Interests and Stability or Ideologies and Order in Contemporary World Politics [1 ed.] 9781443892612, 9781443851763

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Interests and Stability or Ideologies and Order in Contemporary World Politics

Interests and Stability or Ideologies and Order in Contemporary World Politics By

Fabio Fossati

Interests and Stability or Ideologies and Order in Contemporary World Politics By Fabio Fossati This book first published 2017 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2017 by Fabio Fossati All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-5176-0 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-5176-3

To Irene and Rosalba

…Let me take you on a trip Around the world and back Let me show you the world in my eyes… (Depeche Mode, “World in my eyes” 1990)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Chapter One ............................................................................................... 13 The Definition of the Main Political Science Concepts 1. Definitions of the political arena: power, politics, governance, anarchy, institution ........................... 14 2. Definitions of the cultural arena: nation and civilization ............... 16 3. Definitions of the military arena: conflict, war, violence, crisis, peace, security, terrorism................................................................ 17 4. Definitions of the economic arena: cooperation, organizations, regimes, globalization .................................................................... 19 5. The definition of political cultures, interests and ideologies .......... 24 6. The definition of (world) order ...................................................... 32 Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 43 Foreign Policy: Power Status Ranking and Political Cultures 1. Models of foreign policy ranks of power status ............................. 43 2. A deviant case in Europe: Italy’s low profile before 1989 ............. 48 3. Models of political cultures in foreign policy ................................ 55 4. Models of political cultures in migration flows.............................. 59 5. Models of domestic institutions’ decision-making in foreign economic policy ............................................................. 60 Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 63 Post-1989 International System: Power Distribution and Stability 1. Models of the international system after 1989 ............................... 63 2. The definition of international stability .......................................... 66 Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 69 The Cultural Arena: The Promotion of Governance through Pluri-National States Introduction on political cultures in the cultural arena ........................ 69 1. Models of conflict resolution ......................................................... 70 2. Diagnoses of contemporary conflict resolution processes.............. 71 3. Therapies: “preferred worlds” in conflict resolution ...................... 75 4. The influence of political cultures in the cultural arena ................. 78

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Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 85 The Economic Arena: The Promotion of Order through Market Institutions Introduction on political cultures in the economic arena ..................... 85 1. North-North relations ....................................................................... 86 1.1. Four models of globalization processes................................... 86 1.2. Global institutions: international organizations and regimes .... 87 1.3. Global economic system: data on open regionalism ............... 93 2. North-South relations ....................................................................... 96 2.1. Data on economic development of non-Western countries ..... 96 2.2. A model on power/dependence relations............................... 103 2.3. Economic institutional change in developing countries ........ 105 2.3.1. The first institutional change in Latin America: the shift to protectionism after 1929 ................................. 105 2.3.2. The Asian NICs’ market transition at the end of the 1950s ....................................................................... 106 2.3.3. The Chilean market transition in the 1970s. Comparison with Argentina .............................................. 107 2.3.4. The debtors’ cartel failure in Latin America in the 1980s ....................................................................... 109 2.3.5. The Latin American market transition after 1989 ......... 111 2.3.6. The Latin American market reforms since the 1990s ... 112 3. The influence of political cultures in the economic arena.............. 113 Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 117 The Political Arena: The Promotion of Order through Democracy Introduction on political cultures in the political arena...................... 117 1. Models of external anchorage to democracy.................................. 118 2. Political conditionality ................................................................... 120 2.1. Political conditionality on development cooperation ............ 120 2.2. Political conditionality on the European Union enlargement .. 123 2.3. A summarizing typology on conditionality ........................... 132 3. Political rewards ............................................................................ 133 3.1. Rewards to democratizing states: diplomatic pressures ........ 133 3.2. Rewards to democratizing states: increased economic aid .... 134 3.3. Rewards to democratizing states: democratic assistance....... 135 3.4. The relation between enlargement and democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe ............................................. 137 4. Contagion ....................................................................................... 138 4.1. The transition process in Latin American in the 1980s ......... 138 4.2. The beginning of democratic consolidation in Latin America in the 1990s................................................. 141

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5. The exceptions to democracy ......................................................... 148 5.1. Autocracy promotion............................................................. 148 5.2. Models of hybrid regimes...................................................... 149 5.3. Models of non-democratic regimes ....................................... 151 5.3.1. Military regimes............................................................ 154 5.3.2. Neo-patrimonial regimes .............................................. 156 5.3.3. Post-Communist regimes .............................................. 158 5.3.4. Theocratic regimes........................................................ 159 5.3.5. A typology of current non-democratic regimes ............ 161 6. The influence of political cultures in the political arena ................ 162 Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 165 The Relation between Market and Democracy 1. Models on the relation between economic institutions and political regimes .................................................................... 165 1.1. State authoritarianism and liberal democracy ....................... 166 1.2. Protectionist democracy ........................................................ 168 1.3. Market authoritarianism ........................................................ 169 1.4. Two short-cuts: democracy first or market first .................... 170 2. The quantitative analysis of five non-Western regions (in 2015) ....................................................................................... 170 3. The relation between two values of world order (market and democracy) outside the West ................................................. 176 Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 179 The Military Arena: The Promotion of Order through Peace 1. The influence of political cultures in the military arena ............... 179 2. The peace-keeping missions of the United Nations ..................... 184 Conclusions ............................................................................................. 185 Interests and International Stability vs Ideologies and World Order 1. The freezing of ideas in Western diplomacies of multipolarism and bipolarism (Phase 1) .................................. 185 2. The increasing influence of ideological political cultures from 1989 to 2008 (Phase 2) ........................................................ 187 3. Hypotheses on the increasing role of ideas in international relations after 1989 .............................................. 190 4. The changes with Obama from 2009 to 2016 (Phase 3) ............... 192 5. Some contradictions among the values of world order ................ 194 6. The linkage between world order and international stability ....... 196

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Bibliography ............................................................................................ 199 1. International Relations and Political Science theory .................... 199 2. Political cultures and ideologies ................................................... 201 3. World order .................................................................................. 203 4. Foreign policy .............................................................................. 206 5. International system ..................................................................... 209 6. Cultural and Military arenas ......................................................... 211 7. Economic arena ............................................................................ 213 8. Political conditionality ................................................................. 216 9. Market and democracy ................................................................. 225 10. Latin America............................................................................... 230 11. Statistics ....................................................................................... 232

INTRODUCTION

The first important objective of this book is to present a broad analysis of world politics, with a focus on the contemporary (post-1989) phase. This is probably the first attempt to apply the methodology of the Italian school of political science to the study of world politics. This group of scholars (Sartori, Stoppino, Morlino, Panebianco, Cotta...) has always conducted research with a strong emphasis on both analytical theory (definitions and qualitative models) and empirical (mostly qualitative) inquiry in order to understand politics, more than to explain it by formulating theories. Instead, the explanatory theories of the so-called philosophical traditions (Realism, rationalist and reflective liberalism, post-Marxism…) of International Relations (IRs) will not be presented in this book. Italian political scientists have elaborated precise definitions of concepts (for example Stoppino’s definition of politics), and qualitative analytical models (for example Sartori’s models of party systems). American and British scholars have been less “obsessed” with definitions, sometimes confusing conflicts with wars, or nations with states. For example, seven definitions of order have been proposed in the IRs literature in English. Then, some political scientists have developed definitions that fall into the trap of “conceptual stretching” (Sartori 1979). Take the definition of anarchy as the absence of world authority; it has never existed, and we do not need a concept without empirical cases. Another example is the misuse of the concept of interests; according to some scholars, actors are always influenced by interests, so that it becomes a sort of “catch-all concept”. Many political scientists have specialized in either analytical theory -becoming experts in political theory-, or empirical research (for example in the public policies sub-discipline). However, without concepts and models, political scientists simply become secondrank historians; instead, without empirical research, we become secondrank philosophers. In this book, world politics will be analyzed in light of some important concepts (interests, ideologies, order, stability, power, institutions, cooperation…) and qualitative models (of political cultures, foreign policy, international systems, conflict resolution, globalization, political regimes, dependence…). Thus, this book may be classified within the boundaries of “World Politics”, the sub-discipline that has tried (since the 1980s) to build bridges between IRs and comparative politics.

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Introduction

My work has also been inspired by Johan Galtung, who has been one of my masters since we met for the first time when I graduated at the University of Firenze in 1986. In accordance with his teachings, I have not specialized in a single sub-sector of the world, compulsively repeating more or less the same researches across the decades. Rather, I have conducted many studies, each on the most relevant sub-sectors of world politics. This “holistic” book is not a random assembly, but a coherent collage of different inquiries conducted over the years. Of course, one cannot start with holism from the outset. All research needs specialization, but every time I finished a specialized inquiry, I was moved by curiosity to start another one on a different topic. Only after thirty years of studies, could I develop a broad analysis of contemporary events. I started with a dissertation thesis on peace research, and my PhD thesis was on political and economic institutions of Latin America after the 1982 foreign debt crisis. I studied economic regionalism, models of the international system, and global economic organizations/regimes; I analyzed processes of world order, governance and anarchy; I compared the foreign policy of Italy and Spain; I studied political conditionality in foreign aid and in the EU enlargement process; I analyzed the role of political cultures, interests and ideologies in international relations; I focused on armed conflict resolution processes; I studied non democratic regimes and the relation between market and democracy. After thirty years (we are in 2016), I have prepared this book, by combining those specialized (but not compulsive) researches, and trying to say something about the “overall picture” of world politics. It seems that carefully studying each sub-sector of the world is the only way to advance a coherent diagnosis on the whole. This is a heterodox research book, but it is not a monograph; because it is a sum of specialized (but not compulsive) studies, it can also become a holistic text-book for university courses. Galtung’s (1981) teachings also concern knowledge cosmologies, by which the tertium datur principle can be applied to identify something in between the research volumes and the teaching books. I have been influenced by another of Galtung’s (1985) suggestions, that research should focus on relevant objects of analysis. Instead, in the post-modern phase of human sciences (since the 1980s), research has become too sophisticated and has focused on very marginal topics of analysis. It is assumed that political science can study less important events with more precision, while critical junctures of history are to be treated as uncertainties. This book will focus on the topics that are considered most rewarding to study, according to its holistic approach. Galtung has also suggested that research should be policy-oriented; see the section in this book on some therapies in conflict resolution processes.

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This objective was advanced by peace researchers in the modern phase of the human sciences (the 1960s). By contrast, behaviorism has always assumed that if a scholar interacts with politicians, he will be “corrupted”, and will no longer be able to conduct independent research. This is not the main risk, even though it may happen. With the advent of post-modernity since the 1980s, normative efforts have almost been forgotten in the human sciences, with some exceptions (in public policies). However, even if a peace researcher envisaged a preferred world, politics would also be characterized by unintentional effects, so that any attempt to influence it will probably lead to another unforeseen and often worse outcome. The theories of the so-called philosophical traditions of IRs will not be analyzed in this book. In the first century of IRs, Realism, rationalist and reflective liberalism, and post-Marxism developed many explanatory theories (on peace, war, cooperation, imperialism, under-development…), giving rise to a significant progress of the discipline (Fossati 2015). The core of my criticism is not the formulation of these theories; it is difficult, but it can be done. After a hundred years, those schools of thought and their theories have probably become outdated, because they were also a legacy of the Cold War: with the “Republicans versus Democrats” cleavage, and the strong influence of Marxism in Europe (Sil, Katzenstein 2010). In the spring of 2012, the European Journal of International Relations (2013) organized a panel entitled “The end of International Relations theory?”. It seems that since 2001 the main conceptual cleavage is not “power versus institutions”, but “interests versus ideologies”. We can use all these concepts, but why should we emphasize only one of them, according to Realism, liberalism or Marxism? Should we continue to talk of the “main” actors of IRs (states, international organizations, multi-national corporations...), or could we just study the “relevant” actors (governments, regional organizations, global institutions, trans-national groups, domestic movements…)? Especially since 2001 the survival of these philosophical traditions risks producing empty academic intellectual “clans”. Every IRs scholar knows that these clans exist, and that they condition the editorial committees of political science journals. These clans have often turned into “prevailing” schools of thought. In the USA this role has been played by Realism, whose scholars developed assumptions about how politics works, that since the 1950s have come to be shared by most IRs researchers. Guzzini (1998) showed how Realism’s attempts to build general theories of IRs have been unsuccessful, because empirical evidence has never confirmed all the assumptions of Realism taken together. In Europe, since the 1980s yet another prevailing school has materialized in opposition to Realism: so-called “constructivism”.

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Introduction

Keohane’s (1989) expression of “reflectivism” will be preferred. Many books and articles have been written with the aim of criticizing Realism, and formulating too sophisticated theories on marginal topics of research. In this book, the study of political cultures and ideologies has been emphasized, while in the literature of IRs these concepts have not received their due consideration, because many political scientists have been afraid of being influenced by their own values. Then, the prevailing political cultures of our societies have played a major role: rightist conservatism (in the 1950s and 1960s), and leftist “political correctness” (after the 1980s). The practice of under-estimating ideologies has become established, because most political actors have developed a patterned behavior, coherent with those prevailing political cultures. They themselves could not appear to be ideological, precisely because the promoters of those political cultures wanted to avoid the so-called “naked king” effect. For example, pluri-national states have been promoted in foreign policy (with few single-nation exceptions like East Timor) since 1989. This means that the value of multi-culturalism has a strong influence in world politics, but this diagnosis is discouraged by its promoters, because leftist political correctness has become the prevailing contemporary political culture. The book has been structured into eight chapters plus the conclusions. Chapter 1 deals with the definition of the main concepts that are the cornerstones of correct understanding of international relations: power, politics, governance, anarchy, institution, nation, civilization, conflict, war, violence, crisis, peace, security, terrorism, cooperation, organizations, regimes, globalization, political cultures -defined as a mix of interests and ideologies-, and world order. The focus of this book is on two of these concepts: political cultures and order. The relationship among political cultures, interests and ideologies has never been properly understood in the literature of IRs because of the influence of its prevailing school of thought: Realism. In the past, only Goldstein and Keohane (1993) tried to emphasize the role of ideas in world politics. Culture and values are important, but cannot be studied with the overly theoretical and abstract definitions of constructivist scholars. Wendt’s (1999) analytical confusion between interests and values should be avoided. In Western politics, there are four models of democratic political cultures: the conservative, the liberal, the leftist constructivist and the leftist Manichaean. A (qualitative) model is a Weberian ideal-type, like Sartori’s models of party-systems; it is a representation of political reality according to the criteria of simplicity and coherence. Then, every political culture is influenced by philosophical traditions (respectively Realism, liberalism and Marxism), but these models have been built by observing international political behaviors.

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Thus, the relationship between interests and ideologies cannot be conceptualized abstractly, because it differs for each model; conservatism is “interests-intensive”, the other three political cultures are “ideologiesintensive”. Conservatism starts from the promotion of some interests, that generate nationalist ideas. Liberalism, constructivism and Manicheanism start from the promotion of ideologies (democracy and the market, solidarity and multi-culturalism, anti-Americanism and anti-market) and then some interest groups (business groups, unions, NGOs, movements…) support them. In the USA there is too much confusion surrounding the meaning of “liberal”, whereas in the history of European political philosophy there is great precision in the way liberalism has evolved. Finally, in the IRs literature the conceptualization of the two leftist political cultures (and of the difference between them) has been nonexistent. Instead, the concept of world order has been defined in too many ways: seven! The innovative definition put forward in this book has been linked to its meaning in everyday language. The starting point has been the original definition by Stoppino (1994) (a pioneer of Italian political science) of actual (more than potential) power and politics: the search for stabilized compliance. Governance is the stabilization of compliance, that usually leads to pluri-national states. Then, order is a sub-category of governance, and compliance must be anchored to a unit of measurement, a criterion, a benchmark, a value. The post-1989 world order must be anchored to the four values of each arena of international relations: national self-determination -the only one being lowly promoted-, market, democracy, and peace. Consequently, anarchy cannot be defined as the absence of world authority (as in the IRs literature); this is conceptual stretching because a world authority has never existed, and we do not need a concept without empirical cases. Rather, anarchy simply means absence of governance: “political laissez faire”, i.e. abstention from intervening and from trying to stabilize compliance. Power is just the search for compliance, but it is mostly an instrument of politics, to achieve certain aims, like interests and/or ideologies -that may compatible or lead in opposite directions. Institutions have been well defined in the literature of IRs, and the domestic ones are state actors and state laws. The only way to avoid conceptual stretching is to link global regimes to international law, and international organizations to inter-governmental actors. Institutions cannot include informal norms and repeated practices. Organizations without bureaucracy and space are inter-governmental forums. Cooperation has been better defined by Stoppino (1995): an interaction among certain actors, intentionally and reciprocally favorable to them. Thus, it cannot be confused with coordination, which is only a sub-

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Introduction

category of cooperation. Globalization must be linked to interdependence and does not necessarily mean the spread of market reforms. There are concepts that cannot be confused; conflict and war are not synonyms. Conflict is only an incompatibility of ends, while war is armed conflict. Many wars come to an end, but conflicts are not necessarily resolved. Moreover, nations are sociological entities, i.e. groups of individuals with a common identity, while states are juridical organizations. Using these two concepts as synonyms is another unacceptable mistake. Many scholars have often confused conflicts with wars, and nations with states. Then, concepts of peace and security have been more precisely defined, in order to avoid conceptual stretching; peace is absence of war (and not of structural violence) and security is control over threats. Finally, also Galtung’s (1981) definition of civilization has been presented and anchored to objective criteria (the cosmologies, that is to say the common visions of the world), while Huntington’s (1996) subjective conception of civilization has been linked to collective identities. The following two chapters focus on foreign policy (the second) and on the international system (the third). Both of these dimensions are important, and it is just non sense to elaborate useless theories on which of them is more important, as some scholars of Realism and liberalism have done. According to the Italian school of political science (and Stoppino’s teaching), the focus must be on actual (and not potential) power, which conditions both statuses of foreign policy, and power distribution at the systemic level. However, power is mainly an instrument to achieve the objectives of the actors: interests and/or ideologies. Chapter 2 deals with foreign policy. It presents an innovative typology of power statuses of foreign policy: low profile, small, medium, great, and super-powers. In the literature of IRs, the features of these ranks are too vague. Super powers are those of bipolarism; great powers are those of multipolarism; medium powers are former great powers; small powers are small countries; low profile has been anchored to apathy. This typology starts from actual power (behaviors) and not from potential power indicators: per capita income, military expenditures, population… Next, the deviant pre-1989 “low profile” diplomacy (Italy) is presented and explained by the radical ideology of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The latter was the only left party in Europe with a Manichaean/socialist, rather than a constructivistsocial-democratic ideology; the PCI was anti-market, anti-NATO, and anti-EU. Italy became a small power after 1989. China, Russia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK) are middle powers; Spain, Brazil, India, Japan, Australia and South Africa are between the statuses of small and medium powers. The USA have been the only great power, at

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least until Obama. The four (conservative, liberal, leftist constructivist and leftist Manichaean) models of political cultures are applied to diplomacy and migration flows. What matters more: interests, ideologies, or both? In American diplomacy the promotion of interests has always (before and after 1989) prevailed. It has been linked to the “lesser evil” principle (support for military or personalist regimes) over the absolute evil (communism or Islamic fundamentalism). Liberal and constructivist ideas have been promoted only since 1989, together with the neo-con diplomacy in the 2003 Iraq war. However, conservative diplomacy (and the “lesser evil” principle) was abandoned by Obama during and after the Arab Spring. “Low intensity” bombings against Isis in Iraq, Syria and Libya were also far from the promotion of interests. European middle powers (France, Germany, and the UK) have always privileged the promotion of interests, especially in foreign economic policy. Finally, the main features of domestic institutions of foreign economic policy (public bodies entitled to give support to national firms, or foreign aid agencies) are highlighted to elaborate some decision-making models: hierarchy versus coordination, or centralization in ministries versus decentralization in technical agencies. Chapter 3 analyzes the (qualitative) models of the international system after 1989. First, it presents an innovative typology with which to classify the four hypotheses (unipolarism, multipolarism, concert of powers, and economic tripolarism) on models of the post-bipolar structure. The rigid diagnoses (like US unipolarism) of some IRs scholars, only based on potential (and not actual) power, are criticized in this chapter. According to Stoppino’s (1994) definition of politics, labeling the international system as unipolar is a mistake. The USA tried to stabilize compliance, but did not succeed, especially after 2001. According to Rosecrance (1992), in the 1990s, the model of the international system was the concert of powers, while since 2001 both the unipolar push of Bush Jr and the multipolar efforts of Obama have failed. A stable power configuration of the current system has not yet emerged; hence the empirical evidence gainsays the models. Then, international stability is conceptualized as a control process over change. Instability may be the outcome of both international change (as from 1915 to 1945, or after 1989) and domestic values, like those of Islamic fundamentalism. Since 2001, the current international system has naturally become quite unstable. The next empirical chapters analyze the four arenas of international relations: the cultural (the fourth, on conflicts among different civilizations or nations), the economic (the fifth, on North-North or North-South globalization), the political (the sixth, on external processes influencing domestic regimes) and the military (the eight, on wars and peace-keeping).

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Introduction

The seventh chapter analyzes the relation between the economic and the political arenas: between market or state institutions and democratic or authoritarian regimes. Each empirical chapter has an introduction and a conclusion focused on the influence of political cultures in every arena of IRs: both “interests-intensive” conservatism and “ideologies-intensive” liberalism, leftist constructivism and Manicheanism. Thus, the interplay between interests and ideologies is the main dimension of the world order (and not the dialectic between power and institutions), with Western countries trying to stabilize certain values. It can be better understood by emphasizing the role of domestic political cultures; the influence of the schools of thought (Realism, rationalist and reflective liberalism and postMarxism) is less relevant for understanding contemporary events. Chapter 4 analyzes the cultural arena of IRs. First, twelve models on conflict resolution processes, starting from Galtung’s (1987) typology, are presented: integration (with federalism, consensual pacts, or administrative autonomy), (either single or pluri-nation) separation, compromise (with condominiums or confederations), exchange (with amnesty), persuasion (with arbitration), transcendence (with democracy), dominion (with military victory), incapacitation (with ethnic cleansing), multilateralization (with UN peace-keeping)… This section is innovative because the AngloAmerican scholars of IRs have mostly forgotten conflict resolution. Then, nearly ninety armed conflicts in Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Asia are analyzed. Finally, some alternative (both fair and effective) normative solutions are presented, according to the peace research tradition. Chapter 5 analyzes the economic arena of IRs, starting with NorthNorth relations. First, an innovative typology of globalization processes, built on the two dimensions of standardization and uniformization, is presented and linked to political cultures. Second, the main global (trade, monetary, and banking) economic institutions (both organizations and regimes) are classified into hierarchical, reciprocal and preferential, because of different power relations, and linked to political cultures. Other economic interactions are characterized by informal rules (investments by trans-national corporations) or repeated practices (energy sector or foreign aid), and they have not been institutionalized, contrary to the diagnosis anchored to “conceptual stretching” made by some reflectivist scholars. Third, global economic power relations are conceptualized through the scenario of three “open regions” (Americas, Euro-Africa and Asia); some statistics on North-South economic flows are presented to support this diagnosis. The second part of the chapter deals with North-South relations, which have not been sufficiently explored in the Anglo-American literature of IRs. Some sort of delegation has been made to neo-Marxist-

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third-worldist scholars, but they have done little empirical research, which has also been too biased by leftist Manichaean values. First, statistical data on economic development (per capita income and its distribution) of nonWestern countries (Latin America, Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa) are presented, together with a typology of four different development processes according to the combination of those two economic variables. Second, Emerson’s model of power/dependence relations is applied to North-South relations and political cultures, in order to identify four strategies to break dependence relations: self-reliance, import-substitution industrialization (ISI), export promotion, and collective organization. The third section of the chapter analyzes economic institutional change in Latin America and Asia, with the different shifts towards protectionism (in 1929 and 1945) or laissez faire (in 1989). Before 1989, economic institutional change in the Third World was conditioned by some “ideological” political cultures (socialism in communist countries, radical liberalism in Pinochet’s Chile, and socialdemocratic ISI in Latin America,), but “interests-intensive” conservatism was also applied by the four Asian tigers through export promotion. After 1989, many countries (Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile) returned to conservatism, applying moderate market reforms. Venezuela’s Chavez was Manichaean, pushing countries like Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina to social-democratic protectionism. Chapter 6 analyzes the political arena of IRs. Four innovative models of external anchorage to democracy are presented, starting from Whitehead’s (1996) classification: military control, inertial contagion, political conditionality, and positive rewards (diplomatic pressures, increase of economic aid, and democratic assistance). The following sections consider the evolution of political conditionality (on foreign aid to developing countries and on the EU’s enlargement in Eastern Europe), rewards (to democratizing states) and contagion (in Latin America’s regime transition and consolidation processes after the mid-1970s). Finally, the exceptions to democracy in non-Western states are presented: autocracy promotion (by authoritarianisms), and models of (protected, no law and limited) hybrid and (post-communist, neo-patrimonial, military and theocratic) non-democratic regimes. Neo-patrimonial regimes may be personalist or federal; theocracies may be traditionalist or fundamentalist. The category of theocracy has often been neglected by political scientists, owing to the negative influence of the prevailing political culture in post-modern societies: leftist political correctness. A paradox of the current world order is that democracies (especially the USA) have sometimes supported authoritarian regimes, doing so on the “lesser evil” principle.

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Introduction

Chapter 7 deals with the relation between democracy and the market outside the West after 1989. A positive correlation materialized in the West, together with its opposite trend, when both protectionism and authoritarian regimes emerged (in Russia, Italy and Germany) between the two world wars. Before 1989, Latin America privileged democracy but applied protectionism, while the Asian tigers were market-oriented but still authoritarian. The chapter presents post-1989 statistics on non-Western countries (Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, North Africa and the Middle East). Even if most developing countries are pushing towards both democracy and market reforms, there are some objectors to both values of the world order (Cuba, North Korea, many Islamic states…), or only to democracy (China, Russia…). Developing countries have been classified in a typology with nine boxes, and three different (high, intermediate and low) combinations of the two variables. Chapter 8 analyzes the military arena of IRs, and the strategies of the main powers in their decisions to start wars after 1989. Even if Western governments have mostly promoted one of the values of the world order (peace), they have also launched eight wars since 1989: in Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and against Isis (in Iraq, Syria and Libya). This is one of the paradoxes of the current world order. It will be explained in the conclusions. Finally, the peace-keeping missions of the United Nations (UN) are presented, to show where (and why) the UN has organized them, or (on the contrary) has chosen anarchy. The conclusions emphasize the increasing role of ideological political cultures (liberalism, leftist constructivism and Manicheanism) since 1989. Ideologies were frozen after Yalta, and during the Cold War the USA mostly promoted its own interests, with few exceptions like the Vietnam war. Ideologies only mattered in the domestic politics of Western countries, with market and democracy versus socialism and communism of the Eastern bloc. The USA never supported national self-determination, market, democracy and peace outside the West; the Third World was characterized by national frustrations, wars, authoritarian regimes and state (or very protectionist) economic institutions. The definition of the Cold War as an ideological period (with much rhetoric) is not only a stereotype, but also a thesis without empirical evidence. Ideologies become more relevant when international systems change, as they did from 1915 to 1945 or after 1989. This book reaches the innovative conclusion that ideologies were of scant importance during the Cold War (phase 1), contrary to the diagnoses of most IRs scholars. This occurred precisely because behaviors matter much more than declarations, according to Stoppino’s (1994) definition of politics: the search for stabilized compliance on some values.

Interests and Stability or Ideologies and Order in Contemporary World Politics

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After 1989 (phase 2), the West promoted world order with the increasing influence of ideologies: multi-culturalism of the constructivist left in conflict resolution; radical liberal ideas in economic globalization; neocon, liberal “just” and leftist “politically correct” wars; no-global and peace movements of the Manichaean left. However, conservatism remained the prevailing political culture in diplomacies until the Arab Spring. These changes occurred because of the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996), the change of the international system (Wight 1979), and the West’s transition to post-modernity (with the decreasing role of ideologies in domestic politics). Obama decided another, more important, diplomatic change. He abandoned conservatism: first with his neglect of the lesser evil principle in the Arab Spring of 2011, second with his refusal to wage war against the Islamic fundamentalist groups, except for the “low intensity” bombings against Isis in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Western leaders hoped that not making war against Isis would avert terrorism in Europe, but this “catalyst” strategy failed when Isis attacked Paris in November 2015. The USA has lost any consistent diplomatic strategy; Obama has neglected interests (except in the economy), and has not coherently promoted any other ideology (like liberalism or constructivism). Since 2011 (phase 3), conservatism has no longer been the prevailing political culture in diplomacies. The conclusions on the three phases are innovative (1. Cold War: only interests; 2. Post-1989: both interests and ideologies; 3. Post-2011: few interests and incoherent ideas) in the IRs literature. In the last section, the concept of world order has been linked to international stability, because the promotion of ideas often favors some world order, while the defense of interests usually gives rise to more stable international systems. When Islamic fundamentalist actors object to all the values of world order, there is the greatest threat to international stability. In these cases, according to the conservative diplomatic model, Western states should stop promoting democracy and peace (with the “lesser evil” principle, and high intensity wars against Islamic fundamentalist groups), within the paradox of the current world order. This conservative scenario of a disordered stability has never been applied with coherence by the West, but it could undergo a revival in the near future. In the 1990s there was an effort to consolidate both order (with democracy, market reforms and efforts to stop the ethnic wars in Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia) and stability, within the concert of powers. After 2001, there was neither order -with many wars, promoted by Islamic fundamentalist actors-, nor stability -both unipolarism and multipolarism failed. The “potential” scenario of an unstable order would be linked to the liberal promotion of single-nation (only Sunni, or only Shiite) states, especially in the Middle East.

12

Introduction

Acknowledgements All books start with thanks to colleagues and maestri, and I wish to express my gratitude to Jean Blondel, Giampiero Cama, Maurizio Cotta, Robert Devlin, Johan Galtung, Umberto Gori, Joe Grieco, Pietro Grilli da Cortona (+), Stefano Guzzini, Robert Keohane, Liborio Mattina, Leonardo Morlino, Angelo Panebianco, Thomas Risse and Mario Stoppino (+).

CHAPTER ONE THE DEFINITION OF THE MAIN POLITICAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS

A special focus on analytical theory has been the cornerstone of the Italian school of political science, while in the USA and the UK there has not been the same emphasis on the definitions of concepts. This has especially occurred since the 1980s, when post-modern cosmologies were advanced, with rejection of the theoretical framework of the positivist phase of our discipline. For example, Wittgenstein’s slogan was proposed; concepts must not be defined, and their meaning is the outcome of their use. Sartori (1979) insisted on methodological precision, especially in definitions, in order to avoid both conceptual stretching (an excessively broad application of them) and conceptual redundancy, where many terms have the same meaning. For example, conceptual stretching is apparent in the definitions of peace or security, and in the mainstream definition of anarchy, provided by realist scholars. If anarchy means the absence of one authority in world politics, the conceptual stretching trap is certainly not avoided; such a definition of anarchy corresponds to nearly 100% of the empirical cases. Another example of conceptual stretching is the definition -used by reflective-constructivist liberals- of global regimes as repeated practices; in most empirical cases there are repeated practices! The concepts of war, conflict and crisis have often been used interchangeably, and this has been a mistake. Other concepts (politics and cooperation) have been better defined by another Italian political scientist (Stoppino 1994, 1995). In the following chapters, innovative definitions of world order and political cultures (as mixes of interests and ideologies) will be advanced. Words have simple meanings in everyday language, and political scientists must eschew both over-simplification and artificiality. Sartori provided guidance on how to build typologies and classifications, which must be both exhaustive and exclusive. He also elaborated some models, for instance of party systems. Models can be conceptualized according to Weber’s ideal-types; they are simplifications of the reality, that follow the two basic principles of simplicity and coherence.

14

Chapter One

1. Definitions of the political arena: power, politics, governance, anarchy, institution The starting point is Stoppino’s (1994, 1995) definition of politics. Many scholars have refused to give a definition of such a complex concept, but Stoppino’s effort has probably been the best in the history of political science. He rejected the mainstream definitions that link politics with government or the allocation of values (Easton 1953), because those processes do not fit in the international arena that has no central authority. He resumed the conception of politics as a power struggle (Morgenthau 1948), but elaborated it further. Politics is the action that reinforces the exercise of power, which is limited in time and space. Actual power is more important than potential power; if the latter does not materialize, there is a diffusion of power. Power is the search for compliance, while politics is the search for guaranteed (or ensured) compliance, which seeks to stabilize it in time and generalize it in space to many actors. Tribes of prehistory only stabilized compliance in time, while clans of agricultural societies also sought to extend it in space. The first political actors materialized when there arose a “bosses’ boss” structure (Buzan and Little 2000), as exemplified by mafias. Stoppino applied this definition of politics to the monetary (domestic) arena, in which there are government institutions, and to the natural (international) one, in which there are none. In the model of “monetary politics”, the authority produces and distributes rights or dues (guaranteed compliance): the activity of political production. Hence, the scenario of domestic (monetary) politics, where values are defined by the government in a constitution, is this: Actor: Resources Æ Compliance. In the model of “natural politics”, there is no authority defining the ultimate interests and values of the actors. The scenario of world politics has many (and different) interests and values to be promoted. This model shows that power is just an instrument of interests and values. Actor: Resources Æ Compliance Æ Interests and Values The concept of governance has recently been developed in the political science literature by Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) in Governance without Government. They distinguished hierarchical government, as in domestic politics where a single actor rules, from “governance”, where the key decisions are accepted by the main actors through a multilateral (or “minilateral”) decision-making process (Kooiman 1993). Government concerns the subject level: i.e. those who make the decisions; governance concerns the compliance level. Politics (and not governance) is the search for guaranteed (stabilized in time and generalized in space) compliance.

The Definition of the Main Political Science Concepts

15

When politics succeed, and compliance is stabilized and generalized, governance materializes (Fossati 1999a). In governance, some values are fulfilled, but are not fixed and may change, because actors can guarantee compliance with their resources. In the IRs literature, governance has often been used as synonym for politics; instead, politics concerns the process of searching, while governance concerns that of obtaining something. The concept of anarchy cannot mean absence of a world authority, as orthodox realists (Waltz 1979) usually assume, because this definition falls into the trap of conceptual stretching. There would be a connotation with no empirical cases, because a world authority has never existed; this is probably the highest level of conceptual stretching. There has never been an international system with either a world government or a single hegemon. On the contrary, a correct way to conceptualize anarchy is to view it as the absence of governance. It materializes when the international actors adopt a “political laissez faire”, and abstain from stabilizing and generalizing other actors’ compliance (Fossati 1999a). For example, if China occupies Tibet and Western states do not intervene, that is anarchy. It is then important to understand what institutions are, so as to avoid redundancies in meaning and conceptual stretching. In the current political science literature, the meaning of “institution” is almost clear, but there are still some ambiguities, because there are too many definitions and they sometimes differ among disciplines. Many of them do not establish rigid boundaries with informal rules (conventions) and repeated practices. In fact, the sociological definition of an institution as something linked to a high value identification by participants in the system (like the Palio for citizens of Siena, or Pizza for citizens of Napoli), cannot be used in political science. According to Keohane (1989) and Lanzalaco (1995), institutions can be both rules (of the state) and actors (of the state). Instead, rational choice supporters assume that individuals are the only significant actors in politics; hence institutions can only exist as rules (North 1990). The rules of domestic politics are institutionalized only if they are recognized by the state -consider the different kinds of wedding ceremony-, while the regulations of a private club are not. Informal rules (for example on the correct way of speaking) are not institutions. Also repeated practices -for example going to the cinema on Saturday eveningscannot be considered institutions. State actors are usually classified into two categories of public institutions: the political (government, parliament, president …) and the neutral (bureaucracy, judges, armed forces, police…); the latter are not the outcome of elections. Finally, non-state actors, like parties or interest groups, are not institutions.

16

Chapter One

2. Definitions of the cultural arena: nation and civilization The nation is a sociological concept, while the state is a juridical one. States have an authority and a constitution, within a territory, and are recognized in international law. In Europe, most nations coincide with the same states, but this does not occur in other parts of the world, especially in former European colonies. There are three objective dimensions of nations: language, religion and ethnicity (as a sub-category of race: for example, Hutu and Tutsi among black Africans). This is the “biological” definition of ethnicity, rather than the cultural one whereby ethnic groups almost coincide with nations; in fact, there seems to be some conceptual stretching in this last definition, and also some redundancy between the two terms (Fossati 1998). The promoters of political correctness are trying to erase biology, because of the guilt felt by European nations after centuries of nationalistic wars, genocides and racism. Instead, the subjective definition of nation is linked to the self-perception, by a group of individuals, of sharing the same collective identity (Goio 1994). For example, Latin American nations have the same language (except Brazil), the same (Catholic) religion, and the same biology, but they have different subjective identities. However, there are either single-nation (in Europe, Japan…) or pluri-national (in the rest of the world) states. There are also two definitions of the concept of civilization. The objective one (Galtung 1981) was anchored to cosmologies: that is, the visions of the world shared by a group of nations. Galtung identified six cosmologies: conception of time (progress or cycles-linearity); conception of space (center/periphery or decentralization); knowledge foundations (atomistic or holistic, deductive or inductive, Aristotle’s principles of noncontradiction and tertium non datur or yin-yang dialectics); person/person relations (verticalism; individualism or collectivism); person/nature relations (exploitation or vegetarianism); person/god relations (one god or a plurality of gods; universalism or no universalism; transcendence or immanence; eternal soul or reincarnation-nirvana; separation or integration between political and religious spheres). Huntington’s (1996) definition was based on a subjective criterion: the highest level of collective selfperception of identity. In sum, for social and political researchers the identification of nations and civilizations is difficult, because perceptions change over time. According to the objective definition, Galtung’s civilizations are seven: Western (Christian, Jewish, Islamic), Hindu, Eastern (Buddhist, Sinic, Japanese). Huntington excluded the Jewish and the Buddhist civilizations, and added the Eastern-Orthodox, the Latin American and the African ones, according to the subjective criterion.

The Definition of the Main Political Science Concepts

17

3. Definitions of the military arena: conflict, war, violence, crisis, peace, security, terrorism The definition of conflict is as follows (Galtung 1987, Fossati 1998): a relationship among social groups and/or political actors whose objectives are incompatible. Aims must be incompatible; if they are only different, there is no conflict. War is a violent conflict among organized actors that lasts in time; the indicator of 1000 deaths is only used in statistical studies (Bobbio 1984). Thus, conflict and war cannot be used as synonyms; this is a very frequent mistake committed not only by peace researchers or strategic studies’ scholars, but also by some political and social scientists, historians, economists, jurists... Violence is the intentional use of force by someone, that produces suffering in another actor (Stoppino 1995). Instead, a crisis is the sum of three pre-conditions: a severe threat to security, limited time to make decisions, and a high probability of being involved in a war (Brecher 1986). Thus, also the concepts of crisis and conflict cannot be confused, even if they are often used as synonyms. In the 1960s, Boulding (1957) and Galtung (1969) conducted their well-known debate on the definition of peace. Boulding’s orthodox negative definition (peace as the absence of war) finally prevailed. Galtung’s heterodox positive definition (peace as the absence of structural violence) was a typical case of conceptual stretching. If structural violence is everything that causes the difference between human potentials and empirical realizations, there are too many empirical cases of positive peace. Thus, peace would become almost anything: absence of war or of violence, economic development, democracy, fulfillment of human rights, respect for the environment… In fact, it was precisely outside the West that the negative peace conception prevailed. Latin American, African and Asian countries were full of sociologists, economists and historians dealing with problems of development and social justice. But those countries lacked experts on the arms race, disarmament proposals, or conflict management and resolution. Hence peace research institutes in the Third World (in Chile, Brazil, Nigeria, India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines…) mostly avoided studies on structural violence, and focused on negative peace (Fossati 1987). Then, Galtung (1987) identified two kinds of conflict: latent conflict, in which actors do not perceive the incompatibility of their ends; manifest conflict, in which actors perceive it at the level of either (psychological) attitude or (violent or otherwise) behavior. Conflict is often not perceived, precisely because there is much structural violence. According to the “objectivists”, the researcher can decide whether or not there is conflict.

18

Chapter One

Instead, the “subjectivists” (like Boulding) identify conflicts only at the manifest level, and latent conflict is the psychological one. This “conflict” may be resolved, by identifying potential issues of incompatibility through previously defined indicators (latent level). Then, the perception of incompatibility must be tested on actors’ declarations and behaviors (manifest level). The context of perceptual analysis is structural analysis, where the observer identifies potential incompatible objectives (Fossati 1998). The first step in conflict analysis is identification of actors and issues of incompatibility. The second step is identification of the crystallization level and of the resolution models. “Crystallization” means the presence of a conflict; a conflict crystallizes when no resolution is found. A low-crystallized conflict does not last for long, and may take the form of a simple declaration of discord that is not followed by actions. A high-crystallized conflict is not immediately resolved and manifests itself repeatedly, or it is often temporarily frozen (Fossati 1998). In the 1990s, a new debate began on the definition of security. It was the “same old story”. The new slogan was: we cannot conceptualize security only in the military arena. Military security was defined as control over threats to the survival of individuals (Cesa 1991). It cannot be the absence of threats, which always coexist with human life. There are three levels of military security: domestic -when single persons are threatened by other criminal individuals or by their own government-, international when a state is threatened by another state or by terrorist organizationsand global -when the threat of nuclear weapons is against the planet’s survival. Galtung (1985) identified four (military, political, economic, cultural) arenas of security, and the targets (survival, freedom, welfare, identity) of violent threats (use of force, repression, misery, alienation). However, several conceptual difficulties arise if we try to export the definition of military security to the other three arenas. It is hard to conceptualize political security; we must define concepts in the simplest possible way. We already use the terminology of human rights to deal with political security. Instead, the term “cultural security” can be accepted. There are numerous social and political actors, which feel that their identity is threatened by globalization, such as no-global (globofóbicos) groups. Buzan (1983) objected that the economic arena is a typically insecure environment. Thus, market institutions always lead to insecurity, because in that arena conflict is the normal condition of human relations. By contrast, in the military arena peace and the absence of violence are the normal conditions, so that a threshold can be identified, when there are significant threats to human survival. Instead, it is difficult to identify that threshold in the economic arena. However, Buzan admitted that at least so-

The Definition of the Main Political Science Concepts

19

called “energy security” can be conceptualized. When oil or gas prices strongly increase, or when the quantities of energy exports drop, there are high threats to economic/energy security. Some Third World scholars (Valdes 1981) have emphasized that outside the West there is also a significant threshold (human survival): when the basic needs of poorest people are not guaranteed. This is so-called “food security”. Finally, there are two other important dimensions of security, which are somewhat linked to the military and economic arenas (Fossati 1994): environmental (against major threats of catastrophes or accidents) and demographic when population birth rates or immigration flows greatly increase. Of course, terrorism is the greatest threat to security; its aim is cause collective fear, and violence may occur at any moment and with any instrument. In recent decades, there have been four kinds of terrorism, according to their ideology: political (communist or Nazi-fascist) and cultural (nationalist or religious), at both institutional and social levels.

4. Definitions of the economic arena: cooperation, organizations, regimes, globalization Cooperation is an interaction among actors that is intentionally and reciprocally favorable to them (Stoppino 1995). The level of reciprocity cannot be considered in rigid manner (fifty-fifty), but various levels of more or less symmetric outcomes of interactions are cooperative. In the IRs literature, Keohane’s (1989) definition of cooperation has been more often cited: the policies coordination by which actors adjust their behavior towards preferences of other actors. The latter is unsatisfactory because it is vague -reciprocity is not mentioned-, and uses a concept (coordination) that (like collaboration) is only a sub-category of cooperation (Stein 1993). Cooperation can be applied to bilateral, minilateral or multilateral relations. Bilateral cooperation often materializes in agreements that are una tantum events, or may be repeated in time: in firms’ investments, arms control… Minilateral (among few actors) cooperation can also lead to una tantum agreements or may be repeated in time. In the multipolar system, explicit alliances or informal coalitions were formed among European powers: France, Great Britain and Russia, or Germany, Austria and Italy. Since 1945, minilateral cooperation has also led to regional organizations, like the European Union (EU) or MercoSur. These regional organizations are more institutionalized if they have integration targets and supranational institutions (Commission, Central Bank…), like the European Union. Organizations that are not provided with a (neutral) bureaucracy only remain inter-governmental forums, like the Conference on Security

20

Chapter One

and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) before 1989. There are also some minilateral trans-regional organizations, that are not geographic. These actors are usually called either alliances (like NATO) in the military arena, or coalitions (like OPEC) in the economic arena; they can never be labeled institutions. Finally, there are some minilateral regimes, i.e. regional institutionalized rules, like for example the regime on acid rain in Europe. Multilateral cooperation is global in nature and usually leads to institutions (Keohane 1989): both rules (global regimes) and actors (intergovernmental organizations), such as the UN (United Nations), the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the WTO (World Trade Organization). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), like Amnesty International and the Red Cross, cannot be considered international institutions. Institutions are naturally stronger if a global regime has a parallel organization that tries to stabilize the compliance of both governments and domestic actors. Global regimes and institutionalized organizations usually have functional aims like trade liberalization (the WTO), foreign debt management (the IMF), or peace keeping missions (the UN). For example, environment regimes are weaker because there is no international organization on the environment. At the same time, there are global organizations that do not have a neutral bureaucracy and a permanent space; they remain intergovernmental forums (such as the GATT, the G-7, the G-20…). Global regimes are those embedded in international law. Rules are always explicit. There is both customary and codified law; in the case of conflict among them, the former usually prevails. International regimes can be defined as sets of architectural principles and explicit rules on which all the actors’ expectations (on an issue/area) converge. Principles concern the capacity of a regime to generate compliance and to specify the outcomes of an interaction, that is, who is going to win: who devalues, who opens the markets, etc. Rules only define the processes: how to devalue, how to protect, etc. If principles and rules are effective, there is a regime; hence “dead letter regimes” are rules only from a law (and not a political science) perspective (Rittberger 1993). The genesis of a regime is usually connected to a code signed by governments: for instance, the documents of the rounds of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and the Bretton Woods charter for the IMF. Then there may be some sections of a codified regime, that are not observed by states, and remain ineffective; thus, custom prevails over codes. This definition is much simpler than Krasner’s (1983). In fact, two further connotations have been eliminated. On the one hand, the difference between norms and rules seems to be significant in comparative law but not in political science; on the other hand, decision-making procedures are a sub-category of rules.

The Definition of the Main Political Science Concepts

21

However, the main difference concerns the meaning of principles, which Krasner linked to the level of ideas (moral values and beliefs). A regime must comprise both principles and rules; it may have a clear principle and few rules, but it cannot have no principle at all. In fact, if there is no principle, it is only a “quasi”-regime. This definition includes specificity, one of Keohane's connotations of institutionalization; in fact, it is a pre-condition. This implies that a regime must be differentiated from other behaviors with no normative content, like informal rules and repeated practices. This broad definition of global regimes had been advanced by so-called “Grotian” scholars, belonging to the philosophical (reflective-constructivist) liberal tradition, who fell into the trap of conceptual stretching. Another example is Ruggie’s (1983) concept of “embedded liberalism”. This is an excellent picture of the reality, but it is not the normative framework of trade relations. Rules are characterized by laissez faire, while national policies may lead to trade protectionism. Embedded liberalism is the dialectical result (a repeated practice) of liberal regimes and protectionist national policies. Conventions (informal rules) are not institutionalized, and cannot be considered regimes. Instead, Keohane (1989) labeled conventions as institutions, but informal rules do not satisfy the condition of specificity. For example, there are some informal rules on the correct way to speak, and many people follow them even without any kind of coordination. In international relations, there are many bilateral agreements, domestic and minilateral rules (like those of the EU) on foreign direct investments, but there is no global regime. A Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) had been proposed in the Uruguay round of GATT, but that intergovernmental organization has never been approved. However, all those agreements have crystallized a set of informal rules that may induce states to harmonize those agreements (Milner 2014, Simmons 2014). Merely repeated or patterned behaviors do not produce institutions. Of course, they condition expectations, but if they are not institutionalized, there is no regime. For example, there is a group of friends who always meet on Saturday evenings to go the cinema. This is not an informal rule because it is not shared by a large group of individuals across countries; it is just a repeated practice. An example of repeated practices in international relations is provided by the oil market (Haggard and Simmons 1987). In the 1950s and 1960s, the expectations of the actors in the system were in favor of large multi-national corporations: the “Seven Sisters”. Instead, after the 1973 and 1979 oil price increases, power relations changed and expectations were in favor of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) producers. Two different (non-

22

Chapter One

institutionalized) repeated practices, mainly defined by power relations, had materialized. Since the 1980s, power relations have no longer defined clear expectations; sometimes multi-nationals prevail, at other times states do. Thus, there are no repeated practices, but only discordant practices. Considering either informal rules or repeated practices as international regimes is conceptual stretching. If an actor breaches those rules or does not follow those practices, there cannot be any conflict resolution or any sanction, like the dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO. The distance between institutionalized customary and informal rules in international law may be short. Customs consist in unwritten rules provided with the opinio juris pre-condition. In the case of legal uncertainties, the International Court of Justice can decide what is law and what is not. However, not all global institutions (both organizations and regimes) are cooperative. According to its architectural principle, a regime is hierarchical if the effects of interactions are unbalanced, and the most powerful actors gain while the others lose. The non-proliferation regime is an example of hierarchy; the nuclear club states maintain their power and non-nuclear governments renounce their armament projects. The “foreign debt regime” that the IMF began to apply in 1982 was hierarchical, because it favored creditor banks. If the effects are more symmetrical, the regime is reciprocal, like the other global regimes: the Chemical or the Biological armaments, and the Comprehensive Test Ban treaties. The free trade regime managed by the WTO is mostly reciprocal (at least in industry trade). If the architectural principle favors less powerful actors (developing countries), the regime is preferential, like the so-called “New International Economic Order” requested by developing countries in the 1970s -although it has never materialized. Power relations also condition global institutions, and the “power versus institutions” dichotomy cannot be read though Manichaean lens. When only power matters, as in the oil market, there are no institutions. But power can also condition hierarchical regimes; instead, reciprocal and preferential regimes are cooperative. Implementation is the process of “transferring” an international regime into domestic politics. Density is the extent to which a regime rules an issue-area. This concept should not be confused with the strength of an institution in terms of its coherence (of a regime) or its cohesion (of an organization). The IMF is more cohesive because votes are proportional to economic contributions to its budget, so that richer countries are overrepresented. The WTO is less cohesive because it adopts the “one stateone vote” principle. A regime is poorly coherent when its rules are not clear and sometimes permit exceptions, delegating the possibility to apply

The Definition of the Main Political Science Concepts

23

the rule or the exception to the political arena, as in the trade regime. The monetary regime managed by the IMF has been more coherent. The strength of an organization does not naturally coincide with its institutionalization, which depends on two dimensions: autonomy and commonality -specificity is already a pre-condition (Keohane 1989). An organization is autonomous, when it does not depend on state members in order to make decisions. Only inter-governmental organizations with a minimum level of autonomy can be considered institutions. If they are provided with permanent bureaucrats and a physical space, autonomy usually follows. Otherwise international organizations remain at the level of “forums”, and states only establish an organizational instrument to make their decisions. This is the case of the GATT rounds before the institution of WTO, or of the Groups of 7-20. The General Secretariat of the United Nations is more autonomous, while the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN are less autonomous. The second dimension of institutionalization is commonality that is the extent to which expectations about appropriate behavior and understandings on how to interpret action are shared by participants in the system. Commonality is favored by the degree of the representativeness of an organization; a Security Council with members from all the civilizations of the world would have more commonality than the current one. In the WTO, commonality is greater because of the “one state-one vote” principle; it is lower in the IMF because votes are proportional to budget financing. Globalization is another concept that is often linked to cooperation. It can be defined as the extension of (vulnerability and sensitivity) interdependence processes to the world. Vulnerability refers to power relations; sensitivity refers to the communication processes. Internationalization denotes the same phenomenon, though from the sub-system perspective (Keohane, Nye 1977, 2000; Keohane, Milner 1996). Interdependence concerns all the arenas of IRs (cultural, political, military and economic), but it is greater in economics. For this reason, some authors (Cooper 1986) have confined globalization to the economic arena, and assumed that economic globalization is producing a single integrated world market. However, interdependence can also be high among socialist countries. In Chapter 5, different types of globalization, according to power relations, will be conceptualized. Globalization probably started in 500 BC, when each civilization was in contact not only with the closest ones, but also with others without common frontiers (Buzan, Little 2000). Three other major steps in that process were 1492 and the European Renaissance, the end of the Ottoman empire, and the end of the Communist empire in 1989.

