Intentionality and Semiotics: A Story of Mutual Fecundation (Approaches to Postmodernity) [Illustrated] 158966132X, 9781589661325

Citation preview

I n t e n t io n a l it y

and

S e m io t ic s

A PPRO A CH ES T O PO STM O D ER N ITY

J o h n Deely, Series E d ito r VOLUME I

Every movement needs a symbol to grow. If it is the Way o f Signs that leads to postmodemity, how is that path symbollically to be marked. “By the sign of a sign”, Brooke Williams remarked to me in the early days o f the Sem­ iotic Society o f America. Whereupon she lay down on the table the symbol above. “And what is that, pray tell?”, I queried. “A sign o f a sign”, she replied, “the caduceus, the staff o f a messenger bearing a message.” Now let it stand also for this new series as postmodemity advances.

I n t e n t io n a l it y

and

S e m io t ic s

A Story of M utual Fecundation

University of Scranton Press Scranton and London 2007

iii

Copyright © 2007 byjohn Deely All rights reserved.

Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Deely, John N. Intentionality and semiotics : a story o f mutual fecundation / as told byjohn Deely. p. cm. ISBN 978-1-58966-132-5 (h /c) 1. Subjectivity. 2. Intentionality (Philosophy) 3. Semiotics. 4. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225P-1274. I. Title. BD222.D44 2007 110-dc22 2007018941 The birds in the cover illustrations are “Belted Kingfishers” (Megaceryle alcyon, o f the Order Coraciiformes, Family Alcedinidae\ known in French as “Martin-pecheur d ’Amerique”, and Spanish as “Martin Pescador Migratorio”) , from Audobon’s Birds of America Coloring Book (New York: Dover Publications, 1974), p. 23, as rendered by Paul E. Kennedy. These birds breed in summer along streams, rivers, lakes, and estuaries from Alaska to Newfoundland and southward to southern United States; they winter along coasts, streams, and lakes from southern Canada southward to northern South Amer­ ica. Fish are their preferred food, along with aquatic invertebrates, insects, and small vertebrates. From a perch or while hovering, they watch in clear water for prey, plung­ ing into the water headfirst to catch in their bill, pounding the snatched prey to kill it if necessary before eating. During breeding season the Belted Kingfisher pair defends a territory against other kingfishers. A territory along a stream includes the streambed and the vegetation along it, averaging 1 km (0.6 mi) in extent. The nest burrow is formed usually in a dirt bank near the water, with a tunnel (ranging in length from 30 to 250 cm — 1 to 8 ft) that slopes upward.

Distribution: University o f Scranton Press Chicago Distribution Center 11030 S. Langley Chicago, IL 60628 PRINTED ON ACID-FREE PAPER IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The telling of this tale is dedicated to

W. N orris C larke, S.J. Without whom this manuscript would not have been written and to Fr. V ictor Brezik, C.S.B., as Founder o f the Center for Thomistic Studies University o f St Thomas, Houston

If we b o th see th a t w hat you have said is true, a n d we b o th see th a t w hat I am saying is true, w here, I ask, do we see this? N e ith e r do I see it in you n o r you in m e, b u t we b o th see w hat has b ee n said in th a t which is over an d above o u r individual aw areness; a n d so it is with all th at is objective: it exists as reco g n ized o r know n n o t in you o r in m e, b u t on th e basis o f th a t w hich exists in each o f us as fo u n d in g a suprasubjective relatio n term in atin g at the object as recognized. A nd th e sam e h olds tru e fo r w hatever enters awareness, even p rio r to its b ein g recognized in term s o f tru e o r false, spoken o r not, as in th e case o f those anim als which m ake use o f signs w ith o u t know ing th at th ere are signs. — from a c.1900 lost m an u scrip t o f T h eonas (1879-1964) —

v

Note on Reference Style No o n e writes after they die. F or this reason, ideally, the re fere n ce d ate fo r a work in relation to its a u th o r sh ould always be a d ate from w ithin th e lifetim e o f th at a u th o r o r “so u rc e”. O th e r dates m ay be im p o rta n t in th e p artic u la r case, as w hen th e work is a translation o r a p artic u la r ed itio n (th e “access volum e”). B ut in every case th e source date ideally sh ould com e from th e lifetim e o f th e source in question. C iting works in this way is called th e “p rin cip le o f historical layer­ in g ”. So far, this prin cip le has b een em b o d ied in only o n e Style Sheet, th a t o f th e Sem iotic Society o f A m erica (full version available in The American Journal of Semiotics 4 .3 - 4 [1986], 193-215, also in th e Semiot­ ics 1984 P roceedings Volum e, 715-739; abbreviated version a t www .uw f.edu/tprew itt/S S A style.htm ). An electronic variant o f th e full Style S h eet version fo r historical layering can be fo u n d by clicking o n “C en ter for T hom istic Studies Style S heet” at: h ttp ://w w w .stth o m .e d u /S ch o o ls_ C en te rs_ o f_ E x c ellen ce /C e n te rs_ of_E xcellen ce/C en ter_ fo r_ T h o m istic_ S tu d ies/R eso u rces_ A ch iev e m ents/A rchives.aqf,

o r go directly to: h ttp : //w w w .s tt h o m .e d u /P u b lic /g e tF ile .a sp ? F ile _ C o n te n t_ ID = 3424& isDow nload=l

T h e book in the re a d e r’s hands has b een co n stru cted ac co rd in g to this style, em bodying the principle o f historical layering. In th e final References, the colum n o f dates thus shows the re a d e r th e his­ torical layers o f the discourse, as layers o f rock show th e geologist th e history o f the earth. In addition, by reason o f its subject m atter, this bo o k contains m any citations from Latin sources. W ith o n e exception, these cita­ tions are always accom panied by an English translation. Finally, I may note th at since the p u rpose o f q u o tatio n m arks is generally to show what was actually said o r w ritten, p u n ctu a tio n m arks are placed inside quotation m arks only w hen they conform to this purpose; otherw ise not.

Contents at a Glance Note on Reference Style......................................................................................... vi Aviso. By Way o f Evitaring N eedless M isu n d e rsta n d in g s......... xiii Preface. M o d ernity’s P assin g ..................................................................xix Chapter 1. “In ten tio n ality ” ............................................................................ 3 Chapter 2. G ilson an d A q u in a s ..................................................................... 9 Chapter 3. Im m ateriality a n d Intentionality: T h e L atin D evelopm ent, Jacques M ari tain, a n d th e C o n tem p o rary S c e n e .................................................13

Chapter 4. Specifying Form s, Im pressed a n d Expressed: Term s w ithout Equivalence in M odern Philosophy. . . . 23

Chapter 5. T h e P roblem o f T h in g a n d O b je c t....................................... 33 Chapter 6. Specifying Form s, Objects, an d Things. T h e P roblem o f A ctual In tellig ib ility ...................................39

Chapter 7. “A b straction” .............................................................................. 81 Appendix to Chapter 7. ....................................................... 101 Chapter 8. “Agere Sequitur Esse”: T h e Role o f R elation in the O rd e r o f B e i n g ...................115

Chapter 9. R evolutionizing the U n d e rstan d in g o f Subjectivity as Ens Absolutum.................................................137 Chapter 10. Ens Reale as a Sub-Division o f Ens Primum Cognitum. . . 143 Chapter 11. Esse Intentionale A g a in ............................................................ 147 Chapter 12. “Passions o f th e Soul”: Sign-Vehicles as Subjective Factors versus Signs as Suprasubjective R elations . . . . 159 Appendix to Chapter 12......................................................... 164

Chapter 13. O ntological R elation a n d Esse Intentionale....................... 171 Chapter 14. T h e Knowledge o f E s s e n c e s .................................................185 Chapter 13. A T ruth M ore C om plex a n d I n te r e s tin g ..........................199

Contents in Detail Note on Reference Style................................................................................ vi List o f D ia g r a m s ............................................................................................... xi

Aviso: ByW ay o f Evitating N eedless M isunderstandings..................... xiii Preface M o d ern ity ’s P a s s in g ......................................................................................xix

Chapter 1 “In ten tio n ality ” ...................................................................................................3 a. T h e M o d ern C ontext Transform s the M eaning o f th e Term “In tentionality” ............................................................4 b. T h e N eed fo r a S tra te g y .....................................................................8

Chapter 2 Gilson a n d A q u in as............................................................................................9

Chapter 3 Im m ateriality a n d Intentionality: th e Latin D evelopm ent, Jacq u es M aritain, an d th e C ontem porary S c e n e ...................................13 a. T h e L anguage o f A quinas.................................................................14 b. C o n tex t Again: T h a t In ten tio n al a n d Entitative B eing are C o rre la te s .............................................. 19

Chapter 4 Specifying Form s, Im pressed an d Expressed: Term s w ithout Equivalence in M odern P h ilo s o p h y .............................. 23 a. Why the M odern N otion o f In ten tio n ality Is C rip p le d ......... 28 b. Toward a P o stm o d ern C o n tex t fo r U n d e rstan d in g In te n tio n a lity ...................................................31

Chapter 5 T he P roblem o f T h in g an d O b j e c t ............................................................ 33 a. H eid eg ger o n A q u in a s........................................................................34 b. T h e N eothom ist A p p ro a c h ...............................................................35 c. Reality an d Social C o n s tr u c tio n ..................................................... 36

Chapter 6 Specifying Form s, O bjects, an d Things. T h e P ro b lem o f A ctual Intelligibility..........................................................39 a. T h e W orld in the S oul....................................................................... 42 b. E n te r In te llig ib ility ............................................................................ 47 c. T h e Im p o rtan c e o f Ens Rationis in Objectivity............................51 d. E xposing th e Q u o /Q u o d Fallacy. F rom U n ten a b le Dyad to a Necessary T r i a d .............................. 56 e. T h e ‘Q u o /Q u o d Fallacy’ an d Q. 85, Art. 2: E n d in g a L ong M isu n d e rsta n d in g .................................................66 f. W h at th e In tellect A cting (“Intellectus Agens”) E nables th e Possible In tellect To See in O bjects P e rc e iv e d ..........................71 g. F rom P er Se Sensible to P er Se Intelligible: T h e H e a rt o f the M a tte r...................................................................75

Chapter 7 “A b stractio n ” ..................................................................................................... 81 Appendix to Chapter 7. O n the Illuminatio/Abstractio T erm inology in Aquinas: Distinction o r A ltern ativ e?............101

Chapter 8 “A gere S eq u itu r Esse”: T h e Role o f R elation in the O rd e r o f B e in g ..........................................115 a. T h e Singularity o f R e latio n s..........................................................119 D iagram 1. Traditional Presentation of the Aristotelian Doctrine of Categories of Real B eing ...............119 D iagram 2. The Basic Scheme of the Categories of Aristotle: “Esse In ”vs. “Esse A d” ..........................................................123 b. T he T erm inus o f R e la tio n s............................................................ 125 c. Why Intersubjectivity Falls S hort o f th e B eing o f R elation. . 130 d. R elation as the Positive Essence o f All Ens Rationis................ 133

Chapter 9 R evolutionizing th e U n d e rstan d in g o f Subjectivity as Ens Absolutum........................................................................ 137 D iagram 3. Schema of Being as Divided through Transcendental and Ontological Relation .......................... 137 D iagram 4. Being Divided between Absolute and Relative. . . 140 D iagram 5. An Alternative View of Relative vs. Absolute Being................................................ 141

Chapter 10 Em Reale as a Sub-Division o f Em Primum Cognitum............................ 143 D iagram 6. How Esse O bjecdvum Exceeds Ens Reale, or Why Categorial Being Is Inadequate to the Scope of Being as Experienced.........................................145 D iagram 7. Aristotle’s notion of t o ov ( “e n s ”) as transmitted through Boethius to the Latin Age ............ 145 Chapter 11 Esse Intentionale A g a in ...................................................................................147 a. Sensation: Signs w ithout the Possibility o f Entia Rationis . . 148 b. R ooting in N ature the D ifference betw een Things a n d Objects: Objectivity’s Naissance............................................ 153 c. From Sensation to S en se-P ercep tio n ..........................................155

Chapter 12 “Passions o f th e Soul”: Sign-Vehicles as Subjective Factors versus Signs as Suprasubjective R e la tio n s.............................................. 159 A p p en d ix to C h ap ter 12: Phantasiari as Semiosis Independent of Intellection....................... 164

Chapter 13 O ntological R elation a n d Esse Intentionale.............................................. 171 a. T h e Case o f the E ager B eaver........................................................172 b. An Artist at W o rk ...............................................................................173 c. In Qwoand Id Quod A g a in ...............................................................175 d. O b ject an d T h in g Again, a n d th e T erm inus o f R elations. . 178

Chapter 14 T h e Know ledge o f E ssen ces........................................................................185

Chapter 15 A T ru th M ore C om plex a n d In te r e s tin g .................................................199

R eferences, Historically Layered 8c A n n o ta te d ..................................... 205 I n d e x ..................................................................................................................231

x

L is t o f D ia g ra m s D iagram 1. Traditional Presentation of the Aristotelian Doctrine of Categories of Real Being .......................................................................... 119 D iagram 2. The Basic Scheme of the Categories of Aristotle: “EsseIn”vs. “EsseAd”.............................................................................123 D iagram 3. Schema of Being as Divided

through Transcendental and Ontological Relation............................... 137 D iagram 4. Being Divided between Absolute and Relative ........................ 140 D iagram 5. An Alternative View of Relative vs. Absolute B eing ............ 141 D iagram 6. How Esse Objectivum Exceeds Ens Reale, or

Why Categorial Being Is Inadequate to the Scope of Being as Experienced................................................................................. 145 D iagram 7. Aristotle’s notion of t o ov ("“ens ”) as transmitted through Boethius to the Latin A g e ....................................................................... 145

X ll

Aviso

By Way of Evitating Needless Misunderstandings

In the n o rm al course o f b rin g in g a book to p u b licatio n by a university press, th e m an u scrip t goes th ro u g h a g a u n tle t o f “R ead ers’ R epo rts”, a process w hich ideally works to th e im ­ p ro v em e n t o f th e su b m itted m an u scrip t all aro u n d . T h e p re se n t volum e is n o exception; yet in th e course o f soliciting rep o rts by read ers o n e misunderstanding cam e to light w hich was so fu n ­ d am en tal a n d th o ro u g h g o in g as to m erit b ein g h ig h lig h te d in advance an d , if possible, sto p p ed in its tracks. O f th e several re a d e r’s rep o rts w hich I received, o n e o p e n e d w ith th e seem ingly credible, b u t actually in cred ib le, rem a rk th a t “This m an u scrip t is an ex p lo ratio n o f th e develop­ m e n t o f th e c o n c e p t o f in ten tio n ality fro m m edieval to m o d e rn tim es using sem iotics.” T h e rem ark is seem ingly cred ib le, fo r an historical study o f th e co n ce p t o f in ten tio n ality is certainly a w orthy p ro jec t a n d o n e lo n g overdue. B ut th e p re se n t m a n u ­ script u n d erta k es no such study, an d is so far fro m ad v ancing an historical thesis a b o u t th e d ev elo p m en t “fro m m edieval to m o d e rn tim es” th a t th e only sum m ary reply w hich d oes ju stic e to th e re a d e r’s m isap p reh en sio n is th e o n e th a t T h o m as A. Seb eo k once m ade in a sim ilar circum stance: “N o th in g co u ld be a m o re d elu d ed m isconstrual o f th e facts o f th e m a tter.”

XXV

Intentionality and Semiotics

In fact, the p resen t study all b u t passes over the “m o d ern dev elo p m en t” an d application o f the n o tion o f intentionality as th a t n otion makes its ap p earan ce after H usserl an d basically d e­ fines the late-m odern m ovem ent o f th o u g h t labeled “p h e n o m ­ enology”. This book begins with the n o tio n o f semiotics as a determ inately postmodern d ev elopm ent in the history o f philoso­ phy, in o rd e r to show th e relevance to th e d o ctrin e o f signs o f a n o tio n o f intentionality th a t is n o t fo u n d at all in th e m ainstream late-m odern d ev elopm ent o f phenom enology, namely, th e p re­ m o d e rn an d definitively high m edieval n o tio n o f intentionality th a t was o u d in e d in the work o f T hom as A quinas, particularly as taken u p in the closing Latin centuries by J o h n Poinsot, au ­ th o r o f the first systematic treatise d em o n stratin g th e unity an d novelty o f th e sem iotic p o in t o f view as tran scen d in g alike the standpoints o f m edieval realism an d m o d ern idealism . M odern philosophy is over. How long it will take co n tem p o ­ rary protagonists o f philosophy to com e to th at realization I can­ n o t say; b u t in the case o f the read e r’s rep o rt which o p e n e d with a com plete m isstatem ent o f the thesis o f this book, th e body o f the re p o rt soon m ade it clear th at w hat the read er objected to was th e notion th at th ere is o r could be a positive sense o f th e term “po stm o d ern ”, o r th at the term could actually nam e th e p ro sp ect o f a new beginning o r epoch in philosophy’s history. In d eed , the read e r seem ed particularly sensitive to any suggestion th a t p h e ­ nom enology in particular as a contem porary developm ent (latem o d ern m ainstream , as I would say, along with its A nglophile counterpart, “analytic philosophy”) m ight be surpassed. So I feel constrained to warn readers th at anyone who thinks, how ever consciously, th at only extensions an d refinem ents o f m ainstream m o d ern philosophy hold the future, is at risk o f m isreading an d distorting th e thesis o f the p resen t volume. Q uite the contrary o f a historical thesis, th e thesis o f th e pres­ e n t work rath er involves a philosophical bracketing o f m odernity, using the concept o f intentionality in A quinas (an d Poinsot) on the medieval or Latin frontier an d the con cep t o f semiotics on

Evitating Needless Misunderstandings

xv

the postmodern frontier. Medieval and postm odern: these are the bracketing elem ents. T h e thesis o f this work, fundamentally philosophical, p resu p ­ poses th a t the m o d e rn “tu rn to the subject” b eg u n by Descartes, synthesized as betw een Rationalism an d Em piricism in Kant, a n d operative today secondarily as “p h en o m en o lo g y ” an d pri­ m arily as “linguistic philosophy”, has ru n its course. T h e th e­ sis is th a t a w hole new ep o ch o f philosophy, called only fa u t de mieux “p o stm o d e rn ”, is underway, an d th a t th e ‘essen ce’ o r th e­ oretical core o f this p o stm o d ern d ev elo p m en t is th e d o ctrin e o f signs, o r sem iotics (fundam entally a n o th e r m atter, actually, th a n S aussure’s “sem iology”, as th e later 20th-century develop­ m ents ‘slow by slow’ m ade c le a r1). This new d ev elo p m en t ef­ fectively recovers th e fo rg o tten Latin d ev elo p m en t o f sem iotic consciousness betw een A ugustine an d Poinsot, p articularly as A quinas m ed iated it,12 o n th e side o f th e past. O n th e side o f th e fu tu re, this develo p m en t reveals th a t th e epistem ological lim its staked o u t by m ainstream m o d ern theories o f know ledge a n d language are in fact surpassed by th e action o f signs th a t p e n ­ etrates everywhere in n atu re an d is capable o f carrying h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g with it. To this en d , th e p resen t work begins by e x p lo rin g th e 20lh-century d isag reem en t betw een E tien n e G ilson a n d Jacq u es M aritain o n w h eth er th e re is a n o tio n o f esse intentionale p ro p e r to th e th o u g h t o f T hom as A quinas, a n d argues fro m th e texts o f A quinas th a t M aritain is co rrect in seeing h e re a p ro p erly T hom istic n o tio n . I take th e Latin co n tex t o f A quinas as d e b a t­ ed betw een G ilson a n d M aritain o n th e c o n te m p o ra ry scene, th e n , along with th e sta n d p o in t o f sem iotics, fo r my p o in t o f d e p a rtu re ; a n d I do so with a twofold p u rp o se. First, to estab­ lish w h eth er in fact, n o tw ith stan d in g E tien n e G ilson’s view to th e contrary, th e co n c e p t o f esse intentionale was a g en u in ely 1 See Deely 2003b, 2004c, 2006; Petrilli a n d P onzio 2005: 13 a n d passim. 2 See Deely 2004a, “T h e Role o f T hom as A quinas in th e D ev elo p m en t o f Sem iotic C onsciousness”.

XVI

Intentionality and Semiotics

T hom istic co n cep t, o n e fo u n d in th e words an d works o f Aqui­ nas as p ro p erly his own, as M aritain th o u g h t against Gilson. Second, to see w h eth er this co n cep t o f intentionality, b oth p re­ m o d e rn a n d in sh arp co n trast to the m o d e rn n o tio n , has a postmodern relevance in th e co n tex t o f sem iotics o r the doctrin e o f signs. It is th e n this n o tio n o f intentionality, taken directly fro m th e c o n te x t o f A quinas a n d his co m m en tato rs — n o t at all th e m o d e rn n o tio n derived fro m B ren tan o (as is actually m ad e clear in C h a p te r 4 o f th e p re se n t work) — th a t th e book in th e re a d e r ’s h an d s u n d erta k es to re th in k a n d apply in th e p o stm o d e rn c o n tex t o f sem iotics today. Thus, far from b ein g a historical thesis co n ce rn in g “th e d e­ v elo p m en t o f th e co n ce p t o f in tentionality from m edieval to m o d e rn tim es”, th e p re se n t work, wholly on the contrary, is a return to (in H eid eg g erean term s, a retrieve of) th e co n ce p t o f in te n ­ tionality as it a p p ea red in th e Latin th o u g h t o f T h o m as A quinas p rio r to an d in d e p e n d e n t o f (n o t to m e n tio n q u ite co n trary to) th e sense o f the n o tio n o f “in tentio n ality ” as B ren tan o in ­ tro d u c e d it to late m odernity. T h e thesis does n o t c o n ce rn an historical development, b u t ra th e r an historical rupture. I aim to explore th e Latin n o tio n o f inten tio nality as Aquinas p u t it into play, in o rd e r to ex plore this n o tio n , n o t th e m o d e rn n o tio n , in relation to the d o ctrin e o f signs as consisting in triadic relatio n s them selves ra th e r th an in any p articu lar kinds o f “th in g ”, m a te ­ rial o r psychological. (And this cen tral thesis o f sem iotics, by the way, is n o t original with Peirce. Peirce g o t it by re a d in g th e C onim bricenses; an d the thesis was first definitively established by a n o th e r stu d en t o f th e C onim bricenses, J o h n P oinsot.) T he thesis o f the p resen t book is th at the d o ctrin e o f signs as a postm odern developm ent, recovering o n th e m edieval o r Latin side the Thom istic concept o f intentionality (in co n trast to the m odern on e), enables us effectively to bracket th e m ainstream m odern developm ent (from Rationalism to Phenom enology, a n d from Empiricism to Analytic Philosophy) an d to re n d e r th a t de­ velopm ent as an epoch in the history o f philosophy, along with its

Evitating Needless Misunderstandings

XVII

K antian synthesis, depasse. As S hort p u t it (1981: 208), “it is to the sem eiotic process itself” — to semiosis, that is to say, the action o f signs, n o t all o f which by any m eans is involved with o r initiated by h u m an consciousness — “that we m ust look for an analysis o f intentionality.” For w hat semiodcs reveals and the doctrine of intendonality in the context o f semiodcs underscores is th at if (as Aquinas, Poinsot, an d Peirce alike considered3) it is the action of signs th a t carries h u m an understanding, an d if this action in d eed penetrates everywhere in nature, th en the epistem ological lim­ its staked o u t by m ainstream m o d ern theories o f knowledge an d language are re n d e re d nugatory as the establishm ent o f sem iot­ ics constitutes w ithin philosophy a postmodern epoch. T h e re a d e r o f this book may in th e en d disagree with th e thesis; b u t if h e o r she begins by rejecting it, o r begins w ith a closed m in d on th e q uestion o f the m ean in g th e term “p o st­ m o d e rn ” has, should, o r could have in philosophy today, mis­ u n d erstan d in g s o f th e p resen t work are inevitable. A dler may have fallen for th e q u o /q u o d fallacy an d for th e no m in alist p o ­ sition on relations, b u t h e got rig h t th e req u irem en ts fo r fru it­ ful debate: befo re o n e can legitim ately agree o r disagree w ith any thesis, it is first necessary to u n d e rsta n d th e thesis o n th e term s in w hich it is presen ted ; an d on th e term s in w hich th e thesis o f this book is p resen ted , m od ern ity — fro m rationalism to phenom enolo g y , a n d em piricism to analytic philo so p h y — is “fly-over c o u n try ”. T h e re are valuable b ack g ro u n d studies, to be sure, such as S p ru it 1994/1995, P erler 2001, etc., a n d classical co n tem p o rary au th o rs, especially H usserl; b u t this w ork itself is aim ed ra th e r directly at w hat Sokolowski (2002a: 450) calls “th e m o re radical tran sfo rm atio n o f th e co n c e p t o f in ten tio n ality th a t is now n e e d e d in p h ilo so p h y ”, a p o stm o d e rn tran sfo rm a­ tion th a t I aim to show th e d o ctrin e o f signs accom plishes. At th e e n d o f my “P reface” to follow, I tu rn my re a d e r’s at­ te n tio n to the ‘m atter-at-h an d ’, ra th e r th a n get too far a h ea d o f 3 See th e “R esum e a n d Envoi” in Deely 2001: 735ff.

xviii

Intentionality and Semiotics

th e story. Yet I can n o t resist th e tem p tatio n h ere to suggest to th e re a d e r th a t th e re-thinking o f th e en tan g lem en t o f ens rationis with ens reale th at I first en co u n te re d in read in g P oinsot’s Tractatus de Signis (see th e Editorial AfterW ord th e re to — Deely 1985: 465-467, esp. 466 n l0 7 ; an d 481-484) is going to req u ire a n o tio n o f “reality” which goes definitively beyond th e h a rd ­ core m edieval, N eothom istic, n o tio n o f ens reale so ironically illustrated best in th e correctness o f G alileo’s p ro p o n en cy o f C opernicanism over b o th Ptolem aicism an d (to p u t it charita­ bly) “Biblical literalism ”. P o stm o d ern th o u g h t requires a new n o tio n o f “realism ”, even w ithin philosophy, w here the bo u n d aries o f n a tu re itself as well as experience are shifting boundaries, n o t b o u n d aries fixed once an d for all. Some, such as Ransdell, have suggested th e ex­ pression “sem iotic realism ”. W hatever the phrase finally settled u p o n may prove to be,4 it will have to take acco u n t o f B o h r’s q u a n tu m physics n o less th an o f E in stein ’s relativity physics, along with th e pre-m athem atical an d cenoscopic physics o f A ristotle’s writings w herein the world “is e ith er o n e o r many, b u t o f th e m any each is o n e ” (his idea o f substance as th e fu n ­ d am en tal n atu ral u n it o f b e in g ). Ens primum cognitum, as we will see in this book, rem ains the u n ex p lo red no tio n , the co n tex t o f ens reale an d ens rationis alike, w herein it becom es possible fo r h u m a n anim als to learn ‘slow by slow’ that, co m m o n sense a n d all appearances to the contrary, it is the earth an d n o t th e sun th a t moves relative to day an d night. John Deely Whispering Woods, Arkansas 13 August 2006

4 It does n o t figure into th e p rese n t pages, b u t th e Stjernfelt-D eely ex­ ch a n g e in Cybernetics and H um an Knowing, 13.1 (2006), 86-103, a n d 13.3-4 (2006), 161-193, bears read in g on how to u n d ersta n d “realism ” anew in th e c o n te x t o f postm odernity.

Preface

Modernity’s Passing

I have slowly com e to be convinced th at we stand at o n e o f th e g reat “changes o f age” in philosophy and intellectual culture, o n e o f those passages th at becom es clear to everyone in h in d sig h t b u t rem ains obscure to m ost o f those involved in it over the tim e o f its occurrence — an d often, indeed, does n o t even receive a nam e for its positive character until m uch later, in the hin d sig h t o f succeeding generations. So, for exam ple, it was n o t until 1850 th a t scholars began to speak o f “the Renaissance”, th o u g h once the nam e was em ployed it becam e the lens th ro u g h w hich every­ o n e after viewed the period when, especially in th e Italian p e n ­ insula, beginning roughly in the 15th century, know ledge o f the G reek language was recovered an d the com plete works o f Plato finally becam e available to the Latin civilization o f E urope. T he exam ple is particularly apt to o u r own case, for the desig­ nation “renaissance” n o t only lit up o u r understanding o f one of the m ost dram atic periods o f European civilization, b u t did so in a way that served equally to obscure what in philosophy was the most im portant developm ent o f all in the Latin Age for o u r understand­ ing o f the end o f m odernity and the outset o f a postm odern age, namely, the discovery and the opening up o f a Way o f Signs, alter­ native to the m o d em option rath er for traveling the Way o f Ideas.

xix

XX

Intentionality and Semiotics

P o stm o d ern ity begins at th e m o m e n t th a t th in k ers d ecid e to take seriously th e n o tio n th a t co m m u n ica tio n is a p a rt o f reality, th a t intersubjectivity is so m eth in g real, a n d n o t sim ­ ply an a p p ro x im a tio n th a t isolated consciousnesses a p p e a r to achieve becau se th e m ech an ism o f th e ir m in d s is th e sam e, a n d like causes p ro d u c e like effects. T h a t th e w orld is th e p ro d u c t o f each o f o u r m in d s in isolation, in fact, is th e c e n ­ tral te n e t o f m o d e rn philosophy, w hat sets it a p a rt as an ep ­ o ch fro m th e G reek a n d L atin epochs, a n d w hat sets it a p a rt fro m w hat is accep tab le as th e 21st cen tu ry m arks its o p e n in g d eca d e. B ut was it accep tab le even yesterday, o r was it sim ­ ply so m e th in g th e th in k ers w ere u n ab le to avoid? A cco rd in g to P eirce, th e “b reak in g fo rth o f idealism in every d ire c tio n ” over th e m o d e rn cen tu ries was essentially an anti-C artesian re a c tio n to th e fact “th a t u p o n C artesian p rin cip les th e very realities o f things can n ev er be know n in th e least”,1 a co n c lu ­ sion th a n w hich n o th in g co u ld be at g re a te r v ariance w ith th e sp o n ta n e o u s beliefs o f co m m o n sense. If th e develo p m en t o f m o d e rn idealism was in d eed , as Peirce credibly alleges, an anti-C artesian reactio n (b u t u p o n C artesian te rm s), th e n it m ust be said that, in general, it took two very dif­ fe re n t forms. O ne was flatly to reject w hat B erkeley d escrib ed 12 as th e “o p in io n strangely prevailing am ongst m en, th a t houses, m ountains, rivers, an d in a w ord sensible objects have an exis­ tence n atu ral o r real, distinct from th e ir b ein g perceived by th e u n d erstan d in g .” T h e o th e r was to accep t th a t th e re is in d e e d a w orld o f things th at have an existence n atu ra l o r real, b u t to d e­ clare th a t world unknow able in its intrinsic structures. B oth re­ actions are inim ical to com m on sense, th e second n o less th a n the first. A nd the read e r will p erh ap s already have reco g n ized in the second reactio n th e position o f Im m an u el K ant with his “critical philosophy”, w hich set the b o u n d aries to h u m a n know ledge in his strict co rrelatio n o f concepts with percepts. 1 Peirce 1868: 5.310. 2 Berkeley 1710: The Principles o f H um an Knowledge, P art 1, Sect. 4.

Preface. Modernity’s Passing

xxi

W hen th e u n d e rsta n d in g thinks to go beyond the rep resen ­ tations o f sensibility to attain som e aw areness o f the very struc­ tu re o f subjectivity w hich m akes th e source o f sensory stim ula­ tion be w hat it is as a subject in its own rig h t in d ep en d en tly o f th e subject stim ulated, som e aw areness o f th e very stru ctu re th a t enables th a t source to exist in th e physical su rro u n d in g s in d e p e n d e n tly o f its stim ulating activity, th e u n d e rsta n d in g has deceived itself, because “things in them selves”, Dingen an sich, are know able only as to th e fact o f th e ir existence, b u t n o t at all as to th e what o f th e ir p ro p e r being, th e ir own subjectivity. At th e o th e r extrem e, w hen th e u n d e rsta n d in g sets itself to p o n ­ d e r questions o f th e h u m a n soul as able to survive d estru ctio n o f th e h u m a n body, th e know ledge an d action o f angels as p u re spirits, o r in d e e d th e reality o f G od as source o f th e universe, th e u n d e rsta n d in g has again deceived itself, because co n cep ts w ithout p erce p tu al c o n te n t are em pty.3 T hese two delusions o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g m ark th e frontiers a n d limits o f h u m a n know ledge: o n th e o n e side the “things in them selves” as u n ­ know able, on the o th e r side th e “n o u m e n a ” o r purely sp iritual realities equally unknow able. In betw een is th e th in k in g self, now elevated to T ranscendental Ego, w hich is th e actual so u rce o f all th a t each o f us can truly know in w hat we ex p erien ce. T hese limits, from a stan d p o in t o f co m m o n sense, are in ­ credible, and, frankly, u n acceptable. So m u ch th e w orse fo r co m m o n sense in th e co n tex t o f m o d e rn philosophy. B ut all th e while, as m o d e rn p hilosophy stru g g led in vain against th e consequences o f th e C artesian cogito, th e n th o u g h t with K ant to have com e to term s at last w ith th e lim itatio n s o f h u ­ m an u n d erstan d in g , com m u n icatio n , always p resu p p o sed , was yet never co n sid ered them atically as a p h e n o m e n o n in its own right, a featu re o f reality th a t v indicated co m m o n sense ag ain st idealism in all its variants, in clu d in g th e triu m p h a n t K antian 3 T his view o f Kant, v en tu re d (am o n g o th e r places) in his m o d e st Prolegom­ ena to Any Future Metaphysics o f 1783, m akes an in te restin g co n tra st w ith th e view o f M aritain (1959: 220-221) th a t “h e w ho has n ev er c o n te m p la te d th e possible existence o f angels will never b e a m etaph y sician ”.

X X II

Intentionality and Semiotics

variant w hich otherw ise d o m in ated an d effectively m ade a syn­ thesis o f th e seem ingly o p p o sed rationalist an d em piricist cur­ ren ts o f th e m o d e rn m ain stream philosophical developm ent. T he only know able subject, o f course — the m oderns had convinced themselves — was the h u m an subject, and even then only, as it were, “from th e inside”.4 But h u m an subjects do seem, som etim es, som e ways, bo th from outside an d in, to succeed to com m unicate, to establish a veritable intersubjectivity, fragile and tem porary th o u g h it often be. T he fact that all such actual inter­ subjectivity taken as actual reality was necessarily illusory on Kantian 4 So b eg an th e polarity shift in co m m o n usage w here ‘su b ject’ n o lo n g e r co n n o te s substance as m in d -in d e p e n d e n t b ein g b u t only existence in th e m in d (as w hen we speak o f a ‘subjective ju d g m e n t’), a n d ‘o b je ct’ n o lo n g er co n n o te s so m e th in g m erely as know n b u t ra th e r existence o utside th e m in d (as in ‘lo o k in g a t things objectively’). “Som e w ould say”, a review er w rote m e, “th a t this shift h e ra ld e d th e arrival o f m odernity in philosophy.” Similarly, th e grow ing aw areness o f th e linguistic in c o h e re n c e in to w hich this shift has led us (as w hen we speak o f ‘objective re p o rtin g ’, m e a n in g a se­ ries o f statem en ts u n affec ted by th e subjectivity o f th e speaker) h erald s th e ar­ rival o f p o stm o d ern ity in philosophy. P art o f my thesis in th e ex a m in a tio n o f “in te n tio n a lity a n d sem iotics” is to show th a t th e shift was a b lu n d e r a n d that, first, reversing it, an d , second, them atically developing th e co n seq u en ces o f th e reversal, is th e p ath “beyond th e m o d e rn re a list/id e a list im passe”. A n d I m ay n o te th a t w hile this shift is only p a rt o f th e thesis o f th e p re se n t book, I have also developed it as th e com plete thesis o f a n o th e r b o o k so o n to be p u b lish ed u n d e r th e title Purely Objective Reality. T h e distinguished Thom ist, Fr. B enedict Ashley, in a re p o rt on th e m a n u ­ script (30July 2005; bold face added) w hich h e later sh ared with m e a n d g ran te d perm ission to cite, w rote that “Intentionality and Semiotics attacks head-on a p ro b ­ lem m any philosophers a n d scientists avoid o r (like th e so-called p ost-m odern­ ists [the allusion is to Deely 2001: C h ap ter 15, o p en in g p arag rap h a n d n o te 1]) evade. T h e pro b lem is: ‘How can eith er philosophy o r science claim to discover objective tru th w hen w hat philosophers an d scientists assert exists only subjec­ tively, first in th e ir m inds an d th e n in the m inds they cleverly p ersu ad e?’ T h e social and political consequences o f this p roblem are im m ense, a n d cen tral to m o d e rn controversies; yet I know o f n o w ork which has head-on attem p ted a so­ lution to this problem , until now. H ere Deely succinctly an d vigorously p roposes a solution w hich h e arrives at by com bining traditional notions o f intentionality derived both from Thom istic tradition and contem p o rary p h en o m en o lo g y with the notio n o f signs as relations developed by con tem p o rary semiotics. “Deely shows th a t the ‘objective-subjective’ co n trast so fam iliar a n d ce n tral to m o d e rn th o u g h t is in fact confused. Yes, w hat we know a re objects som e-

Preface. Modernity's Passing

xxiii

(or, generally, m o d ern philosophical) principles o f epistem ology only slowly bubbled into realization h ere and there, and norm ally tim es m in d -d e p en d en t, b u t even these objects are signs th a t signify o th e r ob­ jects th a t may be th e term s o f e ith e r m in d -d e p e n d e n t relations o r m in d in d e­ p e n d e n t relations. As h e says: ‘T h e in n e r w orld founds the o u te r world, b u t the o u te r w orld grounds th e in n e r w orld.’ T h u s o u r view o f th e w orld is a ‘sem iotic w eb’ woven o f these two kinds o f signs. To fail to distinguish th e two kinds o f th reads is to e n te r in to th e cyberspace o f fantasy, w hich is D eely’s basic as­ sessm ent o f th e cen tral m o d e rn d ev elo p m en t o f so-called ‘epistem ology’. T h e good news, however, is th a t a critical application o f th e tech n iq u es a n d tools o f philosophical an d scientific th o u g h t, m ade from w ithin th e perspective o f semiotics, can so rt o u t th e p a tte rn o f this web. A nd Deely shows how to d o it. “In th e process, Deely recovers th e classical theories o f know ing from Aris­ totle, T hom as A quinas, a n d G alileo’s contem porary, J o h n Poinsot, b u t h e de­ velops them th ro u g h th e th o u g h t o f m oderns like Charles Sanders Peirce an d H eidegger (on w hom h e w rote an im p o rta n t book som e years a g o ), with fu rth e r insights in tro d u c ed from linguists an d sem ioticians (notably, F erd in an d d e Saussure, T hom as Sebeok, an d U m berto Eco), postm odernists like Jacq u es D er­ rida, a n d analytic philosophers like W ittgenstein. T hus Deely m akes w hat Ber­ n ard L on erg an called ‘th e transition from th o u g h t to historical-m indedness’ with a th o ro u g h appreciation o f th e m o d ern ‘tu rn to th e subject’, while at the sam e tim e recovering the firm er g ro u n d o f the ‘o u te r w orld’ o f classical th o u g h t th a t got lost after D escartes in a perspective so ruthlessly systematized in Kant. “Because th e w ork is steeped in a know ledge o f philosophy’s history a n d yet d eveloped from th e cutting edge o f th e contem porary d evelopm ent o f sem iotics as a centrally ‘p o stm o d e rn ’ idea, Deely’s book results in synthesis th a t provides novel insights into old philosophical problem s (such as the T hom istic co n c ep t o f th e “intellectus agens”, w hich Deely argues consists in the ad d itio n o f m ind-de­ p e n d e n t relations o f self-identity as the m eans by w hich objects are fre ed fro m th e ir exclusive practical relations to hu m an beings as anim als), as well as an original, challenging, a n d un iq u e solution to the pro b lem o f ‘objectivity’. This solution to the problem o f objectivity, in fact, stands alone in the philosophical literature as th e only solution I know o f that has b ee n them atically p ro p o sed to th e question o f how objects can be m atters o f public d ebate alike w hen they are real as things a n d w hen they are fictions n o t yet recognized as such.” F or it is n o t e n o u g h m erely to reverse th e m o d e rn s u b je c t/o b je c t d ic h o to ­ m y as an u n critical re tu rn to p re-m o d ern usage in Latin. W hat is re q u ire d is a th e m atic a n d system atic d ev e lo p m e n t o f th e logical consequences o f th e polarity reversal in o rd e r to achieve an u n d e rsta n d in g o f objectivity th a t n o t only co m ­ p o rts with co m m o n sense b u t can also sustain th e full w eight o f a p o stm o d e rn p h ilo so p h ica l criticism . A nd this is now here to be fo u n d in th e L atin Age, ev en th o u g h th e L atin usage is com patible with as the m o d e rn usage is in c o m ­ p atib le w ith th e re q u ire d solution-to-be-developed to th e p ublic c h a ra c te r o f objectivity a t all levels o f subjective interactions.

XXIV

Intentionality and Semiotics

— alm ost always (such exceptions as B ridgm an stand out) — m et with reluctance. But w hen the inevitability did dawn, as, for ex­ am ple, with B ertrand Russell, o r with Percy B ridgm an th ro u g h his doctrine o f operationalism , the em brasure o f solipsism as the final w ord o f m odernity in philosophy h ad to be spoken. Ideas have th eir consequences, and symbols grow. You can n o t accept m ental im agery at the base o f knowledge in sensation and escape solipsism by any means. Poinsot was perhaps the first ex­ plicitly to anticipate this consequence,5b u t it took the whole o f dis­ tinctively m o d ern philosophy with its doctrine o f “epistem ology” to establish the p o in t as plain to many, and even th en only against the best efforts o f the m oderns to avoid the consequence. Now intersubjectivity c a n n o t be real am o n g h u m an s w ith­ o u t b ein g realized elsew here in n atu re as well. A nd if it is real elsew here in n a tu re as well, th e d o ctrin e o f things in them selves as unknow able is nonsense, exactly as Peirce said in rejectin g K antianism .6 So th e m o d e rn th in k er “has only to ab ju re from th e b o tto m o f his h e a rt”, as Peirce said,7 th e K antian d o ctrin e o f th e D ing an sich as th e externally existing b u t unknow able, “an d th e n co rrect th e details o f K ant’s d o ctrin e accordingly, a n d h e will find him self to have becom e a Critical C om m on-sensist”, 5 In his Tractatus, 1632a: 3 1 2 /2 -6 . See th e ex p licitju x tap o sitio n o f th e texts o f P oin so t with H u m e on this p o in t in Deely 1994: 81-82; a n d th e e x te n d e d analysis co m p arin g a n d co ntrasting th e L atin ap p ro a ch to sen satio n b ased o n th e p ro p e r/c o m m o n sensibles distinction w ith th e m o d e rn a p p ro a c h based on th e p rim a ry /seco n d a ry qualities distinction in th e co n seq u en ces o f b o th fo r sem iotics in Deely 2001: C hap. 12, esp. 522ff. 6 “An unknow able reality is n o n se n se”, as h e p u t it (c.1885: CP 8.43), in o n e o f his m ore tre n c h a n t a n d less p a tie n t sum m aries o f th e K antian d o ctrin e on Ding-an-sich, a d o ctrin e w hich “in h a lf a dozen ways has b ee n pro v ed to be nonsensical” (c.1905: CP 5.525). O n this p o in t P eirce early (1868: 5.310) cam e exactly in to alig n m en t with A quinas, w ho m uch ea rlier h ad p o in te d o u t th a t know ledge that som eth in g exists is necessarily p re g n a n t with an aw areness o f what it is th a t is, a nascen t aw areness th a t in p rin cip le can be d ev elo p ed in to an essential grasp o f m aterial substance at least (as we will see). See th e In d ex entries for ‘U nknow ability’ an d ‘U nknow able’ in Deely 2001: 1009, fo r an ex­ ten d ed com parison o f A quinas a n d K ant on the n o tio n o f th e “u n k n o w ab le”. 7 P eirce 1905: CP 5.452.

Preface. Modernity’s Passing

XXV

th a t is to say, a pragm aticist,8 th a t is to say, a sem iotician (o r “sem iotist”,9 as Rauch w ould have it). P ostm odernity is the rejection o f solipsism as th e final w ord in know ledge, along with th e rejection, n o t o f th e idea o f “things-in-them selves”, b u t o f th e “m eaningless surplus­ ag e”101th a t such things are unknowable. B ut solipsism can be re­ je c te d an d things in them selves can com e to be know n only if com m unicatio n is real, an d co m m u n icatio n can be real only if relations are real. W hen W einberg points o u t11 th a t all o f th e m ainstream p h ilosophers followed W illiam o f O ck­ ham in denying th e reality o f relations ap art from th e m in d ’s own activity, h e is n o t uncovering som e m ere co incidence, fo r th e d en ial o f real relations is th e very essence o f nom inalism in philosophy. W ith o u t th e m etaphor, M aritain co n c u rre d in literal te rm s12 w ith P eirce’s conclusion th a t th e m o d e rn devel­ o p m e n t in philosophy was “a tidal wave o f n om inalism ”:13 8 “T h e pragm aticist, as fully as Kant, recognizes th e m en tal in g re d ie n t” in o u r co n cep ts o f th e w orld o f natu re, says P eirce (c.1905: 5.25); “only (tra in e d by K ant to d efin e ), h e defines m o re definitely, a n d som ew hat otherw ise, th a n K ant did, ju s t how m uch o f this in g re d ie n t com es from the m in d o f th e in d i­ vidual in w hose ex p e rien c e th e cognition occurs.” We will see this in som e d e­ tail over th e follow ing pages. As I have set o u t elsew here at le n g th (esp. Deely 2001), this is why sem iotics, in recovering th e ‘realism ’ o f th e scholastics a n d o f th e G reeks b efo re them , is n o t a m ere going back to th e achievem ents o f a previous age, b u t a going forw ard, w herein n o th in g o f th e positive m o d e rn ach ievem ents — especially in th e spheres o f politics a n d science — n e e d b e lost, b u t w herein a t th e sam e tim e th e ability o f th e m in d to know th e real in its h a rd c o re as well as in its socially co n stru cted dim ensions is re-established. Se­ m iotics is, so to say, th e b rin g in g o f ens reale o u t from u n d e r th e era su re p laced o n it by m o d e rn philosophy, an d alo n g with it th e full dim en sio n s o f th e idea o f esse intentionale w hich p erfo rc e elu d e th e “p h en o m en o lo g ica l stan ce”. 9 R auch 1983. 10 P eirce c.1905: CP 5.525. 11 W einberg 1965. 12 M aritain 1959: 1. “L iteral term s” — th a t is to say, in a fully co n sid ered an d critically c o n tro lled use o f verbal language: see Deely 2006a: “T h e literal, th e m etap h o rical, a n d th e price o f sem iotics: an essay o n philo so p h y o f lan­ guage an d th e d o ctrin e o f signs”. 13 P eirce 1903: CP 1.19. W riting today, p erh a p s h e w ould have called it “th e T sunam i o f N om inalism ”!

XXVI

Intentionality and Semiotics

D escartes was a nom inalist. Locke and all his following, Berkeley, Hartley, H u m e, an d even Reid, were nom inalists. L eibniz was an ex trem e nom inalist, a n d R em usat [C. F. M.?] w ho has lately m ade an a tte m p t to re p air the edifice o f Leibnizian m onadology, does so by cu ttin g away every p a rt w hich lean s at all tow ard realism . K ant was a nom inalist; a lth o u g h his p h ilo so p h y w ould have b ee n re n d e re d com pacter, m ore co n sistent, a n d stro n g er if its a u th o r h ad taken u p realism , as h e certainly w ould have d o n e if h e h ad re ad Scotus. H egel was a n o m in alist o f realistic yearnings. I m ig h t c o n tin u e the list m u ch further. T hus, in o n e word, all m o d e rn philosophy o f every sect has b ee n nom inalistic.

Now intersubjectivity as a them e is taken u p in m o d e rn p h i­ losophy only very late, I m ig h t even say as p a rt o f th e end-gam e, by th e late-m odern m ovem ent called “p h en o m en o lo g y ”, as p a rt a n d parcel with th e ir distinctive p reo ccu p atio n with in te n tio n ­ ality. P henom en o lo g y was am ong th e prin cip al interests o f my stu d e n t days. I read n o t only B ren tan o an d H usserl, b u t Spieg elb erg ’s m asterful overview o f th e m ovem ent, an d w rote my doctoral dissertation on th e philosophy o f M artin H eidegger, a work in which intentionality was th e cen tral th em e, a n d w hose publication was followed by th e publication o f several articles14 developing an d applying th e them e. Later, with my interest in sem iotics a n d th e discovery th ro u g h Poinsot o f the Latin d o ctrin e o f ontological relations, I cam e to see intentionality as a derivative p h e n o m e n o n . T h e “ab o u tn ess” o f hu m an consciousness, along with th e m odes o f in tentionality th ro u g h o u t n atu re, are m ade possible in th e first place by the singularity o f relation as th e only m o d e o f bein g n o t confined to “reality” (in th e scholastic sense o f A ristotle’s t o ov as ens reale). Intentionality as a topic all b u t disappears from my later writings, which cam e to be focused increasingly on th e d o ctrin e 14 Including o n e (Deely 1970; H eid e g g er 1927a) w hich presen ts th e only translation into English o f H eid e g g er’s p a rtin g o f th e ways with H usserl over the essential idea o f p h en o m en o lo g y itself.

Preface. Modernity’s Passing

xxvxi

o f signs as the nascen t th em e p ro p h etic o f a truly p o stm o d e rn tu rn in philosophy, w here th e u n te n ab le K antian d o ctrin e o f “things in them selves” as unknow able is definitively surpassed in semiosis w ithout losing th e m o d e rn aw areness o f reality as actu­ ally ex p erien ced day-to-day being, for th e m ost p art, a socially co n stru cted fabric from which th e co n trib u tio n an d w orkings o f th e m in d o f th e h u m a n anim al in th e sh ap in g o f objectivity — barely a tte n d e d to an d m arginalized am o n g th e G reeks an d Latins, ex cep t in m atters o f logic — can hardly be subtracted. T h en in N ovem ber o f 2002, I p articip ated in a Satellite Ses­ sion o f the 76th A nnual M eeting o f th e A m erican C atholic Philo­ sophical A ssociation h eld in C incinnati, O hio, w here Fr. W. N or­ ris Clarke p resen te d o n e o f th e th ree principal papers discussing my book, Four Ages of Understanding, a book which Fr. Clarke was also reviewing fo r th e International Philosophical Quarterly. T h e session was very lively,15 an d in the afterm ath, Fr. Clarke invited m e fo r th e following year to address th e topic o f intentionality a n d sem iotics before th e In tern atio n al Society o f St T hom as A quinas at its m eeting, h eld in conjunction with th e A m erican P hilosophical A ssociation’s A nnual M eeting in late D ecem ber. Well, I d id n ’t w ant to accept. T he m eetin g was sch ed u led fo r D ecem b er 28, w hich is n o t only ju s t after C hristm as, b u t a d ate on w hich fo r p erso n al reasons I did n o t like to be away from h om e. B ut my frien d sh ip with co m b in ed with my in d e b t­ edness to Fr. Clarke m ad e it n ex t to im possible to say “N o ”. So I acc ep ted Fr. C lark e’s invitation, an d set to work. T h e resu lt is laid o u t in th e pages th a t follow. A ccepting his invitation did n o t dim inish my in d eb tedn ess to Fr. Clarke, it tu rn e d o u t to increase it. For I realized in my at-first-reluctant re tu rn to my old th em e o f intentionality, esse intentionale, b u t 15 A tra n s c rip tio n m a d e o f th e w hole session, in c lu d in g th e m ain p ap e rs as p re s e n te d a n d th e o p e n discussion, w ith an ‘A fterw o rd ’, has now b e e n p u b lis h e d as “G e ttin g th e P o stm o d e rn Perspective: A sym posium o n p h i­ lo so p h y to d ay ”, in The American Journal o f Semiotics 2 1 .1 -4 (2005), 1-74. T his sym posium is set o u t analytically in th e R eferen ces u n d e r “Ashley, C larke, R asm ussen, R e d p a th , e t al. 2002”, q.v.

xxviii

Intentionality and Semiotics

now in th e light o f my larg er th em e o f sem iotics as th e d o ctrin e o f signs, th a t th e d o ctrin e o f intentionality, while su b o rd in ate to th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f relation, is yet essential in its own rig h t to th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f semiosis am o n g anim als, h u m an ani­ mals in clu d ed , insofar as psychology a n d psychological states have an irreducibly sem iotic ch aracter w hich the idea o f in ten ­ tionality best cap tu res o n th e co n tem p o rary scene. Yet I also fo u n d o n ce again, as th e read in g o f M aritain in c o n n e c tio n with my early work o n H eid eg g er h ad already co n ­ vinced m e, th a t th e p h en o m en o lo g ical n o tio n s o f in ten tio n al­ ity a n d intersubjectivity are im poverished derivatives o f these sam e n o tio n s as they w ere m ore originally an d deeply devel­ o p e d in th e L atin Age o f philosophy (I am talking a b o u t th e fou n d atio n s, n o t th e application to the details o f ex p erien ce in th e d escrip tio n o f w hich p h en o m en o lo g y is w ith o u t parallel in th e earlier history o f p h ilo so p h y ), particularly in th e c e n tu ­ ries (betw een A quinas an d Descartes, after O ckham especially) th e study an d know ledge o f w hich m o d e rn p hilosophy in its m ainstream d ev elo p m en t obliterated. A nd so I also fo u n d o nce again, as I h ad in exp lo rin g the d o ctrin e o f signs th ro u g h th e sem inal work o f Poinsot, th a t th e p o stm o d ern era la u n c h e d by Peirce in his recovery an d extension to its full b re a d th o f sem i­ otics requires a retrieval in th e H eid eg g erian sense o f philoso­ phy’s past, particularly its Latin past in th e fo rg o tten cen tu ries im m ediately p reced in g Galileo an d Descartes. How m uch th e discussion o f intentionality has to co n trib ­ ute to the developm ent o f the doctrin e o f signs, an d how m u ch the doctrine o f signs has to co n trib u te to th e u n d erstan d in g o f intentionality, then, is the m easure I try to take in th e fol­ lowing pages. It is a tale, as I say, o f m utual fecu n d atio n . A nd while I concen trate h ere on the intentionality o f consciousness in its semiotic im plications an d overtones, th e re is always at the back o f my m ind M aritain’s tantalizing suggestions th a t in te n ­ tionality bespeaks a being th at is b ro ad er th an the p h en o m e n a of consciousness, a m ode o f being at play even in n atu re itself beyond the anim al sphere, which w ould fit with P eirce’s “G rand

Preface. Modernity's Passing

X X IX

V ision”16 an d the idea o f semiosis as an action verified w herever th e future influences the present and changes the relevance o f th e so-called “past”, beginning with a “physiosemiosis” at once an­ teced en t to and preparatory for the advent o f life in the universe. Well, th e story o f the m utual p ertin en ces betw een in ten tio n ality th eo ry an d sem iotics as th e d o ctrin e o f signs, particularly as b o th are h a rb in g e r o f a p o stm o d ern ep o ch daw ning in in tel­ lectual cu ltu re so far as philosophy is co n ce rn ed , has so m any th rea d s an d loose en d s th a t it is h a rd to tell how best to weave alto g e th e r th e strands into a c o h e re n t p a tte rn a n d riveting tale, how to m ake o f th e th read s a discursive tapestry, as it w ere — w hich is w hat I am going to try to do in th e little tim e we, d e a r reader, have h e re to g e th e r in these pages. I can h ardly h o p e to co m p lete th e task, th o u g h I will do my best to m ake a g o o d b eg in n in g , a n d to indicate lines o f research th a t are m ost es­ sential to th e eventual story u n fo ld in g a ro u n d us. N eothom ism fades in to history, as d id T hom as him self in th e cen tu ry after his d eath , only to be revived in the “first T h o m ism ”, th e Latin d ev elo p m en t betw een C apreolus an d Poinsot, w hich in its tu rn fad ed in to history with th e dying flam es o f th e b u rn in g o f B ru n o a n d th e co n d em n atio n o f Galileo. T h en cam e th e “T hom istic revival” o f Leo XIII, a “second T hom ism ”, a “N eo th o m ism ”, this tim e n o t in Latin b u t in the very national languages o f m o d e rn philosophy itself, against which the N eothom ists saw as th e ir m ain m ission th e vindication o f ens reale, h ard co re reality, as know able. T h a t battle has largely b een won — after all, m o d e rn science from the first, Dr. Jekyll to m o d e rn philo so p h y ’s Mr. Hyde, was on th e sam e side as th e “N eothom ists” all along. B ut it is possible to win a battle an d still lose a war. M ortim er A dler o nce ex p lain ed to m e in th e first days o f my ten u re as a S enior R esearch Fellow at his C hicago-based Insti­ tute for Philosophical R esearch th at the g reat w riters are those whose books, no m atter how often read, constantly tu rn u p in 16 T h e expression is from the H arvard “C harles S anders P eirce Sesquicenten n ial In te rn a d o n a l C ongress” in Deely 1989.

XXX

Intentionality and Semiotics

th e ir re a d e rs’ m inds so m eth in g new, so m eth in g th a t th e previ­ ous gen eratio n s m issed o r m arginalized o r ig n o red . C ertainly so it has b een with th e writings o f A quinas, an d in th e ir zeal for “realism ” his N eo th o m ist followers practically to a m an m issed his d o ctrin e th a t th e division o f b ein g in to ens reale an d ens rationis is n o t a distinction betw een objectivity an d subjectivity, o r betw een th e “o u te r” w orld an d th e “in n e r” w orld (so beloved o f 19th-century psychology an d th e psychologizing ten d en cies w hich beset so m u ch o f th e daw n o f th e 20th-cen tu ry philoso­ phy, T hom ism in c lu d ed ). N ot at all. It is a d istinction w ithin objectivity betw een, o n th e o n e h an d , physical subjectivity a n d intersubjectivity existing w ithin aw areness, an d , o n th e o th e r h an d , p u re objectivity p resen te d along with a n d as essential to th e fram ing o f physical reality fo r b o th th eo retical an d practical concerns. T h e bein g w hich is the p ro p e r object distin g u ish in g intelligere from phantasiari, thus, transcends th e distin ctio n b e­ tw een ens reale an d ens rationis, an d includes b o th fro m th e first in a m a n n e r w hich is confused from th e p o in t o f view o f ra­ tional consciousness b u t intricate and essential a n d an y th in g b u t confused from th e p o in t o f view o f ex p erien ce, in teractio n , a n d life in society. L ong befo re th e h u m a n anim al m ade its en try in to th e evo­ lu tio n o f life, ens reale an d ens rationis \\ 2id com e to g e th e r a n d in ­ terw oven in th e creation o f w hat we in sem iotics call th e objec­ tive w orld o r U m w elt sustained by th e ex p erien ce o f anim als fo r th e purposes o f conscious life. T h e h u m a n anim al was n o t th e first anim al to wrap an d transform th e physical e n v iro n m e n t in a m an tle woven o f m in d -d ep en d en t as well as m in d -in d ep en d e n t relations. All the anim als do that, “m aking use o f signs w ith o u t know ing th a t th e re are signs”, in th e p re g n a n t w ords o f Jacq u es M aritain. T h e h u m a n anim al was only th e first able to recognize w hat it was d o in g an d as a co n seq u en ce able to begin th e en o rm o u s task o f tracing th e p a tte rn in th e weave o f m indd e p e n d e n t an d m in d -in d ep en d e n t relations w hich alo n e will enable us to advance along the ways o f tru th in th a t asym ptotic fashion we have com e to recognize as “infinite sem iosis”.

