmentation and coincides with the growing number of organizations worldwide, it is by and large an indicator of their growing roles in world politics. The next section examines the different ways in which IR scholars have theorized and studied IOs. It will indicate their assessment of the ontological status of IOs by asking to what extent these theories see IOs as autonomous actors that possess agency, especially vis-à-vis states.

International Relations Despite the almost continuous growth in IO numbers, theoretical and empirical attention to IOs has waxed and waned in IR. In the 1920s, “the study of international organizations … stood at the very beginning of the discipline” (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009a: 15). Until World War II, international institution building3 dominated international relations “to such an extent that international organization4 was viewed not so much as a subfield but as practically the core of the discipline” (Rochester 1986: 780; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986), but most studies were of an applied, legal, or historical nature.5 In addition, much writing on IOs was claimed to be of an idealist bend.6 Idealism implied that the functioning of IOs constituted an important contribution to world peace. Marxists, however, did not accord an important role to IOs. They were either tools of capitalist exploitation or irrelevant on the road to communist salvation. In the meantime, realists, such as Carr (2001 [1939]), had already begun to argue that IOs were less important, as states dominated the international system. In line with Hobbes, they attributed states’ conflicts, “egoism and power politics primarily to human nature” (Wendt 1992: 395). Ontologically, they argued, IOs were subordinated to states and possessed little agency. Epistemologically, they were simply not seen as independent variables or interesting units of analysis. As a result, the use of power as an explanatory concept helped set IR apart from legal studies. From 1945 to 1960, studies of the budding UN system dominated (Rochester 1986: 782–97). However, the empirically penetrating studies of IOs in this period lacked “a theoretical hook on which to hang [their] observations, and without a professionalized critical mass of scholars to develop these insights, many important findings were only rediscovered and advanced more than two decades later” (Martin and Simmons 1998: 732). At this stage, lack of theoretical development constrained the understanding of IOs. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, much writing on IOs was of a functionalist nature (Mitrany 1948). This functionalist school argued that the

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expanding functional tasks of IOs would over time foster worldwide, peaceful integration: peace by pieces, as it was called. Interestingly, both functionalists and realists perceived organizations as pliable instruments in the hands of their masters, which was organizationally naïve (Brechin 1997: 7, 31). Organization scholars, however, have long noticed that survival and management interests often supplant the intended goals of their founders. The common judgment in IR that IOs—in particular, those of the UN system—lack autonomy conflicts with this observation (see Haas 1990: 29). Subsequently, regional integration studies from a neofunctionalist perspective, centering mainly on the European Economic Community, began to play a role in the study of IOs in the 1960s. However, as European integration slowed in the 1970s, neofunctionalism lost its shine, especially in the esteem of liberal scholars, who noticed that institutions facilitated cooperation, even in the international system. These scholars shifted attention for the first time to transnational politics and interdependence (Nye and Keohane 1971; Keohane and Nye 1989).7 Yet, this first transnational wave turned out to be short lived. First, security studies, often from a realist state-based perspective, played a dominant role in IR during the Cold War. In particular, Waltz argued that anarchy at the international level—defined as the absence of any legitimate authority in the international system (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998: 658)—characterized relationships among states, in particular in the bipolar international system of the Cold War. States had to help themselves in this system to protect their sovereignty and interests, and in many ways the most powerful states called the shots. Hence, IOs were not a solution to anarchy among states and remained “secondary to great power politics” (Oestreich 2011: 163). They simply lacked autonomy. As long as the assumption of anarchy determined international affairs, IOs remained uninteresting units of analysis. Second, both realism and liberalism became dominated by political economy approaches, and they incorporated rational/public choice and game theory (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998: 646–47). In the process, they were rechristened as neorealism and neoliberalism. Although the rationalist assumptions behind both neotheories facilitated parsimonious explanations of international relations, they failed to do sufficient justice to IOs’ rich social and cultural context. Their methodological individualism was hard to generalize to the interplay of different actors from various cultures with different power bases that permeate the actual functioning of IGOs and NGOs. Economic theories frequently explained the origins of IOs better than their actual preferences and behavior (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). In response, Ruggie (1998: 855–56) sighed that both schools had simply become neoutilitarian.

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Third, scholars from both schools moved toward the study of international regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. These regimes were defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”—a broad type of institution (Krasner 1983: 2).8 Regime theory drew attention to the conditions under which states would cooperate, for example, to create IOs (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 753– 55; Krasner 1983). Yet, as regime theory rose in prominence, research on particular IOs declined further, in part because, “treated as parts of international regimes, international organizations were only arenas through which others, mostly states, acted” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: viii). Moreover, regime theory centered on specific issue areas, such as health, whaling (Iliff 2008), or human rights. The interactions among issue areas and the role of IOs in such interactions received less attention. Skewed theory drew attention further away from real IOs. All in all, IOs were barely seen as actors in their own right. As a result, their internal (dys)functioning, implementation problems, and deviations from their mandate did not receive much attention. Instead, organizations became “black boxes, whose internal workings [were] controlled by traditional bureaucratic mechanisms” without being questioned (de Senarclens 1993: 453). As a consequence, the actual outcomes of IOs’ work could easily be criticized but were hard to explain. In sum, the statebased focus and rationalist approach of both the neorealist and neoliberal schools explained the paradox of a lack of scholarly attention to IOs, despite their growing numbers and scope of activities. By the same token, there was little or no interaction between IR and management and organization theory. The 1970s saw only a few powerful exceptions. Allison’s (1971) work on decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis showed the explanatory power of an organizational process perspective for international decision-making, but was not focused on IOs. Jervis (1976) used organizational learning in his book on perception and misperception in international politics. Cox and Jacobson (1973, 1977) specifically wrote on decision-making within IOs. Their opening up of the “black boxes” of IOs, however, was overshadowed by the rise of regime theory in IR. A few years later, Jacobson (1979) focused on network theory and interdependence to study the functioning of IOs in networks. Decision-making in general received considerable attention in other social sciences, in particular in management and organization theory (Simon 1976). Business and public administration theory moved on from decision-making to the study of implementation and later evaluation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; Dijkzeul 1997: 57–58). Although many IOs hoisted up evaluation departments, this move to implementation and

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evaluation did not make a lasting impact on IR theory. If it had, the agency of IOs would have gained more attention. At the same time, attention to international policy and decision-making bodies in IR continued, so that at least some attention to decision-making theory in IOs was sustained (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004; Fomerand 2017: 9–13). In the 1980s, several IR scholars noted the lack of attention to both IOs and management theory. Jönsson (1986: 39) wrote, “The relation between organization theory and the study of international organization … has largely been one of mutual neglect.” Two years later, Ness and Brechin (1988: 246) reached a similar conclusion: “The gap between the study of international organizations and the sociology of organizations is deep and persistent.” In retrospect, the 1980s constituted the low point in IR attention to IOs and management and organization theory.

After the Cold War: The 1990s During the 1990s, this pattern of neglect initially seemed to endure (Smouts 1993: 443; Brechin 1997; Klingebiel 1999). De Senarclens (1993: 453) contended that “the study of IOs has made scarcely any progress over the past few decades.” Haas (1990), with his book on learning and adaptation of IOs, seemed to be the exception that proved the rule.9 Jönsson (1993) also noted the neglect of organization theory and IOs and criticized the actual study of them. First, he noticed a disproportionate attention to UN organizations. Second, he stated that many studies were monographs that treat “international organizations as self-contained units.” In particular, their modus operandi in a heterogeneous and fluid organizational environment received too little attention. Third, he argued that “research on international organizations has by and large been idiographic rather than nomothetic. The weak or altogether lacking theoretical underpinning has ushered in eclecticism and inadequate cumulation of knowledge” (Jönsson 1993: 464). In 1991, Gallarotti highlighted four destabilizing consequences of managing international problems through IOs. First, when existing issue knowledge and policy tools are inadequate for the complexity of a tightly coupled system, such as G7 management of floating currency exchange rates in the 1980s, simplistic multilateral responses may exacerbate problems and increase instability. Second, by adverse substitution; IOs’ management may alleviate problems in the short run, helping nations avoid costly solutions. However, “doing so can be counterproductive in that it discourages nations from seeking more substantive and longer-term resolutions to their problems,” as happens in some cases of

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UN peacekeeping, economic development, and food aid (Gallarotti 1991: 199–204). Third, by dispute intensification; conducting international disputes on the theatrical stages of UN organizations may heighten conflict by encouraging escalating rhetoric, linking irrelevant issues to the conflict, and mobilizing confrontational alliances. Finally, by moral hazard; when IOs insure against risk, it can encourage nations to take foolish and counterproductive risks, as in financing trade deficits (Gallarotti 1991: 199–204; Dijkzeul and DeMars 2011: 209–13). The implications of Gallarotti’s critique have not yet been fully absorbed by research on IOs. His systematic approach abstracted from the actual functioning of particular IOs, intensifying that blind spot in IR and IO scholarship. When he published his study on the limitations of IOs, the World Bank (1989) had already published its study on development in Africa, mentioning good governance. In essence, this was a normative concept to move IOs away from structural adjustment and push governments to improve the quality of their rule. This concept caught on, and the limitations Gallarotti described were recast as limitations of global governance (e.g., Woods 1999; World Bank 1992). Whereas most authors mentioned above were bothered by the general lack of attention to IOs as organizations, Ruggie (1993: 6) held a different point of view: “Multilateral formal organizations … entail no analytical mystery. … These organizations constitute only a small part of a broader universe of international institutional forms.” And Mearsheimer (1994) warned against the “false promise of international institutions” from a neorealist perspective. He did not discern an independent effect of IOs on state behavior. They had an epiphenomenal ontological status and possessed no autonomy or agency. Moreover, Keohane still asked why some international institutions by which he meant both “the rules that govern elements of world politics and the organizations that help implement rules” succeed and others fail (1998: 82–96). Yet, neither Ruggie and Mearsheimer nor Keohane were studying actual IOs in detail.10 Nevertheless, after the Cold War, neorealists and neoliberal schools began losing support. Many IR scholars felt embarrassed that they had seen neither the fall of the Berlin Wall nor the dissolution of the Soviet empire coming. Their rationalist theories had not equipped them to understand the demise of the communist bloc. They responded with more sociological attention to nonstate actors and IOs and hoped to do more justice to their rich social and cultural context (Finnemore 1993). Drawing a page from the idealist notebook, constructivists particularly studied changing social norms and ideas to explain how governments and other actors construct or change their identities and interests. “Constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life” (Ruggie

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1998: 856). It became the third main IR school, next to neorealism and neoliberalism. It addressed such issues as actor socialization, complex learning, and cognitive framing (Trondal 2013: 164). In this vein, Wendt (1992) argued that “anarchy is what states make of it.” Other constructivists would add that this also held true for nonstate actors. Although the state-based perspective lingered on, constructivists began to look inside organizations to explain their functioning, implementation, and impact.11 Simultaneously, the end of the Cold War and faster globalization— growing transboundary movements leading to greater economic, social, political, and cultural independence among states and their citizens— fostered four related trends in IR’s empirical focus that moved beyond state-centered anarchy. First, IR scholars began working with broader conceptions of security, such as human security (UNDP 1994). When the “high” politics of bipolar military security dominated the political and research agendas during the Cold War, IR topics such as deterrence, regional integration, and regimes had simply explained a larger part of international life than IOs did. In particular, the UN had often been paralyzed between the superpowers. This also meant that units of analysis other than IOs were more relevant, which in turn influenced research questions and outcomes. However, the end of the Cold War opened up new opportunities for “low” politics in economic and social areas (Weiss and Gordenker 1996: 24). With the deadlock between the superpowers broken, many hoped, even assumed, that a more effective UN would be feasible (Roberts and Kingsbury 1993: 11).12 The problems with peacekeeping in particular, for example in Somalia and Rwanda, soon dashed these hopes. Still, in “low” politics, more was possible than before. Even the United States’ unilateral actions after 9/11 did not paralyze the UN to the extent that the Cold War had. In fact, in this more favorable post–Cold War context, continued pathologies or “broken” promises of IOs should have received even more attention as they pointed to deeper political and organizational problems. Relatedly, the second trend was that the international system now allowed nonstate actors more leeway. Advances in information technology and transport reinforced this trend. IR scholars examined a whole array of transnational nonstate actors, such as multinational companies, NGOs, advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), epistemic communities (Haas 1992),13 and social movements, so that a second wave in transnational studies took off. This wave was more sustained than the first one and also had ripple effects in other social sciences. Migration scholars noticed the dynamic and multidirectional nature of current migration and acknowledged the continued homeland ties of migrants and the existence of transnational migrant communities. For example,

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nowadays many migrants regularly move between their country of origin and the country of immigration. In response, Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) criticized “methodological nationalism” that considers migration as a primarily national challenge and takes for granted “the nation state as container of social life, the sole regulator of mobility and the predominant unit of analysis” (Fauser 2020: 278). In business administration, the transnational company and its management became an important part of the research agenda (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Pries 2008). In political science, attention to both domestic and transnational civil society increased. Several different, but comparable, strands of political activity have required acceptance of the concept of civil society in the study of global politics. …14 Women’s groups increased the density of their transnational connections and the effectiveness of their lobbying in UN policymaking. Human rights groups raised issues that were by definition primarily concerned not with relations between governments but with the claims made by individuals and social groups to their rights to act independently and challenge oppressive behavior by governments. Environmental groups increasingly gave priority to global questions and saw their social movement as linking the local to the global, against governments which gave insufficient attention to either level. Then, the anti-globalization movement arose and promoted an ideology of the common struggle of all humanity for global equity. (Willetts 2011: 28)

The NGOs belonging to these movements make up a central part of transnational civil society. At first they received more political than scholarly attention. For those on the right, NGOs were an alternative for bloated governments and bureaucratic IGOs. For those on the left, they were considered closer to the grassroots and could give voice to the poor and oppressed. Yet, neither side was originally able to empirically validate these claims (Dijkzeul 2006). The third trend was that the number of humanitarian crises rose rapidly after the end of the Cold War due to civil wars and disintegrating or failing states. Several peacekeeping operations were not able to stop the bloodshed. In some cases, they actually contributed to an increase in the level of violence. The same happened with humanitarian action. These security issues mainly wreaked havoc within states and differed considerably from the conflicts among states studied in state-centric and (bipolar) military security studies. The humanitarian and peacekeeping problems were so horrible and glaring that many (case) studies were written about the role of IOs in these situations (e.g., Weiss and Pasic 1997; Whitman 1999).15 Often, more general literature on crises also highlighted the fail-

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ings and counterproductive nature of IOs (de Waal 1997; Maren 1997; Suhrke and Juma 2002; Rieff 2002).16 In this vein, others began to detail their operational impact (Anderson 1999; Morales-Nieto 1996; Uvin 1998), while a few authors explicitly applied management theory to IOs in conflict situations (Handler Chayes, Chayes, and Raach 1997; Walkup 1997). The last trend was that governance became a growth market in IR and public and business administration (Finkelstein 1995; Knight 1995; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Rosenau 1995; Weiss 2013; Young 1994). Arguably, this “represents the culmination of the work on regimes, coupled with work on transnational advocacy networks, epistemic communities, and other transnational actors. [It] has led [to] the emergence of the phenomenon known as ‘global governance.’ In particular, this approach not only adopted a vision of the world as a network of formal and informal international agreements, rules, and institutions, but also includes networks of vertical, horizontal, and diagonal arrangements linking citizens to IOs, provincial governments to foreign states, local NGOs to epistemic communities, multinational corporations and consumer advocates, and so forth” (Stiles and Labonte 2010: 11). Governance theory has the advantage that it relaxes state-centric or government-centered assumptions.17 It does not see the state as a unitary actor but instead asks how government institutions, private enterprise, and actors from civil society interact. It thus facilitates the observation of multiactor, interactive processes and networks across the different levels of society. However, it does not necessarily generate more attention to the internal functioning of IOs. A greater focus on organizations can help to explain purposive action (and change) better than most regime and global governance theory do (see Robles 1995: 114). In this vein, Reinalda and Verbeek (1998) began to study the degree of autonomy of IOs. They spoke of autonomy “if international policy cannot be explained simply as a compromise between its most important member states” (Reinalda and Verbeek 1998: 3; Egger 2016: 73). Although this definition was still rather state centric, it allowed for purposive IO action and raised interest to what is happening in IOs. Together these four trends show that states play important roles, but they are not the central, monolithic actors with given interests of neorealist theory. In this respect, the elephant in the state-based IR living room is that many weak states do not function as self-interested unitary actors, if they function at all; anarchy within these states is worse than anarchy among states. Neither donor governments nor IGOs and NGOs know how to rebuild failed or weak states. At best, through their protection, humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping work, they provide

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an incomplete therapy. Similarly, environmental problems, “protecting the global commons,” cannot be solved at the level of single states. International responses to these problems have varied considerably, but they all show the great diversity within the networks of national government agencies, IGOs, INGOs, and local actors that was insufficiently noticed before. In the course of the 1990s, however, NGOs became criticized more strongly.18 They were not the hoped-for magic bullet (Edwards and Hulme 1996). Biekart (1999: 76) writes, “By the late 1990s, [NGOs] were under fire from various sides: from official donors (demanding measurable results and efficiency), from Southern partner organizations (demanding less paternalism and more ‘direct funding’ from official donors), from (some) Northern private donors (demanding transparency), and from their own staff which was squeezed between the demands of institutional growth and efficiency (more turnover with less costs at shorter terms) and developmental impact (which had proven to be expensive and rather slow).” Biekart’s description was quite similar to the criticism leveled at UN organizations. The promise that NGOs would do better than UN and other governmental organizations insufficiently materialized. Just like UN organizations, NGOs came under simultaneous attacks by left-wing activists for sustaining or even facilitating inequality and economic exploitation and right-wing pundits for being too progressive or internationalist. In sum, from the 1960s to the late 1990s, the debate on IOs has been characterized by a continuous lament that more and better study is required. Similarly, organizational and management theories were not used frequently, with the exception of decision-making theory in the 1970s and organizational institutionalism in the 1990s. Nevertheless, attention to IOs in political circles was greater than in IR as a field of research. Ministries have always worked closely with specific UN agencies active in their functional area, such as the Ministry of Labor with ILO and the Ministry of Agriculture with FAO. Diplomats were trained to work with UN organizations and NGOs. Frequently, NGO representatives participated in their national delegation to IGOs and played a role in developing national and international policies. IGOs implemented development and humanitarian projects with the help of NGOs. IGOs and NGOs also took part in international debates, advocacy, and conducted research. And NGOs received more funding from governments and the general public. Simultaneously, the fact that states—or better governments—rarely act as unitary actors and how they differ—from superpower to failed state— was noticed more acutely than before. The rise in attention to humanitarian crises, civil society, governance, and broader conceptions of security implied that the growing exchange

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between actors at the domestic and international levels came into clearer focus. Theoretically, structural explanations that only played at the international level, such as the concept of anarchy, did not suffice anymore to explain world politics, which dovetailed with constructivist criticism that neoliberalism and especially neorealism had failed to foresee the demise of the communist bloc. As a result, sustained study of IOs reemerged in the 1990s, reflecting that the number and activities of IOs had been growing almost continuously for a long time. This was also manifested in new, regularly updated textbooks and readers on IOs. In the 1970s and 1980s they had been few and far between, mainly Bennett (1977) and Archer (1983), but Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate (1994) and Mingst and Karns (1995) published new textbooks on the UN, and Kratochwil and Mansfield (1994) published their reader on international organization.19

From 2000 On: A Rapid Growth in Attention to IOs In the first decade of the 2000s, this change in attention to states, IGOs, and NGOs, as well as their interrelations with other actors, was first and foremost reflected in the growing number of publications on different types of IOs. In 2005, Weiss and Wilkinson founded the Global Institutions series, which by now has published more than 150 volumes, many on IOs.20 The international zoo was filled with a much greater fauna, varying from diaspora organizations (Dijkzeul and Fauser 2020a) to rebel groups (O’Neill 2017), and from private and military security companies (Joachim and Schneiker 2017; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011) to faithbased organizations (Sezgin 2017; Barnett and Stein 2012). In 2004, Karns and Mingst (2004) published the first edition of their textbook on global governance. Readers with an overview of central articles on global governance also began appearing, such as Weiss and Wilkinson (2014). In addition, publishers increasingly issued their own handbooks and research companions, such as the Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Weiss and Daws 2007; 2018), the Routledge Handbook on International Organizations (Reinalda 2013b), the Routledge Handbook of NGOs and International Relations (Davies 2019), the Ashgate Research Companion to Non-state Actors (Reinalda 2011), and the Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organizational Relations (Biermann and Koops 2017). Finally, topical journals, such as the Review of International Organizations and the Journal of International Organizations Studies, were established in 2006 and 2010 respectively. Collectively, growing empirical attention and attempts to summarize the outcomes of the study of IOs drove theory formulation.

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Two realist scholars noted the importance of IOs. While studying regulation of the global economy, Drezner (2007) argued that the three most powerful actors are the United States (a state), the European Union (not a state), and what he calls “global civil society” (not a state), which gains its influence by lobbying the United States and European Union to regulate their large markets to match global civil society principles. He notes that the United States and the European Union often seek to instrumentalize or selectively empower both IGOs and NGOs. They “can be used as agents to accomplish their explicit organizational goals; or to create ‘sham standards’ that foster the illusion of effective action; or for some extraneous purpose apart from either success or failure in their explicit goals” (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015: 15). Drezner concentrated on global civil society in a rather undifferentiated manner. In line with neorealists, who perceive states as monolithic actors with given interests, he saw the United States, the European Union, and global civil society as unitary actors with given preferences that are exogenous to their interaction with other actors. In contrast, Bob (2005) opened civil society up in his book The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, the Media and International Activism. He saw it as a politicized arena filled with contention and asymmetric power relations. For him, NGOs and other actors in the international arena compete with each other. Still, he did not look into individual NGOs. In different ways, both Drezner and Bob emphasize the power differences among actors and how they determine the outcomes of international policies and activism. In this sense, realism still provides a baseline for further study of IOs; another approach is useful only if it better explains the issue of power than older (neo)realist approaches. IR scholars continued to use public and rational choice theory to study IOs and their role in international affairs. In the 2000s, they increasingly borrowed principal-agent theory from economics, as it allowed some agency to IOs (Reinalda 2009: 8–9; Hawkins et al. 2006). The premise of this theory is “that an actor (the principal) delegates some authority to a body (the agent) without renouncing this authority. The purpose of the relationship is that the actor will perform certain tasks for the principal” (Reinalda 2009: 8). Independent action by an agent is called agency slack. It can take place as shirking (when an agent minimizes the effort it exerts for the principal) or as slippage (when the agent shifts policy away from its principal’s preferred outcome and toward its own preferences) (Reinalda 2013a: 17). Principal-agent theory showed again how close neorealist and neoliberal scholars still were. Neorealists appreciated that the states were the principals, while neoliberals focused more on the role of IOs in international cooperation. Just as in regime theory, states were usually seen as the dominant actors for promoting international trade,

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electoral democracy, and intergovernmental treaties and organizations. “The statist premise—that states are causes, while international institutions are consequences” (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015: 10)—explains why, despite its incorporation of various types of actors, liberal scholars remained state centered until the early 2000s. Still, empirical attention to nonstate actors in such areas as human rights, humanitarian crises, and the environment continued to grow (Oestreich 2011). Especially constructivist theory fostered attention to IOs. Probably no other book has done more to refocus attention on IOs than Barnett and Finnemore’s Rules for the World (2004). The authors distinguished four forms of international organization authority (rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expertise) that influence IO policymaking and applied them to three cases: IMF, UNHCR, and UN peacekeeping during the Rwandan genocide. They smartly operationalized the theme of pathology of IOs. They showed how IMF staff’s “expert authority prompted shifts in its mission in ways that have greatly expanded its ability to regulate domestic economic life and to constitute those very systems that need regulation,” but this expansion resulted not from organizational success but from “persistent failure to stabilize the economies of member states” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 45); how UNHCR’s organizational culture led to the involuntary return of Rohingyan refugees to Burma; and how the UN Secretariat’s ideology of impartiality led to the decision not to intervene in the opening weeks of the Rwandan genocide. In sum, the authors argued that IOs can play autonomous roles in world politics, but at the (potential) price of their organizational pathologies. Yet, one unresolved tension in the study of IOs kept coming back. Principal-agent theory understands the conditions for organizational effectiveness under the premise that effectiveness results from subjecting the organization to strict accountability under its donors (Hawkins et al. 2006). However, organizational sociology takes precisely the opposite tack, proposing that effectiveness is rooted in organizational autonomy from other interests, including from its donors (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The main underlying question that both groups of authors consciously or inadvertently confronted was the ontological status of IOs: to what extent were they autonomous actors? As a result of the growing research into IOs, the debate on their ontological status reached a temporary conclusion: IO autonomy is real, but it is a matter of degree and differs over time (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009b: 319). For example, Reinalda analyzed how the ILO evolved from a semiautonomous body (1919–44), through survival (1944–50) to increased autonomy (1950s), continued autonomy (1960s), and then from weakened autonomy (1970s) to finally threatened autonomy (1980s and

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1990s). He describes how strong executive leadership and different subunits with experts, as well as monitoring of labor issues, helped the ILO gain autonomy in the 1950s and 1960s (Reinalda 1998: 48–60). IOs are not just epiphenomena of great power politics or state influence. In this respect, IR theory does not lag any longer behind IO and state practice the way it used to in the second half of the twentieth century. The subsequent question became, what do the IOs do with their differing degrees of autonomy? Or put differently, what is their degree of agency and independence vis-à-vis states and other actors? In principle, it is possible that IOs have autonomy but lack influence (Ege, Bauer, and Wagner 2019: 7). In this respect, questions about their impact, effectiveness, accountability (Hirschmann 2018, 2020), and legitimacy (Tallberg and Zürn 2019) arose. Moreover, the debate on the actual roles of states in international politics—strong and weak, large and small—intensified. States or anarchy among them are not any longer the ontological starting point to analyze world politics (Koch and Stetter 2013: 5). As a result, the relations between states, IGOs, and NGOs have come up in five different ways, in which IR scholars borrowed once again from other disciplines—organizational sociology for management theory on organizations and their networks, history, and anthropology—in the hope to find better explanations of IO behavior and impact. The first group of scholars built further on organizational sociology, but they went thematically far beyond decision-making theory and sociological institutionalism and focused on policymaking (Reinalda and Verbeek 1998), implementation (Joachim, Reinalda, and Verbeek 2007), and evaluation (Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003). Traditionally, in the UN system the international civil service (see Salomons’s chapter in this volume; Ege and Bauer 2013), secretariats (Trondal 2013), reform (Weiss 2016), and state voting behavior (Voeten 2011) also received considerable attention. Many case studies of individual organizations or their policy areas ensued. Scholars also examined specific actors and their roles within these organizations, such as the UN secretary-generals (Gordenker 2010; Kille 2013) and their special representatives (Fröhlich 2013). Some of these scholars concentrated more firmly on the inside of IOs. They argued self-consciously that “bureaucracy, not anarchy, is likely to be the defining feature of the international system in the twenty-first century” (Ege and Bauer 2013: 136). In a seminal comparative study, Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009a) and others examined nine permanent secretariats of environmental IOs as organizations, or as they called it with a nod to Max Weber, their “bureaucracies.”21 They found that these secretariats particularly influenced the knowledge and belief systems of

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different actors when both the salience of the environmental issue for national decision-makers and the costs for public action and regulation are low. In addition, formal characteristics of the organizations, such as an organization’s mandate and financial and material resources, are less influential than expertise in environmental issues in combination with organizational neutrality, a flexible hierarchy, and strong leadership. Too strong a focus on secretariats, however, can give the impression that secretariats and member states in their governing bodies—both recipient and donor governments—function relatively separated from each other, whereas in daily practice they deeply influence each other. It also can lead to a neglect of the work of field offices. Crucially, these scholars of IO bureaucracy ask, who is the bearer of agency within IOs? (Ege and Bauer 2013: 143). To answer this question they also need to differentiate between subunits of the IOs and take the politics of the (member) states and other actors, including other IGOs or NGOs, into account.22 After all, agency—and perhaps multiple forms of agency—may simultaneously play a role in different parts of the IOs: not just in the secretariat but also in the governing bodies or field offices. Later, more advanced studies noted that the agency of IOs often depended on understanding the interplay between external conditions and internal challenges that these organizations face. Knill and his colleagues, for example, identified four management styles—servant, advocate, consolidator, and entrepreneur—in IOs that differed depending on this interplay (Knill et al. 2019). These scholars also noted that although the number of studies on IOs had increased, their outcomes were hard to generalize. In response, Ege, Bauer, and Wagner (2019) made the case for more comparative studies in the hope that these would lead to more generalizable insights. Still, in these studies, it is often not clear how to conceptualize the relationship between organizational management and politics. A second group repeated a move that Jacobson already made in 1979 (Jacobson 1979). After studying IOs as organizations, they shifted their gaze from individual IOs to the interorganizational relationships or networks in which these operate (Biermann 2008; Biermann and Koops 2017). A few authors, such as Jönnson (1986) and McLaren (1990), had continued in this vein, but by the end of the 1990s scientific attention began to grow more rapidly. While Keck and Sikkink (1998) explained the functioning of transnational advocacy networks, Reinicke (1999) examined global public policy networks in which public and private actors, such as government agencies, NGOs, UN organizations, advocacy groups, and firms, work together to address cross-border collective action problems. Similarly, Slaughter (2005) showed how transgovernmental networks ad-

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dress crime, terrorism, or trade. The latter authors generally focused on the positive aspects of international cooperation, but other authors notice more strongly the hidden agendas, competition, and conflicts among the various “partners” in the networks. “Some ‘partners’ may be hidden in some way [e.g., corrupt government officials, local leaders, or intelligence agencies] or may not share all the values and norms by which network members identify each other” (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015: 5). Other authors attempted to develop a stronger theoretical perspective on NGOs and their networks (Ohanyan 2009, 2012; Biermann and Koops 2017). Some scholars examined the specific roles that IOs play in networks; Abbott et al. (2015), for instance, showed the conditions under which IOs also orchestrate other actors, including governments. Other scholars went beyond specific actors and noted how cultural and national factors influenced the management of NGOs. Stroup (2012) provocatively argues that national factors such as laws, funding agencies, and political opportunity structures shape NGOs more than transnational influences do. Additionally, Stroup and Wong (2017) found out that NGOs are also shaped by an interorganizational hierarchy among NGOs themselves, in which well-known NGOs, such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, and Care, lead the way for other NGOs. This hierarchy is a rather persistent form of power that deeply influences—even constrains—their authority and autonomy. The slogan of all these scholars could be “networks instead of anarchy.” Third, the study of global governance moved to the center of IR. It eclipsed the subfield of international organization in looking at processes and structures of world order. Although the actual management and internal functioning of IOs generally still plays a restricted role in these studies, they do show their impact. As IOs assist with formulating constitutions, they actually help to create and empower states (Sripati 2012). Through international law IOs help to establish the rules of the game for their interaction (Romano 2011). The IMF and the World Bank have more economic power than many of the states they are working with. More generally, the conditionalities of their aid deeply influence the functioning of states (Stubbs et al. 2020). Humanitarian and development IOs even keep failing states from falling further apart by providing services that governments cannot or do not want to deliver (Aembe and Dijkzeul 2019). In fact, World Vision International has a higher budget than the national budgets of some the countries it serves. In addition, with support from NGOs, UN organizations “are monitoring and sanctioning states themselves, even powerful ones” (Brechin and Ness 2013: 21). In this respect, Zürn noted that “governance without government [is] a form of governing that takes place on the level beyond the nation state. With this

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shift from regime analysis to the concepts of governance without government, the assumption of anarchy was transcended” (Zürn 2018: 262). The central challenge for global governance literature is, once again, to look into the black box of IOs’ internal functioning, to explain cooperation, competition, and conflict among governments and IOs, and then explicate their impact. The fourth group used historical approaches and has also been vibrant and diverse over the last decade. These authors differ considerably in their opinions about IR theory. Several IR scholars noted that they had used economic and sociological institutional theory far more than historical institutional theory. Fioretos (2017) showed how such theory can complement both economic and sociological institutional approaches and deepen our understanding of IOs. Reinalda (2009) wears IR theory lightly in his magisterial Routledge History of International Organizations and focuses strongly on the historical empirical material. He notes the long intertwined history of IGOs and NGOs since the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15. For example, NGOs helped shape the Concert of Europe, fostered Jewish emancipation, successfully fought slavery, and contributed to international conferences and the creation and functioning of many IGOs. Mazower criticizes IR theory in his history of global governance (Mazower 2013) and his study of the origins of the League of Nations and the UN system (Mazower 2009). He shows that the preservation of white colonial rule was crucial for the founding fathers of both world bodies. They promoted a system of states rather than international arbitration, and individual human rights rather than collective rights, which strengthened the role of the governing (colonial) elites. However, in the early years of the UN’s existence, their aims were thwarted by the newly decolonized states, in particular by India. Ironically, these newly independent states would subsequently rarely allow “their own” minorities to claim collective rights. And they benefited from the UN system legitimizing and strengthening their state structures. Davies (2013) provides a history of NGOs that shows how the number and activities of NGOs have grown and declined in macrohistorical waves since the end of the eighteenth century. “Transnational civil society has developed in three ways with peaks reached in the decades preceding the two World Wars, and at the turn of the millennium” (Davies 2013: 6). Provocatively, Davies suggests that transnational civil society fragmented and declined before the two world wars, inadvertently contributed to both wars, and is currently also in decline. His cyclical, almost Nietzschean, approach to history points to the most serious and recurrent pathology of IOs; in contrast to their professed normative goals to address societal

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problems, they may at times be self-defeating and contribute to violence, even war. Although other scholars noted similar trends, they doubted whether such a cyclical pattern existed. Whereas the League of Nations also seems to fit this pattern, is it not yet clear whether this holds true for the UN system. Despite their differences, these historical studies have in common that they do not accept the mainstream narratives of the exclusive roles of states in international affairs. Instead, they come up with broader or alternative narratives that show how, given the roles of nonstate actors, change takes place over longer periods of time and across issue areas. Implicitly, they criticize the narratives that the main three IR schools developed and used to legitimate themselves. Under the heading of practice research, the fifth group looks in far more detail at what IOs actually do (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Schatzki, KnorrCetina, and Savigny 2001). For example, Gross Stein (2011) describes how international humanitarian organizations engaged self-critically in a debate about their competencies and standards. Yet, she critically notes that in these debates “claims to moral standing are foregrounded, often masking the difficult and troubling [working] practices that continue to be reproduced and sustain” the humanitarian community (Gross Stein 2011: 105). Sending and Neumann (2011) investigate how World Bank practices, in particular its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment to measure country performance “according to a set of Bank-defined criteria for good policies and institutions” (Sending and Neumann 2011: 232), shape the relationships between the Bank and both its donor governments and client countries. Practice studies generally focus on thick description and the microfoundations of IOs’ behavior. Several practice scholars take anthropological methods, in particular field research, to study IOs’ functioning and implementation seriously. As a result, they are able to explain why the impact of their functioning differs from both IR theory and the normative goals of the IOs. Autesserre (2010), for example, shows how IOs and peacekeepers failed in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo because they got the conflict dynamics wrong by focusing too much on conflict minerals and politicians at the national level without understanding land conflicts at the local level. In her next book, an ethnography of peacebuilding, Autesserre (2013) shows how IOs’ standard operating procedures caused failures in peacebuilding because they led to a misunderstanding of local actors and conflict. Micinski (2019) shows how informal, local initiatives to assist refugees on the Aegean Islands were partly coopted and partly crushed by the Greek government. The challenge for practice research will be to link the study of organizational routines and

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other daily practices to deeper social structures. Methodologically, they are strong at zooming in on the local and the daily, but they will also have to zoom out to the international and the structural (Scholte 2019). Finally, Johnson (2014) has studied in Why Governments Are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance how staff of IGOs advocate the creation of new IGOs, participate in their institutional design process, and “dampen the mechanisms by which states endeavor to control new” IGOs. She calls these new IGOs “organizational progeny” and notices that their international staff members gain specialized knowledge and are “extremely well versed in particular policy issues, relegating many states to the position of dilettante rather than political master.” Although the most powerful states may rival IGOs in this respect, they are a minority of the overall population, and the number of parties who have accrued particular expertise is relatively small. Apart from the technical or scientific knowledge that is needed to define a policy issue, international bureaucrats also have administrative, procedural, diplomatic, and organizational knowledge that is needed to address the issue, but they do not necessarily share this information with states. Due to their number and divisions, states have a hard time jointly controlling IOs, while IO staff can reach out to potential allies among other IGOs and nonstate actors, such as NGOs and other civil society actors. If this loss of state control over IOs contributes to new forms of anarchy, it was clearly not foreseen by traditional IR.

Multipolar Populism and an Illness: Threatening IOs In 2016, with the election in the United States of President Donald Trump and the Brexit referendum in the UK, several trends came together that deeply influence the relationships between the domestic and international levels, and increasingly challenge the post–World War II multilateral order and the functioning of IOs. They show that earlier successes of IOs—in promoting free trade and international communication; diminishing the East-West conflict; putting international problems, such as ozone depletion and climate change, on the agenda; and, more generally, in growing their membership and extending their activities—have caused a backlash (Dembinski and Peters 2020). Inspired by the Chicago School’s idealization of the market economy and enabled by US president Ronald Reagan and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, free markets, deregulation, and privatization started to unravel social safety nets in the Global North during the 1980s. Labor unions, especially in sectors hit hard by imports—such as automobiles,

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steel, coal mining, textiles, and machine tools—became skeptical of free trade but rarely were able to make a fist. In the Global South, liberalization through the Washington Consensus and WTO contributed to a decline in social services. Simultaneously, information and communication technology led to higher market concentration in the private sector and growing inequality, in particular in regions where traditional industries and jobs were disappearing. In addition, large corporate scandals, such as those around Enron in the United States or Ahold in the Netherlands, as well as the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001, created a growing sense that the global economic system was rigged against ordinary people. All this diminished the trust in international cooperation as a means toward solving common global challenges. After the attack on New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, on 11 September 2001, terrorists were able to strike regularly in both the Global North and South, and international cooperation was seen through a security prism. The UN Security Council was sidelined by the US-led Coalition of the Willing, which got stuck in Iraq and Afghanistan, unable to win militarily, unable also to prevent the rise of the Islamic State and build functioning democratic states. Unsurprisingly, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq also created tensions among NATO allies, while anti-Western sentiments spread in the Global South, particularly in predominantly Islamic countries. Another long-term trend, migration to the Global North, showed an inverted image: antimigrant and anti-Islam sentiments grew, whereas military interventions and development cooperation lost popularity. IOs had to swim against the current. Crucially, China’s rapid economic rise, a significant part of globalization, spurred economic nationalists to criticize that the “liberal order allowed China to trade unfairly and hollow out” manufacturing in the West (Mastanduno 2020: 533).23 Especially the 2008 housing bubble and financial crisis called into question the neoliberal economic model,24 shattered the Washington Consensus, and reinforced criticism of international elites. Were the elites and IOs still able to protect, let alone improve, the lives of ordinary citizens? After the 2008 economic crisis, and with China as the manufacturing hub of the world, the US unipolar moment seemed over. Overall, the Global North has grown much slower than the economic tigers of East Asia and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The Euro-crisis, the 2015 refugee crisis, and Brexit have further weakened Europe. Strongmen in countries such as Hungary, Turkey, and the Philippines are muzzling civil society and the judiciary. China’s leadership is increasingly preoccupied with security issues and therefore often relies on coercion. It is also building its “own” IOs in which it has strong

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control, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which Russia also plays an important role. Under its authoritarian government, Russia is making strenuous efforts to reimpose itself in its near abroad, leading to wars in Georgia (2008) and the Ukraine (2014), and later further afield with its interference in the Syrian conflict (2015). It also controls regional IOs with states mainly from the former Soviet Union. In sum, the world is becoming multipolar, and if history is any guide, transitions between ascending and standing powers are generally tense and unstable (Dembinski and Peters 2020: 142). This is aggravated by the fact that so-called populists began to dominate national political debates and questioned the legitimacy and effectiveness of internationalist elites and IOs. With their anti-elitism and antipluralism, populists usually distinguish between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” (Schneiker 2020: 3). In this way, they do not follow the traditional left-right divide but create a cleavage between open and closed societies. And with their nationalism, they often condemn international affairs as a zero-sum game and root cause of economic problems. In this respect, for many populist politicians, strong leadership means being able to break established international norms or conventions. Consequently, their foreign policies become more confrontational, and they disrupt IOs and policies in areas such as trade, development, human rights, and the environment. Although these established norms and policies were often incomplete, at times contradictory, and almost always hard to implement, they were based on the ideals of international cooperation that intended to prevent the beggar-thy-neighbor policies and fragmentation from before World War II. In contrast, US president Trump remarked at the seventy-fourth session of the UN General Assembly, “The future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots” (Trump 2019). His administration, for example, has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement on climate change (June 2016), the UN Human Rights Council (June 2018), the Iran deal (June 2018), as well as UNESCO (October 2017) and the WHO (May 2020), and regularly protests that its allies are not sharing their burden in NATO and are weakening the United States. The COVID-19 pandemic is the first major international crisis since 1945 where the United States has not played a leading role. For IOs, two contradictory narratives, an open “cosmopolitan” one and a closed “communitarian” one, have emerged (Zürn 2018: 265–66) that are both reinforced by COVID-19. On the one hand, the “global health crisis has further demonstrated the need for multilateralism and exposed the fallacy of go-it-alone nationalism or isolationism” (Malley 2020: 1).

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On the other hand, “globalization and open borders create vulnerabilities to viruses and other threats, and the … struggle for control of supply lines and life-saving equipment requires that each country takes care of its own” (Malley 2020: 1). Moreover, “under conditions of heightened economic insecurity, there will be a strong impulse to scapegoat foreigners for the crisis” with calls for protectionism, restricting migration and trade, and less support for IOs (Roubini 2020: 2). If the closed narrative wins out, “Sino-American decoupling in trade, technology, investment, data, and monetary arrangements will intensify” (Roubini 2020: 2), which may lead to a new Cold War, this time between the United States and China with Iran and North Korea joining as spoilers, while Russia alternates between being a superpower and a spoiler. In all this turmoil, the UN has once again become paralyzed as superpowers clash. NGOs and UN organizations are limited in their remit and will have to work mainly in “friendly” countries. Currently, the UN Security Council is unable to address COVID-19 and its consequences. For the leadership of IOs it will be decisive to what extent it can proactively deal with politicization and protectionism and, when necessary, make organizational changes or take new initiatives to address pandemics, armed conflicts, forced displacement and the ensuing economic crisis while addressing environmental deterioration. This is a tall order. Can the executive heads and staff of IOs make the case for open and inclusive societies? Or mitigate or transcend the open-closed cleavage? Can they still suggest or lead the way to more sustainable economies? If they do not succeed, new forms of fragmentation, perhaps even anarchy, will come to dominate international affairs.25 Power among states and IOs will remain a central issue in answering these questions (see Fomerand in chapter 3), but IR scholars will continuously have to go beyond structural explanations at only the international level to explain new configurations of the domestic and the international. At the moment, there are not many studies on how multipolarity and populism are affecting IOs. Nor do we know much on how IOs are addressing multipolarity and populism. Are they strong enough to tackle these challenges, or are they hollowed out by pathologies that cripple their ability to meet their mandates? The authors of this book reflect on these questions.

Analysis: Attention and Criticism Revisited What have we learned so far about the study of IOs? First, it is impossible to reach a general judgment on IOs and their management. Ideological distinctions such as left or right or political preferences for open or

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closed societies, or judgments based on the theoretical assumptions of specific IR schools or management theory all deeply influence why and how IOs are being assessed. Moreover, IOs also compete with each other, for example, for funding or media attention, so that a gain for one IO may be a loss for another (Cooley and Ron 2002). Finally, a great diversity of IOs is now working on so many different issues across the globe that a general judgment would not do them justice. By the same token, there is no general theory on their management. Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear that they play many, often crucial, roles in world politics, in particular when dealing with global collective action problems. In response, IR scholars have incorporated and adapted theories from other disciplines, such as law, economics, history, organizational sociology, and anthropology, to understand IOs better. Disciplinary myopia occurs less frequently (compare Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003: 16). With the shift from economic theory to more sociological and anthropological approaches, the four main ontological assumptions about IOs have changed: 1. IOs are not epiphenomenal to states but have a degree of autonomy, which may differ over time; 2. States and IOs are not unitary actors with given preferences but can be disaggregated; 3. Anarchy as a structural explanatory concept at the international level does not suffice but can be replaced by attention to the interaction between networked actors at the international and national levels; 4. IOs are generally set up for a functional/issue area, such as health or food, but the most interesting politics take place at the edges of issue areas or among them. Human rights, gender, the environment, development cooperation, and humanitarian action are often studied as separate issue areas, but in practice they cut across various issue areas, functional and conceptual. These changing assumptions mean that a vertical hierarchical perspective from (donor or receiving) governments to the UN to international NGOs to local NGOs or local administration to people on the ground is being replaced by the study of more diverse networked (also horizontal and diagonal) relationships among them. Similarly, the assumptions of dominant states, unitary actors, a strong focus on the international level, and separate issue areas give the impression that actors and issues are

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self-contained, so that the interaction among them—except for the vertical top-down perspective—barely received attention, which led to a curtailed understanding of both the management and politics of IOs. In the next section, we indicate five themes for future IO research that highlight both the management and politics of IOs that help go beyond these issues.

Old Shortcomings and New Research Directions Five thematic directions stand out in the study of IOs. As can be expected with organizations that address cross-border problems, including the most difficult international collective action problems, these themes are all linked to how the actors and their power relations evolve—and how this is perceived. Which actors can make their case and overcome international collective action problems—and which ones remain behind? The themes concern (1) the role of the state and its subunits; (2) the degree of autonomy of IOs and their subunits; (3) the interplay between internal processes and the external environment of IOs; (4) the implementation of international norms, policies, and decisions; and (5) the resulting impact. To understand implementation and impact, it is crucial to distinguish between direct IO implementation and indirect implementation. With all five themes, questions come up on how these actors influence one another. How independent or permeable are they? The first research theme is based on the fact that the state-centric perspective has become less dominant in IR, which can still be taken a step further. As Willetts (2019: xix) has argued, “the concept of state is only appropriate in international law,” where states have legal personality, so that they have the legal standing to enter into treaties, establish contracts, claim rights, and be held accountable. This concept downplays the role of IOs, be they IGOs or NGOs. It is more useful to speak of governments and distinguish types of governments, from superpowers to failed states, and disaggregate them into their institutional subunits to understand in more detail how (parts of) governments, IGOs, and NGOs coevolve and influence each other’s policies, management, and activities (Hirschmann 2018: 38; Stubbs et al. 2020: 31). The second theme highlights that although IR scholars neglected the autonomy of IOs for a long time, more and more studies have shown that they possess a degree of autonomy that can differ over time. Hence, the degree of autonomy should be an empirical question, not an ontological assumption. Subsequently, the question “What do IOs do and achieve with their autonomy?” came up. Most scholars that study the results of this autonomy concentrate on the policy outcomes of IOs. As a conse-

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quence, themes like accountability and legitimacy of IOs and their policies will continue to receive scholarly attention. Third, the acknowledgment of autonomy also led to more attention to the interplay of internal factors and the external environment, and therewith to the networks of IOs, governments, and other actors. Just as with governments, scholars began to disaggregate IOs to understand the different degrees of agency of their different subunits, such as their secretariats/headquarters, governing bodies, field offices, and expert committees. The interaction of these subunits and more generally the internal functioning of IOs still requires more attention. In this respect, the ongoing interplay between political and managerial aspects should be studied more often—a topic that comes back in several chapters and the conclusions of this volume. Fourth, implementation and concomitantly the impact of IOs are also crucial research topics where this interplay and the degree of autonomy come to the fore. As implementation usually plays at the domestic level, it has often been neglected by IR scholars, although the organizational sociology/management and network scholars, as well as practice scholars, sometimes address it more regularly. Broadly, one can distinguish between indirect and direct implementation by IOs. With indirect implementation, other actors, such as national government agencies, a local administration, private enterprises, or domestic NGOs, execute most of the work. With this form of implementation, IOs—and their scholars—tend to restrict themselves to the international level of analysis, especially on facilitating international negotiations and cooperation. The main examples include agenda setting, setting norms and developing policies, codification and development of law by governments, and carrying out and disseminating research to governments and other actors. To a certain extent, IOs can then evaluate and influence implementation at the domestic level by forms of reporting to the international level (either by member states’ self-reporting, by peer reviews, or by naming and shaming [Kahn-Nisser 2019]). To give a practical example, in the environmental area, scholars of IOs have generally concentrated on such policy-outcome indicators as whether parliaments have accepted new laws or ratified international treaties or how ministries have changed their policies or added environmental departments in response to IOs’ advice, research, and lobbying. Others have studied how governmental voting behavior, funding patterns, reporting, or use of new knowledge in policy discourses regarding environmental issues have changed. Nevertheless, even when IOs achieve such policy outcomes, biodiversity may still decrease, and climate change may get worse. In other words, outcome is not impact; at best, it is a proxy. In the case of

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climate change—probably the hardest international issue of all—IOs can barely influence factors ranging from peat fires in Siberia or car use in England to deforestation in Brazil and carbon tax in the United States. Similarly, the law on the books on internal displacement may be perfect in some countries, whereas internally displaced persons suffer miserably. The same holds true for humanitarian law; the International Committee of the Red Cross may do terrific work as the guardian of international humanitarian law, but what does it matter when rebels do not take notice and kill, maim, or plunder? IOs thus run the risk that although the operation has been successful, the patient has died; changes in policy outcomes do not necessarily mean sufficient impact. Put differently, IOs can influence outcomes, and in this way contribute to a change in impact, but they certainly cannot control impact. With indirect implementation, the challenge is to link the IOs’ normative and policy work at the international level with the networks of implementing partners, such as government agencies, civil society organizations, other IOs, and private enterprises, at the national level (Dijkzeul and Funke 2017). As stated earlier, most IOs also take on operational work on the ground. Such direct implementation includes capacity building, executing programs and projects, advocacy, and funding and working with a wide variety of local counterparts. With direct IO implementation, it is necessary to understand how the IOs function as part of networks of actors that are involved or take an interest in implementation. These actors range from warlords to women’s groups, and from presidents to unemployed adolescents or professional aid workers. Often, this interaction is not well studied, but such studies would help explain how the impact comes about. All these actors influence each other’s activities and impacts, but it is often not clear how exactly. Studying the diversity of actors has the added advantage that it will be possible to incorporate local voices and initiatives from the Global South, which have often been absent in scholarship of IOs so far. In general, knowing impact is crucial if one wants to know to what extent and how IOs influence the societal problem, be it with direct or indirect implementation. Yet, impact is notoriously hard to measure, due to many intervening variables. Policy outcomes are, as stated, easier to identify and assess. Hence, going beyond policy outcomes to evaluating impact and linking this to IO action will be one of the great challenges for the study of IOs. After all, when these organizations are founded to address transborder societal problems, then we need to know how well they influence these problems. So far, only a few studies have assessed the impact of IOs and linked this to either the functioning and interaction of their subunits or the interaction among networks of highly diverse actors during implementation. For example, in Does Peacekeeping Work? Fortna

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(2008) combines quantitative data and qualitative fieldwork to study the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Dijkzeul and Lynch (2006) used epidemiological and organization-sociological research methods to examine how three international NGOs and one local NGO supported primary healthcare in the war-torn east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and assessed their impact in terms of increased utilization of health facilities by patients and the degree of cost recovery of health facilities. We need more work like this on the functioning of IOs. Finally, utilitarian theories perceived states and IOs as hard-shelled unitary actors with given preferences (national security or economic interests). In this sense, they resembled billiard balls that bounced against each other but were not changed by their encounter. However, with the disaggregation of actors, such as government and IO subunits, the need arises to understand both IO and government diversity better, in particular how these actors and their subunits empirically influence, constitute, or permeate each other. To be effective, IOs need to keep many actors in the game. For instance, donor influence may be strong, but IOs also may have to negotiate under the radar with warlords, traditional leaders, religious institutions, media, women’s groups, youth organizations, or corrupt government officials. Many of these actors treat IOs as either a prize to capture or a threat to suppress (DeMars 2005: 43). They will thus attempt to instrumentalize IOs for their own purposes. Depending on the actors involved, this can take many forms, such as cooptation, politicization, marketization, or militarization, which strongly influences the actual impact of IOs’ activities on the ground. Put differently, IOs need to be understood in networks of different actors that permeate each other politically and managerially. Some IOs are able to resist this instrumentalization, some do so partially, and others do become instrumentalized; the mechanisms and extent to which this happens require more study (Weiss 2014). Only then will we be able to understand the actual politics and impact of IOs better.

Outline of This Volume The authors of this volume have attempted to bypass or to surpass the shortcomings in the study of IOs described above. Our aim is to empirically assess and criticize the functioning of these organizations. We show how pathologies come about either within the IOs or in their interaction with the broader environment. We have done this as a group, because addressing these matters requires knowledge of several disciplines. Sound empirical knowledge of IOs cannot be gained within the confines of academia alone. It is essential to engage with IOs both at headquarters and

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in the field and learn from the practitioners and local actors and to stay long enough to understand IOs’ interaction: how do they influence, constitute, and permeate each other? Studying these organizations means understanding their organizational processes from the top, starting with multilateral diplomacy and funding, to the bottom, with action in the field. It also requires an understanding of organizational processes and reforms, as well as knowledge of substantive issues in local contexts, be they the application of international gender norms or the conceptualization and implementation of sustainable human development. Hence, this book follows, to a large extent, the policy and programming process going from decision-making, including resource allocation, to implementation and evaluation. Each chapter identifies some central pathologies and therapies. Cumulatively, the authors show the interrelationship of IGOs and NGOs in addressing international problems, and that there is a whole set of pathologies, and often only imperfect therapies. The first part examines closely the policymaking and decision-making of IOs, with emphasis on the roles of states. In chapter 1, Jim Muldoon and JoAnn F. Aviel focus on the latest trends in multilateral diplomacy, in particular the move toward more networked approaches, combining state diplomacy with multilateral organizations and NGOs. The second chapter by Sandra Aviles and Romano Lasker examines the financing of UN peacekeeping and “regular” activities in which states traditionally play a central role. They note in particular that the functioning of the UN system is increasingly confined to crisis countries, and they indicate what kind of funding is necessary to make its fieldwork a success. They also note how the United Nations has to cooperate with other actors in networks to address its main operational challenges. In chapter 3, Jacques Fomerand studies the conceptualization of sustainable human development (SHD) and the political struggles surrounding it. He shows how international structural factors hamper the implementation of SHD along predictable North-South lines, but also that incremental improvements have occurred over time. In the second part, the internal functioning and decision-making of these organizations is examined. This part focuses on the headquarters level and the central problems, such as organizational reform, policymaking, and internal decision-making. A common theme in these chapters is the hardship in making these organizations function better. In chapter 4, Dirk Salomons studies the pathologies of human resource management in the United Nations, which have their roots in the League of Nations and which continue to obstruct efficient, results-oriented management. In chapter 5, Yves Beigbeder focuses on corruption and culture in the UN system and the managerial difficulties in resolving fraud and corruption.

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The third part treats the issue of implementation in detail. In chapter 6, Dennis Dijkzeul looks at a central tool of IOs, the program approach, and assesses one of the main strategies to make this approach work— participation. He also explains why such participation remains limited. In chapter 7, Monika Krause takes a closer look at the counterproductive, if not counterintuitive, aspects of human rights NGOs from a practice approach. She regards human rights NGOs as valuable structures that are also highly insufficient for what they hope to deliver. In this respect, she explains the collective consequences of the choices these organizations make. Anna Ohanyan and Gevorg Ter-Gabralyan, in chapter 8, study the implementation problems of NGO diplomacy from a network perspective. They provide an illustrative case: the problems in transnational peacebuilding between Turkey and Armenia, two middle-income countries without diplomatic relations, troubled by the genocide more than a century ago. The United Nations barely has a presence in either, and the governments resent UN interference, but local and international NGOs still attempt to take the initiative to foster peace. In chapter 9, Kristie Evenson examines how the funding policies of donor organizations—governments, the European Union, and the UN—actually hamper local NGOs in rebuilding civil society and fostering democracy in Bosnia, which contradicts their professed aims. Similarly, Lucile Martin and Saeed Parto explain in chapter 10 the unsuccessful implementation of gender policies in Afghanistan by IOs, both IGOs and NGOs, despite great investments. They show the disconnect between a top-down normative process (e.g., numerous UN resolutions) and the reality on the ground, where international elites funnel money to national elites, pretending there is a postconflict society whereas in reality violence is brutal, and pretending to develop intricate programs while access to local communities is virtually impossible. There is no real participatory process with bottom-up needs assessments and no accountability downward—just donor-reporting practices as the canon for fake effectiveness. In the last part, the conclusions, Dennis Dijkzeul, Yves Beigbeder, and Dirk Salomons assess the contributions of this book in light of the deficiencies in the study of IOs that have been identified in this introduction. Criticizing the concept of self-contained tasks, it develops a basic theoretical model for explaining the behavior of both individual IOs and the networks in which they operate, while emphasizing the remaining dilemmas as well as possible practical therapies. Dennis Dijkzeul is professor of conflict and organization research at the Social Science School and the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict at Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. He was the

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founding director of the Humanitarian Affairs Program at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University in New York. He has conducted research projects on international and local organizations in the DRC, South Sudan, and Afghanistan, and has worked as a consultant for UN organizations and NGOs in Africa, Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America. His main research interests concern the management of international organizations (the UN, NGOs, and diaspora organizations) and their interaction with local actors in humanitarian crises. His latest books are The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory (Routledge, 2015, with William DeMars), The New Humanitarians in International Practice: Emerging Actors and Contested Principles (Routledge, 2016, with Zeynep Sezgin), and Diaspora Organizations in International Affairs (Routledge 2020, with Margit Fauser). Dirk Salomons is a special lecturer in humanitarian policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. From 2002 until his retirement in 2015, he directed SIPA’s Humanitarian Policy Track and its International Organizations Specialization. Partially overlapping with his academic work, he was managing partner of the Praxis Group, an international consulting firm, from 1997 until 2012. Earlier, from 1970 until 1997, Salomons served in a wide range of management, peacebuilding, and policy advisory functions in several organizations of the UN system, including the FAO, UNDP, ICSC, UNOPS, and UN Secretariat. His most cherished assignment was that of executive director for the UN peacekeeping operation in Mozambique from 1992 to 1993. He has written extensively on the challenges of postconflict recovery, with fieldwork in Chad, Sudan, the DR Congo, and West Africa, as well as in the Middle East (Gaza, Jordan), Mindanao, and the Pacific Islands.

NOTES 1. Compare, for example, the criticism by Glennon (2003) and the reply by Slaughter, Luck, and Hurd (2003). 2. Archer (1983: 1–3) describes how the term “international” subsumes three more specific concepts, namely, intergovernmental, transnational, and transgovernmental. NGOs, for example, are actually transnational organizations. See also Pries (2008). Multinational organizations are a form of private enterprise that also operate transnationally. The term IO, however, is usually reserved for (not-for-profit) multilateral public organizations, as well as for civil society organizations that carry out activities across borders. In our analysis, we do not include regional (multilateral) organizations, such as the European

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8. 9.

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Union, ASEAN, and MERCOSUR. It would make the scope of this book too broad. Nor do we describe government- and/or party-controlled NGOs, or GONGOs, which have been created in countries such as Russia and China in an attempt to identify these with genuinely independent NGOs and benefit from their status. IR scholars use the term “institution” broadly. Institutions guide or even prescribe the behavior of international actors. They often distinguish conventions, regimes, and IOs. The first two types of institutions have a rule or norm like nature. However, a norm, principle, rule, or procedure as one possible meaning of the concept “institution” is often used in this way in economics and sociology, but in management and organization theory, “institution” usually means role or organization. The “norm” or “rule” type of institution is generally diffused among a large number of people. The “role or organization” type is inherent to intentionally constructed human groupings. Goldsmith (1992: 582) states, “Slipping from one definition to the other is easy, for roles and organizations usually need rules and conventions to reinforce them, and vice versa. Moreover, both definitions refer to repetition in the way people act. In either case, an institution is understood to entail stability and persistence.” The main distinction between the two types of meaning is that regimes and conventions do not act—people do, in their roles as heads and staff members of their organizations. International organization is the subfield of international relations that studies the structure and processes of (establishing and maintaining) world order. Originally, international organizations were at the center of the discipline, but as we shall see later they were supplanted by international political economy topics. In contrast to international relations, legal studies or international law has largely sustained attention on international organizations (predominantly intergovernmental ones) throughout the post–World War II period and has been especially vibrant in the post–Cold War period (e.g., international human rights and humanitarian law) (see Fomerand 2017; Noortmann 2019; Bogdandy and Venzke 2013; de Waal 2003). Interestingly, Olson and Groom compared forty IR textbooks published between 1916 and 1941 and found no internationalist or idealist dominance in them. In other words, it may be that early realist scholars were better at rhetorically framing IR literature than reading it, but this framing stuck (Olson and Groom 1991: 81; Reinalda 2013a: 2–3). The Keohane and Nye (1974) article on transgovernmental relations should also have received more attention. For a brief overview of the origins, as well as liberal and realist views, of regimes, see Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner (1998). The main shortcomings of Haas’s book were its remnants of state-centered perspective. The learning processes started mainly through international

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10.

11.

12. 13.

14.

15. 16.

17.

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bargaining and decision-making. The internal functioning and the extent to which these organizations could act or learn autonomously received far less attention. Keohane’s question, “Why do international organizations succeed or fail?” should have been preceded by the question “How do these organizations actually function?” (see Biekart 1999: 14). The second question is a precondition for answering the first one. In other words, measuring effectiveness should be preceded by information on how it is possible to achieve results or failure. Interestingly, Ruggie later worked for Secretary General Kofi Annan as special representative of the UN secretary-general for business and human rights (Carbonnier and Lightfoot 2017: 171, 188). To be fair, Keohane has done research to IOs in the early stages of his career and later coedited a volume on the European Union. Still, this strong focus on norms ran the opposite risk of rational theories. Constructivists “borrow from sociology a methodological collectivism that assumes all the actors share the same norms, rationalist theories, as stated, borrow from economics a methodological individualism that assumes all actors share the same utility-maximizing rationality. Put differently, in both cases, a reductionist argument causes blind spots in the analysis of actors and their politics.” In opposite ways, both schools “make a similar misstep of presuming the homogeneity of actors” (Dijkzeul and Fauser 2020b: 9; Dijk-zeul and DeMars 2015: 290). A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992. See UN Secretary-General (1992). Haas (1992: 3) defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.” A transnational advocacy network is a set of “relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and a dense exchange of information and services” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). Both types of networks focus on collective amelioration. Note that Willetts (2011: 23, 28) places this growth in attention in the 1960s and 1970s. We argue that the number of individual studies, for example after the Helsinki Accords (see the chapter by Krause in this volume) grew, but as shown above the growing attention to NGOs since the late 1980s has constituted a second transnational wave. To a much smaller extent, but in a similar fashion, IOs addressing AIDS also received attention (e.g., Gordenker et al. 1995). In fact, some of the same authors covered UN organizations, NGOs, and countries in crisis extensively. See, for example, Weiss and Gordenker (1996); Weiss (1998). The state-centric approach also explains the popularity of decision-making theory. With this theory, it is easy to remain at the intergovernmental or strategic level, because this is the level where state representatives make

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18. 19.

20. 21.

22. 23. 24.

25.

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decisions. However, the internal functioning, implementation problems, and deviations from mandate then become secondary concerns. With regime theory, something similar happens. Regime theory helps to explain the behavior of governments and other international actors when there is no central authority, but it does not look inside the IOs. The state-centric approach and regime theory also tend to ignore the influence or leadership of international secretariats and their executive heads, for example, James Grant at UNICEF and Halfdan Mahler at the WHO. For his study, Biekart (1999) prefers the more specific term “private aid agencies” to the more general term “NGOs.” Two new journals, Global Governance (1995) and International Peacekeeping (1994), also played a pivotal role in generating more attention to IOs. Disasters, an older journal, also offers regular articles on international organizations. The UN Intellectual History Project also made clear that UN organizations had a larger impact on world politics than IR traditionally acknowledged. Notice that Barnett and Finnemore use bureaucracy and IO interchangeably—whereas Biermann and Siebenhühner only focus on the secretariats— when they talk about bureaucracy and leave out the governing bodies, in which the member states play a dominant role. While we understand the need to focus research on the internal functioning of these IOs, we do think that the interaction between the political and managerial aspects is crucial for understanding IOs. Hence, we prefer not to leave out the member states. In the conclusion of this volume, we will study the combination of the managerial and political logic. For an alternative view of IOs as membership organizations, see McLaren (2005). This is an interesting reversal of dependency theory. Note that the neoliberal economic model, based on monetarist theory, and the neoliberal IR school, based on public/rational choice theory to explain the institutions of international cooperation, differ in focus and explanation. Would that be another trough in Davies’s macrohistorical waves?

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part i

 Decision-Making with National Governments

One central issue in the management of international governmental organizations is the inherent tension that exists between the organization as an actor and the organization as an instrument in the hands of national governments. To the extent that they rely on governments for political support, funding, and contracts, international NGOs also have to deal with this tension, but many are funded privately, giving them more independence. In the end, however, the actor-instrument tension for both parties is an issue of agency and autonomy. Does the international organization determine its own course, or is its course set by governments? Chapters 1 and 2 study two central, strategic factors in the behavior of international organizations: decision-making in multilateral diplomacy and funding. The third chapter, on sustainable human development, illustrates the regular tensions between Northern and Southern states and how these affect IOs. Nevertheless, the chapter also shows that IOs make incremental progress in framing, developing, and implementing policies over time. In these chapters, the issue of autonomy comes back in such questions as: Do the governments agree or disagree on substantive policy issues? Is their consensus necessary, and what do international organizations do to achieve consensus? Or can secretariats and NGOs shape agendas and international outcomes independently? Do governments agree or disagree to grant a degree of autonomy to an international organization? Does governmental control at the strategic level of the organization hamper action in the field?

 c ha p te r 1

Multilateral Diplomacy, Global Governance, and Networks of Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations James P. Muldoon Jr. and JoAnn F. Aviel

Introduction The dramatic changes in the international political, economic, and social landscape since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 9/11, the financial crisis of 2008, and COVID-19 have put immense pressure on states, international institutions, and organizations to adapt structurally and functionally in order to meet the growing demands for effective solutions to today’s global problems. However, the pace and scope of adaptation (or innovation) of international institutions and organizations—governmental and nongovernmental—have been slow and inadequate. The reform efforts of core governance institutions and organizations of international society, in particular the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the international financial institutions (IFIs), have barely kept up with the political, economic and social changes in the world, exposing crucial governance gaps that “considerably impair the capacity of international governance systems to deal with urgent problems (output dimension of legitimacy) and impede some actors’ opportunities to participate in public policy-making (input dimension of legitimacy)” (Brühl and Rittberger 2002: 21–23). Indeed, their inability to adjust to a rapidly changing external environment, especially their decision-making procedures, is one of the more profound pathologies of these international

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organizations, which reinforces the perception that the international system of governance is failing. International organizations have long been criticized for their ineffectiveness in responding to the world’s problems (e.g., terrorism, intrastate conflict, growing inequities and economic disparities in the globalizing world economy, global financial and economic crises, climate change and other pressing global environmental issues, gross violations of human rights, and increasing humanitarian crises) and in managing the aspirations of nonstate actors (e.g., NGOs and the private sector). As Larry Elliott (2000) remarked, “The international superstructure that is supposed to enhance global governance—the gatherings of world leaders at conferences held under the auspices of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund—is creaking. Moreover, at a time when the intensification of globalization has made effective multilateral institutions more important than ever, supra-national bodies have rarely been held in lower esteem. The framework that was established in the aftermath of the Second World War no longer seems capable of finding solutions to the problems that an increasingly integrated and connected world throws up.” Political leaders in countries that helped to establish this framework are now challenging it, as seen by recent elections in the United Kingdom and the United States, among others. The focus of this chapter is on one of the more important aspects of international governance and international organizations—multilateral diplomacy. It is an area that is often overlooked (and understudied) within the burgeoning literature on international and global governance and poorly understood more generally despite the considerable attention given to it in the press (Muldoon et al. 2010). Yet it has unique challenges because of participation by so many areas of government as well as by nonstate actors from so many different cultures with different approaches to a wide range of problems (Cockburn 2012: 10). What follows is an exploration of the role of diplomacy, particularly as it relates to international organizations, in this era of globalization and systemic change. What impact have globalization, the rise of civil society and global business, emerging new economic and political powers (e.g., Brazil, China, and India), and new threats to peace and security in the world (e.g., terrorism; infectious diseases like Ebola, bird flu, COVID-19, and drug-resistant tuberculosis; failed states; and humanitarian crises) had on diplomacy as an institution and a profession? To what extent and in what ways have the decision-making processes and procedures of the United Nations and other international organizations adapted to the increasing complexity and interdependence of contemporary international relations? How does diplomacy contribute to the transformation of the international, increas-

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ingly multipolar system of governance? What is the role of diplomacy in a world of instant communication and the ability of leaders to communicate directly with each other and the public? In exploring these questions, this chapter highlights how diplomacy is changing in practice and character. It also examines the various shortcomings of multilateral diplomacy as a mode of collective decision-making for international organizations that contributes to dysfunction and impede much-needed reforms.

From “Old” to “New” Diplomacy: The Rise of Multilateralism and International Organizations Diplomacy is the method by which states, through authorized agents, maintain mutual relations, communicate with each other, and carry out political, economic, and legal transactions. Although the roots of diplomacy reach back to the beginning of organized human society, the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 is generally believed to be the origin of diplomacy as an international institution, since it marked the beginning of the European nation-state system (which initially consisted of only twelve well-defined sovereign states) and codified the rules of conduct among sovereign and “equal” states. The Westphalian principles of sovereignty and the territorial state that were established in the seventeenth century are the foundation upon which the current world diplomatic system rests. The history of modern diplomacy is often divided between the “old diplomacy” that reached its zenith in the nineteenth century and the “new diplomacy” of the twentieth. The “old diplomacy” was predominantly limited to the conduct of relations on a state-to-state basis via resident missions (embassies), with the resident ambassador as the key actor. The basic features of traditional or “bilateral” diplomacy—permanent diplomatic representation and resident missions, secrecy in negotiations, elaborate ceremony and protocol, honesty, and professionalism—first appeared in Italy during the Renaissance, though honesty and professionalism were rather underdeveloped at the time and “diplomacy” among the Italian city-states was full of intrigue and deception. So it was the French, during the time of Richelieu, “who were chiefly responsible for cleaning up and professionalizing the Italian inheritance and giving us the [diplomatic] system which we have today” (Berridge 1995: 1–9; LegueyFeilleux 2009: 40–44). The “new diplomacy” that began to emerge at the end of the nineteenth century and found its fullest expression in the twentieth is distinguished from the “old” by two themes: “first, the demand that diplomacy should be more open to public scrutiny and control, and second, the pro-

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jected establishment of an international organization which would act both as a forum for the peaceful settlement of disputes and as a deterrent to the waging of aggressive war” (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 137). However, it was the “creation of a system of multilateral diplomacy with a permanent character” in the form of a web of international governmental organizations (IGOs) that marks the transition from old to new diplomacy and the transformation of the institution of diplomacy (De Magalhães 1988: 39–42; Nicholson 1988: 41–54; Watson 1991). The extensive network of IGOs that has developed over the past two centuries also plays an important role in the governance of what Hedley Bull (1995) and the English School of International Relations refer to as international society. As governance mechanisms of international society, IGOs represent an important innovation of the “institutional repertoire of states,” since prior to the appearance of the multipurpose, universal membership organization in 1919 with the creation of the League of Nations and then the United Nations in 1945 states had relied on war, the balance of power (particularly among the so-called Great Powers), a contested and incipient international legal system, and traditional (or “old”) diplomacy to manage and maintain order in world politics. The “move to formal organizations” in the twentieth century was a significant development in international relations and governance, as Ruggie (1993: 23) points out: Prior international organizations had but limited membership, determined by power, function, or both, and they were assigned specific and highly circumscribed tasks. In contrast, here were organizations based on little more than shared aspirations, with broad agendas in which large and small had a constitutionally mandated voice. Moreover, decision making within international organizations increasingly became subject to the mechanism of voting. … Finally, the move [to formal organizations] amplified a trend that had begun in the nineteenth century, a trend toward multilateral as opposed to merely bilateral diplomacy, especially in the form of “conference diplomacy.”

The proliferation of IGOs, especially after World War II, marked the end of the old international order, which was based on a commitment of the great powers to manage their political and security relationships through consultation and negotiations (e.g., the Concert of Europe) and which ushered in a new world order centered on the United Nations system and a commitment by all states to manage their political, economic, and social relationships through collaboration (Mangone 1954). The new order established after World War II placed greater emphasis on multilateral diplomacy, international law, and the role of the great powers and less on war and the balance of power as a way to maintain order and governance of the international system.

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International organizations, particularly the United Nations and the international financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank and the IMF), have long been considered the preeminent institutions of multilateralism inasmuch as they reflect the shared belief among the members of international society (i.e., states) that their relations and international activities should be organized “on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence” (Ruggie 1993: 11). In this regard, IGOs have had considerable influence over the development of the substance and process of multilateral diplomacy throughout the postwar period. Extensive rules of procedure have been devised that cover nearly every conceivable aspect of the process, from the general organization of the meeting (e.g., date and time of the meeting; the way the agenda is set and approved; the languages to be used; whether the meetings are public or private) to the size, composition, and rights of delegations that can participate and the methods of making proposals and taking decisions (Kaufmann 1968: 50–52). From a technical point of view, all these rules and procedures did make for more orderly meetings involving large numbers of participants, but it is questionable if the elaboration of rules of procedure actually improved the efficiency of the proceedings or, more importantly, the effectiveness of the decisions taken (Berridge 1995: 62–73). Moreover, it has exposed a gap between rhetoric, diplomacy, and decision-making on the one hand and compliance, implementation, and evaluation on the other, which has thwarted effective follow-up or execution and undermined the legitimacy of multilateral organizations and institutions. IGOs have also contributed to the expansion of international issues that multilateral diplomacy is expected to address. The UN agenda encompasses not only peace and security questions—the traditional issues of diplomacy—but also economic, financial, social, and cultural concerns, as well as juridical, humanitarian, and human rights issues. Indeed, these nontraditional issues have come to dominate the UN agenda, reflecting both the increasing importance of these issues to newly independent member states who had become the majority in the General Assembly by the 1970s and the diplomatic paralysis in the area of international peace and security caused by the ideological and strategic rivalry between the “superpowers”—the United States and the Soviet Union—during the Cold War. The expansion and intertwining of political, economic, and social issues and concerns on the UN agenda pushed diplomats (and most foreign ministries) into a number of fields well outside their competence and training, thereby giving impetus to the development of substantive

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specializations beyond strategic and security issues within both the foreign ministry and the missions to the UN. It also created an opportunity for “increased involvement in external affairs of domestic ministries, such as those concerned with agriculture, civil aviation, finance and health” (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 217). The growth of non-traditional issues on the UN agenda continues unabated with the addition of religious extremism, failed states, environmental problems, climate change, global health issues, and much more to the diplomat’s plate since the end of the Cold War, opening up multilateral diplomacy to NGOs and expert groups (e.g., climate scientists or medical professionals). These and several other characteristics of multilateral diplomacy that developed within the United Nations, such as bloc or group diplomacy (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 198–99; Kaufmann 1968: 141–52) and informal ad hoc groupings of member states—e.g., advisory committees, contact groups, groups of friends of the UN secretary-general—came about as a reaction to and accommodation of the strategic imperatives of the two superpowers and geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War, which had divided the world along two major fault lines: East-West and North-South. They were novel modifications of diplomatic practice that facilitated collective decision-making of a rapidly expanding international community and enabled the United Nations to partially fulfill its governance role for an intensely divided international society. Over the course of the twentieth century, the “new” diplomacy evolved and adapted to the shifts in the international political and economic landscape. Its multilateral form became an integral part of the “diplomatic culture,” and international organizations as manifestations of “institutionalized multilateralism” are “an essential means of conducting world affairs more satisfactorily than would be possible under conditions of international anarchy or total self-help” (Thakur 2002: 283). However, unilateralism and bilateralism exist as a base choice of most policy areas since multilateralism imposes restrictions and requires states to devote more time and diplomatic effort to reach an agreement. Multilateralism is chosen when the benefits of legitimacy, information advantage, and burden sharing are desired (Tago 2017: 6–8). The “new diplomacy” did not replace the “old” diplomacy, which continued to exist to maintain bilateral relations and to be used in times of crisis. Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy interact and influence each other. For example, “Dutch and German officials (handling European Union affairs in Berlin, The Hague and Brussels) as well as expert-observers confirmed the multilateral effect of Dutch-German bilateralism in practice. Dutch-German bilateralism sought and succeeded to leave its mark on affairs that were at the top of the EU Council’s agenda” (Zunneberg 2017).

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The Cold War Legacy The institution of diplomacy was not immune to the debilitating effects of the Cold War, which had polarized international relations between two politically opposed camps, each led by a nuclear superpower, that often forced multilateral diplomacy into a political and ideological straitjacket (Mills 2005: 25). Cold War dynamics distorted and severely disrupted multilateral negotiations on almost every international issue, especially those of strategic importance to either of the superpowers, and deepened the antagonisms between East and West and North and South that characterized the deliberations in the UN Security Council and General Assembly and other multilateral bodies. According to Petrovsky (1998: 1), “The cold war, the rivalry of two super-powers, the ideologization of international affairs, and military confrontation have made diplomacy a subsidiary instrument of power politics and ideology. As a result, diplomacy has very often executed the ‘dance of death.’”1 In essence, Cold War–era diplomacy was predominantly about maintaining power equilibrium in the international system and was “strongly influenced by military thinking—diplomacy as war by other means, or as a zero-sum game” (Petrovsky 1998: 6). “The principal victims of this pathological behavior have been international organizations and multilateral negotiations” (Kappeler 2003: 54), inasmuch as the UN was often sidelined or simply ignored on international issues whenever either superpower was playing a major role, and multilateral negotiations frequently became hopelessly mired in longwinded propaganda speeches and tactical moves that rarely resulted in workable agreements or compromise solutions. By the 1980s, the “pathological” patterns of postwar diplomatic intercourse inside and out of international organizations had become so acute as to threaten the viability of the multilateral system. The UN system, which was supposed to be the center of the new world order, was on the verge of bankruptcy, financially and politically (Lister 1988; Berridge 1991: 16–19; Hüfner 2003: 40–43); the international economy was in disarray and stagnating in recession and debt (Reynolds 2000: 152–93); and public and official disillusionment and disappointment with the system’s performance was growing (Luck 1999: 34–40). As Susan Strange remarked in 1985, “Many enthusiasts for international organisations now find themselves sunk in despair about the future prospects and inclined to dismiss as utterly futile many of the goings-on at which UN delegates spend so much time and effort. Few doubt that the current scene in New York or Geneva or other places where the members foregather is depressing and the future prospect dim” (Strange 1985: 109).

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Underscoring this mounting crisis of multilateralism was the obvious ineffectiveness of the UN’s intergovernmental bodies (e.g., the Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC, UNCTAD), which were supposed to be consensus-seeking forums that “enlarge and refine a general convergence of views and, where feasible, translate it into practical action” (Fromuth 1988: 88). For a number of reasons, not least of which were the regional rivalries and the continuance of the East-West divide, this primary role of IGOs was thwarted. As Fromuth (1988: 89–90) pointed out: An endemic U.N. problem, one that appears in relation to a variety of political as well as economic issues, is the overlapping of mandates and of areas of responsibility. Process too has often become the enemy of substance. Over the years U.N. forums have developed a number of procedures that weaken their ability to serve as a context for constructive debate and cause member governments to treat them less seriously. Included among these bad habits are: the length of debates, the repetitiousness of speeches, the absence of a germaneness rule, and the length and frequency of meetings. Just as harmful to the utility of proceedings is the approach often taken to decision-making. Problems in this area include: a predisposition to “negotiate,” even when it is clear that a negotiation can only produce a paper outcome often heavily diluted with reservations. … Another problem, one encountered by any effort to conduct a U.N.based negotiation, is that the institutional characteristics of the U.N. setting—universal participation on the basis of one-nation/one-vote, and the group system—are difficult to reconcile with the diversity of interests, power, and systemic responsibilities that characterize the countries participating in the [negotiation].

The “parliamentarianism” of UN deliberations was running roughshod over the basic principles and customs of diplomacy and was leading to the depressing (though accurate) refrain—the UN is nothing more than a talking shop. “There is a dirty secret here—that the United States, like the Soviet Union and the European Community and probably Japan—does not very much need the United Nations on a day-to-day basis. For the Great Powers, as former Indian Permanent Representative Arthur Lall put it, the UN is ‘a forum and not a force’” (Mayer 1983: 315). And by the 1980s the Great Powers had become “powerful disaffected minorities” in the UN context, with the consequential danger of the UN, as well as other international organizations based on the Westphalian premise of one nation/one vote, becoming “ineffectual both morally and politically by the noncompliance or even departure of their strongest members, in

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some cases those institutions’ very founders” (Henrikson 1986: 238–39; Keens-Soper 1985). Bringing the UN and the system of multilateral diplomacy back from the brink were two developments. First, there was “the newfound entente among the five permanent members [of the Security Council] in response to the increasing demands on the Security Council and the SecretaryGeneral,” which had been cultivated by the institutionalization of the council’s practice of informal consultations and facilitated by a radical change in the Soviet Union’s attitude to the UN under Mikhail Gorbachev (Smouts 1999: 30). And second, one could observe the South’s concessions to and accommodations of the United States and the UN’s other main contributors (i.e., West European countries and Japan) on reforming the UN Secretariat, budgetary, and financial operations along the lines recommended by the Group of 18, which seemed to signal a “less antiWestern atmosphere in the General Assembly” (Berridge 1991: 20) and a grudging acceptance that the campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and decade-long North-South dialogue had failed. However, these two developments—a revived Security Council and the reforms adopted by the General Assembly in 1986—only served to “uphold the status quo,” and neither radically or fundamentally changed either the structure of the UN’s intergovernmental machinery or the parliamentarianism of UN decision-making.

Global Challenges after the Cold War: Globalization, the Technological Revolution, and the Rise of Nonstate Actors The collapse of the Soviet Union that ended the Cold War in 1991 and the accelerating pace of globalization introduced many uncertainties into international relations and profoundly affected the United Nations and the practice of multilateral diplomacy. Initially, there was a belief that the end of the Cold War and the West’s triumph over communism had ushered in a new “New World Order” of peace and prosperity based on core Western “liberal” values (i.e., justice and democracy, free and open trade within a global market economy, and the rule of law), and “a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War. A partnership based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations” (Bush 1990: 152). However, the unprecedented harmony among the permanent members of the Security Council in confronting Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait—which was to be the cornerstone of the new partnership and order—was rather short-lived (it did not even last half a decade), and the new order of international

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cooperation and collective action was soon swamped by new problems, such as intrastate conflicts, “failed states,” resurgent irredentism, global threats to the natural environment, and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions (Eban 1995; Terpstra 1999). Globalization and the technological revolution have been reshaping the political and economic landscape both within states and between them. All forms of diplomacy and governance have been transformed by the digitization of communication and the rise of social media, through which one can instantly communicate with vast numbers of people globally without having to go through traditional media or diplomats. Modern communication and transportation have both united and fragmented audiences. Social media has enabled diverse groups to come together, but at the same time it has also increased social and political cleavages. National boundaries have eroded while nationalist fervor has intensified. The globalization of trade, production, and finance has resulted in a marked decline in governments’ abilities to control these sectors and has challenged the traditional concept of state sovereignty. It has also expanded the number of players that can be involved in multilateral processes” (Knight 1999: 277–78). Mathews (1997: 50) argued that the dynamics of globalization were undermining “the absolutes of the Westphalian system—territorially fixed states where everything of value lies within some state’s borders; a single, secular authority governing each territory and representing it outside its borders; and no authority above states”—and causing a “novel redistribution of power” in the international system as governments increasingly shared power with “businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups, known as nongovernmental organizations” (cf. Langhorne 2000; Kennedy, Messner, and Nuscheler 2002; Muldoon 2003; Muldoon et al. 2010). Indeed, states and their primacy within the international system have become increasingly challenged by these developments. As Philip Bobbitt noted, “Tomorrow’s state will have as much in common with the 21st-century multinational company as with the 20th-century state: it will out-source many functions to the private sector, rely less on regulation and more on market incentives and respond to ever-changing consumer demand” (Gingrich 2005). Moreover, the new dynamics of the post–Cold War world where national boundaries are less important changed the patterns of interaction between states, market actors, and civil society on the international level. “Civil society organizations as well as corporations have successfully reorganized themselves on a transnational scale, using various forms and varying degrees of influence to make their interests count in international politics. In some cases, transnational non-state

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interests have managed to almost fully transcend control of nation-states, demonstrated most vividly by the emergence of terrorist networks such as ‘Al Qaeda’ or transnational networks of organized crime. As a result, states are no longer the sole determinants of the international system” (Witte et al. 2002: 4; Cooper 2002; Langhorne 1998). The end of the Cold War also brought a change in the international community’s priorities and concerns. The strategic issues that once dominated the international agenda during the Cold War ceded to economic, environmental, and social issues and problems associated with globalization in the post–Cold War period. This shift in priorities to the global economy reinvigorated the North-South conflict and focused attention on social injustices and the growing poverty and economic disparities in the world, which were increasingly severe and intensified by the forces of globalization. This has spawned new areas of international concern of increasing complexity (e.g., the concept of sustainable human development, the responsibility to protect, or the Sustainable Development Goals) and broadened the notion of security from its traditional narrow focus on the security of state to “human security,” which “puts people first and recognizes that their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security” (Axworthy 2001: 20). The shift in priorities reflected the growing influence and networks of nonstate actors in international relations. Globalization and the technological revolution, in particular the internet, have enabled transnational corporations (TNCs) and NGOs to expand the space they occupy and the role they play in the international system. TNCs have come to occupy a pivotal position within the global economy, commanding incredibly large financial resources and expansive complex global operations. Their influence now extends into the highest reaches of national governments, and, in recent years, they are making their presence felt in regional and international organizations either through industry/trade associations or business NGOs (e.g., the International Chamber of Commerce, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, World Economic Forum) or by joining private-sector advisory panels, business councils, and private-public partnerships (PPPs) that are being set up by multilateral intergovernmental organizations (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Helleiner 2001; Forman and Segaar 2006; Brugmann and Prahalad 2007). Although the international business community has reluctantly assumed a more prominent profile within the political arena, it has been compelled to be more proactive on public policy issues affecting its core interests (e.g., national and international legislation and regulation of business) and to become engaged on international social, development, and environmental policy problems (Hocking and Kelly 2002; Muldoon 2005).