24

Chapter One

Then, it is important to define market institutions as those in which private actors prevail over the state. Before 1989 they characterized only the First World (Western Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), the four Asian tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea) and Chile. Market and capitalism (or laissez faire in French) will be used as synonyms in this book, although they have been defined with some differences in the literature. The term capitalism was more often used in the Cold War, as opposed to the socialism of the communist bloc (the Second World), where private economic activities were forbidden. Before 1989, other state (protectionist) institutions were applied in Third World countries, and especially in Latin America: ISI (Import-Substitution Industrialization). The state protected domestic markets and subsidized local industry, even if private economic actors continued to operate. After 1989, market institutions started to be applied all over the world, except for socialist Cuba and North Korea. Hall, Soskice (2002) identified a variety of (Anglo-American, European and Asian) capitalisms. In the USA and the UK, the intensity of laissez faire is greater. In Europe, a mild capitalism also favors a universal welfare state. In Asia state-market relations are more controlled by governments, patron-client relations are stronger, and the welfare state is corporative.

5. The definition of political cultures, interests and ideologies Interests and values (or ideas/ideologies) have always been the two main objectives of political actors; the former have been more anchored to power relations than the latter. But what is the main problem for the discipline of International Relations? The fact that a central authority has always been lacking has induced most (realist) scholars to assume that world politics is only managed through power relations, and that ideas never or rarely matter. The purpose of the following chapters is to emphasize that the main cleavage is “interests versus ideas”, while power is only an instrument (Waltz 1979), and can condition both objectives. But first we must determine what interests and ideas mean, and specify their relations with the four main democratic political cultures: conservatism, liberalism, leftist constructivism and leftist Manicheanism. Power and the role of interests have already been well defined (Morgenthau 1948, Stoppino 1995). Instead, what ideologies mean is still uncertain, and so is the relation of ideas with interests and political cultures (Fossati 2006). Political cultures and ideologies have already been conceptualized in the discipline of IRs (Goldstein, Keohane 1993; Katzenstein 1996, Wendt

The Definition of the Main Political Science Concepts

25

1999, Wiarda 2013), but these analytical efforts probably need further development. In fact, the analysis of political cultures and ideologies can be undertaken only if the analytical instruments of international relations, comparative politics and political sociology are summarized in a coherent manner. This is the endeavor of this chapter, which recalls the modern (positivist) approach of social and political sciences: for example, by using the instrument of “models” (Weber’s ideal-types). Sympathizers of postmodernism will probably be dissatisfied with this analytical effort; so too will probably be the so-called “splitters”. In fact, this chapter aims at simplifying the analysis by finding some general trends of the main events (and not focusing in a sophisticated way on marginal details), because “lumpers” assume that (simple) analytical instruments are useful, precisely if they aid understanding of (complex) politics. The first analytical effort in this regard is the identification of the main political cultures in Western societies and political systems. Political cultures (Geertz 1973) may be defined as coherent sets of ideas (values and beliefs), that are somehow (i.e. in a different way) linked to the promotion of certain interests. Values are pre-empirical orientations, while beliefs are post-empirical evaluations. The concrete way in which ideas and interests are linked depends on the particular political culture and cannot be selected in an abstract way for all of them. What are the main Western political cultures? There are two approaches to answering this question. For example, the splitters’ approach is to draw up a classification (or a typology) of party ideologies (Ware 1996). The list will be long, because these analytical instruments must be exhaustive. The lumpers’ approach is that of devising models (Weber’s ideal-types); of course, the list will be much shorter because those categories are not exhaustive, and identify only those behaviors that obey conditions of simplicity and coherence. Models are white, yellow, red, blue and black, while reality is also orange, green, gray, violet… For example, Esping-Andersen (1990) elaborated three models of conservative, liberal and social-democratic welfare states1. Both inductive and deductive strategies are used to build models. Empirical analysis is the first step in identifying the main features of political behaviors for a culture; then deductive analysis helps translate the data into something that fulfils the conditions of simplicity and coherence. Political behaviors are also influenced by philosophical traditions, which have always conditioned scholars’ theories. 1

The relation between ideologies and political economy has been much more thoroughly investigated (Jacobsen 1995). For example, the difference between social-democratic (market plus welfare state) and socialist (only state intervention) institutions has always been clear in political economy.

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Chapter One

There follows a scheme of the three closely interacting levels: Philosophical traditions (also embedded in scholars’ theories) Æ Political behaviors (to be observed in international interactions) Å Models of political cultures (developed in this chapter) Thus, social and political scientists observe human behaviors, that are influenced by philosophic traditions, which also constrain their theories. Finally, they construct models. These instruments, which were more used in the modern phase (the 1950s and the 1960s) of political science, are intended to identify regularities, while historians and philosophers look at differences. These models therefore describe the main features of (for example) liberalism in post-1989 world politics, whilst it is well known that there have been several differences among both liberal philosophers and liberal parties in the past. Of course, these models may also differ from theories of IRs usually labeled “liberal”. In fact, there have been several categories of (idealist, institutionalist, utopian, Kantian, rationalist and reflective) liberal scholars. However, these models do not consider possible differences between the European and the American collective perceptions of liberalism, on the assumption that Western populations share the same cosmologies (Galtung 1981). In fact, the main criticism that can be brought against models is their partial artificiality, because they are built by observers: that is to say, by political scientists. The main purpose of this chapter is to identify some post-1989 diplomatic models, constructed through specification of the main features of each Western political culture. In the literature, there have been some attempts to link political cultures and diplomacies of a few relevant states. Most studies have concerned the USA; for example, Guzzini (1998) focused on the “conservatism versus liberalism” cleavage. Instead, not many generalizations have been applied to the West as a whole, because it is assumed that such categories change across countries and over the decades. This is true, and for this reason the analysis of this chapter is mostly limited in time to the post-1989 period. Instead, difficulties linked to “space frontiers” can be overcome by emphasizing that it often happens that political actors apply labels to themselves, that have meanings different (for several reasons) from those of political scientists. For example, Italian communists were in fact socialists because they rejected violence; French socialists were in fact social-democrats because they accepted capitalism; American liberals were often conservatives. Political science manuals contain many categories (models) for (bipolar, multipolar) political systems, for (presidential, semi-presidential, parliamentary)

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governments, for (majoritarian, proportional) electoral systems, but not for political cultures2. And the reality is always complex (and “grey”); for example, some political systems have few and polarized parties. Without any general category for ideas, political science will always remain dependent on political philosophy, while it has become more autonomous from international law (through regimes theory) and economics (through international political economy). The main assumption of this chapter is that political events matter more than declarations, scholars’ theories, and philosophers’ traditions. This occurs precisely because behaviors modify philosophy -even if they are influenced by it-, manipulate declarations… Thus, four diplomatic models will be developed in this book with reference to the four main Western (democratic) political cultures: the conservative, the liberal, the social-democratic/constructivist, and the socialist/Manichaean (Fossati 2006). Non-democratic Nazi-fascism and communism are no longer followed in contemporary politics. Instead, a classification would lead to the identification also of Social-Christian, agrarian, regionalist, green, and other political cultures, but the assumption of this chapter is that the latter represent the orange, the green, the violet, and so on, and that they are less relevant. For example, most of the SocialChristian parties are either conservative or social-democratic, and they often have right and left wings within them. The Greens usually follow the leftist Manichaean ideology, like socialist parties do. In each political culture, the crucial link between ideas and interests is naturally different (Fossati 2006). Conservatism is the political culture that has always been influenced by the realist philosophical tradition. It cannot be confused either with passéisme (defense of the status quo), or with the sociological category of traditionalism, that is to say the defense of traditional values (hierarchy, order, family…), in opposition to rational modernity and anarchic post-modernity. In foreign policy, the emphasis is on the defense of collective state interests, which are often plural (in both security and economy), and become national if (as in Western countries) the sociological nation and the political state coincide. This strategy has often led to the consolidation of a “nationalist” ideology. Thus, in conservatism interests are more relevant, and subsequently favor the consolidation of a set of (nationalist) ideas. 2

In one of the main International Relations manuals, Goldstein and Pevehouse (2006) focused on conservative, liberal and “revolutionary” world views, ignoring the other two left ideologies. The “American” point of view mattered; and the mainstream academic division among Realism, liberalism and Marxism probably influenced the authors. Thus, Goldstein and Pevehouse focused on scholars, while in this chapter the emphasis is on behaviors and diplomacies.

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The linkage between diplomacy and the defense of certain values, such as human rights, democracy, free market, and national self-determination3, represents the core of a liberal foreign policy. For example, political conditionality on development cooperation means that Western foreign aid is tied to the respect of civil rights and democracy by a Third World country; otherwise, development cooperation can be cut or canceled. The influence of leftist neo-Marxist philosophy -that is to say without the violent inclination of communism- on foreign policy is based on thirdworldism and passive non-violence, and it gives rise to a “Manichaean” political culture. In fact, reality is interpreted under rigid dichotomous categories of white-good, black-evil: the USA, neo-liberalismo, and so on. These ideas correspond to the strategies of socialist parties and anticapitalist, but pro-democracy, groups and movements in domestic politics. Leftist post-Marxist philosophy (Von Hayek 1976, Galtung 1977) has consolidated “constructivist” (in Italian “reformist”) diplomacies based on ideas such as multi-culturalism, political participation, welfare state and active non-violence. These have usually been the strategies of European social-democratic parties. Since 1989, the main value orientation of constructivism has been “political correctness”, a post-modern attitude based on the perception that rational Western people can no longer handle reality (Habermas 1995). Political correctness aims at making equal what is different, because under-privileged actors (underdogs) cannot be criticized through either language or politics4. Wendt (1999) has also emphasized that interests and ideas coexist, because all interests have an ideological dimension. However, he did not clarify the linkage between interests and ideas; thus, he fell into the trap of conceptual stretching. In liberalism, constructivism and Manicheanism, ideas precede interests. Democratic ideas favor the formation of prohuman rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs); welfare state values lead to the consolidation of lobbies (unions); anti-American beliefs produce no-global groups and peace movements. Instead, the conservative defense of collective interests (citizens’ security or limits on immigration) consolidates a nationalist ideology, which differs from Nazi-fascism because it is not imperialist (Waltz 1979). Conservatism has abandoned its patronage of specific interests, like those of rural producers in the past. Thus, liberal 3

“People’s self-determination” has a different meaning and has been linked to the conflict between empires and colonies (Abulof 2016). Using “people’s” is a conceptual mistake; the correct expression is “national self-determination”. 4 Von Hayek and Galtung differently evaluated the (negative and positive) effects of “constructivism”, which will not be used in this book with its mainstream meaning: that is, as synonymous with reflectivism (Wendt 1999, Guzzini 2000).

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and leftist political cultures begin with ideas and then consolidate interests, while conservatism starts with interests and then crystallizes a nationalist ideology. In short, conservatism is more “intensive” in interests, while liberalism, leftist constructivism and leftist Manicheanism are more “intensive” in ideologies5 (Fossati 2006). This is the main reason why orthodox realists (Waltz 1979) have always assumed that ideologies reflect power relations. Carlsnaes (1986) also considered ideology as the cognitive dimension of interests: a sort of neo-Marxist superstructure; only the interests of states or classes would matter. This evaluation seems to be suitable for the nationalist ideology, as in the Cold War, which was the derivation of states’ interests. Instead, the thesis of the instrumentality of ideas induces an intellectual mistake for the other three political cultures, which are anchored to more autonomous values/ideas. Precisely because trans-country models of Western political cultures have never been identified, the crucial link between ideologies and interests was missed. Many scholars (Johnston 1995, Farrell 1998, Krause 1998, Reus-Smit 1999) have succumbed to this ambiguity regarding national, regional and strategic cultures. They have referred to some state entity, and those ideas have always appeared to be derivations of state interests; thus, they are not “political” cultures. Katzenstein (1996) stressed the role of local, national and global ideologies (see the next sections), but disregarded the political ideas. Sikkink’s (1993) emphasis on ideologies (the defense of human rights by the USA and the UK) was also focused on national ideas. In this chapter, the emphasis will shift to political cultures, even if it has to be admitted that some of them (like liberalism) have influenced some (English-speaking) countries more than others. Liberalism has always been weak in continental Europe, especially in the Mediterranean countries. However, Ikenberry (2001) often labeled “liberal” what in this chapter has been called conservative. It should be emphasized that ideologies have also been conceptualized by so-called “reflectivist” scholars (Keohane 1989). First, Laffey and Weldes (1997) criticized the proponents of rationalistic approaches with too sophisticated and post-modern language. Checkel (1997) distinguished between interests and ideologies according to the cleavage between (conservative) states and (value-oriented) international institutions and/or 5

Neo-conservatism is a (philosophical and empirical) evolution of conservatism, and Realism becomes “offensive” because it is based on neo-imperialism, aimed at sanctioning rogue states and promoting democracy (Mearsheimer 2001). Neocommunism is a synthesis between non-violent socialism and revolutionary (or terrorist) communism; neo-communists are not directly violent, but appreciate the “violence of the others”: Fidel Castro, for instance, or Chiapas rebels…

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NGOs6. Of course, global institutions and NGOs often promote ideas. Nevertheless, on the one hand the same strategy has been adopted by domestic groups or governments; on the other, those organizations have also suffered from “heterogenesis of ends” (see Michels’ theory), i.e. the process where-by the main objective of an organization becomes its survival, together with free-riding by its members. Hence there are two questions that need to be answered. First, why have political cultures (and ideologies) been so weakly emphasized in the literature7, except for the above-mentioned reference to single countries’ diplomacies? Second, why have some other concepts (like for example humanitarian intervention) been linked to a “global” (and not political) dimension of identity? The explanation for the former phenomenon should be linked to the existence of a “prevailing” political culture perceived as the most legitimate in Western institutions, societies and diplomatic circles. Conservatism performed this role until 1968, but since the postmodern 1980s leftist political correctness has become the new prevailing culture, because the 1970s were the decade of social change. The latter ideology has deeply affected only the intellectual elites: those empowered to influence collective opinions. The general population has remained distant from political correctness; conservatism is being marginalized to Western small towns and the countryside. The existence of prevailing cultures in society has induced most scholars to underestimate the role of ideas in politics. For example, the patterned behavior of political actors consistent with constructivism (like the promotion of pluri-national states) cannot appear to be ideological, precisely because there is a prevailing culture. The same pattern characterized conservatism before 1968. 6

This (more or less rigid) cleavage between values of society and state interests was supported (for example) by all those scholars who assumed that changes in the Soviet Union had been the outcome of non-intentional learning processes linked to the influence of Western peace researchers and movements (Koslowski, Kratochwil 1995, Knopf 1998, Evangelista 1999). Instead, the typical realist explanation was based on the arms race and deterrence (Art, Waltz 1983). Laffey and Weldes (1997) expressed a (post-modern) dislike for the analytical categories of political science, by criticizing all positivist references to ideologies as “commodities” -that is to say, sets of common sense assumptions-, while they advocated empirical research based on concepts like “inter-subjective systems of representation” producing social practices. 7 Yee (1996) formulated a two-fold hypothesis concerning the scant emphasis on ideas in the human sciences. On the one hand, behaviorist/modern scholars felt uncomfortable with the subjective dimensions of that concept; on the other hand, institutionalist/post-modern scholars opted for an excessive indeterminacy in their (soft) theories and (ambiguous) definitions.

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Intellectual conformism linked to the existence of a prevailing8 political culture has produced two outcomes: first (during conservatism’s leadership) the belief that only interests matter and that ideologies always reflect them; second (with the spread of “elitist” political correctness) the equation between partisan attitudes and the supposed existence of global values. In fact, cosmopolitan political correctness has often been presented as a shared dimension (at global level) of identity, whilst instead it is just a partisan political orientation. The only philosophical tradition with universal aims has been the “law of nature”, but its development is so remote in the past, that today its prescriptions have been translated into each contemporary political culture9 (Fossati 2006). A final clarification concerns political actors. In fact, there are intentional promoters of political cultures: both institutional (diplomacies) and social (movements, lobbies or non-governmental organizations). However, more indeterminate and impersonal entities will also be cited: for instance, the (conservative) defenders of interests, or the (liberal, constructivist and Manichaean) promoters of ideologies. In this case, the implicit reference is to intellectuals, press agents, opinion leaders, and the like: that is to say, to actors who influence politics through non-intentional processes. In fact, often used is a metaphor which emphasizes that political cultures have “their own legs”. The above-mentioned dynamics of world politics are the rationalist-intentional and the reflective-inertial ones, which are usually both present in political decisions (Keohane 1989)10. 8

The label of “hegemonic” or dominant culture (Foucault 1980) is not compatible with pluralist democracies and can only be applied to authoritarian regimes. Hegemony is a typical concept of Marxism (Gramsci 1971). The sanction usually applied by the promoters of a prevailing ideology is the marginalization of those scholars or intellectuals who try to dispute its existence: for example, by asserting that the previous prevailing culture is still strong. The metaphor of “the naked king” could be used to explain the difficulties of objecting to prevailing cultures. 9 The concept of humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 1996, Holzgrafe, Keohane 2003, Falk 2014) has been exported to the global level of identity (a sort of law of nature), but it has likely been the outcome of an ideological convergence between liberalism and constructivism. Tesંn (2003) linked humanitarian interventions only to liberalism. The same conclusion can be reached by analyzing the evolution of ideas on apartheid (Kaufman, Pape 1999), the nuclear “taboo” (Tannenwald 1999), and decolonization (Jackson 1993). Before 1989, this convergence between the two ideologies received a trans-national support in several international institutions and NGOs (Risse-Kappen 1995). This process seems to materialize when supporters of Manicheanism are isolated, and interests are “frozen”. 10 The influence of the latter is greater if there are uncertainties (and delays) in decision-making processes, as for example in the decisions on Yugoslavia’s wars.

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The diplomatic models will be applied to the decisions of Western governments and global institutions in the four arenas of international relations: cultural (conflicts among polities pertaining to the different nations and/or civilizations), economic (globalization process), political (democratic transitions and consolidations), and military (wars and peacekeeping missions). This classification into four arenas had been devised by Galtung (1985), and the analysis of each of them will often shift from the international to the domestic level (and vice versa). This book focuses on post-1989 Western diplomacies and on their promotion of the values of the potential world order (one for each arena): see the next section (Galtung 1981, Huntington 1996). In the empirical chapters -from 4 to 8, including that on the relation between market and democracy-, the interactions between interests and ideas will be analyzed in each arena of both pre- and (especially) post-1989 international relations.

6. The definition of (world) order Since 1989 a concept widely used by politicians and scholars has been that of “world order”. This concept has a close relation to the definitions of politics, governance and anarchy, and it will be the core of the analysis of post-1989 international relations. But first it must be defined, because “order” is one of the few concepts still without a stable definition in the International Relations literature. Many scholars assume that it already has an implied (or implicit) meaning widely shared in the literature, and therefore that it requires no further exploration (Zartman 2009). Instead, it is precisely the contrary; the concept has been used since 1989 with too many different meanings, some of which are incompatible. This chapter will review these definitions (starting from old conceptions of political philosophy) and will propose a more consistent definition of “order”. Scholars will be classified according to their definitions and not to the philosophical traditions of International Relations (Realism, rationalist and reflective liberalism, Marxism…) which are artificial analytical categories. Thus, the same definition may have been promoted by scholars of opposite Hay (2010) distinguished between perceived and real interests; the former are emphasized by rationalists, the latter by reflectivists. The conclusions (for each arena) of the book will show that both rational and inertial dynamics matter, while the debate among political scientists has often led to unidirectional diagnoses by either realist or constructivist scholars. This final section will emphasize the influence of political cultures on behaviors, showing that convergences often arise between supporters of interests and/or promoters of different values. Yet, when this occurs, the mainstream thinking is that ideologies merely reflect interests.

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traditions, and it has also happened that the same author has used order with several meanings; finally, a scholar may have defined order in one way, and then used it with a different meaning… A first definition of order coincides with peace: Greek eirene and Roman pax11 (Gori 1970). It was used in the pre-modern phase of Western civilization, and has more recently been proposed by Gilpin (1981) and Bonanate (1995). Order and peace are to be realized through the leader’s control of world politics12, but when his power declines and challengers emerge, there is both war and anarchy -see the literature on cycles of military empires (and economic hegemonies). This definition is not satisfactory because it falls into the trap of conceptual redundancy. Why should we use two concepts (order and peace) with the same meaning? Let us focus on another (the second) definition of order in the International Relations literature. The promoters of the “World Order Model Projects” (WOMPs) had normative objectives (Mendlovitz 1975, Galtung 1980). They aimed to overcome the negative effects of state power through a world government (a supra-national authority), the only one that could guarantee the ultimate values of humanity: peace, economic welfare, cultural identity, and political participation. This was a utopian scenario. Wendt (2003) also linked international order to the emergence of a “world state”, because the logic of anarchy would contain the seeds of transformation towards a global monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. However, current world politics is very far from having one authority (Weiss 2009). This approach recalls the conception of order typical of the Roman Empire, in which compliance depended on the centralized authority of one hegemon. In addition, the European tradition of politics (Hobbes) has linked the genesis of political order to the constraints imposed by the absolute state13 (the so-called Leviathan). 11 In ancient Greece, natural and human conceptions of order coincided in accordance with the unity of the cosmos. Also in Rome, only the emperor could stabilize order, with harmony between the human and the divine. Christianity (St. Augustine) denied that correlation, because only the eternal could permit order; instead, human beings would be naturally inclined to evil, conflict, instability and disorder. Although the Roman popes tried to embody a material power in certain periods, they also sought political order through the realization of a “Christian Republic”. According to Leibniz, during the Middle Ages both the Pope and the Emperor sought to embody political order(s) (Rengger 1999, 2013). 12 Aron (1962) gave five different definitions of order; he focused on order as the scenario that permits the realization of the minimum conditions for coexistence. 13 Rengger (1999) emphasized that the modern European states permitted linking the definition of political order to the concept of sovereignty. Instead, in the Middle Ages political order was still linked to a hierarchical structure of society

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The third conception of world order has been tied to the existence of rules. There are two kinds of rules: institutionalized rules, within domestic or international law -what in IRs are called “international regimes”-; informal rules or social conventions. In fact, Bull (1977) linked world order to the existence not only of institutionalized rules (international law), but also of informal and moral norms14. The former definition has often been used in the IRs literature, and rules have been connected to an incremental institutionalization of horizontal practices: the so-called social contract15 among rational individuals (Locke). Kissinger (2014) linked world order to Westphalia’ s rules of the multipolar system of balance of power. The political parallelism is ancient Greece and the modern AngloSaxon limited state. According to the latter definition, international order would only coincide with conventions (informal norms): the so-called “rules of the game”. Kratochwil (1978) promoted this conception of world order by emphasizing the processes of interaction, that generate repeated patterns of behaviors anchored to some shared background knowledge. International norms would be observed because of socialization processes, even without a central authority. Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) gave a similar definition, linking order to the routinized arrangements (only the that reflected a divine plan. The positive vision of the modern state reached its zenith in the eighteenth century, thanks to advances in science and technology; any linkage with the spiritual sphere was severed. At the same time, that process led to the strong criticism of modernity (and rationality) by Nietzsche, who assumed that human order is impossible. 14 According to Bull, world order can exist only when the elementary purposes of international society are guaranteed. This conception of order is sophisticated. International order aims to maintain sovereignty and property, limiting the use of force, and preserving the system through the pacta sunt servanda rule. Bull linked order to three instruments: common interests, rules, and institutions (the actors able to enforce them). This definition falls into the conceptual stretching trap, in opposite manner to the WOMP conception; it is too wide. If order is linked to respect for the elementary purposes of international society, almost every state action would be ordered. Bull distinguished between international and world order; the former concerned governments’ behavior, the latter human social life. Walzer (1978), Goldstein, Pevehouse (2006), Buzan (2006) and Hurrell (2007) also linked order to rules or institutions. Another scholar (Van Staden 2007) included both formal and informal rules in his definition of order. 15 Both Hobbes’s and Locke’s conceptions of order assumed a dichotomy. In domestic politics (the inside), the state -consolidated through either vertical or horizontal processes- would permit the creation of order. Instead, the international arena (the outside) would be characterized by anarchy and the absence of order. For this reason, Hoffman (1970) doubted the possibility of realizing order in international relations; he used the metaphor of “troubled order”.

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informal and not the institutionalized rules) by which world affairs are conducted16. Hence, world order would not be linked to any “single array of patterns”, and would admit a very wide heterogeneity among values, institutions and behaviors. Huntington (1996) described the current situation of world politics as an order in fieri that will be realized only if the spheres of influence of every civilization are respected. Thus, the West should not export its values (like democracy and the guarantee of human rights) to avoid conflicts with other civilizations. Order cannot be the outcome of single arrays of patterns, because values are plural depending on each different civilization (Galtung 1981). This emphasis on a sort of “political laissez faire” recalls the conception of order of the Austrian philosopher von Hayek (1949). Hayek stressed that order would depend only on spontaneous (economic) laissez faire; any (both conservative rightist and constructivist leftist) intervention by the state would create “disorder”. Thus, this fourth definition of order coincides with laissez faire (Hunt, Mc Namara 2007), and not with markets -which have both an institutional and a spontaneous dimension. However, there are no objections to Huntington’s diagnosis, except to his use of these concepts. In fact, he introduced a conceptual redundancy, because his definition of order as laissez faire coincides with what in this book is called anarchy. A fifth definition was advanced by the French philosopher Bergson (Stella 2003), who assumed that order can only lead to justice. There will be world order, only if global justice is promoted. Order should lead to the achievement of socio-economic equality among individuals in domestic politics. Rawls (1999) also linked order to justice; his scenario of a society of peoples would guarantee recognition of freedom, equality, and respect of human rights. Thus world order will materialize only if global interdependence is achieved by peoples seeking a well-ordered and just international society. In North-South interactions, global justice can be realized only if wide economic inequalities are overcome. This conception has been shared by Weber and Jentleson (2010), Weinert (2015), Falk (2016), and by leftist Manichaean scholars like Chomsky (1994). 16

According to Rosenau and Czempiel (1992), governance implies intentionality; thus, governance would be order (routinized arrangements) plus intentionality (basic decisions). There are two weaknesses in this definition. First, the choice of limiting order to routinized agreements, excluding the fundamental ones, seems to be rather artificial. Second, Rosenau considers three order levels (perceptions, actions, and institutions), but he then clarifies that these arrangements are not causally linked to any “single array of patterns”, which is contrary to the definition advanced in this chapter (see the following sections).

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Waltz’s (1979) (sixth) definition of order coincided with the concept of structure or system. He started from the assumption of anarchy in international politics and equality among actors. He then envisaged a world order based on different configurations of asymmetrical power distribution. His analysis would have been coherent if he had asserted either that ordered international systems are all hierarchical (and with different actors), or that anarchic structures are anchored to equal actors. Waltz cannot assert the existence of anarchy and order at the same time. Another definition of order as system was proposed by Cox and Sinclair (1996), and it is very similar to Marx’s economic structure. However, this conception of (class) order is tautological and suffers from conceptual stretching, because according to Cox almost every economic (capitalist or socialist) institution is somehow ordered17. The definition of order that has recently consolidated in the literature equates it with the concept of governance, defined as governing capability. The definition of order put forward by comparative political scientists was precisely that of governing capability, especially in developing countries (Huntington 1968). Thus, governance and order would have the same meaning (Kupchan 2000). Ikenberry (2001, 2009, 2011, 2014) has written several essays on world order, that was linked to different forms of governance. First, he (2001) identified three liberal orders in three different historical periods: Westphalia, Cold War, and post-1989. The last one was the “post-victory” liberal order, with the governance process of the Western powers in the 1990s, intended to promote co-binding security institutions, penetrated American hegemony, semi-sovereign great powers, economic openness and cosmopolitan civic identity. Ikenberry (2009) emphasized that the post-victory liberal order of the 1990s had been jeopardized by the “neo-imperial” ambitions of Bush Jr with the Iraq war of 2003. However, the “neo-conservative” ideology has soon declined18. 17

Buzan (2011) conceptualized a decentralized world order by emphasizing a regionalized (without super-powers) international system. Lake (2009) focused on regionalized hierarchical orders, where single leaders emerge in each sub-system. Gill (2008) gave a “Marxian” definition to order similar to that of Cox. Ruggie (1983) defined embedded liberalism as the post-1945 economic order/structure. Instead, his scenario is a combination of the institutionalized global free trade regime and national protectionist practices (Bernstein, Pauly 2007). 18 According to Smith (2002), Al Qaeda’s terrorist attack of 2001 was the greatest threat to the new world order. Press-Barnathan (2004) emphasized the features of the world order that Bush Jr wanted to promote with the Iraq war of 2003. He was pursuing a different order, realizing values like the promotion of democracy (against those of the previous order, like state sovereignty) through a different doctrine (preventive war instead of deterrence). According to Clark (2009), there is

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Then, in his third essay on world order, Ikenberry (2011) linked the contemporary American world order (the “Liberal leviathan”) to an uncertain role of global institutions, the erosion of national sovereignty, the decline of the USA, the emergence of new non-Western powers, of higher economic interdependence, and of different geo-political regions. According to Ikenberry (2014), world order will survive even after the decline of the USA, if the values (democracy, peace, and the market) of the post-1945 liberal international order continue to be observed, through path dependency. Finally, Ikenberry (et al. 2015) emphasized that China is objecting to those values, but has not offered an alternative (as legitimate and functional as the current one) vision of world order. In sum, all these different orders show that the values or purposes of the actors may change in different periods of history. Consequently, Ikenberry’s definition is very close to what in this book is called governance19. Another author that has defined order as a form of governance is Sorensen (2006). He was much more pessimistic about the governing capabilities of the main powers after the Iraq war of 2003, precisely because a transition process began after 1989: an inter-regnum between a bipolar order, and another, still uncertain, one. Sorensen (2006a) emphasized that this uncertainty was linked to the trade-off between any (cooperative) liberal progress and all (conflictive) illiberal reactions. A stable world order should avoid both (liberal) universalism, leading to imposition, and (conservative) restraint, based on Westphalia’s nonintervention principle (Sorensen 2011)20. In sum, the redundancy between order and governance also suffers from conceptual stretching because order would become every form of international governance. However, the definition of order as governance order only if the hegemon (the USA) has some legitimacy. Holsti (2016) linked order to the agreements, following every cycle of wars: e.g. Westphalia, Paris… 19 Ikenberry (2001) did not identify national self-determination, as a value of the post-victory world order. Instead, he referred to multi-cultural civic identity, distinct from national, ethnic and religious identity (Deudney, Ikenberry 1999), and compatible with governance and the promotion of pluri-national states. Thus, he focused on the concrete ways in which values were applied after 1989, and their historical evolution. Fukuyama (2004, 2014) emphasized that the main problem with the current world order/governance is state-building in weak and failed states. 20 However, Sorensen’s (2006) definition of order -a governing arrangement among states meeting the current demands for order in major areas of concern- was tautological. Sorensen emphasized the existence of several orders: balance of powers, bipolar system, North-South relations... World order was also linked to peace, institutions, ideologies, and the world economy. Order thus becomes almost anything: a sort of “catch-all concept”!

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has been excessively anchored to the empirical evolution of world politics. Instead, the six above-mentioned definitions were too rigid and mostly anchored to the analytic level of politics. Tertium non datur? It is probably necessary to propose a definition of world order that is not excessively anchored to either speculation or empirical evidence. Thus, first it is important to identify what order is at the analytical level; second, it must be understood whether current world politics is (more or less) ordered. Let us focus on everyday language. Some objects (a list of books) can be ordered, if they follow a unit of measurement (the alphabetical list of authors’ surnames), a criterion, a pattern. What is the unit of measurement in world politics? Order is the governance that concerns the process of obtaining the compliance of the other actors on certain goals: the units of measurement, the criteria, the benchmark, the above-mentioned “single array of patterns” (Fossati 1999a). Other authors have linked order to the existence of some values, but have not clarified them. McKinley and Little (1986) assumed that order is a combination of patterns (of governance processes) and goal satisfaction, but they did not specify those objectives. Strange (1983) also linked order to the existence of some principles in governance processes, but did not clarify them. Rengger (1999) supported a “cosmopolitan” definition of world order, anchoring it not only to institutions, the balance of powers, or the international society, but also to the satisfaction of some ethical-political ends like justice; he admitted that the main problem was ordering those ends. Cooper (2004) conceptualized order as the opposite of chaos, so that non-randomness would be its main feature. Thus, order seems to depend on the existence of that single array of patterns, emphasized -but denied- by Rosenau and Czempiel (1992). In domestic politics, one authority defines one (or more) values. This assures high levels of governance if the authorities can stabilize the other actors’ compliance, as in advanced countries. There are n processes of governance with n authorities, according to n different domestic states. Every government can stabilize one value or can change values over time, if the political arena is not under control, as in fragile or failed states; there, more actors can contribute to governance. In international relations, there is no single authority, and governance is less easily realized. Thus, world order depends on the homogeneity of values. The existence of “one” world order was conceptualized for the first time after 1989, because values were different in the two blocs (democracy versus communism, capitalism versus socialism). This new potential post-1989 world order cannot be characterized by the stabilization of compliance on a single value. There should be at least four values (units of measurement): one for each (cultural, economic, political and military) arena (Galtung 1996).

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How can these four values be identified? This is a very important critical juncture in political theory. First, the four values must be identified by looking at the historical evolution of the main advanced (both Western and Eastern) civilizations in the last centuries (from 1492 to 1989). Second, the empirical evidence of contemporary (post-1989) politics will show if these values have been stabilized (see Chapters 4 to 8). What is the value of the cultural arena that has prevailed in the most advanced civilizations across the centuries? In the West, “single-nation” states have prevailed over pluri-national states, which were the exceptions (Belgium, Switzerland, the USA…). The process was characterized by several conflicts and wars, with mass murders, ethnic cleansing, forced colonization, collective exiles…, but since 1945 the prevailing pattern of relation between European nations and states has been the single-nation state. The principle of national self-determination was formulated in coherent terms by the US president Wilson after World War I. Naturally, within a single-nation state there may be some minorities. Also in Asia, the most advanced states have only one nation. Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea are single-nation states, while China has Tibetan and Muslim minorities, but Chinese citizens are the large majority. Most of the Asian and all the African countries are pluri-national; there, states and nations (the ethnic groups) do not coincide (Keating 2001). In the economic arena, Western single-nation states have promoted market-led development (growth with equity), while pluri-national exceptions like the USA have achieved higher growth but lower equity. All state-led economic institutions (both Nazi-fascist and communist) have produced lower development and economic failure. Thus, national selfdetermination in Europe was the premise for economic liberalization and development. A strong national identity (with Confucian values) also characterized development in the economic liberalization of the main single-nation Asian states. This was the case of Japan in the 19th century, of the four tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) after 1945, and of China after 1989. These countries started with protectionism (import substitution industrialization), but then gradually opened their markets and achieved balanced economic development (growth and equity). In Asia there was cooperation between either state and market, or rich and poor classes, instead of conflict in Latin America and Africa. In the political arena, according to Lipset (1960) and Huntington (1968), market-led economic growth has favored democracy, especially in the first and second waves of political transitions. In the West, economic and political freedoms have always gone together (in the UK, the USA, and France), as well as authoritarianism and economic protectionism

40

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(under communism and fascism). The third wave of democratization since the mid-1970s has favored economic liberalization also in Latin America (after 1989). Instead, the combination between economic and political institutions in Asia has undergone three phases: first authoritarianism and protectionism; second authoritarianism and economic liberalization; third democracy and the market (as in Japan and South Korea recently). In the military arena, one of the few theories of international relations is that democracies do not wage wars against each other (Panebianco 1997). This has happened only to liberal and consolidated democracies. Transition regimes, like Serbia or Croatia (Mansfield and Snyder 1995), and illiberal ones (without constitutional limits to governments’ powers, like imperial Germany in World War I) may be militarily aggressive towards other democracies. The democratization of Japan and South Korea has produced more peaceful relations also in Asia. In sum, European and Asian single-nation states were first built in the cultural arena; second, market institutions led to economic development (growth plus equity); third, economic development favored democratic transitions; fourth, liberal and consolidated democracy promoted peace. Is the West supporting the four potential values of the post-1989 world order in the cultural, economic, political and military arenas? Chapters 4 to 8 develop the empirical analysis on national self-determination, the market, democracy, and peace. Here is an anticipation of the main evidence. Market reforms are being introduced in many developing countries after the failure of all state-led institutions in 1989; the IMF is also promoting these reforms through the hierarchical foreign debt regime. Trade liberalization is emerging at the international level through the WTO and its regime based on reciprocity. There is some resistance to free trade (through covert protectionism) and to laissez faire domestic politics (through incoherent and gradual economic policies). Totally socialist economic institutions persist in few countries, like Cuba and North Korea. Democracy is now a phenomenon embracing Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. There are several exceptions, with authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Belarus, some African and Asian regimes: especially in the Sinic (China, Vietnam, Laos…) and the Islamic (all countries except Tunisia) civilizations. Then, there are several hybrid regimes and illiberal democracies. The former usually limit the regularity of elections, and opposition leaders are often arrested. The latter hold parliamentary elections, but limit civil rights (with scant freedom of the press and of judges). Parliaments do not control governments and heads of state, especially if they are not directly elected. Presidents may have too wide powers, as in “hyper-presidentialism”, being able to dissolve parliaments.

The Definition of the Main Political Science Concepts

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After 1989, there was an initial hope that wars would become obsolete in world politics, but in the following years (especially in the 1990s) wars continued with many “cultural” (infra and/or inter-civilization) armed conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Third World (especially in Africa), along ethnic, linguistic and religious cleavages. Western powers and the UN tried to reduce the level of violence and achieve peace (in the military arena) especially after the end of the war in Sri Lanka in the spring of 2009, even if with some exceptions like Ukraine, Sudan, the Central African Republic... Since the 2011 Arab Spring, many conflicts involving Islamic fundamentalist actors (in Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Philippines…) have turned again into violence. However, although many wars have ended, conflict resolution is difficult to achieve in the cultural arena. Many conflicts remain unstable because they have been frozen in quasi-states (like Cyprus, Kosovo, Crimea…), resolved asymmetrically (by ethnic cleansing or dominion), or anchored to consensus pacts that seem to be feasible only in the short period (see Chapter 4). Most of these conflict resolution attempts have been characterized by the existence of “disordered” pluri-national states. Order has materialized in only a few cases, like Slovenia, southern Sudan, Eritrea, and East Timor, where referenda have been held by the United Nations or local institutions. Thus, the potential fourth objective of world order (the promotion of national self-determination within single-nation states) has rarely been pursued by Western powers and global institutions, which have preferred pluri-national states. In sum, there is still much disorder in the cultural arena. Governance, with the absence of the abovementioned unit of measurement (the guarantee of national selfdetermination), materialized in all disordered pluri-national states: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen... These ones have been ways to “freeze” (or avoid) conflicts. When there has been no attempt to resolve conflict, anarchy has prevailed (in Tibet, Chechnya, Sri Lanka…), where the Western powers and global institutions adopted so-called political laissez faire (Fossati 1999a). In sum, since 1989 Western states have promoted a “near” or quasi order with greater stabilization (even if with several exceptions) of peace, democracy, and the market, and a lower guarantee of the value of national self-determination (Fossati 1999a). In the cultural arena, governance has prevailed, together with the promotion of many disordered pluri-national states. This is the main difference between the historical evolution of advanced Western and Eastern countries before 1989 and the empirical evidence in the post-1989 “near order”. What is the reason for this difference between a potential and concrete world order? The empirical

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analysis of conflicts in Chapter 4 will try to explain this outcome. However, one hypothesis linked to political cultures may be advanced. All Western countries entered post-modernity after 1968. In that phase, leftist political correctness became the prevailing political culture of Western societies. Multi-culturalism is its most important value, and it is deeply incompatible with the promotion of national self-determination. According to the promoters of leftist political correctness, single-nation states are forms of “neo-apartheid”; consequently, they cannot be defended! The cultural evolution of our societies has to do with the negative outcomes of nationalism in Europe: World War I and II, Nazism and fascism. It must be emphasized that, even if those processes have operated in both advanced East and West, the empirical evidence shows that only the West is promoting these values of world order. This does not mean that the (theoretical and empirical) analysis in this book is Euro-centric or Western-centric, according to the diagnoses of the supporters of the contemporary prevailing ideology (political correctness). However, there is a possible paradox concerning the current “near” order. In the conclusions, the concepts of world order and international stability will be linked, and some scenarios of the main objectors to the values of the “near” world order will be presented. The most radical objectors to all the values of the current world order are the promoters of Islamic fundamentalism. Consequently, the main Western countries have sometimes renounced some of those values (like democracy and peace), precisely to fight those objectors. This paradox has materialized in two important exceptions to the realization of world order. First, Western countries have not only promoted democracy, but are still supporting some authoritarian regimes. The USA has applied the “lesser evil” principle, to fight communist actors (for example through Latin American military regimes in the Cold War) or Islamic fundamentalist ones (for example through Algerian armed forces in the 1990s). Second, Western countries have not only promoted peace, but are still waging some wars. This exception to world order in the military arena has materialized in the decisions to wage wars, when the promoters of Islamic fundamentalism have conquered power or vast territories: as in Afghanistan in 2001 and Mali in 2013 (Fossati 2006). How can this paradox of the current “near” world order (with these two exceptions) be explained? To understand those processes, it is important to consider the evolution of the role of political cultures in contemporary politics: see Chapters 4 to 8 on each arena. In the conclusions, some hypotheses on the linkage between the post-1989 “near” world order and international stability will be advanced.

CHAPTER TWO FOREIGN POLICY: POWER STATUS RANKING AND POLITICAL CULTURES

1. Models of foreign policy ranks of power status The main decisions in foreign policy concern the military and the economic arenas. In the former, they deal with arms and disarmament issues, war and peace-keeping operations. In the latter, foreign economic policy touches three issue-areas: decisions within regional organizations like the European Union (EU), diplomatic support of national businessmen abroad, development cooperation with Third World countries. In this typology (Fossati 2009), five models of foreign policy ranks of power status are linked to variables of states’ behaviors (actual power), and not to indicators like population, per capita income, military expenditures (potential power) (Stoppino 1995). The statuses are: low profile (LP), small (sP), middle (MP), great (GP), and super-power (SP): Table 2-1. Variables of foreign policy ranks of power status Ranks of power status (a) coherence in policy of alliances (b) regional selectivity (c) regional mobilization capability (d) sub-regional selectivity (e) effectiveness of diplomatic support and foreign aid (f) inclusion in relevant arenas of concert of powers (g) consistency between economic and military resources (h) governance efforts in foreign countries’ politics (i) governance effectiveness in foreign countries’ politics

LP no no no no no

sP MP yes yes yes yes no yes no yes no yes

GP yes yes yes no yes

SP yes no yes no yes

no

no

yes

yes

yes

no

no

yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

yes

yes

no

no

no

no

yes

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Then, capabilities in military resources (l) are different for each status. These power status ranks have rarely been conceptualized, except for a vague reference to reputation (Paul et al. 2014). Low profile foreign policy is characterized by apathy, inertia, and an ambiguous policy of alliances (a): for example, through the presence of both pro-West and pro-Third World diplomatic attitudes. Before 1989, Italy’s diplomacy was schizophrenic. In fact, the official foreign policy was orthodox, with anchorage to both NATO and the European Community (EC), but there was a parallel underground heterodox diplomacy, that grew out of (thirdworldist, neutralist, and pro-Arab) positions adopted since the late 1950s by ENI’s (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) president Mattei, and then by leftist leaders (Fanfani, Moro and Andreotti) of the Christian Democracy (DC). In the EC, Italy delegated decisions to its main partners (France and Germany) and was not committed to keep public spending -that increased in the 1980s- under control. There was no coherent synthesis between the orthodox and the heterodox levels of foreign policy (Fossati 1999). Something similar occurred in Franco’s Spain, which maintained good relations with radical Latin American and Arab states (Fossati 2000). The small power model concerns governments’ ability to establish some priorities of diplomatic preferences among all the geographic regions (Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Latin America…), overcoming the chaotic approach of low profile foreign policy (b). Then, a small power has a coherent policy of alliances. Before 1994, Italy had not established priorities in either its diplomatic support of (private and public) domestic firms operating abroad or its development cooperation. Both diplomatic missions and foreign aid were the outcome of a chaotic decision-making process, without any regional selectivity. Thus, the label of small power does not concern the limited geographical or demographic size of a country (Vital 1967, Ingebritsen 2006). The Netherlands, Belgium and Austria are small powers, because since 1945 they have satisfied the two above-mentioned analytic conditions. Italy has become a small power only since 1989. First, the heterodoxies in the policy of alliances (in NATO and the EU) were overcome; in both organizations, Italian institutions stopped delegating decisions to their main partners. Italy was involved in several peace-keeping missions (in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq…), and was successful in keeping government spending under control, fulfilling the Maastricht Treaty targets and entering the EMU with Prodi’s government in 1997. Second, the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe emerged as the two main geo-economic priorities, in both diplomatic support to domestic firms operating abroad and foreign aid (Fossati 1999). Also Poland has become a small power since 1989.

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In the IRs literature, the model of middle power has been used as an ambiguous intermediate level, with limited anchorage to standardized indicators (Holbraad 1984, Wood 1987, Cooper et al. 1993). The main feature of a middle power is its regional mobilization capability (c) through the organization of some conferences, that are not only symbolic, but are also aimed at reinforcing economic ties, such as those of the United Kingdom (UK) with the Commonwealth (Martin and Garnett 1997). At the beginning of the 1990s, Spain and Italy tried to organize a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), but that project failed. Another difference between small and middle powers is the perception by the latter of the impossibility of maintaining high-level diplomatic and economic contacts with all the countries of a privileged region. A middle power prefers sub-regional selectivity (d), concentrating its priorities on some partners in that area: for example, former French colonies within Africa (Aldrich and Connell 1989), or Maghreb countries within the Mediterranean for Spain, or Balkan states within Eastern Europe for Italy. The effectiveness of diplomatic support and foreign aid (e) is higher for a middle power, whose national firms establish more contracts, than those of a small power. Finally, small powers are excluded from relevant arenas of the concert of powers (f), such as the European troika of France, Germany and the UK (until Brexit of 2016). Italy was also excluded from the “Contact Group” of former Yugoslavia. France, Germany -since the Ost-Politik initiatives of the 1970s (Cordell and Wolff 2007)-, and the UK are middle powers, while Italy is a small power. Spain is still in between the two ranks, because it has regional mobilization capability only in Latin America (with Las Cumbres Ibero-Americanas), and sub-regional selectivity only in the Mediterranean (towards Maghreb). Spain is not in the Group of 8, though Italy and Canada have a limited role in it, while the Group of 5 (the USA, the UK, France, Germany and Japan) is the inner core of economic powers (Fossati 2000). Then, great powers have been traditionally conceptualized as those of the multipolar international system of balance of powers (from 1492 to 1914), but no standardized analytic categories have emerged for them in the bipolar system (Neack 1995, Miller 2007). A great power intensifies the relations with all the countries of its privileged regions (d), like the USA does in Latin America; it has regional, but not sub-regional selectivity -because it has more economic resources than a middle power. Both super- and great powers can exercise governance capabilities in order to manage with success the main economic or political crises (in market transitions and democratization processes), and to resolve cultural (infraand/or or inter-civilization) armed conflicts in their priority regions (h).

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The attempts at governance by the European powers in Africa and Asia have been weak (Spain in Western Sahara; Italy in Somalia; Portugal in Angola and Mozambique; Belgium in Rwanda, Burundi and CongoKinshasa; the Netherlands in East Timor), and many conflicts remain unresolved, even if most wars have ended. The exceptions were Australia in East Timor, the UK in Sierra Leone, and France in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, where those middle powers showed some governance capability within UN-sponsored attempts at resolving those conflicts. Instead, the military intervention in Libya in 2011 was carried out by NATO, and not only by France and the UK. Thus, small and middle powers have low governance capabilities (solving conflicts), and rarely engage in mediation efforts, but medium powers often use violence, especially to stop wars. Russia is experiencing the anomalous situation of a former great power (Rumer 2007). It has maintained some governance capability in its geopolitical sphere of influence, by sending its troops to Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, and Crimea. In those conflicts, Russia did not act as a neutral actor, but as a partisan supporter of its allies. Instead, Russia’s economic resources are those of a small power, as the difficulties of its market transition process show; there is some inconsistency between economic and military resources (g). Russia is still a medium power, even if with some great power ambitions in the military arena and a small power “reality” in the economic arena. China has maintained a governance capability in Tibet and Xinyang, but not in Taiwan, and there is more consistency between military and economic resources; its market transition works. China is a medium power, with less great power ambitions than Russia. Japan’s status has been lower, since its defeat in World War II; it showed some governance capability in Cambodia, but not in east Timor, where Australia played that role. Both countries are between the statuses of small and medium powers. Emerging powers (Brazil, India and South Africa) have a higher consistency between military and economic resources. However, they are not middle powers yet, as their regional mobilization capability is rather low (see India’s failure in Sri Lanka); they have regional, but not sub-regional selectivity. Some scholars assume that the European Union (EU) will become a great power, if a common foreign policy materializes (Clementi 2004). The first meetings of Foreign Affairs ministers were held in 1970; in that decade there was the positive episode of the Helsinki Conference, with a single representative of the EU. There were also the economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Instead, in the 1980s the EU governments failed to elaborate a common diplomacy in the Falklands war, in Poland, or in the 1983 South Korean jumbo crisis. It seemed that the deep conflict between

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47

the USA and the Soviet Union had frightened the European executives and amplified their diplomatic differences. After 1989, as the EU members increased, it grew increasingly difficult to implement a common foreign policy. However, even if with some delay, NATO countries -with most European governments included- decided on two military interventions: in Bosnia (in 1995) and in Kosovo (in 1999). Then, the EU promoted conflict resolution in Macedonia through the 2001 Ohrid agreement (Tocci 2007). Instead, during the 2003 Iraq military intervention by the USA and the UK, there was a harsh conflict among the European countries (see Chapter 8). Also the 2011 military intervention in Libya saw the initial opposition of Germany (Smith 2014). In sum, as the EU still has several difficulties in fashioning a common diplomacy, it cannot yet claim any kind of power status. Some scholars (Clementi 2004) have argued that the EU is a sort of “civil power”, which delegates the use of force to the USA (with relevant exceptions like Mali). Instead, it seems that the EU has become a “civil impotence”, because of the identity crisis that European countries are not overcoming in their post-imperial phase (Fossati 2015). By contrast, the super-power model has been linked to a standardized analytical category (Neack 1995, Lieber 2001). The difference between a great power and a super-power consists in the superior range of action of the latter, whose geo-political frontiers are global. There is no regional selectivity, because all the areas of the world (also Africa, and parts of Asia) are considered relevant (b). The USSR became a great power after the Cuban crisis in 1962. The USA remained a super-power until the defeat in Vietnam in the mid-1970s and the failed intervention in Somalia in 1992. Then, it became a great power. Super-power governance is more effective than that of a great power (i). The US military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, and low intensity bombings against Isis (also in Syria) -Obama’s priority was limiting human losses and not quickly defeating the enemy- did not stabilize compliance. Castro in Cuba and Chavez (or Maduro) in Venezuela resisted American coercion. The last variable concerns the mobilization of military resources. Low profile diplomacies do not plan any military initiative. Small powers (like Italy) engage in peace-keeping operations (Attinà, Irrera 2010; Ignazi, Giacomello, Coticchia 2012). Middle powers (like France and the UK) support the military interventions of great or super-powers. The difference between great and super powers does not concern their capacity for destruction, but rather the selective or global geographical range of their operations. With Obama’s reluctance to engage in high intensity wars and relevant governance attempts at conflict resolution (Dueck 2015, Keller 2015), it seems that the USA has abandoned great power’s ambitions.