Preface. Modernity's Passing

XXXI

T h e m istake o f th e m o d e rn s in philosophy, a n d in this b lu n ­ d e r th e N eothom ists jo in e d th em , was to th in k th a t the philoso­ p h e r ’s task was n o t to u n d e rsta n d th e weave an d p a tte rn o f m indd e p e n d e n t with m in d -in d e p e n d e n t b ein g in th e objectivity o f ex p erien ce an d know ledge, b u t to unravel th e two in o rd e r to ex­ pose ens reale as alo n e w orth know ing. It was an u n d erstan d a b le m istake (after all, it was th e very reason th e m o d e rn s originally gave fo r in tro d u c in g th e p rim a ry /se c o n d a ry quality distinction, a dram atic illustration o f th e law o f u n in te n d e d co n seq u en ces if ever th e re was o n e, as I have elsew here show n17), but, in th e en d , a fatal one; fo r it m istakes th e weave a n d p a tte rn fo r a m e re tangle, a n d misses th e essentiality o f th e two to g e th e r in giving m e an in g to h u m a n life — in d eed , to th e life o f any anim al. B eing as first know n, ens primurn cognitum, distinguishes intelligere fro m phantasiari, all right. I have w ritten a b o o k o n th e p o in t;18 b u t it does n o t red u ce to an d ca n n o t be re d u c e d to ens reale. This tru th has im plications fo r ethics as well, w hich I h o p e to ex p lo re in a n o th e r book, an d w hich o th e r sem ioticians such as E ero Tarasti (2003) have already b eg u n to ex p lo re, a p io n e e r­ in g effo rt to w hich Susan Petrilli an d A ugusto P onzio (2003) have given th e felicitous title o f “sem ioethics” to d istin g u ish it fro m all those ethical theories w hich have b een fash io n ed b e ­ fo re th e m a tu rin g o f sem iotic consciousness in tro d u c e d a tru e postm odernity. B ut th a t is a work fo r a la ter tim e. H ere I am co n ce rn ed only to m ake a th e o re tic al p o in t, o n e th a t bears directly o n the fu tu re o f T hom ism , o r p e rh a p s I sh o u ld ra th e r say o n e th a t points to th e possibility o f a “th ird T h o m ism ”, n o t an extension o f N eothom ism w ith its cen tral, al­ m ost exclusive p reo ccu p atio n with ens reale (an d th e inevitable distortions in ethical th o u g h t co n seq u en t u p o n th a t p re o c c u p a ­ tio n 19), b u t a truly /?o.sfrnodern Thom ism , o n e th a t begins fro m

17 See “T h e Q ualities Given in Sensation: A C om p ariso n o f M o d e rn a n d M edieval T re atm en t”, in Deely 2001: 428-439. 18 Deely 2002. 19 Cf. M aritain’s prefatory rem arks 1964: ix-x; a n d Deely 2008.

X X X I1

Intentionality and Semiotics

St T h o m a s ’ d o ctrin e th a t th e primum cognitum o f species-specifically h u m a n aw areness can only be developed from w ithin by th e actio n an d use o f signs, because objectivity as such is a p h e n o m e n o n th a t begins n o t with h u m an consciousness b u t w ith an im al consciousness w ithin w hich h u m a n consciousness distinguish es itself as a p art, how ever u n iq u e in bein g able to distin g u ish relatio n s fro m rela ted things, an d so able to know th a t th e re are signs as well as to m ake use o f signs in co m m o n w ith th e w hole o f n a tu re a n d life. O f course, fo r St T hom as, to know b ein g p resu p p o ses sen­ sation an d , in g en eral, “sen se-p ercep tio n ”, w h erein are fo rm ed th e so-called p h an tasm s by ‘co n v ersio n ’ to w hich alo n e u n d e r­ sta n d in g reach es b ein g . T h e co m m o n u n d e rsta n d in g o f this p rocess in th e academ y today has b e e n accurately su m m arized by D o m in ik P e rle r (1996: 280): W h e n I look a t a horse, I first receive a ph an tasm th a t re p re ­ sents this p artic u la r h o rse as it is given to m e with a certain sh ap e, a ce rtain colour, etc. O n th e basis o f th e phantasm , th e a g e n t in telle ct th e n abstracts th e intelligible species th a t re p re ­ sents th e p u re essence o f th e h o rse — th e horse strip p ed o f all individual qualities a n d all p ercep tu al circum stances. T h e in­ telligible species is th a t by w hich (the m ed iu m quo) th e horse is cognized, n o t th a t w hich (th e term inus q u o d ) is cognized.

T his c o m m o n u n d e rs ta n d in g b o th illustrates th e q u o / q u o d fallacy, a n d goes rig h t o ff th e rails w h en a p p lie d to th e process o f co n c e p t-fo rm a tio n A quinas was p re ssu re d by th e lan g u ag e o f his tim es to call “a b stra c tio n ” (in sh arp c o n tra st to A risto tle ’s G reek , w hich re stric te d th e te rm to fo rm a tio n o f m a th e m a tic a l c o n c e p ts). L atin ex ten sio n o f th e te rm ‘a b stra c tio n ’ to th e process by w hich o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g o f n a tu ra l kinds is achieved was, in retro sp ec t, a linguistic b lu n d e r p ro v o k ed by th e m istaken view th a t n a tu ra l kinds are fixed o n ce a n d fo r all. Yet, unlikely as it m ig h t seem in term s o f th e c o m m o n N eo th o m istic p re se n ta ­ tions o f “a b stra c tio n ”, analysis o f th e process th e re to b e teased

Preface. Modernity’s Passing

xxxiii

o u t o f A q u in as’ idiosyncratic usage proves quite com patible w ith u n d e rs ta n d in g th e universe as we today know it to be: a realm o f c h an g in g “n atu ral kinds” (as well as o f individuals w ithin th e shifting b o u n d aries o f those “kinds”). T h e pages following show th a t the use A quinas m ad e o f th e te rm “ab strac tio n ” is n o t wholly exclusive to species-specifically h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g b u t begins in th e process o f p e rc e p tio n follow ing u p o n sensation prescissively considered. In m oving saltationally to in tellection, “intellectus agens” (with w hich “ab ­ stra c tio n ” is norm ally exclusively associated in th e classroom s) does n o t at all rem ove form from all m atter. It m akes p h a n ­ tasm s intelligible by a d d in g to objects o f anim al p e rc e p tio n th e im p ercep tib le m in d -d e p e n d e n t relatio n o f self-identity (m indin d ep en d en tly , things are n o t “identical with them selves”, they sim ply are them selves). This ad d itio n enables th e h u m a n anim al to see objects o f its attractio n an d avoidance as involving also things existing in d e p e n d e n tly o f o u r self-interest. It becom es quickly clear th a t n o t all “is w hat it seem s”. T h e h u m a n anim al, in m oving discursively from m ere p e r­ c ep tio n to intellectu al u n d erstan d in g , learns th a t th e web o f e x p erien ce involves a co n trast betw een m in d -d e p e n d e n t an d m in d -in d e p e n d e n t aspects o f objects, a co n trast invisible to p e rc e p tio n only c o n c e rn e d with w hat is to be so u g h t (+), w hat avoided (- ) , a n d w hat safely ig n o red (0). “A bstraction” is a p o o r nam e fo r this process over-all, how ever m u ch it suits lim ited as­ pects o f th e process. It may be th e n am e we are stuck with, b u t if we b eco m e aw are o f its sh o rtco m in g s we can at least overcom e the sim plistic n o tio n th a t m a tte r is m ainly an obstacle to u n ­ d erstan d in g , th e way a b a n a n a p eel is an obstacle to eatin g b a­ nanas. O n th e contrary, fo r A quinas, m a tte r is th e locus o f th e intelligibility o f th e “n a tu ra l k in d s” as m u tab le, as semiosis may prove th e b e tte r n am e fo r w hat has h e re to fo re m o re obscurely b een called “ev o lu tio n ”. In this way too th e c o n trib u tio n o f sem iotics is essential, fo r in overcom ing th e K antian lim its to h u m a n know ledge sem iot­ ics reveals h u m a n know ledge as in sep arab le fro m th e aw areness

X XXIV

Intentionality and Semiotics

th a t anim als as such have o f th e ir su rro u n d in g s in transform ing th e physical en v iro n m en t into an objective world. T h e objective w orld, th e anim al Umwelt, is itself p resu p p o sed for the possibil­ ity o f tru th as a p h e n o m e n o n o f critical consciousness in ani­ mals, sem iotic o r h u m a n anim als, th a t is, able to becom e aware th a t th e re are — a n d n o t m erely m ake use o f — signs in th e ir differen ce from objects an d things. So, ju s t as th e ratio n al anim al gave way in m o d ern ity to the th in k in g thin g , so th e th in k in g th in g gives way in postm o d ern ity to th e sem iotic an im al as th e essential d efin itio n o r u n d e rsta n d ­ in g o f w hat it really m ean s to be h u m an . To be h u m a n is to be an anim al, b u t a sem iotic anim al, th e only o n e o n earth . A n an i­ m al, however, even a sem iotic anim al, is a n o t a p u re th in k in g thing, a res cogitans. So sem iotics tran scen d s m o d ern ity in yet a n o th e r way, by resto rin g to th e h u m a n b ein g its in tegrity as a p a rt o f th e b io sp h ere, a p a rt o f life o n earth , an an im al fo r all its rationality tied th ro u g h th e action o f signs to th e co n seq u en ces fo r life o n earth o f its own actions, b u t able to assum e resp o n si­ bility fo r those actions a n d p erfo rce finally fo r th e h e a lth o f th e b io sp h e re overall as a sem ioethic anim al. B ut now my rem arks beg in to w an d er too far off — o r ah e a d o f — th e set p u rp o se o f th e p re s e n t work, w hich is to show th e co n seq u en ces fo r th e d o ctrin e o f signs o f in ten tio n ality theory, a n d th e co n seq u en ces fo r in ten tio n ality th e o ry o f th e d o c trin e o f signs. T h e rest — th e la rg e r task — m u st wait. (It is b ey o n d m e anyway, a n d involves th e w hole co m m u n ity o f in q u irers.) L et us tu rn to th e m a tte r a t h a n d . John Deely Ovcha Kupel, 524 Obikolna Strasse Sofia Bulgaria 26 February 2005

I n t e n t io n a l it y

1

and

S e m io t ic s

2

C h a p te r 1

“Intentionality”

Every story has its ch aracters. T h e story o f m o d e rn p h ilo s­ o ph y c a n n o t be to ld w ith o u t m e n tio n o f D escartes la u n c h in g th e tra d itio n th a t w ould be know n as R ationalism , J o h n L ocke la u n c h in g m o d e rn E m piricism as a c o u n ter-trad itio n , w ith Im ­ m a n u e l K ant effectin g th e g re a t synthesis o f ratio n alism a n d em p iricism th a t w ould d o m in ate p h ilo so p h y dow n to th e e n d o f m o d e rn tim es, w hen ratio n alism m olts in to p h e n o m e n o l­ ogy a n d em p iricism in to analytic philosophy. W ith in th e c o n ­ te m p o ra ry p e rio d o f late m o d e rn p h ilo so p h y — over th e 20th century, le t us say, m o d e rn ity ’s ev en in g so n g in p h ilo so p h y — it is w ith p h e n o m e n o lo g y th a t th e te rm “in te n tio n a lity ” is p rim arily associated, a n d above all w ith th e n am e o f E d m u n d H usserl w ho m a d e o f th e “in ten tio n ality o f co n scio u sn ess” th e fo u n d a tio n o f his new m e th o d . T h e te rm itself, how ever, H u s­ serl g o t fro m his teach er, F ranz B ren tan o . B re n ta n o it was w ho called H u sse rl’s a tte n tio n to in te n tio n a lity as th e ch a ra c te ris­ tic w hich provides a c rite rio n d istin g u ish in g co n scio u sn ess as a w hole. In ten tio n ality thus is th e p ro p erty o f th e m en tal w hereby a m e n tal state is always o f o r about som e object, in co n tra st to physical b ein g w hich simply is w hat it is.

3

4

Intentionality and Semiotics

Now B ren tan o was train ed as a D om inican priest, was in fact a theological peiitus for th e First Vatican Council. As an ed u ca ted D om inican, th e re is no way th at B ren tan o could be u n a c q u a in te d with th e works o f two o f his m ost fam ous b ro th e r D om inicans, T hom as A quinas, who lived a t w hat m any naive souls still co n sid er to have b een th e h eig h t o f th e L atin Age, an d J o h n o f St T hom as — J o h n P oinsot — w ho lived at th e b o u n d ary o f L atin scholasticism with m o d e rn times, a co n tem ­ p o rary o f G alileo an d D escartes. A quinas d ied as th e 13th cen ­ tury re a c h e d its final quarter, having b een b o rn ju s t as th e first q u a rte r o f th a t sam e cen tu ry was reached; while P o in so t d ied ju s t two years after G alileo an d six years before D escartes, hav­ ing p u b lish e d his sem inal Treatise on Signs in 1632, th e very year o f J o h n L ock e’s birth . So w hen B ren tan o , in 1874, p ro p o sed in ten tio n ality as th e o n e “positive a ttrib u te ” w hich “holds tru e o f all m en tal p h e ­ n o m e n a generally”, h e also identifies it as having b e e n so ch ar­ acterized by “th e scholastics o f th e M iddle Ages”; a n d h e gives two synonym s fo r this distinctive “in ten tio n al in ex isten ce”: h e calls it also “m e n ta l” a n d “objective”. All o f this h e sums u p in his definitive form ula: m en tal p h e n o m e n a “are such p h e n o m ­ en a as in clu d e an o b ject in tentionally w ithin them selves”. B ren tan o also points o u t th a t this scholastic n o tio n has orig­ inal traces even in th e works o f A ristotle, fo r “in his books on th e soul A ristotle says th a t w hat is ex p erien ced , insofar as it is ex p erien ced , is in th e o n e ex p erien cin g it, th a t sense contains w hat is e x p e rie n c e d w ith o u t its m atter, th a t w hat is th o u g h t is in th e th in k in g in tellect”.1 a. T h e M o d e r n C o n te x t T ra n s fo rm s th e M e a n in g o f th e T e rm “I n te n tio n a lity ” B ut th e allusions B ren tan o m akes to a m edieval an d even an­ cien t ancestry fo r w hat will b eco m e in con tem p o rary philosophy 1 B re n ta n o 1874: 5 0 n l4 .

C hapter 1. “Intentionality

5

th e p h en o m en o lo g ic al n o tio n o f intentionality are p ro fo u n d ly m isleading, if th e co n tem p o rary read e r is n o t fully aware o f th e radically m o d e rn co n tex t w hich transform s this n o tion, ro o t an d b ra n c h , as B ren tan o in tro d u ces it to H usserl, an d H usserl be­ q u eath s it to his following. For, having distinguished o u r in n e r p e rc e p tio n o f th e m en tal from o u r o u te r p erce p tio n o f physical objects a n d events in words th a t seem to m ake co m m o n sense, B ren tan o disavows a n d severs this a p p a re n t link to co m m o n sense in term s th a t ad m it o f n o uncertainty:2 I n n e r p e rc e p tio n is n o t m erely th e only k in d o f p e rc e p tio n w hich is im m ed iately evident; it is really th e only p e rc e p ­ tio n in th e strict sense o f th e w ord. As we have seen, th e p h e n o m e n a o f th e so-called e x te rn a l p e rc e p tio n c a n n o t be p ro v e d tru e a n d real even by m eans o f in d ire c t d e m o n stra ­ tio n . F o r this reaso n , an y o n e w ho in go o d faith has tak en th e m fo r w h at they seem to be is b ein g m isled by th e way in w hich th e p h e n o m e n a are co n n e c te d . T h e re fo re , strictly sp eak in g , so-called external perception is not perception. M en tal p h e n o m e n a , th e re fo re , m ay be describ ed as th e only p h e n o m e n a o f w hich p e rc e p tio n in th e strict sense o f th e w ord is possible.

T h e philosophically sophisticated re a d e r h ere c a n n o t h elp recalling Locke’s d efin itio n o f id ea as “th a t term w hich, I think, serves best to stan d fo r w hatsoever is th e object o f th e u n d e r­ standing w hen a m an th in k s”, covering “w hatever is m e a n t by phantasm , no tio n , species, o r w hatever it is w hich th e m in d can 2 Ibid., bold face a d d e d . S h o rt n o tes (1981: 219-220) th a t “B re n ta n o ’s view” fares n o b e tte r a t th e h a n d s o f R oderick C hish o lm (1952, 1960) in the E nglish-speaking w orld o f analytic philosophy. W hereas T hom istic tre a tm e n t o f intentionality, a n d a sem iotic tre a tm e n t a-fortiori, “exhibits th e co n tin u ity o f the h u m a n m in d w ith th e rest o f n a tu re ” a n d “reveals th e place in n a tu re ” o f o u r species, C h ish o lm ’s w ork “m akes all in te n tio n a lity to be derivative from consciousness,” a n d “m akes consciousness in to an u n analyzable d a tu m ”. As Chisholm proudly rem arks (1960: v): “It sh o u ld be n o te d th a t this b o o k is n o t co n cern ed with scholastic philosophy.” N o t su rp risin g th a t p h en o m en o lo g ists have proved on the w hole to be “th o ro u g h ly m o d e rn M illies”!

6

Intentionality and Semiotics

b e em p lo y ’d ab o u t in thin k in g ”.3 N or can such a re a d e r fail to recall also Berkeley's rejection o f th e term “th in g ” in favor o f the te rm “id e a” for speaking o f w hat is attained in sensation: “be­ cause the term ‘th in g ’ in contradistinction to ‘id e a’, is g en er­ ally supposed to d en o te som ew hat existing w ithout th e m in d ”, w hereas “th e objects o f sense exist only in the m in d ”.4 N o r can th e re a d e r acq u ain ted with Husserl’s biography be u n m in d fu l h e re o f S piegelberg’s matter-of-fact co m m en t5 th a t “th e British em piricists from Locke to H u m e were H usserl’s in tro d u cto ry readings in philosophy an d rem ain ed o f basic im p o rtan ce to him all th ro u g h his later d ev elo p m en t”, to th e ex ten t th a t “h e k ep t reco m m en d in g th em to his students, as I know from p erso n al experience, as o n e o f th e best approaches to p h en o m en o lo g y ”;6 an d th a t Kant to g e th er with Descartes cam e to be viewed by H us­ serl as “the two greatest p ioneers o f th e new a p p ro ac h ”7 th a t he, H usserl, was w orking to establish u n d e r th e rubric o f p h e n o m ­ enology. S piegelberg’s sum m ary rem ark8 is p re g n a n t here: “T h e fact rem ains th a t fo r H usserl ‘b ein g ’ exists only fo r conscious­ ness, an d th a t actually ‘b ein g ’ is n o th in g ap art from th e m ean ­ ing w hich it receives by the bestowing acts o f this consciousness”. In o th e r words, w hen we th in k o f “in tentionality” as p h e ­ nom enology has in tro d u ced it in to con tem p o rary philosophical discussion, despite som e allusions to m edieval an d even an cien t G reek origins o f th e notio n , th e fact is th a t these allusions are so extrinsic to th e u n d erstan d in g o f th e term as in tro d u c e d as to ap p ro ach irrelevance. A nd yet, th e idea th a t consciousness is distinguished from physical b ein g by b ein g intrinsically di3 1690: In tro d u c tio n T[8. O n this m a tte r o f w hat L ocke m istook as syn­ onym s fo r his m o d e rn d efin itio n o f “id e a ”, see Deely 1993. 4 Berkeley 1710: 535. 5 S piegelberg 1965: I, 92. 6 T h a t may be, b u t they are far from a m o n g th e b est a p p ro a ch es to u n ­ d e rsta n d in g th e grow th o f sem iotics e ith e r in th e la te r L atin Age, o r in th e P eircean naissance o f postm odernity, as we shall see. 7 S piegelberg 1965: I, 120. 8 Ibid. 143, italics ad d e d .

C hapter 1. “Intentionality

7

rected tow ard o r u p o n an object has so m uch intuitive ap p eal th a t th e re has n o t b een an d will n o t likely be an e n d o f th in k ers who are p ersu ad ed th a t th e re simply m ust be a way to avoid th e idealistic an d solus ipse consequences o f th e p h en o m en o lo g ical n o tio n o f intentionality.9 9 It w ould n o t be an exag g eratio n to say, for ex am p le, th a t Sokolowski has d ed ica ted his professional life to this p ro p o sitio n , a n d w ith som e co n sid er­ able success. W hy sh o u ld th e re n o t be a p o stm o d e rn re b irth fo r p h e n o m e n o l­ ogy, w h erein th e m o d e rn idealisdc lim itations o f its fo u n d e r a n d fo u n d in g are overcom e? I w ould agree that, even th o u g h H usserl h im self o p te d fo r idealism , a p h e n o m e n o lo g ist can opt ra th e r fo r realism . P h en o m e n o lo g y as a m e th o d is “o n th e fe n c e ” betw een realism a n d idealism . B ut by its m e th o d P h en o m e n o lo g y is n o t, a n d has no way o f m oving, beyond th e m o d e rn im ­ passe; it can only take sides within th e m o d e rn co n tex t a n d as a m a tte r o f ‘individual p re fe re n c e ’, in co n tra st to m ethodological p rin cip le. R e m e m b er th a t realist a n d idealist philosophers have in co m m o n w ith p h enom enologists th e claim to base th e ir work an d conclusions u p o n ex p erien ce. In th e view o f A quinas, Poinsot, o r M aritain — or, for th a t m atter, Peirce — real­ ism as a philosophical o p tio n derives its w arrant n o t simply from h u m a n ex p e­ rien ce b u t from an analysis o f sensation within h u m a n ex p erien ce prescissively co n sid ered as such (i.e., considered in a m a n n er th a t is never direcdy given in co m m o n ex p erien ce, namely, as o n its own an d in sep aratio n from p erc ep tio n ) as it is a p h e n o m e n o n genetically com m on to the anim al kingdom . A p e rso n w ho exp erien ces a p h a n to m lim b with an itch, p h e n o m e n o lo g i­ cally co n sid ered , ex p erien ces a sensation n o less fo r th e lim b ’s ab sence. B ut fo r all th e ex p e rien tial pow er a n d u n deniability o f such an event as an ex p e ri­ en c e, in a fram ew ork o f philosophical realism it is n o t an itch as a sen satio n prescissively a n d p ro p erly speaking th a t we are d ealin g w ith h ere: “Si organ u m se n tie n d i n o n m o v eatu r a rebus extra, sed ex im ag in atio n e vel aliis superio rib u s viribus, n o n e rit vere se n tire ” — “if th e o rgan o f sense w ere n o t to be stim u la ted by a th in g in th e o rg an ism ’s o utside su rro u n d in g s, b u t in stead by th e im a g in a tio n o r in te rn a l sense pow ers [from th e nervous system itself, as we m ig h t today say], it will n o t truly b e sensing” (A quinas c. 125 4 /6 : In I Sent. dist. 44. q. 2. art. 1. sol. 3; fu rth e r in 1265/6: D epotential).7.; etc). T rue sensation prescissively co n sid ered is only w hat arises in ex p e rien c e from a stim u latio n o f ex tern al sense by a physical stim ulus h e re a n d now exist­ ing as stim ulating, an “o th e r ” w hose objectification o p en s th e way fo r m en tal re p re se n ta tio n in te rp re tin g sensation to be o^CT'-representation — th a t is to say, rep rese n tatio n s th a t are o f so m e th in g other, in p rin cip le b u t n o t always in fact, th a n th e self a n d its activities sustenative o f objectivity, th e aw areness o f “things as know n”. T h a t analytical fram ew ork, ac co rd in g to w hich sensation differs from sense p e rc e p tio n (as also from u n d e rsta n d in g ) in b ein g involved w ith th e o rd e r o f ens reale p rio r to th e possibility o f ens rationis, is th e basis o f

8

Intentionality and Semiotics

b. T h e N e e d f o r a S trateg y T h e m ost likely way o f obviating o r achieving the avoidance o f the idealistic consequences o f th e idea o f intentionality as the p ro p erty o f directedness characterizing m ental p h en o m en a, prima facie, w ould seem to be by a kind o f relocating o f the n o ­ tion to its original scholastic o r m edieval context, w here realism in th e sense o f a grasp by th e h u m a n m in d (how ever partial) o f th e way things are was m o re o r less taken for g ran ted . B eginning th e re with a clarification o f th e n o tio n o f in ten tio n ality in its original sense, followed by a critical assessm ent o f th e problem s o f know ledge revealed after the m o d e rn “tu rn to th e subject”, m ig h t e n ab le us to use th e original (i.e., later Latin) n o tio n criti­ cally advanced to a state w here it w ould be equal to th e challenge o f overcom ing th e idealism which h ad triu m p h ed generally in th e m o d e rn n o tio n o f epistemology, em piricist o r rationalist. This was th e p a th (o r “strategy”) attem p ted by many, p e r­ h ap s m ost, T hom istic thinkers, with Jacques M aritain fo rem o st am o n g th em , w ho to o k u p th e challenge o f H usserlian in te n ­ tionality in th e late m o d e rn p eriod. T hese th in k ers w ere com ­ m itte d to a vindication o f realism in philosophy, a n d consid­ e re d in ten tio n ality to be less on loan to th a n stolen an d mis­ a p p ro p ria te d by p h en o m enologists, as also by those ‘analytic’ p h ilo so p h e rs sufficiently lu red by the intuitive attractiveness o f th e n o tio n th a t b ein g o f o r ab o u t som e object is essential to th e b ein g o f any id ea to try to m ake use o f th e n o tio n o f in te n tio n a l­ ity in th e analysis o f language as well as, o r even ap a rt from any co n sid eratio n of, consciousness. “realism ” philosophically speaking. Yet such a fram ew ork, th e very op p o site o f ‘e p o c h e ’, is bey o n d th e pow er o f p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l p ro c e d u re to establish. Sem iotics, by contrast, d e p e n d in g fro m th e sta rt o n th e type o f analysis w hich recognizes a n d establishes th e co n tra st betw een ens reale a n d ens rationis (e.g., P oinsot 1632a: 1 1 7 /1 4 -1 1 8 /1 8 , esp. 1 1 8 /6 -9 E nglish, 7-10; see also 1635: q. 6. art. 1), req u ires a n d establishes a w hole new c o n te x t fo r ph ilo so ­ phy as a w hole, w hich is why, even th o u g h it recovers (o r r a th e r “re-trieves”) w hat P eirce called “Scholastic realism ”, sem iotics also m oves bey o n d th e realist/id e a list choice as th a t choice has b ee n po sed on m o d e rn term s.

Chapter 2

Gilson and Aquinas

I say m ost, b u t n o t all, m o d e rn T hom istic th in k ers w ere attra c te d to th e n o tio n o f in ten tio n ality as a p rospective ral­ lying p o in t fo r th e revival o f ‘realism ’. F o rem o st am o n g th e h o ld o u ts was E tien n e Gilson. Gilson seem ed to co n sid er any a tte m p t critically to vindicate th e realism o f sense p e rc e p tio n as already c o n ce d in g th e gam e to th e idealist enem y. G ilson, o f course, well knew th a t exam ples o f in ten tio n ality are in d e e d to be fo u n d in th e w ritings o f A quinas. B ut h e to o k n o te o f th e fact th a t th e term in o lo g y o f in ten tio n ality is n o t d ev elo p ed in A q u in as’ w ritings, is n o t cen tral to his g en era l lines o f arg u ­ m e n t, is no t, as it w ere, his own o r “p re fe rre d ” way o f speaking. M oreover, w hen th e vocabulary o f in ten tio n ality does b eco m e cen tral to th e T ho m istic lines o f analysis o f p ro b lem s c o n n e c t­ e d with k n ow ledg e,1 this h a p p e n s in th e w ritings o f th e L atin co m m en ta to rs betw een ro u g h ly 1500 a n d 1650, notably in th e w ork o f b o th C ajetan (1465-1534) a n d P o in so t (1 589-1644), in n e ith e r o f w hom G ilson h ad m u c h co n fid en ce, h e to ld m e,12 for th e reason th a t they “use a vocabulary d iffe re n t fro m th e 1 In co n tra st especially with th e use o f th e te rm “in te n tio n ” to ch aracterize p h e n o m e n a o f volition a n d acts o f willing. 2 See Deely 1995.

9

10

Intentionality and Semiotics

vocabulary o f St Thom as h im self’, an d th erefo re ca n n o t be sure e n o u g h guides to the th o u g h t o f St T hom as as co m p ared with studying T hom as him self an d those co n te n t to speak only with T h o m as’s own vocabulary. H ere, o f course, Gilson was thinking an d w riting prim arily as a historian o f Thom istic th o u g h t, which is fair en o u g h ; an d his criterio n was the ipsissima verba o f the A ngelic D octor as th e only 100% sure guides to his actual th o u g h t. I am re p o rtin g h e re n o t m erely as a scholarly read e r o f G ilson’s texts, b u t as som eone who h ad th e privilege o f b efrien d in g Gilson in his last years an d exch an g in g with him a n u m b e r o f letters co n ce rn in g these m atters,3 in w hich h e told m e him self o f his aversion to P oinsot an d his reasons fo r it, as also o f his aversion to th e ter­ m inology o f intentionality as a way even today o f developing th e th o u g h t o f St Thom as. T h e re is certainly m erit in this ipsissima verbist ap p ro ac h an d , as far as it goes, it may even be said to be irrep ro ach ab le. B ut fo r th e p h ilo so p h e r as such, even o ne tem erarious e n o u g h to claim th e label “T hom ist p h ilo so p h e r”, this it is n o t an ap p ro ac h th a t can ever be sufficient. F or th e philosopher, unlike th e historian, c a n n o t legitim ately settle for th e intelligible h o rizo n o f th o u g h t an d qu estio n in g in place at th e tim e o f A quinas’ d eath in 1274. T h e philosopher, even o n e who considers him self a “T h o m ist”, betrays his vocation if magis amicus veritas is n o t his m o tto w hen c o n fro n te d with th e historical limits o f th e writings o f A quinas. F or th e philosopher, even o n e self-styled as a T h o m ist o f the strict observance, is obliged to deal with th e pro b lem s o f o u r own day, an d with th e term s in w hich his co n tem p o raries see those problem s, even if only to co rrect o r rectify th e co n ­ tem porary perspectives an d term inology, b u t always in th e h o p e o f advancing h u m a n u n d erstan d in g . This is th e task p ro p e r to philosophy as th e h u m a n a tte m p t at wisdom so far as ex p eri­ ence provides m aterials therefor! 3 See Deely 1995 in C iapalo ed. 1997: 6 8 -9 6 .

C hapter 2. Gilson and Aquinas

11

In G ilson’s lifelong reflection on Le Thomisme, p o n d e re d a n d revised six tim es betw een 1941 a n d 1964, o n e does n o t find th e term “in ten tio n ality ” in th e index o f subjects, b u t only the te rm “in te n tio n ”, w hich m o reover is used exclusively with re­ spect to th e will. B ut in th e last edition, n o t as a m ain en try b u t as a sub-entry u n d e r “in te n tio n ”, o n e finds finally a single m e n ­ tio n for “in te n tio n a l b e in g ”, w hich reads:4 As so o n as we see th a t the act o f know ledge is com pletely im m a n e n t in th o u g h t, it will n o t be e n o u g h to say th a t it is th o u g h t th a t becom es th e object; we will also have to say th at th e o b ject is acco m m o d ated to th e th o u g h t’s m ode o f b ein g in o rd e r th a t th o u g h t m ay beco m e it. It is n o t its own bein g an d in a d d itio n th a t o f its object except fo r th e fact th at the object takes o n a b ein g in th o u g h t o f the sam e o rd e r as th o u g h t’s 5 own: O m ne quod recipitur in altero, recipitur secu n d u m m odum recipientis. F o r iro n o r a tree to be in th o u g h t as som ething know n, they m u st be th e re according to a spiritual m ode o f b ein g . T his m o d e o f existence th a t things have in the th o u g h t th a t assim ilates th em is called “in ten tio n a l” being ... a d irect likeness w hich th e object [th at is to say, the thing, inasm uch as it is in sen sation th a t know ledge begins] produces by its very n a tu re a n d im prints in us ... [a likeness] not distinguished from its source because it is not a representation o f it but its expression and, as it w ere, its extension. Second, th e re is the likeness o f th e th in g th a t we conceive in ourselves an d which is n o t th e fo rm itself [im pressed, quo ] b u t [now expressed, in quo ] n o th in g m o re th an its re p resen tatio n . T h e question now arises: how can we g u aran tee the fidelity o f the co n c ep t to its object?

T h e term inological concession is grudging, m ayhap; b u t it is all th e m ore clearly fo r th a t a vindication o f the presen ce o f esse intentionale as a term in th e w riting itself by A quinas, be it th e re as little m o re th an , so to say, a ratio seminalis o r ‘seed lin g ’ 4 G ilson 2002: 265-66, trans. o f G ilson 1964; bold face ad d ed . 5 “its”, in th e 1964 translation.

12

Intentionality and Semiotics

fo r th e later Thom ists to n u rtu re. Doyle rep o rts (2006: 8 5 -8 6 ), fo r exam ple, th a t th e Latin term “intentionalitas" (“in ten tio n al­ ity”) seem s first to appear, perhaps as a coinage, in th e writings o f a p ro m in e n t D om inican know n to Franz B ren tan o (him self o n ce a D om inican, as we have n o te d above), namely, H ervaeus Natalis (1 2 5 0 /6 0 -1 3 2 3 ), cited by Tavuzzi (1992: 134) as “th e greatest au th o rity fo r th e Thom ists o f th e R enaissance” in m at­ ters o f philo so p h ical logic. T h e only tim e I lo o k ed in to th e m a tte r o f th e usage o f this term beyond, o r ra th e r sh o u ld I say, p rio r to, A quinas,6 1 cam e away with th e im pression th a t th e term was in tro d u c e d in to th e L atin w orld a little befo re th e tim e A quinas was b o rn by a L atin tran slato r o f Averroes c.1181, b u t is n o t actually to be fo u n d in th e A rabic tex t translated. So th e origin o f th e term in th a t case w ould n o t b e strictly A rabic, b u t Latin by way o f a neologism co in ed to tran slate an A rabic n o tio n fo r w hich th e tran slato r fo u n d n o ready-m ade expression in th e 12th cen tu ry L atin as know n to him . Yet J o h n Doyle assures m e th a t th e term “in te n ­ tio n ” in cognitive contexts was used m any tim es by A vicenna (980-1037) well over a cen tu ry b efore A verroes w rote. This is a m a tte r th a t I happily leave fo r now to th e historians e x p e rt in th e requisite languages.7

6 D eely 1982: 45. 7 I have n o c o m p e te n c e in A rabic, a n d re p o rt these results o f my ea rlier b rie f in q u iry only as a tale to b e p u t to th e test by som e b rig h t g rad u a te stu­ d e n t in search o f a thesis w orth w riting. B ut th a t prospective stu d e n t sh o u ld take h e e d o f E co ’s passing c o m m e n t (2003: 85-87, “T ranslating A verroes”) o n ju s t how messy such a situation can get.

Chapter 3

Immateriality and Intentionality: the Latin Development, Jacques Mari tain, and the Contemporary Scene So w here does this leave us? We have a late m o d e rn n o tio n o f in te n tio n a lity as th e d irected n ess o f consciousness tow ard its object; som e h in ts o f such a n o tio n as early as A ristotle w ith his id ea o f th e senses receiving th e form o f th e ir stim ulus o b ­ je c t w ith o u t its m atter; an d som e m en tio n s o f this p h e n o m ­ e n o n as “in te n tio n a lity ” o r “im m ateriality” even in th e w rit­ ings o f A quinas (1225-1274), if n o t centrally so; a n d we have a la te r T hom istic d ev elo p m en t o f this n o tio n u n d e r th e label o f in te n tio n a lity am o n g som e o f th e g reatest L atin c o m m e n ta ­ tors o n A quinas, especially T h o m as C ajetan (1469-1534) a n d J o h n P o in so t (1 5 8 9 -1 6 4 4 ). T h e n f u rth e r this n o tio n is tak en u p by m any if n o t all N eo th o m istic au th o rs, especially p e rh a p s in th e w ritings o f Ja c q u e s M aritain (1 8 8 2-1 9 7 3 ), a n d en listed against th e idealist te n ets o f m o d e rn epistem ology, in c lu d in g th e d e ra c in a te d usage o f in te n tio n a lity in p h e n o m e n o lo g y by H usserl (1859-1938) a n d th e m any late m o d e rn s w ho com e u n d e r his in flu en ce. Let us look at A quinas himself, an d th e n this line o f Latin com m entary (as in cluding M aritain, even th o u g h he m ainly w rote in French an d English), to see w here th e dev elo p m en t leads us. A nd then let us consider also w hat the d ev elo p m en t o f semiotics 13

14

Intentionality and Semiotics

as the doctrin e o f signs has to add to the discussion. Let us see if I can convince you, my readers o f this text, of my conclusion that the problem o f the external world as it arose for m o d ern philoso­ phy an d has b een arg u ed ab o u t for the last th ree an d a half cen­ turies an d a little m ore am ounts, n o t exactly to an outrig h t error, b u t rather, as Sebeok first suggested, to a “quasi-error”. a. T h e L a n g u a g e o f A q u in a s L et us start with a language o f A quinas th a t is u n d en iab ly his own a n d cen tral to his writings, namely, th e language o f th e “im m ateriality” o f know ledge. Living things as such are n o t ca­ pable o f know ing. B ut am o n g living things all anim als have a capacity fo r know ing, and, in d eed , it is this th a t distinguishes anim als from plants. This sort o f living being, to wit, an anim al, St T hom as says,1 leads a “do u b le existence”. O n e existence is as a bodily substance restricted in tim e an d space to its p articu lar location, its “circum scriptive u b i”, to be technical; this is its m a­ terial existence. Yet a n o th e r existence is th a t acco rd in g to w hich th e anim al is n o t only its isolated self b u t id entified im m ateri­ ally with o th e r things in th e physical en v ironm ent, namely, th e things o f w hich it is aware an d in d eed needs to be able to find fo r fo o d a n d sh elter an d safety. This seco n d o r im m aterial existence by w hich th e anim al becom es w hat it m aterially is n o t is w hat St T hom as occasion­ ally an d his later com m entators constantly will call “in ten tio n a l existence”, esse intentionale. W hile Gilson will n o t h im self care to call this b ein g p ro p e r to know ledge “in ten tio n al existen ce”, h e will in d e ed follow T hom as to call it “im m aterial”; a n d h e will 1 St T hom as A quinas, In IID e Anima, 5, n n 282-84: see pp. 17-18 below at fn. 6 fo r full citation. T his will becom e o u r base tex t fo r discussing th e n o tio n o f intentionality in A quinas. T his is far from th e only such tex t in A quinas. B ut I am trying to w rite a new book, n o t simply re p e a t g ro u n d covered in e a rlie r w ritings — in this case, e.g., “T h e Im m ateriality o f th e In te n tio n a l as S u ch ”, The New Scholasticism 42 (S pring 1968): 293-306; an d (at le n g th ) my Tradition via Heidegger book o f 1971; etc.

C hapter 3. Immateriality and Intentionality

15

em phasize th a t “intelligibility an d know ledge are in sep arab le fro m im m ateriality”.2 However, as Gilson deals with th e n o tio n , it m u st be said th a t h e also short-changes A quinas’ own tre a tm e n t o f th e im m ate­ riality o f know ledge. F or Gilson norm ally ties th e im m ateriality o f know ledge to th e im m ateriality o f th e h u m a n soul, th a t is to say, its spirituality, m ean in g its ability to co n tin u e in existence w hen th e body dies by virtue o f b ein g th e ro o t prin cip le o f in tel­ lectual know ledge w hich is n o t exercised directly th ro u g h a n d in a bodily organ , an d h en ce th a t (on th e p rin cip le o f agere sequitur esse) m ust co n tin u e to be even w hen th e bodily o rgans are destroyed in d eath . However, th a t is to in tro d u ce an equivocation. F or th e ac­ cid en tal im m ateriality necessary fo r th e cognitive existence o f m aterial things is n o t at all th e sam e th in g as o r in any way direcdy linked to th e substantial spirituality p o stu lated in A qui­ n a s’ arg u m en ts a b o u t th e n atu re o f th e h u m a n soul, fo r th e reason th a t all anim als, n o t ju s t h u m a n anim als, cognize th e ir su rro u n d in g s, as A quinas him self m akes explicitly clear. T h e im m aterial existence w hereby things existing in th e physical e n v iro n m e n t com e to exist as know n fo r anim als as living m a te­ rial substances capable o f awareness, A quinas po in ts o ut, has two distinct levels o r “g rad es”, only th e seco n d o f w hich has d i­ recdy to do w ith th e intellectual know ledge o f ratio n al anim als an d h en ce (and even h e re indirectly) with th e form al ‘sp iritu al­ ity’ o f th e h u m a n soul as an in co m p lete substance o r p rin cip le o f substantial being. T h e re is in d e ed a wholly im m aterial exis­ tence things com e to have as able to be u n d ersto o d , th a t is to say, in esse intelligibile et intellecta. B ut th e re is also th e im m aterial existence things com e to have in sense p erce p tio n , w hich tra n ­ scends entirely n e ith e r th e w orld o f m aterial individuals n o r d ep e n d e n c e u p o n th e bodily organs o f th e anim als as m aterial substances, b u t w hich, nonetheless, m akes th e objects o f anim al

2 For exam ple, G ilson 1960: 207.

16

Intentionality and Semiotics

aw areness exist fo r th e anim als as som ehow part of their own being a n d yet known in their otherness. If we can agree with Poinsot an d Mari tain, say, to call even this in te rm e d ia te esse sensibile (which A quinas identifies as im m a­ terial) “in ten tio n al b ein g ”, th en we are in a position to say th a t th e w hole o rd e r o f know ledge is characterized by an im m aterial­ ity w hich is n e ith e r the spirituality o f a soul capable o f surviving bodily existence n o r essentially tied thereto , b u t an im m aterial­ ity w hich is precisely com patible with th e m aterial existence o f individual anim al substances, rational o r not, ratio n al o r b ru te (th a t is to say). T h e im m ateriality in question is an im m ateriality sim ply ro o te d in form as such in its difference from m atter. It was G ilson him self who once p o in ted o u t to m e — I do n o t re m e m b e r if it was in co rresp o n d en ce o r in a tte n tio n h e called to this p o in t in o n e o f his writings, p erh ap s D ’A ristote a Darwin et Retour,3 o f w hich I treasu re a signed copy — th a t every fo rm as such is im m aterial by co n trast to th e m a tte r w hich it inform s. T hose form s only are called m aterial w hich are e d u c e d as actualizations o f th e potentiality o f m atter, in contrast b o th to angelic form s (which exist wholly a p a rt fro m a n d in d e e d as in cap ab le o f in fo rm in g m atter) an d also to th e h u m a n soul (w hich is “m aterial” inasm uch as it is d esig n ed to in fo rm m at­ ter, b u t “sp iritu al” in asm u ch as it can co n tin u e in existence even afte r its in fo rm in g fu n ctio n has b een d efeated by th e d e a th o f th e body it cam e in to b ein g to in fo rm ). So, as spiritual, form s angelic a n d h u m a n are co n trasted to m aterial form s as form s w hich can as o p p o sed to form s w hich c a n n o t exist a p a rt from m atter. B ut as form s, even those w hich c a n n o t exist a p a rt fro m m a tte r are “im m aterial” by co n tra st w ith m a tte r itself. A nd it is this im m ateriality, a t least in th e cognitive pow ers o f anim al substances, w hich is sufficient to sustain th e im m ateriality dis­ tinctive o f know ledge, th e “im m ateriality o f th e in te n tio n a l as su ch ”, as I o n ce p u t it in th e title o f an article4 to w hich G ilson 3 G ilson 1971. 4 Deely 1968.

C hapter 3. Immateriality and Intentionality

17

p ro te ste d in a le tter to O tto Bird th a t it rep resen ted th e “Jo h n of-Sancto-T hom ist” co n tem p o rary T hom ist line o f M aritainSim on-D eely with w hich h e d id n o t care to be associated.5 B ut b efo re we co n tin u e on, let m e cite fo r you an au th en tic text from A quinas w hich I th in k can leave n o d o u b t in your m in d th a t my above characterizations o f his th o u g h t are faith­ ful characterizations, a n d consequently that, if P oinsot an d M aritain (an d Sim on) are using, as they are, “esse in te n tio n a le ” synonym ous with w hat St T hom as calls th e “esse im m ateriale” n o t o f th e h u m a n soul b u t o f all knowledge, sensory or intellectual, th e n th e re is un q u estio n ab ly a legitim ate T hom istic sense o f in ten tio n ality w hich rem ains relevant to p hilosophy fro m L atin tim es to o u r own. T h e know er in som e sense becom es w hat it knows, w hile yet rem ain in g w hat it is: th a t is possible, St T h o m ­ as says, only if th e form o f th e know n is received im m aterially in th e form o f th e knower, as “recep tio n o f form by fo rm ”, in c o n tra st to a “rece p tio n o f form in m a tte r” w hich results in a p u rely subjective m o d e o f existence. H e re is th e tex t o f St T hom as I will cite as my base:6 5 Ironically e n o u g h , it was this private le tte r th a t O tto B ird show ed m e (a ro u n d 1969) th a t led to my own c o rresp o n d e n ce a n d ev en tu al p erso n a l a c q u a in ta n c e with G ilson over th e rem a in in g years o f his life. 6 A quinas i. 1267/68: In II de anima, lect. 5, n n . 282-284: “Living beings w hich a re anim als ... have a tw ofold existence. O n e in d e e d m aterial, in w hich they a re th e sam e as o th e r m aterial things. B ut a n o th e r w hich is im m aterial a n d p articip a tes in a ce rtain way with th e h ig h e r substances. Yet th e re is a dif­ fe re n c e betw een th e two existences: fo r ac co rd in g to m aterial existence, the existence w hich is restric ted o r ‘c o n tra c te d ’ by m atter, each individual th in g is w hat it is a n d n o m o re, ju s t as this rock is n o th in g o th e r th a n this rock; b u t ac co rd in g to im m aterial existence, w hich is wider, a n d in a ce rtain way u n lim ited (inasm uch as it is n o t te rm in a te d by m a tte r), th e th in g is n o t only th a t w hich it is b u t it is also in a ce rtain way o th e r thin g s as well. ... Im m aterial existence o f th e so rt in q u estio n has two levels o r g rades am o n g bodily sub­ stances. F or th e o n e is wholly im m aterial, as intelligible existence. ... Sensible existence by co n tra st is in te rm e d ia te betw een m aterial a n d intelligible exis­ tence. F or in sensory aw areness a th in g has existen ce w ith o u t m atter, yet n o t ap a rt from individuating m aterial co n d itio n s, n o r a p a rt fro m a bodily organ. A nd it is with a view to this tw ofold existence th a t A ristotle says in Book III o f his w ork o n th e soul th a t ‘th e soul in a ce rtain way is all th in g s’.”

18

Intentionality and Semiotics

H u iu sm odi au tem viventia [scilicet, anim alia] ... h ab e n t du ­ plex esse. U n u m qu id em m ateriale, in quo conveniunt cum aliis rebus m aterialibus. Aliud autem im m ateriale, in quo c o m m u n ican t cum substantiis superioribus7 aliqualiter. Est au tem d ifferentia in te r u tru m q u e esse: quia secundum esse m ateriale, q u o d est p e r m ateriam contractum , u n aq u aeq u e res est hoc solum q u o d est, sicut hie lapis n o n est aliud quam hie lapis; secu n d u m vero esse im m ateriale, q u o d est am plum , e t q u o d am m o d o infinitum , in q u an tu m n o n est p e r m ateriam term in atu m , res n o n solum est id q u o d est, sed etiam est q u o ­ d am m o d o alia. ... H uiusm odi autem im m ateriale esse h ab e t duos gradus in istis inferioribus.8 Nam q u o d d am est pen itu s im m ateriale, sicut esse in tellig ib ile.... Esse au tem sensibile est m ed iu m in te r u tru m q u e .9 N am in sensu res h a b e t esse sine m ateria, n o n tam en absque conditio nibus m aterialibus individuantibus, n eq u e absque o rgano corporali. Et q u a n tu m ad h o c d u p lex esse, dicit P hilosophus in tertio huius (nn. 787— 88, 790), q u o d anim a est q u o d am m o d o om nia.

T h ere we have in nuce, w ithout the w ord, th e sum a n d sub­ stance o f A quinas’ notio n o f esse intentionale. P oinsot a n d Maritain, in taking u p the notion, m ean n o th in g less a n d n o th in g dif­ ferent. Moreover, alth o u g h Gilson may be rig h t (I w ould im agine th a t he is) in h o ld in g the term “in ten tio n al b ein g ” o r “in te n tio n ­ ality” never becam e central to th e vocabulary o f A q u in as’ own day, I think en o u g h has b een said to show that, philosophically if n o t philologically, this assertion am o u n ts to a nom inalistic quibble which n eed n o t be fu rth e r d ealt with fo r p re se n t p u r­ poses. We have en o u g h in h an d to deal with esse intentionale as a thoroughly legitim ate item o f T hom istic vocabulary fo r d ealin g

7 T h a t is to say, ‘in w hich they sh a re so m e th in g w ith th e se p a ra te d in te l­ ligences o r an g els’. 8 Scilicet, am o n g those m aterial living substances th a t we call an im als es­ pecially, b u t also p erh a p s in th e e n v iro n m e n t itself. 9 T h a t is, in te rm ed ia te betw een th e m aterial ex isten ce o f an im als as living individuals an d th e wholly o r absolutely ( ‘p e n itu s ’) im m ate rial ex isten ce o f intelligible objects actually u n d e rsto o d .

C hapter 3. Immateriality and Intentionality

19

w ith th e m a tte r o f know ledge. Ipsissima verbism is a good th in g fo r stu d en ts an d certain phases o f scholarship, no do u b t. B ut fo r o n e w ho w ould m aster th e matter-at-issue, magis amicus veritas: new w ords o r old words newly used will be n eed e d to draw o u t previously unrealized consequences. T h e evolution o f language is as inescapable as th e evolution o f life. b. C o n te x t A g ain : T h a t I n te n t io n a l a n d E n tita tiv e B e in g a r e C o rre la te s Still, th e re is m u c h m o re th a t needs to be established co n ­ c e rn in g th e m edieval co n tex t if we are to see th e way in w hich sem iotics im pacts u p o n this established Thom istic usage in a way th a t is useful fo r th e transition to po stm o d ern ity in th e in ­ tellectual cu ltu re o f philosophy. Philosophy may begin in w on­ der, b u t, as S piegelberg has n o te d so well, n o t all w onders are o f eq u al im p o rta n c e to everyone. A ccording to Spiegelberg, “th e ce n tra l m ystery”, so to say, “th e w o n d er o f all w onders”, “was to H usserl n o t B eing as such, b u t th e fact th a t th e re is such a th in g in this w orld as a b ein g th a t is aware o f its own b ein g an d o f o th e r b eings.”10 H u sserl’s w o n d er may n o t have b een th e “w o n d er o f w on­ d e rs” fo r A quinas, b u t it was certainly o n e o f th e m ain things a b o u t w hich A quinas w ondered. We n o te d above th a t th e in te n ­ tional b ein g o f form s in know ledge contrasts with th e ir m aterial existence in individual substances, w hich last th e scholastics also called entitative existence. We n o te d th a t St T hom as calls this in ten tio n al existence an “esse im m ateriale”, w hich we h ad to be careful to distinguish from th e spiritual b u t entitative existence o f th e substantial form s o f angels, an d even o f th e h u m a n soul (also spiritual in th e entitative sense) befo re an d after d eath . K eeping these distinctions in m ind, however, we now n e e d to n o te — an d this is a n o te o f th e first im p o rtan ce — th a t St T hom as also uses th e term “sp iritu al” as a synonym fo r th e esse 10 S piegelberg 1965: I, 87.

20

Intentionality and Semiotics

immateriale o f esse intentionale even in the sense th at in ten tio n al im m aterial b ein g contrasts with entitative spiritual being. Cor­ resp o n d in g to th e two ways in which form exists in anim al sub­ stances, subjectively (o r ‘m aterially’) vs. objectively (or ‘im m a­ terially’ an d in ten tio n ally ), th e re are two ways in which anim als u n d e rg o changes in th e ir individual substantiality: o n e way ac­ co rd in g to w hich th e individual receives a new form o r form al d ete rm in a tio n w hich displaces a previous form , an d so m odi­ fies th e subjective b ein g o f th e anim al acco rd in g to its individu­ atin g characteristics; an d yet a n o th e r way acco rd in g to w hich an anim al, u n c h a n g e d in its m aterial an d n atu ral existence, re­ ceives th e fo rm o f a n o th e r as o th e r o r ‘objectively’, th a t is to say, receives th e form o f th e o th e r w ithout th a t form carrying with it th e o th e r ’s m atter, an d w ithout e n terin g in to th e a n im al’s m atter, either. T h e fo rm o f th e anim al receives, th ro u g h in ter­ actions resu ltin g in cognition, n o t only m aterial m odifications o f itself; its own fo rm as such fu rth e r receives th e fo rm w ith o u t m a tte r o f th e other. T h ereb y th e o th e r becom es objectified o r know n. T h e rece p tio n o f form in an d by m a tte r A quinas calls “n a tu ra l chan g e, immutatio naturalis”; th e rece p tio n o f fo rm in a n d by form A quinas calls ra th e r “spiritual change, immutatio spiritualis . T h e la ter Thom ists, such as th e I 7 th-century P o in so t o r th e 20th-century M aritain, will call these two types o f ch an g e, respectively,“entitative o r physical m odification o r c h a n g e ” a n d “in te n tio n a l m o dification o r ch a n g e ”, b u t across th e te rm in o l­ ogy th e c o n te n t o f th e d istin ctio n will be th e sam e. F u rth e rm o re , th e re is to be n o te d h e re o n e fu rth e r distinc­ tio n o n A q u in as’ p a rt th a t I th in k can only be called an error. F or A quinas th o u g h t that, in th e case o f sight a n d h e a rin g ,11 th e immutatio spiritualis necessary fo r aw areness to p ro v en ate co u ld o ccu r w ith o u t th e re b ein g also an acco m p an y in g immutatio naturalis, while in th e case o f sm ell, taste, a n d to u c h every immu­ tatio spiritualis h a d a co n c o m ita n t immutatio naturalis. We have 1

11 A quinas c.1266: Summa theologiae, I, Q. 78, art. 3c.

C hapter 3. Immateriality and Intentionality

21

le a rn e d e n o u g h since those days to say with confidence th at an immutatio naturalis is c o n c o m ita n t to every immutatio spiritualis, or, to p u t it in w hat I d eem to be som ew hat clearer terminology, every in te n tio n a l fo rm is ca rrie d by an d presupposes an entitative basis: th e re are n o p u rely in te n tio n a l form s in the sense o f p u rely spiritual form s w hich pass betw een existing subjects w ith o u t any su stain in g physical su b stru ctu re at each p o in t of th e passage: w ith o u t an In n en w elt th e re is n o Umwelt.

22

Chapter 4

Specifying Forms, Impressed and Expressed: Terms without Equivalence in Modern Philosophy T h e erro n eo u s idea th a t in ten tio n al form s could exist both wholly in contrast with and severed from the physical form s o f individual subjectivity was fu rth e r m arked linguistically in th e m edieval m ilieu by th e term species. This term is in som e ways u n fo rtu n a te for late m o d e rn — o r even p o stm o d ern — discus­ sions, because fo r us today th e term “species” is a biological term th a t has little directly to do with epistemology, b u t refers prim arily to w hat A ristotle called the diversity o f “n atu ra l k in d s” such as th e birds an d fishes, camels, zebras, an d m onkeys. So let us be clear th a t species (the specifying form s o f m id d le to late Latin th o u g h t), are n o t th e “species” o f biological an d genetic investigation. This is a p o in t th a t needs to be m ark ed term inologically. I will m ark it in this text visually by always p lacing th e cognitive species in italic font. Aurally, I w ould suggest m ark in g the p o in t by always p ro n o u n c in g th e cognitive species as “spaychee-ehs”,1 an d never as “spee-sees”. T h e p o in t in sum m ary is th at the usual u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e w ord “species” in English today concerns biology, while th e L atin term “species” in th e ex­ pressions species impressa an d species expressa does n o t refer to 1 As I suggested pronunciation-w ise in Deely 1982: 45.

23

24

Intentionality and Semiotics

entitatively n atu ral kinds b u t to the specification o f cognitive pow ers to beco m e aware o f this ra th e r th an that. So w hat is a species? Q uite simply, as M aritain an d Poinsot tell us, it is an intentional form, in co n trast to, b u t not wholly in­ d e p e n d e n t of, a subjective m odification o r entitative o r physical fomn as su b stru ctu re. It is always acco m p an ied in fact by a sub­ jective m odification, a physical change, b u t it does not consist in that accom panying physical change. R ather, w hat is distinctive a b o u t it is th a t th e entitative m odification with w hich it is cor­ re la ted o r from w hich it provenates always gives rise to an d p rin ­ cipally consists in a relatio n to som e object, e ith e r actually (in th e case o f psychological states) o r virtually (in th e case o f m a­ terial objects w hich c a n n o t exist otherw ise th a n as involved in relations o f in teractio n and, u n d e r th e p ro p e r scrutiny, provide know ledge a b o u t w hat they have u n d e rg o n e ). In o th e r words, a species is a m o dification o f subjectivity precisely in asm u ch as th e m odification contains o r codifies o r specifies in fo rm atio n . I do n o t th in k th a t this decisive an d crucial p o in t is particularly well conveyed w hen species is translated, accurately m ayhap, b u t still obtusely, as an “in ten tio n al fo rm ” (as in Pisters an d g en era lly ). T h e best translation o f “species”, in the case o f cognition, is n o t as “inten tio n al fo rm ” b u t as “specifying fo rm ”, “specification”, o r “specifier”. It is ironic th a t the very etymology o f th e term in Latin suggested, all along the tortuous history o f this co n ce p t in T hom ism — especially N eothom ism 2 (since transition to th e 2 I d o n ’t know o f a single im p o rta n t figure in th e late m o d e rn T h o m istic revival w ho ac ce p te d fo r him self th e label “N eo th o m ist”. M aritain a n d G ilson reje cte d it with p articu la r vigor. B ut h e re it is n o t a q u estio n o f how they th o u g h t o f them selves, b u t o f w here they a p p e a r in history a n d how th a t p lace sh o u ld be n am ed . I d o u b t th a t P orphyry o r Proclus th o u g h t o f them selves as “N eoplato n ists”, anym ore th a n Gilson o r M aritain th o u g h t o f them selves as “N eo th o m ists”. Still, th e “N eoplatonists” w ere th e P latonists w ho b e lo n g to a d efin ite historical ep o ch after Plato, with its distinctive p re o c c u p a tio n s a n d problem s. J u st so, th e “N eothom ists” w ere th e T h o m ists o f th e revival o f T hom ism called into b ein g by P ope L eo X III’s 1879 encyclical, Aetem i Patris. T his revival was distinctively c o n c e rn e d to vindicate, ag ain st th e m o d e rn idealist d o c trin e th a t the m in d knows only w hat th e m in d itself m akes, th e

C hapter 4. Terms without Equivalence in Modern Philosophy

25

national languages o f m odernity was essential to its success), to say n o th in g o f the late-m odern developm ent o f “p h en o m en o l­ ogy” — the correct an d best translation for the term in ques­ tion. Yet this tran sp aren t ren d erin g o f species as ‘specifying fo rm ’ nonetheless elud ed thinkers over the whole course o f the neothom istic revival! Mari tain felt3 “th at the m ost suitable expres­ sion to re n d e r species would be presentative o r objectifying fo rm ”, ad d ing in a footnote: T h e expression ‘presentative fo rm ’ w ould be o u r p re fere n ce, if th e w ord ‘presen tativ e’ evoked th e id ea o f making present ra th e r th a n th e idea o f presenting, a m ean in g th a t is ra th e r ill su ited to th e intelligible species impressa (it is th e co n c ep t th a t presents th e o bject to th e m in d ). T h e expression ‘objectifying fo rm ’ is b etter, b u t only o n th e co n d itio n th a t th e th in g itself is u n d e rsto o d to be m ade object th ro u g h th a t form (radically only, in th e intelligible species impressa', expressly, in th e co n ­ ce p t). It is to be feared th at th e habits o f m o d ern language lead to m isu n d erstan d in g on this score.