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Business has demonstrated considerable sophistication and diplomatic acumen in its participation in international negotiations, effectively bringing to bear the private sector’s perspective, resources, and managerial expertise on a wide spectrum of global issues and transnational problems, from global health, education, and environment to blood diamonds, the arms trade, and international terrorism. Likewise, NGOs have become important participants in multilateral diplomacy, and many of them have built a solid reputation and an impressive track record as constructive partners with governments and international organizations on a range of international issues (from human rights, sustainable development, and climate change to humanitarian relief, intrastate conflicts, and global health). They have honed their diplomatic skills at the various world conferences that were convened by the UN throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (Fomerand 1999; Schechter 2001), strengthened their expertise and capabilities in conflict mediation and resolution by being on the front lines in every crisis situation since the end of the Cold War, and have become increasingly sophisticated in their methods and techniques for advocating international causes and reform of the international system (Muldoon et al. 2010: 169–82, 183–96, and 297–316). As former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan (1997: 1–2) noted, “Non-governmental organizations are now seen as essential partners of the United Nations, not only in mobilizing public opinion, but also in the process of deliberation and policy formulation and—even more important—in the execution of policies, in work on the ground” (cf. Aviel 2005; Langhorne 2005; Muldoon 2003; Willetts 2006; United Nations 2004a and 2004b).The importance of NGOs in the global order is recognized not only by diplomats and multilateral officials but also by scholars assessing the challenge they pose for traditional international relations theory (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015). Importantly, such scholars indicate that these NGOs constitute networks with NGOs from other parts of the world, donor governments, UN organizations, experts, local leaders and many other institutions. The post–Cold War environment and the many global challenges that emerged initially raised the profile and broadened the role of the United Nations and other multilateral organizations. “During the early 1990s the number of U.N. peacekeeping personnel in the field increased ten-fold, as did the cost of peacekeeping operations” (Kennedy and Russett 1995: 57). The United Nations was asked to provide greater security in not just the political realm but also the social, environmental, and economic realms, which far exceeded its capabilities. Once again, the crisis of the multilateral system intensified due, in large part, to American unilateralist proclivities and its perception of itself as

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both exceptional and indispensable (Eban 1995; Ruggie 2003). Terpstra (2005: 241) argued that “the United Nations and multilateral diplomacy, in general, appear to be experiencing a serious identity crisis. The (perceived) lack of success of UN peace operations, the disappointing results, particularly the lack of follow-up to the UN’s global conferences dealing with socioeconomic issues and human rights, the continuing financial crisis of the organization, and its most important member often ignoring it have undermined confidence both in the United Nations and in the credibility of multilateral diplomacy.”

Resistance to Innovation of IGOs and Formation of Networks Multilateral diplomacy, today, is still struggling to adapt to the “more complex agendas of conferences and negotiations with larger numbers of issues and growing involvement of experts, citizen groups and NGOs” (Petrovsky 1998: 8). In fact, there has been hardly any change in the procedures and decision-making processes of intergovernmental bodies such as the UN Security Council and General Assembly, the ministerial meetings of the World Trade Organization, and the annual meetings of the World Bank and the IMF. These forums continue to be exclusively for states, and many of the practices developed during the Cold War (e.g., group or bloc politics, parliamentarianism) have carried through to the present day. Participation of nonstate actors in these bodies is still limited and largely informal. Hence, some of the very same problems, the “pathologies” of multilateral negotiations and intergovernmental decisionmaking discussed earlier, continue to afflict these multilateral organizations, eroding their credibility and effectiveness as instruments of global governance. Multilateral diplomacy in the United Nations context remains loyal to the Westphalian system and prerogatives of states in international relations. As Earl Sullivan (2005: 282–83) argues: Multilateral diplomacy coexists with traditional diplomacy, globalization with nationalism, and the pursuit of the national interest of individual states with the search for the means to serve the often inchoate interests of the global community. The appeal of multilateralism is strong, but the incentive for powerful states to act unilaterally and their ability to do so remains.

Clearly, the clamor of nonstate actors for a formal role in multilateral diplomacy has not moved governments to grant it. The prerogatives of the

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state will not easily yield to the claims of civil society for an equal position in global governance, even if its protagonists become more competent and capable in the practice of diplomacy and more influential in the United Nations. Furthermore, the forces of globalization that continue to shape world politics do not diminish the intrinsic value of the existing international system of governance even if they undermine the principles underpinning the system. Diplomacy is still primarily the tool of states, and international organizations are still entities created by and for states, thus the reorganization, reform, or transformation of the international system of governance must be rendered primarily by states. At the same time, states’ resistance to innovation of international organizations has only served to encourage alternative forums and modalities to emerge. Some have been instigated by the private sector, others by civil society, and still others by states and international organizations. They go by a variety of names—global public policy networks, private sector/civil society partnerships, public-private partnerships, (ad hoc) global alliances and coalitions—and also include annual summit conferences such as the G7, G8, and G20 (Hajnal 2014). The proliferation and spread of these new, networked forms and structures indicate the increasing efficacy of this approach for problem-solving and reflect the changing shape and scope of multilateral diplomacy. Nonstate actors have turned to these new forms and structures both out of frustration with the inflexibility of states on reforming the UN’s intergovernmental machinery and decision-making and a natural desire to engage with one another and other actors in a constructive and productive way on common problems. Hocking and Kelly (2002: 207) argue that this “strong impetus” for engagement “affects both governmental and non-governmental actors in ways, whilst related, are differentiated by their distinctive organizational characteristics (their ‘actorness’).” In the case of business, this is reflected in the growing concern with corporate citizenship, which, by its nature, focuses on redefining a firm’s relations with an expanded range of “stakeholders.” In the case of governments, it is reflected in the reform of diplomatic services to enhance their interaction with civil society and to reinforce and redefine the “public diplomacy” function. In the case of NGOs, it is reflected in debates about purpose, strategies, and engagement with both business and government, and for multilateral organizations, in reaching out beyond the realm of states in a search for funds, expertise, and legitimacy (Hocking and Kelly 2002). The resulting panoply of public-private partnerships and global public policy and multisector networks have become part of the multilateral sys-

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tem, enlarging both the scope and shape of diplomatic interactions and enhancing the capacity of multilateral organizations to respond to the global challenges of the twenty-first century, even if they have not been formally reformed. The club model of diplomacy has been transformed into a network model in which diplomats interact with a large number of players on a vast array of issues (Jönsson 2018: 3). Multilateral diplomacy is needed to form and maintain these networks, which range in size and complexity but are necessary for the negotiation and implementation of any multilateral agreement. For example, the heads of the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the World Bank invited governments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs to participate in the preparatory process for the World Conference on Education for All as well as the conference itself in 1990 on the basis of complete equality of status and decision-making among all participants. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was established in 1992 to coordinate the work of UN agencies and NGOs involved in complex humanitarian emergencies, and it works with both governments and nonstate actors. The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations involves multinational and bilateral agencies, international development banks, foundations, NGOs, the pharmaceutical industry, and national government health programs. Although all permanent members of the UN Security Council were opposed to banning landmines, a coalition of NGOs (the International Campaign to Ban Landmines) and likeminded states resulted in 123 states signing the Ottawa Treaty in 1997, with other states later signing. The UN Fund for International Partnerships has worked with many UN agencies, businesses, foundations, and NGOs to help promote the Millennium Development Goals (Aviel 2011: 300–302). Major agreements such as the Millennium Development Goals of 2000, the Sustainable Development Goals of 2015, and the Paris Climate Change Agreement of 2015 would not have been possible except for an active network of NGOs, businesses, and local and national governments who supported them. Concurrent with intergovernmental negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change, a broad array of public, private, and hybrid networks of climate governance have developed (Minas 2015). Even after President Trump called for the United States to withdraw from the agreement, a Global Climate Action Summit was hosted by the city of San Francisco, California, and attended by representatives of networks of cities, states, regions, businesses, and civil societies in 2018, prior to the summit of heads of state hosted by the UN secretary-general in New York in 2019 (Nuttall 2019).

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Threats to Multilateral Diplomacy and International Governance Leaders championing national sovereignty and challenging international organizations and global governance have emerged. The British vote to leave the European Union in June 2016 and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States in November 2016 signaled a reshaping of the postwar global order. After his election, President Trump stated, “When do you see the United Nations solving problems? They don’t. They cause problems. So, if it lives up to the potential, it’s a great thing. And if it doesn’t, it’s a waste of time and money” (Wagner 2016). Soon after Trump’s inauguration, his administration submitted to the US National Security Council for quick approval two executive orders on reducing voluntary funding to the United Nations and other international bodies by at least 40 percent overall and on potentially canceling certain multilateral treaties that “do not involve national security, extradition or international trade,” but after opposition by federal officials, the draft orders were withheld for a more complete review by federal agencies (Fisher 2017; Borger 2017). Bipartisan support in the US Congress resulted in the approval of a federal budget through fiscal year 2018 that, while cutting funds, dispensed with the steep cuts that the administration had called for in international affairs and foreign aid (McCarthy and Muhajan 2018). Although a 30 percent cut was called for in the 2019 budget, Congress did not approve steep cuts, but in August 2019 the Trump administration ordered the State Department and the US Agency for International Development to freeze much of the remaining money for foreign aid, including voluntary contributions to UN programs in 2019 (Wong 2019). The Trump administration again proposed significant decreases in funding to accounts supporting the United Nations in the Fiscal Year 2020 budget (Congressional Research Service 2019). The Trump administration withdrew the United States from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Paris Climate Pact, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It pulled out of the UN Human Rights Council and UNESCO and threatened to pull out of the World Trade Organization. It denounced and began to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal, questioned NATO, and renegotiated NAFTA (Wold and Carman 2019). Trump’s third address to the UN General Assembly advised other nations to follow his lead in rejecting globalism: “The future does not belong to globalists, it belongs to patriots” (Rascoe 2019). Trump’s election gave hope to right-wing leaders elsewhere. For example, Frauke Petry in Germany stated, “Just as Donald Trump in America shows the way out of a dead end, with new prospects—including

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for (resolving) international conflicts, we want to do that in the coming months for Europe.” Marine Le Pen in France stated before being defeated in national elections in 2017, “We are experiencing the end of one world and the birth of another. We are experiencing the return of nation-states,” denouncing the European Union (Moulson 2017). The victory of Donald Trump and his subsequent rhetoric and actions regarding multilateral diplomacy prompted scholars to debate the extent of his threat to international organizations and multilateral diplomacy. Some emphasized that “multilateralism and the multilateral institutions face serious threats. This in turn threatens the continuing progress in solving critical global economic and social challenges” (Linn 2018: 86). Others expressed faith in the durability of multilateralism, which has survived other threats in the past. They saw Trump’s unilateral approach as part of historical cycles that swing between nationalism and internationalism (Druckman 2019: 101). However, others were concerned that Trumpism involved a deliberate US withdrawal from political and neoliberal globalization that is supported by “a global array of strong leaders and their accompanying right wing social, economic and cultural policies,” shifting a “worldview from a globalist to a nationalistic center of political gravity” that could survive even after the demise of Trump (Falk 2018: 1–3). Such a US withdrawal would further increase the challenges multilateralism faces from revisionist states like Russia and China. However, so far “a majority of states have responded to the Trump administration’s attack on international mechanisms by increasing their support for them. No other country has followed Washington out of the Paris agreement. The UN’s members signed off on a new Global Compact on Migration despite the US decision not to participate in the process and divisions in and among European states. Operational arms of the multilateral system continue to function despite facing extreme levels of strain in crises” (Gowan 2018: 3). Germany backed by France launched an “Alliance of Multilateralists,” which aims to bring together countries such as Mexico, Canada, and South Korea “to stabilize the rules-based world order, to uphold its principles and to adapt it to new challenges where necessary.” However, “there is no cause for complacency. … The historical record shows that international systems do not necessarily implode all at once” (Gowan and Dworkin 2019). The trend toward broad and nonbinding agreements at the UN on major issues is the result of keeping the multilateral system going by setting limits on what it can do. The Centre for Policy Research at the United Nations University examines how UN officials and others who would like the system to keep doing worthwhile things can make the most of the limited processes and bargains they have available (Gowan 2018: 7–9). “By historical standards,

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this continues to be an era of extraordinary global cooperation, featuring an unprecedented quantity and range of multilateral arrangements and institutions. Although Donald Trump may not like the United Nations system, he turns up at the UN General Assembly annually to register his complaints” (Gowan and Dworkin 2019). Faced with the Trump administration’s cutback of US support for multilateralism, the networks described above have increased their activities in funding and execution of multilateral policies.

Reform of International Organizations and Global Governance The day-to-day practice of multilateral diplomacy reflects and helps to maintain “the international pecking order.” “Pecking order dynamics produce very real effects on the possibilities and limits of multilateralism and institutional reform more specifically” (Pouliot 2016: 153). However, the pecking order can change in response to shifting capabilities as well as practice. It can also change if those at the top attempt to minimize the role of diplomacy and challenge its practice through such actions as personal tweets to the public or phone calls with heads of state and corporations or try to limit contributions to multilateral institutions and withdraw from multilateral treaties. The crises in the current multilateral system represent an opportunity for revisionist states like Russia and China to design a multilateral system that better reflects their authoritarian systems and augments their influence as well as for European and other democratic countries and nonstate actors to increase their influence by building coalitions to defend multilateral action that is supportive of democracy (Gowan and Dworkin 2019). Put briefly, multilateral diplomacy increasingly has to deal with multipolarity. If the United States hopes to retain its position in the global order, it needs to “reconsider abandoning multilateralism and continue to engage globally at the United Nations and beyond” (Boon 2017: 1081). Those who support multilateralism cite the need “to make a stronger case at the popular base and to national leaders,” for multilateral institutions to improve their focus and performance, for “the G20 to actively focus on the threats to multilateralism,” and for “other countries to play a constructive role in maintaining and further strengthening the multilateral system” during the (possible) US withdrawal from global development leadership (Linn 2018: 106–7). They argue that “the multilateralism we currently have should not be taken for granted,” but that supporters should work to reform it and “design superior multilateral institutions to protect the

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security of the world’s people” (Moreland 2019). “Progress remains possible, but the demand to identify new paths forward is urgent” (Lupel 2019). Proposals for the reform of multilateral institutions have been made by scholars of multilateral diplomacy, nongovernmental organizations such as the US Global Leadership Coalition, the International Institute for Sustainable Development, and the Global Policy Forum, as well as diplomats themselves. UN secretary-general António Guterres was appointed in 2016 on an explicit reform platform. Scholars analyzing the implementation of approved reforms have included a list of problems and have scrutinized the extent to which they have been resolved and the challenges that still exist (Cliffe and Gerlach 2019). On 10 September 2019, Secretary-General Guterres, together with the presidents of the United Nations General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council, convened the second in a series of high-level dialogues to discuss the challenges facing multilateralism and the role of the United Nations in preserving it. The dialogue was co-organized by the Permanent Missions of Ecuador, Norway, and the Russian Federation in association with the New York University Center on International Cooperation, which sponsors a program on multilateral reform (Center on International Cooperation 2019). This is but one example of networking between multilateral and national diplomats, nongovernmental representatives, and scholars to engage in multilateral diplomacy and to promote its reform.

Conclusion The number of issues and problems on the world’s agenda continues to grow, stretching to the limit the capacity of international governance systems that have developed since the end of World War II. The COVID-19 crisis has exposed the weaknesses of both national and international systems to meet global challenges. These circumstances demand new forms and modalities of interaction between international actors, which reflect a new and different diplomatic method, an “inclusive” diplomacy that involves public and private, state and nonstate actors in decision-making and negotiations on current and future global problems. Yet, these new forms and modalities are not the cure for what ails the UN system or the international system of governance, nor are they a substitute for reform of the intergovernmental machinery of the UN. They are still a relatively small part of the complex web of interactions among a growing diversity of international actors in the world diplomatic system. These new forms of

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multilateral diplomacy “have not supplanted the ‘old’: they have supplemented and indeed complemented them” (Hocking and Kelly 2002: 222). But as these new forms of multilateral diplomacy become more integrated and institutionalized in the international system of governance, even though challenged by nationalistic leaders, a “new structure of world governance based on public-private partnerships organized along the lines of overlapping networks of governance” (Bull, Boas, and McNeill 2004: 495) is emerging. Although we are still at a very early stage of this transformation and much-needed functional changes within the structures and processes of international and multilateral organizations have yet to be made, there is “a (nonlinear) trend of institutional adaptation toward an opening of intergovernmental institutions vis-à-vis nonstate actors and even the emergence of inclusive, multipartite modes of global governance” (Kruck and Rittberger 2010: 45–46). The breadth and complexity of today’s problems and the existing interactions between networks of both state and nonstate actors have already resulted in the emergence of a new system of global governance, as ineffective and challenged as it yet is. Thus changes in political leaders with policies attempting to limit international organizations and multilateral diplomacy, while disruptive and capable of slowing the growth of global governance and changing its form, are not likely to eliminate it. Threats to multilateralism present an increased impetus toward reform of international organizations and toward network global governance. The effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy will play a crucial role in determining the success or failure of efforts to reform international organizations and the extent and structure of global governance. James P. Muldoon Jr. (1959–2016) was director of education programs with the UN Association of the United States of America (1986–96), visiting scholar at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences in China (1996–99), senior research fellow at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs (1999–2000), senior fellow at the Center for Global Change and Governance at Rutgers University in Newark (2001–12), an independent scholar of international affairs, and vice-chair of the Mosaic Institute’s board of directors in Toronto (2013–16). Muldoon has lectured and published on multilateral diplomacy, global governance, and the United Nations. JoAnn F. Aviel is a professor emeritus of international relations at San Francisco State University and former chair of the International Relations Department. She served as a Fulbright professor in 2008 at the University of Piura, Peru; in 1999 at the University of Costa Rica; and in 1984 at the

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Diplomatic Academy of Peru. She has taught and done research in the areas of Latin America foreign policy, NGOs, and international organization. Publications include Multilateral Diplomacy with James Muldoon, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (August 2020), The New Dynamics of Multilateralism (coeditor, Westview Press, 2011), and “Cambio y continuidad en la politica exterior nicaraguense en el tema de derecho humanos,” in Derechos Humanos en Politica Exterior (ITAM, 2011). She has served on the board of directors of the United Nations Association of San Francisco and the advisory board of the National Model United Nations.

NOTE 1. “Dance of Death” refers to a medieval allegory of a dance, in which Death (personified as a skeleton) leads people to the grave. This allegory was especially used during the plague.

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Financing as the UN’s Chronic Deficiency Sandra Aviles and Romano Lasker

The old financial malaise is emerging with renewed evidence. What was a chronic illness is becoming a critical one. —Excerpt from Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) report on the UN Secretariat, 1993 Globalization is here to stay and the inadequacies of the “traditional approach to order will only become more obvious over time …” —Richard Haass, “World Order 2.0—The Case for Sovereign Obligation,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2017

Introduction This chapter examines how the United Nations is facing the challenge of having to deliver on its numerous mandates in the midst of shifting global dynamics that are resulting in chronic underfunding. This issue is particularly jarring at a time when the world is looking to the United Nations to be the engine and catalyst toward progressing on the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The ability for the United Nations, and particularly the UN Development System (UNDS), to deliver on this ambitious agenda is hampered by a general misalignment and fragmentation between its identified mandates/functions and its financing instruments. The chapter outlines the reasons for which financing of the UNDS must radically change to carry out its emerging functions as dictated by the SDG agenda. At the time of writing, the UNDS is stepping

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into the Decade of Action, and on its seventy-fifth anniversary, we call for a reckoning of the UNDS’s situation and put forward a number of considerations and possible remedies—old and new—to the chronic financial deficit and misalignment that threaten to undermine the multilateral nature of its work and impact. This is even more relevant now in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic that will have a fundamental global impact and will subsequently affect how the United Nations works, where it works, and how it is financed.

The 2030 Agenda and the UNDS: An Intertwined Destiny It is widely accepted that we are living in both the best and worst century with regard to humanity’s capacity to collectively understand, control, and manage unprecedented uncertainties and risks. The progress of the past decades, well into the past century, has been unparalleled both in terms of positive connectivity among people from all walks of life and in economic growth, but that progress has also spawned shocks that have transcended boundaries and at times resulted in cataclysmic global events, such as the two world wars. Globalization has been an incredible boon, but it has also exposed some risks that were not apparent before. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), managing risks effectively in a highly interconnected world requires the international community to work together around common goals by “facilitating knowledge, devoting resources to capacity building and protecting the vulnerable” (Ötker-Robe 2014). In its 2017 Global Trends report, the US National Intelligence Council notes that globalization has fundamentally altered the economic, technological, and security landscape such that the world needs to address cross-country and regional spillovers. Major global problems will need comprehensive and collective solutions. It also notes that existing arrangements—national, regional, or international—are increasingly inadequate in dealing with these types of contemporary and future challenges. Importantly, the report notes that “existing multilateral institutions, which are large and cumbersome, and were designed for a different geopolitical order, will have difficulty adapting quickly to undertake new missions, accommodate changing memberships and augment resources” (US National Intelligence Council 2017: 19). This is ever more apparent as we grapple with the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has clearly exposed the importance of transnational cooperation and the inadequacy of the current mechanisms in place.

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The new mission that now shapes UN common destiny is, of course, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The seventeen ambitious Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) challenge the international community to end poverty and hunger, protect the global environment, reignite equitable socioeconomic growth, and ensure peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. The backdrop for achieving this agenda is equally daunting, and it is based on the following parameters: Global Public Goods are created by the public at large—While the role of national governments is reaffirmed as being central in this agenda, the creation of public value on global issues as they relate to security, human rights, development, or environment/climate is no longer exclusive to intergovernmental arrangements (UN MPTF and Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation 2016) and therefore goes beyond the remit of the UNDS. Integrated approaches and tools are crucial—Agenda 2030 is an integrated framework, requiring novel approaches and tools to solve challenges posed by multiple interconnected sectors and often-conflicting human needs and demands. Effectiveness of solutions will depend on the ability to go beyond traditional silos, innovate, and find cross-sectoral solutions, working together with a diverse set of stakeholders on what is commonly now known as nexus issues (Liu et al. 2018). It will require solutions at scale that bring together and at times extend beyond development, peace, environmental, and humanitarian realms. International cooperation must be inclusive and comprehensive—While Agenda 2030 requires government action to reach adequate interventions to scale, it equally requires a radically different type of international cooperation to instigate transformative change and marshal significant financing to sustain that change (Kharas et al. 2018). An unprecedented level of investment and commitment is required for transformation—Achieving Agenda 2030 requires the global community to dramatically increase financing for development. Indeed, the magnitude of finance required to achieve the SDGs exceeds the current level of financing available for development. It requires new sources of finance, both public and private, as well as new approaches to financing. Importantly, to meet the goals by 2030, all countries, North and South, need to significantly scale up spending. The additional spending needed is equivalent to an additional fifteen percentage points of

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GDP on average in low-income developing countries, which amounts to about half a trillion US dollars in 2030 (Lagarde 2019). These figures will likely increase even further due to the deep global recession that COVID-19 is bringing. The intertwined and complex nature of the SDGs requires a radical transformation in the way the multilateral community—and in particular the UNDS—works. This is especially important with regard to how the United Nations supports member states’ efforts in achieving the SDGs. To do so will require the UNDS to both review and reposition its role in the global financing landscape and to revisit and modernize its financing mechanisms to incentivize collective action. However, past and current trends regarding the funding of the UNDS show that its resourcing often runs contrary to the policy priorities of its mandate and lacks the incentives that could drive and maintain collective action. In fact, the manner by which the UNDS is funded reveals a “highly variegated pattern [of financing] … reflecting [a combination of] history, expedience and not necessarily any master or logical design or strategy” (Browne, Connelly and Weiss 2017: 120).

The Inherited Pathology of the UNDS and Its Financing: “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose?” In 1997, a former UN senior career official, Ruben P. Mendez, wrote that the “UN is hampered by a pathetically inadequate, unpredictable and unsecured financial base. At the same time, the demands on the UN and on the international public sector have reached unprecedented magnitude. …” (Mendez 1997). Fast-forward to 2020, this observation could easily be applied to the UNDS’s current financial situation. Since its inception, the UN system has faced financial pressures linked to demand (for services) outstripping supply (of resources) and to the limited willingness and ability of its member states to pay their share of the UN’s operational costs. Specifically, although the demands vis-à-vis the UN system increased dramatically during the 1990s, the financing of the organizations has not increased commensurately. Here, it should be noted that all organizations in the UN family, including the specialized agencies, are financed on a two-track system: partly by membership fees—so-called “assessed contributions”—and partly by voluntary funding. The assessed contributions cover each agency’s core budget, its basic convening, and normative functions, while operational activities covering development and relief programs are funded from voluntary contributions. Clearly, the payment of voluntary contri-

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butions cannot be enforced. But the persistent financial crisis becomes particularly acute when significant member states do not even pay their assessed dues or pay with significant delay (Weisser 2009). And while these contributions are mandatory, members who do not pay are subject only to a “light” sanction. For example, Article 19 of the UN Charter states that member states that fail to pay their dues risk losing their right to vote in the General Assembly—“a rather weak deterrent, since General Assembly decisions are non-binding” (Barrett 2007). Hence, there is a pathology of weak incentives to pay for the UN’s services in a timely and predictable manner. A second pathology masks a more insidious “illness” that has shaped the current UN financing architecture and capacity to deliver on its mandate. In the original design of the UN’s financing system, the allocation of resources lies firmly within intergovernmental machinery: for the UN Secretariat through the General Assembly and more precisely the Fifth Committee,1 and within the specialized agencies, funds, and programs (AFP) through their respective governing bodies. Allocation of these resources (core or regular budget) is multilateral and is in support of global public goods or the normative functions of the UNDS.2 However, today, 70 to 80 percent of the income of many of the AFPs consists of noncore, extrabudgetary, or voluntary contributions,3 and allocation of these resources is mostly negotiated on a bilateral basis.4 Indeed, in the case of most AFPs, voluntary contributions are much larger than the assessed contributions to the UN Regular Budget.5 This latter shift in the character of UN financing became particularly pronounced with the launch of the Millennium Development Goals at the 2000 Millennium Summit. The shift to more specific goals and measurable targets gave birth to a new generation of voluntary contributions that were earmarked to specific development operational activities. The net effect of the earmarking was to transform the UNDS, whose operational activities took precedence over its multilateral normative mandate (commonly known as the “bilateralization of aid” [Mahn 2012]), and to bring about a fragmented system of AFPs working at the behest of their bilateral donors.6 A third phenomenon that had further complicated the financing “pathologies” of the UNDS is the hidden costs of the exponential growth in the world economy, leading to a trebling in global gross domestic product reaching over $75 trillion over the last twenty years. This has been paralleled with a relentless rise in income inequality both between rich and poor countries, but also between the rich and the poor within countries (UN MPTF and Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation 2016). For the UNDS, this exponential economic growth signaled several opportunities and challenges:

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New nonstate actors, private sector and civil society, are drivers for development—There has been a major rebalancing between private- and public-sector financing actors, and this has strengthened the engagement of the former in global policy discussions that up until recently was marginal. While official development assistance (ODA) from the OECD member states has increased, its contribution is approximately 10 percent of total aid flows. ODA is now dwarfed by remittances and private capital, and the UN’s contribution within the totality of resource flows to developing countries is now less than 2 percent (Browne, Connelly, and Weiss 2017: 3). In addition, while private capital has become a significant funding source and the private sector a source of potential partnerships, this growth in the global economy did not automatically translate into a trebling of contributions to the UNDS. Moreover, embracing these nontraditional governance models poses challenges to the UNDS way of doing business. Exacerbated imbalance between core and voluntary contributions—As was mentioned before, earmarked funding toward operational activities quadrupled since 1995, while core funding to normative functions continued to decline and/or remain stagnant in real terms (Jenks 2014). Thus, while enabling a significant expansion in the size and scope of some of the UN entities’ development operations, the increase in sourcing from noncore funding has led to duplication and competition for both activities and financing among UN agencies, funds, and programs, greater fragmentation in efforts (all actors pursuing their own strategy to mobilize resources), and importantly a significant dilution of the multilateral character and values of the work of the UNDS. Donor incentive mechanisms result in a more divided multilateral response—The first decade of the 2000s witnessed an extraordinary growth in UNDS operational activities related to humanitarian aid and in UNDS engagement with countries experiencing fragility and protracted crises. Humanitarian-related assistance noncore funding has grown 229 percent and development-related noncore funding has grown 146 percent, while core funding for humanitarian assistance has grown 118 percent by 2015, and development-related core funding has grown only 17 percent. The financing of these activities was and is typically sourced from different areas of a bilateral donor’s overall financing envelope, and follows dual accountability lines. This has inevitably created further bifurcations in the UN organizations involved in humanitarian work and in the overall UNDS financing architecture.

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Satisfying the different donor demands and requirements imposes a heavy workload on the United Nations. This overall shift in the volume and type of assistance from the UNDS and the source of financing for these activities (i.e., toward earmarked noncore) has led to the UNDS “selling itself as a mere implementing organization for bilateral programmes … falling short of its potential.”7

Reforms, Reforms, … and More Reforms: Evolution vs. Revolution Cyclical institutional and financial crises are part of the DNA of the UNDS, and efforts to take remedial action or launch reforms to address these crises have been part of the UNDS’s natural evolution as a multilateral entity. Notwithstanding this, past reforms specifically addressing the misalignment between function and financing have only skimmed the surface of a chronic pathology that has plagued the UNDS over its seven-plus decades in existence. Major reform efforts in the United Nations were undertaken over the last thirty years in the effort to achieve greater coherence and complementarity among the disparate parts of the UNDS, but few focused specifically on finance as the catalyst for change. In 1966, there was an attempt to establish central core funding for the UN development entities through a merger of the Extended Program for Technical Assistance and the Special Fund. This merger later became the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In the end, neither the specialized agencies nor the donor governments supported this arrangement, preferring the flexibility of directly funding individual UN entities and thus a greater influence on their spending through the respective executive boards or governing councils. The last comprehensive reform proposal prior to the 2030 Agenda emerged from the 2006 High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence, in its “Delivering as One” report. The initiative sought to break down the silos around planning, programming, and implementing at country level, through the establishment of “One Programme, One Budgetary Framework and One Fund.” In the humanitarian system, reforms were also implemented (in 2006 and 2011), aimed at better coordination and accountability, with recommendations focused on leadership, management, and streamlined processes and the establishment of country-based pooled funds. Overall, the push toward more pooled funding was laudable in that it encouraged joint planning and programming. However, none of these reforms ever fundamentally changed UNDS operational modality and effectiveness, nor were they bold enough to

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propose any rationalization or merger of lesser effective UN entities. For the most part, the reforms were more evolution than revolution (Sagasti, Bezanson, and Prada 2005: 27) and have been overly sensitive to narrow member state interests, preferences, and allegiances instead of looking at operational effectiveness. Dirk Salomons’s chapter in this volume describes a similar problem for UN human resource management. Most importantly, the issue of the funding of the UNDS and creating financial incentives aimed at greater coherence for the whole system has never been at the center of system-wide reforms. Proposed reforms on financing—primarily through the idea of one budgetary framework within a national setting at country level in the case of development assistance and the creation of global and country-based pooled funds in the case of humanitarian assistance—have for the most part been about reversing some of the dysfunctionalities of bilateral earmarked funding and incentivizing greater coordination among actors at country level and containing further diffusion of efforts. Notably, these centralized and pooled mechanisms make up only a small part of the overall funding to the UNDS. It is only recently that a significant attempt at proposing systemwide funding with the explicit aim at transforming the way the UNDS works together to provide integrated solutions has been seriously considered (Weinlich and Jenks 2019).

The Centrality of the Funding Compact in the UN Reform Package: In Pursuit of System-Level Finance As the SDGs’ Decade for Action countdown begins toward 2030, there is an urgency to align financing of the UNDS with the emerging functions (“form must follow function”) and incentivize integrated action to support its implementation. Upon his appointment to the office, SecretaryGeneral Antonio Guterres outlined a major overhaul of the narrow pre2015 approaches of individual UN agencies, funds, and programs in order to adopt system-wide agreement on a set of fundamental shifts in orientation and rules of engagement. This would then create new opportunities to make the UNDS fit for implementing the transformative SDG agenda. The reform agenda centers on three key pillars: development, management, and peace and security (United Nations n.d.). On the development pillar, measures are centered on the creation of a new generation of country teams led by an independent team of UN country experts (“resident coordinators”) that would create the system’s backbone in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

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The second pillar, on management, focuses on the simplification of processes, increased transparency, and improved delivery of mandates. And the third pillar is a reaffirmation of the United Nations’ core purpose of peace and prevention: breaking siloed policies, programming, and operations across the development, peacebuilding, humanitarian, and security pillars of the United Nations.

Underpinning this reform is a new funding compact between the member states and the UNDS to “bring better quality, quantity, and predictability of resources; greater accountability and transparency; and enhanced capacities of the system to deliver on the 2030 agenda” (Adams 2018). In essence, this compact represents an attempt to improve both the quality and quantity of current core and noncore/extrabudgetary funding of the development pillar of the United Nations through a comprehensive package that includes inter alia member states’ commitment to: •

bring core resources to a level of at least 30 percent in the next five years;

•

increase the share of multiyear contributions; and

•

double the levels of resources channeled through developmentrelated interagency pooled funds and single-agency thematic funds.

As part of this package, “the UNDS commits to accelerating results for countries through more collaboration, while reporting on needs and results more clearly, consistently and transparently. …”8 The latter includes the adoption of a levy on fragmentation9 to be paid by the individual UN agencies, funds, and programs toward the new resident coordinator systemwide costs, thus transforming “the weaknesses of fragmentation at entity level into a strategic asset at system level” (Weinlich and Jenks 2019: 123). Working with the operational funding modalities that are in place, the compact addresses some fundamental funding imbalances among the UN entities, injects a certain measure of flexibility in the options put forward, and, importantly, provides financial incentives to foster collective action. While it is still too premature to assess the impact of the funding compact and its plan for implementation,10 we can nonetheless glean that it purports more of the same remedies to the chronic and now festering financing pathology. For all of the recognition that the 2030 Agenda and the associated reforms to make the UNDS fit for purpose present a positive “tipping point,” in our assessment the funding compact—which would underpin and presumably facilitate UN collective action—will likely not

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fundamentally address the systemic and chronic financing crises facing the United Nations. There are four main reasons why we believe so. First, the funding compact, while attempting to address the issue of incentives for collective action, is blind to the fact that the bulk of the finances reaching UN development operations flows to individual agencies at entity level, as opposed to system-wide level. The incentive for collective system-wide action has to be greater than that of entity-level action. Large agencies such as WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF that have strong mandates and large operational footprints and budgets need more incentives in order to coordinate more. Unless donor agencies radically change their approach to funding their favored UN entity and follow discipline in how they contribute to and interact in the various executive boards of these agencies, funds, and programs, funding to the UNDS as a whole will not fundamentally change, and where there is change, it will be incremental. Second, funding of the compact follows the rules governing UN financing noncore funding, and that is legally nonbinding and voluntary. As was noted by Amy Lieberman, a senior adviser of NYU’s Center on International Cooperation, “I do believe that the trust fund idea [as part of the funding compact] is plausible, and it can happen, but when you want to systematize it with everyone giving contributions and so on and so forth it will be more difficult because there are going to be Member States who will say, ‘You like the system, you pay for it—but we are not going to pay for it’” (Lieberman 2018). Third, the funding compact proposes solutions involving institutional efficiency savings and re-engineering that once again point to incremental changes rather than boldly suggesting consolidation and eliminating redundancies. Ironically, this would presumably be the opportunity to align with Secretary-General Guterres’s vision: “The 2030 Agenda is our boldest agenda for humanity, and requires equally bold changes in the UN development system.”11 Yet the funding compact falls short of this vision and fails to contain the financing “contagion” linked to mandates, lines of work, and programs within the UNDS that are either redundant or obsolete and therefore no longer fit for the purpose of supporting the member states to address the challenges of the twenty-first century. The compact only partially proposes financing solutions that could support the third focus of the current UN reform, regarding greater integration of UN action across the areas of development, humanitarian, peacebuilding and security. This is through increased capitalization and use of interagency pooled funds, to the tune of $1.1 billion annually. Finally, a noticeable omission in the funding compact is the lack of any proposals with regards to humanitarian or crisis financing. While this may be justified due to the distinct nature of humanitarian funding, including

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the humanitarian principles of humanity, independence, neutrality, and impartiality, it is nonetheless a glaring omission. Humanitarian funding has risen meteorically, particularly since 2000,12 and it plays a significant role in the relevance and effectiveness of UNDS collective action in crisis contexts. Indeed, humanitarian funds are often used for early recovery or resilience building, which are de facto development interventions, in countries that experience protracted crises and fragility. The compact is silent on this issue, but most importantly the compact does not tackle the issue of the lack of a coherent funding foundation that could potentially incentivize integrated delivery between humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding interventions.

Incentivizing Integration and Transformation: How Can Financing the UNDS Be the Catalyst for Positive Change? The current reform efforts in the UNDS were spurred on by a series of reviews, reforms, and multistakeholder agreements in a variety of disciplines across the aid sector around the time of the crafting of the 2030 Agenda. These milestones include the adoption of the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda (based on the Third International Conference for Financing for Development held in July 2015),13 the Paris Agreement on Climate, reviews of the international community’s response to the Ebola outbreak, major UN reports on the future of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the Stockholm Declaration addressing Peace and Fragility,14 the World Humanitarian Summit,15 the 2016 New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants,16 and the World Bank’s IDA-18 replenishment.17 All of these events had preparatory processes that aligned themselves with the ambitious Agenda 2030 and instigated internal UN processes to revisit and refine the UNDS modus operandi, the aid architecture both at the global and country level, and, by extension, the funding and financing mechanisms that could drive collective action. These events also redefined in broad terms the two typologies of assistance that would become a possible blueprint for the future operational work of the UNDS,18 based on the emerging needs of Member States (UN MPTF and Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation 2016: 10–12). Assistance for challenges associated with (the majority of) middleincome countries (MICs). For the most part, these countries are on the SDG trajectory; their drivers of development are linked to access to markets, capital, and technology, and generally have supportive security, economic, sociopolitical, and environmental conditions. These

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countries have the capacity to mobilize and manage responsibly the full range of resources at their disposal both from international financial institutions as well as from capital markets. These countries require significant domestic resource mobilization as well as increased international commercial flows, such as foreign direct investment and trade to achieve the SDGs. In this context, the United Nations could potentially assume a significant leveraging role, supporting member states in unlocking resources outside of the UNDS.19 It should be noted that much of the UNDG assistance to these countries is linked to the provision of global public goods (GPGs), although this assistance is not exclusive to this set of countries. One should also note that the challenges posed by both the COVID-19 pandemic as well as its socioeconomic consequences may well plunge more MICs into a state that requires humanitarian assistance (UNDP 2020). Assistance for challenges confronting least-developed countries (LDCs) and fragile states: These challenges are related to poorer countries, and focused areas within the latter, and to countries experiencing protracted crises and/or repeated cycles of fragility. ODA and remittances remain the bedrock of assistance in these countries (Keijzer and Klingebiel 2015). Insecurity in these countries has often been the cause of a bifurcation of aid between humanitarian financing for immediate life-saving operations and peace and security interventions to stem the consequences of conflict. Meanwhile development finance and investment often shrink due to the general risk averseness of development ODA. The central piece here for the UNDS is its work to implement the third pillar of the SG’s reform agenda by linking peace and security operations to humanitarian imperatives and development initiatives through approaches that transcend the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus such as the New Way of Working (NWOW).20 The above is a broad blueprint and as such is not intended to neatly define the world into the haves and have-nots. It nevertheless is intended to shed some light on the possible areas for the UNDS to focus its assistance efforts going forward for achieving greater progress toward the SDGs. Overall funding numbers also confirm this trend: total funding for the UN system reached approximately $53 billion in 2018. Of this, peace operations accounted for about 19 percent, and global agenda and specialized assistance for about 13 percent; 32 percent was spent on development activities, and 36 percent on humanitarian assistance (CEB 2017).21 The latter two areas of assistance now make up more than two thirds of total UN funding, about $36 billion—hence confirming the

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need to optimize the coordination of humanitarian and development assistance. This then is the fundamental question: Is the current financing model providing adequate support to the UNDS to meet the challenge of the SDG implementation according to this “blueprint,” fit for purpose?

UN Comparative Advantage: The Case for Major Strategic Choices Academics studying the United Nations and policy advisors on reform all recognize that past reform efforts have been sustainable only for a relatively short period of time and that after some time, initiatives taper off. The reasons for this are numerous, from political blockages from member states, to lack of sustainable funding for reform initiatives, and to the inherent inertia in big bureaucracies that are formed as part of delicate political alliances within such institutions. Yet, the current pressure for a radically new approach to UNDS work and financing stemming mostly from the perfect storm of slow and sudden onset crises (climate change and COVID-19) set against a populist wave across many countries is significant. What is at stake is the UNDS’s relevance and effectiveness in the global efforts to tackle these crises and to support the global trajectory to sustainable development. Healing the financing pathology that has plagued the UNDS since its inception has been the subject of periodic debates and research. As with all considerations and proposals regarding financing, a fundamental reorientation of the financing modalities of the UNDS must go hand in hand with reforms involving structural and operational changes. From an analysis of the policy trends post-2015 and the subsequent call for a more efficient and integrated UNDS, there are two emerging strategic areas that seem to indicate where the UNDS should focus its resources. These are: 1. a strengthened UNDS normative role with regards to the provision of global public goods; and 2. integrated UNDS operations focused on the most vulnerable and poorest states, particularly fragile contexts and countries in protracted crises. The importance of the normative agendas pursued by the UN system cannot be overstated. There is a need for a strengthened UNDS to address cross-country spillovers in response to issues such as climate change, prevention of pandemics, migratory flows, and cybersecurity, and there is almost universal recognition that there is a need for greater investment in global public goods. There is also almost universal consensus that the

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UNDS is uniquely placed to continue its work in these areas from a technical, nonpolitical, and substantive perspective, albeit that it needs to be strengthened. The nature of these problems is such that solutions must be collective and at scale. This in turn implies the need for the UNDS to create and retain a critical mass of learning and knowledge (dangerously compromised by consecutive zero growth applied to the core budget of the UNDS) and the capacity to coordinate with a plurality of actors (beyond member states) to find solutions. Under the current financing modality of assessed contributions, and with core budgets at an all-time low, the UNDS is critically challenged to deliver effectively on this role (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2016). On the need for the UNDS to focus its operational efforts in fragile and crisis states, this is exactly to fulfill the Agenda 2030 pledge to “leave no one behind.” The codirector of the Future UN Development System Project, Thomas G. Weiss, notes that “in terms of standards and principles and agenda, the [UNDS] system has to be universal … but the UN trying to do things in Brazil, China or Chile … seems silly.” Weiss further suggests that the UN’s focus should be narrowed to the most vulnerable countries (Lieberman 2020). His assessment is echoed by those who are calling for the United Nations to refocus operations and funding to reflect the changing realities of emerging economies and those of the poorest countries. Compelling evidence of trends and statistics seems to point to where the United Nations should be investing its resources: •

two billion people are trapped in countries where development is affected by fragility, armed conflict, and recurring natural disasters (Cordaid 2017);

•

the number of people in the world living on less than $1.90 per day is 734 million, representing 10 percent of the world’s population (World Bank 2020). Moreover, the World Bank estimates that an additional 40 to 60 million will fall into extreme poverty due to COVID-19, which has a disproportionate impact on the poor (World Bank 2020). By 2030, some 80 percent of the world’s poor will live in fragile contexts. According to the OECD, 75 countries and contexts have been considered fragile at least once since 2008. Of these 75, 27 countries are considered chronically fragile; 17 of these are low income, 9 lower middle income, and 1 upper middle income (Iraq).22

•

Only 18 percent of fragile states are on target to achieve the SDGs. This means that 82 percent are either off track or lack data and tools to assess progress (Samman et al. 2018).

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Among these countries in fragility, half have experienced five consecutive years of humanitarian response at any point between the years 2000 and 2017. These zones of instability are also where humanitarian, development, and peace actors are most likely to interconnect in practice (Development Initiatives 2018).

Countries that are home to 75 percent of the world’s poorest people receive just 35 percent of ODA targeted at specific countries. Forty percent of aid goes to countries housing only 24 percent of people living in absolute poverty, and a quarter of aid goes to countries that collectively are home to 1 percent of the world’s poorest people. This is important because a growing proportion of the world’s poor is projected to reside in protracted crisis and fragile contexts by 2030 (Development Initiatives 2018). There are fewer and fewer places where multilateral interventions actually deliver solutions at scale. Where there is a significant exception, it is in fragile states where multilateral solutions through the UNDS and the World Bank (and often using pooled fund arrangements) have proven to be most relevant and necessary to prevent further deterioration (Jenks and Kharas 2016). The intersection between the most impoverished countries and countries in protracted crises or fragile states is now widely recognized as a global security threat and the principal obstacle to reaching the SDGs.23 Indeed, parallels can be made here to the current ongoing debate on how to tackle the deadly COVID-19 pandemic, where it is clear that no matter how well the Global North is able to tackle the disease, it will continue to haunt global supply chains and health until it is equally addressed in the most vulnerable countries in the Global South. Already subject of significant discussions prior to the launching of the SDGs in 2015, and ahead of their policy decision to increase their work in fragile states, the World Bank took on these issues in their blog Let’s Talk Development. In this blog, the IMF mission chief for Trinidad and Tobago writes in 2013, “In an increasingly interconnected world, the cost of failure to engage can cross national borders, with far-reaching implications—increasing refugee populations, disease, and conflict, and reduced economic prospects. Sharing a border with a fragile state was estimated to reduce a country’s economic growth by 0.4 percent annually. The ongoing events in the Middle East and Africa demonstrate how contagious conflict and fragility are” (Ötker-Robe 2013). A number of eminent policy makers and institutions also launched a series of reports and initiatives that put forward the need for concerted global attention to fragility as well as new approaches and toolboxes that are focused on tackling fragility.

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Table 2.1. The Case for Focusing on Fragility There are some promising developments globally that extend the concepts and frameworks of fragility from the humanitarian and development world into peacebuilding, security, and diplomacy and provide the basis for significant progress: Pathways to Peace, a first joint UN and World Bank report on fragility and peacebuilding, makes the business case for investing more in prevention in response to the surge in violent conflict since 2010, with rising human and financial costs.24 The World Bank 2018 IDA Replenishment dedicated almost $15 billion in investment in fragile states, accompanied by new flexible financing tools and operational policies designed to improve performance. The Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF concluded that the IMF’s engagement with fragile states, while prioritized, was deeply flawed in terms of the appropriate financing instruments and partnership required to achieve impact in and with fragile states (IMF 2018). With the leadership of Kristalina Georgieva, former World Bank CEO and European commissioner for humanitarian aid and crisis management, at the helm of IMF, the Fund will now embark upon deepening its engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states (Igoe 2019). A High-Level Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, led by former UK prime minister David Cameron, concluded that fragility and fragile states needed to be prioritized and called for the international community to “completely rethink the way it approaches fragile states to ensure reforms take hold and such countries do not plunge back into instability” (Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development 2018). The Global Fragility and Violence Reduction Act of 2018 was passed in the US House of Representatives to inter alia establish ten pilot countries with tenyear mission-led plans to address the specific issues of fragility and instability that cause violence, focusing on coordination of development, security, and diplomacy across the US government and aligning relevant international and multilateral organizations to accomplish the same. A companion bill is currently being drafted in the Senate (Lindborg 2018).25 In parallel, a Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 was introduced in both US congressional chambers, which essentially paves the way for greater use of private-sector capital and skills in more fragile environments. Under the bill, priority is given to areas that “are most underdeveloped and subject to extreme poverty, fragility and violence” (Lindborg 2018).

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(Cont.) At the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos-Klosters in January 2019, a Humanitarian Investing Initiative was launched. Co-chaired by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Bank Group, the initiative was formed to bring together corporations and investors with humanitarian and development actors to work together on new approaches that tackle long term challenges of fragility, protracted crises, and forced displacement. The initiative aims to empower the humanitarian investing community through the following: (1) promote a new narrative that bridges the existing siloes along the humanitarian-development continuum and is inclusive of investors and corporates; (2) map the humanitarian investment landscape with existing financial products and mechanisms; and (3) create a humanitarian investment theme and unlock new capital that supports the most vulnerable communities (WEF 2020). Finally, in light of emerging trends from the OECD’s 2016 State of Fragility report, noting that more countries were experiencing violent conflict than at any time in nearly thirty years, the OECD-DAC members put forward a 2019 recommendation on the humanitarian-development and peace nexus. The recommendation provides a programmatic and financing framework to “promote a more coherent and coordinated effort that strengthens complementarity across the “nexus” and involve a central role for OECD-DAC members in their collaboration with the multilateral system. A common set of principles—this ‘DAC Recommendation’—can help to guide and support this collaboration, and build a common approach across OECD-DAC members, non-OECD DAC members and other Organisations that become Adherents to the Recommendation” (OECD 2020).

The concept of fragility is obviously not new, but the renewed interest and ensuing policy discussions regarding the need for integrated approaches—programmatic, operational, and resourcing—to tackle fragility correspond with the launching of the SDGs. For the most part, fragility has been addressed in silos within the diplomatic, political, economic, development, humanitarian, and security fields, each one often implementing distinct parallel solutions to achieve specific goals over the past two decades. For example, political context analysis that is undertaken by different parts of the UNDS is rarely rolled up into one place in a way that enables all interagency actors to “sing from the same hymn sheet,” unless it is a Security Council–mandated peacekeeping operation or special political mission. In yet another example pertaining to global processes, the UN convened in July 2019 in New York for a High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development focused on SDG 16 on working toward

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peaceful, just, and inclusive societies, while at the same moment, the UN secretary-general convened one thousand diplomats and civil society actors in Nairobi to discuss exactly the same issue, i.e., preventing violent extremism in Africa. Despite the implementation of numerous solutions to address these silos, “the international community has not succeeded in eliminating fragility, and many countries have remained ‘trapped’ in fragility for decades. … The misalignment of resources, including aid, investment, and technical assistance, has contributed to the persistence of fragility, and many attempts to address fragility have failed even when given sufficient resources” (Signe 2020). For the UNDS, the challenge will be in breaking out of traditional siloed approaches—driven by bilateral donor noncore earmarked funding—and working across communities of different aid practitioners within the UNDS as well as inside individual UN entities and aligning resources to coherent, integrated efforts. James Michel notes that “there will be a need for flexible budget authority so that instruments can be timely aligned with identified local priorities and sustained throughout the anticipated time of need” (Michel 2018: 70). “The fastest performers (among fragile states) have required more than a decade to reach a threshold that many fragile states at present trajectory might never reach” (Michel 2016: 53). The UNDS has embarked on the work of operationalizing the nexus approach at country level with interesting results in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin countries, and the Horn of Africa. In spite of this work being one of the three pillars of the secretary-general’s reforms, applying the nexus approach remains novel and patchy. Importantly, the use of funding to create incentives to support priorities has yet to be tested or brought to scale (Poole and Culbert 2019).

The Financing Pathology of the UNDS: Remedial Actions In 1994, Hans d’Orville and Dragoljub Najman, in an article entitled “A New System to Finance the United Nations,” wrote: “We must emphasize again that either a total revolutionary approach will be adopted to the financing of the UN … or one must be prepared to see other organizations fill the lacunae which might be left as a result of the financial difficulties of the world organization” (d’Orville and Najman 1994: 135–44). The excerpt cited could not be more apt in describing the current financing impasse, and the fact that financing has been a recurring issue since even before 1994, with cyclical flare-ups and crisis peaks, seems to suggest that the system—in 2021—is at a tipping point. As noted, past attempts at reform have been incremental and addressed neither the imbal-

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ances cemented over time nor the distorted incentives that created them. Inevitably, the funding of the UNDS has been the outcome of historical circumstances and expediency, with not enough logic or any comprehensive strategy bringing it together. The end result of these circumstances has resulted in a system that is highly fragmented and inefficient, and woefully inadequate to meet the emerging demands of Agenda 2030 and generate integrated solutions linked to its implementation. In recognition of this, the funding compact put forward by SecretaryGeneral Guterres represents a step in the right direction, although, as stated, it falls short of the “revolution” that is needed to finance the UNDS’s work. In order to get system-wide funding right, positive incentives that drive collaboration and integrated approaches must be part of the financing solution. In turn, the question of incentives starts with a review of the relationship between contributors and recipients of the funding. There are a number of factors that play into this relationship that will not be discussed here (Baumann and Sharma 2017: 66–69). It is sufficient to say that, currently, reverse incentives exist that perpetuate financing one UN entity over another and impede the alignment of financing to systemwide priorities. Against this background, it is recommended that an independent advisory group on financing the UN be established. Among other things, this group would review financing incentives (among member states and among UN entities as well as between them) as well as the quality and quantity of financing approaches and financing modalities, in support of system-wide integration. This should also include a systemic review of the current model of financing the UN’s core budget through assessed contributions. Following on from the analysis regarding the emerging areas for UNDS assistance, it is further recommended that the following three areas be considered for priority action, namely financing of international norms and global public goods, financing of the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus, and crisis financing instruments.

Financing of International Norms/Global Public Goods There is universal agreement that the challenges of the 2030 Agenda will require collective responses, based on agreed-upon norms and standards, and that a significant amount of investment will be needed to achieve the SDGs. Yet, in spite of the exponential growth in the global economy, the 2019 OECD data shows that the increase in financial resources that was envisaged in order to achieve the SDGs has yet to be forthcoming (OECD 2018a). Among other things, this shortfall in funding inevitably translates

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into shortfalls in the response by the multilateral community to global crises, such as the recent Ebola crisis and now the outbreak of COVID-19. Importantly, the response shortfalls point to a significant underinvestment in global public goods and in the core normative capacities of international multilateral institutions, in particular the United Nations (Jenks and Kharas 2016). Much research has been published on the subject of financing global public goods, given the changes in global governance. In light of the pervasive nature of global challenges and the policy interdependence among countries that global solutions entail, the importance of involving a multiplicity of actors in this discussion and in the creation of new financing approaches, tools, and platforms for GPGs cannot be emphasized enough. The nature of many GPGs is such that they require a particular systemic integrity to ensure that the services rendered by the GPGs are positive. This is applicable to a wide range of subjects, such as climate change mitigation, financial stability, communicable disease control, and ocean health (Kaul 2018). At present, GPG provision and financing is ad hoc, as if it were a “pick and choose” menu, and regarded as either foreign aid or development assistance delivered through conventional aid agencies and instruments.26 As such, member states have become consumers of GPGs as opposed to investors. The most glaring example of this at the time of publication is the tussle at the World Health Organization (WHO) regarding its role in the COVID-19 response. While the overwhelming consensus is praise for the WHO’s role, and that it understood its constraints in what it could do, dissonant voices have given some member states the excuse to limit funding to this global public good, which could have an adverse effect globally. This status quo is no longer viable. Agenda 2030 requires a very different approach from all countries, one that marries the international issues with national interests. Economists Inge Kaul and Pedro Conceição, in their work on The New Public Finance: Responding to Global Challenges, argue that in order for global public goods to be provided sustainably, member states and/or donor countries must take on the mindset of investors and make a clear separation between financing GPGs and development assistance, allowing “more specificity to the outputs to be produced and allowing financing packages to be structured on a product-by-product basis” (Kaul and Conceição 2006: 28–70). Clearly the provision of GPGs is no longer the exclusive domain of the multilateral development system, particular that of the UNDS. Nonetheless, the UNDS’s body of work in setting universal standards, in establishing information and data systems, and in the provision and operationalization of global public goods is recognized as one of its most vital tasks. While

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the acceleration of globalization reaffirmed the importance of this role, it also shed light on how, over time, the source of funding for the UN’s normative agenda has been jeopardized because of the transformation in the financing of the UN Development System, emphasizing short-term relief over long-term investment in the system.27 Remedies to the aforementioned situation have been put forward: the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation put forward the idea of adopting a system similar to the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) financial model, which entails collecting fees for WIPO’s services in granting patents. Given the UNDS’s current diverse funding base, a similar model could be reviewed, adapted, and possibly adopted. Fees could be developed for the UNDS’s services in ensuring the provision of global public goods. In a similar manner, there have been proposals for a percentage payment from member states’ defense/security budgets, or depending on the type of GPG provided, the relevant line ministries in a national setting can allocate funding from their budgets. The rationale for this is that, in absence of GPGs, the threat to national security becomes exponentially higher (cybersecurity, terrorism, unchecked migration, pandemic outbreaks, armed conflicts, refugee flows, and climate change). Investing a percentage of funds from defense budgets would be justified in the face of looming threats. The collection of these funds need not go through the coffers of the UNDS, but the role of ensuring compliance needs to be entrusted to a well-managed and transparent financing process. This list is clearly not exhaustive, but serious consideration of these and other proposals is merited in the face of the growing demand for GPGs and the role of the UNDS in ensuring a framework of international norms that is adapted to globalization and inclusive.

Financing of the Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding Nexus As the international community takes stock of implementation of the SDGs, one fact becomes starkly evident: a universal SDG agenda should mean a differentiated universal financing response. In other words, while the world generates a $30+ trillion economy, adding even $10 trillion of SDG public (investment) spending to achieve the SDGs tells us nothing about which resources will be allocated to which purposes in which places, and hence nothing about whether or not they will help any countries achieve specific SDG outcomes. Indeed, the lowest-income countries still face enormous constraints alongside “the most severe consequences of funding shortfalls often measured in life and death terms” (McArthur 2019: 90–92). The SDG ethos of “leaving no one behind” has to be clearly

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unpacked even further by the UNDS and bought by the member states and donors. While the richest countries need to ensure that the SDGs are a universal process and use their public resources to do so, emerging economies need to make the match between much-needed investments and investors. Those countries that are at highest risk of being left behind clearly need bespoke long-term assistance matched to a bespoke financing strategy. The challenge for fragile states is that there is often not enough funding and not the right type of funding. Failures of the past point to programs and financing that did not reflect the comprehensiveness of the problems in fragile states. The UNDS is at a critical crossroads with regards to its work in the poorest, most fragile countries where ODA remains the bedrock for sustainable development. More than any other multilateral institution, the United Nations, and the UNDS therein, understands that working under conditions of fragility, be it in countries or specific areas in countries, means staying for the long haul. It also means that to have impact, a holistic approach must be taken, one that recognizes that development/humanitarian and peacebuilding/security approaches are intertwined. A choice to make these countries the programmatic and operational focus is long overdue. Inevitably, the choice of focusing on countries in crisis and fragility may ultimately be determined by donor governments. Some argue however that fragile states do not need new funds but more effective coordination between the funds (Greenhill et al. 2015). With the marked change in a more predictable engagement of Bretton Woods institutions in tackling fragility, the United Nations is poised to work more effectively and in coordination with the gamut of actors engaged in country across the different sectors, including the private sector, if given the right incentives. As mentioned above, promising development is a 2019 OECD-DAC Recommendation on the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus, which lays out eleven key principles on delivering better financing across all its dimensions (see table 2.1). Noteworthy is the recommendation that states, “Use ODA as a catalyst to mobilize the full range of financial flows that do not contribute to conflict, inequality or instability” (OECD 2020). In this regard, DAC donors—which make up the bulk of ODA and principal contributors of UNDS noncore funding—need to use finance as a strategic tool to incentivize change in behavior in coordination and programming, and as a catalytic tool for further investment.

The Promise of Crisis Financing Instruments So the UN’s choice for relevance is clear. For it to succeed in pushing toward the SDGs, it indeed has to ensure that no one is left behind and that

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Table 2.2. Investing in Fragility through a Variety of Instruments Traditional ODA and pooling of grants: this represents the bulk of the current funding going to crisis settings. Insurance-type financial instruments: this includes working with the insurance companies to pay out in the event of relatively predictable crises. Payment-for-results structures: this includes instruments such as impact bonds that bring in private capital to build public structures and programming. Subsidized lending schemes: this means using donor aid funds to leverage new finance from capital markets at a lower interest rate than would normally be granted to crisis states. Blended finance instruments: mixing public funds to guarantee further private-sector investment.

those most left behind are the countries in protracted crises where programming—and financing—is limited primarily to humanitarian action. Crowding in development financing through any variety of instruments is essential to turning the trajectory of these crises from perennial crises to potentially achieving the SDG. Doing so requires the United Nations to play a very delicate balancing act between meeting immediate humanitarian needs and laying the groundwork for sustainable development, in particular: •

ensuring that no life is lost;

•

advising governments on macroeconomic policy that reduces inequality and ensures universality—while not treading on the toes of international financial institutions;

•

with the right mix, crowding in financing from a variety of public and private sources while ensuring that the national interests and sovereignty are made, particularly by not increasing indebtedness.

As table 2.2 on a variety of crisis financing instruments shows, there is now a wide range of options for how to crowd in financing. None of these is the panacea to resolving the financing gap, but the United Nations needs to show its leadership to use and scale up these instruments in different mixes in different contexts. This could ultimately bolster domestic capacity to address fragility, which would require targeting of suf-

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ficient resources, including ODA, domestic resources generated by tax revenues, and a hefty amount of foreign direct investment. As Paul Collier notes, “aid makes private investment more attractive and so helps to keep capital in countries.” While the natural recipients of ODA are the poorest fragile states, to lift countries out of fragility requires simultaneously financing life-saving needs as well as investing in development and security initiatives. The novelty of this approach toward fragility is in the call for comprehensive integrated approaches in financing using a mix of the instruments listed above, which are at the same time tailor-made to local contexts. These approaches also denote a significant shift from a focus on state building and good governance to greater attention to the use of foreign aid as leverage for investment. Frank Bousquet, director of the fragile, conflict, and violence work in the World Bank, notes, “We are present in Yemen, in the middle of a conflict, because we believe that it’s not only a humanitarian crisis, but it is also a development crisis and if we are not strengthening delivery—health, education, cash transfer—we may lose significant development gains” (Igoe 2018). Both the World Bank and the UNDS have embarked on the development of a myriad of innovative financing tools and approaches (see table 1.2) that hold much promise in marrying the interests of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding communities while creating the basis for greater involvement by both international and national private-sector actors, thus laying the groundwork for economic growth in fragile contexts. The challenge of course is in generating the incentives within the UNDS to work integratively to achieve greater synergies and impact and support these more vulnerable countries onto the SDG trajectory. The call for comprehensive approaches and equally long-term integrated financing solutions is embodied in the secretary-general’s implementation of the integrated national financing frameworks (INFFs) (United Nations 2019). The secretary-general’s Strategy for Financing the 2030 Agenda and its three-year roadmap of actions and initiatives commits the UN Development System to support countries to adopt and implement INFFs. The focus of this work is for all member states of the United Nations. While this is laudable, we call for a greater emphasis on the thirty-plus countries that are perennially the focus of humanitarian interventions and certainly not on the SDG trajectory, and for which the elaboration of the INFFs would be pivotal. As indicated above, this is ever more relevant now in the context of COVID-19, where both the pandemic and its global economic consequences could plunge a new set of countries that are already fragile into full crisis mode—and therefore even further away from

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the SDGs. The need to maintain and not wear away at development gains is absolutely imperative.

A Consolidation of Mandates and Work Programs An independent team of advisers (ITA) was appointed by the UN’s Economic and Social Council to look at UNDS coherence in the run-up to the 2016 SG’s report on the Repositioning of the UN Development System (i.e., UNDS reform). Among its conclusions was that, while earmarking and the increase of noncore resources to the UNDS had allowed a formidable expansion of the operational work of the UNDS, funding partners or donors, still “often earmarked resources at the project level to ensure greater accountability and oversight, [forego] the potential benefits of inter-linkages and integration” (ECOSOC 2016: 7–8). The dominance of noncore funding has transformed UN organizations. In some cases, where corporate strategies have been developed to align core and noncore resources more closely, the lines between the two have been blurred, and internal coherence (within the organizational entity) has been enhanced. But for the most part, the preponderance of noncore resources and the processes associated with their contributions has led to dilutions of mandates, increased competition, and additional transaction costs. The secretarygeneral’s funding compact goes a long way in addressing some of the imbalances created by earmarking, and it equally attempts to provide direction and guidance as to where funding should be directed. But, as stated earlier in this chapter, the SG’s reform in general and the compact in particular fail to take up the clarion call for a more strategic and focused UNDS that can deliver in an integrated manner. As part of this clarion call and a subtext to the case for greater investment in global public goods and programmatic and operational shifts toward the ones being left furthest behind, a review of UN entities’ mandates and their relevance to current global challenges is recommended. Facing significant financial pressures and with a looming Decade of Action just getting started, the United Nations has come to its umpteenth existential crisis, once again being asked to do more with less in a context of interagency competition and overlaps in mandates, and also at a time where the global confidence in multilateralism is at its lowest ebb since World War II—all compounded further by the impact of COVID-19. Therein lies an important opportunity: in the form of a blog addressed to the new secretary-general, and in response to a 2016 survey performed on the effectiveness of the United Nations, the directors of the Future of the UN Development System (FUNDS) project, Stephen Browne and

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Thomas G. Weiss (2017), call for a review of mandates of the UN entities, with a view to creating a leaner, more effective organization.28 The call was in response to a survey that cited how the UN’s ineffectiveness is tied to a multitude of duplications among the UN agency mandates; this represents a failure to recognize that solving many of the global challenges of today requires a nexus approach. In undergoing a type of “mergers and acquisitions” operation, the ultimate result would be greater organizational consolidation and performance efficacy, with significant cost savings.

The Opportunity of the UN’s Seventy-Fifth Anniversary: Adapt or Die? As this book goes to print, the world is experiencing the outbreak of the virus COVID-19. The impact of the pandemic is pervasive and complex, affecting all aspects of society as we know it. In its timely publication Shared Responsibility, Global Solidarity, the UNDS notes that “whole societies must come together” and calls for “large scale, coordinated and comprehensive multilateral response” (United Nations 2020: 1). The document outlines in broad terms how this should happen, and in particular notes that close attention should be paid to the impact of the pandemic “on the most vulnerable and in fragile political transitions and in countries already facing a rapid deterioration of security conditions” (United Nations 2020: 11). Among some of the emerging lessons are issues that we are all familiar with: the world cannot afford to go back to the same normal. In a briefing published by the International Crisis Group, it is noted that there are apparent tradeoffs but actually missed opportunities in creating a world based on global goods economies (International Crisis Group 2020). Indeed, if we are learning anything from the onslaught of SARS, MERS, Ebola outbreaks, and now COVID-19, it is that the impact of transboundary crises is amplified because they are not confined to national or even regional borders. Combined with equally dangerous global phenomena such as climate change and growing income disparities, these insidious and often invisible events give us a sense that we are all equally vulnerable. Indeed, helping out the weakest among us will be the only way to ensure the survival of our global community. Crises also give us an impulse to act earlier, with greater urgency and with some imagination, to create a significantly different and better outcome. After all, this was the driving motivation behind the creation of the League of Nations after World War I and then again the establishment

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of the United Nations after World War II. And at the time of writing this chapter, the world economy is being battered by COVID-19, on its way to being transformed in yet unpredictable ways. If anything, this crisis singularly and surgically points to the fact that, now more than ever, there is a need to align capital to need, that is, decide how money should be moved and targeted and affirm that such a transformation has to be done with all actors involved—North and South, rich and poor, stable and crisis—to address the enormous need. How can we as global citizens seize the moment to transform sustainably? This same fundamental question needs to be asked of the United Nations. The urgency and relevance of its mandate has never been so clear. Its call for global multilateral action—particularly in places of heightened vulnerabilities and fragility—has never been so right. There has never been a more crucial moment for the UNDS to act, and yet its own existence is contested and at risk, threatened by the same forces that question citizen empowerment and global solidarity, but also by its own internal inertia to bring greater focus on where there is greater need. The Decade of Action is upon us, and in its first year—the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations itself—there is a devastating wake-up call: adapt or die. Confronted with stress, most people will choose the known even when the known was and is difficult. This is true of the United Nations as well. But history has shown us that we also have the agency to do what needs to be done to improve our plights and raise our humanity. The United Nations and its member states need to seek a more flexible and modern financial basis that is consonant with the twenty-first century and accountable to the outcomes prescribed in its mandate. Fundamentally, this means adopting a new approach to financing international cooperation, especially to financing global public goods. This, in turn, will require the combined efforts of national governments and of a fundamentally reconfigured UN system. And this must be done with the same sense of urgency that we experience when facing a pandemic that threatens our own existence. Sandra Aviles is a senior policy and project management adviser who works to identify international humanitarian and development financing solutions in collaboration with multilaterals, academia, and philanthropists. She has served as head of the Office of the Food and Agricultural Organization in Geneva and as senior humanitarian spokesperson to several high-level UN deliberations and processes. She has twenty years of senior-level experience in policy analysis and project management,

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developing corporate resources mobilization strategies for international multilateral organizations and spearheading several Inter-Agency Standing Committee processes that resulted in major shifts in humanitarian policy, planning, and programming and increased funding toward disaster preparedness and prevention and resilience initiatives. She has worked in both humanitarian and development functions in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Romano Lasker joined the Crisis Bureau of the United Nations Development Program in 2017, focusing on the complementarity between the humanitarian, development, and peace interventions (HDP nexus) of the UN and its partners. Previously he worked for fifteen years at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on operations, partnerships, humanitarian financing, and policy both in Headquarters (Geneva and New York) and in the Regional Office for Asia-Pacific in Bangkok. He began his aid career working at the UN Office for the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, in the so-called Oil-for-Food Program, immediately prior to the 2003 conflict. Romano is interested in how financing can both hamper and enable more effective aid response in crisis and fragile settings.

NOTES The authors are grateful to Barnaby Willitts-King and Lydia Poole for sharing their insights on this topic, and to Gregory Gottlieb, Stephen Perry, Simon LawryWhite, and Daniel Longhurst for providing thoughtful comments on the draft. 1. The Fifth Committee is the committee of the UN General Assembly with responsibilities for administrative and budgetary matters. Based on the reports of the Fifth Committee, the General Assembly considers and approves the budget of the United Nations. 2. Core funding contributions are resources provided to UN entities that are commingled without restrictions and whose use and application are directly linked to the multilateral mandates and strategic plans that are approved by the governing bodies of individual UN entities as part of an established intergovernmental process (see ST/ESA/362, p. 1). 3. The nomenclature on noncore resources changes with each UN entity. Noncore funding is tied or earmarked to specific purposes and geographical areas, and it mainly supports operational activities. 4. See Jenks (2014) for a historical evolution of the UNDS financial architecture. 5. The UN funds and programs include UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, and UNDP (Hüfner 2019: 101).

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6. Noncore contributions, at the extreme, can create UN entity turf for states in their contribution patterns, and over time can severely restrict UNCT mandates and flexibility. See Baumann et al. (2019) and Fleet (2017). 7. The Independent Team of Advisers (ITA), appointed by ECOSOC in 2016, considered that earmarking detracted from UNDS coherence: “The sectoral orientation has been further entrenched by current funding practices, where funding partners often earmark resources at the project level to ensure greater accountability and oversight, forgoing the potential benefits of inter-linkages and integration.” See A/71/63–E/2016/8. 8. A/74/73/Add.1–E/2019/4/Add.1. 9. This levy consists of a fee calculated at 1 percent of the project budgets of tightly earmarked funds. 10. In his report on the “implementation of General Assembly resolution 71/243 on the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the UN system, the Secretary-General reports that ‘… it is premature to conduct any robust analysis on the funding compact’s impact on the quality and quantity of funds entrusted to the UN development system, as 2019 and 2020 data are not yet available, but there are positive developments, particularly regarding the quality and flexibility of earmarked funds, which we will continue to monitor closely.’” See https://undocs.org/a/75/79, p. 33. 11. A/72/684–E/2018/7, para. 1. 12. The change in UN humanitarian ODA since 2000 to 2015 is +136 percent, as compared to UN development ODA over the same period which is +100 percent. See A/71/63–E/2016/8. 13. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda highlights the role of different sources of finance, as well as systemic issues that need to be addressed. 14. The Stockholm Declaration renews the commitment of the international community to the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, which represents an action plan and guide for how to prioritize investment in peacebuilding and state building in fragile environments. The Stockholm Declaration outlines what signatories must do to revive commitment to the New Deal, take it to the next level to Leave No One Behind, and achieve the SDGs, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings. 15. This summit, held on 23–24 May 2016 in Istanbul, brought together nine thousand participants from across the aid sector, including fifty-five heads of state and government, UN agencies, regional groupings, international NGOs, and a large range of civil society and private-sector organizations. Convened by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as one of the last global summits of his tenure, it was seen as an important opportunity to highlight the critical links between war, poverty, inequality, climate change and disaster impacts, risk reduction, crisis management, and response. The summit explicitly reflected the SDGs and the Paris Agreement. Its outcomes—over thirty-five hundred

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16. 17.

18.

19.

20.

21. 22. 23.

24.

25. 26.

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commitments by three hundred stakeholders—included pledges to uphold international humanitarian law, broaden operating models and partnerships to include a more devolved way of working, encourage more diversity and transparency in the way crises are funded, and bring more coherence to humanitarian and development aid. The New York Declaration was later presented at the 2018 UN General Assembly as the Global Compact on Refugees and Migrants. The IDA18 replenishment is the largest in the IDA’s fifty-six-year history and is considered a significant change in the World Bank Group’s commitment to support the 2030 agenda. These challenges facing these two groups are not mutually exclusive, and in the case of some middle-income countries, there are pockets of fragility that require significant concessional finance flows to avoid the “fragility trap.” Jenks and Topping (2017: 71) argue that the “UN’s leveraging role and impact will require more effort on the part of the UN itself in developing robust system-wide financing data and strategies, employing relevant professional capabilities and developing capacities in financing to analyse, strategise and effectively partner with a broader range of financing actors at the local, regional and international levels. A firm commitment to improve these areas would provide for more evidence-based and analytical decisions and platforms, which in turn would promote a more optimal mix, blend and sequence financial flows and instruments.” NWOW calls on humanitarian and development actors to work collaboratively together, based on their comparative advantages, toward “collective outcomes” that reduce need, risk, and vulnerability over multiple years. This notion of “collective outcomes” has been placed at the center of the commitment to the New Way of Working, summarized in the Commitment to Action signed by the secretary-general and nine UN principals at the World Humanitarian Summit and endorsed by the World Bank and International Organization for Migration. See FS-F00-04. The CEB statistics under global norms and standard setting are now designated as global agenda and special assistance. See OECD (2018b: 26) for the main trends affecting fragility. Poverty is becoming increasingly concentrated in fragile and conflict-affected states with low levels of state capacity, and current practice is not well aligned with the long-run challenge of development in these countries. See Greenhill et al. (2015). It further emphasizes the need for more complementary efforts of often stovepiped institutions and sectors, especially entities working on security, diplomacy, and development. See also US Congress (2020). Kaul (2018) argues that part of the reason why states act individualistically is because there is a lack of a full-fledged theory of global public economics.

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States will support a system to finance GPGs if they perceive that global and national interests overlap. Only through a robust theory of global public economics can states understand and be incentivized to support a well-financed system for GPGs. 27. The normative agenda is financed from un-earmarked funding (i.e., assessed contributions and voluntary core contributions). 28. Browne, Connolly, and Weiss (2017: 120) also put forward the idea of the creation of an Independent International Commission on UN Funding, whose overall aim would be to concentrate more support on the undisputed areas of comparative advantage of the UNDS, namely its activities in conflict-prone and fragile states and its work for all countries on the normative aspects of development.

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Public Documents, United Nations Chief Executive Board for Coordination (CEB). 2017. Total Expenditure by Category. Financial Statistics, FS-F00-04. Retrieved 29 May 2020 from http:// www.unsystem.org/content/FS-F00-04. Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). 2016. Leaving No One Behind: The Imperative of Inclusive Development; Report on the World Social Situation 2016. ST/ESA/362. New York: United Nations. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 2016. “Findings and Conclusions.” Working Paper of the Independent Team of Advisors for ECOSOC Dialogue Workshop No. 8, 16 June. New York: ECOSOC. General Assembly. 2015. Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 67/226 on the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of Operational Activities for Development of the United Nations System: Report of the Secretary-General. A/71/63–E/2016/8, 31 December. New York: UN. ———. 2017. Repositioning the United Nations Development System to Deliver on the 2030 Agenda: Our Promise for Dignity, Prosperity and Peace on a Healthy Planet; Report of the Secretary-General. A/72/684–E/2018/7, 21 December. New York: UN. ———. 2019. Operational Activities of the United Nations for International Development Cooperation: Follow-Up to Policy Recommendations of the General Assembly and the Council; Funding Compact: Report of the Secretary-General. A/74/73/Add.1–E/2019/4/Add.1. New York: UN. United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2020. “United Nations Statement to the Development Committee: Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.” Media release, 17 April 2020. New York: UNDP.

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Books and Articles Adams, Barbara. 2018. “SDG Shadow Implementation—Hidden in Plain Sight.” Global Policy Watch, Briefing Note 26, 13 July. Retrieved 22 May 2018 from https://www.globalpolicywatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/GPW26_ 2018_07_13.pdf. Barrett, Scott. 2007. Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baumann, Max-Otto, Erik Lundsgaarde, and Silke Weinlich. 2019. “Shades of Grey: Earmarking in the UN Development System.” In Financing the UN Development System: Time for Hard Choices, edited by the UN MPTF Office and Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation, 106–9. Uppsala: Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation. Baumann, Max-Otto, and Pratyusch Sharma. 2017. “A New Contract for Financing the UN Development System: What Does It Mean and How Can It Be Achieved?” In Financing the UN Development System: Pathways to Reposition for Agenda 2030, edited by the Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation and MPTF Office, 66–69. Uppsala: Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation. Browne, Stephen, Nina Connelly, and Thomas G. Weiss. 2017. Sweden’s Financing of UN Funds and Programmes: Analysing the Past, Looking to the Future. Stockholm: EBA. Retrieved on 23 May 2020 from https://eba.se/wp-content/ uploads/2017/11/Funding-UN-report-FINAL-Webb-version.pdf. Browne, Stephen, and Thomas G. Weiss. 2017. “Advice to António Guterres: A Leaner UN Could Be a Better UN.” PassBlue, 27 March. Retrieved 23 May 2020 from https://www.passblue.com/2017/03/27/advice-to-antonio-guterres-aleaner-un-could-be-a-better-un/. Commission on State Fragility, Growth, and Development. 2018. Escaping the Fragility Trap. International Growth Centre (IGC), London School of Economics and Political Science, University of Oxford´s Blavatnik School of Governments, April. London: International Growth Centre. Cordaid. 2017. Working in and on Fragility. Cordaid Strategy Report 2018–20, November. The Hague: Cordaid. Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation. 2016. “Why Discuss the Role of Norms and the Future of Multilateralism Today?” Paper presented at the UN’s Normative Role in an Agenda 2030 World, Geneva, 2 December. Retrieved 22 May 2020 from daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Norms-paper-final.pdf. Development Initiative (DI). 2018. “What do Emerging Trends in Development Finance Mean for Crisis Actors?” Retrieved 28 May 2020 from https://devinit .org/what-we-do/events/what-do-emerging-trends-in-development-financemean-for-crisis-actors/. d’Orville, Hans, and Dragoljub Najman. 1994. “A New System to Finance the United Nations.” Security Dialogue 25(2): 135–44. Fleet, Michael. 2017. Funding the SDGs: Current Trends and Potential Options. Academic Council on the United Nations System. Retrieved 23 May 2020 from

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https://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Mike-Fleet-Funding-theSDGs-AM17-Paper.pdf. Greenhill, Romilly, Carter Paddy, Chris Hoy, and Marcus Manuel. 2015. Financing the Future: How International Public Finance Should Find a Global Social Compact to Eradicate Poverty. Report by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), April. London: ODI. Hüfner, Klaus. 2019. Financing the UN: An Introduction. Berlin: Frank und Timme. Igoe, Michael. 2018. “Q&A: The World Bank’s Pivot to Fragile States.” Devex, 19 April. Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https://www.devex.com/news/q-a-theworld-bank-s-pivot-to-fragile-states-92572. ———. 2019. “In IMF Debut, Georgieva Brings Fragility Focus to Fiscal Policy.” Devex, 9 October. Retrieved 29 May 2020 from https://www.devex.com/news/ in-imf-debut-georgieva-brings-fragility-focus-to-fiscal-policy-95788. International Crisis Group. 2020. “COVID-19 and Conflict: Seven Trends to Watch.” Special Briefing No. 4, 24 March 2020. Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https:// www.crisisgroup.org/global/sb4-covid-19-and-conflict-seven-trends-watch. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2018. The IMF and Fragile States: 2018 Evaluation Report. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, Publication Services. Jenks, Bruce. 2014. “Financing the UN Development System and the Future of Multilateralism.” Third World Quarterly 35(10): 1809–28. Jenks, Bruce, and Homi Kharas. 2016. “Towards a New Multilateralism: Optimising the Multilateral Development System in an Increasingly Complex World.” Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation, Development Dialogue Paper (20). Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. Jenks, Bruce, and Jennifer Topping. 2017. “The Value of Leveraging.” In Financing the UN Development System: Pathways to Reposition for Agenda 2030, edited by the Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation and MPTF Office, 70–71. Uppsala: Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation. Kaul, Inge. 2018. “Why We Need a Global Public Economics.” Institute for New Economic Thinking, 7 May. Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https://www.inet economics.org/perspectives/blog/why-we-need-a-global-public-economics. Kaul, Inge, and Pedro Conceição. 2006. “The Changes Under Way: Financing Global Challenges through International Cooperation behind and beyond Borders.” In The New Public Finance: Responding to Global Challenges, edited by Inge Kaul and Pedro Conceição, 28–70. New York: Oxford University Press. Keijzer, Niels, and Stephan Klingebiel. 2015. “Financing Global Development: What Role for Official Development Assistance?” German Development Institute (DIE), Briefing Paper 2015 (7). Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https:// www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_7.2015.pdf. Kharas, Homi, Mark Plant, Amar Bhattacharya, and Annalisa Prizzon. 2018. “The New Global Agenda and the Future of the Multilateral Development Bank System.” The Center for Global Development, The Brookings Institution.

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Lagarde, Christine. 2019. “How to Ensure the Effective and Sustainable Financing of International Development.” Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 7 May. Lieberman, Amy. 2018. “A Vision of UN Development Reform Takes Form, amid Funding Concerns.” Devex, 12 July. Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https:// www.devex.com/news/a-vision-of-un-development-reform-takes-form-amidfunding-concerns-93073. ———. 2020. “Is the UN Ready to Face the Future?” Devex, 7 January 2020. Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https://www.devex.com/news/is-the-un-readyto-face-the-future-96254. Lindborg, Nancy. 2018. “Fragility 2.0: Ideas to Action.” In Brookings Blum Roundtable on Global Poverty, 31 July 2018. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Liu, Jianguo, Vanessa Hull, H. Charles J. Godfray et al. 2018. “Nexus Approaches to Global Sustainable Development.” Nature Sustainability 1: 466–76. Mahn, Timo. 2012. “The Politics of Financing Development Cooperation at the UN: Why More Means Less.” German Development Institute (DIE), Briefing Paper 2012 (8). Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https://www.die-gdi.de/up loads/media/BP_8.2012.pdf. McArthur, John W. 2019. “Bye-bye Billions to Trillions.” In Financing the UN Development System: Time for Hard Choices, edited by the Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation and UN MPTF Office, 90–92. Uppsala: The Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation. Mendez, Ruben P. 1997. “Financing the United Nations and the International Public Sector: Problems and Reform.” Global Governance 3(3): 283–310. Michel, James. 2016. Beyond Aid: The Integration of SD in a Coherent Development Agenda: A Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Project on Prosperity and Development. Washington, DC/Lanham, MD: Center for Strategic & International Studies/Rowman & Littlefield. ———. 2018. Managing Fragility and Promoting Resilience to Advance Peace, Security and Sustainable Development: A Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Project on Prosperity and Development. Washington, DC/Lanham, MD: Center for Strategic & International Studies/Rowman & Littlefield. OECD. 2018a. Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2019: Time to Face the Challenge. Paris: OECD Publishing. ———. 2018b. States of Fragility 2018. Paris: OECD Publishing. ———. 2020. DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development Peace Nexus. OECD/LEGAL/5019. Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https://legalinstru ments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf. Ötker-Robe, İnci. 2013. “Seizing Opportunities under Extreme Risks: Fragile and Conflict Affected States.” Let’s Talk Development (blog). World Bank, 17 May. Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https://blogs.worldbank.org/development

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talk/seizing-opportunities-under-extreme-risks-fragile-and-conflict-affectedstates. ———. 2014. “Global Risks and Collective Action Failures: What Can the International Community Do?” Working paper, WP/14/195, October. Washington, DC: IMF. Poole, Lydia, and Vance Culbert. 2019. Financing the Nexus: Gaps and Opportunities from a Field Perspective. Prepared for the UNDP, FAO, and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 3 June. Geneva: FAO, NRC, and UNDP. Sagasti, Francisco, Keith Bezanson, and Fernando Prada. 2005. The Future of Development Financing: Challenges and Strategic Choices. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Samman, Emma, Paula Lucci, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Tanvi Bhatkal, Amanda Telias Simunovic, Susan Nicolai, Elizabeth Stuart, and Charlotte Caron. 2018. SDG Progress: Fragility, Crisis and Leaving No One Behind. ODI and ICRC, September 2018. London: ODI, Retrieved on 23 May 2020 from odi.org/sites/ odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12427.pdf. Signe, Landry. 2020 “Chapter Eleven: Leave No One Behind: Time for Specifics on the Sustainable Development Goals.” In Leave No One Behind, edited by Homi Kharas, John W. McArthur, and Izumi Ohno, 239–80. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. United Nations (UN). n.d. “United to Reform.” Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https://reform.un.org/. ———. 2019. “2019: Integrated National Financing Frameworks for Sustainable Development.” UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development. Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https://developmentfinance.un.org/2019-inte grated-national-financing-frameworks-sustainable-development. ———. 2020. Shared Responsibility, Global Solidarity: Responding to the SocioEconomic Impacts of Covid-19. March. Retrieved 22 May 2020 from https:// unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/SG-Report-Socio-Economic-Im pact-of-Covid19.pdf. United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (UN MPTF), and Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation. 2016. Financing the United Nations Development System: Current Trends and New Directions. Uppsala: Dag Hammersköld Foundation. US Congress. 2020. “H.R.2116—Global Fragility Act.” Retrieved 29 May 2020 from https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2116. US National Intelligence Council. 2017. Global Trends: Paradox of Progress. Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council. Weinlich, Silke, and Bruce Jenks. 2019. “Current and Future Pathways for UN System–wide Finance” In Financing the UN Development System: Time for Hard Choices, edited by the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF) and Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation, 119–23. Uppsala: Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation. Weisser, Eva-Maria. 2009. “Fact Sheet: Financing the United Nations.” Dialogue on Globalization. New York: Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

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World Bank. 2020. “Poverty.” Retrieved 14 June 2020 from https://www.world bank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview. World Economic Forum (WEF). 2020. “Humanitarian Investing Initiative.” Retrieved 29 May 2020 from https://www.weforum.org/projects/humanitarianinvesting-initiative.