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2. A deviant case in Europe: Italy’s low profile before 1989 The low profile of the Italian diplomacy in the Cold War has been a matter of debate among political scientists and historians. Two main hypotheses have emerged; one emphasizes the role of the Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano or PCI); the other focuses on the bipolar international structure. This section sets out to test these hypotheses, through comparison with Spanish foreign policy (Fossati 1999, 2009). In the 1950s, center-right governments led by De Gasperi took the key decisions to enter the Western coalition and its organizations: NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC). Italy’s role remained limited, with little involvement in the EEC decision-making processes; in the 1960s, an Italian politician (Malfatti) even declined the Commission presidency. Italy’s participation in NATO has been even more ambiguous, with permanent delegation of the main military decisions to the USA. Official declarations of the leaders of center-left governments of the 1960s were pro-Atlantic, but at the same time there was an underground and heterodox foreign policy, which developed out of the neutralist and thirdworldist positions of some domestic actors. The diplomatic initiatives of Enrico Mattei, the president of the public energy company ENI in the late 1950s, with many energy (gas and oil) agreements with Arab and communist states, became famous throughout the West1. Italy oriented its foreign policy towards a constant search for compromises, which continued in the 1960s when the leftist wing defeated its conservative foe within the main government party, the Democrazia Cristiana (DC). Development cooperation was channeled without any regional selectivity; most decisions on foreign aid were delegated to the Catholic Church or to leftist NGOs. Finally, Italy was one of the few Western countries unable even to organize diplomatic missions to support (public and private) domestic firms’ investments in, or exports to, foreign countries: thus damaging small and medium-sized enterprises. Large companies like Fiat and Olivetti had their own diplomacy. Important changes came about in the 1980s, and the above-mentioned policy of delegation to the USA and the EEC partners was abandoned. 1 ENI signed several agreements with both moderate and radical Arab countries in order to reduce Italian dependence on oil imports; something similar occurred in Eastern Europe (especially in the USSR) on gas trade. All those initiatives were criticized by the Anglo-American multi-nationals (the so-called “Seven Sisters”), and by the US government. ENI’s increased budget was also used to corrupt Italian politicians, especially those of the leftist wing of Democrazia Cristiana, who favored Mattei’s diplomacy and continued it after his death in 1962 (Fossati 1999).

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Italy participated in some military initiatives in the Mediterranean (Red Sea operations, Lebanon…). Prime minister Craxi (leader of the Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI) crystallized conflict with the USA in the Achille Lauro crisis, by allowing Palestinian terrorists to escape in Sigonella. The defense of terrorists is incompatible with the values of the Western alliance, while it is coherent with a third-worldist strategy2. In the EEC, politicians like Andreotti (of the leftist wing of the DC) and Craxi participated more actively in inter-governmental negotiations. However, Rome’s public deficit remained high in those years (at a two-digit level, incompatible with European obligations3), in contrast to lower deficits of countries such as Spain that had recently joined the EEC, but whose public expenditure was better managed. Italian First Republic politicians were always “European” in their words and nationalistic in their deeds, resisting the control of government spending. Italy was still considered an unreliable partner in both NATO and the EEC. The 1980s were a decade of only partial and limited changes in foreign policy, and Italy’s diplomacy could still be considered low profile, not that of a small power. Right-wing coalitions led by Berlusconi governed in 1994, from 2001 to 2006, and from 2008 to 2011. Left-wing coalitions led by Prodi lasted from 1996 to 2001 and from 2006 to 2008. In 1995/6, a center government was headed by a techno-politician, Dini. Italy abandoned its low profile only in the 1990s, when Prodi’s government complied with the Maastricht treaty targets4, and Italian armed forces started to assume a more coherent 2

Santoro (1991) positively emphasized Italy’s independence from the USA in that crisis, showing a misunderstanding of the basic dimensions of a policy of alliances, which define power status ranks -see the beginning of this chapter. 3 According to Ferrera (1991), Italy abandoned delegation to its main European partners in the 1980s. However, its low profile continued because the Italian public expenditure dramatically increased in that decade (Verzichelli 1999). 4 In that period some ambiguities (typical of “low profile” diplomacies) remained, but only in the short term (Fossati 1999). In 1994, Berlusconi chose to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU) with the first group of Euro-countries, through a budget law based on drastic public expenditure cuts (especially pensions reform). After conflicts with left parties and unions, he was obliged to revise his economic program. EMU targets were not reached, and in that period Berlusconi’s attitude towards the Maastricht Treaty was not clear. His government collapsed soon afterwards (in late 1994), due to the defection of the Lega Nord. At the beginning of his mandate (in mid-1996), Prodi too took an ambiguous attitude towards the EMU. He initially drew up a plan to join the EMU a year late, together with Spain, Portugal and Ireland. But when Prodi proposed this solution to Aznar at Valencia in the autumn of 1996, the Spanish prime minister rejected it. Aznar’s decision induced Prodi to apply tougher economic measures to fulfill Maastricht targets.

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role in NATO, participating in several peace-keeping missions: in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon5. After 1994, diplomatic support for national firms6 and foreign aid7 concerned selected areas: Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Similar changes had not taken place either in the 1980s or in the two technical governments of Amato and Ciampi in the early 1990s. Those two executives had begun a process of tough economic adjustment, although it was not completed. Those were the years of the so-called “Bribesville” scandal, which led to the prosecution of corrupt politicians of the First Republic. Thus, any diplomatic contact with business exporters and investors was discouraged. The trials also involved Italian diplomats; foreign aid was drastically cut8. 5

Italy did not participate in wars, except for limited involvements in Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya. Rome’s armed forces were mostly involved in peacekeeping operations. The only difference between right- and left-wing governments concerned the 2003 US military intervention against Iraq. Berlusconi did not send any troops to Iraq, but politically supported the war (with Aznar’s Spain), unlike Prodi, who joined the Franco-German coalition. 6 Another change concerned the active participation (after Berlusconi’s visit to Russia in 1994) of Italian businessmen in diplomatic missions; that practice had almost been absent during the First Republic, except for some chaotic initiatives in the 1980s. In providing diplomatic support abroad to Italian firms, both coalitions promoted these two regions, but with a different “top priority”: the Mediterranean for the right, and Eastern Europe for the left. During Prodi’s government, an undersecretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Fassino) was given responsibility for relations with all the countries of Eastern Europe (Fossati 1999). 7 These two regions were the priority for Italian aid (in millions of dollars) in 1995/9 (Fossati 1999). Some African countries (Congo, Uganda, Madagascar…) also received extraordinary funds for emergency situations. There was a high convergence between the right and the left, because some Mediterranean countries that are sources of immigration -the blocking of which is close to conservatismare also ex-communist: Albania and Bosnia. Some African states (Ethiopia and Eritrea) were former colonies, thus consistent with the conservative diplomacy. Aid to Somalia was halted, because Italy had given its support to Barre. Other countries like Mozambique were post-communist; thus, their choice was coherent with the constructivist diplomacy. Argentina was still favored in Latin America because of its high percentage of Italian immigrants, which is consistent with the conservative diplomacy. In the following decade (2000/9), funds to Africa increased, because many Eastern European countries entered the EU. 8 This was also the outcome of a “partitioning” practice, whereby single parties (and not the institutions) managed development cooperation with the Third World. For example, only the Christian Democrat party (and not the government) negotiated with Ethiopia, the Socialist party with Somalia, or the Communist party with some communist regimes of Africa: Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania. This anomalous practice greatly favored corruption (Fossati 1999).

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The first hypothesis explaining Italy’s low profile was put forward by the historian Di Nolfo (1977). He saw a linkage between foreign and domestic policy through the anti-system nature of the main leftist party. In domestic politics, the conflict between the center-left government coalition and the anti-system opposition of the PCI had become deeply entrenched within a polarized and extreme multipolarism (Sartori 1976). The Italian communists were not a violent party; the only group with that ideology was the terrorist Brigate Rosse. They had a socialist political culture with an anti-market, anti-West, anti-NATO, and anti-American attitude. That conflict was the outcome of the incompatibility of values (meta-policies), and was resolved through compromise. It was impossible to approve any middle-range reform; only micro-policies (the leggine: “little laws”) were implemented by parliament through a long inter-party mediation process (Cotta 1994). Italy established a consensual democracy, that saw the formal involvement of the PCI in the (compromesso storico) coalitions of the late 1970s and its informal participation in the executives of the 1980s (Pizzorno 1993). The metaphor of Italian politics became the title of Di Palma’s (1977) essay: “Surviving without governing”. In foreign policy, low profile was not the outcome of apathy, but of an intentional choice by DC leaders to minimize and prevent conflict with the PCI, which did not recognize the main values of the West, such as freemarket institutions and participation in NATO (La Palombara 1989). Italy’s activities in the EEC and NATO were characterized by a strategy of under-statement and delegation to its main foreign partners. In 1977, the PCI supported consensus compromesso storico governments -there was the détente with Carter- and accepted both NATO and the EEC (Putnam 1977), but its positions had remained radical. In the 1980s, when USUSSR relations worsened, the PCI (unlike other European left parties) opposed NATO’s Euro-missiles and the European Monetary System. The PCI mildly criticized the USSR in the Afghan war and the Korean jumbo crisis. Only after 1989 was there a change of values (and behaviors), and the PCI became the Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS, then DS)9. 9

Coralluzzo (2000) over-emphasized the declarations of the PCI and described the 1980s as the decade of the “emerging profile”. Isernia (1996) inverted the causal chain; in his view, PCI’s anti-system position was dependent on its exclusion from government. Thus, the above-mentioned radicalization in the 1980s would have allegedly been the outcome of the end of the “compromesso storico” executives of the late 1970s. In reality, it came about not because of domestic factors, but as a consequence of the increasing polarization of US-USSR relations under the Reagan administration. In fact, the PCI left the grand coalition of the late 1970s, precisely because of the persisting deep conflict over foreign policy.

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This hypothesis has been confirmed by comparison with Spain under Franco, a regime in which an anti-system party was in power. Franco’s foreign policy was also low profile. Franco strengthened relations with populist South American leaders and many (moderate and radical) Arab governments. Rightist authoritarian Spain’s policy of alliances was still ambiguous, being somewhere in between the West and the Third World. Thus, the color of the (fascist or communist) ideology is not relevant in defining an ambiguous attitude towards foreign policy. After Spain’s democratic transition, Gonzalez rapidly abandoned the low profile. His leftist party’s political culture was social-democratic (as in Germany, France and the UK), and not socialist like that of the PCI (Fossati 2000)10. It is tangible behaviors, and not the labels that parties apply to themselves, which matter in defining a party’s political culture. There is an alternative hypothesis concerning Italy’s low profile: “Pasquino’s (1974) theorem”. According to that political scientist, Italy’s status was only attributable to international factors, namely the influence of the Cold War on the foreign policy of Italy and other European states11. 10

D’Alema (and not Occhetto) was the promoter of PCI’s ideological change. The imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981 was the premise for the break with Moscow in 1982. Natta and Occhetto wanted, like Gorbachev, the democratic reform of communism, but had remained socialists (Urban 1995). After the split in the PDS, two neo-communist parties remained: Rifondazione Comunista, whose leader was Bertinotti, and Comunisti Italiani, led by Cossutta This anti-system ideology is the socialist/Manichaean one, shared by the Italian Green party (Verdi), characterized by anti-American, anti-market, and anti-Western values. 11 Other hypotheses have been put forward, but none has been confirmed by the empirical evidence. Panebianco (1982) stressed the low centralization of the Italian governments; thus, Italian foreign policy would change only after a constitutional reform based on improved governmental powers through semi-presidentialism or the direct election of the prime minister. Some scholars linked the low profile to the central role of the Democrazia Cristiana in the Italian party system. A third explanation was based on the absence of charismatic leaders in foreign policy (except for De Gasperi and Craxi). Other scholars emphasized the influence of the low state autonomy in foreign economic policy, that usually reduces governments’ strength. In Italy, the influence of organized business was limited in economic policy; state autonomy was low because of the influence of parties, not because of business lobbying. The philosopher La Torre (2003) proposed a model of the “Italian ideology” characterized by compromise decision outcomes which is found throughout the history of Italian political thought, be it Realism (Machiavelli), liberalism (Croce) or Marxism (Gramsci). The features of the Italian ideology are the following. Human actions are instrumental and conflictual. There is no rationality in the goals pursued. Normative arguments are coercive tricks or selfillusions because ethics is perverse or not important. Truth is a pragmatic concept,

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To verify this claim, it is necessary to analyze the foreign policies of other European countries before 1989. If they were not characterized by a low profile, this would mean that the domestic (and not the international) hypothesis withstands the empirical test. Other scholars, like Panebianco (1997) convincingly showed that no other European country had a low profile, even though conditioned by the same external pressure as Italy before 1989. France and the UK were both permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Germany increased its rank with Ost-Politik. Also Belgium, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian states had more coherent diplomacies. Democratic Spain became a small power in the remainder of the Cold War. Spain was a junior partner because it had entered the EEC only in 1986, and had a limited negotiating role, even though Madrid’s government state finances were better managed (with a public deficit/gross domestic product rate around 3.5%) than Rome’s. Spanish participation in NATO has never been characterized by the ambiguity exemplified by the Achille Lauro crisis. Then, in foreign economic policy, Spain has always prioritized diplomatic support and development cooperation towards Latin America and the Maghreb, within the Mediterranean (Fossati 2000)12. Italy has maintained its small power status in recent years (Andreatta, Brighi 2003, Ignazi 2004, Brighi 2006, 2007, Croci 2007, Walston 2007), even after Prodi’s withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq13. That decision did not compromise the coherence of Italy’s policy of alliances in NATO. Berlusconi’s rightist executive had already decided to withdraw the peacekeeping troops. Differences instead concerned the timing of the operation because success is the key of truth. Thought depends on practices, and philosophy is the instrument employed to manipulate events. Ends always justify the means. History is a matter of ex post legitimization. Any ethical criticism is labeled too rigorous, moralist and hypocritical. The public sphere depends on, and is colonized by the private one. Rules and norms are subject to politics and economy, because norms are fictions. Politics is passion, will and force, and it is conditioned by the friend-enemy cleavage; politics and economy are family affairs. General measures are not implemented; particularistic and pragmatic decisions always prevail. 12 Spain defined its participation in NATO through a referendum; no nuclear missiles were deployed on its territory, which does not have a strategic importance comparable with that of Italy and Germany, which are closer to the USSR. There were limited conflicts with the USA over the Falklands war between the UK and Argentina, and the 1989 American military intervention in Panama. Spain did not go so far, as to condemn those two actions in the UN General Assembly. 13 The pre-emptive 2003 war was far more divergent from usual NATO practices, than Italy’s decision to withdraw its troops. The US decision to invade Iraq provoked conflict within NATO, and strategic partners like Germany or France neither supported it, nor sent any peace-keeping mission after the end of the war.

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and the style of the declarations. In summer 2006, Italy decided to play a significant role in the UN peace-keeping mission in Lebanon, supported by the USA. The anti-American and anti-system Rifondazione Comunista party’s push for Italy’s withdrawal from the peace-keeping mission in Afghanistan would have entailed an incoherent decision, which could have had negative effects on the credibility of the Italian diplomacy in NATO. In 2011, Italy participated in NATO’s aerial bombings of Libya, without having (for example) the ambiguities of Germany. Italy could have supported Gaddafi, maintaining a low profile status: for example, because of the personal ties of Berlusconi with the Libyan dictator. But it did not. At the same time, its participation in military bombings was limited and coherent with its small power status, contrary to medium powers like France and the UK (Carbone 2011; Giacomello, Verbeek 2011). A low profile could re-emerge if Italy is influenced in the future by anti-system parties such as the anti-American Rifondazione Comunista even if since 2008 it is no longer in parliament-, and the anti-European Lega Nord, whose positions are incompatible with Italian participation in NATO and the EU. Another anti-system Manichaean left party emerged in the 2013 parliamentary elections: Beppe Grillo’s Movimento a 5 Stelle. Since the economic crisis, Grillo has taken a strong stance against the austerity measures promoted by the EU. The likelihood of Italy shifting towards a middle power rank is still small, not even with the DS prime minister Renzi since February 2014. It seems unlikely that Italy will play any major regional role in the Mediterranean14, although more intensive sub-regional selectivity could emerge in its foreign economic policy towards the Balkan area15. The main problem is the low effectiveness of Italian diplomatic support and foreign aid, if compared to those of countries like Germany. Finally, Italy is likely to be excluded in the future from the main decision-making arenas at both global and regional level. 14

In September 1990, the joint Italian and Spanish proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) failed for various reasons, most notably the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Moreover, Israel has always rejected any proposal for a regional conference, because of its minority position with respect to Arab states. The Italian Foreign Affairs minister was the socialist De Michelis, who also promoted a multilateral initiative in the Balkan area, which failed because of charges brought against him for corruption (Fossati 1999). 15 This priority was emphasized by Berlusconi, but mostly with reference to the NATO enlargement process, whose loose approach has been supported by both right- and left-wing Italian governments (Menotti 2001). Of course, a rigid approach to enlargement (and especially to political conditionality) is more compatible with liberalism. Also within the EU, Italy has always promoted a loose approach in order to facilitate enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria.

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3. Models of political cultures in foreign policy Descriptive analysis of foreign policy can be facilitated by the use of diplomatic models linked to the four (conservative, liberal, constructivistsocial-democratic, and Manichaean/socialist) Western democratic political cultures. The first two diplomatic models have been applied to the foreign policy of the USA, but they can be exported to the analysis of European countries like the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The conservative model corresponds to the strategy of promoting interests, which are linked to the nationalist ideology. There are both strategic (with the fight against Islamic fundamentalism, and control of illegal immigration) and economic (for example, trade preferences to oil exporting countries) interests; thus, all these interests are not always compatible. The priority for former colonies or for close countries is coherent with a conservative foreign policy. Instead, liberalism focuses on values, trying to strengthen contacts only with countries that respect democracy (and human rights), guarantee national self-determination, and apply market reforms: for instance, India, Japan, or those of Eastern Europe and Latin America. The socialist model emphasizes “Manichaean” ideas such as third-worldism, anti-NATO, antiAmericanism, anti-Westernism, and anti-capitalism, privileging ties with Cuba, North Korea and radical Islamic countries like Iran. Instead, the constructivist/social-democratic model is based on privileged relations with post-communist countries of Eastern Europe or with the poorest countries in the Third World. Since 1989, the main ideological dimension of this political culture has been “political correctness”, which stresses the priority of multi-cultural values in decisions concerning both Third World immigration flows and pluri-national armed conflict resolution processes outside the West. For example, some Italian (Rutelli, D’Alema, Fassino…) and European (Blair) leftist politicians have promoted the enlargement of the EU to Turkey, because of the strong ideological appeal of a plurireligious (and not only “Christian fortress”) Europe16. Finally, there can naturally be foreign policies aimed at promoting neither interests, nor values/ideas, and these are low-profile diplomacies, based on apathy, inertia… In fact, it often happens that interests are simply absent. 16 Also the main rightist politicians (Berlusconi and Fini) have supported Turkey because of their “neo-con” ideology. Turkey is perceived as a strategic moderate Islamic country. Its economic and political stabilization, after its entry into the EU, would supposedly halt the advance of religious fundamentalism in the Middle East. Some politicians of Forza Italia (Pera), Margherita, and Unione dei Democratici di Centro (Buttiglione) have promoted a liberal “freezing” with Turkey, because of its poor performance on human rights, and not of cultural biases (Fossati 2008a).

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The foreign policies of the two American (Republican and Democratic) parties have permitted the elaboration of the conservative and the liberal diplomatic models (Fossati 2006). The difference between conservative isolationism and liberal interventionism has concerned pre-1929 American diplomacies; Roosevelt abandoned isolationism. Conservatism relies more upon power and the use of force, contrary to the liberal trust in institutions and negotiations. Conservatives go to war only to protect egoistic interests, while liberals promote universal values (bellum iustum). Conservatism prefers unilateralism, but liberalism promotes multilateralism (or, better, “minilateralism” within NATO). As a consequence, conservatives pursue a great power status, linked to some priorities (Europe, the Middle East, richer East Asia…), while liberals aspire to a super-power status with a global diplomacy. However, these are just models. Consequently, as political scientists, we must verify if either all Republican presidents have applied the conservative diplomacy or all Democratic presidents have followed the liberal model. Indeed, conservatism prevailed over liberalism in the Cold War, and values were sacrificed because of the “lesser evil” principle. In fact, American presidents wanted to avoid that communist parties (the “absolute evil”) might win democratic elections, and kept supporting authoritarian governments (in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia), which represented the lesser evil. Since 1989, the same has occurred to military or personalist regimes in Arab-Islamic countries (the “new lesser evil”) against fundamentalist governments, like in Algeria in the 1990s. Liberalism had some influence after 1989, especially with Clinton in former Yugoslavia’s “just” wars (with limited interests). After 2001, Bush Jr devised the so-called “neo-conservative” diplomacy, with liberal objectives (the promotion of democratic institutions and the solidarity with Israel) and conservative instruments (unilateralism and power relations). Since the 2011 Arab Spring, Obama has abandoned the conservative “lesser evil” priority, and authoritarian leaders like Mubarak, Ben Ali or Gaddafi were not supported anymore. Also “low intensity wars” against Isis (in Iraq, Syria and Libya) have not been part of a conservative diplomacy; the main objective of those bombings seemed to be limiting US human losses and not quickly defeating the enemy. What happened to the European medium powers: the United Kingdom, France and Germany? They focused more on foreign economic policy and developed a conservative diplomacy, mostly centered on protecting the interests of national firms. Liberal values have been sacrificed by France and the UK, mainly because of a sort of post-imperial feeling of guilt. After the Suez crisis in 1956, the main European governments realized that they were no longer able to exercise any governance in the military arena.

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During the Cold War, European governments never requested Third World regimes to respect human rights or to apply democracy, as they were victims of third-worldism. They did not want to appear to be neo-colonial powers, especially in their relations with African leaders. In the 1970s Germany pursued Ost-Politik by promoting the CSCE conference and the Helsinki Charter, within a constructivist diplomacy aimed at favoring communist countries and helping them shift to social-democratic values. These initiatives had the effect of reinforcing German foreign economic policy in Eastern Europe, but the Cold War’s unwritten rules (“traffic light wars”) were not modified: see the 1982 USSR repression in Poland. After the Arab Spring and Isis terrorist attacks in the West, only France is close to a conservative diplomacy, willing to fight Islamic fundamentalism with “high intensity wars”, like that in Mali of 2013. In post-1994 Italian foreign economic policy, the conservative and the constructivist (post-communist and politically correct) models have been applied (Fossati 1997). Economic diplomacy has focused on Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean countries, where interests and ideas are compatible. Multi-cultural (pro-Islamic and post-communist states) values are coherent with the interests of maintaining good relations with both Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean (because of oil imports, prevention of immigration, and threat of Islamic fundamentalism) countries, where small-sized firms are investing in cheap wage economies like Romania. Since 1989, Italian and Spanish (except for a brief confrontation between Aznar and Castro in 1997/8) governments have never supported a liberal diplomacy in foreign economic policy, by privileging more democratic (with better human rights record) or more economically liberal governments of the Third World. There has often been a sort of “antiliberal” foreign economic policy; for example, no Italian executive has ever applied political conditionality to foreign aid (Carbone 2007, 2008). The organizational culture of the indeed very Machiavellian diplomats of the Farnesina may have played some role in the adoption of this policy. There were many diplomatic contacts with Middle Eastern countries, especially through the Foreign Affairs minister (FAM) of the leftist Prodi executive (Dini), who had previously been the Economy minister of the rightist Berlusconi government -his political culture was conservative. He reaffirmed his anti-liberal stance at the FAM by privileging authoritarian regimes (like Libya, Iran, Iraq…), that had been considered “pariahs” in the Cold War. These priority economic relations with rogue states confirmed the important role in the economic diplomacy played by public companies, like ENI, which signed important energy agreements in the Mediterranean and in some Asian (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan…) states.

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Instead, in these countries, Anglo-American multi-nationals’ choices were constrained by the USA and the UK (see also Telecom’s investments in Serbia). Prodi’s left coalition realized the above-mentioned convergence between the conservative and the constructivist diplomacies (Fossati 1997, Davidson 2006, Brighi 2007, Missiroli 2007; Fabbrini, Piattoni 2008). The post-2001 rightist government confirmed this anti-liberal stance in both the Mediterranean (in Libya and Turkey) and Eastern Europe, deepening its relations with Putin’s Russian hybrid regime, with illiberal Ukraine -suspected of illegal nuclear arms trading with Iraq- and with authoritarian Belarus. Berlusconi did not have close ties with postKhomeini Iran. Thus, the ideology of the Italian right was close to neoconservatism, and not to liberalism; otherwise all authoritarian regimes would have been sanctioned. In fact, neo-conservatism aims at penalizing social and institutional actors supporting Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, political objectives prevailed over economic interests17. On the one hand, anti-fundamentalist authoritarian regimes like Gaddafi’s Libya were encouraged18. On the other hand, regimes characterized by radical Islam (like Iran) were marginalized. In the latter case, the economic interests of national firms (especially public companies like ENI) were partly sacrificed, and promoted only if compatible with the political objectives of foreign policy. This preference had already been apparent in Berlusconi’s 1994 Foreign Affairs minister (Martino), but it intensified after September 11. The rightist FAM’s attention to the Mediterranean differed from that of the First Republic, when multilateral channels had been preferred without any distinction between moderate and radical Arab countries. Martino did not attend multilateral (Casablanca’s) conferences, and he favored minilateral (Alexandria’s) forums. Thus, he always privileged relations with those governments (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey), which were fighting Islamic fundamentalism. In that period, Gaddafi’s Libya was still distant from the West (Brighi 2006, 2007, 2007a, Croci 2002, 2004, 2007, Waltson 2004, 2007, Liberti 2004/5, Romano 2006, Missiroli 2007). 17 These examples show that both interests are “national”: the (conservative) interests of public companies like ENI or Telecom, and the (neo-con) choice of avoiding contacts with the promoters of Islamic fundamentalism like Iran (especially in periods of high threat like post-September 11 world politics). Hence, while political cultures seem to define different national interests (Hill 2003), the compatibility among them is not always immediately evident. 18 In the last decade, a huge effort was devoted to diplomatic missions in China, which were undertaken by both Berlusconi and Prodi. Asian and Latin American partners (of large companies) remained far behind the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, because small and medium-sized firms prefer to invest in close regions.

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4. Models of political cultures in migration flows The diplomatic models anchored to political cultures can also be applied to migration flows. In the past, public policies on migration control were under the scrutiny of interior ministries. With the increase of population flows, Foreign Affairs ministries have increasingly dealt with immigration, especially when they manage the relations with neighboring (and poor) countries. Conservatives usually prefer to maintain population flows under control, applying quantitative limits on migration through national legislations and physical obstacles, and trying to implement them in bilateral and minilateral agreements. Liberals are not against population flows, but seek to integrate all immigrants with legal instruments based on reciprocity. Thus, they must respect the laws of the guest country, and the same tolerant laws must be applied to Western citizens visiting the countries of origin of immigrants. The left has applied the ideology of political correctness, renouncing reciprocity and promoting asymmetrical integration. Immigrants are not required to respect domestic laws and their countries of origin may evade legislation based on reciprocity. Thus, since the 1980s, liberalism has been defeated by a convergence between the promoters of conservatism and constructivism. The former has tried to bring population flows under control, and the latter has applied the asymmetric “politically correct” integration laws (Lahav, Lavenex 2013). Migration flows remain out of control, first of all because of the huge income differentials between rich and poor countries: especially in the Americas and Euro-Africa, less in Asia -where the North-South cleavage is softened by yin-yang. Thus, development cooperation did not work. Conflict on migration flows have recently increased, especially since the Arab Spring and the wars in the Mediterranean (in Libya, Syria…). The answer of the USA has been a regional cooperation agreement (NAFTA), as immigrants mainly come from Mexico. The EU decisions based on states’ quotas are insufficient to govern the increased flows of populations, and to reduce the danger of attacks of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. The xenophobic parties of the radical right are increasing their electors, as the answers given by the moderate right and the politically correct left did not produce effective governance. The increased flows of immigrants have changed the nature of the relation between the identity of the European populations and their single-nation (and “single-religion”) states. Many European citizens no longer identify themselves with their states, which were born as single-nation and are becoming pluri-national, with too many immigrants. Both Brexit and Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential elections have probably been conditioned by the threat of immigration.

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5. Models of domestic institutions’ decision-making in foreign economic policy Domestic institutions of foreign economic policy (FEP) are bodies of the public administration dealing with the internationalization process of countries like Italy. The sectors of the decision-making process are three. The first sector concerns the ministry apparatus. The most advanced countries promoted different institutional frameworks in FEP. In France (Direction Générale du Tresor et de la Politique Économique in the Economy and Finance Ministry), Germany (Aussenwirtschaftspolitik: Department of FEP in the Economy Ministry), Spain (Secretaría de Estado de Comercio in the Economy Ministry) and Japan (JETRO: Japan External Trade Organization in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry), decision-making is concentrated in one ministry. This is the hierarchical model, which is inclined to some dirigisme towards firms. In the UK and the USA, whose private enterprises are more autonomous and oriented to laissez faire, the coordination model (both in the National Economic Council) among ministries has prevailed (Bonvicini, Guerrieri 1997). Instead, the FEP decision-making in Italy’s First Republic was highly fragmented, because of the parceling out of ministry positions among the different government parties (Cotta 1994). Thus, the decisionmaking process was anarchic, and communication among the different institutions was low. The reform made by Prodi’s government in 1997 tried to introduce coordination also in Italy. Institutional coordination among the various ministries was delegated to the CIPE (Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica). The Foreign Trade Ministry (FTM) was entitled to play a primus inter pares role within the “cockpit” of FEP, because it had the secretariat role (Fossati 1999, 1999b). After 2001, Berlusconi promoted bilateral coordination in FEP; first, joint offices started to be organized in foreign countries, linking embassies and ICE (Foreign Trade Institute) offices; second, “low politics” coordination began among functionaries of the FAM, the Foreign Trade Bureau of the Economic Development Ministry (EDM), and ICE. In 2008, CIPE’s coordination was halted by Berlusconi, but in 2012 it was relaunched in the Cabina di regia per l’Italia internazionale within the Foreign Trade Bureau of the EDM, and it was co-directed with the FAM. Regional affairs and Tourism, Rural policies, Economy and Finance ministries, representatives of the Regional administrations, Confindustria, Rete Imprese Italia (a consortium of small firms), ABI (Italian Banks’ Association), Cooperatives, and Unioncamere (chambers of commerce) also participated in this “high politics” coordination (Fossati 2015).

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The second sector concerns the public bodies appointed to support the internationalizing of exporters and investors abroad, like foreign trade institutes, insurance-against-political-risk bodies, and financers of exports and investments. In Italy, these public bodies are the following: ICE (Istituto del Commercio Estero), responsible for information support to small and medium-sized exporters -in 2012, it was relaunched by Monti as the Italian Trade Agency-; SACE (Sezione Autonoma per i Crediti all’Esportazione), the public insurance body protecting exports and investments in risky developing countries; SIMEST (Società italiana per le IMprese miste all’ESTero), which channels credits to national firms exporting or investing abroad -this task was once performed by Mediocredito. These institutions are public, or the state controls more than 50% of their budgets, according to the protectionist model of decisionmaking. All these bodies are mostly supervised by the economy ministries: especially the EDM19. The liberal model, that should have favored the privatization of those institutions, was not applied. Another reform, permitting the participation of businessmen in diplomatic missions in foreign countries with institutions -following Berlusconi’s visit to Russia in 1994- has been promoted by the bureaucracies. In 1996, Dini established an institutionalized negotiation channel at the FAM (chaired by the general director of economic relations) to organize the participation of businessmen in official visits: inside and outside Italy (Fossati 1999b). The third sector is foreign aid. Public institutions for development cooperation are based on bureaucratic decentralization in an external (more or less independent) technical agency (close to the liberal model), or on centralization of decisions in the Foreign Affairs Ministry (close to the protectionist model). The USA (United States Agency for International Development: USAID) and Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency: SIDA) have applied the former; France and Japan the latter (Cunningham 1974). Most of the advanced countries are shifting towards the decentralized model. In the Italian First Republic, decisions on foreign aid were made by the FAM through the general direction of development cooperation (DGCS). There were some technical units (Unità Tecniche Centrali) within the FAM, but they were very inefficient. Several attempts at reform, proposed especially by leftist parties in the 1990s, intended to establish an independent (but public) aid technical agency. 19 All companies appointed to support domestic firms in international markets are public in Spain as well. They all depend on the SEC (Secretaría de Estado de Comercio), which is the public institution within the Ministry of Economy, entitled to make decisions concerning Spanish foreign economic policy, according to the inter-ministerial hierarchical model (Fossati 2000).

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Their failure was caused by the objections to the reform of the FAM, supported by the right parties, and by the division within the left parties20. In January 2014 a reform bill, aimed at promoting the Agenzia italiana per la cooperazione allo sviluppo, was drawn up by the vice FAM minister (in charge of foreign aid) Pistelli and was approved by Letta’s leftist government. The agency is dependent on the FAM, with a director appointed by the prime minister (but proposed by the FAM); then it is helped by an inter-ministerial committee for development cooperation (CICS) and a National Council of NGOs. The law was approved in August 2014, under the supervision of Renzi’s leftist government (Fossati 2015). In sum, the reforms of (especially) the second sector of FEP domestic institutions have been classified according to the protectionist and the liberal models. In principle, the market-oriented right should have promoted the latter, and the state-oriented left the former. The empirical evidence has shown that the role of political cultures has been limited in the reforms of FEP domestic institutions in Italy and Spain. All these institutions have remained public because the right of both countries is more conservative (thus, protectionist) than liberal. The outcome of these reforms can be explained by rational variables, anchored to role dynamics among public bureaucracies (Breton 1978). There have been some party projects, but they have been of little account. The main promoters of FEP reforms have been ministry bureaucracies. The role of lobbies (like Confindustria) has also been limited, especially in the initial decisionmaking phase. The Italian inter-ministerial framework reform of the left, which led to minilateral coordination (first in the CIPE, and then in the Cabina di regia), was mainly promoted by the ministry functionaries of the Foreign Trade administration. The reform of the Italian development cooperation agency had been proposed by the left in the 1990s, while the right opposed it with the strong support of the FAM (Fossati 1999, 1999b). The ideological divisions within the (moderate and radical) left led to the “freezing” of the reform, which was finally approved only with an initiative of Pistelli, the under-secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. 20

In Spain the Foreign Affairs Ministry has always managed foreign aid through the SECIPI (Secretaría de Estado para la Cooperación Internacional y Para Ibero-America), established in 1985. In 1988, the Socialist Party added the AECID (Agencia Espanola de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo) to the FAM bureaucracy. The agency is a technical body, but its administrative structure is like that of all the public institutes functioning with diplomats; few experts were brought in from outside. Moreover, the SEC presides over the FAD (Fondos de Ayuda al Desarrollo), which is an instrument of tied aid, i.e. export credits to local producers. Thus, Spanish foreign aid has a parallel decision-making structure.

CHAPTER THREE POST-1989 INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: POWER DISTRIBUTION AND STABILITY

1. Models of the international system after 1989 What is the power distribution of the current international system? It is important that this diagnosis is anchored to actual and not potential power; it matters who achieves, not just who searches for, compliance (Stoppino 1995). From 1492 to 1914, world politics was always characterized by a multipolar system. In the Cold War, there was a bipolar system, with two blocs: the Western and the Communist alliances (Waltz 1979). Most of the “non-aligned” countries, except for India’s Nehru, were allies of the USA or the USSR. After 1989, the system started a change process. The main hypotheses in the IRs literature on the models of the post1989 international system can be classified in the following typology (Fossati 1995). Two dimensions are identifiable in the typology: the (low or high) conflict intensity in world politics, and the (low or high) centralization of the decision-making process among the main powers. DECISION-MAKING CENTRALIZATION low high

high CONFLICT INTENSITY low (Blocs) (Globalized multilateralism) Multipolarism Open economic regions Unipolarism Concert of powers

After 1989, the first hypothesis on the new international system was unipolarism. With the defeat of the USSR, the USA remained the only super-power: the “policeman of the world”. This diagnosis prevailed in the 1991 Kuwait war and the 2003 Iraq military intervention of the USA (and the UK). Unipolarism was proposed by Waltz (2000), Krasner (1993), Ikenberry (et al. 2011), and many others. This model assumes that world politics has high conflict intensity, and that the decision-making process among the main powers is centralized. Unipolarism is centered on military resources, with a high superiority of the USA, and on potential power.

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In the mid-1990s, during NATO’s military interventions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), a new diagnosis was advanced by Rosecrance (1992): the concert of powers. This model is characterized by a high centralization of the decision-making process: with “a rule by a central decision”. At the same time, the main (four/five) powers do not crystallize conflict, but rather try to reach agreements, as in the old concert of European powers (the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15). Rosecrance clarified that the concert of powers would deal only with important and strategic conflicts, like those of former Yugoslavia and the Middle East, while most local wars (in the former Soviet Union, Africa and the rest of Asia) would not be considered. This new concert of powers probably operated until the US military intervention in Afghanistan of 2001. However, the concert of powers failed in Iraq (in 2003), and after the difficulties of US unipolarism in stabilizing compliance in both Iraq and Afghanistan, a new diagnosis was advanced: a multipolar system. It is characterized by high conflict intensity and a decentralized decisionmaking process. Multipolarism was proposed by Huntington (1996), with an emphasis on five or six “cultural powers” represented by the leaders of the main civilizations: the USA (of the Christian West), Russia (of the Orthodox East), India, China and Japan. Kissinger (1991/2) also supported the multipolar model. Mearsheimer (2001) hypothesized that Bush Jr’s efforts to consolidate US unipolarism would lead to a counter-balancing alliance of the other powers (Russia, China, France…) in the future, within a state-centered “political” multipolarism, based on an anarchic balance (and not concert) of powers. The multipolar model was relaunched after 2009, with the declining ambitions of president Obama and his reluctance to start major wars (Dueck 2015); in the 2010s, there have been only “low intensity” bombings, like those against Isis in Iraq, Syria and Libya. The model of “open regionalism” was advanced by some scholars of international political economy. According to Lawrence (1991) and Aggarwal (1994), after 1989 the four economic giants (the USA, the EU, Japan and China) were not consolidating “closed” economic blocs (with strong external protectionism), but rather three open regions, within the global market: the USA with Latin America, the EU with Africa and the Middle East, Japan and China with Asia (see the statistics in Chapter 5). Open regionalism is based on low conflict intensity and a decentralized decision-making process. Regional economic flows (of multi-national firms, governments, and banks) are higher than trans-regional ones (from the USA to Africa/Asia, from the EU to Asia/Latin America, or from China and Japan to Latin America/Africa). This scenario has been helped by the establishment of regional organizations or treaties, like NAFTA

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(among the USA, Canada and Mexico), the Lomé/Cotonou Conventions, (among the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific states), and ASEAN (10 south-east Asian countries) plus three (China, South Korea and Japan). “Closed” blocs only existed during the Cold War, but after 1989 it is no longer possible to support this thesis, unless we forecast that three new blocs will emerge in the future: one American, one European, and one Asiatic. This hypothesis was advanced by Gilpin (1987) and Katzenstein (1993), but only for the future. Closed blocs are based on high conflict intensity among the four regional leaders (the USA, the EU, China and Japan) and on a decentralized decision-making process. The last hypothesis is that of globalized multilateralism, but it is only a potential scenario for the future. This model was proposed by Ruggie (1993), and is based on an intensification of world economic flows until the situation where geography is no longer significant, and relations are characterized by market dynamics alone. For example, Sweden would not privilege the close Baltic states, but will have economic relations at a global level with whichever country (Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Chile…). In globalized multilateralism, conflict intensity is very low and the decisionmaking process is naturally decentralized. In sum, the empirical evidence is “grey” and is currently disobeying models; there is not a stable configuration of systemic power relations yet (Fossati 1995). The current system seems to be a no one’s world (Kupchan 2012). According to Waltz (2000), a more stable power configuration will emerge in the medium-long period. Keohane (1993), Buzan and Little (2000) admitted that today there are probably different power relations in each (cultural, economic and military) arena of international relations. The distribution of “actual” political power is still uncertain, that is to say the capacity to stabilize the compliance, starting from “potential” (cultural, economic and military) resources. Three models have been proposed: concert of powers (Rosecrance), unipolarism (Waltz), and multipolarism (Huntington). Open regionalism (with three regions and four giants) only fits with the economic arena. In the 1990s and in the 2001 Afghanistan war, the model of concert of powers was working, but then failed. With the 2003 Iraq war, Bush Jr tried to consolidate the unipolar model, but it failed again, and compliance in the Middle East has not been stabilized. US unipolarism can be the diagnosis only of potential (and not actual) power. Obama was pushing towards anarchic multipolarism (Keller 2015), but there is still asymmetry between the USA and the other powers (Russia, China, France, the UK…). No “balance of powers” has emerged since the military interventions in Libya (in 2011), Mali (in 2013), and the “low intensity” bombings against Isis in Syria, Iraq and Libya (in 2014/6).

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2. The definition of international stability In the literature, international stability has been anchored to two processes. Some scholars have sought to link it to the global power distribution; others have focused on some features of domestic politics. Waltz (1979) assumed that bipolar systems are more stable, because free riding is difficult. Instead, Kaplan (1957), Deutsch and Singer (1964) argued that multipolarism is more stable. It should be pointed out that all statistical studies on the relation between polarity and stability have shown that both multipolarism (until 1914) and bipolarism (from 1945 to 1989) were quite stable, without relevant differences (Levy 1984). Morgenthau (1948) linked international stability to the existence of a balance of power (and not to a specific world system) or of some equilibrium (Liska 1957, Axelrod 1990). According to Organski (1958), wars and instability have increased in periods of change in the international systems, like that of the two world wars from 1915 to 1945 (and then since 1989). After 1989, centralized decision-making processes of the international system (unipolarism and concert of powers) seemed to be more stable, as decentralized multipolarism could facilitate the crystallization of more conflicts in the medium term (Herd 2010). According to Mearsheimer (2001) and Kupchan (2002), the US efforts to consolidate unipolarism with the 2003 Iraq war (and its difficult conflict resolution process) were indicators only of incomplete (or partial) hegemony. Complete hegemonic unipolarism has never materialized in international relations. Incomplete unipolarism is very unstable because it may lead to anarchic multipolarism in the medium term through a counter-balancing alliance of other powers, giving rise to decentralized (and more polarized) decision-making processes (Mowle, Sacko 2007). Huntington (1996) emphasized the high instability of a multipolar system anchored to the main civilizations. After 2009, the US president Obama abandoned both unilateral and concerted scenarios, and seemed to rely more on an anarchic and balanced (but more unstable) multipolarism (Nye 2015). Yet other scholars are convinced that these counter-balancing effects are still limited and only linked to shortterm US unilateral efforts of hegemony, like those during and after the military intervention in Iraq (Joffe 2002). Cooperation should re-emerge through rational decisions by the main powers because of the “paradox of the American power”. Such a powerful state has never existed in history, but current problems are too complex and cannot be resolved with unilateral efforts (Nye 2002). Cooperation might also arise from the inertial strength of liberal values (peace, democracy and the market) which should push states to return to the concert of powers (Ikenberry 2001).

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The second set of theories on instability has focused on domestic politics. Rosecrance (1963) emphasized stable or unstable periods within European multipolarism, according to those “subversive forces” generated by domestic actors (like Napoleon in France or the various revolutions of 1848). Galtung (1988) criticized Morgenthau’s balance of power by stressing that power distribution was balanced during the Cold War, because the sums of the resources of the three arenas were similar for each great power. According to Galtung, the bipolar international system became unstable, even if it was quite balanced. Galtung (1988) argued that the “consistency” of power at the sub-systemic level would matter much more than the balance of power at the systemic level1. Wight (1979) also emphasized that some domestic values would be the main vehicles of international change: those of the Protestant reformation during the religious wars, of the French revolution -leading to Napoleon’s wars- and of Russian communism (with the side-effect of World War II) in the twentieth century. Then, Huntington (1996) focused on an intentional input of instability coming from the actors of the Islamic civilization. Thus Khomeini’s Islamic fundamentalist revolution of 1979 has been the main input of change in the recent decades, leading to a deep conflict with the West and to an unstable international system. This simple scheme summarizes the scenarios of power distribution of the three sets of (cultural, economic and military) resources: Cultural Æ Multi-polarity (n civilizations) 1

Economic Æ Tri-polarity (the USA, the EU, Japan/China)

Military Uni-polarity (the USA)

According to Galtung, the sum of the resources of the three (cultural, economic, military) arenas of each major power was symmetrical at the systemic level during the Cold War. The USSR had high military (3) and cultural (3) resources, but low economic (1) ones. The USA had high economic (3) and military (3) resources, but intermediate cultural (2) ones, because of difficulties in integrating its immigrants. Thus, power was quite well balanced in bipolarism, with the USA scoring 8 for resources, and the USSR 7. Galtung’s hypothesis is that the main powers must not be similar at the systemic level, but they should have the same amount of resources in each arena. In bipolarism there was a power inconsistency because the USSR had too few economic resources (1), while its military and cultural resources were abundant (3). Instead, the US power was consistent, because differences were smaller (from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 3). Thus, the Soviet Union produced instability. However, Galtung’s theory does not explain why Japan and Germany, with the reverse power inconsistency of the USSR’s (high economic and cultural, but low military resources), did not threaten international stability.

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Since 1989, there has not been a stable international system, because there has been multipolarism (with many civilizations) in the cultural arena, tripolarism (with three regions and four giants: the USA, the EU and Japan/China) in the economic arena, and unipolarism (of the USA) in the military arena. Three threats to stability materialize when: I) cultural powers (Russia, Serbia, India, the Confucian tigers, or Islamic actors) want to get more economic resources; II) economic powers (Germany, Japan or China) try to improve their military resources; III) the change is directly from the cultural to the military arena. An example of the first process is the Asian stock market crisis of 1997/8, which affected ASEAN countries. China’s transition (and the potential shifts in Germany and Japan) fits with the second scenario. An example of the third process is provided by those actors (North Korea, Iran, Isis or Al Qaeda) trying to become military powers without relying upon strong economic resources: the former two with nuclear proliferation, and the latter two with trans-national terrorism. There seems to be international stability, when the process of transition from lower-level rising actors to higher-level governing powers is under control. Thus, stability may be defined not as absence of change, but rather as control over change. Why do some changes go out of control, while others do not (Doyle, Ikenberry 1997)? First, actors should follow a sort of hierarchy among the three arenas: starting with cultural, continuing with economic, finishing with military resources. Then, international stability depends on conflicts on power transitions, stemming from changes in the differential growth of some units that produce status frustrations, and thus push for changes in the international hierarchy of power distribution (Mc Carthy 1998). Acceptance by the higher-level “governing” powers of demands made by the lower-level “rising” actors is crucial. Many scholars have given priority to the status quo (Waltz 1979), but stability may also facilitate an “evolutionary change” (Mc Carthy 1998). Current conflicts on power transitions seem to be linked more to domestic variables than to international factors. Thus, stability depends on the compatibility between the values of the new-comers and those of the old powers (Liska 1957). In sum, international stability has to be linked to world order. The current international system is undergoing deep change, with several critical junctures: 1989, 2001, the Arab Spring… The change process seems to be out of control especially since 2001. The values of Islamic fundamentalist actors (Al Qaeda, Isis…) are incompatible with those of the Western powers, and (in part) of China and Japan. Detailed analysis of the stability of the current international system will be conducted after the empirical analysis of the next chapters; the concepts of international stability and world order will be linked in the conclusions.

CHAPTER FOUR THE CULTURAL ARENA: THE PROMOTION OF GOVERNANCE THROUGH PLURI-NATIONAL STATES

Introduction on political cultures in the cultural arena The cultural arena of international relations concerns the relations among different nations of the same civilization, or pertaining to different ones. After 1989, nearly 90 conflicts degenerated into wars. These (infraor inter-civilization) conflicts may be defined cultural, as they involve collective identities, along religious, ethnic, and linguistic cleavages (Huntington 1996). The cultural nature of conflicts has been denied by the promoters of political correctness. Intellectual conformism has led many leftist intellectuals to emphasize the economic (relevant resources) or the psychological (violent leaders) causes of war (Fossati 2006, 2008). The three scenarios of world politics (governance, order and anarchy) must be linked to the main political cultures. The cultural value of world order is “liberal” national self-determination, anchored to single-nation states. Instead, multi-cultural leftist governance leads to pluri-national states. Conservative anarchy is linked to political laissez faire, which materializes in abstention from intervening in conflicts within other states. Before 1989, the USA and the USSR never promoted national selfdetermination or multi-cultural states. The two great powers never supported national groups outside the West (or the East), and only made “traffic light” wars, where the USA (and their allies) fought the USSR’s allies (in Korea and Vietnam) or vice versa (in Afghanistan). There was only the Soviet Union’s weak diplomatic (and not military) support of the Palestinians against Israel. However, the URSS repressed nationalisms (for example of Chechnya, of Armenia, or even of Russians in Crimea…) in the so-called Second World through ethnic cleansing, forced colonization, and mass deportations (in Siberia). Neither leftist nor liberal “ideologiesintensive” political cultures mattered before 1989, and conservative political laissez faire prevailed (Fossati 2006, 2008).

