Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51: An uneasy relationship? 9781526109453

Citation preview

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51 An uneasy relationship? Daniel W. B. Lomas

Manchester University Press

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Copyright © Daniel W. B. Lomas 2017 The right of Daniel W. B. Lomas to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him/her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for ISBN  978 0 7190 9914 4  hardback First published 2017 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Typeset by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Contents

List of figures vi Acknowledgements vii Abbreviations ix Introduction 1 1 Wartime apprenticeship: Labour and intelligence during the Second World War

31

2 Lacking intelligence? British intelligence, ministers and the Soviet Union

54

3 The Cold War heats up: propaganda and subversion, 1945–48

83

4 Britain’s secret Cold War offensive: ministers, subversion and special operations, 1948–51

116

5 The special relationship? Ministers, atomic espionage and Anglo-American relations

149

6 Defending the realm: Labour ministers, vetting and subversion 186 7 Empire, Commonwealth and security

224

Conclusion: intelligence and the Labour governments, 1945–51

259

Select bibliography 270 Index 283

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Figures

following page 19   1 Clement Attlee in Downing Street, 1945 (© National Portrait Gallery, London) 20   2 Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary (1945–51) (© National Portrait Gallery, London) 21   3 Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council (1945–51) and Foreign Secretary (1951) (© National Portrait Gallery, London) 22   4 Hugh Dalton, Minister for Economic Warfare (1940–42) and Chancellor of the Exchequer (1945–47) (© National Portrait Gallery, London) 23   5 Sir Stewart Menzies, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (1939–53) (© National Portrait Gallery, London) 24   6 Sir Percy Sillitoe, Director General of the Security Service (1946–53) (© National Portrait Gallery, London) 25   7 Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary (1947–64) (© National Portrait Gallery, London) 26   8 Sir William Strang, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office (1949–53) (© National Portrait Gallery, London) 27   9 Christopher Paget Mayhew, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1946–50) (© National Portrait Gallery, London) 28 10 Rt. Hon. Clement Attlee, President Harry Truman and Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King concluding talks on atomic energy, November 1945 (Library and Archives Canada/ William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds/c023271) 29 11 Clement Attlee and prime ministers at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, October 1948 (© National Portrait Gallery, London) 30

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Acknowledgements

The completion of this book would not have been possible without the help of various individuals and institutions. First of all I would like to thank my colleague, Dr Christopher J. Murphy, for his cherished advice and support throughout my research. I can only apologise to him and his wife, Jo, for the endless late night emails and phone calls regarding my work. Thanks should also go to friends and colleagues, both current and former, at the University of Salford, particularly Professor John Callaghan – a fountain of knowledge on the Labour Party – as well as Drs Jim Beach, Brian Hall, Samantha Newbery, Professor Alaric Searle and Dr Steve Ward. I would like to recognise the valuable advice provided by Lord Armstrong of Illminster, Anne, Countess Attlee, Professor Richard Aldrich, Dr Gill Bennett, Tom Bower, Jock Bruce, the late Professor Keith Jeffrey, Professor Michael Herman, Dr Nicholas Hiley, Dr Paul Maddrell, Dr Christopher Moran, Professor the Lord (Kenneth) Morgan, Professor Philip Murphy, Dr Christian Schlaepfer and ‘Tony’ the GCHQ historian. My thanks also go to Roger Smethurst and Alan Glennie of the Cabinet Office, as well as Mary Pring, Russell Pullen, Margaret Pryne and others from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for their invaluable assistance and for dealing with numerous Freedom of Information requests. Further thanks should go to Helen Langley of the Bodleian Library, Oxford; Dr Robin Darwall-Smith, archivist at Magdalen College, Oxford; Emma Goodrum of Worcester College; and Darren Treadwell at the People’s History Museum, Manchester, for their guidance when researching at their respective archives, as well as the unnamed staff of the National Archives, Kew. Special thanks go to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for their generous support in funding my early research, without which I would not have been able to study the Attlee period; the University of Salford where I have been teaching since September 2012, first as an hourly paid member of staff and now as a full-time lecturer in