= c ha p te r 3

Norm Setting at the United Nations The Politics of Sustainable Human Development Jacques Fomerand

Introduction International organizations (IOs) have become “ubiquitous” components of the international relations landscape. This is underlined by the growing number of global and regional, technical and political, regulatory, consultative, and operational institutions dealing with an ever-expanding range of issues (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 1). In turn, this development has, over time, triggered a proliferation of academic studies making competing claims in their quest to describe and explain the role of states and international organizations (Rosamond 2000: 198–205). A central concern in this scholarly work has been to map out the autonomous capacity of international organizations to influence the statist environment they emerged from. By conceptualizing the interests and identities of international state and nonstate agents as socially constructed, constructivist scholars have shown how these mental structures acquire sufficient gravitas to shape the behavior of international agents. They argue that IOs are indeed an integral part of international political processes involving a multiplicity of interacting actors (Ruggie 1998; Kratochwil 1989; Willetts 2011; Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Scholte 2000; Hertel 2006; Haas 1992) and that they do enjoy a variable but not insignificant scope of autonomy, which enables them to influence their principals: the states. In that context, IOs are “producers” of regulatory, distributive, and redistributive policies (Fomerand 2017). One of their most significant functions is to create norms, a term that may be defined as prescriptive

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statements of action in support of desirable goals and aspirational ways of doing things, what Inis Claude long ago labeled a function of “collective legitimization” (Claude 1968: 88). Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to the role of the United Nations in the development of key political, economic, human rights, and social ideas and their impact on policy thinking and practice (Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss 2001), with particular attention to human security (MacFarlane and Khong 2006), prevention (Ramcharan 2008), development approaches (Berthelot 2004; Jolly et al. 2004), finance and trade for development (Toye and Toye 2004), transnational corporations (Sagafi-Nejad and Dunning 2008), the “global commons” (Schrijver 2010), statistics (Ward 2004), the status of women (Jain 2005), and human rights (Normand and Zaidi 2007). In the same vein, the ILO and UNESCO have undoubtedly contributed to the globalization of social and cultural rights (Kott and Droux 2013; Singh 2010). But first and foremost, the extraordinary political journey of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) must be emphasized here. In spite of their backwater origins, the MDGs eventually turned into benchmarks for measuring progress in development as well as a frame of reference for the formulation of national and international policies (Fukuda Parr 2010). In turn, the MDGs generated a dense and broad debate about a desirable post-2015 development agenda (Weiss and Browne 2014), which resulted in the adoption in 2015 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, a “plan of action for people, planet and prosperity … to be implemented by all countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnerships” (United Nations 2015a). As shall be seen later, the so-called sustainable development goals (SDGs) are underpinned by normative assumptions, the novelty of which cannot be underestimated (Shawki 2016), or for that matter overestimated. Indeed, IOs and the United Nations in particular neither “rule the world” (Colemer 2014) nor exert “sovereign powers” (Sarooshi, 2007) but, as “global players,” “enforcers,” “managers” or “authorities” (Jutta, Reinalda, and Verbeek 2007), “self-directed actors” (Oestreich 2012), “global conflict managers” (Whitman and Wolff 2012), or agents of “distinct political cultures” (Zervak 2014), they have come to exert increasingly broad authoritative influence derived not only from their state stakeholders but also from the “constitutive” nature of their culture (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Against this background and focusing on the genesis and evolution of the notion of sustainable human development (SHD), a development paradigm with different interpretations along North-South lines, this chapter seeks to elucidate the role that the United Nations has played, and continues to play, in defining and reshaping its policy contours, contents, and implications. SHD has brought about—or more accurately

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deepened—political discord and cleavages, but these have not necessarily led to disarray, drift, or paralysis for the organization. Far from being a powerless mirror of the world’s divisions or a forum for ritualized exercises in oratory, the United Nations has, in fact, if not restructured, at least contributed to reshape the SHD discourse and, by the same token, development policies. The purpose of this chapter is to explore how this course of events unfolded. In brief, the United Nations was able to effect changes in development thinking by relying on a variety of legitimizing tools deriving from its universality and convening power. First and foremost among them was its advocacy of a “Fabian” interpretation of the meaning and directions of development policy. But at the same time, this process of legitimization has significant drawbacks, which the editors of this volume would label “pathologies” generated by the ambiguous political consensus between “North” and “South” upon which SHD rests. The implementation of this normative concept also raises troubling issues of organizational implementation and financial costs.

The Weight of the Past: Aligning Conflicting North-South Views of Development Sustainable human development is a broad concept, standing at the intersection of the evolving development and sustainability discourses. In 1990, the first issue of the Human Development Report (HDR) published by the UN Development Program (UNDP) put the (then) novel understanding of the process of development onto the international agenda. The core idea of the HDR was to “place people at the center of development.” It originated essentially from the work of development economist Amartya Sen, who argued that poverty could not simply be described as income deprivation but rather as a deprivation of capabilities. For Sen, the prime business of government was to remove all obstacles that hinder or thwart an individual’s “positive freedoms,” i.e., the ability to do something. Amplifying on Sen’s seminal ideas, the 2016 Human Development Report stipulated that “human development is all about human freedoms: freedom to realize the full potential of every human life, not just of a few, nor of most, but of all lives in every corner of the world—now and in the future” (UNDP 2016: iii). Overcoming the obstacles to human development for all, including “deprivations and inequalities, discrimination and exclusion, social norms and values, and prejudice and intolerance,” thus becomes the focus of development policies (UNDP 2016: iii). At least in theory, SHD pays equal attention to the internal as well as the external parameters of development. In the vernacular of the 1993

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HDR, “Human development is development of the people for the people by the people. Development of the people means investing in human capabilities, whether in education or health or skills, so that they can work productively and creatively. Development for the people means empowering individuals to become productive, ‘enlarging people’s choices’ but also ensuring that the economic growth they generate is distributed widely and fairly. [Development by the people means] … giving everyone a chance to participate” (UNDP 1993: 3). The idea resurfaces in the 2016 HDR, which “forcefully argues that caring for those left out requires a four-pronged policy strategy at the national level: reaching those left out using universal policies (for example, inclusive growth, not mere growth), pursuing measures for groups with special needs (for example, persons with disabilities), making human development resilient, and empowering those left out” (UNDP 2016: iii). But the authors of the UNDP flagship report were also mindful of the international determinants of the development process. Thus, the UNDP administrator prefaced the 1996 HDR by pointing out that “all countries must strive to improve the nature and quality of their economic growth. … Of course, policies must be tailored to national circumstances. The global community can, and must, also help countries effect their own strategies of sustainable human development” (UNDP 1996: iii–iv). The 2005 Human Development Report reiterated its call upon rich countries to improve the quality of their aid and trade policies to achieve the MDGs. In the same vein, the 2016 HDR reiterated the idea that “national policies need to be complemented by actions at the global level … [and accordingly] address issues related to the mandate, governance structures and work of global institutions” (UNDP 2016: iii). “National ownership” thus also had to be supported by “partnerships” between North and South based on “a shared vision … an acceptable sharing of obligations and responsibilities and … a package of commitments attractive enough for partners to join” (MDG Gap Task Force 2013: 13). As the 2010 HDR put it, this requires “a global governance system that promotes democratic accountability; transparency and inclusion of the least developed countries; a stable and sustainable global economic climate; and financial stability” (UNDP 2010:110). In sum, the goals and targets of the 2000 Millennium Declaration were to be viewed as a whole and were deemed to embody a partnership between the developed and developing countries engaged in a process conducive to the creation of “an environment—at the national and global levels alike, which is conducive to development and the elimination of poverty.” The idea stands out in regard to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As one UN document puts it, “Turning this vision into reality is primarily the respon-

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sibility of countries, but it will also require new partnerships and international solidarity. Everyone has a stake and everyone has a contribution to make. Reviews of progress will need to be undertaken regularly in each country, involving civil society, business and representatives of various interest groups” (United Nations 2015b). The idea of sustainability itself sprang from a growing concern in the 1970s of the interaction between exponential growth and finite resources and the persistence of poverty in the Southern Hemisphere. How to meet the essential needs of the poor without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs? These two streams were brought together in the 1987 report of the Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future, under the broad concept of sustainable development. The report placed particular emphasis on the strong links between poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation and warned that growth would impair the environment if it were not “socially and environmentally sustainable.” Accepting this premise would entail a “greater need than ever for coordinated political action and responsibility,” an assumption that eventually led to the convening of the Earth Summit of Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and what we refer to below as the Rio process. As a compound concept, SHD clearly brings under the same roof a large array of complex ideas. In this respect, the HDR paradigm itself carries with it a considerable degree of abstractness and ideological tensions (Nicholls 1999: 397–98). One of the HDR’s key policy prescriptions is the requirement to treat all of its dimensions—internal as well as external— in a “holistic” and “integrated” manner. But the paradigm establishes no a priori directive as to what the most suitable mix and hierarchy of national and international policies should be to achieve these objectives. At the same time, the sustainable development concept is singular for its ambiguity and openness to interpretation and may mean very different things to different publics. SHD has thus lent itself to conflicting if not diametrically opposed interpretations, some leaning toward free market prescriptions, others toward Keynesian policies. Ample ammunition has thus been provided for politically polarized debates between North and South. Such debates started way back in the 1980s; they still continue and are reflective of the latent but enduring polarization of UN discussions over the nature of the development process and policies and the role of the organization therein. The concept of SHD—or at least one interpretation of it—has been embraced as the beacon guiding the development discourse of Northern countries, most especially the United States, which sees in it a natural complement to the (current) conventional wisdom of market-directed capitalist development. This embrace is hardly surprising, for SHD has

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much in common with the long-standing US view that development is a process entailing primarily “a fuller utilization” of national resources. From this standpoint, which can be traced back to the immediate postwar years, development hinges primarily on the efforts of individual countries themselves and the mobilization of indigenous, local resources. The purpose of international cooperation is to augment and complement these efforts by advancing “the technical bases of economic development of underdeveloped countries” through studies, surveys, conferences, functional meetings, and technical cooperation measures aimed at increasing productivity and fostering human capital formation, and a wide array of social and labor measures.1 National governments need an international economic environment supportive of their efforts. This means the creation of conditions favorable to capital movements and investment, and of an open and free trading system. The conventional wisdom about development grounded in the so-called “Washington Consensus” is an extension of these earlier prescriptions.2 Hotly contested for some of its prescriptions, the Washington Consensus holds that the market rather than the state is the best guarantor of efficient resource generation and allocation for development purposes. Rapid trade and capital account liberalization and the privatization of state-owned enterprises are therefore deemed to be the ultimate engines of growth. Public international assistance as well as national government policies should accordingly be designed to create conditions allowing private markets to flourish. Concern for international structural change, which overshadowed development thinking until the late 1970s, has given way to a greater focus on the internal parameters and conditions of development, especially “good governance,” a loose term that encompasses a broad range of policy prescriptions from respect for human rights to political pluralism, participation in decision-making, and democracy, and from transparent and accountable processes and institutions to effective government. The 2008 financial crisis does not seem to have led to a commonly accepted Northern alternative to the Washington Consensus, at least in regard to its normative underpinnings and prescriptions on macroeconomic stabilization, the economic opening of national economies in regard to trade and investment, and the expansion of market forces within national economies. While the 2010 US Strategy for meeting the MDGs emphasized that the MDGs were “a declaration of the world’s commitment to eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving gender equality and extending hope and opportunity to millions across the developing world,” it remained silent on concrete policies to achieve these goals and, instead, focused and commented at length on broad and abstract

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“imperatives” dealing with “leverage innovation,” “investing in sustainability,” “tracking development outcomes,” and “enhancing the principle of mutual accountability” (USAID 2010: 2–3). In comments on the strategy addressed to the 2010 Millennium Summit of the General Assembly, President Obama emphasized the importance of “creating the conditions where assistance is no longer needed.” This entailed promoting entrepreneurship, encouraging broad-based economic growth and good governance and democracy, and investing in the health, education, and rights of women as the foundations of poverty reduction (Obama 2010). In the course of the formulation of the 2030 Development Agenda, the United States delegation stressed that notwithstanding their universality, the SDGs “need[ed] to be articulated in a way that can be made relevant to and responsive to different national circumstances, national priorities, and so on …” (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018: 111). Since then, much water seems to have flowed under that bridge. Not surprisingly, the 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States reflects President Trump’s stated suspicion of multilateral trade agreements, US alliance relationships, and the United Nations; it is peppered with references to “America first,” “protect the American people,” “promote American prosperity,” and “advance American influence.” Yet, the document does not put into question the long-standing assumptions of US policy in regard to the development of Southern countries. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed that UN organizations were more a convenient scapegoat for the Trump administration than a venue for international cooperation to beat the virus.

The Perspective from the Global South The developing countries’ position can be traced back to the “structural” studies that emerged from the United Nations and in particular from its Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in the early 1950s. The underlying premise was that developing countries would never overcome their “backwardness” as long as the structural problems facing them at the international level were not dealt with. A sine qua non condition of economic development was accordingly the establishment of regulatory regimes in international trade and financial markets that would shelter national economies and their infant industries from the vicissitudes of global markets while at the same time providing them with “fairer” playing field opportunities (Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss 2001; Stokke 2009). By and large, developing countries continue to adhere to this paradigm as studies emanating from the South Centre—essentially a think tank for the Group of 77 (G77)—show. For the South Centre, the current interna-

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tional development agenda has been radically “pruned” and become “unbalanced” by a liberalizing world order that is unleashing “new forms of colonization” (Obasanjo 2000). International issues of ongoing concern to developing countries—commodities, development finance, transfer of technology, market access, external debt, intellectual property rights— have been taken off the multilateral agenda and superseded by Northern concerns regarding matters such as civil and political human rights,3 the environment, poverty alleviation, governance, and corruption. To achieve this objective, the North has relied on the Bretton Woods institutions and their capacity to impose policy prescriptions for structural adjustment and setting external debt relief conditionalities. The end result of the process has been a net loss of sovereignty by developing countries. Indeed, the argument goes, the challenges facing developing countries remain the same. Primary commodities-related issues—price volatility and market concentration in particular—continue to play a significant economic role for numerous developing countries, and questions of terms of trade and programs enabling them to secure adequate benefits from the production and export of commodities should be reintroduced in the agenda of international organizations (Asfaha 2008). The WTO trade regime does not acknowledge that developing countries are still unequal trade partners, which can prevent their growth and development (Khor 2010a). Special support and exemptions thus remain necessary, and new forms of protectionism emerging in the North that are related to environmental and social considerations should be rolled back (Khor 2010b).4 Notwithstanding the prevailing mood of “aid fatigue,” which has intensified since the 2008 financial crisis and will in all likelihood intensify again in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the South still needs external capital and official development assistance (ODA). New sources of concessional flows (e.g., a tax on speculative global financial transactions) are essential, especially for those developing countries bypassed by commercial capital flows. UN studies should be undertaken to facilitate a “sustained and serious process of negotiations” about the debt question in an “integrated approach that links trade, debt and finance policy, [which is] essential for domestic and international economic policies to adequately support national development strategies” (South Centre 2006; Caliari 2009). New arrangements to govern international capital flows as well as a review of the functions and governance of the Bretton Woods institutions should be considered in the wake of the financial crises that rocked the world economy throughout the 1990s and in particular since the 2008 meltdown (Akyüz 2010, 2012; Khor 2013; South Centre 2006). The emergence of new forms of technological protection (the so-called TRIPS, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which are

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also objectionable for restricting developing countries’ access to knowledge and patented medicines) would amply justify the resumption of a North-South dialogue on science and technology questions (South Centre 2011; Correa and Li 2009, Shabalala 2007; Correa 2016; Velásquez 2014; Velásquez and Boulet 2015). The characteristics and behavior of TNCs (transnational corporations) should be brought back onto the international agenda, as “it is hardly prudent to allow monopoly control of vital areas of human activity by a handful of private actors from a few countries in the North, and to refrain from introducing some sort of oversight by the international community in the public interest.”5 Finally, in regard to environmental questions, developing countries should come to an understanding with the North on the underlying tradeoffs between environmental protection and development: “Policies to effect changes in patterns of development and lifestyles, the development and transfer of environmentally sound technologies, and automatic means of financing global environmental actions still hold the key to a sustainable future” (South Centre 1998: 3–21). From this perspective, the prime objective of the South should be to “work towards universal recognition of the pivotal role of the UN” and of its charter-mandated functions in “global macro-economic management and strategy formulation and guidance.” The organization should be “fully democratic and pluralist.” Its overarching goal should be to “seek improvements in international economic and political relations and to create an external environment that is conducive to the development of the countries of the South.” This would involve significant changes in the relationship between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. The IMF should be “subjected to full multilateral control and revamped in ways to ensure that it focuses on providing a proper framework for international monetary policy which ensures that the burden of adjustment is shared between deficit and surplus countries and that surveillance and discipline apply to all countries.” The World Bank should reduce “substantially” its development policy role, which “properly belongs to the UN,” and focus on the provision of concessional flows of resources “in adequate volumes and on manageable terms to developing countries” (South Centre 1996; Akyüz 2002, 2009). The 2008 financial crisis has further underlined the “dysfunctional” character of the current international financial architecture in the management of the global economy and the need for a more “inclusive” architecture (e.g., Akyüz 2012, 2014). From the South standpoint, the world economy has still not recovered from the adverse impact of the financial crisis. The North’s response to the crisis, essentially based on fiscal restraint and generous monetary policies, has failed to bring a robust recovery and

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has aggravated the systemic problems of the world economy, particularly its financial fragility and growing inequalities; in fact, this response particularly enhanced the vulnerability of Southern economies (Asfaha 2008). Under these conditions, it is not surprising that Southern countries have at times endeavored to frame their development demands in the language of social and economic human rights. Such efforts can be traced back to international debates that took place in the 1950s and 1960s and culminated in the adoption in 1986 of the Declaration on the Right to Development by the General Assembly, which proclaimed in an opening article that development was an inalienable right “by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” Such a broad definition identifying individual states as well as the international community as duty bearers has, of course, triggered anxious reactions among Northern countries, who feared the legitimization of a “right to everything” (Kirchmeier 2006). They voted against the declaration and, since then, have resisted efforts to bring to the mainstream such broad human rights concerns in the formulation of both the MDGs and the SDGs.

Discord at the United Nations: The Rocky Process of the Global Summits Northern and Southern countries have pursued by and large diametrically opposed strategies in UN forums. In brief, the North has primarily sought to focus political action on the internal parameters of SHD that it views as conducive to development, such as good governance, democracy, social progress, and political human rights, while simultaneously pressing for market-based policy prescriptions. In contrast, developing countries have used UN forums, especially the “plus five” events in follow-up to the global conferences of the 1990s, to cast doubt on the market development paradigm, and to refocus policy debates on international governance issues and the design of international regulatory and redistributive regimes in finance, trade, science, and technology. The slow grinding of the “UNCED process,” that is, the regular followup to the UN Conference on Environment and Development, which was originally set in motion by the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, illustrates the contrasting démarches of Northern and Southern countries. One of the central ideas laboriously crafted in Rio was that both rich and poor na-

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tions could contribute to the preservation of the global environment, albeit in different ways. This meant that developing countries would have to factor environmental issues into their national development policies. Concurrently, Northern countries would help them to defray the higher costs of sustainable development by increasing their ODA. This was the meaning of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” For Northern countries, especially the United States, these core ideas were to be understood in the context of national development policies that developing countries should be adopting in order to share in the global responsibilities for the protection of the environment. In contrast, developing countries repeatedly and without success sought to make the principle part of bilateral and multilateral efforts to foster what they called “an enabling environment,” a code word for the creation of international structures and policies supportive of their development efforts. The Rio summit did succeed in avoiding a showdown over development finance by eschewing the question of whether or not genuine commitments had been entered into. But subsequent multilateral action, including the “Rio process,” has had to navigate the reluctance of developing countries to proceed with serious discussions of cross-sectoral issues due to what they perceive as the failure of developed countries to fulfill their Rio “commitments” in regard to poverty eradication, the provision of new and additional financial resources, the transfer of technology, and the initiation of bold steps to alleviate unsustainable levels of debt servicing. Distrust between Northern and Southern countries compounded policy differences over targets and quantified goals and timetables, increases in alternative energy investments, changes in consumption patterns in developed countries, reductions in fishing subsidies, and the phasing out of lead gasoline have also plagued the UNCED process (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018: 45). The 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development may have served as a mirror and catalyst of the diversity, dynamism, and creativity of global civil society but failed in its stated purpose to mobilize the will of world leaders to address the structural political and economic problems hampering the implementation of Agenda 21, which was the aspirational outcome of UNCED. The polarizing issues of access to markets, finance (including foreign investment), and technology transfer furiously resurfaced and were compounded by further divisions over corporate accountability, sustainable development governance, and human rights. Instead of reinvigorating a global commitment to sustainable development, the conference simply identified “deficiencies”: lack of progress and coherence in addressing core issues, including insufficient financial

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resources and the absence of robust mechanisms for technology transfer. A similar scenario unfolded ten years later at the Rio United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. To be sure, Rio+20 launched an intergovernmental process to develop a set of SDGs that built on the MDGs and eventually lead to the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015. The conference also endorsed groundbreaking guidelines on green economy policies, strengthened the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and endorsed the establishment of a high-level political forum superseding the Commission on Sustainable Development. But “burdened by low expectations,” the outcome document essentially recapitulated earlier agreements and lacked specific goals as well as enforceable commitments, as negotiations could not satisfactorily resolve conflicting views about the role of the green economy in achieving sustainable development, the issue of sustainable development governance, and the intractable question of finance. Similar nagging issues and, in particular, the same trust deficit between North and South (Thorvaldsdottir and Valdre 2009) accompanied by “acrimonious debates” (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018: 33) have plagued the “assessments” carried out by the state parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Disputes centering essentially on the distribution of the benefits and burdens of curbing climate change among rich and poor countries explain the disappointing outcomes of these meetings. At the same time, however, they may have served as incubators to the landmark agreement reached in Paris in 2015. The 195 countries that were present agreed to the goal of keeping the increase in the global average temperature increase to “well below 2° C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5° C above pre-industrial levels.” Most of them also pledged to make “intended nationally determined contributions,” which would be reported to the secretariat of the UNFCCC. In addition, the agreement includes a required flow of $100 billion a year, most of it coming from developed countries. As shall be discussed below, the Paris Agreement is an important step in the evolution of the UN climate change regime. It is a treaty under international law, but only certain provisions are legally binding, and many of its operational details were left to be decided by future Conferences of the Parties (COPs).6 In addition, the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the agreement combined with its rolling back of domestic environmental protection measures and commitments to fight climate change made under previous US administrations have cast a long shadow over the achievability of the relatively modest objectives of the Paris accord.

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A New United Nations? In sum, decades-old lines of cleavage between developed and developing countries persist over the definition of the development process, the prioritization of international or internal considerations in the promotion of development, and the role of the United Nations therein. The intensity of these differences belies the notion that the SHD concept encapsulates a commonality of political views. What does this mean for the United Nations? One school of thought takes the view that with the ascendance of neoliberalism, the entire UN multilateral machinery has shifted gears and is now being guided by a liberal, market-oriented conception of SHD. Striking changes have indeed taken place in the activities of the organization. The Bretton Woods institutions, of course, lead the pack as their stated language is now cast in the vernacular of SHD. Thus, according to its annual reports, the World Bank spends close to one-fourth of its total lending on “human development” (i.e., anti-HIV/AIDS and malaria strategies, basic health services, nontraditional approaches to delivering education services to poor people, and social protection). In line with the SDGs, the latest mission statement of the Bank assigns to the institution the objective “to galvanize international and national efforts to end extreme poverty globally within a generation and to promote ‘shared prosperity,’ a sustainable increase in the well-being of the poorer segments of society. … To end extreme poverty, the Bank’s goal is to decrease the percentage of people living with less than 1.90 USD a day to no more than 3 percent by 2030. To promote shared prosperity, the goal is to promote income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population in each country. But the UN General Assembly also now gives its imprimatur to “sound” national macroeconomic policies with their cohort of old developmental prescriptions, ranging from entrepreneurship promotion, to access to land, to education and general health conditions as investments in human productivity and well-being. Organizational mandates have been reformulated: entities created to effect international regime and structural change like the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which were closely associated with the “New International Economic Order” of the developing countries, have jettisoned their original charters and now concentrate on achieving “global partnerships” with governments, civil society, and the private sector (Weiss et al. 2014; Finger and Magarinos-Ruchat 2003).7 Poverty eradication through sustainable human development has become the UNDP’s overriding programmatic objective. The main tool to

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achieve this objective is “good governance,” and now the SDGs. The agency’s country programs are currently designed to strengthen institutional transformations for “democratic governance” and “decentralized development” and to increase “equity of opportunities through access to productive assets” (e.g., housing, safe water and sanitation, health, education, sustainable energy, and social services). Such programs, especially in “transition countries,” also seek to contribute to the “development of the market economy.” In the language of the UNDP 2014–17 Strategic Plan, clearly guided by the injunctions of the SDGs, the agency aspires to help countries “achieve the eradication of poverty, and the reduction of inequalities and exclusion … [and] develop policies, leadership skills, partnering abilities, institutional capabilities and build resilience in order to sustain development results.”8 Its successor plan for the years 2018–21 hammers the same idea: “Anchored in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and committed to the principles of universality, equality and leaving no one behind, the UNDP vision for the Strategic Plan, 2018–2021 is to help countries achieve sustainable development by eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, accelerating structural transformations for sustainable development and building resilience to crises and shocks.”9 Critics also draw attention to the entanglement of the United Nations with the corporate world after decades of antagonistic relations. They point to the jargon of business organizations that has crept into the culture of the organization. The venerable Administrative Committee on Coordination has morphed into the Chief Executives Board (CEB). UN officials now feverishly craft “business plans” and “mission statements” and build “synergies” and “new structures of cooperation,” including “public/private partnerships,” in support of a development process that ascribes to the United Nations the modest role of “facilitator, catalyst, adviser and partner.”10 More disquieting, at least to some observers, was the joint initiative of the secretary-general with leaders from the business community, labor, and civil society to enter into a “global compact” in support of “universal values.”11 This Faustian embrace of the private sector, the argument goes, simply underlines the continuation of a process set in motion in 1992, with the abolition of the Commission on Transnational Corporations and the quiet dismantling of its Secretariat-servicing structures. Both moves effectively put an end to international efforts to make transnational corporations accountable through binding “codes of conduct” as reflected in the voluntary “United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council on 16 June 2011.

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Internationally Managed Capitalism Does this mean that the United Nations has turned into an unconditional advocate of the free market version of the SHD model of development? Appearances notwithstanding, there is no evidence that the organization has cast away the norms of universality, justice, equity, and equality that provided the foundations of its earliest developmental concerns (Thérien 1999). These values derive from the broad injunctions of Article 55 of the charter and have been reaffirmed by the global conferences of the 1990s. To these, the 2000 Millennium Summit and its 2005 follow-up have added another layer of “fundamental values”—freedom and equality, tolerance, solidarity, respect for nature, respect for all human rights, and shared responsibility—all now deemed “essential to international relations in the twenty-first century.” The High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda emphasized that the next UN development agenda should be designed in such a way as to “leave no one behind” (United Nations 2013: 7). A similar idea stands out in the “Synthesis Report” produced by the secretary-general a year before the adoption of the SDGs by the assembly: “We must invest in the unfinished work of the MDGs,” stated Ban Ki-moon, “and use them as a springboard into the future we want—a future free from poverty and built on human rights, equality and sustainability.” Highlighting the central role of the United Nations in overcoming global challenges and achieving the SDGs, his successor António Guterres emphasized that human dignity would be the core of his work as soon as he took office on 1 January 2017. It is not surprising that the first six SDGs on poverty, hunger, health, education, gender equality, clean water, and sanitation address the MDGs’ unfinished overriding objective to ensure people’s access to the means of a decent life, and, in that context, the notions of “left” and “right” still carry considerable weight in global politics and UN proceedings (Noel and Thérien 2008). With these norms as policy guideposts, the United Nations takes it as axiomatic that social systems should be inclusive and that all groups in society should enjoy the fruits of development. As expressed in a 2016 joint interagency statement, the CEB stressed that it shares and strongly supports member states’ ambitions for “a more equal world, that is respectful of human rights and dignity and affirms the UN system’s commitment at the highest level to pursue this vision, putting the imperative to eliminate discrimination and reduce inequalities—within and among countries—at the forefront of UN efforts to support member states in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.” At the same time, the CEB called

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upon all its member organizations “to put this imperative to combat inequalities and discrimination at the centre of their strategic frameworks, policy guidance and global plans of action, as relevant, in support of implementation of the 2030 Agenda over the next 15 years, including to ensure that UN efforts prioritize the needs of those furthest behind first and ensure that no one is left behind” (United Nations 2016). The notion that greater income inequality could be a necessary condition for faster growth and therefore temporarily tolerated while the country establishes itself on a self-sustained high-growth path is clearly more at home in Bretton Woods than at Turtle Bay. As the 1996 HDR tersely noted, “We now know … the limits of trickle-down economics” (UNDP 1996: iii). The underlying reasoning is that by eliminating deprivation and strengthening democratic institutions and processes, social and economic relations will be more harmonious and provide firm foundations for long-term development as well as for civil peace. The same logic applies to the international society in which the moral imperative of “inclusiveness” makes inequalities among nations no less acceptable than inequalities within them. Hence the insistence of UN discourse on the need for policies designed to reduce disparities between have and have-not nations, to promote “equality of opportunity,” to remove factors conducive to “dependency,” and, more generally, to protect the global commons for the “benefit of mankind.” The “development decades” launched by the United Nations since 1961 have all been grounded on these assumptions.12 The same value system pervades the “declarations” and “programs of action” produced by UN global conferences. Against this background, a typical UN report frames a particular development issue or group of issues into a virtually identical pattern of dialectical reasoning: “yes,” “but,” and “thou shalt.” Such reports recognize the immense developmental progress of the South, stress the continuing prevalence of deprivation in terms of empirical indicators, and conclude with a set of remedial policy recommendations addressed to individual member states and the “international community.” Twenty-five years or so ago, the remedial policy measures proposed in the name of the secretary-general would have focused on the central role of the state in the macroeconomic management of national economies to achieve employment growth, poverty alleviation, and overall development. At the international level, such reports would have proposed structural changes, such as the establishment of an integrated commodity program, a common fund, and the development of codes of conduct for multinational corporations. Nowadays, the normative work of the United Nations has shifted to winning acknowledgment that if development is to be both sustainable and human, what must be done encompasses more

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than merely achieving macroeconomic stability, deregulating and privatizing large chunks of national economies, and liberalizing international trade. It also entails public corrective interventions in the operation of national and international markets. For the United Nations, capitalism is a necessary safeguard to personal liberty as well as an essential condition of economic efficiency. But laissez-faire policies alone will not suffice to achieve social justice, stability, and inclusion, or to promote rapid and large-scale improvements in living conditions in developing countries. Markets cannot by themselves reduce inequalities, correct their own imperfections, and promote social convergence and integration. The very first HDR had already stressed that “peoples must be free to exercise their choices in properly functioning markets” (UNDP 1990: 1, author’s emphasis). The efforts of the United Nations to giving a “human face” to globalization stem from the same concerns: “If globalization is properly managed it can produce beneficial effects for the eradication of poverty; but for this to happen, certain measures both at the national and at the international levels must be in place.”13 In the same vein, and at least for its progenitors, the Global Compact initiated by Secretary-General Annan is firmly grounded in the philosophy of corporate social responsibility. In his own words, “Regarding the GC, the business community increasingly sees the UN as a way to ensure the benefits of globalization are spread more widely. … Business is calling for a stronger UN … because this is seen as the most sensible way forward to safeguard open markets while at the same time creating a human face for the global economy” (Krasno and Annan 2012: 752, 882, 1163). These observations foreshadowed those of the final report of the ILO’s World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, which concluded that globalization required new forms of regulation with regard to human rights and the participation of concerned groups. Further reforms of the multilateral system were required in order to make international (economic) relations more democratic, participatory, transparent and accountable (World Commission 2004). The 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic triggered dire warnings within the United Nations that it was threatening past development advances, increasing the incidence of poverty, unemployment, and hunger, and thus called for “deep and lasting … reforms.”14 Virtually all recurring reports of the secretary-general to the General Assembly on finance and trade issues stress the lingering adverse consequences of financial crises on the developing countries’ economies and societies. What is the ultimate objective of these “measures”? In a nutshell, to pave the way toward an internal and external “enabling environment,” that is to say, at the national level, strengthening macroeconomic in-

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stitutions, reforming the financial and banking sectors, developing progressive and effective taxation systems, formulating pro-poor and employment-creation public policies, promoting civil society and the private sector, strengthening government capacities for economic management, delivering of antipoverty strategies, and coping with the risks and opportunities of globalization. At the international level, the term “enabling environment” carries with it injunctions aimed at allowing access to globalization opportunities in foreign investment, trade, and technology transfers; a level playing field in international economic relations (especially for the poorest among developing countries); coordinated and intensified development assistance and support for the development of healthy commodity sectors to reduce commodity dependence; technology adaptation; debt management, relief, and reduction; improved terms of trade and market access; and improved access to development finance. To achieve these objectives, international cooperation—or “partnerships” in the vernacular of the MDGs and the SDGs—are of the essence.

A Human Face for SHD To what extent have the UN’s advocacy of “managed capitalism,” a “fair globalization for all,”15 and insistent demands “that the affluent do not leave the less fortunate behind” steered the concept of sustainable human development away from the market-dominant development wisdom?16 The record is mixed, but a number of changes are unmistakably pointing to greater political sensitivity to the “human” dimension of SHD. To begin with, poverty eradication, an essential condition for the achievement of SHD, has become the overriding programmatic development objective of the United Nations. In the wake of the 1995 Copenhagen Summit for Social Development, the General Assembly launched a Decade for the Eradication of Poverty and requested the secretarygeneral to mobilize the whole UN system to take action to eradicate poverty worldwide.17 The Millennium Development Goals have in effect provided the broad normative parameters that have mobilized, individually and collectively, the organizations of the UN system in the formulation of mutually supportive strategies to help advance the implementation of the Millennium Declaration. The UN system initially developed through the CEB an Action Strategy for Halving Extreme Poverty involving normative work, policy guidance, program development, and monitoring at the global level, as well as advocacy, policy dialogue, and direct support for national poverty eradication initiatives.18 Subsequent steps have involved in particular the drawing up of a “Road Map” by the secretary-general

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and coordinated preparations for the periodic assessments carried out by the General Assembly.19 This was followed by the implementation of a blueprint of recommendations emanating from an independent advisory body headed by Professor Jeffrey Sachs on ways and means to achieve the MDGs (UNDP 2005). The total elimination of poverty in conjunction with a radical transformation of national economies, the promotion of greater gender equality, and the protection of the planet is the overarching objective of the post-2015 development agenda. A robust multilevel review process of the SDGs has been put in place involving the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the High-Level Political Forum. The CEB agenda is now structured around the priorities identified by the SDGs. Prodded since Copenhagen to integrate social considerations into the design of structural adjustment and reform programs, the Bretton Woods institutions have sharpened their focus on poverty reduction. Both the Bank and the Fund introduced in 1999 processes such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which are prepared by governments with the participation of civil society and other development partners and used as a basis for their concessional lending. Consistent with the findings and recommendations of its World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty and in line with the “vision” of the MDGs, the stated mission of the Bank became “sustainable poverty reduction,” a concept calling for actions that “sustainably secure the future of the planet and its resources, promote social inclusion, and limit the economic burdens that future generations inherit” (World Bank 2014: 1).20 The 2001 World Bank’s World Development Report (WDR) for the first time seemed to jettison some of the key tenets of the Washington Consensus. Citing “more recent thinking” as well “empirical evidence,” the authors of the report acknowledged that inequality may not necessarily translate into growth and development. They also recognized the need for “much more emphasis on laying the institutional and social foundations for the development process and on managing vulnerability and encouraging participation to ensure inclusive growth.” In a nod to demands that could bear a UN imprimatur, they also underlined the importance of “global action” designed to open the markets of rich countries to the agricultural goods, manufactured products, and services of poor countries; bridge the digital divide; provide debt relief to poor countries; reduce the risks of economic crises through international systemic financial reform; produce “pro-poor public goods”; and strengthen the capacities of poor developing countries to be represented in global forums, such as the WTO (World Bank 2001: v– vii). Subsequent issues of the WDR have dealt with the “soft” dimensions of development, which may “result in wasted human potential and often weaken prospects for overall prosperity and economic growth,” such as

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gender and development (2012), job creation (2013), human behavior and development (2015), and education and development (2017). The Bank has acknowledged the need for safety nets to respond to the increased incidence of poverty and inequality, worsening nutrition, the reduction in the utilization of education and health services, and the depletion of the assets of the poor resulting from rising food and fuel prices. In the same stride, the Bank set up a Vulnerability Financing Facility to provide immediate relief to countries hit hard by high food prices. The Bank now emphasizes that “the SDGs are aligned with the World Bank Group’s twin goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity” and that it is “working with client countries to deliver on the 2030 agenda through three critical areas: (i) finance, (ii) data, and (iii) implementation—supporting country-led and country-owned policies to attain the SDGs” (World Bank 2020). Since 1999, when it established the Poverty and Growth Facility—now the Extended Credit Facility—the IMF has also made the objectives of poverty reduction and growth more central to its lending operations in its poorest member countries. A year earlier, the Fund had broadened its original mandate by including the “structural and social aspects of fiscal policy” in the programs that it supports and in its general policy advice. A major element of this advice is to facilitate “high-quality growth,” meaning growth that can be sustained by “appropriate domestic and external balances as well as by adequate investment, including human capital, so as to lay the foundation for future growth … [and] policies that protect the environment … and attempt to reduce poverty and improve equality of opportunity” (IMF 1998: 1). Immediately after the September 2005 UN Summit on Implementing the Millennium Declaration, the IMF reviewed its Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework and took further steps in making its lending and advisory facilities more responsive to the needs of low-income countries (IMF 2005). Now, the IMF is “committed, within the scope of its mandate, to the global partnership for sustainable development” and cites as illustrations of its engagement the expansion of its financial support to low-income developing countries and programs boosting developing countries’ domestic revenue mobilization, its growing support of fragile and conflict states, and its “deepening policy advice on aspects of inclusion and environmental sustainability” (IMF 2020). The impact of the UN advocacy of an “enabling” international environment for SHD is also noticeable in debt-related matters. For a long time now—going back to the launching of the 1985 Brady and 1989 Baker Plans—the United Nations has taken the position that some measures of debt relief are necessary. The 1996 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and the IMF was a response to

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growing pressures from the United Nations and other sources to address the difficult situation of a number of low-income countries (mostly in Africa) for whom traditional rescheduling mechanisms were not sufficient to attain sustainable external debt levels. Under continuing criticism, the Bretton Woods institutions approved in 1999 and 2004–6 further changes in the conditions for eligibility of HIPC with the promise of deeper and faster debt relief for more countries and a greater focus on poverty reduction. More important, perhaps, is the increasingly accepted idea that there should be a linkage between debt relief and poverty alleviation. Again, for a long time extending back to UNICEF advocacy in the 1980s of structural adjustment programs “with a human face” (Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1987), the United Nations has taken aim at IMF policies for their focus on macroeconomic aggregates and alleged neutrality in respect to their impact on sectors and industries. Different sectors of the economy, UN researchers argued, are differentially affected by “neutral” policies related to interest rates, money and credit, taxation, exchange rates, and import restrictions. To forestall adverse consequences, the economic and social components of the Fund’s and Bank’s reform packages and structural adjustment programs should be mutually supportive and consistent with one another as indeed the 1995 Social Summit “encouraged” (commitment 8).

Persisting Development Challenges With China and India “taking off,” more and more Southern countries may one day achieve developed status, or at least escape from their poverty traps.21 For the foreseeable future, however, the data simply underscore the uneven progress achieved on many of the MDG and SDG targets and the immensity of the unfinished development tasks facing a majority of Third World countries. True, extreme poverty has dramatically declined (before COVID-19). According to the most recent estimates of the World Bank, globally, the number of people living in extreme poverty fell from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 736 million in 2015 (World Bank 2020, passim). Likewise, the prevalence of hunger has fallen from 14.8 percent in 2000 to 10.8 percent in 2016 (Roser and Ritchie 2020). Primary school net enrollment rates have markedly improved, and the MDG target to eliminate gender disparity in primary, secondary, and tertiary education was met (UNICEF 2018). Despite these enormous strides, more than 700 million people still live in extreme poverty and suffer from hunger, and access to good schools,

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healthcare, safe water, and other critical social goods remain elusive. A pioneering 2006 study of the United Nations University’s World Institute for Development Economics Research presented empirical evidence showing that the richest 1 percent of world adults owned almost 40 percent of the world’s household wealth, a total greater than the wealth of the world’s poorest 95 percent.22 Yet another study published in 2008 showed that the richest 10 percent of adults in the world owned 85 percent of global household wealth (Davies 2008). The most recent private-sector reports document a still deteriorating situation in which “wealth inequality has continued to increase since 2008, with the top percentile of wealth holders now owning 50.4 percent of all household wealth” (Treanor 2015).23 As the latest World Inequality Report (WIR) abundantly makes it clear, “inequality has increased in nearly all countries but at different speeds, suggesting that institutions and policies matter in shaping inequality” (World Inequality Lab 2018: 9). The inequality syndrome, a critical feature of the development landscape in the past fifty years, is indeed related to power asymmetries in the world economic institutions and other structural issues related to international trade and finance, which all represent potent rallying points for the South. The MDG Gap Task Force, which monitored the five core domains of international cooperation laid out in MDG 8—i.e., official development assistance, market access, debt sustainability, access to affordable essential medicines and access to new technologies—shows a typical pattern of “significant positive developments pointing to an effective international partnership” coexisting with several “deficits in development cooperation” underlining “the need for a rejuvenation of the global partnership for development.”24 Meanwhile, “aid fatigue” has translated into declining levels of ODA, far below the 0.7 percent normative target set by the UN back in 1970, which was reaffirmed on numerous occasions, notably the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico. In the wake of the Monterrey meeting, ODA rebounded significantly, increasing, overall, by some 66 percent in real terms over the MDG period reaching $135.2 billion in 2014, $131.5 billion in 2015, and $146.5 billion in 2016. But a significant portion of aid flows consisted of debt relief measures. In the wake of the sharp decline in economic activity triggered by the 2008–9 financial crisis, ODA has stagnated and in fact declined for the least developed countries. The 2015 Addis Ababa conference on finance for development did not generate new pledges of funding, and the ambitious 2030 Development Agenda does not seem to be backed by adequate financial resources.

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Continuing Political Polarization Whether market-based economic policies can resolve these daunting challenges remains the subject of lively controversies. In any case, developing countries have not slackened their efforts to affect international structural change. From their standpoint, the governance of the international economy suffers from a fundamental “legitimacy deficit.” Their attention remains primarily focused on the “injustices” engendered by an international system that, they feel, cancels out their internal efforts.25 Initially skeptical about the whole notion of a “Millennium Assembly,” they have embraced the repeated exhortations of the United Nations directed at developed countries, inviting them in the name of “global solidarity” to further open their markets, provide deeper and faster debt relief, and give more and better-focused development assistance. Developing countries have used the lofty language of the Millennium Declaration and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda as normative rams to batter the wall of Northern indifference, buttressing their claims in the periodic “comprehensive reports” and annual assessments provided by the Secretariat in the monitoring of the implementation of the MDGs and SDGs. All throughout the elaboration of the post-2015 development agenda, developing countries pressed for an SDG framework that would be universally relevant to all countries and would recognize the roles and responsibilities of governments. The implementation of the goals should be differentiated, reflecting different national realities, capacities, and levels of development. As could be expected, they repeatedly underscored the need to integrate international systemic issues into the new development agenda relating to trade, debt, technology, and the reform of the international financial system and global economic governance (Muchhala 2014). No doubt, these issues will resurface in the course of the periodic reviews and appraisals put in place to oversee the implementation of the SDGs. The deliberations and outcomes of UN global conferences have also provided additional opportunities to developing countries to legitimize their quest for an international “New Deal” while at the same time putting the North in the box of the accused. These conclaves may have highlighted the importance of “soft” development issues like education (especially girls’ education), access to basic health services, clean water, safe sanitation, and proper nutrition. But their “outcome” documents all frame these “soft” issues in the context of the impacts of globalization and the corresponding policy need to pay due attention to the importance of fair trade, more ODA, external debt reduction, and the necessity

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of focusing aid flows on neediest countries. Structural concerns remain paramount in the agenda of developing countries. In the meantime, through their numerical majority, developing countries have endeavored to frame their demands for structural change in human rights language. They have found ammunition in the reports of “special rapporteurs” concerned with the “progressive realization” of socioeconomic rights as it may relate to multilateral trade and financial institutions. For example, since his appointment in 2011, a special rapporteur “on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order” has churned out reports on tax avoidance, tax evasion, tax fraud, and profit shifting as well as on international investment agreements and multilateral free trade agreements.26

Power and Incrementalism: The Prodding Role of the United Nations Numerical majorities at the United Nations, however, do not necessarily translate into actual power and influence. In fact, a number of Southern demands collide head-on with the economic and financial interests of industrial countries and are thus likely to remain political nonstarters. A world solidarity fund for poverty eradication for the UN Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1997–2006) and a “democratic and equitable international order” (mapping out the relationship between the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the WTO) fall into the category of “dead on arrival” proposals. The idea of a Global Economic Coordination Council proposed at the 2009 Special Session of the Assembly has remained a dead letter. While normative competitors like “human security” and a “responsibility to protect” are only eliciting modest political interest, active candidates for neglect include proposals originating from the 1999 Human Development Report like the enactment of multilateral codes of conduct for multinational corporations,27 the creation of a world antimonopoly authority, the establishment of a global central bank and lender of last resort, a world environment agency, a world investment trust with redistributive functions, and mechanisms for a broader participation of civil society within the United Nations. The collapse of the Doha negotiations over agricultural subsidies, special safeguard mechanisms, and access to patented medicines is a stark reminder of the quasi impossibility of bridging the North-South ideological divide. In this pathologically polarized setting, incremental and disjointed change is the only scenario that is likely to prevail, as indeed has been

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the case since the issue of development reached the UN agenda.28 In the ever-shifting grounds of development thinking, one may expect the United Nations to endeavor to give a more human face to SHD through the advocacy of the same “Fabian” global norms and principles that helped the organization, in the immediate postwar years, to place the concept of development on the international agenda as one of the key desirable objectives of the international community (Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss 2001). It was in this spirit that the organization issued a ringing manifesto in 1998, proclaiming that “poverty is a denial of choices and opportunity, a violation of human dignity” and calling upon the UN system to mobilize “the energies and resources of all human development actors in the campaign against poverty.”29 The Global Compact initiative of the secretary-general officially sprang from the same concern. As Kofi Annan put it on 26 July 2000, “What we must do … is to ensure that the global market is embedded in broadly shared values and practices that reflect global social needs, and that all the world’s people share the benefits of globalization” (Annan 2000). A decade and a half later, the managers of the compact likewise reiterated that “compact participants across industries are changing the way they operate to implement responsible practices and developing innovative solutions to address poverty and inequality, and support education, health and peace.”30 The same could be said about the MDGs, which were hatched in Annan’s Executive Office, as well as the international “campaign” that he subsequently launched to track countries’ progress toward these goals, assess the cost implications at each stage, and identify resource requirements.31 Typical of his “norm entrepreneurship” was his appointment in 2005 of a special representative to clarify the role and responsibilities of business with regard to human rights in the wake of a contentious and inconclusive debate in the Commission of Human Rights two years earlier. Ban Kimoon may have been far less entrepreneurial. But like Kofi Annan, he endeavored throughout his tenure to prod the main parties concerned to reach a comprehensive agreement on climate change on accelerated emissions reductions by developed countries; mitigation measures by developing nations; financial support from wealthier nations; and increased multilateralism. In an effort to guide the final negotiations over a post2015 development agenda, Ban Ki-moon issued in late 2014 a “synthesis report,” which “looks ahead, and discusses the contours of a universal and transformative agenda that places people and planet at the center, is underpinned by human rights, and is supported by a global partnership.” In the same stride, the secretary-general further pressed national governments by underlining the fact that “[they] have an historic opportunity

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and duty to act boldly, vigorously and expeditiously, to turn reality into a life of dignity for all, leaving no one behind.”32 Four years later, on the occasion of the UN International Day for the Eradication of Poverty, Secretary-General Gutteres joined the chorus with a ringing call, stating, “This year, as we celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, let us remember that ending poverty is not a matter of charity but a question of justice. There is a fundamental connection between eradicating extreme poverty and upholding the equal rights of all people. We must listen to the millions of people experiencing poverty and destitution across the globe, tackle the power structures that prevent their inclusion in society and address the indignities they face. We must build a fair globalization that creates opportunities for all and ensure that rapid technological development boosts our poverty eradication efforts” (UNRCCA 2018). Undoubtedly, the production of information and evidence “that can break down barriers of disbelief and mobilize changes in policy and behavior” (UNDP 2000: 10) remains a hallmark of the UN’s normative work. The question is whether the UN policy prescriptions, however wellgrounded they may be in “shared bases for action,” actually do influence the multilateral process. It is not difficult to anticipate that the road to a more “human” sustainable human development concept will be littered with rejected proposals deemed to be unduly “radical.” And those compromises and policies that are accepted often carry a considerable degree of abstractness and/or ideological tensions. As a result, they are often difficult to implement. All suffer from the same longstanding UN pathology: conflicting interpretations by Northern and Southern countries of ambiguous joint resolutions where the illusion of unanimity hides the absence of a genuine convergence of policy views. Incrementalism thus does generate an impression of immobilisme, as the modest scope of change effected by incremental policies is fraught with ambiguities, loopholes, and contradictions that, in turn, call for further changes still of an incremental nature. The spectacularly innovative SDGs—their universality; weaving of economic, environmental, and political concerns; and ambitious objective “to leave no one behind”—were adopted by consensus by the General Assembly. The process of their elaboration was unusually open, transparent, and inclusive of nonstate actors. Yet, all throughout there were fierce disagreements that were resolved by opaque or ambiguous language. The SDGs are not legally binding, and, typically, at the insistence of rich countries the word “promote” has replaced the word “ensure” throughout the text. Some countries still feel that an agenda of 17 goals and 169 targets is too unwieldy to imple-

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ment. The need to achieve high levels of gross domestic product growth may undermine the SDGs’ environmental objectives. More importantly, the cost of “transforming the world” is believed to require about $2–3 trillion per annum for the next 15 years. Goal 17 of the SDGs, in language strikingly reminiscent of Goal 8 of the MDGs, elusively talks about revitalizing “the global partnership for sustainable development” to deliver on sustainable development objectives but contains no firm commitment of governments or the private sector (Ford 2015). In the same vein, the much-vaunted 2015 Paris Agreement on environmental stewardship could become a reality only after North and South agree, after several years of negotiation, on a more nuanced form of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. But only elements of the Paris pact are legally binding, and national pledges by countries to cut emissions are voluntary and subject to review at a later date. Not surprisingly, the battle between developed and developing countries has resumed with the annual review conferences of the state parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change precisely on the features and scope of nationally determined contributions (Raman 2017). This being said, over the longer term, incremental policy outcomes do make a difference, however marginal they may be at first. The UN’s relentless Fabian reaffirmation of the legitimacy of the notion of “equality of opportunity” for the weak throughout its empirical and normative work has had a noticeable impact on the understanding of the internal and external parameters of SHD.33 It is increasingly acknowledged that social protection and the reduction of vulnerability are legitimate developmental goals, that debt relief must come faster and be more generous, and that international trade is a two-way street. Words still need to be matched by deeds. But there is a growing convergence of views that poor nations have done more than their fair share to free up trade and mobilize their internal resources. The pressure decidedly remains on the rich countries to address the structural pathologies of the international economic system. Jacques Fomerand had a lengthy career with the United Nations Department of Economic Affairs. When he retired in 2003, he was director of the United Nations University Office for North America in New York. Since then he has taught in the UN Program at Occidental College, Los Angeles. He also teaches at New York University and John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York. He has published widely on international relations, international organization, human rights, NorthSouth relations, and human security.

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NOTES 1. These views are articulated in the earliest issues of the annual reports of the president to the US Congress, US Participation in the UN, published by the State Department. 2. The term is indeed a misnomer because, as should be abundantly clear in this discussion, there never was any “consensus” between North and South on these matters. 3. At the same time, Southern countries rely on social and economic human rights arguments to bolster their claim that Northern countries have development assistance obligations. 4. For a full overview of developing countries’ demands, see the 27 September 2018 declaration of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Group of 77 and China (G-77 2018). The South Centre has issued numerous “analytical notes” on the WTO and e-commerce, agriculture, subsidies and food security, and trade facilitation; see South Centre (2020). 5. For a useful overview of the politics of TNCs’ regulation at the United Nations, see Sagafi-Nejad and Dunning (2008). 6. The COP is the main decision-making body of the UNFCCC. All states that are parties to the convention are represented at the COP. During a COP, they review the implementation of the UNFCCC and any other legal instruments that the COP adopts and make decisions necessary to promote implementation of the UNFCCC. 7. See UNCTAD (2020). The “new” UNIDO addresses such “key concerns” as “rural entrepreneurship, women and youth in productive activities, human security, post crisis rehabilitation and migration issues, advancing economic competitiveness, safeguarding the environment and strengthening knowledge and institutions.” See UNIDO (2020). Likewise, the UNDP Strategic Plan for the period 2014–17 devotes considerable attention to “partnerships”; see UNDP (2014). 8. “Our Work,” see UNDP (2020). 9. DP/2017/38, October 2017. 10. DP/2000/8, 15 December 1999. 11. As stated by Kofi Annan in his 31 January 1999 address to the World Economic Forum in Davos. See Secretary-General 1999. 12. GA Resolution, A/RES/1710(XVI), A/RES/2626(XXV), and A/RES/35/56. 13. A/55/407, para. 28–46. 14. For warnings on the adverse consequences of the financial crisis, see, among others, UN Press releases dated 19 May 2009, 20 May 2009, 28 May 2009, 11 June 2009, 25 June 2009, 6 July 2009. For the immediate response of the secretary-general to the COVID-19 pandemic, see his March 2020 report Shared Responsibility, Global Solidarity: Responding to the Socio-economic Impacts of COVID-19 (UN 2020).

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15. To use the language of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All. See World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004). 16. SG/SM/7553. 17. A/RES/53/198. 18. ACC/2000/POQ/CRP/16 of 14 September 2000. 19. A/56/326. The related activities of the CEB can be found in its Annual Overview Reports; see CEB (2020). 20. In another report, the Bank speaks of “three pillars” for poverty reduction: “increasing opportunity, enhancing empowerment, and strengthening security.” See World Bank (2001). 21. At the same time, their rise to power is making the world more multipolar, which can lead to more instability that will hamper reducing poverty. More research is needed on the actual effects of multipolarity. 22. The institute’s World Income Inequality Database (WIID) provides the most comprehensive set of income inequality statistics available; see United Nations University (2020). 23. Data on inequality between and within countries may be obtained from the Institute for Policy Studies (2020); see also the World Inequality Report 2018 (World Inequality Lab 2018). 24. As stressed by a 2016 report of the secretary-general on “partnerships”; see UN DESA (2016). 25. These views are well summarized in a paper produced by the South Centre; see Montes (2014), and also Montes (2015). 26. A/71/286. 27. In 2014, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, South Africa, and Venezuela resurrected the idea of binding codes of conduct to regulate transnational corporations in the Human Rights Council. 28. For an enlightening (and enlightened!) elaboration of this point, see Puchala, Verlin Laatikainen, and Coate (2007). 29. ECOSOC/5759. 30. As stressed in its mission statement, see UN Global Compact (2020). 31. E/2001/45, p. 3. 32. A/69/700. 33. For an exhaustive analysis of the economic and social ideas that have “nurtured” the development work of the United Nations, see Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss (2001).

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Scholte, Jan Aart. 2000. Globalization: A Critical Introduction. New York: Palgrave. Schrijver, Nico. 2010. The UN and the Global Commons: Development without Destruction. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Shabalala, Dalindyebo. 2007. “Towards a Digital Agenda for Developing Countries.” South Centre Research Papers 13. Retrieved 3 April 2020 from https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/RP13_Towardsa-Digital-Agenda-for-LDCs_EN.pdf. Shawki, Noha, ed. 2016. International Norms, Normative Change, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Singh, J. P. 2010. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). New York, NY: Routledge. Smith, Jackie, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco, eds. 1997. Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. South Centre. 1996. For a Strong and Democratic United Nations: A South Perspective on UN Reform. Geneva: The South Centre. ———. 1998. Towards an Economic Platform for the South. Geneva: The South Centre. ———. 2006. Trade and Finance Linkages for Promoting Development. Report from a Policy Roundtable. Geneva: The South Centre. ———. 2011. The Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health Ten Years Later: The State of Implementation. Geneva: The South Centre. ———. 2020. “Analytical Notes.” Retrieved 24 April 2020 from https://www .southcentre.int/category/publications/analytical-notes/ Stokke, Olav. 2009. The UN and Development. From Aid to Cooperation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Thérien, Jean-Phillipe. 1999. “Beyond the North South Divide: The Two Tales of World Poverty.” Third World Quarterly 20(4): 723–42. Thorvaldsdottir, Svanhildur, and Pim Valdre. 2009. Negotiating Climate Change: From Bali to Copenhagen. New York: International Peace Institute. Toye, John, and Richard Toye. 2004. The UN and Global Political Economy: Trade, Finance, and Development. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Treanor, Jill. 2015. “Half of World Wealth Now in Hands of 1 Percent of Population—Report.” The Guardian, 13 October. Retrieved 24 April 2020 from https://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/oct/13/half-world-wealthin-hands-population-inequality-report. United Nations University. 2020. “The Institute World Income Inequality Database (WIID).” Retrieved 24 April 2020 from https://www.wider.unu.edu/ project/wiid-world-income-inequality-database. United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2010. Celebrate, Innovate and Sustain: Toward 2015 and Beyond; The United States Strategy for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Washington, DC: USAID. Velásquez, German. 2014. Some Critical Issues Related to Access to Medicines and Intellectual Property. Geneva: The South Centre.

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Velásquez, German, and Pascale Boulet. 2015. The WHO “Red Book” on Access to Medicines and Intellectual Property—20 Years Later. Geneva: The South Centre. Ward, Michael. 2004. Quantifying the World: UN Ideas and Statistics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Weiss, Thomas G., and Stephen Browne, eds. 2014. Post-2015 UN Development: Making Change Happen. New York: Routledge. Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe, Roger Coate, and Kelly-Kate Pease. 2014. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Whitman, Richard G., and Stefan Wolff. 2012. The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager. New York: Routledge. Willetts, Peter, ed. 2011. Non-governmental Organizations in World Politics. New York: Routledge. World Bank. 2001. World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2014. World Bank: A Stronger, Connected, Solutions World Bank Group; An Overview of the World Bank Group Strategy. Washington, DC: The World Bank Group. ———. 2020. “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2030 Agenda.” Retrieved 8 April 2020 from https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/sdgs2030-agenda. World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization. 2004. A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All. Geneva: ILO. World Inequality Lab. 2018. World Inequality Report 2018. Paris: Paris School of Economics. Zervak, Antonia. 2014. Resetting the Political Culture, Agenda: From Polis to International Organization. New York: Praeger Publishers.

part i i

 Decision-Making within International Organizations

Part II shows that IOs are largely, but certainly not fully, dependent on government support. Multilateral diplomacy, funding, and policymaking pose strategic design issues where the top management of the IO can be intimately involved in both trying to follow and shape the government decisions. Decision-making is also crucial within the organization, for example in organizational change. This part looks more closely at decision-making issues where the balance between external government control and internal managerial control shifts toward internal decision-making and action. The areas of human resource management and fraud and corruption are areas in which the organization can take action that is, in principle, more autonomous as compared to funding and multilateral diplomacy. In this respect, importation of management techniques from private enterprise reflects that the role of the state is changing, with shifting roles and networked configurations of governmental institutions, private enterprise, NGOs, and international governmental organizations.

 c ha p te r 4

Managing People at the United Nations Squaring the Circle of Merit and Patronage Dirk Salomons

Introduction When, in 1945, a Preparatory Committee sat down to draw up a framework for the establishment of the United Nations (UN), it paid particular attention to the staffing of its Secretariat. In doing so, the committee was guided by the staff regulations that governed the Secretariat of the League of Nations (1946). These, in turn, had been inspired by the British concept of an independent civil service, based on merit, first formulated in the Trevelyan-Northcote Report of 1853, which meant to bring an end to a pattern of patronage and incompetence that the Empire could no longer afford as it rapidly expanded its grip on its colonies. If there were such a discipline as “administrative archeology,” the current staff regulations of the United Nations, with their venerable roots in the nineteenth-century management reform movement, would present a prime site for digging, and a museum of memorabilia would easily be filled. Where in the modern world (other than the Salvation Army) are staff still called “officers,” are business trips called “missions,” and do remnants of the colonial era such as “home leave” remain in such well-preserved state? Yet, the influence of these strong historical traditions is felt in more than just a few comical administrative relics. It has permeated the culture of the United Nations to the extent that the reforms of the Victorian era have now become the stumbling blocks of the present.

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In this chapter, I will examine how the very principles that created a strong British Civil Service in the days of the Empire—command-andcontrol, seniority, independence, and merit—have now become distorted into pathological, if not downright pathetic, fetishes standing in the way of true human resources reform at the UN Secretariat. In doing so, I also point at promising ways that may lead to effective changes. The starting point for this review of UN staffing policies and practices is the assumption of contingency theory that there are no “good” or “bad” human resources strategies in absolute terms—their effectiveness is determined by their context. While, for example, the concept of “career service” may be functional for a post office, where experience contributes to quality performance, this vision of long-term employment would be totally dysfunctional for a football team where youth and physical prowess is everything. We should therefore begin by asking: What are the current functions of the Secretariat, its funds and its programs, and which human resources strategies and policies are most likely to support these functions? How do these compare to the current human resources framework? That leads to the question: How are human resources strategies at the United Nations shaped? What is the role of member states? How have they helped or hindered reforms? Did the results of their effort match their intentions?

Vision of the Founding Fathers The Preparatory Commission, in recommending staff regulations and rules to the General Assembly (Preparatory Commission of the United Nations 1945), followed closely in the tracks of the League of Nations. A comparison of the League’s 1945 staff regulations with the draft text submitted by the commission shows remarkable similarities, and many parts are identical. Both stress that the responsibilities of international civil servants are “not national, but exclusively international.” Both prescribe the same oath of office, mutatis mutandis. Both grant the same functional immunities and privileges. Both restrict staff’s participation in public activities. Men and women are equally eligible for posts in the UN Secretariat, as they were in the League. And both the League’s and its successor’s regulations stress that appointments shall be made on a competitive basis. Characteristic for both organizations’ design is the emphasis on seniority, and on promotions from within in preference to appointments from outside.1 This trait is still as dominant in the United Nations today as it was seventy-five years ago. The structure of oversight committees for appointments and promotions emphasizes broad and high-level partici-

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pation, so that no single department can decide on staffing issues—these decisions are taken for, and by, the organization as a whole. While the League of Nations had a seven-year term limit on the service of directors and undersecretaries-general (and ten years for the secretary-general), the Preparatory Committee did not recommend such restrictions for the United Nations, and proposed that assistant secretaries-general, directors, and “other principal higher officers” serve for five years but be subject to the possibility of renewal.2 This further strengthened the concept of a career service. The Preparatory Commission had strong views on the importance of career prospects: Unless members of the staff can be offered some assurance of being able to make their careers in the Secretariat, many of the best candidates from all countries will inevitably be kept away. Nor can members of the staff be expected fully to subordinate the special interests of their countries to the international interest if they are merely detached temporarily from their national administrations and remain dependent upon them for their future. Finally, it is important that the advantages of experience should be secured and sound administrative traditions established within the Secretariat. For these reasons, it is essential that the bulk of the staff should consist of persons who will make their career in the Secretariat. They should be given contracts for an indeterminate period subject to review every five years on the basis of reports by their superior officers.3

From the perspective of those early days, this vision was fully functional. The Secretariat’s main role at the time was to support a set of intergovernmental committees: the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. In addition, there would be staff versed in public information, legal issues, conference services, and administration. Once candidates had the basic academic qualifications, they could acquire most of the specific skills required for this type of function through on-the-job training, and as such the necessary further experience could best be gained in-house. The organization’s mandate, and hence its functions, were limited. The emphasis in all of this was on the servicing of the United Nations’ deliberative bodies. Operational activities were not foreseen. Most posts were funded from the regular budget, and extrabudgetary activities were few and far between. All the secondary characteristics, therefore, of the UN personnel system as it emerged were linked to the concept of life-long employment in a stable and static bureaucracy—particularly the pension benefits, which accrued slowly over time and which only had value if one endured until

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retirement age; premature departure carried a heavy penalty. Benefits like home leave, children’s allowance, education grants, and generous annual leave mimicked the pattern of the major powers’ foreign or colonial services.

What’s Needed Now: Staffing for the New United Nations To what extent does this stationary staffing model still apply? The needs of the United Nations have changed dramatically since its inception. It is required to display expertise in a far broader range of specializations, so that it tends to recruit people who have gained experience elsewhere: in national government, academia, the NGO world, or the private sector. At its core are still, as of 31 December 2018, a total of 3,107 positions subject to geographical distribution—representing a shadowy imprint of the Secretariat as it was envisaged in its earliest days.4 While diversity is certainly the essence of the UN Charter’s focus on “geographical distribution,” it has become a more technical term, referring to those positions in the UN budget that are funded from assessed, compulsory contributions. In this, the nationality of support staff does not count—the allocation of professional staff, however, does: each member state gets a “range” for the posts it can claim, depending on its level of contributions, mainly. This gives the OECD countries an edge, and is a source of concern for developing countries, the more so since the size of a country’s population hardly has any weight. Countries like India, therefore, are at a major disadvantage. The total staffing of the global Secretariat, however, stood at 37,505 staff as of December 2018, reflecting Headquarters in New York and Geneva, regional offices, and, above all, peacekeeping operations.5 This number does not even include the United Nations’ funds and programs, such as the UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, and the international criminal courts, with some thirty thousand staff among them, many of them locally appointed. The programs and activities implemented by these actors tend to be complex, decentralized, and often highly specialized—thus requiring higher-level, experienced staff with a track record acquired outside of the UN System, with a broad backing of nationally recruited support staff. The obsessive focus, therefore, of the General Assembly on the relatively small “political” group “subject to geographical distribution,” which has remained constant throughout the years, is thus becoming increasingly marginal in relation to the real issue: how to recruit and retain a multifaceted and mobile staff in this changing and demanding environment. The fact that “geographical distribution” itself,

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as defined by the General Assembly, has become highly politicized (as we will see later) does not help matters. The Secretariat’s regular staffing tables show another reason why the old career-based model no longer holds up: by the end of 2017, out of a total of 12,719, there were only 1,315 professional staff at the entry level (P-1/P-2), compared to 8,179 at mid-level (P-3/P-4).6 This means that recruitment is largely done at mid-career levels, not from the bottom up. The average age of professional staff members is 45.3; they have a relatively high average age even at the entry grades (36.7 years at the P-2 level).7 Training resources, another hallmark of a career-based system, are limited everywhere, and these are mainly allocated to language training, information technology, and management—leaving little for occupational training or professional development. Posts for young professionals under extrabudgetary programs are even scarcer, and special programs such as the donor-financed Junior Professional Officer Program or the subsequently introduced Young Professional Program8 are not large enough to change the picture. Posts funded from extrabudgetary resources, moreover, tend to be short-term. The chronic lack of resources (and career path models) to create entrylevel positions for young professionals makes it far more difficult to build a common culture, and the energy and critical enthusiasm that characterizes young staff is now scarce. At the same time, the emphasis on hiring people who have already been “molded” by careers outside the United Nations is now a fact on the ground, and adjustments have to be made to serve at least this group well. This means that the United Nations should be able to offer terms of employment that are appealing for people entering in mid-career and for people who plan to spend only a few years at the United Nations as part of a career path that includes alternatives such as academia or national institutions. As so many government functions have been privatized over the past ten to fifteen years, the skills and knowledge associated with them have also wandered over to the private sector. Gone are the days that cuttingedge knowledge in fields such as tropical medicine, telecommunications, or remote sensing could be found in the member states’ ministries. Competencies that are key to the UN’s mandate in the fields of international finance, trade, and economic development are now most easily found in the banking sector. A suitable human resources framework for the United Nations should therefore be geared to facilitate recruitment of talent and expertise from the private sector. This, in turn, should have implications for the manner in which salaries are set. Given the UN’s wide mandate, covering a bewildering range of activities, it will have to rely on staff who show a high level of initiative and

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autonomy, and provide them with the tools to work independently in the context of teams rather than in a top-down and controlled environment. This will not just require a change of culture but also of financial regulations and audit practices. The rapid ascent of countries in the South in academic and professional terms has created a vast pool of talent that would allow the United Nations to reach a truly “equitable geographic distribution” of staff. Current recruitment policies and practices, however, cut off access to core UN positions for the vast majority of this deserving group of potential “players,” and until the UN Secretariat reconsiders its definition of “equitable geographical distribution” (i.e., who pays most gets the largest number of posts), it will remain a postcolonial museum. The UN funds and programs, likewise, should be less inclined to link their staffing to their funding, as this again creates undue dependence on a few wealthy donors as the core recruitment source. If the United Nations intend to remain relevant and staffed with people “of the highest competence,” in accordance with the Charter, it must ensure that its human resources policies and terms of employment will enable it to recruit and retain staff who meet this new profile: truly multinational, specialized, mobile, mid-career, entrepreneurial, and independent. Will it be able to do so? A review of the UN’s past efforts to adapt the organization to the reality of its environment may shed some light on its capacity to handle internal reforms and help us identify some of the key policy issues that will affect its prospects of meeting future challenges.

Implementing the Vision: Pathological Problems Emerge (1946–74) Article 101 of the UN Charter states that “the paramount consideration in the employment of staff and in the determination of conditions of service is the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard is also to be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.” The Preparatory Commission understood that there was a potential conflict between these two objectives, but it believed that they could “in large measure be reconciled.”9 While it recommended the use of tests, especially for higher-level positions, it argued for flexibility. It also noted that the examination system would “be inapplicable to many candidates of high character and ability who, owing to war service, underground activities in enemy occupied territories, internment in concentration camps,

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etc., would not have the desired academic qualifications and will be at a disadvantage in formal examinations. For such candidates other processes of selection—the interview, and the analysis of personal records, for example—would be useful.”10 This illustrates the strong faith that the Preparatory Commission had in the value of character and life experience as indicators of success—a hallmark of the British Civil Service tradition. Implicitly, this approach would also make it easier to recruit candidates from underrepresented countries. When the General Assembly met in 1946 to discuss the report of the Preparatory Commission, it found very little that was controversial, and the commission’s recommendations were adopted virtually unchanged. Thus, a framework was put into place that proscribed the organization of the Secretariat, adopted an information policy, set out staff regulations, and defined key personnel policies (including taxation, types of appointments, options for termination, and retirement benefits). Within a year, however, the General Assembly began to express misgivings about the manner in which the personnel system was put into place, and it asked the secretary-general “to examine the recruitment policy that has been followed to date with a view to improving the present geographical distribution of posts within the various Departments” and to review “the qualifications, background and experience of the present members of the staff, with a view to replacing those who do not reach the high standards fixed by the Charter.”11 Clearly, the flexibility advocated by the Preparatory Commission had led to some undesirable results. This was hardly surprising, as the United Nations had started in 1946 with some three hundred persons, most of them belonging to the Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission or to the now defunct League of Nations. The first secretary-general had to improvise the recruitment of about twenty-nine hundred staff members in a few months, and the demobilization of American troops provided a ready recruitment source. Soon, half of the staff subject to geographical distribution were US nationals. The British army also was an attractive pool for the hiring of candidates with logistic and management experience. The resulting lack of balance in the composition of the staff took years to redress, and was then compounded by the onset of the Cold War, which made it difficult to recruit candidates from the Soviet bloc (Langrod 1968: 175). In the fall of 1952, the General Assembly adopted a set of expanded staff regulations based on the work of an International Civil Service Advisory Board (ICSAB). These addressed issues related to social security, staff relations, disciplinary measures, and appeals, and established a detailed pay system for the professional and director categories, including mechanisms for salary differentials to reflect relative costs of living

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across the globe, as well as children’s allowances, repatriation grants, and education grants. Conceptually, this system has remained virtually unchanged ever since. During the first twenty-five years of its existence, the UN Secretariat maintained a very simple system of career development based on the principle that staff had priority above outsiders when it came to filling vacancies (so that recruitment would focus on the lower ranks, and a UN career would span several decades). Staff who had reached a certain level of seniority within their grade became eligible for promotion. The most deserving staff members (selected by an appointment and promotion board) would be placed on a promotion register, and vacancies would be filled from the register as they occurred. While merit played a role, seniority was the key determinant—there was a strong sense that careers should develop slowly, like fine wine, and that no one should be left behind. While the promotion register has made way for a system of managed competition, the underlying emphasis on seniority has not changed, and to this day, UN system vacancy announcements for senior-level posts stress the need for decades of experience.

The First Malignancy: The Unresolved Tension between Merit and Patronage As the Secretariat became operational, it quickly became apparent that the British model of the civil service as an independent meritocracy was by no means a commonly accepted standard. The basic underlying assumption that a cast of permanent civil servants will be able to serve neutrally and loyally under varying ideological regimes, executing faithfully whatever the legislature decides, is shared by only very few national administrations. In the United States, for example, a party change in the presidency leads to a virtual exodus in Washington, as thousands of civil service appointments linked to the losing party are terminated and new staff are selected, taking into account their party loyalty as much as their competence. Similar massive turnover occurs at the state and local level when party control shifts. Only in this manner, advocates of patronage systems believe, can one make sure that the ideological convictions of the victors will be translated into political action—“independent” civil servants could never be trusted to implement change. Many Western countries, such as Canada, Italy, Ireland, and Iceland, follow a similar pattern (Kristinsson 1996: 438). As Nikita Khrushchev, the premier of the USSR, put it, “While there are neutral countries, there are no neutral men. There can be no such thing as an impartial civil servant in this deeply divided

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world, and the kind of political celibacy which the British theory of the civil servant calls for is in international affairs a fiction” (quoted in Langrod 1968: 320). In many other administrative cultures, the quid pro quo is even more direct: power brings with it an obligation to share the spoils. When people have learned from experience that loyalty to the family, clan, or tribe is the most reliable strategy for survival, this awareness is carried over into governance models. When one has finally gained a position where one controls resources, it is time to honor the many obligations that have accrued on the way up. Associates have to be rewarded, favors have to be returned. At the same time, security is paramount—jobs can only be given to people who can be fully trusted, and again, the family, clan, or tribe are the most reliable recruitment sources. This, in the eyes of those who have grown up with this type of patronage, is not corruption but realism. Many developing countries have relied on this model for governance since their early days, as it often had its roots in tribal systems and usually also in the social control mechanisms of the colonial era. While efforts are made to introduce the rule of law, court systems, procedural protections, and other elements of a framework that shifts trust from kin to codes, it will take a long time before these new notions have been fully assimilated. When people nurtured on patronage, be they from the North or the South, are brought into the United Nations, either as government representatives or as staff, they experience a total cognitive disconnect: the United Nations and its member states in the General Assembly volubly profess a merit-based system, behave as if it did not exist, and then censor themselves in resolution after resolution denouncing the evils of political dealmaking. If the United Nations were able to acknowledge openly that patronage is an important and valuable element of the way it operates, much could be gained, because then the boundaries of the patronage system could be drawn and the space for merit could be demarcated. The vaguest outlines of such a system already exist. Appointments at the senior director level (D-2) and above, for example, are the prerogative of the secretary-general and are not subject to review by the regular review panels. But this does not mean, unfortunately, that therefore appointment at lower levels is made purely on merit, as the review process itself has ample room for political influence. It is only when a department, program, or fund has a clear mandate with concrete outputs, and when the results of its work are immediately visible to the public eye, that merit by necessity becomes an issue. The UNHCR, for example, cannot afford to let “first cousins” run its refugee programs. The World Food Program

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must be able to rely on each and every logistician on its staff in order to get food to the needy. One could therefore formulate a law: the amount of patronage in the management of the United Nations’ human resources is directly inverse to the level of public accountability of the entity affected. This also means that the end of the Cold War, and the increased emphasis on good governance as a prerequisite for continued development assistance, has brought about a renewed effort at the United Nations to make accountability and responsibility central to its own management. These attempts at reform, which came in waves beginning in the 1970s, accelerated with the appointment of Kofi Annan as secretary-general in 1996. They have had a certain measure of success, although the underlying sources of managerial disarray—i.e., the tension between central control and individual empowerment, between patronage and merit, and between political and management values—have not disappeared.

The Second Malignancy: Control Crushes Empowerment The staffing structure of the United Nations, with its strict hierarchy and top-down quasi-military command structure, as well as the control mechanisms embedded in its financial regulations, create an environment where decisions are not made easily. The standards of conduct promulgated in 1954 by the ICSAB stipulate obedience: while a staff member “has the right, which should be safeguarded, to record his views in the official files, it is his duty to accept, carry out, and even defend decisions of his superiors once they are taken, whether or not they accord with his own opinions.”12 When it comes to the control of financial resources, managers have to face a series of hurdles. They must deal with a budgetary process whereby the use of program funds is planned on a biennial basis. The process of budget formulation, review, and approval takes about one year. This means that managers must be able to look as far as three years ahead in planning their work. Since there are restrictions on their ability to move money across budget lines, and since money not spent reverts to the member states, managers have little room left for flexible responses to external changes or unforeseen developments. An extensive system of internal controls further ensures that no official can authorize any expenditure without third-party approval and certification.13 This makes a lot of sense in a static environment, but it can create embarrassing delays in relief operations or other situations where rapid action is required. Managers have responsibility but not the corresponding authority. While this has been common knowledge for the past seventy years, the system seems immutable, notwithstanding external criticism.

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This lack of managerial authority is therefore a recurrent theme when we review how the organization has tried to manage its people over the past decades, oscillating between efforts to emphasize the need to get things done (favoring the managers) and the need to keep political control and micromanage all decisions (favoring the member states). This has constantly placed the secretary-general in an unenviable corner.

The Third Malignancy: Poor Governance, Reforms Abandoned (1974–94) In 1974, the General Assembly, inspired by several studies submitted by the International Civil Service Advisory Board, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), expressed its support for a program of major reforms in the area of human resources, which consisted of the following elements: •

defining a staff structure for the Secretariat, based on specialized occupational qualifications and on the need for job classification;

•

introducing a modern and efficient recruitment system, paying more attention to the principle of geographic distribution (as defined by the UN General Assembly) while adopting long-term forecasting and competitive selection methods;

•

introducing a new promotion, career-planning, and training system, based on occupational groups.14

Two years later, the Joint Inspection Unit carried out an evaluation of the results achieved.15 This effort was led by Maurice Bertrand, a French public administration specialist who had spearheaded the JIU’s efforts to guide personnel reform at the United Nations since the late 1960s, and who had consistently argued for a system including the elements of a French cheminement de carrière (career path). In this model, staff compete for entry into an organization through exams held on the basis of occupational groups, and their career develops strictly along an occupational career path. This contrasts starkly with the British Civil Service concept, whereby a “good man” with a general broad academic background can be expected to succeed in virtually any occupation; character, gender, and networks define the career path. (The topic of gender at the UN deserves separate treatment; it took several decades before women became visible at the UN’s top). For the UN administration, which in the late 1960s and early 1970s was still very much influenced by the same

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British culture that had created the UN staff regulations in the first place, the approach of the JIU reeked of heresy. Lip service was paid to reform, but resistance was strong. In their report to the General Assembly, the inspectors criticized both the pace of the implementation of the approved reform and the methods used. They cited the secretary-general’s progress report, which recognized that “much further action is needed” and listed “the division of the staff into occupations and occupational groups, the completion of the job classification system, the development of career patterns, the organization of staff assignments, the restructuring of the General Service category and the completion of the review of the appointment and promotion procedures.”16 Thus, the inspectors concluded, “five years after submission of the report17 we are still, as regards the most important fields, in the preliminary study and experiment phase.”18 The inspectors recalled that a long-term recruitment plan had been published in 1972, but that no system had been developed for the regular updating of such a plan. While a roster had been instituted, only 7 percent of the recruitment in 1974 had been drawn from that roster, and less than 0.3 percent of the staff recruited over a three-year period (1973 through 1975) had participated in special recruitment examinations. The inspectors noted a similar lack of progress in the area of job classification. “Basically, as regards the problem of structure, there seems to be no real reason why most of the remaining measures needed to institute reform could not be carried out in the course of 1977, since the job classification system for professional posts begun in 1975 was to be ready in two years and since there are no real obstacles remaining to the immediate drafting of comprehensive and detailed rules on occupational groups …”19 The Secretariat began to draw increasingly sharp criticism during the 1970s. In addition to the reports of the JIU, external observers raised words of warning (Finger and Mugno 1975). Their studies emphasized the need to raise the quality of the staff through improved recruitment, training, and career development practices. In doing so, they pointed at the underlying cause: political pressures and interference by member states. In a follow-up study conducted in 1980, Finger found that the situation had deteriorated (Finger and Hanan 1981). He noted that officials were accused of taking payoffs from individuals seeking jobs and that, as a result of preliminary investigations, the assistant secretary-general for personnel had left the employment of the Secretariat in the fall of 1980. Employees felt alienated, high-ranking officials engaged in political giveand-take, interest groups lobbied for their country’s advantage. There was a growing rift between management and staff, and a class system

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had emerged whereby movement from the support staff levels to the professional ranks had become nearly impossible. To some extent, this general malaise was a direct corollary to the overall impact of the Cold War on world affairs. The United Nations was largely paralyzed in the exercise of its core functions under the Charter, certainly in the areas of peace and security as well as human rights, and the General Assembly had become a forum for recriminations and ideological sparring. Most of the positive results coming out of the UN System could be attributed to the specialized agencies and to the UN funds and programs, such as UNICEF and the UNDP, rather than to the Secretariat. Where there was no real work to do, and where no measurable results could be expected, posts became chips in a global poker game. The poor leadership of Secretaries-General U Thant and Waldheim further demoralized staff and member states alike. The rapid growth in the number of member states during the decolonization process also created pressures to allocate high-level posts to nationals of newly emerging countries, and in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s merit was often secondary to geographic distribution in the recruitment process, even at the lower levels. In resolution 33/143 of 20 December 1978, the General Assembly reaffirmed that the chief consideration in employment of staff was high standards of efficiency and competence, together with the principle of equitable geographical distribution. At the same time, the assembly expressed concern about the urgent need to improve the representation of developing countries at senior policymaking levels—sending a double message to the administration. Robert Jordan, former director of research at UNITAR, and the Dag Hammarskjöld Professor of International Relations at the University of South Carolina at the time, concluded: The pendulum may have swung too far in favor of equitable geographical distribution, and it is time to focus more on efficiency, competence and integrity. Since the organization, in its economic and social activities, exists more to serve the needs of development rather than, for instance, advancing greater industrialization in the advanced industrial states, it stands to reason that the more efficiently the organization’s activities are carried out, the greater the benefits for the newer Member States. (Jordan 1981)

The United States, meanwhile, resisted any pressures to redefine the formula for the allocation of posts in favor of the financially less endowed nations. “[The United States] was determined to resist efforts to reduce the weight assigned to the value of contributions in establishing targets

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to reflect the geographical considerations laid down in the Charter.”20 The battle lines were clearly drawn. As the UN Secretariat did not manage to develop a coherent human resources policy, and as the long-awaited job classification standards failed to materialize even several years after the JIU had derided their slow development, the General Assembly began to look to the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) for guidance. The establishment of this body had been part of the Preparatory Commission’s recommendations in 1945, but it only came about in 1974, as part of the overall reform process. The ICSC consists of fifteen experts, appointed in a personal capacity by the General Assembly. It makes recommendations to the General Assembly and other governing bodies on personnel policies and on conditions of service, including salaries, and it has limited decision-making powers in the area of job classification and certain allowances, such as cost-of-living adjustments and compensation for hardship. Its statute has been accepted by all of the specialized agencies, thus creating a “common system” of salaries and benefits that facilitates mobility across the UN organizations. The Bretton Woods institutions, however, while part of the UN system, are not part of this arrangement, and salaries of World Bank and IMF employees are therefore much higher than those of their UN counterparts. Hence the subtle difference between “the UN system” and “the UN common system.” As the reforms proposed by the JIU had never taken hold in the UN Secretariat, the General Assembly asked the ICSC to develop common job classification standards for all professional posts throughout the UN organizations in order to ensure that the concept of “equal pay for equal work” would permeate the entire “common system” network. It also asked the ICSC to develop a broad framework for the concept of careers and to prepare guidelines for recruitment, training, promotion policy, human resources planning, and performance evaluation. In 1982, the ICSC promulgated a comprehensive job classification system based on a points factor analysis model supported by occupational standards and a fully developed occupational coding system. This made it possible to prepare an inventory of all common system jobs grouped by occupation and to develop career paths across organizations within common fields of work. To some extent, the reform process had moved from the UN Secretariat to the “common system,” and some progress became visible. Once the job classification standards had been implemented by all the organizations, some three years after their promulgation, a framework for mobility had been created that moved the discussion about careers from the level of individual organizations to that of the UN common system as a whole.