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1. Models of conflict resolution A conflict may end in three ways: resolution of the incompatibility, avoidance or freezing -so that incompatibility persists-, and mutual destruction. Starting from Galtung's (1987) typology, twelve models of conflict resolution have been identified (Fossati 1998, 2008). Territorial conflicts are usually resolved through either separation or integration (Galtung 1987). In separation, the actors cease to interact or they divide the territory causing their incompatibility, as between the Czech Republic and Slovakia after 1989 (Tir 2005). Single-nation separations follow the “ordered” principle of national self-determination, when the new states (like Slovenia, Eritrea, Southern Sudan, and East Timor) are homogeneous according to the national identity of their citizens, following the principle of one nation = one state. This solution usually leads to single-nation states, and is compatible with the liberal scenario of world order. Pluri-national separations lead to the secession of new pluri-national states, as in the other conflicts of Yugoslavia: Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia. This scenario is compatible with governance and is usually promoted by the multi-cultural left. In integration, a fusion comes about whereby the actors unify their territories, as between East and West Germany. There are two models of symmetric integration: federalism, as in Iraq and Bosnia (Horowitz 2002, Anderson 2013), or consensual (power-sharing) pacts, as in Afghanistan and Lebanon (Diamond, Plattner 1994, Lijphart 2002, O’Leary 2005). In federalism, central power is divided among all state entities. In consensual or consensus pacts, there is a power-sharing agreement among the polities in conflict. If only administrative autonomy is conceded to minorities, as between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza, an asymmetric integration materializes. This scenario is close to the conservative scenario of anarchy. In compromise, neither actor achieves its objective; both agree on an alternative and complementary (fifty-fifty) solution. Confederations are a compromise between integration and separation, as in Serbia-Montenegro or in the USSR, where former member states had the right to secede (Pavkovic 2007). Shared sovereignty (“condominium”) is another compromise solution. Pluri-national separations, symmetric integrations and compromises are coherent with the governance scenario of plurinational states, promoted by the constructivist left. In exchange, conflict is over (at least) two goals and only one is achieved by each actor. For example, amnesty is granted to all those fighters that renounce terrorism. In transcendence, both actors simultaneously achieve their objectives; for example, when democratic elections stabilize some peace agreements.

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In persuasion, one actor achieves its objective, and the other renounces its own, whether or not through coercion, which is an asymmetrical relation, where the weak has only two negative choices and the strong pushes towards the “lesser evil”. For example, this occurs through an arbitration. In dominion, one actor imposes its objective and the loser does not agree. This often happens through a military victory after a war. In incapacitation, one actor physically neutralizes the other one, for example through expulsion (ethnic cleansing). In segmentation, one actor divides the other one into two actors, and has a positive interaction with only one of them. In subversion, one actor promotes a change of authority in the other one, and has a positive interaction only with the new leaders. In diversion, the actors freeze the old conflict and start a new relationship: negative (second conflict) or positive (cooperation). In multilateralization, the actors freeze the old conflict and start to interact with a new actor: jointly (the two old actors versus the new one) or separately (an old actor versus a new and an old one together); the typical example is United Nations peace-keeping missions.

2. Diagnoses of contemporary conflict resolution processes A few conflicts have been resolved through single-nation separation, according to the ordered scenario anchored to the liberal principle of national self-determination. Single-nation states arose in Slovenia, Eritrea (separation from Ethiopia in 1993), East Timor (separation from Indonesia in 1999), and Southern Sudan (separation from Sudan in 2011 after the 2005 peace agreement) through popular referenda. Kashmir’s separation was the outcome of the 1963 inter-governmental agreement between India and China. Among former Yugoslavia’s separations, only the Slovenian one was single-nation, while all the secessions of Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and Macedonia were pluri-national. Montenegro’s separation (from Serbia in 2006) also gave rise to a pluri-national state, according to the politically correct leftist governance scenario. The declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008 did not follow the self-determination principle, because pluri-national separation benefited only Albanians, and damaged Serbs. Symmetric integration has been achieved through two scenarios. The first is federalism, which materialized in Bosnia (between Croats/Muslims and Serbs) after the 1995 Dayton Agreement, Iraq (among Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites) after the 2005 referendum, Nigeria after the Biafra war of the 1960s, Ethiopia (since 1995), Somalia (since 2003), and India (in Punjab, Kashmir, Assam, and Uttar Pradesh).

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The second scenario is a consensual pact with the representation in government of all the main groups in conflict. This occurred in Ulster (between Unionists and Catholics after the 1998 Agreement), Libya (after the 2015 agreement), Lebanon (after the 1943 constitution), Afghanistan (among Tajiks, Uzbeks and Pashtuns since 2001), Tajikistan (among Russians and Uzbeks in the north and Tajiks in the south since 1997), Burundi (since 2003), Sierra Leone (since 2002), Liberia (since 2005), Kenya (after the 2007 elections), Zimbabwe (after the 2008 elections), and the Central African Republic (since 2014). In Ivory Coast (from 2007 to 2010) and Belgian Congo (from 2003 to 2006), consensual pacts had only temporary effects, and failed after the first democratic elections. Confederation is a compromise between integration and separation. There were no conflicts after the partition of the former Soviet Union, because confederations admit secessions. The Bosnian confederation is only formal because single polities (like the Serbian one) cannot declare independence. This is often perceived as an unstable scenario and voters usually reject it, as in the 2002 UN Annan Plan for Cyprus. Models of symmetric integration and compromise are close to the politically correct governance scenario, promoted by constructivist leftists. Asymmetric integration consists in the concession of administrative autonomy, as in Euskadi to Basques (within the Spanish constitution), in Croatia to Serbs (after the end of the war of the 1990s), in Macedonia to Albanians (since 2001), in Israel to Gaza’s Palestinians (after the 1993 Oslo Agreement), in Pakistan -whose federalism is only formal-, in Bangladesh (in Buddhist Chittagong), in the Philippines (in the Muslim isle of Mindanao), in Indonesia to Aceh’s minorities, in Niger (after the mid-1990s peace agreement with Tuareg groups), in Turkish Kurdistan (since the beginning of negotiations on the EU enlargement in 2005). In Christian Casamance of Senegal and in indigenous Chiapas (since 2001), autonomy is only partial, but violence has almost ended. Asymmetric integration is not full anarchy, but is usually promoted by conservatives. Persuasion comes about if actors in conflict accept an arbitration; two examples are Libya’s return of the Aozou Strip to Chad, and Nigeria’s return of the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon. Exchange has been applied when governments have granted amnesty to criminals in exchange for their renunciation of violence. This happened in the 1990s in Algeria towards Islamic fundamentalist groups and in Cambodia towards the communist Khmer Rouge party. In Colombia amnesty was conceded to most local communist groups; the last (2016) peace agreement concerned FARC, while the Peruvian government refused to grant amnesty to the communist terrorists of Sendero Luminoso.

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Transcendence can be realized if democracy resolves conflicts, as in post-apartheid Namibia and Mozambique, then in post-1989 Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador (after the “traffic light” wars of the 1980s), in Nepal and the Philippines (after the wars with communist groups). In Ukraine it worked for nearly 20 years; then a war started between the proEuropean west and the pro-Russian east. In Dominican Republic, after the 1965 invasion by the USA, democracy emerged in the late 1960s. Haiti was subject to two American military interventions (in 1994 and 2004), and democracy could overcome hybrid regimes of both patrimonial right and populist left. If democracy is illiberal (as in Haiti, Mozambique and Nepal), transcendence is only potential. The armed conflict in Lebanon (between Israel and Hezbollah) was frozen thanks to the multilateralization of the United Nations, which sent troops to the frontiers between the two polities. Other conflicts have been resolved through asymmetric processes like a military victory, so that a dominion materializes. This occurred to the UK against Argentina in the 1982 Falklands war, to China against Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinyang (with the communist party repression since 1945), to Albanians against Serbs in Kosovo (after the 1999 NATO intervention), to Russians in Dagestan (since 1998), Transnistria (against Moldova) and Crimea (against Ukraine since 2014), to Ossetians against Georgians in South Ossetia, to Israel against Palestinians in West Bank (after the 1967 Six-Day War), to North against South Yemen since 1994, to Shiite Alawites against Sunnis in Syria, to Iran against Kurds, to Sri Lanka against Tamils (after the government’s victory in 2009), to Myanmar against ethnic minorities, to Thailand against Muslims in Pattani, to Laos against some minorities, to Indonesia against the Christian population of West Papua, to Fijians against Indian minorities, to northern Islamic Chad against southern Christian populations (since the beginning of the 1980s and after Deby’s victory in 1990), to Ethiopia against Eritrea after the late-1990s war over Badme, to Sudan against South Sudan in the Abyei region, to Tutsis against Hutus in Rwanda (after the 1994 genocide of Tutsis by Hutus), to governments of Guinea (with Conté’s repression), Ivory Coast (after Outtara’s victory in the 2011 elections), Belgian Congo (after Kabila’s victory in the 2006 elections), Angola (after Dos Santos’s victory against Savimbi’s Unita in 2002), Uganda (with Musuveni’s repression), French Congo (after Sassou-Nguesso’s victory in 1999), and to Peru against the communist terrorists of Sendero Luminoso. In Chechnya, Russia tried to provoke a segmentation of that Islamic nation, by promoting an alliance with moderate Chechens. In Mali, France has privileged Tuareg groups against radical Islamic actors since 2013.

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Fundamentalist groups are trying to enact subversion in many Islamic states: in Chechnya (through Caucacus Front), Afghanistan and Pakistan (through Talibans), Syria, Iraq and Libya (through Isis), Yemen (through Islamic Youth), Somalia (through Islamic courts), Nigeria (through Boko Haram) and Mali (through Al Qaeda for the Islamic Maghreb). When military victory is coupled with “ethnic cleansing”, there ensues incapacitation. This occurred in Abkhazia (against Georgians), in the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (against Azeris), in North Ossetia (in Prigorodny, against Islamic Ingushes), and in the Golan Heights (Israel against Syria) after 1967. In Cyprus there was a reciprocal incapacitation, with the expulsion of Greeks from the north and Turks from the south after 1974, and then UN multilateralization. Ethnic cleansing is sometimes partial, and some minority populations remain: as in Western Sahara where Morocco expelled Sahrawis after Spain’s withdrawal in the mid-1970s, in Darfur where Islamic Africans were thrown out by Islamic Arabs in the late 1990s, and in parts of Indian Kashmir where some Hindus were expelled by Muslims after 1989. Many conflicts have a double dimension: one among the social (majority-minority) actors within a section of territory; the other among the states that are involved. The latter conflicts usually undergo a freezing process, with a de facto separation that is not recognized by international law. This occurred in north Cyprus after the 1974 war between Greece and Turkey, Kosovo (after the 2008 declaration of independence), Transnistria (after the 1992 war), Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia (after the two wars of 1992/3 and 2008), Armenia and Azerbaijan (after the 1992/4 war in Nagorno-Karabakh), Crimea (since 2014), India and Pakistan (after the 1947 and 1965 wars over Kashmir), and British Somaliland (since 1991) the rest of Somalia was an Italian colony. In sum, most of these armed conflicts went through a very violent phase in the 1990s, but mainstream ethnic, linguistic or religious wars ended, with some exceptions: Ukraine, the Central African Republic, Sudan… However, even if many wars are over, only few conflicts have been resolved; most incompatibilities have only been frozen or are unstable. This is evident in regard to the above-mentioned de facto separations, the asymmetric conflict avoidance processes (dominion and incapacitation), and many consensual pacts -which seem to be efficient only in the short term. Instead, conflicts involving Islamic fundamentalist actors (in Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, the Philippines…) are very crystallized and have not been resolved; they are all in a very violent phase, especially since the 2011 Arab Spring (Fossati 2008): see also Chapter 8 on the military arena.

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3. Therapies: “preferred worlds” in conflict resolution In the modern phase (1960s) of Peace Research (PR) there was a positivist hope of influencing politics, and Galtung (1985) launched the “preferred worlds” project. It was a sort of pacific engineering, focused on those conflict resolutions closer to a positive sum game, being at the same time equitable, feasible and not totally unrealistic. Peace researchers have been discouraged by the passage of Western societies to post-modernity (after 1968), which weakened rational projects like PR. Some mistakes have been committed by researchers, with an intellectual subordination to the prevailing ideology of post-modernity: leftist “political correctness” (Fossati 2006). Pluri-national states (with integrations or pluri-national separations) have always been promoted, while national self-determination has been considered a “new-apartheid” scenario. Many leftist researchers often had the usual post-Marxist ideological bias against nationalisms, idealistically assuming that most conflicts will be “transformed” only when politically incorrect collective identities are overcome. Let us now consider the typical conservative objection: why are you intervening to promote conflict resolution? Everyone should be satisfied with the decrease of violence since the late 1990s, even if wars sometimes start again (as in South Ossetia in 2008). If you try to resolve frozen conflicts, wars are probably going to resume. Anarchic conflict freezing is the mini-max outcome: worse than a definitive solution, but much better than war -which could stem from attempts at governance or order. This objection is reasonable, but case by case empirical solutions may suggest whether there is some room for improvement, or anarchy is the only reasonable strategy. Anarchy usually leads to zero-sum conflict resolution processes, such as dominion, incapacitation or asymmetric integration. Then, many conflicts go through lengthy peace negotiations (Zartman 1978)1, and it is probably better to have some creativity to be able to solve them; otherwise violence may resume. In sum, conservative, liberal or constructivist left biases should not affect peace researchers, even if they condition politicians; nor can national self-determination become a panacea. Federations, more than consensus power-sharing agreements or compromise confederations (Galtung et al. 2002; Galtung 2008), are probably the most equitable solutions. 1

A negotiation is a communication process among two or more actors, aimed at reaching a joint decision. Zartman (1978) identified three models of negotiations: concession-convergence of bargaining processes (in disarmament talks), formuladetails if the formula is fixed and details are flexible (between the IMF and debtor governments), and progressive construction (between Israel and the Palestinians).

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The following therapies are the “preferred worlds”, which must not be read as rigid positions (Fossati 2008). The two conflicts of Kosovo and Western Sahara could be resolved with more symmetric single-nation separations, and the division of territories in two parts: the north under the sovereignty of Serbia/Morocco, and the south becoming independent. The exact frontier could be drawn by the International Court of Justice. The Israel-Palestinian conflict could be resolved with an independent state in all the PLO’s West Bank; instead, as long as Hamas does not renounce the destruction of Israel, administrative autonomy should remain in Gaza. Separate peace could be facilitated by exchanges of territories (between Israel and the Palestinians) within and outside the 1967 frontiers; some Arab neighbors could offer strips of land as gifts to the Palestinian state. The most equitable solution to the Falklands conflict is independence from both the UK and Argentina. Kurds have the right to build their own state as well, joining their territories in Syria and Iraq. Separation between India and Pakistan in Kashmir should also be legalized. In Africa, Somaliland could become independent from Somalia without violating the 1963 OAU pact, because these two polities were divided by their empires: Italy and Great Britain. Condominium (shared sovereignty) could be implemented in Abyei between Sudan and South Sudan. There are several anomalous scenarios in former USSR, where some territories were offered as gifts to other states. The return of these lands to their “mother” nations seems to be the most equitable solution. Thus, Moldavian Transnistria should return to Ukraine; Ukrainian Crimea to Russia; the northern Ossetian region of Prigorodny to Ingushetia; Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Separation is inevitable in Nagorno-Karabakh; the memory of the Turkish genocide is still vivid for Armenians, which should return the Lachin corridor to Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, with a UN (and not Russian) guarantee. In Bosnia, Cyprus, Afghanistan, and Irian Jaya, referenda with a choice between federalism and separation should stabilize peace. The victory of secessions could lead to other integrations: with Croatia and Serbia (and an independent Islamic Bosnia), with Greece and Turkey; with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (and an independent Pashtunistan), and with Papua New Guinea. A referendum should be held in Kashmir, so that populations can choose the exact frontier between India and Pakistan. Asymmetric integration with autonomy is to be implemented by China in Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinyang. The same scenario could be applied by Iran to Kurds, by Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia (in Aceh) towards minorities. Autonomy should also be strengthened in Chiapas. Then, confederation is feasible in Georgia, a puzzle of too many nations.

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Confederations could be short-term solutions between Shiites and Sunnis, in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. In the future, Sunni Iraq and Syria, or Shiite Lebanon and Syria, could be re-united within single-nation states. In these countries, conflicts with Islamic fundamentalist actors, like Al Qaeda or Isis, cannot be resolved in the short period. The promoters of Islamic fundamentalism highly increased their power in pluri-national states (like Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan…), and conflicts between Sunni and Shiite groups degenerated into wars, especially after the Arab Spring. In the medium term, Islamic fundamentalism can be weakened only by moderate (and more legitimate) authorities of new “single-nation” states. In Africa (and Libya), federalism should be the solution, as consensual pacts seem to be feasible only in highly ethnically-mixed (between Hutus and Tutsis) Burundi and Rwanda (and in the Fiji Islands). Federalism can be applied in Sunni Libya, and exported from India to Sri Lanka, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and the Philippines. This scenario could also be implemented in Ukraine (between the pro-European west and the proRussian east), in the Islamic nations of Russia (Chechnya and Dagestan) where the federal entities are the provinces and not the republics, which only enjoy autonomy- and in Tajikistan (between the Russian-Uzbek north and the Tajik south). In Ireland and Spain, a combination between federalism and consensual pacts can be implemented. Local governments should be managed by consensual pacts in both Ulster and Euskadi. Federalism could be applied between Eire and Ulster (with the separation of Ulster from Great Britain) and among the various nationalities in Spain, whose autonomies already constitute an informal federalism. However, Galtung’s (et al. 2002, 2008) suggestions also concern a fair and effective mediation process. First, all “tolerant” (even if terrorist) actors should be invited to the negotiating table, except for those who do not accept the right of other actors to exist, and have genocidal intentions (like Fatah in the past and Hamas or Isis today). Second, the mediator should conduct separate discussions with each actor, especially in the initial phase; only when common solutions are envisaged, may minilateral negotiations begin. Third, the mediator should have thorough knowledge of the history of the conflict in order to be able to elaborate an objective (his “preferred world”), which must be managed neither too rigidly, nor too flexibly. Fourth, compromises should not be passively pursued, with a constant search for fifty-fifty solutions, because “equidistance” is not always a virtue and more favorable (even if not excessively) solutions to a particular party may be pursued. Fifth, the mediator should not be ideological, preferring leftist pluri-national states (governance), liberal self-determination (order), or conservative political laissez faire (anarchy).

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4. The influence of political cultures in the cultural arena After the Cold War, national self-determination is still far from being guaranteed, except in some cases with single-nation separations: Slovenia, East Timor, Eritrea, and Southern Sudan. In most conflicts, pluri-national states have been promoted; non-ordered governance (i.e. without any unit of measurement) has emerged in both symmetrical integrations (Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya…) and pluri-national separations (as in former Yugoslavia except Slovenia), which became or remained multi-cultural polities. Anarchy has materialized in the other cases (Chechnya, Kurdistan, Tibet, Sri Lanka…), in which there was no involvement of the main powers or the United Nations to resolve conflicts. In sum, since 1989 there has been a “near” or quasi-order, because national self-determination was weakly supported (Fossati 1999, 2008). There is an ideological explanation of this “near” order (Fossati 2006). The conservative right has always been obsessed with an anti-liberal bias against national self-determination and secessions, as its main fear has been a domino effect. National aspirations not linked to Western interests are considered to be “diseases” generating conflict, terrorism and wars (Shapiro, Hardin 1993). Conservative strategies have been linked to anarchy, avoiding attempts at both governance and order. At most, asymmetrical integration (administrative autonomy) has been the lowintensity conservative conflict resolution scenario. Huntington (1996) supported the conservative strategies within a sort of “political laissez faire” among the main powers to prevent the clash of civilizations. Western states should abstain from intervening, when self-determination demands are raised by repressed nations (Chechnya, Kurdistan, Tibet…) in the “zones of turmoil” (Singer, Wildavski 1993). Military interventions by the West should be limited to strategic areas, like the Middle East, to contain violence that damages Western interests, without encouraging any nationalist group. Then, it has to be emphasized that neo-conservatives have never supported national self-determination: for example, in Iraq. The promoters of leftist constructivism have always preferred nonordered pluri-national states within a “politically correct” multi-cultural governance process, based on integration or separation (Held 1995, Keating 2001). Cosmopolitan peace formulas could lead to compromise within larger confederations (Galtung et al. 2002). Then, multi-cultural integration has been advocated to solve conflicts concerning immigration into Western societies. The left has always had an ideological bias against national self-determination, which is considered a politically incorrect form of neo-apartheid. It is the well-known “super-structure syndrome”,

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typical of post-Marxism. Constructivist intellectuals criticized Huntington (1996) for his emphasis on cultural conflicts. For example, European leftist leaders never proposed separation as a conflict resolution formula for Bosnia; nor did they support secession of Kosovo. There is an apparent contradiction between integration and separation, because both solutions lead to pluri-national states. The USA and the EU did not support the symmetric separation (into two parts: one Albanian and one Serb) of Kosovo, because it could have upset Dayton’s equilibria in pluri-national Bosnia. This is the “Dayton paradox”, within another “King Solomon’s” syndrome. In fact, the EU has never supported secessions, not even in Montenegro, with the sole exception of Palestine (Tocci 2007). Finally, Manichaean leftists have suggested separations only when underprivileged actors have been involved, as in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Nationalism is accepted if it is supported by a third-world actor, but it becomes “evil” if it is consistent with a Western national aspiration. Liberalism is the only political culture that has supported order and national self-determination -leading to separate peace, and secessions of single-nation states-, because its ideology is based on cultural pluralism, and free society pressures are preferred to state control (Fossati 2006). Realists and Marxists have always defended the interests of states or classes. American president Wilson (of the Democratic Party) was the main promoter of national self-determination (with little success) in the 1920s. It is usually the outcome of a referendum, organized by the UN, which often leads to a separate peace formula, even if populations may prefer pluri-national scenarios. The transfers of minorities should give rise to culturally homogeneous polities. Consensual or unilateral population movements have been rare; the exceptions have been (respectively) India and Pakistan after 1945, or Israel’s withdrawals from Sinai and Gaza. National self-determination is not easy to achieve in three scenarios: populations mixed together (as in the Israel-Palestinian conflict), enclaves (as in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict), and immigration floods in foreign countries (as in the Kosovo-Serbia conflict). Single-nation states could probably better manage conflicts with Islamic fundamentalism, as their leaders enjoy more legitimacy in their (more cohesive) populations. As researchers, we can only observe reality, and if there is cultural violence, we cannot conduct any “judgement of intentions”, and we should only advance suggestions on how to solve conflicts. European nations waged cultural wars against each other for centuries; other peoples in the world should not repeat that mistake, but it is normal if they do so. When political correctness was not yet the prevailing culture, it was widely accepted that people with a common identity would constitute their state.

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The second complementary hypothesis on the convergence between governance and anarchy is anchored to rationality. Pluri-national states and frozen or unstable conflicts represent the mini-max option in the prisoner’s dilemma of game theory. National self-determination and order can resolve incompatibilities in the long period (option #1), but they may lead to more violence in the short term (option #4). Rational decisionmaking is linked to the high probability that actors want to avoid that binary choice: the best and especially the worst ones. Rational behavior will try to reach intermediate options through a (probably non-intentional) convergence between the promoters of conservative anarchy/political laissez faire (option #3) (as in Tibet, Chechnya, Sri Lanka…) and leftist non-ordered governance/political correct pluri-national states (option #2) either by integration (as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Lebanon, Libya…) or separation (as in Kosovo). Those polities have often been anchored to consensual pacts, which in the short period are easier to accomplish than federalism. In sum, states do not collaborate and apply a rational coordination leading either to pluri-national states, or -if it fails- to anarchy. Since 1989, conservative and constructivist strategies have been promoted -interests and those ideas are compatible-, more than Manichaean and liberal diplomacies. However, the convergence between the promoters of these two political cultures has mostly been non-intentional. Governance and anarchy are preferred -see the prisoner’s dilemma prediction of the mini-max solution-, because order is the best option in the case of success, but it may also lead to the worst one; if national self-determination cannot be guaranteed, the most likely outcomes are conflict, war, ethnic cleansing, terrorism... (Fossati 2006, 2008). However, pluri-national states may be democratically inconsistent, when citizens of a single nation become the parliamentary majority within the state and form a culturally homogeneous government, excluding the losing minority from power. In these cases, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe, electoral democracies have often led to war. Power should be shared at all levels, but especially in public institutions (civil service, the judiciary, armed forces, security forces, and secret services). This is the perverse effect of the post-1989 “near” world order. If many Third World states do not resolve the primary conflict among the various nations within them, they are likely to remain unstable. Consensual pacts do not easily survive in the medium period, and electoral democracy may lead again to conflicts (and wars), as in Belgian Congo or Ivory Coast after the recent elections. The alternative is between a potential transcendence (with a “power-sharing” agreement in all the different neutral institutions, but not in government) and dominion, with “the winner takes all” formula.

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However, if after the elections all the main groups have to reach a pact, someone might object: why are you wasting so much money on organizing them, if the outcome is more or less the same? Thus, elections can only facilitate calculation of the percentages for the division of power in the various institutions. In sum, federalism seems to be more compatible with consolidated democracies than consensual pacts, because it decentralizes power and can better prevent and manage conflict (Fossati 2008). The hypothesis of convergence between the promoters of conservatism (through anarchy) and of leftist political correctness (through governance), concerns the relation between interests and those ideologies. Because political cultures are a mix between interests and ideas, the assumption is that they represent the “building blocks” of international relations and influence all actors: governments, regional alliances, global institutions, NGOs… (Fossati 2006). This has happened because political cultures condition all actors, more than the contrary: governments or global institutions influencing political cultures. The empirical evidence in the other arenas (see Chapters 5 to 8) will show that both rational and inertial processes matter: see the conclusions. The following table summarizes both diagnoses and therapies for each conflict resolution process: Table 4-1. Diagnoses and therapies of conflict resolution processes CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS THERAPY Dominican Rep. transcendence-democracy Haiti potential transcendence transcendencewith democracy democracy Chiapas asymmetric integrationmore autonomy autonomy Nicaragua transcendence-democracy Salvador transcendence-democracy Guatemala transcendence-democracy Colombia exchange with amnesty Peru dominion government exchange with amnesty Falklands dominion Great Britain separationindependence Ulster integration-consensual pact integration-federalism +consensual pact Euskadi asymmetric integrationintegration-federalism autonomy +consensual pact Cyprus reciprocal incapacitation- referendum Æ ? multilateralization

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Croatia

asymmetric integrationautonomy Bosnia integration-federalism Kosovo freezingdominion Albanians Montenegro separation-independence Macedonia asymmetric integrationautonomy Transnistria freezingdominion Russians Ukraine (east-west) freezing, war Ukraine (Crimea) freezingdominion Russians Abkhazia freezingincapacitation Georgians South Ossetia freezingdominion Ossetians North Ossetia incapacitation Ingushes (Prigorodny) Nagorno-Karabakh freezingincapacitation Azeris Dagestan dominion Russia Chechnya segmentation vs Chechnya Israel-Palestinian asymmetric integration(Gaza) autonomy (West Bank) dominion Israel Israel-Lebanon UN multilateralization Lebanon integration-consensual pact

referendum Æ ? single-nation separation

separation-integration with Ukraine integration-federalism separation-integration with Russia compromise confederation compromise confederation separation-integration with Ingushetia exchange: Lachin to Azerb., NK to Armenia integration-federalism integration-federalism

single-nation separation ? compromise confederation Syria dominion Alawites, war compromise confederation Iraq integration-federalism, war compromise confederation Kuwait-Iraq separation Kurdistan (Turkey) asymmetric integrationautonomy Kurdistan integration-federalism separation(Iraq and Syria) independence Kurdistan (Iran) dominion Iran asymmetric integrationautonomy

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dominion North (1994) war (2010s) Al Qaeda, Isis (project of) subversion Western Sahara dominionincapacitation Sahrawis Algeria exchange with amnesty Tuareg (Niger) asymmetric integrationautonomy Tuareg (Mali) segmentation pro Tuareg Chad dominion Islamic North Libya-Chad persuasion Libya (Aozou strip) with arbitration Libya integrationconsensual pact, war South Sudan separation-independence Sudan-South Sudan dominion Sudan, war Darfur dominion-incapacitation Senegal asymmetric integration(Casamance) autonomy Liberia integration-consensual pact Sierra Leone integration-consensual pact Guinea dominion Conté Ivory Coast dominion Outtara Nigeria integration-federalism Nigeria-Cameroon persuasion Nigeria with arbitration Zimbabwe integration-consensual pact Mozambique potential transcendence with democracy Namibia transcendence-democracy Angola dominion Dos Santos Rwanda dominion Tutsi

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compromise confederation ? single-nation separation

integration-federalism integration-federalism integration-federalism

integration-federalism

compromise with condominium integration-federalism integration-federalism integration-federalism integration-federalism integration-federalism integration-federalism

integration-federalism integration-federalism

integration-federalism integration-federalism integrationconsensual pact Burundi integration-(potential) integrationconsensual pact consensual pact Belgian Congo dominion Kabila Jr integration-federalism Central African Rep integration-consensual pact integration-federalism French Congo dominion Sassou Nguesso integration-federalism

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dominion Musuveni integration-federalism integration-consensual pact integration-federalism separation-independence dominion Ethiopia persuasion Ethiopia with arbitration integration-federalism, war integration-federalism integration-federalism separationindependence integrationreferendum Æ ? consensual pact, war integration-consensual pact integration-federalism freezingseparation multilateralization by a referendum separation

integration-federalism incapacitation Hindus Pakistan asymmetric integration(Mohair, Baluchi) autonomy India (Punjab, East) integration-federalism Sri Lanka, Laos dominion government Bangladesh asymmetric integrationautonomy China (Tibet, Inner dominion China Mongolia, Xinyang) Nepal potential transcendence with democracy Myanmar, Thailand dominion government Cambodia exchange with amnesty Philippines transcendence-democracy Philippines asymmetric integration(Mindanao) autonomy East Timor separation-independence Indonesia (Aceh) asymmetric integrationautonomy Indonesia Irian-Jaya dominion Indonesia Fiji Islands dominion Fijians

integration-federalism autonomy with redesign of provinces integration-federalism

asymmetric integrationautonomy transcendencedemocracy integration-federalism

integration-federalism

referendum Æ ? integrationconsensual pact

CHAPTER FIVE THE ECONOMIC ARENA: THE PROMOTION OF ORDER THROUGH MARKET INSTITUTIONS

Introduction on political cultures in the economic arena Domestic institutions of political economy have often been linked to political cultures. Constructivist social-democrats support the welfare state without denying capitalism. Socialists have promoted the nationalization of private property; they have been anti-market, even if pro-democracy, contrary to communism which was anti-capitalist and anti-democratic. Conservatism and liberalism are distinguished according to their either moderate or radical application of economic freedoms. Conservatives are nationalist and try to protect domestic firms against foreign corporations in privatization processes. Reagan and Thatcher applied liberal economic policies in the 1980s, while most Western executives were conservative or social-democratic. The Allende government in Chile has been the only case of socialism within democracies (Fossati 2006). In international relations, liberals promote a radical application of laissez faire principles, and this favors multi-national firms’ activities. Conservatives suggest correcting laissez faire with a moderate state governance, through international institutions (organizations and regimes) and inter-governmental forums like the G-7. Social-democrats prefer a more intense governance, trying to reduce the North-South gap, through development cooperation and the World Bank’s economic supervision. Socialist actors (like no global groups) are still anti-market, with a negative Manichaean vision of all international institutions. Since 1945, conservatism has been the prevailing political culture in the economic arena of international relations. Radical liberalism has been strengthened since the 1980s. Social-democrats and Manicheans have been strong only in the Third World, while they have been weak in the West, except in the Scandinavian countries (Fossati 2006). At the end of this chapter, some conclusions will be drawn on each political culture since 1989.

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1. North-North relations The first section of this chapter concerns interactions among advanced countries. At the beginning, four different models of economic globalization will be conceptualized, and linked to the four Western political cultures. Then, the main international (organizations and regimes) institutions will be identified in order to emphasize the importance of state governance, according to either conservatism or constructivism. Finally, statistics on the system of so-called open regionalism will be presented.

1.1. Four models of globalization processes The following typology differentiates the four main dimensions of economic globalization. It has been built by combining two variables: uniformization and standardization of increasingly interdependent goods. For example, in the case of uniformization, people consume the same good (cola or wine); in that of standardization there is only one (multi-national) producer of cola or wine. The following typology shows the four combinations of different types of globalization: UNIFORMIZATION low high

high STANDARDIZATION low Oligopolistic (interInteractive national economy) (cultural arena) Monolithic Ordered (politics, (hypothetic scenario) domestic economy)

The simplest scenarios are those combining two highs and two lows. In monolithic globalization, only a standardized good is consumed: for example, Cola. No-global movements of the Manichaean left promote this scenario, because economic globalization would hide “Americanization”. However, it is far from being applied, even in the military arena, where interdependence is lower -since 1989 wars have been less internationalized than in the Cold War- and US capabilities are high, although that state is not the only producer: there are China, Israel... In interactive globalization, goods of different civilizations (pasta, rice, couscous…) are exchanged, with a further differentiation of producers for each good (Chianti, Lambrusco, Barbera, Pinot...). Thus, the cultural arena seems to be the closest to the interactive model. It is supported by constructivist social-democrats, who prefer a very symmetric dimension of North-South relations, based on reciprocity.

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In ordered globalization, there is high uniformization of goods, with low standardization. The post-1989 world order is based on high uniformization in economy and politics. Socialism and communism no longer influence economic and political institutions; the current values in those arenas are democracy and the market. There is no standardization because there are various kinds of democracy (majoritarian, consensual; presidential, parliamentary; federal, centralized), or there are different combinations of economic institutions: see the variety of capitalisms (Hall, Soskice 2001). This scenario is supported by conservatives, who usually prefer a moderate application of market principles. In the oligopolistic scenario, there is low uniformization of goods, because multi-national firms usually differentiate their product ranges (in the industrial, food, financial, and trade markets). At the same time, the formation of cartels causes the increasing standardization of goods, each of which is very similar to those offered by another network of producers. Competition is oligopolistic; for example, airline and telecommunication companies have formed alliances which discourage a really “free” market. Thus, cartels are becoming a new form of sophisticated (and covert) protectionism, that especially damages the firms of developing countries. International markets are less free than domestic ones, because there are no anti-trust authorities at the global level, but only at the regional (in the EU) and domestic levels. This scenario is usually supported by liberals, who always prefer a radical application of laissez faire.

1.2. Global institutions: international organizations and regimes International institutions are both organizations and regimes. They must be identified and differentiated from informal rules and repeated practices; state governance must be linked to either conservatism or constructivism. The two main international economic institutions are the free trade and the monetary regimes, anchored to two global organizations: the WTO (World Trade Organization) and the IMF (International Monetary Fund). The banking regime is weak; multi-national firms’ activities and oil relations are not institutionalized. The GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) regime on global free trade was established in 1947. It is based on reciprocity among member states; its principle is “no discrimination in preferences”; in fact, free trade favors both importers and exporters. The GATT was a forum, but in 1995 it was replaced by the WTO, whose institutionalization is higher, because a neutral tribunal (the Dispute Settlement Body) tries to resolve conflicts on the application of its rules among all state members.

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Each state has the same voting power. However, this regime has lower coherence, because there are many exceptions to its rules. The free trade regime especially covers industrial trade, where tariffs have strongly decreased; thus, its architectural principle is reciprocal. Agricultural trade complies with a hierarchical (protectionist) principle, because domestic credits to rural producers are still high in the USA, the EU, Japan and South Korea. One major conflict in the WTO concerns non-tariff barriers (NTBs); in fact, the effectiveness of rules forbidding them is low (Grieco 1990). The liberalization of services is at a preliminary stage. In the 1970s, developing countries pressed for preferential treatment; now they prefer liberalism to covert protectionism of industrialized states (Aggarwal, Keohane, Yoffie 1987). The Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) was hierarchical, as it pushed textiles and shoes exporters of developing countries to comply with quotas (“voluntary export restraints”); it favored industrialized states’ importers (Aggarwal 1985). In the Uruguay Round of GATT, industrialized and developing countries agreed that the MFA would be canceled, and liberal rules were applied to textiles and shoes. There are two preferential trade regimes: the International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) and the Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSPs). Both regimes have been ineffectual. The ICAs were collective agreements to stabilize prices of primary goods (coffee, tin…), but did not work. The GSPs was applied only to Third World countries that were producing semi-industrial goods (like canned fruit, cocoa butter…) on a small scale (with too many exceptions). After 1979, the “enabling clause” permitted industrialized countries to establish when a developing country would cease to receive preferential treatment because of its higher growth rates (Lake 1993). The Doha negotiations of WTO began in 2002; a weak agreement was reached at the end of 2013 in Bali, lowering some NTBs and allowing some protectionism and preferential treatment for developing countries. In sum, global trade relations are quite institutionalized, especially in industry, where the regime is reciprocal (Ikenberry 1996). This institution is closer to the conservative diplomatic model, as free trade coexists with some covert protectionism (with NTBs), and especially because the regime is still hierarchical in agriculture, even if not in textiles and shoes, which are less produced by advanced states than food and drinks. Constructivists would prefer a reciprocal regime also in the trade of agricultural products, in order to favor developing countries’ exporters. The 1944 Bretton Woods monetary (or balance of payments) regime was built upon a reciprocal principle. In fact, the IMF would issue credits on the condition that both deficit and surplus countries adjusted their domestic political economy, by devaluations and revaluations respectively.

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But the regime principle forcing surplus countries to revalue was not effective. Industrialized countries in deficit did not adjust their economies by relying on the IMF conditionality, but rather did so autonomously: either by acquiring credits from other central banks, or by issuing domestic public bonds (Cohen 1993). That regime remained ineffective, because it was applied only to some deficit governments of the Third World. Then, in the 1950s and 1960s, economic nationalism prevailed among developing countries through Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) institutions. In sum, only rules (on fixed or flexible exchange rates) and not principles were effective; the monetary regime became a “quasi-regime”. There was a change of rules (not of regime), with the shift from fixed to flexible exchange rates (Ruggie 1991). In fact, rules only define the processes, and not the outcomes. Consequently, the USA has never been able to constrain Japan or Germany to some institutionalized exchange rate policy. In 1982, the IMF regime began to be applied to debtor countries. The governments of developing countries had over-exploited ISI institutions. During the 1970s they avoided adjustment through the use of foreign credits from the banks involved in the petro-dollar market. This behavior had a boomerang effect which came to a head with the debt crisis of 1982. A new architectural principle materialized: the rescheduling (and sometimes the refinancing) of foreign debt versus the application of the IMF adjustment by debtor countries. The regime was hierarchical because most costs were to be paid by debtors. It was different from the old balance of payments regime, not only because of the linkage with the debt service, but also because it also concerned surplus (but indebted) countries; moreover, the IMF often supported fixed exchange rates. There has been some evolution towards reciprocity, when creditor banks applied a discount to debtor countries (after the 1989 Brady Plan), and preferential treatment, with the late 1990s proposals on debt moratorium to some African countries. In the 1980s, the World Bank (WB) started to supervise also market reforms, especially in Africa (with structural adjustment loans); previously, there had been only interventions in single sectors of the economy: infrastructures, agriculture… The division of labor between the IMF and the WB was geographical, even though some conflicts arose between them: for instance, on Argentina in 1988 (Fossati 1997). Since the 1990s, the IMF has also supervised former Communist states, even if after 1997 the EU candidate countries mostly satisfied economic conditionality. After the crisis of 1997/8, the IMF started to supervise the economic policies of some Asian countries (except for Malaysia and the three “small Chinas”), and not only the Philippines. Since the economic crisis of 2008, the IMF has also supervised the economic policies of some advanced (but

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indebted) countries like Greece, whose agreements have also been hierarchical (Moschella 2010, 2013). After 1989, the IMF started to supervise not only short-term measures but also structural reforms (like privatizations, trade and finance opening), while the WB supervises only medium-term (and not short-term) reforms (Wolfensohn 2001). Instead of operating together, the two organizations often avoid each other in order to forestall conflicts, but their division of labor is not as rigid as in the 1980s. In March 1989 an agreement was signed between the IMF and the WB to favor coordination (Polak 1994) in interventions in low-income countries, but not in middle-income states, where the IMF prevails (IMF 2001). The WB has always been closer to leftist constructivism. In the mid-1990s, the IMF began to support radical laissez faire by coercing many developing countries towards short-term capital liberalization, and some economic crises materialized in east Asia, Russia (in 1997/8), and Argentina (in 2002) (Cohen 2003, Chwieroth 2010, Tomz 2013). Since the 2002 crisis in Argentina, some conservative limits (to short-term capital movements) have been accepted again by the Fund; thus, there has been some learning process by the states and the IMF (Wilson 2004). In sum, the IMF started with moderate conservatism in 1945, then shifted to radical liberalism in mid-1990s, and returned to conservatism after 2002. Also the monetary regime is closer to the conservative political culture, as it is mostly hierarchical, and debtor countries must bear all the costs of adjustment, even if some reciprocity was introduced in Latin America in 1989, when creditor banks accepted some losses. However, IMF’s recent agreements with both Asian countries and Greece were again hierarchical. The capital movements of banks are slightly institutionalized. In 1988 the central banks of the main advanced countries agreed at the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) to establish the so-called Basel I regime. It consisted in pushing banks to follow some basic procedures regarding financial regulation of banks’ deposits, with monitoring by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In fact, it is only a “quasi” regime, as there is not any architectural principle on the outcomes of financial relations -every bank can autonomously decide its credit policy- and there are only rules on the processes concerning security reserves (Kapstein 1989). Basel II (in 2004) relaxed those procedures under pressures by large private banks, but after the 2008 financial crisis, the Basel III agreement (in 2010) strengthened the banking regime. Other measures were adopted to face the 2008 economic crisis that affected advanced countries. Since 1999, the G-20 forum (with the main emerging countries, like Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa…) has largely replaced the G-7 forum, in the post-crisis decision-making process.

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In 1999, the Financial Stability Forum, consisting of the finance ministers, central bank governors, and the BIS secretary, was established in Basel, but could not prevent the 2008 crisis. In 2009 that forum was replaced by a global institution, the Financial Stability Board, in close relation with the G-20. It was established in order to reinforce the weak banking regime, and prevent financial crises, in coordination with the IMF and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In 2009, on the initiative of president Obama, a code was signed to limit capital flight through the “black list of fiscal havens”, and many of those entities have complied with it. However, also this (weak) banking “quasi” regime, even if it was strengthened in 2009, is closer to the conservative diplomatic model, as state governance to regulate financial markets has remained limited. A constructivist socialdemocratic diplomacy would push for a more intense regulation and collaboration among global institutions. Other sectors of the global economy are not institutionalized. The most exemplary case of “non-regime” is oil (Keohane 1984). In this sector, there is no institutionalized regime, because power (and not principles or rules) defines the outcome of international interactions (Prontera 2011). There is no organization joining producers and consumers together; this proposal, made by Kissinger in the 1970s, could have favored the consolidation of an oil regime. The International Energy Agency (IEA) only deals with patterned behaviors of consumers. In some periods there have been repeated practices, and the actors’ expectations materialized in some predictable outcomes. In the 1950s and 1960s there were expectations that multi-nationals (the “Seven Sisters”) would prevail. In the 1970s, the power of energy producers increased after the oil crises of 1973 and 1979; expectations favored OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). In those periods, regimes as repeated practices materialized, but they have ceased to do so since the 1980s. Bargaining between producer states and multi-national investors is strong and there are no predictable expectations as to who will prevail. Thus, there is no global regime on oil, even if it is conceptualized as a repeated practice. Another example of the absence of a global regime is provided by foreign investments of multi-national firms. In the 1970s, developing countries proposed the institutionalization of a protectionist regime: the code of conduct for trans-national corporations (TNCs). This regime was promoted in the context of the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO), and TNCs were requested to transfer technology in favor of developing countries. Of course, TNCs did not respond to the appeal. The recent proposal of a Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) for the liberalization of those flows has failed in the Uruguay Round of GATT. However, many bilateral or

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minilateral agreements on the protection and promotion of investments are oriented towards liberalism. In these cases, many governments follow informal rules to apply similar domestic norms on investments, especially to regulate neutral arbitrations of bilateral or regional treaties (Milner 2014, Simmons 2014). Of course, not all countries abide by these informal conventions; thus, there is no consensual or codified regime on foreign direct investments (Strange et al. 1991). Multi-national firms have always rejected such regulation, because they prefer to operate in a more anarchic economic arena1. Thus, in oil and TNCs investment, the liberal diplomatic model has prevailed, as there are no global regimes regulating those interactions. There is another “non-regime”, and it is foreign aid. Lumsdaine's (1993) thesis is that a development cooperation regime -being naturally conceptualized as repeated practice- has materialized, because states have been (especially since 1989) channeling aid to the poorest countries, often through multilateral organizations. Instead, the largest donors (the USA, the UK, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Japan, Australia…) select, among the poorest countries, those compatible with their own interests, according to the conservative diplomacy: those that are geographically closer, former colonies, energy exporting countries, or allied states in relevant armed conflicts. Only the “like-minded countries” (Canada and Scandinavian states) channel aid to the poorest recipients, according to the constructivist diplomacy (Fossati 1999c). At the beginning of the 1990s, foreign aid was also directed to some democratic developing countries (by the USA, the UK, the Netherlands…), according to the liberal diplomacy of political conditionality: see chapter 6. In sum, there are no clear expectations as to which practice will prevail: the constructivist selection of the poorest states, the choice of recipient countries compatible with either donors’ interests (conservatism), or democratic values (liberalism). Thus, there is currently no aid regime, even if it is conceptualized as a repeated practice. There have been repeated practices, precisely when Lumsdaine did not identify a regime; in fact, before the 1970s almost all the donors were applying strategic behaviors in development cooperation. In sum, the conservative political culture has prevailed in foreign aid, even if there are also some liberal and constructivist diplomacies. In sum, in economic institutions conservatism has prevailed in trade, monetary and banking regimes, also thanks to inter-governmental forums 1 Most TNCs’ investments (data of 2010) come from advanced countries (80% of the total stock); the USA accounts for 21%, the EU member countries as a whole for 43%, Japan for 5%, and China for 2%. Two thirds of investments go to developed economies, one third to developing countries: 20% to Asia, 10% to Latin America and 3% to Africa (UNCTAD 2012).

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like the G-7 and G-20, while liberalism and unregulated laissez faire have emerged in the oil market and in the investments of multi-national firms. Foreign aid has not been institutionalized either; there, conservatism has prevailed, together with some constructivist and liberal diplomacies. Leftist Manicheanism remained marginal, but very assertive, because noglobal movements deeply criticize whichever global institution: either reciprocal like the WTO, or hierarchical like the IMF. This radical position is opposite to that of the (moderate) constructivist left, which always prefers reciprocal global institutions, trying to reduce the North-South gap. In fact, constructivism is probably the weakest political culture in the debates on economic globalization: see the conclusions of this chapter.

1.3. Global economic system: data on open regionalism The asymmetric (North-South) flows from the four economic giants (the USA, the EU, Japan and China) to the four macro-regions (Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East: NA/ME) of developing countries (DCs) will be presented to match the open regionalism thesis. This analysis enables better evaluation of the intensity of globalization. The symmetric level (North-North) within industrialized countries is characterized by a high intensity of economic relations. Other ways to establish hierarchies among countries, like the sophistication level of products, have been emphasized by economists. A first glance at the economic flows (on development cooperation, foreign trade, and multi-national firms’ investments) suggests that there are only four “giants” with a global distribution of flows: the USA, the EU, Japan and China. Only trade data are available for China because it is not an OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) country; China’s statistics on foreign aid and on investments are not available (n.a.). Brazil, Russia, South Africa, India, South Korea… are far from having giant status, as their economic flows are mostly concentrated in their own macro-region. This empirical evidence makes it possible to exclude the model of globalized multilateralism, because only the four giants have widespread economic relations with the rest of the world. The USA is no longer the most significant actor in all the regions, because its flows are not the largest; it is no longer possible to support the thesis that the USA is an economic hegemon and that there is a unipolar system. Thus, two models remain to be tested: protectionist blocs or open regions. The following table reports data on public development cooperation (Official Development Aid commitments, including EU funds: OECD 2015), foreign trade (imports + exports: IMF 2015) and Foreign Direct

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Investments (FDI) by multi-national firms (OECD 2015a). The table shows the regional distribution of flows, using the target region criterion. ODA is the sum of (public) foreign aid commitments from 1990 to 2014; i.e. all those development cooperation funds that have been decided -not sent- in those years. Trade is the sum of export and import flows in the year 2014. FDI data indicate the stock amount in 2012, even if some of them (for example those of the USA towards Asia and the Middle East) show 2008/9 amounts. FDIs by multi-national firms of the EU gather ten advanced European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria). Table 5-1. Main economic flows from the four giants to DCs regions ODA (90/2014) Imp+Exp (2014) FDI (2012) Sub Sah. Africa EU 66.5% 24.4% 75.2% USA 18.3% 6.3% 20.7% Japan 5.7% 2.9% 4.1% (+NA) China n.a. 17.6% n.a. 4 giants 90.5% 51.2% 100 % ODA (90/2014) Imp+Exp (2014) FDI (2012) NA/ME EU 18.1% 47.2% 73.6% USA 39.1% 6.8% 24.4% Japan 9.2% 2.0% (-NA) 7.5% China n.a. n.a. 13.1% 4 giants 95.6% 45.5% 100 % ODA (90/2014) Imp+Exp (2014) FDI (2012) Asia EU 34.8% 13.1% 45.4% USA 15.4% 11.0% 31.5% Japan 23.1% 37.7% 7.5% China n.a. n.a. 5.7% 4 giants 87.9% 37.2% 100 % ODA (90/2014) Imp+Exp (2014) FDI (2012) Latin America EU 12.2% 35.1% 52.1% USA 27.4% 36.2% 57.1% Japan 11.0% 2.6% 7.8% China n.a. 12.6% n.a. 4 giants 90.6% 63.7% 100 % The empirical evidence shows that three protectionist blocs no longer exist, because economic flows do not produce a strong concentration of each regional giant in its own macro-region. The highest concentration of

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regional flows is in Euro-Africa. Then, there are some minor differences among the three flows to the same region. The EU also predominates in North Africa and the Middle East in foreign aid and investments, but not in trade, where Japan plus China prevail. The USA does so in Latin America in trade and investments, but not in foreign aid where the EU prevails. Japan plus China predominate in Asia in foreign aid and trade, but not in investments where the EU prevails. Euro-Africa is the only scenario similar to a bloc, especially because of the lower economic development of Sub-Saharan African countries, even if there is no regional organization, but only some regional cooperation agreements, like the Lomé (then Cotonou) Conventions between the EU and the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. However, SubSaharan African countries never implemented any protectionist legislation against Asian and American states. In the other (richer) macro-regions (the Americas and Asia), open regionalism is prevailing, also thanks to organizations like NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and MercoSur (with Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay), or ASEAN (Association of South Asian Nations) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). Then, the development of an open Asia-Pacific region has also been favored by Japan’s strategy of not supporting the protectionist requests made in the past by countries like Malaysia (Fossati 1995). Data on the flows of single recipients during the Cold War have been analyzed in Fossati (1995). There have been some exceptions to the abovementioned generalizations, but those cases were only a minority. The main thesis was not modified, but specific ad hoc explanations have been added. In fact, there were some high-income countries with a low intensity of flows from one of the giants (Japan in Venezuela, Argentina, and Israel; the USA in some Gulf emirates and Brunei; the USA and Japan in South Africa…). Moreover, low-income countries were sometimes linked with a giant not pertaining to their own macro-region. During the Cold War, both situations materialized because the USA wanted to stabilize strategic recipients (because of the conflict with the USSR). This occurred either directly (in Cyprus, Zaire, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Egypt) or through “lateral” pressures on Japan (in Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Yemen, Algeria, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Ecuador, and Uruguay). The USA and Japan sometimes coordinated their interventions; at other times Japan invested alone, because the American governments were not willing to deepen relations with certain “uncomfortable” partners (Fossati 1995).