As is usual with M aritain, all o f these m usings b ear o n w hat is es­ sential to u n d e rsta n d in g th e point. Yet it still seems to m e that, in th e case before us, th e m ost central fu n ctio n o f th e species is th a t it specifies an aw areness to have fo r its c o n te n t this ra th e r th an th a t objectivity, this ra th e r th a n th a t featu re know n. F or this is th e o n e fu n ctio n (unlike ‘b ein g p resen tativ e’) th a t tra n ­ scends even th e distinction betw een species impressa a n d expressa, rights o f th e T hom istic d o c trin e th a t th e m in d is cap ab le o f a grasp o f things as they exist in ens reale. T his was th e m o d e rn m e a n in g o f “realism ”, as also o f th e post-A quinian “scholastic realism ” th a t P eirce id e n tified as b elo n g in g to the distinctive essence o f pragm adcism in its d iffe ren ce fro m p rag m ad sm an d m o d e rn philosophy generally (Peirce 1905: CP 5.423; discussed at len g th in Deely 2001: C hap. 15, “P ragm adcism is n o t P rag m atism ”, p. 616ff.). T h e Thom ists who w ere p reo c cu p ie d with th e claim s o f m o d e rn idealism , a n d especially who c h a m p io n e d realism against th a t idealism , are, as a historical g ro u p an d intellectual m o v em en t o f th e late 19th th ro u g h th e 20th century, th e “N eo-Thom ists” (from Deely 2001: 342n200). 3 M aritain 1959: 115, text a n d n o te 2.

26

Intentionality and Semiotics

an d th at has its origin n o t inside b u t outside the anim al or­ ganism . For these species o r intentional form s o f medieval Latin th o u g h t were conceived of, correctly, as existing in the envi­ ro n m e n t itself p rio r to the arising o f anim al awareness an d as essential th e re to (even if incorrectly conceived as free-floating, un acco m p an ied necessarily by any su b ten d in g an d su p p o rtin g entitative structures). M aritain waxes e lo q u en t on the po in t:4 Even w hen esse intentionale has n o th in g to d o with the world o f know ledge, it is already a way for form s to escape from this e n to m b m e n t in m atter [which characterizes th e subjec­ tivity o f m aterial substance]. T h e scholastics often gave the n am e esse spirituals to this existence (which is n o t fo r itself), th e tendency-existence w hereby form s, o th e r th an th e ir own, com e u p o n things. We think it would be o f g re at in tere st to p h ilo so p h ers to study the role th at esse intentionale plays in the physical w orld itself, w herein th e re u n d o u b ted ly arises from such existing, th a t so rt o f universal anim ation w hereby m o­ tion puts into bodies m ore th an they are, a n d colours th e w hole o f n a tu re with a sem blance o f life an d feeling u n d o u b t­ edly derived from it.

H e goes on, in a no te to the text,5 to suggest th a t th e physical action o f a m over u p o n a m oved “passes in to th e m obile th in g secundum esse intentionale ’, providing a p o in t o f view fro m w hich “it w ould becom e possible to h o ld G alileo’s prin cip le o f in e rtia to be valid” in the co n tex t o f traditional philosophy o f n a tu re as well as from the p o in t o f view o f physico-m athem atical science.6 Yves Sim on, who pushes th e e n tita tiv e /in te n tio n a l distinc­ tion h a rd e r th an perh ap s anyone else o n th e late m o d e rn scene,

4 M aritain 1959: 115. 5 Ibid. 1 15nl. Cf. K lubertanz 1949. 6 I am sim ply rep o rtin g , n o t subscribing to, this re m a rk by M aritain. I have n o idea w h eth e r h e was fam iliar o r n o t with th e c o n te m p o ra ry w ork o f A naliese Maier. B ut I am sure th a t M aier has w ritten n o th in g o n th e p ro sp e c t o f physiosem iosis, to w hich th e rem arks o f M aritain have so m e p e rtin e n c e .

C hapter 4. Terms without Equivalence in Modern Philosophy

27

insists7 th a t th e term “‘id ea’ alone can express with the n eed ed vividness th e m ean in g o f th e A ristotelian ethos and o f the scho­ lastic s p e c ie s This re n d e rin g enables him to claim that,8 while “o th e r philosophies know o f ideas b o rn in the soul, e.g., intel­ lectual rep resen tatio n s co n seq u en t u p o n images, images conse­ q u e n t u p o n sense im pressions”, only “A ristotelianism knows of ideas th a t are initial in an absolute sense an d are n o t b o rn in the soul b u t in n atu re. T h e sensorial idea is th e A ristotelian answer to th e p ro b lem o f th e initial co n n ectio n betw een physical n atu re an d th e soul. T hose things are im possible to explain if we trans­ late species sensibilis by sensible ‘species’ o r ‘fo rm ’ o r anything sh o rt o f th e thought-provoking pow er o f th e w ord ‘id e a ’.” Thus, w hen th e scholastics distinguish betw een the initial stim ulus to ex tern al sense as a species impressa an d th e p ercep tu al response o f in tern al sense as a species expressa o r “p h an tasm ”, Si­ m o n w ould have us say th a t we are dealing with im pressed ideas initially an d ones developed by the anim al organism itself in re­ sponse as expressed ideas! This way o f speaking is n o t only vivid, b u t sounds at least as m uch like Locke as it does Aristotle an d A quinas. W hat differentiates Aristotle an d Thom as from Locke an d H u m e in the m atter o f sensations, however, is th a t the stim u­ lus specifying w hat th e sense will objectify in its interaction with the physical surroundings (for sensatio est actio sensibilis in sensu, after all) is precisely not an idea o r representative form at all b u t quite simply the effect o f a stim ulus h ere and now active u p o n a sense organ an d placing it in relation with the h ere an d now ac­ tive source existing on the same m aterial level as th e sense organ itself being transactionally stim ulated and “specified” toward the source o f the stim ulation. T he “form ” carried by the stim ulus specifies the response o f the organ to objectify this ra th e r than th a t aspect o f the su rro u n d in g environm ent, n o th in g m ore. It is n o t an ‘id e a’. Only species expressae fit th at notion. 7 Sim on e t al. 1955: 613-14n4. 8 Ibid. 615. In Deely 1982: 162-64n2,1 cited Sim on on this p o in t at length. H ere, however, I now add th e qualification o f the follow ing p arag rap h .

28

Intentionality and Semiotics

T hus th e w ord species n o t only has no equivalent in the lan­ guages o f m o d e rn philosophy, as M aritain n o ted, b u t also:9 F or th e p h ilosophers, the n o tio n o f species is not, any m ore th a n th e n o tio n o f esse intentionale, an explanatory factor al­ ready know n a n d already clarified by som e o th e r m eans. Spe­ cies are, as it were, the abutments upon which an analysis o f the given leans for support, the reality o f which the mind, by that very analysis, is com pelled to recognize — with certainty, if th e analysis itself has p ro c e e d e d correctly an d u n d e r the c o n sta n t p ressu re o f intelligible necessities. Som e d e te rm in a ­ tio n m ust, o f necessity, actually supervene u p o n the knower, th an k s to w hich a th in g th a t is n o t th e know er will exist in th e k n o w er se cu n d u m esse intentionale (n o t as an accid en t in a sub stan ce) a n d by w hich the th in g will be able to exist with th e very sam e active superexistence w hich is th e existence o f th e kno w er th a t has b ecom e th e th in g know n. T h e species is n o th in g b u t th a t in te rn a l d eterm in atio n .

A nd h e refers us to St T hom as o n this p o in t.101 a. W h y th e M o d e r n N o tio n o f I n te n tio n a lity Is C r ip p le d So we see th e p ro fo u n d difference betw een th e esse inten­ tionale o f th e T hom istic dev elo p m en t a n d th e in ten tio n ality p ro p o se d by H usserl. F or th e H usserlian in ten tio n ality begins with th e consciousness as b ein g d irected tow ard o r rela ted to its object, w hereas, on th e contrary, th e T hom istic in ten tio n ality “brings the other in to m e ‘b eg in n in g w ith ’ its own o th ern ess an d m akes m e be th e o th e r”.11 In ten tio n ality tran scen d s th e differ­ ence betw een physical a n d psychological subjectivity, betw een th e “in n e r” a n d “o u te r” o f consciousness. H usserl has m issed the distinction th a t Sim on b lu rre d betw een in ten tio n al form s o r species impressae o rig in atin g in th e e n v iro n m en t an d conveyed

9 Maritain 1959: 115, bold face added. 10Aquinas i.1259/65: II Contra Gentiles, 98. 11 Maritain 1959: 104.

C hapter 4. Terms without Equivalence in Modern Philosophy

29

to th e know er in sensation p rio r to any active involvem ent o f th e soul in fo rm in g ideas, on the o n e h an d , and, on th e o th e r h a n d , th e in ten tio n al form s o r species expressae thanks to w hich th e subjectivity o f th e know er en ters into th e h ig h e r processes o f stru c tu rin g th e w orld o f objects. This process H usserl well sees is acc o rd in g to th e kno w er’s own co n stitu tio n o f n eed s a n d desires, b u t his ap p ro ach is u n ab le to take acc o u n t o f how a n d why th e process is as well acco rd in g to th e d em an d s o f th e phys­ ical co n stitu tio n o f th e en v iro n m en t acting u p o n th e physical org an ism o f som e anim al to m ake th a t anim al p e rfo rc e aware o f som e aspects o f th e e n v iro n m en t ra th e r th a n others. O nly th e n is th e anim al faced with th e n e e d o f in te rp re t­ in g th a t initial aw areness by tu rn in g it to th e o rg an ism ’s advan­ tage in th e struggle fo r existence h e re an d now. In d e e d it is in in te rp re tin g , first perceptually, later (for sem iotic anim als) intellectually as well, th a t intentionality realizes its fu n ctio n in consciousness. B ut th e process is two-sided, n o t one-sided. T h e in ten tio n ality as recognized by p h en o m en o lo g y can be c o m p ared to th e situation o f a soldier w ho has lost a leg in th e m o d e rn philosophical war betw een realism an d idealism (an d Sokolowski has proven th a t a one-legged m an can still h o p , even if w alking is beyond him w ithout p rosthesis12) . H usserlian 12 See Sokolowski’s rem arks o n “realism ” (2000: 21, 216), w hich h e does n o t seem to realize are fully com patible with th e K antian sense o f ‘realism ’ accord­ ing to w hich we know only that th e re are ‘things in them selves’ w ith o u t b ein g able to p e n e tra te to an aw areness o f w hat they are in th e ir own co n stitu tio n sub­ jectively p rio r to o r in d e p en d e n tly o f consciousness. Cf. Deely 2001: 559-565. By con trast, fo r “in te n tio n a lity ” in th e T hom istic trad itio n , as Doyle has show n (2006: 92) in his tre a tm e n t o f H ervaeus N atalis, “th e re m u st b e a first te n d in g o f a faculty tow ard a ... real b ein g outsid e th e m in d ” — a th in g de facto partially objectified, as we w ould say, w hich occurs necessarily a n d ini­ tially in sensation as th e basis o f e x p e rie n c e in d e p e n d e n t o f th e fo rm a tio n o f any species expressa — “p re su p p o se d in an o rd e r o f p rio r to p o ste rio r with resp ect to all relations o f things to th e m in d . W ith o u t this basic act,” beg in ­ n in g with (o r from ) sentire in its d iffe ren ce fro m phantasiari, as A quinas a n d P o in sot said, “an d [what] it p resu p p o ses as its term in u s, th e re w ould be no fu rth e r in te n tio n s o r in te n tio n a lity ”. T his is exactly why, fo r H ervaeus in th e T hom istic line (Doyle 2006: 86) w here m e n tal re p re se n ta tio n is n o t th e

30

Intentionality and Semiotics

intentionality knows only th e species expressa, w ithout articulat­ ing o r even realizing its d ep en d en cy in form ation u p o n a species impressa, first o n e fo rm ed by th e physical en v iro n m en t in sensa­ tion, th e n o n e fo rm ed by the u n d e rsta n d in g ’s own activity in tran scen d in g p ercep tio n . H ence “it so often seem s to h a p p e n to E. H usserl”, opines M ari ta in ,13 th a t “h e seems to be b ru sh in g th e skirts o f the true n a tu re o f know ledge”, yet “in th e final reck o n in g h e always misses th e g reat secret”: H e d o e s n o t se e t h a t k n o w le d g e h a s n o n e e d to g e t o u ts id e o f its e lf to a tta in th e th in g t h a t ex ists o r c a n e x is t o u ts id e k n o w l­ e d g e . . . . F o r th e v e ry g lo ry o f th e im m a te ria lity o f t h o u g h t is to b e a h i g h e r life w h ic h p e r f e c ts its e lf b y t h a t w h ic h is n o t it, itself, e v e n w ith o u t g o in g o u ts id e itself, b y a n in te llig ib le re a lity w h o s e f e r tile s u b s ta n c e th e m in d g ra s p s t h r o u g h th e se n s e s , t h a t f e r tile s u b s ta n c e d r a w n by th e s e n s e s f r o m a c tu a l, e x is tin g ( m a te r ia l) th in g s . T h e w ay to m a k e th e p r o p e r m y s­ te ry o f k n o w le d g e v a n is h is p re c is e ly to g e t r id o f e x t r a m e n ­ ta l b e in g , to s u p p r e s s th o s e o n to lo g ic a l ( m e ta lo g ic a l) “f o r b e g in n in g o f aw areness b u t only its su b se q u e n t in te rp re tiv e p h ase, “th e d i­ re c tio n o f intentionality as such was n o t fro m k n o w er to k n o w n ” first o f all — as w ith B ren tan o a n d a m o n g th e m o d e rn p h e n o m e n o lo g ists afte r h im , b e g in n in g with H usserl, becam e, as Doyle n o tes, th e c o m m o n view w ith “alm ost universal ac c e p ta n c e ” — “b u t ra th e r oppositew ise fro m know n to k n o w er”. W hat H ervaeus a n d th e T hom ists generally, p rio r to P o in so t (see Doyle 2006: 94ff.; a n d even after P oinsot, if we look to th e N eo th o m ism o f late m o d ­ e rn tim es), failed to see, however, is th a t this situ atio n d id n o t sim ply p lace th e relatio n (s) o f inten tio n ality wholly o utsid e th e “categ o ries” as th e divi­ sions o f ens reale, releg atin g th e ir tre a tm e n t to Logic as a “science o f se co n d in te n tio n s”, b u t called ra th e r fo r a w hole new tre a tm e n t fro m a sta n d p o in t tran sc en d in g th e distinction betw een ens reale a n d ens rationis, nam ely, th e sta n d p o in t o f sem iotic or, as P oin so t p u t it (1632a: 1 1 8 /1 -1 0 ): th e sta n d p o in t p ro p e r to a doctrina signorum. (Cf. th e con clu sio n below to Ch. 8, p. 136.) Cf. D oyle’s trac in g (2006a: 8 0 n l3 ) , fro m th e 1597 te x t o f Suarez, o f Poinso t’s originality in applying this in sig h t o f th e positive univocity o f m in d d e p e n d e n t w ith m in d -in d e p e n d e n t rela tio n s to “th e w ork o f c le a rin g a n d o p e n in g u p ” th e d o c trin e o f signs. 13 M ari tain 1959: 104.

Chapter 4. Terms without Equivalence in Modem Philosophy

31

th e m s e lv e s ”, fu lly i n d e p e n d e n t o f m y t h o u g h t , 14 a n d w h ic h m y t h o u g h t m a k e s its o w n by m a k in g its e lf th e m .

T h ere is thus n o room to d o u b t th a t the very n o tio n o f intentionality, in passing from th e h ands o f the m edieval scholas­ tic realists to the h an d s o f p h en o m en o lo g ists an d analysts via B rentano has, from a Thom istic p o in t o f view, “lost its effective­ ness an d value”, exactly as M aritain says, for th e reason th at th e w hole m eanin g o f esse intentionale was originally conceived th ro u g h an opposition to an d co n trast with the esse entitativum o f m aterial substances:15 I n te n t io n a li ty is n o t o n ly t h a t p r o p e r ty o f m y c o n s c io u s n e s s o f b e i n g d ir e c te d tra n s p a r e n c y , o f a im in g a t o b je c ts in th e d e p th s o f itself. A b o v e all, intentionality is a property o f thought, a p r e r o g a tiv e o f its im m a te ria lity , whereby b e in g in itself, p o s it­ e d “o u ts id e t h o u g h t ”, i.e ., being which is fully independent o f the act o f thought, becom es a thing existing within thought, s e t u p f o r t h o u g h t a n d in te g r a te d in to its o w n a c t t h r o u g h w h ic h , f r o m t h a t m o m e n t, th e y b o th e x ist in t h o u g h t w ith a s in g le , se lf-sa m e s u p ra s u b je c tiv e e x is te n c e .

b. T o w a rd a P o s tm o d e r n C o n te x t fo r U n d e r s ta n d in g In te n tio n a lity W h en M aritain says, after all this, th at “the p ro b lem o f th in g a n d o b je ct” is th e h e a rt o f th e m atter,16 he can n o t be accused o f ex ag g eratio n . “Every realism ”, he w arns,17 “th a t com es to term s w ith D escartes an d K ant” — esteem ed by H usserl as th e “two g re a t p io n e e rs” o f his new approach, rem e m b er — “shall o n e day see th a t it belies its n am e.” Yet, like H usserl d ealin g with th e n a tu re o f intentionality, M aritain himself, in dealin g with th e re la tio n o f th in g an d object, “in th e final reck o n in g misses 14 So we have from M aritain a whole series of synonyms for esse entitativum. 15 M aritain 1959: 103, bold face added. 16 Ibid. 107. 17 Ibid. 100.

32

Intentionality and Semiotics

th e g re a t secret”. For he casts th e m a tter in term s o f an e ith e r / o r choice betw een realism an d idealism in the post-C artesian co n tex t, w ith o u t ever realizing th a t the “p ro b lem o f th in g an d o b je ct” transcen d s th e term s o f th a t co n tex t o f choice. Yet his very a d m o n itio n 18 sh o u ld have alerted him to a fuller d im en sio n o f th e problem : “It is a serious m a tter fo r a philoso­ p h e r n o t to be able to distinguish betw een ens reale an d ens rationis.” In d e e d it is. O n e m ig h t alm ost call it th a t p a rt o f th e h u ­ m an co n d itio n w hich p hilosophy was b o rn to rem edy, th e very difference in potentia o r virtualiter betw een th e b ru te a n d th e ratio n al anim al, th e anim al capable o f know ing th a t th e re are signs a n d n o t only o f using signs (th e sem iotic anim al). A n d yet th e rem edy c a n n o t be effective if th e term s o f the distin ctio n are n o t fully u n d ersto o d . A nd th e term s o f this distinction betw een ens reale a n d ens rationis can n o t be u n d ersto o d with sufficient fullness if th e anim al co n trib u tio n to rationality is m inim ized, d en ig ra ted , o r m arginalized (as it typically is am o n g m any later m o d ern s, n o t m erely th e N eothom ists) in th e th eo retical analy­ sis o f “ideogenesis”, th e fo rm atio n o f species-specifically h u m a n concepts — n o t to m en tio n in th e analysis o f objectivity as itself involving, as it w ere, “equally” (from the stan d p o in t o f supposi­ tion w hich is to say, “som etim es”, o r even “ofttim es”, in th e co n ­ text o f social reality) m in d -d ep en d en t an d m in d -in d ep en d e n t being, fo r w hich m ain term s in St T hom as him self (I le arn ed to my surprise from Poinsot) are non ens (with th e m ean in g o f ens rationis) a n d ens (with th e m ean in g o f ens reale).

18 Ibid. 106.

Chapter 5

The Problem of Thing and Object

We can agree with M aritain th a t “th e p ro p e r task o f a straig h tfo rw ard philo so p h y ” is “to assign th e reasons fo r w h at is given to it a n d to gain an u n d e rsta n d in g o f th a t d a tu m .” Yet “w hat is given” to th e h u m a n in tellect in its first, its speciesspecific, aw akening a n d d ifference fro m an im al sen se-p ercep ­ tio n is precisely being o r ens, a n d this ens primum cognitum is n o t sim ply ens reale. It is th a t w hich first divides in to ens reale a n d ens rationis: th a t is the “d a tu m ” th a t is given to b e u n d e rs to o d , a n d th e n e e d e d u n d e rsta n d in g c a n n o t be arrived a t by any analysis th a t begins by o m ittin g o r waving to th e side h a lf th e d atu m . St T hom as was clear o n this p o int, w ith o u t them atically p u r­ suing it: ens primum cognitum, id quod primum cadit in intellectu, is w hat provides h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g with its form al object, the m eans o f distinguishing u n d e rsta n d in g as a cognitive pow er distinct from an d su p ero rd in ate to th e estim ative pow er o f sense perceptions, as also from th e in tern al sense o f m em o ry a n d o f im agination. T hese th re e cognitive pow ers o f in te rn a l sense — estim ation, m em ory, im ag in atio n 1 — sh are w ith th e u n d e r­ standing, intellectus, the n e e d fo r a specifying stim ulus o r species 1 See D eely 1971a fo r a tex tu al analysis o f St T h o m a s o n th e n u m b e r a n d fu n c tio n o f in te rn a l senses. See also D eely 2001: 3 4 5 -3 5 4 ; B a rk e r 2007.

33

34

Intentionality and Semiotics

impressa in o rd e r to initiate the p ro p er activity which results in th e form ation o f a ‘c o n ce p t’ o r species expressa, the “in ten tio n al o r presentative fo rm ” which, as a quality o f the soul, has fo r its d e­ fining distinctiveness precisely the directedness u p o n an o b je c t2 w hich alone th e phenom enologists em phasize. a. H e id e g g e r o n A q u in a s T h e re are n o t m any points, p erh ap s only o n e, o n w hich H eid eg g e r is a b e tte r guide to u n d e rsta n d in g St T h o m as th a n is Jacq u es M ari tain, b u t if th e re is o n e such p o in t, this is it. T h e p o in t is p u t in a fu n d am en tal statem en t, o c c u rrin g at various places in A q u in as’ writings, b u t specifically in th e Prima Secundae o f his Summa theologiae, Q. 94, art. 2c: “illud q u o d p rim o cad it in ap p re h e n sio n e [h o m in u m ], est ens, cujus in tellectu s inclu d itu r in om nibus, q u aecu m q u e quis a p p re h e n d it” — “T h a t w hich occurs first to h u m a n aw areness an d w hich d istinguishes th a t aw areness in everything w hatsoever it bears u p o n is th e aw areness o f b e in g ”. H ere, H e id e g g e r correctly tells us,3 “th e te rm ‘B e in g ’ d oes n o t d efin e th a t realm o f en tities w hich is u p p e rm o s t w h en th ese are a rticu la ted co n cep tu ally acc o rd in g to g en u s a n d sp ecies”, w hich w ould have to be th e case if th e b ein g h e re w ere d eterm inately ens reale. No. T h e p ro b le m is r a th e r th e p rio r “u n ity o f B eing as over ag ain st th e m ultiplicity o f ‘ca te g o rie s’ ap p licab le to th in g s”, th e grasp o f b ein g p rio r to its division in to ens reale vs. ens rationis, le t alo n e th e fu rth e r c o n tra c tio n o f ens reale in to 2 Cf. P o in so t 1632: 29 0 b 4 5 -4 (= 1632a: TDS First P re am b le, A rticle 2, 5 8 /1 3 -2 0 : “E t su m itu r in te n tio in p rae sen ti, n o n p r o u t d ic k ac tu m v o lu n tatis, q u i d istin g u itu r ab elec tio n e e t resp icit finem , sed p ro actu seu co n c ep tu s intellectu s, q u i d ic itu r in te n tio g e n e ra li m o d o , q u ia te n d it in aliu d , scilicet in o b ie c tu m .” — “A nd we a re u sin g th e te rm ‘in te n tio n ’ in th e p re s e n t c o n te x t n o t as b esp ea k in g th e act o f th e will d istin g u ish e d by ch o ice a n d re sp e c tin g a goal, b u t fo r th e act o r r a th e r th e c o n c e p t fo rm e d by th e u n d e rs ta n d in g w hich is called an ‘in te n tio n ’ in a g e n e ra l way by rea so n o f th e fact th a t it te n d s tow ard so m e th in g , nam ely, tow ard an o b je c t.” 3 H e id e g g e r 1927: 3.

C hapter 5. The Problem of Thing and Object

35

th e categories. “In m edieval ontology this p ro b lem was widely discussed, especially in th e T h o m ist a n d Scotist schools, w ith­ o u t re a c h in g clarity as to p rin cip les”.4 F or th e p rin cip les w hich b rin g clarity to this p ro b lem o f ‘fu n d a m e n ta l o n to lo g y ’ (n o ­ tice th a t I d o n o t say epistemology, w hich I shall arg u e is o n e o f th e m isb eg o tten n o tio n s o f m o d e rn p hilosophy) are precisely th e p rin cip les o f th e d o ctrin e o f signs, as shall a p p e a r over th e co u rse o f th e ch ap ters following. In th e L atin Age, th e focus o f discussion o f this q u estio n o f th e primum cognitum was as a p re a m b le to discussion o f th e A ristotelian physics, w h erein th e focus w ould be o n th e know ability o f categ o rial b ein g , ens reale, from w hich all socially co n stru cted reality as su ch is in p rin c ip le excluded. b. T h e N e o th o m is t A p p r o a c h But the N eothom ist treatm en t o f this problem -area has b een n e ith e r phenom enological n o r particularly semiotic. It can be given a sum m ary statem ent as follows. Objects are p resen te d to th e h u m a n m ind by concepts. But for th e realist objects m ust be things. So we arrive at the fam ous q u o /q u o d distinction o f FrancoA m erican N eothom ism : concepts are n o t that which (id q u o d ) we know, b u t th at by which (id quo) we know things. A nd, they im ag­ ine,5 at a stroke idealism is overcom e an d realism vindicated. B ut th e re is a p ro b lem here. N o t so fast. F o r th e “realist”, objects m ust sometimes be things, o r at least be able to include things, w here is m e a n t by “th in g ” w hat exists w h e th e r o r n o t it is know n, a n d by “o b ject” is m e a n t precisely so m e th in g know n. F or n o t even th e stau n ch est “realist” co u ld soberly m a in tain th a t all objects are things. A nd even w hen they are also things, 4 Heidegger, loc. cit. For an actual list of the Latin scholastics who dis­ puted this question between Aquinas and Poinsot, see Poinsot 1633a: esp. 22a35-b29, 24b7-13. 5 Into this simplistic trap even Maritain stumbles in his exposition of “The Concept”, Appendix I to Maritain 1959: 390, a point we shall take up further below.

36

Intentionality and Semiotics

they are n o t q u ite “th in g s” in ju s t th e sam e sense th a t they exist as objects. T h e p re sid e n t o f Jo h n s H opkins University, assum ­ ing th a t th e p o st is filled ju s t now a n d th a t th e o n e assigned to th a t post is n o t d ead , is, as a biological organism , a th in g in d e ed , a veritable ens reale\ b u t as p re sid e n t o f th e university h e is so m eth in g m o re, in d e e d an ens rationis as well, a reality socially constructed, a reality w hich could not be as such o u tside th e c o n tex t o f cognitive social relations, entia rationis6 in term in g led with ens reale. c. R eality a n d S o cia l C o n s tr u c tio n We are a t th e b e g in n in g o f a g reat p ro b lem atic h ere, solidly ro o te d in th e p h ilo so p h y o f being, yet o n e o f w hich th e g reat 6 P o in so t 1632: 2 91b22-46 (= 1632a: TDS First P ream ble: O n M ind-D e­ p e n d e n t B eing, A rticle 2, 6 0 /2 6 -4 4 ): “U bi discern e, q u o d licet co g n itio sit causa, ex q u a re su lta t relatio rationis (q u o d om n i e n d rationis co m m u n e est), e t ita u t co n v e n ia t e t d e n o m in e t relatio rationis aliq u o d su b iectu m , necessario ex ig at c o g n itio n e m , n o n ta m en se m p er co g n itio re d d it ip su m o b ie ctu m a p tu m e t c o n g ru u m susceptivum tabs d en o m in atio n is, ita u t solum co n v en iat illi in esse cognito, sed solum h o c co n tin g it in in te n tio n ib u s secundis. E t ita rela tio C reato ris e t D om ini, iudicis e t doctoris, u t d e n o m in e t su b iectu m , req u irit c o g n itio n e m , q u ae talem rela tio n e m causet, sed n o n q u a e co n stitu a t su b ie ctu m in esse co g n ito capax, u t d e n o m in a tio n e m illam suscipiat. A t vero esse g en u s vel speciem n o n solum su p p o n it co g n itio n em ca u san tem tales relationes, sed etiam su p p o n it cog n itio n em , qu ae re d d a t su b iectu m ab stractu m ab in ferio rib u s, e t su p e r rem sic abstractam cad it ilia d e n o m in a tio .” — “H e re n o te this difference: even th o u g h co gnition is th e cause fro m w hich a m indd e p e n d e n t re la tio n results (as it is th e cause o f all m in d d e p e n d e n t b e in g ) , a n d thus, as th e m in d -d e p e n d e n t relatio n belongs to a n d d e n o m in a te s som e subject, it necessarily req u ires cognition, yet co g n itio n do es n o t always r e n d e r th e o b je ct itself a p t a n d co n g ru o u s fo r th e re c e p tio n o f such a d e n o m in a tio n , so th a t th e d e n o m in a tio n belongs to th a t ob ject only in co g n ized b ein g , fo r this h a p p e n s only in seco n d in te n tio n s. A nd thus th e relatio n s o f c re a to r an d lord, ju d g e a n d doctor, as they d e n o m in a te a subject, re q u ire a co g n itio n w hich causes such relations, b u t does n o t re n d e r th e su b ject cap ab le in cog­ nized o r know n b ein g o f receiving th a t d e n o m in a tio n . B ut in d e e d th e b ein g o f a g enus o r species n o t only supposes co g n itio n causing such relatio n s, b u t also supposes a co g n itio n w hich re n d e rs th e su b ject ab stracted fro m in d i­ viduals, an d u p o n th e object so abstracted falls th a t d e n o m in a tio n [i.e., th e d e n o m in a tio n by a second in te n tio n ].”

C hapter 5. The Problem o f Thing and Object

37

m asters o f th a t tra d itio n in th e hig h m iddle ages barely did m o re th a n en u cleate. T h e social co n stru ctio n o f reality was n o t o n e o f th e ir them es. Today a w om an c a n n o t be b u rn e d for b e­ in g a w itch, b u t it was n o t always so (an d may n o t always be so). T oday a m a n c a n n o t b e im p riso n ed fo r life fo r b ein g suspected o f u n d e rm in in g th e revealed tru th th a t th e sun revolves a ro u n d th e e a rth , w hich is statio n ary a n d at th e c e n te r o f th e universe; b u t it was n o t always so. Today, a t least in m any states, a w om an c a n n o t be fo rced to w ear a scarlet le tte r in o rd e r th a t she be publicly know n as a n ad u lterer, o r p u t to d e a th fo r th e d eed ; b u t it rem a in s an u p h jll clim b. Today th e re are p erso n s in posi­ tions o f legal responsibility w ho are u n ab le to u n d e rs ta n d why m a rriag e trad itio n ally sh o u ld involve m o re th a n o n e gender. You can see fro m th ese dram atic exam ples, a n d o th e rs o f y o u r ow n e x p e rie n c e I am sure, how tru e it is7 th a t “it is a seri­ ous m a tte r fo r a p h ilo so p h e r n o t to be able to distinguish b e­ tw een ens reale a n d ens rationis". N o less serious is th e m a tte r w h en a ju d g e a n d ju ry fail to tell th e difference, a n d sen ten c e a n in n o c e n t m a n o r w om an. O n th e o th e r h an d , th e successful lie d e p e n d s u p o n th e sam e confusion, so we are d ealin g w ith so m e th in g truly fu n d am e n tal. T h e d atu m given us to u n d e r­ sta n d is th a t th e particu lars o f th e ens reale/ens rationis d ifferen ce o fte n e lu d e us, a n d th a t as far as socialization is c o n c e rn e d ens rationis can be in som e ways m o re fu n d a m e n ta l th a n ens reale. We have to assign reasons fo r this fu n d a m e n ta l featu re o f ex­ p erie n ce, a n d dism issing entia rationis as subjective p h e n o m e n a will h ardly do, fo r th e p re sid e n t o f J o h n s H o p k in s U niversity is n o t a state o f my m in d , even th o u g h a state w ithin my m in d is essential fo r th a t p re sid e n t to a p p e a r to m e a n d be reco g n ized as such.

7 M aritain 1959: 106.

38

C h ap ter 6

Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things. The Problem of Actual Intelligibility

L et us go back to th e p ro b lem o f th e species, th e w ord w hich “has n o equ iv alen t in o u r m o d e rn languages”, th e “specifying fo rm ”, as we have said,1 w hich exists in n a tu re befo re it exists as a quality w ithin th e soul as species expressa. We have seen th a t this n o tio n is intim ately b o u n d u p with th e n o tio n o f esse intentionale, a n o tio n w hich, in its own tu rn , d ep en d s fo r its o rig in al sense o n a co n tra st with esse entitativum, th e b ein g p ro p e r to things in th e ir co n trast to known things, objects. Known things p resu p p o se in te n tio n a l form s by w hich they exist w ithin th e soul as qualities o n th e basis o f w hich th e know er is cognitively rela ted to w hat also exists “ex tram en tally ”, th a t is to say, in th e physical e n v iro n m e n t su rro u n d in g th e organism . O f this cornplexus M aritain says (an d h e re I substitute fo r his tran slatio n “presentative fo rm ” th e tran slated o riginal te rm species, o th e r­ wise leaving alo n e his use o f italics):12 it seems that St Thomas was much more concerned with the relation between the extramental thing and the species thanks to which it [the extramental thing] is made object than with the 1 See above, chap. 4, esp. pp. 24-25. 2 M aritain 1959: 389n4.

39

40

Intentionality and Semiotics

relation between the species and the object itself taken as such. That is why ... it often happens that he deals with the concept not by distinguishing between m enta l concept and objective con­ cept,3 but rather by speaking of it, at one time, in the sense of mental concept ( intentio intellecta could then be translated as “the mental aim”) and, at another time, in the sense of objec­ tive concept ( intentio intellecta could then be translated as “the object aimed at mentally”). This is to say, he speaks of the con­ cept by thinking of the mental concept not precisely as species but from the point of view of the object it presents to the mind. In o th e r w ords, in St T h o m a s’ own co n te x t (w here th e mis­ s h a p e n te rm “co n cep tu s obiectivus” as such n ev er rears its ugly h e a d ), th e em p h asis was o n th e o rd e rin g o f sen satio n to objec­ tify o r m ake know n aspects o f things physically existing in th e o rg a n ism ’s im m ed iate su rro u n d in g s, a n d o n show ing th a t it is in th e b e c o m in g aw are o f these things ex tern al to us th a t all know ledge o f anim als, in c lu d in g th e ratio n al anim als, begins a n d finds its n o rm a l term in u s. B ut St T hom as also h ad m u ch to say, n o t wholly u n ified th e­ matically, it is tru e, b u t n o netheless rich (indeed, m u ch as was th e case w ith his reflections o n signum34) , a b o u t the necessity o f entia 3 H e re le t m e e n te r my p ro test to th e later m edieval reso rt — already in Scotus a n d C ajetan after — to the expression “conceptus objectivus” to express th e d ifference betw een th e term inus o f th e inten tio n al relatio n o f co g n itio n a n d its fu n d a m e n t o r subjective gro u n d , the “con cep tu s subjectivus” o r id e a in th e knower. T his was a term inological m arker along th e way o f th e d ev elo p in g L atin ap p re cia tio n o f th e difference in principle betw een object a n d thing, b u t o n e so p re g n a n t with a pro sp ect o f m isun d erstan d in g th a t w hat it principally cam e to m ark was th e fork in th e ro ad w here th e m o d ern s took th e ir leave o f th e se­ m iotic consciousness so hard-w on am ong th e later L atin Ib erian s (after d ’Ailly, I th in k especially o f Soto, the C onim bricenses, A raujo, an d Poinsot) in o rd e r to follow ra th e r th e Way o f Ideas th a n th e Way o f Signs, a n d to develop th e m o d e m idealist d o ctrin e o f objectivity in th e place o f a sem iotic objectivity p erm e ab le to th e o rd e r o f environm entally existing things. Gilson, in his Index Scolastico-Cartesien (1912: 49, text #80), identifies this expression in Suarez 1597, an a u th o r certainly rea d by D escartes; b u t Suarez repeats it as a “vulgaris distinctio” — an already w idespread m a n n e r o f speaking tow ard th e close o f th e 16lh century. 4 See D eely 2004a; P o in so t 1632a.

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

41

rationis for th e know ledge we acquire o f entia realia. Principally, b u t n o t exclusively, th e necessity fo r entia rationis in developing know ledge even o f ens reale is ro o ted n o t only in the finitude of o u r know ledge, b u t in its p ercep tu al anim al origins, an d espe­ cially in its discursive character.5 H u m an u n d erstan d in g , Poinsot rem arks,6 develops only over tim e (“m e n su ratu r te m p o re”) “on acc o u n t o f its d ep en d en cy u p o n th e p hantasm s”, th e species expressae o f sense percep tio n , as we have seen, “from w hich we receive 5 P o in so t 1632: Art. 5, “U tru m D eus F o rm e t E ntia R ationis” — “W h e th e r G o d form s m in d -d e p e n d e n t bein g s”, 3 0 8 al7 -3 2 : “aliquas relatio n es ratio n is e t in te n tio n e s logicas fu n d a ri su p e r co g n itio n em im p e rfe cta m m an ifeste co n stat, q u ia istae relatio n es f u n d a n tu r in rebus cognitis p e r ab stractio n em , p e r p ra e d ic a tio n e m seu co m p o sitio n em a u t discursum ; su n t en im relatio n es universalis abstracti ab inferioribus, praed icati ad subiectum , an te c e d e n tis ad co n seq u en s. E rgo intellectus carens abstractione [scilicet, in tellectu s angelicus seu divinus, sed n o n h u m a n u s!], com positione e t discursu n o n p o te rit p e r se im m e d ia te talia e n tia rationis fo rm are, sicut n e q u e sensus e x te m u s e a fo rm at, q u ia c a re t isto m o d o co g n o scen d i.” — “th a t som e m in d -d e p e n d e n t relatio n s a n d logical in te n tio n s are fo u n d e d o r based u p o n an im p e rfe ct co g n itio n is fairly p la in to see, because th e relations in questio n are fo u n d e d u p o n objects k now n th ro u g h abstraction, th ro u g h p red ic atio n o r co m p o sitio n o r discourse; fo r they a re universal relations o f p red ic ate to subject, a n te c e d e n t to co n se­ q u e n t, ab stra cted fro m instances. T h erefo re an in tellect w ith o u t n e e d fo r ab­ stractio n [such as a n angelic in tellect o r th e divine in tellect, in co n tra st to th e h u m a n intellect!] will n o t itself be im m ediately able to fo rm su ch m in d -d e p e n ­ d e n t beings by co m p o sitio n a n d discourse, as n e ith e r can e x te rn a l sense fo rm th e m , by reaso n o f lacking th e requisite m a n n e r o f fash io n in g aw areness.” 6 P oinsot 1643: disp. 40, art. 5, par. 37, pp. 542-43: “In tellectio n o n m e n su ra ­ tu r te m p o re p e r se e t ex n a tu ra sua, quia indivisibilis actio est, sed p e r accidens, u t in nobis, p r o p te r d e p e n d e n tia m a ph an tasm atib u s a q u ib u s accipim us sp e­ cies. E t in tali in tellectio n e p h ilo so p h a n d u m est sicut d e aliis m o tib u s te m p o re m ensuratis: q u o d n o n est possibile q u o d intellectus te m p o re p ra e c e d e n ti quiescat, n o n accip ien d o species, e t in ultim o instanti term inativo illius tem p o ris sine alio m o tu p h an tasm atu m illas h a b e a t.” — “B ecause its ac tio n is indivisible in tellection is n o t o f its p ro p e r n a tu re a n d essentially m e asu red by tim e, b u t it is so m easu red accidentally in o u r case o n a c c o u n t o r o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g ’s d e ­ p e n d e n c e u p o n th e ph an tasm s from w hich we derive th e intelligible specifying form s. A nd in such circum stances o f in tellectio n th e act o f p h ilo so p h izin g is m easu red by tim e ju s t as are o th e r m ovem ents: fo r th e re is n o way th a t th e h u ­ m an u n d e rsta n d in g can rem a in in a tim e p rio r to th e ac ce p tin g o f im p ressed form s o f specification a n d in a final in stan t term inative o f th a t p rio r tim e pos­ sess those specifications w ith o u t any o th e r m o v e m en t o f th e p h an tasm s.”

42

Intentionality and Semiotics

th e species” as intellectual stim uli (species impressae intelligibiles) to th e fo rm atio n by th e u n d erstan d in g o f its own p ro p e r concepts o r species expressae. This is in d e ed the ro o t o f th e fallibilism o f h u ­ m an know ledge so em phasized by Peirce.

a. The World in the Soul C o n sid er th e o rd e r o f th e prim itive co n ce p ts7 necessarily a c q u ire d by th e h u m a n m in d in o rd e r to reac h a grasp o f th e d ifferen ce b etw een an objective w orld o f e x p e rie n c e d objects as so m eth in g co m m o n to all anim als a n d th e species-specifically h u m a n id e a o f a physical en v iro n m en t o f things existing in d e ­ p e n d e n tly o f th e ir relatio n to anim als as objects ex p erien ced . “B eing as first know n” is n o t so unlike th e “b lo o m in g buzz­ ing co n fu sio n ” th a t W illiam Jam es (1842-1910) refle cted u p o n .8 F or A quinas, a n d in his school after h im ,9 th e Latins saw q u ite well th a t th e primum cognitum was n o t an abstract gen u s o f logic, b u t an initial a p p reh e n sio n o f th e intelligibly know able as such w ithin th e objective w orld o f sense-perception, a p p re h e n d e d in a confused a n d in d istin ct o r quasi-potential m an n er, acc o rd in g to th e everyw here accep ted m axim , anima est quodammodo om­ nia: “th e soul” — especially th e h u m a n soul — “is in a certain way all thin g s”, to wit, as able to know b ein g in its tran sce n ­ d en tal am plitude. U n d erstan d in g , they divined, p ro ceed s n a tu ­ rally from potency to act, from th e im p erfect to th e (relatively) perfect. T h e p ro p o rtio n a te object o f such a pro g ressio n m u st likewise be so m eth in g confused a n d im p e rfe c t b u t ad m ittin g 7 F u rth e r discussion o f this p o in t below, p. 72ff. See also D eely 2001: 3 4 7 357, esp. 355ff. 8 Jam es 1911: 50, w here h e a ttrib u te s th e ex p ressio n to “so m e o n e ”. 9 T he m ost ex ten d e d discussion o f being-as-first-known, De Primo Cognito, in th e school th a t developed o u t o f th e w ritings o f A quinas seem s to b e th a t o f Poinsot 1633a. But, in T ho m ist term s, C ajetan c.1493 also treats o f th e m atter; an d the p o stm o d ern d ev elo p m en t o f sem iotics has m ad e u n m istak ab le th e lim ­ ited purview o f th e ea rlier discussions, h a m p e re d as they w ere by b ein g located in the co n tex t o f aim ing prim arily a n d virtually exclusively a t e x p o u n d in g th e d o ctrine o f substance an d accid en t as ens reale. Cf. G u agliardo 1992-1994.

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

43

o f d evelopm ent. A nd, inasm uch as th e m ore distinct as such is com paratively m o re p erfect th an th e confused, th e n o tio n o f b e in g as m anifested in any p articular object o f aw areness has a m o re confused — a m ore “p o te n tial” — intelligibility as indistincdy m ingling o r p o rte n d in g every ch aracter actually fo u n d o r fin d ab le in th a t object ( including aspects there as a consequence o f that object’s involvement in the realm o f concern o f another animal, o f o u r own o r som e o th e r species — entia rationis, in a w ord, objectively given in th e w orld o f things objectified101). T his “b e in g ”, as th e m ost prim itive o f intellectual a p p re h e n ­ sions,11 ens primum cognitum, is given to u n d e rsta n d in g by th e 10 P o in so t 1632: Art. 5, “U tru m D eus F orm et E ntia R ationis” — “W h e th e r G o d form s m in d -d e p e n d e n t beings”, 307b21-36: “id, q u o d co g n o scitu r u t existens e x tra p ro p ria m p o ten tiam , n o n potest h ab ere esse ex vi talis cognitionis; n a m ens rationis n o n p o test esse ex tra poten tiam fo rm an tem illud. Q u a n d o au tem co g n o scitu r ens rationis u t form atum ab alio, cognoscitur ex tra p o te n ­ tiam , scilicet in cog n itio n e alterius. E rgo ex vi talis cognitionis n o n accipit esse e t fo rm a tio n e m tale ens rationis, atq u e adeo ilia cognitio n o n est form ativa e n d s rationis, sed cognoscitiva form ati; u n d e cognoscit illud u t p e n d e n s a m eo in tellectu , n o n a su o ” — vel e converso ex suo intellectu, n o n a m eo! — “th a t w hich is cognized as existing in d e p en d e n tly o f o n e ’s own m in d c a n n o t have its existence by virtue o f the very cognition in question; fo r a m in d -d e p e n d e n t b e in g c a n n o t exist in d e p en d e n tly o f the pow er form in g it. But w hen a m indd e p e n d e n t b ein g is cognized as form ed by another, it is know n in d e p e n d e n tly o f th e cognitive pow er o f the o n e know ing it, to wit, as existing in th e cog­ n itio n o f th e other. T h erefo re th e m in d -d e p e n d e n t b ein g in q u estio n does n o t receive its existence a n d form ation by virtue o f th e co g n itio n reco g n izin g it, a n d th e re fo re n e ith e r is th a t cognition form ative o f th e m in d -d e p e n d e n t being, b u t ra th e r th e beco m in g aware o f so m eth in g already a n d elsew here fo rm ed ; w hence it cognizes th a t b ein g as d e p e n d in g u p o n my u n d ersta n d in g , n o t u p o n yours” — o r conversely u p o n your u n d ersta n d in g , n o t u p o n m ine! A nd, o f course, w hen it is a questio n n o t o f intellectus b u t o f vis aestimativa in th e case o f b ru te anim als, th e ens rationis is grasp ed objectively b u t only m aterially ra th e r th a n form ally (“p h an tasian d i, n o n in te llig en d i”, as we m ig h t p u t it), th a t is to say, it is a p p re h e n d e d as stru ctu rin g th e objects a p p re h e n d e d b u t is n ever form ally recognized as non ens com paratively to w hat those ob­ je c ts have o f ens reale. 11 T h e “p rim a ratio cognoscibilis seu p rim u m cog n itu m fo rm ale resp ectu n ostri intellectu s” (“p rim ary ratio n ale o f know ability o r first form al know n in resp e ct o f h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g ”), as P oinsot fo rm u late d it (1633: Q. 1, Art. 3 , 2 0 a2-33b38).

44

Intentionality and Semiotics

senses, to be sure, b u t especially by th e internal senses, w here the species impressae o f ex tern al sense have already b een cognitively re sp o n d e d to a n d e lab o rated by th e h ig h e r in tern al senses o f m em ory, im ag in atio n , a n d estim atio n to p ro d u c e yet a fu rther, h ig h e r level o f cognitive specification, nam ely, a “c o n ce p t” o r species expressa. And this ‘species’ is not that by which (“id quo”) but that on the basis o f which (“id in quo”) an object is presented as known — that is to say, as object in what differentiates object as such from thing as such, namely, the relation to the knower on the basis of which every object as such, whether also a thing o f nature or not, ex­ ists as presented in awareness and known. N o r is this all. T h e species expressae o f th e th re e h ig h e r in te r­ nal sense pow ers — “p h an tasm s” o r th e species expressae o f p e rc e p ­ tion, o f phantasiari, as we may follow th e Latins in saying12 — d o n o t o f them selves p re se n t th e ir objects as intelligible, n o t even in w hat they co n tain directly from ex tern al sen satio n o f th e sur­ ro u n d in g physical en v iro n m en t o f existing things. T h ey p re s e n t th e ir objects as interpretively co n stru cted , th a t is to say, as sensep e rce p tib le, n o t as intelligible. As St T h o m as p u ts it, “th in g s are p e r se sensible, b u t they have to be made in tellig ib le”.13 A quinas assigns this task — o f m aking actually in telligible th e actually sensible b u t only potentially intelligible objects o f e x p e rie n c e — to th e p reco n scio u s activity o f th e in tellect as agens. T h e obscurely a n d (in h in d sig h t) p erh ap s p o o rly n a m e d “process o f a b stra c tio n ” associated w ith this tran sfo rm a tio n sh o u ld n o t a n d c a n n o t p ro p erly be (th o u g h it usually is!) p re s e n te d as a 12 “P h a n ta sia ri”, th e activity o f p ro d u c in g ‘p h a n ta sm s’ o r ‘m e n ta l re p re s e n ­ ta tio n s’, is th e ric h e st L atin te rm fo r th e c o m b in e d cog n itiv e activity a n d p r o ­ d u c tio n o f th e in te rn a l sense, d istin ct o n th e o n e side fro m (b u t in c o rp o ra tiv e of) th e activity o f e x te rn a l sense, a n d o n th e o th e r side fro m th e activity o f th e in te lle c t a n d linguistic m o d e lin g w hich re n d e rs th e p h a n ta sm s in te llig ib le by a d d in g to th e m th e ens rationis o f self-identity w hich severs th e o th erw ise exclusive link o f th e ‘p h a n ta siz e d ’ to th e bio lo g ical self. See P o in so t’s u se o f this te rm in his Tractalus de Signis (1632a), B ook II, Q u e stio n 2, p p . 2 4 0 -2 5 3 , esp. th e e x te n d e d discussion o f this te rm in n o te 2, p p . 2 4 0 -2 4 1 . 13 See A quinas c.1266: Sum m a theologiae, I, Q . 79, art. 3, c o rp u s a n d a d 3 (reply to o b je ctio n 3).

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

45

sim ple process o f extraction o r “draw ing o u t” from th e sensible; o r — w orse yet — as an “in tu s le g e re ” like an x-ray m a c h in e 14 revealing th e intelligible sk eleton m a in tain in g a n d u n d erly in g th e sensible ap p ea ran ces. If an y th in g like th a t w ere th e case, th e “intelligibility” w ould already have to actually be th e re in th e sensible things as such. To th e contrary, however, A quinas is q u ite clear th a t w hat is “th e re ” p e r se is so m e th in g sensible th a t has to be made intelligible. P er se, th e re is n o actu al in telli­ gibility in m aterial substances as such, only th e possibility o f being made intelligible by a discursive intellect. In w hat th e n does this “m ak in g in tellig ib le”, this “ab strac­ tio n ” so-called, consist? T h e re are a t least two reasons why th e in te n tio n a l passage o f th e fo rm o f th e th in g entitatively in d e p e n d e n t o f aw areness in to th e soul o f th e know er (w here it is received form ally a n d w ith o u t th e a tte n d a n t m a tte r necessary fo r entitative existence) is n o t sufficient to explain this saltus. First, a n d again T h o m as is q u ite clear, it is n ev er th e substantial form as such a n d directly th a t is p re s e n te d to sense, in tern al or extern al, b u t only th e ac­ cid en ts o f en v iro n m en ta l th in g s.15 T h e esse intentionale o f th e species impressa o f ex tern al sensation, w h erein alo n e th a t “th in g ” is p u rely (if only aspectually a n d accidentally) p re s e n te d o b ­ jectively, is n o t a m ig ratio n o f a substantial “fo rm w ith o u t m at­ te r” across th e b o u n d a ry o f “in n e r / o u te r ” sep aratin g cognitive organism from its en v iro n m en t. Yet it is only th e substantial form that, to g e th e r with th e m atter, en ters in to a n d co n stitu tes th e actual essence o f m aterial substances. So if th e species are never substantial form s, how do they “identify th e kn o w er w ith th e know n” in such a way as to yield know ledge o f th e essence o f th e known? H ow does in te n tio n a l id en tificatio n o f c o n c e p t 14 M ari tain actually resorts to this d e sp e ra te im age (u n su sta in ab le by rea­ son o f th e synchrony o f perspective in w hich a lo n e it m akes sense, as we will see in this section a n d fu rth e r below, pp. 97 -9 8 ) in his early Introduction Ge­ nerate a la Philosophie (1920: 121; in O C II, p. 169). 15 See A quinas c.1266: Summa theologiae 1.77.1 ad 7; f u rth e r cited below in n o te 19, p. 47.

46

Intentionality and Semiotics

as fu n d a m e n t with object as term inus yield a know ledge o f es­ sence, if essence is substantial form an d species is never substan­ tial form ?16 S econd — an d this is th e p o in t resp ectin g w hich the Neothom ists generally were th e m ost recalcitran t to recognize — th e essences o f m aterial substances are n o t in d etail17 fixed an d u n ch an g in g , as could still be th o u g h t in th e tim e o f A quinas, w hen it was believed th a t th e w orld today consisted o f th e sam e “n a tu ra l kin d s” as th e w orld indefinitely past fro m th e b eg in ­ n in g o r indefinitely fu tu re u n til th e e n d .18 H en ce (in A q u in as’ day) o nce th e “fo rm w ith o u t m a tte r”, one and the same form, th e species, th e “in ten tio n al fo rm ”, h ad “spiritually” m ig rated in to th e soul o f th e know er an d b e e n grasp ed th e re conceptually, su pposing th a t it co u ld som ehow reveal an essence o r m ake th e essence o f its source know n, n o t only w ould th e essence b e know n, how ever im perfectly, b u t th e essence w ould b e know n once a n d fo r all. F or th a t sam e form revealing th e essence in th e know er w ould exist secundum esse entitativum in th e th in g (co n ­ stituting th e th in g as an individual o f a n a tu ra l kin d ) a n d secun­ dum esse intentionale in th e know er (co n stitu tin g th e k n o w er as “quidditatively aw are” o f th e th in g ), an d secundum esse divinum in the creative idea o f God; w hence h u m a n w isdom , in g rasp in g 16 T h e q u estio n raised h e re req u ires m any p relim in arie s, so th e re a d e r m u st be p a tie n t u ntil, with these in place, we will state th e answ er only in C h a p te r 14 below. 17 T hus, th e a p p a re n t “n a tu ra l k in d s” o f th e b ird s a n d th e fishes, fo r ex a m ­ ple, d o n o t as such re p re s e n t essential kinds, even th o u g h to b e alive sim ply o r to be alive as an anim al, o r again to b e alive as a b ru te o r as a ‘ra tio n a l’ an im al, d o re p re se n t saltational levels o r types o f b e in g in n a tu re , types as in c o m p a t­ ible with in te rm ed ia ry states as is b e in g p re g n a n t. See A d ler 1940, 1941, a n d 1952, to g e th e r with D eely 1969. 18 T h e case is c o m p arab le to th e m o d e l o f a g e o c e n tric u n iv erse in th e tim e o f E udoxus, Plato, a n d A ristotle: th e prima facie tru e th e o ry w hich m o st o r all th in k ers ac ce p te d as su ch a n d w hich c o n fo rm e d th e m o st readily to th e best available evidence sim ply p ro v ed over tim e to b e in fact false a n d n o t co m p atib le at all w ith th e w eight o f evid en ce th a t w ould ac cu m u late over tim e. A stronom y a n d biology, thus, as m o d e rn ity has estab lish ed th e m , are o u tstan d in g exam ples o f u n d e rs ta n d in g as discursus.

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

47

th e essences o f things, w ould also p articip ate how ever feebly in th e tim eless w isdom o f G od him self, alb eit externally. It is a nice p ictu re, b u t it c a n n o t work. W h ere it c a n n o t work, ironically, is in th e real w orld o f physical n a tu re as scientifically know n; only in th e ideal w orld o f a pre-G alilean d re a m la n d p e r­ p e tu a te d by self-styled w ould-be “realists”. F o r th e p ic tu re to b e a tru e p ictu re, first, it w ould have to b e th e su b stan tial form s, n o t th e accidents, th a t in ten tio n ally p e n e tra te th e senses a n d w ork th e ir way u p th ro u g h th e in te r­ n al senses to th e possible intellect, a n d this St T h o m as expressly d e n ie s.19 S econd, a n d decisively, it w ould have to be th e case — as b o th A ristotle a n d A quinas h ad g o o d b u t w rong reaso n to believe20 — th a t th e n a tu ra l kinds fo u n d now w ould b e th e n a tu ra l kinds th a t w ould always be fo u n d in th e p ast o r in th e fu tu re o f o u r p la n e t fo r how ever lo n g th e e a rth m ig h t last — an im ag in ary possibility w hich we have le arn ed , slowly, b e g in n in g in th e 17th century, to be definitively false. b. E n t e r In te llig ib ility So how does intelligibility e n te r th e h o rizo n o f h u m a n know ledge o f m aterial substances? H ow is it th e case th a t it is 19 T h e p o in t co u ld hard ly b e m o re clearly stated (A quinas c.1266: Summa theologiae 1.77.1 ad 7): “q u ia ta m en fo rm a e substantiates, q u ae se c u n d u m se su n t nobis ig n o ta e, in n o te s c u n t p e r accidentia; n ih il p ro h ib e t in te rd u m ac­ cid en tia loco d iffe re n tia ru m sub stan tialiu m p o n i.” — “becau se, how ever, sub­ stantial form s a re in th e ir ow n b ein g u n k n o w n to us, they b ec o m e know n th ro u g h individual characteristics o r accidents; in th e in te rim th e re is n o th ­ in g to stop us fro m taking con g eries o f characteristics o r accid en ts as sta n d in g fo r d ifferences o f su b stan ce .” 20 In th e n a tu ra l collections o f A lbertus M agnus, th e p rin cip al te a c h e r o f A quinas a n d sp o n so r o f his first a p p o in tm e n t to th e U niversity o f Paris Faculty o f Arts, th e re w ere fossils; b u t n o o n e, in c lu d in g A lbert, rec o g n ize d th e m as such. F or w hat we now call fossils they th e n h a d n e ith e r id e a n o r nam e. W h at we now see as th e key to th e fo rm e r existence a n d co n stitu tio n o f th e g rea t reptiles as they w ere in them selves, they th e n saw as an o m alies, e x p e rim e n ta l d ata defying ex p lan a tio n o n th e basis o f w hat was know n o r th o u g h t to be know n a b o u t th e n atu ra l w orld. S tones th a t a re n o t carvings yet resem b le liv­ in g things? C om e on!

48

Intentionality and Semiotics

th e “q u id d ity ” o f m aterial things th a t is th e form al ob ject o f h u m a n u n d e rs ta n d in g in its d ifferen ce fro m sense p ercep tio n ? To ap p re c ia te th e tru e p ro p o rtio n s o f T h o m a s’ rem ark ab le d o c trin e a b o u t w hat d istinguishes h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g (as well as th e b rillian ce o f K an t’s insistence th a t reinen Vernunft it­ self is o b lig ed to p ro v id e th e e le m e n t o f necessity in th e objects as sense provides th e m , o n ce th e m istaken assu m p tio n co m m o n to rationalists a n d em piricists — th a t even sen satio n term in ates in ‘id e a s’ — was in place, h o w ev er21), it is necessary at o n ce to g et clear a b o u t th e basics c o n c e rn in g essences. W h en it is said th a t a th in g has an “essen ce”, w hat is basically m e a n t is n o t at all th a t every individual in stan tiates an u n c h a n g ­ in g fo rm across g en era tio n s a n d co rru p tio n s. W hat is m ean t, rath er, is th ree fo ld . First, th a t every individual ex isten t has an in te rn a l c o n stitu tio n by w hich th e individual ten d s tow ard sta­ bility a n d regularity betw een its g e n e ra tio n a n d co rru p tio n . Sec­ ond, th a t this in te rn a l co n stitu tio n at ro o t is a substantial form , a n d n o t a m e re co m p lex o f accidental form s, i f th e individual in q u estio n is truly a n a tu ra l u n it, an unum perse (w hich is n o t re a d ­ ily d e te rm in e d by “co m m o n sen se” o r coenoscopic know ledge alo n e w hen it com es to investigating th e details o f n a tu re , by reaso n o f w hat my old te a c h e r a n d frie n d R alph A ustin Powell u sed to call “th e d im in ish in g illum inative pow er o f th e h u m a n esque analogy”, w h erein we ju d g e o f individuality fro m o u r ex­ p e rie n c e o f o u r own selves). A nd third, th a t th e re m u st in d e e d be such n a tu ra l un its o r “substances” if th e w orld is n o t sim ply o n e, because every m any by d efin itio n p resu p p o ses ones. So we com e to w hat is essential in th e id e a o f essence as th e objective form ality distinctive o f h u m a n ap p re h e n sio n . W h en it is said th a t th e h u m a n m in d is capable o f g rasp in g th e essences 21 F o r w ith o u t this c o m m o n a ssu m p tio n as th e basis o f th e K an tian syn­ thesis o f th e early m o d e rn c u rre n ts o f R atio n alism , o n th e o n e h a n d , a n d E m piricism , o n th e o th e r, th e rem oval o f causality, necessity, etc. fro m th e o r d e r o f ens reale in p rin c ip le k n ow able as su ch is a su p e rflu o u s rem oval, a sp u rio u s altern ativ e to th e intellectus agens o f A risto tle a n d St T h o m as.