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

viii

Acknowledgements

International History; and the staff at Manchester University Press, particularly Tony Mason. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their continued backing throughout my research. I owe a tremendous debt to my mother, Jackie Norris, and stepfather Michael for their unselfish support, particularly the latter for my love of history and politics. Thanks should also go to other members of my family, especially my grandmother, Joyce Barton, and Vincent Kelly, who have both taken immense pride in my work, as well as Ian and Janet Staley, Alan and Ann Staley and others for their interest in this project. I am extremely fortunate to have good friends who have allowed me to switch off from my research, including Juan Calvo, Georgina McDaid, Ste and Nicola Bagwell, Sean Timperly, Holly Johnston, and my long-term schoolmates Chris Hudson, Dave Kitchen and Tom Morecroft. I would also like to thank Ed Brooker, Dan Shingleton and Rachael Thomas who were there at the start of my studies at the University of Salford. I would like to show my gratitude to my long-suffering partner, Emma, for her continued support. Our own relationship has quickly developed since this project started and I’m proud to say that she is now my wife. Emma has been a source of comfort and strength throughout, putting up with endless research and conference visits. I would also like to thank my son, Joshua, whose boundless energy, love of Manchester City, knights and Star Wars has been a welcome distraction from the Attlee government, and our latest arrival, Emily, who, thankfully, knows nothing about the dark days of the Cold War. Finally, I would like to express thanks to my father, Brian Lomas, who peacefully passed away after a short illness in November 2012. While I never said it during your lifetime, I am eternally grateful for your constant support in everything that I did, and my one true regret is that you never saw the final product, though I was told by friends of your immense pride and interest in my work. This project is dedicated to you and your memory. You are forever in my thoughts. Daniel William Barton Lomas December 2015

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Abbreviations

AIOC Anglo-Iranian Oil Company ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BOD Bodleian Library, Oxford C Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service CAB Cabinet CAC Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge C-in-C Commander-in-Chief CO Colonial Office COS Chiefs of Staff CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIPC Colonial Information Policy Committee CPGB Communist Party of Great Britain CRO Commonwealth Relations Office D-G Director General (MI5) DO Dominions Office FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FO Foreign Office FOIA Freedom of Information Act GC&CS Government Code and Cipher School GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters GEN 110 Ministerial Committee on Fascism GEN 164 Cabinet Committee on Communism GEN 180 Ministerial Committee on Illegal Immigration GEN 183 Cabinet Committee on Subversive Activities GEN 226 Committee on European Policy GEN 231 Cabinet Committee on Propaganda GEN 241 Cabinet Committee on Germany GEN 374 Ministerial Committee formed to discuss the Brook Report HMG His Majesty’s Government

x

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

HO IRD JIB JIC LHASC LHCMA

Abbreviations

Home Office Information Research Department Joint Intelligence Bureau Joint Intelligence Committee Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London LSE London School of Economics MAG Magdalen College, Oxford MI5 Security Service MI6 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation PLP Parliamentary Labour Party PUS Permanent Under-Secretary PUSC Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee PUSD Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department PWE Political Warfare Executive RAF Royal Air Force SED Socialist Unity Party (Germany) SIGINT Signals Intelligence SIS Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) SO Special Operations SO1 Special Operations 1 (propaganda) SO2 Special Operations 2 (operational) SO3 Special Operations (planning) SOE Special Operations Executive T Treasury TGWU Transport and General Workers Union TNA The National Archives TUC Trade Union Congress ULTRA Intelligence derived from Enigma-encrypted German signals traffic VENONA Anglo-American operation to decode intercepted Soviet telegrams WO War Office WOR Worcester College, Oxford

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

Clement Richard Attlee, the Labour Party’s longest serving leader and Prime Minister during an unprecedented period of change for Britain, stands in the ‘top flight’ of post-war premiers.1 A poll of MPs in 2015, seventy years after Labour’s first ever majority in Parliament, rated Attlee as the greatest post-war prime minister, with an average score of 7.2 out of 10 for overall impact.2 Kenneth Harris, his official biographer, argued that Attlee implemented a policy programme ‘so massive and so radical that … it entitles him to be regarded as a great Prime Minister’ while Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds similarly considers him the ‘greatest post-war Prime Minister’.3 Beyond his electoral success, studies have focused on what has been called the ‘Attleeite Settlement’ – the development of the modern-day welfare state and the creation of the National Health Service – and, overseas, the start of decolonisation and the development of the transatlantic ‘special relationship’. Yet many endorsing Attlee for the so-called ‘Spirit of ’45’ overlooked his support for Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent, Cold War foreign policy and, importantly for this study, the development of Britain’s Cold War ‘secret state’ and his intimate relationship with British intelligence. This book is the first major study of Attlee’s relationship with Britain’s intelligence agencies during the formative years of the Cold War, making use of extensive archival research and information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act to show the intimate link between ministers and senior intelligence officials in Whitehall. In office, ministers made use of secret information to fight the Cold War both at home and overseas in Eastern Europe and in Britain’s colonial territories. The book also explores Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the US and ministerial attempts to repair the often fractured nuclear alliance.