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2. North-South relations This section concerns the economic development of non-Western countries and North-South relations. Even if economic development is studied by economists, it can be defined as the combination of economic affluence and social equity. Little empirical research has been conducted on these issues, and a “delegation” was given to third-worldist/neoMarxist scholars. Development theories (especially on Latin America) will not be analyzed in this book. Marxism has been the prevailing philosophic tradition in North-South studies, and (radical or moderate) third-worldist scholars have promoted socialism in Cuba or ISI (Import-Substitution Industrialization) in the rest of Latin America. Both conservative interests and liberal, constructivist or Manichaean ideas have influenced liberal or protectionist economic institutions in developing countries (Fossati 1997).

2.1. Data on economic development of non-Western countries This section presents the statistics on yearly per capita incomes (in millions of dollars: World Bank 2015) and Gini indexes on income distribution2 (World Bank 2015a) of developing non-Western countries, except the Asian Tigers and Gulf monarchies. Before 1989, some Asian countries achieved high levels (Singapore 55000, Hong Kong 40000, Japan 35000, South Korea 30000, Taiwan 25000 million dollars) of yearly per capita income, but only Japan’s income distribution index is available (32). The Persian Gulf monarchies reached high per capita income levels (Qatar 95000, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates 45000, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 25000, Oman 20000 million dollars), but their income distribution is unknown. Data on Cuba (7000), Libya (6500), Lebanon (10000), Eritrea (500), and Equatorial Guinea (19000) will not be presented either, because per capita income (in million dollars) statistics are available, but not their Gini indexes on income distribution. 2 Haggard and Kaufman (2008) compared the welfare states of Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. Before 1989, the lowest public investments in social policies were made in Asia because of the weakness of the left in those countries, but education policies were good. In Latin America, populist governments only favored urban sectors, while in Eastern Europe the welfare state of communist countries was universal. Since 1989, Asian states have improved social policies, while Eastern Europe has maintained its standards thanks to the supervision of the EU. In Latin America, social policies have changed their priorities after 1989; focused social programs in favor of the poorest sectors of society have been launched, but the middle-low class has been weakened by economic liberalization.

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The following typology presents the four combinations of income level and distribution: SOCIAL EQUITY high low

low INCOME LEVEL high Poor societies Developed societies Mal-developed societies Oligarchic societies

Developed societies have high levels of income and distribution; if both levels are low, a society is “mal-developed”. If there is no affluence but social equity, a society is poor. If the income level is high but social equity is low, a society is oligarchic. Boundaries between high and low are 10000 million dollars of yearly per capita income, and 40 on Gini index. Graph 5-1. Per capita income and Gini index in Latin America (2014)

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Graph 5-2. Per capita income and Gini index in Eastern Europe (2014)

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Graph 5-3. Per capita income and Gini index in North Africa and the Middle East (2014)

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Graph 5-4. Per capita income and Gini index in Asia (2014)

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Graph 5-5. Per capita income and Gini index in Africa (2014)

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Developed societies have been identified in the nine East-European new members of the European Union (all except Romania and Bulgaria) and Kazakhstan, especially thanks to their welfare states (Haggard, Kaufman 2008). Eight Latin American states (Mexico, Panama, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile), Russia, Turkey, Malaysia, and Gabon are oligarchic societies; Lebanon and Equatorial Guinea are probably in the same category. The rest of Eastern European, many Asian (like China and India) and some African states are close to the poor society scenario. The other Central and South American countries and most of African states are mal-developed societies. Eastern Europe has the lowest income differences (between 25 and 45), while Asia, North Africa and the Middle East have intermediate indexes (between 30 and 40/45). Latin America is very unequal (between 40 and 60 on the Gini index), but Africa has the highest income differences (between 30 and 65). In sum, twenty-five years after 1989, countries with at least medium levels of income are the new Eastern members of the EU, some Latin American states, Turkey, Lebanon, Malaysia, and some energy exporters (Russia, Kazakhstan, Gabon). Analysis of yearly growth rates (World Bank 2012) in the twenty years before the economic crisis (from 1990 to 2007) shows that the countries with the highest annual increases were Vietnam (+13%) and China (+12%). Eastern European states achieved good yearly growth rates: Poland (+11%), Armenia and Albania (+10%), Czech Republic, Romania, Estonia, Slovakia, Lithuania (+9%), Hungary and Latvia (+8%). In Latin America, Chile had the highest annual economic growth (+8%). In the Middle East, Lebanon recorded the strongest yearly income increase (+11.5%). In Africa annual income growth rates were lower, with some exceptions among energy exporters like Angola and Nigeria (+7%), while statistics on Equatorial Guinea are doubtful (+26%). Some African countries decreased their yearly income levels: for instance, Belgian Congo, Burundi (-3%) and Zimbabwe (-9%). Then, the economic crisis started in 2007/8. Two lessons have been learned from that crisis. First, a free market that is too unregulated and too oriented to laissez faire, will fail, as the 2008 crisis in the USA and the UK demonstrated, as well as those of some developing countries (Mexico in 1994 or Asia in 1997/8). Second, a free market that is coupled with too high public expenditure, because some governments spend more than their budget revenues, will fail as well: see Argentina in 2002 or Greece in 2010. It therefore seems that economists already know what has to be done -balance budgets and control markets-, but politicians do not always obey them. However, African per capita income differentials are so huge, that it is even impossible to think about “development” in those countries.

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2.2. A model on power-dependence relations The second step in this section is to focus on the strategies to break from dependence relations and to launch a development path. It is important to start from models, and not from theories3. Emerson’s (1962) model of power/dependence relations can be applied to North-South relations. It is based on a game with two actors (A and B). The reciprocal power structure depends on two variables: the relevance of the outcome, and the possibility of finding alternative outcomes. In an asymmetric power relation, A exercises power on B, and B is dependent on A. If dependence is symmetrical, there is interdependence. Emerson (1962) emphasized four ways to break asymmetric power/dependence relations. Dominion of A on B depends on four pre-conditions: a) A’s economic resources (X) are salient for B; b) A has the monopoly on X; c) B’s economic resources (Y) are not salient for A; d) B has no access to other resources like violence. Strategies to break dependence are the following: a) B can modify its hierarchy of values, setting X’s advantages at a lower level, b) B can find surrogates for X; c1) B can make Y more salient by qualifying them, or c2) by looking for collective organization; [d) C can modify its resources by resorting to violence (the revolutionary option)]. In (both capitalist-capitalist and socialist-socialist) North-South relations of the Cold War, the post-colonial division of labor was an asymmetric power relation: X are industrial products, and Y are primary goods. The four strategies to break relations of asymmetric power, are: a) Self-reliance (SR) based on an alternative model of development. B should only produce to satisfy basic needs (for example, food and energy), renouncing industrial products and thus changing its hierarchy of values. This almost autarchic strategy had been envisaged for the poorest regions of the world (Africa), but the only country that applied it in the past (with little success) was Nyerere’s Tanzania in the late 1970s. b) Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI), to protect infant industry production in developing countries. Trade barriers reduced industrial imports from advanced countries; rural exporters were also taxed in order to finance domestic industrial production. Since 1929 (and 1945), ISI has been applied by Latin American countries (and by some African and Asian states). Its economic effects have not been positive in the long-term, and ISI was largely abandoned by developing countries after 1989. 3

In the (economical and sociological) literature, there has been a wide debate on both development and under-development theories. In Fossati (1997), there is a detailed review of the literature of Marxist, neo-Marxist and post-Marxist theories of development, and of the dependencia scholars who promoted them.

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c1) The export promotion strategy of the Asian NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries). The Asian “tigers” (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) had started with ISI after 1945, but then (at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s) they promoted exports. There was a gradual and selective liberalization of the economy; state subsidies were only directed to local firms able to compete in the world market. Export promotion favored tigers’ economic success. Since 1989, exports have been promoted by many developing countries (Bordo, Taylor and Williamson 2003). c2) The NIEO (New International Economic Order) strategy of the 1970s. It intended to profoundly change North-South relations in regard to trade, finance, technology, and foreign aid. For example, the promoters of the NIEO pressed for the implementation of a code of conduct for transnational corporations (TNCs) in order to favor technology transfer to the Third World. The instrument was coalition-building among all developing countries: the so-called Group of 77, and the “Non-Aligned” movement. This strategy has largely been a failure, and the NIEO was abandoned. This theoretical framework is important to conceptualize the different development strategies that non-Western countries have chosen in recent decades. In the Cold War, developing countries implemented protectionist economic institutions, because of the influence of “neo-Marxism” in the Third World, with few states (the four Asian tigers and Chile) applying laissez faire and promoting exports. Socialism -always implemented by communist regimes (and “Marxist” scholars)- and Self-Reliance were closer to the leftist Manichaean political culture. Instead, protectionist ISI and the NIEO were moderate constructivist strategies. Asian tigers’ export promotion was close to the moderate conservative political culture, while Pinochet’s Chile laissez faire reforms were compatible with radical liberalism. Thus, economic development paths in the Third World before 1989 were strongly conditioned by “ideological” political cultures, but the “interests-intensive” conservatism was also followed. At the same time, the USA and the European countries did not really promote the value of the free market outside the West before 1989. The decisions of the Asian tigers have been autonomous in their development paths, like Japan before 1945 and China since the 1980s: because of yinyang cosmologies, with a flexible mentality, and more limited conflict between both labor versus business, and rich versus poor states (Galtung 1981). The USA have promoted military regimes in Latin America, because of the “lesser evil” priority, but all their development choices were protectionist, with the exception of Chile: for the analysis of this deviant case, see the following pages. This an apparent paradox of the economic arena: much ideology in the Third World and little in the West.

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Thus, the Third World was influenced by ideologies in the Cold War; socialism was close to Manicheanism and ISI to constructivism. The advanced countries could not change almost anything. Conservatism remained the main political culture being applied by the West in the economic arena, with a moderate (and not coercive) diffusion of market reforms, that never materialized, except in those cases (Asian tigers) that made that choice in an autonomous way. The foreign debt regime, applied since 1982 by the IMF, did not push Latin American countries to laissez faire reforms (like privatizations, trade and financial opening), and ISI kept being applied until 1989. In the 1980s, the IMF only suggested a short-term (conservative) ajuste, without any economic conditionality in favor of (liberal) export promotion and privatization reforms. In the following section, the change processes of economic institutions, from protectionism to liberalism (in 1929 and 1945), or vice versa (in 1989), will be analyzed in detail. Realist, rationalist or reflective liberal, and post-Marxist change theories of the IRs literature (Fossati 1997) will not be identified, because we, as political scientists, have to focus on the interplay between interests and ideologies.

2.3. Economic institutional change in developing countries 2.3.1. The first institutional change in Latin America: the shift to protectionism after 1929 ISI (Import-Substitution Industrialization) protectionist economic institutions started to be applied in Latin America after two exogenous shocks: the crisis of 1929 and World War II. The previous economic institutions had followed European colonization and were based on laissez faire: the exporting of primary goods and the importing of industrial products. ISI was based on a combination of two instruments: first, strong trade protection for local producers, especially through tariff barriers; second, a wide variety of public subsidies to national (either public or private) industry. At the same time rural exporters were punished with a range of economic instruments: exchange rate manipulation, taxes... ISI was applied without either selection or gradualism, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. ISI strategies have been the outcome of an “ideological project”, being promoted by a group of constructivist left intellectuals of the United Nations institute of the CEPAL (Comisiިn Econިmica para América Latina) at Santiago (Chile). These scholars, and their leader (the Argentine Prebish), had embraced the neo-Marxist/third-worldist political culture, supporting the evolution of ISI protectionist economic institutions.

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They thought that ISI would be the best instrument to break the South’s “dependence” on the North (Geddes 1991). In fact, it was a moderate political culture of the constructivist left, while the radical Manichaean one has only been implemented by Communist Cuba, where (full state) socialist economic institutions were applied. Populist leaders, like Peron in Argentina or Vargas in Brazil, implemented ISI reforms, especially in the first phase until the 1950s (Alberti 1994). Public expenditure was strongly increased and many Western multi-nationals were nationalized; their effects were hyper-inflation and economic crisis. Thus, ideologies prevailed over interests of both the agrarian sector and the advanced countries, whose exports to Latin America were cut. 2.3.2. The Asian NICs’ market transition at the end of the 1950s The newly-industrialized countries (NICs) of Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) also began with “state-centered” ISI, but since the end of the 1950s they have increasingly promoted exports. Hence, these economic institutions should be labeled “market-centered”. The state also played a role because trade opening was the instrument that enabled the selection, by banks and governments, of those producers entitled to receive public subsidies (Haggard 1990). Asian tigers’ economic change has been explained by cultural factors (Confucian values), leading to a rational learning process of Western (first) and Japanese (second) economic institutions. Those institutions were mainly conservative, and the ideology of moderate laissez faire was promoted; interests of both advanced and developing countries were defended. Latin American governments did not implement the same institutional change, and were unable to “learn” from Asia; thus, the constructivist left ideology kept prevailing over interests. The only limited change was a more open attitude towards trans-national corporations in the second phase of ISI, at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s. Democratic governments could not bear the costs of that economic change; there ensued a wave of soft military authoritarianisms (so-called dictablandas). Popular mobilizations generated pressure for another wave of democratic transitions in Latin America at the end of the 1960s, and some populist governments rose to power: Peron in Argentina and Allende in Chile -who was implementing even more radical (“almost socialist”) reforms. Both political and economic mismanagement pushed most of Latin American countries into social and political disorder, which was exacerbated by the action of terrorist communist groups: especially in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.

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2.3.3. The Chilean market transition in the 1970s. Comparison with Argentina After the failure of the second wave of populism, in the mid-1970s another authoritarian transition came about in many Latin American countries; these golpe were supported by the US Republican president Nixon. Three rightist military governments (of Argentina, Uruguay and Chile) violently repressed the communist groups, and declared themselves willing to introduce economic changes, aimed at promoting exports and stopping ISI. Finally, only Pinochet introduced such reforms in Chile: with the radical approach of the “Chicago Boys” (in the mid-1970s) and then with a moderate “corrected” laissez faire (in the 1980s). Argentina and Uruguay coupled ISI with non-structural adjustment (Fossati 1997). In September 1973, the Chilean economy minister Leniz launched a gradual liberalization program. Public expenditure increased, and there were no major privatizations: only of those enterprises nationalized by Allende. Because inflation had increased, in April 1975 Pinochet gave all power to the “Chicago Boys”, a group of young economists of Santiago’s Universidad Catިlica who had studied in Chicago. Gradualism was abandoned, and a shock therapy was applied; the economy minister De Castro implemented a privatization program, and an opening to foreign trade and investments. Radical reforms affected areas such as social security, labor legislation, education and pension systems. Chile became an experiment in the application of the theories of the Chicago School. The limited supervision of economic liberalization by public institutions produced some negative effects. In 1981 a financial crisis erupted, and some banks (45% of the entire system) failed because of the excessive credits issued to the large “differentiated” business groups that had bought state enterprises. In June 1982 the exchange rate was devalued, and by the end of 1983 all the Chicago Boys left the government. In February 1983, a new “pragmatic” political economy was launched. The inflation rate was kept under control, and the state started to channel credits to private enterprises, especially in the agriculture and the construction sectors; then some price controls were introduced. The economic ministers were Caceres and Collados, both close to the reformed (but more “localized”) business groups. At the beginning of 1985, a bureaucrat (Buchi) became the new economy minister. He institutionalized negotiations with business associations to implement decisions. Trade liberalization was stronger than in previous years; taxes were lowered; price controls were reduced to some basic agricultural products; privatizations were increased. However, the copper industry in the north of the country was never privatized: neither by the Chicago Boys nor by Buchi. In the mid-1980s, Chile

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reached some economic agreements with the IMF, whereas the radical governments of the 1970s had refused any foreign supervision. Economic stability improved, and foreign investments started to accumulate at a high rate, whilst in the 1970s they had been lower also because of Pinochet’s poor human rights record (Silva 1992/3, 1993; Velasco 1994). In Argentina, there have been neither privatizations nor trade and investment openings, because of the nationalism of the armed forces, which were unwilling to favor foreign capital. After the 1976 military golpe, all power was given to the economy minister Martinez de Hoz, and president Videla declared that his country was going to abandon ISI institutions. However, Argentine economic policies were heterodox, and there were public tariffs controls and overvaluation of the exchange rate. Thus, rural exports were damaged, while capital flight was favored. In fact, financial supervision had been scant. In 1980 there occurred a financial crisis whose effects were deeper than in Chile, because there had been no structural reforms. A devaluation ensued in February 1981, and both Videla and Martinez de Hoz resigned. Viola was the new president, and the economic policies of the following governments were even more incoherent. The main political event was the Falklands war in April 1982, but that military defeat favored political transition after two other presidents: Galtieri and Bignone. In 1984 the new democratic president Alfonsin inherited a disastrous economic situation in the country. Two factors exacerbating Argentina’s poor performance were the split within the armed forces and the protectionist stance of the “localized” business associations, except (naturally) for the rural ones (Fossati 1997). In sum, in Chile the liberal ideology prevailed over interests in the first radical phase of the Chicago boys, while the second Buchi phase was conservative, and moderate laissez faire reforms were implemented. Argentina remained anchored to ISI and the “ideologies-intensive” political culture of the constructivist left. Chile’s economic institutional change has been explained by the strategies of a charismatic leader: Pinochet. The head of state was able not only to centralize all centrifugal tendencies in the armed forces, but also to strategically choose and/or abandon any other ally in order to control and maintain power (Arriagada 1988, Remmer 1989). That outcome was also influenced by nonintentional dynamics, as the radical reforms of the 1970s were probably applied because of a single and random event. Many young students of Santiago’s Universidad Catިlica got their masters and PhDs in Chicago. However, Chile’s economic success under Pinochet did not lead to a learning process by the other countries of Latin America.

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2.3.4. The debtors’ cartel failure in Latin America in the 1980s The economic institutional change with the shift from protectionist to laissez faire institutions did not occur in 1982, when the foreign debt crisis exploded. In the 1980s, an incoherent adjustment was applied in Latin America, and ISI institutions survived in the entire region. There was monetary, prices and wages stabilization, but the main structural reforms (privatizations, trade and finance opening) were not implemented. This was the main economic error of the IMF, which was more conservative than liberal in the 1980s. Many scholars (especially the neo-Marxist/thirdworldist ones) did not comprehend the nature of incoherent economic policies, like those of Argentina or Uruguay in 1970s or those of all the countries in the 1980s, which were all labeled as “neo-liberal”. The debt crisis arose after Mexico’s threat of default in August 1982. That conflict was resolved by an exchange between creditors and debtors; the old debt would have been rescheduled and (sometimes) refinanced with fresh credit, if the debtor country had applied an adjustment program. These agreements were negotiated on a country-by-country basis, and the IMF was the guarantor of that formula (Griffith-Jones 1988). Hence the foreign debt regime was hierarchical, and the main adjustment efforts were made by debtors. The only objector to that exchange was Peru’s president Alan Garcia, who declared a moratorium on debt service in 1985. In the 1970s, governments of Latin America had used foreign credits to solve their crises of balance of payments and avoid adjustment. This strategy has led to an enormous increase in foreign debt, also because the credits were badly invested or favored private domestic actors (Devlin 1989). After 1982, Latin American countries were pressurized by the IMF to apply domestic adjustment. There was coordination only among creditors: banks and governments, whose forum was the “Paris Club”. In the 1980s, laissez faire policies were incoherent and very gradual. Since the 1990s a second phase of structural adjustment (with privatizations, opening to trade and foreign investment, tax and finance reform) has been applied, because previous short-term adjustment programs had failed. What were the main attempts made to form a Latin American debtors’ cartel? In January 1984, the Argentine president Alfonsin decided to continue the involuntary moratorium on foreign debt applied by the previous military regime, but this time the limits on payments to creditors were the outcome of an intentional policy. Alfonsin negotiated with other governments of Latin America to persuade them to form a debtors’ cartel. The other governments did not follow Argentina and obtained better rescheduling conditions, precisely by threatening to follow Alfonsin. Creditor banks wanted to avoid a “contagion” to other governments.

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Conflict crystallized with Argentina on the opportuneness of bypassing the IMF to reschedule its foreign debt. This policy was sponsored by Grinspun, the economy minister. In September 1984, an agreement was reached with the banks and the IMF. Alfonsin had given up; rescheduling conditions were good and there also were fresh credits. Both agreements were suspended in February 1985, because Argentina had not complied with the targets of economic conditionality. Grinspun was dismissed. Then, in June 1985 the IMF accepted the “heterodox” Plan Austral decided by the new economy minister Sourrouille, even if was based on price, wage and exchange rate freeze (Fossati 1991). However, Sourrouille never threatened a foreign debt moratorium (Manichea, Sommer 1990). The Peruvian leftist president Alan Garcia applied the most rigid approach to foreign debt. In July 1985, Garcia limited debt service to 10% of Peruvian export incomes, and continued the involuntary moratorium of the previous rightist president Belaunde. However, Garcia’s moratorium was intentional, and was not accepted by the banks and by the IMF; thus, negotiations were suspended. Some payments were made to the creditor (Western and socialist) governments and to the World Bank, but relations were progressively stopped. Garcia had rejected the formula of the 1982 foreign debt regime, and kept applying a highly heterodox economic plan without the IMF’s supervision (Figeroa 1991). Peru remained isolated and was not imitated by the other governments of Latin America. Another moratorium was declared by Brazil in 1987, but it only had the objective of obtaining better rescheduling conditions. By contrast, countries (like Venezuela) that had always satisfied their debt obligations, obtained worse rescheduling conditions (Rodriguez 1988). However, creditor banks and governments had tolerated the Peruvian moratorium because its foreign debt was low (and mostly public); instead, a moratorium by Argentina, Brazil or Mexico would have had a greater impact. In fact, two variables matter in power relations, like those on foreign debt: the importance of the outcome, and the possibility of obtaining alternative outcomes. First, foreign debts of larger countries were high, but not that of Peru. Second, all creditor banks and governments had built a stable coalition, so that Latin American debtor governments would have been unable to find other funds to finance their economic programs. In sum, conflict was resolved in favor of the creditor banks with the usual segmentation strategy. The foreign debt regime consequently remained hierarchical in the 1980s. Then, the 1989 US Brady Plan introduced some losses also for creditor banks, inducing them to make discounts (usually of 20/30%) to permit Latin American governments to service their debts.

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2.3.5. The Latin American market transition after 1989 The economic institutional change occurred only after 1989; the end of ISI institutions in Latin America was linked to the external change of 1989. During the Cold War, only Chile had applied laissez faire reforms; after 1989, all the countries of the region (Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentine…) started to implement structural reforms like privatizations, trade and financial opening. Interests prevailed, but were compatible with ideologies, also because moderate (and not radical) laissez faire reforms were implemented in Latin America (Fossati 1997). However, the international change was also coupled to some domestic shocks, especially in countries that had continued to follow the macroeconomic populism of the past. Peru and Argentina experienced hyperinflation crises and social revolts in 1989. These events represented the focal points, that pushed governments to stop exploiting ISI and to explore market reforms4. At the beginning, Peru and Argentina performed better in the economic liberalization of the early 1990s, with limited social and political opposition. In Peru, there were intentional obstacles to reforms raised by opposition parties (like APRA), but president Fujimori was able overcome them by relying on popular support for his “auto-golpe” of 1992. In Argentina, the economy minister Cavallo anchored the local peso to the dollar, with a fixed exchange rate, and was able to cut the inflation rate. At the beginning of the 1990s, Mexico and Venezuela went through severe economic crises in the initial phase of the reforms, because these countries had not suffered a focal point like the 1989 hyper-inflation. Oil revenues had permitted low levels of inflation, in the context of economic populism. In the short term, social and political actors (especially parties) started to oppose market reforms, and were legitimated by the population. There were two attempted military-populist coups in Venezuela in 1992, and two political leaders were killed (by narco-traffickers with political links) in Mexico in 1994. These events led to stock exchange and currency crises. Brazil can be classified somewhere in the middle. At the beginning of the 1990s economic liberalization was gradual, because before 1989 there had been neither oil bonanzas nor high inflation rates, and real wages had increased. Sunk costs of protectionism were linked to the resistance by both labor and industry to market reforms. 4

Fossati (1997) applied March’s (1991) theory of “over-exploitation”, which was pursued by Latin American governments to avoid changes because of the high sunk costs of ISI, as the main engine to explore an ever deeper change in the opposite direction (market reforms) after a focal point (1989 hyper-inflation and estallidos socials); see also Weyland’s (1991) prospect theory.

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2.3.6. The Latin American market reforms since the 1990s In all these countries (Mexico, Chile, Peru, Argentina, and Venezuela at first), the laissez faire reforms of the beginning of the 1990s were implemented by change teams (Evans 1992) or “technopols” (Dominguez 1997), and the “embedded” (i.e. in ties with business groups) autonomy of the state bureaucracy favored economic change (Evans 1995). The consolidation of (moderate) market reforms in the 1990s was not easily achieved; there were many social and political actors that obstructed the process (Haggard 2000). Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Brazil continued market transition, contrary to Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and also Argentina. The step back towards protectionism was more radical with former military golpista Chavez in Venezuela, especially after he became president in 1999; he used oil revenues to increase public expenditure. Venezuela became a hybrid regime, with a new illiberal constitution and too many powers given to Chavez and the armed forces. Also Bolivia (with gas) and Ecuador (with oil) slowed market reforms (Silva 2009). The economic crisis of 2002 -because of the fixed exchange rate maintained for too many years, the great difficulties in tax reform, and the higher state expenditures- pushed Argentina towards a milder application of market reforms with both Nestor and Cristina Kirchner (of the Peronist Party)5. The rightist president (Macri), elected in 2014, should return to moderate laissez faire. In these countries, ideologies have prevailed over interests; Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina were closer to the ideas of constructivist left, while Chavez became a promoter of the Manichaean values. Instead, countries like Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile kept implementing moderate market reforms, and the “interests-intensive” conservatism has been applied. Mexico enjoyed an important recovery made possible by the US support with the IMF package, after the Tequila economic crisis of 1994; Mexico was a member of NAFTA as the most strategic Latin American country. In Brazil, coherent adjustment had been postponed in the first half of the 1990s; Collor was autonomous, but not “embedded” (i.e. too much isolated). In the second half of that decade, Brazil exhibited a more stable economic liberalization process, as socialdemocratic president Cardoso profited from the Asian crisis of 1997/8 to devalue Brazil’s currency, contrary to Argentina (Resende-Santos 2001). Then Lula, even if he belonged to a socialist party, kept applying moderate market reforms, close to the conservative political culture (Fossati 2015). 5

Argentina has the most polarized political system in Latin America, with the cleavage between Radicals and Peronists (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). The opposition of the Justicialista party increased the difficulties of De la Rua in 2002.

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3. The influence of political cultures in the economic arena In the Cold War, conservatism was the prevailing political culture in the domestic economies of advanced countries and in North-North relations. The moderate market domestic institutions of Western countries until the 1980s (except Reagan’s and Thatcher’s radical reforms), and of the Asian tigers in the late 1950s have always been close to conservatism, with state governance limiting laissez faire. In international relations, the post-1945 global economic organizations, leading to moderate market reforms, have also been built under the influence of conservatism. The IMF was the global institution charged with managing economic crises in the Third World, but remained mostly unemployed until 1982, while the G7 was the inter-governmental forum that dealt with North-North crises. Conservative diplomacies prevailed, and coordination among advanced governments was promoted to avoid adverse interests, that is to say the crises stemming from radical laissez faire (Hirst, Thompson 1996). The gradual consolidation of the global trade regime has also been compatible with the interests of governments, which often applied some covert protectionism within the “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1993). The weak 1988 Basel (I) quasi-regime on banks’ deposits has also been consistent with the conservative political culture (Fossati 2006). Instead, radical liberalism starts from the assumption that globalization has positive effects at all levels. The liberal diplomatic model in the economic arena rejects state governance, choosing a firm laissez faire stance, whose philosophic inspiration is Smith’s ideology of the “invisible hand”. The radical promoters of liberalism have always criticized the IMF and the World Bank interventions, because they would obstruct a positive learning process in economic liberalization; states should fail as firms do (Vaubel 1983). This position has been supported by Western trans-national corporations (TNCs), that prefer an environment without many rules (such as anti-trust or workers’ rights regimes), and increased their investments in developing countries only after 1989. The laissez faire values of TNCs are naturally compatible with their interests (Risse-Kappen 1995). Before 1989, radical liberalism was not applied by developing countries, except Pinochet’s Chile. The economic policies of the Asian tigers were more moderate. In the West, Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in the UK applied radical liberal reforms in the deregulation processes of the 1980s, which also modified North-North international flows, especially thanks to capital liberalization. After the 1982 foreign debt crisis of Latin America, liberalization efforts were limited to (wage and monetary) short-term adjustment policies, without structural reforms, like privatizations, trade

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and financial opening (Fossati 1997). The big push towards a liberal globalization (especially in Eastern Europe and in Latin America) started only after 1989, but at first it remained moderate and compatible with conservatism. In the mid-1990s, the IMF began to support radical laissez faire by coercing many developing countries towards capital liberalization. Then, TNCs destabilized market stability through capital movements in the various crises: in Mexico (1994), Asia and Russia (1997/8) (Strange 1988, 1996; Risse 2002). Since the 2002 crisis in Argentina, some limits to short-term capital movements have been accepted again by the IMF, which returned to conservatism and moderate market reforms. The 2008 financial crisis in advanced countries has been the outcome of the diffusion of the ideology of radical liberalism in some Western countries, with few controls on the financial sector. This also happened because of the weak Basel banking regime; trans-national financial groups had softened the rigid (conservative) Basel I criteria, with the flexible (liberal) Basel II of 2004. After the failure of some banks in the USA and the UK in 2008, the Financial Stability Board was launched in 2009, and the conservative Basel III regime was strengthened in 2010 (Moschella 2013). After a radical liberal period (from 2004 to 2010) in the banking regime, moderate conservatism has prevailed again (Moschella, Tsingou 2013). In the Cold War, Manichaean anti-market ideas had been applied by communist regimes; after 1989, they are surviving only in socialist Cuba and North Korea. In the West, the paradox is that Manicheanism became strong precisely after 1989 and the failure of communism and socialism, when “no-global” movements strongly mobilized in the 1990s. Leftist Manicheans object to market actors: TNCs, Western governments (the USA and neo-liberal Europe), their forums (the G-7) or global institutions, like the hierarchical IMF and the reciprocal WTO (with no differences). No-global movements have the same socialist ideology of the Cold War, even if some of them used (Nazi-fascist or communist) means of violent protest. Promoters of leftist Manicheanism assume that globalization has negative effects for the working class and productive business, because it favors financial speculation (Cox 1994). No-global movements are usually anti-American, and recent mobilizations (Della Porta et al. 2006) have strengthened since the 2008 economic crisis (Fossati 2006). Social-democrats do not reject the market, but they assume that state governance should be reinforced through collaboration to achieve common values, like global equality (Sachs 1998). Before 1989, constructivism was strong only in domestic political economy, in both European countries (with the implementation of welfare state) and the Third World, especially in Latin America, where ISI has been applied by populist governments.

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Then, constructivism materialized in the priority given to poorest countries in foreign aid (by Scandinavian states) and in the World Bank supervision. Since 1989, constructivists have promoted the strengthening of global regimes in anti-trust, environment, labor, and investment areas by redefining TNCs’ interests. Stiglitz’s (2002) criticism of the IMF was also based on the moderate left’s ideology, aimed at changing its objectives: not just preventing or controlling instabilities, but supporting developing countries’ market transitions. Constructivist and Manichaean positions seem to be incompatible, because they push in opposite directions. Another indicator of the influence of political cultures consists in the different responses to the problems of developing countries in their market transition. Conservatives assume that liberalization is very asymmetric because of the covert protectionism of the advanced countries. Liberals believe that many economic mistakes are often made by governments, and that liberalization processes are too gradual or too incoherent; for example, a fixed exchange rate is an anti-market measure with negative economic effects. Constructivists assume that laissez faire cannot have a positive outcome, where economic inequalities are too wide, and liberalizations are poorly regulated by the state. Manichaean leftists’ neo third-worldist dogma is that the free market leads to poverty and to all the economic problems of the developing countries (Fossati 2006). In sum, during the Cold War conservatism was the prevailing political culture in both domestic institutions (of Western governments and the Asian tigers) and the international economy (with the GATT, the IMF, the G7 and the Basel I regime). The other three “ideological” political cultures were relevant only in some domestic economies: radical liberalism in Chile, the USA and the UK in the 1980s; constructivism in Latin America (with ISI) and Europe (with the welfare state); socialism in communist countries. Thus, before 1989 ideologies did not matter so much in the international relations of the economic arena, and market reforms were not promoted by the USA, the EU and the IMF in non-Western countries. This happened because of the influence of leftist ideologies in the Third World: either radical socialism (in communist countries) or moderate constructivism (in protectionist ISI of Latin America). Moreover, the rare economic liberalization efforts outside the West have been the outcome of domestic decisions, without significant external pressure. The moderate reforms of the Asian tigers have been autonomous for cultural reasons, like Japan before 1945 or China since the 1980s. Pinochet Chile’s market transition was an exception in Latin America, that cannot be explained by American coercion; all the other military regimes of the region, being supported by the USA, did not privatize anything (Fossati 2006).

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Since 1989, governments have continued to apply the conservative model in the domestic economies and at the international level, promoting moderate market institutions outside the West, according to one of the values of the post-1989 “near” world order. Radical liberalism has been defended by TNCs, pushing for weak (in banks’ deposits) and ineffective (in trans-national investments) regimes (Rosenau 1997). The IMF has been closer to either conservatism (before 1995 and after 2002) or liberalism (from 1995 to 2001). The G-20’s efforts (like the launching of the Financial Stability Board in 2009) to fight the economic crisis are some coordination measures coherent with conservatism and not with constructivism, which would need a much more intense collaboration (Moschella, Weaver 2014). In the 1990s, there was a convergence between promoters of conservatism and liberalism. Since 1989, constructivist and Manichaean leftist political cultures have declined in the Third World, because of the abandonment of ISI and socialism, with few exceptions. Manicheans have survived in no-global mobilizations. Constructivists are weaker because social-democrats are restrained (for electoral reasons) in their criticism of radical anti-market positions of Manichaean movements. Then, many leaders of the European moderate left are still so much concerned with defending the conquests of welfare state in their countries, that they have never been able to elaborate a strategy to defend workers of developing countries. There is a sort of rationality trap, because if a global regime on the protection of workers’ rights was approved, the average level of protection (in wages, security, legislation…) would reach (for example) 50%. In China workers have 30% protection, in Africa 15%. The outcome would be excellent for those workers. But protection is around 65% in the USA, or 80% in Europe; thus, a global regime could lower the average level of workers’ protection in advanced countries (Fossati 2006). The 2008 economic crisis has weakened radical liberalism, because of the negative effects of financial deregulation, and constructivism, with the crisis of the EU countries with a large public expenditure, decided by social-democratic executives in the past: the “PIGS” (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain). If governments of those states support banks (with bad financial investments), public expenditure must decrease in countries with either large income differences (like between the north and the south of Italy), or low industrialization (like the other Mediterranean countries). The 2008 financial crisis has also been worsened by the weakness of the moderate left on globalization, with exceptions like Stiglitz (2002). The current “debate” is mostly between the moderate and radical rights, because the positions of the moderate left are too shy, and those of the Manichaean left are not feasible, even if they are assertive (Fossati 2006).

CHAPTER SIX THE POLITICAL ARENA: THE PROMOTION OF ORDER THROUGH DEMOCRACY

Introduction on political cultures in the political arena The political arena of international relations is also conditioned by political cultures, through the processes of external influence on domestic regimes. Conservatives assume that democracy cannot be promoted from the outside, and that inertial anarchical contagion is the only instrument to diffuse it, because external manipulation has damaging effects and produces anti-West attitudes, cultural conflicts, and terrorism (Huntington 1996). Before 1989, democratic transitions were mostly the outcomes of processes of non-intentional contagion (Whitehead 1996), through three democratization waves involving most of Europe and Latin America, Japan and India (Huntington 1993). Liberals sponsor economic negative sanctions against authoritarian regimes, through political conditionality. The link is established between some (usually economic: foreign aid or trade preferences) decisions of the advanced democratic government and the political performance of the recipient country (defense of human rights and democratization). Leftist constructivists prefer economic or diplomatic positive rewards to democratizing states, like foreign aid, which before 1989 was channeled by social-democratic governments to the poorest Third World states. Political conditionality, based on negative sanctions towards developing countries, is a politically incorrect diplomacy. Neoconservatives assume that only war can promote democracy, because economic sanctions are weak or ineffective. Leftist Manicheans do not consider democracy to be a priority and do not support any external pressure to foster it. Non-democratic regimes often support authoritarian governments, through “autocracy promotion”. Democracies sometimes support authoritarian regimes through the conservative “lesser evil” priority, by promoting personalist or military regimes against the “absolute evil”: Islamic fundamentalism or communism.

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1. Models of external anchorage to democracy In the political science literature there has been an intense debate on the patterns of the external diffusion of (and/or influence on) democracy. Pridham (1991) was the first author to focus on international factors in the democratization processes of the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece), represented by the external linkage (or anchorage) through their entry into the European Union (EU). Whitehead (1996) proposed a classification among control (by imposition), contagion (non-intentional), and consensus (intentional). Control is exemplified by cases of military intervention in order to promote democracy, contagion by democratization waves (Huntington 1993), and consensus by international processes of intentional promotion of democracy, as in European integration. Schmitter (1996) added a fourth category, conditionality, which is applied by economic sanctions, while control is based on military sanctions. EU enlargement is an example of conditionality. Schmitter and Brouwer (2000) extended the international modes of the “promotion and protection of democracy”, by labeling the category of consensus as assistance. Democratic assistance means positive rewards to democratizing countries, like electoral monitoring, funds intended to promote institution-building and to support pro-human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Pridham (2001) distinguished convergence, which implies a direct causal linkage between external actors promoting democracy and intentional domestic reactions, from contagion, in which the external influence takes the form of only non-intentional factors. For example, after 1989 Eastern European candidate countries applied convergence in accordance with the EU’s expectations; Latin American states only developed contagion in the transition wave of the 1980s. Although this is a good clarification, convergence and contagion appear to be two sub-categories of the same analytical category: the inertial diffusion of democratization. Some recent studies have sought to elaborate this classification further; but the outcome has been the identification of excessively sophisticated analytical categories, that are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive1. The increase in economic aid to democratizing countries was ambiguously labeled as rewarding or “positive” conditionality (Baracani 2009), but reinforcements by reward do not appear conditioned at all (on this distinction, see the next sections). Levitsky and Way (2005) and Burnell (2005) devised the category of diplomatic pressures, like those of 2003/4 1

Kubicek (2003) proposed a tetra-partition among control, contagion, convergence and conditionality, but this last category is ambiguous because it includes negative and positive sanctions -which have also been labeled “democratic assistance”.

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that favored popular protests against autocratic leaders in Eastern Europe, in order to differentiate them from economic sanctions and rewards. Other scholars have modified the above-mentioned classification2. Morlino and Magen (2009) proposed another classification among military control, conditionality (negative sanctions and positive rewards), socialization (by social, educational, technological, and cultural processes), and exampleemulation (intentional lesson-drawing)3. In fact, these categories do not seem to satisfy the criterion of mutual exclusion; EU socialization (Schimmelfennig 2006) and candidates’ intentional emulation are two faces of the same process4. Finally, summarizing sanctions and rewards in only one category is even more imprecise. The classification of the models of external “anchorage” to democracy is as follows: inertial emulation (contagion if spontaneous, or convergence if intentional), control (direct by military intervention, or indirect through arms trade and military assistance), political conditionality -by applying negative sanctions to authoritarian regimes: trade sanctions, cuts to 2

The categories have been reduced to three: inspiration, coalition and substitution (Jacoby 2006); or emulation, promotion and imposition (Grilli da Cortona 2008, 2009). Emulation and inspiration are similar to convergence or contagion; imposition and substitution to control. Promotion and coalition coincide with consensus (Whitehead 1996), which was later distinguished in conditionality and assistance. Promotion denotes both positive and negative sanctions. Coalition has been used to indicate processes of external (economic and diplomatic) support for domestic popular protests intended to induce illiberal presidents to step down. 3 Magen, Risse and Mc Faul (2009) labeled democratic assistance as “capacity building”, and socialization as “normative suasion”; they also put ex-post inducements and ex-ante conditionality in the same analytical category. 4 There follows the typology of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005): KEY ACTORS of consequences LOGIC of appropriateness European External (positive and Social learning Union negative) incentives Candidates Lesson-drawing (intentional) Lesson-drawing (spontaneous) The logic of appropriateness relies upon identity, values and norms, while that of consequences is based on actors’ rational behavior. The category of external incentives is too broad because it includes both rewards and punishments (positive and negative conditionality). Then, the social learning category (anchored to identity) identifies expectations that materialize through socialization processes (Whitehead’s consensus); for example, the EU fixes norms, and candidates comply with them. Finally, the two categories of lesson-drawing identify both intentional convergence and spontaneous contagion, mostly anchored to domestic processes. In the former, lobbies are more important; in the latter, epistemic communities are.

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economic aid, exclusion from the enlargement process-, and rewards to democratizing states (Fossati 2011). Political conditionality means that foreign policy is implemented by establishing a linkage between certain (usually economic) decisions (foreign aid, trade preferences, or entrance in the EU) and the political performance of the recipient country; it has been applied to strong violations of human rights and democratic procedures. Rewards may be divided into three classes: democratic assistance (specific funds aimed at improving the political performance of the recipient country), diplomatic pressure (declarations or official missions supporting domestic pro-democracy groups), and economic assistance (increased aid to democratizing states). Then, democratic assistance consists in economic aid aimed at organizing electoral monitoring or reinforcing political participation: by financing pro-human rights NGOs and an independent press5. It should not be confused with aid intended to improve “good governance” (public administration reform, of the judicial system, of security forces, fight against corruption…), which may be compatible with an illiberal democracy or a hybrid regime (Mattina 2004).

2. Political conditionality Two processes of political conditionality will be analyzed: foreign aid of democratic governments to developing countries (Fossati 1999c), and the EU’s enlargement to the East (Fossati 2004, 2011).

2.1. Political conditionality on development cooperation Before 1989, political conditionality was not applied to foreign policy. The EU did not emphasize the defense of political rights with ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries in the Lomé conventions, which had a strong third-worldist ideological orientation. Most of the African chiefs of state were authoritarian and some of them were criminals, but European governments did not overcome their post-imperial feeling of guilt (Stokke 1984). During the Cold War, the US Democratic and Republican presidents applied the diplomatic principle of the “lesser evil”. Thus, if the enemy was a communist state or a totalitarian regime like Khomeini’s Iran, Washington tolerated violations of human rights by their less authoritarian (military or personalist) allied regimes, like those of 5

Levitsky and Way (2006) emphasized the influence of leverage (vulnerability of the transition country) and (the intensity of) linkages in the external promotion of democracy. Tolstrup (2013) replied that target governments may obstruct those pressures, by playing the role of “gate-keepers”.

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Somalia, Guatemala, Indonesia, the Philippines... (Fossati 1999c). Carter has been the only US president who has tried to promote (especially in his electoral campaign) the linkage between human rights and foreign policy (Rosati 1987). However, Carter’s support of human rights was more coherent only in Latin America, which in the 1970s was characterized by the presence of very violent military regimes (especially those of the Southern Cone: Chile, Argentina and Uruguay), that had been supported by the previous Republican administrations. Only those three repressive military regimes were sanctioned by Carter, but their amount of foreign aid was limited, because they were quite rich countries (Eide 1986). Then, Reagan did not apply political conditionality either; in fact, he exerted strong diplomatic and military pressure only on communist authoritarian regimes like Cuba and Nicaragua (Carothers 1991). The end of the Cold War removed those structural constraints, and liberal diplomacies were also promoted, especially immediately after 1989. The most committed states were those in which liberal values are stronger: the USA and the UK. Clinton, more than Bush (Burkhalter 1992, Carothers 1995), sought to stabilize Latin American regimes like Peru and Guatemala, whose presidents (at the beginning of the 1990s) had dissolved parliaments (with auto-golpes). British political conditionality on foreign aid was directed towards its former colonies in Africa: Malawi, Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone… (VV.AA. 1992). France was initially determined to apply political conditionality on foreign aid with Africa, but in 1993 Balladur declared that development cooperation would no longer be conditional on political criteria (Martin 1995). Otherwise France was obliged to change its foreign economic policy, downgrading its priorities from former colonies to democratic African states. Italy and Spain never linked foreign policy to human rights. Aznar conditioned foreign aid on human rights only with Cuba in 1997/8, but that liberal policy was abandoned after a couple of years before any real democratic progress of Castro’s regime (Fossati 1999c). Other states disregarded political conditionality on foreign aid: Japan, Australia, Austria and Switzerland (VV.AA. Yearbook, Uvin 1993). The so-called “like-minded-countries”, i.e. Canada (Mahoney 1992) and four northern Scandinavian countries (Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland), chose the aid recipients according to the poverty criterion, applying the socalled “aid regime” (Lumsdaine 1993). This is the typical constructivist foreign policy in development cooperation, even if Manichaean values have also been promoted; for example, since the 1970s the first recipient of Swedish aid has been communist Vietnam.

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After 1989 the EU’s “minilateral” funds were conditioned to the defense of political rights (Pace 2012). The Netherlands was determined to link foreign aid to democratic performances; in 1991 development cooperation with Indonesia was suspended after human rights violations in East Timor (Van den Ham 1993). Denmark also promoted political conditionality to foreign aid (Michelsen 1994). Germany and Belgium were strongly committed to that policy (Sorensen 1993). New member countries (like Sweden, Finland and Austria) were less determined to make aid conditional on human rights performance (Stokke 1995). In sum, political conditionality only concerned major violations of human rights and important obstacles to democracy (Fossati 1999c); hybrid regimes and illiberal democracies were tolerated (Youngs 2012). The most committed countries had strong traditions of liberalism: the USA and the UK. The least committed were the Latin/Mediterranean states: France, Spain and Italy. Then, the basic discriminating criterion was (long) membership in the EU. Germany, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands promoted political conditionality; Japan, Australia, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland did not apply it. In sum, political conditionality on foreign aid had little effect. This happened precisely because Western countries were not cohesive, and political conditionality was not applied in a consistent manner by them. Some donor countries linked foreign aid to recipients’ political performances, but many others did not (Fossati 1999c). The consequence was that a Third World recipient government could easily find new donors, if aid was cut or canceled for political reasons (Crawford 1997). Developing countries have also escaped that coercion, because of autocracy promotion of non-democratic states: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, China… (Escriba-Folch 2015). Indonesia, whose foreign aid was limited by the Netherlands in 1991, easily found some substitutes: Australia and Japan. Cuba also found support from European states to evade American sanctions. Another empirical finding concerns all recipient countries. Political conditionality has never been applied to countries that were very distant from Western values, like those pertaining to the Sinic (Stubbe Ostergaard 1993) and Islamic civilizations. For example, aid to Thailand and Burma both pertaining to the Buddhist civilization- was cut, but this sanction was not applied to authoritarian China or Vietnam. Foreign aid to Arab countries has not been cut either, because there was the threat of Islamic fundamentalism; only Sudan was sanctioned, as those radical actors were already in power. Finally, Western donors have never applied politically conditionality on foreign aid, if recipients were authoritarian or repressive countries involved in armed conflicts, like Congo-Kinshasa.

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2.2. Political conditionality on the European Union enlargement .

The EU has undergone various phases of enlargement since the Treaty of Rome signed by the six pioneer member states. Before 1989, EU political and economic conditionality towards new candidates (like Spain, Portugal and Greece) was weak, because those countries had to be protected from the political threats raised by domestic Communist parties. Whitehead (2000) emphasized that in the Cold War the military dimension of world politics was of great importance. Hence the priority was the stabilization of some “key” Mediterranean allies without too many political constraints. Then, Southern European countries had had a longer previous democratic experience than post-Communist states. Finally, the economic performances of the Mediterranean countries were superior to those of the Eastern partners, whose per capita income was only 40% of the average of the EU states. Northern new members (Austria, Sweden and Finland) did not have political and economic problems (Fossati 2004). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, East European governments began to pressurize their Western colleagues to accelerate the EU enlargement process. In the 1990s two transitions came about: political democratization and economic liberalization. The capacity of the EU to influence Eastern European governments materialized in two phases. In the first half of the 1990s, candidates intentionally satisfied the EU’s expectations as fixed in the 1993 Copenhagen political and economic criteria. A convergence process therefore took place. After 1997, when the EU Commission started to publish its regular reports, political and economic conditionality was applied to the candidates of Eastern Europe, Cyprus and Malta. The EU started to impose a patterned timetable on its Eastern partners; something similar had also been applied in the previous phases of enlargement: economic assistance (through the Phare Programme), trade liberalization agreements, and association agreements (Mayhew 1998). Phare and trade preferences were conceded in an initial phase, although the EU maintained some protectionist measures towards the candidates (especially quotas, many of them in agriculture), which remained with a trade deficit in favor of the EU exports throughout the 1990s (Sedelmeier, Wallace 2000). Of course, most candidates had inefficient production systems inherited from the socialist period. Trade with the EU greatly increased for many candidates, reaching levels of 60/65% of total trade. Enlargement reinforced the consolidation of a continental economic region, and European members could more easily beat their American and Asian competitors; for example, only members and candidates could participate in Phare tendering procedures (Fossati 2004).