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The ICSC’s numerous recommendations made between 1982 and 1986 on personnel policies, furthermore, shaped the thinking about a common approach while respecting the individual characteristics of the participating organizations (Goossen 1990). While these system-wide changes had some impact on the UN Secretariat, they did not resolve its problems. In 1985, the General Assembly created an advisory “Group of 18,” which was composed of high-level intergovernmental experts called upon to reform the UN’s structure. This occurred at a time of severe financial constraints. The United Nations faced a major liquidity crisis, exacerbated by the United States’ withholdings linked to legislation seeking weighted voting on budgetary questions in the United Nations.21 A recruitment freeze played havoc with the ability of the organization to deliver key program elements, and staffing patterns were severely disrupted as the freeze continued for several years. The Group of 18 recommended 15 percent staff cuts across the board, with further cuts at senior levels. Pension benefits were reduced. Cost-of-living adjustments were frozen, further reducing the purchasing power of salaries, which had themselves been frozen since 1975. Promotions were deferred. In this climate, “reform” became a synonym for “cost cutting,” and concerns about career structures or the development of a learning culture were subjugated to a relentless quest for savings. Staff representatives were highly critical of these developments and suspended their participation in most consultative mechanisms where staff welfare matters are discussed. During all these years, before and during the financial crisis, the General Assembly time and again expressed its disappointment about the state of human resources management in the Secretariat, and the secretary-general, year after year, submitted ambitious plans for systemic reforms—but they never materialized. In 1976, the General Assembly, “concerned about the slow pace of the implementation of those reforms [i.e., the JIU proposals],” invited the secretary-general “to accelerate the implementation of the above-mentioned reforms.”22 In 1977, the assembly urged the secretarygeneral to intensify his efforts for the effective implementation of its previous resolutions on personnel reform and requested detailed information on staff demographics as well as on recruiting missions, including “publicity, groups contacted, meetings held, the number interviewed by age and sex, the number of candidates added to the roster, and the number of candidates appointed, and thereafter to report on this matter annually.”23 Needless to say, given the rapid turnover of diplomats in the Fifth Committee, these data were only produced once. In 1980, the General Assembly repeated its concern “about the limited progress achieved in the establishment of a coherent personnel policy” and stressed the need to improve geographical distribution and to in-

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crease the representation of developing countries in senior and policymaking posts.” It then set out the most detailed recruitment procedures ever devised by any governing body: a convoluted scheme whereby vacancies were to be grouped by those “for which it is reasonable to expect several vacancies each year” and those “for which recruitment will be open only at widely spaced intervals.” On the basis of this distinction, work plans would be developed for the recruitment process, and a program of competitive exams was introduced for levels P-1 and P-2, later to be extended to level P-3.24 Movement of General Service staff to these entrylevel posts was limited to 30 percent of the available vacancies, and “a given number of vacancies should be defined and offered to each [underrepresented] country in advance.” Examinations were to be conducted on a national basis, in consultation with the government concerned (an idea first proposed by inspector Bertrand of the Joint Inspection Unit).25 The impact of this decision can be felt to this day, and its unintended consequences continue to hamper the organization’s recruitment efforts. While there is merit in the concept of competitive examinations, and while the Charter emphasizes geographical diversity, the combination of these two mandates into one program has created some odd anomalies. The General Assembly, in insisting on examinations on a national basis, created a situation whereby the UN administration only conducts competitive exams in countries that are underrepresented in the Secretariat. This means that young people from countries within range, such as the United States, have no access to entry-level “core” posts. Around the same time, in the early 1980s, the UN Secretariat abandoned the practice of an annual promotion review and adopted a “vacancy management” process, whereby all posts are advertised, staff as well as external candidates compete (with preference still given to staff), and the candidate selected automatically gets the grade of the post. Seniority requirements to be eligible for selection at a higher level, however, remained intact. Two years later, the General Assembly stressed, among other concerns, the importance of having the largest possible number of member states represented at the higher levels of the Secretariat and welcomed the secretary-general’s intention to develop medium-term plans for recruitment and career development.26 These plans never materialized, and in 1984 the General Assembly, in what had become something of a ritual, deplored “the lack of progress toward meeting the goals and objectives established” with respect to recruitment and career development, especially for women.27 By 1986, a medium-term recruitment plan had been completed, but since a recruitment freeze had gone into effect a year earlier, this had lit-

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tle practical effect. Under the circumstances, the General Assembly could only ask the secretary-general to explore alternatives to the recruitment freeze—not a promising undertaking. At the same time, the assembly maintained its special concern for equitable geographical distribution at the highest levels, particularly for undersecretaries-general and assistant secretaries-general. The problems facing staff, such as the salary cuts and the drastic reduction in posts, were ignored in that year’s resolutions.28 The fact that a relatively large number of posts was cut at the most senior levels caused the General Assembly in 1987 to deplore “the negative effect” on geographical distribution, and in 1988 another resolution was passed that focused exclusively on geographical distribution at the top.29 This obsession with geographical distribution, to the detriment of all other aspects of personnel policy, continued to characterize the considerations of the General Assembly at the beginning of the next decade as well. As the Soviet Union fell apart, a new problem emerged: what to do with the Soviet nationals who happened to be on secondment to the Secretariat when the game of musical chairs came to a sudden halt. For fifty years, the Soviet Union had selected and placed its own candidates, who were rotated regularly and kept on a very short leash (with salaries confiscated by the Soviets and mandatory housing in Soviet compounds). Now these staff members clamored for regular appointments, while the new post-Soviet regimes hoped to fill their allotment of posts with their own protégés. The Administrative Tribunal ruled in favor of the incumbents, notwithstanding the General Assembly’s protestations. Thus, many former Soviet Union “apparatchiks” found a safe haven in the UN’s career service while their empire crumbled. This left the Secretariat, at the end of the Cold War, with a legacy of political wounds created by relentless jockeying for posts by players exerting patronage, by staff cuts and reductions in terms of employment advocated by governments that wanted to gain budgetary control and weighted voting, and by anemic personnel policies and management practices brought about by the benign neglect of a series of weak or unconcerned secretaries-general.

In Remission: Reforms Revisited, Hope Renewed (1994–2001) At the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, in the fall of 1994, the UN Secretariat stepped forward with a full-blown proposal for an integrated human resources management strategy based on the development “of a culture supportive of having staff members contribute to their

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maximum potential, effectiveness, and efficiency.”30 This included the establishment of a planning unit within the Office of Human Resources Management, the introduction of a goal-oriented performance appraisal system (moving away from the traits-based system used earlier), more flexibility in recruitment procedures, improvements in career counseling and training, and renewed efforts to achieve gender balance and equity. Links were made between the overall strategic plans of the organization, the program budget, and the development of skills profiles. This would coincide with an “enhanced attrition program” (euphemism for voluntary separations induced by financial incentives) and new emphasis on mobility across the offices of the United Nations.31 In the following years, particular efforts were made to introduce a performance evaluation system that would create direct links between the achievement of individual performance plans and the overall objectives of the organization.32 In 1997, the secretary-general came forward with an ambitious proposal to introduce a system of performance awards or bonuses, reflecting recommendations made earlier by the International Civil Service Commission.33 The debate about reform further deepened as Secretary-General Annan, who once had been assistant secretary-general for human resources management, took a personal interest in the development of a comprehensive human resources management program. This led to a broad process of internal and external consultations (including the private sector), culminating in the most far-reaching and comprehensive proposal for change and renewal thus far.34 As a companion to his personnel reform proposals, the secretary-general issued a report on accountability and responsibility in the organization, based on the premise that “giving managers more authority and responsibility for decisionmaking is essential to the improvement of delivery of programme objectives.”35 This integrated set of reform proposals for human resources management covered the entire gamut: planning, recruitment, placement, promotion, mobility, contractual arrangements, competencies and continuous learning, performance management, career development and conditions of service. But once again, little was implemented, and what was done hardly represented an improvement over the previous systems. The proposals for the streamlining of the recruitment process, for example, aimed at reducing the overall time to fill a vacancy from 275 to 120 days.36 This was still an excruciatingly long period by any standard. The General Assembly’s decision that all external vacancies must be posted for sixty days contributes to the length of this process—as if the age of information technology and rapid data flow had completely escaped it. While in principle managers now were given a decisive say

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on selection, their discretion was tempered by the oversight of a review body that was supposed to ensure gender equity and geographical balance, and a recourse process involving the Department of Management. Across the street, the UN Office of Project Services, a self-financing entity with performance standards linked to the private sector, was able to hire professional staff members within ten days (Tesner and Kell 2000: 135). The dazzling complexity of the recruitment process in those days, both before and after the 2001 reforms, is best understood from the comparative charts prepared by the UN’s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which are reproduced here as figures 4.1 and 4.2. At this time, the UN’s capacity to develop a credible human resources planning function had become equally doubtful. By now, it had been struggling with this challenge for over thirty years, and according to the Office of Internal Oversight, most of the Human Resources Planning and Management Information Systems Service’s resources were “committed to IMIS [integrated management information system] support activities, such as data cleansing and statistics production, and file maintenance, rather than to planning. Only two temporary junior professional staff are assigned to the planning function, which mainly involves preparing materials for departmental human resources planning meetings.”37 When it came to promotions, mobility, and placement, two conflicting approaches clashed. As noted earlier, since the mid-eighties, the United Nations had moved toward a system of “vacancy management,” whereby each post would be advertised, the selection would be done on a basis of open competition (more often than not including external candidates), and appointments would be made at the grade level of the post. Thus, a promotion required the identification and successful acquisition of a higher-level post. No active placement on the part of the UN’s administration was needed, as the competitive process was self-guiding. Staff either remained where they were, and saw their careers stagnate, or ventured into the internal job market. Often, the best opportunities existed in the field, and thus the choice became stagnation or mobility. Under the round of reforms introduced in 2001, this faith in the markets was replaced by faith in central planning. Rosters of qualified candidates were created as an alternative to vacancy announcements, allowing managers to pick directly from a prescreened set of candidates, and a mobility policy was announced that signified “movement from a voluntary to a managed approach.”38 Post occupancy was time limited, lateral moves were required before upward moves toward a promotion could be permitted, and junior professional staff were assigned to posts across the entire range of UN offices on a rotating basis.39

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These reform proposals included a drastic and much-needed simplification of the current broad array of contractual instruments. The so-called “permanent” contract would be abolished, and only three types of contract would remain: (1) short-term, up to six months; (2) fixed-term, with extensions of up to a maximum total of five years, and (3) continuing, open-ended contracts where service continues as long as organizational requirements are met, and performance is satisfactory. This in itself seemed eminently sensible, but at the same time it hinted at a further erosion of the career service model that was at the base of the UN’s early staffing models. Around the turn of the century, also, at the end of a lengthy and costly consultative process, supported by external consultants, the United Nations arrived at a competency model that included “three core values, eight core competencies, and six managerial competencies, as follows: Core values: integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity; Core competencies: communication, teamwork, planning and organizing, accountability, creativity, client orientation, commitment to continuous learning, and technological awareness; Managerial competencies: leadership, vision, empowering others, building trust, managing performance, and judgement/ decision-making.40 This remains part of the canon to this day, but here the United Nations has fallen into a classical trap, notwithstanding the consultants’ guidance: confusing traits, values, and competencies. These competencies are meant to be applied to the areas of recruitment, staff development, career support, and performance management. But, rather than competencies proper, most of these so-called competencies are traits or intangible values, which are defined as “a cluster of related knowledge, attitudes and skills that affects a major part of one’s job, that correlates with performance on the job, that can be measured against well-accepted standards, and that can be improved via training and development” (Parry 1996; italics added by author). Integrity and respect for diversity are impossible to measure and usually only become manifest by default (and rarely in recruitment interviews or performance evaluations). Creativity and commitment are equally nebulous. Professionalism is in the eyes of the beholder and cannot be imparted in a training course. Vision and leadership are elusive and come in many shapes and colors. It is hard to imagine how these “feel-good” concepts can contribute to better human resources management and create “a culture of continuous learning in the Organization.”41

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Metastasis: Tensions between the Secretary-General and the General Assembly (2001–10) The first decade of our century has often been one of strife between the secretary-general and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, with the referee, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, showing a distinct bias in favor of the member states. In several key areas, reform proposals submitted by the secretary-general have been blocked, and to many observers, this decade looked only too much like its predecessors—a time of ambitious plans running afoul of political realities. In fact, to an outside observer, it often seems as if time has stood still in the UN Secretariat. All the policy issues that were on the agenda in the 1980s, or even in the days of the 1945 Preparatory Commission, still haunt the halls of the General Assembly and remain unresolved. The then secretary-general Kofi Annan, with his long experience at the United Nations in human resources, finance, and peacekeeping operations, understood the need to streamline the contractual system of the Secretariat, which had remained virtually unchanged since 1946. In 2006, he proposed “to modify contractual arrangements and harmonize conditions of service to meet the needs of an increasingly field-based Organization (italics added by author).”42 It took a few years, but finally, in 2008, the General Assembly endorsed the concept and decided, effective 1 July 2009, to merge the 100, 200, and 300 series of the staff rules, respectively covering staff funded from regular budgets, projects, and short-term activities. This was meant to simplify the administration and to grant similar benefits to the staff who had been recruited under the various rules.43 It would put the UN Secretariat personnel in line with those of the funds and programs under the concept of “One United Nations” and ensure that staff would have identical benefits while working together in same functions, especially in the field. “The Organization will need to integrate field and Headquarters staff into one global Secretariat with competitive conditions of service.”44 However, the General Assembly, while agreeing to the merging of the staff rules, did not follow the vision of Kofi Annan of a harmonized system and refused to grant to the Secretariat staff serving on missions the benefits acquired by the staff of funds and programs. The General Assembly decided “that all staff appointed or assigned to non-family missions should be installed in accordance with conditions of the United Nations common system, without the special-operations approach.”45 The cost of providing hardship entitlements across the UN system proved just too high. The merging of the staff rules thus led to an erosion of the benefits for many staff serving in missions, and while it tried to enhance mobility, the

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new system actually became an impediment to mobility. The UN Secretariat staff member who now wished to go on a mission received emoluments for his new post without any compensation to support his family in a different location. This new situation prevented staff members from opting to go on a mission, as they now had to absorb the cost of two-duty stations on one set of benefits. Meanwhile, their colleagues from all other parts of the UN system got adequate “special operations” compensation. By the summer of 2010, it appeared that the harmonization of conditions of service had backfired, leaving bitterness and frustrating recruitment for peace operations. The General Assembly had violated the spirit of the UN Charter, leaving the secretary-general looking foolish. Fortunately, the International Civil Service Commission, which has a mandate to ensure consistency in the terms of employment among the various organizations of the UN Common System, insisted in its annual report to the General Assembly that the harmonization of terms of employment be restored, in the interest of Common System unity, and recommended a solution whereby the existing benefit would be slightly reduced but extended to staff serving in peace operations.46 Reluctantly, the General Assembly “approved the recommendations of the Commission on the harmonization of the conditions of service of staff of the organizations of the UN Common System serving in non-family duty stations, as contained in its annual report for 2010,” to take effect by the middle of 2011.47 In 2009, the Secretariat once again submitted a proposal to replace permanent appointments, reviving the concept of “continuing contracts” (first launched by the ICSC in 1985). Staff with five years of continuous service and good performance, and whose occupation fell into the category of “continuing need,” could be considered for a continuous appointment.48 However, the proposal was not supported by either the staff or the General Assembly, for diametrically opposed reasons. The staff wanted the guarantee of long-term employment provided by the permanent contract system, where the organization is responsible to place staff members in an equivalent position if the program they were working for is no longer funded by the General Assembly and thus their old post is abolished. The proposal was also questioned by the General Assembly, which wanted the United Nations to get as far away as possible altogether from the responsibility of providing long-term employment to the staff. Member states wondered: In a world where technical requirements change rapidly, how does one define the types of functions for which a need can be projected in the future? The proposal of the secretary-general, moreover, was based on the premises that some staff have qualifications, past experience, and training that would demonstrate “transferable skills.” Another concern for the General Assembly was the impact on the geographical distribution of posts. As the proposal

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did not distinguish between local staff in established duty stations and those working in peacekeeping operations, temporary by definition, the General Assembly questioned how the secretary-general could propose to grant “continuing appointments” to locally recruited staff in mission when, by definition, the need for these staff was linked to an operation with a mandate of limited duration. “Individual peacekeeping operations are, by their very nature, temporary. Awarding continuing appointments to locally recruited staff whose service is limited to one operation in one location seems to contradict the principle underlying the introduction of continuing appointments. Accordingly, the local staff employed by those operations should continue to be hired on contracts of a finite duration.”49 At its sixty-fourth session, the General Assembly endorsed the secretarygeneral’s decision to proceed with a “one-time” review of those residual staff who would be eligible for permanent appointments as of 30 June 2009 and to close the door once and for all for any further permanent appointments at the United Nations. This review proceeded slowly, as the pent-up demand was considerable. However, the General Assembly kept postponing the issuance of “continuing appointments,” although the organization’s liability would be limited by existing budgetary provisions. Until the beginning of 2011, everyone thus remained on fixed-term contracts, except the happy few “grandfathered” with the right to a permanent contract. The General Assembly struggled with the development of practical criteria for the granting of “continuing appointments” but finally settled, at its sixty-fifth session, for a system whereby posts must be established for a period of five years or more and staff become eligible after five years of service, provided their service has been satisfactory. Thus far, the decision seemed clear, but the waters were then troubled by the introduction of a points system with seven distinct factors, whereby eligible staff are further ranked to compete for the “posts envelope” actually available, taking into account that more staff qualify based on length of service than can be accommodated against eligible posts. This system, in its fiendish complexity, defies the logic and fairness of the basic principle.50 Once again, the General Assembly has prevailed over the secretarygeneral, and a sound solution has sunk away in the quicksand of political expediency.

Paralysis: A Karmic Cycle of Unresolved Problems (2010 and Beyond) In the fall of 2019, the UN Secretariat and the General Assembly had struggled for yet another decade to square the circle and find a balance between the secretary-general’s authority as the chief administrative of-

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ficer of the organization, under article 97 of the Charter, and the General Assembly, with its broad mandate and power of the purse. Every two years, the General Assembly, and specifically its Fifth Committee, would spend considerable time and effort to review the organization’s human resources policies and practices, and every biennium would be presented as the beginning of a truly transformative era, finally resolving previously intractable conundrums. Thus, at its sixty-seventh session, in the fall of 2012, the General Assembly received yet another ambitious report from the secretary-general, Overview of Human Resources Management Reform: Towards a Global, Dynamic and Adaptable Workforce.51 It introduced a new staff selection system, taking all authority away from line managers and placing final selection recommendations in the hands of “job network boards,” so that managers would “spend less time on recruitment tasks.”52 A new mobility scheme was introduced, enforcing post occupancy limits, with priority given in the filling of vacancies to staff from other duty stations. Promotions to the supervisory level, P-5, would require at least one geographical move. But special boards would be created to review exceptions.53 In order to give the permanent missions of the member states better access to data on human resources, the secretary-general announced the creation of a special electronic information platform for their exclusive use. At the same time, a new Young Professionals Program, replacing the earlier competitive exams, was being implemented, and the first placements had resulted in the summer of 2012. In the absence of an adequate number of posts at the lowest professional levels, this program still raised more hopes than it could fulfill. The performance evaluation system was once again being overhauled, and a learning management system was to be piloted.54 It still took 212 days on average to fill a vacancy, as hiring managers took an average of 112 days to present their choice of the candidates submitted—due to the fact that they would often receive an overwhelming number of files for each opening. Hence—one assumes—the decision to take this responsibility away from them and leave the choice to “job network boards.”55 The Fifth Committee, charged with the oversight of the organization’s management and finances, prepared a resolution for the General Assembly that was highly critical, though carefully shrouded diplomatic language. The committee noted the need to “avoid duplication and contradiction,” as coherence among various human resources management initiatives appeared to be lacking, and asked the secretary-general to redouble his efforts to create and implement a fair performance evaluation system. It also asked to “investigate the reasons for delays at each stage of

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the staff selection and recruitment process” and stressed the importance of “ensuring opportunities for external candidates to be considered for selection and recruitment,” demonstrating again the General Assembly’s concern that the diversity and geographical distribution in the Secretariat might be negatively affected by the advancement of internal candidates. The career system envisaged by the Preparatory Committee well over seventy years ago has apparently made way for a model combining marketoriented strategies with the remnants of a patronage culture.56

Another Lost Decade In this lengthy overview of the Secretariat’s efforts to manage its human resources, there has been one consistent pattern: ambitious efforts at reform, leading to paralysis. As the UN Secretariat itself is now well beyond retirement age, a number of remarkable instances of “déjà vu” deserve to be flagged. Every two years, the General Assembly pays special attention to human resources policy and practices. Every two years, also, the secretarygeneral prepares his Overview of Human Resources Management Reform. Every two years, the ACABQ prepares detailed comments. Every two years, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly dedicates a large portion of its fall session to a review of all this before preparing a draft resolution with its comments and recommendations for adoption by the General Assembly. One might expect a steady stream of improvements. Yet, it sometimes seems as if time instead has come to a stop. There is much on the agenda: conditions of service, the pension system, the young professionals program, geographical distribution. But every biennium, four major themes dominate: workforce planning, staff selection and recruitment, performance management, and mobility.

Workforce Planning: Perpetual Pilot Projects In his overview of reform initiatives undertaken by the summer of 2012, the secretary-general described his efforts to develop a strategy for succession planning, with emphasis on forecasting retirements, in order to speed up recruitment. This would rely on the development of a new electronic information platform and further work on defining job families.57 However, over time the organization had accumulated approximately seven thousand different job codes, many of which were outdated or incomplete. This made any workforce analysis challenging, if not downright impossible.58

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Two years later, the secretary-general flagged new problems in aligning those efforts with the current budgetary framework and the new career development and mobility framework. Further efforts were required. A workforce advisory group had been established, and a new methodology had been elaborated, based on a new vision. A pilot project was in the works.59 In reporting to the General Assembly in the fall of 2016 on progress made, the secretary-general confirmed that a five-step workforce planning methodology had been developed, noting that some successful small-scale pilot projects had proven the value of this methodology. It was now a matter of strengthening workforce planning “at the entity level” and bringing the system in line with job networks, recruitment, and career development.60 In its comments on this report, the ACABQ noted that only 25 percent of the retired staff in a recent sample had been replaced without a gap in service. It further underscored the importance of consistency between other reform initiatives and “the various efforts to improve workforce planning.”61 In his subsequent report on human resources management reform, presented to the General Assembly in 2018, the secretary-general was somewhat reticent on progress made in workforce planning, drawing attention only to a new training guide that had been used in two departments.62 This left much unsaid, and probably better so.

Staff Selection and Recruitment: Overwhelmed The situation in 2012 caused the secretary-general some concern. After the initial posting of a vacancy, it took another 170 days on average to fill it: the time it took managers to come to a recommendation, well over 100 days, was the main bottleneck. Managers complained that they were given literally hundreds of applications to screen for each opening.63 Of the 33,791 applicants in 2011/12 to the Young Professionals Program, 4,426 were selected to take a written examination; of these, 132 were interviewed, and 96 ultimately qualified. Not all of them could be accommodated, though. This foretold a permanent pattern of deception. For those applicants who have not seen these statistics, the program raises hopes that can only be dashed, and lures them into preparatory efforts that are largely a process of self-improvement, leading nowhere. By 2014, a new electronic support system, Inspira, had taken over some of the initial screening workload. While between 2011 and 2013 the number of job openings varied from some 2,100 to 2,500 annually, applications grew from 375,000 in 2011 to 514,000 in 2013—over-

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whelming numbers. The average time it took to fill a vacancy was 213 days, a number flattered by the inclusion of roster candidates, who could readily be brought in. More problems were foreseen for the time that a new mobility system would become operative, requiring a total overhaul of the selection system. All this gave the secretary-general no reasons for optimism.64 Meanwhile, some 33,500 young people applied to the Young Professionals Program each year. Of the few successful candidates in 2012, 35 were placed in a job. Outcomes were no better in 2011 or 2013.65 In his 2016 report on human resources management reform, the secretary-general informed the General Assembly that the number of days it took to fill a nonfield vacancy had grown to an average of 236 days. The reasons were clear: after the Inspira system had electronically screened incoming applications, the ones that survived were sent directly to the managers seeking to fill those vacancies. That implied that hiring managers were required to review 200 to 400 applications for each opening, and then establish log- and shortlists of candidates through written assessments and interviews. However, the secretary-general promised that a completely new system was on its way.66 One can imagine how member states felt about this. The ACABQ lamented a “lack of clarity.”67 This new system was actually announced at the very end of 2015, with the intention of coming into effect in the second half of 2016. It combined new policies and procedures for the selection process with new rules for managed mobility. It focused on the filling of vacancies through internal selection, linked to mandatory mobility, and went to great lengths in presenting detailed definitions and establishing assessment panels, which would conduct written tests and interviews. Program managers would therefore have far fewer applications to consider, often no more than three. This was a big improvement over the hundreds they had to review earlier, but it also represented a total shift in power, away from the manager into the hands of an outside committee. A Global Central Review Board would endorse suitable candidates, and Job Network Boards would provide a third level of review.68 Two years later, the secretary-general’s report on human resources management reform for the period 2017–18 was overshadowed by the extensive reports on mobility issued that same year. But a bit of information on the duration of the recruitment process was still provided. This time, the data included field service staff, who had not been part of the sample in earlier years, and thus the alleged improvement, a recruitment timeline of no more than 159 days, is hard to evaluate (it seems that rapid recruitment from the roster is also folded in).

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Mobility: From Practice to Dogma, and Back Again The UN Secretariat is sui generis. It is not field-based, like its funds and programs, but it does have a global presence beyond New York, ranging from permanent offices in Geneva and the equally permanent sites of the regional economic commissions on various continents to short-term peacekeeping operations in a number of “hardship” countries. Historically, there has always been some mobility among these various positions, but most of the permanent posts in the Secretariat demand skills of a very different type than those in peace operations, where only relatively few human rights specialists, economists, conference staff, or IT technicians can find a place—and then only one funded on an annual basis instead of from an ongoing core budget. So it seemed somewhat odd when all of a sudden mobility became dogma in the Secretariat and an elaborate machinery was created to force this concept down staff’s throat. While it was initially, in 2014, presented broadly, implying moves across occupational groups as much as moves across continents, it soon became clear that the true intent was to have staff transition out of the comfort of established duty stations and into the adventure of the UN’s field operations. Thus, the new multilayered staff selection and recruitment system described above, with all its checks and balances, would now also serve to impose mobility: there would be a limit on the number of years staff could stay in the same post.69 In December 2015, a bulletin issued by the secretary-general formally announced the new system, which would come into force on 1 January 2016. Its introduction would be gradual, starting with one job family and then expanding.70 The secretary-general’s first major report on the implementation of the new system followed in August 2016, and it described in great detail the functions of the Senior Review Board, Job Network Board, Special Constraints Panel, Global Central Review Board, and the network staffing teams. A first pilot attempt had been made with staff in the job network of political affairs, with eight more networks to come. Modest results were noted.71 In the early months of 2018, a new report on mobility came out, which flagged a major hurdle: in order for staff members to be able to participate, “the funding of their position had to be guaranteed for two years. As most of the positions in POLNET are funded annually, that requirement was extremely difficult for field offices to meet.”72 A second report followed in September of that year: the secretary-general called the whole thing off and “paused” in order to reflect. The rationale was lucid, and showed how much time and resources had been wasted: the mobility framework “was based on the experience of other UN entities without considering the specificity of the Secretariat and the dual nature of its

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entities: normative and operational.”73 In other words, the short-term and annually funded field operations could not be integrated into the ongoing work of the core Secretariat. The dogma had met its match: reality.

Performance Management In virtually every organization, public or private, this is a challenging and often contentious component of the human resources management cycle. At the United Nations, an effective system to evaluate the performance has been elusive for decades, and most likely it will never emerge—even after innumerable rounds of review and retooling. There are too many barriers. Staff come from some 190 different countries, with very different cultures, and not all accept the concept of brutal confrontation that is at the root of a ranking system. Staff serving in smaller duty stations, such as field missions, are deeply connected socially and dependent on each other: a bad rating creates animosity but does not lead to the removal of the weakest links, so why bother? Many areas of the UN’s work have such vague mandates that it is very hard to identify valid performance indicators. And above all, there are no meaningful rewards (such as promotions, raises, or bonuses) in the line manager’s toolkit, nor are effective sanctions readily available. In a detailed report on the state of affairs in the area of performance management, the secretary-general admitted as much. Over the biennium 2013–14, only 1 percent of the staff had received a rating “partially meeting expectations” or “not meeting expectations,” while in some departments more that 50 percent received the highest rating, “exceeded expectations”—in all departments and offices taken together, over onethird of the staff “exceeded expectations.”74 While some simplifications of the process were being considered, and while training for staff would be given priority, further policy development would be needed to achieve satisfactory results.75 This report was then withdrawn, so the General Assembly never got to consider it, and a new report was tabled in time for the assembly’s fall 2016 session. Here, the secretary-general argued that it was not a matter of improving the process but of “changing the related culture and behaviours in the Organization.”76 During the 2014–15 cycle, 71 percent of the staff had received a rating whereby they fully met expectations, and 28 percent exceeded expectations: only 1 percent partially met those expectations, or not at all. Therefore, the secretary-general intended to design a system whereby performance would be more closely linked to career progression.77 This proved to be aspirational. In his September 2018 report on human resources management reform to the seventy-third session of the General

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Assembly, the secretary-general stressed that considerable investments had been made in staff training, especially aimed at improving the ability of managers to manage the performance of others. Compliance had gone up, but no ratings distribution data were revealed.

Death and Transfiguration: A Legacy of Self-Inflicted Wounds As the seventy-third session of the General Assembly directed its attention to the administration of the Secretariat, it received a landmark report outlining a “global human resources strategy 2019-2021.” In taking stock of all those past reform efforts, the secretary-general more or less acknowledged defeat. Presenting his “case for change,” he pointed out that “the Organization continues to struggle with the challenge of getting people with the right skills to the right place at the right time. Recruitment is still too slow; many human resources processes are centralized, rigid and cumbersome, and policies are not sufficiently adapted to the field and are not always consistently applied. A fundamental change in mindset is required.” Thus, after all these years, the United Nations is still struggling to adjust its human resources policies and practices to the reality. At the beginning of this chapter, I noted how the profile of the typical international civil servant has changed over the years. To function effectively, the United Nations must be able to attract and retain people with a prominent professional track record, recruit them swiftly while they are still interested and available, compete with the private sector for their skills, give them control over the resources for which they are accountable, create an environment that favors learning and welcomes an honest mistake, give them opportunities to compete for advancement, and, in so doing, demonstrate that the Charter’s insistence on staff of the highest caliber is no hollow phrase. This is no time to stand by idly. In the area of development, the Bretton Woods institutions and new regional initiatives threaten to marginalize the rest of the UN system. In the area of global trade, the WTO overshadows UNCTAD, while the entire multilateral trade system is under siege. In peacekeeping and peacebuilding, large regional organizations such as NATO move in when their essential interests are at stake (as in Afghanistan, the Balkans, or Libya) and play dead when there is nothing to be gained (as in Rwanda or Syria). The United Nations, with a comatose Security Council, gets no more than the crumbs falling off the table, such as Mali. In the delivery of humanitarian assistance, NGOs, bilateral

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agencies, and private contractors are becoming the agents of choice (as became manifest in Iraq and Afghanistan, where they cashed in billions). In this highly competitive environment, the UN system will have to reform its reforms, or go down reforming. Several dilemmas that have crippled the United Nations for generations, however, remain unresolved, and this organizational pathology stands in the way of the UN’s efforts to remain meaningful as the competition mounts. This chapter has tried to shed some light on some, but certainly not all, of these afflictions. When it comes to managing human resources, the following are the obstacles that the United Nations must overcome: •

its addiction to the trappings of a careers-for-life staffing model, with its emphasis on seniority, managed careers, and slow accrual of material benefits such as pensions, while de facto moving into a market-oriented approach with a relatively high turnover;

•

its adherence to a compensation system that uses a poorly paid national government, that of the United States, as its sole comparator—ignoring its competitors;

•

its affection for a “winner-takes-all” pension system that penalizes all but the hardy lifers by depreciating accrued benefits for early leavers;

•

its fear of offending member states, which exert political pressure, by not insisting on merit in staffing, particularly at the highest levels;

•

its reliance on patronage as a survival strategy, especially where outputs are nebulous;

•

its obsession with central control mechanisms and compulsive oversight at the expense of individual initiative and efficiency;

•

its tacit understanding that equitable geographical distribution is defined by the financial clout of wealthy donor countries rather than by the intellectual acumen of individual candidates or countries with more brains than brawn;

•

the persistent gap between its perennial promises to improve human resources management and its capacity to deliver; and

•

its obsession with cosmetic reforms, hiding the root causes of dysfunctionality.

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For most pathologies, there is a cure. For the United Nations, faith healing will not suffice. Surgery may be called for. The decision to take up the scalpel, however, can only come from member states. They have allowed most of the symptoms to fester, and they alone have the power to reverse decades of poor governance at the United Nations. Dirk Salomons is a special lecturer in humanitarian policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. From 2002 until his retirement in 2015, he directed SIPA’s Humanitarian Policy Track and its International Organizations Specialization. Partially overlapping with his academic work, he was managing partner of the Praxis Group, an international consulting firm, from 1997 until 2012. Earlier, from 1970 until 1997, Salomons served in a wide range of management, peacebuilding, and policy advisory functions in several organizations of the UN system, including the FAO, UNDP, ICSC, UNOPS, and UN Secretariat. His most cherished assignment was that of executive director for the UN peacekeeping operation in Mozambique from 1992 to 1993. He has written extensively on the challenges of postconflict recovery, with fieldwork in Chad, Sudan, the DR Congo, and West Africa, as well as in the Middle East (Gaza, Jordan), Mindanao, and the Pacific Islands.

NOTES 1. League of Nations Staff Regulations, art. 16; Preparatory Commission, section D, para. 47. 2. Preparatory Commission: chap. VIII, section 2, E, para. 61. 3. Preparatory Commission: section 2, E, paras. 59–60. 4. A/74/696, para. 10. 5. A/74/82, table 2. 6. Ibid., table 10. 7. Ibid., figure VIII. 8. Ibid., para. 48. 9. Ibid., section 2, A, para. 7. 10. Ibid., section 2, D, para. 54. 11. GA Resolution 153 (III) of 15 November 1947. 12. International Civil Service Advisory Board, Report on Standards of Conduct in the International Civil Service, COORD/CIVIL SERVICE/1986 EDITION, section II, para. 15. 13. Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, ST/GB/Financial Rules/1/Rev.3 (1985), article X. 14. GA Resolution 29/24. 15. JIU/REP/76/8, annexed to A/31/264 of 13 October 1976. 16. A/C.5/31/9.

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17. Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Personnel Problems in the U.N., A/8454, October 5, 1971. 18. JIU/REP/76/8, para. 7. 19. Ibid., para. 16. 20. Doc. A/C/.5/34/SR.33, 13 November 1979, p. 3. 21. For a detailed discussion of UN reforms, see Beigbeder (1990). Some of the underlying issues are further examined in Beigbeder (1997). 22. GA Resolution 31/27, 29 November 1976. 23. GA Resolution 32/17, 11 November 1977. 24. GA Resolution 40/258, 18 December 1983. 25. GA Resolution 35/211, 17 December 1980. 26. GA Resolution 37/235, 21 December 1982. 27. GA Resolution 39/245, 18 December 1984. 28. GA Resolution 41/206, 11 December 1986. 29. GA Resolution 42/220, 21 December 1987; Resolution 43/224, 21 December 1988. 30. A/C.5/49/5, para. 5. 31. GA Resolution 49/222, 18 December 1994. 32. A/C.5/51/55. 33. A/52/30, chap. VI, sect. B.; A/51/950. 34. A/55/253. 35. A/RES/55/270, Summary. 36. A/55/253, annex II, para. 5. The estimate of 275 days was actually contested as being too low. 37. A/55/397, para. 25. 38. A/55.253, para. 40. 39. A/55/253, sections C and D; annex III. 40. A/55/253, para. 58. 41. A/55/253, para. 59. 42. A/60/692, p. 19, proposal 4. 43. A/63/250 and A/64/230. 44. A/60/692, para. 29. 45. A/63/639, para. 27. 46. Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-Fifth Session, Supplement No. 30 (A/65/30). 47. A/RES/65/248, section C. 48. A/64/267, para. 7. 49. A/64/518, para. 14. 50. A/RES/65/247, section V. 51. A/67/324. 52. A/67/324, para. 10 (b). 53. A/67/324, para. 10 (c). 54. A/67/324, table 1. 55. A/67/324, para. 35. 56. A/C.5/67/L.29 and A/67/816.

188 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

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A/67/324, sections III and IV. Ibid. A/69/190, section III.B.1. A/71/323, III.B.1. A/71/557, paras. 24–26. A/73/372/Add.1, section II.B.1. A/67/324, section IV.C. A/69/190, section III.B.2. A/69/190/Add.3, section III.H. A/71/323, section III.B.2. A/71/557, para. 29. ST/AI/2016/1. A/67/324/Add/1, section II. ST/SGB/2016/2. A/71/323/Add.1. A/72/767, para. 10. A/73/372/Add.2, para. 35. A/69/190/Add.2, figure 2. A/69/Add.2, section E. A/71/323, para. 80. A/71/323, section III.B.3.

REFERENCES

Public Documents, League of Nations Secretariat of the League of Nations. 1946. Staff Regulations. Geneva: Secretariat of the League of Nations.

Public Documents, United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations. 1985. ST/GB/Financial Rules/1/Rev.3. New York: Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations. General Assembly. 1971. Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Personnel Problems in the U.N. A/8454. New York: UN. ———. 1976. Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on the Implementation of the Personnel Policy Reforms Approved by the General Assembly in 1974 (JIU/ REP/76/8). A/31/264. New York: UN. ———. 1994. A Strategy for the Management of the Human Resources of the Organization: Report of the Secretary-General. A/C.5/49/5, 21 December. New York: UN.

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———. 2000a. Human Resources Management Reform: Report of the SecretaryGeneral. A/55/253, 1 August. New York: UN. ———. 2000b. Accountability and Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General. A/RES/55/270, 23 July. New York: UN. ———. 2000c. Follow-Up Audit of the Recruitment Process in the Office of Human Resources Management: Note by the Secretary-General. A/55/397. New York: UN. ———. 2000d. Human Resources Management Reform, Accountability and Responsibility, Personnel Practices and Policies and Management Irregularities: Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. A/55/499. New York: UN. ———. 2006. Investing in the United Nations for a Stronger Organization Worldwide: Report of the Secretary-General. A/60/692, 7 March. New York: UN. ———. 2008 Human Resources Management: Report of the Fifth Committee. A/63/639, 30 December. New York: UN. ———. 2009a. Provisional Staff Rules: Report of the Secretary-General A/64/230, 5 August. New York: UN. ———. 2009b. Implementation of Continuing Appointments: Report of the SecretaryGeneral. A/64/267, 7 August. New York: UN. ———. 2009c. Human Resources Management: Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. A/64/518. New York: UN. ———. 2012. Overview of Human Resources Management Reform: Towards a Global, Dynamic and Adaptable Workforce; Report of the Secretary-General. A/67/324, and addendum 1, 22 August. New York: UN. ———. 2013. Human Resources Management: Report of the Fifth Committee. A/67/816, 5 April. New York: UN. ———. 2016a. Overview of Human Resources Management Reform: Report of the Secretary-General. A/71/323, 23 August. New York: UN. ———. 2016b. Human Resources Management: Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. A/71/557, 21 October. New York: UN. ———. 2018a. Mobility: Report of the Secretary-General. A/72/767, 27 February. New York: UN. ———. 2018b. Mobility: Report of the Secretary-General. A/73/79, 12 April. New York: UN. ———. 2018c. Global Human Resources Strategy 2019–2021: Building a More Effective, Transparent and Accountable United Nations. A/73/372, 12 September. New York: UN. ———. 2019. Composition of the Secretariat: Staff Demographics; Report of the Secretary-General. A/74/82, 22 April. New York: UN. ———. 2020. Composition of the Secretariat: Staff Demographics; Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. A/74/696, 13 February. New York: UN.

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International Civil Service Advisory Board (ICSAB). 1986. Report on Standards of Conduct in the International Civil Service. New York: International Civil Service Advisory Board. Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. 1945. Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. New York: Preparatory Commission of the United Nations.

Books and Articles Beigbeder, Yves. 1990. “Administrative and Structural Reform in the Organizations of the UN Family.” In International Administration: Law and Management Practices in International Organizations, edited by Chris de Cooker, 111–41. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ———. 1997. The Internal Management of United Nations Organizations. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Finger, Seymour Maxwell, and John F. Mugno. 1975. “The Politics of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat.” ORBIS 19(20): 45–117. Finger, Seymour Maxwell, and Nina Hanan. 1981. “The United Nations Secretariat Revisited.” ORBIS 25(1): 197–208. Goossen, Dirk-Jan. 1990. “The International Civil Service Commission.” In International Administration: Law and Management Practices in International Organizations, edited by Chris de Cooker, 41–83. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Jordan, Robert S. 1981. “What Has Happened to Our International Civil Service? The Case of the United Nations.” Public Administration Review 41(2): 236–45. Kristinsson, Gunnar Helgi. 1996. “Parties, States and Patronage.” West European Politics 19(3): 57–433. Langrod, Georges. 1968. The International Civil Service. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications. Parry, Scott B. 1996. “Just What Is a Competency?” Training 35(6): 58–64. Tesner, Sandrine, and Georg Kell. 2000. The United Nations and Business: A Partnership Recovered. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

= c ha p te r 5

Fraud, Corruption, and the United Nations’ Culture Yves Beigbeder

Introduction United Nations (UN) organizations have periodically been accused of widespread fraud and corruption. Fraud or poor management have caused financial losses to the organizations concerned and damaged their public image and credibility. The revelation that public funds provided by governments and other contributors have been defrauded by staff members or outsiders or wasted through incompetence or negligence is usually made even more damaging by the high expectations created by the worthy UN ideals—world peace and security, development of poor nations, protection of the environment, promotion of human rights, and humanitarian action—and the erroneous assumption that UN staff should be less subject to human frailties than national bureaucrats or staff of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or profit-making organizations (Weiss 2009). However, in spite of their involvement in high-minded global programs, UN staff as a whole cannot be expected to deviate from human and bureaucratic behavior found in other organizations. Fraud has been defined in 1996 by the Panel of External Auditors of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency as “an intentional act by one or more individuals among management, employees, or third parties, which results in a misrepresentation of financial statements.”1 Corruption is generally defined as an abuse of power or a deviant behavior by employees for personal gain, which can be financial, as in the case of fraud, or nonmaterial, as in the case of favoritism (e.g., giving preferential treatment to a friend

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or a company). Corruption and fraud may involve the use or abuse of privileges by UN staff for their personal gain, embezzlement of UN funds or theft of UN property, the submission of false documents as a basis for undue allowances or grants, the acceptance of undue excess payments, bid rigging, the search for or acceptance of bribes, unauthorized outside financial activities, or other unethical conduct. This chapter is limited to fraud and corruption found in the UN Secretariat, the UN funds and programs, and UN peacekeeping operations, the main targets for public criticism, although a few references will be made to the whole UN system of organizations. It first reviews the applicable UN conduct norms and disciplinary sanctions, then gives a sample of important cases, followed by an overview of the various UN institutions dealing with this topic and the impact of UN culture. The conclusions indicate the many obstacles to addressing fraud and corruption and healing the UN culture.

The Many Rules The United Nations has designed a comprehensive set of standards of conduct, set out first in the UN Charter, then in staff regulations and rules and disciplinary sanctions to be applied in the case of staff misconduct, and finally in secretary-general’s bulletins. Recovery mechanisms have also been approved. Article 101, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter defines the qualities required from candidates for UN employment as the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity: integrity is required before and should be exercised during UN employment. Staff rules and staff regulations set out the principles on human resources policy for the staffing and administration of the Secretariat.2 The secretary-general is required by the staff regulations to provide and enforce such staff rules. Staff regulation 1.2 (g) prohibits staff from using their office or knowledge acquired from their official functions for private gain, financial or otherwise, or for the private gain of any third party. Regulation 1.2 (m) requires that when an actual or possible conflict of interest arises, the conflict must be disclosed by the staff member to his/her head of office, mitigated by the organization and resolved in favor of the interests of the organization. Staff regulation 1.2 (r) requires staff members to respond fully to requests for information from staff members and other UN officials authorized to investigate possible misuse of funds, waste, or abuse. Finally, under staff regulation 1.2 (o), a new financial disclosure obligation was created in order to prevent any financial conflict of interest.

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An Information Circular of 24 March 2005 established that staff members “have the duty to report cases of suspected misconduct either to a higher-level official, whose responsibility is to take appropriate action, or to OIOS [Office of Internal Oversight Services].”3

Disciplinary Measures Failure by staff members to comply with their obligations may amount to misconduct and may lead to a disciplinary process and the imposition of disciplinary measures (rule 10.1 [a]). Disciplinary measures include written censure, loss of steps in grade, suspension without pay, fine, demotion, separation from service, and dismissal. In case of misconduct, a staff member may be required to reimburse the United Nations either partially or in full for any financial loss suffered by the organization as a result of his or her actions, if such actions are determined to be willful, reckless, or grossly negligent (rule 10.1 [b] and 10.2). Following the completion of an investigation, the staff member concerned must be notified in writing of the charges against him or her and given the opportunity to respond. The staff member must also be informed of the right to seek the assistance of counsel in his or her defense through the UN Office of Staff Legal Assistance, or from outside counsel at his or her own expense (rule 10.3). A staff member against whom disciplinary measures have been imposed may submit an application to the UN Dispute Tribunal. An appeal against a judgment of the tribunal may be filed with the UN Appeals Tribunal. In a number of cases, the United Nations has sought and obtained the assistance of national law enforcement authorities such as police and courts to complement internal administrative sanctions with national criminal prosecution and possible sentences involving incarceration and fines.

Recovery Procedures Wrongdoing may involve defrauding the organization of small or large amounts of funds. Once a case has been thoroughly investigated and fraud clearly attributed to a staff member or former staff member, the interests of the organization and basic justice require that these funds be recovered by the organization. A 1992 report by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)4 noted that, in quite a few cases, efforts toward recovery of misappropriated funds or other losses to the organization had been negligible or unsuccessful, due in some cases to the individual having left the jurisdiction of the United Nations. When losses incurred by

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the organization are recoverable from the staff member, deductions may be affected by the staff member’s salary and other emoluments, including termination payments. However, this is only feasible when the staff member is still employed by the United Nations and when the sums involved do not exceed the staff member’s credits. Recovery of indebtedness cannot, however, be obtained directly from the pension entitlements of staff members. In addition to recovery action taken internally, cases may be referred to national authorities with a view to recovering the full amount of indebtedness to the United Nations or obtaining compensation for damages. A 2016 JIU report has found that such referrals have been mostly ineffective throughout the UN system.5 In some instances, the Office of Legal Affairs estimated that the cost of the required procedures was in excess of the sums that the United Nations could expect to recover.

Selected Cases of Fraud or Corruption These cases came to media interest over the period 1996–2019. They are also found in annual reports of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), in a few judgments of the UN Administrative Tribunals, and in reports by human rights NGOs.

The Oil-for-Food Program The Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP) was run by the United Nations from 1996 to 2003 with more than $100 billion in transactions: large-scale failures in the UN’s management and auditing of this program damaged the reputation and credibility of the organization, which was charged with mismanagement and corruption. While it provided some relief to the Iraqis,6 it benefited Saddam Hussein’s government by generating illicit revenues through oil smuggling, illicit commissions, and surcharges on commodity and oil contracts. The Iraq Survey Group7 estimated these illicit revenues at $10.9 billion. Audit reports by OIOS released in January 2005 found recurring problems in procurement, financial and asset management, personnel and staffing, project planning and coordination, security, and information technology. These audits, conducted from 1999 to 2004, showed a lack of oversight and accountability by the offices and units concerned. In April 2004, facing mounting criticisms and accusations, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan had to establish an external body, the UN Independent Inquiry Committee (IIC), headed by former US Federal Reserve

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chair Paul Volcker, to investigate allegations of mismanagement and misconduct within the program. The IIC, following five interim reports, issued its final report in September 2005. The report’s main conclusions were: The OFFP had achieved important successes toward its most notable ends: depriving Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction and maintaining minimal standards of nutrition and health in the face of a potential crisis; The UN Secretariat lacked adequate controls and auditing, which allowed isolated instances of corruption among senior UN staff as well as those working in the field; The United Nations requires stronger leadership from its executive, comprehensive administrative reform, and more reliable controls and auditing (Volcker, Goldstone, and Pieth 2005). The report showed the reluctance of both the secretary-general and the deputy secretary-general to recognize their own responsibility for the program’s shortcomings. There was a lack of oversight on the administration of the Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) and on its executive director, Benon Sevan. To some extent though, the Security Council had built incentives to defraud into the design of the OIP. In order to entice Saddam Hussein to go along with the initiative, he was authorized to set the price of the oil sold (with the revenues going into the trust fund to meet humanitarian needs). This enabled him to sell oil below market value to cronies who then pocketed the difference and sent kickbacks to Saddam’s Swiss bank accounts: a voucher from Saddam entitling the recipient to buy oil under this scheme was a valuable asset. Sevan reportedly accepted bribes from Saddam Hussein in the form of such oil vouchers. On 7 February 2005, Kofi Annan suspended Sevan with pay for his role in the fraud. Volcker’s report found that Sevan had accepted such bribes and recommended that his immunity be lifted to allow for a criminal investigation. Sevan resigned from the United Nations on 7 August 2005, one day before the report was released. He reportedly fled the United States to return to his native country, Cyprus. In January 2007, Sevan was charged in a seven-count US federal criminal indictment for taking kickbacks in exchange for steering lucrative contracts for buying Iraqi oil to an Egyptian oil trader in 2001. He, and another UN staff member, were charged with wire fraud and conspiracy. Sevan’s lawyer called the charges “baseless” and maintained his client’s innocence.

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Nevertheless, Sevan has not returned from Cyprus to face a trial in the United States (Crook 2007: 485–86). His impunity, however, has not been challenged, and he is enjoying his full pension benefits as a UN retiree in his own country.

Cases in UN Headquarters in New York François Loriot8 reports on a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) case of “Institutional Amnesia on Accountability Issues.” In the early 1990s, contractual overpayments, corruption, and bribery concerning the UNDP’s Reserve for Field Accommodation (RFA) contracts led to estimated losses of over $25 million in the construction of housing and office units for the UN African operations. When these losses were disclosed to the UNDP Executive Board in 1995–96, member states’ delegates expressed their outrage and requested strong action to identify the responsible officials, to recover the financial losses, and to prosecute staff members and third parties involved. Audit and investigation teams found responsibilities up to the level of an assistant secretary-general (ASG) and his deputies.9 The ASG was reprimanded and his contract not renewed by the UNDP as a result of the improprieties and failures in these construction projects. A few days later, the same ASG was rehired in another ASG position in the UNDP. Yet, a lower-level official was sanctioned: Mr. G., the ASG’s subordinate, was summarily dismissed, after which he appealed to the UN Administrative Tribunal. He was later indicted by a US grand jury for fraud and bribery in his RFA management and charged before a New York criminal court. He died before a verdict was reached in that court and before the UN tribunal had rendered a judgment in his case. The fraud case of Sanjay Bahel, former chief of the UN Commodity Procurement Section from 1999 to 2003, a senior official of the Indian Defence Auditing Services on secondment to the United Nations, raised concern over the Investigations Division (ID) of OIOS. A first investigation totally exonerated Bahel of any culpability in fraudulent activity. Following the assumption of duty of Inga-Britt Ahlenius as the new undersecretarygeneral of OIOS and another investigation, this finding was reversed. In June 2007, a jury in New York Southern Court found Bahel guilty on six federal criminal counts, for bribery, wire fraud, and mail fraud. He had helped a friend to secure $50 million in contracts with the United Nations in exchange for a huge discount on two luxury Manhattan apartments and cash (Lee 2006). According to an IO Watch report of 2009,10 the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) has suffered “active and long-established

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cronyism and nepotism,” as well as mismanagement and unaccountability. It refers to a Mr. G.B., a former head of a DESA unit promoting “good governance” who allegedly “recklessly mismanaged a $2.8 million Greek trust fund development project.” An OIOS investigation found that he had committed “gross negligence” and recommended that he be held “personally accountable and financially liable.” His DESA superiors allegedly blocked any such action. Ban Ki-moon finally called for disciplinary action, but only after G.B. had retired, also, on full pension. In the period July 2015 to June 2016,11 229 matters pertaining to non-peacekeeping operations were reported to the OIOS Investigations Division, representing an increase of 29 percent over the previous year. Following an evaluation, 64 were to be dealt with by the division and 95 matters referred to other entities—48 reports were issued during the period. In 36 of these reports, the allegations were substantiated. They mainly concerned criminal activity, financial issues, fraud, management, personnel, procurement, and prohibited conduct (as well as sexual abuse and harassment, not reviewed in this chapter). The average time taken to complete an investigation and issue the report was fourteen months— however, in June 2016, there were still 58 matters under investigation that had been pending for an average of six months. The financial implications of OIOS recommendations for the report period were estimated at $18,779,506 while only a few, representing $2,120,854, were implemented.12

Peacekeeping Operations The expansion of peacekeeping operations with large military contingents under national control into many countries, under difficult and often dangerous conditions, has been a major challenge for the UN oversight system. In 2007, OIOS issued 154 oversight reports related to peace operations.13 In her report of 23 February 2009 on peacekeeping operations in 2008, Inga-Britt Ahlenius, undersecretary-general for Internal Oversight Services, wrote that, overall, the results summarized in the report largely mirror what has been observed repeatedly in the past: substantial deficiencies in internal control have exposed the Organization to unnecessary risk and in some cases have facilitated the mismanagement and misuse of resources. Lack of standard operating procedures, poor planning and inadequate management and record-keeping are just a few of the types or repeated deficiencies highlighted. It must be stressed that the establishment and the exercise of proper internal controls are a core responsibility of management.

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According to its annual report for 2015,14 OIOS issued 162 oversight reports related to peace operations in 2015. The reports included 524 recommendations, 63 of which were classified as critical to the organization. Matters investigated by OIOS involve sexual exploitation and abuse, fraud, corruption, and procurement. The highest number of investigation reports related to personnel issues, including falsification of documents, misuse of information and communications technology resources, recruitment irregularities, conflict of interest, and abuse of authority. Investigation activities involved nine peacekeeping missions. Many cases showed either collusion between UN staff members or UN peacekeepers with local militia groups, or business contacts or internal conflicts between senior UN officials, and in all cases a lack of adequate control and a lack of accountability. According to its annual report for 2017,15 OIOS issued 204 oversight reports relating to peace operations in 2017. They included 552 recommendations, 13 of which were classified as critical to the organization. In this period, the Investigation Division issued 125 reports, giving priority to the investigation of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Other cases involved misconduct of peacekeepers and procurement activities. Investigations were carried out in 10 UN missions.

Funds and Programs While the specialized agencies of the UN system are autonomous, with their own governance structure, the UN funds and programs have been created by the UN General Assembly, and they fall under the administrative authority of the secretary-general. While some of this authority has been delegated to the heads of the funds and programs, entities such as the UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHCR, and UNRWA all largely have to play by UN rules and regulations, and they also have had to deal with their share of scandals. In November 2019, Pierre Krähenbühl, the head of the agency for Palestinian refugees UNRWA, suddenly resigned amid a misconduct probe. The agency’s internal ethics office had found “abuses of authority for personal gain, to suppress legitimate dissent and to otherwise achieve personal objectives,” and a further OIOS investigation then led to a statement from the secretary-general’s office that “managerial issues” had been found that “need to be addressed” (Parker and Slemrod 2019). UNAIDS, the joint program to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic, also faced serious problems in 2018, including instances of sexual assault, administrative denials, and intimidation. Allegations were cast against its

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deputy executive director, Luiz Loures, but he was exonerated in a mismanaged internal review, although he admitted to “kissing and engaging in physical contact with staff which may be viewed as inappropriate.” This then led to calls for an independent investigation by the Treatment Action Campaign, especially when other women came forward who had earlier feared to speak up (The Lancet 2018: 1550). At the UN Environment Program, Erik Solheim, its head, was forced to resign at the end of 2018 by the secretary-general after audit findings were leaked showing a massive misuse of funds—for example, spending nearly half a million dollars in air travel and hotels in twenty-two months—and being absent from Headquarters 80 percent of the time (Crossette 2019). In early 2019, a draft report was leaked by an independent task force that had found “unacceptable workplace behaviours” at UNICEF. The study had been commissioned by UNICEF’s executive director, Henrietta Fore, to examine the role of discrimination and abuse of authority in the organization (Lieberman 2019). While the report itself was harsh in identifying multiple cultural issues across UNICEF’s global range of activities, including favoritism and lack of trust, it should also be noted that such an honest effort to confront its inner demons sets UNICEF apart among its peers.

A Complex Oversight System The UN oversight system includes an internal mechanism, part of the Secretariat—OIOS—and two external, independent mechanisms—the UN Board of External Auditors and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), an interagency body. Other intergovernmental or expert bodies—ACABQ and the Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC)—provide the General Assembly with additional assessments and recommendations on administrative and financial questions.16 The General Assembly is assisted in its oversight governance functions by the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, a subsidiary body of the assembly, which started functioning in January 2008.17 Its five members are senior-level experts in the field of financial audit and/or other oversight-related expertise. Among these bodies, only OIOS fulfills the hands-on functions of financial inspection and investigation,18 in particular with the detection of management and financial irregularities, including fraud, that result in financial losses to the United Nations. The various funds and programs, such as the UNDP, rely on their own Internal Audit units to provide for investigations, in consultation with OIOS as required.

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The Office of Internal Oversight Services The General Assembly expressed “concern” in 1990, 1991, and 1992 about cases of deficiencies in program and financial management and inappropriate or fraudulent use of resources as reported by the UN Board of Auditors (Res. 45/235, 46/183, 47/211). Under pressure from the assembly and in response to a specific US demand, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Mohamed Aly Niazi (Egypt) as assistant secretary-general for inspections and investigations as of 1 September 1993. As an instance of financial blackmail, the US Congress withheld 10 percent of the US contribution to the UN budget for 1993, then 20 percent for 1994, until the US secretary of state had certified that an independent inspector-general had been appointed. OIOS was established in 1994 by the General Assembly (Res. 48/2188). It conducts internal audits, monitors and evaluates the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of programs and mandates, conducts inspection of programs and organizational units, and investigates reports of mismanagement and misconduct. It covers all UN activities under the secretary-general’s authority.19 The head of OIOS is the undersecretary-general for OIOS. He or she is appointed by the secretary-general, following consultations with member states, and is approved by the General Assembly for one five-year term without possibility of renewal. OIOS reports are submitted to the secretary-general, who in turn submits them to the General Assembly together with any comments he might consider appropriate. Reports are also provided to the Board of Auditors and the Joint Inspection Unit. The Fifth Committee of the General Assembly also reviews the functions and reporting procedures of OIOS, which is divided in three main divisions: Internal Audit, Investigations, and Inspection and Evaluation. In 2019, OIOS had 294 staff members and a budget of $61,500,000.20 The Investigations Division (ID), the focus of this section, is responsible for investigating reports of violations of UN regulations, rules, and other administrative issuances, i.e., fraud, corruption, waste, and abuse, and for transmitting their results to the secretary-general with appropriate recommendations to guide the secretary-general in deciding on jurisdictional or disciplinary action to be taken. However, ID does not have an independent budget and is dependent on the organizations to be investigated for funding. Investigations in peacekeeping operations are funded by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This system of various sources of funding, and funding by those to be investigated, inevitably creates conflicts of interest and weakens the authority of OIOS. Moreover, ID’s role is limited to fact-finding and issuing recommenda-

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tions. It is neither a police unit nor a prosecuting authority with regard to disciplinary, administrative, or judiciary matters. Disciplinary decisions can only be taken by the Human Resources Division following a review by the Ethics Committee. Such decisions are subject to appeal and judgments by the UN Administrative Tribunals.

Evolution, Internal Crises, and Challenges In 2005, measures were taken to strengthen the capacity of OIOS audit and investigatory work. Circulars gave instructions on “Reporting of Suspected Misconduct” and on “Protection against Retaliation for Reporting Misconduct and for Cooperating with Duly Authorized Audits or Investigations.”21

The Procurement Task Force, 2006–7 A Procurement Task Force was established in January 2006 as a temporary body within OIOS to address fraud and corruption in the procurement function of the United Nations, both at headquarters and in peacekeeping missions.22 It reported significant findings of corruption, fraud, waste, abuse, negligence, and mismanagement in a number of high-value contracts in six of the seven peacekeeping missions examined, reflecting in part a deficiency in the UN internal control systems. Although the UN auditors23 considered that the task force did not expose widespread corruption at the United Nations, they felt that its existence may have served as a deterrent. It also helped to eliminate undesirable suppliers from the UN list of vendors. The task force recommended legal action in thirteen cases. In spite of its successful track record, a number of member states (Russia and Singapore in particular) refused to extend its mandate beyond 31 December 2008 (Schaefer 2009).

The Erling Grimstad Report, 2007 Erling Grimstad submitted his Review of the OIOS Investigative Division, United Nations on 26 June 2007 to the head of OIOS. It contains severe criticisms of ID for its lack of effectiveness and quality work.24 A built-in problem is that, as ID recommendations are purely advisory and nonbinding, the immediate supervisor of the staff member under review is responsible for taking the next course of action, such as referring the matter for administrative or disciplinary action. This creates the potential for miscarriages of justice where in spite of evidence of serious wrongdoings, in violation of the organization’s rules and regulations, no

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disciplinary or criminal investigation action is taken against an alleged perpetrator, possibly because of close links between the immediate supervisor and the accused. This may be also attributed to a lack of courage on the part of the head to confront and sanction his/her subordinate, or to an ill-placed sense of solidarity with his/her staff. ID investigators operate in an extremely difficult environment, in part due to the lack of a coherent and efficient judicial system within the organization, lack of an independent budget, conflicts at the senior management level, and micromanagement by top management—even, at times, by the General Assembly. They have to function in peacekeeping operations in areas with underdeveloped state structures, threats or unsafe conditions, political instability, or difficult or impossible access to vendors or other witnesses outside the organization. Their motivation may suffer due to a lack of confidence in the final results of their work. Other obstacles include language problems and culture challenges. The review blamed a “volatile management style that is driven by an obsessive and excessive need for confidentiality, on a par with the style of intelligence organizations.”25

Other Issues In July 2010, a clash between the departing undersecretary-general for oversight services, Inga-Britt Ahlenius, and the secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, exposed the disarray in OIOS, with the fundamental conflict between the need for an effective and strict control of managers’ performance and behavior and the risk of antagonizing these managers’ member states, and political constraints. In her letter of 14 July 2010, Ahlenius reported that, in spite of Ban’s good intentions, there was a lack of accountability and no transparency. She also did not see any signs of reform in the organization. For her, the Secretariat was “drifting into irrelevance.” She accused the secretary-general of having strived to control OIOS, which undermined its position, and undermined her authority to make her own selection of a candidate for the top investigations job. Ban replied on 19 July and rejected her charges. He fully recognized the operational independence of OIOS but as secretary-general had to respect UN recruitment policies on geographical and gender distribution (Ahlenius 2010; Nambiar 2010).26 Diplomats and lawyers contended that no important cases of financial fraud had been identified since the Volcker Committee ceased to function and that most allegations were simply bounced back to the agency where they originated.27 On 28 July 2010, the General Assembly approved the secretary-general’s proposal to appoint Carman LapointeYoung of Canada, a highly qualified candidate, to replace Ahlenius as of 13 September 2010 (UN Press Release, General Assembly 2010).

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In June 2015, OIOS’s Inspection and Evaluation Division issued a report acknowledging “excessively long delays in completing investigations by the Investigations Division between 2008 and 2013, with 16 months as the average time for an investigation. The longest investigation lasted 62 months, while the quickest was wrapped up in a month” (Lynch 2015). At the end of her five-year term of office in September 2015, LapointeYoung reported28 that although the vacancy rates (unfilled posts in OIOS) remained high, the division had successfully investigated a number of major frauds committed by implementing partners of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). However, “efforts to recover fraudulently used funds and prosecuting perpetrators of these crimes have not yet been successful.” In addition, “another issue that remains to be dealt with is the frequency with which staff members in the Organization avoid responding to allegations of misconduct, and ultimately avoid accountability altogether by taking paid sick leave. If our internal administration of justice system is ever to be seen as an effective proxy to its external equivalent, this extensive practice of allowing evasion of (indeed rewarding) inappropriate behaviour must be outlawed.” These very serious charges addressed to the UN Administration should have been followed up, investigated, and publicly reported on. They were not. Lapointe’s report did not mention her call on Susana Malcorra, the UN secretary-general’s chief of staff, in January 2015 when, according to a Foreign Policy article of 26 August 2015, she wanted to “decapitate” the Investigation Division for having grown consumed by interoffice backbiting and score settling. Lapointe later developed a plan to target the Investigation Division’s director and four other top managers for dismissal.29 No such plan was approved. The report submitted by Lapointe’s successor, Heidi Mendoza, in July 2016 did not raise any such issues: for her, “while some internal and external challenges remain, there is certainly no need to reinvent the wheel.” She even asserted that “during 2015 there was no inappropriate scope limitation that impeded the work or independence of OIOS.”30

Retaliation against Whistleblowers The Joint Inspection Unit has emphasized that “whistle-blowing and protection against retaliation are essential components of an organization’s accountability and integrity; when responses are inadequate, or systems are weak, personnel are deterred from coming forward to report misconduct and wrong-doing. This increases the risk of substantive damage to the organization’s reputation and undermines operations.”31

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Several reports of the same unit have shown the deficiencies in identifying, preventing, and punishing retaliation against whistleblowers in UN organizations. In January 2006, an Ethics Office was created at UN Headquarters in New York: it is responsible, in part, for managing and overseeing the new whistleblower protection scheme. It soon revised financial disclosure policies and developed ethics training programs for staff. An Ethics Committee was then created in January 2008. Its mandate is to establish a unified set of ethical standards and policies and advise on complex issues raised by Ethics Offices or the chairperson of the Ethics Committee, the results of which have UN system–wide implications. UN funds and programs may set up their own Ethics Offices—or be covered by the UN Secretariat’s Ethics Office. In August 2009, the secretary-general approved the text of a code of ethics for UN personnel prepared by the Ethics Committee, which was then submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration and endorsement.32 The protection against retaliation for reporting misconduct and for cooperating with audits or investigations was promulgated in a secretarygeneral’s bulletin of 19 December 2005.33 It actually sets out a slow, complex, and weak process: a staff member complaining of retaliation has to submit a complaint to the Ethics Office, which is then referred to OIOS for investigation and recommendation, then returned to the Ethics Office, which, in turn, may recommend measures to the head of department or make a recommendation to the secretary-general, while the Ethics Office may, pending the completion of the investigation, recommend that the secretary-general take measures to safeguard the interests of the complainant. Retaliation against an individual because that person has reported misconduct constitutes misconduct, which, if established, will lead to disciplinary action or transfer to other functions. An individual who has suffered retaliation retains the right to seek redress through the internal recourse mechanisms. In the introduction of its 2010 report on Ethics in the United Nations System,34 the Joint Inspection Unit wrote that “the establishment of the ethics function can help to limit problems and foster a culture and atmosphere of integrity and accountability.” This cautious expectation was however corrected by the inspectors’ finding that “there was a strongly held perception throughout the UN System of a pervasive culture of secrecy in the decision-making processes of the organizations and little or no accountability. Against this background, there was little staff buy-in to the ethics function, which was viewed merely as a management device that did nothing to address the underlying problem. Without staff confidence and staff involvement, however, the ethics function will struggle

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to make an impact.” The inspectors then stressed the “paramount” importance that the ethics function operates independently of management and made several recommendations to that effect. In their report on Fraud Prevention, Detection and Response in United Nations System Organizations of 2016,35 the inspectors found that “whistleblowers alone account for the uncovering of more fraud and corruption than all other measures of fraud detection combined.”36 However, “integrity and ethics surveys and reports, conducted internally by some United Nations system organizations, indicate that whistle-blower reporting and protection against retaliation rank high among problem areas reported by staff.”37 The UN Ethics Office, in the first ten years of existence (2006–15), following prima facie review and subsequent investigation by OIOS, made a final determination in only four cases.38 Furthermore, in a few cases, the UN Appeals Tribunal, while acknowledging that retaliation measures had been taken, rejected the appeals based on the findings of the Ethics Committee on the ground that no administrative decision had been taken by that committee, ignoring the stress, pain, and the serious material and moral damage experienced by some of the complainants. A JIU fraud survey of 2016 revealed that more than half of the respondents were not certain they would be protected against retaliation if they reported fraud.39 The 2018 JIU report on whistleblower policies and practices in 28 UN organizations, which together employ more than 150,000 personnel,40 shows a high level of underreporting of misconduct/wrongdoing and retaliation. Between 2012 and 2016, a total of 10,413 misconduct and wrongdoing cases were reported to the oversight offices of these organizations. In the same period, a total of 278 retaliation cases were formally reported to the designated channels in 18 organizations. Of these, a total of 62 prima facie cases of retaliation were determined and forwarded for investigation. Retaliation was substantiated in only 20 cases. Underreporting of both misconduct/wrongdoing and retaliation against whistleblowers was widely mentioned in interviews with staff in the surveyed organizations, including ethics and oversight officers, ombudsmen, human resources professionals, managers, and staff associations. The main reasons for nonreporting were personal fears or risks of reporting and lack of confidence in the reporting systems and functions in place. Another failing is the perceived or built-in lack of independence of the Ethics Office and the various organizational oversight offices, including OIOS. The Joint Inspection Unit has recommended that members of all such units should enjoy independence through time-limited employment and the production of an annual report submitted to the relevant organization’s governing body of member states. The report should include misconduct/wrongdoing and retaliation cases, specifically the allega-

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tions, findings, and outcomes, including administrative action taken, with due respect to confidentiality. Besides this exigency for transparency, executive heads should develop, publicly support, and demonstrate by their own action a culture of accountability.

A Few Notorious Cases of Retaliation The first case concerns allegations of financial corruption by UN officials, while the others concern nonfinancial allegations of obstruction and retaliation against the whistleblowers. A whistleblower, James Wasserstrom (USA), the former head of the Office for the Coordination of Oversight of Publicly Owned Enterprises in the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), complained on 3 May 2007 to the UN Ethics Office about retaliation because he reported misconduct (allegations of a lucrative kickback scheme linking senior UN officials to a local utility company) to and cooperated with OIOS.41 “The acts of alleged retaliation against him were the closure of his office, ending his assignment with UNMIK and commencing an unauthorized and unwarranted investigation against him in the course of which he was treated in a manner that was appalling and in breach of his rights to due process.” On 29 July 2007, the Ethics Office found that there was a prima facie case of retaliation under the terms of Section 5 of ST/SGB/2005/21 and forwarded the case to the Investigation Division of OIOS for investigation. Based on the OIOS report, the Ethics Office concluded on 21 April 2008 that “there … cannot be a finding of retaliation in this case.” Mr. Wasserstrom then appealed to the UN Dispute Tribunal (UNDT), which determined that the decision of the director of the Ethics Office that retaliation did not occur was an “administrative decision” and that his appeal was receivable, overruling the secretary-general’s opposite position. In its judgment on liability, the tribunal concluded that the Ethics Office had failed to carry out an independent and proper review of the OIOS report and that its uncritical acceptance of the OIOS conclusion of no retaliation was an error in law. The tribunal then awarded Mr. Wasserstrom $50,000 as compensation for “non-pecuniary damages at the extremer top of the end of the scale” and $15,000 for the secretarygeneral’s “manifest abuse of proceedings.” The case was then heard by the UN Appeals Tribunal. In its judgment of 27 June 2014, the tribunal decided by majority, with Judge Mary Faherty dissenting, that the Ethics Office recommendations are not administrative decisions subject to judicial review and reversed the UNDT’s Judgment on Receivability and Liability (except for the $15,000 award). The Appeals Tribunal confirmed its jurisprudence in the Nguyen-Kropp

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and Postica case, set out in a judgment of 30 June 2016 (judgment 2016UNAT-673): the Ethics Office recommendations are not administrative decisions subject to judicial review. At the same time, the tribunal acknowledged that in the case of Mr. Wasserstrom, as in the case of the appellants, the Ethics Office failed in its duty to make a recommendation pursuant to Section 5.7 of the UN Bulletin ST/SGB/2005/21: “Under the law as it presently stands, the [UN] Tribunals do not have the power to order the Ethics Office to comply with Section 5.7, nor to order the SecretaryGeneral to take action when the Ethics Office fails to do so. The remedy to such a situation rests with the General Assembly.” The two appellants had been subjected to a damaging retaliatory investigation, publicized by OIOS, which had them treated with suspicion in professional circles: neither award of professional or moral damage nor apology was granted to them. The Kompass case is another cause célèbre. In July 2014, Anders Kompass, a former Swedish diplomat, director of the Foreign Operations and Technical Cooperation Division of the UN Geneva-based Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), received a report written by a human rights officer in the M’Poko camp in the Central African Republic (CAR) (Edwards 2016). The report gave evidence of sexual abuse of boys by French peacekeeping troops in CAR, but the United Nations failed to raise the alarm and stop the abuses. In the absence of a proper UN response, Kompass gave the report confidentially to the French Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. French military and government authorities then initiated an investigation. The UN response, when it came, was to ask Kompass to resign, and when he declined, he was suspended from his duties on 17 April 2015 by the high commissioner for having given a confidential UN report to a member state without official authorization by the United Nations. On 6 May 2015, a judge on the UN Dispute Tribunal ordered the United Nations to immediately lift the suspension, a prima facie unlawful decision (Laville 2016). In a statement to the tribunal, Kompass stated that he had informed his supervisor, the deputy high commissioner, in July of his leaking the report to the French. The United Nations denied it. Kompass was then publicly and privately the object of a campaign to malign him and his action on behalf of the children by claiming that he had endangered them by reporting the abuses. Under pressure by several governments, the UN secretary-general set up a three-person independent panel to review the United Nations’ response to the reports of child sexual abuse and its treatment of Kompass (Anyadike 2016). On 17 December 2015, Kompass was exonerated by the panel, which found that three officials had specifically “abused their authority”: Babacar

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Gaye, the special representative of the secretary-general for MINUSCA; Carman Lapointe, head of OIOS; and Renner Onana, chief of the Human Rights and Justice Section in MINUSCA. Gaye was fired by the UN secretary-general in August 2015. Lapointe, who initiated the internal investigation into Kompass, resigned after the regular completion of her nonrenewable five-year term in September 2015. Susanna Malcorra, Ban’s chief of staff, was also criticized by the panel over a “conflict of interest”: she had facilitated a meeting with OIOS and the UN Ethics Office, two offices formally independent of one another, to discuss what to do with Kompass. On 8 January 2016, OIOS notified Kompass that its investigation had also cleared him of leaking. The whole affair showed that the watchdogs and responsible officials, who were supposed to protect staff and civilians—in this case even protect children from sexual abuse—did not do so and lacked independence and accountability. After thirty years’ service for the United Nations, Kompass resigned on 31 August 2016 in protest over what he sees as the United Nations’ failure to hold its senior officials to account: “The complete impunity for those who have been found, in various degrees, [to have] abused their authority, together with the unwillingness of the hierarchy to express any regrets for the way they acted toward me sadly confirms that lack of accountability is entrenched in the United Nations.” He told the news service IRIN, “This makes it impossible for me to continue working here.” Several other cases and judgments involve Caroline Hunt-Matthes, a former UNHCR senior investigator. In 2003, Hunt-Matthes was instructed to conduct a rape investigation in Sri Lanka in which the alleged rapist, a UNHCR staff member, had been transferred (Hunt-Matthes and Gallo 2017: 8–9). Her investigations resulted in the firing of the rapist but were met by repeated obstruction. She was separated from UN service on 27 August 2004 based on a flawed negative performance appraisal. In 2006, she applied to the UN Ethics Office for protection against retaliation, providing evidence of obstruction and overt interference from senior officials in the conduct and outcome of her investigations. Her application was rejected. In 2013, the UN Dispute Tribunal found in two judgments that her termination had been an act of “retaliation against her for questioning the UNHCR investigation methods and requesting investigations into the conduct of some senior officials.”42 The tribunal also found the UN Ethics Office negligent in its failure to protect Hunt-Matthes. In 2014, the United Nations appealed against both UNDP judgments to the UN Appeal Tribunal, which subsequently vacated these judgments. Following four years of legal battles, the fifteen-year retaliation case ended in June 2018 with a financial settlement and a statement of regret by the UNHCR that the

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“issues and the lengthy delays have impacted upon Hunt-Matthes’s employment and personal life” (Smith 2018). The new secretary-general, António Guterres, former high commissioner for refugees, has the reputation of an effective international manager. He has indicated that in order to fulfill accountability, we need a culture of evaluation, independent and real-time evaluation with full transparency” (UNEG 2016). In January 2017, he approved an updated whistleblower policy to enhance protection for individuals who report possible misconduct or cooperate with audits and investigations.43 He also wanted to enhance the independence of the Ethics Office by having it report directly to the General Assembly: this would need the assembly’s approval. All in all, the current record of the Ethics Office is appalling: in the 2006–16 period, it rejected 96 percent of protection applications. In addition, the UN Appeals Tribunal has determined in 2014 that the Ethics Office rejections could not be challenged by the UN Tribunals.44 Observers consider that the new whistleblower policy “does little toward acknowledging the shortcomings of the previous policy and will be implemented using the same mechanisms that have failed UN staff over the past decade.” António Gutteres’s intentions are laudable, but an effective protection mechanism would require giving an independent status to the Ethics Office and to OIOS and implementing mandatory enforcement of disciplinary sanctions on those responsible for retaliation. This would require an even more ponderous challenge: how to ensure that UN heads of secretariats and other senior staff are accountable to their governing bodies for their management and administrative decisions. In the final analysis, the ball is in the court of the member states.

The “UN Culture” This section will first attempt to identify the main reasons for the extent and continuation of fraud and corruption in the United Nations as part of a broader culture. The selected cases above, which certainly do not constitute an exhaustive list, show first that fraud and corruption are still common in the UN Secretariat and UN funds and programs, and even more strikingly in the peacekeeping operations; second, that there is a clear lack of accountability by UN managers at various levels; third, that a lack of prompt disciplinary sanctions or judiciary prosecution on staff members’ proven misconduct or criminal activities is common; fourth, that the lack of protection of whistleblowers remains a serious problem; and fifth, that a lack of clear procedures and division of labor exists be-

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tween the organizations that investigate and judge fraud and corruption. Moreover, they are financially dependent on those organizations they need to investigate. The scandal of the Oil-for-Food Program showed a lack of supervision and control by the Office of the Secretary-General over its own appointee, Benon Sevan, the head of the program. After years of undetected corruption, it allowed him to flee New York for Cyprus, thus remaining out of reach for any disciplinary sanction or judicial prosecution. He has retained all his illicit gains. It was only through political and media pressures that the secretary-general finally set up an independent inquiry committee. Basically, this committee showed that the OFFP—imposed on by the Security Council and accepted by the UN Secretariat—was unmanageable for the UN bureaucracy, in the midst of heavy interference by three permanent members of the Security Council45 and a manipulative Iraqi regime. While this is now all in the past, it remains indicative of a void where political constraints and managerial incompetence create the perfect breeding ground for malversations. Similarly, the proliferation of peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council has stretched the UN Secretariat well beyond its managerial capacity, with a concomitant lack of effective supervision and control over quasi-autonomous national military contingents deployed in areas far from UN headquarters in dangerous conflict zones. In addition, oversight itself remains difficult to organize and manage well. Many cases reveal the internal problems of OIOS in fulfilling its mandate, in part due to its own staffing problems, its financial dependence, and its lack of executive authority, and in part due to the resistance by senior staff in the UN Secretariat, the Department of Management, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and heads of peacekeeping operations, who often ignore or reject OIOS recommendations. The Bahel case showed a lack of supervision for more than four years, as well as the initial incompetence of the Investigation Division of OIOS in overlooking his fraudulent activities, and later staffing disputes. Additionally, the lack of competence and/or independence of the Ethics Office, and the overreliance of the administration on narrow legalistic requirements, have compounded problems. Moreover, there is no evidence that there is any systematic follow-up to contemporary recommendations, such as public reports on individual disciplinary sanctions or referrals to national tribunals for alleged criminal actions. It also appears that senior UN officials tend to benefit from their status by gaining protection from fraud allegations against themselves or their staff, while lower-level staff have, at times, been sanctioned. In

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addition, OIOS itself has occasionally had difficult relations with the UN secretary-general, to whom it reports. A related problem specific to the United Nations is that the heads of the Secretariat’s departments, the undersecretaries-general, have traditionally been more concerned with their political and diplomatic functions than with the effective management of their staff. The weak resistance of top management to member states’ pressures or even political blackmail such as a threat of withdrawing support for the reelection of the secretary-general, or withdrawing or reducing financial support to the organization, has at times ensured the immunity of political appointees alleged of misconduct. Thus, mismanagement often results from uneven leadership skills down the line; lack of management qualifications and training of directors and other responsible officials; lack of hands-on supervision and control; lack of accountability; reluctance to take disciplinary action; collusion and mutual protection among staff of regional or ethnic groups or of the same nationality; and the impunity of political appointees. Lack of transparency is often due to a top-heavy bureaucratic hierarchy of many levels in which initiatives and whistleblowing are discouraged or even punished. A further problem is the lack of trust of staff in senior management. In a June 2004 “United Nations Organizational Integrity Survey,”46 respondents frequently “did not see senior leaders as positive role models for integrity and ethical behaviour.” They perceived that they were unprotected from reprisals for reporting violations. More generally, the staff perspective appeared to be that “most of the infrastructure to support ethics and integrity is in place: accountability is not.” This still seems to be the case today. In addition, the United Nations is not, as was the Secretariat of the League of Nations, a small group of elite bureaucrats assigned to one comfortable and safe duty station, Geneva. Most of the staff of the UN’s funds and programs and of peacekeeping operations are not assigned to New York and Geneva but to many hardship duty stations around the world. Many have arduous operational tasks that include, for some, diplomatic and management functions.47 Peacekeeping missions have generally been organized in haste, following political approval given by the Security Council and financial authorization given by the General Assembly. By definition, they have been run in conflictual or even adverse environments, while being exposed to strong political pressures and critical media observation. The administration of these missions is the responsibility of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at UN Headquarters, but missions have often suffered locally from the lack of adequate

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financial and personnel resources; the lack of basic equipment and reliable communications; the lack of adequate administrative leadership, staff supervision, and regular financial control by headquarters; as well as mismanagement at the local level. As shown, the United Nations actually has a comprehensive set of standards of conduct, rules, as well as disciplinary sanctions and recovery procedures. But this elaborate system proves difficult to implement within a politicized and permissive UN culture of impunity, hierarchical dominance, fear of offending member states, and secrecy. In a report of February 2008,48 the secretary-general himself described the “accountability framework” within the UN Secretariat as a “broad collection of loosely integrated rules, regulations, policies, procedures, protocols, incentives, sanctions, systems, processes and structures that affect the way in which the mission of the Organization is accomplished.” In other words, a bureaucratic nightmare aimed at killing personal initiatives and destroying individual accountability. The report added that “today’s Secretariat may be considered risk-averse.” In this context, working for the United Nations under UN staff rules and regulations does not guarantee that all of the staff will understand, agree to, and comply with required personal and professional standards of conduct. Hence, they need to be properly briefed and trained as international civil servants and as supervisors, and their performance and conduct must be periodically supervised. The means and political will among member states to do so, however, are often lacking. In a 2008 survey of UN staff on accountability,49 most of the respondents believed that change in the United Nations was necessary (90 percent) but that the United Nations had been slow to change (82 percent). Only 31 percent believed that the UN leadership and management were serious about change, and 65 percent disagreed with the statement that the best candidates are usually selected in the promotion process. Finally, 53 percent felt that meeting administrative requirements was considered more important than meeting the program or operational objectives. Not much has changed since. This same culture prevailed in the Investigations Division of OIOS itself (Girodo 2007). New staff discovered that “a highly valued staff member is one that is obedient, anti-intellectual and offers no independent voice. … For 50 years, the United Nations had relied on an informal ad hoc system of justice based on diplomatic negotiations in a political environment and informal arrangements, a known and preferred system … ad hoc systems are silent and quick but they make for inconsistencies in decisions, and at worst, corruption.” There was an initial struggle in OIOS between this tra-

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ditional informal justice system and a new one introduced by Karl Paschke, its first USG, based on a legal model of administrative and criminal justice. In view of the politicized culture of the UN Secretariat, it is likely that the ad hoc informal justice system will continue to prevail. In sum, the serious fraud and corruption cases listed above, the lack of accountability of senior UN officials, the delayed investigations, the lack of prompt disciplinary sanctions and/or judicial prosecutions, the lack of protection for whistleblowers, and the interference of member states have resulted in a pathological “UN culture.” This culture can be described as a heterogeneous, overstretched, permissive, and politicized bureaucracy that has not been able to institute and follow a legal model of administrative and criminal justice.