2

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Still a ‘missing dimension’? The phrase ‘the missing dimension’ has become something of a cliché often used to contextualise research into the history of British intelligence.4 Yet in the case of Clement Attlee and his Labour government, the description is an accurate one that provides a useful starting point. Any reference to intelligence between 1945 and 1951 tends to be predicated upon negative assumptions surrounding the relationship between the Labour Party and the intelligence and security services as a result of the events of 1924 and the Zinoviev Letter affair, which was widely believed to have destroyed the first Labour government of James Ramsay MacDonald.5 Rather than drawing upon the ever-increasing body of archival intelligence material now available, there is a tendency for academics to continue to rely on accounts written before such material became available, continuing this distortion of the historical record.6 While studies by Morgan, Pelling and others devote numerous pages to foreign and defence policy, they make no reference to intelligence or security, an omission that extends to the biographies of several senior government figures.7 Despite being the subject of many significant studies, only the official biography of Attlee by Kenneth Harris refers to the case of Klaus Fuchs, whose espionage had serious implications for Anglo-American relations.8 Similarly, Bullock’s impressive biography of Bevin makes no reference to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) or any other branch of Britain’s intelligence apparatus and its influence on policymaking.9 Such omissions are, of course, understandable. Many of these accounts were published before the release of substantial intelligence material into the public domain. Kenneth, now Lord, Morgan, explained: ‘I was doing my research in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the materials for covering this delicate area were scarcely available’.10 Yet even with the growth in archival material, intelligence continues to be omitted from studies of Attlee and his government. A study of Attlee’s wartime experiences by Crowcroft neglects intelligence, despite wartime files on the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Government Code & Cipher School (GC&CS) being available for over a decade, while biographies by Beckett and Thomas-Symonds also overlook the subject, despite drawing extensively on Attlee’s private office papers at the National Archives.11 Nor is this position one sided. While historians with an interest in intelligence can point out the blind spots in earlier studies, it can be suggested that they, too, suffer from their own cognitive limitations.12 The study of intelligence in Britain has largely taken place in a ‘bubble’, leading to a fundamental disconnect from the wider policy context. In

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

3

his study of British signals intelligence, Ferris suggests that the ‘hidden dimension is filled with train-spotters’.13 New releases to the National Archives, while making the study of intelligence more accessible, take intelligence and security issues out of their decision-making context. It should be noted that the disconnect between studies of intelligence and policy had been observed by Andrew who, after reviewing a study of incoming American presidents and intelligence briefings, noted that until similar volumes were available about British prime ministers and others, the ‘use made of intelligence by world leaders will continue to be a major gap in our understanding of both modern government and international relations’.14 A few years later, Andrew once again observed that many basic questions regarding twentieth-century prime ministers and intelligence had ‘yet to be asked, let alone answered’.15 In contrast to the growing body of literature covering the theory behind the intelligence/ policymaker relationship, our knowledge of the interaction between prime ministers and the intelligence services continues to be restricted to Winston Churchill’s lifelong curiosity in spies and special operations, alongside Harold Wilson’s initial interest in and later paranoia towards the Security Service.16

Sources and methodology The Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government marked a sea change in attitudes towards secrecy in Britain. Previously closed information on intelligence found in the records of the Cabinet Office (CAB) and Foreign Office (FO) entered the public domain for the first time, alongside the surviving archive of the wartime Special Operations Executive and papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee.17 In 1997 these were joined by records from the British Security Service (MI5), which became ‘the guinea pig in tentatively opening part of the historical archives of traditionally the most secretive part of the state’.18 Now approaching its thirtieth release, the Service has released well over 5,000 files to the National Archives, stretching from the organisation’s establishment in 1909 into the 1960s.19 The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has also released a substantial amount on early Cold War signals intelligence, with highlights including the BRUSA agreement of 1946, which formalised post-war transatlantic signals intelligence collaboration; the famous UKUSA agreement of 1948; and Eastern Bloc decrypts; and while the archives of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) remain closed, details of foreign intelligence collection and covert action can be found in papers of the Cabinet Office and