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At the beginning of the 1990s, ten candidate states were selected: the core central European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia), the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), two Balkan countries (Romania and Bulgaria), and only one state of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia). The other partners of Yugoslavia were excluded because wars had continued for several years in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, and all those countries were suffering different, but often severe, limitations of democracy. Members of the former Soviet Union remained under the influence of Russia, except for the three Baltic states: also Moldova, whose population was mostly Romanian, and Ukraine, which had a crystallized conflict between its western (pro-European) and eastern (pro-Russian) parts that has recently degenerated into war6 (Fossati 2004). The critical juncture of the enlargement process was the Copenhagen Council of June 1993. Members of the EU decided to establish the political and economic criteria that were going to facilitate the selection of the Eastern candidates for enlargement. In fact, these criteria were very general principles on liberal democracy and the free market. In the following years, the legal-administrative prerequisites (the so-called acquis communautaire) were also fixed. In June 1995 a long White Paper was issued in this regard. Since 1997, the Commission has compiled very detailed yearly reports covering all the areas of the enlargement process. In December 1997, at the Luxembourg Council, the first five countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia) were selected in order to start the negotiations on enlargement. The selection was contested for several reasons. Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania protested against their exclusion (Emerson 1988). These states were not complying with either economic (Latvia and Lithuania) or political (Slovakia) pre-conditions. In those years the nationalist government in Slovakia, headed by Meciar, had not respected the basic principles of democracy in either political or civil rights; also obligations towards the Hungarian minority were lowly guaranteed (Henderson 1999). The economic indicators of Latvia and 6

Political conditionality has also been applied by the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) in the relations with its member countries, even if in only a few cases. Political conditionality has never been negotiated by the IMF and the World Bank; the latter has focused on so-called good governance (Gibbon 1993). EBRD’s sanctions have only concerned significant obstacles to democratization. Milosevic’s Serbia was not admitted and Lukashenko’s Belarus was suspended, while illiberal democracies like Tudjman’s Croatia and Armenia were tolerated, also because those regimes were involved in armed conflicts. Second, when human rights violations were committed by Islamic countries (Azerbaijan and central Asian authoritarian regimes), political conditionality was not applied by the EBRD (Fossati 1999d).

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Lithuania were inferior to those of Estonia, which was recognized as the best performer in market transition by the main international organizations like the IMF. Finally, in that year Bulgaria and Romania were noncompliant with both economic and political criteria. In fact, per capita income was very low, and the privatization process was only beginning. Then, the behavior of security forces was not compatible with the practices of liberal democracies, especially towards the Roma minority, and many other civil rights were being violated, especially those of children in Romania; in fact, the conditions of public orphanages were dreadful. In December 1999, negotiations also started with all the other five candidates. Moreover, the EU member states decided to apply the “regatta” model to negotiations, and every candidate had to satisfy the criteria, so that second tranche candidates could also enter the EU before the others that had started in 1997 (Berglof, Roland 2001). Slovakia had resolved its political problems thanks to Meciar’s defeat in the elections. Latvia and Lithuania had improved their economic records. The decision to include the two Balkan states was more doubtful, because their political (in regard to the guaranteeing of civil rights) and especially economic performances were still quite poor. The final decision by the European institutions, taken between October and December 2002, was based on the acceptance of eight candidates. Romania and Bulgaria were excluded, because their economic records were still highly unsatisfactory, although there had been several improvements on the political criteria. These eight countries entered the EU in May 2004, together with Malta and (the Greek part of) Cyprus. Romania and Bulgaria entered in 2007. Negotiations followed the “formula/details” model (Zartman 1978). The political and economic criteria were elaborated at Copenhagen in 1993. Then negotiations covered the details, i.e. the legal-administrative changes that candidates’ parliaments had to approve before their entrance into the EU. In previous phases of enlargement, the acquis communautaire was completed after effective adhesion had taken place. Then, political conditionality followed ex post mechanisms of evaluation; instead, economic conditionality was mostly based on some quantitative indicators and followed ex ante criteria. Thus, the EU’s economic conditionality was anchored to the advancement of liberalization reforms, and not to per capita income. For example, Slovakia’s violations of political rights were gross, and the EU Commission emphasized that negative sanctions (the postponement of the start date of negotiations with Slovakia) would be applied. The same occurred with Bulgaria and Romania in regard to the issue of civil rights. The EU’s economic conditionality was similar to that of the World Bank, with a closer focus on structural benchmarks (and the

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progress of medium-term reforms), and not on the short-term quantitative indicators like those of the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, the EU did not coerce single candidates towards fast (“shock therapies”) or gradual processes of economic adjustment (Fossati 2004). There has been a rigid division of labor between the Commission and the governments. The former has decided on who shall enter the EU, while the latter has maintained closer control on the timetable of accession (De Witte 2002). In sum, the liberal model of foreign policy has been applied by the EU, with a quite coherent application of the economic and political criteria, at least in the final outcome of negotiations, that is to say when candidates entered the EU. Thus, Eastern candidates were fulfilling the Copenhagen political and economic criteria in both 2004 (eight of them) and 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria). In 2004 the two Balkan countries were not compliant with the economic criteria (Fossati 2004), but in 2007 Romania and Bulgaria had reached the EU targets of economic conditionality7. Instead, political and economic conditionality has not been rigidly applied in the initial phase of negotiations. In fact, in 1997 and 1999 negotiations started with some candidates (Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria) partially complying with political and economic criteria. According to Zielonka (1998), the conservative diplomatic model and the logic of interests has influenced the EU, because the EU’s neutrality had been modified by the member governments’ lobbying, either to protect their own partisan interests (because of “patron/client” links), or to assure political stability in security issues. Slovakia did not have the same strong support that both Slovenia and Estonia received (especially) from Austria and Finland. Instead, Avery and Cameron (1998) denied this evolution of the European foreign policy, by emphasizing that also “excluded” Latvia and Lithuania had received that support, from Sweden and Denmark respectively. Then, negotiations started (in 1999) with Romania and Bulgaria, even if they did not fulfill political and economic criteria. A rigid application of the Copenhagen principles would have led to postponement of their negotiations (Fossati 2004). Thus, the EU’s decision of 1999 was coherent with a conservative diplomacy to compensate Romania and Bulgaria for the negative effects of NATO’s military 7

The indexes on economic liberalization (EBRD 2014, Fossati 2004) can be used to measure the progress of the liberalization process in the implementation of structural economic reforms (Aslund 2002). In 2003 Romania’s liberalization index was 24.2 and Bulgaria’s was 26.2. In 2007, Romania recorded 27.8 and Bulgaria 28.8. In 2003, the candidate with the lowest index was Slovenia with 27.1, but that country also had the highest per capita income. In 2009, Slovenia again had 27.1, so that even Bulgaria and Romania were more liberalized.

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intervention and economic sanctions against Serbia in Kosovo (Hassner 2002). Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria had strong cultural and economic ties, since the two Balkan states differed from the other eight candidates by belonging to the Eastern/Orthodox and not to the Western/Christian civilization (Huntington 1996). The other two exceptions to a liberal diplomacy concerned Estonia and Latvia (Zielonka, Pravda 2001). When negotiations started with the EU (in 1997 and in 1999), both countries showed scant respect for minority rights, especially those of Russian immigrants (nearly one third of the population). Laws on nationalizations were restrictive. Thanks to the EU, new measures were introduced to favor the granting of citizenship to Russians; yet most of those minorities preferred to obtain temporary permits and avoid the duties of nationalization. The EU Commission reports show that the minority issue in Estonia was resolved only in 1998, while in 1997 the law was presented in parliament, but still had to be approved. In the following years, the two countries adopted language legislation, limiting the rights of the (Russian or also Western European) workers who did not speak the local languages (Pettai 2001). These anomalies were corrected, but only the 2000 report (and not the 1999 edition) established that the two Baltic states were respecting civil rights (Gelazis 2000). Political criteria were applied flexibly, assuming that both countries would have soon resolved their problems. These exceptions to the (liberal) neutral diplomacy cannot be explained by “conservative” corrections, like for example German patronage towards Estonia and Latvia for the historic “feeling of guilt” after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. These exceptions can be explained by a hypothesis based on the inertia of the process (Friis 1998). In fact, many EU countries (Sweden, Denmark and Italy, through its prime minister Dini) have supported a political approach to the candidates, to avoid deep divisions among them (Friis and Murphy 1999, 2000). The perception was that if a too rigid political conditionality had been applied at the beginning of negotiations, the convergence towards the economic and political criteria at the end of the process would have failed (Fossati 2004). Laws on Russian minorities had not been approved by their parliaments when negotiations began, but only after they entered the EU. Applying conditionality at the beginning of negotiations was an “ultra-solution”, with apparent positive short-term effects, but with negative effects at the end of the process. The positive evolution of the Russian minorities issue in Estonia and Latvia was especially due to EU pressures, because all the other international organizations (the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: OSCE) had been ineffectual (Gelazis 2000).

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In sum, the enlargement process has been coherent with a liberal diplomacy, and governments could not manipulate the selection process of the EU, which remained neutral in applying the economic and political criteria of adhesion at the end of negotiations (in 2004 and 2007). Security constraints, according to a conservative diplomacy (in Bulgaria and Romania), or inertial dynamics (in Estonia and Latvia) can be useful for explaining some exceptions to the prevailing liberal trend, when (in 1997 and 1999) negotiations with the EU started (Fossati 2004). The process of enlargement has positively conditioned the democratization of Eastern European countries, even if many of them (especially those with previous experience of political freedoms) could have achieved the same outcome through an unintentional contagion process (Epstein, Sedelmeier 2009). This evaluation concerns the dynamics of the enlargement process developed through the analysis of negotiations with each candidate. Then, the conservative and the liberal “collective” promotions of regionalism have been both confirmed. Enlargement was coherent with the interests of both members -finding investment opportunities for their firms, and preventing illegal migration- and candidates -receiving EU structural and agriculture funds, and using the EU as an anchor for democratization and economic liberalization processes- (Moravscik, Vachudova 2003). The EU’s decision to improve the enlargement process was also based on common European and Western values (Schimmelfennig 2002), and it appeared as the most legitimate to all members (Schimmelfennig 2003). The influence of the Manichaean (neo-Marxist) model in the European foreign policy -only economic, and not political, conditionality would have mattered (Pravda 2001)- is to be rejected, because of the consistent application of political conditionality to Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. In 2007, the second phase of negotiations on the EU enlargement started with five potential candidates of former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia), and Albania (Fossati 2011). In July 1999, the EU had launched in Kohl the Stability Pact for SouthEastern Europe, which included Slovenia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. The aim of the pact was to stabilize both democratization and economic liberalization of the Balkan countries, in order to facilitate their future adhesion to the EU. Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania were in the first tranche of enlargement candidates, and became new members in 2004 and in 2007. Serbia was temporarily excluded from the pact as long as Milosevic was in power. A diplomat representing Montenegro was admitted to the negotiations, even if it was not yet an independent state. These principles were repeated in June 2000 at the European Council in Feira, where Balkan countries were legitimated

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as “potential candidates” -the government of Yugoslavia was still absent-, and in November 2000 at the Zagreb Summit. EU economic assistance was channeled to those countries through the CARDS fund established in 2000; then, aid decreased after September 2001 (Fossati 2011). Eastern European countries had been divided into two groups. The recipients of the Stability Pact became the potential candidates, and the convergence process was the premise for the conditionality process. By contrast, former Soviet Union countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Caucasus states) were excluded from those objectives because they still pertained to Russia’s geo-political sphere of influence (Sasse 2013). As a consequence of these events, also EU aid to that region was limited. In January 2000, elections in Croatia were won by the center-left coalition, and the right-wing nationalist party was defeated. Croatia had performed well in both democratization and economic liberalization. EU conditionality concerned only “judicial” criteria, with the request to deliver war criminals to the International Criminal Court (ICC): especially Gotovina, who was alleged to be responsible for episodes of ethnic cleansing of Serb minorities in Krajina and Slavonia in 1995. In March 2004, the beginning of negotiations with the EU was postponed owing to Croatia’s scant cooperation with the ICC. In October, Carla Del Ponte of the ICC declared that Croatia had begun to cooperate two weeks before, and negotiations with the EU started. At the beginning of December, Gotovina was arrested in Tenerife (Roter, Bojinovi 2005, Wichmann 2007). Croatia strongly lobbied to gain the support of France, Italy and Austria, threatening to block negotiations with Turkey (Jovic 2006), but negotiations began when Carla Del Ponte was informed by the Croatian secret services that Gotovina was going to be arrested (Schimmelfennig 2008, Jovic 2009). In April 2011, Gotovina was found guilty by the ICC for former Yugoslavia, but he was absolved in the appeals verdict of November 2012. After resolving its border dispute with Slovenia in June 2011, Croatia concluded negotiations and entered the EU in July 2013. In October 2000, Milosevic lost the elections, which were won by the opposition leader Kustunica, and immediately thereafter the EU declared that Serbia had become a potential candidate; the opposition also won the parliamentary elections in December. In January 2001, Carla Del Ponte requested Kustunica to extradite Milosevic. In March, Milosevic was arrested in Belgrade, and he was extradited in June. In March 2003 the (pro-European) prime minister Dindic was killed. In July 2004 Carla Del Ponte accused the Serbian government of not cooperating on delivery to the ICC of the war criminals Karadzic (leader of Serbs in Bosnia), Mladic (responsible for the Srebenica massacre in Bosnia), and Hadzic (the

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perpetrator of many episodes of ethnic cleansing in Croatia). In November 2005 negotiations began on the association agreement, but they were suspended in May 2006, because of scant cooperation on the arrests of Karadzic and Mladic. In June negotiations resumed on the association agreement, because a new (and more independent from the nationalists) executive had been formed. In April 2008 the EU signed the association agreement with Serbia, but the Netherlands refused to ratify it. Karadzic was arrested in July and extradited to the ICC (Wichmann 2007). In December 2009 the trade (but not the association) agreement was unblocked by the Commission, without any veto by the Netherlands (Presnall 2009, Uvalic 2010). In May 2011 Mladic was arrested in Vojvodina and sent to the ICC. The president of the Commission Barroso declared that this was an important step for Serbia, and that its official recognition of Kosovo would not be a pre-condition for EU entry. In July, Hadzic was arrested and brought before the ICC. In March 2012 Serbia received the status of official EU candidate, and negotiations started in January 2014. Macedonia signed a stability and association agreement in April 2001. Since then its cooperation with the ICC has been good. Conflict with Greece on the choice of the name of the state has not yet been resolved. The granting of candidate status to Macedonia in December 2005 can be explained by the choice of stabilizing peace with the Albanian minority after the Ohrid Agreement promoted by the EU in 2001 (Giandomenico 2009). Montenegro became independent in May 2006 (Friis 2007) and signed the association agreement in October 2007. In December 2010, Montenegro obtained the status of EU candidate, and negotiations started in June 2012. Its cooperation with the ICC has been good. Bosnia signed the association agreement with the EU in June 2008. Bosnia is a federation that is still dependent on international instruments of governance; the functioning of common institutions is reduced and conflicts between the three entities are frequent. Local trials against war criminals continue amid numerous legal and practical difficulties. Bosnia’s cooperation with the ICC has been quite satisfactory since the arrest of Karadzic. Then, Albania signed the association agreement with the EU in June 2006. Kosovo is a potential EU candidate, but negotiations on the association agreement have not started because its independence is recognized only by 22 members: not by Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia, and Romania. Serbs continue to boycott elections and have built their own institutions. At the end of 2004, the EU decided to start negotiations (in 2005) with Turkey, even though that country was not entirely compliant with political criteria. Enlargement commissary Rehn promised that the EU would rigidly apply political conditionality at the end of negotiations (Pridham 2007).

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The EU has applied “judicial conditionality” on countries of former Yugoslavia (Fossati 2011). Its insistence on the extradition of war criminals was not a symbolic diplomatic instrument; rather, it resulted from the perception that only that policy could assure definitive resolution of the conflicts of the 1990s, as the sole premise for the compatibility of their nation-building process with their entrance into the EU. If those criminals had remained in their countries, the radical nationalisms of the 1990s would still have found legitimacy (Schimmelfennig 2008). Croatia became democratic, extradited war criminal Gotovina, and entered the EU in 2013. Serbia’s collaboration with the ICC had been limited until 2011, when both Mladic and Hadzic were arrested. In 2014 negotiations with Serbia started, because its political performance largely complied with the EU criteria, as did that of Montenegro. Bosnia’s political performance is still poor because of the difficult functioning of post-Dayton federalism, even though Karadzic was arrested in July 2008 (Pridham 2013). Albania and Macedonia are improving their political performance, although the rule of law is little guaranteed in those democracies. In sum, judicial conditionality has been anchored more to values -postwar nation-building processes of those countries had to be compatible with those of the recent European enlargement process- than to the short-term (economic) interests of the EU through the “logic of appropriateness” (De Bardeleben 2008, Braniff 2009). Conservative and liberal diplomatic models can also be applied to these candidates (Fossati 2011). Past sanctions on Serbia -when Mladic and Hadzic had not yet been arrestedconfirmed the liberal and neutral orientation of the Commission, without any conservative correction -linked to interests or security assumptions of the EU members (Hillion 2010). Croatia’s critical juncture in the enlargement process was between October -when negotiations started- and December 2005 -when Gotovina was arrested. The conservative patron’s (Austria) lobbying of its client (Croatia) influenced the unblocking of negotiations. According to Schimmelfennig (2008), the liberal orientation of the EU has been more important, because Carla Del Ponte lifted her veto only after having received assurances that Gotovina was going to be arrested. The beginning of negotiations with Turkey can also be explained by both security and inertial processes (Schimmelfennig 2001). There were security reasons for Turkey’s negotiations with the EU -stabilizing a strategic country in the Middle East-, and this conservative diplomacy has been supported by Italy and Spain. Then, there was also the fear that postponing negotiations might have the even worse effect of definitively halting political and economic reforms in Turkey; thus, inertia had to be encouraged (Baracani 2008, Huber 2015; Aydin-Dugzit, Tocci 2015).

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2.3. A summarizing typology on conditionality Comparison of political conditionality applied to development cooperation and to EU enlargement has permitted elaboration of the following typology, which includes some other cases of economic conditionality, within global or regional organizations. The first dimension is the (flexible or rigid) manner of application of the criteria; the second variable concerns the (high or low) density of the conditioned activities whether conditionality is applied to many or few negotiation issues. CRITERIA flexible rigid

many ACTIVITIES few Eastern Europe enlargement Foreign aid IMF EU Maastricht Treaty

The analysis of the above-mentioned reports by the Commission shows that EU (political and economic) conditionality has had two features. On the one hand, it has been anchored to the flexible Copenhagen criteria of 1993, because there were no quantitative targets for economic and political performances. On the other hand, it has concerned a very wide range of activities, which (moreover) have increased over time; for example, they have been extended to other areas like the environment. Grabbe (2002) labeled these two dimensions as “uncertainty” and “density”. Instead, political conditionality on foreign aid has concerned a limited range of activities: both flagrant violations of human rights (torture, murders, etc.) and major obstacles to the democratization process, though some electoral irregularities and civil rights limitations have been admitted. At the same time, it has been applied flexibly, and without previously defined rigid pre-conditions. Moreover, political conditionality on development cooperation has usually been implemented through ex post decision-making mechanisms: for example, after opposition leaders have been arrested, or election results have proved unreliable. Economic conditionality of the IMF has been rigid and concerned a wide range of activities: targets for the inflation rate, balance of payments, economic growth, and debt rescheduling conditions. Recently, mediumrange reforms, such as privatizations, have been subject to IMF supervision through “structural benchmarks”, which are quantitative indexes. The economic criteria of the European Monetary Union’s “reciprocal” conditionality, established by the Maastricht Treaty, were similar to those of the IMF, but in the following years targets were reduced to enable some countries like Italy to enter the Union. In fact, Italian public deficits, but not its consolidated debts, were in line with those of other countries.

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3. Political rewards Leftist constructivists do not support political conditionality because it is politically incorrect. Negative sanctions against authoritarian regimes of the Third World are against the principle of cultural relativism, while positive rewards to democratizers are politically correct. Rewards may take three forms: diplomatic pressure for free and fair elections, increased economic aid to democratizing states, and democratic assistance through funds intended to foster democratic groups and a free press (Fossati 2011).

3.1. Rewards to democratizing states: diplomatic pressures The cases of important diplomatic pressures are: the mobilizations supported by the USA- against Chavez in Venezuela of 2002; the “colored revolutions” in Eastern Europe of 2003/4; the popular protests in Iran of 2009/10 and during the “Arab Spring” of 2011/2 (Youngs 2015, Mitchell 2016). Way (2011) emphasized a limited role for external actors in the Arab Spring, except for NATO’s military intervention in Libya. Obama was modestly supportive of popular protests by Arabs; he only emphasized that democracy could not be imported from outside (Carothers 2013). Since the de facto division of Eastern Europe into two parts at the beginning of the 1990s, the former USSR countries have never been considered potential EU candidates. But they have been subject to diplomatic pressures before or after some contested elections leading to the “electoral revolutions” of Georgia (at the end of 2003) and Ukraine (at the end of 2004). There have been some diplomatic missions and declarations, and then some mediation efforts by the USA in Georgia and by the EU in Ukraine (Fossati 2011). In Georgia, Bush Jr urged Shevarnadze not to rely upon electoral manipulation in his diplomatic mission of July 2003; after the first round of votes, Powell declared that there had been several irregularities (Fairbanks 2004). During the crisis, Shevarnadze negotiated with foreign ministers of the USA (Powell) and Russia, but not with EU diplomats. Only the American government applied pressure on Georgia to revoke the elections (Borzel, Pamuk, Stahn 2009). External economic support for the revolution had been limited (Forbrig, Demes 2007), and so too were the diplomatic pressures of the American ambassador in Tbilisi (Miles), of the European Council and the OSCE (Jawad 2008). Instead, the EU states and the USA declared that the contested Armenian presidential elections of 2008 had been fair, but invited the Armenian president to revoke the state of emergency after the popular protests (Stewart 2009).

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In Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 “Tulip revolution”, mobilizations had been low, but they favored transition to a hybrid regime (Radnitz 2006). In Azerbaijan, the low popular protests of 2005 produced no effect (Alieva 2006). In Ukraine, before the late 2004 presidential elections, Bush Jr and Powell repeatedly discouraged (also in their diplomatic missions) any electoral manipulation; these declarations were made especially after the first round of elections (Way 2005). Governments of the EU were much more muted in their declarations, except for Lithuania and Poland (Aslund, Mc Faul 2006). After the first round of elections, mediation was conducted by a team of four diplomats (the secretary of OSCE Kubys, the presidents of Poland and Lithuania, and the EU commissioner for foreign policy Solana). Bush Jr was informally contacted without any direct participation in the negotiations (Mc Faul 2007). EU governments had threatened to cancel the cooperation agreement and to apply economic sanctions, if Ukraine used violence (Borzel, Pamuk, Stahn 2009). The EU has never envisaged membership for Ukraine, which has been the only former USSR country negotiating (since 2008) a sort of association agreement with the EU on the constitution of a free trade area (Tocci 2008). In Moldova, elections have always been quite fair, and there have never been significant protests. However, the diplomatic pressure of the EU on Ukraine (and of the USA on Georgia) has not been the main factor behind the “colored revolutions”; these regimes failed especially because their institutions were very weak (Way 2008; Bunce, Wolchik 2009).

3.2. Rewards to democratizing states: increased economic aid Economic aid by Western countries has increased, after rapid and/or unexpected changes, such as the electoral revolutions of Georgia and Ukraine of 2003/4, or when the nationalist governments of Croatia and Serbia were defeated in the 2000 elections. EU aid strongly increased after those changes (Fossati 2011). The political progress of Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Spring of 2011 was also rewarded by aid increases (Hullen 2015). Instead, the EU aid did not reward or sanction gradual changes, when for example the political situation worsened in Georgia some years after the Rose Revolution. Then, EU aid did not decrease after the 2013 military coup in Egypt (Freyburg 2015). The EU has also applied political conditionality on development cooperation with former Soviet Union countries, but only after severe violations of democratic principles, as in Belarus and Russia. Aid was strongly cut back (in 1997) in authoritarian Belarus (Koresteleva 2009). When Putin restricted the democratization process at the end of the 1990s,

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TACIS funds decreased by nearly one third. Political conditionality was less stringent on Russia, because that regime was not as authoritarian as Belarus, and that country was a (quite rich) energy-exporting economy. Instead, hybrid regimes like Georgia (after Saakashvili’s involution) and Armenia (after the 2008 irregular elections) have not been sanctioned by the EU (Fossati 2011). European negative sanctions did not produce any political improvement either in Russia, or in Belarus, which has received “autocracy” promotion (i.e. economic aid) from Putin (Hogenauer, Friedel 2008). The external anchorage for the promotion of democracy in former USSR has been weak. It is also for this reason that Edwards (2008) and Sasse (2008) emphasized the inconsistency of the EU’s neighborhood policy. Only Ukraine, and only with western pro-European presidents (Valasek 2010), has undertaken a democratic convergence, but it has not been rewarded with the granting of candidate status by the EU, which has never envisaged Ukraine’s membership, because this might increase conflict with the eastern pro-Russian region (Lavenex, Schimmelfennig 2010). Sasse (2013) pointed out that economic, political and cultural linkages with Russia limited the EU’s promotion of democracy. This empirical evidence (Tomasevki 1993) supports the theoretical choice of not summarizing negative and positive conditionality in one analytical category. The EU does not give rewards or sanctions along a gradual continuum from very negative, negative, through neutral, to positive and very positive. Negative sanctions are applied only after very severe violations of democratic principles; in intermediate cases, i.e. with illiberal democracies or hybrid regimes, there is no reaction. If political and civil rights are improved, rewards only materialize when the democratic transition is rapid (and often unexpected); thus, they do not depend on the quality of democracy either (Fossati 2011).

3.3. Rewards to democratizing states: democratic assistance Among the three instruments, democratic assistance is the typical constructivist reward. It has been applied by Western countries especially since the second half of the 1990s, precisely when political conditionality on development cooperation had failed to produce significant effects. The main feature of democratic assistance is its limited capacity to generate political effects (Fossati 2011). Thus, it is a typical example of “organized hypocrisy”. Western governments have applied democratic assistance, when they have become aware that the other effective solutions have failed (Bush 2015). In the 1990s, the percentage of democratic assistance in economic aid was around 7.5% for the USA, 9% for Germany, 7% for

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the United Kingdom, 5% for Spain, while France and Italy recorded lower percentages (Carothers 1999, 2004). In the following decade (data for 2005), the USA increased democratic assistance to around 12%, while Scandinavian countries of northern Europe had higher percentages: Sweden 24%, Denmark 13%, and the Netherlands 12% (Youngs 2008). The EU democratic assistance has been applied in both phases of Eastward enlargement (Fossati 2011). In the first decade, it was limited because in the 1990s EU economic aid (Phare) to the candidates had been low (5%) compared with structural and cohesion funds channeled to its members. The percentage of democratic assistance (on the total amount of EU economic aid within Phare) in the first tranche of Eastern Europe candidates represented around 2% of the total (Smith 2001, Youngs 2008). A larger 25% of Phare went to support institutions (public administration and regionalization) and expenditure on training and research (Fossati 2004). Economic aid to states of former Yugoslavia has been higher: around 5% of the funds directed to EU member countries. In the first half of the last decade, democratic assistance reached the following percentages: Croatia 28%, Bosnia 19%, Serbia 14%, Macedonia 5%, Albania 3.5%, Montenegro and Kosovo 8%. Data on the former USSR (in the second half of the decade) are overestimated because these percentages also include aid to improve good governance. Ukraine (Kuzio 2005, Burger 2008) received 30%, Armenia 30%, Georgia 26%, and Moldova 18%. In Belarus, precisely because standard economic aid was totally cut, nearly 60% of the few funds of 2005 were channeled to support civil society (Briens 2008). In Russia, EU democratic assistance was nearly 4% of the total (in the first half of the decade), but since 2005 Putin has started to refuse EU aid to independent NGOs (Mc Faul, Petrov, Ryabov 2004). In Bosnia and the former USSR, traditional democratic assistance (to support independent NGOs and the free press) has been limited. The EU has focused on good governance to improve the effectiveness of public administration and to favor the acquis transfer (Youngs 2009, 2010). In sum, EU democratic assistance has rewarded democratizing states, and especially the candidates with more concrete chances of entering the Union (like Croatia), or neighbors with uncertain political transitions (like Georgia and Ukraine). But the EU has never sanctioned illiberal democracies, hybrid or authoritarian regimes (Vachudova 2002). This has occurred precisely because democratic assistance had to compensate the negative effects of post-war (pluri-national) illiberal democracies (Bosnia), and of hybrid or authoritarian regimes (Armenia, Russia and Belarus) (Youngs 2008). That foreign policy has been coherent with the constructivist ideology of “political correctness” (Fossati 2011).

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3.4. The relation between enlargement and democratic consolidation in eastern Europe The EU enlargement process has greatly favored the democratic consolidation of Eastern European countries since the political transition phase, whose main “engine” was the collapse of the Soviet bloc. European cooperation was the external “anchor” that encouraged both economic and political reforms. The same hypothesis was advanced by Pridham (1991), who emphasized that enlargement to some Mediterranean countries was the external linkage that reinforced their democratic consolidation. Instead, the post-World War II democratization of other European countries mostly had domestic origins (except its starting point: 1945). However, this hypothesis has to do only with the critical juncture between transition and consolidation, and this important phase has (probably) not been studied enough in the literature. Then, also domestic factors may have influenced the different speeds of political stabilization in each Eastern candidate. The recent enlargement helps in formulating some diagnoses on the democratization process (Holzer 2016). Kitschelt (2003) argued that the institutional legacies of the past would influence democratization in Eastern Europe. Democratic transition should be simpler in countries that in the past had bureaucratic (and democratic regimes: East Germany, Czech Republic and, in part, Poland) or national-accommodative (and semi-authoritarian regimes: Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, and, in part, the three Baltic states, Slovakia, Serbia) communism, and more difficult in those with a legacy of patrimonial (and authoritarian regimes: Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldavia, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Georgia, and Armenia) communism -Kitschelt did not elaborate diagnoses for Bosnia. Kopstein (2003) and Pop-Eleches (2007) also emphasized that past (institutional and cultural) legacies would influence the process of democratization in Eastern Europe, more than EU political conditionality (Cirtautas, Schimmelfennig 2010). The 2004 enlargement decisions confirmed Kitschelt’s thesis, because all new members pertained to the first two categories. Moreover, the EU stabilized four “boundary” cases between nationalist and patrimonial communism: the three Baltic states and Slovakia (Tomini 2015). The 2007 enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria did not confirm Kitschelt’s hypothesis, because the two Balkan countries had had a patrimonial communist regime in the past, but their democratization process was stable after their entrance in the EU in 2007 (Schimmelfennig, Scholtz 2010). Croatia had a semi-authoritarian past and, according to Kitschelt, should fully democratize in the near future. Serbia is another “boundary” case like the other four countries. Ukraine

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(with authoritarian and patrimonial past) has recorded (but only with Western presidents) a political performance similar to that of Serbia. Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo had authoritarian and patrimonial pasts; according to Kitschelt’s hypotheses, they should have an unstable political future. Hence the explanatory capacity of the hypothesis on the historical legacies has only been partial (Fossati 2011). The alternative hypothesis is that of socio-economic modernization (Moeller, Skanning 2009). According to it, countries with a stable political future (like more modernized Macedonia, Ukraine and Russia) would increase, but precisely the empirical evidence in these less democratic regimes (and especially in the last one) has not supported this thesis. In sum, the democratization process of the Eastern candidates has been reinforced by the EU enlargement in some boundary cases (Baltic states, Slovakia, and Serbia); that of Romania and Bulgaria has been modified by the EU (Pridham 2002, 2005). The democratization of Ukraine, a noncandidate country with an authoritarian and patrimonial past, has been reinforced by its cultural proximity to the West, but Ukrainian democratic performances have only improved with western pro-European presidents.

4. Contagion Instead, contagion is the process that is usually supported by the promoters of conservatism, and it is based on non-intentional processes, like those that pushed Latin American countries to democratize after the fall of Franco’s fascist regime in Spain in the mid-1970s. The history of political regimes in Latin America in the last century has been linked to the so-called pendulum practice, with some years of populist democracies, followed by military regimes, then a democracy again, and so on.

4.1. The transition process in Latin America in the 1980s In the 1980s, most countries of Latin America underwent a democratic transition, except for Cuba, Chile and Paraguay. In 1982 there was the foreign debt crisis (see the chapters on the economic arena and on the relation between market and democracy). Many (especially neo-Marxist) observers predicted a positive relation between the international debt crisis and the domestic conflict (Przeworski 1991). Industrial firms and workers in both formal and informal sectors should have crystallized conflict against debtor governments of Latin America (Fossati 1993a). There were few cases of social revolts by the marginal sectors of the population in the last decades of economic liberalization. Venezuela (in

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February 1989), Argentina (in May 1989) and Peru (in July 1990) were arenas of spontaneous social revolts (estallidos sociales), with different levels of intensity. These were mostly protests by the marginal sectors of the population: that is to say, people living in the shantytowns and usually working in the informal sector of the economy. The origin of these revolts, which consisted mainly of assaults on supermarkets and stores, were cuts to public subsidies on food and gasoline. Popular protests were highly spontaneous and directly linked to price increases. When prices stabilized, protests usually ended. Governments responded with violent repressive measures -in Venezuela nearly 300 people died-, or proclaimed a state of emergency after (Argentina) or before (Peru) taking those measures. The intensity of the revolts was strong in Argentina and Venezuela, but it was weak in Peru. The third-worldist scholars linked these revolts to the shock adjustment policies, negotiated by Latin American governments with the IMF and “imposed” on them in order to pay foreign debt to creditor banks. Instead, while in Venezuela and Peru the estallidos were the consequences of an adjustment decided by C.A.Perez and Fujimori, in Argentina they were provoked by a long sequence of compromise (and heterodox) economic programs applied by the Radical president Alfonsin in a context of hyperinflation. Then, the collective memory of high inflation may have played some role, and this historical legacy was present in Peru or Argentina, but not in Venezuela. However, a sociological factor can explain the differences among the three countries. In fact, estallidos occurred where marginal sectors of the population were not organized. In Peru, which has more grupos de vecinos because of a long tradition (since the 1960s) of mass mobilization, there were weak protests. In the other two countries, where the organization level of the marginal sector is low, there were violent riots; in Argentina protests did not occur in barrios with a higher organization level. In sum, popular revolts of 1989/90 were not linked to laissez faire reforms or to the IMF, but to the organization level of marginal sectors of the population (Fossati 1993a). The other third-worldist hypothesis concerned conflict over laissez faire economic policies with formal workers and especially with organized unions. Workers were harmed by the short-term adjustment of the 1980s, but the highest losses were caused by economic populism: in Alfonsin’s Argentina and Garcia’s Peru (in 1988/9). CEPAL statistics on democratic Chile and Mexico show that structural adjustment has led to real wage increases since 1992. In the 1980s, conflict with unions crystallized only in Argentina, but it did so for political reasons. In fact, the Conféderación General de Trabajo, the Peronist union, declared thirteen general strikes against the Radical president Alfonsin, whose economic policies were

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heterodox, with limited attempts at liberalization; ISI institutions had been maintained in the 1980s. Instead, with a Peronist president in power (Menem after 1990), general strikes were canceled precisely when deeper economic liberalization began. Popular protests started again in 2002 with the Radical president De la Rua, whose economic policies were (again) less liberal than Menem’s. All countries of Latin America (with the sole exception of Argentina in 2002) have recorded a low level of conflict since the 1990s, when more coherent laissez faire economic policies have been applied. In some cases, economic liberalization has been lower because of the decisions by some governments exporting energy resources like those of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. Argentine neo-protectionism can be explained by the higher polarization of its party system, and by the mobilization capacities of the Peronists. In the rest of Latin America, unions were unable to crystallize conflict, because the percentage of formal workers was too low in comparison with Europe, while the corruption of union leaders was high, like in Venezuela (Fossati 1993). The final third-worldist forecast was a deep conflict between Latin American governments and industrial business sectors over economic liberalization, because of the effects of the 1982 foreign debt crisis. What were the main differences among Latin American firms? They did not depend on production factors, on different (industrial versus rural or liquid versus fixed assets) sectors, or on leader firms. The cleavages were within the same production sectors (Lake 1993). Governments’ choices on Latin American economic institutions led to the formation of two coalitions of business actors: the liberal and the protectionist. ISI protectionist economic institutions were defended by the import substitution industry, non-traditional (industrial) exporters, small industry, and domestic market rural producers. Liberal economic institutions favored the exporting rural producers, the financial sector (banks) and the importers. Then, the large business groups, with their portfolios diversified among different activities (industry, agriculture, trade and finance), rarely took part in business associations characterized by specialized activities; they could adapt to whatever government decision, even if they naturally preferred laissez faire. However, conflict intensity with protectionist business was not high, precisely because Latin American governments did not abandon ISI institutions after the 1982 foreign debt crisis, but only after 1989 (Fossati 1993). Conflict with liberal business was greater only when some Latin American presidents (like Alan Garcia in Peru) tried to implement Manichaean “socialist” measures, like the (failed) nationalization plan of two banks in 1987. The paradox was that conflict with liberal business had not emerged in 1985, when Garcia declared a moratorium of foreign debt.

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4.2. The beginning of democratic consolidation in Latin America in the 1990s Latin America had experienced its last democratic transition in the 1980s, but expectations of another authoritarian cycle were strong especially after the foreign debt crisis of 1982. It was precisely after 1989 that a new wave of military regimes should have taken place, according to the “pendulum practice”8. Instead, after 1989 democracy resisted in all the countries of the region (except communist Cuba) and was then exported to Chile and Paraguay. Thus, in the 1990s Latin American democracies were finally in a position to undertake a profound political institutional change, by passing from the “long lasting” transition of the pendulum to the beginning (for the first time) of democratic consolidation (Fossati 1997). The definition of democratic consolidation has been the object of a debate (Higley and Gunther 1992) between two positions. Some scholars (Morlino 1991) view consolidation as the institutionalization process, or something similar, of norms (the electoral system) and roles (the authority structures like the relation between government and parliament), coupled with the legitimation of politics by citizens. Di Palma (1990) identified consolidation as a “point” event: the agreement (a pact) among the main actors to accept the democratic “rules of the game”. The former definition has received more support in the debate; consolidation is a phase that follows transition. The turning point in the passage from transition to consolidation is what Di Palma means by consolidation. In Latin America, 1989 was the critical juncture (the settlement) from the pendulum swings to the beginning of democratic consolidation (the convergence process). In Latin America, the institutionalization process is advanced, while the legitimacy given by citizens to politics often remains low because of the poor performance of regimes in income distribution. Moreover, low respect for the rule of law, frequent patron/client relations, and high levels of corruption undermine the quality of Latin American democracies (O’Donnell 1999, Mainwaring, Scully 2010). Democratic consolidation still remains weak, but this does not mean that it has not started at all. For example, Schmitter (2000) emphasized that consolidation is not “a zerosum” concept with 100% or 0% consolidation. Instead, some neo-Marxist (Przeworski 1991) and post-Marxist (O’Donnell 1999) scholars objected 8

A strong bias against democracy in Latin America was due to a supposed cultural incompatibility between hierarchical (Catholic) religious values in South America and horizontal (Protestant) democratic freedoms in the USA (Wiarda 1974). Then, some scholars (like Malloy, Seligson 1987) elaborated cycle theories on political transitions, precisely linked to those cultural “permanent” factors.

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that Latin American democracies of the 1990s were not consolidated because of market reforms’ constraints. In sum, since 1989 consolidation has started for all the countries of Latin America, even if this process has been more (Chile, Brazil and Argentina9) or less (Peru10) advanced. In Venezuela with Chavez11, there was a political crisis, and that country is now a hybrid regime. It is also for these reasons that Carothers (2002) criticized the “transition paradigm”, asserting that it remains correct for the first and second democratic waves, where consolidation followed political transitions. Instead, the usual outcome of post-1989 transitions is a limited illiberal democracy (Diamond 2002), where only political (and not civil) rights are guaranteed, or a hybrid regime, where elections are not fair or some parties are prevented from participating in elections (Zakaria 1997). However, Carothers’ objection seems to be reasonable especially for the fourth (post-1989) wave of African and Asian democratizing countries, but not for the Latin American third wave of the 1980s (with the above-mentioned exception of Venezuela). What has been the main cause of the onset of democratic consolidation in Latin America12? The main reason for the pendulum practice was linked to the Cold War (Fossati 1997). The USA has promoted military regimes in Latin America because they were considered the “lesser evil” with respect to communist parties, that could have won democratic elections. Thus, political instability in Latin America was a side-effect of the Cold 9

Argentina’s economic crisis of 2002 with De La Rua did not lead to any political crisis. Argentina was close to Remmer’s (1995) scenario of “democracies of lowered expectations”, with its incoherent application of laissez faire. 10 Peru experienced a regime crisis with Fujimori and his frequent abuses of power, but in the end that corrupt president was forced to resign. This is the only case confirming the neo-Marxist hypothesis on the relation between market reforms and difficulties in consolidation. Then, Peru has been politically stable (Schmidt 2000). 11 Venezuela became an unstable political regime; not only there was a step back to populist decision-making, but Chavez “consolidated” a hybrid regime with two main institutional features: too many presidential powers and too low control over the armed forces. In 2002, there were strong popular protests and also an attempted “democratic golpe” aimed at the holding of new elections in the short term. That unstable situation did not lead to the ousting of Chavez, even if the USA had not fully legitimized his regime (Cameron, Major 2001). Chavez died in March 2013, but his successor (former vice-president) Maduro maintained the hybrid regime. 12 Remmer (1991) emphasized that different hypotheses on the democratic transitions of the “pendulum phase” had been put forward, but no general theory has ever emerged. She criticized those “multi-dimensional” authors like Baloyra (1987), who identified too many causal factors, and other descriptive analyses, which linked the democratic transition of the 1980s to “case by case” compromise pacts (O’Donnell et al. 1986).

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War and of the destabilizing influence of the communist bloc led by the USSR. Democratic consolidation could begin only after 1989, and the emergence of a “near” world order based on the existence of the value of democracy in the political arena. After 1989, the USA had a stabilizing political effect, through political conditionality, when aid was cut after the auto-golpes of Serrano in Guatemala and Fujimori in Peru, and regional organizations; for instance, the external anchorage to NAFTA reduced the negative effect of the 1994 economic crisis in Mexico (Fossati 1999c). The complementary hypothesis to explain the political institutional change in Latin America is based on the positive influence of market institutions on democratic consolidation, according to the values of the post-1989 “near” world order: a sort of anti-Marxist theory (Fossati 1997). The launching of market reforms (after 1989) has permitted a more stable political phase. This hypothesis is compatible with Lipset’s (1960) theory on the correlation between economic growth, channeled through market institutions, and democracy. This correlation has been confirmed by the emergence of an illiberal neo-populist leader, Chavez, that limited both economic and political freedoms, obstructing democratic consolidation. Protectionist economic institutions have been strengthened by the impact of domestic energy resources, which are usually controlled by the state (Ross 2001). Oil for Venezuela, Mexico and Ecuador, or gas for Bolivia, have favored illiberal democracies (in the last three cases) or hybrid regimes (in Venezuela). Since 1989, Mexico has made more political progress, than the other three energy exporters, thanks to its anchorage to NAFTA. Instead, before 1989 Mexico had a hybrid regime, because of large-scale electoral frauds, while in the 2000 elections the left of Partido Revolucionario Institucional (in power since the 1920s) was defeated for the first time by the right of president Fox. Another “rational choice” hypothesis on the persisting political difficulties of Latin America has emerged in the literature. Some scholars have emphasized the institutional schizophrenia between presidentialism and proportional representation in Latin America, because many heads of state do not enjoy parliamentary majorities, and in crisis periods military golpes are the only viable solutions after these institutional stalemates (Linz, Valenzuela 1994). However, this schizophrenia is persisting, so that the rational hypothesis cannot explain the post-1989 political change, with the beginning of democratic consolidation. One of the consequences of this schizophrenia between presidential governments and proportional electoral systems has been the widespread use, within the “delegative democracies” (O’Donnell 1992), of decrees by presidents, willing to introduce market reforms despite parties’ and parliaments’ obstructionism.

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In some cases, the use of decrees has also been the outcome of a tacit agreement between presidential governments and parliamentary parties to simplify the decision-making process (Shugart, Carey 1992; 1998). The linkage between economic liberalization and political change can be reinforced by citing Morlino’s (1980, 1986) emphasis on one of the prerequisites for democratic consolidation: a quite balanced relationship between state and market forces. Governments should guarantee the interests of both public and private actors, but in the ISI phase that relationship was unbalanced. Only protectionist business was recognized as a legitimate actor by governments, while export-oriented groups were penalized with many instruments. Post-1989 structural adjustment has set the stage for a re-equilibrium and for the beginning of democratic consolidation. Nor was the political pre-condition of giving economic citizenship to export-oriented business respected in the 1980s, when ISI policies continued to be applied (within a non-structural adjustment). Some analytical models have been identified to better comprehend the political institutional change of 1989 (Fossati 1997). The decision-making processes of Latin American governments before 1989 can be summarized in two models: the populist and the bureaucratic. Most democracies had populist governments, which were not liberal regimes. The role of intermediate (i.e. between the masses and the leader) actors was of scant importance. There were workers’ unions and business associations, but these groups were created by the leader (like Peron in Argentina); parties in parliament had only a ratifying role. There has always been a linkage between political and economic populism; leaders applied expansionary economic policies especially in the first phase of ISI (the 1950s). Instead, most authoritarian governments were bureaucratic (O’Donnell 1973). The armed forces governed with the técnicos, otherwise they would not have been able to make economic decisions, which were always constrained by the nationalistic ISI project. A sub-category of bureaucratic government was the “penetrated” one, in which decisions were made in collaboration with the international organizations (the IMF and/or the World Bank). In the pendulum phase, both populist and bureaucratic decision-making processes were highly illiberal, and fell short of the minimum standards of democracy. Control (by parties or groups) on governments’ decisions was limited. The last wave of democratization occurred in the 1980s, after the economic failure of most military regimes (except Chile). After the 1982 foreign debt crisis, there was another swing (in favor of democracy) of the pendulum. There were both populist (in Peru, Venezuela, and Brazil) and bureaucratic (in Mexico) governments; in Alfonsin’s Argentina, there was a conflict between a populist (Grinspun) and a técnico (Sourrouille).

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Morlino (1986) identified four models of democratic consolidation: by parties, by groups, by charismatic leaders, and by international actors. Latin American governments of six countries (Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Argentina, and Chile) from 1990 to 1995 will be classified according to the main actors of the decisions. The following typology identifies four decision-making processes of democracies (Collier, Levitsky 1997), through the selection of two dimensions: a) the main actors involved in the decisions: either the groups (business and unions) or the parties; b) personalized (by informal contacts) or institutionalized (through legalized sets of roles and norms) negotiation processes. In all four cases, the minimum conditions for citizens’ participation (through either parties or groups) in decisions are respected, even if decisions involving parties have a higher “quality” of democracy -because groups represent only their members and not all citizens. Instead, these conditions are not satisfied by the decision-making processes of either (domestic and/or international) bureaucratic governments or (illiberal) populist leaders. The “penetrated” executives case corresponds to Morlino’s model of consolidation by international actors (for example by the IMF and/or the World Bank). All governments’ decisions are naturally made in collaboration with both (business and labor) groups and parties, but this typology precisely identifies which is the most relevant actor in each decision. There follows the typology, with the four decision-making processes (Fossati 1997): DECISION-MAKING institutionalized personalized

with groups GOVERNMENT with parties Neo-corporatist Party government Neo-oligarchic Partitocrazia

In neo-oligarchic decision-making processes, power is concentrated in the head of government, together with the leaders of the main business groups (not the associations) and some union “bosses” (not the formal secretary). Thus, the main decisions are the outcomes of informal (and non-institutionalized) meetings among these actors. There are two subcategories: with or without colonization of the government. In the former case, for example, the economy minister of a developing country is a member of one of the families of the large business groups. In neo-corporatism, decisions are institutionalized in trilateral bodies, whose participants are government ministers, business associations’ and unions’ representatives. Thus, most key decisions are made outside parliaments, which only have the power of ratification. It is useful to distinguish between symmetrical and asymmetrical (union or businesscentered) neo-corporatism.

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In partitocrazia, the main actors are governments and those party representatives, who act from their hidden ranks. Governments are usually vetoed, and their few decisions are the outcomes of a network of relations especially with parties’ non-institutionalized leaders. This concept is borrowed from Italian politics, where agreements among party secretaries have been more important than cabinet decisions. Vetoes may be applied by either coalition or opposition parties (the two sub-categories). Instead, party governments are the outcome of the majority-opposition relationship conducted through parliamentary debates. An example is the United Kingdom, where the leader of the party that wins the elections becomes the Prime Minister. First Republic Italy was a partitocrazia, as party secretaries never became heads of government. Also in this case, the possibilities are two, and they reflect the existence of either strong parliaments or strong governments. There follow the results of the empirical research on the 1990/5 phase: NEO-CORPORATIST PARTY GOVERNMENT asymmetric symmetric strong (pro-business) government parliament Aylwin NEO-OLIGARCHIC PARTITOCRAZIA colonization of the groups veto from with without coalition opposition Perez I Perez II Salinas I Salinas II Fujimori III Fujimori II Menem/Rapanelli Collor II Menem/Cavallo

In the first half of the 1990s many Latin American governments especially those applying laissez faire reforms- followed neo-oligarchic decision-making processes, according to one of the models of democratic consolidation (by groups) identified by Morlino: Argentina with MenemCavallo, Peru with Fujimori after his auto-golpe, Mexico initially with Salinas and then after the Tequila crisis, and Venezuela only in the first phase of the “IESA boys”. In these cases, reforms were implemented by the so-called “technopols” (Dominguez 1997) or “change teams” (Evans 1992), belonging to the same research institute (like CIEPLAN in Chile or IESA in Venezuela). Governments negotiated with leaders of the large business groups, more than with those of the official industrial or rural associations. Labor leaders were mostly excluded.

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Latin American partitocrazie were against market reforms in the first half of the 1990s: in Brazil (in the second phase of Collor), Venezuela (after 1992), Mexico (in the last phase of Salinas) and Peru (before Fujimori’s auto-golpe). Parties were far from performing the function of gate-keepers, that has favored democratic consolidation in Europe. The only case of advanced institutionalization has been neo-corporatist Chile with Aylwin and Foxley, in which business leaders played a more relevant role than labor. More institutionalized party governments were still absent. Dominguez and Shifter (2008) emphasized the weakness of parties in Latin America especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Other governments failed to fulfill the minimum conditions of democracy (Fossati 1997). The Menem-Rapanelli government was neooligarchic, with colonization of one of the large business groups: Bunge y Born. The first Fujimori and the Menem-Gonzales governments were internationally penetrated: respectively by the World Bank and by creditor banks. Collor was domestic-bureaucratic: quite autonomous, but not “embedded”, that is without strong ties with the industrial business groups. Caldera was populist (Geddes 1994); then Chavez was even more populist, within a hybrid regime. The Argentine “colonized” exception was linked to the deep conflict between two business coalitions: the rural exporters against the industrial producers. Most of these cases were transitory decision-making processes, and then more democratic frameworks emerged, except in Venezuela with Chavez (and then with Maduro). In sum, the prevailing influence of group-dominated decision-making processes (neo-oligarchic in Argentina, Mexico and Peru; neo-corporatist in Chile) immediately after 1989 has also confirmed the hypothesis on the linkage between economic reforms and political change (Fossati 1997). This is even more evident in the case of Chile, the last country to undergo the democratic transition (at the end of the 1980s), but the most advanced in regime consolidation in the mid-1990s -due to the implementation of market reforms by Pinochet in the 1970s. The linkage between market reforms and the beginning of democratic consolidation has also been confirmed by Venezuela’s “negative correlation”; it was the only case located outside the typology. The fact that this country is applying a marginally coherent package of market reforms has fostered a step back to populism (with Caldera) and the election of the military officer (Chavez), responsible for the attempted anti-market coup of 1992. Economic institutions did not change with the new president Maduro, after the death of Chavez in 2013, and Venezuela is still a hybrid regime. Thus, when the economic institutional change runs into difficulties, old and lowparticipatory populist decision-making patterns re-emerge (Roberts 1995).