Conclusions Corruption and fraud are not unique to the United Nations (Ameri 2003; Marinelli 2000; Soussan 2008). They are due to human greed and dishonesty and can be found in many organizations, public and private. Within a specific organizational culture, the level of corruption is related to the presence or absence of effective controls and sanctions. A strong sense of mission alone is no panacea. Fraud and corruption in the United Nations, even if not overbearing, have become sufficiently visible since the demise of the Oil-for-Food Program to cause public dismay about the ability of the United Nations to reform itself. This pathology is due to the United Nation’s own culture of a mix of politics, patronage, and lack of accountability. The Joint Inspection Unit reported in 2016 that “compared with fraud statistics reported by professional associations, national government entities, the private sector and academia, the level of fraud reported by the UN system is indeed unusually low. In broad terms, the public and private sector average is in the range of 1 to 5 percent of total revenue, whereas it is in the range of 0.03 percent for the UN system. In other words, underreporting and/or non-detection in the United Nations system could be significant and endemic.”50 This would show a lack of interest in detecting and then fighting fraud on the part of heads of secretariats of UN organizations, and/or a lack of transparency on their part, and/or a resistance by these secretariats to the concept and practice of internal management control and accountability. One area of concern is the extension of the UN’s role into trade and semi-commercial areas (e.g., peace operations and humanitarian aid pro-

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grams with massive procurement components) under conflicting political pressures where the UN Secretariat is not always ready to assume such broad and heavy responsibilities. Subcontracting to sometimes unreliable partners may also remain a domain where the opportunities for fraud are not easily detected. The challenges faced in managing peacekeeping operations are particularly formidable and durable. UN peacekeepers themselves have only too often failed to observe due standards of conduct and military discipline. They do not report to the UN’s force commander but only to their own national authorities. UN managers are then placed in the difficult position of trying to convince the commanders of national troop contingents to initiate investigations of their own troops, or, failing these, to try to investigate alleged violations of UN rules under dangerous conditions. This is rarely effective: troop-contributing countries simply threaten to withdraw their cooperation when pressed for action. Nevertheless, thanks to the creation of OIOS, a degree of transparency and accountability has been imposed on the UN administration, on some of the UN funds and programs, and on UN peacekeeping operations. OIOS investigations into financial irregularities and fraud and their results are now released publicly: however, reports on specific programs and operations, together with the functions and names of individual managers or staff members charged with misconduct, should also be made available more publicly. OIOS should also insist on prompt action to be taken by the UN authorities on misconduct, such as disciplinary measures, and possible referral of criminal conduct to national authorities. There should be regular follow-up reports on such actions. Recovery of lost or stolen funds has remained difficult and is, in some cases, impossible. In any case, it is not acceptable to have allowed bureaucratic delays in effecting recovery to have caused avoidable losses. The secretary-general should ensure that senior UN managers do not enjoy impunity: their alleged misconduct should be promptly investigated and stern disciplinary measures taken if justified. Such action would show that action follows words and would improve staff members’ morale. Such formal policy changes will, however, only go so far. Any improvement in the work of the organization depends first on changing its internal culture, which is not an easy task. There are more than enough audit, control, and inspection bodies at the internal level and at the intergovernmental level. There are more than enough standards, codes, rules and regulations, and administrative instructions. What is needed internally is first an improvement of the recruitment and assignment standards and practices: less political appointments, more appointments

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of motivated and competent managers, effective management training for new supervisors. Improvement also depends on the qualifications, independence, and determination of internal and external auditors, of OIOS inspectors and investigators, and of ethics officers; on the quality and honesty of their reports; on their resistance to internal and external pressures; and on the capacity and will of senior management to respond promptly to audit criticisms and recommendations, and to apply sanctions. Moreover, oversight is but a tool, not a substitute, for effective management. Even the most lavish investment in oversight bodies may yield only modest results if officials and member state representatives are complacent about deficient performance. Behind and beyond the issues of management reform and oversight mechanisms lie larger questions concerning the lack of agreement of member states on program and budget priorities, and, more generally, on the extent of the mandate of UN organizations and operations. The United Nations’ failed reform initiatives are a direct response to insistent demands and pressures from big contributors (the United States and other Western member states). The Secretariat’s efforts to satisfy these member states has led to a pathological superimposition of internal and external oversight bodies without sufficient public results. The discovery of management problems and the suspicion of corruption by senior elements within OIOS has added to the malaise. Power relationships and interests have not changed much in recent years in the 193 member states. Western countries still want more rationalization, effective management and financial control, and budget and staffing reductions. Developing countries have less interest in oversight, but both groups prefer the General Assembly to maintain control over budget, staffing, and management reform, leaving less room for the secretary-general. In the final analysis, the role of member states is pivotal in fighting corruption and changing the culture of the United Nations. Yves Beigbeder interned at the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946. After studying in the United States, he worked first for the UN Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome, and then for the World Health Organization in Brazzaville, Copenhagen, Alexandria, and New Delhi. His last post was deputy director of human resources in Geneva. He has a doctorate in public law and has lectured on international organizations, international civil service, and international criminal courts at universities in Paris, Geneva, St. Louis, Boston, and Vancouver. He has published numerous works on international organizations in French and English.

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NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7.

8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

JIU/REP/20/2016/4, p. 5. ST/SGB/2014/1. ST/IC/2005/19. A/47/500. JIU/REP/20/2016/4, p. x. According to Richard M. Garfield (2004: 341–62), the Oil-for-Food Program slowly reduced and eventually reversed many aspects of the stunning decline in social conditions, including those in nutrition and curative medical care, that occurred in Iraq in the 1990s. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was a fact-finding mission sent by the multinational force in Iraq after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq to uncover the alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that had been the main ostensible reason for the invasion. See François Loriot, “Accountability at the United Nations—in Need of a Genuine External Enforcement Body,” in De Cooker (2005: 69–70). Loriot is a barrister and president of the Bar Association for International Governmental Organizations, Inc. He is a retired head of the UN Legal Services. The ASG worked under the UNDP administrator, the head of UNDP, who is an undersecretary-general. See “Management Systems, V, 2009 (continued),” www.iowatch.org, retrieved on 8 December 2009. A/71/337 (Part I). A/71/337 (Part I)/7Add.1./Rev.1. A/62/281 (Part II)/Add. 1. A/70/318 (Part II). A/72/330 (Part II). For details on these bodies and their role, see Beigbeder (1997: 36–51, 106–28). The IAAC was created by Res. A/60/218. Its terms of reference are in Annex to Res. A/61/275; see General Assembly (2006) and (2007b). OIOS officially assists the secretary-general in fulfilling his oversight responsibilities in respect of the resources and staff of the organization through the following functions: monitoring, internal audit, inspection and evaluation, investigation, implementation of recommendations and reporting procedures, support, and advice to management; see GA Res. A/RES/48/218 B. This includes the UN Secretariat in New York, Geneva, Nairobi, and Vienna, five regional commissions, peacekeeping missions and humanitarian operations; OIOS gives assistance to the funds and programs. A/74/6 (sect. 30), figure 30.II. ST/IC/2005/19 and ST//SGB/2005/21. A/62/272. A/63/167.

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24. The following text is based on the Executive Summary of the Report; see Grimstad (2007). 25. See ibid. 26. Ban argued that Ahlenius had the power to propose a shortlist of three candidates, including one woman, but he had the power to select the winner from the list. The post was that of OIOS’s head of investigations. 27. See MacFarquhar (2010). 28. A/70/318 (Part I). 29. JIU/REP/2018/4. 30. A/71/337 (Part I). 31. JIU/REP/2018/4, p. iii. 32. A/64/316. 33. ST/SGB/2005/21. 34. JIU/REP/2010/3. 35. JIU/REP/2016/4. 36. Ibid., p. viii. 37. Ibid., para. 229. 38. Ibid., para. 231. 39. JIU/REP/2016/4, para. 227. 40. JIU/REP/2018/4. 41. The case is summarized from the UN Appeals Tribunal (2014), see also Warah (2016: 15–17). Rasna Warah quotes the TV channel France 24 referring to allegations of a lucrative kickback scheme linking UN officials to a local utility company. 42. UNDT 2013/84 and /85. 43. ST/SGB/2017/2. 44. 2014/UNAT/457. 45. A committee of the Security Council, called the 661 Committee, consisting of all members of the council, was created by Security Council Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990. It served as an oversight committee. According to Claudia Rosett (2004), the United Kingdom and United States did some overseeing of the program without having any direct business with Iraq. The UN representatives of the other three permanent members, China, France, and Russia, “devoted their energies chiefly to urging expansion of the Programme and forwarding the paperwork submitted by the many contractors in their respective nations whom Saddam had selected as his buyers and suppliers.” 46. OIOS commissioned this survey to Deloitte & Touche LLP. The purpose was to measure both attitudes toward and perceptions of integrity among UN staff. It had a 33 percent response rate out of a total of 18,035 employees. 47. For instance, 41 percent of UNHCR’s 274 field offices are in “hazardous” locations. See UNHCR (1998). 48. A/62/701, paras. 21, 37. 49. Ibid., Annex I. 50. JIU/REP/2016/4, p. iii.

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Crook, John R. 2007. “Contemporary Practice of the United States: U.N. Officials Face U.S. Criminal Corruption Charges.” American Journal of International Law 101(2): 485–86. Crossette, Barbara. 2019. “With Scandals Rife Across the UN: Are Managers at Fault?” PassBlue, 24 April. Retrieved 2 April 2020 from https://www.passblue .com/2019/04/24/with-scandals-rife-across-the-un-are-managers-at-fault/. De Cooker, Chris, ed. 2005. Accountability, Investigation and Due Process in International Organizations. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Edwards, Bea. 2016. “Anders Kompass Cleared: UN Official Who Reported Child Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers Speaks Out.” Government Accountability Project (GAP), 19 January. Retrieved 2 April 2020 from https://whistleblower .org/uncategorized/anders-kompass-cleared-un-official-who-reported-childsexual-abuse-by-peacekeepers-speaks-out-4/. Garfield, Richard M. 2004. “Humanitarian Action in Iraq: Changes since 1990 and Challenges in 2004.” In Between Force and Mercy: Military Action and Humanitarian Aid, edited by Dennis Dijkzeul, 341–62. Berlin: Berliner WissenschaftsVerlag. Girodo, Michel. 2007. A Culture Review of the Investigations Division of OIOS. Consultant’s report submitted to Inga-Britt Ahlenius, Undersecretary-General, OIOS, 13 July. Retrieved 2 April 2020 from https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/ 2008/un/Culture.Review.OIOS.Inv.Div.pdf. Grimstad, Erling. 2007. Review of the OIOS Investigations Division, United Nations. New York: United Nations. Hunt-Matthes, Caroline, and Peter Anthony Gallo. 2017. “The UN Whistleblowing Protection Gap: Implications for Governance, Human Rights and Risk Management.” In Selected Papers from the International Whistleblowing Research Network Conference in Oslo, June 2017, edited by David Lewis and Wim Vandekerckhove. London: International Whistleblowing Research Network. Lancet, The. 2018. “Sexual Harassment and Abuse—the Sinister Underbelly.” Special Report 391(10130): 1550. Laville, Sandra. 2016. “UN Suspension of Sexual Abuse Report Whistle-Blower is Unlawful, Tribunal Rules.” The Guardian, 6 May. Retrieved 2 April 2020 from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/06/un-suspension-of-sexualabuse-report-whistleblower-is-unlawful-tribunal-rules. Lee, Jennifer. 2006. “Manhattan: U.N. Official Arrested.” New York Times, 8 June, B6. Lieberman, Amy. 2019. “‘Unacceptable Workplace Behaviors’ at UNICEF, Leaked Report Summary Says.” Devex News, 21 June. Retrieved 2 April 2020 from https://www.devex.com/news/unacceptable-workplace-behaviors-at-unicefleaked-report-summary-says-95077. Lynch, Colum. 2015. “The U.N.’s Investigation Wars: An FP Investigation Shows How a Bitter Internal Fight Is Making It Harder for the U.N. to Police Its Own Crimes, from Corruption to Sexual Abuse.” Foreign Policy, 26 August.

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part i i i

 Implementation and Evaluation

The first two parts of this volume deal with international decision-making at the strategic level of IOs and more internally focused decision-making and management; these issues partly overlap. This third part turns to implementation and evaluation in what is often called “the field.” How autonomous is the IO in the field? Do the management problems change considerably? There are more actors active at the field level than at the strategic level, varying from local NGOs, traditional leaders, and municipal governments to women’s groups and warmongering criminals. Sometimes tensions arise between headquarters and field, while donor government demands and international norms and policies can become far removed from the local reality. Since program management is such a central tool for IOs, this topic will open this part and set the stage for chapters on determining which human rights and beneficiaries receive attention, implementing and evaluating new forms of NGO diplomacy, the difficulties of building long-term democratization and civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and finally unsuccessful gender policies in Afghanistan. Together these chapters evaluate how the interaction among many disparate but networked actors determines the impact of international norms and policies. They also show that most actors have some degree of agency but that their boundaries are rather porous. Especially during implementation, IOs are more permeable to other actors than most IO theories have acknowledged. IO agency and influence from other actors are mutually constitutive. As a result, IOs can simultaneously cooperate and compete with these actors. Together the chapters in this part highlight potential therapies for the problems in implementation and evaluate dilemmas that remain due to the interaction of the manifold actors.

 c ha p te r 6

The Program Approach and Its Lack of Participation Dennis Dijkzeul

Introduction Programs are the main tool of action at the field level for most IOs. They are used for many tasks in development cooperation and humanitarian action, as well as in human rights promotion and public sanitation, to name just a few. Their popularity is not confined to IOs alone; most corporations also use programs or projects extensively, for example, in research and development, and in organizational development (Graham and Englund 1997; Kerzner 1998). One of the potential strengths of the program approach is that it allows for the participation of various groups. In general, such participation is necessary to ensure local ownership, follow-up, and sustainability. However, in reality many, if not most, programs fail to foster such participation; as a result, their impact is often minimal or even negative. This chapter studies why this is the case. This chapter first looks at the reasons for the popularity of the program approach. It then delineates the different program stages, and the criticism on the program approach, as well as techniques for improvement. Further, the chapter reviews some of the related organizational and interorganizational issues, which help explain the sometimes pathological lack of impact of program management. It also asks which alternatives offer a way out of the pathologies associated with the program approach.

What Is a Program? Many IOs use program management as an instrument to structure their activities, in particular, their service delivery. As a consequence, pro-

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grams have almost become synonymous with service delivery for many managers. In manufacturing terms, this service delivery is known as the primary process of the organization. Hence, understanding program management, or as it is often called, the program approach, can provide valuable insights into the operational core of the organizations, as well as their interorganizational relationships, in particular with their donors and target groups.

Reasons for Program Management Organizations generally need to integrate different projects into a concerted program. Wijnen, Renes, and Storm (1990: 30) define a project in the following terms: •

A project has a limited set of separate activities.

•

A project is an endeavor in which several parties (persons, groups, or organizations) have a clear interest.

•

A project needs to be realized within a set time frame and with limited resources.

•

A project focuses on one or more concrete results that often contain one or more completely new elements for the parties involved.

This is a broad definition that highlights the fact that projects contain nonroutine tasks. They combine a quest for results in terms of change while specifying the target groups, resources, and time allocated. In principle, they are well suited for solving societal problems in such areas as development, human rights, and humanitarian and environmental action. A program combines projects in various functional sectors, such as health, education, and agriculture, with activities for different target groups. For example, a program that aims to bring down the Under-Five Mortality Rate (U5MR) of children can integrate projects for maternal education, prenatal care, oral rehydration, and breastfeeding, as well as the improvement of local agriculture for better feeding and advocacy to the local governments. Programs are thus sets of related projects. One can see a program as a megaproject, involving the same elements but integrated at a larger scale to achieve synergy among the individual projects. Both the UN system and NGOs originally focused on individual projects. In many organizations, this project focus has slowly evolved into a broader,

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more long-term program approach.1 However, UN organizations and NGOs differ widely in the quality of their programming. Some are still stuck in the individual project mode; others have become leaders in their field and have produced elaborate manuals (e.g., Eade and Williams 1995/2005; Gosling and Edwards 2003).

Definition of Program Management Programs “can be seen as responses to either perceived or incipient communal problems.” Their origin lies in “the recognition of a ‘social problem’—by which we mean a defect in the human and social condition—and a resolve to take purposive, organized action to remedy the problem” (Rossi and Freeman 1985: 38–39). The basic assumption behind program (and project) management is that intentionally structured action can lead to societal improvement. Its proponents argue that programming provides a neutral procedure in the sense of ordered steps to achieve results. They see it as a hammer that does not determine which nails you need to hit into whatever object is at hand; program management does not determine by itself which actions or societal improvements need to be realized. In Weberian terms, programming seems therefore a form of instrumental rationality. Nevertheless, the value-oriented rationality is then implicitly left up to those who define a situation as a social problem and establish why it should be addressed. As a result, program management often looks like a technical tool, but its actual use depends on the social construction of problems by those in power, which often includes IOs (Rossi, Lipsey, and Henry 2019). Hence, the questions of how a problem is being defined, which actors are being included or excluded, and whose impact is being achieved will always come back in critiques of the program approach.2 In its simplest form, program management comprises three related stages: preparation and design, implementation, and evaluation (see figure 6.1). A carefully established program should consider the possibilities and provisions for good evaluation research. Evaluation often has a double meaning: it is seen either as the final assessment of a program (or project) or as a review of each stage of program management. An evaluation of the preparation stage is called appraisal; during implementation it is called monitoring. After the completion of a program, the final evaluation takes place. All in all, programs can become long processes that are subject to many external variables, and in turn can also influence donors, national government institutions, UN organizations, and NGOs as well as target groups.

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   Figure 6.1. Stages of Program Management.

From a positive point of view, the program approach is a powerful tool to rationalize and ameliorate the process for long-term societal investment. “Its principal advantage lies in providing a … framework and sequence within which data can be compiled and analyzed, investment priorities established, project or program alternatives considered, and sector policy issues addressed. It imposes a discipline on planners and decision-makers, and ensures that relevant problems and issues are taken into account and subjected to systematic analysis before decisions are reached and implemented. Correctly applied, it can greatly increase the development impact of … scarce investment resources” (Baum and Tolbert 1985: 335).3 Baum and Tolbert (1985: 335) go on to describe the limitations of the program approach. The success of a program also “depends on quantitative inputs of data and can be no more reliable than those data. It … depends on estimates and forecasts, which are subject to human error. Risks can be assessed but not avoided, and projects must be designed and implemented against a constantly shifting background of political, social, and economic changes.” They conclude that “in the last analysis, the ef-

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fectiveness of the … approach depends on the skill and judgment of those who use it.” In principle, the tools to improve program management come in two groups: first, techniques to improve the activities for each of the program stages and their interaction, and second, techniques to improve the assessment and analysis of program management. In practice, they are often used together, but for the sake of analysis I will treat these two groups separately.

Program Preparation During the preparation stage, the perceived problem and the organization’s policies are translated into projects that, hopefully, will have a lasting impact on the societal problem. The program will be the framework in which the projects should fit. Although it is impossible to foresee all future changes, careful program preparation can, to some extent, prevent managerial problems. Program preparation generally results in a “program proposal,” sometimes officially called a statute. Conscientious program appraisal can strengthen a program proposal considerably (World Bank 1998: 101). Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 544–48) have developed a statutory model that distinguishes seven independent “variables” in a proposal that “together lend direction and coherence to the complicated process of program implementation” (see figure 6.2).

Policy Variables 1. Precision of objectives: Does the program statute provide clearly ranked instructions for the agency and show the target group how to conform to program objectives? 2. Validity of causal theory: Does the program statute indicate how the implementing agencies will produce the planned change in the target group?

Instrumental Variables 3. Hierarchical integration: Does the program statute create an integrated hierarchical network of implementing agencies? And which organization, department, or person is responsible for which tasks? 4. Stakeholder participation: Does the program statute provide liberal rules of participation in decisions made by stakeholders committed to the program?

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5. Decision rules: Does the program statute stipulate how the decision regulations of the participating organizations support the program goal?

Resource Variables 6. Financial resources: Does the statute indicate the availability of funds for the program activities? 7. Personnel resources: Does the statute assign program implementation to officials who are strongly committed to program objectives? (Van de Vall 1991b: 47). Partly overlapping techniques have been developed to assess each of these variables. Since they can be used independently without applying the statutory model for program appraisal, they are treated separately later in this chapter. A program that scores positively on all seven variables is not necessarily successful, as unforeseen problems inevitably arise during the implementation process.

Program Implementation Politicians and diplomats score headlines with policy initiatives, not with their execution. As a result, the implementation stage often receives scant attention. Nevertheless, such attention can offer opportunities to improve the current program and to lay the groundwork for future programs and better policies. Particularly after the early 1970s, business and public administration scholars increasingly focused on the topic of implementation (Berman 1978; Mayer and Greenwood 1980; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980; Scheirer 1981; Van de Vall 1991b: 41-57; Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Durlak and DuPre 2008; Funke 2022). These scholars emphasized the complexity of joint action as one of the crucial characteristics of implementation. Subsequently, they attempted to develop conceptual models to graphically describe and analyze (aspects of) the multiactor program process (Van de Vall 1991a: 5). These models differentiate internal implementation from external, or contextual, implementation (Berman 1978: 157). Internally, the organization is rather autonomous and can establish its own procedures. Externally, the context of the organization deeply influences program management. Internal implementation. In daily practice, the programming process is often long and complex. It combines decisions at headquarters with international funding and activities in the field. With a delta flowchart, it is possible to capture the organizational procedures from program concep-

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Figure 6.2. The Relationship between Statutory Variables and Program Implementation. Source: Van de Vall 1991b: 47.

tion to completion. Such a flowchart aims specifically at clarifying the internal aspects of program management (Harrel Allen 1978: 107; Scholtes, Joiner, and Streibel 2000). They are frequently used in total quality management and other internal organizational improvement techniques. As an illustration, figure 6.3 provides an example of the UNICEF programming process. Contextual Implementation. Van de Vall (1991b: 48–50) has elaborated a contextual model (see figure 6.4) based on Mayer and Greenwood (1980: 130). This model provides an overview of the entire execution of the program and the variables that impinge on it. The model incorporates nine variables into a causal pattern. Four variables are manipulable, and five other variables are non-manipulable by the management of the organization. “The core of the model is the relationship between the independent variable statute of the program and the dependent variable program impact.” In between are two intervening variables: internal program management and the bridging variable. The latter variable indicates the complexity of joint multiparty action in achieving program impact. Various actors involved in the program are so autonomous that they cannot be forced directly to cooperate with the program. Consequently, the “bridg-

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Figure 6.4. Contextual Model of Program Management. Based on Mayer and Greenwood 1980: 130.

ing variable is a non-manipulable condition for attaining the program goal” (Van de Vall 1991b: 48). “Understanding the success or failure of policy may often hinge on the decision maker’s awareness of a bridging variable” (Mayer and Greenwood 1980: 126). Two other intervening variables, namely, environment of the program and characteristics of the target group, are also difficult to control. The third intervening variable, the adjunct variable, represents additional or related programs that help to bring about the desired change in a synergetic way. Better access to healthcare, for example, can also lead to an increase in family planning. The collateral and latent consequences can best be viewed as side effects from, respectively, program preparation and program results.4

Program Evaluation Evaluations, sometimes called assessments, can in principle take place at any time during the program cycle. Originally, the term “evaluation” was associated with a focus on the quantitative outcomes of a program, but one can also focus on qualitative appraisal, monitoring, or retrospective evaluation. These quantitative and qualitative methods of evaluation can be combined with each other. Figure 6.5 depicts the resulting possibilities. Concentrating on the quantitative outcomes of a program implies emphasizing the state of a societal problem ex ante and ex post of the

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Figure 6.5. Different Forms of Evaluation during the Program Cycle. Based on Pressman and Wildavsky 1984: 181–205; Rossi et al. 2019; Buchanan-Smith et al. 2016.

program. Evaluation research from this more traditional perspective can be defined as “research with a quasi-experimental design which tries to determine to which degree a used policy measure is effective, with preestablished goals and criteria” (Van der Zouwen 1990: 90). Consider-

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ing the experimental nature of this definition, it becomes evident that evaluation “uses the methods and tools of social research … in an action context that is intrinsically inhospitable to them,” for researchers are unable to control the conditions of a real-life situation as they would in an experiment (Van der Zouwen 1990: 89). The interests, resources, goals, and priorities of sponsors, stakeholders, and executing agencies will often be in a state of flux. Furthermore, unanticipated problems can arise in the intervention or during the research itself. Finally, preliminary results of evaluation research can lead to alterations during the different stages of a program (Rossi and Freeman 1985: 33). In sum, the continuous changes in both the implementing agency and the program environment give rise to so many intervening variables that it becomes difficult to assess whether the program does in fact cause the change in the policy problem that it set out to address. Practically, the quantitative focus on the ex post and ex ante situation can have one important drawback—it can draw attention away from the preparation and implementation of the program. The implementation phase particularly is then treated as a black box, which makes it hard to determine why a program was effective or ineffective. This lack of relevant feedback is a crucial impediment to improving policy analysis and programs (Patton 1978: 151). The program manager or policy maker is left in the dark on the execution and improvement of a program. Consequently, a focus on outcome or impact measurement runs the risk of having a low utility for the daily management of a program.5 Another method concentrates more on the different stages of program management. Such evaluation research “is the systematic application of social research procedures in assessing the conceptualization and design, implementation, and utility of social intervention programs” (Rossi and Freeman 1985: 19). This method offers more qualitative guidance to the decision maker. Problems and opportunities are identified, together with pathways for policy and program improvement. The statutory,6 trajectory, and contextual model are all useful tools in this respect. They can provide a baseline for comparison in the final evaluation.7 Limited availability of resources may force an organization to choose between the two evaluation methods. The two methods can also be triangulated into a so-called comprehensive evaluation, which combines the strengths of each method. As stated in the introduction of this volume, knowledge of both impact (what are the results?) and the implementation process (how did the results come about?) offers the most beneficial learning experience for the IO. Such a comprehensive evaluation comes close to policy analysis. Hence, evaluation not only leads to changes in the program but can also contribute to broader policy changes.8

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Assessment Techniques and Tools for Program Management In addition to improving the different program stages, a growing set of tools has been developed to cater to the needs of program and project management in various fields of operations. These tools are linked to the specific aspects of the program as well as to the environment in which they are applied. Commonly used techniques concern assessment of costs, target groups, and the broader environment, including needs analysis, logical framework analysis, participatory rural appraisals, stakeholder analysis, institutional assessment, and cost-benefit analysis. Importantly, each technique can fit into at least one of the three stages of program management and the concomitant models discussed above.

What Is a Technique or Tool for Program Management? The simplest way to clarify the concept of techniques or tools of program management is to explain logical framework analysis (LFA), because it is the most frequently used technique. The logical framework—usually called “logframe”—is a clear example of a managerial tool, because it attempts to deal with the specifics of program and project management in the development and relief fields in a well-structured manner. Originally developed by USAID in 1969, LFA was later widely adopted by other bilateral and multilateral organizations as well as NGOs. It is a “tool which provides a structure for specifying the components of [a program] and the logical linkages between a set of means and ends. It is a means by which a project may be structured and described in a logical fashion.”9 Therefore, it is a way of testing the logic of a plan of action. A basic LFA model consists of a four-by-six matrix that analyzes means and ends. The ends are defined on the vertical axis in (1) a hierarchy of objectives, the so-called program structure, with the (2) program objective (the ultimate goal), (3) project objectives, (4) outputs, (5) activities, and (6) inputs; and the means of evaluation are defined on the horizontal axis by the (1) project structure or narrative summary, (2) indicators by which the project/program can be measured, (3) means of verification and/or the data sources for those indicators, and (4) risks and assumptions upon which the program or project is formulated. Risks are often hypotheses about environmental factors outside the control of the program management. For example, after the 2008 economic crisis, many development programs had to adjust their activities because there was rather suddenly less funding available. The risk of COVID-19 has taken many program managers by surprise, but the risk section is in principle meant to include

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Table 6.1. Outline of Logical Framework for Program Design Program Structure

Indicators

Means of Verification

Assumptions and Risks

Program Objective

Measures of goal achievement, broader societal impact

Evaluation data Examination of records, statistics, and surveys

Assumptions and external factors necessary to sustain objectives in the long run

Evaluation data Examination of records, statistics, and surveys

External conditions necessary if achieved project objective is to contribute to reaching program goal

Organizational measures and observation data

Factors out of project control, which, if present, could restrict progress from outputs to achieving project objectives

Actions undertaken to produce outputs (what will be done)

Organization’s records and documents, financial and observation data

Factors out of project control, which, if present, could restrict progress from activities to achieving project outputs

Implementation target

Organization’s records and documents

Assumptions on availability of inputs (funds, equipment, human resources, etc.)

Project Objective(s)

Outputs

Activities

Inputs

Conditions that indicate purpose achieved at end of project, outcome

Magnitude of outputs (products and services from activities)

Source: Bryant and White 1982: 120; Fyfe 1993: 31–42; Buchanan-Smith et al. 2016: 95.

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such potential threats. The basic assumption of LFA is that logical ordering and clarifying assumptions will facilitate implementation.10 Hence, LFA is an organizing device that covers every step from the project formulation to the specific arrangements for implementation. USAID wanted a device “that would lay out the flow of project inputs and anticipated outputs and indicate possible measures for project fulfillment” (Bryant and White 1982: 119). This device is used to structure and describe a project in a logical fashion. If correctly applied, LFA focuses on mutual consultation and clarifications fostering dialogue among participants. In terms of the statutory model, the logical framework can help to increase the precision of the objectives and link them to the activities. As a consequence, logical framework analysis can greatly aid further appraisal, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. In turn, clear and well-linked objectives can also facilitate the checking of several other variables of the statutory model. Logical framework analysis addresses the hierarchical integration of the different actors in the implementation network; for example, clear objectives help to determine who is responsible for what tasks. This can also provide an input for stakeholder analysis and simplify the decision rules. Internally, the ranking of objectives and discussion of the means can create greater clarity on the necessary financial and personnel resources. Most critiques of the logframe approach have focused on its actual application and the causal relationships among its vertical objectives. The first critique has argued that LFA stifles creativity. Instead of thinking through projects and programs anew, managers in the field tend to reuse old logframes; they thus miss out on original new solutions or inappropriately recycle old ones. As a result, the logical framework analysis can defeat its own purpose of clearly thinking through all aspects of the program in advance. The second critique states that LFA and the causality among the levels of objectives in a logical framework are rarely worked out in sufficient detail. Achieving higher-level objectives implies more intervening variables and risks that are often ill understood and certainly not controlled by the implementing organization. As a result, LFA provides a false sense of security or comprehensiveness. Over the years, several alternatives to LFA and new tools have been developed.

Evolution of Program Management and Its Tools As mentioned before, program management tools and techniques are linked to and influenced by the specifics of the development or humanitarian program as well as the environment in which they are applied. This

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section concentrates on the evolution of techniques as a way to exemplify practitioners’ receptiveness to critiques of the implementation and outcomes of programs.11 As might be anticipated, the evolution and improvement of the specific tools applied in order to reach the objective(s) of the program also reflect the changes in development and humanitarian thinking and contexts. This general evolution in development and humanitarian cooperation has led to the improvement of existing techniques or the creation of new tools to cope with the new objectives that the development and relief industries have envisioned. Similarly, specific critiques relating to the failures of implementation have forced the improvement of existing tools or the creation of new ones.12 They include the graphic Theory of Change models that attempt to work out the causal linkages in more illustrative detail and the participatory rural appraisal discussed below (see also Hummelbrunner 2010). Changes in the conceptualization of humanitarian and development action also affect program management. This is clearly seen in the “culture of performance,” that is, the interest of both donors and practitioners in being able to measure the results and achievements of development and relief programs (Amici and Cepiku 2020). This interest in measuring results goes hand in hand with the increasing set of monitoring and evaluation tools that have been redefined and newly formulated in order to facilitate performance analysis. Large donor agencies have developed manuals for performance monitoring and evaluation for their staff and partners. While some performance analysis guidelines are widely applicable, others are relevant only to specific sectors, elements, or actors. For example, specific tools have been created for institutional and environmental evaluation.13 Also, the increasing importance given to institutions and the generation of new “capacity building” programs have been reflected in the creation of new management tools for these types of projects, with institutional assessment being one of the best-known means to diagnose the state of institutional development.14 Similarly, attention to the role that different stakeholders play in the design and implementation of programs and projects—and therewith influence impact—has given rise to a range of different methodologies, generally known as stakeholder analysis. Stakeholder analysis focuses on the interests a group takes in an issue and the level and types of resources a group can mobilize to affect the outcomes; the purpose is to indicate which interests should be taken into account and which should not when making a program or project management decision.15 Among the multiple general changes, two have had critical repercussions in program management techniques. The first has been the growing

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awareness about the interrelation of multiple actors and the multidisciplinary aspects of development, humanitarian, human rights, and environmental projects. The second has been the normative ideal to shift from a top-down to a bottom-up approach to development, which has been reflected in the attention given to participation in program management (e.g., Groupe URD 2009). These two developments are crucial because they have changed to a great extent the conceptualization of program management. Put differently, these changes have forced not only the creation of new tools to meet new needs but also the “reconceptualization” of existing tools.16

Multidisciplinarity The paradigm of development as a multidisciplinary discipline,17 instead of just an economic one, has been expressed in critiques of specific techniques that were unable to include social or non-economic issues easily. In other words, such critiques questioned the underlying causal theory of development and humanitarian action. Besides economics, the following disciplines, just to name a few, have become integral parts of the multidisciplinary approach to development: sociology, anthropology, political science, behavioral psychology, law, and organizational theory.18 In principle, the program approach itself easily allows for a more multidisciplinary approach—one can change the activities of an existing or planned project or just add more projects. A clear example of the criticism of monodisciplinary approaches is the critique of cost-benefit analysis. This form of analysis examines the project proposal in terms of its costs compared with its projected financial benefits; all benefits are converted into financial terms for the purpose of the analysis.19 Therefore, cost-benefit analysis requires economic expertise. It is especially relevant for those programs whose objective is to increase wealth—and this is precisely the focus of the critique. For those development programs that have social objectives instead of financial ones, the technique’s appropriateness has been questioned. There were attempts to overcome these critiques while still considering costs and benefits, such as the variation called cost-effectiveness analysis, which has been used to analyze whether or not the objectives can be achieved at a reasonable cost. Although both techniques have been used extensively when trying to compare different programs or when trying to compare different projects that hope to achieve the same objectives, their lack of flexibility to include social or other non-economic issues has remained a source of criticism.

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The increasing concern about development as a multidisciplinary discipline that is connected not only to economics but also to other social sciences has been reflected in the use of new or improved tools that account for the effects of economic development in the social sphere and vice versa. Hence, the increasing importance that the development field began giving to the environment required management tools to cater to and measure the environmental sustainability of the projects under consideration. Similarly, the increasing attention to gender considerations has required program management tools to include gender components. An interesting outcome of this evolution is that these changes have given rise not only to specific tools for gender and the environment but also to the inclusion of these components in other more general tools, echoing the multidisciplinary approach.20 In sum, the change toward a more interdisciplinary approach in development has been driven by both critiques in the general policy arena and critiques of programs that failed to deliver the expected results. Indeed, the argument to envision a more multidisciplinary approach can become crucial if critics are able to point precisely to the lack of cross-sectoral analysis as the cause of the failures of one particular program in reaching its objectives. A spate of books and articles has focused on analyzing in depth such failures as infrastructure projects that harmed the natural environment, or projects that did not consider the social implications of a particular action or that were not culturally sensitive. The failures of these programs that lacked crucial aspects for development in both their design and implementation can be more broadly divided into errors of commission and errors of omission. Most of the techniques discussed so far have implied a broader range of activities for each program. Of course, applying all of these techniques is a logistical impossibility. They have opportunity costs: resources committed to analysis cannot be used for implementation. Appraisal cannot last long, and IOs have to make choices. In daily practice, only a few techniques are selected for use in actual programming. Sometimes this means that program managers overlook various multidisciplinary aspects of the problems at hand. Other times, the managers apply the techniques in a technocratic or rushed manner, which results in superficial programming. Nevertheless, despite the growing use of multidisciplinary approaches, one crucial omission stands out: the difficulty of dealing with power politics at different levels, varying from the international to the village level (see also the subsequent chapters and the conclusions). In this respect, it is important to note that the current architecture of international laws and institutions is not conducive to success in at least

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two ways. Despite the SDGs, rich countries have not committed themselves to global antipoverty obligations or commitments that extend further than merely providing aid, and even then only on an ad hoc basis. They have insufficiently opened up their markets to Southern exporters, large or small. Too often they still use subsidies, tariffs, and quotas to protect their own producers. Progress with debt relief has been slow. Rich countries have also routinely kept corrupt regimes in power. In addition, they have not stemmed the international weapons trade and have sometimes supported warring factions for their own short-term economic or geopolitical advantage. Second, the amount of official development assistance (ODA) by OECD-DAC donors—the richest countries in the world— decreased as a percentage of gross national income from 0.53 percent in 1962 to 0.23 percent in 2001. Since then it has grown with some ups and downs to 0.30 percent in 2019. Although ODA increased over the last decade, this has not offset the overall decline in ODA since 1962 (OECD 2020); more ODA could help to stabilize and strengthen societies. As a consequence, the global economic system often does not facilitate successful program management. The DOHA Round on international trade policy stalled in 2008 and has shown that Southern countries and other actors lack the leverage to change this global system (see Fomerand in this volume). Instead, a limited deal was clinched in Bali in 2013, which focused on reducing red tape. Naturally, the question of power also comes into play at the national and local levels. In his classic study of an integrated rural development program in Lesotho, Ferguson (1994) describes its failure and the unexpected political outcomes. By conceptualizing the program as a technocratic, value-free, economic development endeavor for improving agriculture in a poor mountainous area, the designers failed to see the severe shortcomings of their analysis.21 They did not take into account the oppressive political situation and local culture, with its different traditional property rights and economic values for men and women that prohibited the free trade of cows and some other livestock. Nor did the designers realize that the regional economy had already been monetarized and was fully dependent on migrant labor in the mines of South Africa (which itself suffered under the apartheid regime). Instead, the program unrealistically elevated the role of local agriculture and predicted that better market access and technical improvements would improve the agricultural outputs and local economy considerably. Predictably, all of the efforts in livestock improvement, administrative decentralization, and crop improvement failed. Yet the political side effects of the program were considerable.22 The program involuntarily extended the oppression of the ruling party by providing access roads, administration, and newly

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built facilities. Soldiers were also able to reach the region better than before. Failing to reach its goals, the project inadvertently assisted the undemocratic central government in extending its influence. In a similar vein, Uvin (1998) provided a critique of the way the development agencies in Rwanda failed to see how their work actually contributed to the genocide. He studied both specific projects and the broader development policies and activities and how they impinged on local society. He argues that racial prejudice among Tutsis and Hutus had been a structural feature of life in Rwanda at least since colonial times. Structural violence and social exclusion characterized Rwandan society and caused “profound popular anger, frustration, cynicism, ignorance, and desire for scapegoating.” Parts of the Rwandan elite were able “to mobilize these sentiments against minority groups.” Under military, political, and economic threat, this elite instigated the genocide. Uvin (1998: 8) summarizes that “at different points in time, and through different processes, the development aid system interacted with the processes of social exclusion, shared many of the humiliating practices [for example, obligatory communal labor, expropriation of patches of land for development project buildings, or income differences and displays of wealth], and closed its eyes to the racist currents in society. Aid was also unwilling and possibly unable to stop the process of radicalization that took place in the 1990s.” In sum, despite the many efforts to broaden the scope and inclusiveness of programs to provide better aid, one problem remains hard to solve: challenging and changing existing power relationships. Often, program management sticks to a technocratic application of procedures and fails to address—or even see—the wider political and social problems. Ferguson and Uvin both show, in different ways, that the inability to address this problem of power can have extremely dire consequences.

Participation The second general change identified above is the normative shift from top-down to bottom-up approaches, which has been reflected in the crucial importance given to participation in program management (Groupe URD 2009). Here the issue of power comes back, in particular in the form of hoped-for empowerment. Participation and multidisciplinary program approaches interact conceptually. The daily problems that the local population brings to the table through its participation do not follow neat, academic categories or specific issue areas. They are linked, and as a result they normally require multidisciplinary approaches. Participation can also have a political effect by making the voices of the local popu-

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lation better heard. Finally, participation can also lead to demands for greater accountability of political leaders. Participation “entered the international discourse on development in the 1960s and achieved wider currency in the 1970s” (Stiefel and Wolfe 1994: 22).23 “The development community first began experimenting with participatory methodologies … through the application of social anthropology, farming systems research, participatory action research, and others” (Maynard 2000: 1). In the traditional structure of rural projects, decisions were made and resources were allocated by “outside experts”; local people were rarely consulted and even more rarely had any role in decision-making. The shift toward a more bottom-up approach to development also meant that local people were no longer seen as passive beneficiaries but rather as active agents and partners. The idea that the “outside experts” had the key to solutions was replaced by recognition of the knowledge of local people. Consequently, the role of development professionals has also changed—they tend to be seen less as controllers and more as facilitators. Table 6.2 gives an example of an innovative participatory action-research project.

Participatory Rural Appraisal The growing trend toward more participation is further illustrated by the conception and use of one of the best-known tools for enhancing participation in program and project management: participatory rural appraisal. Participatory rural appraisal (PRA), which refers to rural, and increasingly also urban, data-gathering techniques, has its origins in the participatory learning movement as well as in the increasing dissatisfaction with rural development in the 1980s. PRA is intended to be more than just a tool to learn more about the realities of local people; rather, it emphasizes the process that enables local people to analyze the data and the circumstances that are meaningful to them. PRA has been described as “a growing family of approaches and methods used to enable people to analyze and share their knowledge of life and local conditions. Through PRA, both rural and urban groups are able to identify their own priorities and make their own decisions about the future” (Jones 1996: 11).24 Therefore, the participatory approach is not simply a specific technique or methodology. It goes beyond the boundaries of a data-gathering technique to become a new paradigm: action with and by local people. This includes the creation of methodological approaches to gather more

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Table 6.2 Food Security and Program Management in South Sudan In July 2011, South Sudan became independent. In December 2013, a vicious civil conflict broke out, in which to this day many forms of violence—armed, ethnic, criminal, looting, and gender-based—are shockingly common. South Sudan’s economy has been devastated, and food insecurity has worsened. Food production and transport were already difficult due to the destruction wrought by the war with the North (now Sudan), an unforgiving climate, ethnic tensions (including regular cattle raids by different ethnic groups), and a low degree of economic development. During the dry season, many people eat only one meal a day or less. About 2.3 million South Sudanese have fled to neighboring countries, approximately 880,000 of them to northern Uganda. With support from Phineo, a German funding organization, Caritas Germany has initiated a multisectoral—read multidisciplinary—three-year food-security program with three local organizations: Mary Help Association (MHA) in Wau; the Bishop Gassis Relief and Rescue Foundation (BGRRF) in Agok, close to the border with Sudan; and Caritas Gulu in northwestern Uganda. The latter organization supports South Sudanese refugees in settlement camps, who obtain a small plot for agriculture; some also rent land from the local host community. The program started in May 2018. This was a bit later than expected, and the organizations had to rush their activities, because the planting season had already started. As the three organizations focus on displaced South Sudanese and host communities, their activities overlap to some extent. They supply different types and amounts of seeds (e.g., sorghum, millet, tomatoes, and other vegetables) and tools (e.g., hoes, machetes, and rakes) based on local needs and experience from earlier agricultural projects. They also execute agricultural training and establish or strengthen forms of social organizing (e.g., community gardens). Participation in the community gardens and agricultural training is popular, and the participants—often groups made up of displaced people and host community members—in turn are supposed to help other people with improving their agricultural output. In this way, the organizations also support integration of displaced people and host communities. In addition, the BGGRF and MHA also train participating farmers in ox plowing. This is important because many participants in their areas are Dinka, who were pastoralists and only recently have started working with agriculture. They still lack agricultural skills, and for some using cattle for plowing feels like a taboo. Yet, when people notice that yields improve, they become more eager to cooperate with other farmers, who are already using ox plows. Finally, the BGRRF also drills boreholes to improve access to water. As a result of its work in the settlement camps in Uganda, Caritas’s work differs a bit from the other two organizations. For example, it also works with a form of microcredit called village savings and loan associations (VSLAs), metal and mud energy-savings stoves, and cash-based assistance, as well as with peacebuilding among the different ethnic groups, who need to live closely together in the camps but who fought each other in South Sudan. In 2018, the BGGRF’s agricultural activities were hampered due to heavy early rains and flooding, which washed away some of the crops, whereas MHA-

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(Cont.) supported crops suffered from drought. Caritas Gulu’s agricultural activities also suffered from drought, but not extremely. Cattle also fell ill and died due to the heat. In 2019, the rains were good for the first time in several years, so that the harvests were much better. Nevertheless, yields are not high enough for participants to provide food to indigent neighbors, and rarely are there enough seeds for the next planting season. Due to the geographic distance among them, the organizations do not know each other’s work well. Phineo, however, not only provides funding for three years (which is longer than most humanitarian funding cycles) but also finances evaluation, training, and exchange among these organizations and Caritas Germany. During a workshop—an elementary form of South-South cooperation—the organizations realized that they can learn much from each other in order to improve food security and strengthen their management. At the workshop, the three organizations compared the effectiveness of the different types of seeds and tools that they used in order to be able to provide a better mix of seeds and tools to their target groups. The MHA and BGRRF considered VSLA projects for more income-generating activities, as well as cash-based assistance. They were especially enthusiastic about energy-saving stoves, which saved people from traveling (too far) to fetch firewood, allowed them to spend less money on firewood or charcoal, reduced the amount of smoke they inhaled (which prevents respiratory infections), and contributed to the slowing of deforestation (a bit). The stoves also enhance security, because women and children are regularly attacked, raped, or killed while searching for firewood. With support from Caritas, the MHA and BGRRF began introducing and explaining different metal and mud energy-saving stoves. Moreover, staff members and the population are deeply worried about deforestation, and with additional funding from Caritas, they have recently started their first reforestation projects. Since all seed banks in the BGRRF area have been destroyed, its staff learned from the other organizations how to build effective seed banks to ensure better and more seeds for the next planting season. The organizations also decided to become more active in climate change adaptation and establishing linkages with private enterprises, such as transport companies and banks. Considering their internal management, the three organizations also discussed how to professionalize their operations. In their program management, the organizations examined how to shift from being output oriented to becoming more outcome oriented. They received training on monitoring and evaluation, including needs assessment, baseline and impact studies, and use of clearer indicators. They also compared their human resource management, reporting, and accounting systems. They will institute joint training for their staff members, and they have initiated learning visits with each other on the topics mentioned above. As the project is still ongoing, sustainability is not ensured. Overall, target communities are now better equipped to enhance food security, but full food security has not been achieved and will, in fact, likely be very hard to achieve as climate change, armed violence, and poverty continue to pose almost intractable challenges. In sum, the three organizations and the projects’ participants have shown promising results under the adverse conditions of insecurity and climate change, but much work remains to be done.

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accurate information as well as approaches for joint analysis and planning to ensure meaningful participation.25 Hence, the specific methods employed tend to use group discussions as well as visuals and diagrams as opposed to individual interviews and verbal communications that were the norm in the traditional work of development and relief practitioners. PRA was originally intended as an alternative to the logical framework, but it is now often used to provide inputs to the logical framework (Aune 2000). The core of PRA is a process of sharing and developing ideas within the community where the program is intended to be implemented; this process ideally leads to local analysis, planning, and action as well as monitoring and evaluation. Hence, it includes all of the stages of the program or project cycle, yet it is implemented under a participatory approach. The complete approach would start with a participatory appraisal, local analysis, participatory planning, locally driven action, participatory monitoring, and local evaluation that would then serve as feedback for the next participatory appraisal. Understood as a process, PRA not only leads to information analysis but also actively involves and engages people, focuses on local capabilities, creates ownership, builds self-reliance, and empowers local people. Unfortunately, the rapid spread of and the increasing demand for PRA has not necessarily meant fostering local participation in either analysis or decision-making. Among the main causes of its failure, the most notorious have been routine and rushed applications, the lack of welltrained practitioners or poor quality training, and the neglect of behavior and attitudes crucial for participatory approaches. These implementation problems have shown that although the rhetoric of PRA was increasingly used, it did not necessarily keep up with the main philosophy and objectives of the participatory approach. Ironically, in some cases, the topdown imposition of PRA by donors has led to the use of the rhetoric over the real practice of PRA. In other cases, participation meant that the local population had to provide labor “voluntarily” without being involved in decision-making for the program. In other words, participation became a way to obtain cheap labor for the IOs and governments involved (de Waal 1997; Uvin 1998: 8). These failures in implementation and the use of only the rhetoric of PRA—with the subsequent decrease in expectations about its applicability—are some of the major obstacles to achieving viable solutions to the inherent problems of program and project management.26 When participation leads to more local organizing and more vociferous demands for accountability and political change, it can also provoke a counterreaction from undemocratic forces. Hence, one cannot lightheartedly start a par-

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ticipatory approach; just as with the issue of multidisciplinarity, political power games are bound to come up. IOs need to think through the possible consequences as much as possible in advance. Taking risks may be necessary, but at times it requires careful tradeoffs.

Internal Management Issues Given the complexity of the societal problems that most IOs address, setting up the internal organization geared to facilitate program management poses a considerable challenge. Figure 6.3 of the UNICEF programming process illustrates how intricate that process can become. Setting up an organization for program management leads to a paradox. While the program itself is temporary, program management for the organization is not. There will always be several programs going on simultaneously. Moreover, programs always contain one or more new element for their participants. Yet for the IOs, be they UN or NGOs, program management has become a routine process. When one program cycle ends, it usually feeds into a new cycle. In other words, the organization applies standard processes to create something new. For the managers at headquarters and in the field, that requires setting up an organization that controls what is happening in the field while remaining flexible. Likewise, to achieve success, managers need a program that is comprehensive in scope and yet targeted enough to make a critical change. Field managers often express that they would like to be more flexible, better able to do contingency planning and grasp opportunities. In short, they want to be more agile. Whereas they often complain that the programming process is too labor intensive, managers at headquarters often fret about their lack of control: donors impose their demands; programs last too long, cost too much, and do not deliver sufficient results. Finding a balance between control and flexibility, comprehensiveness and targeting is not easy. Fortunately, organizations can do a lot on their own initiative to facilitate program management.27 Sometimes such facilitation implies that it is actually better for top management not to interfere in an ongoing program. One can jointly determine deadlines, objectives, and methods in advance, but changing the scope of the program midway through or the responsibilities of the people in the field often wreaks havoc. Unsurprisingly, most recommendations for improving the management of programs focus on the relationship between upper management, often at headquarters, and the field.

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A clear mission for the organization acts as a unifying theme so that everybody knows where the organization is heading. It helps to set priorities, and it facilitates communication. Ideally this mission informs a strategy for decentralized service delivery for faster response to local needs and capacities. Some important points for attention are: •

Is it possible to simplify the current program processes to make them more flexible? Review and remove unnecessary procedures, documents and meetings; make sure that program staff obtains a good overview of the whole program process; provide guidelines with clear techniques and tools.

•

Does upper management support the programs well enough? The answer to this question is eminently practical. It focuses on such practices as “negotiating deadlines, supporting the creative process, allowing time for and supporting project planning, choosing not to interfere in project execution, demanding no useless scope changes, and changing the reward system to motivate project work” (Graham and Englund 1997: 6).

•

Should there be a different division of labor between field and headquarters? Think, for example, of a higher degree of autonomy for the field offices, in particular for the execution of the programs. Support this with measures such as higher budget ceilings, local procurement, and local staffing so that headquarters—and regional offices—can focus on support, audit, and control.

•

Can the organization create teams that combine upper and field managers? Multidisciplinary approaches always require support from people with different backgrounds. Is teamwork rewarded, or is the organization focusing on functionally or geographically differentiated departments and divisions that have a hard time working together?

•

Can the capacity to process information between headquarters and field be improved? For example, is it possible to use management information systems, in particular, to streamline and speed up financial processes? Good program management software should be utilized. When possible, use the information system for obtaining and distributing “compiled evaluation lessons.” In addition, the organization can strengthen training, both as an induction into

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the organization and its programming and as a method for continuous skills improvement, which also leads to a higher degree of professionalization. •

Do programs use clear goal setting—for example, in a logical framework—in order to provide a shared sense of direction and to promote evaluation of the programs? Participation is crucial in setting these goals.

•

Is there a need to strengthen evaluation capabilities? This can be accomplished through setting up better organizational structures and better guidelines for explaining the evaluation methodology.

It may seem a paradox, but a clear mission can actually foster local participation. Participation does not mean slavishly following what the local counterparts want; it is more about finding out who wants to address what problems and how to do that effectively (Dijkzeul 2005; Christopolos 2005: 46). Participation implies openness and mutual adjustment. The organization needs to develop its areas of expertise and have resources available. For this, it needs a mission and a strategy. In response to local initiatives, the organization can work at its edges and over time change its mission, but fostering participation requires in-house expertise, and this takes time to develop. Many of the recommendations above may seem straightforward, but organizations usually have a hard time implementing them. For example, participatory approaches and the shift from a project mode to the programming approach have been promoted since the 1960s. Still, after more than half a century, many IOs still struggle with these approaches. IOs, like all organizations, need to work continuously on improving their management. But IOs face an extra hurdle. On the one hand, implementing these programs requires open communication and clear goals; the recommendations are based on a managerial logic that emphasizes the values of authenticity (managers mean what they say) and sincerity (managers really do what they say they will do). Without these values, implementing the recommendations will first take place in a haphazard manner, and slowly implementation will become harder, if not impossible. On the other hand, the political contexts in which these programs are implemented require extremely deft handling. Here managers need to follow a political logic that emphasizes the role of power, ambiguity, feasible steps, and compromise. These two logics are not always in conflict, but they certainly do not automatically function in happy unison. Sometimes, the managerial logic can be followed mainly within the organization, whereas the political logic needs to be pursued in cooperation—or competition—with other parties that have a stake in the program.

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Interorganizational Relationships As stated, many parties are involved in programming. At the international level, the donor government or the public at large needs to be satisfied. But catering to these groups does not imply meaningful participation at the field level. It is more common than not that donor governments do not know what actually happens in the field. Moreover, many donors push their own pet projects and policies, which are often intertwined with other national interests, for example through earmarked funding. Through their funding, donor governments have considerable leverage over UN organizations and NGOs. As a result, IOs need to cater to their donors and local partners at the same time, which limits the autonomy of the programming organization and makes program management difficult. IOs also need to work under the rules and regulations of the national governments of the countries where they are active. Officially, UN organizations can only design and carry out programs at the request of the national government. Nowadays, they often cooperate under the UN Development Group’s Common Country Assessment methodology and its UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) model (Dijkzeul and Fomerand 2018). Unofficially, they of course also make suggestions to their governmental counterparts. NGOs generally have more leeway, but they still need the cooperation of the government with such issues as accreditation, security, and taxes. Especially during civil conflict or with corruption, IOs need to be savvy operators in order to reach and work with the local population without antagonizing those in power. Yet, the nature of their programs in development, humanitarian affairs, human rights, and so on often leads to either tensions or conflicts with the government, other elites, or even local warlords. As a consequence, IOs often try to work in a technocratic manner—supposedly value free and neutral. With such a way of operating, the organization can claim that its autonomy should be safeguarded, which can make life considerably easier in a multiactor context. Nevertheless, technocratic behavior can take the organization only a limited distance; in order to be successful in their program, they can never leave the local political context completely out of consideration. Even if they succeed in overcoming the hurdles above, they face yet another problem: although IOs are nonprofits, they can compete fiercely for media and donor attention. In addition, their management systems and procedures may be incompatible, making coordination difficult. For example, in the Huehuetenango department of Guatemala, there were at least five agricultural development organizations active at the same time. They all professed to support local participation, but their programs were rarely compatible. In one specific case, a UN organization did not want to work with an agricultural government agency; instead, it worked with

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an independent governmental investment fund. This meant that the older agricultural organization, in fact, got an additional competitor within the governmental structure. International support thus complicated local agricultural improvement and turned two government institutions against each other. Similarly, one donor government funded two local organizations that sometimes worked at cross-purposes (author’s field notes, Guatemala 1999). Governmental institutions are not the only national or local bodies that IOs work with. They also cooperate with local NGOs, sometimes to build their capacities, sometimes to work with them as implementing partners. The latter is a crucial “make-or-buy” decision for the IO that deeply influences the nature of program management. “Farming out” can lead to long aid chains (Biekart 1999; Fowler 1996: 169–86). In principle, supporting and working through a local NGO is already a form of participation, albeit minimal. However, in their funding of these local NGOs, IOs make many mistakes. Smillie (1996) observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina that IOs and donor governments took several missteps, namely the following: •

They did not adequately assess the capacities of the NGOs. As a result, the organizations grew rapidly in financial terms but did not yet possess the skills to implement good quality projects.

•

They often provided only short-term funding, whereas the local NGOs needed assurances of long-term funding to strengthen themselves. Many of their rebuilding projects also required longterm funding.

•

They did not make their payments on time; since the NGOs had no liquidity of their own, these delays caused considerable hardship and hampered financial management.

•

They did not pay a reasonable proportion of the overhead costs of the organization. Yet to be viable, an NGO also needs to build up its own capacity.

•

They wanted local NGOs to take over some of their projects but did not support them to become financially sustainable.

•

They imposed considerable requirements on the NGOs, for example, a deluge of paperwork regarding monitoring, evaluations, and budgeting. Even worse, the various IOs used different guidelines and formats to which the local NGOs had to conform.

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In addition, donors often promoted their favorite program topics and were insufficiently responsive to the local needs and capacities. They simply did not listen well enough to the proposed initiatives from the local NGOs and population. In this sense, the IOs need more responsive funding mechanisms (Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001). It is worrisome that Smillie (1996) studied these already twenty years before the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit highlighted the same problems. IOs focused at different times on infrastructure rebuilding, reconciliation, and psychosocial care. However, local needs differ from place to place and do not follow a straight path in which one works first on infrastructure, then on psychosocial care, and then on the next new thing. Sustained and responsive funding is a necessity. In chapter 9, Evenson discusses these problems in regard to democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina in more detail. In general, such popular buzzwords as empowerment, resilience, and, yes, participation reflect the assumptions, priorities, and marketing of either donor governments or IOs. In their actual use of these terms, IOs rarely reflect on the perspective of the local population and instead impose their concepts on the local fabric, which in turn hampers meaningful participation and decreases sustainability. Only through actual local participation can the local situation be better understood and updated continuously. Yet, as mentioned, in some cases the elite, warlords, or the corrupt or weak government may actually oppose such participation, because it weakens their power base. All in all, IOs engage in complicated networks of a great variety of actors to carry out their service delivery. Working in these networks requires political and tactical acumen, which brings back, or actually intensifies, the problematic tension between the political and the managerial logic.

Critique of the Program Approach As mentioned earlier, Baum and Tolbert enumerated the advantages of program management, namely, providing a framework for analyzing and compiling data, establishing investment priorities, considering project or program alternatives, and addressing sector policy issues. Program management imposes discipline on both planners and decision makers. It also ensures that relevant problems and issues are taken into account and analyzed systematically before decisions are reached and implemented. “Correctly applied, it can greatly increase the development impact of … scarce investment resources” (Baum and Tolbert 1985: 335).

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The crux of the criticism on the program approach lies in these words: correctly applied. Is it possible to do so? Program management must inevitably deal with the diversity of a multiactor environment. Depending on their goals, values, and interests, various parties will define the meaning of correctly applied differently. Although the program approach at least forces the main actors to explicitly consider their value judgments, several of them will be mainly interested in the resources. Baum and Tolbert also stress the importance of good quality data for program design and the difficulty of implementing programs in a constantly changing world. In their final analysis, the quality of the program depends on the skills and judgment of those who apply the program. This chapter illustrates many techniques to improve these skills and judgments, but it also demonstrates that many of these techniques could be ill applied. Almost by definition, IOs have to tackle difficult development and humanitarian problems. Many things can go wrong. The program can be ill conceptualized. There can be problems in analysis and with faulty assumptions. Understanding different cultures and local perceptions has high opportunity costs and is time consuming but necessary. The program can lack critical mass to make a change. The program may be insufficiently multidisciplinary and participatory. The program may be set up, funded, or executed by an organization that is not up to par in its program management. The program can suffer from too little, too late, or irregular funding. The program may take place in a network of organizations that compete with each other for funding and media attention, which obstructs fitting the different programs in the same region together. Moreover, Krause (2014) has used the practice approach to highlight an inevitable problem of program and project management. As IOs will not have unlimited means, access, or geographical scope, they will have to choose which local actors they can support and which not (see also her chapter on human rights in this volume). In the process, they have to “sell” their beneficiaries to donor institutions. As a result, these beneficiaries are “commodified” to fit program and donor requirements. This can make it harder for them to raise their voices, and it curtails their participation. Fundamentally, and in contrast to what many of its proponents advocate, the instrumental rationality of programming also entails value-laden decisions concerning the selection and commodification of the target groups and simultaneous (implicit) exclusion of other groups of people. Finally, even if the program is truly multidisciplinary and participatory, the program managers will almost inevitably have to deal with the tension between the political and managerial logic. Similar to Krause’s critique of

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commodification and exclusion, this leads to a critique of programming as an open procedural tool for linking sectors and actors through design, implementation, and evaluation. Programming as a tool gives the impression that it can be applied everywhere in a similar manner. By providing objectives, an activity timetable, and a budget, the program approach allows for a high degree of control of the development or humanitarian projects. However, in itself, the program approach does not indicate whose objectives are being taken into account and the degree of cultural sensitivity that will be applied. In some politicized environments, it allows the pretension that this approach involves simply technocratic, value-free work. As a ploy to get work done, this may function well, but when program staff starts to believe that it is actually just carrying out technocratic tasks, then it must think again—seriously. The issue of political control and therewith the political logic is bound to raise its head. A program helps to control the management of service delivery, but it does not automatically align itself with other actors and broader societal processes.

Alternatives We should always entertain the possibility that it may be better not to start a program (see Ferguson 1994: 287). Sometimes the local population is better off on its own. Other times, programs can worsen the local situation, as has happened with many structural adjustment programs and humanitarian interventions (Terry 2002; Grünewald, Binder, and Georges 2010). In those cases, it is better to stay home and look for the root causes of poverty and conflict that do not lie in the developing countries. What are the decisions and activities in the industrialized world that hamper local development elsewhere? This may often be of greater fundamental importance than program management, because it influences the conditions for overall development (Dijkzeul and Hilhorst 2016). Many IOs will have a hard time selling this approach, but they probably should do so more often (see Fomerand’s chapter on SHD in this volume). Within the South, it is also possible to mention nonprogram alternatives. They fall into two categories of responsible governance, namely, sound macroeconomic policy and promoting law. To start with the latter, most developing countries have good laws—they are just not implemented well enough. Respecting laws can range from promoting a well-functioning judiciary to fighting corruption to the proper maintenance of land reform law. Land reform can be effective in fighting poverty (Chambers 1983: 151–52). Legal aid to the local population and respect-

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ing fair interest rates, especially in extremely poor areas or after disasters, can also bring great benefits. The effects of macroeconomic policy play out in at least two different ways: first, in prices and terms of trade and, second, in terms of the national budget and its priorities. According to Chambers, prices are an important weapon in augmenting incomes. Monopoly marketing of cash crops by parastatals creams off surpluses from the local farmers and reallocates these to the bureaucracy and elite behind the parastatal organizations. Similarly, “an overvalued foreign exchange benefits the urban middle classes by keeping down the prices of the imported goods they buy, and discriminates against the rural populations by giving them less for the commodities they produce for export, such as jute, sisal, tea, coffee, cocoa, coconut oil, palm oil, rubber, and cotton” (Chambers 1983: 150–51). Some governments also have an official exchange rate for IOs that is higher than the (black) market rates. The banks and/or government institutions responsible for money exchange then pocket the difference between the official and market rates. As a result, this money is not spent on the actual programs but rather is used to finance the bureaucrats and elites in power. Closely related to the issue of prices and terms of trade is the issue of sound macroeconomic budgeting by the government. In and of itself, this is a broad and contentious area. Budgetary policies, however, do reflect the actual government priorities and have great influence on economic growth and the possibilities of reduction of poverty and other forms of social exclusion. For programming, it is crucial to note that aid is fungible. Even if aid is focused on a certain sector or program, it still expands the total government budget, so that the government can allocate other parts of its budget differently. For example, if an IO supports an educational program, then the government can spend its freed-up funds on—say— the military. Impact evaluations rarely to never measure these net effects of programming. In contrast, in countries with sound macroeconomic policy and good public service delivery, the World Bank (1998) has made a case to give aid directly in the form of overall budget support. Such support can considerably simplify administration and lessen overhead for both donor and recipient—something that happens too rarely with programs. All of these alternatives have a common theme: when a government functions well, the need for outside interventions by IOs decreases. Respect for the law, fair prices, and sound macroeconomic policy all assume that the government has the interests of the population close to its heart. Hence, it is easy to turn this argument on its head. Whenever national

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governments fail, it is important for outsiders to step in. In response to the World Bank, the Global Humanitarian Assistance report asked, “If development cooperation is restricted to ‘good policy’ countries, where does this leave the most vulnerable people and countries where stability, resources, and optimism may be in shortest supply?” (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2000: 76). It is of course possible to doubt whether national budgets reflect democratic participation. And when they do, it is generally through a convoluted bureaucratic process. In addition, even with sound economic policies, specific groups, such as women, children, and people living in pockets of poverty, will need assistance, which will generally be given in the form of, once again, programs. Except for doing nothing and turning the focus of action, including advocacy, northward, the alternatives do not make programming superfluous. It is more that the alternatives place the onus of responsibility on national actors and, in particular, on the government. In doing so, proponents of the alternatives implicitly claim that the government should be free of corruption and should work for the interests of the people. To put it mildly, this is not always a realistic option, and programming by outside organizations remains necessary. Moreover, the alternatives do not exclude programming. If a government receives direct budget support or promotes the law, it will need programs to carry out its policies. In conclusion, with the alternatives, the need for specific programs changes and the actors involved change, but programming itself does not disappear.

Conclusions IOs are heavy users of the program approach. It is a procedural tool to link activities and actors in a phased manner. In principle, it allows for disciplined analysis, execution, and evaluation. Most of all, it can be applied in many different contexts. Still, after more than half a century of trying, actual participation in program management is rarely effective. The weaknesses of the program approach stem from the assumptions behind it, namely: •

A program is a procedure that is open and amenable to different kinds of societal problems.

•

A program can divide the problem and the answer to it into stages and (sub)projects, which are limited in time and resources.

•

A program has a target group.

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•

A program is an intentional tool in the sense that goals and purposively structured action lead to the desired results.

•

A program receives sufficient support to carry it out.

•

A program is based, adjusted, and evaluated on the basis of correct data.

The irony of programming is that it rarely takes place in an environment in which these assumptions are fully realized. First of all, these assumptions do not elucidate who controls the programming process. By focusing on procedure and leaving out the question of who controls the program, a technocratic approach is implicitly fostered. Selecting a target group can lead to their commodification to donors and exclusion of others. If the procedure is open and amenable, it does not guarantee that the right societal problem (and root causes) are being addressed. Nor does a program by itself divide the problems into stages and subprojects; societal problems and processes have their own rhythm, and it is not at all certain that the program can tap into that rhythm with its timeframe and limited resources. Problems can also differ hugely; the procedures for programs in development and humanitarian work need to be adapted considerably. It is certainly not always true that the programming organizations can collect the right data for their decisions. They often need to play it by ear and work with insufficient information. Intentional action by IOs may not be possible or required to alter societal processes. Intentional action in a multiactor environment can lead to opposition. Other actors will have different views and values; they may not care about the problem or might have different priorities. In particular, they may conceptualize the societal problem differently. This also weakens the assumption of sufficient support. Underneath this assumption is the hope that one or more actors—a benign state bureaucracy, a capable UN organization, a wise local leader, an idealistic NGO, and so on—are autonomous enough to pull the program through. Yet, the IO is often more limited in its autonomy than the programming process assumes. One can argue that this problem of control can be overcome or circumvented if the concepts or interests behind the program are cogent and valuable enough that they unify the actors involved in a common pursuit. This may sometimes be true when there is a strong consensus within a society about a problem and its possible remedies. However, such a consensus is more often absent than not, for many IOs focus on such wicked problems as development, humanitarian affairs, human rights, and the environment. Finally, donor governments and national governments of the countries where the field activities take place play a crucial role. Even

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if the governments cooperate well, the self-interest of management can preclude or hamper local inputs. In both cases, a top-down approach prevails and participation suffers. The problem of control often shows the hardships in combining the managerial and political logic of action. The three models—statutory, contextual, and internal—and the many programming techniques in this chapter are efforts to address these problematic assumptions. To some extent, they can succeed at this, but generally they find ways to deal better with the shortcomings of the assumptions instead of eliminating them. In addition, the actual use of the techniques has its own problems. For example, they can lead to onesided attention to analysis and goal setting instead of actual implementation. Moreover, applying them requires tradeoffs between control and flexibility, as well as between comprehensiveness and targeting. Still, the alternatives do not fundamentally exclude the program approach. In the end, how a program will be carried out depends on the skills and judgment of the actors involved. As a procedural tool, the program approach has a double nature: it can be used to shove delivery down local throats or to foster a participatory process toward the realization of shared objectives. In other words, the program approach allows for the integration of value judgments of donors, executing agents, and the local population, but it does not do so by itself. Programming is an inevitable tool, but its quality depends on its actual application and, in particular, on the participation of other actors. Its pathologies will show in its application. As a result of the assumptions behind programming, most practitioners of the program approach fail to see its double nature and the need for delicate management. All the resources of the world, improved techniques, and the right language do not, by themselves, lead to successful participatory programs. Dennis Dijkzeul is professor of conflict and organization research at the Social Science School and the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict at Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. He was the founding director of the Humanitarian Affairs Program at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University in New York. He has conducted research projects on international and local organizations in the DRC, South Sudan, and Afghanistan, and has worked as a consultant for UN organizations and NGOs in Africa, Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America. His main research interests concern the management of international organizations (the UN, NGOs, and diaspora organizations) and their interaction with local actors in humanitarian crises. His latest books are The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory (Routledge, 2015, with William DeMars), The New Humanitarians in International Practice:

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Emerging Actors and Contested Principles (Routledge, 2016, with Zeynep Sezgin), and Diaspora Organizations in International Affairs (Routledge 2020, with Margit Fauser).

NOTES 1. DP/1990/9. 2. This also holds true for the decision about the discontinuation of a program (McKay et al. 2018). 3. Baum and Tolbert mainly concentrate on project management, but their argument is equally valid for program management. 4. The contextual model also has a disadvantage. As a linear model, it does not display the feedback loops that exist among the various variables. 5. This is similar to the way in which IR treated IOs as black boxes. See the introduction to this volume. 6. With time and money, it is possible to compare the degree of realization of the statutory variables to infer how they contributed to the program outcomes. 7. Retrospective evaluations and final assessments can take many forms: output measurement, efficiency measurement, effectiveness assessment, societal cost and benefit studies, and sustainability studies. Finally, meta evaluations compare several program evaluations in order to compile the lessons learned from several programs. 8. The next problem, of course, becomes whether the evaluation will actually be used to improve the current or new programs. 9. Part of this definition is originally from the International Service for National Agricultural Research and was quoted by Price (1991). 10. This model can be adapted. For example, some LFA models split up the indicators into baseline values and target values. The current value is then the value measured at a specific point in time during program implementation (e.g., a midterm review). 11. But it is beyond the scope of this chapter to enumerate them all, including their applicability, usefulness, and failures. 12. In this respect, the European Union directorate general for humanitarian action and civil protection has developed a long-term, structured form of cooperation, the so-called Framework Partnership Agreement, which indicates the conditions that the organization has to fulfill before project proposals are taken into consideration. In this way, ECHO attempts to safeguard the quality of the management of the organizations before they submit project proposals for funding. Government funding agencies of other countries in Europe often demand that these organizations have an FPA. Other large donors outside of Europe have similar arrangements. 13. For institutional evaluation: GIZ (2019), IFAD (2009), Misereor (2015), and UNDP (2009, 2010, 2011). For environmental evaluation: IUCN (2020) and UNEP (2004).

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14. It also facilitates assessing all three instrumental variables—hierarchical integration, stakeholder participation, and decision rules—of the statutory model. 15. Obviously, stakeholder analysis is a useful tool for addressing the stakeholder participation of the statutory model. 16. For a more elaborate review, including alternatives to LFA, see Gasper (2000a and 2000b); Hummelbrunner (2010). 17. Integrated development programs are the ultimate ideal as a set of projects that form one “Gestalt” in which the dividing lines between the disciplines are not visible anymore. While this is a great ideal to strive for, it is either rare or impossible in practice that programming participants can seamlessly fit together all of their different backgrounds, approaches, and goals. 18. The validity of the causal theory is an important part of the statutory model. 19. It can also provide a useful input for gauging the resource variables, in particular the financial resources, of the statutory model. 20. In the 1970s, integrated programming was very popular. It combined different functional sectors and disciplines—for example, better health required better healthcare, stronger agriculture, and improved diets (Krishna and Bunch 1997: 137–52). 21. Ferguson lays out in detail how this deficient analysis is based on a broader development discourse. He uses Foucault to criticize the depoliticizing concept of “development.” 22. Following Foucault, Ferguson uses the term “instrument effects” for “side effects.” Although the contextual model is rather instrumental—an approach that Ferguson criticizes—these side effects comprise the collateral and latent consequences of this model. 23. Stiefel and Wolfe (1994) also focus on broader popular participation and its many meanings, such as pluralist democracy, labor unions, peasant movements, and social movements of the poor. 24. A variation of PRA that reduces the time and the monetary resources applied is the Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), which is a set of different methodologies to collect accurate information from local people. Qualitative methodologies for acquiring data are crucial for RRA. RRA concentrates on generating information, which is then analyzed away from the field. Although local people are consulted, the subsequent decisions are still rarely taken by them. 25. In his classic Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Chambers (1983) illustrates many of the pitfalls in understanding (and neglecting) rural poverty. In addition, he provides many suggestions for better learning from local rural people and suggests improvements for professional behavior and practical action. 26. Also outside PRA, thinking about participation has developed further. In their influential book Rising from the Ashes, Anderson and Woodrow (1998) make the simple yet crucial distinction between reducing vulnerabilities and building (on) capacities. They argue that humanitarian organizations have focused too little on building (on) local capacities. After all, participation also

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means building on local initiatives, which reduces the chance of creating dependency. Anderson and Woodrow also argue to take into account simultaneously the physical and material, the social and organizational, and the motivational and attitudinal aspects of rebuilding. In the early 2000s, attention to rights-based programming has increased in humanitarian circles. The main thought behind it is that refugees, internally displaced people, and others affected by conflict have a right to assistance. Moreover, this assistance should fulfill certain quality criteria. People in war-torn societies thus have a claim to assistance; they are not just needy subjects left to the whims of IOs. Such a rights-based approach should enhance the accountability of IOs, and it is in line with other initiatives such as the SPHERE Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (2018) and the Core Humanitarian Standard (2018). 27. By and large, management literature focuses on the management of projects within the organization. Development and humanitarian literature focuses far more often on the role of the programs and projects in the field.

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Books and Articles Amici, Marco, and Denita Cepiku. 2020. Performance Management in International Organizations. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Anderson, Mary B. 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Anderson, Mary B., and Peter J. Woodrow. 1998. Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Aune, Jens B. 2000. “Logical Framework Approach and PRA—Mutually Exclusive or Complementary Tools for Project Planning?” Development in Practice 10(5): 687–90. Baum, Warren C., and Stokes M. Tolbert. 1985. Investing in Development: Lessons of World Bank Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. Berman, Paul. 1978. “The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementation.” Public Policy 26(2): 157–84. Biekart, Kees. 1999. The Politics of Civil Society Building: European Private Aid Agencies and Democratic Transitions in Central America. Utrecht: International Books and The Transnational Institute.

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Bryant, Coralie, and Louise G. White. 1982. Managing Development in the Third World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Buchanan-Smith, Margaret, Paul Knox, John Cosgrave, Alexandra Warner, Francesca Bonino, Neil Dillon, and Ralf Otto Clarke. 2016. Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide. London: ALNAP/ODI. Chambers, Robert. 1983. Rural Development: Putting the Last First. Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd. Christopolos, Ian. 2005. “Institutional Capacity Building amid Humanitarian Action.” In ALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action in 2004: Capacity Building, edited by ALNAP, 29–72. London: ALNAP. CHS Alliance, Groupe URD, and Sphere Association. 2018. Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability: Updated Guidance Notes and Indicators 2018. Retrieved 17 July 2020 from https://corehumanitarianstandard .org/files/files/Core_Humanitarian_Stabdard-Guidance_Notes_and_Indica tors-2018.pdf. Dijkzeul, Dennis. 2005. Models for Service Delivery in Conflict-Affected Environments: Drawing Lessons from the Experience of the Ushirika/GBV Partnership Programmes in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In mimeo, Consultancy Report for the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), Bukavu. Dijkzeul, Dennis, and Jacques Fomerand. 2018. “Coordinating Economic & Social Affairs.” In The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, edited by T. G. Weiss and S. Daws, 655–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dijkzeul, Dennis, and Dorothea Hilhorst. 2016. “Instrumentalisation of Aid in Humanitarian Crises: Obstacle or Precondition for Cooperation?” In Humanitarianism and Challenges of Cooperation, edited by Volker Heins, Kai Koddenbrock, and Christine Unrau, 54–71. London: Routledge. Durlak, Joseph A., and Emily P. DuPre. 2008. “Implementation Matters: A Review of Research on the Influence of Implementation on Program Outcomes and the Factors Affecting Implementation.” American Journal of Community Psychology 41(3–4): 327–50. Eade, Deborah, and Suzan Williams. 1995/2005. The Oxfam Handbook of Development and Relief. London: Oxfam (UK and Ireland). Ferguson, James. 1994. The Anti-politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Fowler, Alan F. 1996. “Assessing NGO Performance: Difficulties, Dilemmas and a Way Ahead.” In Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post–Cold War World, edited by Michael Edwards and David Hulme, 169–86. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. Funke, Carolin. 2022. Durable Solutions: Challenges with Implementing Global Norms for Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia. New York: Berghahn Books.

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Fyfe, Alec. 1993. Child Labor: A Guide to Project Design. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. Gasper, Des R. 2000a. “Evaluating the ‘Logical Framework Approach’ towards Learning-Oriented Development Evaluation.” Public Administration and Development 20: 17–28. ———. 2000b. Logical Frameworks: Problems and Potentials (Teaching Material for ISS Participants). The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). 2019. Organisational Capacity Self-Assessment Tool (OCSAT): Practitioner’s Guide. Bonn/East Jerusalem: GIZ. Gosling, Louisa, and Michael Edwards. 2003. Toolkits: A Practical Guide to Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation. 2nd ed. London: Save the Children. Graham, Robert J., and Randall L. Englund. 1997. Creating an Environment for Successful Projects: The Quest to Manage Project Management. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Groupe URD. 2009. Participation Handbook for Humanitarian Field Workers, 2009. Retrieved 7 July 2020 from https://www.urd.org/en/publication/participationhandbook-for-humanitarian-field-workers/. Grünewald, Francois, Andrea Binder, and Yvio Georges. 2010. Inter-agency RealTime Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months after the Earthquake. Retrieved 14 July 2020 from https://www.gppi.net/media/binder_2010_haiti-RTE.pdf. Harrel Allen, Thomas. 1978. New Methods in Social Science Research: Policy Sciences and Futures Research. New York: Praeger Publishers. Hummelbrunner, Richard. 2010. “Beyond Logframe, Critique, Variations and Alternatives.” In Beyond Logframe: Using Systems Concepts in Evaluation, edited by Nobuko Fujita, 1–33. Tokyo: Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development. IFAD. 2009. Guidance Notes for Institutional Analysis in Rural Development Programmes: An Overview. Rome: IFAD. Retrieved 3 July 2020 from https://www .ifad.org/en/web/knowledge/publication/asset/39417009. IUCN. 2020. Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA). Gland, CH: IUCN. Retrieved 3 July 2020 from https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/iucn_esms_ esia_guidance_note.pdf. Kassam, Yusuf, and Kemal Mustafa, eds. 1992. Participatory Research: An Emerging Alternative Methodology in Social Science Research. New Delhi: Society for Participatory Research in Asia. Kerzner, Harold. 1998. In Search of Excellence in Project Management: Successful Practices in High Performance Organizations. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. Krause, Monika. 2014. The Good Project: Humanitarian Relief NGOs and the Fragmentation of Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Krishna, Anirudh, and Roland Bunch. 1997. “Farmer-to-Farmer Experimentation and Extension: Integrated Rural Development for Smallholders in Guatemala.” In Reasons for Hope: Instructive Experiences in Rural Development, ed-

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ited by Anirudh Krishna, Norman Thomas Uphoff, and Milton Jacob Esman, 137–52. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. Mayer, Robert R., and Ernest Greenwood. 1980. The Design of Social Policy Research. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Maynard, Kim. 2000. “Post-conflict Community Participation: Using a Development Approach in a Chaotic Environment.” Unpublished paper for UNDP’s Emergency Response Division and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives for the roundtable “Community-Based Reintegration and Rehabilitation in Post-Conflict Settings.” 30 and 31 October, in mimeo. McKay, Virginia R., Alexandra B. Morshed, Ross C. Brownson, Enola K. Proctor, and Beth Prusaczyk. 2018. “Letting Go: Conceptualizing Intervention Deimplementation in Public Health and Social Service Settings.” American Journal of Community Psychology 62(1–2): 189–202. Misereor. 2015. A Handbook for Socio-Economic Analysis and Management of Water-Supply Facilities. Vol. 1: Socio-Economic Analysis of the Environment. Aachen, Germany: Misereor. OECD. 2020. “Aid by DAC Members Increases in 2019 with More Aid to the Poorest Countries, 16 April 2020.” Paris: OECD. Retrieved 3 July 2020 from www.oecd .org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/ODA2019-detailed-summary.pdf. Patton, Michael Quinn. 1978. Utilization Focused Evaluation. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Jones, Carolyn. 1996. PRA in Central Asia: Coping with Change. Oxford: INTRAC, International Development Studies (IDS). Pressman, Jeffrey Leonard, and Aaron B. Wildavsky. 1984. Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland. 3rd ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Price, Neil. 1991. “The Project Framework Approach to Population Project Planning and Management: A Working Paper of the Sir Davis Owen Population Center.” Unpublished paper. Photocopies available from Overseas Information. SCF. Rossi, Peter H., and Howard E. Freeman. 1985. Evaluation: A Systematic Approach. 3rd ed. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Rossi, Peter H., Mark. W. Lipsey and Gary T. Henry. 2019. Evaluation: A Systematic Approach. 8th ed. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Sabatier, Paul A., and Danial A. Mazmanian. 1980. “The Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework of Analysis.” Policy Studies Journal, Special Issue, Symposium on Successful Policy Implementation 8(4): 538–60. Salomons, Dirk, and Dennis Dijkzeul. 2001. “The Conjuror’s Hat: Financing United Nations Peace-Building in Operations Directed by Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.” New York/Oslo: Center on International Cooperation (NYU)/Fafo Programme for International Cooperation and Conflict Resolution. Scheirer, Mary Ann. 1981. Program Implementation: The Organizational Context. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

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= c ha p te r 7

How NGO Practices Mediate International Human Rights Monika Krause

Introduction This chapter discusses how practices inside international human rights NGOs mediate human rights and human rights law.1 International human rights organizations—what de Waal (2003) has called “secondary human rights organizations”—are only one site for investigating “human rights”; today human rights claims circulate through different world regions and different institutional sites (Merry and Levitt 2009; Nash 2012), including national and local activist scenes, social movements, the United Nations (Moeckli and Nowak 2007; O’Flaherty 2007), the European Union and the African Union (Kilander and Abebe 2011), humanitarian and development nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international courts (Hagan 2003), national courts, national political institutions (Wanyeki 2003; Sassen 2006; Nash 2007; Schjolden 2009; Mwambene 2018), universities, and the news media (McPherson 2012, Wright 2016). But Western international human rights NGOs have disproportionately shaped the imagination of what “human rights” are, and the debates between the “champions” of human rights and their critics in particular have taken these NGOs as a central reference point. Drawing on observations about the day-to-day practices of staff in these organizations allows me to offer a perspective, which cannot be easily subsumed into either a celebratory or a critical account of human rights work: I argue that human rights NGOs form a shared social space with a shared repertoire of practice, and that this social space can mediate between external factors and the work that human rights organiza-

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tions do on the ground. Shared practices mediate between the values and aspirations associated with human rights on the one hand and the work that human rights organizations actually get to do on the other hand; they also mediate between donor interests and the work that human rights organizations do. I will first introduce the field of human rights organization as an object of analysis with a specific history, which we should always try to consider as an unlikely history that could have gone other ways. I will then highlight the selective ways in which these organizations practice human rights, through a broad but not unlimited repertoire of practice and structured by themes and focus countries. I will describe the bias introduced by the pressure to produce results and briefly examine organizations at the edges of what is considered legitimate practice, organizations that nevertheless form part of the field and contribute to its effects. To illustrate further how organizational practices mediate the ideas of human rights, I will discuss briefly how humanitarian NGOs have taken up the concept of human rights before returning to some of the normative and political questions associated with the debate about human rights.