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

4

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Foreign Office, ­specifically the files of the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department (PUSD), a significant number of which were released in May 2013. While undoubtedly welcome, such increased access to intelligence archives has met with scepticism. Gill has argued that the new developments mark a ‘variation in information control’, while Aldrich has likewise suggested that the new era of openness has offered the authorities an alternative to ‘old-fashioned “stonewalling”’ by allowing it to ‘set the agenda for archive-based researchers of the secret service’.20 The process of selection, declassification and destruction of files, he argues, affords officials ample scope to ‘massage the representation of the more secretive aspects’ of government.21 More generally, he has pointed to the dangers of extensive research at the National Archives, using records that have been ‘pre-selected, cleaned and processed by officials who are the institutional successors to those who we wish to study’. Aldrich suggests that historians are ‘remarkably untroubled’ by this, and tend to regard the material at the National Archives ‘as an analogue of reality’, with the resulting danger of them becoming ‘something close to official historians, albeit once removed’.22 Aldrich has further argued that the material on offer at the National Archives provides a ‘somewhat constrained’ view of Cold War intelligence.23 The argument that the authorities release their own ‘carefully packaged’ version of the past may be overly suspicious. Sir Stephen Lander, during his time as Director General of the Security Service, spoke of a widespread awareness across the intelligence community that they ‘did not own the past and certainly cannot change it’, while Jackson, in direct response to the claims made by Aldrich, has argued that historians do not believe everything they read in government archives. Those sceptical of recent archival releases, he argues, ascribe an ‘unrealistic level of efficiency to government machinery … in the ongoing struggle to maintain secrecy and shape popular perceptions’, especially in the media-intrusive environment of today.24 Nonetheless, it remains the case that the newly released official material should be examined with a degree of caution. An examination of files released post-Waldegrave shows that several subjects continue to be withheld from the public domain, and the ‘discovery’ of a large archive of colonial era records, the so-called ‘migrated archives’, at the Foreign Office’s Hanslope Park near Milton Keynes did little to dampen the ‘legacy of suspicion’ between historians and government.25 Many of the files are also incomplete. In the case of MI5, the Service’s new releases contain numerous gaps; Lander himself talked about the state of the Security Service’s historical archive, suggesting that ‘given the Service has worked continuously for over 90 years, there

Introduction

5

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

is rather less material than might have been expected’, with the blame falling on staff shortages, enemy action and an ‘inconsistent approach to file destruction’.26 Increasing availability of intelligence records has, arguably, resulted in a temptation to become too dependent on the new material. Ferris writes that: Nothing could be more futile than to sit at a table, head in hands, reading HW 1 files as though these blue binders contain the heart of British policy. These files, and those in DIR/C, have merit … Better read the FO 371s [where the influence of intelligence can be examined] and not the HW 12s.27

New intelligence releases, while making the subject more accessible, take the subject out of its broader context, leading some to ‘fetishize and … sensationalize’ it.28 Callaghan and Morgan have highlighted the potential consequences of relying on the records of a single intelligence organisation, pointing out that MI5 material provides a distorted record of communist subversion in Britain, and consequently reaffirms the ‘basic scholarly principle’ of ‘consulting as widely as possible’.29 Both argue that the Security Services ‘were often wrong about the detail or significance of developments within the CPGB and the Comintern, even when they were aware that something important was happening’.30 Despite the need to exercise due caution, it should be added that any study of government and intelligence that entirely neglected the files at the National Archives would, of course, be deeply flawed. While private archives can provide a small number of official papers, the National Archives is the only major repository of documents on government and contains the files of Whitehall departments, detailing working processes and decision-making. While Aldrich and others have pointed to the pitfalls of extensive research based on official material at Kew, archival studies provide the solid foundations of research into intelligence and security, though it remains necessary to consult the records as broadly as possible. Wark argues that historians need to adopt ‘a more radical definition of the nature of intelligence archives, and to turn our sights from the question of explaining what secret agencies did or do, to how governments think and act’, pointing to all government departments that ‘receive, incorporate, digest and report on intelligence that comes to them from both secret and overt sources’.31 While a painstaking process, a search of the file series of the Prime Minister’s Office, Foreign Office, Cabinet Office and others provides a significant insight into the ­intelligence–policymaker relationship during the Attlee period. While it is true that the archives still provide a ‘somewhat constrained’