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5. The exceptions to democracy Order has been promoted in the political arena, but the value of democracy has not been fully stabilized. Carothers (2002) emphasized the crisis of the “transition paradigm”, with the survival of many illiberal democracies and hybrid regimes after 1989. Especially in the Sinic and the Islamic civilizations, there are still several authoritarian regimes, that are supported by non-democratic regimes, within the “autocracy promotion”. However, authoritarian regimes have also been supported by democracies, through the “lesser evil” priority of the US (conservative) diplomacy.

5.1. Autocracy promotion The last (4th) post-1989 democratic transition wave has been frozen; several fully or semi-authoritarian regimes are resisting (Burnell 2010), and are surviving also because of the international alliances promoted by other leading authoritarian regimes (Vanderhill 2013). This is the case of Russia (towards Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia and central Asian states), Iran (towards Syria and Sudan), Saudi Arabia (towards Egypt and Jordan) and China (towards North Korea, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam). Autocracy promotion may be defined in exclusive or inclusive terms: with reference to either direct or indirect tools13. The former usually consist in military, economic and diplomatic support. The latter include socialization -promoting anti-democratic values- and bargaining processes, like building an international environment more favorable to the domestic authoritarian coalition. This happened when Russia promoted an energy conflict with Ukraine and the pro-Russian coalition won the next presidential elections; Ukraine shifted from democracy to a hybrid regime (Ambrosio 2009). Authoritarian regimes have also been promoted by democracies. During the Cold War, Western countries (especially the USA) supported (personalist or military) authoritarian regimes, which were considered the “lesser evil”, while communism was the “absolute evil”. Thus, the value of democracy was not promoted outside the West before 1989. That conservative diplomacy survived after 1989 and was applied to Islamic countries, especially Algeria, where a fundamentalist party won the democratic elections at the beginning of the 1990s; thus, France and other Western governments supported a repressive military regime. This (conservative) priority is naturally incompatible with the values of the post-1989 “near” world order, based on the promotion of democracy. 13

The type of authoritarianism is not relevant in the cooperation among different non-democratic regimes (Erdmann, Bank, Hoffmann and Richter 2013).

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Lesser evil priority was stopped by the neo-conservatives, who promoted elections in Iraq after the 2003 war. Later, the promotion of elections in other Islamic countries led to the victory of fundamentalist Hamas in Gaza; thus, the neo-cons were marginalized in the US diplomacy. Since the 2011 Arab Spring, the “lesser evil” principle (to Ben Ali, Mubarak, Saleh, and Gaddafi) has been abandoned by Obama; this decision has interrupted the prevailing influence of conservatism in diplomacies. In July 2013 there was a coup by the Egyptian armed forces, even if it mostly had domestic origins; then, that military regime was not sanctioned by Western governments through political conditionality. After the analysis of non-democratic regimes, the conclusions will try to summarize the empirical evidence on both democracy and autocracy promotion.

5.2. Models of hybrid regimes Many hybrid and authoritarian regimes still exist outside the West after the decline of Nazi-fascism (since 1945) and communism (since 1989). In fact, the category of hybrid regimes has been elaborated since 1989, because there were few “grey” cases (for example, Mexico) during the Cold War, and countries were mostly either democratic or authoritarian. In hybrid regimes, the participation of citizens in elections is limited, and the freedom of competition among parties is not complete. Schedler (2006) emphasized that most post-1989 authoritarian governments organize elections within the so-called “electoral authoritarianisms”; during the Cold War, only democracies organized elections. Morlino (2008) has identified three models of hybrid regimes: protected, no-law, or limited democracies. In protected democracies, a veto player (usually the armed forces or a monarch) limits governments’ power. Protected hybrid regimes are: Venezuela, Armenia, Singapore, and the Fiji Islands (by the armed forces); Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bhutan (by the monarch). No-law democracies are those in which there are no relevant veto players, but institutions are very weak and the rule of law is limited by high levels of patron/client relations and by corruption14. 14

Transparency International (2015) compiles the perception of corruption index (CPI), which is related to a weak rule of law: the minimum is 10; the maximum is 0. Balkan countries are between 3 (Kosovo 3.3, Albania 3.6, Bosnia 3.8) and 4 (Macedonia 4.2, Montenegro 4.4). Eastern European countries are between 2 (Ukraine 2.7, Russia 2.9) and 3; Georgia has 5.2. In Latin America, liberal democracies are less corrupted, on the contrary of Venezuela and Haiti (1.7); hybrid regimes are between 2 (Nicaragua and Paraguay 2.7, Guatemala 2.8) and 3 (Honduras 3.1, Ecuador 3.2, Bolivia 3.4, Mexico 3.5, Colombia 3.7); Cuba has 4.7.

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Limited democracies usually respect political rights, but not civil rights; for example, freedom of the press is not complete, and the judiciary is not fully independent. They are also called “illiberal” democracies. Illiberal or limited democracies are those with a Freedom House (2016) index of 3, while no-law or protected regimes have a 4/5 index. The following typology presents hybrid regimes in the four continents: Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. HYBRID Latin REGIMES America No law Guatemala Honduras Haiti

Eastern Europe Kyrgyzstan

Africa

Asia Lebanon Pakistan Bangladesh Sri Lanka Nepal Thailand Malaysia

Armenia

Mali Guinea Bissau Guinea Ivory Coast Togo Nigeria Kenya Mozambique Zimbabwe Morocco

Protected

Venezuela

Limited

Mexico Nicaragua Domin. Rep. Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Paraguay

Bosnia Kosovo Albania Macedonia Montenegro Moldova Ukraine Georgia

Niger Burkina Faso Liberia Sierra Leone Tanzania Zambia Malawi Madagascar

Kuwait Bhutan Singapore Fiji Islands Turkey Philippines Hong Kong East Timor Papua N.G.

In Asia, countries with market institutions are less corrupt, while those with state institutions are the most (North Korea 0.8, Cambodia 2.1, Myanmar 2.2); China records 3.7, India 3.8; hybrid regimes are between 2 and 3. In Africa, the least corrupt states are: Botswana (6.3), Rwanda (5.4), Namibia (5.3), Ghana (4.7), South Africa (4.4); the most corrupt are: Somalia (0.8), Sudan (1.2), South Sudan and Angola (1.5). In the Middle East, Gulf monarchies and Israel are the least corrupt (between 4 and 6), and the most corrupt are: Yemen and Syria (1.8), Libya and Iraq (1.6), Afghanistan (1.1); Iran has 2.7, Turkey 4.2.

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5.3. Models of non-democratic regimes Before 1989, models of non-democratic regimes were built in the political science literature, starting from the criterion of the kind of the authoritarian authority: personalist, military and single party regimes (Linz-Stepan 1996, Geddes 1999, Morlino 2001, Brooker 1999, Grilli da Cortona 2009). In each model, the selected authorities were: the single leader and his clan, the armed forces, and the (communist, Nazi-fascist, nationalist, or religious) party bureaucracy. Of course, as in every sector of political science, the main problem is that models are rigid and obey the conditions of simplicity and coherence, whereas the empirical reality is flexible, complex and incoherent. Models of party systems suffer from the same problem. Both regimes and political systems may start their institutional lives by closely following a model; then things start to become more complex. For example, there may be multiparty systems that become limited (according to their number) and polarized (according to their ideological distance). Instead, models should be either limited and moderate or extreme and polarized. What produces this distance between models and the empirical evidence? On the one hand, there may be single events that facilitate changes, for example a war, an economic crisis, or an external shock like 1989. On the other hand, there is a natural and gradual change process that can be linked (for example) to the passage of Western societies from modernity to postmodernity. According to sociologists, this passage came about after 1968, and it consolidated especially in the 1980s. While in modernity there was a collective effort to anchor daily life to rationality, with post-modernity there is no stable hierarchy among values. Thus, no collective legitimacy principle has materialized in post-modern societies. Reality has grown increasingly complex, and the solutions elaborated by institutions no longer follow any rational principle, and become more and more flexible. In post-modern societies, it is very difficult for politics to “obey” models. The same has happened to regimes, which are influenced by both the 1989 change and post-modernity. Many regimes started their institutional lives with precise anchorage to a leader, the armed forces, or a party. But in every regime, the three actors have always coexisted. For example, many single (nationalist) party regimes in Africa of the 1960s were thereafter characterized (in the 1970s and 1980s) by the influence of a leader and/or the armed forces. The main problem for political scientists became how to differentiate those flexible and complex empirical cases. The criterion of the main authority seemed to grow less and less useful in selecting the analytical categories of the different regimes.

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After 1989, military regimes started to be fewer than in the past, also because the Latin American democratic consolidation process started immediately after the end of the Cold War (Fossati 1997). Latin American military regimes had been sponsored by the USA before 1989, because they were the “lesser evil” with respect to communist regimes. However, there were also domestic causes of the armed forces’ power (Morlino 2001). Since 1989 military regimes have survived especially in the Arab states, being supported by Western countries as the “new lesser evil”: this time against Islamic fundamentalist governments. The main example is Algeria, where post-1989 elections led to the victory of a radical Islamic party. After a few days, there was a military coup by the Algerian armed forces, supported by the main Western countries. Other similar cases were Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen (before the Arab Spring); in these three regimes, there was also a neo-patrimonial dimension, but the “lesser evil” principle mattered more. Where it was weaker -as in Libya, because Western governments realized that Gaddafi was less reliable than (for example) Mubarak-, regimes (even with significant armed forces in power) were labeled neo-patrimonial. Thus, the “lesser evil” principle represents the legitimacy criterion of military regimes. The main change concerned African regimes. Bratton and Van De Walle (1994) proposed the analytical category of neo-patrimonial regimes, where the legitimacy of the authorities is linked to the division of the population among ethnic groups, and to the strength of local leaders that permeates both parties and armed forces. The formal difference between a civil and military regime is misleading. According to Bratton and Van De Walle, many single (nationalist) party regimes grew more militarized, and some military regimes formed their parties. Which mattered more? The analytical categories of “civil-military” regime (Finer 1976, Nordlinger 1977) or “party-army” regime (Perlmutter 1977) were proposed, but those hybrids flout the architectural principles of a model, according to the rules of Weberian ideal-types. Models are like the simple colors; they are white, yellow, red, blue and black. Empirical reality is complex and flexible; it is green, orange, violet... A political scientist should be able to determine whether civil or military powers are more important, even if both of them coexist in every regime. Bratton and Van De Walle found a third category (neo-patrimonialism) which resolves the inadequacies of the other two models. These regimes can also be called “personalist”, while the label of “sultanism” (Chehabi, Linz 1998) has been used as well, but it may cause misunderstandings, as this concept has different meanings in daily life, one of which is linked to Islamic political institutions. The other model of theocracies has been introduced to clarify the difference with sultanism.

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Another empirical finding has been the decline of Nazi-fascist, communist and (third-worldist) nationalist ideologies. This process started in the 1970s and 1980s, but radically increased after 1989. Whilst today Nazi-fascist parties in power have disappeared and third-worldist nationalism is a declining ideology -giving rise to many hybrid regimes-, several communist parties have survived. Neo-communist regimes (like Cuba and North Korea) still apply full socialist economic institutions, while ex-communist regimes have started transition to the free market. Both types may be labeled post-communist regimes. Their legitimacy criterion is that they follow, either through a continuous or discontinuous change, a communist regime because of the legacies of the past. Finally, the choice of a different criterion with which to select nondemocratic regimes has especially concerned Islamic countries. In the past, those regimes were labeled either as “religious single-party” (Iran) or “sultanistic” (the Gulf monarchies). Other scholars (Hadenius, Teorell 2007, Kailitz 2013, Wahman et al. 2013, Geddes et al. 2014) used the analytical category of “monarchy”, but that label -anchored to the kind of authority in power- may also cover personalist regimes. The difference with the other three models concerns the religious legitimacy criterion. In political philosophy, the concept of theocracy has often been used (Ferrari 1983). Hadenius and Teorell (2006) identified theocracy as a minor type of authoritarianism. Instead, political scientists have felt uncomfortable with it, because they selected the criterion of the authority in power; God is “invisible”. Then, the label of theocracy has appeared to be “politically incorrect” since the emergence of constructivism as the prevailing political culture in Western post-modern societies. Thus, under-privileged actors cannot be criticized, and all differences in language must be eliminated. For example, a slogan is that there are fundamentalisms in all religions; it does not matter if only Islamic fundamentalists are violent and have significant political power. The same happens to regimes; only in Islamic regimes is there still unity between religious and political power. But labeling those regimes as theocratic is politically incorrect, because there is a language discrimination against Islam (Fossati 2006). However, political scientists must obey the empirical evidence, and not the current prevailing political culture. Thus if we select the legitimacy criterion, theocracy is the most correct label for these regimes, whose legitimacy principle is religious: traditional values (through the subordination of law to Sharia) in Gulf monarchies, or fundamentalist values in the republic of Iran (after Khomeini’s revolution). Hence there are either fundamentalist or traditional theocracies. Neo-patrimonialism is also present in traditional theocracies, but it is not their main legitimacy principle.

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In sum, (military, neo-patrimonial, post-communist, and theocratic) models of non-democratic regimes have been built by identifying the legitimacy criterion (“lesser evil”, personal ties, legacies of the past, and religion) of non-democratic authorities (Grilli da Cortona 2009), and not the kind of authority in power. Since 1989, regimes have been influenced by cultural differences among the civilizations: post-communism in Latin America, Europe and Asia; neo-patrimonialism in Africa; theocracies or military regimes in the Middle East. Most non-democratic regimes organize elections, within “electoral authoritarianisms” (Schedler 2006). A final remark concerns the problem of the difficult linkage between rigid models and flexible reality. The empirical analysis will confirm that there are many hybrid cases combining two or three models (Ezrow, Frantz 2011). How can this schizophrenia be resolved? Each empirical case is characterized according to a hierarchy among one, two (or three) legitimacy principles. For example, there are military (second dimension) neo-patrimonial (first dimension) regimes, or neo-patrimonial theocracies. The four models will be classified with the other combinations according to the secondary dimension: 16 categories in total! If there is only a legitimacy criterion, there are “pure” cases. It is important for a political scientist to make a choice, and only the legitimacy principle permits it, because many actors coexist and it is very difficult to select the main one. 5.3.1. Military regimes Pure Military [Mali4.5

Traoré (March 2012/August 2013) Hybrid regime (Sept. 2013Æ)] Neo-Patrimonial Military Algeria 5.5 Military regime (1992Æ), Bouteflika (1999Æ) Egypt 5.5 Al Sisi (May 2014Æ) [Military Neo-Patrimonialism Syria 7 Bashir Assad (2000Æ), father Hafez (1971/2000)] Failed states Libya 6 Al Sarraj (2016Æ) Yemen 6.5 Hadi (2012Æ) Numbers are the indicators of the Freedom House (FH) (2016): 7 the most authoritarian; 5.5 the least. Before 1989, military regimes were supported by Western countries, and especially by the USA, because they were considered the “lesser evil” with respect to communist regimes in Latin America and all the Third World. The decline of communism after

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1989 led to the disappearance of many military regimes (Fossati 1997). In political science, several sub-categories of military regimes have been identified: bureaucratic, corporative, praetorian, populist… (Morlino 2001), but the main difference has concerned economic institutions. Latin American military regimes applied Import-Substitution Industrialization, based on protectionism, while only Pinochet’s Chile implemented laissez faire. Some military regimes (Burma and Peru) applied fully socialist institutions. Except for pure cases, the sub-categories are those of the other non-democratic regimes: neo-patrimonial, post-communist and theocratic. Until the 2011 Arab Spring, military regimes were especially present in Islamic states, and were supported by Western countries because they were considered the lesser evil with respect to fundamentalist theocracies that might emerge after elections, as in Algeria in the 1990s. Before 2011, many of these regimes (except Libya) were electoral authoritarianisms. Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen all had pro-West military regimes. In Syria and Libya neo-patrimonialism was stronger because Western support had been lower. Since the Arab Spring (Ieraci 2013), Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen have undergone a political transition, but its outcome is uncertain (Battera 2012, Sassoon 2016). Only Tunisia has become a democracy, with a FH performance of 2 in 2014. Egyptian elections were held in 2012, with the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood, but Al Sisi’s armed forces staged a military coup in July 2013 and ousted the Islamic leader Morsi. Libya and Yemen are failed states, with ongoing wars. In Yemen, the Sunni president Hadi is facing two armed conflicts: one against a Shiite fundamentalist group (the Islamic Youth) in the northern Sadah region; another one in the southern Abyan region against Ansar al-Sharia, a Sunni group linked to al Qaeda. In January 2015 the Shiites seized power in the north, and Hadi moved to the south. Yemen could be fragmented into two de facto “quasi states”. After the first free elections of July 2012 in Libya, Al Thani (a civilian) became prime minister in March 2014. In May a war started; Muslim Brotherhood seized Tripolitania, and Haftar’s armed forces controlled Cyrenaica, while Isis conquered some towns like Sirte in the north. A weak power-sharing consensus agreement was reached in December 2015, with the new prime minister Al Sarraj, but it still has to be implemented. In Syria a war is being waged against Assad after the Arab Spring, because of the dominion of Assad’s Alawite-Shiite minority over the Sunni majority. Isis conquered a large section of the Sunni territories and in June 2014 formed an informal fundamentalist theocracy, by uniting the territories of Sunni Iraq and Syria. In Mali a military coup was staged in 2012 in order to fight Ansar Dine, an Islamic fundamentalist military group that had conquered Azawad, the northern Tuareg region.

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Then, democracy was restored after the elections of September 2013. In May 2014, there was a military coup in Thailand to limit the power of a local businessman (Thaksin Shinawatra). Since 1989, Thailand has had hybrid regimes, and new elections (after a constitutional reform) should be organized in 2017. However, this regime cannot be considered military, precisely because its legitimacy principle is not the “lesser evil”. 5.3.2. Neo-patrimonial regimes Pure Neo-Patrimonialism Belgian Congo 6 J. Kabila (2001Æ) Personal dictator Cameroon 6 Biya (1982Æ) Plebiscitary 1 party Djibouti 5.5 Omar-Guelleh (1999Æ) Personal dictator Equatorial Guinea 7 Obiang (1979Æ) Personal dictator Eritrea 7 Afwerki (1993Æ) Personal dictator French Congo 5.5 Sassou Nguesso (1997Æ) Plebiscitary 1 party Gabon 5.5 Bongo Ondimba (2009Æ) Plebiscitary 1 party (father 1967/2009) Swaziland 6 King Mswati (1986Æ) Personal dictator Zimbabwe 5 Mugabe (1987Æ) Multiparty polyarchy Afghanistan 6 Ghani (2014Æ) Post-war leader Iraq 5.5 (federal) Al Abadi (2014Æ) Post-war leader Military Neo-Patrimonialism: Burundi 6.5 Nkurunziza (2005Æ) Military oligarchy Central African Rep. 7 Touadéra (2016Æ) Military oligarchy Chad 6.5 Deby (1990Æ) Military oligarchy Gambia 6.5 Jammeh (1996Æ) Military oligarchy Mauritania 5.5 Abdel Aziz (2009Æ) Post-coup leader Rwanda 6 Kagame (1994Æ) Military oligarchy South Sudan 6.5 Salva Kiir (2011Æ) Post-war leader Uganda 5.5 Musuveni (1986Æ) Military oligarchy Syria (see next chapter) Post-Communist Neo-Patrimonialism Angola 6 Dos Santos (1979Æ) Communist Ethiopia 6.5 (federal) Hailemariam (2012Æ) Communist Traditional Theocratic Neo-Patrimonialism: Jordan (see next chapter) Brunei 5.5 Bolkiah (1967Æ) Fundamentalist Theocratic Neo-Patrimonialism Somalia 7 (federal) Sharmarke (2014Æ) Post-war leader Sudan 7 Al Bashir (1989Æ) Military oligarchy

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Regimes where a single leader rules have also been called “sultanistic” (Chehabi, Linz 1998), with an emphasis on arbitrary vertical relations in traditional societies, but this does not seem to be the correct label because it has different meanings in everyday language, and may be confused with theocracies. In the 1990s Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) applied the category of neo-patrimonialism to modern African regimes. The legitimacy of the authority was anchored to the division of the population into ethnic groups and to the emergence of a single leader within each of them. Many African regimes have also been called “ethnocracies” (Snyder 2006). According to Weber, patrimonialism was personal rule with the influence of patriarchal traditional values, as opposed to charismatic rule. Roth (1968) labeled the modern adaptation of patrimonialism as personal rule. Thus, the term “personalist regime” has also been used (Brooker 1999). Several attempts have been made to distinguish between neo-patrimonialism and personal rule (Jackson, Rosberg 1984; Guliyev 2011), according to their different institutionalization levels, but these distinctions are artificial, as both regimes are poorly institutionalized. Neo-patrimonial leaders permeate both parties and the armed forces; the formal distinction between civil and military regimes is misleading. These regimes strongly rely upon rent-seeking and patron/client relations; the rule of law is weak (Erdmann, Engel 2006). There are two kinds of neo-patrimonialism. The first is personal neo-patrimonialism, where only a single leader emerges, also after a war (Lyons 2016). There is a neo-patrimonialism of second level, where the different ethnic/religious groups are linked by federalism, and a bosses’ boss structure is implemented. Thus, there are both federal (in Ethiopia, Somalia and Iraq) and personalist (in the other cases) neopatrimonial regimes. In the previous table, prime ministers have been listed in federal, and presidents in personalist regimes. In Syria, neopatrimonialism does not follow an ethnic, but rather a religious cleavage. Mugabe’s Zimbabwe has become a hybrid regime (5). Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) distinguished among the following sub-categories: personal dictatorships, military oligarchies, plebiscitary single-party regimes, competitive single-party regimes, and multi-party polyarchies. Except pure cases, the sub-categories of the secondary features of neo-patrimonialism are those of other three regimes: post-communist (with a heavy legacy of parties in power during the Cold War), military (with a greater role of the armed forces), and theocratic -where Islam has a key role in legitimating the regime, as in Sudan or Somalia. Most of these neo-patrimonial regimes are electoral authoritarianisms, except for post-independence Eritrea.

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5.3.3. Post-communist regimes Pure Post-Communist China 6.5 Communist Party of China No patrimonial leader Laos 6.5 Lao People’s Revolutionary Party No patrimonial leader Vietnam 6 Communist Party of Vietnam No patrimonial leader Military Post-Communist Myanmar 5.5 Union Solidarity and Dev’t Pact No patrimonial leader Neo-Patrimonial Post-Communist Cuba 6.5 Communist party of Cuba Raul Castro (2008Æ, brother Fidel 1959/2008) Belarus 6.5 Communist Party of Belarus Lukashenka (1994Æ) Russia 6 United Russia Putin (1999Æ) Azerbaijan 6.5 New Azerbaijan Party Aliyev (2003Æ) father (1993/2003) Kazakhstan 5.5 Nur-Otan Nazarbaev (1991Æ) Tajikistan 6.5 People’s Democratic Party Rahmon (1992Æ) Turkmenistan 7 Democratic Party of Turkmenistan Berdimuhamedow (2007Æ, Niyazov 1986/2007) Uzbekistan 7 People’s Democratic Party Mirziyoyev (2016Æ) Karimov (1990/2016) North Korea 7 Workers’ party of Korea Kim Jong-Un (2011Æ, father 1994/2011, grand-father 1948/1994) Cambodia 5.5 Cambodian People’s Party Hun Sen (1986Æ) Hybrid regime (author. 2000/4) Independent Akayev (1990/2005) (author. 2009) Ak-Jol Bakiyev (2005/2010) Kyrgyzstan 5 Social Democratic Party Atambayev (2011Æ) In the Cold War, there were communist, Nazi-fascist, and (thirdworldist) nationalist single-party regimes. All those ideologies declined across the decades: first (in 1945) Nazi-fascism, then (in the 1970s and 1980s) nationalist third-worldism -many of those regimes are now hybrid-, and (after 1989) communism. During the Cold War, communist regimes applied socialist institutions with no economic freedoms, but after 1989 socialism was abandoned and some market reforms were implemented by most of these regimes, except Cuba and North Korea (Way 2015). Socialism had also been applied by some military regimes, like post-1962 Burma or Velasco Alvarado’s (from 1968 to 1975) Peru. According to its legitimacy principle, Myanmar is not a military regime -the armed forces are not in power because of the “lesser-evil” principle-; it is a post-

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communist regime -the armed forces have enjoyed autocracy promotion by China. After (almost free) elections in November 2015, Myanmar could become a hybrid regime. The only regimes with parties still in power, being no longer “single”, are the post-communist: the ex and the neocommunist ones (Cuba and North Korea). Their legitimacy criterion is the legacy of the past, which is especially strong for those that have experienced revolutions (like Russia, China and Cuba). Holbig (2013) emphasized that ideology is still important for countries like China, which has been called an “ideocracy”. Of great importance for post-communist regimes is the economic and military support (autocracy promotion) of states like Russia or China. Some regimes have experienced a gradual change, with the new elites belonging to the same party that was in power before 1989 (like China); others have undergone a discontinuous change, with new parties replacing the old communist ones (like in Russia). In Belarus and Uzbekistan there is not even a single post-communist party. Most of these regimes (except China) are electoral authoritarianisms. There are weak or strong single party systems (Ezrow and Frantz 2011); the former are closer to Sartori’s (1976) hegemonic system and could become hybrid regimes. Kitschelt (2003) identified three (bureaucratic, national-accommodative or patrimonial) legacies of European communist regimes according to their democratic, hybrid or authoritarian past. Except for pure cases -anchored only to the power of party bureaucracy-, the subcategories of post-communism are those of the other post-1989 nondemocratic regimes: military, neo-patrimonial and theocratic. 5.3.4. Theocratic regimes Pure Fundamentalist Theocratic Iran 6 No patrimonial leader [Traditionalist Theocratic Neo-Patrimonialism Jordan 5,5 Abdullah (1999Æ), father Hussein (1962/1999)] Neo-Patrimonial Traditional Theocratic Bahrain 6.5 Hahmad (2002Æ), father Isa (1961/2002) Oman 5.5 Qaboos (1970 Æ), father Said (1932/1970) Qatar 5.5 Tamin (2013Æ), father Hamad (1995/2013), grand-father Khalifa (1972/1995) Saudi Arabia 7 Salman (2015Æ), brother Abdullah (2005/2015), brother Fahd (1982/2005) UAE 6 (United Khalifa (2004Æ), father Zayed (1971/2004) Arab Emirates)

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Many Islamic countries have theocratic regimes where the legitimacy principle is religious, and is linked to either (Sunni) traditional values, with the subordination of law to Sharia (Amanat, Griffel 2007) in the Arab monarchies (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE) or to (Shiite) fundamentalist values in the republic of Iran. In the quasi states of Sunni Isis in parts of Iraq and Syria, of Sunni Muslim Brotherhood (and Isis) in parts of Libya, and of Shiite Islamic Youth in the north of Yemen, there are informal fundamentalist theocracies. In these radical regimes, which are the outcome of popular revolutions or violent coups, religious and secular authorities usually coincide. The concept of theocracy has been used more in philosophy than in political science, whose scholars have felt uncomfortable with concepts such as religion, because theocracy has been used in a (politically incorrect) discriminatory way against Islam. In the past, the Iranian regime has often been labeled a religious singleparty regime, because it was the outcome of Khomeini’s 1979 revolution, with a high mobilization process. However, that label is misleading, because Iran’s legitimacy principle is different from those of the other single-party regimes. In Iran (Chehabi 1991), since Khomeini’s 1979 revolution the supreme leader has been a religious authority chosen by an assembly of experts composed of nearly 90 Islamic theologians elected by public vote. The political authority is the president of the republic, but he has limited power, like the parliament (the Islamic consultative assembly). There are two parallel power systems (one religious, the other political), but the former dominates the latter (Abrahamian 1982, Martin 2003). Khomeini formed the Islamic Republic party after the 1979 revolution, but it was dissolved in 1987, and has never been the main political actor in Iran. Today there are numerous parties in the parliament (within the conservative and the reformist coalitions), and all of them must accept the religious governance system. The personal dimension is low, except with Khomeini (from 1979 to his death in 1989), because the turnover among leaders is high. Especially since the terrorist attacks of 2001, the creation and spread of theocracies has become the main strategy of some Islamic governments (Iran), and of trans-national groups like Al Qaeda and Isis. In traditional theocracies, Sharia may be the only (in Saudi Arabia) or the main (in the other monarchies) source of law. Traditional theocratic regimes have all a rather strong (secondary) neo-patrimonial dimension, linked to royal dynasties. Thus, they are all “neo-patrimonial theocracies”. Instead, if the role of Sharia is more limited because that doctrine is only one of the sources of the law, personalism becomes the most important dimension, as in Jordan, Brunei or in some African and Asian states. Jordan is a theocratic (second feature) neo-patrimonialism (first feature).

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Before 2001, Jordan was a hybrid regime, but since 2002 it has become authoritarian, with a FH score of 6/5. Bahrein is the only Persian Gulf country with large-scale Arab Spring protests (since February 2011) of the Shiite majority population against the Sunni minority in power. The monarchy of Morocco -where Sharia is not the main source of law eitherhas remained a hybrid regime with a score of 5/4. Fundamentalist theocracies (like Iran) are not neo-patrimonial, even if Sharia remains the only source of law. Only Iran and Bahrain are electoral authoritarianisms. 5.3.5. A typology of current non-democratic regimes Post-1989 empirical evidence seems to disobey the models of the Cold War. Current states rarely have single-party regimes; military governments are few, while there are many neo-patrimonial regimes: both personalist (the majority) and federal. Finally, there is Iran after Khomeini’s 1979 revolution, which has always been difficult to label. It is for this reason that the analytical criterion for classifying non-democratic regimes has been changed: the legitimacy principle, and not the kind of the authorities in power. Regimes may have one, two, or even more legitimacy principles. In the following typology, not only the primary (first) legitimacy principle of a regime, but also the secondary (second) one has been emphasized, in order to better evaluate the complex evolution of current non-democratic regimes. Thus, legitimacy is the only criterion that permits differentiation among the different features of a regime, because too many actors (single leaders, armed forces, parties…) co-exist within it. In this typology, current non-democratic regimes are classified along two dimensions: the first (rows) and the second (columns) legitimacy principle of a regime. The possibilities are 16, and 12 are matched by empirical cases. Regimes are post-communist, neo-patrimonial, military, fundamentalist (F) or traditional (T) theocratic; they may have only one legitimacy principle or at least a second one. Cases within parentheses are no longer authoritarian, and have become hybrid regimes. Four boxes show the “pure” cases, with the same legitimacy principle in both criteria. Instead, the other 12 boxes have alternate combinations. However, analytic models are always rigid, while political practices are flexible, with different empirical evidence. For example, it could be argued that in the future, when the legacies of the past are “forgotten”, post-communist regimes will disappear, and they will be characterized only by their second principle of legitimacy. However, this may occur only when the next generation of future leaders will not have spent part of their political careers before 1989, when communism was still “alive”.

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AUTHORIT. REGIMES PostCommunist

PostCommunist China Laos Vietnam

NeoPatrimonial

Angola Ethiopia

Military Theocratic

NeoPatrimonial Cuba, Russia Belarus Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan North Korea Cambodia Belgian Congo French Congo Cameroon Equat. Guinea Eritrea, Gabon Swaziland (Zimbabwe) Djibouti, Iraq Afghanistan Algeria, Egypt Bahrein, Oman Saudi Arabia Qatar, UAE T

Military

Theocratic

(Myanmar)

Burundi Centrafr. Rep. Chad Gambia Mauritania Rwanda South Sudan Uganda Syria (Mali)

Somalia F Sudan F Jordan T Brunei T

Iran F Isis F

6. The influence of political cultures in the political arena Before 1989, (liberal) democracy was not promoted by the USA and the EU in the Third World. It could be diffused only with inertial contagion, like in Latin American countries from Spain and Portugal in the 1980s. Conservatism has been the only political culture widely applied in behaviors. In fact, during the Cold War the USA also supported many authoritarian (military or personalist) regimes (in Latin America, Africa and Asia), considered the “lesser evil” with respect to the “absolute evil” (communism). There was some rhetoric on human rights in official discourses (for example by the US president Carter), but not in political practices. Moreover, European governments did not support democracy either, especially in their relations with the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries in the Lomé conventions, because of their post-imperial feeling of guilt (Fossati 2006).

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Instead, since 1989 the political arena of international relations has shown the high influence of both conservatism and liberalism on the main actors’ behaviors, with a short-term influence of the neo-con ideology in 2003. Interests are still influencing diplomacies, because democracy has been spread in Sub-Saharan Africa and central-eastern Asia mostly through inertial contagion processes. The USA and the EU governments kept supporting “lesser evil” authoritarian states, like the Algerian military regime in the 1990s, at least until the Arab Spring of 2011. Ideologies started to matter, especially in the EU enlargement process, with the strong influence exerted by (liberal) political conditionality on the candidates of Eastern Europe. Political conditionality on foreign aid has produced limited effects, because the conditioning countries were not cohesive. There were no EU free riders in the process of European enlargement to the East, while many donor countries (Italy, Spain, Australia, Japan, Canada, Scandinavian states…) refused to link foreign aid to recipients’ political performances. After 1989, France applied political conditionality to foreign aid in Africa, but in 1993 Balladour declared that development cooperation would no longer be conditional; otherwise France would be obliged to abandon its priority for former colonies (Fossati 1999c). Since the French decision, political conditionality to foreign aid has failed. EU political conditionality was more coherent and effective with Eastern candidates: by sanctioning the nationalist government of Slovakia in 1997 for abuses of political rights, those of Romania and Bulgaria for violations of civil rights, and that of Turkey for violations of both civil and political rights; by exerting pressure on Estonia and Latvia to change the legislation on Russian minorities, and on Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia to comply with the ICC requests on criminals of war. Governments have not modified the outcome of negotiations, thanks to the liberal diplomacy of the EU Commission firmly inclined to apply political conditionality (Fossati 2004). There were only some short-term exceptions, and political conditionality was not applied to the initial phase of negotiations: in 1999 -when negotiations started with Romania and Bulgaria, still with problems in economic conditionality-, and in 2005 -when negotiations started with Turkey. The Balkan countries were rewarded for supporting NATO’s intervention in Kosovo; in Turkey the EU was afraid that by postponing negotiations, political reforms would be halted. Before 1989, the EU had not politically conditioned the accession of the Mediterranean countries, which had to be stabilized because of their strong communist parties. EU enlargement to Turkey will show whether liberalism (under the influence of the Commission) will persist also at the end of the process, or whether conservatism will push towards a softening of political conditionality.

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Neo-conservatives have promoted democracy through war (as in Iraq in 2003), but that strategy has not been successful. Leftist strategies are weak, as democratic assistance is still low and diplomatic pressures are limited in world politics. There have been some “democratic revolutions”: in Eastern Europe (2003/4), in Iran (2009/10), and in the Arab Spring (since 2011). Popular mobilizations have had only a short-term positive effect for democratization. After the 2011 Arab Spring, only Tunisia became a democracy, while Egypt organized free elections, but there was a military coup in 2013; Libya, Syria and Yemen are failed states. Western governments applied weak diplomatic pressures to favor democracy, and democratic assistance programs were limited. Obama was unable to promote democracy during the Arab Spring, and Western countries’ capacity to influence those regimes was also weakened by the “autocracy promotion” of Iran and Saudi Arabia (Fossati 2006). An important change in the political arena has materialized since the Arab Spring of the 2010s, affecting not democracy, but autocracy promotion. After those events, Obama ended the “lesser evil” priority, abandoning leaders like Mubarak, Ben Ali, Gaddafi... The defense of those personalist and military leaders had been the cornerstone of the US conservative diplomacy: both before (against communism) and after 1989 (against the promoters of Islamic fundamentalism). “Lesser evil” priority was naturally incompatible with the post-1989 “near” world order, aimed at supporting democracies and not autocracies. The survival of that “exception” was possible, precisely because after 1989 conservatism was still the prevailing diplomatic political culture. Instead, since Obama’s decision to stop the “lesser evil” priority, most of those countries (except Tunisia) are experiencing wars with strong Islamic fundamentalist groups (in Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Syria…), that have occupied vast territories. In 2013, an authoritarian regime was restored in Egypt, after a military coup by the armed forces, but that event was the outcome of domestic factors, and not of the military and economic support by an international coalition of Western governments. Obama, unlike former Republican presidents, has never been sympathetic with the military leaders of the Middle East. This attitude is confirmed by the difficulties of the Libyan armed forces in that conflict, where the USA is not promoting a military coup, but a power-sharing agreement with Tripoli’s Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian armed forces imprisoned Morsi, the leader of Cairo’s Muslim Brotherhood. However, the Egyptian military coup has been supported by Israel and Saudi Arabia. After Obama’s change (since the 2011 Arab Spring), conservatism is no longer the prevailing political culture in the political arena of international relations (Fossati 2015).

CHAPTER SEVEN THE RELATION BETWEEN MARKET AND DEMOCRACY

1. Models on the relations between economic institutions and political regimes The relation between economic and political institutions is crucial for understanding both market transitions and democratization processes in recent decades, and the stabilization of the values of the post-1989 “near” world order outside Western countries. The following typology combines two variables. Economic institutions rely upon either state intervention and protectionism or the free market; political regimes are either authoritarian or democratic. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS market state/protectionist

POLITICAL REGIMES authoritarian democratic Market authoritarianism Liberal democracy State authoritarianism Protectionist democracy

The most coherent boxes are the two opposite ones, which combine low (state authoritarianism) or high (liberal democracy) political and economic freedoms. The other two combine either democracy and state intervention (protectionist model) -a democratic regime limits economic freedoms-, or authoritarianism and market -an authoritarian regime applies laissez faire (Fossati 2013). The empirical evidence has shown a positive relation between market and democracy in the West, especially since 1945, when economic and political freedoms have mutually reinforced each other (Beetham 1993, 1997; Whitehead 2002). It is quite difficult to clarify the causal chain, that is to say whether “the egg or the chicken” comes first (Mc Lean 1994). However, it is important to emphasize the different trends in the relation between political and economic institutions in each democratization wave (Fossati 2013).

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1.1. State authoritarianism and liberal democracy In past centuries, Great Britain and the USA have supported the spread of both economic and political freedoms in the West. Hence, these two institutions seem to have been “born together”. Western countries of the first democratization wave (from 1828 to 1926) always applied the British “recipe”, living through long phases of economic growth and political stability (Huntington 1993), except for short periods of external trade protectionism (at the beginning of industrialization and during some economic crises, for instance that of 1880). French imitation began with the 1789 revolution led by the bourgeoisie against the aristocracy (Moore 1966). That episode induced many observers to believe that economic liberalization comes before democratization; this intuition was exported to the other (Western) countries of the first wave (Fossati 2013). According to Higgott (1983), socio-economic modernization has come before “political development” in the first-wave of democratizing states. Lipset (1959), Huntington (1993), and Diamond (1992) hypothesized a positive relation between market-led economic growth and democracy. Then, Johnson (1958) applied this theory to the economic and political development of non-Western countries, which were supposed to shift from state authoritarianism to market democracy thanks to the modernization process. Black (1967) clarified that the interaction between political and economic variables has materialized not in two, but in four phases: (i) that of modernizing leaders (within constitutional monarchies); (ii) that of economic transformation -usually initiated by applying market reforms-; (iii) that of full democratization (through universal suffrage); (iv) that of social integration (thanks to welfare state policies). The correlation has also been confirmed by the main “deviant” cases like communist Russia, Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and Spain. The halt in the first wave of democratization in the 1920s and 1930s led to the correlation also between the alternative institutions: authoritarianism and protectionism. In communism, state control on the socialist economy was total, while in Nazi-fascism private business kept operating, but external protectionism greatly weakened economic freedoms. The hypothesis that better explains the reversal of the first wave of democratization is the sociological theory on the modernization process (Gerschenkron 1962). The different industrialization phases conditioned the political choices of Western countries. First-comers (the USA, Great Britain and France) chose market and democracy. Second- (or late-) comers applied stateprotectionist economies in a shorter period, with limited time at their disposal, that was easier with authoritarian regimes than with democracies.

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After World War II, the second democratization wave also favored market reforms. The international bipolar structure (Waltz 1979) pushed towards domestic economic and political changes. Western bloc countries applied both market and democracy also because of the coercion made by their leader (the USA). However, it seems that political change preceded economic change (Fossati 2013). This occurred precisely because almost all new democracies (especially the European ones: Germany, Austria, Italy, or also Spain and Portugal in the 1970s) had previously experienced political pluralism. Thus, economic liberalization was more gradually applied after World War II, because Nazi-fascist protectionism had left a profound imprint; then, after 1945 the American Marshall Plan helped the implementation of market reforms in Europe. This linkage has been strengthened over the decades because democracy is anchored to the rule of law, which is the pre-condition for free market institutions. In the third wave of the mid-1970s, with a contagion from Spain and Portugal to Latin America, democratization did not produce economic liberalization, which only occurred after 1989. In the 1980s there was only short-term economic adjustment (with cuts to public expenditures and wages, and a very uncertain liberalization of prices, interest rates and currencies), without the launching of structural reforms: privatization, trade and financial opening (Fossati 1997, Griffth-Jones 1988)1. In the fourth wave after 1989, both democratization and economic liberalization were parallel processes, because most countries outside the West had not previously experienced either market or democracy, except for a few cases which had undergone only one of the two processes. 1

Most scholars did not realize that the foreign debt crisis of 1982 had not changed the Latin American economic institutions, which remained protectionist; market reforms started only after 1989 (Fossati 1997). Many “third-worldist” political scientists (except Haggard, Kaufman 1992; 1995) did not understand the functioning of economic institutions. In the 1980s, the -today outdated- debate among comparative politics scholars focused on the relation between politics and economy, even if in that decade there was only short-term adjustment. Scholars adopted two positions. The former -on studying the historical evolution of a few countries- assumed that military regimes would apply austerity, while democracies would support expansionary policies (Skidmore 1977; Foxley, Whitehead 1980; Kaufman 1985). The latter -on studying more countries, with quantitative methods (Nelson 1984; Haggard 1985; Remmer 1986; Bienen, Gersovitz 1985)- denied that the regime variable would influence the economy; the regime difference played a role in the initial period of reforms, while the strength of the regime was crucial in the implementation phase (Haggard, Kaufman 1989). Past authoritarian regimes would have better applied economic adjustment, but only within polarized or fragmented political and party systems (Haggard, Kaufman 1992; 1995).

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1.2. Protectionist democracy Hirschman’s (1968) application of Gerschenkron’s theory to Latin America gainsaid Johnson’s positive forecast. The economic institutions of ISI (Import-Substitution Industrialization) promoted both external protectionism and state subsidies to industry. They were launched in Latin America from 1929 to 1945 and represented the easiest option for the “late late-comers” in modernization. Those policies, similar to the autarchy options of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, could be more easily applied in an authoritarian context. However, in Latin America the correlation must be redefined, by linking the economic institutions to high political instability: the “pendulum” between authoritarian (military) regimes and populist democracies (especially from 1929 to 1989). When the pendulum swings towards authoritarianism, Hirschman’s theory well explains state intervention, and is compatible with Gerschenkron’s theory. When there is a democratic phase, the pendulum swings towards the protectionist model. Then, Latin American democracies have been characterized by illiberal decision-making processes, with little influence of parties and interest groups; most power was concentrated in the president, a charismatic leader, who made plebiscitary appeals to the people (Fossati 2013). However, protectionist democracies have gone through two phases. The populist one (the first ISI phase of the 1950s) was characterized by strong economic nationalism with many legal obstacles to foreign investments. Imports from the USA and European countries were limited by high tariffs, and local industry was supported with state promotion. Public expenditure strongly increased and social policies were launched (for example by Evita Peron) to protect the poorest sectors of the population. Trade and balance of payments deficits increased, and hyperinflation was fueled; most multi-national firms left Latin America. The second ISI phase of the 1960s was the modernizing one (of the socalled desarrollismo), because protectionist economic institutions were kept alive, but governments tried (without much success) to attract multinational firms’ investments. High tariffs were maintained to limit imports, and state support to industry continued, but public expenditure was kept under control. Nationalizations of foreign firms were stopped. Those efforts were made at first by democracies, and then by “soft” military regimes (dictablandas) (Sikkink 1991). The economic performance of Latin American countries did not improve, and multi-national firms did not return. This is the reason why populism underwent a revival in the 1970s with Peron in Argentina and Allende in Chile; their (economic and political) failure led to another wave of (more repressive) military regimes.

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1.3. Market authoritarianism Neo-Marxist scholars advanced a different theory based on the negative effects of the market on political regimes in Latin America and in poor countries2. This theory was built by observing the post-colonial phase (from 1929 to 1945), when oligarchic political regimes (without universal suffrage) applied market (export-oriented) institutions. After the 1929 crisis, agrarian producers’ oligarchies -damaged by ISI- proposed a similar pact to Latin American armed forces, but they rejected it (Fossati 1997). In the Cold War, only authoritarian regimes like the Asian tigers and Chile implemented market reforms. However, Pinochet was the exception; all the other military regimes (Argentina, Brazil…) continued with ISI. NeoMarxists committed the methodological mistake of the “fallacy of interferences”. This hypothesis was recast by neo-Marxist Przeworski (1991), who applied rational choice and foresaw that market reforms would be incompatible with post-1989 democratic consolidation in Latin America. As democracy resisted in the 1990s (see Chapter 6), Oxhorn and Ducatenzelier (1998) supported another “post-Marxist” hypothesis on the correlation between economic liberalization and hybrid regimes. The combination between authoritarianism and economic liberalization is typical of Asia, where a different historical evolution has emerged. The first phase was based on state intervention and economic protectionism, together with authoritarianism (a). Then, market reforms were applied (without shock therapies), thanks to the gradual and selective promotion of exports through state subsidies (Haggard 1990) within still authoritarian regimes (b). Finally -even if to date only in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea-, there was the democratization process as well (c). This evolution has been exhibited by Japan in the 19th century, the Asian tigers during the Cold War, China and Vietnam since 1989 (Fossati 2013). The difference between East and West can be explained by the knowledge cosmologies of Asian civilizations, based on the dialectical yin-yang principle -instead of Western Aristotle’s tertium non datur- and the collectivist (and not individualist) nature of person-person relations (Galtung 1981). These cosmologies have favored more flexibility between state and market, and more cooperative relations between rich and poor classes (or countries). 2

Post-Marxist scholars assumed that electoral democracy may conceal the interests of the richest social classes (Ruescheimer, Stephens, Stephens 1992). According to Dalpino (2000), during the Cold War the USA only promoted economic (and not political) liberalization in some authoritarian (military) regimes, because of the “lesser evil” priority. Finally, Robinson (1996) linked democracy promotion of the USA to the diffusion of globalization and market reforms in the Third World.

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1.4. Two short-cuts: democracy first or market first In the first democratization wave, economic reforms preceded the political ones, contrary to the second wave after 1945. In the third wave of the 1970s there was only democratization. The evolution of political and economic institutions before 1989 can be summarized in three middlerange generalizations. 1) In the West, the positive correlation between market and democracy (and the negative one between state intervention and authoritarianism) was confirmed in the 1900s, except for short periods of external protectionism alone, like after the economic crisis of 1880. 2) Outside the West, transition countries achieved some “short-cuts” before 1989. In Latin America (except for Chile) economic freedoms were limited by populist democracies (Remmer 1995), that subsidized industry and protected markets from external trade. 3) The Asian short-cut gave priority to economic liberalization and constrained political institutions, which underwent long authoritarian phases (Fossati 2013). Thus, two short-cuts have materialized: democracy first in Latin America, and market first in Asia. The existence of the two possibilities has been perceived in the literature, but these scenarios were not anchored to transparent explanatory factors and to the empirical evolution of the two regions (Armijo, Biersteker, Lowenthal 1994; Encarnación 1996; Haggard, Webb 1994; Oxhorn, Ducatenzelier 1998; Oxhorn, Starr 1999).

2. The quantitative analysis of five non-Western regions (in 2015) The debate on the relation between market and democracy can only be anchored to every geographical and cultural region. If correlation or regression indexes are applied to the whole universe of cases (Rodrik, Wacziarg 2005; Pearson, Tabellini 2006), the comprehension of both politics and economy will be difficult. The main questions addressed by this chapter are the following. What has happened since 1989 in a context of increasing globalization? What are the (economic and political) transition countries doing? Are they (as in Eastern Europe) following the coherent path of Western liberal democracies, by experiencing transitory phases with hybrid regimes and partial economic liberalizations (Simmons et al 2008)? Or are they following one of the two short-cuts, being dependent on the path pursued by Asia (“market first”) or Latin America (“democracy first”)? What is going to happen to African countries, which had been neither democratic nor liberal before 1989?

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The concept of “economic development” is not used in this chapter. Only the intensity of the liberalization process will be analyzed. For example, since 1989 the growth rates of an authoritarian country like China have greatly increased, undermining Lipset’s (1960) thesis; thus, development and democracy do not seem to be necessarily linked (Grilli da Cortona 2009). This chapter will not focus on social equity either3. However, this choice is not due to the difficult definition of development, like many post-modernist scholars assume; in fact, it is easy to define. It is the outcome of two processes: economic growth and social equity. Studies on growth and development concern the outcomes of decision-making, and they are usually conducted by economists. We, as political scientists, are more inclined to study the decision-making processes at the domestic level or in international negotiations, by focusing on the dynamics of power and conflict. Instead, economists usually focus on the outcomes of decisions or negotiations. For example, political scientists have better discerned between liberal and protectionist institutions, while economists have deepened an interesting debate on the preference for slow or fast market reform processes (Stiglitz 2002). However, scholars of international political economy have established some unwritten rules for a fair “division of labor” between the two disciplines, remedying the mistakes of the past, when for example some political scientists (the promoters of “political development”) tried to substitute economists by conducting research on economic development. Unfortunately, nor did economists always respect these unwritten rules on the division of labor between scholars working in the two disciplines: for example, by using the “catch-all” concept of institutions. 3

According to Przeworski (et al. 2000), market led-growth does not have links with democratic transition, but only with democratic consolidation. Boix and Stokes (2003) found a positive relation also between economic development and democratic transition. There is an intense debate on the relation between political regime and equity. Somaini (2008) linked Freedom House political indicators with Gini indexes on income distribution (of the World Bank), drawing different conclusions for the various geographic areas. Neo-Marxists (Przeworski et al. 2000) assume that the absence of social equity may endanger democratic stability. Instead, according to liberal scholars (Muller 1988), in the long period growth also favors equity, through the so-called “cascade effect”. Fossati (2015) tried to find a synthesis on this debate. First, it seems that economic liberalization is not the cause of poverty; at the same time, laissez faire reforms are not improving the high inequalities in income distribution of many developing countries (see chapter 5). Scant equity does not seem to obstruct democratic transition, but it may endanger consolidation, which is linked to both institutionalization of the regime and the legitimacy accorded to the authorities by citizens (Oxhorn, Starr 1999).