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

49

o f m aterial things, all th a t is b ein g said is th a t th e h u m a n m in d is ordered to knowing and can come to know the internal constitution o f its environmental world, b u t only by o b servation a n d p a tie n t analysis, trial a n d erro r, as it w ere (ex p erim en tal in teractio n w ith th e su rro u n d in g s), a n d n o t by in tu itio n o f fo rm alo n e, as so m any “realists” have fo r so lo n g im aginatively (n o t to say wist­ fully) po stu lated . So, w hen the intellect grasps as its form al object being, ens primum cognitum as th e species-specifically distinctive elem en t o f intellectual aw areness in co n trast with th e purely p ercep tu al aw areness o f b ru te anim als, w hat it grasps is th e w orld o f p er­ ceived objects according to a possibility o f conceiving those ob­ jects as existing in themselves. O n ce given as existing m o re th a n in relation to the an im al’s classification o f +, - , 0, th e objects o f ex p erien ce over th e course o f experience soon m anifest a g reat difference, namely, th e difference betw een aspects o f th e w orld o f objects th a t simply red u ce to o u r experience o f th e objects (such as a flag signifying N apoleonic France; an d this is th e d im en sio n o f ens rationis already given in the p ercep tu al ex p erien ce o f b ru te anim als,22 alth o u g h n o t th ere recognizable as such) a n d o th e r as22 P o in so t 1632: “P er qu am p o te n tia m e t p e r q u o s actus fian t e n tia ra tio ­ n is” — “By w hat pow ers a n d th ro u g h w hich acts d o m in d -d e p e n d e n t b ein g s co m e a b o u t”, 3 01b33-302b4 (= 1632a: TDS, First P ream b le, A rticle 3, 6 6 /4 6 6 8 /3 1 ): “Sensus in te rn i fo rm a n t e n tia rad o n is m a te ria lite r sed n o n d iscern e n d o d iffe ren tia m in te r ens reale e t ens rationis, seu ens e t n o n ens, e t in d e n o n form aliter. “D icim us ‘fo rm a liter lo q u e n d o ’ n o n fo rm a re ilia, id est d isc e rn e n d o in te r ens ratio n is e t ens reale, e t c o n c ip ie n d o id, q u o d n o n est ens, ad in star en d s reads. M aterialiter au tem co g n o scere ens ratio n is est ipsam a p p a re n tia m re a ­ ds e n d s attin g e re , sed n o n d isc ern ere in te r id, q u o d ratio n is e t realitatis est. ... Sed in istis solum a ttin g it id, q u o d sensibile seu q u o a d sen su m re p ra e se n ta bile est. Q u o d a u tem h a b e a n t h ab itu d in e m ad n o n ens e t ex ista h a b itu d in e e n tia ficta seu ratio n is d ican tu r, q u o d est fo rm a liter d isc e rn e re in te r en s e t n o n ens, sensus in te rn u s n o n attingit. “R atio v id e tu r m anifesta, q u ia sensus in te rn u s n o n p o te st ferri in aliq u id nisi sub ra tio n e sensibilis; q u o d a u tem id, q u o d sibi re p ra e s e n ta tu r u t sensi­ bile, o p p o n a tu r e n d read, ad ipsum n o n p e rtin e t iu d icare, q u ia n o n c o n c ip it en s sub ra tio n e ends. Q u o d au tem aliquid accip iatu r ta m q u am ens fictum , fo rm a lite r consistit in hoc, q u o d co g n o sca tu r nihil e n d ta d s h a b e re in re, e t

50

Intentionality and Semiotics

pects o f objects which do n o t reduce to b u t seem to antecede and transcend the objectivity o f experience (such as milk in a wom­ a n ’s breasts signifying child-birth, o r sm oke signifying som ething burning; an d this is the dim ension o f ens reale in the categorial sense co n cen trated o n by Aristotle an d the Latin scholastics). ta m en ad in star en d s attingi; alioquin n o n d isc ern itu r in te r ens reale e t ensfictum , sed solum a ttin g itu r illud, ad cuius instar fo rm a tu r ens rationis. Q u o d q u a n d o est aliquid sensibile, n o n re p u g n a t a sensu cognosci, sed ad sensum solum p e r d n e t id, q u o d in illo d e sensibilitate est atd n g ere, h a b itu d in e m vero ad n o n ens, cuius loco su b ro g atu r e t u n d e ficte h a b e t esse, ad sensum n o n pertinet, e t id eo ens fictum sub form ali ra d o n e ficd ab en te vero n o n discernit. “Q u o d vero ens fictum materialiter possit cognoscere sensus, co n stat m anifeste. N o n quidem , q u ia sensus etiam externus p o test v. g. co g n o scere co lo rem fictum seu ap p a ren te m , quia iste color, licet a p p a re n te r sit color, n o n ta m en est ens fictum , sed verum e t reale, scilicet aliquid ex luce resultans. Sed ex eo p ro b atu r, q u ia sensus in te rn u s m ulta ad invicem co m p o n it, q u ae ex tra se n u llo m o d o su n t a u t esse possunt. C ognoscit ergo aliquid, q u o d in se est ens fictum , licet ipsam ficdonem n o n a p p re h e n d a t, sed solum id, q u o d in illo e n te ficto ta m q u am sensibile se offert.” — “In tern al senses fo rm m in d -d e p e n d e n t beings m aterially b u t w ithout d iscerning th e difference betw een a m in d -in d e p e n d e n t b ein g a n d a m in d -d e p e n d e n t being, th e difference, th a t is to say, b etw een b e ­ in g a n d n o n b ein g , a n d for this reason in te rn al sense is n o t said to fash io n m in d -d e p e n d e n t beings ‘form ally speaking’. “We say th a t th e in tern al senses ‘form ally sp eak in g ’ do n o t fo rm m indd e p e n d e n t beings, th a t is, they d o n o t form th em by discrim in atin g betw een m in d -d e p e n d e n t bein g a n d physical being, a n d by conceiving th a t w hich is n o t a b ein g after the p a tte rn o f physical being. Materially, however, to cognize a m in d -d e p e n d e n t bein g is to attain th e very ap p e aran c e o f a b ein g physically real, b u t n o t to discrim inate betw een th a t w hich is o f the m in d a n d th a t w hich is o f th e physical world. For exam ple, the im aginative pow er can fo rm a gold m o u n ta in , a n d similarly it can construct an anim al co m p o sed o f a she-goat, a lion, a n d a serpent, w hich is th e C him era [of G reek m ythology]. B ut in these constructions th e im agination itself attains only th a t w hich is sensible o r re p ­ resentable to sense. Yet in tern al sense does n o t attain th e fact th a t objects so know n have a condition relative to non-being, a n d from this relative co n d itio n are said to be constructed, Active, o r m in d -d e p e n d e n t — w hich is form ally to discrim inate betw een bein g an d non-being. “T h e reason seems clear: internal sense ca n n o t refer to anything ex cep t u n d e r a sensible rationale; b u t the fact th at that w hich is rep rese n ted to it as sensible h ap ­ pens to be opposed to physical being, does n o t pertain to in tern al sense to ju d g e , because internal sense does n o t conceive o f being u n d e r d ie ratio n ale o f being. T h e fact, however, o f anything’s being reg ard ed as a co n stru cted o r Active bein g formally consists in this, that it is known to have n o th in g o f en titativ e reality in

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

51

c. T h e Im p o r ta n c e o f E ns R ationis in O b je c tiv ity So this initial grasp o f ens — ens primum cognitum, th a t is, ‘equi-distant’, as it were, from th e su b seq u en t p o larization o f aw areness betw een ens reale an d ens rationis, “b ein g ” (ens) a n d “n o n b e in g ” (non ens), as St T hom as also expresses th e co n tra st — can hardly be id entified with th e co n crete physical o b ject in­ sofar as th a t object is a physically individual existent, o r co m p lex o f individual existents, an ens reale. F or “b ein g as first k n o w n ” is also the richest o f all objectifications, em b racin g every p a rtic u ­ lar intelligible object in th e am p litu d e o f analogy, alb eit acc o rd ­ ing to confused an d largely u n d iffere n tiated o r u n d istin g u ish ed aw areness (such as th e m uch later fo rm atio n a n d critical estab­ lish m en t o f a n o tio n o f “ens commune” o r ens inquantum ens ex­ te n d in g intelligibility beyond th e o rd e r o f m aterial substances helps to dispel). T hus m aterial entities as p articu la r bein g s are ex p erien ced “factually” only because bein g has b e e n previously grasped in a way th a t is very d ifferen t from co n cep tu alizatio n s o f the logical order. This is th e m ean in g o f th e saying o f A quinas, th e physical w orld, a n d yet is a tta in e d o r grasp ed o n th e p a tte rn o f a physi­ cal entity; otherw ise, no discrim ination is m ad e betw een m in d -in d e p e n d e n t b ein g a n d co n stru c te d o r Active being, b u t only th a t is a tta in e d o n w hose p a tte rn a m in d -d e p e n d e n t b ein g is fo rm ed . W h en this o b je c t is so m e th in g sensible, th e re is n o reason why it c a n n o t be know n by sense. B u t sen se attain s only th a t w hich is sensible in an object, w hereas th e c o n d itio n relative to th e n o n -b ein g in w hose place th e o b ject is su rro g a te d a n d w h en ce it Actively has b eing, d oes n o t p e rta in to sense. F or this reason, sense d o es n o t d iffe re n tia te a co n stru c te d being, u n d e r th e form al ratio n ale o f b e in g a c o n stru c t, fro m a tru e being. “B ut th a t sense is able to know Active b e in g m aterially is m anifestly th e case. N ot, in d e e d , from th e fact th a t even ex te rn a l sense can , fo r e x a m p le , cognize a Active co lo r o r a p p e a ra n c e , becau se this color, even th o u g h it is th e co lo r [o f a given object] only apparently, is nev erth eless n o t a Active b ein g , b u t o n e tru e a n d physical, th a t is to say, it is s o m e th in g re su ltin g fro m light. B ut th a t sense grasps m in d -d e p e n d e n t beings is pro v ed by this fact, th a t in te r­ n al sense synthesizes m any things w hich o u tsid e itself in n o way a re o r c a n be. Sense th e re fo re knows so m e th in g w hich is in itself a c o n s tru c te d o r Active b e ­ ing, a lth o u g h th e Action itself sense d oes n o t a p p re h e n d , b u t only th a t w h ich , in th e Active being, offers itself as sensible.”

52

Intentionality and Semiotics

“b ein g is w hat first falls u n d e r h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g ” (“primo in intellectu cadit ens"). T his is also th e reso lu tio n o f H e id e g g e r’s p e rp le x ity 23 as to “W hy does B eing g et ‘co n ceiv ed ’ ‘pro x im ally ’ in term s o f th e presen t-at-h an d and not in term s o f th e ready-to-hand, w hich in d e e d lies closer to us?” E n v iro n m en tal beings as ready-to-hand are precisely th e objects o f sen se-p ercep tio n s tru c tu re d a n d p re ­ sen ted th ro u g h phantasiari, th e species expressae o f in te rn a l sense acc o rd in g to th e classification o r ‘categ o ries’ o f w hat is to be so u g h t (+), w hat is to b e avoided (- ) , a n d w hat can be safely ig­ n o re d (0). So th e objective w orld o f sen se-p ercep tio n is alread y a fabric o f relations w hose p a tte rn is a p p re h e n d e d as “being' b u t w hose te x tu re is an interw eave o f ens rationis w ith ens reale. T his interw eave n eed s to be tak en in to acc o u n t in th e so-called epis­ tem ology o f “id eo g en esis” o r “co n c e p t fo rm a tio n ”, th e “ab strac­ tio n ” by w hich p ro p erly intellectu al concepts are fo rm e d o n th e basis o f th e species expressae o r “p h an tasm s” o f in te rn a l sense b e­ in g tran sfo rm ed , by th e in tellect’s own a n d p ro p e r activity, in to species impressae fo r th e fo rm atio n this tim e (species intelligibiles) o f p ro p erly intellectual concepts (species expressae intellectae). N o r m u st th e essential phases o f this “a b strac tio n ” be e lid ed o r g lid ed over. L et us en u m e ra te th e irred u cib ly d istin ct phases th a t m u st be reco g n ized if th e accu sto m ed m islead in g tru n c a ­ tions o f th e process are to be overcom e: 1. T h e species impressae o f ex tern al sense are fo rm e d in th e sense organs o f th e anim al by th e action o f th e physical su rro u n d in g s o n th e body o f th e anim al. 2. T hese sensory stimuli specifying sensation are co-ordinated o r synthesized by the sensus communis function o f th e n er­ vous system, stim ulating now the h ig h er level o r “in terio r senses” actively to form , in conform ity with the needs an d desires o f the anim al organism (i.e., according to its biologi­ cal heritage an d individual ex p erien ce), th e species expressae 23 H eid e g g er 1927: 437.

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

53

o f phantasiari as interpretations o f what is sensed. These are the species, the “phantasm s”, the m ental representations o f otherness (not at all the ‘self-representations’ which ob­ jects involve) that organize and presen t the environm ent u n d e r the categories o f anim al interaction (attraction +, repulsion o r indifference 0, as we have seen). 3. T h e phan tasm s o r species expressae sensuum internorum, in tu rn , fu rth e r stim ulate th e ‘ratio n al a n im a l’ to a d d to th e phantasm s by its own activity ( intellectus agens) th e fo rm al relatio n o f self-identity, so m eth in g w hich phantasiari o n its own is in capable o f d o in g .24 4. T h e phantasm s, p resen tin g a n d o rg an izin g th e objective w orld in relatio n to th e organism , th ro u g h th e a d d itio n to them selves o f th e relatio n o f self-identity, a re th e re b y tran sfo rm e d from species expressae phantasiandi in to ra th ­ e r species impressae intelligibilis. 5. In response to this now species intelligibilis as stim ulus (the species expressae phantasiandi tran sfo rm ed by th e in ­ tellect ad d in g to the p h an tasm a relatio formaliter rationis o f self-identity into a species impressae intelligibilis), th e u n ­ d erstan d in g itself (intellectus possibilis) now in first act re­ sponds by actively fo rm in g further th e species expressae intellectae, a n d these are th e species w hich p re se n t th e objective w orld now (for th e first tim e in biological evolution) u n ­ d e r th e guise o f being, ens primum cognitum, w hence arises th ro u g h ex p erien ce th e form al co n tra st betw een ens reale a n d ens rationis, m aking possible th e first intellectual ju d g ­ m e n t yielding th e p rin cip le o f co n trad ictio n , etc.,25 to say n o th in g o f th e first form s o f cu ltu ral as su p ero rd in ate to m erely social o rg an izatio n o f th e an im al group. 24 Cf. P o in so t 1632a: Tractatus de Signis, F irst P re am b le, A rticle 3, pp. 64-76 (= 1 6 3 2 :3 0 1 a l-3 0 6 b 3 5 ). 25 O n th e o r d e r o f th e prim itive in te lle ctu al co n c ep ts, see Deely 2001: pp. 355-357; a n d th e f u rth e r discussion below at p. 72ff.

54

Intentionality and Semiotics

We are p resen te d h ere with n o th in g less th a n th e o n to lo g i­ cal fram ew ork for the scientific researches by w hich Ja k o b von U exkull arrived at his b reak th ro u g h U m w eltstheorie,26 a fu n d a ­ m e n tal c o n trib u tio n to ‘epistem ology’ (if you like), b o th ccenoscopically an d ideoscopically co n sid ered , w hich S ebeok h a d p laced o n th e center-stage o f sem iotic d ev elo p m en t by th e 20th c e n tu ry ’s e n d ,27 b u t w hich has b een n o ticed am o n g T hom ists so far only by J o se f P ie p e r28 — a situation w hich I fo r o n e am w ork­ in g to c h an g e .29 B ut at this p o in t let us allow P o in so t to fram e th e fu n d a m e n ta l issue in his own w ords:30 that an object be real or Active makes a difference only in the rationale of being, not in the rationale of object and some­ thing knowable. Whence it can well happen that something is an object simply speaking, and is simply not a real being. For the differences of things in physical existence and be­ ing are one thing, the differences of things as objects and 26 Cf. J. von U exkull 1899-1940. 27 See esp. Kull 2001; a n d n o te well S ebeok ’s caveat (1991: 2) th a t ‘ep iste­ m ology’ con stitu tes fo r sem iotics n o m o re th a n a “m id-m ost ta rg e t”, precisely b ec au se study o f th e actio n o f signs uncovers th e p a th b ey o n d th e re p re se n ta ­ tive c o n te n ts o f consciousness to th e objects re p re se n te d as su ch — th a t is, as h e re m in d -in d e p e n d e n t, th e re m in d -d e p e n d e n t, a n d so o n , in th e u n e n d in g spiral o f sem iosis le ad in g “everyw here in n a tu re ” (E m m ech e 1994: 126). 28 P ie p e r 1952: 80-90. 29 See Deely 2004e. 30 P o in so t 1632a: TDS B ook I, Q u estio n 4, 1 8 7 /2 8 -4 3 (= 1632: 6 7 8 M 5 27): “q u o d o b ie ctu m esse reale vel rationis solum facit d iffe ren tia m in ra tio n e en d s, n o n in ra tio n e obiecti e t cognoscibilis. E t stat b en e , q u o d aliq u id sit sim p liciter o b iectu m , e t sim pliciter n o n sit ens. Aliae en im su n t d iffe ren tia e re ru m in esse rei e t entis, aliae in ratio n e obiecti e t cognoscibilis, u t b e n e ad v e rtit C aietan u s 1. p. q. 1. art. 3. E t sic univoce c o n v e n iu n t p lu ra in ra tio n e scibilis e t n o n in ra tio n e entis, vel e con tra. E t sim iliter p o ssu n t co n v e n ire specifice in ra tio n e scibilis et n o n in ratio n e entis, vel e converso, u t p le n iu s d ic itu r quaest. ult. in libros P o sterio ru m .” H ow fu n d a m e n ta l this p o in t is fo r sem iotics can be g le an e d from its c o n sta n t re c u rre n c e in P o in so t’s Treatise on Signs. See, fo r e xam ple, th e discussions in Book I, Q u estio n 4, 1 8 7 /2 6 - 1 9 0 /2 3 (=1632: 678b-6 7 9 a2 9 ), a n d n o te 33 th e re to , p. 187-190 (= 1632: 8 1 8 b 2 4 8 2 0 a l0 ); in Book II, Q u estio n 1, 2 3 5 /3 6 2 3 6 /4 6 (= 1632: 7 0 0 a 4 3 -7 0 1 a l7 ), a n d Q u estio n 5, 2 7 0 /3 7 2 7 1 /2 1 (= 1632: 7 l5 b 3 7 -7 l6 a 2 6 ); etc.

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

55

knowable something else again — a point well made by Cajetan.31 Whence it is that many things are the same in the rationale of knowable which are not the same in the rationale of being, and similarly can many things coincide specifically in the rationale of knowable and not in the rationale of being, or conversely, as is discussed more fully in the last question of my treatm ent of the books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Now n o tice th a t th e species expressae o f in tern al sense are fo rm e d by th e anim als them selves th ro u g h m em ory, th ro u g h im ag in atio n , a n d th ro u g h estim ation.32 By these species th e e n ­ v iro n m e n t objectified is p resen te d in p ercep tio n o rg an ized otherw ise th a n it exists either in sensation or in d e p en d en tly o f aw areness altogether. T h e re is n o ens rationis in sensation prescissively distin g u ish ed fro m p ercep tio n , as we will fu rth e r see.33 F o r entia rationis arise only as ad d ed in to sense p erce p tio n to m ake th e leap from , to elevate, m ere en vironm ental features im p in g in g o n organs o f ex tern al sense an d naturally o rg an ized as an in c ip ie n t web o f relations o b tain in g betw een p ro p e r an d c o m m o n sensibles (an d so, as we will see, already sign-relations, already a sem iotic web, in S ebeok’s phrase) to th e level o f ob ­ je c ts e x p e rie n c e d as desirable, th reaten in g , o r neu tral. T h e species expressae o f in tern al sense organize an d p re se n t th e objective w orld o f every h ig h e r anim al, b u t they do n o t co n ­ tain any actual intelligibility. T hey do n o t p re se n t an d organize th e objects o f h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g in w hat is species-specifically p ro p e r to th em . T hey p re se n t a w orld o f objects actually perceived b u t only poten tially intelligible. “A b stractio n ” is th e 31 C ajetan 1507: Commentarium in summam theologicam (= o n A quinas c.1266), 1. p. q. 1. art. 3. 32 T h e textual analysis o f St T h o m as o n this p o in t can b e fo u n d in D eely 1971a, now far m o re co m pletely in B ark er 2007. 33 See pp. 7 6 -7 7 a n d 157-160, below; b u t we have already seen P o in so t m e n ­ tio n th e reaso n in n o te 5, p. 41 above, to wit, th e ab sen ce o f actively fo rm e d co m positions o n th e side o f th e o rganism in e x tern al sense d ata, p r o p e r a n d co m m o n sensibles b e in g m utually d eterm in a tiv e u n d e r th e e n v iro n m e n ta l in ­ flu ences h e re a n d now playing u p o n th e an im al body.

56

Intentionality and Semiotics

n o t entirely fo rtu n ate term chosen in th e m edieval m ilieu o f (supposed) tim eless essences to designate th e process w hereby h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g actively m an ipu lates th e phantasm s to transform th em from sensible in to intelligible form s.34 d. E x p o s in g th e Q u o / Q u o d Fallacy: fro m U n te n a b le D y ad to a N e c e s s a ry T ria d Now com es a very crucial point. T h e form s specificative of sense p ercep d o n , th ro u g h th e addition to the species impressae o f external sensation o f th e species expressae o f im agination, memory, an d estim ation in o r on th e basis o f which objects are ex p erien ced as desirable, undesirable, o r neutral, are, respecting th e intellect — u n d erstan d in g — n o t actually intelligible. They have to be m ade intelligible by the activity o f the intellect itself, the intellectus agens, as St T hom as says. This m eans th at w hat are species expressae for the th ree intern al senses are taken over by th e intellectus agens to becom e species impressae respecting the intellectus possibilis. In this ch an g e o f role — this reversal w herein w hat h a d b e e n an in ten tio n al form specificative expressa is tu rn e d to fu n ctio n now ra th e r as a species impressa, a specificative stim ulus ra th e r th a n a quality already provenating its term inus — w hat h ad b e e n “id in q u o ” fo r in tern al sense becom es ra th e r “id q u o ” fo r th e intellect. J u st as w hat h ad b een “id q u o ” for th e ex tern al senses — namely, th e species impressae from th e en v iro n m en tal things a n d aspects p ro p o rtio n e d to th e bodily organs o f o u te r sense — is in c o rp o ra te d into th e response o f th e in n e r sense by th e for­ m atio n o f species expressae or phantasm s as th e “id in q u o ” actually

34 A quinas c.1266: Summa theologiae 84.4 ad 2: “ad secundum d ic e n d u m q u o d res m ateriales, se c u n d u m esse q u o d h a b e n t ex tra an im am , p o ssu n t esse sensibiles actu; n o n au tem actu intelligibiles. u n d e n o n est sim ile d e sensu e t in te lle c tu .” — “th e answ er to th e se co n d ob jectio n is th a t m aterial things, ac co rd in g to th e existence they exercise in d e p e n d e n tly o f o u r m inds, can be sensibles in act; yet they c a n n o t be intelligibles in act. W h en ce in tellig ib le objects d o n o t stan d in th e sam e rela tio n to th e pow er o f u n d e rs ta n d in g as sensible things stan d to th e pow ers o f sen se.”

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

57

p resen tin g objects evaluated perceptually as this o r that, so now w hat h ad b een “id in q u o ” respecting in tern al sense is further ordered respecting intellect (“h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g ” to becom e simply “id q u o ” stim ulating the fo rm atio n o f a yet h ig h e r level “id in q u o ”, a level p resen tin g no lo n g e r a potentially intelligible objective w orld (th e anim al U m w elt as tran sfo rm ed by th e intel­ lect actively in tro d u cin g form al relations o f self-identity in to th e sense-perceived objects) b u t now instead an actually intelligible objective w orld crying o u t to be investigated in its own b ein g an d acco rd in g to th e m any ways in w hich b ein g can be said. It will prove, this objective w orld o f anim al realism now p erfu sed with th e actual intelligibility o f being, to be a realm fo r poets a n d novelists n o less th a n fo r scientists an d philosophers, a w orld in w hich inquisitors no less th an astronom ers will find th e ir way a n d have th e ir day. T h e possible in tellect resp o n d s to th e stim ulus (“id q u o ”) p ro v id ed by th e a g en t in tellect in a p p ro p ria tin g th e species expressae (“id in q u o ”) o f in tern al sense to fu n ctio n as species impressae (“id q u o ”) fo r th e possible intellect to resp o n d to th e sem iotic a n im a l’s su rro u n d in g s in its own rig h t th ro u g h in c o rp o ra tin g these “id q u o s” in to its own p ro p e r “id in q u o ” m ean s fo r th e p re se n ta tio n a n d aw areness o f objects finally as actually a n d n o t ju s t possibly intelligible on the basis o/'the irred u cib ly in tellectu al specifying form s fash io n ed an d m ade by th e possible in tellect itself, th o se species expressae (“id in q u o ”) w hich alo n e p re s e n t th e objects previously perceived an d sensed now as able to be under­ stood fu r th e r s involved with things existing in th e ir own right. In short, ju s t as th e species expressa o f intern al sense as “id in q u o ” d ep en d s u p o n the species impressa o f o u te r sense as “id q u o ”, so th e species expressa o f the intellect as “id in q u o ” d ep en d s u p o n th e transform ation by the intellect’s own activity o f w hat had been “id in q u o ” for p ercep tio n into a sim ple “id q u o ” fo r intellection. T h e in te rp re te d o r com p leted object, then, as an object o f actual experience, w h eth er the anim al a p p re h e n d in g be b ru te o r rational, sem iotic o r m erely semiosic, is never p resen te d as

58

Intentionality and Semiotics

such by a “q u o ” (a species impressa) b u t always fu rth er by an “in q u o ” (a species expressa). O n the basis o f an “in q u o ” alone does the object exist in awareness eith er as perceived only (from the species expressa o f in tern al sense) o r also as und erstan d ab le (from the species expressa fo rm ed by th e u n d erstan d in g itself taking the species expressa o f in tern al sense as species impressa fo r the fu rth er purpose o f making intelligible the objects o f sense p ercep tio n ). In e ith er the case o f th e b ru te o r o f the rational anim al, o f course, som ething o f th e “o u te r w orld” is retain ed in the “in n e r w orld” o f ap p rehensio n , from the fact th at th e species o f o u te r sense are a p u re “id q u o ” inco rp o rated , first, into th e “id in q u o ” o f p er­ ception (the species expressae o f in n e r sense), an d th en fu rth e r in to th e “id in q u o ” o f intellection (the species a j f r a w o f h u m a n u n d erstan d in g in w hat is species-specifically differentiative o f it) . W hat is species impressa fo r sensation becom es p a rt (b u t only part) o f w hat is species expressa for perception; an d w hat is species ex­ pressa for p ercep tio n becom es species impressa for intellection, an d th e n ce p a rt (b u t only part) o f w hat is species expressa for the intel­ lect in actually perceiving the p e r se sensible w orld as now actu­ ally intelligible in its own being as in som e m easure in d e p e n d e n t o f w hatever relations it may h ap p en to have to m e as aware o f it. So th e “relatio n to a know er” essential to every o b ject as such is precisely w hat is n o t essential to every th in g as such, even th o u g h it is essential to every th in g insofar as th a t th in g becom es objectified o r know n (“bein g know n” an d “b ein g an o b je ct” bein g b u t two ways o f saying th e sam e th in g ). T h e w orld “e x te rn a l” to th e know er as an anim al organism becom es “in ­ te rn a l” to th e know er th ro u g h th e esse intentionale o f th e species impressae sensuum extemorum as th e m eans by w hich things are know n (“id q u o ”), an d ju s t this “externality” is in c o rp o ra te d in to th e “intern ality ” p ro p e r to th e universe o f know ing at its h ig h e r levels o f p erce p tio n an d u n d e rsta n d in g (“id in q u o ”). H en ce th e fam ous “q u o /q u o d ” distinction o f M o rtim er A d ler35

35 See esp., p erh ap s, A dler 1967 passim-, cf. Sim on 1969: 8 1 -8 2 n 3 .

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

59

a n d o f N eoscholasticism generally — “concepts are n o t th a t w hich (id q u o d ) b u t th a t by which (id quo) we know th in g s” — is revealed as the oversim plification th a t it is, c o n trib u tin g to th e failure o f even such greats as Jacq u es M aritain to see th e ir way beyond th e m o d e rn im passe o f “realism ” versus “id ealism ”. It is in c u m b e n t to speak o f “the q u o /q u o d fallacy” in this re g a rd , a fallacy ro o te d in a m isreading (o r p e rh a p s ju s t an u n d er-read in g ) o f th e Summa theologiae, Q u estio n 85, A rticle 2, d escrib e d by M aritain36 as “th e m ain tex t in w hich St T h o m as shows th a t th e species intelligibiles are n o t th e o b ject ( quod) b u t th e p u re m eans {quo) o f know ing”. M aritain reg ard s this te x t as “equally applicable to th e c o n c e p t”, i.e., to th e species expressa o f th e possible intellect, an d to th e species impressa o f th e possible in tellect fo rm ed by th e ag en t in tellect in s u b o rd in a tin g th e p h a n ta sm (th e species expressae o f in te rn a l sense) to th e ro le o f stim ulus {species impressa) reg ard in g th e possible in tellect. B u t it rem ains th a t this is an erro n eo u s read in g , a n d o n e su rp risin g fo r M aritain. F or no o n e read P oinsot to g e th e r w ith T h o m as as m u c h as M aritain read b o th . M aritain was always grow ing, al­ ways m oving on, always b reak in g new g ro u n d , an d , at th e sam e tim e, always looking back, always d e e p e n in g his grasp o f th e T hom istic texts in view o f th e p h ilo so p h ical d e m a n d s o f th e p ro b lem s th a t cam e in to his view. His u n d er-read in g (o r over-reading) o f th e Stm ratzl.85.2c in p o in t o f th e q u o /q u o d distinction th e re essayed is n o t u n re la t­ ed to (in fact is o f a piece with) an earlier e rro r la ter c o rre c te d ,37 clearly a co n seq u en ce o f n o t having re a d at th e tim e, o r at least n o t having read thoroughly, P o in so t 1632: Q. 22, Art. 2,38 w here­ in P oinsot shows th e d ifferen ce fo r co g n itio n betw een a species impressa (“id q u o ”) a n d th e species expressa (“id in q u o ”) respect­ ing the ‘th in g ’ know n in a n d with th e o b ject o f ap p reh e n sio n 36 M aritain 1959: 390. 37 M aritain 1924, passim ; c o rre c te d in 1959 (1st ed. 1932): 120n3 in finem, a n d 394n3. Yet cf. 393n2, w hich, as it w ere, qualifies even th e co rrectio n . 38 = P o insot 1632a: TD S B ook 2, Q u estio n 2.

60

Intentionality and Semiotics

(“id q u o d ”). W here at o n e tim e M aritain expressly e q u ated th e n o tio n o f so-called “form al sign” with th e species indifferently impressa o r expressa,39 Poinsot always expressly restricts (an d ex­ plains th e necessity o f th e restriction of) th e form al sign to th e species expressa, in d ifferen t only to th e q uestion o f w h eth er it be a species expressa o f p erce p tio n o r o f intellection, b u t n o t indif­ fe re n t at all to th e question o f w h eth er it be a species impressa o r species expressa, an id quo o r an id in quo. P o in so t explains th e d ifference betw een th e species impressa as such — i.e., be it such from ex tern al sense respecting th e h ig h e r in te rn a l senses, o r fro m th e in tern al senses u n d e r th e form ative in flu en ce o f th e in tellect acting ( intellectus agens) respecting th e b rin g in g to th e level o f ‘first a c t’ th e possible intellect — a n d th e species expressa as such in term s o f th e difference precisely betw een an “id q u o ” o f know ledge an d an “id in q u o ”, b o th alike resp ectin g (b u t in th e ir quite d ifferen t ways) th e “id q u o d ” o r object know n:40 39 M aritain 1924; we saw ea rlier a sim ilar co n flatio n o r b lu rrin g a t w ork in th e w ritings o n this p o in t by o n e o f M aritain ’s b est stu d en ts, Yves Sim on: above, pp. 26-27 at n o te 7, an d , in rela tio n to H usserl, p. 28ff. 40 P o in so t 1632: 7 0 5 a 4 2 -b l2 (= 1632a: TDS Book II, Q u estio n 2, 2 4 9 /1 4 2 5 0 /6 ), th e n 705b31-45 (= 1632a: 2 5 0 /2 2 -3 4 ): “St. T h o m as calls th e m e n ta l w ord an in stru m e n t by w hich th e u n d e rsta n d in g knows so m e th in g , n o t as if th e c o n c e p t w ere a know n m e d iu m w hich is an in stru m e n t a n d e x te rn a l m eans, b u t as it is an in te rn a l m ed iu m o r m ean s in w hich th e u n d e rs ta n d ­ ing u n d e rsta n d s w ithin itself, a n d this is to be a fo rm al sign. B ut ‘im p ressed specifier’ is th e n am e fo r th a t fo rm o f specification by w hich th e u n d e rs ta n d ­ in g form ally u n d ersta n d s, because it obtains o n th e side o f th e p rin cip le o f th e action o f u n d ersta n d in g ; b u t th a t w hich keeps to th e side o f a p rin cip le o f actin g is called a form . A nd yet St. T hom as d id n o t say th a t an im p ressed specifier form ally signifies o r rep resen ts, b u t th a t it is th a t p rin cip le by w hich th e u n d e rsta n d in g form ally u n d ersta n d s; b u t it is o n e th in g to b e a fo rm al sign, a n d a n o th e r to be a p rin cip le ‘by w h ich ’ o f u n d e rsta n d in g . ... a c o n c e p t is n o t said to re p re se n t as so m e th in g first know n in th e m o d e o f an extrinsic object, so th a t th e qualification ‘know n’ w ould be an extrinsic d e n o m in a tio n ; a c o n c e p t is said to re p re se n t as so m e th in g intrinsic know n, th a t is, as th e ter­ m inus o f th e know ledge w ithin the power. B ut b ecause it is n o t th e te rm in u s in w hich th e co g n itio n finally stops, b u t o n e by w hose m e d iatio n th e pow er is b o rn e to th e know ing o f an o utside object, fo r this reason a c o n c e p t has th e b ein g o f a form al sign, because it is so m e th in g intrinsic know n, th a t is to say, because it is th e in trinsic ratio n ale o f the know ing. W h en ce an in stru m e n ta l

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

61

D. Thomas vocat verbum [interiorem, i.e., speciem expressam] instrum entum , quo intellectus aliquid cognoscit, ... ut medium internum , in quo intellectus intelligit intra se, et hoc est esse signum formale. Species autem impressa dicitur id, quo formaliter intelligit intellectus, quia tenet se ex parte principii intellectionis; quod autem tenet se ex parte principii, vocatur forma. Et tamen non dixit D. Thomas, quod species impressa formaliter significat seu repraesentat, sed quod est id, quo formaliter intellectus intelligit; aliud est autem esse signum formale [scilicet, species expressa], aliud principium quo intelligendi [scilicet, species impressa]. ... conceptus autem est cognitum ... tamquam id, in quo continetur res cognita intra intellectum. Et sic eadem cognitione per se attingitur conceptus et res concepta, non ex cogni­ tione eius devenitur in cognitionem rei conceptae. Et quia sign is know n as so m e th in g w hich is know n extrinsically a n d as a th in g know n, fro m th e know ledge o f w hich th e significate is arrived at; b u t a c o n c e p t is k n o w n as so m e th in g w hich is know n, n o t as is an extrinsic know n th in g , b u t as th a t w ithin th e u n d e rsta n d in g in w hich is co n ta in e d th e th in g know n. A n d so, by th e essentially sam e cogn itio n , co n c ep t a n d th in g co nceived a re a tta in e d , b u t th e c o g n itio n o f th e th in g conceived is n o t arrived a t fro m th e c o g n itio n o f th e co n c ep t. A nd because th e c o n c e p t is th a t in w hich th e th in g o r o b je ct is r e n d e re d p ro p o rtio n e d a n d im m aterialized in th e m o d e o f a te rm in u s, fo r this rea so n th e c o n c e p t itself is said to be know n as so m e th in g ‘w h ic h ’, n o t as a th in g separately know n, b u t as co n stitu tin g th e o b je ct in th e ra tio n a le o f know n te rm in u s [o r “g ro u n d ” in P e irc e ’s sense: D eely 2001:343,641], B u t even th o u g h an in stru m e n ta l sign can b e atta in e d with th e signified by a sin­ gle ac t o f co g n itio n , it rem ains tru e even th e n th a t it is fro m th e know n sign th a t th e significate is arrived at, th a t th e [in stru m e n tal] sign itself d o es n o t form ally co n stitu te th e [signified] th in g as know n.” T his te x t shows how u n reliab le is th e tre a tm e n t th a t P o in so t’s sem io tic o f co n c ep ts receives in th e 2003 w ork o f O ’C allaghan. Suffice to re m a rk h e re th a t P o in so t expressly ho ld s the opposite o f th e view O ’C allag h an re p o rts h im to h o ld (e.g., p. 217, tex t a n d n o te 46) in th e m a tte r o f such analogy as A qui­ nas m akes betw een m irro r im ages a n d m e n tal rep rese n tatio n s: th e fo rm e r is an im age objectively, th e la tte r only presuppositively a n d form ally. T h u s th e im age in a m irro r is itself objectively apprehended in its own right a n d h e n c e stan ds w ithin a cognitive rela tio n as objective terminus th ereo f. By co n tra st, th e c o n c e p t as a ‘m en tal re p re s e n ta tio n ’ stands w ithin a cognitive rela tio n not at all as terminus quod b u t as fundam ent o f th e rela tio n (‘te rm in u s in q u o ’) w hich terminates (q u o d ) at th e o b ject rep rese n ted .

62

Intentionality and Semiotics

[species expressa] est id, in quo res seu obiectum redditur proportionatum et immaterializatum per modum termini, ideo dicitur ipse conceptus cognosci ut quod, non tamquam res seorsum cognita, sed tamquam constituens obiectum in ratione termini cogniti. W h en ce arises this sum m ary d ifference betw een “q u o ” a n d “in q u o ” as far as co n cern s th e species, th e in ten tio n a l o r specifying fo rm :41 Species expressa semper est imago viva et producitur per actio­ nem vitalem a potentia, cui deservit, ut per earn cognoscat. Sed species impressae sunt, quae ab una potentia [sive intra sive extra animalem] ad aliam imprimuntur et ad cognitionem formationemque idoli movent aliam potentiam. — An ex­ pressed specifier (or expressed form of specification) is always a living image produced through a vital action by the power which it serves in order that the power might know by means of it. But impressed fo rm s o f specification are specifiers that are 41 P o insot 1632a: TDS Book II, Q uestion 2, 2 4 5 /1 7 - 2 4 6 /4 (= 1632: 7 0 3 b 4 2 7 0 4 a l). M aritain says th e sam e (1959: 393): “T h e c o n c e p t is n o t a p u re m ean s in th e sense o f a p rin cip le o r fertilizing seed, like th e p resen tativ e [ra th er: specifying] form w hich is received (species impressa) ; it is a p u re m ean s as term o r fru it {species expressa, presentative [or specifying fo rm w hich is u tte r e d ) .” B ut h e th e n goes on, as we saw above, unw ittingly to d im in ish th e fo rce o f th e crucial distinction betw een “q u o ” a n d “in q u o ”. P oinsot, o n this p articular, does exactly th e opposite (TDS II.2, 2 4 3 /1 2 -2 2 ; = 1632: 7 0 2b45-703a9): “Sic u t enim , u t o biectu m esset praesens e t u n itu m p o te n tia e in ra tio n e p rin cip ii co n c u rre n tis ad fo rm a n d am cogn itio n em , o p o rtu it p o n e re speciem im pressam, ita u t praesen s sit in ra tio n e term in i, ad q u ern te n d it co g n itio , o p o rte t aliam sim ilitu d in em seu speciem p o n e re , si res sit absens. Vel se cu n d o o p o rte t p o n e re co n c ep tu m in tra p o te n tia m , u t res co g n ita seu o b iecta re d d a tu r prop o rtio n a ta et conform is ipsi p o te n tia e .” — “For ju s t as it was necessary to p osit an im pressed specification o r form in o rd e r fo r th e o b ject to b e p re se n t a n d u n ite d to a cognitive pow er in th e ratio n ale o f a p rin cip le c o n c u rrin g in th e fo rm in g o f th e p o w er’s co g n itio n , so m u st a n o th e r sim ilitu d e o r specifier be posited in o rd e r fo r th e ob ject to b e p re se n t in th e ra tio n a le o f th e term in u s tow ard w hich know ledge tends, if th e th in g ob jectified is ab sen t. In th e sec­ o n d place, it is necessary to posit th e c o n c e p t w ithin th e p ow er in o rd e r for the things know n o r objects to be re n d e re d p ro p o rtio n e d a n d co n fo rm ed to th e pow er itself.”

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

63

im p ressed by o n e pow er on a n o th e r a n d m ove th at o th e r pow er to co g n itio n a n d th e fo rm atio n o f an icon.

H en ce too, m utatis m utandis, in p ercep tio n an d intellection alike, inasm uch as b o th alike d e p e n d u p o n th e form ation by the anim al o f a species expressa (in co n trast to the an im al’s sensation, fo r w hich alone suffice th e en v iro n m en tal stim uli conveying from w ith o u t th e species impressa thanks to which p ro p e r an d com m on sensibles initiate th e process o f objectification, transform ing the su rro u n d in g physical en v iro n m en t in to an objective w orld filled w ith species-specific m eanings — an Umwelt, as th e Thom istic th in k e r Jo se f P iep er p u t it 42 on th e basis o f w hat he le arn ed from th e ex p erim en tal work in biology o f Jak o b von U exkull43) , w here th e difference in principle betw een objects an d things, de facto id en tified at the level o f external sensation, com es to a de jure fru itio n as th e objects o f experience are form ed o n th e basis o f a n d blossom fu rth e r in to signs, first o f w hat th e anim al needs (b o th to fluorish by attaining an d to survive by av oiding), an d th e n (for rational anim als) signs o f w hat th e w orld is in its p ro p e r b ein g a n d in its dep en d en cy u p o n a First Cause w hose signature is existence (“esse”) w herever it may be fo u n d in act:44

42 P ie p e r 1952. 43 See Kull 2001. 44 P o in so t 1632a: TDS B ook II, Q u estio n 2, 2 4 3 /2 2 - 2 4 4 /2 8 (=1632: 7 0 3 a9 -4 3 ): “S icut en im o b iectu m n o n p o te st te rm in a re v isionem ex tern am , nisi luce visibili p e rfu n d a tu r, ita n ec o b ie ctu m p o te st ab [sen su in terio ri m e m o riae , im ag in atio n is, e t aestim ativae; n ec ab] in te lle c tu attin g i, nisi a sensibilitate sit d e n u d a tu m e t luce spirituali, q u a e est im m aterialitas [relatively so in casu sensus in te rn i] seu ab stractio [strictly immaterial in casu in te lle ctu s h u m a n i] affectum e t fo rm a tu m . Im m aterialis a u te m lux n o n in v e n itu r e x tra [p o te n tia m p h a n ta sia n d i seu etiam ] p o te n tia m in tellectivam ; erg o o p o rte t, q u o d in tra ipsam illu m in e tu r o b ie ctu m e t fo rm etu r ilia sp iritu a litate [m ed iatu m in casu sen su u m in te rn o ru m , c o m p le tu m seu p e n itu s in casu in tellectu s seu ratio n is], u t a ttin g a tu r; e t h o c fo rm a tu m in esse o b iecti est v erbum seu co n c ep tu s [ly ‘expressed fo rm o f sp ecifica­ tio n ’, id est], q u o d n o n est ipsa cognitio, u t su p ra ex D. T h o m a d ix im u s e t in fra q uaest. 4. dicetur, q uia te n e t se ex p a rte o biecti seu te rm in i co g n iti, e iu sq u e officium n o n est re d d e re fo rm a liter co g n o sce n tem , u t co g n itio est

64

Intentionality and Semiotics

F or ju s t as an o b ject c a n n o t te rm in a te th e sense o f sight u n less it b e b a th e d in light, so n e ith e r can an o b ject be at­ ta in e d by [th e in te rn a l sense o f m em ory, im ag in atio n , a n d estim atio n ; n o r by] th e in te lle c t unless it be strip p e d o f the co n d itio n s o f e x te rn a l sen sa tio n a n d affected a n d fo rm e d by th e sp iritu al lig h t w hich is im m ateriality [ se c u n d u m q u id in th e case o f in te rn a l sense] o r a b stra c tio n [p e n itu s im m a te r ia l in th e case o f h u m a n u n d e rs ta n d in g ]. B ut an im m aterial lig h t is n o t fo u n d o u tsid e th e [th e p e rcep tiv e o r] in telle c­ tive pow er; th e re fo re m u st th e o b je c t o f n e e d s b e illum i­ n a te d a n d fo rm e d by th a t sp iritu ality [m ed ia te in th e case o f in te rn a l sense, co m p le te in th e case o f in te lle c tio n ] in o rd e r to b e ap p reh en siv ely a tta in e d ; a n d this b e in g fo rm e d in th e b e in g o f o b ject is th e w ord o r c o n c e p t [th e species expressa, th a t is ], w hich is n o t th e sam e as th e very co g n itio n itself, b ecau se th e c o n c e p t stands o n th e side o f th e o b ject o r term in u s o f th e co g n itio n , a n d its fu n c tio n is n o t to re n ­ d e r th e an im al form ally know ing as c o g n itio n is a te n d e n c y tow ard a n object, b u t to re n d e r ra th e r th e o b je c t p re s e n t a fte r th e m a n n e r o f th e term in u s co g n ize d o r know n. N o r d oes th e species expressa a n te c e d e th e c o g n itio n , as d o es th e species impressa, because it is fo rm e d w ith in th e c o g n itio n it­ self; n o r [again un lik e th e species impressa] d oes it exist as an in itia tin g p rin c ip le o f th e co g n itio n , b u t as th e te rm in u s o f th e co g n itio n . N o r on this a c c o u n t m u st it b e said th a t th e w o rd o r species expressa is co gnized as th a t w hich is know n [id q u o d ], as if it w ere a q u estio n o f co g n izin g a n im age te n d e n tia ad o biectum , sed re d d e re obiectu m p raesen s p e r m o d u m te rm in i cogniti. N ec a n te c e d it co g n itio n em sicut species im pressa, q u ia fo rm a tu r p e r c o g n id o n e m , nec [rursus dissim ile ad ly ‘im pressed fo rm o f sp e cific atio n ’] datu r u t p rin c ip iu m cognitionis, sed u t term inu s. N ec p ro p te re a o p o rte t, q u o d tale v erb u m seu species cogn o scatu r u t q u o d [id q u o d ], sicu t co g n o scitu r im ago exterior, u t in ea res re p ra e se n ta ta attin g atu r, q u ia cu m re p ra e s e n te t in tra [sensum in te rn u m u t etiam ] in tellectu m e t u t fo rm a in fo rm an s ilium , n o n re p ra e s e n ta t obiective et prius cognitum , sed fo rm a liter e t u t ratio cognosc en d i [id est, u t ratio ipsa objecti p ra e sen ta n d i in m o d o ipso in te rp re ta to , sive u t q u id attractivum , u t q u id re p u g n a n te m , vel u t q u id in d ifferen s (in casu p h a n ta sia n d i), seu u t verum vel fictum (et aliq u aliter co rrec te vel in c o rrec te , in casu in te lle c tio n is)]”.

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

65

in e x te rn a l sen sa tio n in o rd e r to a tta in ap p reh en siv ely th e th in g re p re s e n te d th e re in , fo r th e reaso n th at, since th e species expressa re p re se n ts w ithin [th e in te rn a l sense or] th e in te lle c t a n d as a form in fo rm in g th a t very power, it does n o t re p re s e n t objectively a n d as itself alread y co g n ized , b u t fo rm ally a n d as th e ra tio n a le o f th e co g n izin g [th a t is, as th e very re aso n fo r th e o b je c t’s b e in g p re s e n te d in te rp re te d in th e m a n n e r th a t it is p re se n te d , e ith e r as d esira b le , re p u g ­ n a n t, o r ig n o ra b le (in th e case o f in te rn a l sen se ), o r as tru e o r Active (a n d in e ith e r case rightly o r wrongly, in th e case o f u n d e rs ta n d in g ) ].

P erh ap s e n o u g h has b e e n said by now to reveal ju s t why th e c e le b ra te d N eo th o m istic “q u o /q u o d d istin c tio n ” as a re ­ sponse to o r re b u tta l o f idealist claim s re g a rd in g know ledge is n o t ju s t a sim plification b u t an oversimplification, a n d as such a veritable fallacy, as I have shown a n d em phasized. N ecessary to ex p lain th e case o f objects n o t necessarily id e n tified in fact w ith th in g s is a trich o to m y ra th e r o f “q u o /in q u o /q u o d ”. W ith this trich o to m y we are well underw ay, as will shortly ap p ear, tow ard o v ercom in g th e post-C artesian re alism /id ealism o p p o ­ sition, a n d n o t by co m in g to term s w ith D escartes a n d K ant, b u t ra th e r by ch an g in g th e term s in w hich w hat is co n v in cin g a b o u t K ant in p a rticu la r com es to light, nam ely, th e a-p rio ri ro le o f biological co n stitu tio n (n o t at all o f th e u n d e rs ta n d ­ ing, as h e h im se lf m istakenly th o u g h t, fo r w ant o f a d istin ctio n betw een sen satio n as n o t involving an d p e rc e p tio n as involv­ ing a species expressa, o n th e o n e h an d , a n d b etw een in te lle c ­ tio n a n d p e rc e p tio n in asm u ch as in tellectio n o r u n d e rs ta n d ­ in g tran scen d s th e species expressa o n w hich p e rc e p tio n in o th e r anim als is exclusively b ased ,45 a lth o u g h it p e rfo rc e m akes use o f th a t expressa as impressa resp ectin g th e fo rm atio n o f its own p ro p e r expressae) in th e fo rm atio n o f th e U m w elt. H e re le t us sum m arize th e po in t.

45 See D eely 2001: esp. 553-570.

66

Intentionality and Semiotics

e. Q . 85, A rt. 2 a n d th e Q u o / Q u o d Fallacy: E n d in g a L o n g M is u n d e r s ta n d in g W ith A rticle 2 o f Q u estio n 85 in th e First P art o f th e Summa, St T h o m as asks us w h eth er th e intelligible specifying form s ‘ab­ s tra c te d ’ from th e phantasm s are related to o u r in tellect as th a t w hich is u n d ersto o d ; a n d M aritain, along with M o rtim er A dler a n d m ost o r all o f th e N eothom ists,46 in terp rets this q u estio n as applying equally to th e species impressa fo rm ed by th e ag e n t in tel­ lect a n d to th e species expressa fo rm ed by th e possible intellect. B ut this is n o t th e case, an d am o u n ts again to an oversim pli­ fication. T h e reaso n is th a t th e species impressa fu n ctio n s as th e “id q u o ” simply by w hich a stim ulus o rig in atin g with th e physi­ cal en v iro n m e n t is conveyed in tentionally in to th e fo rm atio n o f th e in tellectu al co n ce p t along with th e m aterial entia rationis necessary to th e stru ctu re o f p erce p tio n fo r any anim al o f o u r type, w hile th e species expressa functions ra th e r as th e “id in q u o ” o n th e basis o f w hich th e p e r se sensible e n v iro n m e n t alo n g w ith a n d w ithin th e p ercep tib le w orld o f in te rp re te d objects fo r th e first tim e appears ra th e r in the guise o f so m eth in g able to be u n d e rsto o d acco rd in g to its being, acco rd in g to w hat it actu ­ ally is both w ithin and in d e p en d en tly o f objectification. H en ce it will n o t do simply to arg u e47 th a t “th e expression in quo” is o n e “w hich in n o way destroys o r dim inishes th e force o f th e w ord quo as ap p lied to th e concept, b u t only m akes it m o re precise, an d signifies th a t th e act o f u n d e rsta n d in g 46 F or m any years, it was M o rtim er A dler w ho m ost egregiously illu strat­ ed in his w ritings th e q u o /q u o d fallacy. In 2003 this crow n passed to J o h n O ’C allaghan with his atte m p t to ac co m m o d ate N eo th o m ism to th e “linguistic tu r n ” o f co n te m p o ra ry analytic philosophy (on a m u ch lesser scale, B rain e 2002 illustrates th e sam e). Cf. Deely 2006a fo r details o f th e difficulties in th e way o f any such ac co m m o d atio n , w hich com e dow n to this: w hile th e th o u g h t o f St T hom as, th o u g h itself pre-sem iodc, is yet in th e line o f a n d co m p atib le with th e d ev e lo p m e n t o f sem iotics, late m o d e rn linguistic p h ilo so p h y c a n n o t survive analysis from th e sem iotic p o in t o f view, exactly as a n d fo r th e reaso n T odorov p ro jec ted (1977: 40). 47 M aritain 1959: 393.

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

67

indivisibly includes, at once an d by the sam e token, b o th th e c o n c e p t signifying an d the object signified”. This will n o t do, because th e “object signified” on th e basis o f th e species expressa o f in tern al sense, by com parison with the th in g stim ulating th e ex tern al sense an d originating the species impressa w hich is th e quo — p u re quo — o f sensation, is only partially ‘th e sam e’, fo r a n d inasm uch as th e object know n in p erce p tio n is n o t simply th e physical source in itself o f th e stim ulus o f ex tern al sense b u t is th a t source as in c o rp o ra ted into the needs an d in terests o f th e organism perceiving th at it be evaluated as in d icatin g som e th re a t (-) o r desirable elem en t (+) o r so m eth in g th a t n e e d elic­ it n o co n ce rn at th e m o m en t (0). In o th e r words, “th e co n cep t signifying” in sense p e rc e p tio n is n o t signifying ens reale simpliciter, b u t ra th e r ens reale secundum quid, namely, as in clu d ed in th e co n cep t as an expression — spe­ cies expressa — both o f som ething o f th e physical e n v iro n m en t and o f w hat th a t so m eth in g m eans o r could m ean in rela tio n to th e organism perceiving. This requires th a t th e organism itself ad d so m eth in g o f its own in its own form ation o f th e species in response {expressa) to th e species received (impressa) from ex ter­ nal sense. It is this “som ething m ore, so m eth in g a d d e d ”, th a t is at issue in th e transition from quo to in quo. L et m e cite here, in su p p o rt o f my above rem arks,48 th e tex t o f St T hom as i. 1259-60: Summa contra gentiles B ook I, chap. 48 A quinas c. 1265-66: De potentia 9.5c is also w orth co n su ltin g o n this p o in t, w here T h o m as clearly distinguishes th e form (i.e., species impressa), w hich is th e “in tellig en d i p rin c ip iu m ” a n d “n o n sicut in te llig en d i te rm in u s”, fro m th e “p rim o e t p e r se intellectum , q u o d intellectu s in seipso c o n c ip it de re in te lle c ta ”, w hich is th e “verbum interim”, w hich in itself, as we are seeing, is an “in q u o ” per se, b u t w hich becom es a “q u o ” only secundum quid: o n th e o n e side (as re c o u n te d e a rlier), th ro u g h in c o rp o ra tin g th e species impressa sensuum extemorum ut relicta et praesens in phantasmatibus ex quo intellectus agens form at speciem impressam intellectus possibilis; an d , o n th e o th e r side (as T h o m as ex p lains in th e text we are co n sid erin g ), resp e ctin g th e verbum extmor, i.e., th e ex a p ta tio n o f language in th e ro o t sense (Sebeok 1984, 1986, 1987 a n d 1987a; Deely 2001: chap. 1) to co n stitu te linguistic c o m m u n ic atio n as speciesspecifically h u m a n : “n o n enim vox e x te rio r significat ipsum in tellectu m [th e

68

Intentionality and Semiotics

43. T h e first p a rag rap h o f my citation reads like the com m on (mis) in te rp re ta tio n o f A quinas c. 1266-73: Summa theologiae 1.85.2c, u n d e r discussion. B ut th e n ex t p arag rap h goes on to ex p lain exactly th e p oints o n w hich th e first p arag rap h rem ains silent b u t presu p p o ses, in th e sense that, ab sen t a grasp o f the p re su p p o se d (silent) points, th e p arag rap h o p en in g reduces to an oversim plification th a t falsifies th e matter-at-issue. To the o p e n in g p a ra g ra p h , I ad d my own em phasis in th e form o f bold face type. To th e follow-up clarification I in sert my glosses in ital­ ics betw een sq u are brackets. H ere is th e text from SCG 1.43:49 u n d e rs ta n d in g itself], a u t fo rm am ipsius intelligibilem [th e species intelligibilis impressa], a u t ipsum in tellig ere [the act o f u n d e rsta n d in g ], sed conceptum intellectus quo mediante [italics add ed ; w here “q u o m e d ia n te ” m ean s n o t a w indow th ro u g h w hich is viewed th e object b u t th e species expressa seu intellecta o n th e basis o f w hich prov en ates th e cognitive rela tio n te rm in atin g at th e th in g as o b je ct know n in this o r th a t perspective — i.e., as “specified”] significat rem : u t cu m dico, ‘h o m o ’ vel ‘h o m o est an im al’.” — “fo r th e sp o k en w ord d o es n o t signify th e in te lle ct itself, o r th e intelligible fo rm itself, o r th e act o f u n d e r­ stan d in g ; th e sp o k en w ord signifies th e c o n c ep tio n o f th e in te lle c t by m ean s o f w hich th e spo k en w ord signifies w hat it is th a t is u n d e rsto o d , th e o b ject u n d e rsto o d : as w hen I say ‘m a n ’ o r ‘m an is an an im a l’.” (C o m p are, in Poinsot 1632a, A p p en d ix A, “O n th e Signification o f L anguage: W h e th e r vocal expressions prim arily signify concepts o r th in g s”, 344-350; = P o in so t 1632: “U tru m voces significent p e r prius co nceptus an res”, 104b31—108a33.) T h e n occurs o n e o f those astonishing co n tin u atio n s so co m m o n in St T h o m a s (which m ake him always new to re a d ) : “E t q u a n tu m ad h o c n o n diffe rt u tru m in tellectus in telligat se, vel intellig at aliu d a se. S icut en im cu m intellig it aliu d a se, fo rm a t co n c ep tu m illius rei q u ae voce significatur, ita cu m in tellig it se ipsum , fo rm a t co n c ep tu m sui, q u o d voce etiam p o te st e x p rim e re ” (“A nd as far as co n c ern s this m a tte r o f th e signification o f sp o k e n w ords, it m atters n o t a w hit w h eth e r th e in tellect u n d ersta n d s itself o r so m e th in g o th e r th a n itself: ju s t as w hen it u n d ersta n d s so m eth in g o th e r th a n itself it fo rm s a c o n c e p t o f th a t th in g w hich is signified by th e voice, so w hen it u n d e rsta n d s itself it does so by fo rm in g a co n c e p t o f itself, w hich can also be e x p re ssed by a sp o k en w ord ”). H ow could th e esse intentionale d o c trin e th a t th e k n o w er b e ­ com es w hat it knows m o re strikingly be expressed th a n in this c o n tin u a tio n ? See ex te n d e d discussion o f this p o in t as regards th e “in te n tio n a l life o f th e h u m a n b ein g ” in Deely 1971; b u t also below in C hap. 13, p. 182-184. 49 A quinas i.1259-60: Summa contra gentiles I, ch ap . 43: “A cc o u n t m u st be taken o f th e fact th a t an ex terio r th in g u n d e rsto o d by us d o es n o t ex ­ ist in o u r u n d e rsta n d in g ac co rd in g to its p ro p e r n a tu re , b u t th e re m u st

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

69

C o n sid e ra n d u m est q u o d res e x te rio r in tellecta a nobis, in intellectu n o stro n o n existit sec u n d u m p ro p ria m n atu ram ; sed o p o rte t q u o d species ejus sit in in tellectu nostro, p e r q uam fit intellectus in actu. Existens au tem in actu, p e r hu iu sm o d i speciem , sicut p e r p ro p ria m form am , intelligit re m ipsam ; n o n au tem ita q u o d ipsum in tellig ere sit actio tran sien s in re m intellectam , sicut calefactio tran sit in calefactum , sed n e e d s b e a fo rm specificative o f th a t th in g in o u r u n d e rsta n d in g , th ro u g h w hich specification the actual understanding com es ab o u t. E xisting in act th ro u g h a fo rm al specification o f this so rt th e u n d e rsta n d in g u n d e rsta n d s th e th in g itself as if th ro u g h its p r o p e r form ; yet n o t in suchwise th a t th e very ac t o f u n d e rs ta n d in g w ould b e a n ac tio n passing in to th e th in g u n d e rsto o d , as h e a t passes in to a h e a te d thin g . T h e actual u n d e rsta n d in g rem ain s w ithin th e very o n e u n d e rs ta n d in g a n d has a relation to the thing which is understood, based on the fact that the afo re m e n tio n e d specificative form is a formal si­ militude of that very thing [ra th e r th a n o f so m e th in g e lse ]. “A cc o u n t m u st fu rth e r be taken o f th e fact th a t th e [possible] u n d e rs ta n d ­ in g specificatively fo rm e d by a th in g [ namely, the form o f specification impressed by the intellect’s own activity], in actually u n d e rsta n d in g form s w ithin itself a c e rta in in te n tio n o f th e th in g u n d e rsto o d [namely, an expressed specificative form] w hich is th e ratio n ale o f th a t th in g w hich a d efin itio n signifies. A n d this fu rth e r p o sit is necessary from th e fact th a t th e u n d e rsta n d in g u n d e rsta n d s in d ifferen tly p re se n t a n d ab sen t things, in w hich im ag in atio n has so m e th in g in co m m o n w ith u n d e rsta n d in g . B ut th e u n d e rsta n d in g has fu rth e r [compara­ tively, that is, to internal sense or to sense-perception generally speaking] th e ability also to u n d e rs ta n d a th in g as sep arate d from th e m aterial c o n d itio n s w ith­ o u t w hich th e th in g in n a tu re c a n n o t exist. A nd this co u ld n o t b e u n less th e u n d e rs ta n d in g w ere to form fo r itself th e a fo re m e n tio n e d fu rth e r [expressed] specification. Yet this u n d e rsto o d o r “in te lle c te d ” [expressed] in te n tio n , since it is a quasi te rm in u s o f th e intelligible o p e ra tio n , is o th e r th a n th e in telli­ gible specifying fo rm [impressed by the intellect’s own acting] w hich th e in te lle c t m a d e to be actually intelligible, fo r th e intelligible [impressed] specification is re q u ire d as th e p rin cip le o f th e intelligible o p e ra tio n , even th o u g h b o th specifications [both the one impressed by the intellect acting on the phantasm and the expressed by the possible intellect] are a form al sim ilitude o f th e th in g u n d e rsto o d . F o r from th e fact th a t this intelligible specifying form , w hich is stim ulative o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g a n d th e p rin c ip le o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g , is a sim ilitu d e o f th e ex terio r th in g [ insofar as it is expressed by the interior senses on the basis o f the specifications impressed upon the external senses] it follows th a t th e u n d e rs ta n d in g form s an in te n tio n sim ilar to th a t very thing; becau se as a th in g is, so does it act. A nd from th e fact th a t th e u n d e rsto o d in te n tio n is a likeness o f som e thing, it follows th a t th e u n d e rsta n d in g by fo rm in g this in te n tio n u n d e rsta n d s th a t specific th in g [ra th e r th a n an y th in g o th e r] .”