The Field of Human Rights Organizations Evidence of human rights ideas—ideas that could or have been claimed to be ideas of human rights—can be found in sources across different time periods and to some extent across cultural traditions (e.g., Ishay 2008). The history of human rights often accords a prominent role to the French Revolution (Hunt 2007), to the antislavery movement (Bender 1992), and to the Holocaust. It is important to note that when we ask about the field of human rights organization, as a field of professional organizations that understand themselves primarily as human rights organizations, we are asking about a more recent and more particular phenomenon, whose history cannot be subsumed into the history of human rights ideas, even if we heed Samuel Moyn’s warning against linear and teleological accounts (Moyn 2010). Today we can recognize a set of organizations that identify as human rights organizations and share a basic set of practices (Dezalay and Garth 2006). Though they do of course disagree about priorities, policy, and strategy, they see each other as relevant others and bind themselves together to some extent precisely if and when they engage in debate and contestation (Fligstein 2001; Krause 2014; 2019). In calling international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch “secondary human rights orga-

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nizations,” de Waal highlights that these organizations are different from activist organizations that pursue specific causes in specific contexts (de Waal 2003). The term also highlights that the work of these organizations involves people advocating on behalf of other people rather than people advocating for themselves, which makes them heirs to the tradition of philanthropy and charity rather than that of social movements. Human rights NGOs are not a part of the United Nations, though the field of human rights would not have been possible in its current form without multilateral conventions and treaties, such as the UN Charter (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the Genocide Convention (1948), as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which were approved and opened for ratification in 1966. Human rights NGOs are formally independent of governments, though they often rely on government funding. We can also distinguish human rights NGOs from humanitarian and development NGOs, who engage in policy discussions under these other labels and treat such organizations as their peers, though some humanitarian and development NGOs now pursue rights-related advocacy (Fox 1995; Wong 2012) and apply rights to their own programs (Miller 2010; Brennan and Martone 2007; Frohardt, Paul, and Minnear 1999; Krause 2014; Hilhorst 2012; Kindornat, Ron, and Carpenter 2012). We can find examples of single international human rights organizations in the early twentieth century: the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues founded in 1922 is generally cited as the oldest international human rights organization after Anti-Slavery International (1839). Amnesty International was founded in 1961 and remains perhaps the most prestigious human rights organization. But only since the 1970s, especially since the Helsinki Accords, have human rights NGOs begun to play the prominent role we are accustomed to today (de Waal 2003; Guilhot 2008), and this field only consolidated to fully show the dynamics of mutual referencing and contestation in the 1980s.2 The number of human rights organizations has multiplied during the 1980s and 1990s, and funding has increased significantly (Smith, Pagnucco, and Lopez 1998). The positioning of human rights NGOs has been shifting with shifting administrations and foreign policies, particularly foreign policy of the United States and Western Europe, but it would be wrong to portray them as simply executing Western policies. Conservative and liberal governments were both construed as providing opportunities of different kinds. In the 1980s, Western human rights NGOs tried to use the global reach of US Cold War policy with an emphasis on exploiting a gap between neoconservative rhetoric of freedom and reality. Under liberal govern-

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ments, efforts are focused on directly influencing policymaking (de Waal 2003: 243). At the time of writing, it is unclear what, if any, opportunities the rise of populist authoritarianism brings within the countries affected. Some UK and US organizations have reported an influx of direct contributions from small donors in the wake of the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Yet in assessing the overall situation, we must bear in mind that overall the field has come to depend on government funding to a large extent.

The Repertoire of Practice of Human Rights NGOs A number of studies by social scientists and practitioners have opened up empirical perspectives on the ways international human rights organizations do their work (Hopgood 2006; Wong 2012; Kennedy 2004; Moon 2012; Smith, Pagnucco, and Lopez 1998; McPherson 2015; Bob 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010; Cooley and Ron 2002; Prakash and Gugerty 2010). It is important to note that the most prominent specialized human rights organizations interpret the concept of human rights in a very specific way and call for very specific practices. Their focus has also shaped the perception of what “human rights” means outside this field. Human rights organizations focus on collecting evidence, monitoring, and researching and writing reports. They engage in advocacy work, they conduct campaigns, and they educate about rights. As Alex de Waal has pointed out, “They use research, documentation and publication combined with the skilled use of the media and lobbying of politicians to make their concerns known. Their basic premise is that if people know about an abuse they will be moved to want to stop it” (de Waal 2003: 239). Clifford Bob has suggested that human rights work can be modeled as a “market for information” (Bob 2010). Human rights organizations produce information for a market in information and are influenced both by demand in this market (by donors and political audiences) and by attempts of potential “causes” to market themselves. Bob’s analysis has two virtues that are not often combined in the same study: it is parsimonious, and it pays attention to the specificity of human rights work. He describes an important dynamic of human rights work, but I would argue it does not quite exhaust what the organizations are doing. My sense is that the range of practices in human rights work is broader than the hypothesis of a “market for information” might suggest if taken too literally, but that range is not unlimited. In this chapter, I am using the idea of repertoire to convey that there is choice for actors, but not unlimited choice (Swidler 1986; Silber 2003). In this case, the repertoire

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is shared within a particular social group of human rights organizations (Lamont and Thévenot 2000). Research and reporting has been a major activity for human rights organizations. Human rights organizations, such as very prominently Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, accord a central role to the “report” as a product of their activity in the planning of and accounting for their work. Some other activities such as research, press releases, and dissemination and advocacy work are added onto reports. Human rights organizations have developed a particular notion of “research,” one that is heavily influenced by legal research. This means that researchers are generally looking for particular victims of human rights violations and that the information in human rights reports is heavily fact-checked. “Reports” are a specifically important product. But “campaigns” and “projects” are also important units of human rights work with potentially different implications for how work is organized. Practices such as writing a press release, sending advocacy letters, conducting research, or issuing extended press releases are sometimes part of producing one of these units and sometimes stand on their own. A singular emphasis on reports or on information as products of human rights work would lead us to underestimate the legal aspect of human rights work, or at least would reduce what is particular about information when it becomes part of legal and institutional practices: human rights organizations are regularly involved in writing briefs for court cases (Van den Eynde 2017), providing legal advice, sending an observer to a court case, participating in monitoring visits, sending a protector, or engaging in strategic litigation (Van den Vet 2012, 2014). Some human rights organizations have whole projects or units devoted to servicing multilateral legal instruments—such as the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review or the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture—and their regular review processes. In this way, they network with states and UN bodies. Other common practices include organizing workshops and training people, be they professionals, such as police or judges, or human rights defenders and activists working with local human rights organizations. Though the repertoire has diverse elements, by virtue of being a repertoire, it still acts as an implicit pre-selector of the kind of action taken in the name of human rights: resources are, in some way, distributed across these practices, not just across “victims” or “violations” (Krause 2019). When we compare international human rights NGOs to primary mobilizations, as Alex de Waal (2003) has done, we can note how restrictive this repertoire is: as secondary human rights NGOs, these organizations do not tend to invest a lot of staff resources in establishing relations of trust

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in communities, nor do they provide long-term social services combined with public education in a place or turn out people for rallies (though sometimes they do work with people who do).

The Structure of Human Rights Organizations: Themes and Focus Countries Most human rights organizations have both regional and thematic divisions. Human Rights Watch, for example, has regional programs as well as the following themes: children; immigration; disability; the United Nations; women’s rights; business and human rights; the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights Program; health and human rights; arms; and international justice. The International Commission of Jurists, for example, has a program that covers Europe and the former Soviet republics, one for the Middle East and North Africa, one for Asia, and a regional office in Central America. The organization also has a program on the independence of judges; on the United Nations; on business and human rights; on economics, social, and cultural rights; on sexual orientation and gender identity; on women’s human rights; and on global security and the rule of law. Only some very specialized organizations have regional divisions: the Association for the Prevention of Torture, for example, names its programs largely on a regional basis, but it also has staff that focus specifically on detention monitoring and advisors that focus specifically on work related to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture. The themes themselves have a history and a politics; they change and may be subject to fashions (Bob 2008). De Waal (2003: 241) notes that human rights organizations initially “decided to confine themselves to violations of fundamental rights, such as torture, arbitrary detention, and execution, along with restrictions on civil and political liberties.” More recently, some organizations have established programs that address social, economic, and cultural rights (Hertel 2017). Business and human rights has become a label, which allows NGOs to address some of these concerns—though here we can compare the specific methods of human rights organizations with more traditional forms of mobilization and regulation (Seidman 2007; Bartley 2018). LGBT rights, in another example, are today not only the focus of specific LGBT organizations but have come to be included as an explicit focus by many mainstream international human rights organizations—this is the result of intense pressure and a long struggle (Mertus 2008).

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For some human rights NGOs, “universalism” means that they aim to monitor the human rights situation in the entire world, in each and every country. But most organizations today more or less reluctantly acknowledge that they have focus countries. The very idea of focus countries relates to the thought that no organization can effectively cover all countries. Focus countries also become a reference point for discussions relating to organizational strategy (Krause 2019). On the one hand, organizations cannot focus too narrowly, but neither should they overextend. The choice of focus countries is based on previous experience, donor preferences, and chances of success. While by law all individual victims and all rights are equal, the fact that human rights organizations have themes and focus countries means that it matters which aggregate of violations an individual’s violation is a part of. As I have discussed elsewhere in more detail, whether or not, for example, a lawyer who is arrested somewhere becomes part of a statement or campaign depends partly on an organization’s specific mandate and on its focus countries and current funded projects (Krause 2019).

How to Make a Difference As in other fields, such as development and humanitarian relief work, NGOs consider how they can “make a difference” or “add value” when they are picking activities to engage in (Krause 2014, 2019). Once staff members consider how their actions can make a difference, a number of considerations enter the discussion. In order to determine how activities can have an impact, it matters, for example, what other organizations are already doing and where an organization can uniquely add value. Organizations also consider conditions on the ground that would make success more likely. Certain conditions in a country must be fulfilled to make engagement meaningful. The Association for the Prevention of Torture, for example, states that a country engagement “should be capable of having an impact in the national context. In particular there should exist the possibility to promote and pursue the three integrated elements for effective prevention of torture (transparency, legal framework, will and capacity changes).”3 When considering the likely success of human rights work, levers can become important points of orientation. This can be illustrated by the case of Human Rights First, a (universalist) human rights organization geared around a single leverage. It aims to “challenge America to live up to its ideals,” meaning that its unique strategy is to think about areas

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and issues to focus on and means it can use to exert pressure on the US government to make the most difference for improving human rights outcomes across the world. This focus on likely success is in tension with proportionality of attention to all cases. Contrary to simplistic arguments about human rights NGOs as tools of Western foreign policy, the focus on likely success can sometimes entail a disproportionate focus on Western countries that are seen as amenable to advocacy (Krause 2019). It does mean that human rights NGOs tend to focus on countries that are already the focus of Western foreign policies and neglect violations that are in countries that hardly feature in explicit Western policy agendas. It is easier to find funding for work that has demonstrable results and harder to find funding for work that does not. The focus on results, defined in distinction to activities, has a long history in discussions of management across organizational sectors, dating back, for example, to progressive critiques of corrupt government, critiques of bureaucracies in the 1960s, and new public management of the 1980s and 1990s (Krause 2014; for human rights, see Desormeau and Ignatieff 2005; International Council of Human Rights 2012). This pressure is brought to human rights work partly from donors, but it is not the same as donors’ (geopolitical) self-interest, and it is pushed by internal reformers as well. An important way to show results in human rights work is to demonstrate legal change in one way or another. Legal change could be a policy change in a specific state, a new international instrument, or the text of a constitution. Strategic litigation is also a strategy, which can be seen to result in a form of legal change. The pursuit of both constitutional guarantees and strategic litigation can be in tension with other dimensions of assessing what makes human rights work meaningful. Litigation involves building a relationship with possible clients, which can take many years, and involves personal investments on all sides. Donors usually expect strategic litigation projects to finish sooner. While it is relatively easy to find funding for work that claims to produce legal change, it is harder to fund general operations and to fund a capacity to give advice to people and react to current affairs.

A Range of Actors, a Range of Resources Though there is a recognizable repertoire of practice, which is to some extent shared across organizations, the field of human rights includes a diverse set of organizations. There are certainly some ideological differences among organizations: Some organizations working on human

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rights in Latin America, for example, are influenced by the legacy of leftwing movements of solidarity from the 1970s and 1980s, whereas organizations funded by the philanthropist George Soros tend to start from a liberal rather than a socialist agenda (Guilhot 2005). Yet on a practical level, each organization is perhaps shaped more by its structure and its unique strengths or assets rather than by its ideology: the differences between Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have received the most attention, and they are also differences in organizational structure. Amnesty International preserves its status as a membership-driven organization and resists professionalization and managerial concerns to some extent, whereas Human Rights Watch fully embraces professional fundraising and PR strategies (Hopgood 2006; Wong 2012). An organization might have expertise in a particular geographical area, staff members with certain contacts among funders, or a link to a specific professional group, such as lawyers or journalists. PEN International, for example, is more or less built around its links to prominent and dedicated writers in a range of countries. Stonewall has links to the (British) movement for LGBT rights. Sometimes the differences among organizations become the object of highly charged contestations, which take up fundamental questions about who or what can legitimately call themselves a human rights organization. Like in other fields of organizations, the ways in which actors access resources from outside the field and manage relationships to funders is closely observed, and under certain conditions some actors accuse others of “selling out.” In this respect, the most sensitive area for human rights organizations is their relationship to states. Many human rights organizations accept funding from international organizations (such as the European Union), development funding agencies, and foreign offices, and some are highly dependent on such funding. Yet under certain conditions, this funding is seen as a fundamental threat to the legitimacy of organizations, notably when the source of the funding can be seen as compromising to the kind of activity that the funding supports. The Association for Human Rights Austria (Verein für Menschenrechte Österreich), for example, has a public profile as a human rights organization active in the area of migration and refugees, collecting public donations and advertising its activities in the areas of monitoring and legal advice. The organization is funded almost exclusively by large contracts with the Austrian ministry of the interior. It assists asylum seekers, yet it does so with a focus on “help to return home” rather than “help to stay.” It focuses on those in detention, though it does not provide them with

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legal advice, nor does it comment publicly on state practices. This has led the director of Amnesty International Austria to comment that the association is a “dependent service-provider, not an NGO.”4 There are also some for-profit actors whose work overlaps with the work of human rights NGOs in the area of development cooperation, a version of what is known as “beltway bandits” with reference to where some of these organizations are located in Washington, DC, in the United States. They deliver contracts for large donor governments, advising developing countries on the design of legal systems and on access to justice, yet with little public activity or campaigning work. While many in the field do not consider this work to be human rights work, from the point of view of a sociology of human rights it is worth noting that they do operate successfully as part of the field of human rights. They draw on the legitimacy provided by the field, and they share it with the governments paying for their services. These organizations also contribute to the overall effects of the field of human rights organizations.

The Role of Human Rights in Humanitarian Relief Other international NGOs, such as those in development and humanitarian relief, have been encouraged to engage with the idea of human rights. In this last section,5 I will examine the ways in which humanitarian NGOs have interpreted and taken up the concept of human rights because it is another way of highlighting how a set of ideas is mediated by organizational routines and practices. Accounts of the relationship between human rights and humanitarian relief can focus on ideas, either by contrasting “human rights” and “humanitarianism” or by focusing on what they share. Those who emphasize what is shared will discuss the universalism of both human rights and humanitarianism, an orientation to human dignity, and a concern with distant suffering regardless of nationality, race, and religion. Those who contrast human rights and humanitarianism will portray human rights as political and oriented toward the long term and humanitarianism as a more limited form of charity (Kant 1983 [1795]; Marx and Engels 1967 [1848]; Arendt 1958). Some then hold humanitarianism to be more pure precisely because it is more limited (Rieff 2003; Chandler 2001; de Torrenté 2004). Yet neither this supposed unity nor these oppositions tell us very much about the practices of NGOs. I would argue that we can distinguish two separate fields of organizations with different repertoires of practice, and the differences between these repertoires do not necessarily map onto

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the supposed ideological differences between the two sets of ideas. One, humanitarianism, is organized around delivering life-saving assistance with relatively large budgets and complex logistics and operations. The other, human rights, produces reports, advocacy, legal services, and political connections but has a much thinner presence on the ground. Relief workers have increasingly used the concept of human rights, but they have interpreted the concept in selective and in several different ways. This selectivity is shaped by the very specific idea of human rights practice promoted by international human rights law and by what humanitarians have already been doing—that is, it is shaped by the shared practices of the field of human rights and the shared practices of the field of humanitarian relief. Aid workers in humanitarian relief have drawn on human rights claims in a variety of different contexts, and with different and contradictory practical implications. First, they have used the concept of human rights to discuss how their work relates to the practice of reporting abuses. Second, they have used the concept of human rights to confront the issue of extreme violence against populations whom they serve. Third, they have used the concept of human rights to advocate for a right of beneficiaries to basic services of the kind that humanitarian relief agencies can deliver. Lastly, they have discussed questions about the long-term effects of their work through the concept of human rights. With regard to the first point, because specialized human rights organizations such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch have had such an influence on how human rights are understood more broadly, some discussions about human rights among humanitarian agencies are focused only on how aid workers relate to the reporting of abuses. Humanitarianism as a field has been profoundly shaped by a group of doctors who insisted against the ICRC’s policy during the Biafra war that humanitarians had to speak out about atrocities they witnessed and founded Doctors without Borders (MSF). But because humanitarian agencies, in contrast to human rights NGOs, have a substantial presence in the field and need access in order to be able to deliver relief to people in need, they cannot simply include reporting in their practice. Second, relief workers sometimes equate the concept of human rights with a concern for violence against people in crisis situations (Brennan and Martone 2007; Frohardt, Paul, and Minear 1999). The crises of Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995) showed how vulnerable populations served by agencies were to violent attack (Terry 2002), and one result is the area of protection as a programming activity. Under conditions of results-based management, protection, however, becomes an agency’s practical concern as a project for specific beneficiaries and a product

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for specific donors. In extreme cases, protection becomes narrowed to protection for agencies and their programs in a problematic fusion of international humanitarian law, human rights law, and refugee law (de Waal 2003: 257). Third, some humanitarian relief workers have looked to the concept of human rights as a new basis for the work they have already been doing (Darcy 2004). In this tradition, humanitarians argue that people not only need food, water, healthcare, and shelter, they also have a right to food, water, healthcare, and shelter. By adopting rights language, officials hope they can take relief beyond charity. For humanitarian agencies, the concept of human rights could be the basis for a new relationship with the populations they serve, functioning to shape an encounter with beneficiaries as rights holders rather than primarily as people in need. In this context, the concept of human rights is used in a way that emphasizes basic material needs, not civil or political rights. The Humanitarian Charter speaks of the rights of people to an adequate standard of living, and the minimum standards outlined by Sphere give aid workers a concrete indication of what an adequate standard of living might mean. Yet, the impact of the attempt to give relief a foundation in human rights is also limited by standards being implemented in projects for specific beneficiaries chosen by the relief organization; people’s right to relief in practice becomes the right of those who are served by relief agencies to access the services the relief agency has to offer. Relief workers also express concerns and desires about long-term consequences in human rights terms. They express concerns about negative consequences of relief, such as serving perpetrators as well as victims of atrocities (Terry 2002). Relief workers also use human rights to evoke possible positive consequences of humanitarian relief. Donor agencies have increasingly emphasized the links between relief and longer-term strategic goals (Duffield 2001). Some agencies hold that relief can and should be linked to long-term human rights targets, as well as to peace, stability, security, and development. The International Rescue Committee, for example, an agency with a traditional focus on refugees and disasters, has developed an expertise regarding the integration of relief, reconstruction, and development, and human rights is used to make the link between these.

Conclusion I have tried to give an account of the practices of international human rights NGOs, and I have tried to identify certain patterns in these prac-

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tices, which hold across organizations, and which hold particularly among these organizations and not others, while also acknowledging diversity among them. Observing practices in international human rights NGOs is a basis for engaging celebratory and critical accounts of human rights. I am not convinced by accounts that paint human rights NGOs simply as a tool of Western governments or ideology: Western governments and institutional donors do influence the work of human rights organizations, but we have to remember that these states reflect societal divisions within themselves to some extent and that they exercise their influence somewhat indirectly, precisely as mediated through a repertoire of practice specific to this group of organizations. Neither am I convinced by cynical accounts that focus on the self-interests of organizations or individuals: yes, human rights work has become a professional pursuit, and people seek salaries while at the same time relying on activists and volunteers. That means they need to consider available funding. But in most cases, funders still fund very specific practices, whose legitimacy depends on the mutual recognition among those who focus specifically on human rights. I think we also need to rethink some assumptions found within celebratory accounts. I have been asked whether we can see these organizations as “outside the state,” which I take to mean as flowing directly from the text of the law or as somehow linked directly to people’s voices and needs. Human rights NGOs interpret treaties and conventions, and they are and want to be linked to UN bodies and to states and state policy. To say these organizations work on behalf of “human rights” or “human rights victims” tends to minimize the active role managers and professionals have, and the selections they make. The field of human rights organizations has a logic of its own, which fosters unique practices and can pose some resistance to the crudest forms of instrumentalization. This logic also has its own politics and its own pathologies: It has its own politics regarding which themes are included and which are not. It has its own politics regarding how relations with donors and the targets of advocacy are managed. It has its own pathologies when practices are applied by default to situations because they have previously won funding, when agencies do not watch out for granting more in legitimacy than they receive in concessions, when projects cannot be followed up upon because of funding time frames, and when a drive for measurable outputs overrides the substantive focus of the work. Human rights organizations confront—rather than avoid—the deepest forms of human suffering, and they address some of humanity’s highest

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aspirations; yet they do so with a set of practices that can seem profane and banal to the uninitiated, and they are only able to address a small fraction of abuses in a small fraction of geographic areas. The institutional structure of human rights is very selective, both in specific ways that human rights actors are very aware of and in other ways that they do not usually consider. Human rights professionals are highly aware that they are not doing enough. All actors, individually and collectively, wish they could do more. Yet at the same time, for example, few people look at the collective consequences of choices that maximize measurable impact per organization. All political ways of relating to human rights have to start from a recognition that human rights institutions are man-made and vulnerable structures, and they have to start from an honest appreciation of the gap between the hopes and expectations associated with human rights and the work that is actually done in their names. That is, one has to start from the paradoxical and contradictory insight that the field of human rights NGOs is a valuable structure that is also highly insufficient for what it is hoped to deliver. Monika Krause is an associate professor of sociology at the London School of Economics, where she also co-directs LSE Human Rights. Her research examines practices in NGOs from a sociological perspective. She is the author of The Good Project: Humanitarian NGOs and the Fragmentation of Reason (University of Chicago Press, 2014), which won awards from the British Sociological Association, the American Sociological Association, and the Association for Research on Non-profit Organizations and Voluntary Associations.

NOTES 1. This chapter draws on ideas developed in prior works by the author including Krause (2014) and Krause (2019). The British Academy Small Grant Scheme and a Future Research Leaders’ Grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (R116810) supported the research. 2. For evidence of symbolic contestation among organizations with different sponsors in the early years of the Cold War, when the US government supported the International Commission of Jurists in opposition to the liberal Association Internationale des Juristes Démocrates, see Dezalay and Garth (2006). 3. Retrieved 22 August 2017 from http://www.apt.ch/content/files_res/APTCou ntryEngagement_En.pdf (no longer available online).

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4. Cited in Eva Bachinger, “Der Platzhirsch,” SOS Mitmensch, n.d., retrieved 9 March 2021 from https://www.sosmitmensch.at/site/momagazin/alleausga ben/23/article/235.html (my translation). 5. This section draws on Krause (2014), chapter 6.

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Networked Diplomacy and Changing Polarity in World Politics An Armenia-Turkey Normalization Attempt Anna Ohanyan and Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan

Introduction The social contract between global NGOs, the United Nations (UN), and mostly Western donors has underpinned the fabric of liberal world order in the post–World War II period: Western funding of NGOs, transnational and local, has been central to promoting liberal values and facilitating globalization of capitalism and promotion of democracy worldwide. While the relationships between many NGOs and international organizations have been contentious in many cases (Carey 2010), their engagement has been developed within the liberal paradigm of democracy promotion and market capitalism. In the Cold War period, NGOs have emerged as key extensions of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, whether working in transnational advocacy on human rights and environmentalism or for service delivery in economic development and poverty eradication, to name but a few (Ohanyan 2008, 2009; Ahmed and Potter 2006). In many war-torn societies and postconflict states, NGOs have filled in major gaps in governance that the shattered states or the UN were unable to produce (Ohanyan 2008, 2009). In the specific context of postwar state building, the work of NGOs has been unfolding as that of keyimplementing actors in advancing the liberal peace paradigm (Paris 2004). This translated in their engagement deep into the communities, localizing globally conceived policies, be it security sector reform or microfinance provision (Ohanyan 2008).

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Currently, this social contract stands to be disrupted, likely producing revisions, restructuring, and renegotiation of NGO engagement with its mostly public donors, bilateral or multilateral. The rise of centrifugal politics in world order that has been weakening the social contract (McMahon 2017) is partly fueled by democratic declines in and outside of the industrialized West, in consolidated democracies and competitive authoritarian states alike (Ohanyan 2020). In Eurasia, Russia’s authoritarian resurgence is particularly significant (Ohanyan 2020), best captured by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 in blatant disregard of the rule-based world order (Ohanyan 2018). In addition, regional modes of engagement have been challenged, with the Trump administration questioning the fundamentals of NAFTA, NATO, and the European Union, and Great Britain simply walking out of the European Union. As a result, democracies, old and new, are tested by forces that are local as well as global (refugee crises, populism). At the time of this writing, the debate on the future of world order oscillates between voices on the “rise of China” argument to the rise of a multipolar and multiplex world or self-sabotage of the liberal world order by the United States (Acharya 2018; Ikenberry 2017; Mead 2014). Regardless of where one stands in these power transition debates (Paul 2016), changing patterns of diplomacy in this shifting world order (Cooper, Heine, and Thakur 2013) are hardly debatable. The erosion of the social contract between the NGOs and their Western donors will be directly affected by these changes, and the practice of diplomacy is one area where this is most explicit. NGOs have played distinct diplomatic roles with the rise of complex multilateralism throughout the second half of the twentieth century. In this period, the smaller states have enjoyed elevated political positions in global diplomatic structures, but they routinely were outperformed by NGOs in terms of diplomatic capacities. In many cases, NGOs have joined diplomatic representations of smaller states in global forums that require highly specialized and technical knowledge. The state-centric and centralized diplomatic model that emerged with the formation of sovereign states in Europe is rather outdated in confronting contemporary challenges in world politics. Its associated studies in diplomatic state practices are also inadequate in explaining contemporary developments in global diplomacy (Cooper et al. 2013). With deep integration of NGO donor networks in various areas of governance in the developing countries, NGOs have been bolstered in their global representations, often compensating for weaker capacities of smaller states. This chapter examines the transformations of global diplomatic practice in world politics, specifically reflecting on the transition from “club diplomacy” to “network diplomacy” (Heine 2013). It then explains the

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limits and opportunities presented to NGOs in these new terrains of diplomatic practice. It focuses on the implications for evaluation of the NGO sector in the context of changing diplomatic contours globally. The theoretical discussion is grounded in the case study of a consortium of eight organizations, four from Armenia and four from Turkey, in building cross-border engagement between the two countries, with the lack of the official political engagement between them as the backdrop.

Global Changes in Diplomatic Structures The NGO agency in world politics has long been a watershed issue in the dominant theories of international relations (IR). Scholars have been divided on their assessment as to how central the NGO sector has been in shaping global events over time. The agency and autonomy of NGOs from their stakeholders and donors has received particular currency in this debate (Josselin and Wallace 2001). In light of shifting world politics and power transition, NGOs reclaim a new policy and theoretical relevance. As we argue, unpacking the immediate ties and institutional connections of NGOs and their respective donor structures is instrumental toward explaining how NGOs navigate still-unsettled geopolitical terrains in world politics. We argue that understanding the network structure in which an NGO is embedded is one way to comprehend the institutional ecology of global diplomacy. Rising power accommodations will alter the political and institutional fabric of global policy networks, of which NGOs are constituent components (Reinicke 1998; DeMars 2005; Ohanyan 2008, 2009). Conflicts and confrontations between great powers, as well as lowintensity warfare between and within small states, are perhaps the most visible theaters where power transitions in the post-American world order take shape (Paul 2016). And NGOs are no strangers to complex security settings and crises, whether in terms of their involvement in peacebuilding activities on the ground or in closed-door negotiations and agenda-setting forums on various issues. These spaces, local and global, offer markedly different access points to processes of diplomacy, and each offers different sets of resources and openings to NGOs, particularly in terms of their legitimacy and capacities as diplomatic actors. In this respect, the rise of NGOs in global forums modifies the structural story of diplomacy focused on the distribution of state capacities, with greater powers having more diplomatic sway over smaller ones (Pouliot 2016). The NGOs’ performance in various governance capacities has made them a diplomatic asset for smaller states. While “sovereign

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equality” remains a foundational myth in world politics, and multilateralism is far from being the great equalizer that many wished it would be (Pouliot 2016), the transnational NGO sector has chipped away from the diplomatic hierarchies that are routinely practiced at the global stage. In parallel, the reliance on Northern NGOs by donor countries, particularly in complex security settings and conflict areas, has worked to undermine the local diplomatic infrastructure in such settings. While advancing liberal values through their work with major NGOs, the Western donors have been less strategic in many cases toward building the longterm capacities of public diplomacies in conflict regions: long-term support of local, smaller NGOs in such settings is one key area that has been neglected by many donors in many cases, an argument to which we will return later in this chapter. In the post–Cold War period, with the eruption of intrastate violence, the growing complexity of security environments has propelled the rise of collective conflict management patterns (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011), thereby formalizing and institutionalizing NGO roles in various stages of peace processes and peacebuilding interventions (Fitzduff and Church 2004). Still, the scholarly assessment of NGO input in areas of global strategic studies has been highly uneven. Many have highlighted the growing political presence of NGOs in global spaces of multilateral diplomacy and underlined the ability of the NGO sector in shaping global agendas and policy outcomes. The role of NGOs in global governance has been celebrated as one of actors that shape agendas, influence norms and values, draft policy proposals, and build discourse coalitions (van Ham 2014) and move information and resources (DeMars 2005). The changes in the nature of power deployed at the global level also elevated NGOs as legitimate diplomatic actors. With the advent of “soft power” (Nye 2005) and social power, states have given leeway to NGOs in areas of public diplomacy (van Ham 2014). Social power, defined as the ability to set standards and create norms and values (van Ham 2014), has empowered NGOs because of their organizational flexibility on a global stage and their unique associative capacities and skills in forging networks and partnerships from around the world (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015; DeMars 2005; Ohanyan 2009). Indeed, NGO engagement in global as well as local peacebuilding forums has expanded consistently, particularly in the post–World War II period (Fitzduff and Church 2004). While the value added of the NGO sector for diplomatic practices in conflict areas is significant, the dilemmas it poses are also quite tangible (Carey 2010; McMahon 2017). The relative independence of NGOs from geopolitics, as noted by Carey (2010), is perhaps the central issue in regard to the promise and pitfalls of NGO engagement in diplomacy. Rel-

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egated to the margins of geopolitics in conflict management processes in the perception of power holders, NGOs enjoy limited leverage in conflict settings. Even if their scope of engagement is expanded, NGOs are prone to produce partisan and one-sided approaches in peacebuilding processes. Particularly in cases where civil society structures and deliberative capacities in a given conflict zone are weak, NGOs tend to struggle to become an institutionalized mechanism for cross-conflict dialogue and cooperation (Carey 2010). Lacking credible partners in and outside of a given state that is party to a conflict, the NGOs become reliant on the governments to carry out their work either within Track Two initiatives or organizationally more insular programs. The NGO cooptation by the government then becomes a political reality in many such settings (Ohanyan 2009; Ebrahim 2005; Carey 2010). An associated issue affecting NGOs’ independence is their engagement with the international donor structures. Here the tension between the short-term goals of the donors versus the long-term peacebuilding goals of NGOs (Carey 2010) is crucial to mention. In particular, the short-term attention span of democratic donors, often subject to electoral cycles, is a formidable challenge for the long-term peacebuilding realities in regions where donors work. NGOs, if primarily supported by such donors, become vulnerable to unsteady donor support, which undercuts their leverage as a diplomatic actor (Ohanyan 2015). Notwithstanding these challenges to NGOs’ role in diplomacy, they possess organizational resources and capabilities that are crucial for building effective peace processes on the ground and in implementing and consolidating negotiated agreements. Their links to the broader society and cross-conflict access points, combined with organizational skills that are often superior to those of governments, are some of the strengths that they bring to the table. Importantly, the global NGO sector has been a key component in the modernization of diplomacy since the post–World War II period, which is gaining a fresh momentum in the emergent post-American world order.

From Clubs to Networks and the Modernization of Global Diplomacy Broadly sketched, the expansion of forums and types of diplomatic practice has been the key feature in diplomatic modernization worldwide. This process played out in terms of expanded boundaries of participation and elevated NGOs and other nonstate actors in such forums. With its multiparty, multichannel, and multi-issue nature, modern diplomacy

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has deepened the issues and the nature of engagements in diplomatic settings (Cooper 2013). This has often required significantly more technical and specialized expertise, which opened doors for NGOs and other non-state actors. In contrast to traditional understandings and practice of diplomacy, modern diplomacy not only includes the conduct of official relations by states but also with other entities with any presence and engagement in world politics. These organizational changes have profound political effects. Deeply networked in nature, they have activated and mobilized diverse groups in diplomatic processes worldwide. Changes in number of actors, forums and issues covered in diplomatic settings reflect an increasingly complex mosaic of organizations, institutions and practices that alter the way power is produced, maintained and applied. Growing hetero-polarity, defined in terms of diversity of actors engaged in an increasingly networked manner, is identified as central by many researchers and practitioners of diplomacy (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010; Ohanyan 2015; Copeland 2014). Such hetero-polarity has produced a dispersion of power and influence, with sources and vectors pointing in different directions (Copeland 2014). “The emergence of a heteropolitan world in which the drivers and goals of power and influence are no longer easily meshed will inevitably cause friction” (2014: 58), maintains Copeland. This heteropolar order simultaneously creates windows of opportunity for NGOs as diplomatic actors but also threatens to dilute their power. Copeland specifically highlights that in these circumstances nonstate actors are uniquely positioned to take the lead in forming new partnerships and managing such hetero-polar currents in world diplomacy. This endorsement of nonstate actors echoes the increasingly institutionalized mechanisms of “diplomacy going public” (Copeland 2014). Transitions from “clubs” to “network” is the key development in these processes. In this respect, specific organizational changes in diplomatic practice have driven the rise of hetero-polarity in networked diplomacy around the world. The development and growing political significance of social power in world politics has elevated the NGO sector in diplomatic settings. Successful cultivation of social power has been contingent on the quality of connections between the actors in diplomatic theatres and NGOs, due to their superior “associative capacities” (DeMars 2005); such networks have been key in world politics in facilitating and deepening connections between various types of actors, large and small, state and non-state. Indeed, the traditional emphasis on actors, agency and their diplomatic effectives has given way to attention to the connections between those actors and the processes of engagement that such connections produce. The traditional diplomacy, referred to as “club diplomacy,”

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has lost ground to rapidly evolving “networked diplomacy” (Heine 2013). While the former is elite-driven, exclusive with limited agenda items, and mainly with diplomats from states and the UN involved, the latter is inclusive, multifaceted and increasingly public. Club diplomacy is described as hierarchical, formal and with little transparency, contrasted with flatter forms of organization and high level of transparency practiced in networked patterns of diplomacy (Cooper, Heine, and Thakur 2013). NGOs played a key role in deepening the networked diplomacy by mobilizing their grassroots bases, channeling information between the grassroots and the diplomatic elite, forging cross-conflict ties in cases of deadlocked negotiations, framing issues, and giving voice to groups and communities that are excluded from traditional forums of diplomacy. Although the rise of the networked diplomacy in a heteropolar world elevates the diplomatic profile of the NGO sector, it also creates vulnerabilities for NGOs in terms of their diluted power and diminished impact on the ground. While credited for superior diplomatic capacities in some settings, NGO legitimacy in such settings is continuously challenged. Whether assessing these capacities or their legitimacy claims, IR scholarship lacks the theoretical tools by which to examine NGO engagement as diplomatic actors in a heteropolar world (Dijkzeul 2003). NGO engagement in conflict zones is broadly covered by the peacebuilding literature, which highlights the changing nature of war and armed conflict and its increasingly internal nature (DeMars 2005; Ohanyan 2008, 2009; McMahon 2017). This backdrop of changing patterns of armed conflicts also necessitated engagement at the local levels of conflict and illustrated the comparative advantage of NGOs. Yet, this line of scholarship remains disconnected from the scholarship on diplomatic studies. Similarly, NGO engagement in global forums is investigated by the scholarship on multilateralism and social advocacy, but with relatively little scrutiny of the impact of NGOs on negotiated outcomes and their implementations. In between clubs and networks is Track Two diplomacy, in which NGOs are key players. By emerging as key actors in Track Two diplomacy, NGOs offered a qualitatively new path in diplomatic exercise. In this capacity, their engagement with the policymaking deepened, getting them closer to decision-making circles. At the same time, this entailed much closer engagement with the governmental agencies and the UN, raising new sets of criticisms, mostly directed at NGOs’ ability to maintain neutrality and political independence from the states (Fitzduff and Church 2004; Ohanyan 2009: 475–501). Such criticisms notwithstanding, NGOs, as key players in Track Two diplomacy, are also credited with (1) “socializing” the participating elites and broadening the menu of choices on the table; (2) “filtering” externally conceived policy ideas and localiz-

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ing them in a particular conflict case; and (3) building local capacities of conflict management, to name a few (Jones 2015). Track Two diplomacy has been recognized as offering important forums for conflict parties to come together to clarify longstanding disagreements, explore different possibilities for resolving them, and gain insight into promoting collaborative processes toward finding an agreement (Gawerc 2006). Yet, Track Two as a model of diplomacy is conceived within the hierarchic and state-centric models of diplomatic engagements. While offering clear outlets for NGO input, such channels are also institutionally constraining for the NGOs. In most cases Track Two models did not translate into a seat at the table for negotiation processes for NGOs, and as a mechanism of building political solutions to peace processes, the NGO sector role has been marginal. A variety of institutionally diverse forms of NGO engagement as quasi-diplomatic actors, ranging from professional exchanges to critical thinking seminars, have all been included under this broad umbrella. Specific functions of each type of engagement have been obscured when they are all viewed within the Track Two framework. Somewhat underexplored but highly significant in political terms is the extent to which NGOs in Track Two initiatives are able to democratize and liberalize polities in conflict areas (Hemmer et al. 2006). While the research in this area has room to grow, a consensus is emerging that official negotiation processes currently examined by the scholarly community are portrayed as disembodied structures, poorly accounting for broader societal pressures on such negotiations. Elsewhere, Ohanyan has argued that Track Two diplomacy simplifies the political realities on the ground. It does so by bringing political elites together who often lack domestic legitimacy (Ohanyan 2015; Ohanyan 2012: 433–60; Ohanyan 2016). Moreover, such processes also place a premium on enhanced communication between the negotiators, reflecting the often-false assumption that a deadlock in a given conflict is due to a lack of creativity or ideas among official diplomats in charge of negotiations. Such assumptions have underestimated the complexity of the conflicts and the drivers of their intractability, reducing them to the lack of creativity on the side of the diplomats.

NGOs, Networks, and Modernization of Diplomacy Despite the uncertain geopolitical environment and the centrifugal currents on both sides of the Atlantic, there are political openings for NGOs

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as diplomatic actors, particularly in various conflict zones. Modernization of diplomacy worldwide has created a new demand for NGO engagement with governmental agencies, either directly or indirectly, due to the emergence of local, national, and global levels of collaboration between state and nonstate actors. The involvement of international organizations in various areas of state governance in the developing world is one example of that trend. Staff from international organizations working side by side with local levels of government, particularly in cross-border projects, signals localization and subnationality in some diplomatic engagements in the developing world.1 The political implications of these institutional changes have been most dramatic. The reliance on NGOs in diplomatic settings has helped to offset the political inequalities between great powers and small states in multilateral forums. The propensity of multilateral diplomacy to reflect and reproduce power inequalities between states (Pouliot 2016) offers a solid rationale for smaller states to partner with NGOs to compensate for their limited political resources at the world stage. While the political rationale for NGO engagement is a bit clearer for smaller states, great powers also have a demonstrated reliance on the NGO sector at the global stage. Whether in setting the agenda, participating in negotiations, or implementing negotiated agreements (Hochstetler 2013), NGOs have fully integrated themselves into the fabric of global diplomatic practice. In short, openings for the NGO sector in diplomatic capacities are driven by deepening diplomatic structures from above as well as by broader processes of a heteropolar world underpinning them. Transformations in the way power resources are developed and applied are at the core of these changes. Social power, alternative to material power, is discursive, reflecting the significance of framing, norm advocacy, agenda setting, and communication. It refers to the ability of an actor to set standards and create norms that are viewed as legitimate, without resorting to coercion or payment (van Ham 2014). Hence, Graham maintains that “the currency of power in international politics has become less material and less coercive, and more ideational and communicative” (Graham 2014: 522). Changing patterns of power, she further clarifies, are maintained socially as well structurally, through discursive and symbolic construction of meaning (Graham 2014; Castells 2011). As such, social power transcends “soft power,” which centers on attraction and persuasion as instruments of power and remains centered on specific, and measurable, resources. Social power, in contrast, evolves from social interactions, processes, and institutions.

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Perils of Organizational Evaluations in Networked Diplomacy While recognizing the specific role and position of NGOs in the organizational ecology of modern diplomacy, rethinking NGOs is also overdue. The network-based approach developed here is one attempt to address that shortage. As we argue, any evaluation framework of NGOs within modernizing diplomatic infrastructures needs to start with an appreciation of the deeply associative capacities of the NGOs. Regardless of one’s starting point to examine the diplomatic agency of NGOs in IR literature, recognizing their ties and connections with their multiple stakeholders is a prerequisite. Diplomacy is a deeply social enterprise, embedded in political as well as social contexts. Theorizing NGOs in this area requires conceptual tools that factor in ties, connections, and social contexts. The study of NGOs within their immediate networks of donors and beneficiaries is a concrete theoretical strategy for moving forward. Network theory of NGO behavior (Ohanyan 2008; Ohanyan 2009: 475–501) offers one such framework that can be applied to study NGO behavior in a variety of issue areas in diplomatic settings. The network theory of NGO behavior maintains that the network structure in which the NGO is embedded is highly consequential in determining the final policy outcomes as delivered by the NGO during the implementation stage. Network structure shapes NGO behavior as well as the level of political autonomy NGOs enjoy relative to their donor base. Network approaches to NGOs (DeMars 2005; Reinicke 1998; Pallas and Guidero 2016) is a small but a growing area of study in IR. Network theory is an effective approach to contextualize and study NGOs as diplomatic actors in IR. It allows the evaluation of NGOs within their immediate institutional context and, importantly, helps the researchers to zoom in on the quality of ties and the nature of social power that NGOs produce and scale up. The key obstacle to moving forward here rests with developing indicators to assess NGO behavior in diplomatic settings. Should NGO performance in diplomatic settings be assessed in terms of its perceived legitimacy and/or capacities? Which of the settings should be viewed as “diplomatic settings”? While case-specific assessments of NGO behavior in diplomatic settings are quite tangible (focused on a given conflict case or an issue area), they raise questions on generalizability of such theories. How far can we go, and should we go, toward theorizing NGOs for diplomatic studies? The key contribution of the network theories for NGO evaluation studies is their focus on system-wide effects on the given organizational “field,” or organizational “neighborhood” supporting NGO action in a

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given conflict setting. This is in contrast to conventional evaluation studies, particularly those in the Track Two levels, which remain organizationally focused. The latter have reduced the network complexity to a single organization, with rather unhelpful policy implications for evaluation. The scholarship on network studies and network measures is rather vast, but it is largely absent in the context of conflict management evaluations. Indeed, network theories have developed a broad swath of measures to assess the quality of ties inside networks, ranging from density, centrality, to the distribution of power resources within networks (Ohanyan 2009; Kahler 2009). Slaughter’s work in particular is relevant for this research (2017). She distinguishes between resilience networks, task networks, and scale networks, arguing that these networks are associated with problems of resilience, execution, and scale, respectively. She further contends that these types of problems are currently most common in challenging foreign policies of states, large or small. In this chapter, we focus on developing a case-specific approach, leaving the issue of generalization for future research. The empirical section of this chapter presents the case of a program called the Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process (ATNP), which has been implemented with funding from the European Union by eight civil society organizations, four in Armenia and four in Turkey. The ATNP is implemented by the Civilitas Foundation (CF), Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), Public Journalism Club (PJC), and Regional Studies Center (RSC) from Armenia; and Anadolu Kültür, the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Citizens’ Assembly (CA), and Hrant Dink Foundation (HDF) from Turkey. The EPF is the lead agency of this program. It has been an incubator of civil society groups working on various Armenia-Turkey normalization processes in both countries for many years. Being a key node in a network that is internationalized and globalized and deeply local at the same time, the EPF and ATNP serve as a case study for developing a framework in which to analyze the diplomatic agency of the NGO sector in IR. It is important to highlight that this case study is not an evaluation of the EPF within the ATNP framework or of the ATNP, but should be viewed as an initiative to situate the EPF/ATNP within the diplomatic studies. It is an effort to demonstrate the use of a network-based framework in thinking about Track Two initiatives, which are geared toward the official/governmental as well as toward grassroots levels of conflict resolution. As such, this is a good case study to examine the modernization of diplomatic practice. This particular case study is also significant because of the absence of the United Nations in its conventional role of spanning diplomatic networks globally. Indeed, the United Nations in this case study is conspicuous in its absence for several reasons. In particular, this absence in

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advancing diplomatic relations on the opening of the land borders between Armenia and Turkey has to do with the fact that the UN has not been invited to mediate, which precludes any role for the UN in this context. Similarly, the UN and its institutions, such as the UNDP regional office, have not been engaged in any of the nongovernmental cross-border activities for the same reason, even though such informal discussions are taking place from time to time. The UNDP could have been engaged in environmental dialogue, in the area of trade support, youth exchanges, among others, but the lack of any formal invitation from the governments left the UNDP as an untapped resource in this case. The fact that the UNDP regional office moved from Bratislava to Istanbul complicated its involvement even further. Still, the United Nations played one significant role, albeit an indirect one, in the case of diplomatic relations between the two countries. This relates to the inclusion of the ruins of a medieval Armenian city Ani, currently located in Turkish territory, on the list of UNESCO World Heritage Sites. This has contributed to the recognition of Ani as a site of Armenian cultural and architectural heritage. Prior to this, Turkey would avoid any mention of the Armenian origins of this medieval city, but this has changed since the UNESCO recognition. Both the Turkish and Armenian Ministries of Culture have played a constructive role in this process, and the handshake of the officials from Turkey and Armenia on the day when the decision was made is probably the only handshake of official representatives of the two sides in the last decade. Anadolu Kültür, one of the main partners in the ATNP discussed in this chapter, has played an important role in making this development possible, both as part of ATNP activities and independently. Its chair Osman Kavala, a renowned Turkish human rights activist, imprisoned in Turkey since 2017, has been unfairly accused of supporting the Gezi Park protests (Rodrik 2017).2 Mr. Kavala has been an ardent supporter of this initiative and has advocated incessantly for saving Ani. His work and the work of his organization were instrumental in achieving this result. We now turn to the empirical section to discuss the ATNP project in light of the theoretical themes developed in this work.

Politics of Blockade and Hopes of Open Borders between Armenia and Turkey The ATNP3 had been negotiated since 2012 and commenced in 2014. Its second stage ended in October 2017. Its third stage started in 2019, while other, smaller-scale activities were taking place in-between. It was

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a program designed to foster societal engagements between Armenia and Turkey in the context of absent diplomatic relations between their respective governments. The genocide of the indigenous Armenian communities in Ottoman Turkey, which culminated in 1915, and the subsequent denial of successive Turkish governments of the atrocity (Göçek 2015; Bloxham 2007; Kieser, Öktem, and Reinkowski 2015; Morris and Ze’evi 2019; Rogan 2016), are among the main factors that have precluded formal diplomatic engagement between the two states. The most notable attempt at normalization of relations at the governmental level is the signing of the two Zurich Protocols in 2009 by the officials from both sides, which, if they had been ratified in both countries, would have established formal diplomatic relations between the two countries and would have opened the border between them, currently closed as a result of the Turkish blockade of Armenia. Attempts at normalization of efforts have also become complicated due to Turkey’s close alliance with Azerbaijan, with which Armenia is locked in a conflict around the predominantly Armenian enclave of NagornoKarabakh (NK). NK, while part of Azerbaijan, is currently de facto a selfgoverning state, with close ties to Armenia (Caspersen 2013; Broers 2014). Turkey had agreed to decouple the NK issue from its normalization efforts with Armenia, and the NK conflict was not included in the protocols. The Armenian side had agreed for engagement with Turkey without placing the genocide recognition by Turkey on the table. The protocols were not ratified and were stalled until 2018, at which time the Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan, citing lack of progress in the Turkish side, declared the protocols null and void. Analysts connect the failure to ratify the protocols in Turkey to Azerbaijan’s objections to the normalization of relations between Armenia and its ally Turkey, citing the unresolved status of the NK conflict (Phillips 2012). Pushing ahead with the ATNP initiative against this political backdrop remains controversial in Armenia. Genocide scholars describe the genocide denial as the last stage of the genocide, and any engagement with those maintaining the persistent denial has been met with criticism in Armenian society, as well as in the Armenian diaspora, which is largely formed by the descendants of the genocide survivors. Indeed, the crippling incapacity of the Turkish state to confront the history of the mass killings of Armenians and other minorities in the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century (Akcam 2007; Bloxham 2007; Suny 2017; Cheterian 2015) has been a symptom of democratic weakness in Turkey. The subsequent democratic decline in the country is partly a result of the unconfronted history, sustained by silencing its civil society and purging

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educational institutions and curricula of research and mentions of the Armenian genocide. Restarting negotiations is unlikely at the moment, especially due to the deterioration of democracy in Turkey as a result of the failed 2016 coup, subsequent emergency rule, the referendum that strengthened President Erdogan’s grip on power, and the mass repressions of civil society, academia, and media. Finally, the international community’s attention has been diverted to the bloody civil war in Syria, the Russian-Ukraine war, and the United Kingdom’s Brexit from the European Union, to name a few distractions. This has relegated Armenia-Turkey rapprochement to the back burner of regional diplomacy. In this context, the role of the European Union has been noteworthy. In the past, various EU countries, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, along with the United States and Switzerland, have advocated Armenia-Turkey rapprochement at the political level; have supported and in some cases mediated official contacts and negotiations; and have to a certain extent supported, financially or rhetorically, NGO initiatives in this direction. The European Union welcomed the signing of the protocols for the establishment of diplomatic relations and normalization between Turkey and Armenia in 2009, but its financial and organizational support for Turkey-Armenia engagement at the NGO level did not transpire until the ATNP initiative (see below). The European Union’s engagement in both countries takes place via different mechanisms, including the presence of significant delegations whose work is usually directed toward internal reform in a variety of areas and which supports the implementation of international obligations of these states; but the work across the divide did not take place until the ATNP. The EU’s support of interaction between Armenia and Turkey via the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), while only confined to civil society interaction, became a major indication of the EU’s decisiveness to continue promoting regional stability.

ATNP Background and Structure This case study reflects on the role of an NGO, as an actor that has been “spinning” an organizationally dense web of cross-societal connections, modernizing and deepening the otherwise bare diplomatic infrastructure between the two countries. This qualitative change in the fabric of diplomacy, in which the NGOs play a central part, is a development not yet registered in methodologies of evaluation in conflict analysis and resolution (CAR).

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Despite the political challenges discussed above, in January 2014 the European Union provided two million euros via the IcSP to support the eighteen-month ATNP in an effort to promote mutual dialogue, exchanges, and confidence building between civil society representatives of Turkey and Armenia. In 2016, the consortium that implements the ATNP received a further 1.5 million euros for a sixteen-month continuation of the program. As stated, the ATNP is implemented by four Armenia-based and four Turkey-based civil society organizations. Only the first stage of the ATNP (January 2014–September 2015) consisted of twenty-one projects run by eight consortium partners. Importantly, the eight consortium partners employ a subgrant mechanism, issuing grants for additional projects, developed and proposed by civil society actors not included in the consortium. In total, thirty-two separate activities were implemented by nineteen agencies, both ATNP consortium members and others, in the first stage (Matveeva 2015). The undertakings are varied in scope and scale. For example, a travel grant project allowed over two hundred individuals to travel across the border for various activities, including visits to thirty-three cities. The Armenia-Turkey Cinema Platform project resulted in two workshops for filmmakers held in Istanbul and Yerevan. Participation in two international film festivals resulted in twenty film projects. The Turkey-Armenia Fellowship Scheme allowed fifteen organizations from Armenia and Turkey to host professionals from across the border. Fifteen professionals spent four to eight months with their host institutions. Concerts, exhibitions, and public talks were organized within the Meeting Cities Program. Information technology sector innovators from Armenia and Turkey met for the first time and consecutively participated cooperatively in contests, developing some joint partnerships. Considering the lack of diplomatic relations between the two states, broader societal animosity supported by the negative propaganda, and overall instability in the region, these projects have been particularly significant in maintaining sustained and meaningful contacts, links, and institutional infrastructure between the two sides. The external evaluation of the first stage of the ATNP was positive. And so were reports carried out by implementers, as well as feedback received from beneficiaries and EU personnel engaged in the program. Despite a lack of direct support, the neutrality of the governmental structures of both sides toward this initiative also signaled the value added of the ATNP to the dormant relations between Turkey and Armenia. Overall, over a million people have learned about the ATNP via the innovative internet resources put forward by the program, and hundreds have par-

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ticipated personally, visiting each other, including students, businesspersons, journalists, policy writers, teachers, and innovators.

The ATNP, Diplomatic Modernization, and the Failures of Track One The main goal of the ATNP since the initial stage of the program has been to facilitate the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia, including the establishment of diplomatic relations and supporting4 the opening of the border through civil society efforts. As it was mentioned above, the efforts toward these aims were designed around a wide range of issues and areas aimed at enhancing people-to-people contacts, expanding economic and business links, promoting cultural and educational activities, and facilitating access to balanced information in both societies. The idea behind this has been to provide an opportunity to the various segments of society to learn about the “other side,” overcome stereotypes and tunnel vision, engage in constructive dialogue, and build a solid constituency pursuing the need for conflict transformation and sustainable peace. The consortium of eight organizations presented a wide variety of competences, sectors and issue areas. Importantly, they were identified for their potential to transmit their impact to the broader societies on both sides. The initiative’s methodology utilized significant European experiences, such as the German-French dialogue since 1945 and more recent successful or partly successful examples, such as the Turkey-Greece dialogue and the dialogue between civil societies of the parties to the conflict in Cyprus. The goal of the ATNP program was formulated against the political realities evolving on the ground. In a simplified form, three possible scenarios of political developments were taken into account. The first possibility is that the political situation changes for the better and both sides engage in renewed negotiations to open the border. The Theory of Change underpinning the ATNP claimed that, in such a case, the constituencies of the ATNP would be primary supporters and promoters of advancement in negotiations and implementers of the agreements. Second, the political situation stays more or less the same—both sides do not engage in negotiations but consider confidence-building measures and keep the option of opening the borders open. The Theory of Change claimed that, in such a case, ATNP constituencies would be actively advocating for moving to address the issues that divide the two polities and for generating political will to reengage officially. Third, the political situation worsens—both sides undertake actions that diminish the chances for reengaging at the political level. The Theory of Change claimed that, in such a case, ATNP

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constituencies would be significant drivers for reestablishing trust and would also play the role of conflict preventers, diminishing the impact of possible negative actions. The political realities and contexts for the ATNP evolved to resemble a scenario that has a mix of second and third projections listed above. Specifically, the political situation in both countries worsened,5 though due to factors mostly unrelated to the mutual issues, such as the events of 2016 in Turkey: a coup attempt, emergency rule, and large-scale persecutions of different actors. In Armenia the years of the ATNP were also rather unstable: the “four-day war” in April 2016 across the Line of Contact of NK; the July 2016 armed standoff around the police station in Yerevan and, as a result, a change of several government officials; the 2017 referendum on constitutional changes to the parliamentary system; and other events made the work on the ATNP both riskier as well as seemingly less relevant from the perspective of power holders, who claimed that in the current circumstances they could not capitalize on the program’s achievements and restart any type of reengagement officially. In the larger context, as mentioned, the Ukraine/Crimea war, Brexit, and the war in Syria take away a very significant amount of attention regionally and globally. Given the situation, both societies moved to a more nationalist discourse. The issues of normalization of bilateral relations, establishment of diplomatic relations, and opening borders have been moved down on the agenda of both countries. However, by the consortium’s own assessment, the ATNP played a significant role in making inroads into repairing transnational, society-level relations between the two countries. In particular, and considering the deteriorating political situation in the region, the ATNP played an important preventive role in cultivating and maintaining an institutionally dense network of organizations connecting the two countries, in a region that has been inhospitable to cross-border links even between countries that do not have political problems with one another, such as Georgia and Armenia. The program created an infrastructure of public diplomacy for both Armenia and Turkey, one that was highly networked, and heteropolar, linking diverse sectors and diverse players with one another. The governments of Armenia and Turkey have looked at the ATNP as well as other Track Two projects with a narrowly political perspective. The Turkish government hoped to use similar programs with Armenia either as a way to take the genocide issue off the agenda or as a way to demonstrate to the West that some dialogue with Armenia can take place. For the Armenian government, which has tried to decouple its relationships with Turkey from the ones with Azerbaijan, and the NK conflict in particular, the ATNP is interpreted first of all as a risk. The Armenian

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side fears that the West can believe and buy into the Turkish position that the genocide recognition as a political issue should be delayed in Western capitals because Turkey is currently engaged in this initiative with Armenia. Armenian policymakers always feared that Turkey’s position on the genocide issue has been disingenuous, and the ATNP in this context is simply a diplomatic tool for Ankara. In addition, in a July 2017 interview with one of the authors (Ohanyan), the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Armenia, Tigran Balayan, expressed skepticism in Track Two initiatives with authoritarian countries in general, referencing to Turkey. Nevertheless, the power holders in Armenia at the time, even before Armenia’s democratic transition in 2018, liked to emphasize that they are democratic and therefore let NGOs pave their own way in public diplomacy (Broers and Ohanyan 2020). At times, the ATNP or similar initiatives are criticized for failing to alter public attitudes and for trying to influence governmental policies, as expressed by Tigran Balayan. Indeed, Balayan was apprehensive of NGOs focusing on “security areas,” where governmental officials see little value for NGO input (anonymous government official, interview with author, 24 July 2017). Put simply, authoritarian governments do not want independent NGOs to engage in national security–related areas of work, since such interference may (a) challenge their own incapacity or expose their lack of desire to move the needle on challenging foreign policy issues, and (b) make it possible for other governments to intervene in their security realm via the NGO donor base. The latter argument is very much linked to the idea that NGOs are agents of donor influence. This perception is, for example, the underlying justification for President Putin’s onslaught on NGOs in Russia. Officially Armenia, while a close ally of Russia and highly dependent on it (Ohanyan 2019), has not chosen that road and is only watching attentively what happens in Russia and Turkey. Armenia’s own legislation on NGOs was developed as a result of engagement between the government and the NGO sector under heavy pressure from the international community, particularly the United States and the European Union, which helped the NGOs to push back on governments’ attempts at excessive centralization (anonymous head of an NGO in Armenia, interview with author, 2017). President Erdogan’s recent onslaught on Turkey’s civil society stems pretty much from the same façade justification on the grounds of the conspiratorial role of NGOs as perceived by the government, part of a much bigger campaign to erode democratic institutions inside Turkey. At the same time, informal conversations that one of the authors (Ter-Gabrielyan) has had with government members indicate that some within the Armenian government also entertain a faint hope that these

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activities may enable future political engagement, for instance, via sensitizing the European Union, its member states, and/or actors within them, as well as the United States and others, on the need to renew their push on both sides to reengage. Regardless of the governments’ motives, the ATNP as a public diplomacy infrastructure survived within the overall decline on civic freedoms in the region. It has not been touched and has continued functioning at full scale. The initiatives that it supported are characterized by beneficiaries as a “beacon of stability and progress,” counterbalancing pessimism that the civil societies of both sides experience because of democracy and human rights setbacks in many areas. Importantly, the cumulative impact of individual interactions and connections can be claimed to acquire elements of sustainability. After the first stage of the program, individual success cases have evolved into credible, well-functioning, and sustainable links and partnerships between some professionals, institutions, and activity lines. They include ongoing business, academic, and NGO partnerships as well as the cautious development of relations between statelinked institutions. For instance, at the first stages of the program, school and university teachers from Armenia could not officially participate in exchanges because their institutions would deny them a business trip for an Armenia-Turkey dialogue exchange and refuse to interpret it as a part of their professional duties. However, over time some state universities and other state entities agreed to take part in such exchanges.

The ATNP Network and Modernization of Diplomacy We now place the ATNP case study in the context of the theoretical discussion on modernization of diplomacy, its heteropolarity, and its networked nature. This fresh theoretical lens offers new insights to thinking about and evaluating the role of NGOs in the contexts of unresolved political conflicts and crisis-prone diplomatic settings. Indeed, to a naked eye, and within traditional frameworks of conflict analysis, the ATNP program can be described as a typical example of public diplomacy, involving elements of Track Two and grassroots diplomacy (Ohanyan 2012). Viewed from such a perspective, the ATNP should be assessed relative to its abilities to change public attitudes and governmental policies on both sides. Such an evaluation is not the subject of this chapter. Instead, it simply highlights how traditional conceptions and program designs within the field of conflict analysis and resolution tend to produce somewhat linear evaluation tools. Importantly, they obscure the overall added value of the NGO sector in altering the diplomatic infrastructure in a given conflict area.

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The traditional evaluation tools and program designs developed for conflict regions by the donors (mostly Western), grew out of frameworks and metrics of broader international development practice. The focus on measurability and tangible impacts are essential properties of such frameworks, which are rarely adjusted to programs in conflict areas. Frameworks originally established to assess number of bridges built, albeit modified, are often applied to assess behavioral and attitudinal changes in conflict settings. As a result, important program outcomes are left out of evaluation frameworks and reports, mostly due to the lack of evaluation and monitoring mechanisms designed specifically for conflictsensitive programs. When viewing the ATNP from the lens of diplomatic studies, a dramatically different picture emerges, one that allows the delineation of the diplomatic agency of the NGO sector. Viewing the ATNP case within the diplomatic scholarship literature covered earlier, it emerges quickly that the ATNP as an example of a public diplomacy is deeply networked and is highly sustainable, as it is evidenced by the ongoing business, NGO, and academic partnerships established, and by the ATNP project and its offshoots’ ability to attract new funding sources. The link with media has been particularly effective in reaching larger segments of population on both sides. As a form of networked public diplomacy, the ATNP has created (thanks to its eight “hands” and its donor) an institutional infrastructure in various areas of civil society, academia, and the market. The institutional significance of the ATNP emerges fully only after the types of network ties cultivated within the ATNP framework are examined. The structure of networks can be a powerful determinant of final policy outcomes (Ohanyan 2009, 2008; Börzel 1998). In addition, as mentioned earlier, Slaughter (2017) has already detailed the specific roles that different types of networks can play in foreign policy practice. To reiterate, she distinguished between resilience networks, task networks, and scale networks, which she saw as associated with problems of resilience, execution, and scale, respectively. Resilience networks, in her work, refer to the network ability to survive in the face of threats, whether man-made and natural. For the ATNP, assessing its resilience capacities is important considering the persistence of diplomatic discord between Armenia and Turkey, and the unresolved status of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The ATNP has already demonstrated its resilience amid the unfavorable and often deteriorating political climate in the region, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The networks created by the ATNP have held up well, against the backdrop of multiple stressors on the Turkey-Armenia relationship.

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Task networks are created to perform precise and time-bound assignments. Such networks are usually cultivated to produce cooperation (working together to carry out a prescribed task), collaboration (working together to figure out the best ways of carrying out a prescribed task), and innovation (working together to generate new ideas, processes and products in the service of a prescribed general goal) (Slaughter 2017: 112). With clearly defined tasks, consortium members pulled together to address their shared goals in a timely manner, so that their undertakings make sense in a challenging environment and produce the intended results, in parallel with meeting donor requirements pertaining to program implementation. Balancing donor requirements, often rigid and constraining, with the political challenges and social intricacies on the ground, in a complex conflict region, has been a major accomplishment indeed. Innovation networks link people tasked with generating new ideas, processes and products toward a prescribed goal. The consortium structure of the ATNP and its subgranting mechanism allowed significant leverage and freedom for network members at the grassroots level to innovate and guide processes within the overall goal of improved relations between societies and states of Turkey and Armenia. Functioning as a “funnel” of sorts, the network was open to new ideas and initiatives coming from the travel grantees, subgrantees and their partners, and host institutions on the other side. At the same time, as a result of its governance structure, both hierarchical but also horizontally spread, the ATNP has been able to maintain a significant level of coherence in public messaging across all subgrantees. The ATNP’s governing board, which includes the heads of all eight organizations, added to the strategic focus of the governance processes inside the ever-growing network of actors and beneficiaries, simultaneously empowering each member to have a share of decision-making influence on the overall strategy of the program. This organizational innovation is different from more traditional consortia, where the lead agency is the sole strategic actor and others are only service providers or particular task implementers. Here the European Union should receive accolades for allowing and even supporting the setting up of such an unusual structure, a practice that deserves a closer examination for future replication in other settings and issue areas. In addition, the other major structural difference and innovation is that the consortium comprises only local, Armenia- and Turkey-based civil society actors. It is more typical for the EU-supported consortia to include also European members, if not to be managed and implemented exclusively by them.

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The reliance on EU NGOs has been particularly dominant in contexts of conflict transformation. In short, the very fact that a consortium comprising four organizations from one side of a conflict and four from another is working together on a conflict transformation project, supported by the European Union, is a determinant factor of the ATNP; and its implications will be discussed below. The most important implication is that obviously, in such a setting, confidence and trust building among the consortium partners—and particularly across the conflict’s divide—are crucial. The methodology of the program becomes determined by the fact that the consortium develops and offers a model for confidence building between the entire two societies: it bases on its own “inside” experience (a) to “externalize” to the larger societies its own achievements and lessons learned, and (b) to offer itself as an example replicable for others and for a variety of scales. It is the third type of network that Slaughter differentiates as the scale network, which is normally charged with replicating a successful program from a single community across many other villages and communities (Slaughter 2017). In addition to the above, the ATNP can be viewed as a scale network also in that it multiplies people-to-people contacts through a variety of mediums reaching millions of people. The ATNP qualifies as a scale network also because its consortium-based structure, built around local organizations working together across the conflict’s divide, is currently being replicated by the European Union, EPF, and other partners in the context of other conflicts, such as the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. As mentioned, the ATNP, along with its governing board, practices centralized decision-making pertaining to issues of strategic significance. This approach allows the ATNP to maintain control over the messaging in a politically divided conflict setting with multiple actors involved. Yet, its subgranting mechanism allows the network to solicit new ideas and initiatives, thereby developing and deepening the general, predetermined objectives. The ATNP has been supportive of innovation and inclusive of grassroots actors on both sides. While in terms of strategic decision-making, “the ATNP has a center and an organizational cluster that functions as the core of the network, at the level of activities it has created a mechanism of a much wider public engagement, beyond the eight consortium partner organizations. Only when considering the ATNP’s access points to the broader societies in both countries and the system of connections with grassroots players can the network be described as having a “mesh,” distributed, structure (Slaughter 2017). Mesh networks are argued to be the most resilient in situations where the network faces a crisis and overcomes it. In this case the network was tested with the Four-Day War and

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current persecutions in Turkey,6 which test the quality of ties between the organizations within the ATNP consortium. Understanding how cross-conflict networks form, operate, and sustain themselves in peacebuilding is a research area in need of further investigation. Any work that has been done thus far suggests that systematic principles of network cultivation, developed against a backdrop of specific political goals, are important in the work of peace activists, donors, and diplomats. The ATNP case illustrates the theoretical and practical opportunities and limitations of a network-based approach to conflict transformation for diplomatic scholarship. The ATNP distinguishes itself from networks designed for nonconflict settings, and compares itself favorably to those designed particularly for conflict settings, such as Caucasus Forum (Ter-Gabrielyan 2013). Building civil society dialogue channels across conflict divides in conditions lacking support from power structures at the national level is a formidable task. Moreover, such an initiative is particularly challenging when it transcends Track Two types of negotiations and meetings and spills over into the broader society, engaging people from all walks of life, via multidimensional networks that are personal as well as institutional. With network politics, the links between structural properties of networks and their impact on outcomes is widely studied by various disciplines, but there are very few studies on types of cross-conflict networks cultivated by peacebuilding practitioners and the impact they have on peace processes on the ground (Ohanyan 2015). To conclude, the ATNP has been conceived by the European donors as a program geared toward affecting policy at the national levels on both sides (i.e., “transfer up”) as well as building greater spaces of engagement between the societies and the grassroots (i.e., “transfer down and sideways”). This holistic approach is highly valuable. Taken separately, these approaches reflect traditional conceptions of conflict analysis and resolution, with their associated theories of change. Whereas, if viewing the ATNP through the lens of network theories and diplomatic scholarship, its holistic methodology allows for dramatically different evaluation tools to become available. The theoretical implications of such an approach are significant, which we discuss in the concluding remarks of this chapter.

Policy Implications for Evaluation Studies of NGOs in Conflict Settings The policy implications from this research on modernization of diplomacy, pertaining to evaluating NGOs working in diplomatically polarized

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conflict settings, are numerous. Within conventional evaluation studies of organizations in conflict regions, individual organizations or programs are assessed, along with their broader systemic effects. In contrast, within this network-based diplomatic modernization framework of analysis, the social ties within an organization and its broader network, in this case the EPF/ATNP and the nature, direction and density of those ties in and outside of the network, are also assessed. This approach applied to the ATNP allows a focus on its varied network structure, from the consortium partnership to subgrantees to beneficiaries. It results in a more dynamic picture and clarifies the specific value added of the program. Within conventional evaluation frameworks, the methods of ATNP evaluation will necessarily be outcome based, which is a commonly used approach within the field of international development. Within this proposed network-based diplomatic modernization framework, the method of evaluation is process based, with the emphasis on outcomes as well as the processes and mechanisms of network cultivation. When applied to the ATNP, this approach reveals that the ATNP has been designed as an open network, with engagement mechanisms available to groups and individuals on both sides of the border, and a special effort has been put into cultivating these mechanisms. Also, a special emphasis has been put on the fact that the network is going to be built across the conflict divide. In light of previously lacking contacts and partnerships, this initiative allowed the broadening of activities, which has been valuable as hopes evaporated of “transfer up” to governmental levels, which are usually advocated by those developing such cross-conflict Track Two projects. Indeed, the program implementation process has offered numerous mechanisms and has enjoyed numerous opportunities for the grassroots to innovate and bring in ideas from the “bottom up,” a key condition for the long-term sustainability of this program. Another policy implication relates to the value assigned to changes at the national level. Conventional evaluation methods of NGOs/initiatives in conflict regions usually emphasize policy change at the national levels as a measure of program success (Ohanyan 2012). In contrast, within the framework developed here, the stress on policy change is only moderate. The ability of the ATNP network to exhibit resiliency in times of political crisis between the two countries, a more realistic aim, is more structural than, for example, its direct contribution to the opening of diplomatic channels between the two countries, which seems currently out of the question anyway. If the relationships between the two countries continue to remain fragile, with or without open borders, diplomatic channels can deteriorate quickly. Within this framework, therefore, the policy change

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as an indicator is deemphasized relative to the durability of the network structures that the ATNP has cultivated. Conventional methods of evaluation often focus on measurable outcomes, such as the number of trainings or people involved in projects, without due attention to more intangible outcomes, such as attitude change, longer-term impact, and especially unexpected/unplanned impacts. In contrast, the approach developed here acknowledges that such intangible outcomes are often difficult to assess quantitatively. Assessing and measuring changes within systems through indicators can be complicated, which can be perceived as a limitation for such network-based frameworks of evaluation. Instead, this approach emphasizes “social physics,” which in the ATNP network is manifest in terms of the diversity and multivector directions of social ties between participant organizations, implementers, intermediaries, and donors alike. The conventional approaches with their focus on transfer up or transfer down, usually favored by the donor community, translate into a linear approach to evaluation: when applied to the ATNP, they may obscure the diversity of connections and “wiring” that the ATNP has created between the two countries and their societies. Modernization and deepening of diplomacy of (non)relations between Turkey and Armenia, and the organizational flexibility of the ATNP network in “bypassing” the limitations imposed by the hierarchical structures of both states, are values added by the ATNP, which only become evident when a network-based diplomatic modernization approach is applied.7 Table 8.1 summarizes the different evaluation approaches to NGO work in conflict settings.

Conclusion The theoretical implications stemming from the network-based study of the ATNP within the context of diplomatic scholarship are numerous. The most important one is the study of modernization of diplomatic structures between countries, driven by NGOs, at a time when national level channels of engagement are blocked and official engagements between countries are stalled. Such a condition reveals the rise of people power as an increasingly potent independent variable, capable to shape political outcomes nationally or globally. The era of institutionally and politically contained neat states is over, and the disrupted links between governments and their people undermine state-centric frameworks of analysis. Such developments are consequential for the practice of governmental as well as public diplomacy.

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Table 8.1. Comparison of Evaluation Methods Conventional Evaluation Methods of NGOs/Programs in Conflict Settings

Network-Based Diplomatic Modernization Framework of NGO Evaluation

Target of Evaluation

Individual organization or a program

Subsystem or an organizational cluster

Methods of Evaluation

Outcomes based

Process based

Emphasis on State Policy Change

High

Moderate

Quantitative Measurability

High

Moderate

Emphasis on Social Physics

Directions and linearity of ties as a determinant in assessing outcomes and processes

Quality of social ties as a determinant of diplomatic capacities; multilayered and heteropolar ties are favored

Concentrated and hierarchic conception of power, viewed as top down, and predominantly focused on the state.

Broader and multilayered conception of power; embeddedness of assessment methodologies in the broader political, social, cultural, and other contexts

NGO Assessment Pathologies

The modernization of diplomacy, and the NGO agency in it, requires updating the definitions of diplomacy. Developing new concepts that can examine diplomatic capacities and their impact on ongoing conflicts is essential. The ATNP case demonstrated a case of transformations within diplomatic structures against the backdrop of a fragile relationship between Turkey and Armenia. Persistently stalled political deadlock between the two countries did not take away from the deepening of engagement between the two societies through the ATNP network.

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Moving forward, rethinking our methods and frameworks of evaluating NGO performance in conflict settings is also of central value. Using the ATNP as a case study, this chapter presented the network-based diplomatic modernization of NGO evaluation, calling for further refinement of concepts, categories, and measures of evaluation. Implications stemming from traditional models of diplomacy, as well as the Track Two approaches to conflict resolution, have direct implications for the NGO sector in increasingly complex diplomatic settings. Track Two diplomacy is perhaps the most widely recognized and relatively more institutionalized tool of diplomatic modernization, particularly in conflict areas. However, this approach has allowed for a rather small opening for the NGO sector. These developments have limited us to see NGOs’ “diplomatic profile” to implementation of existing peace agreements or relegated them to organizationally small and politically insignificant areas of cross-conflict engagements. Instead, the evaluation framework presented here allows for a more expansive study and analysis of the NGO roles in a context of increasingly modern diplomatic practice, which, however, is far from a guarantee for political breakthroughs at the national level. Transitions to and from authoritarianism inside countries in conflict regions have altered the nature of connections between governments and their publics, with a range of implications for diplomatic “behavior” of national governments. The top-down negotiation process favored in authoritarian and hybrid regimes excludes NGOs and elevates mostly “principled” negotiation processes as opposed to ones that also explore the interests, values, and needs of conflict parties (Burton 1990). Such processes often exclude community engagement initiatives (Ross 2000), thereby jeopardizing the long-term sustainability of outcomes that are negotiated via elite-dominated channels (Pearson 2001; Hancock 2008; Lipschutz 1998). An important consequence for these trends is the exclusion of human security issues from negotiation agendas in which NGOs and their networks have a demonstrated organizational strength to advocate and address (Richmond 2005). Yet, in conflict settings, NGOs can reach out across conflict lines to build, manage, and sustain networks across various issue areas. This is significant against the backdrop of lacking networks and capacities to reach out across conflict lines by the governmental agencies. The hierarchic nature of the governmental spaces of diplomatic conduct, and the horizontally organized patterns of the NGO sector in diplomatic settings, position them differently in diplomatic environments. The transition from “club” to “network” diplomacy as a key feature of diplomatic modernization is set to elevate the role of NGOs in global diplomacy primarily due

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to their superior abilities of network cultivation, relative to governmental players. In these processes of diplomatic modernization, the NGO sector will emerge as a “wild card” in international relations (DeMars 2005), as it possesses, or attempts to create, the channels to broader societies in conflict zones. If the pressures on governments and state-centric institutions, particularly in conflict zones, continue to strengthen, the diplomatic value and leverage of NGOs and civil society will only increase. The network-based approach to the study of diplomacy and the NGO sector is a useful framework to explore and evaluate these prospects, dilemmas, and trade-offs of the NGO sector in diplomatic settings. Anna Ohanyan is the Richard B. Finnegan Distinguished Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Stonehill College in Massachusetts, USA, and Nonresident Senior Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She is a two-time Fulbright Scholar in Armenia. She has authored, edited, and coedited four books, including Russia Abroad: Driving Regional Fracture in Post-Communist Eurasia and Beyond (Georgetown University Press, 2018), Networked Regionalism as Conflict Management (Stanford University Press, 2015), and Armenia’s Velvet Revolution (Bloomsbury Press, 2020, with Laurence Broers). Her articles have appeared in such scholarly journals as International Studies Review, Peace and Change, Conflict Resolution Quarterly, Global Governance, and Global Society. She has also contributed to the Washington Post, Foreign Policy, Al Jazeera, and Wilson Quarterly. Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan is an international development expert and writer with thirty-two years of experience working in public and private spheres in transitional countries across the Balkans and Central Asia with a primary focus on Armenia. He became the executive director of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) in Armenia in 2007. He has also worked as a Eurasia program manager and as senior policy advisor at International Alert. He writes fiction and essays in Armenian and Russian, as well as journalism pieces in Armenian, Russian, and English. He has edited several handbooks and manuals on anticorruption, project management, and conflict-sensitive reporting.

NOTES 1. This, however, does not apply to the conflicts in the Caucasus, or to Armenia and Turkey, where only the highest levels of government can engage in dialogue, with or without international facilitators. Also, local governments

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3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

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(e.g., district or county authorities or township mayors) usually have no authority or mandate to engage in informal exchanges. However, international NGOs usually establish deep and trustful relations with local NGOs, since civil society dialogue processes and joint projects of nonpolitical nature are possible to some extent and sometimes such interactions do not need state/ government approval. The spark of the protest was the Erdogan government’s initiative to remove the popular green spaces in Gezi Park to rebuild Ottoman-era Taksim Military Barracks, demolished in 1940s. Rapidly deteriorating rights of freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were added to the list of issues the protesters raised. Disclosure: Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan is the head of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation in Armenia, which is the lead agent in the Armenia-Turkey Normalization Program (ATNP). The data presented in the article are drawn from his firsthand experience in developing the ATNP, in addition to being corroborated from a variety of sources, including EU official documents and external evaluation reports. In particular, an external evaluation report has been useful in the empirical section. It is an unpublished manuscript authored by Anna Matveeva in 2015, titled “Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process: A Programme Funded by the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.” It can be obtained by contacting the Eurasia Partnership Foundation-Armenia office. See the Eurasia Partnership Foundation’s website (2020) and the website for Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process (2020). The word support is emphasized here to demonstrate the limited ambition of a civil society program. This chapter discusses the Armenian political situation until April 2018, i.e., until the Velvet Revolution. This peaceful revolution brought to power a legitimate new government through free and fair elections (as different from the previous authoritarian government) and considerably changed Armenia’s political situation. However, as of 2 October 2019, it has not changed the overall situation between Armenia and Turkey. One of the main partners of the ATNP, the chair of Anadolu Kültür, Osman Kavala, an internationally renowned public and cultural activist, has been in jail in Turkey on a charge unrelated to the ATNP—a charge that does not stand scrutiny—for one thousand days as of 30 July 2020. He was once released briefly and imprisoned again within a few hours (Zafer and Turner 2019). Overall, the application of network theory to assess peacebuilding and Track Two initiatives requires much deeper engagement than what has been presented in this chapter. While particular network attributes may be valued in nonconflict settings, in conflict settings these attributes may be less valuable, if at all. Understanding and identifying those network attributes that are most effective for sustained peacebuilding is a crucial question. Some of this work

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can be found in Ohanyan (2015). The strength of network ties may not be the strength of networks in conflict settings, with flexibility being more valuable, for instance. Hypotheses generating studies in this area are overdue.

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Crocker, Chester, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall. 2011. “The Mosaic of Global Conflict Management.” In Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World, edited by Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, 3–23. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press. DeMars, William E. 2005. NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics. London: Pluto Press. DeMars, William E., and Dennis Dijkzeul, eds. 2015. The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory. Oxon: Routledge. Dijkzeul, Dennis. 2003 “Healing Governance? Four Health NGOs in War-Torn Eastern Congo.” Journal of International Affairs 57(1): 183–99. Ebrahim, Alnoor. 2005. NGOs and Organizational Change: Discourse, Reporting, and Learning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eurasia Partnership Foundation. “Armenia—Turkey.” 2020. Retrieved 31 March 2020 from https://www.epfarmenia.am/project/Armenia-Turkey. Fitzduff, Mari, and Cheyanne Church, eds. 2004. NGOs at the Table: Strategies for Influencing Policies in Ares of Conflict. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Gawerc, Michelle I. 2006. “Peace-Building: Theoretical and Concrete Perspectives.” Peace and Chane 31(4): 435–78. Göçek, Fatma Müge. 2015. Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789–2009. New York: Oxford University Press. Graham, Sarah Ellen. 2014. “Emotion and Public Diplomacy: Dispositions in International Communications, Dialogue, and Persuasion.” International Studies Review 16(4): 522–39. Hancock, Landon E. 2008. “The Northern Irish Peace Process: From Top to Bottom.” International Studies Review 10(2): 203–38. Heine, Jorge. 2013. “From Club to Network Diplomacy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, edited by Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh C. Thakur, 54–69. New York: Oxford University Press. Hemmer, Bruce, Paula Garb, Marlett Phillips, and John L. Graham. 2006. “Putting the ‘Up’ in Bottom-Up Peacebuilding; Broadening the Concept of Peace Negotiations.” International Negotiation 11(1): 129–62. Hochstetler, Kathryn. 2013. “Civil Society.” In The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, edited by Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur, 176–91. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ikenberry. John G. 2017. “The Plot against American Foreign Policy: Can the Liberal Order Survive?” Foreign Affairs 96(3): 2–9. Jones, Peter. 2015. Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Josselin, Daphné, and William Wallace. 2001. “Non-state Actors in World Politics: A Framework.” In Non-state Actors in World Politics, edited by Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, 1–20. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kahler, Miles, ed. 2009. Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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Kieser, Hans-Lukas, Kerem Öktem, and Maurus Reinkowski. 2015. World War I and the End of the Ottomans: From the Balkan Wars to the Armenian Genocide. London: I. B. Tauris. Lipschutz, Ronnie D. 1998. “Beyond the Neoliberal Peace: Conflict Resolution to Social Reconciliation.” Social Justice 25(4): 5–19. Matveeva, Anna. 2015. “Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process: A Programme Funded by the EU Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace.” In mimeo. McMahon, Patrice. 2017. The NGO Game: Post-conflict Peacebuilding in the Balkans and Beyond. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Mead, Walter Russell. 2014. “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers.” Foreign Affairs 93(3): 69–79. Morris, Benny, and Dror Ze’evi. 2019. The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey’s Destruction of Its Christian Minorities, 1894–1924. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ohanyan, Anna. 2008. NGOs, IGOs, and Network Mechanisms of Post-conflict Governance in Microfinance. New York: Palgrave. ———. 2009. “Policy Wars for Peace: Network Model of NGO Behavior.” International Studies Review 13(3): 475–501. ———. 2012. “Transfer Up or Down? Dialogue Groups between Turkish and Armenian Communities in the United States.” Conflict Resolution Quarterly 29(4): 433–60. ———. 2015. Networked Regionalism as Conflict Management. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ———. 2018. “Theory of Regional Fracture in International Relations: Beyond Russia.” In Russia Abroad: Driving Regional Fracture in Post-Communist Eurasia and Beyond, edited by Anna Ohanyan, 19–40. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. ———. 2019. “How Old Courts Derail New Democracies.” Foreign Policy, 14 August. Retrieved 30 March 2020 from https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/14/ how-old-courts-derail-new-democracies/. ———. 2020. “What’s Next for Armenia? Authoritarian Reserves and Risks in a Democratic State.” In Armenia’s Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World, edited by Laurence Broers and Anna Ohanyan, 231–53. London: I. B. Tauris. Pallas, Christopher L., and Amanda Guidero. 2016. “Reforming NGO Accountability: Supply vs. Demand-Driven Models” International Studies Review 18(4): 614–34. Paris, Roland. 2004. At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press. Paul, Thazha Varkey, ed. 2016. Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present, and Future. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pearson, Frederic. 2001. “Dimensions of Conflict Resolution in Ethnopolitical Disputes.” Journal of Peace Research 38(3): 275–87.