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The quantitative indicators will be those on civil and political rights used by the Freedom House (FH) (2016), and the indexes of economic freedom will be those used by the Heritage Foundation (HF)4 (2016). On the x-axis are the FH political indicators of democracy, which range from a minimum (7) to a maximum (1). On the y-axis are the HF economic liberalization indexes: from a minimum (0) to a maximum (100). Besides democratic and authoritarian regimes, and countries with liberal or protectionist economic institutions, there are the intermediate categories of illiberal democracies (Zakaria 2003) and hybrid regimes (Schedler 2006, Morlino 2008), or with only partially liberalized economic institutions. Authoritarian regimes have indexes from 5.5 to 7, hybrid regimes from 3 to 5, and democratic regimes from 1 to 2. According to the HF, the liberalization process is limited with indexes below 50, intermediate with indexes from 50 to 60, and intense with indexes above 705. HF indexes include both domestic liberalization and foreign trade openness, which have often been parallel processes since 1989 (Fossati 2013). The following 9-box typology develops the 4-box one, by adding the intermediate categories of hybrid regimes and partial liberalizations: Market Authoritarian Regime Semi-Liberal Authoritarian Regime State Authoritarian Regime

Liberal Hybrid Regime Political & Economic Hybrid Protectionist Hybrid Regime

Liberal Democracy Semi-Protectionist Democracy Protectionist Democracy

In the following pages, the graphs of the five regions are presented. 4

The HF indexes are ten in number: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom (low taxes), government spending, monetary freedom (in the currencies market), investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom. Some of these are classic “positive” freedom indicators, while others are “negative” ones with an inverse relation, like low level of taxes, of public spending, of corruption... However, HF indexes do not emphasize the high percentage of the state’s share (because of oil) in the economy, like that of the Persian Gulf monarchies, but only the flows of public expenditure. 5 For Eastern Europe, the EBRD (2014) indexes on economic liberalization are available (Fossati 2013). It is high with 26/32 indexes, intermediate with 20/25 indexes, or low with indexes below 20. EBRD uses eight indicators: large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization, corporate governance (level of creditssubsidies and bankruptcy law) and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policies, banking reform, interest rate liberalization, securities market, and non-bank financial institutions.

The Relation between Market and Democracy Graph 7-1. Latin America (2015)

Graph 7-2. Eastern Europe (2015)

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Graph 7-3. North Africa and the Middle East (NA/ME) (2015)

Graph 7-4. Asia (2015)

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Graph 7-5. Africa (2015)

The following table presents the correlation indexes between the two processes of democratization and economic liberalization in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and the average in five non-Western regions: Latin America, Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Fossati 2013). Table 7-1. Correlation indexes (1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, average) 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Average Latin America 0.74 0.84 0.81 0.71 0.68 0.76 Eastern Europe 0.69 0.69 0.54 0.58 0.63 0.63 NA/ME 0.33 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.33 0.44 Asia 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.57 Africa 0.40 0.55 0.59 0.50 0.55 0.52

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Data show that the correlation between the two processes of reform was on average higher for all the regions in 2000, because in the new millennium economic liberalization has been slower than democratization (and also with some steps backwards after the 2008 crisis). The correlation index is now slightly lower, especially for the two regions (Eastern Europe and Latin America) that in 2015 had the highest levels. Among the various regions, Asia has the most similar indexes, so that the two processes are the most stable and the slowest at the same time. In the Middle East there was strong discontinuity in 1995, but in that year data on the five postcommunist Asian republics were not available, and the correlation indexes for the rest of those countries were lower. In 2012 a decrease to 0.20 occurred because of increased democratization (after the Arab Spring) with scant economic reform; in 2015 it was 0.33. Africa started from a low correlation index (0.4), then had temporary increases in 2000 and 2005, and settled at an intermediate level of around 0.5. In 2000 and 2005 there were more cases with simultaneously low (or high) levels of economic and political liberalizations; thereafter the two processes became more unbalanced in several countries. Some changing trends materialized in Eastern Europe and Latin America, and they were linked to certain key cases (Fossati 2013). For example, Argentina (a stable democracy) had a high economic liberalization process (around 75) in the mid-1990s, which slowed to around 50 after the 2002 crisis, especially with Peronist presidents (Nestor and Cristina Kirchner); with the new right president (Macri), economic freedoms should improve (in 2016). Brazil has also slowed its economic liberalization in recent years: from 63 to 56. Serbia usually had more political than economic freedoms; however, Serbia improved its economic index from 46 to 62. Ukraine slowed its economic liberalization in the past decade albeit with better (political and) economic performances with Western (55) than with Eastern (46) presidents. Then Serbia is not a member of the WTO, and Ukraine entered it only in 2008.

3. The relation between two values of world order (market and democracy) outside the West The foregoing analysis of the relation between market and democracy, two of the values of the current “near” world order, has been anchored to its historical evolution (in the three democratization waves before 1989) in each geographical and cultural region: the West, Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Previous attempts to aggregate data and formulate general theories had produced little progress.

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The aim of this chapter has been to map the empirical evidence after 1989 outside the West (Fossati 2013), with a statistical analysis of the processes concerning two values of the current “near” world order. The first empirical finding (Fossati 2013) is that while democratization indexes reach the highest level (1), this does not happen to the economic liberalization indexes, which usually peak at medium-high levels (around 80/100). Stiglitz (2002) linked this outcome to the fact that the failures of some shock therapies in the 1990s has induced many developing countries to apply only partial and gradual market reforms (with 50 or 60 indexes). Data show that the hypothesis on a direct relation between economic and political freedoms has been confirmed as the main trend in nonWestern countries after 1989: in yes-yes, in no-no, and in hybrid cases (Fossati 2013). The model of liberal democracy arose in some countries of Eastern Europe (Czech Republic and the three Baltic states), Chile, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Botswana and Israel. Before 1989, the correlation between democracy and economic development was strong (Schmitter, Karl 1991), but no longer after 1989, because of the high growth of authoritarian China, whose economic liberalization is only intermediate. The state authoritarian model is often applied by some post-communist (Cuba, Belarus, Laos, Myanmar, North Korea…), a few Middle East authoritarian (Libya and Iran), and some neo-patrimonial African (Eritrea, Angola…) regimes. Thus, there are several cases of objectors to both values of current world order: market and democracy. Ross (2001) showed that since 1989 there has been a correlation between authoritarian regimes and oil producers; exports of primary goods in the energy sector may push towards state authoritarianism, even with some exceptions like Mexico. The two boxes with alternate combinations (much democracy with little market, and much market with little democracy) are rare (Whitehead 2002). These two radical short-cuts seem to be less appealing after 1989. The protectionist model was realized only by Peronist Argentina of the 2010s, but president Macri should increase economic liberalization again. This scenario is unlikely, as a strong isolation from world markets (like that of Latin America in the Cold War) is no longer desirable. The presence of a few cases of market authoritarianism shows that there are still some objectors to one of the values of the current “near” world order: democracy. This happened only in some Arab “petro-monarchies” (like Qatar, the UAE and Bahrain). These cases are limited because post-1989 economic crises have not weakened political regimes: those of Mexico (1994), Argentina (2002), Asian countries and Russia in 1997/8 -where political indicators worsened because of Putin’s authoritarian leadership.

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Intermediate outcomes are those with hybrid regimes and partial economic liberalizations. Liberal hybrid regimes (Colombia, Georgia, Malaysia and Singapore) are rare, denying the post-Marxist thesis on the relation between those regimes and economic liberalization (Oxhorn, Ducatenzelier 1998). Cases of semi-liberal authoritarianism are Russia, China, Vietnam, some Middle East states..., because their economic liberalization indexes are intermediate. Semi-protectionist democracies are larger countries like India, Brazil, South Africa… Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ukraine and Zimbabwe have protectionist hybrid regimes. The average correlation indexes (in the 1995/2015 phase) reveal a hierarchy among the regions: Latin America (0.76), Eastern Europe (0.63), Asia (0.57), Africa (0.52) and the Middle East (0.44). The first two regions are culturally closer to the West. Latin America is privileging democracy because democratic transition began in the 1980s, but those countries liberalized their economies only after 1989. The advanced position of Latin America can be explained by the different economic liberalization patterns of the two models to be imitated: higher for the USA (around 80), and lower for the average of European countries (around 70). Several states in Eastern Europe are not members of the WTO (Bosnia, Serbia and Belarus) -Ukraine and Russia entered only recently- or have lower external trade openness. Eastern Europe is making economic and political progress, thanks to its external anchorage to the EU. In Asia, political and economic freedoms are at a quite high level. Economic liberalization started before 1989; since then democratization has been slower than market transition because of the example of authoritarian China, whose economy is not very liberalized. Progress in the Middle East and Africa is slower, as the deviant cases (from the general trend line) in the two graphs show. In Africa, political and economic freedoms are at a very low level, but democratization has been more rapid than economic liberalization. Democracy is far from being applied in the Middle East, because the Arab Spring led to democratization only in Tunisia; Gulf monarchies are economically (but not politically) free. Hence the Middle East is closer to the “market first” scenario; Africa to the “democracy first” scenario.

CHAPTER EIGHT THE MILITARY ARENA: THE PROMOTION OF ORDER THROUGH PEACE

1. The influence of political cultures in the military arena Since 1989 many nationalist (ethnic, religious and linguistic) conflicts have degenerated into wars in Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. The wave of wars of the 1990s has decreased its violence (except in Ukraine, the Central African Republic, Sudan…), even if many conflicts have not been definitively resolved (Fossati 2008). Another wave of violence, promoted by Islamic fundamentalist actors, has increased: first after 2001, then after the 2011 Arab Spring, polarizing Shiite and Sunni groups. In the military arena, Western powers have reacted not only with the diplomatic promotion of peace, trying to stabilize this value of world order, but they have also promoted some (eight) wars: Kuwait (in 1991), Bosnia (in 1995), Kosovo (in 1999), Afghanistan (in 2001), Iraq (in 2003), Libya (in 2011), Mali (in 2013) and against Isis in Iraq, Syria (since 2014) and Libya (since 2016). The “paradox” of the current world order was presented in the introduction and will be explained in the conclusions. In fact, some of those wars were fought against the promoters of Islamic fundamentalism, which are the deepest objectors to the value of peace of the post-1989 world order. Then, there have been nearly 50 peace-keeping missions of the United Nations (UN), especially where the main powers did not want to be involved. The balance has mostly been negative, with many failures, but there have also been some (few) “success stories”, as in Cambodia, East Timor, Central America, Mozambique, Namibia… In sum, the value of peace has been less stabilized than those of democracy and the market. In the political arena there have been exceptions too, as both democracies and autocracies (see the “lesser evil” priority) were promoted, but the former finally prevailed. The analysis of these eight wars, which have represented the exceptions to the promotion of peace, will be linked to the role that the political cultures are playing in the military arena of contemporary international relations.

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Political cultures have greatly influenced the military arena since 1989: the neo-communist, the leftist Manichaean, the leftist constructivist, the conservative, the liberal, and the neo-conservative (Fossati 2006). A neocommunist hybrid has arisen in post-modern societies. It combines two coherent (pacifist socialist and violent communist) models. Its supporters are non-violent, but they are sympathetic to the use of force by the underdogs: Fidel Castro, Chiapas rebels, no-global groups… This is a “false pacifism”. Communism was violent and pursued its aims through revolution and “proletarian dictatorship”. In the West, it was promoted by terrorists: the Brigate Rosse in Italy and the RAF in Germany. The other (social-democratic and socialist) left ideologies are anchored to pacifism. Manichaean peace movements chose a passive conception of non-violence whose philosophical reference is Tolstoy; they reject war even in an ultima ratio scenario, under the influence of utopian socialism (Bobbio 1984). Manichaean peace movements are anti-West and anti-American; they mobilize when Western powers intervene (with the same intensity before or after 1989), but remain silent if a Third World actor is violent. The Gandhian active conception of non-violence is the philosophical principle of constructivism; war is accepted, even if under exceptional circumstances (Galtung 1985). First, constructivists go to war only when “weak” non-Western actors are to be defended, such as Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo. Second, aggressive states linked in some way to the West (like Serbia, a small power) can be attacked, but not Third World countries (like communist Vietnam, totalitarian Iraq and Libya, Hutus in Rwanda, or Arab Sudan). “Politically incorrect” wars are rejected because of the value of cultural relativism. Third, asymmetrical conflicts, for instance those involving medium powers, like Russia against Chechnya or China against Tibet, should not induce military interventions by the West, so as to avoid a risky escalation. Fourth, violence can only be used reactively; decisions must be made immediately, but only to stop the use of force by the aggressors. Constructivists follow the prescriptions of global institutions, like the UN, even if these decisions are not made by democratic states. Only two multilateral military interventions have been authorized by the UN Security Council: in Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1991. Before 1989, this ideology was strong in the universities (among peace researchers), but not in politics; it had some influence only on the trans-armament programs of German and British leftist oppositions in the 1980s. The dialogue between peace researchers and peace movements -pushing for Western unilateral disarmament- was not fruitful; the two sides had different nonviolence conceptions. The former preferred Gandhi’s active/constructivist definition, the latter Tolstoy’s passive/Manichaean conception.

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The liberal diplomatic model envisages a linkage between war and values whose philosophical reference is the tradition of bellum iustum (Fixadal, Smith 1998), like the decision of the US president Johnson to make war against communist Vietnam in the 1960s -there were no strong American interests in that area (Morgenthau 1969). “Evil” must be fought, even if politically incorrect wars (i.e. against Third World states) are necessary. Wars have been considered legitimate against Nazi-fascism, communism and Islamic fundamentalism. Violence is chosen only after severe violations of human and political rights. This scenario materialized in all post-1989 military interventions of Western powers: in Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Isis. Liberals are inclined to respect global institutions (the UN), but only if their decisions are made by the “concert” of democracies (like Kant’s foedus pacificum). Conservatives go to war only if their (security or economic) interests are at stake, according to Clausewitz’s realist prescription; war is the continuation of politics by other means. Then, the conservative model relies upon the threat or use of violence without the involvement of rigid global institutions. Republican presidents followed this policy under the leadership of Kissinger in American diplomacy. The USA militarily intervened in the “traffic light” wars (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan…). These have been fought by two local actors and only one of the two great powers. The conservative model is based on respect for Westphalia’s international law, on sovereignty, and on the non-interference principle, with little regard to national self-determination. Before 1989, Republican and Democratic presidents often applied the “lesser evil” principle, as military or personalist regimes were considered better than communist governments, especially in Latin America. There was no bipartisan outcome (between two political cultures), but interests largely outweighed values. The Vietnam war was more consistent with the bellum iustum tradition -to defend the Vietnamese from communism-, than with interests. After 1989 Western interests were defended in Kuwait, Mali, Afghanistan, and against Isis. Kuwait had been attacked by Hussein, destabilizing the oil market. Afghan Talibans were allies of Al Qaeda and supported Bin Laden. In Mali there was an Islamic fundamentalist government. Isis troops in Iraq, Syria and Libya had the same ideology. Western interests were limited in Bosnia and Kosovo; Milosevic was repressing some national groups, like in many other conflicts. Wars in Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011) damaged Western countries’ interests, because Hussein and Gaddafi were the “lesser evil” of Islamic fundamentalism. A military intervention in Syria against Assad might have provoked a conflict with Iran, and would not have been compatible with a conservative diplomacy.

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“Neo-conservatism” became manifest in the 2003 Iraq war. The conservative diplomacy was based on Kennan’s containment doctrine (Guzzini 1998), which materialized in the French and Russian positions. After the war, Bush and Blair could not give strong support to their declared security commitments based on the defense of two interests: avoiding the Hussein-Bin Laden alliance, and preventing the deployment of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The liberal objectives of the war were anchored more to values (the defense of Israel, a “civilization ally”) Hussein had to be sanctioned for his support to Palestinian terrorists-, than to interests -Hussein was not directly threatening the USA (Mearsheimer, Walt 2007). Exporting democracy was another ideological objective of the Iraq war. Neo-cons also applied the conservative strategy of refusing the concert of democracies within the UN. Italy and Spain followed the mainstream liberal diplomacy by supporting the “just war” under the UN umbrella. The neo-con diplomacy was based on a hybrid combination of two models. It coupled liberal objectives and conservative strategies, within the strategic doctrine of “offensive Realism” (Mearsheimer 2001). During the Cold War (phase 1), conservatism has been applied in most armed conflicts, with one exception: the (liberal) Vietnam war. Its failure induced Democratic Party leaders to abandon the bellum iustum tradition. Constructivism and Manicheanism have been supported, respectively, by American (of the 1960s and 1970s) and European (of the 1950s and 1980s) peace movements, but they were not significant. Leftist and liberal “ideological” political cultures were rarely promoted before 1989. The emphasis on ideologies during the Cold War was mostly rhetorical, without major effects on politics, because the USA did not export peace in the Third World, where many “traffic light” wars (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan…) were fought against the Soviet Union (Fossati 2006). From 1990 to 2010 (phase 2), Western states and movements followed all four political cultures (the conservative, the liberal, the constructivist and the Manichaean) and the two hybrids (the neo-communist and the neocon), but conservatism remained the prevailing one. Interests prevailed, but ideologies were relevant too (Fossati 2006). An intentional alliance arose between the promoters of conservatism and liberalism in Kuwait and Afghanistan. Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo were supported by liberals (Clinton) and constructivists (Blair and D’Alema); democratic values and weak people (but no strong interests) had to be defended. The two decisions were the outcome of non-intentional processes, as both were long and difficult. In the “neo-con” Iraq war of 2003 there were two parallel alliances: on the one hand between neo-conservatives and liberals, and on the other hand between “old” conservatives and constructivists.

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Thus, after 1989 the promotion of conservatism (with the wars in Kuwait and Afghanistan) co-existed with -and probably prevailed over- the stabilization of peace, within the paradox of the current world order (see the conclusions). Until 2010, the exceptions were the politically correct wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the neo-con war in Iraq (Fossati 2105). The main diplomatic change has been the outcome of the Arab Spring since 2011 (phase 3), which coincided with the new US president Obama. Since 2011, conservatism is no longer the prevailing political culture in the military arena. The 2011 war in Libya, promoted by France and the UK, was coherent only with liberalism, as the “lesser evil” (Gaddafi) of Islamic fundamentalism was attacked; it was a just and politically incorrect war against a Third World leader. Then, territorial advances of radical Islamic groups in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen should have provoked a strong military response from the USA and the Western powers, according to the conservative diplomacy. The only conservative war was French military intervention in Mali (in 2013). Western leaders hoped that not making war against Isis would keep terrorists in the Middle East, avoiding violence in Europe, but this strategy failed when Isis attacked Paris in November 2015. The low intensity bombings against Isis in Syria, Iraq (since 2014), and Libya (since 2016), are both conservative and liberal, but they have produced few short-term military effects; their priority has not been to defeat the enemy rapidly, but to limit US human losses. While Clinton and Bush Jr promoted conflict resolution, Obama suggested a weak formula (a power-sharing consensus pact) only in Libya, to the same actors (Muslim brotherhood and the army), that are in fierce conflict in Egypt. More than promoting interests or ideologies, Obama has avoided consistent decisions, refusing any coherent diplomatic strategy (see the conclusions). Western military forces have only launched aerial bombings, while local (Bosnian, Afghan, Iraqi, Libyan…) groups have attacked by land movements. The West has chosen to make one war at a time against the rogue states: first Afghanistan, then Iraq, Libya… The most efficient military strategies against terrorists are intelligence research, torture -to discover organization networks and new terrorist attacks-, and attempts to kill their leaders, like Bin Laden’s murder in Pakistan in 2011. One of the main objectives of Western wars against Islamic fundamentalism has been a catalyst effect; violence was welcomed in the Middle East, but terrorism had to be prevented in Europe and America. The perception of threat had been higher after al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London (in the 2000s) than after Isis military conquests in Iraq, Syria and Libya (in the 2010s). This “catalyst” strategy had worked so far, but failed when Isis launched a new terrorist attack in Paris in November 2015.

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2. The peace-keeping missions of the United Nations The most successful UN missions have concerned post-bipolarism conflicts, as in Central America (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala), Namibia, Mozambique, and Cambodia. In post-1989 armed conflicts, the UN has made mediation efforts, but they were not successful: in Cyprus, Western Sahara, Bosnia and Kosovo. In Croatia, Afghanistan and Iraq, the role of the UN has been limited, and all governance attempts have been promoted by Western governments. Military intermediation has been successful in Cyprus and Kashmir, but an informal agreement for conflict freezing was reached (between India and Pakistan) only in the latter. In Yemen, military intermediation failed, while in Lebanon it achieved partial success because of Israel’s frequent attacks. UN interventions have been successful only after the mobilization of governments, as in East Timor (Australia), Sierra Leone (the UK) and Ivory Coast (France). Other UN missions have been successful thanks to collaboration with other organizations: in the Dominican Republic (with the Organization of the American States), and in the conflict between Chad and Libya (with the arbitration of the International Court of Justice). In Africa, the UN has played a significant role, with an informal delegation by the main powers, unwilling to undertake governance efforts in that region. The UN helped Eritrea (in 1993) and South Sudan (in 2011) to organize the referenda for national self-determination, that led to independence of both countries. Rwanda, Belgian Congo, Darfur (with the UN/OAU mission), Somalia, the Ethiopian-Eritrean war, the Central African Republic and Angola were cases of failure. The UN has also made some political mistakes, by leaving countries with asymmetrical conflict resolution scenarios, as in Liberia (and also in Haiti and Macedonia). Then, the UN has sent peace-keeping forces only after the end of violence, as in Burundi (Fossati 2008). In other conflicts without external interferences, political laissez faire has prevailed. Anarchy has materialized (Popescu 2009) when middle regional powers (Russia) have favored their allies (in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Transnistria and Tajikistan) or repressed rebels (Russia in Chechnya; China in Tibet and Xinyang). The UN has not intervened against Islamic fundamentalist actors, as in Algeria and Mali. It has chosen anarchy when strong African leaders have been involved: Deby in Chad, Conté in Guinea, Musuveni in Uganda and Sassou-Nguesso in French Congo. The UN has rarely been involved in Asia, in countries with strong cultural identities and institutions: in India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, the Philippines… It has not intervened in conflicts with communist or third-worldist rebels in Latin America: in Chiapas, Peru and Colombia.

CONCLUSIONS INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY VS IDEOLOGIES AND WORLD ORDER

1. The freezing of ideas in Western diplomacies of multipolarism and bipolarism (Phase 1) Political cultures had a low influence on Western diplomacies in both multipolarism and bipolarism (Fossati 2006). There was the prevailing influence of only one of them (conservatism: the most “intensive” in interests), leading to a multipolar and a bipolar structure (Aron 1962). Thus, there was international stability (see chapter 3), but a “single” world order (with fixed values) never materialized. Only in the phase (1915/45) of system change, did ideologies become more important, owing to the increasing influence of Nazi-fascist and communist actors as both (Italian, German, Russian…) governments and domestic groups or movements1. After Yalta, the states’ search for interests became the main engine of international relations, and Europe was divided into two blocs. The values of each bloc differed: market and democracy in the West versus socialism and communism in the East. During the Cold War, the USA and the URSS did not try to change those values outside the blocs (Waltz 1979). There was no Western reaction against the USSR repression in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. And what happened in the Third World? Did, for example, the USA promote values that were already applied in the first world: national self-determination, market, democracy and peace? They were not promoted outside the West, and the only relevant ideology was nationalism, so that it was subordinated to states’ interests. Before 1989, Third World countries were mostly characterized by armed conflicts, authoritarian regimes, economic protectionism and national frustrations. The only objective of the USA in the Third World was to stop communism and the USSR, as part of a conservative diplomacy channeled through the 1

In multipolarism, there were two phases in which ideas became important: after the Protestant Reformation with the religious wars, and after the French Revolution with Napoleon’s wars (Wight 1979). However, these were not “political” cultures.

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“traffic light” wars and the “lesser evil” diplomacy. This especially happened with Republican presidents under the intellectual leadership of Kissinger, whose main aim was to marginalize ideologies: see the rapprochement with communist China. National self-determination was not promoted because conservatism has always been against nationalism, which usually leads to conflict, violence, terrorism, wars... Democracy was not supported because of the “lesser evil” priority (to personalist or military regimes), since communist parties could have won elections. Peace was sacrificed by “traffic light” wars (Afghanistan, Vietnam, Korea...) against communist countries. The market was rejected by Third World leaders (especially of Latin America), who were fascinated by the ideas of the moderate left (CEPAL), which applied protectionism through Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI). Only the four Asian tigers and Pinochet’s Chile promoted market reforms, but through quite autonomous decision-making processes. Thus, only the domestic economies of developing countries were influenced by ideologies (radical liberalism in Chile, socialdemocracy in ISI, and Manicheanism in socialist countries). Ideologies mattered only in rhetorical declarations of foreign policy, with a “vanity fair” effect. The diagnosis based on the importance of ideologies in the Cold War has not been supported by the empirical evidence; they were important within the West, but were not promoted outside it. Some Democratic presidents emphasized liberal values, but these were either declaratory (Wilson’s hope for national self-determination in the 1920s; Carter’s appeal for human rights in the 1970s) or temporary (the “just war” in Vietnam promoted by Johnson in the 1960s) episodes in diplomacy (Guzzini 1998). Before 1989 interests often outweighed values especially through the “lesser evil” principle. Many Democratic presidents endorsed this diplomatic strategy, thus marginalizing liberal ideas. Foreign policies of European powers were mostly anchored to economic interests. Leftist constructivist and Manichaean ideas rarely emerged in diplomacies, and their political impact was low. The moderate constructivist American and the radical Manichaean European peace movements mobilized against the Vietnam war in the 1960s and the US Euro-missiles in the 1980s. After Yalta, conservatism became the prevailing political culture in diplomacies. Before 1989 international relations were scantly conditioned by liberal and leftist ideas, which emerged only in a temporary, marginal, and potential manner. Instead, ideologies influenced domestic politics, like leftist ISI in Latin America or radical liberalism in the USA, the UK and Chile in the 1980s (Fossati 2006).

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2. The increasing influence of ideological political cultures from 1989 to 2008 (Phase 2) The comparative analysis of the four arenas shows that after 1989 conservative diplomacies are still the prevailing ones, but many political behaviors follow the other three “ideologies-intensive” political cultures as well: liberalism, leftist constructivism and Manicheanism (Fossati 2006). After 1989, conservatism is still influencing Western diplomacies. Anarchy was applied in many nationalist conflicts and in democratization processes; war often followed Clausewitz’s basic principles: in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Mali, and against Isis. Global economic institutions were still modeled on post-1945 “conservative” coordination; for example, when the Financial Stability Board was established after the 2008 crisis. From 1945 to 1995, the IMF always promoted moderate corrections to laissez faire, and this occurred again after 2002, as the Fund resumed its support for short-term “conservative” limits to capital liberalization. The Basel I banking regime of 1988 has also been conservative. Liberalism emerged in the EU enlargement, and political conditionality was applied to the candidates of the East, while before 1989 it had been sacrificed to the fear of communism in Spain, Portugal and Greece. The same policy was tried by some Western governments with foreign aid to Third World countries, but that attempt failed. The 2003 Iraq war was conditioned by the liberal objectives and the conservative strategies of the “neo-cons”. The 2011 war in Libya was coherent only with liberalism. In the 1980s, radical laissez faire was applied in the domestic policies of the USA, the UK and Chile. Since 1989, it has been supported by many transnational corporations (TNCs) for their investment in developing countries. The IMF shifted to radical liberalism from 1995 (not from 1982) to 2001, by favoring capital liberalization in the Third World. This also happened to the Basel II banking regime of 2004. The ideology of radical laissez faire led to the financial crisis of many advanced countries in 2007/8. After 1989, leftist Manicheanism was even stronger than in the Cold War. While mobilizations of peace movements were of the same intensity, no global protests began; before 1989, third-worldism was strong only in academe and in the domestic (socialist) economies of communist states. Constructivism was also applied after 1989, when Western governments launched “politically correct” wars to defend weak people (Bosnians and Kosovars), and many conflict resolution processes were modeled on multicultural governance, with the promotion of pluri-national states. Before 1989 peace researchers had not influenced diplomacy; constructivism only materialized in the domestic economies of Latin America, through ISI.

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After 1989 this increasing influence of ideas led to a “near” world order, with the promotion of market, democracy and peace (but not of national self-determination). There was stability only in the 1990s, with the concert of powers; after 2001 both unipolarism and multipolarism failed, and the international system became unstable (see chapter 3). The following typology summarizes the arenas with a high density of behaviors for each diplomatic model: the first before 1989, the second after 1989 (Fossati 2006). The proportion of “ideological” diplomacies was 2 out of 12 before 1989, and it has been 7 out of 12 after since 19892. BEFORE 1989 Conflicts Anarchy Conservative Liberal Constructivist Manichaean AFTER 1989

Conflicts Anarchy

Conservative Liberal Constructivist Manichaean

Multiculturalism

Wars Globalization Democracy Wars for Moderate Contagion interests market Values wars Peace movements Wars Wars for interests Values wars

Globalization Moderate market Radical market

Democracy Contagion Political conditions

Politically correct wars Peace No-global movements groups

The ways in which diplomatic models convert themselves into political behaviors should be emphasized. The dialectic between the promoters of interests and values takes place through two analytical processes, which are mixed at the empirical level. First, political cultures influence actors’ preferences, because these sociological drivers are “collective ways of thinking” strongly consolidated in both societies and domestic institutions. Most people involved in politics (at the society level) think in the simple and coherent ways, that have condensed in the recent centuries of Western societies’ evolution. Domestic actors, lobbies and/or movements initially promote international behaviors coherent with each diplomatic model. 2

Grey diplomacies, combining several political cultures, are the neo-conservative (between liberalism and conservatism) and the neo-communist (between socialism and communism); both have only been important in the military arena.

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Second, and at the same time, integration dynamics among the supporters of these political cultures lead to either intentional alliances or inertial convergences, because governments mix everything together, especially after the passage of Western societies to post-modernity (1968). Political behaviors are the outcomes of these two processes. Interests and values may coexist, and the observer (the researcher) is not obliged to establish which matters most, like orthodox realists and Marxists do with interests. The focus now shifts to the second (or parallel) phase of the process. Behaviors are the outcomes of (rational) explicit alliances and/or (inertial) unintentional convergences -the two processes are often mixed- between promoters of interests and values, or between supporters of different sets of ideas. These are the concrete ways in which political cultures -oriented either to interests or values- affect behaviors. The hypothesis stemming from domestic politics would be a coalition between the two lefts and the two rights. This has occurred in rational alliances on wars: either between liberals and conservatives (in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Mali and against Isis) or among various pacifists (except in Kosovo). A non-intentional coalition between constructivists and liberals materialized over former Yugoslavia’s “politically correct” wars. Amid globalization, convergence between the conservative interests of states -promoting minimum coordination- and liberal strategies -permeating TNCs behavior-, with a “swinging” attitude of the IMF, was the outcome of inertial processes. The alliance between the two lefts on the world economy is more explicit, but constructivists are weaker than Manicheans; collaboration proposals become ineffective, if social-democrats do not distance themselves from no-global movements. The responses to cultural conflicts have given rise to a latent convergence between conservative interests and constructivist values, within an international compromesso storico, to avoid national self-determination. The same alliance (see the explicit Franco-German axis) also materialized in opposition to the Iraq war in 2003, which was coupled with the intentional coalition between liberals (Aznar and Berlusconi) and neo-conservatives (Blair and Bush). In democratization processes, convergences are weak, except in the Iraq war. Liberalism has prevailed in the outcomes of the EU enlargement process, even if the beginning of negotiations (for example with Turkey) has also been influenced by conservatism (Fossati 2006). Relations between promoters of interests and/or values have been more complex since 1989. There are four potential kinds of relations between political cultures and behaviors. A total level of correlation is based on the absence of “grey” (in between two models) and low-profile foreign policies. Instead, both scenarios have materialized: in the neo-conservative and neo-communist hybrids, or in the diplomacies of less powerful states.

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Another unrealized relation is the stable bipolar convergence between the two lefts and the two rights. A third scenario corresponds to a bi-univocal relation between political cultures and their supporters. All the cells of the typology should be filled, while for example constructivist leaders (Blair) often choose liberalism, or liberals (like some US Democratic presidents) sometimes become conservative. Instead, the empirical evidence has supported a fourth scenario, with just a univocal correspondence; political cultures have promoters, who do not necessarily declare that they comply with those models. Political actors often seek to apply rational behaviors, but political cultures also influence them through unintentional processes. Both rationalist and reflective dynamics influence political behaviors. Alliances and convergences are usually both present in world politics decisions, even if one of the two sometimes prevails3.

3. Hypotheses on the increasing role of ideas in international relations after 1989 Some hypotheses on this international change (the increasing role of ideologies in international relations from 1989 to 2008) will be presented (Fossati 2006). The first is linked to Huntington’s (1996) theory. The high influence of ideologies after 1989 is due to the conflict opposing the West and radical Islam. The threat raised by Islamic fundamentalism provokes an intense ideological reaction in the West. This proposition is in apparent opposition to Fukuyama’s (1992) prediction about the death of ideologies after 1989. This has only occurred to anti-democratic Nazi-fascism and communism, which strongly conditioned diplomacies for nearly thirty years (from 1915 to 1945). Instead, democratic ideologies (like liberalism, leftist constructivism and Manicheanism) have increased their influence in foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Then, according to Wight (1979), when ideologies are very significant -as they were after the Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution until the Vienna Congress, and the Soviet revolutions until Yalta-, the rational dimension of foreign policies becomes less important. By extension, Khomeini’s revolution of radical Islam at the end of the 1970s has probably represented the fourth major input of change in the past millennium, giving rise to more ideological (and less rational) diplomacies. 3

Scharpf (1997), even though he adopted a pure rationalist approach, labeled these processes as constellations giving rise to different modes of interaction. Goldstein and Keohane (1993) used the metaphor of “glue”, in order to emphasize those focal points that lead to an equilibrium among different actors.

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This pronounced reliance on ideologies in the West could also be a transitory phenomenon, since the international system is in transition from bipolarism to a still unknown scenario (Buzan and Little 2000). The global system is the second independent variable of these diplomatic changes. Nazi-fascist and communist ideologies were more important from 1915 to 1945, when the international system was undergoing a change process. Krasner’s (1988) theory on punctuated equilibria may also be cited. 1989 was the “focal point” that emphasized ideologies; then path dependency should lead to rationality again. This diagnosis is compatible with that of Kepel (1979), who assumed that contemporary violence by radical Islamic groups would be so strong, precisely because they are in the final phase of their political lives. Kepel well explains Al Qaeda’s political process, especially after the killing of Bin Laden, but not the increasing power of Isis in Iraq, Syria and Libya, and that of other Islamic fundamentalist groups in Mali, Somalia, Yemen… Consequently, these conflicts in world politics appear to be transitory; in the medium term, rational conservatism should become again the main diplomatic tool, and the role of (liberal, constructivist and Manichaean) ideologies should decrease. This conclusion is not incompatible with the opposite trend of domestic politics, where ideologies (and left-right polarizations) are less marked, especially after 1989; these are probably “two sides of the same coin”. The influence of ideas was strong after 1945, but started to decrease in domestic politics during the 1960s, with the passage of Western societies to post-modernity (Kirchheimer 1966). The decreasing influence of ideologies in domestic politics may also be due to the fact that both liberal (on civil and political rights) and leftist (to promote welfare state and workers’ rights) mobilizations have been successful, so that it is difficult to launch new ideological battles. Many contemporary cases show that the traditional cleavages (with the left in favor of expansionary economic policies, and the right in favor of restrictive ones) are no longer followed. The deepest ideological cleavage in Western domestic societies probably concerns relations with Islamic immigrants, and the strong post2001 criticism of multi-cultural solutions to those conflicts. An intermediate (third) variable that may explain the increasing role of ideas in post-1989 international relations concerns the above-mentioned permanent sociological phenomenon: the passage of Western societies to post-modernity. Whilst before 1968 conservatism has been the prevailing political culture, constructivist political correctness has prevailed since the 1980s. This sociological change has also exerted its effects in international relations, where constructivism could emerge as the prevailing culture in the future. To date, leftist constructivism has been the prevailing political

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culture of international relations only in the cultural arena, which is the closest to the post-modern sociological change. This outcome seems to be uncertain, owing to the lower anchorage of political correctness in less educated sectors of the population. At the beginning of this social change (the late 1960s), the weakening of conservatism led to some temporary influence of the liberal (and much less of the constructivist) ideology in the military arena (with the Vietnam war): see the summarizing table. Some factors can explain the greater importance of ideologies since 1989 (Fossati 2006). The “West versus Islam” cleavage, which began after Khomeini’s revolution in 1979 and became conflict after 2001, seems to be the main independent variable and the greatest threat to international stability. The international system’s change, like that from 1915 to 1945, and the passage of Western societies to post-modernity may have boosted this revival of ideologies, also as a temporary or partial phenomenon.

4. The changes with Obama from 2009 to 2016 (Phase 3) In January 2009, the Democratic president Obama started his first term (Dueck 2015, Keller 2015). The main thrust of his electoral campaign had been his determination to abandon the neo-con ideology. Did he intend to return to old conservatism or was he going to launch a new constructivist or a liberal diplomacy? There follows empirical evidence in each arena: Cultural arena. Obama’s discourse on relations with the Islamic governments seemed to be the premise for a new constructivist relation anchored to cultural relativism and political correctness. Obama did not react to the Singhalese repression of Hindu Tamils in May 2009, and Sri Lanka remained a pluri-national state. Obama was never close to liberalism, and never supported secession requests (in Ukraine, Yemen…). His involvement in conflict resolution proposals in all those conflicts was limited; the USA only promoted a consensual pact in Libya, emphasizing its constructivist support of pluri-national states. Economic arena. Obama criticized radical liberalism in both NorthNorth (in the financial crisis) and North-South (through the reinforcement of the G-20) relations. He initially seemed to be willing to launch a new constructivist diplomacy. Since the 2008 crisis, state governance has revived in both domestic and global political economy, but with what intensity? There seems to be a mild conservative coordination (through the Financial Stability Board), more than a deep constructivist collaboration scenario, which would require new and strong reciprocal global economic institutions, with greater involvement of developing countries.

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Political arena. Both soft (liberal political conditionality) and hard (neo-con military intervention) instruments to export democracy were abandoned by Obama: for example, in Iran and Syria. Constructivist positive rewards (democratic assistance and diplomatic pressure) remained his main foreign policy instrument, even if they had limited political impact. The end of economic sanctions on Cuba and Iran emphasized Obama’s distance from liberalism, but also from constructivism, since those positive rewards were not linked to significant political progress of any of them. The democratic revolutions in the Arab Spring were spontaneous, and American influence was limited, but Obama no longer supported Ben Ali, Mubarak, Gaddafi, Saleh… He abandoned the conservative “lesser evil” principle (with autocracy promotion), that had been the cornerstone of American diplomacy. Then, there was a military coup in Egypt, but without any significant support from the USA. Military arena. The neo-con ideology was criticized and abandoned by Obama. Bin Laden was killed, with a fast military mission compatible with conservatism. The 2011 war in Libya was close only to liberalism (bellum iustum), and not to constructivism, being a politically incorrect war. It was also far from conservatism and the defense of Western interests; Gaddafi had been always perceived to be the “lesser evil” with respect to Islamic fundamentalism. The “low intensity” aerial bombings against Isis in Iraq, Syria and Libya were consistent with both liberalism and conservatism, but had little short-term political effects; their priority seemed to be limiting human losses. Territorial advances of radical Islamic groups in Yemen have not been sanctioned either. A conservative diplomacy would have probably led to “high intensity” wars. Thus, conservatism is not the prevailing diplomacy even in the military arena. In sum, what changes did Obama produce? It seems that a phase 3 has started in world politics. During the Cold War (phase 1), there were only conservative diplomacies with one ideological exception (the Vietnam war). Thus, there was stability without order. From 1989 to 2008 (phase 2), the West also promoted “ideologies-intensive” (liberal, constructivist, neo-con and Manichaean) diplomacies, even if “interests-intensive” foreign policies still prevailed. Thus, there was an attempt to achieve a world order, but stability lasted only until the 1990s with the concert of powers, while it failed after 2001. Obama has lost any coherent strategy concerning political cultures; there was something of conservatism (in economy), of leftist constructivism (in the cultural and political arenas), one liberal decision (the Libyan war), and nothing of neo-conservatism. With Obama, conservatism is no longer the prevailing diplomatic political culture of the USA (phase 3). He abandoned the “lesser evil” principle (the

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cornerstone of US diplomacy) during the Arab Spring. Obama stopped defending authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen..., even if in 2013 there was a military coup in Egypt, which did not receive significant support from the USA. In the deep conflict between the West and Islamic fundamentalism, he launched “low intensity” wars against Isis in Syria, Iraq (since 2014) and Libya (in 2016), whose main objective seemed to be limiting US human losses, and not winning those wars quickly. His promotion of the values of world order, like democracy (through weak positive rewards) and peace (with the proposal of a consensus pact in Libya), was also week. More than promoting interests or ideas, he avoided any stable decision, refusing any consistent application of liberalism, constructivism, neo-conservatism, and conservatism. After 2011, few (economic) interests were supported by the USA. In the cultural, political and military arenas, Obama lost any coherence, and conservatism is no longer the prevailing political culture in the US diplomacy. In sum, since 2001 the international system has lost its stability, but after 2009 also the post-Cold War “near” world order was weakened.

5. Some contradictions among the values of world order The empirical chapters have shown that the realization of the values of the post-1989 “near” world order has not always been compatible with the evolution of the role that the four democratic political cultures are playing in contemporary international relations. Several centuries ago, Machiavelli emphasized that the ultimate values of society are not always compatible: especially Christian and civic values, like those of the Roman empire (Berlin 2000). This “doubt” should be applied to the four values (national self-determination, market, democracy, and peace) of the post-1989 transition processes in the four (cultural, economic, political and military) arenas outside the West (Fossati 2006). However, power did not raise any problem, as it has always been an instrument of both interests and values. The current “near” world order has rarely promoted national selfdetermination. However, there are several possible bottlenecks in the three post-1989 transition processes (among the four values) in non-Western countries. The first bottleneck concerns the relation between the cultural and the economic arenas. How can pluri-national states, having such a low cultural identity, accomplish a balanced development, coupling economic growth with social equity? In those cases, the most likely outcome is economic growth without equity because the latter is usually reached when cultural identity is higher, as in all single-nation states (Galtung 1981). The low guarantee of national self-determination, through pluri-national

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states, may also weaken democracy, which may be embedded in the power-sharing agreements through consensus pacts or federalism (second bottleneck: relations between cultural and political arenas). Not all plurinational democracies work well, as exemplified by Bosnia. In many cases (especially in Africa), wars have occurred in pluri-national states, when parties winning the elections have not guaranteed minorities’ rights, and those marginalized national groups have started an armed conflict (third bottleneck: relations between cultural and military arenas) (Fossati 2008). Then (fourth bottleneck), in the relation between the economic and the political arenas, if there is little guarantee of social equity in pluri-national states, the political legitimacy of those regimes will be weaker. Hence democratic consolidation will be more difficult and remain at the initial stage, because regimes may be institutionalized -they last in time, with no major political crises-, but have scant legitimacy, as in Latin America (O’Donnell 1999, Fossati 1997). In the fifth bottleneck (relations between political and economic arenas), authoritarianism may be used to induce market reforms; this instrument was applied in east Asia (by Japan, the four tigers, and China), whilst in the West it was used only by Pinochet in Chile in the 1970s (Fossati 1997). The sixth bottleneck concerns the relations between the political and the military arenas. If regimes remain illiberal and not consolidated, wars with other democratic or transition countries (or within democratizing regimes) are likely, as in former Yugoslavia (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). The seventh bottleneck concerns the opposite relation (relations between military and political arenas); wars are fought to promote democracy. This happened in the non-violent 1994 US intervention in Haiti, and in the 2003 Iraq war, waged by the USA under the influence of the neo-cons. The (eighth) bottleneck concerns the relations between the economic and the military arenas. If economic liberalization is not consolidated, and is advanced only in foreign trade but not in domestic institutions, wars may occur: for example, Greece against Turkey in Cyprus, and NATO against Serbia in Bosnia and Kosovo (Rosecrance 1986). Instead, wars have never been promoted to favor market liberalization (potential ninth bottleneck in the opposite relation between military and economic arenas). The difficult compatibility among the four values raises the following question: who are the objectors to the post-1989 “near” world order? The main objections (of governments or trans-national groups) naturally come from non-Western civilizations. The empirical evidence has confirmed this diagnosis, but it has also happened that Western countries did not promote some values of world order (especially democracy and peace), precisely to fight those objectors. This is the paradox of world order.

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6. The linkage between world order and international stability The analysis of the “not always easy” compatibility among the four values of the post-1989 “near” world order shows the existence of some permanent objectors to democracy, market and peace; the fourth value (national self-determination) has in fact been marginalized: a) Manifest objectors to democracy. This is the case of countries of the Sinic civilization: especially China, Singapore and Vietnam. China does not object to market and peace, unless it attacks Taiwan (see the chapter on the relation between market and democracy). b) Manifest objectors to market and democracy. There are some examples: Belarus, Cuba, Venezuela, Myanmar, and especially North Korea. This last regime accepts peace, unless it attacks South Korea (see the chapter on the relation between market and democracy). c) Manifest objectors to peace, market and democracy. The promoters of Islamic fundamentalism (Iran, Al Qaeda, Isis…) reject all the values of the post-1989 “near” world order: peace -they want religious wars and terrorism (Jihad) against the West and Israel-, democracy -they prefer totalitarian theocracies-, and the market -they support state (and oil)centered economic institutions. The main strategies of the promoters of Islamic fundamentalism are taqiya (dissimulation towards infidels) and fatwa (the call to kill the enemies of Islam). These threats may materialize if Iran, Al Qaeda, or Isis attack Israel (Mearsheimer, Walt 2007). Then there are latent objectors to peace, market and democracy, but their threats to stability are less intense. Russia has a hybrid regime, applies gradual and incoherent market reforms, and repressed the rebellion in Chechnya or sent peace-keeping troops in the former USSR. These scenarios of permanent objectors to the current “near” world order promoted by the West must be linked to international stability, which was defined (in chapter 3) as a control process over change. Change processes threatening stability are both international -with three different threats coming from power transitions among the various arenas (from cultural to economic powers, from economic to military powers, from cultural to military powers): see chapter 3- and domestic -anchored to the permanent objections to three values (democracy; market and democracy; peace, market, and democracy) of the post-1989 “near” world order. The highest instability is coming from Islamic fundamentalist groups, which are realizing the third scenario at both levels. They are trying to improve their status from cultural to military power, and object to all values of order. Other power inconsistencies do not threaten international stability.

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Take the example of the transitions of Germany and Japan (from economic to military powers); it is not giving rise to instability because their values they respect market, democracy and peace- are compatible with those of the higher level power: the USA. In sum, stability does not seem to be neutrally linked to nuclear proliferation; for example, India’s and Israel’s weapons are not perceived as threats, because the values of both countries are compatible with those of the current “near” world order. Let us try to summarize the relation between order and stability. After 1989 and until 2001, it seemed that both world order and international stability could be realized. In the 1990s, many non-Western countries (not only in Latin America, but also in Asia and Africa) were applying market reforms and undergoing democratic transitions. It is true that there were many nationalist wars (especially in eastern Europe and Africa), but violence was decreasing at the end of the decade. The main objectors to the post-1989 “near” world order (like Iraq or Serbia) never threatened international stability before 2001, as those change processes were under control. International stability was assured by the “concert of powers”, that materialized in the two wars of Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). After 2001, the threat coming from Al Qaeda materialized, and both order and stability entered crisis. The paradox of world order has been the outcome of the above-mentioned third (c) scenario of manifest objectors (the promoters of Islamic fundamentalism) to the values of current “near” world order: market, democracy and peace. Precisely because there are those permanent objectors, Western countries have often renounced promoting some of those values (especially peace and democracy) to fight the supporters of Islamic fundamentalism: see the first chapter. After 2001, Western powers could have returned to a conservative diplomacy, aimed at defending interests, by supporting “lesser evil” authoritarian (military or personalist) regimes (as in Algeria and Egypt), and waging “high intensity” wars when Islamic fundamentalist groups conquered power or vast territories, as in Afghanistan (2001) or in Mali (2013). Instead, in the short run ideas emerged again, and Bush Jr abandoned conservatism, because the 2003 war against Hussein in Iraq was against a “lesser evil”, and followed the “ideologies-intensive” neo-con diplomacy. Thus, the concert of powers failed in the decision to wage the Iraq war in 2003, leading to a conflict among NATO’s governments. Obama became president in 2009, and immediately abandoned neoconservatism. The Arab Spring started in 2011, and also Obama decided to renounce the “lesser evil” principle. The authoritarian regimes of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen were no longer supported by the USA. Obama abandoned conservatism also in the war of 2011 against Gaddafi in Libya.

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This was a liberal decision because also Gaddafi had been considered the “lesser evil” against Islamic fundamentalism. In 2013, the armed forces staged a military coup in Egypt, even if without any significant US support. Obama kept refusing conservatism also when some Islamic fundamentalist groups conquered large parts of Syria, Iraq, Yemen and post-Gaddafi Libya. Western leaders hoped that not making war against Isis would catalyze violence in the Middle East, avoiding terrorism in Europe. In 2014, the USA started “low-intensity” bombings against Isis in Iraq and Syria, but with little short-term military effects; Obama seemed to want to limit US human losses. Those objectors to the post-1989 “near” world order (the promoters of Islamic fundamentalism) were no longer fought with the usual conservative strategies of the American diplomacy: wars and autocracy promotion. At the same time, Obama did not strongly promote peace and democracy either; weak diplomatic and economic rewards were channeled to democratizing regimes. Thus, since 2001, international stability has also been weakened. The concert of powers of the 1990s failed with the 2003 Iraq war, while neither Bush Jr’s unipolarism nor Obama’s multipolarism have materialized. In sum, since 2001 there has been neither world order, nor international stability. What is going to happen after the recent Isis terrorist attacks in Paris (of November 2015) and in Brussels (of March 2016)? The USA, the UK, France and Russia have increased their bombings in Iraq, Syria and especially in Libya; in August 2016 the USA started to target Sirte, a town in the north that had been conquered by Isis. They remain “low intensity” military interventions, even if Isis has lost some territorial conquests. Recent Isis attacks in Europe could lead to a revival of conservative diplomacies (by the new Republican President Trump), with the promotion of new “lesser evil” dictators, and of new “high intensity” wars against the promoters of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, a disordered stability could materialize, with the weakening of the values of the “near” world order (democracy and peace), and a new concert of powers against Isis. There could be a fourth scenario of unstable order, with the priority given not to stability, but to world order. The values of democracy, peace and national self-determination could be stabilized in the Middle East, by the promotion of single-nation states through popular referenda, leading to: only Sunni or only Shiite countries, a Palestinian and a Kurd state... The authorities of these states would enjoy more legitimacy among their citizens, and could fight Islamic fundamentalism better. Conservative diplomacies (and especially Westphalia’s sovereignty principle) would be marginalized, but peace and illiberal democracies could be favored. In the short period, this strategy would naturally increase international instability.

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