70

Intentionality and Semiotics

m a n e t in ipso intelligente, et habet relationem ad rem quae intelligitur, ex eo quod species praedicta, quae est principiu m in tellectualis o p erationis u t form a, est similitudo illius. U lterius autem co n sid eran d u m est quod intellectus [pos sibilis] p e r speciem rei form atus [scil. species impressa exp h a n ta sm ato ab intellectu agente] intelligendo form at in seipso quam d am in te n tio n e m rei intellectae [ scil. species expressa], quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat diffinitio. Et hoc quidem necessarium est, eo q u o d intellectus intelligit in d ifferen ter rem ab se n te m e t praesentem ; in quo cum intellectu im aginatio convenit. Sed intellectus hoc am plius h a b e t [scil. com parative a d sensus interiorem sen p h a n ta sia ri generaliter loquendo ], q uod etiam intelligit rem u t separatam a conditionibus m aterialibus, sine quibus in re ru m n a tu ra n o n exisdt; e t hoc n o n posset esse, nisi intellectus in ten tio n e m sibi p raedictam [ expressam ] fo rm aret. H aec autem in ten tio intellecta [expressa], q u u m sit quasi term in u s intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili [ impressa ab intellectu agente ], q uae facit in tellectu m in actu, quam [ im pressam ] o p o rte t considerari u t intelligibilis o p eratio n is p rincipium , licet u tru m q u e [et im pressam ab intel­ lectu agente et expressam ab intellectu possibile ] sit rei in tellectae sim ilitudo. P er hoc enim , q u o d species intelligibilis, q u ae est fo rm a intellectus et intelligendi p rin cip iu m , est sim ilitudo rei exterioris [in q u a n tu m est expressa ab sensibus interioribus ex speciebus impressis supra sensus exteriores], seq u itu r q u o d in­ tellectus in te n tio n e m fo rm e t illi rei sim ilem ; q u ia q u ale est u n u m q u o d q u e , talia operatur. Et ex hoc q u o d in te n tio in tel­ lecta est similis alicui rei, seq u itu r q u o d intellectus, fo rm a n d o hu ju sm odi in ten tio n e m , rem illam intelligat.

W hence to insist simply th a t th e expression “in q u o ” in n o way “destroys o r dim inishes th e force o f th e w ord ‘q u o ’” is to miss a crucial p o in t an d to beg th e question. F or th e quo as spe­ cies impressa simply conveys iconically th e o th e rn e ss o f its source, w hereas the in quo norm ally an d necessarily (by virtue o f its fu nction to e n g e n d e r a perception an d n o t m erely to d u p licate a sensation) adds to th a t iconicity “relatio n s o f re a so n ” (entia rationis), w h eth er only m aterially (as in th e p e rc e p tio n o f b ru te

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

71

anim als re n d e rin g th e cognized en v iro n m en t m eaningful for them) o r also form ally (as in the intellection o f rational anim als re n d e rin g th e perceived en v iro n m en t so m eth in g able to be u n ­ d ersto o d in term s o f being, b o th reale an d rationis) . A nd it is as terminus o f th e relations founded in (p rovenating from ) th e spe­ cies expressae th a t th e object perceived exists, w hich includes b u t does n o t red u ce to th e relations to th e en v iro n m en tal source w hich provenate from th e species impressae as sensory stim ulus. D espite having recognized th e lim itation at w ork in T h o m ­ as’ own w ritings on th e qu estio n ,5051M aritain th e n him self also fails to sh ift the em phasis n eed e d to acco u n t fo r those aspects o f reality w hich are socially con stru cted an d as such involve ens reale w ith o u t red u cin g th ereto , from (in M aritain’s own term s) “th e relatio n betw een th e ex tram ental th in g an d th e p resen tative form [species impressa] thanks to which th e th in g is m ad e o b ject” to “the relation betw een th e presentative form [species expressa] a n d th e object itself taken as such”. f. W h a t th e I n te lle c t A c tin g (“Intellectus Agens”) E n a b le s th e P o ssib le I n te lle c t To S ee in O b je c ts P e rc e iv e d So th e initial o r prim itive awareness o f th e objective w orld n o t simply in term s o f anim al in teractio n (+, - , 0) b u t now also in term s o f actual bein g gives a w hole new d im en sio n to th e ex­ p erien ce o f “this” an d “w hat is n o t this” as a d ifferen ce in being, a difference in w hat is an d w hat is n o t recognized, w hich involves th e ability to distinguish ens rationis as such (“form ally”) — com ­ parative non-bein g to th e ens reale o f th a t w hich is o r seem s to be so. T h e ens reale o f th e sensible en v iro n m en t b ecom es e n ­ tangled with relationes rationis in o rd e r to exist as a stru c tu re d o r m eaningful w orld o f objects fo r th e anim al, an Umwelt; an d this is what the rational animal awakens to51 as th e initial c o n tra st

50 M aritain 1959: 389n4, cited on pp. 39-40 above. 51 From th e first o f m any sleeps, as we m ig h t say (fo r “il est p o u r l’h o m m e plusieurs d o rm ir” — M aritain 1959: 2).

72

Intentionality and Semiotics

betw een being {ens reale) an d n o n b ein g (ens ralionis), betw een som ething o f objectivity th at does (ens rationis) an d th a t does n o t (ens reale) red u ce to o u r experience o f it. In this very act o f com parison, the u n d e rsta n d in g grasps (again for the first tim e) distinction in a co n cep tu al form . J u st so, in th e course o f ex p erien ce, bein g an d n o n b ein g , ens reale an d ens rationis, create each o th e r form ally an d correlatively as elem ents o f ex p erien ce.52 They are n o t absolutes, they are 52 Cf. P eirce (1868: CP 5.311): “th e real ... is a co n c ep tio n w hich we m u st first have h ad w hen we discovered th a t th e re was an u n rea l, an illusion; th a t is, w hen we first co rrec ted ourselves. Now the d istin ctio n fo r w hich a lo n e this fact logically called, was betw een an ens relative to private inw ard d e te rm in a ­ tions, to th e n egations belo n g in g to idiosyncrasy, a n d an ens su ch as w ould stan d in th e lo n g ru n .” You can see h e re th a t Peirce has o n e foo t o n th e trail, b u t th e n , exactly like th e N eothom ists (e.g., Ashley 1973), his o th e r fo o t h e leaves o n th e p a th to psychologism w hich so bedeviled th e logic a n d philo so p h y o f his tim e. F o r th e discovery o f th e u n re a l n e e d hardly consist in th e discovery o f illusion. It consists even m o re fundam entally in th e discovery o f things th a t have n o subjective reality per se while they are yet far fro m “private inw ard d e te rm i­ nations, n egations b elo n g in g to idiosyncracy”. T h e b o u n d a ry b etw een Texas a n d O k lah o m a o r betw een D u b uque, Iowa, a n d East D u b u q u e, Illinois, o r th e P residency o f th e U n ited States, have n o reality a p a rt fro m th e encultu ra te d social ex p e rien c e o f sem iotic anim als, yet they can h ard ly b e said to re d u c e to ‘private inw ard d e te rm in a tio n s’ o r ‘n eg atio n s b elo n g in g to idiosyn­ cracy’, unless we ex te n d “private” a n d “idiosyncratic” well b ey o n d individu­ ality as such to th e w hole w orld as species-specific to sem iotic anim als. T h e u n rea l is w hat c a n n o t be p h o to g ra p h e d o r perceived as such by sense, yet is n o n eth ele ss public a n d determ inative o f h u m a n life. A nyone w ho has ever h ad to flee th e police knows ju s t how real is th e “u n re a l” b o u n d a ry b etw een Texas a n d O klahom a. T h e re are, o f course, “private inw ard d e te rm in a tio n s” an d “negations b elo n g in g to idiosyncracy”, as w h en I d eclare m yself K ing o f F rance a n d p ro ce ed to act accordingly. B ut even th ese private a n d idiosyn­ cratic d eterm in a tio n s, as giving rise to relatio n s w ithin an U m w elt, can, in th e Lifew orld, b eco m e far from private a n d idiosyncratic, as w h en N ap o leo n d ecid ed h e w ould be E m p e ro r o f F ran ce (o r even h a d h e — privately an d idiosyncratically — d ec id e d a t th e tim e to be th e n e x t K ing in stead ) an d so in tro d u c e d in to th e U m w elt a ro u n d h im en e rg etic in te rp re ta n ts th a t he soon so becam e. Ens rationis d oes n o t b e lo n g to th e in n e r w orld a n d ens reale to th e outer. To th e in n e r w orld b elo n g th e species expressae, b o th those o f phantasiari a n d those o f intelligere, w hich com p rise th e In n en w elt on th e ba­ sis o f w hich exists as public in p rin cip le th e objective w orld o r U m welt; an d

Chapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

73

correlates; and, as in ex p erien ce so co rrelated , they provide the basis o f all fu rth e r distinctions o f u n d erstan d in g . This new grasp, in tu rn , enables yet a n o th e r new grasp, grasp in ju d g ­ m e n t o f the first p rinciple o f intelligible discourse, w hich — in its tu rn — provides the g ro u n d o f endless fu rth e r ju d g m e n ts o f a logical kind. This first p rin cip le o f intelligible discourse is exactly as A quinas described it,53 a n d is called (see th e h u m o r in this) by som e the principle of contradiction a n d by o th e rs the principle of non-contradiction. B ut at least b o th a n d all ag ree on exactly w hat is the c o n te n t o f this principle: th a t it is n o t possi­ ble to b o th be an d n o t be at the sam e tim e in th e sam e respect, “impossibile est esse et non esse simuV’. As the d irect outcom e o f the ju d g m e n t th a t b ein g {ens reale) is n o t non-being {ens rationis), the principle o f co n tra d ictio n participates in the non-alternative, th erefo re necessary, ch arac­ ter o f th a t p rio r ju d g m en t. U nderstanding, unable, o n th e in­ w ard side,54 to affirm and deny the same th ing u n d e r th e sam e aspect, has m anifested to it by the senses likewise th a t entities are one way o r an o th e r b u t n o t b o th in a given aspect, giving it is this objective, public w orld com prising th e interw eave o f entia rationis a n d entia realia as equally objective th a t is th e w orld o f an im al ex p e rien c e. In tro d u c in g into the h u m an Innenw elt intellectual co n cep ts alo n g w ith a n d su p e ro rd in a te to phantasm s m akes only this difference, b u t it is h u g e: th a t it becom es possible for the anim al using signs now to recognize also th a t th e re are signs— relations in th e ir difference from an d co n trast to re la te d th in g s— w hich som etim es term in ate at m in d -in d e p en d e n t objectivities a n d som etim es ra th e r at m in d -d e p e n d e n t objectivities, norm ally at ad m ix tu res o f b o th . At this m o m e n t th e generically anim al U m w elt becom es th e species-specifically h u m an Lebensw elt, o p e n e d by th e n o tio n o f b ein g as such to th e ex p lo ra­ tions o f subjectivity w ithout w hich th e re w ould be no science, as well as to th e flights o f fancy w hich d ep ict even b etter objective w orlds, such as ‘u to p ia s’. 53 A quinas c. 1268-72: Commentary on the Metaphysics o f Aristotle, Book IV, lect. 6, n. 605. 54 In w ords we can say anything; b u t A quinas th o u g h t like A ristotle o n this p o in t (Aristotle c. 348-47a: Organon, 76b24-27): “dem o n stratio n is ad d ressed n o t to th e spoken word b u t to the discourse w ithin th e soul, an d th o u g h we can always raise objections to th e spoken word, to th e inw ard discourse we c a n n o t always object”. O ften you can actually see so m eo n e say w hat they clear­ ly d o n o t think, ju st to preserve th eir position (or prid e) in an arg u m en t.

74

Intentionality and Semiotics

rise to th e n o tio n o f “being und iv id ed ” o r unity. But w hat is ex­ p erim en tally u n divided in itself is given, in an d by th a t very ex­ p e rie n c e , as divided from others. So arises (intellectual) grasp o f plurality, o f m any beings each o f which is itself o n e.55 A t this stage, finally, tautological ju d g m e n t (a ju d g m e n t true by virtue o f logical form alone) an d th e recognition o f identity (“every b ein g is w hat it is”) becom es possible. O nly th e n does the reco g n itio n o f an “outside w orld” as such, th a t is, a world ap art fro m o u r subjectivity an d beyond o u r Um w elt (i.e., in d e p e n ­ dently existing in respect o f o u r being as know ers), a ‘w orld’, in s h o rt — namely, th e physical env iro n m en t a n d universe — with a subjectivity a n d intersubjectivity o f its own,56 b eco m e possible as well. We have th e n seven prim itive elem en ts u p o n w hich th e e x p erien ce o f th e physical universe o r w orld o f c u ltu re alike as actually intelligible rests, as o n a fo u n d atio n : b eing, n o n -b ein g , distin ctio n , co n trad ictio n , unity, plurality, identity. O nly with these fo u n d a tio n stones in place does “tru th as co n fo rm ity ” b eco m e a possibility in discourse — o r even a q u estio n .57 T h e seq u en ce o f these elem ents, b ein g th e sam e fo r all anim als 55 See the reply to the 15th objection in Q. 9, art. 7, o f his Quaestiones disputatae depotentia, w here A quinas (c.1265/6; in Busa vol. 3, p. 258) provides a near-com plete sum m ary exposition o f this discussion. 56 It may n o t be p rem a tu re to n o te th a t this rec o g n itio n sets th e h u m a n use o f signs (or “anthroposem iosis”) ap a rt in p rin cip le fro m th e use o f signs b ru te anim als m ake (“zoosem iosis”) as such. As it m ig h t b e said, a n d as Jacq u es M aritain did say (1949: 9): “In its m ost p e rfe c t fu n ctio n , w hich is n o t to m a n u ­ facture ideas b u t to ju d g e , the u n d e rsta n d in g seizes u p o n existence exercised by things.” 57 T he basis for the p rio r possibility o f such conform ity b ein g so m eth in g else again, as H eidegger (1943) was first to p o in t o ut, in an essay all th e m o re im p o rta n t for com ing in the wake o f K ant’s elab o rate ex p lan a tio n o f why any such conform ity could be n o m o re than a m e re ap p e aran c e, a “p h e n o m ­ e n o n ” in the invidious sense K ant so well m an ag ed to attach to th e final o n ­ tological im poverishm ent o f th a t term . It is — to answ er this la ter q u estio n o f H eidegger (1943) — the basis for th e p rio r possibility o f tru th as co rresp o n ­ den ce o r “conform ity”, then, th a t semiosis establishes th ro u g h b u t beyond, as we have seen, “anim al realism ”. See pp. 134-135 below.

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

75

possessed o f reaso n in its d ifferen ce from sense, is w hat lays th e g ro u n d o f possibility fo r intersubjective a g re e m e n t in th e linguistically co m m u n icab le results o f ju d g m e n ts as well. We have h ere, so to speak, th e in tellectu al in frastru c tu re o f cul­ tu ral reality in its d ifferen ce fro m th e pu rely social w orld o f anim al com m unities. Idealism in the m o d e rn sense (th at th e m in d knows only w hat the m ind itself makes) is p reclu d ed in th e setting o f such an analysis “by the fact th a t th e know ing subject is discovered” — or, m ore exacdy, discovers itself — “only within a world o f change subject to the law o f co n trad ictio n ”.58 This “law o f co n trad ictio n ” itself, m oreover, along with the transcendentals an d o th e r logi­ cal concepts, as Strasser well says,59 “such as ‘so m eth in g ’, ‘id en ti­ ty’, ‘non-identity’, ‘ag ree m en t’, ‘d isagreem ent’, ‘characteristic’, ‘rela tio n ’, an d ‘co n n ec tio n ’,” is ro o ted “in o u r concrete dealings with beings”, w hat I prefer to call “anim al realism ”. O ver an d above this (again Strasser), “T he elem entary rules o f logic owe th e ir com pelling force to o u r habitual knowledge ab o u t the id en ­ tity, unity, in n e r indivision o f being and its difference from o th e r beings. In o th e r words, the logical evidences are based u p o n , or, rather, arise o u t of, a certain experience o f being as b ein g ”. g. F ro m P e r Se S e n sib le to P e r Se In te llig ib le : T h e H e a r t o f th e M a tte r B ut notice in all this th e crucial role o f the entia rationis, th e relation o f identity in particular: “every bein g is w hat it is”. Every anim al lives in a w orld o f objects stru ctu red b o th acco rd in g to the physical n a tu re o f th e en v iro n m en t an d also acco rd in g to the needs an d desires o f th e anim al. T h e physically sam e item o f the en v iro n m en t may be evaluated as object oppositely by anim als o f diverse species, n e ith e r b eing “w rong”; an d diverse 58 Ashley 1973: 291-292. 59 Strasser 1963: 263. Cf. A quinas, c .1268/72: Commentary on the Metaphys­ ics, Book V, lect. 11, n. 912. A nd see th e diagram o f A quinas’ n o d o n o f the im plicit c o n te n t o f the primum cognitum in C h a p te r 15 o f Deely 2001: 648.

76

Intentionality and Semiotics

species even sense diverse aspects o f th e sam e en v iro n m en t as th e ir species-specific basis fo r fu rth e r organizing th a t en viron­ m e n t in to an objective h ab itat which suits th e ir needs. So the objective w orld o f d irect p ercep tu al ex p erien ce, unlike the rela­ tions given in an d by ex tern al sense at th e fo u n d atio n an d core o f objectivity w here th e entia rationis as yet have n o p u rch ase,60 is an irred u cib le m ix tu re o f m in d -d e p e n d e n t an d m ind-inde­ p e n d e n t being, woven to g e th er in th e web o f ex p erien ce by relationes indifferently reales et rationis (an d we will shortly see th a t entia rationis are nothing but relations) so far as th e anim al in its anim ality is co n cern ed . W hat is im p o rta n t fo r th e anim al as anim al is th e cycle o f day an d n ig h t an d o f th e seasons, n o t w h eth er this cycle results from the sun m oving ro u n d th e earth o r the earth m oving ro u n d th e sun. If we b ear in m in d th a t th e “ag en t in tellect” (th at is, th e in tellect by its own activity) form s th e intelligible species impressa fo r th e possible intellect n o t directly from th e stim ulation o f ex­ tern al sense (which is p rio r to th e m aterial fo rm atio n o f entia ra­ tionis) b u t directly from the m aterial provided by th e p h an tasm s (i.e., the species expressaejo in tly p ro d u ced by m em ory, im agina­ tion, an d estim ation, which are interpretive o f th e e n v iro n m e n t 60 A nim als w hich learn from exp erien ce do so d e facto only with th e as­ sistance o f relations “o f reaso n ”, m aterially only in th e case o f b ru te anim als, form ally as well in th e case o f rational anim als; b u t th e ex tern al senses u p o n w hich these anim als rely resp o n d only selectively ra th e r th a n in terp retiv ely to th e stim uli from th e ir surroundings, w hence th e netw ork o f rela tio n s a m o n g com m o n a n d p ro p e r sensibles in each case is naturally d e te rm in e d even th o u g h it obtains only in cognition, a n d leaves n o ro o m fo r th o se “rela tio n s o f rea so n ” — “n eq u e sensus ex tern u s relationes ratio n is fo rm at, quis ca ret isto m o d o co g noscendi”, scil., p e r m o d u m in te rp re tatio n is in fo rm a tio n e specierum expressarum — which necessarily e n te r in in o rd e r fo r th e d ata o f ex tern al sense to be interpretively organized o n th e basis o f th e subjective, i.e., biological, n a tu re o f th e cognizing organism ac co rd in g to th e p e rc e p tu a l categories o f in teraction, +, - , 0, as we have ea rlier co n sid ered . Exactly h ere , in th e co n n ectio n betw een p ro p e r an d com m o n sensibles, d o es th e m o d e rn distinction o f “epistem ology” from “ontology” b reak dow n, as it com es a-cropp e r also over the singularity o f ontological relatio n in g en eral, as I have so m any tim es elsew here discussed, a n d will again h e re in ch ap ters 8 a n d 11.

Chapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

77

an d n o t m erely selective respecting it — and which, as in te rp re ­ tive, while including the pure quo o f the species impressae o f ex­ ternal sense revealing irreducibly aspects of the physical reality, th e ens reale o f the situation, add to that m anifestation th e in quo w ithout which the anim al would n o t be able to “m ake sense” of its surroundings in o rd e r to get on with life), we see at once th at while the w orld o f perceived an d exp erien ced objects neces­ sarily contains m aterially elem ents o f entia rationis, an d in d eed “hangs to g e th er” experientially an d objectively (as op p o sed to m erely physically) because of these relationes rationis (the anim al organism could n o t otherw ise so m uch as o rien tate itself in space to find its way hom e!), p ercep tu al aw areness as sensory does n o t and can n o t directly reveal the difference betw een th e entia rationis and the entia realia in the constitution o f th e Umwelt. P erceptual awareness in its sensory dim ension relies u n ­ wittingly on the functional equivalence o f m in d -d ep en d en t an d m in d -in d ep en d en t relations for purposes o f action a n d in terac­ tion.61 But the p o in t is so fundam ental, yet so little co n sid ered o r generally understood, th at it bears rep eatin g h ere:62 61 Cf. above, pp. 54-55. 62 Poinsot 1632a: TDS Book I, Q uestion 4, “In W hat Way A re O bjects Di­ vided into Stimulative and Term inative”, 1 8 7 /2 8 -1 9 0 /3 (1632: “Q u aliter dividatur obiectum in m otivum et term inativum ”, 6 7 8 b l5 -6 7 9 a6 ): “w h e th e r an object is m in d -in d ep en d en t o r m in d -d e p en d en t m akes a d ifferen ce only in the rationale o f being, n o t in the rationale o f object a n d know able thing. S om ething can well be an object simply an d n o t be a b ein g simply. F o r th e dif­ ferences o f things in physical existence a n d b ein g are o n e m atter, differences in the rationale o f an object an d cognizable th in g q u ite an o th er, as C ajetan well notes in his C om m entary on the Summa theologica, I, q. 1, art. 3. A nd so many things coincide univocally in th e ratio n ale o f th e know able, a n d n o t in rationale of [endtative] being, o r conversely. A nd sim ilarly can m any things coincide specifically in the rationale o f the know able a n d n o t in th e ratio n ale o f being, or conversely. ... For th e rationale o f th e know able only bespeaks th e necessary connection o f truth, w hich co n n e ctio n coincides univocally with any o th e r necessary connection w hatever in the ratio n ale o f th e tru e, even if they would n o t coincide in rationale o f being. A nd w hen it is said th a t an object perfects a power, the response is th a t even a m in d -d e p e n d e n t b ein g perfects, not by reason o f itself formally, b u t by reason o f its fu n d a m e n t a n d o f the m ind-independent being on whose p attern it is conceived.”

78

Intentionality and Semiotics

quod obiectum esse reale vel rationis solum facit differentiam in ratione ends, non in radone obiecd et cognoscibilis. Et stat bene, quod aliquid sit simpliciter obiectum, et simpliciter non sit ens. Aliae enim sunt differentiae rerum in esse rei et ends, aliae in ratione obiecti et cognoscibilis, ut bene advertit Caietanus 1. p. q. 1. art. 3. Et sic univoce conveniunt plura in ratione scibilis et non in ratione ends, vel e contra. Et similiter possunt convenire specifice in ratione scibilis et non in ratione ends, vel e converso. ... Ratio enim scibilis solum dicit connexionem necessariam veritatis, quae univoce in ratione veri convenit cum quacumque alia necessaria connexione, etiamsi in ratione ends non conveniant. Et cum dicitur, quod obiectum perficit potentiam, respondetur, quod etiam ens rationis perficit, non ratione sui formaliter sed ratione sui fundamenti et ends reads, ad cuius instar concipitur. So it w ould alm ost seem as th o u g h all th a t th e “agency o f in tellect” n eed ad d to the phantasm s in o rd e r for th e sensible w orld to be p resen te d to th e possible in tellect u n d e r th e guise o f b ein g — th a t is to say, as actually an d n o t m erely potentially intelligible — is th e form al relation o f reason o f self-identity, even if its initial form ation belongs to the preconscious, th a t is to say, even if th a t actual form ation is p rio r to th e form al recognition o f th e relation as such (i.e., as ‘ens ratio n is’): an objective w orld seen in relation to itself w ould be a w orld in which experience o f th e difference betw een aspects o f objec­ tivity which do (entia rationis) an d aspects o f objectivity w hich do n o t (entia realia) red u ce to o u r ex p erien ce o f th e objects w ould o p en the way to investigating the intrinsic stru ctu re o f the objects p resen ted , n o t according m erely to th e way th a t they appear to be (+, - , 0: th e “p h e n o m e n a ”) b u t acco rd in g to the way th a t they are in th e ir intrinsic subjective a n d intersubjective structures o f existence — w hich, we have already n o ted , is the “essence o f the idea o f essence” so far as co n cern s the knowability o f finite being.

C hapter 6. Specifying Forms, Objects, and Things

79

In re sp o n d in g to th e phantasm s as species impressa resp ect­ in g th e fo rm atio n by th e possible in tellect o f its p ro p e r species expressa, th e aw areness o f bein g is n o t only “first” in a te m p o ­ ral sense b u t — n o te this well — accompanies every awareness distinctively intellectual throughout, thus permeating even sense per­ ception in the human case. “Every b ein g is w hat it is”, th e re fo re , is, in any case we choose to investigate, e ith e r an ens reale, an ens rationis, o r a m ix tu re o f th e two th a t can be so rted o u t in ­ correctly o r correctly, acco rd in g to th e circu m stan ces o f th e individual case. B ut th e b ru te anim al has n o ratio n ale available to it u n d e r w hich to them atize such inquiries; only th e ratio n al anim al, aware o f b ein g (objects as involving things existing), can fu r ­ ther form ally identify this o r th a t b eing o r aspect o f b ein g as rationis, this o r th a t bein g o r aspect o f bein g as realis, a n d le arn from m istakes in p articu lar cases. A nd only th e sem iotic an i­ m al, able to know th a t th e re are signs because able to know relations in th e ir difference from w hat is related, is thus able to know being. For the b ru te animals, while they can in d e ed learn from mistakes, th e ir mistakes do n o t occur in th e o rd e r o f w hat is tru e an d false, b u t only in the o rd e r o f w hat works a n d w hat does not. From th e beg in n in g o f anim al life until its en d , w hat m atters is the cycle o f day an d n ig h t an d o f th e seasons; th a t th e cause o f this cycle is th e m otion o f the earth relative to th e sun ra th e r th an o f th e sun relative to the earth m atters n o t a wit for the b ru te animals, an d for the rational anim als it m at­ ters only to the ex ten t th a t th eir possibility o f caring a b o u t th e tru th is b ro u g h t actually to the fore, which is certainly n o t in every case. H ence the cri de coeur M aritain u tters with his Peasant o f the Garonne: “W hoever does n o t love th e tru th is n o t a h u m a n b e­ ing!” T he ability to be co n cern ed with the tru th is u n iq u e to th e rational anim al, p red icated on the species-specifically h u ­ m an awareness o f the objective world u n d e r the guise o f being,

80

Intentionality and Semiotics

transform ing from the outset the anim al Umwelt o f objects ready-to-hand into an objective ‘life-world’ o f things present-athan d , able to be investigated for what they are, the Lebenswelt o f sem iotic animals.

C h ap ter 7

“Abstraction”

H ere le t us re tu rn briefly to a p o in t b ro u g h t u p earlier, nam ely, th e p ro b lem o f how best to m ake sense o f th e ex p res­ sion “ab strac tio n ”, n o t in L ocke’s sense m erely o f o m ittin g o r p rescin d in g from , b u t in T h o m as’s sense as a m ean s to g rasp ­ ing th e essences, th a t is to say, th e in tern al co n stitu tio n , th e very subjectivity o f things in them selves a n d th e in tersu b jec­ tivities they sustain an d are sustained by. N o te rm in A qui­ n a s ’ own vocabulary bears m ore th e lim iting m ark o f his own tim e th a n does this expression “a b stra h e re ”, w ith its baggage o f c o n n o tatio n s o f a tim eless, synchronic, cyclical universe, w here only individuals com e an d go th e ro u te o f g e n e ra tio n a n d c o rru p tio n . In A ristotle’s G reek, “ab stractio n ” applies only to th e for­ m ation o f m athem atical entities, particularly those o f geom ­ etry, w here shape, fo r exam ple, is “ab stracted ” from m aterial objects and re n d e re d ‘id e al’ simply by leaving out m ateriality an d individual im perfections in th e shapes o f objects in th e en ­ vironm ent. In m edieval Latin, th in k in g th a t n o th in g specific changes form , b u t only individuals com e an d go, au th o rs (p re­ sumptively) ex ten d ed this G reek idea to pro p o se th a t th e for­ mal essences o f enviro n m en tal things can be attain e d in ju s t 81

82

Intentionality and Semiotics

th at way: by strip p in g away the m ateriality o f individual differ­ ences along with m atter itself (som e th o u g h t) to leave only the u n ch an g eab le an d u n ch an g in g essential form — the “essence”, the “universal”. This simplistic picture works well en o u g h against the back­ g ro u n d o f a universe — a cosm ological im age — the specific structures o f w hich are fixed once an d fo r all. B ut once th at im aginary pictu re has b een shown to be illusory, th e term “ab­ stractio n ” in its original sense ex ten d ed from th e abstraction th a t constructs m athem atical objects to putatively describe the “draw ing o u t” o f form al essences from individuals o f th e vari­ ous species turns, all u n n o ticed , into literal nonsense. F or w hen th e u n d erstan d in g constructs “by ab stractio n ” a geom etrical figure it in d e ed has b u t to “leave o u t” all b u t th e form of, say, triangle o r circle, etc., im perfect in its m aterial in ­ dividual instantiations b u t absolutely p erfect in its “abstracted fo rm ” o f circularity. B ut w hen the u n d erstan d in g constructs an oak tree, say, in co ntrast to a ju n ip e r o r m aple, it does n o t m erely “leave o u t” b u t positively gathers a focal congery o f ac­ cidents as its starting p o in t for recognizing oak tree as a dis­ tinctive type o f subjectivity — distinctive “specifically” over an d above individual distinctivity. To the focal ph an tasm “oak tre e ” th e acting in tellect adds only the form al relation o f reason o f self-identity (m in d -d ep en d en t, for the oak tree simply is itself, n o t identical with itself), which severs th e objects phantasized (the object perceived by sense) from exclusive relatio n as +, - , o r 0 to the knower, opening the way to (hardly com pleting) the investigation o f th at p resen ted subjectivity according to “w hat it is” essentially, i.e., w hat it is th at makes o r fails to m ake its subjectivity distinctive in the o rd e r o f ens reale, precisely as in the exam ple o f “w ater”, a com m on object o f sense-perception to m any anim als besides hum ans, b u t knowable only to h u m an anim als as “essentially consisting in H 20 ”. M atter is o f the essence o f m aterial realities, w hereas in d i­ vidual differences, while inescapable (inasm uch as substances

C hapter 7. Abstraction

83

only exist as individuated), are n o t o f the essence. T hus, in the case o f m aterial substances, never is the common matter o m it­ ted from attem pts at essential un d erstan d in g : a m aterial form which is n o t intellectual, sep arated from co m m o n m atter, has no reality (let alone an “essential” reality), n o reality at all, in th e d o ctrin e o f A ristotle o r A quinas (in co n trast to P latonism an d N eoplatonic “T hom ism s”). W hat separates th e fo rm o f a m aterial thing from all m atter, in short, is n o t at all th e process o f ideogenesis Thom as called “ab straction”, b u t purely a n d sim­ ply intellectual im agination d elu d ed on th e point. T hom as is so em p h atic on this neglected p o in t th a t it is w orth citing him ra th e r fully. Discussing a view b ru ited a b o u t am o n g th e A rab com m entators on A ristotle,1A quinas presen ts th e m a tter as follows:12 Since o u r intelligence is b o rn to abstract from m atter th e es­ sence o f a m aterial thing, if again in th at abstracted essence th e re rem ains som ething o f the m atter, the intellect will be

1 W ould-be T hom ists sh o u ld well co n sid er L ee’s careful show ing (1981) o f th e d ifferen ce betw een A quinas an d the A rab co m m en tato rs b efo re him (b o th A verroes a n d A vicenna) in th e ir construal o f th e “abstracdve” w ork o f th e intellectus agens: th e Arabs, acco rd in g to Lee, th in k o u r in te lle ct in a c d n g attains to p u re form s w ithout any m atter. Be th a t as it may, A quinas sees th a t th e in te lle ct by “ab stra ctio n ” attains (in th e m a tte r o f th e essential know ledge o f m aterial substances) only form s as together with and constrained by co m m o n m atter. 2 A quinas c.1266: Summa theologiae 1.88.2c. “cum en im intellectus n o ster natus sit ab stra h ere q u id d itatem rei m aterialis a m ateria, si iteru m in ilia quidd itate sit aliquid m ateriae, p o te rit iterato ab strahere, e t cum h oc in infinitum n o n p rocedat, tan d em p erv en ire p o te rit ad intellig en d u m aliquam q u id d ita­ tem quae sit o m n in o sine m ateria, e t hoc est intelligere substantiam im m aterialem . — q u o d qu id em efficaciter diceretur, si substantiae im m ateriales essent form ae et species h o ru m m aterialium , u t platonici p o su eru n t. — hoc au tem n o n posito, sed supposito q u o d substantiae im m ateriales sint o m n in o alterius rationis a q u id d itad b u s m aterialium rerum ; q u an tu m cu m q u e intellectus n o ste r ab strah at q uidditatem rei m aterialis a m ateria, n u n q u am p erv en iet ad aliquid simile substantiae im m ateriali. e t ideo p e r substandas m ateriales n o n possum us p erfecte substandas im m ateriales intelligere.” See fu rth e r th e reply to objection 3 (i.e., 1.88.2 ad 3) in particular.

84

Intentionality and Semiotics

able to again abstract form ; and since this c a n n o t go on to infinity, o u r intellect will finally arrive at the u n d ersta n d in g o f som e essence which is entirely w ithout m atter. A nd this is to u n d erstan d an im m aterial substance. This w ould in d eed be well an d truly said were it only the case th at im m aterial substances were the form an d specifica­ tions o f these m aterial things, as the Platonists posited. But w hen the opposite is posited, w hen we suppose that im m aterial substances are o f an alto g eth er o th e r o rd e r an d rationale th an are the essences o f m aterial things, th e n the situation is th a t no m atter how far o r often o u r in tellect ‘ab­ stracts’ the essence o f a m aterial thing from m atter, it could never arrive at som ething like the form o f an im m aterial sub­ stance. A nd th erefo re we are n o t able to perfectly u n d e rsta n d im m aterial substances on the basis o f abstraction from m ate­ rial substances.

Yet century after century, self-styled ‘realists’, in clu d in g ones who fancied themselves ‘T hom ists’, co n tin u ed to re p e a t the em pty form ula o f “reaching essences by abstraction, by stripping away matter from form”, thereby co n trib u tin g in th e ir own way an d despite themselves to the tidal wave o f nom inalism w hich swept over all realist pretensions in the m o d ern period. Yet we should n o t be w ithout sympathy for th e m isu n d er­ standing. Really, it com es down to w hat Bergson used to call “the n atural geom etry o f the h u m an m in d ”, obtuse to history an d in general to all th at preced ed it on the stage o f tim e, for the reason A quinas well u n d ersto o d :3 O u r intellect can consider abstractly w hat it knows in a state o f com position (in concretione). For, although it knows things th at have a form in m atter, yet it analyzes ( resolvit) the com ­ posite in to both, an d then considers the form itself in its own

3 A quinas c.1266: Summa theologiae 1.12.4 ad 3: “intellectus n o ster p o test in abstractione considerare q u o d in concretione cognoscit. Etsi en im cognoscat res haben tes form am in m ateria, tam en resolvit com positum in u tru m q u e , et consid erat ipsam form am p e r se. Et sim iliter intellectus angeli ...”.

C hapter 7. Abstraction

85

rig h t [as if it were the w hole story, so to say]. A nd likewise in th e case o f the angels ....

As a co n seq u en ce,4 those who ju d g e o f form s as if they w ere substances fall into a variety o f errors.T his seem s to h a p p e n as a co n seq u en ce of th e fact th at form s in th e abstract are signified as if they were substances, as w hiteness, for exam ple, o r a power, o r anything o f this kind; w hence som e, following th e p a tte rn o f speaking, ju d g e o f th em as if they w ere substances ... n o t a tte n d in g to th e fact th a t ju s t as existence does n o t b elo n g to a form b u t to a subject th ro u g h form , so also the com ing to be w hich ter­ m inates at existence is n o t the com ing to be o f a form b u t o f a subject. F or ju s t as a form is called a being, n o t b ecause it it­ self exists, if we are speaking properly, b u t because so m eth in g else exists by it; so too is it said th at a form com es to be, n o t because th e form itself com es to exist, b u t because so m eth in g else com es to be qualified by it: d u rin g the tim e th a t a subject is re d u c e d from potency into act.

Raising th e tem p tatio n to th in k we are angels w hen we are n o t m ig h t have h ad the effect o f w arning us off o f th e b lu n d er, a n d perh ap s in d e ed A quinas partly h ad this in m ind. B ut if so, th e p ro jec ted lesson was lost on D escartes, an d m any after him . B ut let us n o t get off on th e sidetrack o f m odernity. P ostm odernity requires, if n o t the unlikely eventuality o f a n o th e r term entirely th an “ab stractio n ” for th e ach iev em en t o f essential know ledge o f physical subjectivities (such as allow ed 4 A quinas, i. 1269/72: Quaestio Disputata De Virtutibus in Communi, art. 11: “m ultis e rro r accidit circa form as ex hoc q u o d d e eis iu d ic a n t sicut d e substan d is iudicatur. Q u o d q u id em ex hoc co n tin g ere videtur, q u o d fo rm ae p e r m o d u m su b stan tiaru m sig n a n tu r in abstracto, u t albedo, vel virtus, a u t aliq u id h u iu sm o d i; u n d e aliqui m o d u m lo q u e n d i sequentes, sic de eis iu d ic an t ac si essen t substantiae ... n o n a tten d e n te s, q u o d sicut esse n o n est fo rm ae, sed su b iecd p e r form am , ita nec fieri, q u o d te rm in a tu r ad esse, est fo rm ae, sed subiecti. Sicut en im form a ens dicitur, n o n quia ipsa sit, si p ro p rie lo q u am u r, sed q u ia aliquid ea est; ita et form a fieri dicitur, n o n q u ia ipsa fiat, sed q u ia ea aliq u id fit: d um scilicet subiectum re d u c itu r d e p o te n tia in ac tu .”

86

Intentionality and Semiotics

for th e invention o f the Salk vaccine to c o n q u e r polio, etc.), th e n at the very least a th o u g h tfu l an d critical d escrip tio n o f how essential know ledge is actually achieved in those lim ited cases w here it is achieved (an d n o t simply claim ed). Take again the sim ple case o f water, a substance fam iliar to all anim als: w hat is its “essence”? If th e answ er is an y th in g like H 20 , th e n it behooves th e “realist” to co n sid er ju s t how lo n g it took th e h u m a n anim al to arrive a t th a t know ledge, a n d by w hat m eans th e know ledge was achieved: certainly n o t by “ab­ stractio n ” in any usual sense o f “p eelin g away m a tte r to reveal form a lo n e ”, let alone by m en tal x-ray. A ristotelians an d , m o re pointedly, self-styled T hom ists, have to stop p re te n d in g th a t th e ir n o m in al d efin itio n s o f term s reveal w ith o u t fu rth e r ado “essential fo rm s” a n d reco g n ize th at, w hile linguistic term s as such c a n n o t exist a p a rt fro m th e activity o f th e h u m a n m o d elin g system (“in tellectu s ag en s”) as biologically u n d e rd e te rm in e d , those term s o f them selves do n o t necessarily d esignate essential stru ctu res on th e side o f n a ­ tu re, even som etim es w hen we (m istakenly) th in k th a t they d o — still less th a n because we in a given case w ant th e m to d o so. Ccenoscopy precedes b u t does n o t supplant ideoscopy. As Klim a p u t it (2002: 191-192): t h e e s s e n c e o f w a te r is by all p r o b a b ility c o r r e c tly d e s c r ib e d b y s a y in g t h a t w a te r is a b o d y o f H 90 m o le c u le s . ... Y et th is n e e d n o t im p ly t h a t w h o e v e r k n o w s th e s ig n ific a tio n o f ‘w a­ t e r ’ w o u ld th e r e b y k n o w t h a t w a te r is H 90 .

It may be th e sam e “essence” know n in b o th cases; b u t in th e first case it is know n n o m o re th a n initially an d as a coenoscopically prospective p o in t o f d e p a rtu re fo r investigation, w hile in th e seco n d case it is know n only th ro u g h a n d o n the basis o f co n sid erab le ideoscopic investigation over tim e. C er­ tainly th e resu ltin g “H vO ” is an “a b strac tio n ”; b u t it is m o re a positive focal co n stru ctio n o f m aterial possibilities th a n a “leav­ in g o u t” o f m atter.

C hapter 7. Abstraction

87

In know ing, th e em b o d ied h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g begins fro m th e existence o f bodily things m aking u p th e s u rro u n d in g w orld, th e en v iro n m e n t h ere an d now so far as th a t en v iro n ­ m e n t is capable o f activating (is p ro p o rtio n e d to) th e ex tern al sense org an s o f th e h u m a n anim al body. Now “m a tte r”, in its first m e a n in g fo r A quinas (“m ateria p rim a ”), is th e p u re p o te n ­ tiality w ithin sensible substances to b eco m e o th e r things th a n w hat they are h ere an d now. This “m a tte r” is n o t itself sensible m a tter; it can be u n d e rsto o d b u t n o t as such perceived, still less ex p erim en tally isolated as a ‘facto r’ o r ‘v ariab le’. This m a tte r c a n n o t even exist ex cep t u n d e r som e substantial fo rm h e re a n d now, as th e potentiality o f th a t form to be rep la ced by som e o th e r substantial form — som e o th e r “kind o f th in g ” — e n tire ­ ly. So th e “m aterial individual” is, by its form , this ra th e r th a n th a t k in d o f thing; b u t it is b ro u g h t into existence in th e first place th ro u g h th e in teractions o f p rece d in g substances o r in d i­ viduals in tro d u c in g into sensible m a tter dispositions w hich n o t only m o re o r less change the individual in teractin g b u t also, in th e instances o f g en eratio n an d co rru p tio n (which always go together, accordin g to th e fo rm u la “corruptio unius est generatio alterius”), b rin g new individuals in to existence. Now m aterial individuals in teractin g occupy space, a n d d e ­ p e n d in th e ir causal in teractio n s u p o n spatial proxim ity, som e­ tim es contiguity. T hus they are, as material substances, extended in space, having “parts outside o f p arts” u n d e r th e unity o f th e ir substantial form . O ccupying space, o r “qu an tity ”, thus, A ristotle an d St T hom as specify as th e first characteristic o r “acc id en t” o f a m aterial substance, as “quality” is th e first characteristic o f form (a specific actuality) in co n trast with m a tte r (th e p o te n ti­ ality in a specific individual to b eco m e o th e r th a n w hat it h ere an d now is). T h e dispositions o f sensible m a tte r w hich o b tain at th e m o­ m e n t o f g e n e ra tio n (“co m in g in to b e in g ”), thus, ineluctably individuate th e new substance, a n d St T h o m as thus identifies th e q u an tified m a tte r ch aracterized by th e in teractio n s it has

88

Intentionality and Semiotics

u n d e rg o n e as th e “p rin cip le o f in d iv id u atio n ” (“materia signata quantitate’); b u t this indiv id u atio n is n o t so radical as to elim i­ n ate th e fact th a t th e “new ” (i.e., newly ex isten t as such) indi­ vidual has, as it w ere, som e d efin ite “sic e t n o n ” characteristics as well w hich, b eyond in d iv iduation, specify it as living o r not, living as p la n t o r as anim al, as b ru te o r as ratio n al anim al. T h at d e p e n d s u p o n th e substantial form . B iological speciation is a n o th e r m atter. T hus, we have le a rn e d th a t th e differen ce b e­ tw een e lep h an ts a n d giraffes is n o t som e single form al differ­ en ce a n d is n o t d u e to form alone, as are th e a fo re m e n tio n e d sic et non differences, b u t are accum ulative a n d congeristic. T he surro u n d in g bodies m aking u p the an im al’s environ­ m ent, thus, may be characterized as follows:5 “p e r m ateriam determ in atu r form a rei ad aliquid u n u m ” — any specific form is deter­ m ined by m atter to be some individual unity. By contrast, w hen an anim al becom es aware o f its surroundings, in th at awareness the anim al becom es som ething m ore than an individual lim ited by its m atter to this p o in t in space/tim e; the anim al now occupies a cognitive space, a sphere o f awareness, which is considerably larger than the bodily sphere that it occupies as a m aterial individual. Having defined materiality as th at by which th e anim al is coarctated to its bodily sphere (“d eterm in atu r ad aliquid u n u m ”), St Thom as characterizes the cognitive sphere o f awareness which includes many besides the anim al’s own body as, by contrast, “im­ m aterial”; and he uses this contrast to identify two ways o f receiv­ ing form. O ne way to receive form is as an individual m aterial substance o f a specific kind, and this is to receive a form in m atter o r “materially” to receive form. T he o th er way to receive form is as an individual o f the specific kind able to becom e aware o f w hat is o th e r than o n e ’s bodily self in the surro u n d in g world, an d this is to receive form only as specifying o n e ’s own form to be aware o f this and that in the surroundings, which is to receive form (by con­ trast) “immaterially” — that is to say, to receive in o n e ’s own form 5 St T hom as c.1266: Summa theologiae 1.84.2c.

C hapter 7. Abstraction

89

a fu rth e r form al specification (“species') on the basis o f which o n e becom es related to o n e ’s su rro u n d in g n o t simply th ro u g h inter­ action b u t now th ro u g h apprehension o r awareness o f the world. W h en ce St T h o m as reaches a twofold co n clu sio n :6 first, th a t th e ratio n ale o f co g n itio n is op p o site to th e ratio n ale o f m a teri­ ality, to th e m aterial existence o f substances; an d , seco n d , th a t co g n itio n becom es m o re p e rfe c t th e m o re it p articip ates in th e im m aterial m a n n e r in w hich “re c e p tio n o f fo rm ” d efines co g n i­ tion in th e first place. It is h e re th a t th e positive m e a n in g o f th e te rm “ab strac­ tio n ” is to be so u g h t in th e th o u g h t o f A quinas:7 because the act o f awareness extends itself to things w hich are outside o f th e one knowing, we are cognizant o f things w hich exist in d ep en d en d y o f their relation to us. But the form o f a giv­ en individual thing is determ ined thereto by the th in g ’s m atter. W hence it is clear that the rationale o f cognition contrasts oppositionally to the rationale o f materiality, such th at things which receive form s only materially are in n o way cognitive beings .... 6 Ibid: “u n d e m anifestum est q u o d ratio co gn itio n is ex o p p o sito se hab e t ad ratio n em m aterialitatis. e t ideo q u ae n o n re c ip iu n t fo rm as nisi materialiter, n u llo m o d o su n t cognoscitiva, sicut p la n ta e ” e t in o rg a n ic a in gen ere; “q u a n to au tem aliquid im m aterialius h a b e t fo rm a m re co g n itae , ta n to p erfec tiu s cognoscit.” Full q u o te in follow ing note. 7 A quinas c.1266: Summa theologiae 1.84.2c: “q u ia actu s co g n itio n is se exte n d it ad ea q u ae su n t ex tra cogn o scen tem , cognoscim u s e n im etiam e a q u ae ex tra nos sunt, p e r m ateriam au tem d e te rm in a tu r fo rm a rei a d a liq u id u n u m . u n d e m anifestum est q u o d ratio co gnitionis ex o p p o sito se h a b e t a d ra tio n e m m aterialitatis. e t ideo q u ae n o n re c ip iu n t form as nisi m aterialiter, n u llo m o d o su n t cognoscitiva, sicut plan tae. ... “q u a n to au tem aliquid im m aterialius h a b e t fo rm a m rei co g n itae , ta n to p erfectius cognoscit. u n d e e t intellectus, qui a b stra h it sp eciem n o n so lu m a m ateria [re cip ien te speciem in fo rm a p o te n tia e cognoscitivae sensitivae, sicut erg o ‘fo rm a in fo rm a ’ e t n o n sicut fo rm a in m ateria, q u o d accid it in sensus interiores m em oriae, im aginativae, e t aestim ativae u t fo rm a n s p h a n ta sm a ta p raesentates o bjecta ad anim al u t +, - , 0], sed etiam a m a teria lib u s co n d itio n ibus individuantibus [q u o d accidit in in te lle ctu possibili co g n o scen s o b jecta p rae sen ta ta a p h an tasm atib u s u t res existens in se e t n o n sim p liciter u t ob jec­ ta sensata q u o ad nos], p erfectiu s cognoscit q u am sensus, q u i accip it fo rm am rei cognitae sine m ateria q u id e m , sed cum m aterialib u s co n d itio n ib u s.”

90

Intentionality and Semiotics

T h e m o re anything possesses im m aterially the form o f th e th in g know n, th e m o re perfectly is it aware. W hence the h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g , which draws a form o f specification not only8 from th e m atter [receiving the specifying form in a sen so ry pow er o f ap p reh en sio n , th ere fo re as a ‘form in a fo r m ’ a n d n o t as a form in m atter, which occurs in th e in te­ rio r senses o f m em ory, im agination, an d estim ation as fash­ io n in g th e p h an tasm s p re sen tin g objects to the anim al as pleasin g , displeasing, o r safe to ig n o re], but also9 from th e in­ d iv id u atin g m aterial co n d itio n s [which occurs in th e possible in te lle c t know ing th e objects p re se n te d by th e p h an tasm s as th in g s ex isting in them selves a n d n o t sim ply as objects sensed in re la tio n to o u r need s a n d desires], knows m o re perfectly th a n sense knows. F or in sense p e rcep tio n the form o f the know n th in g is received in th e sense pow ers in d e e d w ithout th e m atter, b u t n o t w ith o u t th e individuating m aterial co n d i­ tions [w hich tie things objectively a p p re h e n d e d to th e ‘h ere a n d n o w ’ in terests o f th e o n e p erceiv in g ].

In th e era o f th e u n ch a n g in g cyclical universe, we co u ld p e r­ haps afford to n eg lect o r at least to dow nplay th e im p o rtan ce o f o u r com in g to u n d e rsta n d anim al aw areness as such, alo n g w ith o u r own place in th e n atu ral w orld as an anim al am o n g th e o th e r anim als, in o rd e r to em phasize o u r “d iffere n ce” as ra­ tional anim als. B ut th a t hardly rem ains tru e today.10 We n e e d to 8 “N o t only” — th a t is, as do the sense pow ers o f mem ory, im ag in atio n , a n d evaluation o r estim ation in ‘ab stractin g ’ a form al specification w hile reta in in g in th a t form th e conditions w hich tie it to so m eth in g perceived h e re a n d now. 9 “B ut also” — th e ‘ab stractio n ’ w hich goes beyond th e experimentum o f sense to see perceived objects as also things having a bein g o f th e ir own w ith a constitution in d e p e n d e n t o f o u r p erc ep tio n an d o f o u r estim ation o f its utility. 10J u s t as th e use o f signs in aw areness distinguishes th e an im als w ithin th e realm o f n a tu re , so th e discovery o f relations as th e im p e rc e p tib le b e in g o f signs in h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g distinguishes th e ratio n al an im als as semiotic animals able to b ec o m e aw are o f a n d h e n c e to take responsibility fo r th e semioses p rio r to u n d e rsta n d in g w ith o u t w hich u n d e rsta n d in g in its h u m a n fo rm o f “rationality” c a n n o t exist. In an evolving m aterial universe such as we find ourselves in, a n d by co n tra st to th e im aginary cyclical universe o f th e an c ie n ts an d m edievals, this new d efin itio n o f the h u m a n b ein g n o t only recovers th e

C hapter 7. Abstraction

91

realize that, even th o u g h th e p o in t has alm ost n ev er b een m ade in m o d e rn T hom istic lite ra tu re ,11 th e re is n o t only “ab stractio n ” in intellectual u n d erstan d in g , b u t already, a n d as a necessary p re p a ra tio n th e re to , in sensory aw areness even as th a t aw are­ ness is sh ared with, co m m o n to, h u m an s an d o th e r anim als, as T hom as describes in e n d in g 1.84.1c. In o rd e r to transcend bodily co arctatio n in space an d tim e, a p p re h e n sio n has to rise above th e m aterial indiv id u atin g co n ­ ditions w hich d efin e such co arctatio n . P ercep tio n tran scen d s th e bodily co arctatio n o f th e anim al in b eco m in g aware o f so m eth in g o f the individuals m aking u p its su rro u n d in g s. In tel­ lection, o r u n d e rsta n d in g in th e h u m a n sense o f u n d e rs ta n d ­ ing, transcends b o th th e bodily co arctatio n o f th e h u m a n an i­ m al a n d th e bodily co arctatio n o f th e s u rro u n d in g bodies by seeing those bodies as things existing in th e ir own rig h t over a n d above th e ir existence for m e h e re an d now as +, - , 0. T h e anim al sees w hat it in terp rets as water, an d , if it is thirsty (+), takes a drink; if not, passes o n (0). T h a t is tru e fo r every anim al, b ru te o r h u m an . B ut th e h u m a n anim al sees th e su p p o sed w ater also as a th in g in its own rig h t a p a rt fro m th o se “relatio n s to m e ” w hich co n stitu te an d ex h au st its objective b e ­ in g fo r p erce p tio n . T h e in tellectual objective b ein g th e w ater has is fu rth e r th a t o f a subject o f existence having a subjective bein g, co n stitu tio n , o r stru ctu re in its own rig h t th a t we can com e to know th ro u g h careful investigation, fo r ex am p le, as H 20 . T h a t is th e d ifferen ce betw een objects a n d things, a p ­ p earin g an d being; a n d it is fro m th a t d ifferen ce th a t h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g in its distinctiveness b eg in s.112 traditional on e (against the m o d e rn res cogitans) b u t ren d e rs it aufgehoben: see Deely 2003c, d, e, 2004d, 2005, a; Deely, Petrilli, an d Ponzio 2005; Petrilli 2004. 11 T he only significant exceptions in the m o d e rn p erio d know n to m e are Deely 1971a, restricted to m ain texts o f Aquinas; an d B arker 2007, an extensive survey o f the neothom istic literature based o n an attem p t at an exhaustive survey o f T hom as’ own texts on the ‘cogitative pow er’. But cf. also Fabro 1938: 345. 12 A q u in a s c .l266: Summatheologiael.84 .2 c“in te lle c tu s,q u ia b stra h itsp e c ie m n o n solum a m ateria [sicut sensus], sed etiam a m aterialib u s co n d itio n ib u s

92

Intentionality and Semiotics

W hence “abstraction” as a process has its beginnings in sense even before a n d in d ependently o f the “acting o f the intellect” (mtellectns agens); yet it is in intellection that this process reaches its highest level, by revealing the world o f interacting physical bod­ ies as a world o f knowable things if only we will take the trouble to investigate those things on th eir own term s (as transcendental rela­ tives over and above th eir ontological relativity to us as anim als). This is what it m eans “to abstract” intellectually: to be aware of th at which exists in a m aterial individual b u t precisely as a spe­ cific structu re n o t restricted to th at individual instance before us.13 In its m ost prim itive h u m an state (“ens p rim um co g n itu m ”), “abstraction” is n o th in g m ore n o r less th an the initially confused awareness o f the objective world as including a world o f things existing in th eir own right, an awareness o f the world in precisely th at sense th at K ant d eem ed “unknow able”. It is w ater in itself th a t consists o f H 90 , even tho u g h th at consistency as such is far from given in the initial awareness th at every anim al has o f w ater as an object in th e m atrix +, - , 0. N or would the h u m a n anim al ever discover this consistency as H 90 were it n o t aware o f objects as things — which is what distinguishes h u m an u n d erstan d in g . Thus, w hen St T hom as says th at “the p ro p e r object o f th e h u ­ m an intellect is an essence o r n atu re existing in a bodily individ­ u al” (cf. also 87.3c),14 he is talking ab o u t th e essence o f th e in d i­ vidual as a specific kind or type o f individual only in th e in ch o ate individuantibus, p erfecd u s cognoscit quam sensus, qui accipit fo rm a m rei cogn itae sine m ateria quidem , sed cum m aterialibus co n d itio n ib u s.” See th e ex­ p ansion o f this p o in t T hom as m akes as the o p e n in g p ara g ra p h s o f q. 1.85.1c. 13 A quinas c.1266: Summa theologiae 1.85.1c: “c o g n o scere id q u o d est in m a teria q u id e m co rp o rali individualiter existen tem , n o n tam en p r o u t est in tali m a teria .” 14 Ibid. 1.84.7c: “intellectus h u m a n i ... p ro p riu m o b iectu m est q u id d itas sive n a tu ra in m ateria co rporali existens. ... de ratio n e h u iu s n a tu ra e est q u o d in aliquo individuo existat, q u o d n o n est absque m a teria c o rp o ra li”, sensible m a tte r individuated in its quantitative d im ensio n . Cf. also 1.87.3c., w h ere an u n d e rsta n d in g o f concepts as fo u n d atio n s for o n tological relatio n s is th e only way o f rem oving an a p p a re n t an tinom y c o n c e rn in g th e “first o b je ct” o f in tel­ lectual awareness.