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Pouliot, Vincent. 2016. International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nye, Joseph. 2005. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Phillips, David. 2012. “Diplomatic History: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols.” Carnegie Russia and Eurasia Program. Retrieved 31 March 2020 from https:// carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/17/diplomatic-history-turkey-armeniaprotocols-event-3630. Richmond, Oliver P. 2005. “The Dilemmas of Subcontracting the Liberal Peace.” In Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of the NGO Peacebuilding, edited by Oliver. P. Richmond and Henry F. Carey, 19–35. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Ross, Marc Howard. 2000. “Creating the Conditions for Peacemaking: Theories of Practice in Ethnic Conflict Resolution.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23(6): 1002–34. van Ham, Peter. 2014. “Social Power in Public Diplomacy.” In Relational, Networked and Collaborative Approaches to Public Diplomacy (Routledge Studies in Global Information, Politics and Society), edited by Rhonda S. Zaharna and Amelia Arsenault, 17–28. New York, NY: Routledge. Reinicke, Wolfgang H. 1998. Global Public Policy: Governing without Government? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Rodrik, Dani. 2017. “A Good Citizen Jailed in Turkey.” New York Times, 3 November. Retrieved 12 December 2019 from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/ 03/opinion/osman-kavala-erdogan-turkey.html. Rogan, Eugene. 2016. The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East. New York: Basic Books. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2017. The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Suny, Ronald Grigor. 2017. “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else”: A History of the Armenian Genocide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process. 2020. “Home Page.” Retrieved 31 March 2020 from http://armenia-turkey.net/. Ter-Gabrielyan, Gevorg. 2013. “The Experience of the Caucasus Forum: An Experiment in Holistic Peacebuilding.” In Mediation and Dialogue in the South Caucasus: A Reflection on 15 Years of Conflict Transformation Initiatives, edited by International Alert, 147–94. London: International Alert. Zafer Yılmaz and Bryan S. Turner. 2019. “Turkey’s Deepening Authoritarianism and the Fall of Electoral Democracy.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 46(5): 691–98.

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The Use and Limits of Civil Society for Postconflict State Democratization Donor Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina Revisited Kristie D. Evenson

Introduction Donor support from states and international organizations (IOs) of civil society to further democratization efforts has been a key component of state-building policies in postconflict states. Yet this review of their practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) highlights the limits of using civil society to build up democratic state structures and processes in such challenging contexts. It builds on research undertaken by Ian Smillie in 1996 for a paper commissioned by CARE to examine the extent to which donors were fostering civil society development over building service delivery agencies (Smillie 1996). In 2001, the author returned to the region, collaborating with Smillie, to identify how the situation had changed. The 2001 research highlighted the reason why so many donors had emphasized the creation of a strong civil society where few had existed in the communist and war-torn past. It was based on the idea that a postwar and democratic state required some basis for legitimacy besides nationalism, and that civil society might provide at least some of the answers to the fraught question on how to promote stable and peaceful democracy (Smillie and Evenson 2003). There had been a rapid growth of civil society organizations in BiH, but they had been funded in short-term project cycles and mainly for service delivery, which hampered building their capacities in a more sus-

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tainable manner. Ever-present “capacity-building” efforts were comical if not incompetent. Bosnian civil society benefactors—international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), the United Nations (UN), and state donors alike—evinced short attention spans and, by late 2001 and early 2002, waning interest. Kosovo had overtaken BiH as the crise du jour, but even Kosovo had been usurped by Afghanistan as donor interest turned east after 9/11. The conclusion was that “after five years and billions of aid dollars, the state remained fragile and the concept of civil society remains elusive” (Smillie and Evenson 2003: 304). Almost two decades later, the author returned to look at BiH again, but this time to get behind the assumptions that fueled the 2001 analysis. What was not critically examined in the 2001 study was the idea of “Civil society for which purposes and with which limits?” The assumptions that civil society development and its sustainability would also somehow correlate with democratization of the state were inherent to our thinking as well as to most donor-led programming. Like many authors, we built part of our earlier argument for a strong and sustainable civil society on the idea that civil society is part of a means for achieving another goal—a peaceful and democratic state in BiH. We did not specify how civil society contributes to democratization beyond the general formula for democratization found in the literature at the time.1 Nor did we distinguish how the contested and postconflict context of BiH might factor into these efforts. Like many at the time, we assumed that things would come together. However, things in BiH have not come together. In early 2020, the level of dysfunction is more than readily apparent. Bieber (2016) describes BiH as a country both at peace and in limbo—it took a year to form a government after fall 2018 elections, and European Union accession reform processes have been in a stop-start loop there since 2008.2 The Republika Srpska’s (RS) efforts to undermine and actively dismantle the state institutions continue to intensify without much domestic or international pushback.3 Steady emigration reflects citizens’ fatigue and disillusion with the state-building project.4 The international efforts to end the war and the design of the peace are a clear factor in the current dysfunction. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council 1995) ended four years of violent conflict. The agreement’s complex design of a new state based on two entities composed of the RS and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that contains ten cantons, each with its own level of competencies, a weak central state, and three ethnic constituencies (Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims [Bosniaks]) provided little incentive for war victors to build up a functioning state.5

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As Bieber (2006) describes, it allowed many of them to continue their respective ethnic-based wartime objectives. Such a contested state basis coupled with the international community’s on-again and off-again pressure to build up institutions contributed greatly to the poor democratization outcomes.6 How civil society might be able to influence democratization in such a challenging context seems necessary to (re)consider. Partly due to the lack of democratization success in BiH and subsequent fruitless internationally led state-building attempts around the world, the role of civil society in democratization and reform processes began to gain more attention. This attention is welcome. It raises critical questions about the assumptions behind 1990’s donor-designed assistance for civil society (Carothers 2002; Pouligny 2005) and the links between how societies may or may not become more democratic and what role IOs and civil society might play in this process. More recently, critical questions have also been posed about how assistance is designed and implemented (Youngs 2015; Carothers 2009, 2015). Yet within this more critical examination of democracy assistance, much is still unclear. To better understand how donor designs and practices may affect postconflict democratization, a return to look at these efforts in BiH merits attention. BiH was one of the first large-scale efforts to use civil society for democratization, and as such it continues to be a “model” for donor engagement in such contexts around the world. This examination proceeds in four steps. First it examines how donors envisioned certain types of civil society fostering democracy; next it looks at trends of civil society funding in BiH—going from the initial waves of humanitarian aid to the point when civil society development and democratization became more clearly linked. Based on this, the chapter then concentrates on the specific sector of civil society most explicitly connected to democratization efforts and the effects donors had on the democratization project in BiH. The final section uses the trends noted in BiH to pose a number of design and implementation questions that donors should consider when engaging with civil society in other postconflict state-building democratization efforts.

Civil Society Development and Assumptions: Which Is the Right Kind of Organization? Donor support of civil society generally tends to include a variety of types of organizations, from grassroots and community-based organizations to service-delivery organizations as well as those more specifically focused

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on policy, rights, and advocacy issues.7 Together the sector encompasses what donors describe as civil society. Yet, when considering how civil society organizations fit into the democratization formula, many donors (particularly US-based ones) have tended to consider civil society as primarily represented by NGOs, and then largely by the specific group of NGOs focused on policy, human rights, and advocacy issues as the organizations of key importance for democratization. These organizations are seen partly according to the democratization transition paradigm emerging from Central Eastern Europe after the Cold War as either a safe haven for reformers against a still authoritarian government or a force of pressure for a slowly democratizing government that needs to be watched, aided, and encouraged to take on a reform agenda. As Diamond outlined in his 1994 article on civil society and democratization, there are a number of activities, from promoting basic democratic ideals to providing alternative channels for the articulation of interests vis-à-vis the government, by which civil society can affect the democratization of a state and its society (Howard 2011; Diamond 1994). Adapting this to a postconflict and state-building context, such NGOs were considered to be willing partners of the international community in its state-building efforts and, if needed, voices of reason for domestically pushing forward a democratic state-building agenda. Or as Howard (2011: 101) argues, “From the onset, civil society was seen as key to the successful implementation of the Dayton (Peace) Accords and became an integral part of international efforts.”8 So what happened? To understand the story of civil society development in this particular area it is important to track this in relation to the parallel efforts by the international community for promoting and building up a democratic state structure.

Phases of International Intervention, Donor Support, and Donor Theories of Change The international effort can be broken down into three broad phases of intervention (Evenson 2014: 51–60). Immediately following the end of the war through roughly 2000, most international efforts were focused on rebuilding and humanitarian assistance. From 2000 to 2006, the international community—composed of the UN Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBIH), NATO-led multinational peace enforcement forces, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union, and INGOs—was coordinated under the direction of the international community representative in BiH

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as embodied in the Office of the High Representative (OHR), Paddy Ashdown.9 The emphasis was on building the institutions of the state and making the state function. The OHR, in coordination with the other key international actors, pushed, cajoled, incentivized, and demanded results in building up key institutions and the functioning of a state. Notably, the UNMBIH mission successfully ended its mandate in 2002 given progress that had been reached in key areas. Its remaining activities were folded under the OHR umbrella. Other UN agencies continued specific sector programming in coordination with the larger OHR umbrella effort.10 Prospects for BiH in 2006 appeared to be considerably brighter than only a few years earlier. Partly due to this progress and partly due to the changing international interest and geopolitical considerations, the international community had a much more hands-off approach during the third phase from 2006 until the present. The European Union played a growing role in relation to the OHR, and it took the lead specifically after 2006. Other UN actors and IOs worked in coordination with the OHR and European Union as lead international actors. By 2011 the EU special representative (EUSR) was housed in a different building from the OHR. The EUSR was focused on European integration, the OHR on still fulfilling aspects of the Dayton Agreement (Evenson 2014: 50–51). Donors assumed that the need for local ownership and a combination of carrots and sticks in relation to the EU accession process would be sufficient for continuing the democratization process (Evenson 2014: 54–56). Donor emphasis on supporting civil society followed these rough phases. Most humanitarian efforts and service delivery focus occurred during the first phase. Only after 2000 did a greater percentage of funding begin to focus on democracy promotion efforts. It is difficult to get an accurate estimate of donor funding given that democratization includes both institution building and technical assistance as well as democracy promotion efforts through civil society, Still, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data suggests that of the $9 billion that went to BiH in international assistance up through 2006, “democratization” funding reached a bit more than 10 percent of the total funds by 2003 (Evenson 2009). Of this, on a year-to-year basis, between 20 and 30 percent could be categorized as going to civil society. This funding, while somewhat diminishing after 2006, appears to have remained relatively stable if viewing the portfolios of key donors (both the European Union and United States) to BiH from 2007 onward (Howard 2011: 102). Yet, the funding view is only part of the story. While funds for civil society and democratization continued to be available after 2006, the tasks

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and ability to carry out these tasks diverged. As long as the OHR and engaged BiH institutions enjoyed an upward momentum in state building, having NGOs provide additional pressure and expertise seemed to more or less work. NGOs tended to complement the voices of the OHR and later the EUSR (if not always those of BiH institutions) in the provision of ideas, expertise, and pressure to develop and reform the wide set of institutions, standards, legislation, and practices that needed to be put into place. However, after 2006, the reality on the ground changed even if international donor understandings did not. While the state-building project effectively slowed down, donors continued to fund democracy-focused NGOs as if everything was on track with the theory of change that NGOs would play a complementary role to the reform process. The assumption appeared to be that the multiple levels of government would eventually find a way to function together and the role of the civil society would again fit the theories of change that the donors had designed. More than a decade later, this official donor position has changed very little. For example, the European Commission Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) strategy paper for 2014–17, while recognizing the challenges in the reform process, (still) cited the role of civil society to essentially make citizens aware of and increase demand for reform in line with EU membership criteria (European Commission 2017). The discrepancy between democratic state building that was wished for and that which actually happened has affected efforts to build up civil society as well as its ability to impact democratization. Below we unpack four areas of donor practices that have affected the civil society sector and its ability to affect democratization.

Funding Practices Reinforce Political Divides First, stalled political progress has meant that donor-funding practices (despite the declared objectives and visions) have often served to reinforce the political divisions in the country. Most counterparts for such programming are based in the state capital, Sarajevo, and these are the ones that primarily focus on the BiH state-building project as a whole. Identifying democracy-oriented NGOs outside of Sarajevo, in cities like Mostar, has been challenging for many donors as they carry out civil society network or reconciliation work,11 and for the most part, if such counterparts are present, they are more focused on immediate environments around them and the local structures that have been put both de facto and de jure into place. For example, most organizations based in the second entity of BiH—the Republika Srpska—tend to focus on entity-level institutions. This is appro-

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priate for many of their efforts given the institutional competencies at this level (as per the Dayton Peace Agreement). At the same time, this at least indirectly fortifies the political reality of BiH where democracy promotion efforts within RS circles are less on the state level or the cross-entity level than within the internal RS political context. Nevertheless, pension reform or anticorruption policy are and should be simultaneously an intraentity, interentity, and state-level set of coordinated efforts. Domestic organizations can and do take on this challenge, including efforts to form wider coalitions and partnerships, and donors do attempt to encourage these when possible. For example, the NGO Centers for Civic Initiatives (CCI) (2020), which has five offices countrywide,12 is still an embodiment of both the state and the civil society ideal (per the international community view) and continues to play a key role in civil society in the country (partly due to long-term USAID cooperation and support). Similarly, Transparency International BiH (2020) has had a high profile countrywide as it conducts research on corrupt practices and ways to legislate change. Yet overall, the reality is that donors generally direct the majority of their efforts on the expertise and energy in the capital, Sarajevo; this is due to perceived, as well as donor-developed, competencies of NGOs and interests that are more prevalent in the capital than in the regional cities. While this might be considered normal in most countries, in BiH, given the complex governance structure, multiple urban centers need to be included, yet this has only sometimes been done. If an initiative does not include or have counterparts in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Mostar at the very least (to cover the three primary urban centers and ethnic-based centers of power), then it can undermine the state-building objectives it is supporting.

Grooming NGOs as Political Access Gatekeepers The political environment also created heightened risks of exclusivity between donors and NGOs doing democracy programming. While the tendency of donors to pick early partners that become longtime partners (in whichever field) is not new, the implications in relation to democracy programming need to be further examined. On the plus side, having multiyear relations builds competency, trust, and possibilities for long-term agenda setting; this is clearly important for democracy-focused NGOs. On the negative side, such long-term partnerships have tended to evolve with only partial attention to the democracy governance standards of the organization.13 Many donor counterparts have shared a similar view of the country as a united and functioning

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democratic state. The vision of such organizations can become an inspiration for the citizens and the government. Yet, these very values can also separate them from the average citizen they claim to represent. Most would say that they are working in the name of the “people” (i.e., citizens, not ethnic groups, which is already a plus in BiH), and many of the people supporting citizens’ rights and diversity are glad that someone is fighting for them. Yet this portion of the population is in the minority, so that the level of credibility such an organization has with its wider range of stakeholders becomes a concern. Such organizations—often partly due to long-term funding relationships with donors—can easily begin to talk “in the name of the people” without necessarily regularly consulting those that they claim to represent. Even analytical organizations that tend to practice more formal research methods for gathering evidence and stakeholder views for their work rarely use participatory processes for gaining input on their own research and advocacy agendas. The reasons vary, but many, when asked, tend to suggest that they “know what is in the interest” of the populations they are describing.14 Speaking for “their constituency” and having a clear constituency are different propositions, and many such organizations only have a vague sense of whom they represent and what claims they can make in their names. Donor support of strong actors without holding them accountable for their practices can result in civil society democracy programming implementers mimicking the very undemocratic practices of the government that they are trying to change; these civil society actors can become the political gatekeepers between the wider population and their government. This has been exacerbated by the “eliteness” factor of many such NGO actors. Many of the actors that went into the sector related to democracy issues are still in the NGO sector many years later. Some have gone into the government (something many in the international community welcome as a sign of political normalization) or into the private sector. Yet given the political and economic frustrations of the country, most have remained in the sector, partly for its “job security.” Public perception of such actors is that they are an extension of the international community or their own domestic political actors. Both sides have high salaries and steady employment15 without the “need” for clear results. The local language used to describe the sector among people on the street or by taxi drivers, as the “NGO business,” is not new. However, the fact that this group includes specifically those that claim to speak in the name of others to promote democratic values amplifies the disconnect between how they are working, with whom they are working, and on whose behalf.

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This disconnect stood out when the “Bosnian spring” protests in 2014 gathered strength in different cities across BiH (and then fizzled out), without the most prominent NGOs engaged in democracy-related programming visible around the protests. When asking “Where were the NGOs?” most donors, taxi drivers, and NGOs themselves just shrugged their shoulders.16 At least symbolically, those organizations that were supposed to be the “face of the people” were not clearly present as people expressed their frustrations with the government on the street.

Policy Research without Clear Demand (and Engagement) from and with the Government A third and very practical effect has been that the Bosnian democracyfocused NGOs often are both pushing and pulling reforms processes while standing alone without a government counterpart. International donors and organizations have built up a cadre of organizations that have some level of professional specialization in one area or another. Much of this growth can be attributed to long-term institutional funding support combined with different management and mentoring. For example, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) had a “mentoring plus franchising” model in their efforts with specific organizations, and the Think Tank Fund, Open Society Foundation’s institutional grants, provided support to such organizations as the Centre for Security Studies, the Atlantic Initiative, and the Foreign Policy Initiative, which have focused on security and international issues, as well as policy research centers like Analitika and Populari, which have focused on a variety of local government and EU-related reform processes.17 Such organizations display innovative ideas and practical solutions. Yet many such efforts have not translated into policy-related action. Why? Even in the most “normal” policy contexts, NGOs can only hope to have some influence on policy processes rather than clear impact. This is something that donors and organizations alike are becoming more cognizant of as increasingly sophisticated monitoring and evaluation methods tend to curb unrealistic expectations.18 International donor expectations in relation to BiH have somewhat recognized the difficulties of direct causal impact arguments, but they have been slower to recognize that the playing field is far removed from their typical policy process logframe matrices. Rather than a potentially reluctant set of government officials that needs to be convinced, the challenge in BiH is simply often one of missing counterparts. These counterparts are missing due to the lack of formation of key institutions or departments within government institutions. They are also due to the

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lack of competence displayed by officials who hold political leadership positions. A study undertaken by the Urban Institute in BiH (Struyk and Miller 2004) seeking to better understand the “demand” for such policy research services captures this dynamic. It describes a setting where government officials work in “substantial isolation” and where the idea of seeking outside policy advice is “rather foreign.” Little has changed since this study was undertaken on formal cooperation levels. For example, it was only in 2017 that the government finalized the Agreement on Cooperation with Civil Society, and in 2018 it took the initiative to develop an Advisory Body of the Council of Ministers of BiH for civil society (USAID 2019: 54). BiH also represents a context of complex and unclear decision-making that involves the international community itself. The OHR retreated significantly from overt policymaking since 2006, but how the different levels of government engage with the OHR, the EUSR, the remaining UN organizations, the bilateral missions, and partly with each other is still a complex and unclear process. Donor- and IO-directed efforts on consultation processes are one way to try to address (or paper over) these realities. Donors and IOs began relatively early to require consultation processes between domestic NGOs and government officials. However, first steps to do so tended to emphasize the box-checking exercise of consultation, even in relation to the ministry in charge of civil society relations, not to mention when it came to more “serious” issues. Many donors and NGOs themselves suggest that much of these processes have been little more than cosmetic. There has been little follow-up, and there have been even fewer indications that the consultation processes are evident in ensuing decision-making or legislation and its implementation.19 International efforts in recent years to support expert teams and consultation processes have helped somewhat. Encouraging domestic NGOs to identify technical experts within institutions who actually “do the work” and supporting their collaboration with both international and domestic NGO experts can bring results. For example, domestic NGOs have worked with several government institutions to develop and enact legislation on issues ranging from business environment improvements to energy efficiency and cultural program reforms.20 However, the general donor tendency has been to see the analytical product or project completion as key rather than ensuring a process that would allow all sides to work together to produce policies and reforms that are enacted. Donors also still tend to view these efforts in isolation from each other and/or from ongoing policy process cycles. Despite official coordination mechanisms, there is a great deal of similar funding for research and

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advocacy that is neither coherent nor necessarily coordinated to maximize results. Structurally this is partially a holdover of the international community oversight structure in BiH; a strong US presence gradually taken over by EU actors is also reflected in donor funding. Clustering donor support around key democracy and governance issues has its benefits, providing significant funds and emphasis to issues areas. At the same time, this has also resulted in the funding by donors like USAID and the European Union of similar research and advocacy campaigns, such as anticorruption, that oftentimes have been more duplicative than complementary. Silent or open rivalry between donors in such areas provides little encouragement for domestic NGOs to coordinate their approaches. Another worrying trend in the past ten years is that donors have increasingly funded other big intergovernmental organizations to do this reform work in the place of the domestic organizations. With the rationale that such organizations might make more progress, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) are two of the most “successful” in receiving EU and other donor funds to then engage in judiciary, local government, and other reforms. These “implementers” generally regrant some of this money to the same policy and think tank organizations and domestic NGOs that had previously received the funding to carry out the same work (but now with less funding). There is little evidence to suggest that this donor practice has had more impact on the reform process. A clear result though is that less funding is available for those groups already challenged to carry out reform-focused missions.21 For all these reasons, policy research organizations’ results are disappointing. Numerous conversations with organizations engaged in different efforts emphasize the difficult policy environment and the frustrating lack of impact many feel in carrying out their work.22 This, of course, could describe the frustrations of bright, dedicated, overworked researchers and activists in think tanks anywhere, but the challenges here go beyond the usual political back and forth common in most transitional or even older democratic states. They rather embody the less clear terrain of how to work within a political space that is not ready for them, lacking clear “rules of the road,” governmental counterparts, and a sense of sharing in a common state-building objective. Some, like the organization Zašto ne? (Why not?), have gone back to the people through engagement on social media to spread their reform messages and priorities for change. This makes for more popularity but often still has little traction with pressuring government officials to engage and react.

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Although such work is not futile, it suggests the need for a long view and managed expectations; what can be accomplished by policy research and advocacy organizations tackling issues such as corruption, public administration reform, etc., is complex, takes time, and will need at least midterm donor and IO engagement.

Addressing High Politics through NGO Means Perhaps most striking, however, among all these effects has been the tendency of donors to address high political issues through the use of domestic NGOs. Donors’ reluctant realization of BiH political realities has meant that many of the sensitive political issues that the international community lost its appetite to tackle in the past decade have been addressed through these NGOs. If one looks at any of a number of donor priorities that were articulated on websites since 2006, many appear to be similar to those that international actors set for the institutions themselves—good governance, anticorruption, etc. This is not a coincidence. It was thought that a similar focus would strengthen the institution-building and democratization processes in the same manner as had worked before. Less explicit was the point at which the only actors pushing this process became mostly those in civil society. If domestic political will at the government institutional level was not present, say, with the anticorruption agency despite international donor support for the functioning of the agency, then the convenient mechanism for this implicitly became civil society through funding of anticorruption monitoring and advocacy mechanisms. This did not necessarily pressure the government institutions to function, but it served to increase the knowledge and frustration of citizens about the problem. Effectively, civil society became both the voice of the domestic interests for democratization and that of the international community. One of the most telling examples of this was the role that civil society has played in relation to efforts at constitutional reform. Since the beginning of the international postconflict presence in BiH, there were both international and domestic concerns about how to transform the Dayton Peace Agreement—which was also the basic constitution of the country—into a more functional constitution. The narrow defeat of the April 2006 constitutional reform package in parliament23 effectively closed the door on international efforts to develop something until 2009, when the international community again tried to bring the various political sides together through a conference held at the Butmir military base.24 This, too, failed,

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and after these efforts, the political climate for discussing constitutional issues became extremely sensitive. International political efforts appeared to take a “time out” from encouraging constitutional reform. Yet, funding for civil society in this area continued. Specifically through funding different citizen and NGO opportunities for engagement on constitutional reform among themselves and with the government institutions, donors and IOs hoped that such support would move the process forward from the grassroots levels. Constitutional reform is still not a reality regardless of civil society efforts. Yet this was not for lack of trying. What particularly stands out, at least according to local sources,25 is that when there was some traction, hint of success, and push forward, international political backing of domestic NGOs that they had funded was less present. Those that had risked much to even tackle the issue found themselves relatively alone as IOs and donor governments deferred to the same political actors that had been blocking the process. Whether it was the issue itself of NGO consultation within the political process or whether it concerned international support for specific initiatives proposed by civil society, the international response was muted (Perry 2016). Such efforts also served to undermine the standing of some domestic NGOs as they became associated with donor and international community agendas and as they became known as political actors themselves. Again taking constitutional reform as an example, many NGOs agreed with general international positions on these issues, but they may have different opinions on areas of negotiation and methods for how to achieve such objectives. Arguably, many of these local nuances and positions got lost under the larger set of headlines and political sparring around constitutional reform. The result was a reform agenda that, despite domestic NGO inputs, still appeared donor driven and lacking domestic legitimacy.

What Do These Practices Suggest about the Role of Democracy-Focused NGOs in Postconflict Democratization? An international effort to encourage state-level democratization through support of civil society organizations focused on democracy and advocacy efforts makes sense in theory. In postconflict situations, it seems a good investment in building a democratic state and society. What is missing, however, from this logic is a more critical view of the limits that such international donor and IO support can have on democratization efforts. The examination of the situation in BiH illustrates that up to a point, civil society can be a parallel support for the institution-building

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process. However, if the political situation changes direction, deteriorates, or simply stagnates, the role that such NGOs can play changes too. Hence, the BiH experience provides us with a number of key lessons to consider as donors assess their strategies in other such complex postconflict democratization effort contexts.

Political Dynamics Dictate Civil Society’s Ability to Push Democratization The political dynamics of a postconflict country where the political elite overwhelmingly benefits from the status quo rather than from reforms is not a “normal” donor context for democratization. In such a context, domestic NGOs take on a dual role of being both the supporters of key reforms and often the sole voices pushing for reform. Civil society itself is not a government, nor should it assume this role. Therefore, if the donor community loses its government interlocutors due to the political dynamics, substituting civil society actors for government officials will likely result in disappointing outcomes on all sides. As this type of context has increasingly become the new normal in many conflict and postconflict countries in the world, how domestic NGOs can and should be part of such efforts still needs more consideration. Building programs that promote democratization without a clear set of political actors that have a similar agenda provides little guarantee that donor and civil society efforts will have any traction. Rather, having a look at what is possible and what is probable with local actors would better position all sides to be able to affect the (more realistic) change that they desire.

Funding and Implementation Strategies Can Inadvertently Undercut State-Building Efforts Donors and IOs by definition influence local situations, and they assume mostly for the better. In fraught political contexts, however, donors’ best intentions can further fuel the political divides. Funding reformists who are primarily in the capital over those in the provinces is common practice; doing this in a complex state structure like BiH (Kosovo, Iraq, or others) can have consequences on how these actors work together and how they influence or try to influence state-level and regional governance structures, and it can generate ethnic or other divisions. Similarly, long-term partnerships can enhance domestic NGO abilities, but they can also create an additional elite that contributes to, rather than pushes against, the status quo; at the very least, such elites may manage

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access to those protecting the status quo. Many domestic NGO leaders engaged in democracy and advocacy issues work based on their values, but the NGOs that grow up around such efforts tend to identify with funding and management practices that ensure their continued existence. If these are aligned with a general democratization effort that is fine, but there is also a danger that such forces of change become less interested in change than in their own version of institutional stability (which is something that some donors also emphasize).

Successful Civil Society Inputs into the Policy Process Require a Government to Function and Have Some Demand The case of BiH shows that a steady buildup of policy- and advocacyrelated organizations can assist and contribute to a difficult state-building project, but they are not a substitute for it. The assumption that policymaking is possible and that this can be founded on evidence-based/civil society–informed policy processes is probably too ambitious for many postconflict contexts. Efforts to build up the supply side through supporting civil society development of technical expertise provide a valuable resource to the country. However, if there are few government interlocutors to be part of this process due to either limited interest, scarce capacity, or simply a lack of the institution in place, then little can be achieved. Such efforts often create two-way dialogues between international donors and domestic NGOs rather than three-way dialogues also including the government, which are more likely to have some traction for building civil society and obtaining government cooperation. The building of local supply is essential to eventual thoughtful policymaking processes, but basic state institution functioning, basic interest or capacities of government officials, and some level of political will and expertise need to be present for meaningful results from such donor support in these areas. Circumventing this process by assigning funds to intergovernmental organizations to “manage and get results” does little but further scatter funds.

Domestic Democracy-Focused NGOs Require International Backup Regardless of domestic political context and particularly if the context is one of stalemate, domestic NGOs need international donor support. These NGOs are asked to address the politically sensitive issues that government actors fear or have no interest in. Yet as NGOs, they do not possess any of the carrots and sticks that international donors and the international community might bring to the table. This could be as simple as coordination between donors in their efforts to have a unified voice

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on a particular policy issue. Such would be important vis-à-vis both the international community and the domestic political actors. However, even more critical is that international donors and their officials uphold the principles that they are supporting domestic organizations to advocate for. If the grant is for inclusive processes or for innovative solutions, they need to back up the findings and actions of the organizations should they be challenged by domestic political actors.

Civil Society Cannot Undertake State Building Stalling of state-building progress by political actors should not invite state building by different means. Donors frustrated with the slow political progress in BiH after 2006 tended to direct more attention to civil society in hopes of getting around the political impasses. However, civil society actors, no matter how visionary, cannot replace political actors and institutions. Even when they have de facto credibility with the population, they do not have the formal credibility as representatives of the population that would be needed to build up an accountable governance system. Nor do they have the tools at their disposal to actually carry out the institutionbuilding and reform efforts they are tasked with addressing. In short, even as these organizations take on big issues that need to be dealt with, they are still NGOs, not enforcers of an international peace agreement or representatives of foreign governments that can exert pressure. Funding and direct political support of civil society actors can also politicize civil society organizations in a manner that dilutes their civic if not their political credentials. Finally, it sends an indirect message to political players that it is (still) acceptable to be a spoiler or to keep the status quo since civil society and international donors will somehow get (keep) the state functioning and international funds flowing. The BiH experience further suggests some lessons on implementation practices to consider in such contexts: Be ready to seek critical domestic partner inputs on evolving strategy and have the adaptive flexibility (that donors officially encourage) with domestic partners. Democratization efforts require a constant (re)examination of the environment, the players, and the assumptions of those involved. Not always but often the best understanding of what is and will happen, and why, is held by domestic partners. They often wear multiple hats as civil society activists, researchers, educators, etc., and through their different daily engagements have the widest view of the situation. Seeking out their feedback, ideas, and, yes, criticism of ongoing programming is only done by the most confident donors, but it is something that should become a normal part of designing, checking, and rede-

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signing quality democratization programming. Moreover, donor-funding cycles need a serious tweaking and reworking to align with the need for quick acting flexibility and adaptability; private foundations are ahead of the curve, the other main donors in BiH, bilateral ones and the European Union, not so much. Expect domestic partners to exhibit the good governance practices that they are promoting. Through their own and international encouragement, many organizations have improved their financial transparency and accountability. Democracy-focused NGOs have made less progress in conducting their work in a way that adheres to best practices in consultation and evidence-based advocacy. Challenging NGOs to articulate more clearly what they want to do, to reach beyond their NGO and citizen comfort zones, and to employ rigorous methods and engagement strategies will encourage NGOs to be the connectors with credibility rather than the gatekeepers between citizens and their government. This includes a focus on organizations’ own financial transparency and governance practices. Further good practices of critical donor support with an eye to at least midterm commitments. Democratization-focused civil society programming needs time, particularly that which involves policy research and participation in the policy process. While long-term partnerships with NGOs can have pitfalls in exclusivity, funding short-term research and advocacy efforts for complex policy problems is likely to have few results. Rather, funding efforts that articulate realistic steps for addressing policy issues and for working with key institutions and other sector partners should be emphasized. Further coordinate tactics and strategies among international actors to ensure a solid chance for results. Donor coordination is never perfect, but democratization-focused efforts on fraught political issues particularly require donors and international actors to be coordinated and strategic in their funding focus areas. Whether it is two “blocs” of donors like the European Union and the United States or other combinations, identifying what is possible in the policy context and how to fund this collaboratively rather than competitively could create better momentum for change in key areas.

Conclusion Civil society can in principle play a crucial role in democratization efforts. The actual extent to which civil society does and should play this role in internationally led postconflict democratization efforts is an area that requires additional examination.

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A reexamination of Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty-five years after the Dayton Peace Agreement and the new state structures were put in place highlights the dilemma of applying donor democratization strategies to extraordinary contexts. For a while, this strategy appeared to work, but after 2006 when the political situation took a sharp turn from its state-building efforts, the strategies were less effective. Expectations by definition appeared to be too ambitious and the chances for failure too high. A critical reboot of donor strategies to fit the actual political context did not take place. Rather, donors appeared to engage in a type of communal wishful thinking that such strategies would still have traction in an increasingly challenging environment. To be clear: donors were not alone in this wishful thinking, as it is difficult to separate the role of donors from that of the international community led by US and EU governments, who had decided to reduce their amount of direct intervention into the state-building efforts. Yet donors in this instance were those that continued to particularly promote the “healing practices” of civil society. As a result, donors were both peddling a questionable elixir as well as undercutting the democratization effort they were espousing. The situation today is not all gray. Civil society has a certain robustness; democratically minded NGOs and their leaders continue to fight for a functioning, accountable, and democratic BiH. The investment is not all in vain, and the donor efforts to build up civil society will likely continue to have limited positive effects in the years to come. What is now needed is clear-eyed strategizing: what is and is not possible with such NGO forces of democratic change in weak postconflict states? Democratization literature has increasingly become more sophisticated in its understanding of the many factors that contribute to a functioning and democratic state. Similarly, during the past decade there has been a more critical examination of donor inputs for democratization funding. Now is the time to link these two areas of investigation explicitly to see where donor practices and donor assumptions need their own critical reboot to align reality with strategy for working with democracyfocused NGOs. The conclusions of the study in 2001 remain: building real institutions and genuine democratization takes years; and it will take many more years in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Civil society can be a pillar of this democratization process, and domestic NGOs focused on democratization and advocacy can particularly be part of the solution. Donors have the opportunity to look again at BiH and to recalibrate as they can. They also have the ability to apply a similar clear-eyed view of the state of civil society democratization assistance to other state-building efforts around the world. In both situations, the opportunity is passing, but it is still there.

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Kristie D. Evenson is a research practitioner with more than twenty years’ experience in democratic governance and conflict mitigation programming with a specific focus on civil society development processes. This includes working as an implementer on managing and designing programming as well as working with donors to evaluate and to design program interventions. She first came to the Balkan region in 1996 and since then has primarily worked in this region, and the wider East Europe and Eurasia region, with some further global comparative efforts. She received her doctorate of social science in policy studies from the University of Bristol, School for Policy Studies.

NOTES 1. See Diamond (2004) and Putnam (1993). For a literature review of democratization factors, see Magen (2009). 2. BiH has been in limbo in relation to the EU for more than a decade. It signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2008, but this was not ratified until 2011. Given little progress on certain EU conditions, it did not go into force until June 2015. See European Commission (2015). On 15 February 2016, BiH submitted a formal application to start the accession process, but without fulfilling any requirements. This was accepted in September 2016. See Council of the European Union 2016. In February 2018, BiH completed and delivered the questionnaire to the EU; in May 2019, the EU issued its opinion on BiH’s application for membership, stating that it was not ready to consider formal membership talks. See European Commission (2019). For key BiH-EU dates, see Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina (2019). 3. For a look at recent maneuvers by RS president Dodik, see Kovacevic (2019). 4. The Union for Sustainable Return and Integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina estimates that approximately 173,000 citizens have left BiH in the past five years. See N1 (2019). 5. Manning (2004) describes how the war elite became the political elite. 6. See the various factors specific to BiH summarized in Evenson (2009), or, for a more comparative analysis of postconflict democratization factors, see Zuercher et al. (2013). 7. See for example, the definition provided by the Civil Society Sustainability Index (CSOSI) in USAID (2019). 8. USAID’s civil society assessment in 2004 specifically lays out civil society’s role in peace implementation and long-term democratization (Perry 2016: 22). 9. Each high representative was under the guidance of the Peace Implementation Council, which was the international community’s decision-making

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10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18. 19. 20.

21.

22. 23.

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body composed of fifty-five countries and donors overseeing the peace process in BiH. See OHR (2017). For a list of UN agencies present in BiH, see UN BiH (2020). Field interviews with donors for a number of BiH-focused evaluations between 2011 and 2015. They use the plural due to the “multiple” centers they have. Efforts to encourage and hold NGOs accountable for financial reporting and similar implementation concerns have been considerably developed. Most long-term partners in BiH engaged in democracy-related programming can claim a certain competency and level of financial transparency and accountability. The author has evaluated many analytical and policy research organizations in BiH and routinely has asked these questions during these evaluations. This includes working with different donors on the evaluation of five policy research institutions in 2011, evaluating programs with policy actors during 2012–15, and evaluating USAID civil society programming in 2016. As well, she continues to serve as an advisor to Freedom House’s Nations in Transit publication, which tracks civil society as well as general democratization trends on BiH and other countries in the region, and she has served as a regional expert for the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) for BiH and other countries in 2019 and 2020. NGO actors would likely dispute the idea that they have a steady income given that most need to constantly search for donor funds. However, public perception is that the sector continues to be well funded. The author spent time in BiH during and following the protests in 2014, gathering research for another project, which included collecting impressions related to formal NGO involvement in the protests. For more information on these organizations, see CSS (2020); Atlantic Initiative (2020); Foreign Policy Initiative BH (2020); and Populari Think Tank (2020). Tsui, Hearn, and Young (2014) discuss these dynamics. Analysis based on field evaluation conducted during 2010 and field research in 2014. The author served on an evaluation team in 2016 where USAID-supported programming had components of this strategic partnership approach. See Vukotic et al. (2016). Field research with think tanks and policy groups during 2016 and 2017 provided some insights into these donor practices, which are present throughout the region. See also the 2019 CSOSI for more details. The author has engaged with many of these organizations during research and evaluations on policy influence efforts. “On 26 April [2006], the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly House of Representatives (HoR) did not adopt the principles of the Proposed

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Amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Out of 42 members of the HoR, 26 voted in favour, while 16 voted against. The required majority for the adoption of the amendments to the Constitution is the two thirds of those present and voting members, which on 26 April would have been 28 votes” (CoE 2006). 24. See Bieber (2010) for international efforts around reviving constitutional change. 25. Evenson (2014) consulted with various donors and implementers related to their efforts on constitutional reform and the role of the international community on postconflict democratization in BiH as part of her dissertation research (2012–14).

REFERENCES Analitika. 2020. “Analitika: Center for Social Research.” Retrieved 18 March 2020 from http://www.analitika.ba. Atlantic Initiative. 2020. “Atlantic Initiative: Center for Security and Justice Research.” Retrieved 18 March 2020 from http://atlanticinitiative.org. Bieber, Florian. 2006. “After Dayton, Dayton? The Evolution of an Unpopular Peace Working Version.” Revised version published in Ethnopolitics 5(1): 15–31. ———. 2010. “Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Preparing for EU Accession.” European Policy Centre, April. Retrieved 15 April 2015 from http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/1087_constitutional_reform_in_bos nia_and_herzegovina.pdf. ———. 2016. “Conclusion: Bosnia and Herzegovina; A Failed Success.” In State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia, edited by Valery Perry and Soeren Keil, 213–20. New York: Routledge. Carothers, Thomas. 2002. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy 13(1): 5–21. ———. 2009. Revitalizing Democracy Assistance: The Challenge of USAID. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ———. 2015. “Democracy Aid at 25: Time to Choose.” Journal of Democracy 26(1): 59–73. Centers for Civic Initiatives. 2020. “Centers for Civic Initiatives.” Retrieved 21 May 2020 from http://cci.ba/index.php?lang=2. Centre for Security Studies (CSS). 2020. “Centre for Security Studies BiH.” Retrieved 18 March 2020 from http://css.ba/. Council of Europe (CoE). 2006. Constitutional Reform in Bosnia. Parliamentary Assembly Report, Doc. 1098227, June. Retrieved 26 October 2013 from http:// assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=11406&Language=en. Council of the European Union. 2016. “Council Conclusions on the Application of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Membership of the EU.” Press release, 20

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September. Retrieved 9 January 2017 from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ en/press/press-releases/2016/09/20-conclusions-bosnia/. Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2019. “Key Dates.” Retrieved 29 October 2019 from http://europa.ba/?page_id=496. Diamond, Larry. 1994. “Towards Democratic Consolidation.” Journal of Democracy 5(3): 4–17. ———. 2002. “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy 13(2): 21–35. Evenson, Kristie. 2009. “Bosnia and Herzegovina: State-Building in the Time of International Oversight and Ethnic Politics.” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 5(1). Retrieved 1 November 2009 from http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0501/093-126Kristie percent20D. percent20Evenson.pdf. ———. 2014. “Means and Ends in Democratic Statebuilding: Exploring the Significance of International Implementation Performance in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Democratic Political Development.” PhD diss., University of Bristol, UK, April. European Commission. 2015. “Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina Enters into Force Today.” Press release, 1 June. Retrieved 9 January 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-155086_en.htm. ———. 2017. “Indicative Strategy Paper for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2014– 2017).” Retrieved 21 May 2020 from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/news/indicative_strategy_paper_for_bos nia_and_herzegovina_2014_2017_revised_16_11_2017.pdf. ———. 2019. “Communicating from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Application for Membership of the European Union. SWD (2019) 222 final.” 29 May. Retrieved 29 October 2019 from http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/ 2019/05/20190529-bosnia-and-herzegovina-opinion.pdf. Foreign Policy Initiative BH. 2020. “About Us.” Retrieved 18 March 2020 from http://vpi.ba/en/about-us/. Howard, Ivana. 2011. “Building Civil Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Challenges and Mistakes.” In The Challenges of Political Transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, edited by Eldar Sarajlić and Davor Marko, 93–126. Sarajevo: Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies, University of Sarajevo. Ishkanian, Armine. 2007. “Democracy Promotion and Civil Society.” LSE Online. Retrieved 24 June 2015 from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/37038/1/Democracy_ promotion_and_civil_society_(lsero).pdf. Kovacevic, Danijel. 2019. “Senate Hearing Blames Dodik for Bosnia’s Stalemate.” BalkanInsight, 24 October. Retrieved 28 October 2019 from https://balkanin sight.com/2019/10/24/senate-hearing-blames-dodik-for-bosnias-stalemate/. Magen, Amichai. 2009. “Evaluating International Efforts at Promoting Democratic Development: Transition.” Working Paper. Stanford: Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, March. Retrieved 1 October 2015 from

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http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/evaluating_external_influence_on_ democratic_development_transition/. Manning, Carrie. 2004. “Elections and Political Change in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Democratization 11(2): 60–86. N1. 2019. “Over 173,000 People Left Bosnia in the Past Five Years.” Retrieved 29 October 2019 from http://ba.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a318660/Over-173000-people-left-Bosnia-in-the-past-five-years.html. Office of the High Representative (OHR). 2017. “Peace Implementation Council.” Retrieved 10 January 2017 from http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1220. Perry, Valerie. 2016. “Constitutional Reform Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Top-Down Failure, Bottom-Up Potential, Continued Stalemate.” In State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia, edited by Valery Perry and Soeren Keil, 15–40. New York: Routledge. Populari Think Tank. 2020. “Populari Think Tank.” Retrieved 18 March 2020 from http://www.populari.org/index.php?bGFuZz1lbiZyPTE=. Pouligny, Beatrice. 2005. “Civil Society and Post-conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building ‘New’ Societies.” Security Dialogue 36(4): 495–510. Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Smillie, Ian. 1996. “Service Delivery or Civil Society? NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Sarajevo: Care Canada. Smillie, Ian, and Kristie Evenson. 2003. “Sustainable Civil Society or Service Delivery Agencies? The Evolution of Non-governmental Organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology & Promise, edited by Dennis Dijkzeul and Yves Beigbeder, 287–306. New York: Berghahn Books. Struyk, Ray J., and Christopher Miller. 2004. “Policy Research in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role and Impact of Local Think Tanks.” Southeast European Politics 5(1): 45–59. Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2020. “Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Retrieved 30 October 2019 from https://www.transparency.org/ country/BIH. Tsui, Josephine, Simon Hearn, and John Young. 2014. “Monitoring and Evaluation of Policy Influence and Advocacy.” London: Overseas Development Institute. Retrieved 1 October 2015 from http://www.odi.org/publications/8265gates-monitoring-evaluating-advocacy. United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2019. “The 2018 CSO Sustainability Index for Bosnia and Herzegovina.” FHI 360. Retrieved 29 October 2019 from https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/docu ments/resource-csosi-2018-report-europe-eurasia.pdf. Vukotic, Naida Carismamovic, Kristie Evenson, Emina Cosic Puljic, and Anesa Hadzic. 2016. “Strengthening Civil Society’s Legitimacy, Competence, and Professionalism and Increasing Its Influence on Public Policies in Bosnia and

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Herzegovina: Performance Evaluation of USAID/BiH Civil Society.” United States Agency for International Development. Retrieved 11 January 2017 from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00mb9f.pdf. Youngs, Richard. 2015. “Rethinking Civil Society and Support for Democracy.” Swedish Expert Group for AID Studies, 22 April. Zürcher, Christoph, Kristie Evenson, Nora Röhner, Sarah Riese, Rachel Hayman, and Carrie Manning. 2013. Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding & Democratization after War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan Opportunity or Rhetorical Device? Lucile Martin and Saeed Parto

Introduction In the aftermath of the Western military intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001, “reconstruction” and “state building” were at the center of international and national political discourse on the country. One of the central elements of the reconstruction project has been the new Afghan state apparatus with a Western liberal model of democracy, of which gender mainstreaming is a key component. From the onset, the alignment of national policies with international rights conventions and protocols has been one of the main mechanisms driving the gender mainstreaming agenda (Billaud 2015; Kandiyoti 2009). The adoption in June 2015 of a national action plan for implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on women, peace, and security (WPS), was a key outcome of this process. Joachim and Schneiker (2012) have underlined the importance of domestic “battles over meaning” in the translation of international normative frameworks such as UNSCR 1325 in national settings. In Afghanistan, the translation of UNSCR 1325 into an implementation plan has taken place in the midst of complex systems of interactions between national and international stakeholders. In a context where international actors are involved in all dimensions of the policy process, “battles over meaning” need to be understood within the ideological and paradigmatic framework that emerged after the military intervention of 2001, the intense politicization of women’s rights, and the practical modalities under which interactions

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between the Afghan state, foreign donors, international organizations and agencies, and local civil society have evolved since 2001. The goal of this chapter is to provide an empirically based analysis of networks of interactions between international and national stakeholders in processes of localization of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan. Building on field observations and sixty-eight interviews carried out with representatives of foreign diplomatic missions, UN agencies, international NGOs, the Afghan government, and civil society between 2015 and 2018, we examine how Afghanistan’s national action plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (NAP 1325) and the women, peace, and security agenda have been operationalized in the domestic space.1 Analyzing the institutional context within which gender mainstreaming has been operationalized, this chapter focuses on the role of international organizations as intermediaries for implementation and mediators entrusted with providing representations and meaning of international normative frameworks. The analysis attempts to draw out trends in patterns of interaction among the various international actors with heterogeneous profiles, sectoral focus, and strategies on the one hand and the Afghan government and national NGOs as implementing partners on the other. The analysis contributes to a more in-depth understanding of the processes of localization of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan and, more generally, in environments affected by conflict. The chapter is organized as follows. We first examine the institutional context in which discourses on UNSCR 1325 emerged in Afghanistan and subsequently affected processes of implementation of UNSCR 1325 provisions, including through the development of Afghanistan’s NAP 1325. We then analyze the concrete implications of complex networks of interdependency in the construction and definition of processes of localization of UNSCR 1325. Finally, we attempt to show how processes of localization are shaped by institutional constraints generated by de facto networks organized around power relations in which the Afghan government, donor states, international organizations, and local NGOs are enmeshed.

UNSCR 1325 in Context: From Wishful Consideration to Institutionalization? Women’s oppression and the appalling social and economic status of Afghan women were invoked as some of the key justifications for the military intervention by international forces in Afghanistan in late 2001. In the aftermath of the overthrow of the Taliban, Afghanistan became the arena of the largest ever gender-focused aid intervention, with com-

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mitments to gender equality as a major feature of reconstruction and state-building plans. These commitments, first made in the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, were later formalized in international meetings bringing together the government of Afghanistan, the United Nations, and international donors, resulting in the adoption of benchmark documents framing the political and development agenda of the Afghan government and funding pledges by donors (Kandiyoti 2009). Gender mainstreaming became the key strategy advancing women’s status as an outcome of the Berlin Conference of 2004, with gender as a crosscutting theme to be incorporated into all government policies and all manner of donor aid programming. The Afghanistan Compact, signed at the London Conference of 2006, reiterated constitutional commitments to gender equality and nondiscrimination and led to the adoption of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (2008–13), with the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan (NAPWA 2008–18), as the key policy framework for advancement of women’s rights. These commitments were reiterated in successive international conferences in Bonn, Tokyo, London, Brussels, and Geneva, with associated frameworks intended to measure progress against stated objectives. The government of Afghanistan made specific commitments to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2004 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, including MDG 3 on “achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls,” SDG 5 on “end[ing] all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere” and “eliminat[ing] all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation,” and SDG 16 on “promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” In December 2011, the Bonn Conference renewed the commitment of the international community to support Afghanistan after the transfer of the responsibility for security from international to national security forces planned for 2014, and during Afghanistan’s “Transformation Decade” (2015–24), underlining gender equality and the rights of women as key areas of focus (EEAS 2011). These commitments were renewed in 2014 at the London Conference. In December of the same year, new commitments were made under the Self-Reliance Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF), with a specific focus on the development of a policy framework for empowering women, increasing participation of women in the government, and implementing of the WPS agenda outlined under UNSCR 1325. The Brussels Conference in 2016 and the Ge-

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neva Inter-ministerial Conference in 2018 reaffirmed the commitment by the Afghan government and its international donors to continue efforts toward gender equality and effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent related resolutions. Two key documents have been used as the basis on which to advance women’s rights in Afghanistan: the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Adopted in October 2000, UNSCR 1325 officially recognizes the adverse effects of conflict on women and acknowledges women’s right to participate in all aspects of conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, and to be included in decision-making bodies at all levels of government. UNSCR 1325 is structured around four thematic areas, or pillars, intended to support the goals of the resolution: Participation, Protection, Prevention, and Relief and Recovery, intended to ensure full engagement of women and recognize gendered differences of adverse effects of conflict. UNSCR 1325 formalized the conclusions of the Windhoek Declaration on “Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations” and was followed by six subsequent resolutions on women, peace, and security, creating a normative policy framework for UN member states to adopt a gender perspective in their peace operations and provide guidance for translating high-level recommendations into concrete policies and action plans (table 10.1).2 The government of Afghanistan ratified CEDAW in 2003 without reservations—a notable exception among states with status codes deriving from the shari’a (Kandiyoti 2009). The Constitution of Afghanistan offers guarantees to uphold principles of gender equality and makes general provisions for the advancement of women’s economic rights by creating and protecting spaces for women in the workforce, monitoring progress, and developing institutions that foster female employment under Article 22. Further, Article 7 commits Afghanistan to “abide by the UN Charter, international treaties, international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To accommodate concerns over the compatibility of international conventions with Islam on gender equality principles, Article 3 of the constitution states that no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of Islam—providing legal grounds for contesting commitments to international treaties on gender equality and human rights. Nevertheless, Articles 7 and 22 of the Afghan Constitution establish a strong basis on which Afghan civil society and international stakeholders alike could (and would) advocate for the development and implementation of policies aimed at promoting and protecting women’s rights.

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Table 10.1. Subsequent Resolutions to UNSCR 1325 Resolution 2122 (2013) on women’s leadership and empowerment as a central component for resolving conflicts and promoting peace through a number of specific calls for regular consultations, funding mechanisms to support women’s civil society organization and changes in the Council’s working methods in relation to WPS. Resolution 2106 (2013) on the need to better operationalize existing obligations, particularly those related to sexual violence. Resolution 1960 (2010) calls for refining institutional tools to combat impunity related to sexual violence, notably through the setup of a “naming and shaming” list in annual reports. Resolution 1889 (2009) focuses on women’s participation in peacebuilding and calls on the United Nations secretary-general to develop a set of global indicators to measure the impact of UNSCR 1325 at global and national levels. It further welcomes “the efforts of member states in implementing Resolution 1325 at the national level, including the development of national action plans.” Resolution 1888 (2009) calls for appointment of a special representative on sexual violence in conflict and the establishment of women’s protection advisors within peacekeeping missions. UNSCR 1820 (2008) draws attention to sexual violence being used as a weapon of war and calls for the need for prosecution of gender-based war crimes. Source: UN WOMEN, Global Technical Review Meeting: Building Accountability for Implementation of Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, Final Report, November 2013

Symbolically, the ratification of international protocols and conventions was intended as a signifier of national sovereignty, officially marking Afghanistan’s rejoining of the international community and its more active role as a UN member state (Kandiyoti 2009). In the “era of reconstruction” that followed the military intervention of 2001, however, state sovereignty was subject to the pervasive involvement of international (mainly Western) stakeholders throughout all stages of the policy process, including lawmaking. In practice, the sway of Western stakeholders dominated the actions of the Afghan state in the development of national priorities, policies, and strategies, and the oversight of their implementation.

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Concretely, the gender mainstreaming agenda was to be supported by a set of structures and tools developed in the wake of the Bonn Conference of 2001. This included the creation of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in 2002, with a mandate to mainstream gender in policies and programs of government ministries, and the establishment of gender units, gender focal points, and working groups within ministries, as well as interministerial gender task forces. International technical advisors were appointed to various ministries to assist in the development of gender policies, introduce local ministerial staff to gender concepts, and support the production of accountability documents required by donors (Billaud 2015; Kandiyoti 2005, 2009). Trainings on gender were provided for security and police forces through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), a program aimed at supporting the development of capacity and systems within the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and dialogue was initiated to improve the working conditions of women in the police, formal justice, and civil service. Priorities set by the government were reviewed, revised, and rearranged before approval and disbursement of funding by donor states.3 Despite the support provided by international donors to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, formal international support for gender mainstreaming linked to the women, peace, and security agenda was not clearly formulated until the release of Afghanistan’s national action plan for implementing UNSCR 1325 (NAP 1325) in June 2015. Beyond the formalization of NAP 1325 within the structures of the Afghan government, an aspect often overlooked in debates surrounding the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan is that of the extent to which international actors with a stake in Afghanistan have succeeded, or failed, to meet their own commitments to UNSCR 1325 as part of their development, political, and military activities in the country. UN member states have all been expected to develop national action plans (NAPs) to implement UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions on women, peace, and security. The need for NAPs was elaborated in the UN Security Council statement (2002), UN Secretary-General’s Report (2004), and UNSCR 1889 (2009), inviting member states to prepare countryspecific documents as a step toward the implementation of UNSCR 1325, with identifiable actions, actors responsible for implementation, timelines, and financial allocation (Gumru and Fritz 2009). By 2012, most donor countries involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan had developed their own national action plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, with various degrees of specification concerning external engagement in peacekeeping missions, development, and humanitarian aid. At the time

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of the adoption of the Afghanistan’s NAP 1325 in June 2015, however, NATO and the United Kingdom were the only international actors to have developed and made public a specific action plan with related indicators for their intervention in Afghanistan.4 The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), administered by the World Bank, which channels coordinated international financial support to the government of Afghanistan, developed a scorecard with gender-specific indicators to measure the performance of ARTF-funded projects and programs only as of 2016, as a response to pressure from Nordic+ countries and Canada (Martin and Parto 2017). Efforts for institutionalizing aspects of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan prior to 2015 had often washed up against a combination of lack of political will and coordination within the government of Afghanistan and lack of unanimity among international actors on the approach to gender mainstreaming. An illustrative example is the tense debate in 2014–15 between the Nordic+ countries, on the one hand, and the United States and the United Kingdom, on the other, over the incorporation of gender in the LOTFA. While the Nordic+ countries advocated for an integrated approach, including gender-sensitive training, strategies for recruitment of female officers, and community policing alongside salary provision, the US and the UK’s position was to separate recruitment from training and focus funding on the payment of salaries only. Another point of dispute among donor states was over the use of conditionality mechanisms as leverage to hold the Afghan government accountable to its commitments and institutionalize gender mainstreaming.5 Within the Afghan government, the extent to which commitments to the WPS agenda were translated into action depended on the degree of commitment to gender mainstreaming of personnel in charge of overseeing its implementation, and/or their ability to effect change at the ministerial level. Ministerial gender units, directly funded by international donors, were set up more as a necessary structure to satisfy donor requirements than as an institutional feature of ministries, all of which remained aloof to the operations of their respective gender units and focal points. In effect, gender units were never integrated and were continuously sidelined. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs, heavily reliant on international funding for its running costs and UN Women for its capacity needs, has never been in a position to lead or oversee government performance in meeting commitments to gender equality. An illustrative example is the ill-fated National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan 2008–18, which set unrealistic gender equality targets to please the international community that were never met (APPRO 2014).

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In the absence of an integrated approach by the international donors and the government of Afghanistan, any action related to gender mainstreaming demanded of or proposed by the government of Afghanistan has been tied to a demand for earmarked funds. These conditions led to delays when international donors did not immediately oblige to providing resources, usually on the grounds that a sufficiently convincing case had not been made by the government. The Karzai administration, pressured by international donors to make women’s rights and gender equity a national priority, displayed little political will to actively take on the gender mainstreaming agenda and go beyond formal declarations and symbolic measures. Engagements at nongovernment levels by international donors on gender equality and women’s rights issues have typically relied on a select number of local knowledge brokers on the situation of women in Afghanistan. This reliance is due mostly to severe limitations on the movement of internationals on the account of heightened insecurity. Diplomats, UN staff, and international staff of international NGOs have restricted mobility and limited contact with Afghan society in general and civil society in particular. Limited human resources and institutional capacity within field missions constitutes an additional obstacle. In general, the old adage about the personnel in diplomatic missions in Afghanistan since 2008, with a few notable exceptions, is that the rapidly changing personnel teams at these missions consist of “start-up” diplomats and development professionals, and postretirement but experienced personnel who would like to have another “kick at the pot” prior to fully retiring. In the case of the very young personnel, the experience is missing. In the case of the postretirement personnel, again with some exceptions, the drive and commitment are missing. Further, gender focal points or specialists within diplomatic representations often have several mandates, combining gender with one on human rights and/or governance. High turnover at diplomatic missions, and the combination of the very young and very old personnel, limits the development of institutional memory and hampers the effectiveness of these missions. In effect, “consultations with civil society” rarely go beyond a roundtable discussion with an established network of Afghan women-led NGOs whose heads or representatives speak good English, have long-established access to international circles and funding, and are thus in a position to monopolize the discourse on gender.6 It is against this background of asymmetrical relations between the Afghan government and international and local development actors that debates on UNSCR 1325 emerged in the early 2010s, eventually resulting in the finalization and adoption of the National Action Plan for the

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Implementation of United Nations SCR 1325 (NAP 1325) in June 2015, which became, as of 2015, the main policy document according to which the gender mainstreaming agenda of the Afghan government would be shaped. The explicit commitment by the National Unity Government to further advance gender equality opened up a new opportunity to rethink and address gender mainstreaming in a more integrated and strategic manner.

Developing Afghanistan’s NAP 1325: “A Complex Jungle of Actors and Processes” Afghanistan’s NAP 1325 was adopted on 30 June 2015 following a long and painstaking process involving “a complex jungle of actors,” in the words of a senior UN staff representative.7 Since 2009, international donors and a select group of Afghan civil society organizations, spearheaded by the Afghan Women’s Network (AWN), had been engaged to support the development of an “Afghan-led” national action plan for implementing UNSCR 1325. With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the lead, the development of the plan was conducted in coordination among ministries, cabinet representatives, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), and the Afghan Women’s Network, with support from a technical advisory group from international organizations and diplomatic missions. Early on, the role of international development stakeholders was explicitly considered as crucial in supporting the implementation of NAP 1325, particularly in relation to Pillar 4 on Relief and Recovery. Similar to the case of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Israel outlined by Aharoni (2014), localization of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan was the result of a dynamic and multilayered process involving constant negotiation among a complex web of institutions and actors. In the case of Afghanistan’s NAP, however, international actors (donor states and international organizations) played a key role in interpreting UNSCR 1325 and framing the content of the Afghan NAP. The process was thus caught in an imbroglio of mixed signals from various stakeholders. The emphasis of the donors on the role of (and material support to) UN Women and civil society in supporting the women, peace, and security agenda generated confusion about what the role of the Afghan government was to be in the implementation of UNSCR 1325, and what the purpose of yet another plan [i.e., the failed National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan—see above) was.8 The appointment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the lead implementing agency for a plan that was to be exclusively focused

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on internal affairs in Afghanistan was both symptomatic of this confusion and illustrative of the extent to which the Ministry of Women’s Affairs had been sidelined in gender mainstreaming processes. The inefficient and confused manner in which Afghanistan’s NAP 1325 was developed and finalized raises questions as to whether the final product was simply mimetic of donor states’ own domestic implementation structures (most having their own Ministries of Foreign Affairs as the lead implementing agency) rather than on a contextualized approach clearly recognizing the fact that Afghanistan’s focus on gender equality has to look inward through domestic structures and policy processes rather than outward through foreign policy. A first draft of Afghanistan’s NAP 1325 was endorsed by the NAP 1325 steering committee in 2014 amid uncertainty concerning the results of the 2014 presidential elections and the appointment of the new government. Members of the steering committee immediately announced that Afghanistan now had a national action plan—before its approval by the cabinet—creating turmoil among international donor members of the technical advisory group who regarded the plan as inadequate and impossible to implement in its current state. An international expert was called in to revise and redesign the NAP in light of best international practices.9 A revised NAP 1325 was completed by an international consultant and formally adopted in June 2015. The objectives of NAP 1325, though consistent with the four pillars of UNSCR 1325, are based very much on the assumption of continued reconstruction programming in Afghanistan, considered as having transited out of conflict and having entered, from 2015 onward, its “Transformation Decade.” Crucially, these assumptions resulted in neglect, throughout the NAP, of conflict-related gender issues and gendered adverse effects of political violence. The document, for instance, does not mention processes of disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation. Despite these challenges, the adoption of the NAP 1325 and its endorsement by President Ghani generated optimism among national and international stakeholders and brought a much-needed impetus for targeted actions to address the vulnerabilities of women. The plan also provided a framework to monitor progress under the four pillars of UNSCR 1325, creating opportunities for civil society to advocate for change, call for the protection of gains made toward gender equality since 2001, and demand accountability from the state based on the legitimacy provided by NAP 1325. In the first two years following its adoption, the implementation of NAP 1325 continued to stumble against the modus operandi of relations between the government and international development actors institu-

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tionalized over the years. Instead of building linkages with existing ministerial provisions such as gender units, gender focal points, and gender policies, another set of parallel structures was created with the appointment by UN Women of “NAP 1325 Focal Points.” In practice, this implied that NAP 1325 was a standalone policy requiring additional and separate resources, and therefore additional budget, instead of revising existing processes to integrate NAP 1325 objectives and activities in the functioning of ministries and incorporating a gender-sensitive approach to existing plans and budgets. As a result, initial costing proposed by implementing ministries resembled more a “wish list” to demand additional funding from donors rather than a well-thought-through, integrated request for assistance in implementation, arguably the hardest part of any policy. The initial requests for funds to implement NAP 1325 included activities that overlapped with or duplicated ongoing women-centered programs (Parto, Raha, and Cesaretti 2018). The Ministry of Finance played a crucial role in realigning and streamlining funding requests by the various ministries. Funding proposals were assessed to establish whether the specific requests could be addressed through existing budgetary provisions or through additional funds earmarked for implementing NAP 1325. Civil society was consulted as a means to verify and prioritize implementation activities and identify areas relating to WPS covered under existing budgetary provisions, and thus not requiring additional funding. The Ministry of Finance also aligned each funding proposal with different laws, policies, and ministerial plans developed for women’s rights since 2001 (Parto, Raha, and Cesaretti 2018). The inevitable delays in costing processes and the disagreements that arose between donors and the government over funding NAP 1325 resulted in postponement of the government’s implementation plans and activities. The 2017 progress report issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA 2017) manages only to take stock of policies adopted to support gender equality, to quantify the headcount of female staff in government ministries, and to identify the number of individuals trained in Kabul and major regional urban centers. None of the indicators reviewed in the report are explicitly related to gendered effects of conflict and political violence. Areas of gender equality addressed in the report are essentially focused on previous areas addressed by the donor-led gender mainstreaming agenda: political participation of women, gender-based violence, and economic empowerment, with no explicit recognition of the ongoing conflict and its gendered effects. Progress reported outside of Kabul is particularly thin, and the Relief and Recovery pillar of NAP

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1325 neglected. Beyond the capital and large cities, local government representatives display limited understanding of what NAP 1325 entails in terms of practice, and sometimes they have no awareness of its existence (Parto, Pugh, and Sadaat 2018). To date, the inclusion and participation of women as mediators and/or negotiators in the Afghan peace process remains a blind spot of WPS interventions. The High Peace Council, where most efforts have been focused for the inclusion of women, has been sidelined in the peace negotiations that began in late 2018. Only with protestations from some international aid providers to Afghanistan and some civil society organizations in the aftermath of the Moscow talks in spring 2019 have steps been taken to include women in the ongoing talks—minimally and for the sole purpose of discussing women’s rights. In the meantime, the gap left in the interpretation and implementation of NAP 1325 has been, to a large extent, filled by nongovernmental organizations. Aside from bilateral and multilateral funding to government programs, the donor community has used multilateral funding to UN Women and direct grants to international NGOs and a small circle of well-introduced, English speaking, Kabul-based national civil society organizations (CSOs) to support gender-responsive programming under the framework of NAP 1325. The broad scope of UNSCR 1325, ranging from women’s participation in the political sphere to service delivery and humanitarian aid, provided grounds for both international and local NGOs to invest in the implementation of the NAP. Historically, international and national organizations have been at the forefront of public services delivery, due to the government’s limited reach and inability to deliver services, particularly in remote areas. NGOs have also been directly involved in local governance initiatives aimed at empowering communities to manage development programs at the local level, such as community development councils, and in structures aimed at protecting women from violence, such as women’s shelters, legal clinics, and health and psychosocial support units for female survivors of violence. In effect, almost all areas of intervention envisaged under NAP 1325 were managed by NGOs through grants from the international donor community. In practice, government actions and nongovernment programs to support NAP 1325 thus have tended to run parallel to each other rather than act as complementary components. Expecting that international development stakeholders and their national NGO counterparts would address indicators under the Relief and Recovery pillar as part of humanitarian aid, the government did not devise action related to this pillar despite the escalating conflict, increased internal displacement, forced returns, and the deterioration of economic conditions.

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INGO-NGO Relations and UNSCR 1325 As in other contexts, international organizations in Afghanistan serve as an interface between donors and local civil society, channeling international aid to national NGOs and other civil society organizations (Aldashev and Navarra 2018). Through the combined effect of the steady deterioration of security (limiting the donors’ ability to monitor programs), concerns about the accountability and transparency of local NGOs, and pressure for tangible results from the home constituencies of the donors, most international donors in Afghanistan have opted for disbursing their funds through multilateral agencies, INGOs, and private foreign contractors. More familiar to the donors, these entities are, rightly or wrongly, seen as having more internal capacity for responding to donors’ reporting requirements and are thus better suited for serving as intermediaries for donors to disburse funds and manage implementation (EEAS 2018). Donors’ preference to rely on international intermediaries for disbursement of funds has several implications. As the main intermediaries between donors and local implementing organizations, international organizations play a key role in the interpretation of normative frameworks shaping development interventions at the local level. Their interpretations, however, are shaped by relationships of interdependency between donors, international organizations, and local NGOs. The almost exclusive reliance of national NGOs on international organizations for funding, and that of international organizations on donors for financial support, results in an “upward model of accountability,” through which NGO choices and programs are shaped by rules and requirements set by the donors and no-less-isolated international intermediaries rather than by contextual needs assessment or sectoral expertise (Ebrahim 2003; Moore and Stewart 2000). To report to their constituencies, donors need visible, measurable, and preferably favorable results, in a relatively short period of time. In interviews carried out in 2015 as the Afghan NAP was being developed, two representatives of donor countries explained that, while they recognize that operationalizing UNSCR 1325 required changes in gender relations which could only happen over the long-term and sustained engagement, this was rarely the case due to pressure from their constituencies for tangible results.10 In practice, this pursuit of [favorable] results entails a higher focus on “functional accountability” to account for the use of resources and on short-term results against standardized outputs, number of deliverables and number of beneficiaries—rather than “strategic accountability” processes focused on longer-term outcomes and impact, institutional change and the wider operating environment (Ebrahim 2003).

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Competition between national and international NGOs and among all NGOs over funding exacerbates these dynamics, resulting in a riskaverse attitude of applicants for donor funding. Program designs that have proved useful in securing funding in the past are adapted rather than efforts to develop innovative or experimental approaches based on contextual analysis of needs—which typically would require additional time and resources, as well as risk-taking on the part of donors, to which most are averse. Relations between “leading” international NGOs and their local partners are more akin to donor-grantee relations than they are to those based on complementarity and equal partnership. Dependent on international organizations for financial resources, local NGOs are often under pressure to adapt to donor strategies, assimilate concepts and terms, and translate them into practice based on a predetermined framework (Ahmad 2006). Most tend to tread carefully and shy away from asking strategic questions or offering new innovative approaches that deviate from the guidelines set by the donors through INGOs. The net result of this asymmetrical relationship has been the consolidation of an aid-dependent group of NGOs disinterested in proposing alternatives, being focused instead on reporting success against inputs and outputs rather than questioning the adequateness of the activity parameters imposed by international organizations, identifying what worked and what did not, and why. All donors emphasize that “sustainability” should be addressed in project implementation reporting, but, in effect, the manner in which funding is allocated and managed, as described in the preceding paragraphs, disallows sustainability. Perhaps the most paradigmatic example of preference for “functional” rather than “strategic” accountability is the use by some donors of international private sector contractors engaged in the “development sector” as intermediaries for disbursement of funds. Motivated primarily by the profit generated through the implementation of large-scale development programs, private contractors focus almost exclusively on ensuring reporting against performance indicators on inputs and outputs. Local partners responsible for implementation are placed under high pressure to report against established templates, with little or no incentive to report on outcomes, impact or sustainability. The bulk of the funding is disbursed to cover management costs of private contractors, security infrastructure, and inflated salaries of international staff—with only a fraction of program funds invested in actual implementation. An example of such programs is PROMOTE, a large, women-centered program that coincided with Afghanistan’s NAP 1325 of 2015 and was funded by USAID, costing $216 million over five years to “promote gender equity” by capitalizing on previous investment in education for Af-

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ghan women and girls. The program’s goal was to improve the status of more than seventy-five thousand young women in all levels of society. In 2014, the USAID Mission for Afghanistan (USAID/Afghanistan) awarded three indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts to private US-based enterprises (Chemonics International Inc., Tetra Tech ARD, and Development Alternatives Inc.) to implement PROMOTE. Although challenged on a number of occasions by civil society actors as to why PROMOTE had no provisions to link its activities to NAP 1325, the three contractors carried out their activities without reference to NAP 1325 while providing impeccable accounting and reporting to USAID/Afghanistan. Revealing of the lack of focus on impact and sustainability is the fact that no baseline was carried out at the onset of the program, limiting the ability of the implementers to gather evidence of short- or longer-term impact of activities. Potential negative impacts of programming were also ignored (SIGAR 2018).11 The implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions through nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan is another case in point. Gender has been on the agenda of most NGOs—national and international—throughout the reconstruction period, but UNSCR 1325 emerged as a framework for development intervention only as Afghanistan’s NAP was being developed and as international donors were incorporating the resolution in their own strategies for development aid. This coincided with the decision by many international donors to reorient their funding after 2014, with a preference for multilateral funding through trust funds such as the ARTF, and multilateral agencies such as UN Women. The decrease in funding available for development programs implemented through bilateral grants to NGOs exacerbated competition between national and international NGOs over funding. The implicit assumption that international organizations are better equipped than national NGOs to produce standardized outputs and adequate systems for financial and administrative reporting meant that funding was directed primarily at international NGOs. Partnerships with local NGOs were (and continue to be) encouraged as a means to strengthen local civil society, but, in cases where these take place, the main responsibility of reporting and accounting for resources and outputs to donors rests with the international NGO as the lead organization—which is also responsible for program design, while the bulk of on-the-ground activities such as training, research, and advocacy is done by local NGOs. International organizations are, therefore, in an uncontestable position to define, redefine, and disaggregate the whole system approach inherent in UNSCR 1325.

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Two types of approaches toward implementing UNSCR 1325 have emerged since the release of Afghanistan’s NAP 1325 in 2015. The first approach consists of aligning ongoing gender-focused programs with at least one of the four pillars of UNSCR 1325 but continuing implementation very much as before the release of NAP 1325. This approach includes programs to support survivors of gender-based violence, education for women and girls, economic empowerment programs focused on women, and the inclusion of women in local governance processes. The second approach entails the development of new programs explicitly focused on supporting the implementation of NAP 1325 provisions, with components including capacity building for local civil society to monitor the implementation of NAP 1325 and/or the engagement of subnational government stakeholders through technical support. In the first approach, the reference to UNSCR 1325 as a normative framework does not induce significant changes in how gender had been addressed in development programs in Afghanistan. The advent of Afghanistan’s NAP 1325 has not triggered new reflections on how to address gender in conflict, nor has it allowed for taking stock of outcomes, positive and negative, of earlier programming in gender mainstreaming. In the second approach, a lingering, operational challenge rests in the confusion surrounding the process of gender mainstreaming among international development actors and local civil society (Abirafeh 2005; Kandiyoti 2005; Woodsworth 2008; AREU 2013). Concepts of gender and gender mainstreaming, quickly translated into Dari and Pashto, remain largely aloof even to those charged with the responsibility of operationalizing them in programs and projects. Gender mainstreaming in Afghanistan has been consistently equated with promoting and protecting women’s rights. Though acknowledged in recent rhetoric, the inclusion of men and boys in gender programming remains minimal or formulated through a quasi-exclusive focus on community and religious leaders to back women-centered programming. This second approach has been described as “women highlighting” at the expense of a broader, gendersensitive approach that would take into account the complexities of gendered power relations (Abirafeh 2005). Program design and implementation in Afghanistan is based on predefined ideas about gender roles and relations. Typical examples include the adaptation of programs to the Afghan context that have “worked” in other settings or the uniform implementation of a program across different provinces without adaptations to local institutional, geographical, and cultural realities. Interpretations of gender as women-focused programming, embedded in representations of “Afghan” or “rural” women

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as homogeneous groups facing similar challenges and opportunities regardless of specific, local realities of gendered power relations, are continually reproduced. An added flaw in international organizations’ overgeneralized approach to women highlighting is the almost exclusive reliance on a group of educated, English-speaking, and urbanized women who present themselves as the unified voice of all Afghan women and who see little or no need to base arguments on reliable and current evidence. Little attention has been paid to the multiple, varying, and evolving nature of gender roles and relations across the geographical, institutional, and social settings of Afghanistan. In an environment where violence is pervasive and affects all strata of society, the often exclusive focus by international donors on women is also not easily understood or accepted and, in many cases, is resented by the traditionally more conservative. A case in point is UN Women’s “Localization of NAP 1325” program in Afghanistan. This program is implemented as workshops for government “NAP 1325 Focal Points,” conducted by international experts in regional centers of Afghanistan and focused on the technicalities of implementing NAP 1325. In a fashion similar to how gender mainstreaming has been operationalized throughout the reconstruction period, international experts are expected to produce insights on how to implement policy based on examples from other contexts. While the examples may be rich and practical, they are provided to the trainees on the assumption that all trainees have basic knowledge of the policy process and are sufficiently empowered within their ministries to act on the learning acquired through participating in these workshops. Further, there has always been a lingering problem with training delivered by international experts who do not speak at least one of the local languages—much of the meaning in the training content is lost in translation or goes over the heads of the participants, who are less likely to ask questions through an interpreter than speak directly to the instructor. Another example is capacity building of local civil society to monitor implementation of NAP 1325 by international NGOs in partnership with national NGOs. Aspects of NAP 1325 are selected as the focus of intervention, and implementation is carried out through training of local civil society organizations, women’s groups, and community representatives on aspects or the content of NAP 1325 and tools to monitor its implementation. The focus on specific aspects or isolated pillars of NAP 1325 ignore the interconnectivity of UNSCR 1325 pillars as inseparable parts of an integrated, whole-system approach. Arguably, women’s participation in elections under the Participation pillar or gender equality in access to aid distribution services under the Relief and Recovery pillar cannot be

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disconnected from prevention of, and protection from, different forms of gender-based violence. Further, the more difficult aspects of UNSCR 1325 related to defense and security, or demobilization, are typically left untouched. A striking feature of the examples of interventions to support UNSCR 1325 mentioned above is the continuity in frameworks for implementing the gender mainstreaming agenda before and after the security transition of 2014 and the release of NAP 1325. Despite questions and criticisms from multiple sources of previous models of gender mainstreaming and programming in Afghanistan (Abirafeh 2005; Woodsworth 2008; Kandiyoti 2005, 2009; APPRO 2013; Billaud 2015), these models have remained largely unchanged. The establishment of new and sometimes duplicative structures, such as gender focal points and NAP 1325 focal points at various ministries and provision of trainings by international experts, remain the main tools for mainstreaming gender in state institutions. The intractable conflict situation or the advent of Afghanistan’s NAP 1325 do not seem to have been fully acknowledged as key factors to inform design or implementation of gender mainstreaming programs. Women-centered programs, conducted previously or imported from other contexts, continue to be repackaged through adding reference of their contributions to specific objectives of NAP 1325.

Contingencies of Development Work in Conflict The practical realities of the operationalization of programs by international organizations (INGOs and UN agencies alike) in an increasingly volatile security situation have significant bearings on processes used to manage programs, and hence their implementation. Security restrictions limit the mobility of the vast majority of expatriate staff of international organizations, confining them to their secure compounds and thus severing contact with local stakeholders and eliminating opportunities for contextual understanding of the multifaceted realities of program implementation. High turnover of expatriate staff due to restrictive living conditions adversely affects institutional memory and thus the ability to draw lessons learned from past interventions. The physically isolated and frequently rotated internationals bear the bulk of decision-making responsibility within these organizations. The turnover of senior expatriate staff forces new staff to adapt quickly and maintain the flow of program activity, inevitably shifting attention from strategic and context-related approaches to the technicalities of activity management and performance, and no longer focusing on the

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longer-term outcomes and risks of program implementation or questioning the underlying assumptions of implementation frameworks in light of a rapidly changing context. In relation to NAP 1325, the result is a paradoxical situation in which conflict is acknowledged as drastically affecting all operations and everyday experiences of international development workers, yet it is often overlooked in the conceptualization of approaches to gender programming. Contextual aspects of the gendered implications of decades of conflict, for instance, are seldom reflected in programming in relation to NAP 1325.

Implications The complex network of interdependency in which international donors, the Afghan government, international NGOs, multinational agencies, private sector contractors, and local NGOs are embedded is poorly understood or discussed. In a development framework, networks bringing together state and nonstate actors have been defined elsewhere as coalitions formed and sustained by resource dependencies between members that share a common system of meanings or a shared vocabulary, and which regularly interact and constantly negotiate and renegotiate their position vis-à-vis one another (Ohanyan 2012; DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015). NGOs (and notably transnational and international organizations) play a “bridging” role between different actors in development by sustaining links and relationships with donor states, multinational agencies and organizations, and national governments in countries of intervention, as well as domestic NGOs, local-level governance structures, and communities (Ohanyan 2012). In the case of Afghanistan, one type of bridging mechanism arguably dominates the patterns of interactions between development actors: “regulative bridging.”12 Regulative bridging takes place when relations between donors and NGOs are based on already tested and established capacities of NGOs to meet the regulatory and administrative demands of donors in program or project implementation. Donors choose to privilege relations with organizations with which they have a track record of working and which are familiar with their reporting requirements. International NGOs in Afghanistan have been particularly successful in capitalizing on donor needs for standardized mechanisms of accountability. Delegating most of the on-the-ground activities to local partners, international NGOs can strive to satisfy the need of their donors for administrative predictability. In practice, this division of tasks between international NGOs and local implementing partners places pressure on the local partners to generate all manner of administrative information

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to satisfy donor reporting requirements at the expense of programming content and impact. This type of bridging is the product of not only resource endowment and the position of organizations within a network but also conjuncture and the contingency of everyday interactions between network members. In a conflict environment, security concerns are translated by international actors into internal measures in terms of human resource management (short-term missions with regular rotation of staff) and logistic considerations (highly secured compounds walled off from the rest of the city, restrictions in mobility within and outside the capital). This, in turn, conditions the patterns of interaction among members of development networks. In this sense, “battles over meaning” associated with a given norm— in this case, UNSCR 1325—take place at the intersection of networks of power, in which the government, donor states, international organizations, and local NGOs are enmeshed; paradigmatic frameworks in which these networks operate (the “reconstruction agenda”); and contingencies of operationalization of aid and development. While the adoption of NAP 1325 in the immediate aftermath of the security transition could have provided a useful framework to rethink intersections of policy process, development, gender, and conflict, “business continued as usual” under the implicit assumption that Afghanistan was a postconflict environment when it had, in fact, never fully transitioned out of conflict. In effect, NAP 1325 has become a legitimizing rhetorical device rather than an opportunity to rethink approaches to gender mainstreaming and protection of women and their rights in conflict environments. Tellingly, the relationship between donors, international NGOs, local NGOs, and Afghan civil society has not improved much since 2001.

Conclusions Conjunctural aspects of processes of interactions between development stakeholders and the circumstances under which such processes take place shed light on how the translation and implementation of normative frameworks both inform and are affected by contingencies in the operating environment. The translation of UNSCR 1325 cannot be understood outside the paradigms of reconstruction and state building, on the one hand, and the multiple dynamics of interactions between national and international stakeholders on the other. In the conflict environment of Afghanistan, the implementation of NAP 1325 cannot be dissociated from political instability, insecurity, and uncertainty about the future—recently

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all exacerbated by the pandemic conditions of COVID-19—and the repercussions of these uncontrollable factors on the dynamics of interactions between stakeholders. Undeniably, women-centered programming in Afghanistan, despite its many flaws, has resulted in significant mainstreaming of women in society, particularly in urban centers. The adoption of Afghanistan’s NAP 1325 was expected by many to be a crucial tool to transition from a patchwork of women-centered programs to an integrated approach to gender mainstreaming. In many ways, though, Afghanistan’s NAP 1325 represents another missed opportunity to rethink how gender should be addressed based on the lessons from the earlier years of the post-2001 period and in light of the deteriorating security conditions across the country. Mechanisms of program management within international organizations were adapted to accommodate the continuous deterioration of security, but there has been little evidence of attempts to reorient tools or set new objectives of gender programming in response to the changed conditions or as a response to the new requirements of NAP 1325. In the battles over meaning that followed the adoption of NAP 1325, the strategic orientations of donors and their perceptions of priorities in terms of gender relations in the Afghan context played a key role in interpreting the norms and framing the content of Afghanistan’s national action plan. The application of these interpretations, however, was conditioned by the modalities of interactions between the Afghan government, intermediaries of donor funding, and its ultimate beneficiaries: the women of Afghanistan from different ethnic and religious backgrounds in cities and remote villages. The implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan requires a rethinking of modalities of interactions between the various stakeholders at multiple levels. This needs to be done at the political level of dialogue between international decision makers. Rethinking is also needed at the policy level—assessing how different actors involved in developing, implementing, and monitoring implementation of NAP 1325–related policy frameworks can effectively support the women, peace, and security agenda. Finally, a new approach by international donors may be helpful at the practical level of modes of interactions between development stakeholders, in order to move beyond asymmetrical relations focused on outputs toward impact-oriented, contextualized interventions based on integrated partnerships between international and national stakeholders in development. Most importantly, it is crucial to move away from a postconflict, reconstruction framework and recognize the impact of the ongoing conflict on these interactions.

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Lucile Martin is a PhD candidate and a member of the Conflict Research Group of the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences at Ghent University, Belgium. Her research focuses on how cultural transfers through return migration affect perspectives on gender in urban Afghanistan. She has over ten years of experience in applied research focusing on migration, governance, and policy analysis in conflict environments, with a focus on gender. Based in Kabul, Afghanistan, since 2012, she currently works as a research program manager with the Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO). Saeed Parto is cofounder and director of research at the Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO). He has over twenty-five years of experience in academic and consultancy work and holds a PhD in human geography from the University of Waterloo (Canada), specializing in policy analysis. He has carried out academic and applied research, published, and lectured extensively on policy and institutional analysis to an audience that has included undergraduate and graduate students, operations laypersons, NGOs, donor organizations, and private- and public-sector decision makers.