C hapter 7. Abstraction

93

sense o f a potentiality actualizable by investigation ro o ted in o u r species-specifically h u m a n (or “intellectual”) awareness o f the objective w orld as n o t reducible to o u r awareness o f it according to th e anim al p ercep tio n o f objects as +, 0, because th a t sam e objective w orld is also a w orld o f things existing in d ep en d en tly o f how we in te rp re t them , w h eth er perceptually o r intellectually (for th at m atter). T h e “quidditas seu n atu ra rei m aterialis” is a generic object, n o t an individual o r specific o n e in th e “first grasp o f b ein g ”, even th o u g h th a t generic “essence” is grasped only in specific individuals know n by sense an d investigatable intellectually. “B eing as first know n”, ens primum cognitum, is the grasp o f th e fact th a t th e w orld exists as m ore than an d ap art from o u r awareness o f it h ere an d now. W hence St T hom as says th a t “th e n atu re o f any m aterial th in g w hatsoever can n o t be com pletely an d truly know n by the h u m an m ind otherw ise th an as existing in the particulars o f the w orld a ro u n d us.”15 Intellectual “ab stractio n ”, in St T h o m as’ th o u g h t, does n o t “leave o u t” th e existing individuals o f the sensible w orld so m u ch as it sees in them and beyond them the dim ension o f b ein g as w hat is in d e p en d en tly o f o u r awareness o f it, w hat is “o th e r”16 an d know able even ap art from th e individuals. “T h e object p ro ­ p o rtio n a te to th e h u m a n in tellect is the n atu re o f th e sensible

15 1.84.7c: “n a tu ra lapidis, vel cuiuscum que m aterialis rei, cognosci n o n p o te st co m p lete e t vere, nisi secu n d u m q u o d cogn o scitu r u t in p articu lari existens. p a rd c u la re a u tem a p p re h e n d im u s p e r sensum e t im ag in atio n em . e t id eo necesse est ad hoc q u o d intellectus actu intelligat suum o b iectu m prop riu m , q u o d con v ertat se ad ph an tasm ata, u t sp e cu letu r n atu ra m universalem in p ard c u lari ex iste n tem .” — “th e n a tu re o f a stone o r o f any m aterial th in g w hatsoever c a n n o t be com pletely a n d truly know n unless it is know n in ac­ co rd a n ce with th e way it is existing in th e p articu lar reality. B ut we a p p re h e n d p ard cu lars th ro u g h sense a n d im agination. A nd for th a t reason th e intellect, h u m a n u n d ersta n d in g , necessarily takes its o rien tatio n from th e p h an tasm even in o rd e r to know its p ro p e r object, w hich is to see th e universal n a tu re existing w ithin th e p articu la r instance.” 16 1.84.2c: “th e act o f know ing ex ten d s to th e things w hich are a p a rt from th e o n e know ing” — “actus cognitionis se e x te n d it ad ea q u ae su n t ex tra co g n o sce n tem .”

94

Intentionality and Semiotics

thing; an d o f this we c an n o t form a p erfect ju d g e m e n t unless we take into acco u n t everything th at p ertains to the existence o f th a t th in g ”; w hence the aim o f natu ral know ledge is “th at which is perceived principally according to sense,”17 an d n o th in g th a t does n o t fall w ithin p ercep tio n as the objective w orld p resen ted by sense an d in tellect w orking to g e th er is prim arily an d essen­ tially know able to th e h u m a n m ind (alth o u g h such realities can com e to be know n secondarily an d incidentally on th e basis o f w hat we com e to u n d e rsta n d o f th e sensible w o rld ).18 T h e in tellect, n o t itself — i.e., n o t as a d istin ct a n d spe­ cific cognitive pow er — p ro p o rtio n e d to aw areness o f th e in ­ dividual as such, n o n eth eless does perceive this individual by reaso n o f its fu n ctio n al d e p en d e n cy u p o n p h an tasm s, as th e eye sees shapes a n d m ovem ents even th o u g h sight itself is p ro ­ p o rtio n e d directly only to th e aw areness o f th a t d iffere n tiatio n o f lig h t th a t we call color.19 W hat n eed s to be u n d e rs to o d a n d 17 1.84.8c: “ita n aturalis scientiae finis est q u o d vid etu r p rin cip aliter secu n ­ d u m sensum ... u t sciat rationes eo ru m quae v id e n tu r secu n d u m sen su m .” 18 1.84.7c: “intellectus hu m an i, qui e stc o n iu n c tu s co rp o ri, p ro p riu m obiectu m est q uidditas sive n a tu ra in m ateria corp o rali existens; e t p e r h u iu sm o d i n atu ra s visibilium re ru m etiam in invisibilium re ru m aliq u alem co g n itio n em asce n d it.” — “th e p ro p e r object o f th e intellect o f a h u m a n b ein g w hich is co n jo in ed to th e body is th e essence o r n a tu re existing in bodily m atter; a n d th ro u g h th e n atu re s o f these sorts o f visible th in g th e in tellect reach es also to som e know ledge o f invisible things.” Similarly 1.88.1c: “in tellectu s noster, se c u n d u m statum praesentis vitae, n atu ra lem resp ectu m h a b e t ad n atu ra s re ­ ru m m aterialium ; u n d e nihil intelligit nisi co n v erten d o se ad p h an tasm ata, u t ex dictis patet. e t sic m anifestum est q u o d substantias im m ateriales, q u ae sub sensu e t im a g in atio n e n o n cad u n t, prim o e t p e r se, se cu n d u m m o d u m cognitionis nobis ex p e rtu m , intelligere n o n possum us.” — “O u r in te lle ct in o u r p re se n t state o f life is naturally o rd e re d to th e n atu res o f m aterial things; w hence it u n d e rsta n d s n o th in g ex cep t by taking o rie n ta tio n fro m ph an tasm s, a n d so it is a p p a re n t th a t im m aterial substances w hich prim arily a n d essen­ tially d o n o t fall u n d e r sense a n d im agination we are n o t able to u n d e rsta n d ac co rd in g to th e m o d e o f cogn itio n ex p e rien c ed by u s.” 19 See 1.86.1c: “p rin cip iu m singularitatis in reb u s m aterialib u s est m ateria individualis ... q u o d au tem a m a teria individuali ab strah itu r, est universale, u n d e in tellectus n o ste r directe n o n est cognoscitivus nisi universalium . indirec te au tem ... quia etiam p ostquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, n o n p o test se c u n d u m eas actu in telligere nisi c o n v e rten d o se ad p h an tasm ata, in q u ib u s

C hapter 7. Abstraction

95

e m p h a siz e d , w h en it is said th a t “th e in tellect knows universals”, th e n , is th a t this way o f sp eak in g is already an ab stractio n , in a sm u c h as “th e in te lle c t” in no case e ith e r knows o r fu n c­ tio n s w holly in d e p e n d e n tly o f sense; w hence — an d this p e r­ h a p s c a n n o t be o v erem p h asized — “as reg ard s th e aw areness p r o p e r to h u m a n beings, th e aw areness o f singulars is [n o t only tem p o rally b u t logically as well] p rio r to th e aw areness o f u n iv ersals”.*20 T h a t is w h at u n d e rs ta n d in g o r “in te lle c tio n ” ad d s to th e p e rc e p tio n o f sense: w hereas o th e r anim als see th e in d iv id u alities o f th e ir e n v iro n m e n t only as objects in re la tio n to them selves, h u m a n anim als see these sam e individualities ra th e r as kinds o f things, subjects o f ex istence (“b ein g s”) able to be in v estig ated as such. Yet fo r all th e ir “d iffe re n c e ” a n d “u n iq u e n e s s ”, hum an anim als rem a in animals fro m first to last; a n d even w h en th e last m o m e n t has passed a n d th e in tellec­ tu al soul n o lo n g e r an im ates th e h u m a n an im al body, th a t soul species intelligibiles intelligit. sic ig itu r ipsum universale p e r speciem intelligibilem d ire c te intelligit; in d ire c te au tem singularia, q u o ru m su n t p h an tasm ata. e t h o c m o d o fo rm a t h a n c p ro p o sitio n e m [ex isten tialem ], socrates est h o m o .” — “T h e p rin c ip le o f singularity in m aterial things is th e individual m a tte r ... w hereas w hat is ab stra cted fro m th e individual m a tte r is th e u n i­ versal. W h en ce o u r in te lle ct directly is aw are only o f universals. Indirectly, how ever, ... because even afte r it has ab stracted th e intelligible form s o f speci­ fication, h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g is n o t able to fashion an aw areness in term s o f th e m save by tak in g o rie n ta tio n fro m th e phan tasm s in w hich it u n d e rsta n d s th e in telligible form s o f specification. In this way th e in te lle ct d irectly u n ­ d ersta n d s th e universal itself on th e basis o f th e intelligible specifying form ; b u t in d ire cd y it u n d e rsta n d s th e singulars p re se n te d by th e p h an tasm s. A nd this is how th e h u m a n m in d form s this p ro p o sito n [existential a n d sin g u lar]: ‘Socrates is a m a n ’.” See also 1.84.6c. 20 1.85.3c: “in co g n itio n e n o stri intellectu s d u o o p o rte t co n sid erare. p rim o q u idem , q u o d co g n itio intellectiva aliquo m o d o a sensitiva p rim o rd iu m sumit. et quia sensus est sin g u lariu m , intellectu s au tem universalium ; necesse est q u o d cognitio singularium, quoad nos, prior sit quam universalium cognitio.” — “th e re are two things th a t m u st b e c o n sid e re d w h en it com es to o u r in tel­ lectual awareness: th e first is th a t u n d e rsta n d in g always takes its o rig in in o n e way o r a n o th e r from sensation a n d sense p e rc e p tio n ; th e o th e r is th at, b e­ cause sense bears o n singulars, even th o u g h th e in te lle ct knows in a universal way, it is always the awareness of singulars that is more fundamental than the

awareness of universals.”

96

Intentionality and Semiotics

survives only in a crip p led , p artial fashion, as St T hom as is at pains to p o in t o u t.21 Thus, to say that th e intellect as such is n o t o rien ted to the awareness o f singular existents b u t to the “universal” aspects th ere­ o f o r to “the essences” o f things can be (and often has been) pro­ foundly misleading, if we do n o t u n d erstan d the full dim ensions o f the d ep en d en ce o f intellect u p o n sense for its p ro p e r op era­ tion, the reality o f th e “anim al” dim ension o r p art o f the “rational animal” (and further, today, the fulfillm ent o f “rationality” in the awareness o f th e dep en d en cy of all objectivity u p o n th e action o f signs, semiosis, in th e discovery o f which th e rational anim al takes on the identity o r guise o f semiotic animal, th e only anim al that n o t only uses signs b u t is capable o f knowing th at th e re are signs in th eir difference from b oth objects an d things). St T hom as puts th e m atter this way: because intellectual cog­ nition takes its origin in a definite way from sensitive awareness which is o f singulars existing in o u r physical surroundings (both p resen t an d absent concrete existents), even tho u g h intellectual awareness as such is o f individual things as o f this o r th at kind, it rem ains th e case that, o f necessity, the awareness o f concrete individuals — singular things — for hum an beings precedes an d accom panies th e awareness o f kinds o f things.22 W hence th e ‘na­ tu re ’ to which it hap p en s that it be u n d ersto o d o r ‘abstracted’ to form in the intellect an ‘in ten tio n o f universality’ is som ething re­ alized only in singulars, concrete individuals; b u t th e u n d ersto o d n atu re which is u n d ersto o d w hen ‘abstracted’ — the in ten tio n o f universality (“id q u o d natum est praedicari de pluribus”) — is in the intellect as the foun d atio n for the relation o f awareness which term inates in an awareness o f individuals which transcends o r goes beyond th eir sensible characteristics as individuals.23 21 Summa theologiae 1.89.1, on u n d e rsta n d in g in “se p a ra te d ” souls. 22 c.1266: Summa theologiae 1.85.3c, as cited in n o te 20 above. 23 Ibid. 85.2 ad 2: “cum d ic itu r intellectum in actu, d u o im p o rta n tu r ... e t sim iliter cum d ic itu r universale abtractu m [scilicet, ‘id q u o d n a tu m est in an im a praed icari d e p lu rib u s’], d u o in telligun tu r. ... ipsa ig itu r n a tu ra cui accidit vel intelligi vel abstrahi, vel in te n tio universalitatis, n o n est nisi in

C hapter 7. Abstraction

97

“To abstract a universal from a particular,” St T hom as sum ­ m arizes,24 “o r an intelligible form al specification from th e sen­ sible form al specifications o f in tern al sense, is to co n sid er w hat is before us as som e kind o f th in g in itself, ra th e r th a n as an individual object rep resen ted th ro u g h p h an tasm s” — th a t is to say, ra th e r th an as a sensible object a p p re h e n d e d only in its sen­ sible aspects. For w hat p ertain s to th e kind o f th in g th a t som e m aterial object is — a stone, say, o r a m an, o r a ho rse — can be co n sid ered a p a rt from individuating characteristics w hich are n o t essential to b ein g o n e o f th a t k in d .25 I h o p e th a t this sufficiently fu rth e r clarifies w hat was said above as to why th e expression “p e r m o d u m abstractionis” is a p hrase b e tte r suited to th e synchronic perspective o f L atin tim es th a n it is to th e diach ro n ic perspective th a t m o d e rn ideoscopic science has fo rced u p o n us,26 inasm uch as “to ab stract” in English today suggests first o f all “to draw o r drag away from , singularibus; sed h o c ipsum q u o d est intelligi vel abstrahi, vel in te n tio universalitatis, est in in te lle ctu .” — “w hen so m eth in g is said to be actually u n ­ d e rsto o d , two things are conveyed by this expression ... a n d likewise w hen th e universal is said to be abstracted are two things u n d ersto o d . ... T h e re is th e n a tu re itself to w hich it h ap p e n s to b e u n d e rsto o d o r ab stracted , o r th e ‘in te n tio n o f universality’, w hich does n o t exist o th e r th a n in singulars; b u t this very th in g w hich is to be u n d e rsto o d o r to be ab stracted , to wit, th e in te n u o n o f universality, is w ithin th e u n d e rsta n d in g ” as th e fo u n d a tio n fo r th e rela tio n — th e in te n tio n — to w hat is in d e p e n d e n t o f th e subjectivity o f th e knower. 24 A quinas c.1266: Summa theologiae 85.1 ad 1: “et hoc est ab stra h e re u n i­ versale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a ph an tasm atib u s, co n sid erare scilicet n atu ra m speciei absque con sid eratio n e individualium p rin cip io ru m , q u ae p e r p h an tasm ata re p ra e se n ta n tu r.” — “a n d this is to ab stract a universal from a particular, o r an intelligible form o f specification from th e ph an tasm s, nam ely, to co n sid er th e n a tu re o f w hat is specified a p a rt from a co n sid eratio n o f th e individual principles w hich are re p re se n te d th ro u g h th e p h an tasm s.” 25 Ibid. 85.1 ad 1: "... ea q u ae p e rtin e n t ad ratio n em speciei cu iu slib et rei materialis, p u la lapidis a u t hom inis a u t equi, p o ssunt co n sid erari sine principiis individualibus, q u ae n o n su n t d e ratio n e speciei.” — “... those things w hich p e r­ tain to the ratio n ale o f th e specifying form o f w hatever so rt o f m aterial th in g , fo r exam ple, o f a stone o r o f a m an o r o f a horse, can be co n sid ered a p a rt from th e individual principles w hich are n o t o f the ratio n ale o f th e sp ecificatio n .” 26 See pp. 4 6 -4 7 , a n d 8 1 -8 2 above.

98

Intentionality and Semiotics

to pull o u t o f ’, w hich actually c a n n o t q u ite be th e case here: for A quinas m akes it clear th a t this co g n itio n al “ab stractio n ” o f w hich h e speaks does n o t first o f all draw something out b u t adds something to th e ph an tasm s (namely, actual intelligibility). T h e in tellect is able to b rin g o u t w hat is already in th e phantasm s only after it has itself first added so m eth in g to th em , so m eth in g th a t enables objects to a p p e a r n o t m erely as +, - , 0, b u t ra th e r as objective beings, things: objects with an entitative d im en sio n in n e e d o f b ein g d iscrim in ated as such in its co n trast with so­ cial co n stru ctio n , if tru th is to em erg e an d to grow am o n g th e “co m m u n ity o f in q u ire rs”. In w hat, th e n , does “ab stractio n ” in this p rim ary cog n itio n al sense o f p h an tasm s b ein g re n d e re d intelligible consist? I w ould suggest fro m th e fo reg o in g so m eth in g like th e following. H e re are th e p hantasm s, th a t is to say, th e m en tal im ages o r re p re se n ta tio n s o f objects as related a n d relevant to (m ean in g ­ ful for) us as anim als. T hey are th e p ro d u cts o f phantasiari, th e species expressae o f th e m em ory, im agination, a n d an im al estim a­ tions. As such, th e p hantasm s are n o t actually b u t only p o te n ­ tially intelligible. Now w hat is it th a t th e activity o f th e intellect, th e agency o f th e in tellect (“intellectus agens”), does to tran sfo rm th e p o te n ­ tially intelligible species expressae o f sense-perception in to actual­ ly intelligible species impressaevrYncYi can provide th e in tellectu al stim uli in response to w hich h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g can fo rm its own species expressae, th e ‘in tellected fo rm s’ o r qualities o n th e basis o f w hich th e h u m a n In n en w elt will tran sfo rm th e an i­ m al U m w elt in to a L ebensw elt o f actually understandable objects a n d aspects o f objects? I w ould suggest th a t th e in tellect actively adds to the objective world a self-referentiality — in itself an ens rationis— by w hich th e objects o f ex p erien ce are d e ta c h e d from exclusive referen c e to th e anim al organism know ing.27 R em ain­ ing objects, a n d as such related to th e knower, they are now 27 See P a rt IV o f Deely 1994.

C hapter 7. Abstraction

99

viewed also prospectively as things existing o r possibly existing in som e if n o t all aspects in d ep en d en tly o f th a t relation to the knower. Now it becom es possible in principle to sort o u t entia realia from entia rationis, socially co n stru cted from n atu ral reali­ ties, illusions from givens, an d th e ir various com binations. T h e intellect, by its initiating activity, detaches the m ental rep­ resentations o f percep tio n from th eir exclusive relevance for the organism seeking to u n d erstan d , so th at they are en ab led p o ten ­ tially to rep resen t the object as som ething able to be considered in itself according to whatever being it may have — reale or rationis, o r b o th — luhether or not th a t being is im m ediately relevant to the anim al knower. In o th e r words, the phantasm s, which u p till now (as species expressae sensuum interiorum) re n d ered only aspects o f the su rro u n d in g s organized on the basis o f the organism ’s needs an d desires according to its biological constitution, are freed (in being m ade species impressae quoad intellectum possibilem) by th e in­ tellectual agency to further rep resen t (in the species expressae intel­ le c ts possibilis) w hat those same objectified aspects are o r m ight be even if o u r organism (our particular biological constitution) were n o t involved as the exclusive basis o f the objectification. It is this further possibility o f o th er-rep resen tatio n as specify­ in g c o n c e p t fo rm atio n in th e h u m an u n d erstan d in g th a t proves to be th e ens rationis o f “self-identity”, i.e., th e relatio n o f th e o bject to itself, w hich enables th e u n d erstan d in g , in co n trast to sense-perceptio n , to query what appears so as to d e te rm in e (o r try to d e te rm in e ) w hat w ithin th e ap p earan ces transcends or reduces to them — w hich is th e m ean in g o f w hat A quinas id e n ti­ fies as th e “first distinction w ithin being as first know n”, nam ely, th e distinction betw een bein g as m in d -in d ep en d e n t (ens reale) an d b ein g as m in d -d e p e n d e n t {ens rationis), b o th being, n o te well, equally objective Within experien ce th o u g h n o t at all equally subjective as regards th e m a tter o f the “things in them selves”. T h e distinction, notice, betw een ens reale an d ens rationis, n e e d n o t an d c a n n o t be correctly an d exhaustively draw n o n ce a n d fo r all for all objects o f experience: th e d istinction po in ts

100

Intentionality and Semiotics

ra th e r to distinct dim ensions certainly if confusedly p resen t w ithin th e objective w orld as a w hole co n sid ered in relatio n to itself. T h e initial ‘d istin ctio n ’ is draw n, thus, only as a basis for exploration, as w hen we discover “w hat we are not looking fo r”. W ithin th e ap p earan ces, we gradually discover w here these two threads lead in various cases in th e various p attern s o f cu ltu re, w here they co m b in e an d w here they sep arate in diverse ways to constitute th e fabric o f h u m a n ex p erien ce as a w hole. T h e estab lish m en t o f this possibility (for e x p lo rin g in details th e difference betw een ens reale an d ens rationis in th e objective and public in principle realm o f w hatever exists as know n) is w hat distinguishes h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g from an im al in tellig en ce in sense-perception. T h e playing o u t o f th e co n seq u en ces o f this possibility in th e inquiries an d positions individual h u m a n beings take a n d co m m u n icate is th e history o f w hat we call p h i­ losophy a n d science an d literatu re, n o t to say o f civilization a n d cu ltu re as a whole.

A ppendix to C h ap ter 7

On the Illu m in a tio /A b s tr a c tio Terminology in Aquinas: Distinction or Alternative?

In th e

De Veritate Q u e s t io n 11 “D e M a g is tr o ”, A r tic le 3, “W h e t h e r a

h u m a n b e i n g c a n b e t a u g h t b y a n a n g e l ”, O b j e c t i o n 12 n o t e s t h a t i f a n a n g e l c a n te a c h a h u m a n t h a t w ill h a v e to b e b y t h e a n g e l c a u s in g a s p e c if y in g f o r m , f o r e x a m p le , “il l u m i n a n d o s p e c ie s q u a e s u n t in p h a n t a s m a t i b u s ” (w h ic h a r e

species expressae sensatae o f t h e i r

p r o p e r n a t u r e ) “u t a b h is s p e c ie s in te llig ib ile s in i n t e l l e c t u p o s s ib ili h u m a n o r e s u l t e n t ”. F o r it is o n ly u n d e r th e s p e c if y in g s ti m u lu s

species intelligibiles t h a t th e p o s s ib le i n t e l l e c t a c tiv e ly r e s p o n d s b y species expressae intellectae. T h u s (it w o u ld s e e m ) th e p h a n ta s m s as species expressae sensatae, w h ic h a r e o f s in g u la rs , r e s id e in th e h i g h e r s e n s e p o w e rs, w h ile th e spe­ cies impressae intelligibiles a n d th e species expressae intellectae a lik e r e s id e of

t h e f o r m a t i o n o f its o w n c o n c e p t s , w h ic h a r e o f t h e i r n a t u r e

in th e p o s s ib le in te lle c t, a n d “a b s tr a c t io n ” c o n s ists in th e r e lo c a tio n o f th e p h a n ta s m s as s e n s ib le f o rm s o f s p e c if ic a tio n f r o m th e i n te r n a l se n se s to th e p o s s ib le in te lle c t, w h e r e th e y b e c o m e r a t h e r in te llig ib le s p e c ify in g f o rm s a b le to g u id e th e f o r m a tio n o f a c tu a l c o n c e p ts ,

species

expressae intellectae. So far, w e m ig h t try to c o n c lu d e (as d id M a rk B a r k e r in th e p e n ­

The Cogitative Power: Objects and Terminology, p. 1 4 9 ), t h a t “th e a c tiv e in te lle c t a b s tra c ts im p r e s s e d in te l­ lig ib le fo rm s o r s p e c ie s ( species intelligibiles impressae), w h ic h a r e th e n s to r e d in th e p o s s ib le in te lle c t as e x p r e s s e d in te llig ib le s p e c ie s ( species u ltim a te v e rs io n o f h is 2 0 0 7 th e sis,

101

102

Intentionality and Semiotics

intelligibiles expressae)". B u t in th e w ay o f th is a r e tw o facts. F irst, th a t it species expressae, a n d n o t as intelligibiles b u t r a t h e r as intellectae, i.e ., in te lle c tu a l c o n c e p ts . S e c o n d , t h a t t h e r e s p o n s e to a n y g iv e n species impressa is n o t d e te r m in a te ly o n e b u t c a n b e v a r io u s species expressae.’ T h u s a s in g le s tim u lu s m a y p ro v e is t h e p o s s ib le in te lle c t its e lf t h a t f o rm s th e

n a t e a v a rie ty o f c o n c e p t u a l r e s p o n s e s .

A q u in a s r e p lie s to th e a b o v e O b je c tio n 12 t h a t t h e r e is n o w ay th a t a n a n g e l c a n e ith e r p ro d u c e a

species intelligibilis in th e p o s s ib le

i n te lle c t o f a h u m a n b e in g , o r (w h a t w o u ld a m o u n t to th e s a m e ) im ­ m e d ia te ly ill u m in a te o u r p h a n ta s m s , w h ic h is th e w o rk o f o u r o w n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a c tin g in e a c h o f u s ( “ intellectus

agens”) s p e c ific a lly as

in f l u e n c i n g th e s e n s o ry p o w e rs. S o th e q u e s tio n c a n b e p u t th u s : H o w e x a c tly is th e a c tiv ity o f t h e i n te lle c t (“ intellectus

agens”) w h ic h “illu m in a te s ” ( illuminat) o r “il­ species sensiblilis — m o r e sp e c ific a lly a n d p rec isely , a species expressa sensata, a p h a n t a s m — r a t h e r a species impressa intelligibilis o n th e b a sis o f w h ic h th e p o s ­ s ib le in te lle c t c a n f o r m a c o n c e p t, a species expressa intellecta r e l a t e d to lu s t r a te s ” ( “illustrat”) th e p h a n ta s m s so as to r e n d e r a

th e p r o c e s s o f sp e c ific a lly in te lle c tu a l (in c o n t r a s t to th e p r e s u p p o s e d p e r c e p t u a l ) 12 p r o c e s s o f “a b s tr a c tio n ”? A re w e ta lk in g tw o p r o c e s s e s 1 A quinas c. 1256/9, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, q. 8, art. 13, ad 2: “ex u n a specie qu am intellectus penes se habet, in diversas cogitationes p r o d i t ...”. 2 A quinas c .1270/71. In libros posteriorum analyticorum, B ook II, lectio 20, n. 594: “ex ex p e rim e n to singularium accip itu r u n iv ersale”, e t im o ly p rim u m universale: “Si enim ac cip ian tu r m u lta singularia, q u ae su n t in d iffe re n tia q u a n tu m ad aliquid u n u m in eis existens, illud u n u m se c u n d u m q u o d n o n d iffe ru n t, in an im a accep tu m , est p rim u m universale, q u id q u id sit illu d , sive scilicet p e rtin e a t ad essendam singularium , sive n o n ” — “fro m th e ex p e ri­ e n c e o f singulars derives th e universal”, a n d in d e e d th e first o r u n d e rly in g universal in th e c o g n id o n o f sem iotic anim als: “F o r if a m ultiplicity o f sin­ gulars a re e n c o u n te re d w hich are in d iffe re n t as reg a rd s so m e o n e fe a tu re fo u n d in each o f th em , th a t o n e aspect a c co rd in g to w hich they a re n o t dif­ fe re n t im pressed u p o n th e soul is th e first universal, w hatever th e fe a tu re may be, w h e th e r it p erta in s to th e essence o f th e sin g u lars o r n o t”, as in my 1971 exam ple (p. 75) o f th e process by w hich a given an im al “com es to reg a rd all w hite m e n as en em ies a n d all black m e n as frie n d s”. (By co n trast, w hat is “universal” in th e strictly in tellectu al sense o f “seen to h o ld in every

Appendix to C hapter 7. Illuminatio/Abstractio

103

h e r e , o n e p r e p a r a t o r y to ‘a b s t r a c t i o n ’, th e o t h e r a b s tr a c tio n p r o p e r ? O r a r e w e ta lk in g a b o u t o n e a n d th e s a m e p ro c e s s , e i t h e r tw o a s p e c ts th e r e o f , o r s im p ly tw o d if f e r e n t w ays o f s p e a k in g a b o u t o n e a n d th e

locus, so to say, r e s p e c ti n g th e p o w e rs o f th e s o u l, w h e r e r e s id e th e s e phantasmata ut intelligibiles, in c o n t r a s t to t h e phantasmata ut sensatae — i.e ., th e p h a n t a s m s as a n im a l species expressae sensatae o f s e n s e - p e r c e p tio n ? s a m e p ro c e s s ? A n d w h a t is th e

In s h o r t, w h a t e x a c d y d o e s “a b s tr a c tio n o f th e n a t u r e f r o m th e p h a n t a s m s ” c o n s is t in a n d w h e r e d o e s it o c c u r? Is it th e w o rk o f th e

intel­

lects agens a lo n e , o r d o e s its c o m p le tio n r e q u ir e the response o f th e p o ssi­ b le in te lle c t to a c h ie v e c o m p le tio n , i.e., th e a w a re n e s s o f th e “u n iv e rs a l q u id d ity ” a c tu a lly a p p r e h e n d e d , th e w o rk o f p r e p a r i n g th e p h a n ta s m s ( ‘m a k in g th e m a c tu a lly to b e in te llig ib le ’) b e in g o n e th in g , th e a c tu a l b e c o m in g c o n s c io u s o f a n a t u r e as u n iv e rs a l, i.e., n o t r e s tr ic te d to th e s e n s e - o b je c t p e r c e iv e d h e r e a n d now , b e in g s o m e th in g e lse a g a in ?

I n h is

Summa theologiae, Q u e s tio n 8 5 “O n th e m a n n e r a n d o r d e r

o f h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g ”, A rtic le 1 “W h e th e r th e h u m a n in te lle c t u n d e r s t a n d s c o r p o r e a l a n d m a te r ia l th in g s by a b s tr a c tio n f r o m p h a n ­

both ill u m in a te d b y and further [ th a t] th e ‘s p e c ie s in te llig ib ile s ’ a r e a b s tr a c t e d by th e p o w e r o f th e i n te lle c t’s a g e n c y [per virtutem intel­ lects agentis]”. T h is s t a te m e n t s e e m s to s u g g e s t “ill u m i n a t i o n ” as a ta s m s ”, S t T h o m a s te lls u s t h a t th e p h a n ta s m s “a r e th e a c tiv ity o f th e in te lle c t

p r e p a r a t o r y s ta g e to th e p r o c e s s o f a b s tr a c tio n p r o p e r as a f u r t h e r a n d f in a l s ta g e ( “e t i l l u m i n a n t u r a b in te lle c tu a g e n te ; e t ite r u m a b eis, p e r v ir tu te m in te lle c tu s a g e n tis , s p e c ie s in te llig ib ile s a b s t r a h u n t u r ”) :3 case” c a n n o t be sensed as such a n d p erta in s to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g in th e co n c e p tu a l sense w hich is “essen tial” o r “necessary” — ap p licab le to b u t n o t p erc ep tib le w ithin th e objects o f anim al p e rc e p tio n as co m m o n to h u m a n a n d beast.) 3 A quinas c.1266, Summa theologiae 1.85.1 ad 4, em p h ases ad d ed : “illumi­ nantur qu id em , quia, sicut pars sensitiva ex co n iu n c tio n e ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, ita p h an tasm ata ex virtute in tellectu s agentis r e d d u n tu r h abilia u t ab eis in te n tio n e s intelligibiles abstrahuntur... in q u a n tu m p e r vir­ tu tem intellectus agentis accipere possum us in n o stra co n sid eratio n e n atu ras sp ecieru m sine individualibus con d itio n ib u s, se cu n d u m q u a ru m sim ilitudines intellectus possibilis in fo rm atu r.”

104

Intentionality and Semiotics

th e p h a n ta s m s a re illuminated in d e e d , by re a so n o f th e fac t th a t j u s t as th e sensitiv e p a r t o f th e soul is r e n d e r e d m o re c a p a b le by v ir tu e o f its c o n ju n c tio n w ith th e in tellectiv e p a rt, so also a re th e p h a n ta s m s by v irtu e o f th e activity o f th e in te lle c t m a d e su itab le f o r in te llig ib le in te n tio n s to b e abstracted fro m th e m ... in so fa r as w e a r e a b le to ta k e in to o u r c o n s id e ra tio n th e n a tu re s o f th e o b ­ je c ts o f th e in te llig ib le specify in g fo rm s a p a r t fro m th e in d iv id u a l c o n d itio n s , in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e sim ilitu d e s [th e lik e n esses o r species impressae] o f w h ich th e p o ssib le in te lle c t is in fo rm e d . A b s tr a c tio n o c c u r s in s o f a r as w e a r e a b le to re c e iv e in to o u r c o n s c io u s ­ n e s s a c o n s id e r a t io n o f th e n a t u r e its e lf o f th in g s p r e s e n t e d b y p h a n ­ ta s m s u n d e r c o n d i tio n s o f in d iv id u a lity , b u t n o w w ith th o s e in d iv id u a l c o n d i t i o n s le f t b e h i n d , as it w e re , in a c c o r d a n c e w ith th e s im ilitu d e s o f w h ic h th e p o s s ib le in te lle c t is in f o r m e d th a n k s to th e p o w e r

intel­

lects agentis, o f th e in t e l l e c t ’s o w n activity, t h a t is, in c o n j u n c ti o n w ith t h e se n s itiv e p o w e rs o f th e s o u l d e p e n d e n t u p o n b o d ily o r g a n s . N o w w h a t a r e th e s e “s im ilitu d e s o f w h ic h th e p o s s ib le i n te lle c t is i n f o r m e d ”? A re w e ta lk in g h e r e o f

species intelligibiles t h a t h a v e ‘m o v e d ’

f r o m th e s e n s e p o w e rs w h e r e p h a n ta s m s a r e p r o d u c e d a n d r e s id e , o r a r e w e ta lk in g r a t h e r o f

species intellectae, th e a c tu a l c o n c e p ts f o r m e d b y

t h e in te lle c t its e lf u n d e r a s tim u lu s a r is in g f r o m th e se n s itiv e p o w e rs b u t its e lf r e m a in in g in th e se n sitiv e p a rt?

I t s e e m s to m e th a t, stric tly s p e a k in g , o n ly species intellectae c a n inform as s u c h — th a t is, in trin s ic a lly q u a lify in a n e w w ay — t h e p o s ­ sib le in te lle c t ( th a t is to say, c a n q u a lita tiv e ly i n h e r e t h e r e i n as f o u n d a ­ tio n s o f th e r e la tio n s o f in te lle c tu a l c o g n itio n w ith in th e a n im a l se n s e p e r c e p tio n w h ic h th e p h a n ta s m s , in th e i r o w n r ig h t as

species sensatae

q u a lita tiv e ly i n h e r i n g in th e in t e r i o r s e n s e p o w e rs, a lso s e rv e as f o u n ­ d a t io n o f r e la tio n s to th e o b je c ts p e r c e iv e d as w ell as u n d e r s t o o d in ­ te lle c tu a lly ) , f o r th e s im p le r e a s o n t h a t o n ly a s p ir itu a l q u a lity stric tly s p e a k in g c a n in f o r m ( c o m e to i n h e r e in , to in tr in s ic a lly q u a lify ) a p o w e r t h a t is n o t as s u c h e d u c e d o r e d u c ib le f r o m th e p o te n c y t h a t c o n s titu te s p r im e m a tte r in its b e i n g c o r r e la tiv e w ith in f o r m in g f o rm . T h u s , o n c e f o r m e d , a c o n c e p t in itia lly

species expressa intellecta w ill r e ­

m a in in th e p o s s ib le in te lle c t in a v ir tu a l o r ‘h a b i t- f o r m in g ’ m a n n e r

Appendix to Chapter 7. Illuminatio/Abstractio

105

a f t e r t h e a t t e n t i o n o f th e m in d h a s t u r n e d e ls e w h e re u n d e r y e t o t h e r s p e c if ic a tio n s , a n d w ill e v e n se rv e as a k in d o f se c o n d -le v e l species impressa intelligibilis f o r f u tu r e t h o u g h t . 4 H e r e w e c a n p e r h a p s a p p ly th e r e m a r k A q u in a s m a k e s a p r o p o s o f id e a s in th e m in d o f a n a r tis a n o r a r c h ite c t, e tc . ( De

Veiitate 2 7 .7 ): “q u a n d o s im ilitu d o e ffe c tu s e s t in

c a u s a n o n s e c u n d u m e sse n a t u r a le , s e d s p ir itu a le , ta m e n q u ie tu m , ... e s t q u a e d a m in t e n t i o in te llig ib ilis in a n i m a q u ie s c e n s ” — “w h e n t h e lik e n e s s o f a n e f f e c t is in th e c a u s e n o t a c c o r d in g to a s e n s o ry b u t r a t h e r a s p ir itu a l e x is te n c e , y e t q u ie te d , ... it ex ists as a k in d o f in te l­ lig ib le sp e c ify in g f o r m r e s tin g in th e s o u l”. By c o n t r a s t w ith th e species expressae intellectae, th e in itia l species intelligibiles impressae, i.e ., th o s e w h ic h a ris e f r o m p h a n ta s m s , a r e th e p h a n t a s m s as tr a n s f o r m e d by th e c o n j u n c ti o n o f s e n s e p o w e r s w ith th e p o w e r o f in te lle c t in th e h u m a n s o u l as th e u n i q u e s u b s ta n tia l f o r m w h ic h c o m e s in to e x is te n c e as in f o r m in g a p a r t i c u l a r b o d y a n d is y e t n o t w h o lly r e d u c ib le to th e p o te n c y o f m a t t e r w h e r e b y t h a t b o d y r e m a in s s u s c e p tib le to y e t f u r t h e r s u b s ta n tia l c h a n g e . S o th e ‘h u m a n f o r m ’ is a s u b s ta n tia l f o r m — a s o u l, m o r e sp e c ific a lly , b e ­ in g th e s u b s ta n tia l f o r m o f a liv in g b o d y — w h ic h , a l o n e a m o n g s u b ­ s ta n tia l f o rm s o f m a te r ia l s u b s ta n c e s , c o n t in u e s to e x is t r a d ic a lly ( if in c o m p le te ly ) w h e n th e b o d y it in f o rm s p e r is h e s a t th e o r g a n i s m ’s d e a th . T h e h u m a n s o u l w ith its in te lle c tu a l p o w e rs ( in c l u d in g th e v o ­ litio n a l s id e as th e a p p e tit e e lic ite d by th e in te lle c tu a l c o m p o n e n t o f h u m a n a w a re n e s s ) a n d th e m o d if ic a tio n s th o s e p o w e rs h a v e s u f f e r e d a n d a t t a i n e d o v e r th e c o u r s e o f th e s o u l’s life as in f o r m in g its p r o p e r b o d y : th e s e a l o n e su rv iv e th e o r g a n is m ’s d e a th w ith th e d e s t r u c t i o n o f b o d ily e x is te n c e th a t d e a th e n ta ils . O n c e d e a th h a s in te r v e n e d , “c o n v e r s io n to th e p h a n t a s m ” ( h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g “ta k in g its o r i­ e n t a t i o n f r o m ” o b je c ts o f s e n s e - p e r c e p tio n ) , w ith o u t w h ic h th e in te l­ le c t in its n o r m a l c o n d i tio n c a n n o t f u n c tio n , is n o lo n g e r p o s s ib le f o r th e s e p a r a te d so u l. Yet S t T h o m a s h o ld s ( Summa theologiae 1.89. lc ) th a t a w a re n e s s d o e s n o t p e r is h w ith th e b o d y th e so u l c o m e s in to e x is te n c e to a n im a te , 4 O r even as species impressa for the concepts o r species expressae th e soul form s w hen sep arated by d ea th from its body, as St T hom as says (Summa 89.6c): “secundum species intelligibiles hie acquisitas, an im a sep arata intelligere possit quae prius intellexit; ... et ita m an et q u id em in an im a sep arata actus scientiae hie acquisitae”, i.e., over the course o f bodily existence.

106

Intentionality and Semiotics

o n ly a w a re n e s s in s o f a r as it is in trin s ic a lly tie d u p w ith a n d d e p e n d e n t u p o n b o d ily o r g a n s . T h e

species intellectae a c c u m u la te d o v e r th e c o u r s e

o f life as h a b it- f o r m a tio n s , th e s e r e m a in in th e ‘s e p a r a te d s o u l’ a n d

species sensibiles impressae c a n b e re c e iv e d via th e s e n s e s s in c e th e se n se s a r e n o m o r e ( Summa 1 .8 9 .6 c ): “s e c u n d u m s p e c ie s in te llig ib ile s h ie a c q u isita s, g iv e it a n a w a re n e s s su rv iv in g e v e n d e a th , a l th o u g h n o n e w

a n i m a s e p a r a ta in te llig e r e p o s s it q u a e p r iu s in te lle x it; ... e t ita m a n e t q u id e m in a n i m a s e p a r a ta a c tu s s c ie n tia e h ie a c q u is ita e ” — “th e so u l w h o s e b o d y h a s p e r is h e d c a n u n d e r s t a n d w h a t it k n e w b e f o r e in a c ­ c o r d a n c e w ith th e in te llig ib le sp e c ify in g fo rm s th a t it a c q u ir e d o v e r th e c o u r s e o f its b o d ily e x i s t e n c e ; ... a n d so a c ts o f in te lle c tu a l u n d e r s t a n d ­ in g a c h ie v e d in th e c o u r s e o f b o d ily life r e m a in in th e s o u l s e p a r a te d a t d e a t h ”. A n d w h ile it is n o t n a t u r a l to th e in te lle c t u a l s o u l to r e c e iv e s tim ­ u la tiv e s p e c if ic a tio n s o th e r w is e t h a n v ia th e s e n s e s , in its c o n d i t i o n o f b e i n g n o w s e p a r a t e d f r o m th e b o d y it c a m e in to e x is te n c e to i n ­ f o r m , t h e h u m a n s o u l is f o r c e d b y its c h a n g e o f c i r c u m s ta n c e s 5 to b e ­ c o m e a w a re o f s tim u li s p e c if y in g its f u r t h e r f o r m a tio n o f c o n c e p t s in m u c h t h e w ay t h a t th e a n g e ls as p u r e ly s p ir itu a l s u b s ta n c e s n a t u r a lly r e c e iv e

species impressae actualiter intelligibiles (Summa 1 .8 9 .1 c ): “c u m

a u t e m f u e r i t a c o r p o r e s e p a r a ta , c o m p e t i t ei m o d u s in t e l l i g e n d i p e r c o n v e r s io n e m a d e a q u a e s u n t in te llig ib ilia s im p lic ite r ” — “w h e n it h a s b e e n s e p a r a t e d f r o m th e b o d y , t h e h u m a n in t e l l e c t a c q u ir e s a w ay o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h r o u g h t u r n i n g to th e th in g s w h ic h a r e s im ­ p ly in te l l i g i b l e ”, w h ic h is n a t u r a l f o r a n g e ls b u t u n n a t u r a l to t h e h u ­ m a n i n t e l l e c t .6

5 “C o n sid eran d u m est”, A quinas rem arks ( Summa 1.89.1c), “qu o d , cum n ihil o p e re tu r nisi in q u a n tu m est actu, m odu s o p e ra n d i u n iu scu iu sq u e rei se q u itu r m o d u m essendi ipsius; h a b e t au tem an im a alium m o d u m essendi, cum fu erit a co rp o re separata, m a n e n te tam en ead em an im ae n a tu ra ” — “We have to th in k that, since n o th in g o p era tes otherw ise th a n ac co rd in g to its actual co n d itio n , th e m o d e acco rd in g to w hich each single th in g fu n ctio n s follows in accord with its way o f existing, a n d the soul has an o th e r way o f ex­ isting w hen it is u n ite d with th e body an d w hen it will be sep arated fro m the body, while yet its n a tu re rem ains u n c h a n g e d ,” even th o u g h it is, in th e latter situation, in a co n d itio n “q u o d est ei p ra e te r n a tu ra m ” — “w hich is fo r it an u n n atu ra l c o n d itio n ”. 6 See Deely 2004, on “T h e Semiosis o f A ngels”.

Appendix to C hapter 7. Illuminatio/Abstractio

107

J u s t as t h e species impressae se n su u m extem oru m , as g a t h e r e d to g e t h ­ e r b y th e sensus co m m unis, p r o v id e th e s tim u li in r e s p o n s e to w h ic h t h e t h r e e h i g h e r i n te r n a l s e n s e s — m e m o ry , im a g in a tio n , e s tim a tio n — ac tiv e ly f o r m t h e i r in t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f th e d a t a o f s e n s e t h r o u g h spe­ cies expressae sensatae w h ic h c o n s titu t e th e p h a n t a s m , so th e a c tiv ity o f t h e i n te lle c t a d d i n g to th e o b je c ts o f th o s e species expressae th e relatio ra tionis o f s e lf-id e n tity tr a n s f o r m s w h a t w e r e f o r p e r c e p t i o n species ex­ pressae sensatae in to species impressae intelligibiles f o r t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( th e ‘p o s s ib le in t e l l e c t ’, th e in te lle c t a b le to k n o w s e n s ib le th in g s in t h e i r b e in g ) .T h u s d o th e s e n s ib le p h a n ta s m s b e c o m e f u r t h e r species intelligibiles c a p a b le o f s tim u la tin g a n d s p e c ify in g th e p o s s ib le in t e l ­ le c t to f o r m species expressae r e p r e s e n tin g th e o b je c ts o f s e n s e as r a t h e r “th in g s in th e m s e lv e s ” w ith a s u b je c tiv e c o n s titu t io n o r n a t u r e w h ic h is f o u n d v e rif ia b le o r “c o m m o n ” to m a n y in d iv id u a ls , n o t j u s t to th o s e hie et n u n c in d iv id u a lly r e p r e s e n t e d w ith in th e p h a n t a s m , e v e n i f a c ­ c o r d i n g to s o m e c o m m o n f e a tu r e . T h e s e species expressae intellecta o r “c o n c e p ts o f th e in t e l l e c t ”, lik e th e “c o n c e p ts o f in te r n a l s e n s e ”, i n t e r p r e t th e o b je c ts o f e x p e r ie n c e ; b u t w h e r e a s th e la tte r c o n c e p ts i n t e r p r e t th e o b je c ts o f e x p e r ie n c e so le ly a c c o r d in g to th e n e e d s a n d in te r e s ts o f th e o r g a n is m p e r c e iv ­ in g , th e f o r m e r c o n c e p ts i n t e r p r e t th e s e s a m e o b je c ts n o w “u n iv e rs a l­ ly”, t h a t is to say, a c c o r d in g as th e y tr a n s c e n d th e in te r e s ts o f t h e c o n ­ c e iv in g o r g a n is m b y r e a s o n o f h a v in g a “b e i n g in th e m s e lv e s ” w h ic h c a n b e in v e s tig a te d by th e h u m a n m in d . A n d it is th is t h a t is m e a n t by t h e “n a t u r e s o f th in g s ”: n o t th a t th e o b je c t is s e e n as a n u n c h a n g i n g f o r m “u n iv e r s a l” in th e s e n s e th a t it is a n “u n c h a n g i n g e s s e n c e ” o f t h e s o r t th a t p r e c lu d e s th e p o ssib ility o f e v o lu tio n in th e w o rld o f n a t u r e . N o t a t all. R a th e r is th e object o f s e n s e p e r c e p tio n n o w p r e s e n t e d to th e u n d e r s t a n d i n g as a th in g in its o w n r ig h t h a v in g e x is te n c e a p a r t f r o m m e , r a t h e r th a n sim p ly as a n o b je c t to b e s o u g h t (+ ), a v o id e d ( - ) , o r sa fe to ig n o r e (0 ). T h a t th e species intelligibiles m a d e by th e i n te lle c t’s o w n ac tiv ity f r o m th e p h a n ta s m w h ic h f u n c tio n as species impressa f o r th e p o s s ib le in te lle c t to f o rm in its o w n r ig h t species expressae r e m a in o u ts id e th e p o s s ib le in te lle c t in its, so to say, ‘fa c u lta tiv e b e i n g ’ as e m a n a tin g f r o m th e d im e n s io n o f th e h u m a n s o u l w h ic h is n o t r e d u c ib le to th e p o te n -

108

Intentionality and Semiotics

cy o f m a tte r , in c o n t r a s t to th e p h a n ta s m s as p r o d u c ts o f ‘f a c u ltie s ’ o r p o w e rs o f t h e so u l w h ic h e m a n a te f r o m th e d im e n s io n o f th e h u m a n s o u l w h ic h a n im a te s m a tte r, is s tr o n g ly s u g g e s te d by th e c o n c lu d in g s e n te n c e o f St T h o m a s ’ r e p ly to 1.85.1 a d 3. ( e m p h a s e s a d d e d ) : S in ce th e p h a n ta s m s a re sim ilitu d e s d raw n fro m in d iv id u als a n d ex ist in b o d ily o rg a n s, th ey d o n o t have th e sa m e m o d e o f exis­ te n c e th a t th e h u m a n in te lle c t has ... a n d fo r th is re a s o n ... by v irtu e o f th e in te lle c t’s activity th e r e resu lts a c e rta in sim ilitu d e in th e p o ssib le in te lle c t w h e n it takes its o r ie n ta tio n fro m th e activity o f th e in te lle c t u p o n th e p h a n ta sm s. And through this

orientation an intelligible form o f specification is said to be ab­ stracted from the phantasms ...7 S o far, w e c o u ld o n ly c o n c lu d e , as w e saw s u g g e s te d a b o v e , t h a t “th e a c tiv e in te lle c t a b s tra c ts im p r e s s e d in te llig ib le f o rm s o r s p e c ie s ( species

intelligibiles impressae), w h ic h a r e t h e n s to r e d in th e p o s s ib le in te lle c t intelligibiles expressae) Y et j u s t

as e x p r e s s e d in te llig ib le s p e c ie s ( species

th is i n t e r p r e t a t i o n S t T h o m a s se e m s to w a n t to p r e c lu d e w ith h is n e x t r e m a r k ( ib id .):

not that some numerically identical form which was formerly in the phantasms comes to be afterward in the possible intellect, in the way that a body is taken from one location and transferred to another .8 D e s p ite th e la n g u a g e , t h e n , w h ic h o f te n s u g g e s ts t h a t t h e species ex­ pressae sensatae tr a n s f e r to th e p o s s ib le in te lle c t w h e n t h e i n t e l l e c t ’s a c tiv ity “a b s tr a c ts ” th e m by m a k in g th e m in to species impressae intelligi­ biles, th e t r a n s f o r m e d p h a n ta s m s — r e n d e r e d in te llig ib le , as it w o u ld s e e m , by th e f o r m a l a d d i tio n o f th e ens rationis o f s e lf- id e n tity w h e r e b y 7 “p h an tasm ata , cum sin t sim ilitudines in d iv id u o ru m , e t e x ista n t in organis corp o reis, n o n h a b e n t e u n d e m m o d u m ex isten d i q u ern h a b e t in te lle c tu s h u m a n u s ... e t id eo ... virtute in tellectu s agen tis re su lta t q u a e d a m sim ilitu d o in in te lle ctu possibili ex conversio n e in tellectu s ag en tis su p ra p h a n ta s m a ­ ta ... rep rae sen tiv a e o ru m q u o ru m su n t p h a n ta sm a ta , so lu m q u a n tu m ad n a tu ra m speciei. et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a

phantasmatibus ... .” 8 “non quod aliqua eadem numero forma, quae prius fuit in phantasmati­ bus, postquam fiat in intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco et transfertur ad alterum.”

A ppendix to Chapter 7. Illuminatio/Abstractio

109

t h e o b je c t o f t h e p h a n t a s m b e c o m e s v isib le to th e p o s s ib le in te lle c t f u r t h e r as a t h i n g — a c tu a lly r e m a in in in t e r i o r s e n s e w h ile th e y s tim ­ u la te t h e p o s s ib le in te lle c t to its o w n activ ity in th e f o r m a tio n o f th e species expressae intellectae th a t a c tu a lly g r a s p th e o b je c t in its o n to lo g i­ c a l c h a r a c t e r as a b e i n g e x is tin g o b je ctiv ely , yes, b u t a lso more th a n o b je c tiv e ly as a p r o s p e c tiv e s u b je c t o f e x is te n c e in its o w n r ig h t. S o species intelligibiles, d e s p ite p a r tic ip a tin g in a level o f “im m a te r ia l­ ity ” t r a n s c e n d i n g th e im m a te ria lity o f th e p h a n ta s m s in b r u te a n im a ls , a r e y e t n o t species expressae, th e y a r e r a t h e r species impressae. A n d j u s t as th e species impressae sensuum extem orum as c o - o r d in a te d b y th e sensus com m unis a r e p a s s e d u p to th e activ e in te r n a l se n se s o f m e m o ry , im a g i­ n a tio n , a n d e s tim a tio n , n o t to r e s id e th e r e , b u t sim p ly to p r o v o k e o r s tim u la te a n interpretive r e s p o n s e t h r o u g h th e f o r m a tio n o f species expres­ sae sensatae, so a lso th e s e species expressae sensuu m in te m o ru m as tr a n s ­ f o r m e d by th e intellectus agens ( th a t is, th e c o n ju n c tio n a n d h i g h e r a ctiv ­ ity o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g as a c o g n itiv e ‘fa c u lty ’ o r p o w e r o f tr a n s f o r m in g th in g s s e n s e d in to o b je c ts tr a n s c e n d in g th e p h y sic a l e n v i r o n m e n t as in te r a c t in g m a te r ia l e x is te n ts h e r e a n d n ow ) in to , r a th e r , species impres­ sae intelligibiles by th e s im p le a d d itio n o f relationes rationis sui-identitatis w h ic h , im p e r c e p tib le to se n se (as a r e all relationes u t sic in ente supra subjectivum ), y e t o p e n th e w ay to a n in v e s tig a tio n o f th e o b je c ts o f s e n se p e r c e p tio n w h ic h tr a n s c e n d s th e r e la tio n o f th o s e o b je c ts as k n o w n to th e b io lo g ic a l c o n s titu tio n o r h e r e d ity o f th e o r g a n is m p o s s e s s in g a n a w a re n e s s o f th e m . T h e p h a n ta s m s m a d e in te llig ib le b y th e a d d i tio n o f th e ens rationis r e la tio n o f se lf-id e n tity a d d e d to th e i r o b je c ts e n a b le a view o f th e o b je c ts as su b je c tiv e ly c o n s titu te d th in g s in v e s tig a tib le a n d f u r t h e r o b je c tifia b le as s u c h in th e ir m i n d - in d e p e n d e n t b e in g . B u t it m u s t b e g r a n t e d t h a t th e s k e in o f th e r e la tio n a l lin e s in ­ v o lv ed h e r e is n o t a l to g e t h e r easy to u n ta n g le :9

9 A quinas i. 1 2 59/65, Summa Contra Gentiles, B ook 2, C h ap . 73, n o . 26: “Intellectus enim possibilis, sicut e t q u a e lib e t [p o te n tia cognoscitiva in aliq ua alia] substantia, o p e ra tu r se c u n d u m m o d u m suae n a tu ra e . S e c u n d u m au tem suam n atu ra m est [p o te n tia cognoscitiva ra d ic a tu r in] fo rm a c o rp o ­ ris. U n d e intelligit q u id em im m aterialia, seel inspicit ea in a liq u o m a teria li. Cuius signum est, q u o d in d o ctrin is universalibus e x e m p la p a rtic u la ria pon u n tu r, in quibus q u o d d ic itu r inspiciatur. Alio erg o m o d o se h a b e t in te l­ lectus possibilis ad p h an tasm a q u o ind ig et, a n te sp eciem in tellig ib ilem : et alio m odo postquam rec ep it speciem in telligibilem . A n te en im , in d ig e t

110

Intentionality and Semiotics

T h e p o ssib le in te lle c t, like [a faculty in] an y o th e r su b sta n c e , w o rk s in a c c o rd a n c e w ith its n a tu re . B u t a c c o rd in g to its n a tu re it is [a co g n itiv e p o w e r r o o te d in] th e fo rm o f a body. W h e n c e it u n d e r s ta n d s im m a te ria l th in g s, in d e e d , b u t by in sp e c tin g th e m in s o m e th in g m a te ria l. T h e sign o f this is th a t in u n iv e rsa l te a c h ­ in g s p a r tic u la r e x a m p le s a re given w h e re in w h a t is said ca n b e s e e n e x e m p lifie d . T h e r e f o r e th e p o ssib le in te lle c t sta n d s in o n e r e la tio n to a p h a n ta s m w h ich it n e e d s p r io r to th e in te llig ib le sp e cify in g fo rm : a n d in a d iffe re n t o n e a fte r it h as rec eiv e d th e in te llig ib le specifier. F o r b e fo re , it n e e d s th e p h a n ta s m in o r d e r to re c e iv e th e re fr o m in te llig ib le sp e cific atio n : w h e n c e th e p h a n ­ ta sm is r e la te d to th e p o ssib le in te lle c t as [p re s e n tin g ] a s tim u la t­ in g o b je c t.*10 B u t a fte r it has rec eiv e d th e sp e c ific a tio n , it n e e d s th e p h a n ta s m as a n in s tr u m e n t o r r a th e r basis f o r th e fo rm in g o f its ow n e x p re ss sp e cific atio n : w h e n c e it re la te s to th e p h a n ta s m n o w as a n e ffic ie n t cause; fo r a c c o rd in g to th e d e m a n d o f th e in ­ te lle c t is f o rm e d in th e im a g in a tio n a p h a n ta s m su ita b le f o r th e in te llig ib le sp e c ific a tio n in q u e s tio n , a p h a n ta s m in w h ich th e in te llig ib le sp e c ific a tio n sta n d s f o rth as th e e x e m p la r in th e ex ­ e m p lifie d , o r in a n im a g e. If th e re fo r e th e p o ssib le in te lle c t h a d always h a d specify in g fo rm s, it w o u ld n e v e r have b e e n r e la te d to a p h a n ta s m as a re c ip ie n t re s p e c tin g a stim u lu s o b je ct.

“B e in g ” as “th a t w h ic h is firs t k n o w n ” c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to ens reale, s in c e it divides in experience a c c o r d in g to th e c o n t r a s t b e tw e e n b e in g s e x is tin g o n ly o b je c tiv e ly ( ens rationis) a n d b e in g s e x is tin g eo u t ab eo accipiat speciem intelligibilem : u n d e se h a b e t ad in tellectu m possibilem u t [osten d en s seu praebens] obiectum m ovens [vide P o in so t 1632a: 1.4, pp. 166-192]. Sed post speciem in eo recep tam , in d ig e t eo quasi instrum e n to sive fu n d a m e n to suae speciei: u n d e se h a b e t ad p h a n ta sm a ta sicut causa efficiens; se cu n d u m enim im p eriu m intellectus fo rm a tu r in im aginatio n e p h an tasm a conveniens tali speciei intelligibili, in q u o re sp le n d e t species intelligibilis sicut ex e m p la r in ex em plato sive in im agine. Si erg o in tellectu s possibilis se m p er habuisset species, n u n q u a m c o m p a ra re tu r ad p h an tasm ata sicut recipiens ad obiectum m otivum .” 10 “O b iectu m m ovens”: F or an e x te n d e d L atin discussion o f this idea, see P oinsot 1632a: Book I, Q uestion 4, “Q u aliter d ividatur o b iectu m in m otivum e t term in ativ u m ” — “In w hat way are objects divided in to stim ulus objects a n d term inative objects”, 166-192.

A ppendix to Chapter 7. Illuminatio/Abstractio

s u b je c tiv e ly as w ell as o b je c tiv e ly ( ens

111

reale); b u t ens primum cognitum,

p r e s e n t e d by th e first stric tly in te lle c tu a l c o n c e p t, v ie w in g th e o b je c ­ tiv e w o rld as c o m p r is e d o f th in g s e x is tin g in t h e ir o w n r ig h t, is th e

ens reale in its c o n t r a s t w ith non ens (S t T h o m a s ’ s y n o n y m f o r ens ralionis), a n d h e n c e

a w a re n e s s w h ic h firs t o p e n s th e w ay to th e c o n c e p t o f

to t h e in v e s tig a tio n o f b o t h — th e in v e s tig a tio n in its fu ll a m p litu d e o f “r e a lity ” as a m a t t e r o f p u b lic e x p e r ie n c e , h e r e as a so c ia l c o n s tr u c ­ t i o n , 11 t h e r e as a p r o v e n a n c e o f n a t u r e in its b e i n g f u n d a m e n ta l ly in ­ d e p e n d e n t o f o u r e x p e r ie n c e o f it. N o t o n ly is

ens rationis n o t in anywise a sy n o n y m f o r p s y c h o lo g ic a l

su b je c tiv ity , as th e N e o th o m is ts w e re w o n t to s u p p o s e , b u t m u c h r a t h ­ e r d o e s p s y c h o lo g ic a l su b je c tiv ity b e l o n g to th e o r d e r o f ‘c a te g o r ia l b e i n g ’ — w h ic h is to say,

ens reale. By c o n tr a s t, ens reale a n d ens rationis, ens

“i n q u a n t u m c o g n i t u m ”, b e l o n g a lik e a n d e q u a lly to th e o r d e r o f

objectivum. T h e i r o n ly d if f e r e n c e lie s in su b je ctiv ity , n o t th e su b je c tiv ity ens reale), b u t m u c h r a t h e r th e s u b je c tiv ity

o f th e k n o w e r (w h ic h is a n

o f t h e o b je c t as a lso a th in g : d o e s th e o b je c t also h a v e s u b je c tiv ity o r n o t? Yes o r n o ? I t is t h e q u e s tio n o f th e d if f e r e n c e b e tw e e n H a m l e t as P r in c e o f D e n m a r k a n d N a p o le o n as E m p e r o r o f F ra n c e . “A b s tr a c tio n ”, in s h o r t, is in itia te d b u t n o t c o m p le t e d b y th e “in te lle c tu s a g e n s ”, in s o f a r as “a g e n s ” in th is e x p r e s s io n is c o n t r a s te d w ith o r o p p o s e d to “p o s s ib ilis ”. N o . A b s tr a c tio n fin a lly a c h ie v e s its fu ll c o m ­ p l e tio n o n ly w h e n th e o b je c ts o f a n im a l p e r c e p tio n a r e s e e n r a th e r , 1

11 W ere it n o t fo r th e late-20th-century d ev e lo p m e n t o f so-called “A nalytic T h o m ism ” p rin cip ally u n d e r th e in flu e n ce o f th e th eo ry o f “m e a n in g as u se ” in tro d u c e d by th e la te r W ittgenstein (cf. Lisska 1973), it w ould go w ith o u t saying th a t c o n c ep ts — strictly in tellectu al concep ts (w hat S ebeok te rm e d “lan g u ag e in th e ro o t sense in c o n tra st with th e linguistic co m m u n ic atio n so co m m o n ly co n fu se d with la n g u a g e ”) alo n g with th e p e rc e p tu a l co n cep ts o f in te rn a l sense — are logically a n d ontologically p rio r to, how ever m u c h they b ec o m e subseq u en tly d evelopm entally d e p e n d e n t u p o n , linguistic c o m m u ­ n icatio n . So h e re is my final answ er to Lisska’s 1973 critiq u e o f D eely 1971, ap p ly in g th e w ords o f M ari tain 1968: 14: “L et th e m invoke th e slogan o f lin ­ guistic categories as m u c h as they like”, these ‘A nalytic T h o m ists’. “It is n o t la n g u ag e th a t m akes concepts, b u t co n c ep ts th a t m ake la n g u a g e ”, as can b e se en fro m this fact: “T h e re are prim itive languages th a t have n o w ord fo r th e id e a o f b ein g , b u t th a t is a far cry from saying th a t th o se w ho sp eak th e m d o n o t have this id e a in th e ir m in d .”

112

Intentionality and Semiotics

m is ta k e n ly o r n o t, as th in g s by h u m a n u n d e r s ta n d in g : th a t is th e m e a n ­ in g o f p rim u m in intellectu cadit ens, “b e in g is th e p o in t o f d e p a r tu r e f o r d is tin c tiv e ly h u m a n u n d e r s ta n d in g , ev e n as se n se is th e p o in t o f d e p a r ­ tu r e f o r th e a w a re n e ss o f all a n im a ls, in c lu d in g h u m a n s ”. T h e “ex is­ te n c e o f G o d ” as th e ens in quo esse d istin g u i non potest aliter quam rationis ab essentia follow s, b u t o n ly lo g ically a n d u p o n c o n s id e r a b le re f le c tio n , as a n in e s c a p a b le ‘c o n s e q u e n t’. A n se lm , fin ally ,12 h a s h is day. 12 F rom Deely 2001: 238-241, footno tes d eleted: “W riting in 1266, two h u n d re d an d forty-two years after th e first ap p e aran c e o f A nselm ’s arg u m en t, T h o m as A quinas rejected th e ontological arg u m e n t o n two g ro u n d s. His first g ro u n d was th a t p erh ap s n o t all w ould accept A nselm ’s d efin itio n o f th e term ‘G o d ’, ‘seeing th a t som e have th o u g h t th a t G od was a b o d y ’. T his cursory dism issal o f A nselm ’s ‘d e fin itio n ’ o f the term ‘G o d ’ as ‘th a t th a n w hich n o n e g re a te r can be conceived’ could be an u n fo rtu n a te co n seq u e n ce o f th e fact th a t A quinas may well have know n A nselm ’s a rg u m e n t only in tru n c a te d fo rm as tran sm itte d th ro u g h o n e o f th e late florilegia, th e frag m en tary d o g m atic a n d ascetical o r ethical anthologies o f early C hristian w riters co m p iled a n d circu ­ lated from as early as th e 5th century in th e East u p to th e tim e o f St. T hom as. T hus, it n eed s to be b o rn e in m in d that, as above n o te d , in ad d itio n to th e th re e ch ap ters o f th e Proslogion ... , th e re are (besides th e p re a m b le a n d ch a p ­ te r o n e) twenty-two su b seq u en t chapters w hich elab o rate precisely th e m e a n ­ in g o f th e expression ‘th a t th a n w hich n o n e g rea ter can be co n c eiv ed ’, a n d are thus in a sense a co n tin u atio n o r fuller d ev e lo p m e n t o f th e basic p ro o f. T h e ‘sh o rt fo rm ’ o f th e arg u m en t, thus, is a n u cleu s ra th e r th a n a n u b . “W hat w ould A quinas have h ad to say o f A n selm ’s d efin itio n o f th e te rm ‘G o d ’ h a d he seen the full elaboration, a n d h a d h e seen it as th e seq u el to A nselm ’s p rio r discourse on th e essence o f divinity, th e Monologion? W ould A quinas still have so sum m arily dism issed A n selm ’s a tte m p t a t d efin itio n ? P erhaps not; b u t th e n again, in view o f his own a p p ro a c h to th e q u estio n o f how to attach existential im p o rt an d m e a n in g to th e te rm ‘G o d ’, p e rh a p s yes. Yet th e re is n o denying th a t th e 13th-cen tu ry Commentary o f A quinas o n th e 6lh-century treatise On the Divine Names a u th o re d by th e Pseudo-D ionysius voiced conclusions re d o le n t o f th e ll^ -c e n tu ry se n tim en ts A nselm ex p ressed in his Monologion, o r ‘discourse o n th e essence o f divinity’: ‘W h o ev er investi­ gates so m eth in g in c o m p reh en sib le sh o u ld be satisfied if h e rea ch es by way o f reasoning a q u ite certain conclusion th a t it exists, even if h e is n o t able to p e n e tra te by u n d e rsta n d in g th e m a n n e r o f this necessary e x iste n c e .’ A nd w hat could equal th e inco m p reh en sib ility a n d ineffability o f ‘th a t w hich tra n ­ scends in its existence th e existence o f all th in g s’? If, th e re fo re , th e h ig h est exercise o f u n d e rsta n d in g an d reason leads to th e c o m p re h e n sio n th a t th e source o f existence is in c o m p reh en sib le becau se, in c o n tra st to everything from w hich o u r ex p e rien c e a n d rea so n in g begins, w h at it is has n o distinc­ tion from th e fact th a t it is, ‘th e fo u n d a tio n o f o n e ’s certain ty is n o t shaken

Appendix to Chapter 7. Illuminatio/'Abstractio

113

“As w ith se v e ra l o t h e r te rm s I h a v e in v e s tig a te d ”, B a rk e r c o n c lu d ­ e d , “t h e r e a r e tw o r e la te d b u t d is tin c t se n se s o f illu m in a tio ; th e sp e c ific s e n s e p r e p a r a to r y to a b s tr a c tio n p r o p e r ”, w h ic h I say is th e in te lle c t a d d i n g to th e p h a n ta s m s by its o w n activity m in d - d e p e n d e n t r e la tio n s

in th e least’ by o n e ’s com ing to co m p re h e n d th a t th e m a n n e r in w hich th e so u rce o f existence knows the things w hich exist, the very things from w hich we by reaso n in g arrive at th e know ledge o f the necessary existence o f th a t source, is in co m p reh en sib le. F or ‘w ho will explain how h e knows o r expresses th a t hig h est source ab o u t w hich the h u m a n bein g knows e ith e r n o th in g o r n e x t to n o th in g ? ’, A nselm queries plaintively in those pseudo-dionysian tones w hich w on th e sym pathy o f A quinas for ‘negative theology’, in n o small p art, th ro u g h his assum ption o f the authenticity o f th e ir source. “In any event, A quinas rejected the claim o f probative force fo r A n selm ’s lin e o f reaso n in g on a second a n d m ore fu n d am e n tal g ro u n d : even g ra n tin g th e w ord G od to m ean so m eth in g th an w hich a g re a te r ca n n o t be th o u g h t, th e co n seq u e n ce o f this definition is n o t th a t G od actually exists b u t only th a t we are (righdy o r wrongly, as m ust b e fu rth e r d e term in e d ) thinking o f G od as actually existing. “T his brings us to th e very pro b lem th a t we n o te d above as n o t having oc­ c u rre d e ith e r to A nselm o r to any o f the m any p ro m o ters o f th e o n to lo g ical a rg u m e n t since A nselm , namely, the p ro b lem th a t n o t only is it g re a te r to exist in b o th th o u g h t a n d reality th an to exist in th o u g h t alo n e o r in real­ ity alo n e, b u t to exist as n o t able n o t to be th o u g h t is g re a te r th a n to ex­ ist as som etim es able to be th o u g h t an d o th e r tim es n o t. T hus, th e p o in t o f th e ontological a rg u m e n t turns on the singularity o f its object, th at-th an w hich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought. T his object, to escape self-co n trad ictio n , i f thought, m u st be th o u g h t as really existing. B ut it n e e d n o t b e th o u g h t, a n d o ften is n o t, fo r n o t everyone at all tim es is actually th in k in g a b o u t G od. B ut to have to be th o u g h t is g re a te r th a n w hat can e ith e r b e th o u g h t o r n o t be th o u g h t. T h e re fo re th a t w hich really, th a t w hich in itself a n d n o t ju s t in th o u g h t, is som ething-than-w hich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought c a n n o t b e an o b ject w hich can som etim es be th o u g h t, som etim es n o t th o u g h t. T h e re fo re A nselm ’s a rg u m e n t does n o t have fo r its o b ject a really existing so m eth in g than-w hich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, b u t only an o b ject w hich, if th o u g h t, m ust be thought as really existing, b u t w hich, at th e sam e tim e, m anifests th a t it is n o t really that-than-w hich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, fo r w hatever is really that-than-w hich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought c a n n o t so m etim es be th o u g h t a n d o th e r tim es not. “A nd the p o in t can be p ressed even fu rth er. If G od really is that-than-w hicha-greater-cannot-be-thought, th e n G od m ust exist as a self-subsisting th o u g h t (which is actually w hat b oth A ristotle a n d A quinas, w ith d ifferin g d eg rees o f com pleteness, su cceeded in show ing), a n d is nev er as o b ject o f o u r th o u g h t direcdy p rese n t as such — th a t is, as G od ‘is in th e ex isten ce p ro p e r to G o d ’

114

Intentionality and Semiotics

o f s e lf - id e n tity f o r th e o b je c ts in th e w o rld o f a n im a l s e n s e - p e r c e p ­ t i o n ; “a n d a b r o a d e r s e n s e th a t is s y n o n y m o u s w ith abstractio", to w it, w h e n t h e p o s s ib le i n te lle c t u n d e r th e s tim u lu s o f th e p h a n ta s m th u s r e n d e r e d i n te lli g ib le s e e s th e o b je c ts o f s e n s e - p e r c e p tio n as in v o lv in g t h i n g s t h a t d o n o t r e d u c e to t h e ir r e la tio n to u s as p le a s in g (+ ), r e p e l­ l e n t (—) , o r u n i n t e r e s t i n g ( 0 ), b u t in v o lv e f u r t h e r a being in t h e ir o w n r i g h t w h i c h m a k e s t h e m e x is t as m o r e th a n m e r e o b je c ts , in ways th a t r e m a i n t o b e in v e s tig a te d if th e y a r e rig h tly to b e u n d e r s to o d .

— even when we them atically focus u p o n that-th an -w h ich -a-g reater-can n o tbe-thought. For that-than-w hich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, as a n o b je ct o f our thought, n eed n o t always be th o u g h t, w hereas that-than-w hich-a-greatercannot-be-thought, as really existing, c a n n o t fail to be th o u g h t. W h e n ce , n o m atter how the ontological a rg u m e n t is co u c h ed , it fails to to u c h o n th e real existence of God, at w hich it is aim ed, b u t co n c lu d e s only to s o m e th in g w hich holds for o u r situation as finite th in k e rs.”

Chapter 8

“Agere Sequitur Esse”: The Role of Relation in the Order of Being

A nd now let m e try to show how this w hole, irreducibly his­ torical, en terp rise o f h u m a n u n d erstan d in g d ep en d s u p o n th e action o f signs — a term we have seen in the p re se n t w ork thus far m ainly in Mari ta in ’s referen ce to the species expressa (“id in quo”) as b ein g a “form al sign”, distinguished by P oinsot fro m th e species impressa (o r “id quo”) which is em phatically not a form al sign.1 Yet species expressa is a term which is n o t only far fro m ex­ h au sted in th a t “signum fo rm ale” form ula, b u t is o n e th a t does n o t even settle u n d e r th a t form ula alto g eth er com fortably, fo r the reason th a t th e b ein g p ro p e r to no signs is th e b ein g o f a subjective structu re psychological or m aterial, while th e b ein g 1 T his p o in t applies even to th e p h an tasm s in th e ir ro le resp e ctin g th e activity o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g w hereby they are tran sfo rm ed fro m species expressae phantasiandi in to species impressae intelligibiles: in th e fo rm e r role, they are in d e e d sign-vehicles o f th e so rt called “form al signs”, i.e., psychological states in ten tionally p ro v en a tin g cognitive re la d o n s to th e su rro u n d in g s as ob jecti­ fied. B ut w hen they are su b o rd in a te d to th e u n d e rsta n d in g in th e fo rm a tio n from the p h antasm s o f species impressae intelligibiles, they go insofar, as it w ere, “u n d e rg ro u n d ” in th e preco n scio u s o f th e in te lle ct as such, w h en ce they em erg e again in to the su n lig h t as in c o rp o ra te d w ithin th e furthei- fo rm a tio n by th e possible intellect o f species expressae intellectae p re se n tin g th e objective w orld form erly perceived by sense alo n e now p re se n te d as intelligible as well o n th e very side o f th e objects a p p re h e n d e d .

115

116

Intentionality and Semiotics

p ro p er to all signs is the being o f ontological relation. As we have com e to see,2 what M aritain an d late Latin tradition cam e to call “form al signs”, to g eth er with so-called “signs” in the usual sense o f som ething we see, hear, o r p o in t to (m aterial signifying struc­ tures technically term ed by the Latins, in contrast to psychologi­ cal states as form al signs, “instrum ental signs”), are strictly and technically n o t signs at all b u t ra th e r vehicles of signifying, signvehicles, as is said in semiotics today, in contrast with the triadic reladon in which the being o f th e sign form ally speaking con­ sists, and which relation im parts to th e sign-vehicle its ch aracter as sign-vehicle n o t by reason o f its subjectivity as such b u t by reason o f the position it occupies respecting the significate directly an d the in te rp re ta n t indirectly (so th at w hat is a sign-vehicle in one set o f circum stances can function ra th e r as a significate in another, o r an in terp reta n t in yet another, yielding th e “spiral” ch a ra c te r3 w hereby semiosis unfolds toward th e in finite). Sign-vehicles, w hen they are n o t purely objective, in d e e d have a subjective existence e ith e r as psychological states o r as m aterial structures. But it is n o t th e ir subjective existence as such w hich makes them fu nction as sign-vehicles, b u t ra th e r is it th e ir subsum ption as particu lar item s o r term s w ithin a tri­ adic relation ontological an d suprasubjective th a t m akes th e m so function an d ap p ear as w hat are called in co m m o n sp eech “signs”. A bsent this suprasubjective an d triadic relatio n sh ip , a n d the sign-vehicles w ould cease to be signs at all, sinking back in to m ere subjectivity. T he m aterial structures b eco m e at b est m e re objects as well as things, th e psychological states b eco m e m e re traces in th e nervous system, perhaps, m ark in g th e passage o f form erly conscious states in fu rth e r ind iv id u atin g subjectively the being o f the person involved. 2 An in terestin g convergence in th e sem iotic o f P o in so t a n d P eirce, as I discovered (see Deely 2001: 993-94, In d ex e n try fo r “Sign”), th a t has also becom e central for any m a tu re u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e d o c trin e o f signs today. 3 For a diagram m atic re p re se n ta tio n o f th e “sem iotic sp iral”, see Deely 2001a o r 2003: 164; with fu rth e r discussion in 2001b.

C hapter 8. The Role o f Relation in the Order of Being

117

T h e action o f signs in the h u m an case — n o t th e being o f signs, b u t anthroposmtVm's, the action distinctively c o n seq u en t u p o n th a t b ein g in h u m a n anim als, by which action we com e to realize th a t th e re are signs in the first place, an d only ‘slow by slow ’ (after th e fashion o f a discursive anim al, after all, even o n e rationally discursive) to the fu rth e r realization o f what signs a re in th e ir p ro p e r being — is the key. For we shall see th a t every thing ever singled o u t as a sign was singled o u t m inim ally b ecause th e th in g in question (in terio r psychological state o r perceived m aterial stru ctu re ex tern al to the organism perceiv­ ing) served to m ake p resen t in awareness — th a t is to say, to o r fo r a n o th e r — so m eth in g o th e r th an itself, wholly o th e r o r b u t m odally o th er,4 yet always “o th e r”. T h e “in te n tio n a l fo rm s”, w h eth er two-legged scholastic on es o r th e one-legged p h en o m en o lo g ical ones, fro m this persp ective, at once also reveal th e essentiality to th e m o f re­ lationship, o ften ch aracterized as “intersubjectivity”, b u t, as we shall see, this ch aracterizatio n is too n arrow (even su p p o s­ in g th e idealist limits o f th e m o d e rn “in ten tio n ality ” co u ld be b re a c h e d w ith o u t inconsistency), because relatio n s o b ta in also, in th o u g h t especially, betw een w hat exists in physical re a l­ ity a n d w hat does n o t so exist, a n d this last again (like b e in g it­ self) in m any ways. “Intersubjectivity” p resu p p o ses two subjects o f entitative o r ‘physical’ existence re la te d categorially; suprasubjectivity, however, ch aracterizes all relatio n s ontologically, a n d n o t ju s t categorially. So we shall see th a t th e b ein g o f signs is realized a n d m aintains itself only in acts o f relatin g , b u t in rela tio n sh ip s n o t only in d iffe re n t o n to logically to th e ir subjective g ro u n d b u t also o f an irred u cib ly u n iq u e k in d — triad ic, in a w ord, in con trast to th e dyadic in tersu b jectiv e rela tio n s initially typi­ cal o f ens reale, w hen rela tio n s are u n d e rs to o d to exist in th a t o rd e r at all (which m ost m o d e rn p h ilo so p h e rs clefacto failed to 4 T h e case o f m odal d istin ctio n alo n e I c o n s id e re d in D eely 1986a; see also Ransdell 1979.

118

Intentionality and Semiotics

u n d e rs ta n d ).5 T h ese o n to lo g ical a n d triad ic relatio n s consti­ tutive o f signs, thus, are possible at all only by reaso n o f th a t singularity, as we m u st now try to ex h ib it, w hich establishes relation, a n d ex consequenti sign relatio n s, s u p e rio r to th e di­ vision betw een ens reale a n d ens rationis. It is this singularity, m issed (yet b a re ly 6) by M aritain, yet p o in te d o u t by P oinsot in express te rm s,7 th a t o p en s th e way n o t so m u c h to a “re c o n ­ ciliatio n ” b etw een realism a n d idealism (fo r in th e ir m o d e rn p h ilo so p h ical sense, M aritain, to g e th e r w ith P eirce, is right: they c a n n o t b e re c o n c ile d ), as to a tra n sc e n d in g o f th e term s set fo r th e m in m odernity, by show ing b o th th a t ens reale is in ­ trinsically know able by th e h u m a n in tellect a n d th a t m u c h o f th e reality e n c o u n te re d w ithin h u m a n e x p erien ce (as w ithin an im al e x p e rie n c e generally) is socially co n stru c te d by a for­ m al in volv em en t o f ens rationis in th e b ein g a n d actio n o f signs. T his actio n is m ad e possible by th e sam e featu re o f reality th a t m akes possible th e d ifferen ce betw een ens reale a n d ens rationis in th e first place, a n d th a t explains th e positive o n to lo g ical stru c tu re o f th e c en tral featu re o f conscious in ten tio n ality as a “b e in g d ire c te d to w ard ”. F or th e p ro b lem o f th in g a n d object ad d ressed by M arit­ ain is only p a rt o f th e story. It is in d e e d necessary to see how th in g a n d ob ject can be id entical in know ledge, thanks b o th to th e u n iq u e esse intentionale o f th e species an d to th e fact th a t th e species impressa o f sensation received in physical in teractio n betw een th e an im al body a n d bodies o f th e en v iro n m en t sur­ ro u n d in g th e a n im a l’s body contains n o th in g o f ens rationis a n d is thus in c o rp o ra te d sequentially, first, in th e species expressae o f in te rn a l sense, th e n , in th e species impressae fash io n ed by th e a g e n t intellect, an d , finally, in th e species expressae o f th e possible 5 It is an in c re d ib le tale o f a ra re u n an im ity am o n g th e m o d e rn m ain ­ stream th in k ers, o f w hich th e best sum m ary know n to m e is th a t fo u n d in W ein b erg 1965. 6 D eely 1978, a n d esp. 1986. 7 P o in so t 1632: 6 46b25-45 (= TD S Book I, Q u estio n 1, 1 1 7 /2 8 -1 1 8 /1 8 ).

C hapter 8. The Role o f Relation in the Order of Being

119

in te lle c t (h u m a n u n d e rsta n d in g ). B ut to see this m u ch is yet n o t e n o u g h to resolve th e p roblem . Besides this, it is fu rth e r necessary to see an d to co n sid er how th e differen ces betw een things an d objects are m ed iated by a w eb o f relatio n sh ip s th ro u g h w hich things b eco m e a n d are m a in ta in e d as objects in th e first place. T h e b eg in n in g s only o f this p ro b lem are ad d ressed by th e d o c trin e o f species as p u re vicars o r “form al rep re se n ta tio n s” o r “p resentative fo rm s” specificative in tendency. T h e w hole m a tte r has to be m ad e m o re explicit in term s o f th e ro le o f rela tio n as a m o d e o f b ein g p re ­ su p p o sed even to th e possibility in th e first place o f o n e th in g re p re se n tin g an o th er, w h eth er in ten tio n ally (as in th e case o f “fo rm al” sign-vehicles) o r entitatively (as in th e case o f som e “in stru m e n ta l” sign-vehicles). At th e c e n te r o f all these p ro b ­ lem s, in short, is th e n e e d to u n d e rsta n d th e singularity o f rela­ tio n am o n g th e categories o f ens reale.

a. The Singularity of Relations T h e full schem e o f categories o f b ein g as able m ind-indep en d en tly to exist, th e A ristotelian schem e w hich was th e origi­ nal atte m p t to classify th e ways in w hich b ein g can exist in d e ­ p en d en tly o f h u m a n th o u g h t, is usually re d u c e d to its essentials as a distinction betw een b ein g in itself, substance, a n d b ein g in an o th er, accident, thus: in itself: SUBSTANCE Being in another:ACCIDENT

Diagram 1. T ra d itio n a l P resentation o f the A ristotelian D octrine o f Categories o f R ea l B ein g

B ut this way o f ap p ro ac h in g th e m a tter has th e serious difficulty, for o u r purposes, o f glossing over w hat needs to be highlighted in th e m atter o f w hat is n o t only u n iq u e b u t in d eed singular ab o u t relation w ithin the categories so conceived. For while every form o f being w ithin the categories is u n iq u e in the

120

Intentionality and Semiotics

sense that, w ere it n o t uniq u e, it w ould n o t b elo n g to a distinct category,8 yet relatio n is further u n iq u e in th a t it is th e only posi­ tive m o d e a n d form o f ens reale th a t can also be realized in its distinctive positive b ein g outside th e w hole o rd e r o f ens reale to w hich alo n e th e categories are conceived o r aim to p ertain . This is th e singularity o f relation. As I will do my best now to show, this singularity o f relatio n in th e o rd e r o f ens reale is th e ro o t w hich m akes possible th e difference betw een th e o p p o sed o rd ers o f ens reale a n d ens rationis th ro u g h o u t, a n d is also th e ro o t fo r th e actio n o f signs, semiosis, m ed iatin g th e d ifference betw een ob­ je c ts a n d things. This ontological singularity o f relatio n resp ect­ in g th e o th e r m odes o f ens reale is n o t only p rio r to b u t th e ba­ sis fo r th e intelligibility o f any su b seq u en t distinction betw een “epistem ology” an d “ontology” w hich does n o t sever any link betw een o r possible in te rp e n e tra tio n o f th e two realm s. L et us beg in at th e beginning, with ens primum cognitum, th e first division o f w hich, according to St T hom as, is into ens reale an d w hat is com paratively non ens, namely, ens rationis. Im p o rta n t to n o te from th e o utset is th a t o u r original co n cep t o f “n o n -b ein g ” is n o t th e co n ce p t o f “absolute n o th in g ” b u t ra th e r a co m p ar­ ative concept, i.e., “n o n-being co m p ared to w hat we take ra th e r as ‘re a l’ b ein g ”, w here th e fo rm er exists from th e m in d while th e la tte r exists n o t only from the m ind b u t also fro m th e physical realm as in d e p e n d e n t o f m ind. Still — an d this is a n o th e r p o in t carefully to n o te — ju s t as being is fu ndam entally objective, th a t is to say, consisting o f th e w orld as cognized o r know n, so this know n w orld is first divided into w hat exists subjectively as well as objectively, namely, esse entitativum, an d w hat exists only objec­ tively, namely, esse rationis (keeping in m in d h ere th a t esse rationis refers to objective being, n o t to th e subjectivity o f th e ratio n al anim al; an d th a t th e distinctive subjectivity o f th e ratio n al an i­ m al, “reaso n ” o r intellectus, is p resu p p o sed for esseseu entia rationis 8 T his p o in t was raised in a classroom discussion in itiated by David Arias, a discussion w hich m ad e plain to m e th e inadequ acy o f sp eak in g sim ply o f “th e u n iq u e n ess o f re la tio n ” in this c o n te x t o f th e categories o f m s reale.

C hapter 8. The Role o f Relation in the Order of Being

121

to exist formaliter— th at is, recognized as such in th e ir co n trast to ens reale— b u t n o t for these same beings to exist materialiter an d to fu n ctio n w ithin th e purely anim al Umwelt in its difference from a n d irreducibility to the physical environm ent, for which th e in tern al senses o f phantasiari are quite sufficient to consti­ tu te th a t ad m ix tu re o f m in d -d ep en d en t an d m in d -in d ep en d e n t relations th a t we call the “sense-perception o f objects”).9 This is necessary to keep in m ind, fo r com m only neothom istic p erso n ae write an d act as if ens reale eq u alled w hat th e m o d e rn s call “the external w orld”, a n d ens rationis e q u alled w hat th e m o d ern s call psychological subjectivity, th e “p riv ate” realm o f “o n e ’s own th o u g h ts an d (m ayhap) d elu sio n s”. O n th e contrary, for St Thom as, an d in fact, ens reale a n d ens rationis as subdividing initially ens primum cognitum are equally objective, equally in princip le p u blic.101 R em em ber: as anim als, we start o u t know ing only b ein g as sense-perceptible, w here ens rationis is in clu d ed in th e w orld o f objects perceived “attrib u en d o ei en titatem q u o d n o n h a b e t” — “by attrib u tin g to it a ch aracter which it does n o t have”11 9 I may m e n tio n h ere to th e re a d e r th a t this p ara d o x P o in so t b rin g s to lig h t — to wit, th a t “beings o f rea so n ” are fo rm e d by a n d fu n c tio n fo r anim als w ith o u t reason (“b ru te anim als”) alm ost as th o ro u g h ly as h a p p e n s also to “raU onal anim als”, w hich is why all anim als live w ithin an U m w elt first o f all — is so m e th in g th a t I have discussed a t le n g th in e a rlier works, su ch as Deely 1982, 1990, an d 2001, am o n g others. See n o te 1, p. 144 below. 10 Cf. Poinsot 1632: 307b26-34, cited in n o te 10, p. 43 above. 11 29 P oinsot 1632: 3 0 9 b l2 -2 5 : n o n “co g n o sc e re tu r a D eo en s ratio n is eo m o do, q u o nos illud ap p re h en d im u s, id est a ttrib u e n d o ei en tita tem , q u am n o n habet, sicut q u a n d o nos cognoscim us n o n en s ad in star en d s. E t h o c n o n convenit Deo, quia q u id q u id a p p re h e n d it, ita p e rfe c te a p p re h e n d it, q u o d etiam iudicare potest, u t a p p re h e n d it; si en im alite r iu d ic a re t q u am a p p re h e n d it, im p e rfe cte se h ab e ret. Si au tem iu d ic a re t esse re la d o n e m id, q u o d ad instar relationis a p p re h e n d it, cum n o n sit, falso iu d ic a re t.” — “M indd e p e n d e n t beings are n o t know n by G od in th e sam e m a n n e r th a t we know them , to wit, by attrib u tin g to th e m a reality they do n o t have, as h a p p e n s w hen we cognize n o n b e in g o n the p a tte rn o f being. A nd this d o e s n ’t h a p p e n in G o d ’s case, because w hatever G od a p p re h e n d s is so perfectly a p p re h e n d e d th a t th e A p p re h e n d o r is able to ju d g e it ju s t as it is a p p re h e n d e d ; fo r if G od w ere to ju d g e w hat is a p p re h e n d e d otherw ise th a n it is a p p re h e n d e d , th e ju d g m e n t

122

Intentionality and Semiotics

(“ipsam ap p a re n tia m realis en d s a td n g ere, sed n o n d iscern ere in te r id, q u o d rationis e t realitads est”:11! ‘to attain th e outw ard a p p e a ra n c e o f real being, b u t n o t to d iscern w ithin th a t a p p ea r­ an ce w hat belongs to objectivity alo n e a n d w hat belongs to th e subjectivity o r intersubjectivity o b jectified ’ — like th e m ove­ m e n t o f th e sun a ro u n d th e earth , w hich any anim al can p er­ ceive a n d h u m a n anim als observe!). O nly th ro u g h su b se q u en t in tellectu al co m p ariso n s unavail­ able to b ru te an im als13 d o we realize th a t “n o n o m n e ens est w ould b e im p e rfe ct. B ut if G od w ere to ju d g e to b e an en titativ e re la tio n th a t w hich is a p p r e h e n d e d as p a tte rn e d afte r an en d tativ e rela tio n , w h en it is n o t a n entitativ e rela tio n , th e ju d g m e n t w ould be false.” 12 P o in so t 1632a: TDS First P ream b le “O n M in d -D ep e n d en t B ein g ”, A rti­ cle 3 “By W h a t Pow eres a n d T h ro u g h W hich Acts D o M in d -D ep e n d en t B eings C om e A b o u t”, 6 7 /6 - 9 (= 1632: “P er q u am p o te n tia m e t p e r q u o s actus fian t e n tia ra tio n is”, 3 0 1 b45-47). 13 P oin so t 1632a: loc. cit. 6 7 /2 0 - 6 8 /1 7 (= 1632: 3 0 2 a ll-3 4 ): “sensus in te rn u s n o n p o te st ferri in aliquid nisi sub ratio n e sensibilis; q u o d au tem id, q u o d sibi re p ra e se n ta tu r u t sensibile, o p p o n a tu r e n d reali, ad ipsum n o n p e rtin e t iudicare, q u ia n o n co n cip it ens sub ratione ends. Q u o d au tem aliq u id accip iatu r ta m q u am ens fictum , form aliter consistit in hoc, q u o d co g n o scatu r n ih il entitatis h a b e re in re, e t tam en ad instar entis attingi; alioquin n o n d isc ern itu r in te r ens reale e t ens fictum , sed solum attin g itu r illud, ad cuius in star fo rm a tu r ens rationis. Q u o d q u a n d o est aliquid sensibile, n o n re p u g n a t a sensu cognosci, sed ad sensum solum p e rtin e t id, q u o d in illo d e sensibilitate est attin g ere, habitud in e m vero ad n o n ens, cuius loco su b ro g atu r e t u n d e ficte h a b e t esse, a d sensum n o n p ertin et, e t id eo ens fictum sub form ali ratio n e ficti ab e n to vero n o n d isc ern it.” — “in te rn al sense c a n n o t refer to an y th in g ex c ep t u n d e r a sensible rationale; b u t th e fact th a t th a t w hich is rep rese n ted to it as sensible h a p p e n s to be o p p o se d to physical being, does n o t p erta in to in te rn a l sense to ju d g e , because in te rn a l sense does n o t conceive o f b ein g u n d e r th e ratio n ale o f being. T h e fact, however, o f an y th in g ’s b eing reg a rd e d as a co n stru c te d o r Active b e­ in g form ally consists in this, th a t it is know n to have n o th in g o f entitative reality in th e physical w orld, a n d yet is attain ed o r g rasp ed o n th e p a tte rn o f a physical entity; otherw ise, n o d iscrim ination is m ade betw een m in d -in d e p e n d e n t b ein g a n d c o n stru c te d o r Active being, b u t only th a t is attain ed o n w hose p a tte rn a m in d -d e p e n d e n t b ein g is form ed. W hen this o b ject is so m e th in g sensible, th e re is n o reason why it c a n n o t be know n by sense. B ut sense attains only th a t w hich is sensible in an object, w hereas th e co n d itio n relative to th e n o n -b ein g in w hose place th e o bject is su rro g ated a n d w hence it Actively has being, does n o t p e rta in to sense. F or this reason, sense does n o t d ifferen tiate a co n stru c te d being, u n d e r th e form al ratio n ale o f b ein g a construct, fro m a tru e b ein g .”

C hapter 8. The Role o f Relation in the Order o f Being

123

reale”, so to speak (“n o t everything objective is really p a rt o f th e physical su rro u n d in g s”), a n d realize at th e sam e tim e th a t som e o f w hat we take to be “re a l” may have ra th e r a Active o r purely objective character, a n d in any ev en t th a t th e w orld o f objects as in te rp re te d on th e basis o f th e real relatio n s b etw een p ro p e r a n d co m m o n sensibles d e p e n d s o n a w eb w hose p a tte rn a n d fabric includes th read s o f relatio n sh ip s w hich definitely b e lo n g to ens rationis as well as w hatever th rea d s tie us to ens reale a n d relationes reales. O nly those aspects o f b ein g w hich have m o re th a n an objective existence, th e n , co n stitu te th e o r d e r o f ens reale, a n d these are w hat A ristotle a tte m p te d to e n u m e ra te w ith his schem e o f categories. If we w ant to fo re g ro u n d fro m th e first th e singularity o f relatio n , th e follow ing way o f p o rtray in g th e essential list o f categories so far as co n cern s th e irred u cibly distinct types o r kinds o r m odalities o f ens reale will serve us m u c h b e tte r th a n th e trad itio n al ap p ro ach : “ it s e l f

(substance)

- a n o th e r

(inherent accidents)

r inB e in g

-

as able to exist L- to w a r d a n o th e r

(relation)

D iagram 2. The Basic Scheme of the Categories of Aristotle Foregrounding

the Singularity of Relation: “Esse In ”vs. “Esse A d ” T his portrayal has a twofold advantage over th e c o m m o n “s u b sta n c e /a c c id e n t” start-off. First o f all, it hig h lig h ts a t th e o u tse t th e u n iq u en ess o f relatio n vis-a-vis each a n d all o f th e o th e r n in e categ o ries.14 A nd secondly, it provides us w ith occa­ sion to rem a rk rig h t o ff that, while eig h t o f th e te n categories a d m it o f d ire c t p erce p tu al indicatio n , substance an d relatio n at 14 Actually, if th e schem e o f the trad itio n al ten categories is ex a m in e d in d e ­ tail from this p o in t o f view, it tu rn s o u t th a t fo u r o f th e ten categories — w hen, w h ere, p o stu re, a n d vestition — p resu p p o se relation, a n d only five fully qualify as inesse— substance, quantity, quality, action, an d passion; th o u g h even this m akes clea re r th a n in the trad itio n al p rese n tatio n ju s t how singularly distinc­ tive rela tio n really is w ithin th e schem e. See Deely 2001: 7 4 - 78, esp. 77.

124

Intentionality and Semiotics

th e two extrem es (ens realissimum an d ens minimum) can directly only be understood, n o t directly p erceptually illustrated. You can­ n o t p o in t to a substance th e way th a t you can to a size o r a place, n o r can you p o in t to a relation; b u t only to things th a t you claim to be substances, o r to things th a t are related. B ut substance in its p ro p e r n o tio n a n d relatio n in its p ro p e r n o tio n is, each of them , available only to th e u n d erstan d in g , n o t to th e d irect p er­ cep tio n o f sense. T h e im p o rtan ce o f this observation will grow in th e following pages, b u t may be an ticip ated in th e following rem a rk by th en -C ard in al R atzinger:15 “th e un d iv id ed sway o f th in k in g in term s o f substance is en d ed ; relatio n is discovered as an equally valid p rim o rd ial m o d e o f reality” . For th e m o m en t, I w ant to call your attention to the observa­ tion o f St T h o m as16 th a t “solum in his, quae sunt ad aliquid, inven iu n tu r aliqua secu n d u m rem et aliqua secundum ratio n em ”, i.e., th a t p u re relations are singular in having a positive structure o r ‘essence’ th a t is in d ifferen t to th e difference betw een wdiat exists in d e p en d en tly o f an d w hat exists d ependently u p o n thought. This cryptic observation on T h o m as’ p a rt proved to be th e source o f m any c o n u n d ru m s am o n g th e later co m m en tato rs, as P o in so t testifies an d am ply illustrates in reco u n tin g th e history o f th e discussion.17 B ut h e re we can be c o n te n t with co n sid erin g only th e o u tco m e o f th e lo n g discussions, which is this. W hen o n e th in g is rela ted to another, th e relation itself is in n e ith e r o n e o f th em , b u t between th e two things, linking th em on th e ba­ sis o f o n e o r a n o th e r o f th e ir subjective characteristics — size, shape, position, etc. Thus, A is “larg er th a n ” B o n the basis o f th e size intrinsic to o r in h e re n t in A an d th e size similarly “in ” B. N ote th a t fo r A to be larg er th an B, however, b o th A a n d B m ust exist. If e ith e r o n e ceases to exist, so does th e relation betw een them . L et us say B is destroyed. A’s size is unaffected 15 R atzinger 1970: 132. 16 A quinas c.1266: Summa theologiae 1.28.1c. 17 P oinsot 1632: 5 8 0 a3 0 -5 8 2 a l6 (= TDS, Second Pream ble, A rticle 2, 9 3 /1 6 - 9 6 /3 6 “R esolution o f C ounter-A rgum en ts”).

C hapter 8. The Role of Relation in the Order of Being

125

by this d estructio n , yet the relation “larger th a n ” based on th at size is affected, for it ceases to be. For th e relation, th en , th ree things are necessary: 1. th e two things, ‘substances’ o r subjects o f existence, let us say, real individuals; 2. th e characteristic on th e basis o f which they are related, a subjective characteristic existing separately in each o f them ; 3. th e relation itself which is d e p e n d e n t u p o n w hat is subjective o r intrinsic to A an d B b u t w hich itself is in n e ith e r o f th em b u t between th e two. T h e characteristic u p o n which a relatio n is based is also called its “fo u n d a tio n ” o r “fu n d a m e n t”. N otice th a t this in h e r­ e n t o r subjective characteristic (esse in) is so m eth in g w ithout w hich the relatio n could n o t exist, so m eth in g u p o n w hich th e relation d ep en d s fo r its existence; an d yet, w ithout B, th e size o f A could n o t give rise to th e relation “larg er th a n B”, even th o u g h it is th e very sam e size th at A has before an d after th e d estru ctio n o f B. So th e fu n d am e n t in A is the cause o f a rela­ tion n o t accord in g to its being as in h e re n t to a substance sim ­ ply, b u t only in th e fu rth e r circum stance th at B actually exist; a n d in th a t case th e relation follows.18 b. T h e T e rm in u s o f R e la tio n s T he term inus o f the relation involves a subtlety equally strange and liable to go unnoticed. T h e two things in 1. above, 18 So P o insot rem arks (1632a: TDS S econd P ream b le “O n R e la tio n ”, A rti­ cle 2, 8 8 /1 8 -2 7 ; = 1632: 577b31-42): “E tlic e ta d o m n e m e n tita te m e tfo r m a m re q u ira tu r causa, specialiter tam en ad relatio n em d ic itu r re q u iri fu n d a m e n tum , qu ia aliae form ae solum re q u iru n t causam , u t p ro d u c a n tu r in esse e t existant, relatio au tem p ro p te r suam m inim am en tita tem et q u ia ex p ro p rio co n c ep tu est ad aliud, req u irit fu n d a m e n tu m n o n solum u t existat, sed etiam u t sit capax existendi, id est u t sit entitas realis.” — “a lth o u g h fo r every en tity a n d form al characteristic a cause is necessary, yet in a special way a fo u n d a tio n is said to be necessary fo r a relation, because in h e re n t form s re q u ire a cause only in o rd e r to be p ro d u ce d in bein g an d exist, w hile a rela tio n , o n a c c o u n t o f its m inim al entitative ch a racter an d for the reaso n th a t a rela tio n in its p ro p e r co n c ep t is a respect tow ard an o th er, req u ires a fo u n d a tio n n o t only in o rd e r to exist, b u t even in o rd e r to be capable o f existing, th a t is to say, in o rd e r to be a m in d -in d e p en d e n t o r actual entity.”

126

Intentionality and Semiotics

in so far as they involve an actual relation, are correspective, b u t th e o n e as pro v en atin g th e relation (providing its fo u n d a tio n ), th e o th e r as term in atin g it. Take n o te o f this: even th o u g h o u r ex am p le involves a relation betw een two things subjective o r a b ­ solute in th e ir bein g as substances, an d m odified in th e ir subjec­ tivity by in h e re n t accidents, it is n o t as an “ab so lu te” th in g th a t B te rm in ates th e relatio n by which A is “larg er th a n B”, b u t only as and in the relation itself does B stand as term inus o f th e relation. A gain, let A be destroyed ra th e r th an B: th e size o f B is u n af­ fected by th e h ap p en stan ce, b u t th a t sam e size w hich formerly ter­ m in a te d th e relatio n no longer term inates it, so th a t we m u st say th a t a term in u s as term inus, even w hen it exists in d e p e n d e n tly o f th e relatio n as an in h e re n t accid en t o r subjective ch aracter­ istic o f an individual, yet d ep en d s q u a term inus o n th e b ein g o f th e relatio n sh ip itself ra th e r th an o n th e bein g o f th e substance it m odifies as an in h e re n t accident. Poinsot says, simply b u t em ­ phatically:19 “Ratio form alis term ini relativi, u t term in u s est, n o n p o test esse aliquid o m n in o absolutum et ad se” (“T h e form al rationale o f th e term inus o f a relation, as it is a term inus, can ­ n o t be anything entirely absolute an d in trin sic”), fo r th e reaso n th a t “term in u s relationis est aliquid relationis” (“th e term in u s o f a relation is an essential p a rt of, belongs essentially to, th e rela tio n ”), even th o u g h fo r th e relation to be in th e o rd e r o f ens reale the term inus does in d e ed have fu rth e r to b e “aliquid reale et inesse existens” (“so m eth in g m in d -in d ep en d e n t an d subjectively existing”) — a subjective characteristic in h e re n t in a subject. Now let us tu rn to th e case o f a m in d -d e p e n d e n t rela tio n . Like a m in d -in d e p e n d e n t o r “re a l” relatio n , a m in d -d e p e n d e n t relation o r relatio rationis sen fe ta is n o t in b u t between two, b u t the “two” in this case are objects a n d n o t necessarily things, a n d the “two” are n o t even necessarily d istin ct except in th o u g h t, as in the paradigm case o f th e “re la tio n ” o f self-identity, w here 19 Poinsot 1632: Q. 17 “O n th e C ategory o f R e la tio n ”, Art. 5 “U tru m relatio form aliter te rm in e tu r ad abso lu to m vel ad relativ u m ”, 595 -6 0 0 , esp. 5 9 6 a4 3 45 and 5 9 6 b l-3

C hapter 8. The Role of Relation in the Order o f Being

127

fo u n d atio n an d term inus are o n e an d the sam e as th in g b u t yet m odally distinct objectively as fo u n d atio n an d term inus. A rela­ tion could n o t exist u n d e r these co n d itio n s in the o rd e r o f ens reale, yet can an d does so exist in th e o rd e r o f ens rationis. “T h e reason for this d ifferen ce”, P oinsot explains:20 is that, in the case of mind-dependent relations, their actual existence consists in actually being cognized or formed objec­ tively, which is something that does not take its origin from the fundament and terminus, but from the understanding. Whence many things could be said of a subject by reason of a 20 P oinsot 1632: 303b8-42 (= Tractatus de Signis, First P ream b le, A rticle 3, 7 0 /2 4 - 7 1 /1 0 ) , h e re given in fu ller context: “... in relatio n ib u s ratio n is contin g it fieri d en o m in a tio n e m , etiam an teq u a m actu co g n o scatu r p e r co m p aratio n e m ipsa relatio, solum p e r hoc, q u o d p o n a tu r fu n d a m e n tu m . ... In q u o d iffe ru n t relatio n es rationis a realibus, q uia reales n o n d e n o m in a n t nisi existant. ... Cuius ratio est, q u ia in relationibus rationis esse actu ale ip sa ru m consistit in actu a lite r cognosci obiective, q u o d n o n p ro v en it ex fu n d a m e n to e t term in o , sed ex intellectu. U n d e m ulta p o te ru n t ratio n e fu n d a m e n ti dici d e su biecto sine resultantia relationis [exem pli gratia, os d inosauris, re p e rtu m a casu, n o n necessarie rec o g n o sce re tu r u t sic; posset e rra te co n sid eratu m u t lapidus, si sit fossiladum , etc.], q uia haec n o n se q u itu r ipsum fu n d a m e n tu m e t te rm in u m , sed cognitionem . In relationibus vero realibus cum relatio natura lite r resu ltet ex fu n d am e n to et term ino, nihil co n v en it ex vi fu n d a m e n ti in o rd in e ad te rm in u m nisi m ed ia rela tio n e .” — “W h en ce you can see th at, in th e case o f m in d -d e p e n d e n t relations, th e re com es a b o u t a d e n o m in a tio n even b efo re th e relatio n itself is know n in act th ro u g h a co m p ariso n , ow ing solely to this: th a t th e fu n d a m e n t is posited. ... In this m in d -d e p e n d e n t o r Active relations differ from m in d -in d e p e n d e n t o r physical relatio n s, because m in d -in d e p e n d e n t relations do n o t d en o m in ate unless they actually exist. ... The reason fo r this difference is that, in th e case o f m in d -d e p e n d e n t relations, th e ir actual existence consists in actually b ein g cognized objectively, w hich is so m e th in g th a t does n o t take its origin from th e fu n d a m e n t a n d term in u s, b u t from th e u n d ersta n d in g . W hence m any things co u ld be said o f a subject by reason o f a fu n d a m e n t w ithout th e resultance o f a relatio n [for ex am p le, th e d in o sa u r b o n e, on b ein g discovered, m ight n o t b e reco g n ized as a d in o ­ saur bo n e, b u t m istaken for a rock, if fossilized, etc.], because this d oes n o t follow u p o n th e fu n d a m e n t itself an d th e term inus, b u t u p o n co g n itio n . But in th e case o f physical relations, since th e relation naturally results fro m the fu n d a m e n t an d the term inus, n o th in g belongs in an o rd e r to a term in u s by v irtue o f a fu n d am e n t, ex cep t by th e m ed iu m o f a rela tio n .” For fu rth e r dis­ cussion o f this text, see Deely 2002: 114-115n5.

128

Intentionality and Semiotics

fu n d a m e n t w ithout the resistan ce o f a relation [for exam ple, th e d in o sau r bo n e, on being discovered, m ight n o t be recog­ nized as a d in o sau r bone, b u t m istaken for a rock, if fossilized, etc.], because this does n o t follow u p o n the fu n d a m e n t itself a n d th e term inus, b u t u p o n cognition. But in the case o f physi­ cal relations, since the relation naturally results from the fu n ­ d a m e n t a n d the term inus, n o th in g belongs in an o rd e r to a term in u s by virtue o f a fu n d am en t, except by the m ed iu m o f a relation.

So th e u n d e rsta n d in g (as also th e p e rc e p tio n o f objects, “p h a n ta sia ri”, as we have seen) is involved in objective relations, b u t these relations do n o t necessarily have term in i in th e o rd e r o f ens reale, although nothing in the being o f relation as such precludes there being termini in ens reale, and under certain conditions such a terminus is necessitated. P oinsot q u o tes an in trig u in g text n o t actually w ritten by St T hom as, b u t w hich P oinsot rightly construes as expressing au th en tically w hat th e th o u g h t o f T hom as in this m a tter requires us to co n ced e, a n d th e ju stice o f P o in so t’s read in g is m o re th a n v in dicated by th e com plex o f a u th en tic texts w hich su rro u n d his citation. In real­ ity, th e re can be one-sided relations. But in o u r th in k in g a b o u t o r aw areness o f such situations, h e observes,21 21 A nnibale D ’A nnibaldi c.1246, as cited in P oinsot 5 9 7 b8-13, c o n tin u in g in P o in so t’s words from 597M 3-19. H e re let m e cite th e L atin n o t only fo r th e English extract above, b u t also fo r th e su rro u n d in g c o n te x t o f th e ex­ tract, namely, P oinsot 1632: 597a41-598al3, w hich tex t is n o t p a rt o f th e p rin t ed itio n o f TDS, b u t was a d d e d as Z21 to the 1992 e n h a n c e d elec tro n ic e d i­ tion: “Dico secundo: Probabilius videtur, quod in relativis tertii ordinis non

datin' terminus formalis correlativus, sed solum fundamentaliter proxime. “Ita te rd a se n ten d a supra relata. Et deduci videtu r ex D. T h o m a, q u i saepe docet, q u o d cointelligitur oppositio in term inis istarum rela tio n u m p e r intellectum e t n o n in re, u t p a te t in 1. p. q. 13. art. 7., p raesertim ad 2. E t in 1. ad A nnibaldum dist. 30. art. 1. ad 3. dicit, ‘q u o d cuilibet relatio n i o p p o n itu r alia relado, quae q u an d o q u e est in re, ad quam relado term in atu r, q u a n d o q u e est in intellectu tantum , n o n sicut in relato, sed sicut in in tellig en te aliq u id sub ra d o n e ’. C onstat ergo ex D. T hom a, q u o d term in u s o p p o sid o n e m dicit reladvam, e t tam en n o n sem per est ista relad o in re te rm in an te, sed in intellectu, atque adeo n o n d a tu r term inus form aliter in re. — Et m anifeste d e d u c itu r ex

C hapter 8. The Role of Relation in the Order of Being

129

‘to each relation another relation is opposed, which some­ times is in the thing at which the relation terminates, but other times is in the cognition alone, not as in the related thing but as in the animal understanding [or perceiving] p ra e c e d e n ti conclusione, q uia form alis ratio term in i co n sisd t in o p p o sitio n e ad su u m correlativum ; haec au tem oppositio n o n in v e n itu r fo rm a lite r ex p ar­ te alterius extrem i, q uia n o n h a b e t rela tio n e m realem e t c o n s e q u e n te r n e q u e o p p o sitio n em relativam ; ergo n o n est fo rm a liter te rm in u s in re. “Q u o d vero fu n d a m e n ta lite r pro x im e sit term inu s, p ro b atu r, q u ia d en o m in a tu r ex trinsece tabs a relatio n e existente in altero ex trem o , sicut D eus d ic itu r d o m in u s ex rela tio n e servitutis ex istente in creatu ra, e t C hristus se c u n d u m D. T h o m a m 3. p. q. 35. art. 5. et in 3. dist. 8. d icitu r filius V irginis o b re la tio n e m m a tern ita tis existentem in V irgine. E t videri p o test in 1. dist. 40. q. 1. art. 1. ad 2., ubi inquit: ‘In relativis q u a n d o q u e d e n o m in a tu r aliq u id p e r id, q u o d in ipso est, sicut p a te r p atern ita te, q uae est in ipso; q u a n d o q u e au te m d e n o m i­ n a tu r eo, q u o d solum in altero est, sicut in illis, in q u o ru m alio est rela tio se­ cu n d u m rem e t in alio se cu n d u m ratio n em ta n tu m ’. Q u ae o m n ia f u n d a n tu r in dicto A ristotelis 5. M etaph. textu 20., q u o d saepe re p e tit S. T h o m as, q u o d m e n su ra b ile e t scibile d icitu r aliquid eo, q u o d aliquid d ic itu r ad ipsum , sicu t d ic itu r aliquid scibile, quia de eo d a tu r scientia. Facta au tem h ac d en o m in a tio n e p o test p roxim e in ilia fundari conceptus relatio n is o p p o sitae, q u a e im p o rta t fo rm alitatem term in i.” — “I say secondly: It seems more probable

that in relatives of the third order [i.e., in the case of the non-reciprocal rela­ tion of measured to measure] there is no correlative formal terminus, but only a terminus proximately correlative after the manner of a fundament.” “Such is the third o f the three opinions outlined above. A nd it seem s to be draw n from St. Thom as, who often teaches th at the reciprocal op p o sitio n in term s o f these relations is from the und erstan d in g a n d is n o t in th e things re­ lated, as is clear in the Summa theologica, I, q. 13, art. 7, especially in th e reply to objection 2. Also in the first book o f the Commentary Written fo r Annibald, dist. 30, art. 1, reply to the third objection, h e says, ‘th at to any relation w hatever th e re is opposed an o th e r relation, which som etim es is in th e th in g at w hich th e first relation term inated, som etim es is in the u n d erstan d in g only, n o t as in a related thing, h u t as in the u n derstanding o f som ething u n d e r th e aspect o f a relatio n .’ W hat is certain from this rem ark by St. T hom as is th at a term inus bespeaks a rel­ ative opposition, and yet n o t always is this relation in d ie term in atin g thing, b u t in the understanding, an d in such a case th ere is no term inus form ally existing in the tiling. — A nd this clearly follows from the p reced in g conclusion, because the form al character o f a term inus consists in the opposition to its correlative; b u t this opposition does n o t obtain formally o n the side o f th e o th e r extrem e, because it does n o t have a m ind-in d ep en d en t relation, a n d consequently n e ith e r a relative opposition; therefore th ere is n o t formally a term in u s in th e thing. “B ut th a t th e re is a term in u s in th e th in g proxim ately after th e m a n n e r o f a fu n d a m e n t, is proved by the fact th a t th e th in g is extrinsically d e n o m in a te d

130

Intentionality and Semiotics

s o m e t h i n g u n d e r a r e l a t i o n . ’ W h a t is c le a r, t h e n , ... is th a t a t e r m in u s b e s p e a k s a r e la tiv e o p p o s it io n , a n d y e t th is r e la ­ tio n is n o t in e v e ry c a s e in t h e t e r m i n a t i n g th in g , b u t s o m e ­ tim e s o n ly in t h e [ p e r c e p t i o n o r ] u n d e r s t a n d i n g , in w h ic h c a s e t h e r e is n o t g iv e n a te r m i n u s f o r m a lly in t h e o r d e r o f

ens reale.

c. Why Intersubjectivity Falls Short of the Being of Relation Go back to p. 123 D iagram 2, th e o rd e r o f ens reale exhaustive­ ly divided betw een inesse an d adesse. In this order, rela tio n seem s at first glance adequately to be described as “intersu b jectiv e”; because fo r any relatio n to exist in this o rd e r b o th fu n d a m e n t a n d term inus m ust actually exist subjectively, as accidents o f sub­ stances (subjective d eterm in atio n s o f individuals), follow ing th e d o ctrin e o f St T h o m as22 th a t “only so m eth in g in d e p e n d e n t o f th e soul pertain s to th e categories”, so that, as P o in so t p uts it,23 “th e first th in g th a t m ust be excluded from every category is

as fu n d a m e n t fo r a relation by the relation existing in th e o th e r ex tre m e, as G od, fo r exam ple, is called lo rd from the relatio n o f b ein g su b ject existing in creatures, o r as Christ, according to St. T hom as in th e Summa theologica III, q. 35, art. 5, a n d in his Commentary on the Sentences o f Peter Lombard, B ook 3, dist. 8, q u estio n 1, art. 5, is said to be the son o f Mary o n ac c o u n t o f th e rela tio n o f m atern ity existing in Mary. P ro o f o f th e thesis can also b e seen in B ook I o f St. T h o m a s’s Commentary on the Sentences o f Peter Lombard, dist. 40, q. 1, art. 1, reply to objectio n 2, w here h e says: ‘In the case o f relative things, som etim es so m e th in g is d e n o m in a te d by th a t w hich is in it, as a fa th e r by th e p atern ity w hich is in him ; b u t som etim es so m e th in g is d e n o m in a te d by th a t w hich is only in th e o ther, as in th e case o f those relatives in o n e o f w hich th e re is a relatio n acco rd in g to fact, a n d in th e o th e r o f w hich th e re is a relatio n ac co rd in g to th e u n d e rsta n d in g only.’ All o f w hich is based on th e saying o f A ristotle, in th e Metaphysics, Book 5, chap. 15 ( c.3 4 8 /4 7 bc 1021a29), w hich St. T h o m as o ften repeats, th a t som e­ th in g is called m easu rab le a n d know able from this, th a t so m e th in g is said rela­ tive to it, as so m e th in g is said to be know able because th e re is know ledge o f it. Given this d e n o m in a tio n , however, th e re can be fo u n d e d proxim ately on it the co n c ep t o f an o pposite relatio n , w hich im p o rts th e form ality o f a term in u s.” 22 A quinas c. 1 265/6: Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, Q. 7, art. 9. 23 P o in so t 1632: 500b36-501a2.