NOTES 1. Interviews were carried out as part of research and monitoring conducted by Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO), including SIDAfunded NAP 1325 Monitor, and research for the EU Roadmap for Engagement of Civil Society in Afghanistan (2018). 2. Windhoek Declaration: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/windhoek_ declaration.pdf. 3. Interview with two multilateral agency representatives, Kabul, January 2015. 4. The national action plan of the Netherlands for 2012–15 mentioned Afghanistan as a priority area of intervention. By 2017, Norway and Sweden also included Afghanistan as a geographical area of focus as part of their national action plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. However, no countrylevel strategy was made public by any of these countries. 5. Interviews with diplomats and international organizations’ representatives, Kabul, January 2015. 6. Confirmed in interviews with three representatives of diplomatic missions and two senior staff of multilateral agencies, Kabul, January 2015. 7. Interview, Kabul, January 2015. 8. Ibid. 9. Interview with an international expert, Kabul, January 2015.

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10. Interview with two donor country representatives, Kabul, January 2015. 11. For a critique on the failures of PROMOTE, see the Audit Report of the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR): https:// www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-18-69-AR.pdf. 12. For a typology of bridging mechanisms, see Ohanyan (2012).

REFERENCES Abirafeh, Lina. 2005. “Lessons from Gender-Focused International Aid in Postconflict Afghanistan … Learned?” Gender in International Cooperation 7. Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Aharoni, Sarai B. 2014. “Internal Variation in Norm Localization: Implementing Security Council Resolution 1325 in Israel.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 21(1): 1–25. Ahmad, Mokbul M. 2006. “The ‘Partnership’ Between International NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations) and Local NGOs in Bangladesh.” Journal of International Development 18(5): 629–38. Aldashev, Gani, and Cecilia Navarra. 2018. “Development NGOs: Basic Facts.” Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 89(1): 125–55. APPRO. 2014. “Implementation of the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan: An Assessment.” Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization. Retrieved 9 August 2019 from http://appro.org.af/publications/a-criticalassessment-of-napwa/. AREU. 2013. “Women’s Rights, Gender Equality, and Transition: Security Gains, Moving Forward.” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Retrieved 12 August 2019 from https://areu.org.af/publication/1308/. Billaud, Julie. 2015. Kabul Carnival: Gender Politics in Postwar Afghanistan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. DeMars, William E., and Dennis Dijkzeul, eds. 2015. The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory. London: Routledge. Ebrahim, Alnoor. 2003. “Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs.” World Development 31(5): 813–29. EEAS. 2011: “Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade. Conference Conclusions.” The International Afghanistan Conference, Bonn, 5 December 2011. Retrieved 8 August 2019 from http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/afghanistan/docs/2011_11_conclusions_ bonn_en.pdf. ———. 2018. “EU Country Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Afghanistan 2018–2020.” European Union External Action Service. Retrieved 8 August 2019 from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/cso_roadmap_20182020_final.pdf. Farhoumand-Sims, Cheshmak. 2009. “CEDAW and Afghanistan.” Journal of International Women’s Studies 11(1): 136–56.

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Government of Afghanistan. 2004. The Constitution of Afghanistan. Retrieved 4 August 2019 from http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/The Constitution.pdf. Gumru, F. Belgin, and Jan M. Fritz. 2009. “Women, Peace and Security; An Analysis of the National Action Plans Developed in Response to UN Security Council Resolution 1325.” Societies without Borders 4(2): 209–25. Joachim, Jutta, and Andrea Schneiker. 2012. “Changing Discourses, Changing Practices? Gender Mainstreaming and Security.” Comparative European Politics 10(5): 428–563. Kandiyoti, Deniz. 2005. “The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan.” Occasional Paper 4. United National Research Institute for Social Development. ———. 2009: “The Lures and Perils of Gender Activism in Afghanistan: The Anthony Hyman Memorial Lecture.” School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Martin, Lucile, and Saeed Parto. 2017: “Gender Programming in Afghanistan: Critical Review of NAP 1325 Policies.” Kabul: Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organizations (APPRO). MOFA. 2017. 2017 Status Report on the Afghanistan National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 (Women, Peace and Security). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Retrieved 2 August 2019 from https:// www.mfa.gov.af/reports-and-documents/2017-status-report-on-the-afghani stan-s-national-action-plan-on-unscr-1325-women-peace-and-security.html. Moore, Mick, and Sheelagh Stewart. 2000. “Corporate Governance for NGOs?” In Development, NGOs, and Civil Society, edited by Deborah Eade, 80–90. Oxford: Oxfam. Ohanyan, Anna. 2012. “Network Institutionalism and NGO Studies.” International Studies Perspectives 13(4): 366–89. Parto, Saeed, Sarah Pugh and Ehsan Saadat 2018. NAP 1325 Monitor Cycle 4: January–April 2018. Project Report, Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization. Retrieved 8 August 2019 from http://appro.org.af/wp-content/ uploads/2018/07/2018-07-15-NAP-1325-Monitor-Cycle-4.pdf. Parto, Saeed, Hasan Raha, and Laura Cesaretti. 2018. Afghanistan’s NAP 1325 (2015–2018): A Critical Assessment. Assessment Report, Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization. Retrieved 8 August 2019 from http://appro.org .af/publications/afghanistans-nap-1325-2015-2018-a-critical-assessment. SIGAR. 2018. Promoting Gender Equity in National Priority Programs (Promote): USAID Needs to Assess This $216 Million Program’s Achievements and the Afghan Government’s Ability to Sustain Them. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 18-69 Audit Report, Retrieved 12 August 2019 from https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-18-69-AR.pdf. Wordsworth, Anna. 2008. “Moving to the Mainstream: Integrating Gender in Afghanistan’s National Policy.” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Retrieved 12 August 2019 from https://areu.org.af/publication/803/.

part i v

 Conclusions

The setup of this book has gone from decision-making, first strategically and externally oriented and then more internally oriented, to action at the field level. In the final part of our book, we will evaluate the pathologies and therapies from the preceding chapters in light of their possible contribution to a theory, or at least a conceptualization, of IOs that helps to understand their functioning better. Are there some characteristics that they all share? They are increasingly functioning in networks. In some ways, the United Nations has become a network of networks. Many IOs also struggle with North-South tensions, the consequences of the antiinternationalism of populism, and the strains of a multipolar world. This brings us back to the questions of how autonomous IOs and states actually are and whether we can improve the functioning of IOs. Are there therapies for the diseases?

 c ha p te r 1 1

Therapies and Conclusions Toward a Better Understanding of the Management of International Organizations Dennis Dijkzeul, Yves Beigbeder, and Dirk Salomons

Introduction Searching for the answer to the question “Why is it that the high-minded decisions and normative ideals for IOs so often lead to mediocre or counterproductive results?” the contributors to this book have highlighted both pathologies and therapies of IOs. They have accordingly assembled a broad array of relevant empirical examples of the functioning and impact of IOs. This chapter takes the analysis of the authors a step further. It asks whether a theory or model that explains the behavior of IOs is possible. In order to develop such a model, the changing assumptions in the study of IOs as noted in the introduction serve as a starting point.

Pathologies and Therapies of International Organizations The general perception of IOs comprises cycles of high hopes and bitter disillusionment. Many parties—the press, the public, member states, and scholars—are highly critical. The main complaint is that expectations are not being fulfilled. The ideals and normative goals of these organizations in fact often fail to translate into fruitful action. That this so often happens suggests a systemic problem: goals and ideals are too far from the results of implementation and evaluation. Does this point to problems of organizational design? The answer, we believe, is yes. However, systemic design problems cannot be resolved easily. In

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particular, sometimes major and sometimes minor parts of the UN system seem moribund; yet death is always delayed indefinitely, and resuscitation is avoided. From critical observers, NGOs have generally received a more positive press, but they also increasingly arouse strong doubts. Nevertheless, the academic study of IOs seldom proposes therapies for the pathologies that lead to disillusionment. As noted in the introduction, the four main ontological assumptions about IOs have changed: 1. IOs are not epiphenomenal to states but have a degree of autonomy, which may differ over time; 2. States and IOs are not unitary actors with given preferences but can be disaggregated; 3. Anarchy as a structural explanatory concept at the international level does not suffice but can be replaced by attention to the interaction between networked actors at the international and national levels; 4. IOs are generally set up for a functional issue area, such as health or food, but the most interesting politics take place at the edges of such issue areas or among them. Human rights, gender, the environment, development cooperation, and humanitarian action are often studied separately, but in practice they cut across various issue areas, functional and conceptual. As stated, these changing assumptions mean that a vertical hierarchical perspective linking donor governments via either receiving governments, the United Nations, or international NGOs to local NGOs or local administrations, and finally to people on the ground, has become less useful. It is being replaced by the study of more diverse networked (also horizontal and diagonal) relationships among many more actors. Similarly, the assumptions of (1) dominant states; (2) unitary actors; (3) a focus on the international level; and (4) separate, siloed issue areas all give the impression that actors and issues are self-contained and have clear boundaries. Consequently, the interaction among them—except for the vertical top-down perspective—has barely received attention. Instrumentalization in a multiactor context and the concomitant politics of IOs have thus also received scant attention, so that our understanding of how IOs function is still limited. As a result, we lack a theory that explains the ongoing cooperation, conflict, and competition among IOs, governments, and other actors.

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By combining empirical material with analysis based on different disciplines, the authors in this book have closely examined these issues. Some common themes have emerged that simultaneously show pathologies and promising therapies. The chapters on financing the UN, diplomacy, and sustainable human development (SHD) emphasize the influence of governments on IOs, yet these organizations are also perceived as actors in their own right. The chapters on UN personnel policies and fraud and corruption show how organizational strategy and policy—and concomitant implementation—are only slowly changing. Improvement is slow, hampered by multipolarity and North-South tensions, populism, old organizational habits and procedures, and governments’ reluctance to take responsibility for the better functioning of these organizations. The chapters on program management, human rights, networked diplomacy, democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and gender in Afghanistan show that IOs also have a hard time working at the field level. In terms of implementation, IOs are generally outsiders that need to keep an eye on their donors’ procedures and demands and often are out of touch with local needs and capacities. As a result, they sometimes conceptualize and evaluate their activities badly. The organizations often need to improve their management instruments. Several chapters suggest public administration and private enterprise tools, yet applying these tools is not easy. While the chapters illustrate many of the problems that IOs confront along a wide swath of challenges, yet more topics, as diverse as trade relations, coordination, and even pit latrines, could have received attention. This abundance results mainly from the growing role of IOs since the end of World War II. During the late 1940s and the 1950s, IOs concentrated on negotiating international rules and standards while functioning as clearinghouses and forums for information exchange and debate through their intergovernmental machinery. Several UN specialized agencies served mainly as expert centers for policy research and development. Hence, they functioned as instruments controlled by the member states. Decolonization and its aftermath provided a powerful impetus for taking on operational work, so that more IOs have become active in relief and development. In essence, they supported the new, nominally sovereign states in their efforts to achieve fuller political and social-economic independence, as well as stability. By taking on operational work, UN organizations increasingly became actors in their own right, in addition to their traditional role as intergovernmental instruments. Over the years, the growing operational work has posed a dilemma to IOs. On the one hand, it has allowed them to grow and gain global influence. Supporters of IOs have viewed policy work and building expertise

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as insufficiently practical by themselves. On the other hand, operational work also entails a pact with the devil: these organizations supposedly can pick up the pieces in either ill-functioning states where individual governments neither want nor dare to tread or with international issues that individual governments cannot address alone. As a result, they are often active in places and on issues that are either economically or geostrategically marginalized and/or politicized. Working successfully under these conditions is extremely hard, and as Aviles and Lasker have shown, it has become more difficult over the years. UN organizations are not provided with the resources to be successful. NGOs may pick up some of the slack, but they also often lack critical mass and compete among themselves for donor funding, blocking cooperation. With the declining belief in the welfare state and the merits of government intervention from the 1970s on, NGOs became much stronger in structure and in initiating action, and they became more numerous. They were also presumed to be more flexible operationally than IGOs, especially those of the UN system. In addition, the precarious financial position of the UN system did not leave much space for improving its functioning. This partly explains the rise of NGOs; they could grow and take on tasks, while the UN could not escape its difficult financial position. Yet many of the most active NGOs have also become financially more dependent on donor-government contributions while taking on extremely difficult, complex, long-term operational work in areas such as relief, rebuilding, human rights, and development. In the end, they also gain and suffer simultaneously from the combination of political and governmental neglect. They gain because their role is to carry out work that states either cannot do or do not want to do on their own. They suffer because they get insufficient international support, be it financial or political. As a result, NGOs are—often simultaneously—cooperating partners and competitors of UN organizations. In some regions, IOs have even taken over or replaced central or local government tasks. This has increased their responsibility, and, as events in Rwanda, Somalia, and Afghanistan showed, failures can have a horrendous impact on the survival and livelihoods of local people. As a result, IOs function in political quagmires at both the international and national levels. In particular, humanitarianism will “always be as much an emblem of political failure as it is an expression of human decency” (Rieff 1999: 39).1 Other situations may be less extreme, but the organizations often face similar conditions of political failure and governmental neglect. Lack of consensus among governments on international policy intensifies the predicament of IOs. In addition, many governments and other actors will not look at IOs as simple self-contained actors. They will perceive them

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and their activities instrumentally as either threats to suppress or opportunities to capture. This situation is not likely to change. Forms of globalization (migration, transport, trade, telecommunication, and tourism, but also pandemics, crime, and arms trade as well as climate change) influence or affect more people at different places simultaneously. Some observers advocate giving IOs a broader role in global governance. The shift from the emphasis on sovereignty to universal human rights, and a concomitant emphasis on social and economic rights, mirrors the broadening of peacekeeping that took place in the 1990s. Traditional peacekeeping, which essentially meant placing Blue Helmets between warring factions—generally, two states—after a cessation of fighting while peace negotiations intensified, has increasingly been replaced by “second-generation” peacekeeping operations. These peacekeeping operations work in ongoing, usually civil conflicts with the explicit aim of fostering rebuilding and restarting development. And when regional organizations such as the African Union get into the game, that is called “third-generation” peacekeeping. Yet human rights, peace, and development often remain lofty ideals that are insufficiently realized at ground level. IOs are thus caught in a double bind of increasingly ambitious agendas and insufficient support in a challenging multiactor environment. This results in pathologies and simultaneous therapies that can better be understood by examining the design of IOs.

The Origin of International Organizations: The Myth of Self-Contained Actors In essence, IOs are based on a simple premise: states and many of their problems are interdependent—linked across many issue areas. In this section, an ideal-typical lens is trained on the concepts underlying this interdependence. These determine the design or setup of the international system and, as a corollary, of the IOs in it. Schematically, the origins and necessity of this interdependence lie in the multilevel processes of societal differentiation and integration that characterize many societies and have become especially dominant since the Industrial Revolution. For IOs, these processes take place in five related ways, namely: 1. division of peoples and territories into states with governments and, in principle, territorial integrity and political independence; 2. functional differentiation among organizations (mandates, demarcating functional sectors/issue areas);

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3. division of labor among organizations, organizational units, and employees; 4. separation of decision-making and policymaking from execution/ implementation; 5. division between private and public spheres and actors. Functional differentiation generally offers the economic benefits of specialization. As early as 1776, Adam Smith (1986: 109) described these benefits in his famous pin factory example. Through specialization, actors can achieve a higher combined output than by working alone. In principle, the actors also possess more knowledge and control over localized and specialized tasks. The negative sides of differentiation comprise long chains of decision-making and action that create such problems as overly complicated manufacturing or policy processes, alienation of workers, and a lack of contact with citizens, customers, or beneficiaries. Differentiation also requires control, which is achieved through the design of self-contained tasks. The basic assumption is that by specializing and localizing tasks, actors—either as a subunit or individually—gain greater autonomy to carry out that task without interference by another actor. Autonomy would be complete if these tasks did not require any inputs or other forms of cooperation from other actors. In such an extreme situation, there is no reason to interfere in each other’s business: you take care of yours, I take care of mine. Independence and noninterference are thus based on the design principle of self-contained tasks. Normally, however, tasks are almost never completely self-contained. Autonomy is thus always limited. For example, in manufacturing, one task leads to another: one person makes perfect pinheads, another puts these heads together with other components, yet another person packs the pins, and so on. In this way, limited autonomy combines with interdependence.2 Moreover, even the manufacturing process itself is embedded in broader systems. The pin manufacturing process, for example, presumes administrative control systems, be they traditional hierarchy, or budgeting, or, nowadays, total quality management. As a consequence, the assumption of autonomy always breaks down in three related ways, which reflect the shortcomings of self-containment: 1. Some tasks need integration because the actor or unit cannot solve common problems—for example, cross-departmental or cross-border ones—alone. 2. The unit or actor breaks down. This always brings up the question as to who is then responsible and who should intercede.

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3. Another unit or actor does not respect the autonomy of other actors to pursue their own interests. Most studies in IR and management do not sufficiently recognize the manifold actors and their overt or hidden agendas, and how these impact the outcomes of IOs at the national and international levels. With the first issue, most actors can still get away with some mutual adjustment and joint decision-making. Yet over time, most actors and their units develop their own interests, which can hamper integration. In general, the second issue is very complicated, because when an actor breaks down, outside actors need to step in and cooperate to address the consequences of this breakdown. The third issue spells either competition or conflict. In sum, the processes of differentiation separate the actors from each other, yet they generally remain to some extent dependent on each other. Autonomy and noninterference reduce interdependence by trying to limit interaction, but this relates to the conceptual design of self-containment, not to operational reality. Hence, the process of differentiation needs, in addition to autonomy, forms of integration. Through differentiation and integration, however, different actors also develop different interests and perceptions. At times, this can foster cooperation; at other times, it can lead to competition or conflict.3 In addition, even in this ideal-typical world there is always the problem of dealing with the malfunctioning or breakdown of other actors and units.

The Limits of Self-Containment Looking at the first form of differentiation from an ideal-typical design perspective, the state can be seen as an attempt to reduce interdependence by creating self-contained, autonomous systems. The kernel of this idea was already expressed during the wars of the Reformation with the principle cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion), in the hope that the rulers would stop interfering in each other’s realm so that the wars of religion could end. More generally, states should concentrate on solving their problems internally and refrain from interfering in each other’s business. The constituencies of these states build up their political, economic, social, and cultural systems, and they formulate foreign policy. Along this line, as long as states respect each other’s sovereignty, including territorial integrity and political independence, the international system will not run into problems. Discussing development discourse about Lesotho, Ferguson (1994: 64) refers to the principle of governmentality: “‘Development’ discourse does not usually assume that the government has absolute and total control, of course, but it does systematically tend

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to produce analyses which suggest that that which is under state control is determinant, while that which lies beyond its control is secondary.” In IR, neorealism and neoliberalism also tended to develop similar analyses. More generally, theories that consider states as unitary actors with given preferences tend to develop such analyses. The principle of governmentality results from a focus on self-contained tasks, so that states and IOs were assumed to have clear boundaries. And indeed, when such containment shows its shortcomings, states institutionalize issues of the environment, development, economics, and cultural ties—as well as migration and other cross-border activities— through setting up IOs, varying from the Rhine Commission to the World Trade Organization (WTO). To a large extent, these issues can be dealt with through the decisions and norm setting of the intergovernmental machinery. But when there is a breakdown affecting the polity—for example, a Yemen in conflict or economic underdevelopment—other actors have to step in. In any case, for many developing states, sovereign autonomy is more a design principle than a reality. Sovereignty never describes the actuality; striving for self-containment would be a more apt description.4 It is ironic that for such a long time sovereignty was considered sacrosanct and IR analysis took IOs as peripheral to states, because states and IOs ultimately result from the same process of differentiation and concomitant efforts at integration, in particular to solve international collective action problems. The second form of differentiation from an ideal-typical design perspective into organizations also leads to incomplete autonomy and interdependence. In principle, an organization focuses on a few tasks for which it can become self-contained. Public organizations traditionally focus on one (or only a few) functional areas. Private organizations generally focus on their “core” businesses. Yet even as officially independent legal entities, organizations need to exchange goods and services to survive. In this way, the tasks of an organization are never fully selfcontained; as a consequence, the organization is always embedded in a broader network of competing and cooperating organizations and other actors. Functional organizations that focus on one issue area, such as food or labor, particularly encounter challenges with multifunctional—in other words, multidisciplinary—issues. The third form of differentiation, as subunits within organizations, implies that while different departments, divisions, or strategic business units may be good at their core tasks, they always need cooperation, if not integration, with other parts of the organization. Studies that disaggregate IOs into their subunits may reveal tensions within an IO. Meeting this need for integration becomes the task of the organizational manage-

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ment, by means of, for example, setting a strategy. Within organizations, different forms of hierarchy and networked relations, such as teams, will be established to link self-contained subunits. Fourth, differentiating decision-making and policymaking from implementation sharply profiles the limits of autonomy. Rare is the situation in which decision-making or policy processes are self-contained tasks separated from their implementation. It may be designed this way, particularly when IOs are considered to function as forums for debate and setting international policy, but such design assumes stable, predictable environments. In more rapidly changing environments, these processes require feedback and reaction from each other. Finally, the last form of differentiation between public and private has contributed to analyses in which private actors focus more on their own interests and competition and public ones concentrate on (norm-based) cooperation and the public good. NGOs as nonprofits with public goals straddle both categories. Although this public-private distinction is a gross oversimplification of organizations—the field of public choice is based on criticizing this distinction—it still reinforces forms of analysis in which actors are self-contained, in this case with clear public-private boundaries. Making such a distinction may suggest that private organizations are more inclined to compete and public ones cooperate, and neglect that most organizations—and actors in their environment—can simultaneously compete and cooperate. In sum, differentiation can be addressed by designing self-contained tasks, which grants a higher degree of autonomy to the specific actor involved. Structuring self-contained tasks is a form of design, in other words, a form of organizing. As a design principle, it may seem perfect and a satisfactory guide to human action, but the everyday reality may be quite different. Some forms of self-contained tasks contradict each other. The strong distinction between decision-making and implementation as separate, self-contained tasks, moreover, does not facilitate action at the field level but helps to maintain the myth of sovereign, independent—largely self-contained—states. In a similar vein, IOs are an acknowledgment that states are interdependent and that these cannot go it alone. This leads to the paradoxical situation that interdependent states officially control international governmental organizations, and accredit NGOs, in order to safeguard their independence as much as possible. Too much attention to the self-containment of one type of actor leads to a twisted understanding of the relative autonomy of another. IR theory has too often argued that sovereign states dominate IOs. Business and public administration theories generally focus on organizations as autonomous actors competing for survival or growth and describe the in-

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tegration of organizational subunits, such as departments and divisions, into the overall organization. In particular, in business administration, governments and politics tend to be seen as obstacles instead of crucial everyday problems. Further, development theorists frequently argue that the local population cannot participate enough and that both donor states and IOs are too imperious. These three strands of theory cannot all be right at the same time. State sovereignty and organizational autonomy are always limited. The question then becomes: To what extent are the differently organized tasks self-contained, and where and how is self-containment limited? The answer makes it possible to assess which actor wields control over which others.

Differentiation and Integration for IOs in Practice When IOs confine themselves to helping states negotiate binding or recommended international rules and standards, and if they act as forums for information exchange and debate, they generally do not work directly within countries, which limits friction with governments. States either adjust unaided to each other or else make decisions jointly in the intergovernmental machinery—for example, in the G20 or the UN General Assembly—and ideally effectuate these with some support from an IO as an expert center. When, however, IOs start operational tasks in the diverse fields of development, relief, human rights, environment, and security, conflicts of interest emerge at both the international and national level. States may disagree with each other on the proper roles and tasks of the IOs, as with SHD, or one or more states may quarrel with, withdraw support from, or even abandon an IO, as has happened with the WHO and UNESCO. Operational tasks also inevitably add managerial complexity. In their operations, IOs not only must deal with the central government, but they also need to cooperate with subnational governmental institutions, as well as with segments of civil society such as the private sector and the local population. As stated, when parts of society promote different interests, which can reach extreme levels during armed conflict or deep corruption, the functioning of IOs suffers or even collapses. In severe and increasingly evident cases, IOs nevertheless address the problems of state failure, as during the chronic crises in Somalia and Afghanistan. The long-term lack of stability in these countries shows how difficult such operational work is. Internally, IOs also confront the twin processes of differentiation and integration. For most, this takes place as functional differentiation into several sectors, such as health and agriculture. Many UN organizations were set up to resemble national functionally based bureaucracies, such as

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the ministries of health and agriculture. Many NGOs have also established similar specific sectors of expertise. Still, the problems in the field do not necessarily follow this sectoral setup of issue areas. For example, the differentiation of IOs into security, development, and humanitarian organizations and divisions reflects the design of these organizations; it does not reflect the situation on the ground in, say, Somalia or Syria. The crucial operational question centers on determining when an IO takes over the tasks of the state. This question implicitly acknowledges that the design principle of self-containment confuses governmentality with real autonomy. It poses a spate of new operational questions: When should an IO intervene in a nominally sovereign—so-called autonomous—state? Does the IO have sufficient expertise in its mandated areas of interest and others related to it? Consequently, it becomes crucial to determine how other actors operate and how they can be coordinated to offer the multisectoral action that allows sustainable, peaceful development. In the actuality of daily practice, the presumed self-contained character of an organization guides its actions in the field. It is designed to look at most problems through the lens of its expertise, generally in a functional sector. Its perspective gains reinforcement from the impetus of organizational survival, which discourages giving up autonomy through cooperation. Most IOs confront the same paradox: they need to cooperate or coordinate at the field level because of weighty political problems and the need to spend limited resources efficiently, yet they also need to compete in order to acquire as much of the limited resources as possible. Within organizations, a related process of differentiation takes place. International governmental organizations officially function on behalf of the member states. These states provide funding, set mandates, determine policies, approve programs, and appoint senior management. NGOs also have to be accountable to their donors, usually the same donor governments that finance the UN system (Biekart 1999: 61; Duffield 1994: 59). As argued above, decision-making and policymaking tend to become separated from implementation. Cultural differences and geographical distances further aggravate this separation. In particular, the distinction between the cultures of headquarters and the field for both international nongovernmental organizations and governmental organizations is notorious. Likewise, huge differences usually exist between the final decision documents of international conferences and the actual follow-up actions in the field. As a result, many UN organizations and NGOs have internal command-and-control problems. In addition, they often work parallel or complementary to state structures, which opens up yet another set of coordination problems. Differentiation and integration lead to widely different procedures among organizations, as well as to very different organizational forms.

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! 

Figure 11.1. The Humanitarian System. Based on IFRC 1996: 59.

When organizations can work independently, procedural differences may not be significant, but when they must interact, conflicts may flare. Moreover, all of these organizations together form erratically grown systems in which ad hoc solutions among individual organizations and states linger on. These systems only adapt incrementally (see Smillie 1998: 81–82). For instance, nobody with a sane mind would have designed the humanitarian relief system as it exists today (see figure 11.1). Often the local population gets lost in such complicated systems. In addition, many actors (in circles) that are not officially part of the humanitarian system would like to benefit from it or prevent others from benefitting from it. At times, governments or other actors will attempt to instrumentalize humanitarian organizations—or peacekeepers for that matter—for their own benefit. Frequently, most actors, especially in situations of armed conflict, will not be open about their agendas. It is the interaction among these actors that determines the impact of humanitarian work (or in a similar vein, development, environmental, or human rights activities). Dealing with these actors requires great political and management skills. Yet, IR has not paid enough attention to this interaction. As a result, it has had a hard time explaining why the international policies and norms and their results on the ground differ so much. In these processes, actors can gain or lose autonomy. Some actors are able to resist this instrumentalization

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or even instrumentalize other actors. But their degree of autonomy is determined in these struggles, and not by the principle of self-contained units. Instead of self-contained actors, IR scholars should perceive IOs more generally as actors with permeable boundaries. In sum, the processes of differentiation and integration operate in different parts of our world at different societal levels, and they have led to many different types of IOs. These organizations address issues that states alone cannot or will not address. When they do operational work, they often take over tasks that would be done by the government in a well-functioning state. Given the important role of states, IOs have to steer clear of both the Scylla of being instrumentalized by other actors that pursue their own ends (e.g., donor dependence, corruption, or militarization) and the Charybdis of maintaining autonomy purely for organizational survival. In both cases, the interests of the local population can go astray in the maze of international politics and bureaucracy.

Beyond Self-Containment of IOs: IOs as Intermediary Organizations This section focuses on the operational management of IOs. These organizations are, in principle, set up to address societal issues; they rely on the assumption that they can ultimately transfer resources and knowledge to people who need them. They operate simultaneously in two arenas: a strategic arena, in which goals are set and decisions are made, and an implementing arena, in which these goals and decisions should be translated into action in order to help people by addressing societal problems.5 Ideally, the latter happens in close cooperation with these people. Understanding the dynamics of the different actors in and between these arenas helps to explain the outcomes of IOs’ work. IOs form the link between those two arenas; they are intermediary organizations.6 As occupants of two arenas, IOs usually attain the status of outsiders due to their different functions. They are able to transfer resources and knowledge that they can acquire from their donors—often, but not always, the rich industrialized countries. Still, they remain dependent on the collectivity of providers of resources, who often also shape the decisions in the strategic arena. Those groups with whom they work in the implementing arena rarely provide sufficient resources and do not always have a voice in the IO itself. Consequently, neither the arenas nor the IO are fully self-contained; they have only limited autonomy.7 Knowledge of the intermediary characteristics of IOs is a prerequisite to understanding their management. Practically, this requires insight in

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Figure 11.2. The International Organization between Two Different Arenas.

both arenas, as well as an understanding of the internal management processes of individual organizations. Furthermore, the actual complexity and diversity of management reflects the several implementing and strategic arenas in which these organizations need to operate simultaneously. In the strategic arena, the governments set the goals and policies of the intergovernmental organizations, generally either through an assembly or executive board, or simply with their funding decisions. Each donor government may pursue its own ends and vie for control of IOs. Despite the fact that in the UN as strategic arena, a semblance of democracy—one state, one vote—lingers in the formal rules, the chapters by Aviles and Lasker, Salomons, and Fomerand in this volume detail in different ways the consequences of donor behavior for the position of the United Nations and its relation to North-South antagonism. In addition, multipolarity makes it increasingly difficult to find consensus in the strategic arena. Recipient governments and other actors may also affect decisions. Moreover, the issues that play in the strategic arena can be highly contentious; these include not just financing but also forms of intervention, power relations between states, and the nationality of political appointees. Although NGOs and UN organizations can differ widely in

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their specific arenas, they generally have to deal with an overriding tone set by the strategic arena.8 In coping with the strategic arena, managers of IOs need political and diplomatic skills. Often they can promote ambiguity in the debates and decisions and so facilitate compromise, accommodation, and cooperation among actors with different interests. At least, they should be able to lessen political tensions and avoid dysfunctional directives. Once decisions, mandates, recommendations, and wishes are set out, IOs have to translate them into the implementing arena by such means as program management and advocacy. Such action in the implementing arena can be difficult indeed. Possible obstacles range from competing demands from local parties, to corruption, to a lack of competence on the part of recipient governments and of other counterparts. The latter may not just include other IOs, NGOs, and local administrations but also, as indicated above, a wide variety of actors that pursue their own interests. Sometimes geographical distances, cultural sensitivities, or something as simple as a bad internet connection can obstruct implementation. Generally, implementation requires patience and persistence. In the implementing arena, an IO has to obtain official permission from the relevant national government before setting to work. This formal requirement for accreditation can sometimes become an obstacle and can in some cases simply be ignored. In the Nuba Mountains in Sudan, for instance, some NGOs have gone in directly without permission during periods of intense civil strife and destitution. The implementing arena also requires a political logic, but the actual political tactics differ from country to country and from the political logic in the strategic arena. In many implementing arenas, special complexity may emerge from the need to deal with such local factors as a corrupt elite or a contentious religious movement. The chapters by Dijkzeul (program management), Krause (human rights organizations), Ohanyan and Ter-Gabrielyan (peace process between Turkey and Armenia), Evenson (civil society building and democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Martin and Pardo (gender in Afghanistan) all describe both characteristic complexities in the implementing arena and the strong impact of the strategic arena. In short, the IO needs a political logic in both arenas, but the actual politics differs in each arena. This political logic raises the question as to whether it is possible at all to solve collective action and distribution problems, preferably in a more or less democratic manner (Finger 2001). Understanding power relationships is a crucial part of the political logic. Internally, the operational tasks of the IO seem more straightforward. These tasks are based on a managerial logic that centers on providing goods and services efficiently and effectively (Finger 2001). For IOs, this

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means programming for delivering services, training, technology transfer, and advocacy, with the ultimate aim of building national and local capacities for self-reliance. To be successful in these operational tasks, management has to eschew ambiguity. Directness, including transparent guidance and goals from the actors in the strategic arena, can facilitate program implementation and evaluation, but this occurs only infrequently. Internally, accountability requires explicit goals, clear lines of authority, and unambiguous delineation of responsibility, as well as strong evaluation and follow-up. This is based on a managerial logic that emphasizes the values of authenticity (managers mean what they say) and sincerity (managers really do what they say they will do). Without these values, implementing organizational change or programs will be haphazard at first and later will become harder, if not impossible. These, then, pose two central management problems for IOs. First, IOs need to be able to use a political logic in both the strategic arena and the implementing arena in order to avoid political pitfalls in resolving collective action issues. Only in rare cases will complete clarity carry the day. Second, IOs nevertheless need a managerial logic, especially in their internal management, to achieve results in delivering goods and services in the implementing arena. Integrating the two logics and arenas is difficult, and at times they can contradict each other. The implementing arena needs to be understood on its own terms. The perceptions in the strategic arena, which is removed from the field, are not necessarily valid on the ground. The main problem that the IO faces in the implementing arena is that it comes as an outsider equipped with resources, knowledge, and, often, good intentions into local situations that can be very hard to understand. The power relationships, social exclusion, and political volatility of complex emergencies are a case in point. More generally, the variety, hidden and overt agendas, and capacities of the highly diverse local actors are often ill understood. Hence, management needs political astuteness and often ambiguity in both arenas. IOs use at least three political approaches, depending on the local circumstances. 1. They use ambiguity and compromise, which allows them to achieve at least part of their goals. 2. They are confrontational, as in the above example of the NGOs working in the Nuba Mountains in Sudan. 3. They become technocratic, which allows the organization to carry out its tasks by pretending that its operational work is value free and definitely not political.

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Actors in both arenas generally do not know each other well enough for meaningful interaction or understanding. After all, not many district midwives, warlords, or traditional leaders address the UN Security Council. In sum, IOs display several typical management problems that result from the myth of self-contained actors, be they sovereign states or independent organizations. Consider the following: 1. IOs are outsiders. At times they will not understand the local situation, or they are limited in their responsiveness. Building up local knowledge and capacity takes time. Applying the political logic astutely is difficult. 2. IOs generally come in when a societal problem—a pandemic, underdevelopment, overpopulation, pollution, or conflict—is already playing out. So they are almost always late; prevention does not get sufficient attention. 3. They tend to be or become donor driven, because they need funding. Accountability to local populations is difficult to achieve. Ideally, the government of the country in which the IO is active should be accountable to its population and hold the IOs in its territory to account. In practice, IOs frequently work in countries where governments do not want or are not able to ensure such accountability. 4. IOs have an implicit top-down perspective. As outsiders, they bring in intellectual, political, and financial resources that local actors often lack. By focusing on local needs instead of capacities, IOs often start from the implicit assumption that they provide and local actors receive. 5. Many other actors focus less on IOs’ normative goals and policies, instead seeing them as prizes to capture or threats to suppress. In this way, they have a huge influence on the outcomes of IOs’ work (DeMars 2005: 43). Relevant managerial logic is necessary to identify and overcome the related problems of originally being an outsider, being late (in the sense that the societal problems usually are already playing out), being donor driven, and having an implicit top-down perspective. Addressing these five general problems requires balancing the managerial and political logic in both arenas. Frequently, the concurrence of the political logic and the managerial logic creates a tension between ambiguity that is directed externally and clarity that is required for internal management.

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Most managers are not able to carry on this balancing act, because it poses contradictory demands. Overcoming the problems of being a late-coming outsider is challenging enough, but the various political pressures in both arenas are even harder. For example, the staff available to an executive head may be unable to maintain this continuous balancing act. In addition, political appointees will be pushed, sometimes openly so but most often only informally, by one or more interested governments. Especially if the candidate is not up to the job or dissatisfies other donors, the appointment of such a person will likely frustrate his or her new colleagues. Yet declining to accept the political appointee will also dissatisfy the appointee’s supporters. In addition, other organizations, NGOs, and the UN that compete for funding or other resources often benefit when the other party performs badly. Although some executive heads are able to pull off this balancing trick, most are, over time, likely to err internally with too much ambiguity or externally with too much clarity at the wrong moment. As a result, most organizations become politicized over time, which in turn leads to a lack of effectiveness in the field. The manager’s job is further complicated by the fact that some strategic arenas pose different politicized issues, such as abortion or free trade, or because of imperfect or absent technocratic solutions, as is the case with illnesses such as malaria or COVID-19. If the strategic arena is highly politicized—that is, posing controversial social choices for donors, other member states, or other actors—the IO will also become politicized. This effect deepens the complexity of managing. It can, for example, prevent necessary decentralization to the field, as central management strives to prevent political clashes.9 Yet such a tendency to centralization can obstruct work in the implementing arena. For example, as a result of its mandate in population, which automatically touches on political issues such as abortion, premarital sex, the position of women, and the possible use of forced population policies, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) management has constantly been under pressure to avoid scandals and other unwelcome attention. It thus was constrained to centralize, yet effectiveness at the field level required decentralization. UNFPA management thus found itself in a bind from which it was hard to escape. An IO can sometimes find advantages in operating in several strategic arenas simultaneously. UNICEF, OXFAM, CARE, MSF, and other organizations have established their own national offices within donor, and increasingly also recipient, countries. By doing this, they can tailor their activities to specific partners, whether national or subnational governments, private enterprise, or the general public. Although this decentralization in the strategic arena facilitates fundraising and international

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Figure 11.3. The Multiplication of Arenas.

advocacy, it can also lead attention away from other national offices and field operations. At times, it also causes tensions among the management of different national organizations that can permeate their field operations. For example, MSF France sometimes has a tense working relationship with MSF Belgium or MSF Holland. Similarly, in 2018 issues of sexual misconduct by staff of OXFAM Great Britain led to a sudden loss of membership at OXFAM/NOVIB in the Netherlands.10 As with the strategic arena, some implementing arenas are harder to cope with than others. Wars present the most severe problems. The organizations need considerable political acumen to understand the volatile and violent local power relationships without getting caught up in them. Conventional development cooperation also presents difficulties: it is essentially an attempt to change the behavior of other actors. Success is therefore always indirect and dependent on these others, whether a local community or the central bank. NGOs often can choose to engage different countries and thus differing strategic arenas. As for implementing arenas, UN organizations pride themselves on their universality. Most NGOs try to apply their trade in different areas. This increases opportunities for obtaining resources

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and motivates many employees. Yet implementing arenas do differ: the Gambia is not Bangladesh; eradicating polio differs from building roads. And, as stated, the organization will at least initially be an outsider in an unfamiliar implementing arena. The next problem is that not all organizations fulfill the same kinds of tasks. Other issues for management reflect the differences in the tasks undertaken by IOs. Some are essentially funding organizations that distribute their resources to other organizations. Subsequently, they check and support management, program delivery, and outcomes. For example, a Northern NGO helps a Southern NGO, or the UNFPA helps fund population activities through the Ministry of Health and Social Work. The chapter by Martin and Parto on Afghanistan indicates the many problems that can occur in such cooperation. Furthermore, the local counterpart organization sometimes subcontracts to other national or local organizations. These further forms of differentiation lead to elaborate chains of action, complex interorganizational networks, and unclear accountability.11 Ad hoc solutions, as noted earlier, linger on. Vested interests and the desire to maintain organizational autonomy create and maintain these unwieldy networks. Importantly, in the networks in which IOs operate, in particular during implementation, they will interact with many actors. As stated above, some are less visible, and many will have an open agenda but also hide part of their interests so that, as indicated above, they will often look at IOs as prizes to capture or threats to suppress, which leads to forms of instrumentalization. IOs may be pressured locally to provide kickbacks in exchange for access or permits. They may be blocked in order to hide human rights violations or war crimes. Donors may insist on procurement from their national industries. In many ways, the boundaries of IOs are more permeable to these actors than is recognized in IR theory. As intermediary actors, some IOs may be able to retain or strengthen their autonomy better than others. How they do so or fail to do so requires more attention from IR scholars. But the design principle of self-contained actors or the hierarchical perspective focusing on policies and norms at the international level are lousy guides to understand the dynamics of interaction among the many actors in both arenas.

Shortcomings and Strengths of the Model Like all models, this model of IOs as intermediary organizations linking two arenas is a simplification of actuality. It lacks, for example, the dynamic capacity to show how different concepts in development theory

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and public administration have shaped the actual functioning of organizations.12 Nevertheless, the model does highlight the main characteristics of the management of IOs. The model draws its main strength from the empirical comparisons in the preceding chapters, which show that despite the influence of governments, IOs strive to maintain autonomy. Both state sovereignty and organizational autonomy are limited in application as a result of the design principle of self-contained tasks. At the same time, the model explains the lack of bottom-up initiatives, the absence of which many development scholars lament. It also explains the similarities in the shortcomings of both international NGOs and IGOs. The specific organizations and arenas may be different, but all IOs have to deal with the central problems of intermediary organizations: two different arenas and a double political and managerial logic. Monodisciplinary explanations often fail to take into account the complexity of IOs as intermediary organizations. Hence, scholars and practitioners applying the model can also encourage cross-fertilization among the disciplines of IR, business administration, and public administration.

Therapies Therapies may take place at two levels: the individual organization and the organizational networks.

The Individual Organization After reading the chapters in this book, one might conclude that IOs are either so complex, or so pathological, that their management cannot be improved. That conclusion would be mistaken. An analysis of the double balancing act of two arenas and two logics leads to the identification of possible therapies. 1. Acknowledge the problems. Despite the cycles of high hopes for and disillusionment with IOs and the vociferous criticism they receive, their management hardly receives full or sustained attention in either academia or media. Much management theory fails to integrate the political logic. However, IR often neglects the daily management problems, especially at the local level. Combining the political and managerial logics is almost always a challenge. Acknowledging the difficulties with the double arenas and dual logics would forestall some of the high hopes and should thus prevent some of the cycles of disillusionment. It would also lead to a better understanding of the limitations of IOs.

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Important causes for the malfunctioning of IOs lie with the actors in the strategic arena—in particular, the national governments or private donors when they fail to provide sufficient support. The specific problems in the implementing arena further explain a lack of results. In both cases, these problems are part and parcel of the daily functioning of these organizations but are hardly caused exclusively by them. For governments, IOs fulfill a positive function whether they fail or succeed. If they fail, they are convenient scapegoats. If they succeed, the governments can continue to hand over tasks in those regions where they do not want to interfere. In any case, our indelible question concerns how to address these problems. IOs are limited by design; looking beyond those givens will uncover complementary therapies. 2. Build consensus. Since IOs are intermediary organizations, it follows that the more aligned the two arenas of their concern may be, the easier their functioning becomes. Some strategic arenas are notoriously difficult, such as the population field, with its issues of abortion, anticonception, premarital sex, and reproductive health rights. How to align the two arenas? A basic answer is by fostering consensus, which underlines the importance of advocacy for these organizations. Consensus ideally consists of two components: •

Agreement on a basic substantive issue. In contrast to the population field, improving the lot of children often gains widespread support; at the very least, there is not much vocal opposition. This popular consensus makes the work of UNICEF and Save the Children easier. It helps with fundraising and implementation. The SDGs and the global conferences, such as the World Humanitarian Summit, are the main examples of such efforts to build consensus, and many IOs use them as a normative frame of reference in their policies and activities.

•

Technocratic approaches. Without instruments, action becomes difficult or even impossible. Without a treatment (e.g., medicine or physical exercise), an illness has no therapy. The availability of technocratic solutions can help to depoliticize issues. UNICEF, for example, was extremely successful in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with its GOBI measures, which supported growth monitoring, oral rehydration, breastfeeding, and immunization. With these technologically rather simple measures it has been possible to reduce child mortality rates dramatically in many countries. In contrast, managing AIDS or COVID-19 is still difficult, because there is no definitive cure. Moreover, the difficulty of influencing

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gender-based behavior in Afghanistan demonstrates how even seemingly technocratic tools such as prenatal care can be seen as value-laden interventions. SHD advocates and human rights organizations have to cope with a different problem: they largely deal in values and norms rather than technical solutions. 3. Strengthen management. IOs can use innovative general management techniques, varying from strategic management to total quality management and benchmarking. Many of them try the latest management fads and are prone to the same management mistakes as other organizations. In addition, most management techniques stem from profitmaking enterprises, and thus they are not geared toward working with the double arena and both logics that characterize IOs. Frequently, these techniques only stress the managerial logic. As a consequence, IOs apply management tools that are imperfectly suited to their tasks. Although these organizations have the whole regular management tool kit at their disposal, the application of these tools thus requires adaptation to both logics and arenas. No magic formula exists to solve the contradictory demands inherent to this adaptation. On the positive side, when a managerial technique works well under the adverse conditions of an IO, then it is likely to function well for other organizations too. 4. Rotate staff. The more staff members learn about both arenas and logics, the better they and their organizations can function. Staff rotation provides a simple tool to achieve this. Many UN organizations and NGOs employ rotation schemes. Yet many staff members dislike moving from one country to another, and many prefer to stay at headquarters. Most organizations, unfortunately, fail to reap the benefits of rotation because they have not (yet) incorporated the information it generates into regular learning and evaluation mechanisms. 5. Encourage downward accountability. On all levels of their management and in all stages of their programming, IOs should dilute their implicit outsider, top-down approaches with far more attention to the local populations. In some cases, this will mean reforming organizational procedures in order to become a better “listener,” as the World Bank claims to have done. At the very least, programming and evaluation techniques should always be participatory. This can result in heavy demands on managers, but it is necessary to ensure sustainability. Local capacities should be identified better and used more often. Ombudsman procedures, possibilities for lodging complaints, and so on should also be instituted to a far greater degree. Ideally, local NGOs and communities should carry out evaluations of the quality of their donors and providers of technical support, but this happens too rarely. The central problem will

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always be how to get information from the implementing arena to the strategic arena and vice versa. Such downward accountability is difficult but not impossible. 6. Aim for transparency. Finally, transparency of decisional and administrative processes can be useful managerially. When politicization carries the day, people forget that carefully improving and analyzing management data often offers keys for improvement. Internally, linking budgeting and performance measurement can be taken much further. Externally, ameliorating the quality of advocacy remains crucial. Performance measurement—or actually the philosophy behind it—offers a technocratic approach to improve IO management, but only in those cases where outputs are indeed measurable. Due to information technology, it is indeed easier nowadays to link work in the implementing arena with the strategic arena. Yet this is only one step in the long process of ensuring greater transparency and downward accountability. All six strategies discussed here share two characteristics. They link the strategic and implementing arenas closer to each other, and they acknowledge and counteract the usual shortcomings of self-contained tasks. Their application, especially in a joint manner, would align the two arenas and further their overlapping. This would improve the management of IOs. Without waiting for states to take action, organizations could strengthen their function by adopting these strategies.

Relationships among Organizations The six strategies for improving management mentioned above can also help with bettering interorganizational relationships. First of all, when one organization puts its own house in order, it facilitates cooperation in networks with other organizations. Good quality information or the mere absence of delays can already have a great impact. Second, the same strategies can be applied jointly by several organizations. 1. Acknowledge the problem. Just being able to state the problem is even more important. In the final analysis, political trade-offs and ambiguity are part and parcel of IOs’ management. Messy international structures and networks cannot be cleaned up easily, which is in a sense acknowledged by slight attempts to do so. Open acknowledgment of the stubborn difficulties with combining both the politic and managerial logics would probably prevent the cycle of high hopes and subsequent disillusionment, but it alone would not lead to real improvement in effectiveness. For that, the other strategies are required. 2. Build consensus. Building consensus is even harder among organizations than among colleagues within an organization. Normally, one

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organization will have to take the lead. Modern mass media offer new opportunities to either build international consensus or destroy it. The campaign to ban landmines provided a successful example of consensus building.13 As stated, the SDGs and global conferences are now the main tools for building consensus. However, most populists stress state sovereignty against an evil outside world. In other words, they prefer independence and want to focus on reducing interdependence, which tends to reduce consensus. COVID-19 has shown that even when there is agreement on a substantive issue, namely the need to fight the pandemic, the work can be obstructed by blame games and the lack of technical solutions—medicines or vaccines. 3. Strengthen management. Sound interorganizational management requires considerable training and time. Managing cross-cultural communications is an essential skill. Most academic education and organizational training falls short in this respect. As earlier noted, the suitability of general management techniques is limited. The main contribution that an individual organization can make to interorganizational cooperation is to have its own house in order. 4. Rotate staff. Rotation of staff members among different organizations has been institutionalized only to a very limited extent, mainly by UN organizations. It would be useful if bilateral organizations, international and local NGOs, and UN organizations, as well as recipient governments, could exchange staff more frequently between them. However, different human resources management practices and outdated procedures tend to prevent this. A joint global pension fund, for example, would remove a serious obstacle to mobility. Such rotation could be used as a learning tool if organizations were prepared to build on the experience and criticism of the exchange staff. 5. Encourage downward accountability to the target groups. Organizations need to take into account the impact of their own work on that of others. If they fail to incorporate an assessment of this impact into their regular procedures, improvement will depend only on ad hoc initiatives by well-meaning individuals.14 Performance measurement and information technology also have the potential to improve downward accountability.15 Ideally, the local population, or their representatives, should be enabled to evaluate and even help to determine the role and cooperation of donors and IOs. 6. Aim for transparency. The way in which IOs combine the political and managerial logics against and with each other receives too little attention in IR scholarship. Simultaneous competition, cooperation, and coordination requires more attention. It would greatly help everyone if IOs were allowed to go bankrupt more often. The international develop-

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ment and humanitarian systems do not punish malfunctioning organizations strongly enough. This immunity could be defended as long as the causes of malfunctioning lie outside the IO with the donor governments in the strategic arena, as with funding the UN system. When organizations malfunction in the field, they should either improve or go out of existence. Establishing the legal, managerial, and economic incentives to create such a “bankruptcy” system needs far more attention than is currently available. Just as UNCTAD was largely bypassed by the WTO, it is highly likely that intermediary organizations will face a hard time when donors directly fund the activities of their Southern counterparts, which is currently starting to happen. Ultimately, such bypasses may force some IOs, including those redundant segments of the UN, out of business. At the very least, they will have to shape up their management considerably. At the interorganizational level of analysis, the limitations of creating self-contained tasks become immediately visible, because interorganizational relationships by definition transcend self-containment. For improving the situation, the onus is on governments as the main players in the strategic arena. This will be a major challenge: in all likelihood, improvements to the haphazardly designed interorganizational relationships will only be incremental. The complex global network of IOs, with their overlapping mandates and disparate constituencies, will be tough to sanitize. In any case, reforming one organization is more readily achieved than reforming an interorganizational system.

Conclusions IOs fulfill many important tasks, yet they are subject to widespread criticism. In order to better understand them, the authors of this volume have assembled more empirical material than usually underpins critical treatment of the management of international organizations. They have indicated pathologies in many different areas, among them: •

limited funding, and withholding funding to exert influence, as well as crippling competition for resources, blocking cooperation;

•

antiquated personnel management, with incomplete organizational adaptation to changing circumstances and ideologies;

•

fraud, nepotism, and corruption;

•

North-South antagonism and its impact on SHD;

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•

uncritical application of program procedures, which hampers local participation;

•

too narrow interpretation of human rights by IOs;

•

ill-conceptualized and ill-directed funding of civil society in order to promote democracy;

•

curtailed implementation of international gender norms.

At various points, the authors have used theories and insights from other disciplines than IR, such as business and public administration. They have also paid considerable attention to problems of implementation and internal functioning. Finally, they have pointed out the importance of Southern perspectives and experiences in our multipolar world. The fact that goals and ideals of IOs seemingly remain beyond reach suggests a systemic design fault. We posit that self-contained tasks were confused with organizational autonomy and national sovereignty. Both concepts imply clear boundaries that are absent in practice. This has led us to develop an alternative model of IOs as intermediary organizations that are active in both the implementing and strategic arenas. In most IR literature, the assumption prevails that IOs are largely dependent on states. But it is more accurate to state that they have to carry out a difficult double balancing act of two arenas (implementing and strategic) and two logics (political and managerial) that combine in manifold ways and that contradict the design principle of self-contained entities at different levels of society. Strategies for improvement exist. As intermediaries, IOs can align their respective arenas through the strategies for improvement set out here. While these strategies are no magic eraser to rub out all faults, together they alleviate politicking, conflicts of interest, and substandard scholarship. Pathologies are not an immutable given. They can be understood as opportunities for strategic therapeutic interventions to bring promises closer to performance. Dennis Dijkzeul is professor of conflict and organization research at the Social Science School and the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict at Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. He was the founding director of the Humanitarian Affairs Program at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University in New York. He has conducted research projects on international and local organizations in the DRC, South Sudan, and Afghanistan, and has worked as a consultant for UN organizations and NGOs in Africa, Europe, Central Asia, and

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Latin America. His main research interests concern the management of international organizations (the UN, NGOs, and diaspora organizations) and their interaction with local actors in humanitarian crises. His latest books are The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory (Routledge, 2015, with William DeMars), The New Humanitarians in International Practice: Emerging Actors and Contested Principles (Routledge, 2016, with Zeynep Sezgin), and Diaspora Organizations in International Affairs (Routledge 2020, with Margit Fauser). Yves Beigbeder interned at the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946. After studying in the United States, he worked first for the UN Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome, and then for the World Health Organization in Brazzaville, Copenhagen, Alexandria, and New Delhi. His last post was deputy director of human resources in Geneva. He has a doctorate in public law and has lectured on international organizations, international civil service, and international criminal courts at universities in Paris, Geneva, St. Louis, Boston, and Vancouver. He has published numerous works on international organizations in French and English. Dirk Salomons is a special lecturer in humanitarian policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. From 2002 until his retirement in 2015, he directed SIPA’s Humanitarian Policy Track and its International Organizations Specialization. Partially overlapping with his academic work, he was managing partner of the Praxis Group, an international consulting firm, from 1997 until 2012. Earlier, from 1970 until 1997, Salomons served in a wide range of management, peacebuilding, and policy advisory functions in several organizations of the UN system, including the FAO, UNDP, ICSC, UNOPS, and UN Secretariat. His most cherished assignment was that of executive director for the UN peacekeeping operation in Mozambique from 1992 to 1993. He has written extensively on the challenges of postconflict recovery, with fieldwork in Chad, Sudan, the DR Congo, and West Africa, as well as in the Middle East (Gaza, Jordan), Mindanao, and the Pacific Islands. NOTES 1. Rieff (1999: 39) continues: “Humanitarians occupy the central role in these crises precisely because they are otherwise of so little geo-strategic or economic importance to the powers that could intervene militarily, or use their diplomatic clout to change the situation on the ground for the better far more effectively than the most dedicated humanitarian can ever hope to. To put it

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2.

3. 4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

397

starkly, MSF has a place at the table about Rwanda because so few institutions care about Rwanda.” Hence, such limited autonomy only assumes that the actor or unit is generally able to take care of itself and that it keeps its own house in order in relation to a specific set of self-contained tasks. The classic study of interdependence, which takes a broader perspective than this section, has been written by Keohane and Nye (1989). See Ratner (1997: 33–34) for a more elaborate discussion of sovereignty as an amorphous concept. Strictly speaking, sovereignty is a legal concept and points to absolute control by each state of its own affairs—that is, a solid self-containment. In application in the actual world, sovereignty describes only the aspiration of the law. In actuality, it describes nothing at all outside the legal textbooks. Putnam’s (1988) article on the logic of two-level games theory is somewhat similar, but it essentially deals with the interplay between diplomatic negotiations at the interstate level and domestic politics. Negotiators have to reach agreement in international negotiations, while they also need acceptance of decisions nationally. In contrast, IOs possess less autonomy than the politicians and government officials in this theory. Their life is more complicated; even if they are in total alignment with the strategic arena, they still have to work in the implementing arena with many different actors at various levels of society. Especially taking into account the role of the different national governments, one can speak of a multilevel theory for IOs. The two arenas summarize these levels. The intermediary position comes close to the double principal-agent relationship that Eliassen and Kooiman (1993: 1) posit for all public organizations. Weiss et al. (2017: 2–6) speak of three United Nations: one where governments meet and make decisions; one comprising the various secretariats, officials, and soldiers who implement these decisions; and one in which networks of civil society organizations, experts, private enterprises, media, and academics cooperate closely with the first and second UN. This perspective offers an interesting similarity with an intermediary organization and the two arenas, although the authors do not work out this distinction from a management perspective. The actual way in which states control IOs depends largely on the setup of these organizations. UN organizations have member states that make decisions and provide (too little) funding. By following the concept of sovereignty, many IOs, in particular those of the UN system, are actually designed to have decisions made by an intergovernmental machinery far removed from implementation in the field. Supposedly, states have a more indirect relationship with NGOs. These NGOs should then have greater autonomy to act on their own volition. In practice, however, governments do have considerable influence through funding, national laws, and other legal obligations.

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9. It can be argued that the nature of most IOs, especially UN organizations, is political from inception, and therefore the point about the politicization of IOs is described more negatively than should be the case. The fact that staff is politically inept is then more an indictment of the personnel recruitment/ selection process than of the organization and its design. In other words, the complexity of politics within and among IOs is a given. Therefore, the managers of IOs should be both technically and politically competent no matter which arena they find themselves in. If they are incompetent in one or both capacities, they share some of the responsibility for the malfunctioning of IOs. However, while this argument is valid about the recruitment process, its conclusion does insufficiently acknowledge that the management of IOs continuously has to juggle contradictory demands from both the strategic and implementing arenas, as well as both logics. It is near impossible to do this successfully over long periods of time. 10. Dirk Salomons interview with senior OXFAM/NOVIB staff, summer 2018. 11. Biekart (1999) provides a clear description of the elaborate aid chains in Central America. 12. Other factors that deserve attention include short-term interests and the ethical aspects of the decision-making, and actions of states and organizations. 13. At a more operational level, the joint evaluations and studies of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance (ALNAP) illustrate practical opportunities for improving humanitarian assistance. 14. For an overview of coordination issues from a managerial perspective, see Dijkzeul (1997) and Fomerand and Dijkzeul (2018). 15. In the humanitarian field, initiatives to strengthen accountability include the Core Humanitarian Standard and Sphere, with its humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response.

REFERENCES Biekart, Kees. 1999. The Politics of Civil Society Building: European Private Aid Agencies and Democratic Transitions in Central America. Utrecht/Amsterdam: International Books and The Transnational Institute. DeMars, W. E. 2005. NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press. Dijkzeul, Dennis. 1997. The Management of Multilateral Organizations. Boston: Kluwer Law International. Duffield, Mark. 1994. “The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid.” In War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies, edited by Johanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, 50–69. London: Zed Books with Save the Children Fund (UK).

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Eliassen, Kjell A., and Jan Kooiman. 1993. Managing Public Organizations: Lessons from Contemporary European Experience. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Ferguson, James. 1994. The Anti-politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis. Fomerand, Jacques, and Dennis Dijkzeul. 2018. “Coordinating Economic & Social Affairs.” In The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, edited by Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, 655–78. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Finger, Matthias. 2001. College Notes 2001 of Guest Lecture at SIPA. New York: Columbia University. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). 1996. World Disasters Report 1996. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 1989. Power and Interdependence. 2nd ed. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. Maynard, Kimberly A. 1999. Healing Communities in Conflict: International Assistance in Complex Emergencies. New York: Columbia University Press. Putnam, Robert D. 1988 “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 42(3): 427–60. Ratner, Steven R. 1997. The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War. London: MacMillan. Rieff, David. 1999. “Moral Imperatives and Political Realities: Response to ‘Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action.’” Ethics and International Affairs 13(1): 35–42. Smillie, Ian. 1998. “Relief and Development: The Struggle for Synergy.” Occasional Paper of the Watson Institute 33. Providence: Brown University, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies. Smith, Adam. 1986 [1776]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Books I–III. London: Penguin Classic Books. Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate, and Kelly-Kate Pease. 2017. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. 8th ed. London: Routledge.

= I N DEX

9/11, 11, 51, 319 accountability, 17–18, 29, 33, 82–83, 85, 101, 105n7, 116, 119, 123, 162, 170, 174, 194, 196–198, 202, 203–204, 206, 208–209, 211–214, 216n8, 244, 247, 262, 334, 337n13, 346, 347, 351, 354–355, 360, 384, 385, 388, 391–393, 398n13, 398n15 Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), 163, 171, 175, 179–181, 193, 199 Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 350, 352 Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 347, 348, 351 Afghanistan, 2, 24, 33–34, 184–185, 223, 259, 319, 342–365, 371–372, 378, 383, 388, 391, 395 African Union, 267, 373 Ahlenius, Inga-Britt, 196–97, 202, 217n26 aid fatigue, 120, 134 Amnesty International, 20, 268–269, 271, 275–277 Anadolu Kültür, 295–296, 313n6 Annan, Kofi, 36n10, 137, 162, 175, 194–95. See also United Nations Secretary-General (SG) anti-slavery movement, 268–269 armed conflicts, 26, 90, 97, 291, 378, 380 Armenia, 33, 285–316, 383 Armenian genocide, 298

Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process (ATNP), 258–318. See also Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) assessed contributions, 80–81, 90, 95, 107n27 The Association for the Prevention of Torture, 272–73 autonomy, 7, 10, 13, 17–18, 20, 27–29, 49, 113, 158, 249, 251, 258, 287, 294, 370, 374–381, 388–389, 395, 397n2, 397n5, 397n8 Azerbaijan, 297, 301, 304, 306. See also Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) Balkan, 184, 312, 336. See also Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH); Republika Srpska (RS) Ban Ki-moon, 105n15, 127, 137, 197, 202. See also United Nations Secretary-General (SG) Berlin Wall, 10, 51 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 223, 252–253, 318–341, 371, 383. See also Balkan Brazil, 24, 30, 52, 90 Bretton Woods institutions, 98, 120– 121, 125, 128, 131, 133, 136, 166, 184. See also under United Nations Brexit, 23–24, 270, 298, 301. See also United Kingdom (UK) Brussels, 4, 56, 344 business administration vii, 12, 13, 378, 389 Bush, George W., 59

402

INDEX

Canada, 67, 160, 202, 348 CARE, 20, 318, 386 career development, 160, 164, 168, 170, 180 Chief Executive Board for Coordination (CEB), 106n21, 126–127, 131, 141n19 China, 24, 35n2, 52, 67–68, 70, 90, 133, 140n4, 217n45, 286 and US, 24–26 civil service. See International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) climate change, 3, 23, 25, 29–30, 52, 56, 62, 65, 89, 96–97, 102, 105n15, 124, 137, 139, 246, 373. See also Paris agreement; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) Cold War, 2, 7, 9–12, 26, 35n5, 55–57, 59–63, 162, 165, 169, 269, 280n2, 285, 288, 321 constructivism, 10. See also international relations (IR) Copenhagen, 130–131 corruption, 32, 120, 151, 161, 191– 221, 251, 255, 257, 329, 371, 378, 381, 383, 394 COVID-19, 2, 25–26, 51–52, 69, 78, 80, 88–91, 96, 100, 362, 386, 390, 393 Cyprus, 195–196, 210, 300 Dayton Peace Agreement, 319, 324, 329, 335 decolonization, 165, 371 democracy, 4, 17, 33, 59, 68, 118– 119, 122, 261n23, 285, 298, 303, 318–342, 382, 395 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 22, 31, 34 democratization, 223, 253, 318–341, 371, 383 diplomacy ix, 2, 32–33, 49, 51–76, 92, 106n24, 151, 223, 285–294, 298,

301–304, 307, 309–312, 371. See also under United Nations (UN) club/network diplomacy, 286, 290–91, 311 global diplomacy, 286–287, 289, 311 grassroots diplomacy, 303 multilateral diplomacy, 32, 51–76, 288, 293 networked diplomacy, 285–317, 371 Track Two, 289, 291–92, 295, 301–303, 307, 311, 313n7 Doctors without Borders. See Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) donor, donor agencies, 2, 4, 13–14, 17, 19, 22, 27, 31, 33, 51–112, 157–58, 185, 223, 226–27, 239, 242, 247–48, 251–254, 256, 258–59, 260n12, 268, 270, 273–74, 276, 278–79, 285–289, 294, 302, 304–305, 307, 309, 318–336, 337n9, 337n11, 337n14, 337n21, 338n25, 343–345, 347–356, 358, 360–363, 364n10, 370–72, 378–379, 381–382, 385–386, 388, 390–91, 393–94 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 58, 69, 101, 105n7, 131, 141n29, 155 Ecuador, 69, 136n27 equality, 65, 118, 126–128, 131–132, 139, 288, 344–345, 348–352, 358 Erdoğan, Reccep Tayyip, 298, 302 government, 313n2 Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), 295, 306, 308, 312, 313n3 European integration, 7, 322 European Union (EU), 16, 33, 36n10, 56, 66–67, 260n12, 267, 275, 286, 295, 298–299, 302–303, 305–306, 319, 321–321, 328, 334, 336n2

INDEX

European Union Special Representative (EUSR), 322–323, 327 extreme poverty. See under poverty finance/financing, 77–112, 132. See also pathology: UN system-level finance, 84 foreign policy, 71, 251, 269, 274, 375 France, 67, 217n41, 217n45, 298, 387 fraud, 2, 32, 136, 151, 191–221, 371, 394 funding compact, 84–86, 95, 101 fundraising, 275, 386, 390; funding agencies, 20, 260n12, 275 gender, 3, 27, 32–33, 118, 127, 131– 133, 163, 170–171, 202, 223, 241, 245, 272, 342–365, 370–371, 383, 391, 395. See also programming mainstreaming, 342–365 General Assembly. See United Nations General Assembly Geneva, 4, 57, 103–104, 156, 182, 207, 211, 215, 216n19, 344, 396 Georgia, 25, 301 Germany, 66–67, 245–246, 298 Gezi Park protests, 296, 313n2 Ghani, Ashraf, 351 Global Compact on Migration; Global Compact (GC); compact, the, 67, 106n16, 126, 129, 137 global governance, 10, 13, 15, 20–21, 23, 37n19, 51–76, 96, 116, 288, 373 global health, 25, 56, 62 global public goods (GPG), 79, 81, 88–89, 95–97, 101, 103, 107n26 Global North/South, 5, 23–24, 30, 91, 119; Northern/Southern, 4–5, 14, 49, 117–119, 120, 122–123, 133, 135–136, 138, 140n3, 242, 288, 388, 394–395. See also North-South global summits, 105n15, 122

403

globalization, 11–12, 24, 26, 52, 59–61, 63–64, 67, 77–78, 97, 114, 129–130, 135, 137, 138, 141n15, 285, 373 good governance, 10, 100, 118–119, 122, 126, 162, 197, 329, 334 governmentality, 375–376, 379 grassroots/community-based organizations, 12, 291, 295, 305–308, 320, 330 Great Britain, 286–287. See also Brexit; United Kingdom (UK) Greece, 300 Aegean Islands, 22 Group of Seven (G7), 9, 64 Group of 18 (G18), 59, 167 Group of Twenty (G20), 64, 68, 378 Group of 77 (G77), 119, 140n4 Guterres, António, 69, 84, 86, 95, 127, 209. See also United Nations Secretary-General (SG) Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), 132–133 Helsinki Accords, 36n14, 269 heteropolarity, 290–91, 293, 301, 303, 310. See also multipolarity HIV/AIDS, 4, 125, 198 Human Development Report (HDR), 115–117, 128–129, 136 human resources management, 153–190, 393 human rights, 4, 8, 12, 17, 20–21, 25, 27, 33, 35n5, 36n10, 52, 55, 62–63, 66, 79, 114, 118, 120, 120, 123, 126–127, 129, 136–139, 140n3, 141n27, 165, 182, 191, 194, 207–208, 223, 225–226, 240, 251, 254, 258, 267–285, 296, 303, 321, 345, 349–350, 370–373, 378, 380, 383, 388, 391, 395 Human Rights Watch, 20, 268, 271–272, 275, 277

404

INDEX

humanitarian aid/humanitarian assistance, 82, 84, 88, 92, 184, 213, 257, 320–321, 347, 353, 398n13 Humanitarian Charter, 262n26, 278, 398n15 humanitarian-developmentpeacebuilding nexus, 88, 95, 97. See also nexus approach Hunt-Matthes, Caroline, 208–209 Hutu, 243 implementation, 4, 8, 11, 18, 28 (norms, policies, decisions), 29, 33, 55, 65, 84, 85, 94, 95, 115, 131, 132, 182, 200, 216, 223–366, 369, 371, 374, 377, 379, 383–84, 390, 395, 397n8 and design, 241, 390 direct, 28, 30 failure of, 239, 247 indirect, 28, 30 INFF, 100 IO, 22, 28, 371, 388 MDGs, 135 Millennium Declaration, 130 NAP 1325, 357, 358, 361, 362 of programs, 200, 230, 235, 239, 260n10, 305, 308, 355, 357, 359 (gender mainstreaming), 360 problems, 8, 33, 36n17, 223, 247 of reforms, 69, 164, 167 SDG, 89, 97, 135 UNFCCC, 140n6 Of UNSCR, 1325 343, 345, 347, 350, 356, 362, 363n4 implementing arena, 381, 383, 384, 386–88 390 392 397n5 398n9 independent team of advisers (ITA), 101, 105n7 India, 21, 24, 52, 133, 156 Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), 298–99, 313n3 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 65, 104, 257

intergovernmental organizations (IGO), 3–5, 7, 12–16, 18–19, 21, 23, 28, 32–33, 54–55, 58, 61, 65, 328, 332, 372, 377, 379, 382, 389 intermediary organization, 381, 388–90, 394–95, 397n7 International Civil Service Advisory Board (ICSAB), 159, 162–63 International Civil Service Commission (ICSC), 166–67, 170, 176 The International Commission of Jurists, 272, 280n2 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 30, 93, 277 international humanitarian law, 30, 105n15, 278 international institutions, 10, 51 International Labor Organization (ILO), 14, 17–18, 114, 129 International Monetary Fund; Fund, the (IMF), 52, 78, 91–92, 121, 132–33, 166 and World Bank, 55, 63 international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 3–4, 7, 14, 27, 31–33, 105n15, 319, 321, 343, 349, 353, 359–61, 370, 379, 389 INGO-NGO relations, 354–359 international relations (IR), 2, 4, 6–7, 35n3–6, 37n24, 52, 54, 57, 59, 61–63, 113, 165, 260n5, 287, 291, 294–95, 312, 376–77, 380–81, 388–89, 393, 395 international society, 51, 54–56, 128 intrastate conflicts, 52, 60, 62 Iran, 25–26, 66 Iraq, 24, 59, 90, 185, 210, 216n6–7, 217n45, 331. See also Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP) Office of the Iraq Program (OIP), 195 Istanbul, 105n15, 296, 299. See also Turkey Italy, 53, 161

INDEX

Japan, 58–59 Kavala, Osman, 296, 313n6 Kompass, Anders, 207–208 Kosovo, 319, 331 Lapointe-Young, Carman, 202–3 League of Nations, 21–22, 32, 54, 102, 153–55, 159, 211 leaving no one behind, 97, 126 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT), 272, 275 Lesotho, 242, 375 liberalism, 7. See also international relations (IR) neoliberalism, 7, 11, 15, 125, 376 local nongovernmental organizations, 13, 27, 31, 352–53, 360–61, 370, 391, 393 Malaria, 125, 386 managerial logic, 3, 250, 253–54, 383–85, 389, 391–93 Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors without Borders (MSF), 4, 277, 386–87, 396n1 methodological individualism, 7, 36n11 Mexico, 67, 134 Millennium Declaration, 116, 130, 132, 135 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 65, 81, 113–149, 344 Millennium Summit, 81, 119, 127 Mostar, 323–24 multidisciplinarity, 240–43, 245, 248–49, 254, 376 multilateralism, 53–56, 58, 67–70, 101, 137, 286, 288, 291 multipolarity, 26, 68, 141n21, 371, 382 Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) (conflict), 297, 304. See also Armenia; Azerbaijan Nairobi, 4, 94, 216n18

405

neofunctionalism, 7. See also international relations (IR) neoliberalism. See international relations (IR); liberalism neorealism, 7, 11, 15, 376. See also international relations (IR); realism network theory, 8, 294, 313n7 New International Economic Order (NIEO), 59, 125 New World Order, 54, 57, 59 New York, 4, 24, 56, 65, 93, 156, 182, 196, 204, 210–11, 216n19 New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants, 87, 106n16 nexus approach, 94, 102. See also humanitarian-developmentpeacebuilding nexus norm setting, 4, 113–150, 376 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 66, 286 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 24–25, 66, 184, 286, 322, 348 North-South, 2, 32, 56, 114–15, 136 antagonism, 382, 394 conflict, 61 dialogue, 59, 121 tensions, 371 Norway, 69, 363n4 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 203 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), 207 Office of the High Representative (OHR), 322–23, 327 Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), 171, 193–94, 196–212, 214– 15, 216n18–19, 217n26, 217n46 Office of the Iraq Program (OIP), 195. See also Iraq official development assistance (ODA), 82, 88, 91, 98–99, 100, 105n12, 120, 123, 134–35, 242

406

INDEX

Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP), 104, 194, 195, 210, 213, 216n6 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 82, 90, 95, 322 -DAC, 93, 98, 242 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 321, 328 organization theory, 8–9, 35n3, 240 organizational design, 369, 376 organizational sociology, 9, 17–18, 29. See also organization theory Ottoman Empire, 297, 313n2 Paris agreement, 25, 65, 67, 87, 87n15, 124, 139. See also climate change participatory rural appraisals (PRA), 236, 239, 244, 247, 261n24–25 participation, 33, 52, 58, 62–63, 118, 129, 131, 225, 229, 240, 244, 245, 252, 254, 257, 259, 261n14– 15n23n26, 334, 345 local, 243, 247, 250–51, 253, 395 staff, 154, 167 women, 344, 346, 352–53, 358 pathology, 2, 81, 83, 85 financing, 80, 85, 89, 94 IO, 17, 21 UN, 138, 185, 213 patronage, 2, 153, 160–62, 169, 179, 185, 213 peacebuilding, 1, 22, 34, 85–86, 87n14, 92, 98, 100, 184, 186, 245, 285–365, 396. See also humanitarian-developmentpeacebuilding nexus interventions, 87, 288 local, 288 long-term, 289 women’s participation in, 346 peacekeeping, 2, 11, 13, 30, 31, 87, 184, 207, 245, 345, 373

mission, 198, 201, 346–7 operations, 12, 67, 93, 156, 175, 177, 182, 192, 197, 200, 202, 209–11, 214, 216n19, 373, 396 UN, 10, 17, 32, 34, 186, 396 performance evaluation system, 166, 170, 178 permanent appointments, 176–77 policy advisor(s), 89, 312 policy change(s), 214, 235, 274, 308, 310 policy research, 326, 328–29, 334, 337n14, 371 policymaking, 4, 9, 12, 17–18, 32, 51, 165, 168, 270, 291, 327, 332, 374, 377, 379 political logic, 3, 37n21, 250, 253–55, 259, 383–85, 389, 392–93, 395 Political, Peace, and Humanitarian Job Network (POLNET), 182 populism, 23, 26, 286, 371 post-2015 development agenda, 114, 127, 131, 135, 137. See also sustainable development: sustainable development goals (SDGs) postconflict democratization, 318, 320, 330, 334, 336n6, 337n25 post-Cold War period, 35n5, 61, 285, 288 poverty, 61, 79, 91, 105n15, 106n23, 115, 117, 127, 132, 137–38, 246, 255–57, 261n25 extreme poverty, 90, 92, 118, 125, 130, 132–33, 138 poverty alleviation, 120, 128, 133, 138 poverty eradication, 123, 125–26, 129, 130, 136, 138, 285 poverty reduction, 119, 131–133, 141n20–21, 256 Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework, 132 Preparatory Commission, 154–55, 158, 159, 166, 175

INDEX

prevention, 85, 89, 92, 104, 114, 273, 345, 359, 385 principal-agent theory, 16–17 private-public partnerships (PPP), 61, 64, 70, 126 program management, 225–266, 312, 362, 371, 383 programming, 83, 85, 99, 104, 225–66, 277, 319, 322–23, 333, 344, 351, 356, 361, 384, 391 democracy/democratization, 324, 334 gender, 353, 357, 359–60, 362 USAID, 325n14, 337n20 public administration, 8, 13, 155, 163, 230, 329, 371, 377, 389, 395 realism, 7, 16, 161. See also international relations (IR) reconstruction, 278, 342, 344, 347, 351, 356, 358, 361, 362 recruitment procedures, 168, 170 regime theory, 8, 16, 36n17 repertoire of practice, 267, 268, 270–72, 274, 276, 279 Republika Srpska (RS), 319, 323 Rhine, 5, 376 Rio Earth Summit, 117, 122. See also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Rio process, 117, 123 Rio United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 124 Russia, 25–26, 35n2, 67–69, 201, 217n45, 286, 302 Russian-Ukraine conflict/war, 298, 306 Rwanda, 11, 17, 184, 243, 277, 372. See also Hutu; Tutsi Saddam Hussein, 194–95. See also Iraq Sarajevo, 323–24. See also Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

407

Second World War, 52. See also World War II self-containment, 374–379, 381, 394, 397n4 service delivery, 225–26, 253, 255, 285, 318, 320, 322, 353 public, 256, 353 Sevan, Benon, 195, 196, 210 sexual abuse, 197–98, 207–8 Smillie, Ian, 252–253, 318–319 sociological institutionalism, 18. See also international relations (IR) Somalia, 2, 372, 378–79 South Africa, 24, 242 South Centre, 119, 140n4 South Sudan, 34, 245, 259, 395 sovereignty, 7, 53, 60, 66, 99, 120, 281n4, 346, 373, 375–76, 378, 389, 393, 395 Soviet Union (USSR), 25, 55, 58–59, 160, 169 specialization, 34, 56, 156, 326, 374 Sphere minimum standards, 261n26, 278, 398n15 state building, 100, 105n14, 285, 318–324, 328, 331–333, 335, 344, 361 strategic arena, 381–87, 390, 392, 394–95, 397n5, 398n9 strategic litigation, 271, 274 Sudan, 34, 186, 345, 383–84, 396 supervision, 210–12 sustainability, 115, 127, 225, 246, 253, 260n7, 303, 308, 311, 319, 355–56, 391 environmental, 117, 132, 241 sustainable development, 62, 89, 98–99, 113–149, 379 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 77–79, 83–87, 95, 105, 106n17, 114, 124, 126–128, 132 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), 61, 65, 77, 79, 80, 84,

408

INDEX

87, 88–91, 93, 95, 97–101, 105n14n15, 114, 116, 119, 122, 124–27, 130–33, 135, 138–39, 242, 344, 390, 393 sustainable human development (SHD), 32, 49, 61, 113–149, 255, 371, 378, 391, 394 Syria, 2, 184, 379 conflict in, 25, 298, 301 Taliban, 343. See also Afghanistan technological revolution, 59–60 Theory of Change, 239, 300, 323 therapy, 1–3, 14, 32–33, 369–399 transnational corporation (TNC), 61, 114, 121, 126, 141n27 Trump, Donald, 2, 23, 25, 65–68, 119, 124, 270, 286 Trump administration, 2, 25, 66–7, 119, 124, 286 Turkey, 24, 33, 285–316, 383. See also Erdoğan, Reccep Tayyip. Tutsi, 243. See also Rwanda United Kingdom (UK), 52, 92, 217n45, 270, 298, 348. See also Brexit United Nations (UN), 11, 15, 26–27, 32–33, 51–221, 248, 267, 269, 272, 285, 291, 295–96, 319, 344, 370, 381n7, 382, 386, 394 administration, 163, 168, 171, 203, 214, 371 advocacy, 115, 130, 132, 137 (specialized) agencies, 14, 65, 80, 82, 84–86, 102, 105n15, 191, 198, 322, 343, 359, 371 agenda, 55–56, 89, 97, 127, 137 bodies, 58, 104n2, 155, 271, 279 Bretton Woods institutions, 121, 136 budget of, 81 (UN Regular Budget), 95, 104n1, 155–56, 200 change, 115, 212

corruption, 201, 209, 213 culture of, 153, 191–92, 212, 215 decision-making, 52, 59 diplomacy in, 63–64 entities, 104–3n2–6 financing, 77, 81, 86, 175, 199, 371 forums, 122 funding/funds, 66, 84–86, 88, 97, 101, 104n5, 156, 158, 165, 192, 198, 204, 209, 211, 214 human resources, 32, 84, 175, 184 management of, 32, 162, 194, 209, 212, 214 mandate, 77, 101–3, 104n2, 121, 157, 183, 215 member states of, 67, 100, 103, 161, 345–47 norm/normative, 89, 97, 128 officials, 67, 126, 198, 206, 208, 210, 213, 215, 217n41, 397n7 organizations, 3–4, 9, 10, 14, 19–20, 36n17, 37n20, 62, 82, 101, 119, 204–5, 213, 215, 227, 251, 258, 371–72, 378–79, 382, 387, 391, 393, 397n8, 398n9 oversight system/committee, 154, 199, 217n45 personnel, 155, 163, 177, 204 programs, 66 reform, 51, 83–84, 86, 213, 215 role of, 62, 69, 88, 114, 125–27, 136, 213, 296 social contract, 285 staff/staffing, 153, 162, 164, 174–75, 191–92, 195, 198, 209, 215, 217n45, 349 standards of conduct, 192, 212 system, 4, 6–7, 18, 21–22, 32, 54, 57, 68, 80, 88–89, 103, 105n10, 130, 137, 156, 160, 165–66, 171, 175–76, 184, 192, 194, 204–5, 213, 226, 372, 379, 394, 397n8

INDEX

United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 169, 194, 201 United Nations Charter, 81, 156, 158–59, 165–66, 168, 176, 178, 184, 192, 269 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 4, 36n17, 65, 81n5, 86, 133, 156, 165, 198–99, 231–32, 248, 286, 390 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 122–23 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 58, 125, 184, 394 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 34, 65, 83, 104n5, 115–16, 125–26, 140n7, 156, 165, 186, 196, 198–99, 208, 216n9, 296, 328 United Nations Development System (UNDS), 77–91, 93–103, 105n7, 107n28 United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT), 193, 206–8 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 25, 65–66, 114, 296, 378 United Nations Ethics Office, 198, 204–210 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), 65, 124, 139, 140n6 United Nations General Assembly, 25, 55, 57–59, 63, 66, 68–69, 81, 104n1, 105n10, 119, 122, 125, 129–31, 138, 154, 156–57, 159, 161, 163–170, 175–184, 198–200, 202, 204, 207, 209, 215, 319, 378 Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, 81, 104n1, 167, 175, 178–179, 200 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 17, 104n5, 86, 156, 161, 198, 208, 217n47

409

United Nations Human Rights Council, 25, 66, 126, 141n27, 271 United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, 271 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 125, 140n7 United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), 163, 164, 166–168, 194, 199–200, 203–5, 213 United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBIH), 321–22 United Nations peacekeeping operations. See peacekeeping United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 156, 198, 386, 388 United Nations Secretariat, 59, 77, 81, 135, 153–160, 163–169, 175–177, 179, 182–184, 192, 195, 199, 202, 204, 209–215, 216n19 United Nations Secretary-General (SG), 18, 36n10, 56, 62, 65, 69, 86, 94, 100–1, 105n10n15, 106n20, 126–130, 137–138, 140n14, 141n24, 155, 159, 161–164, 167– 170, 175–184, 192, 195, 198–200, 202–204, 206–212, 214, 216n18, 346–347 United Nations Security Council, 24, 26, 57–59, 63, 65, 155, 184, 195, 210–11, 217n45, 342, 346–47 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), 217n45, 342–51, 353–54, 356–59, 361–62, 363n4 United Nations Women, 348, 350, 352–53, 356, 358 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 66, 236, 238, 324, 328, 336n8, 337n15n20, 355–56 United States of America (US/USA), 11, 16, 23–25, 30, 58–59, 65–69, 92,

410

INDEX

117–119, 123, 159, 160, 165, 168, 185, 195–96, 200, 206, 215, 269–70, 276, 286, 303, 321, 328, 348 2016 presidential election, 23, 66, 270 administration, 124 and China, 24–26 Congress, 66, 140n1, 200 Congressional chambers, 92 and EU, 16, 302, 322, 334–35 foreign policy, 269 National Security Council, 66 post-American world order, 287, 289 president, 23, 25. See Bush, George W.; Trump, Donald; Trump administration and Soviet Union, 55, 58 and UK, 52, 217n45, 348 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 138, 269, 345 UNSCR 1325, 342–362. See also United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) voluntary contributions, 80–82, 107n27

Washington Consensus, 24, 118, 131 Washington, DC, 24, 276 whistleblowers, 203–206, 209, 211, 213 women, peace, and security (WPS), 342, 345–347 agenda, 243, 347, 350, 362 World Bank (Group), 10, 65, 106n17n20, 90–93, 100, 121, 125, 133, 256–257, 348, 391 IDA-18 replenishment, 87, 92 and IMF, 20, 55, 63, 166 practices, 22 World Food Program (WFP), 86, 104n5, 161 World Health Organization (WHO), 25, 36n17, 378 COVID-19 pandemic, 2, 96 World Humanitarian Summit, 87, 106n20, 253, 390 World Trade Organization (WTO), 24, 51–52, 63, 66, 131, 136, 140n4, 184, 376, 394 trade regime, 120 World War II, 4, 6, 25, 35n5, 52, 54, 69, 101, 103, 285, 288–89, 371 Yemen, 100, 376