C hapter 8. The Role o f Relation in the Order o f Being

131

m in d -d ep en d en t b ein g ”. So relation as a category excludes Ac­ tive relations, relationes rationis, an d yet the positive essence o f any relation, realis o r rationis, rem ains the sam e in b o th cases: a “b ein g tow ard”, a “bein g betw een ”, a “resp ect”. This is n o t true w hen a Active being, an ens rationis, is fo rm ed on the p attern o f any type o f inesse, fo r the positive essence o f a substance is to be able to exist in itself, w hereas a Actional substance, like H am let o r S herlock H olm es, precisely does n o t have any existence in itself, n o inesse in th e sense o f subjective existence. T h e sam e fo r any in h e re n t accidents, th e subjective characterisdcs o f individuals: th e ir positive essence is to exist in a n o th e r as in a subject: yet Actional quantities o r qualities, like th e smile o f th e C heshire cat in W onderland o r the sh attered sh ap e o f H u m p ty Dumpty, precisely do n o t exist subjectively in an o th er. Ens rationis, Active being, is form ed on the pattern o f non-Active b e­ ing delivered originally via th e species impressae o f ex tern al sense a n d elab o rated in the species expressae o f p ercep tio n and, eventu­ ally, o f intellection as well (in the case o f rational an im als). So th e re are at b o tto m two variant p attern s fo r th e fo rm a­ tion o f entia rationis, namely, esse in an d esse ad. In th e Arst case, th e m in d -d e p e n d e n t o r Active being, th e ens rationis, will n o t be w hat its p a tte rn is, an d so is called by St T h o m as “a n eg a­ tio n ” — it is th e negative o f its positive p attern . In th e seco n d case, th e m in d -d ep en d en t o r Active being, th e ens rationis, will be w hat its p a tte rn also is, namely, a respect, a “b ein g tow ard”, a relation, an d so is called by St T hom as by th e sam e n am e as th e p attern , because w hat is fo rm ed duplicates th e positive essence o f th a t p attern : b o th p a tte rn an d p a tte rn e d after are relations. Poinsot sums up th e m a tter thus:24 24 Poinsot 1632: 581b30-582al6. TDS 9 6 /7 -3 6 : “n o n d icitu r ens rationis illud, ad cuius instar form atur; fo rm a tu r enim ens rad o n is ad instar ends realis, sed dicitur ens radonis illud n o n reale, q u o d ad instar realis ends concipitur. N on d atu r ergo substantia rationis nec quantitas radonis, q uia licet aliquod n o n ens concipiatur ad instar substantiae, v. g. chim aera, et aliquid ad instar q u andtads, v. g. spadum im aginarium , n o n tam en ipsa substantia vel aliqua substantiae rauo concipitur p e r ra d o n e m e t fo rm atu r in esse ad instar alterius

132

Intentionality and Semiotics

th a t o n whose p attern a m in d -d ep e n d en t being is form ed is n o t called m in d -d ep en d en t; for m in d -d ep en d en t being is fo rm e d on the p a tte rn o f m in d -in d ep en d e n t being, b u t th at u n re a l b ein g which is conceived on the p attern o f a m ind-ind e p e n d e n t b ein g is called a m in d -d ep e n d en t being. T h ere is n o t th ere fo re m in d -d ep e n d en t substance n o r m ind-depend e n t quantity, because even th o u g h som e non-being may be conceived on the p a tte rn o f a substance — for exam ple, the c h im era — a n d som e on th e p attern o f quantity — fo r ex­ am ple, im aginary space — yet n eith e r substance itself n o r any ra tio n ale o f subjectivity is conceived by the u n d ersta n d in g an d fo rm e d in bein g o n the p attern o f som e o th e r m in d -in d ep en ­ d e n t being. A nd for this reason th at negation o r chim erical n o n -b ein g a n d th at non-being o f an im aginary space will be said to be a m in d -d ep e n d en t being. But this [i.e., any u n real o b ject w hatever conceived as being a subject o r a subjective m odification o f being] is the m in d -d ep e n d en t bein g which is called negation, yet it will n o t be a m in d -d ep e n d en t sub­ stance, because substance itself is n o t conceived as a m ind-de­ p e n d e n t being p attern ed after som e m in d -in d ep en d e n t be­ ing — rather, negations o r non-beings are conceived on th e p attern o f substance and quantity. But in the case o f relatives, ind eed , n o t only is th ere som e non-being conceived o n th e p attern o f relation, b u t also the very relation conceived on the p a rt o f the respect toward, while it does n o t exist in th e m indin d e p e n d e n t order, is conceived o r fo rm ed on the p a tte rn o f a m in d -in d ep en d en t relation, an d so th at w hich is fo rm e d in b e­ ing, an d n o t only th at after whose p attern it is form ed, is a rela­ tion; an d by reason o f this th ere are in fact m in d -d e p e n d e n t

ends realis. Et ideo ilia negatio seu n o n ens chim aerae, e t illud n o n en s spatii im aginarii d icetur ens radonis. Sed hoc est ens radonis, q u o d v o catu r n eg a u o , n o n autem erit substantia radonis, cum n o n ipsa substantia lit en s rad o n is ad instar alicuius realis concipiatur, sed n egadones seu n o n e n d a ad in star substanuae e t quandtads. At vero in reladvis n o n solum aliq u o d n o n ens co n c ip itu r ad instar relationis, sed etiam ipsa relatio ex p arte respectus ad, cu m n o n ex isd t in re, concipitur seu form atu r ad instar relauonis realis, et sic est, q u o d fo rm a tu r in esse, et non solum id, ad cuius instar form atur, e t ra d o n e h u iu s d a tu r rela d o radonis, n on substantia radonis [nec alia accidentia realia q u am re la d o ].”

C hapter 8. The Role o f Relation in the Order of Being

133

r e la tio n s , b u t n o t m i n d - d e p e n d e n t s u b s ta n c e s [ n o r m in d - d e ­ p e n d e n t a c c id e n ts o t h e r th a n r e l a t i o n ] .

d. Relation as the Positive Essence of All Ens Rationis Now we have to carry the arg u m en t o n e m ore step. If the o rd er o f ens reale is exhaustively divided into esse in an d esse ad, then m ind-indep en d en t reality consists o f individuals (substan­ ces) with their subjective characteristics (in h e re n t accidents) an d relations (intersubjective accidents) betw een an d am o n g these individuals consequent upon th eir (subjective) characteristics an d interactions; b u t the o rd er o f ens rationis consists exclusively o f rela­ tions. Because no m in d -d ep en d en t being has inesse, every m indd ep e n d e n t being — “negations” an d “relations” alike — con­ sists essentially in a being-patterned-after, an d o th e r th a n inesse there is only adesse, albeit ones th at im itate subjective b ein g while themselves being b u t patterns o f relations (like D racula) as well as ones th at im itate intersubjective being n o t necessarily by b e­ ing themselves intersubjective (though som etim es they are) b u t rath e r by being always themselves suprasubjective, w hich is w hat being intersubjective essentially presupposes: suprasubjectivity. C onsider the case o f a p a re n t whose child has d ied. Is th a t p erso n still a p arent? Obviously in one sense not. A nd yet th e re ­ lation to the child w hich u n d e r previous circum stances was real continues u n d e r p resen t circum stances as m in d -d e p e n d e n t. M any interestin g exam ples o f this p o in t can be given — th e child m istaken ab o u t who th e fath e r is; th e “fa th e r” m istaken ab o u t whose the child is — b u t th e p o in t is th a t while som e relations exist physically in n atu re , yet are wholly unknow n, an d o th e r relations exist wholly in th o u g h t a n d could n o t exist outside th o u g h t (like logical o r gram m atical relatio n s), in be­ tween these extrem es o f relations purely physical a n d relations purely objective are m any relations w hich are b o th physical an d objective u n d e r o n e set o f circum stances th a t b eco m e purely objective o r purely physical u n d e r a n o th e r set o f circum stances.

134

Intentionality and Semiotics

T he p o in t is th a t th e re is n o th in g in th e positive stru ctu re o r es­ sence o f relation w hich d eterm in es w h eth er any given relation as suprasubjective belongs to th e physical o rd e r o r th e objective order, b u t only su rro u n d in g circum stances extern al to the rela­ tion in its p ro p e r b ein g d e te rm in e this. This is th e final m ean in g o f St T h o m as’ observation th at only in th e case o f relatio n do we find b o th so m eth in g o f n atu re a n d so m eth in g o f th o u g h t, to wit, because only relatio n can pass back a n d fo rth , simply by reason o f ch an g in g circum stances, betw een th e o rd ers o f m in d -d ep en d en t an d m in d -in d e p e n d e n t b ein g with its positive c o n te n t o r stru ctu re u n ch an g e d . H ere we have th e answ er to th e p ro fo u n d q u estion po sed by H ei­ d eg g er resp ectin g th e trad itio n al defin itio n o f tru th as th e cor­ re sp o n d e n c e o f th o u g h t with thing: Yes, b u t how is such a cor­ re sp o n d e n c e possible? W hat is th e basis o f th e p rio r possibility o f corresp o n d en ce? H ere we have th e answer: co rresp o n d en ce is possible because th o u g h t consists essentially in th e fo rm atio n o f relations, a n d it is o f th e n atu re o f relations to be able to exist acco rd in g to th e ir p ro p e r bein g in th o u g h t an d in n a tu re indifferendy! W hen a p attern o f relations is ju d g e d to be th e way it actually is in th e o rd e r o f ens reale, th e n th a t objective p a tte rn places us in th e tru th , otherwise in error. N otice th a t o u r recognition o f things in everyday life is p re ­ cisely by th e ir m anifesting a relational p a tte rn th a t co rresp o n d s to w hat o u r th o u g h t makes us anticipate. W hen we are looking for som eone a n d know th a t person, as soon as they com e in to view we recognize them for who they are — an d if we prove to be m istaken (“O h, excuse me. I th o u g h t you w ere A ugusto. You look ju s t like h im .”) it is because th e objective b ein g m istakenly identified with a subjectivity th a t has e n te re d o u r p erce p tu al awareness has n o t only m ore to its bein g th a n first ap p ea red , b u t has this ‘m o re ’ otherw ise th an o u r ex p erien ce o f reco g n i­ tion led us to believe. But h ere we see as well the inadequacy o f th e term “intersubjective” to cap tu re th e essence o f relatio n as it transcends

C hapter 8. The Role o f Relation in the Order o f Being

135

th e distinction betw een relations o f reason an d real relations: for a relation to be intersubjective, it m ust obtain betw een two really existing subjects. But often a relation obtains betw een two objects n e ith e r o f which exists, o r betw een a th in k er an d som e object o th e r th an th e o n e existing before him m istakenly identified. Yet in language, for exam ple, such relations can com ­ m u n icate nonetheless. So w hat we m ust say is th a t the positive essence o f relations in every case is to be a suprasubjective m ode o f being, w hich in som e cases (b u t n o t in all) proves to be in­ tersubjective as well. To express the n o tio n th a t relations are in every case suprasubjective an d can be e ith er ens rationis o r ens reale according to circum stances, th e Latins took over from B oethius an expression he originally co in ed to designate only th e catego­ ry o f relatio n ,25 namely, relatio secundum esse, “relatio n acco rd in g to th e way relatio n singularly has b ein g ”, o r ontological relation. P arallel w ith this d ev elo p m en t, in th e la ter L atin w orld a seco n d te rm in o lo g ical evolution took place th a t revolutionizes th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f categories in th e A ristotelian sense — o r will revolutionize it, if this arcan e evolution ever reach es th e p o in t w here it is generally u n d e rsto o d , w hich is still fa r fro m th e case today. A ccidents (in h e re n t accidents especially) have to be u n d e rs to o d relative to substance. Yet even su b stan ce re ­ q u ires to be u n d e rsto o d n o t m erely in term s o f a co m p o sitio n o f m a tte r a n d fo rm an d existence, o r fo rm a n d ex isten ce if th e re be angels, b u t also in term s o f so m eth in g m o re , so m e­ th in g w hich is n o t th e substance itself in q u estio n . Take any p a rtic u la r m aterial substance: it re q u ire s a ran g e o f e n v iro n m en ta l co n d itio n s b ey o n d w hich it c a n n o t c o n tin u e to be. In biological term s, th e id ea o f an o rg an ism is in se p a ra ­ ble fro m th e id ea o f an en v iro n m en t. N o b e in g can b e u n d e r ­ stood w ith o u t th e o n e w ho u n d e rsta n d s it m ak in g re fe re n c e to a n d b rin g in g in to th e a c c o u n t m any factors a n d circu m stan ces w hich are plainly n o t p a rt o f th e physical subjectivity o f th e

25 F or details, see Deely 2001: 226-231.

136

Intentionality and Semiotics

individual b ein g we are seeking to u n d erstan d . A fish is n o t wa­ ter, b u t n e ith e r can a fish be u n d e rsto o d outside a relatio n to water. T his re q u ire m e n t th a t every finite b ein g in o rd e r to be u n d e rs to o d req u ires b ein g re fe rre d in th o u g h t to m any o th e r things w hich th e individual in q u estio n subjectively is n o t b u t c a n n o t e ith e r be (now o r previously) o r be u n d e rsto o d w ith­ out, th e la te r Latins called (a n o th e r expression tak en from B oethius) relativum secundum did, “relatio n a cc o rd in g to th e way b ein g m u st be expressed in d isco u rse”, o r transcendental relation, because relativity in this secundum d id sense applies to all th e categories o f esse in. Thus, ju s t as th e traditional distinction betw een inesse an d adesse exclusively an d exhaustively divides the o rd e r o f ens reale, so this later Latin distinction (as Poinsot draws it) betw een rela­ tivum secundum did an d relativum secundum esse exhaustively an d exclusively divides th e prospective ens primum cognitum co n cep t — th e co n cep t which initiates an d perm eates th ro u g h o u t the species-specific awareness o f the objective w orld as distinctive o f h u m a n anim als — in a way which foregrounds (in co n trast with th e ens reale/ens rationis distinction, which ra th e r backgrounds) relation as providing the com m on tie which unifies th e “m any ways in which being can be said” insofar as bein g constitutes an objective whole irreducible to ens reale. Precisely h e re 1 P oinsot finds the stan d p o in t which alone suits the d ev elo p m en t o f th e doctrine o f signs “as it includes equally the natu ral an d th e social sign”, an d so transcends the m o d ern oppositional fram ew ork o f “realism vs. idealism ”.

26 P oinsot 1632a, Tractatus de Signis, Book I, Q u estio n 1, 1 1 7 /1 8 -1 1 8 /1 8 , esp. 1 1 7 /2 8 -1 1 8 /9 (= 1632: 646M 6-45, 646b25-36); centrally cited o n p. 161 below in n o te 5.

C h ap ter 9

Revolutionizing the Understanding of Subjectivity as E n s A b s o lu tu m

W ith this division betw een being relative secundum e ith e r esse o r did, then, we have a new tool for th e in te rp re ta tio n o f fi­ nite being th a t is exclusive an d exhaustive, as may be seen from a correlation with diagram 2, p. 123 above, thus: itself: substance

in: Subjectivity

_ a n o th e r: accident J

Being -

I- transcendental ~i Relatives -Being

mind independent ~ - ontological J relatives

*- toward (or relation): Suprasubjectivity _ mind-dependent

-1

D ia g ra m 3. Schema o f B ein g as D ivided through T ranscendental a n d O ntological R ela tio n

As com pared with the traditional p resen ta tio n o f A risto tle’s categorial schem e, this new presen tatio n , w ith o u t ad d in g to o r changing the c o n ten t on the side o f t o ov o r ens reale, yet has a n u m b e r o f advantages, first an d forem ost o f w hich is th a t it does n o t leave o u t th e elem en t o f objective being, th e single m ost im ­ p o rta n t elem en t for u n d erstan d in g the n atu re o f ex p erien ce as able to su p p o rt real an d un real relations equally in th e consti­ tution o f w hat is ex p erien ced (real an d u n real objects, natu ral 137

138

Intentionality and Semiotics

a n d social co n stru tio n s, etc.), and for u n d erstan d in g how the ability to cognize objects u n real respecting th e strict o rd e r o f ens reale is essential to a finite intelligence d e p e n d e n t u p o n dis­ co u rse a n d investigation fo r arriving at tru th in any area. Secondly, a n d o f alm ost equal advantage, this new presenta­ tion qualifies from th e start the n o tio n o f substance as ens absolutum as an absolutum relativum, n o t an absolutum absolutum, which last is an idea applicable (veridically) to G od alo n e.1 In m o d ern biology, th e d e p e n d e n c e o f organism u p o n en v iro n m en t is a co m m o n p lace, such th at in tru th a given organism has n o chance o f b ein g u n d e rsto o d by any in q u irer who refuses to consider the en v iro n m en t w hich is n o t th at organism b u t u p o n w hich th a t organism d ep en d s an d w ithout which the organism in question could never have com e to be in the first place n o r co n tin u e to be in th e presen t. W hat is this, except an o th e r way o f saying th a t the organism is transcendentally relative to environm ental factors w hich the organism itself em phatically is not? W hen St T hom as says12 th a t “nihil potest esse m edium in ter substantiam e t accidens, quia div id u n tu r secundum affirm ationem e t neg atio n em , scilicet secun d u m esse in subjecto et n o n esse in subjecto”, th e expression th at requires exegesis (and norm ally does n o t receive it) is the m ean in g o f “n o n esse in subjecto” (o r “esse in se e t n o n in alio sicut in subjecto", for the en v iro n m en t is n o t an individual su b ject— the only sort o f “in subjecto” th a t A quinas is ru lin g o u t for substance; b u t the env iro n m en t is an in teractin g collection o f subjects am ong which any given individual substance is o n e an d u p o n which interacting whole th at individual substance d ep en d s in its being, as A quinas well u n d e rsto o d ). F or it is this “n o n esse 1 T h o u g h K ant fam ously (see text at n o te 3 follow ing) c o n sid e re d it to apply to all substance, as did som e m isguided m edievals — a n d la te r th o se “realists” who co nsider the potentiality o f m a tte r as p e rta in in g n o m o re to “es­ sences” in the m aterial universe th an to those o f angels in th e sp iritu al w orld. 2 A quinas c.1266: Summa theologiae 1.77.1 ad 5: “th e re can be n o m e d iu m betw een substance a n d accident; because they a re d iv id ed by affirm atio n an d negation, th a t is, ac co rd in g to existence in a su b ject, a n d n o n -ex isten c e in a subject.”

C hapter 9. Revolutionizing the Understanding o f Subjectivity

139

in su b jecto ” way o f expressing substance w ithout qualification as to its d e p e n d e n c y on bein g in (“esse in") an en v ironm ental niche th a t led to th e m o d e rn d ead -en d n o tio n o f substance as an abso­ lutely in d e p e n d e n t (an d ultim ately unknow able) substrate, such as K ant, by 1747, cam e to en u n ciate:3 Since every self-sufficient being contains within itself the com­ plete source of all its determinations, it is not necessary for its existence that it stand in relation to other things. Substances can therefore exist, and yet have no outer relation to things, nor stand in any actual connection with them. By contrast, in St T hom as an d P oinsot (which is to say in th e L atin T hom istic line over th e last three-and-one-half cen tu ries o f th e “m iddle ages”, so com m only neglected in th e stan d ard histories o f philosophy, in cluding th a t o f Gilson w ho h ad n o use fo r th e Latin dev elo p m en t o f Thom ism , as it tu rn e d o u t), th e n o ­ tion o f substance as “absoluta’’ (“ens absolutum j does n o t have th e m o d e m English co n n o tatio n o f “absolute”, b u t ra th e r th e sense o f “so m eth in g having its b oundaries as an existing individual”, separate from o th e r individuals b u t n o t “absolutely in d e p e n ­ d e n t” o f its surroundings. T h e n o tio n o f substance as “ab so lu ta”, th e n , am o n g th e Latin Thom istic thinkers — a subjectivity able to m aintain itself according to an in tern al identity, separate from th e rest o f th e physical universe, b u t n o t separated from th a t u n i­ verse, an d in d e e d dependent upon specific parts o f th e universe external to its body in o rd e r to m aintain its in tern al identity over 3 K ant 1747: Thoughts on the True Estimation o f L iving Forces, p. 8. T his was K an t’s first p u b lish ed work. It is w orth n o tin g th a t in this early work, w ith th e n o tio n o f substance cu t loose from all referen c e to ex p e rien c e, K ant is ab le to deduce from Aw n o tio n o f th e individual substance conclu sio n s w hich A ristotle only abduced (o r hypothesized) o f th e physical universe o r “w o rld ” as a w hole — such as th a t it has n o “p la c e ” w here it exists (n o “ubi circumscriptivum”, in th e categorial p arla n ce o f th e L atin scholastics), a n d “o th e r p ro p o sitio n s, w hich are n o t less rem ark ab le, an d w hich c a p tu re th e u n d e rsta n d in g so to speak against its own will”. (It w ould be h a rd to find a b e tte r capsule sum m ary o f classical m o d e rn p h ilosophy th a n this n o tio n o f “rem a rk a b le p ro p o sitio n s ca p tu rin g th e u n d e rsta n d in g against its will”.)

140

Intentionality and Semiotics

tim e (and only for a tim e) — is a notion as com patible with the m o d ern no tio n o f organism in biology as the m odern concep­ tion o f substance as a self-sufficient substrate underlying b u t un­ affected by interaction is incom patible. T he substance that Aquinas and Poinsot understand from Aristotle, above and before all else, needs to be understood as a unified center o f action and interaction which is n o t a “p art” o f a larger whole in the sense o f a whole unified by a single intrinsic principle (such as substantial form is posited to be, an unurn per se o r “fun­ dam ental natural u n it”, as Ashley likes to p u t it), b u t is yet indeed a “part” of a larger whole in the sense o f an ecosphere constituted by m any distinct forms o f life and sustained by their interactions, apart from which neith er the individual forms o f life n o r the eco­ sphere as a whole would long endure. Precisely this is the u n d er­ standing o f inesse enunciated by Boethius and taken u p by Aquinas and Poinsot as relativum, indeed, n o t secundum esse, b u t yet secun­ dum did, in the senses o f these term s explained in chapter 8. If we w ant to brin g G od into the picture, two divisions occur to m e as perh ap s useful to clarify th e overall situation: Being

I----------------------------

absolute absolutely absolute GOD

Persons in the Godhead

absolutely relative RELATIONS I

1

relative

relatively relative INHERENT ACCIDENTS

relatively absolute SUBSTANCES

founded in physical subjectivity: relation es

founded in psychological subjectivity: reales |--------- 1-------- 1 sometimes relation es sometimes relatio n es reales

ra tio n is

d e p e n d in g upon varying circum stances b u t always te rm in a tin g suprasubjectively

D ia g r a m 4 . B ein g D ivided between Absolute a n d R elative

C hapter 9. Revolutionizing the Understanding of Subjectivity

141

Or, p erh ap s better: Being absolutely relative (suprasubjective): RELATION (subsistent in God; dependent upon accidents in finite being)

relatively absolute (subjective): SUBSTANCE respecting the surroundings

absolutely absolute GOD INHERENT ACCIDENTS respecting substance

Diagram 5. An Alternative View of Relative vs. Absolute Being

H ere it is useful to b ear in m ind that, according to A ugustine and Aquinas, the being o f G od which is ‘absolutely absolute’ re­ specting the universe o f finite existents is, internally, ‘absolutely relative’ in the com m unity o f the three divine Persons. T h at is an interesting, indeed, a fascinating, idea, and one th at no d o u b t has u n en d in g ram ifications for the theological u n d erstan d in g o f semiosis; b u t it takes us far beyond o u r present p o in t o f concern. P oinsot explains the p resen t p o in t o f co n cern th u s:4 “th e difference betw een substance an d accident is u n d ersto o d from th e d ifferen t o rd e r an d m a n n e r in w hich each m aintains an existence outside o f causes, because an accident m aintains exis­ te n ce d e p e n d e n t u p o n in h e rin g in an individual [which is tru e even o f relation as ens reale, if we consider its n e e d fo r a fu n d a­ m en t] , while a substance m aintains existence w ithout that k in d o f d e p e n d e n c y ”, w hich is n o t to say free o f any d ep en d e n cy whatever. For th e individual co ntinues in existence only so long as it m aintains its species-specific in teractio n with th e en v iro n ­ m e n t (such as b reath in g in the case o f land anim als, ingestion an d digestion for all anim als, an d so fo rth ). C o n tra st this la te r L atin n o tio n o f su b stan ce (as a tran scen d en tally relative c e n te r o f unity a n d actio n w hich, th ro u g h its 4 P oinsot 1632: 526a31-37: “differen tia substantiae e t accidentis su m itu r ex diverso o rd in e e t m odo, quo p etit existere ex tra causas, q u ia accidens existe re p e tit cum d e p e n d e n tia in h a eren tiae , substantia sine tali d e p e n d e n tia ”.

142

Intentionality and Semiotics

activities, struggles a n d m u st co n tin u ally struggle so to d o m i­ n a te b o th th e in te rn a l systemic re q u ire m e n ts a n d th e e x te rn ­ al e n v iro n m e n ta l stru c tu re s as to m a in tain itself in existence) w ith th e m o d e rn o u tc o m e o f th e line o f in te rp re tin g sub­ stan ce as ens absolutum. W hen th e R ationalists afte r D escartes, a n d th e E m piricists fro m Locke on, ch allen g e th e n o tio n o f su b stan ce, it is n o t th e n o tio n o f su b stan ce as tran sce n d en tally relative b u t th e c o n c e p tio n o f su bstan ce as “a b so lu te ” with w hich they do b attle, a n o tio n o f su b stan ce fro m w hich rela­ tivity has b e e n totally ab stracted , leaving th e “s u b stra te ” able to exist only in a ra tio n a list’s d ream , b u t m an ifestin g itself in th e sobriety o f w aking h o u rs exactly as P eirce d escrib ed : a “m e an in g less su rp lu sag e”.5 M any w ould-be ‘p o stm o d e rn s’ have tried to arg u e th a t rela­ tions are all an d substances th e useless surplus. F or anyone w ho u n d e rsta n d s A quinas (or, fo r th a t m atter, A ristotle), however, it is n o t substance th a t is superfluous — n o t at all. T h e “things in them selves” are n o t th e problem , fo r th e re c a n n o t be m any w ithout th e re b ein g ones, as A ristotle n o te d .6 T h e attach in g o f th e qualifier “unknow able” to th e things in them selves: th a t is th e ‘m eaningless su rplusage’, the idea th a t ‘in h a lf a do zen ways has b een proved to be n o n sensical’.7 For “th e h u m a n b ein g has m any sleeps”, as M aritain rem inds us.8 A nd in w aking u p again to the things themselves, philosophy in its p o stm o d e rn ep o ch is discovering — o r rediscovering — th ro u g h semiosis th at, as science has b een suggesting all along (w hispering in th e ears o f the rationalist dream ers, as it w ere), these things su rro u n d in g us are far from unknow able.

5 Peirce c.1905: CP 5.525. 6 A ristotle c.3 4 8 /7 bc: Metaphysica, Bk. Ill, chap. 4, 1001b6: “All things are eith er one o r many, a n d o f the m any each is o n e .” 7 Peirce c.1905: CP 5.525. 8 M aritain 1959: 2.

Chapter 10

E n s R eale

as a Sub-Division of E n s

P r im u m C o g n itu m

T h e m ain advantage o f reconceptualizing the original Aristo­ telian schem e o f categories in term s o f the tran sce n d en tal/o n to ­ logical relative distinction is th at it gives us a way o f u n d erstan d ­ ing finite being th at includes ens primum cognitum, which can n o t be d o n e on the Aristotelian scheme, precisely because relatio rationis by definition falls outside the category o f relation an d can n o t be included u n d e r it, even though what is included u n d e r the category o f relation also falls u n d e r relatio secundum esse, in the sense this latter expression took on as “ontological relatio n ”. I say “took o n ”, because it seems th at B oethius’s original coin­ age o f the expression relativum secundum esse was in te n d e d only to express the contrast, within to bv as ens reale, betw een relatio realises consisting form ally an d positively in adesseo r in tersu b jec­ tivity, on the one h an d , and, on the o th e r h an d , ens subjectivum — substance with its in h e re n t accidents — consisting form ally an d positively in inesse as b o th sustaining th e intersubjective b e­ ing o f relations an d requiring th a t being as a circum stance o f the existence o f subjective being w ithin the physical en v iro n m en t and of the intelligibility o f subjective b eing w ithin th e objective o rd e r (this latter side o f the co n trast b ein g sum m arized an d expressed in the B oethian coinage, relatio secundum d id ) . 143

144

Intentionality and Semiotics

T h e later ap p ro p ria tio n o f the expression relalio secundum esse — first by A quinas to m ake rational sense o f a triu n e com ­ m u n io n o f relative persons as the in n e r life o f G od, th e n by P oinsot as point de depart for th e doctrina signorum — to express th e fact th a t th e w hole o rd e r o f ens rationis has, form ally an d positively, th e very sam e positive essential stru ctu re th a t relation has in th e o rd e r o f ens reale, an d th a t consequently even relationes rationis, notw ith stan d in g th e ir m in d -d ep en d en t ch ara cter o f existence, c a n n o t be red u ce d to subjectivity; so th a t all rela­ tions, w h e th e r realis o r rationis, are irreducibly suprasubjective w h e th e r o r n o t they are also intersubjective; an d th a t this ir­ reducibly characterizin g featu re o f relation is b o th w hat m akes possible th e objectivization o f subjectivity an d intersubjectivity w ithin ex p erien ce an d know ledge th ro u g h objective relations wTiich, acco rd in g to circum stance, are also entia realia, an d en ­ ables — at th e sam e tim e an d fo r the sam e reason — th e pos­ sibility o f pure objectivity as well as awareness o f objects having a physical existence b u t n o t im m ediately p resen t in th e sensepercep tib ly accessible physical su rro un d in g s h ere an d now: this is w hat is in te n d e d in th e English translation o f P o in so t’s relatio secundum esse 2^, “ontological rela tio n ”.1 So th e key realization is twofold. T h e first aspect lies in rec­ ognizing th a t th e positive b ein g o f every ens rationis, regardless o f th e p a tte rn in ens reale on the basis o f w hich it was fo rm ed , is, as we discussed above,12 a “b ein g p a tte rn e d after”, w hich is to say 1 H ow crucial it is fo r th e d o c trin e o f signs th a t th e full sense o f this E ng­ lish expression be g rasp ed in relatio n to its o rig in al L atin usage in P o in so t’s Tractatus is well illu strated in th e discussion in Deely 2001: 369-371, tex t an d notes 24 a n d 25, o f M eier-O eser’s atte m p te d re a d in g (1997) o f Poinsot. A nd fully to ap p re c ia te all th ese points, th e re a d e r n eed s to ru m in a te u p o n the excessively a n th ro p o m o rp h ic c h a ra c te r o f d esig n atin g purely objective rela­ tions as entia rationis, inasm u ch as all anim als, ‘b r u te ’ o r ‘ra tio n a l’ alike, neces­ sarily if unwittingly, form a n d em ploy relationes rationis as an essential p a rt o f zoosem iosis, as P oinsot p o in te d o u t (in his Tractatus de Signis, First P ream ble, A rticle 3) a n d I have elsew here discussed in m o re d etail (Deely 1982; 2001: 350-354, etc.). 2 C hap. 8, esp. Sect, d., p. 133ff.

145

Chapter 10. Intentionality Again

th a t the underlying being o f respectus o r esse ad, relation accord­ ing to the way relation has being, is w hat constitutes every ens rationis as such, ju s t as it constitutes every relatio realis as an ens, an in h a b itan t o f t o o v . See D iagram 6 :

{

Being

itself Ens Reale:

onother

the limited scope of the categories

(inherent accidents)

as able to exist

in de p e n d e n t of tho ught:

toward another

relatio realis

(relation)

d e p e n d en t upon tho ught:

relatio rationis

Being as First Known:

“ but patterned after inesse: negation

_ the scope of human experience

Ens Rationis:

}

“being patterned after” (= purely objective)

and patterned after _ adesse: relation

Diagram 6. H ow E sse O b je c tiv u m Exceeds E n s R e a le , or W hy Categorial B eing Is Inadequate to the Scope o f B ein g as Experienced

T he second aspect lies in the realization th a t ontological relation establishes the p o in t o f overlap o r “in tersectio n ”, as Sebeok liked to p u t it,3 w here objects move back an d fo rth w ithin experience betw een the orders o f objectivity an d physicality. This too can be usefully illustrated diagram m atically: dep en d en t upon thought:

relatio rationis

(“being patterned after”) “

Being

("esse”) as able to exist

toward another

(relation, “esse ad”)

-

Ens Rationis:

outside the categories

-O n to lo g ic a l R elativ ity

(“Relativum secundum esse”)

in dependent of tho ught:

Experience

relatio realis

POINT OF OVERLAP

another

(inherent accidents, “esse in alio”) itself

(substance, “esse in se”)

Ens Reale:

the scope of Aristotle’s categories

- POIN T OF OVERLAP

- Transcen dental R elativ ity

(“Relativum secundum did")

Diagram 7. A ristotle’s notion o f t o ov ( “e n s ”) as transm itted through Boethius to the L a tin A ge 3 E.g., Sebeok 1975.

- >

of objects as terminating cognitive and cathectic relations

146

Intentionality and Semiotics

I th in k we are now in a position to show how semiotics pro­ vides th e co n ce p tu al tools at last to give a better answer to Gil­ s o n ’s q uestio n , th e qu estio n th at has bedeviled the 20th-century tw ilight o f m o d e rn philosophy, for Thom ist and non-Thomist p h ilo so p h e rs alike: “H ow can we g uarantee the fidelity of the c o n c e p t to its object?”4

4 G ilson 2002: 266, trans. o f Gilson 1964.

Chapter 11

Esse In te n tio n a le

Again

F or establishing a g u aran tee o f the fidelity o f co n ce p t to object I th in k we can (and m ust) agree with M aritain th a t th e n o tio n o f esse intentionale is indispensable. B orn in n atu re as a species impressa in th e inform ation carried in an d by th e physical action o f o n e m aterial substance u p o n another, it is this species, this specification, th a t arouses th e anim al to its first awareness (w hen, th a t is, th e substance acted u p o n by its su rro u n d in g s is a living substance which has developed bodily parts p ro p o r­ tio n ed to be activated by som e given range of environm ental stim uli so as to becom e aware o f those stim uli in th e ir source): an d so w hat we call an eye responds to differentiations in the light striking th e organ o f sight as reflected off o f the sur­ ro u n d in g bodies, an d in so do in g reveals in those su rroundings shapes, m ovem ent, positions; w hat we call an ear responds to a certain range o f vibrations striking th e organism as sounds, an d in so doing also reveals (m ore o r less definitely) positions, m ovem ents, intensity; w hat we call a nose detects from the en­ viro nm ent w ithin a certain range of stim ulation odors, which also reveal (with varying clarity) proximity, position, som etim es m ovem ent; w hat we call taste reveals flavors h ere an d now of m aterial being ingested, an d in so doing may also reveal lim ited 147

148

Intentionality and Semiotics

position an d shape an d m ovem ent; an d finally, in the m ost in­ tim ate action o f all after taste, perhaps, touch reveals a texture to objects, p erhaps h eat an d cold from a little distance or by contact, shape, m ovem ent, an d position.

a. Sensation: Signs without the Possibility of Entia Rationis T h at which the given sense c an n o t help b u t respond to u n d er stim ulus is called by the scholastics the “p ro p e r o r form al object” o f th at sense; an d yet these p ro p er objects are n o t at all known ‘atomically’ as ‘this sense-datum here an d now ’ (as early analytic philosophers fantastically postulated), b u t ra th e r the p ro p e r ob­ jects, first logically, are yet temporally both simultaneous with and distinct from what th e scholastics called “com m on sensibles”, the “m aterial object” o f sensation given with and by the form al ob­ ject, in a network of relations that, u p o n analysis, are seen to be — quite prio r to any sense perception as such (“phantasiari”) , and so both prio r to and as basis for the h ig h er cognitive powers (both sensory and, in the case o f rational animals, intellectual) to form in their tu rn species expressae — already sign relations (which is the same, provided we speak strictly, as to say simply signs). This is to say th at the “p ro p er sensibles” (differentiated light o r ‘color’, sound, flavors, textures, odors), created by the im pact o f an environm ental influence h ere an d now physical in its own being bu t carrying inform ation intentionally w ithin th a t very physicality, function as sign-vehicles m aking p resen t along with themselves in the anim al’s awareness th e “com m on sensibles” (shape, size, solidity, rest or m otion, position, n u m b e r o r p lural­ ity, warm or cool), and the relations both o f the p ro p e r sensibles to the com m on sensibles and of the com m on sensibles am ong themselves as given in the awareness h ere an d now constitute as a whole the “m aterial object signified” o f th e “external sensa­ tion” which the sensus communis will co-ordinate an d pass u p to the memory, im agination, and estim ation, an d (if the anim al is rational as well), th rough those hig h er internal senses, to the in­ tellects agens or activity o f the intellect which will th en so impress

C hapter 11. Esse Intentionale Again

149

th e intellectus possibilis with a stim ulus (namely, the phantasm , or collective p ro d u c t o f memory, im agination, an d estim ation, p re­ sen ted u n d e r a form al m in d -d ep en d en t relation o f self-identity) as to aw aken the possible intellect to an awareness o f being ex­ pressed in concepts (species expressae), an awareness o f an objec­ tive w orld able to be ex p lo red an d u n d ersto o d according to w hat its c o m p o n e n t objects are “in them selves” an d n o t only accord­ in g to w hat they are fo r m e as an anim al o f a p articu lar bodily type o r “species” in th e biological sense. T h e re is no discourse th e re in sentire prescissed fro m phantasiari, n o grad u al passage from , say, d ifferen tiated lig h t as “col­ o r” to shapes, positions, an d m ovem ent, an d n o entia rationis, e ith e r,1b u t ra th e r a com plex o f in fo rm atio n given at once, vary­ in g only as th e in p u t itself varies fro m m o m en t to m o m e n t — b u t a com plex objectification created an d sustained by sign re­ lations am o n g the sensibles. F or th e relations o f p ro p e r to com ­ m o n sensibles, a n d o f com m on sensibles am o n g them selves as a tta in e d by m o re th a n o n e ch an n el o f th e an im al’s ex tero cep tions, are ro o te d in causality w ithout red u cin g to th a t causal­ ity, inasm uch as they m ake p resen t to the organism in aw areness w hat they them selves are not, are, in short, triadic in asm u ch as they e n ab le this ru d im en tary objectification w h erein th e o rg an ­ ism first becom es aware o f so m eth in g o f its su rro u n d in g s12 (as a

1 See n o te 5, p. 41 above. 2 P o in so t 1632: 6 8 6 b l-8 (= 1632a: 2 0 6 /2 5 -3 1 ): “N am n o n est u lla ratio, c u r n e g e tu r sensui exteriori, q u o d d e d u c a tu r de u n o ad aliu d sine d iscu rsu et collatione. A d u te n d u m au tem signo e t significatione n o n re q u iritu r aliq u id am p lius n ec necessarius est discursus. E rgo usus signi ex terio rib u s sensibus attrib u i p o te st.” — “T h e re is n o reason to deny th a t ex tern al sense is le d from o n e th in g to a n o th e r w ith o u t discourse an d collation. B ut fo r u sin g a sign a n d signification, n o th in g m o re is req u ired , n o r is discourse necessary. T h e re fo re th e use o f signs can be a ttrib u te d to th e ex tern al senses.” Ibid. 687b28-42 (= 1632a: 2 0 8 /2 4 -4 7 ): “sensus cognoscit sig n atu m in si­ g n o eo m o d o , q u o in signo praesens est, sed n o n eo solum m o d o , q u o cum signo idem est. Sicut cum videtur sensibile p ro p riu m , v. g. color, et sensibile co m m u n e, u t figura e t m otus, n o n v id etu r figura u t id em cum colore, sed u t co n iu n c ta colori, e t p e r ilium visibilis reddita, nec vid etu r seo rsu m co lo r et

150

Intentionality and Semiotics

basis for in te rp re ta tio n at th e level o f in tern al sense-perception expressed in phantasiari by th e classification o f th e m aterial o f sense in term s o f th e in teractio n categories o f +, an d 0). seo rsu m figura; sic cum vid etu r signum e t in eo praesen s re d d itu r signatum , ibi sig n atu m a ttin g itu r u t co n iu n ctu m signo e t c o n te n tu m in eo, n o n u t seor­ sum se h ab e n s e t u t absens.” — “sense cognizes th e significate in a sign in th e way in w hich th a t significate is p re se n t in th e sign, b u t n o t only in th e way in w hich it is th e sam e as th e sign. F or exam ple, w hen a p ro p e r sensible such as a co lo r is seen, a n d a co m m o n sensible, such as a pro file a n d m o v em en t, the p ro file is n o t seen as th e sam e as th e color, b u t as co n jo in ed to th e color, an d re n d e re d visible th ro u g h th a t color, n o r is th e co lo r seen separately a n d th e p ro file separately; so w hen a sign is seen a n d a significate is re n d e re d p re se n t in it, th e significate is a tta in e d th e re as co n jo in ed to th e sign a n d c o n ta in e d in it, n o t as existing separately an d as ab sen t.” Ibid. 687b 43-50 (= 1632a: 2 0 9 /1 -7 ): “Et si instetur: Q u id est illu d in sign a to c o n iu n c tu m signo e t praesens in signo p ra e te r ipsum signum e t entitatem eius? R e sp o n d e tu r esse ip su m m et signatum in alio esse, sicut res rep raese n ta ta p e r speciem est ip su m m et obiectum in esse in te n tio n ali, n o n reali.” — “A n d if you sh o u ld insist: W hat is th a t in th e significate co n jo in ed to th e sign a n d p re se n t in th e sign besides the sign itself a n d its entitative being? T h e resp o n se is th a t it is th e very th in g signified itself in a n o th e r existence, ju s t as a th in g re p re se n te d th ro u g h a specifying fo rm is th e very o b ject itself in in te n tio n a l, n o t physical, b ein g .” B ut h e re , in th e case o f extern al sense, re m e m b e r th a t th e species is impressa, conveyed a n d caused by th e dyadic action o f th e sensible th in g u p o n th e o rg an o f sense, so th a t th e triadic cognitive relatio n p ro v en atin g fro m it subsum es in to th e cognitive o rd e r th e very sam e relatio n w hich, o n th e side o f cause an d effect, is a physical an d m in d -in d e p e n d e n t relatio n , b u t now as part. WTience finally, ibid. 6 8 8 a l8 -2 8 (= 1632a: 2 0 9 /2 2 -3 2 ): “Ex dictis au tem co llig itu r in brutis e t in nobis rep e riri ratio n em signi univocam , q u ia ratio signi n o n p e n d e t ex m o d o , q u o p o te n tia u titu r illo d isc u rre n d o vel com para n d o a u t sim plici m o d o attin g e n d o , sed ex m o d o , q u o signum rep raesen tat, id est re d d it praesen s aliud a se obiective, q u o d e o d e m m o d o facit, sive p o te n tia sim plici m o d o co gnoscat sive discursivo.” — “F rom th e fo reg o in g rem ark s it can be g a th e re d th a t a univocal ratio n ale o f signs o b tain s in the case o f b ru te anim als a n d in th e case o f ratio n al anim als, because th e ratio­ nale o f a sign does n o t d e p e n d on th e way in w hich a cognitive pow er uses it (by disco u rsin g o r co m p arin g , o r by a sim ple way o f attain in g ), b u t o n the way in w hich th e sign rep rese n ts, th a t is, re n d e rs so m e th in g o th e r th a n itself p re se n t objectively, w hich is th e sam e w h e th e r th e pow er knows in a sim ple m a n n e r o r in a discursive o n e .” So, 6 8 8 b l3 -2 2 (= 1632a: 2 1 0 /1 7 -2 4 ): “aliqu id significent, licet significationem n o n in te n d a n t, e t sic talis significatio u t in te n ta co llatio n em p e tit e t discursum , n o n significatio absolute. Nec solum

C hapter 11. Esse Intentionale Again

151

It is a curious case. O n th e o n e h an d , th e relations in ques­ tion involve entia recilia, to wit, relationes reales ro o ted in causal in teractio n o f organism an d environm ent. O n the o th e r h and, these sam e relations as pro v en atin g an d sustaining an in cip ien t d ic u n tu r significare, q u ia aliq u id faciunt, u n d e significado sequitur, sed qu ia sig n ific ad o n e m e x e rc e n t e t signatum p e rc ip iu n t, q u o d n o n faciu n t res inanim a ta e .” — “they do signify so m e th in g , even th o u g h they d o n o t d elib erately in te n d th e signification, a n d so such signification as is d elib erately in te n d e d calls fo r co llad o n a n d discourse, n o t signification absolutely. N o r are anim als said to use signs only becau se they do so m e th in g fro m w hich signification fol­ lows, b u t becau se they exercise signification a n d perceive a significate, w hich in a n im a te th in g s d o n o t d o .” For, 6 8 9 a3 6 -4 7 (= 1632a: 2 1 1 /2 9 -3 3 ): “ad usum signi n o n req u iri duplicem c o g n itio n e m , n ec q u o d ex u n a co g n itio n e d ev e n ia tu r in aliam , sed sufficit, q u o d ex u n o co g n ito ad aliu d co g n itu m deveniatur. A liud au tem est p e r u n u m c o g n itu m a ttin g e re alteru m , aliud ex u n a co g n itio n e causare alteram . A d ra tio n e m significationis sufficit, q u o d d e u n o co g n ito d ev e n ia tu r a d aliud, sed n o n est necesse, q u o d d e u n a co g n itio n e ad aliam .” — “a d o u b le know l­ e d g e is n o t re q u ire d fo r th e use o f a sign, n o r is it re q u ire d th a t fro m o n e a c t o f k n o w ledge a n o th e r act o f know ledge sh o u ld be rea ch ed , b u t it suf­ fices th a t fro m o n e know n o b ject a n o th e r know n o b ject sh o u ld be rea ch ed . B u t th ro u g h o n e know n object to attain a n o th e r know n o b ject is o n e th in g , by o n e act o f know ledge to cause a n o th e r act o f know ledge is q u ite so m e­ th in g else again. F or th e ratio n ale o f signification it suffices to rea ch from o n e know n o b je ct to an o th er, b u t it is n o t necessary to pass fro m o n e ac t o f know ledge to a n o th e r.” A n d finally, 689b27-45 (= 1632a: 2 1 2 /1 9 -3 4 ; h e re a n ticip atin g sen se-p er­ c e p tio n as well bey o n d sensation prescissively c o n s id e re d ): “E t ad id, q u o d dic itu r d e co g n itio n e significationis, q u o d est co g n o scere re la tio n e m aliq u am e t o rd in e m , re sp o n d e tu r, q u o d n o n est necesse in b ru tis p o n e re co g n itio n e m rela tio n is fo rm a lite r e t com parative; sed exercitiu m eius, q u o d fu n d a t rela­ tio n e m sin e co m p a ra tio n e e t collatio n e cogn o scu n t, sicut b ru tu m cognoscit rem d istan te m , ad q u am se m ovet, e t re c o rd a tu r rei p ra e te rita e e t h a b e t spem p ra e d a e fu tu ra e , u t d o c e t S. T h o m as 1. 2. q. 40. art. 3., sine h o c, q u o d rela tio n e m fu tu ri a u t p ra e te riti vel d istan tiae cognoscat, sed co g n o scit in exercitio id, q u o d est distans a u t fu tu ru m a u t rep rae sen ta n s, u bi f u n d a tu r relatio, q u am fo rm a lite r e t com parative n o n cognoscit.” — “A nd to th a t w hich is said c o n c e rn in g th e know ledge o f signification, th a t it is to know so m e rela tio n a n d order, th e resp o n se is th a t it is not necessary to p o sit in th e b ru te an im als a know ledge o f rela tio n form ally a n d com paratively; b u t it is necessary to p o sit th a t anim als know its exercise, w hich fo u n d s a rela tio n w ith o u t co m ­ p ariso n a n d collation, th e way an anim al knows a d istan t th in g in rela tio n to w hich it m oves, recalls a th in g o f th e past, an d has a n ex p e c ta tio n o f fu tu re

152

Intentionality and Semiotics

o r nascent a p p reh e n sio n by th e anim al o f its su rro u n d in g s are objective, th a t is, they exist as known (not, in d eed , form ally as such, but) m aterially in an d with th e en v iron m en tal aspects they ob­ jectify. They b elo n g n e ith e r wholly to th e o rd e r o f ens reale in the physical sense, n o r to th e o rd e r o f ens rationis as having nothing prey, as St. T h o m a s explains in th e Summa theologica, I-II, q. 40, art. 3, w ith o u t know ing th e rela tio n o f fu tu re o r past o r d istan ce, b u t th e an im al knows in exercise th a t w hich is d ista n t o r fu tu re o r re p re se n tin g , w h e re o n is fo u n d e d th e rela tio n w hich th e anim al d oes n o t know form ally a n d com paratively.” In sum , 6 9 0 a l-1 9 (= 1632a: 2 1 2 /3 5 - 2 1 3 /7 ) : “in c o g n itio n e sim plici sine hoc, q u o d tra n se a t ad discursum vel co llatio n em , p o te st attin g i n o n solum o b iectu m , q u o d im m ed iate p r o p o n itu r seu a p p o n itu r sensui, sed q u o d in eo c o n tin e tu r; s ic u t... species re p ra e se n ta n s co lo ra tu m etiam re p ra e s e n ta t figuram e t m o tu m aliaq u e sensibilia co m m u n ia ibi c o n te n ta e t ad iu n cta , n ec tam e n o b h o c d esin it esse sim plex cognitio, licet co g n itu m n o n sit sim plex, sed p lu ra, alio q u in n o n possem us sim plici visione p lu ra o b ie cta videre. Q u o d si possum us, c u r n o n etiam o rd in a ta e t u n u m p e r aliud, e t c o n s e q u e n te r signatu m p e r signum e t u t c o n te n tu m in signo?” — “in a sim ple ac t o f k n ow ledge w hich d oes n o t b ec o m e discourse o r collation, n o t only can th e o b je ct w hich is im m ediately p ro p o se d o r ap p o sed to sense b e a ttain ed , b u t also th a t w hich is c o n ta in e d in th a t object; ju s t as, fo r exam p le, ex tern al vision sees H e rc u ­ les in a statue, a n d ju s t as a specifier [a sense im p ressio n ] re p re s e n tin g a co lo re d th in g also rep rese n ts th e profile a n d m o v e m en t a n d o th e r c o m m o n sensibles th e re co n ta in e d a n d ad jo in ed , yet does n o t o n this a c c o u n t pass b e y o n d sim ple aw areness, even th o u g h the th in g know n is n o t sim ple, b u t plural: otherw ise, we w ould n o t be able to see a plurality o f o bjects by a sim p le vision. B ut if we are able to see m any objects in a single vision, why n o t also an o r d e r e d plurality a n d o n e th in g th ro u g h an o th er, a n d c o n se q u e n d y a significate th ro u g h a sign a n d as co n ta in e d in th e sign?” W h e n ce is th e triadic c h a ra c te r o f th e actio n o f signs, sig n ificatio n o r “sem iosis”, a p p a r e n t from th e b e g in n in g o f aw areness in se n satio n th ro u g h , as we shall see, th e h ig h e st reach es o f in te lle ctio n as also in b etw een , in th e ac­ tio n o f in te rn a l sen se-p ercep tio n (691a4—12; = 1632a: 2 1 4 /3 6 —44): “sig n u m e t significare d e su m itu r univoce p e r o rd in e m ad sig n atu m u t m an ifestab ile p o te n tia e . Q u o d vero id fiat tali vel tali m o d o , q u o p o te n tia u titu r signo, n o n re d d it an alo g am a u t aequivocam ratio n em signi ex g e n e re m a n ifesta n d i, sed diversum m o d u m p o te n tia e in co g n itio n e e t u su signi.” — “a sign a n d an ac t o f signifying are tak en univocally th ro u g h th e o rd e r to th e signified as so m e th in g m an ifestab le to a cognitive power. T h e fact th a t this com es a b o u t in such o r such a way a c co rd in g as th e pow er m akes use o f th e sign does n o t r e n d e r th e ratio n ale o f th e sign an alogous o r equivocal in th e o rd e r o f m an i­ festing, b u t re n d e rs th e m o d es o f th e cognitive p ow er d iffe re n t in th e co g n i­ tio n a n d use o f th e sign.”

C hapter 11. Esse Intentionale Again

153

but objective being. They are, in short, relations at one and the same time physical and objective; they will subsequently (in sense p e rc e p tio n an d intellection) m ake relationes rationis possible, by providing th e ex p erien ced p attern o f esse ad w hich, alo n g with e x p erien ced p attern s o f esse in, are req u ire d fo r any fo rm atio n o f entia rationis.3 As physical, however, in this case as arising from causal in teractio n , th e relations in q uestion are dyadic, n o t triad ­ ic; yet as subsum ed in to cognition these sam e relations acq u ire from th e first a triadic character.

b. Rooting in Nature the Difference between Things and Objects: Objectivity’s N aissance H e re we have, th e n , o n e o f th e irred u cib le d ata m an ifest­ in g th e d iffere n ce betw een esse entitativum a n d esse intentionale. T h e re is always a virtuality in in ten tio n al b ein g w hereby it m a in ­ tains constantly a te n d en cy tow ard objectification o f w hat it re p ­ resen ts in its b ein g as in ten tio n al, w hich originally was b u t m ay n o t now a n d n e e d n o t always be a thing. This virtuality, th e n , this esse tendens per repraesentationem ut fundam entum in quo radicatur relatio secundum esse tendentialem (as giving rise to a p u re re ­ latio n w h enever circum stances p erm it, be those circum stances p ro v id ed by th e m in d in th in k in g o r by n a tu re in th e existing en v iro n m en ta l circum stances) is th e ro o t o f th e d ifferen ce in p rin cip le betw een th in g as th in g (w hich n e e d n o t be know n in o rd e r to be) a n d object as object (th a t w hich req u ire s a rela­ tion to a know er in o rd e r to be an d , in o r ‘fro m ’ th e know er, a relatio n toward itself as terminus, regardless o f w h e th e r it also h ap p en s to be a th in g ). 3 P o in so t 1632: 581a3 0 -3 5 (= TDS 9 6 /7 - 1 1 ) : “n o n d ic itu r en s ra tio n is illu d, ad cuius in sta r fo rm a tu r; f o rm a tu r e n im en s ra tio n is ad in sta r e n d s realis, sed d ic itu r ens ratio n is illud n o n rea le, q u o d ad in sta r realis e n d s co n c ip itu r.” — “th a t o n w hose p a tte rn a m in d -d e p e n d e n t b e in g is fo rm e d is n o t called m in d -d e p e n d e n t; fo r m in d -d e p e n d e n t b e in g is f o rm e d o n th e p a tte rn o f m in d -in d e p e n d e n t b ein g , b u t th a t u n re a l b e in g w h ich is co n ceived o n th e p a tte rn o f a m in d -in d e p e n d e n t b e in g is called a m in d d e p e n d e n t b e in g .”

154

Intentionality and Semiotics

O f these two relations (o f ob ject to know er in o rd e r to be object an d o f know er to ob ject in o rd e r to be object known), th e fo rm e r may be m erely tran sce n d en tal; b u t th e la tter can only be onto lo g ical,4 because it is as term in u s o f an o n tologi­ cal relatio n th a t th e object p articip ates in th e in d ifferen ce to th e distinctio n betw een ens reale a n d ens rationis th a t enables objective b ein g — sustained by th e web o f sem iosic relations th a t co n stitu te ex p erien ce as a cum ulative in flu en ce o f fu tu re ex p ectatio n an d past ap p reh en sio n s o n w hat is objective in th e a n im a l’s p re se n t — to tran scen d th e confines o f th e h e re a n d now in dealin g with th e env iro n m en t. T h e two — object an d th in g — may coincide, a n d d o in fact coincide, as we have ju s t seen, in sensation; b u t even in th e ir coincidence th e re obtains a difference in p rinciple, fo r betw een two things simply as things in teractin g th e re o b tain dyadic real relations, while betw een two things in teractin g o n e o f w hich is an anim al as such capable o f awareness, th e in teractio n itself so far as it involves environm ental aspects p ro p o rtio n e d to those o f th e an im al’s bodily parts ad ap ted to sense inevitably gives rise triadically to a lacing o f real relations w hich objectifies in an in c ip ien t o r nascen t fashion th e en v iro n m en tal factors involved; so th a t w hat are things in dyadic causal relatio n sh ip b eco m e also partially objectified to o r for th e organism sensing, p roviding thus the basis fo r 3.further objectification th a t will p re s e n t w hat is sensed in a p ercep tu al fram ew ork o f interpretation o f w hat n eed s to be d o n e in term s o f seeking (+), fleeing (-), o r ig n o rin g (0). 4 T h e relatio n o f sign to signified, in o th e r w ords, is necessarily a n d at o n ce form ally distin ct from a n d su p e ro rd in a te to a d ire c t re la tio n o f sign to power, by th e fact th a t th e fo rm e r rela tio n is always o n to lo g ical, w hereas the la tte r relation may be only tra n sc e n d e n ta l (P o in so t 1632a: TDS Book I, Q uestion 1, 1 2 3 /1 3 -2 5 , 1 2 6 /2 3 -1 2 7 /6 a n d 1 2 8 /9 -1 9 , esp. 19). It is precisely this form al su p e ro rd in a tio n th a t m akes possible in th e first place sign-vehicles w hich are such w ithout b ein g them selves initially co g n ized objectively in th eir own right, i.e., sign-vehicles w hich rela te th e k n o w er to ex tern al objects im ­ m ediately (erstw hile called “form al signs”: cf. R ansdell, 1979, as discussed in Deely, 1980 an d 1985a). Cf. P o in so t’s 1632 Tractatus de Signis, Book I, Q ues­ tion 3, 1 5 8 /1 -1 5 9 /6 , with Book I, Q u estio n 2, 1 5 1 /9 -1 4 .

C hapter 11. Esse Intentionale Again

155

c. From Sensation to Sense-Perception: Animal Realism This is a crucial point: th e ex tern al senses are selective, b u t they are n o t interpretive. T h a t is why they are called passive: they c a n n o t b u t resp o n d acco rd in g to th e ir n a tu re to an a p p ro ­ p riate stim ulus acco rd in g to its n a tu re , m an ifestin g in conse­ q u en ce so m eth in g o f th e b ein g o f an in teractio n in itself dyadic th ro u g h a triadic n e t o f naturally d e te rm in e d sign relations weaving so m eth in g o f th e esse entitativum o f th e physical envi­ ro n m e n t into th e esse intentionale o u t o f w hich th e o rg an ism will develop its in terp reta tio n s o f th a t en v iro n m en t, first in p e rc e p ­ tion an d th e n fu rth e r (if th e anim al is rational, a prospectively sem iotic anim al) in intellectio n o r u n d erstan d in g . T h e in te rn a l senses, by contrast, like th e intellect, are p ri­ m arily active. F or them , th e species impressae passed u p th ro u g h th e co m m o n sense from th e stim ulations o f ex tern al sense are b u t rationes seminales, hints an d suggestions fo r w hat is to be d o n e ‘to m ake the w orld safe for dem ocracy’, th a t is, fo r w hat­ ever th e m ain interests o f the anim al are (an d this varies fro m species to species, w hich is why the objective w orld o f every an i­ m al as interw oven m aterially with m in d -d e p e n d e n t on to lo g ical relations is species-specific, even as th e physical en v iro n m en t in th e sense o f ens reale is th e same for every anim al, not, in d e ed , in its p e rtin e n t parts — w hat m ake u p th e so-called ‘en v iro n ­ m ental n ic h e ’ — b u t in its overall ch aracter as ‘G aia’). T h e species impressa received is resp o n d ed to by in c o rp o ra t­ ing it w ithin a species expressa which, if it be a q u estio n o f m em ­ ory, wraps the stim ulus in relations to things past, temps perdu, which relations, bein g ontological, are suprasubjective respect­ ing the anim al an d so p resen t th e ir term in atin g object in (or ‘on the basis o f ’) the species expressa as “fam iliar” o r “un fam iliar” o r som e com bination th ereo f.5 5 T hom as c.1266: Summa