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

6

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

view of Cold War intelligence, government departments have been willing to release details of Cold War activities. One particularly useful research tool has been the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Coming into effect in January 2005, the Act allows a general right of access to information held by public bodies, including central government departments. While Section 23 of the Act precludes ‘Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters’, requests under the FOIA have led to the release of new intelligence and security-related material from the archives of the Cabinet Office, Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence; a research strategy reminiscent of Wark’s more radical definition of the intelligence archive.32 While it may be too early to offer any definitive comments on the impact of the FOIA, it is important to acknowledge that its use does not, in any sense, represent an ‘easy’ research option. Requests are often time consuming, requiring users to invest a considerable amount of effort, while documents can also be released out of their broader context, raising the problem of government manipulation. While the FOIA has resulted in the release of new material, its effectiveness should not be exaggerated. One area in which the Act is not helpful is in the field of intelligence liaison, where historians face a series of exemptions that prevent the release of information acquired from foreign governments.33 Another important source of information has been the private papers of ministers and senior officials housed in research libraries and private institutions. As with official sources in state archives, private papers pose similar problems for researchers, and scholars are not assured an ‘analogue of reality’ due to selective memory, destruction of files and institutionalised bias. As a result, it has been necessary to cross-check information with other sources. The quality and nature of these have varied. Bevin’s private papers, while important for understanding his working methods, are wholly devoid of intelligence material. More significant are his working papers, now held by the National Archives. In contrast, Attlee’s private papers at the Bodleian Library proved to be surprisingly revelatory. While used extensively by other biographers and academics, they included traces of intelligence material, along with his frank view of the British intelligence community in the spring of 1950. The Dalton papers were also important in understanding Labour involvement in wartime special operations, while Morrison’s private papers proved an important source on the Burgess and Maclean episode.34 Besides senior government ministers, this study has also made extensive use of the private papers of a number of senior officials.35 The unpublished memoirs of Sir Patrick Reilly, for example, gave substantive insight into the management of post-war intelligence, as well as the

Introduction

7

Foreign Office response to the Burgess and Maclean defection, while other papers, including those of Sir Alexander Cadogan, have been of particular use in complementing existing source material.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The British Labour Party and intelligence: a brief history The British Labour Party’s attitude towards security and intelligence remains something of a neglected subject. While Labour’s views on other associated subjects, including defence and foreign policy, have received in-depth analysis, the views of senior Labour figures, MPs and party activists towards the intelligence community are absent from much of the academic literature, with Andrew acknowledging that historians ‘have so far shown a surprising lack of interest in the relations between the Labour leadership and SIS’ – an omission that can, arguably, be extended to the rest of the British intelligence community.36 In part, this absence reflects the general lack of information about party politics and intelligence and security, although some limited attention has been given to the Conservative Party’s intimate links to the inter-war intelligence community.37 In the main, what has been written about the British Labour Party and the intelligence agencies has been dominated by investigative journalists and left-leaning commentators who, in drawing heavily on a long tradition of mistrust between the political ‘left’ and the ‘secret state’, point to events such as the Zinoviev Letter affair of 1924 and accusations that Britain’s intelligence community used dirty tricks to undermine the first Labour government, and the later ‘Wilson plot’ of the 1970s, to highlight the intrinsic bias of the agencies against the left. In a study of Labour and the ‘secret state’, the author Robin Ramsey commented that the intelligence services were ‘the enemy’ of the labour movement, while in January 1996, the then Labour MP for Brent East, Ken Livingtone, during a debate on revisions to the Security Service Bill, was able to draw on the Zinoviev affair and the Wilson plot to claim that there were ‘strong links between the Conservative Party and MI5’ and a climate of ‘treason against Labour Governments … endemic in MI5 throughout its history’.38 The formation of Britain’s first minority Labour government under James Ramsay MacDonald caused shockwaves in the corridors of power. Writing in his diary, having witnessed MacDonald being sworn in as a Privy Councillor, King George V wrote: ‘Today twenty-three years ago dear Grandmama died. I wonder what she would have thought of a Labour government.’39 Winston Churchill believed, with characteristic hyperbole, that Labour would be a ‘national misfortune’

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

8

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

comparable only to defeat in war.40 Individuals inside Britain’s intelligence and security community were also alarmed, having monitored senior party figures from time to time. During the First World War, the authorities had, based on MI5 information, considered prosecuting MacDonald for sedition because of his anti-war speeches, and in 1920 officers were asked to investigate claims that George Lansbury, a future leader of the party and editor of the Daily Herald, had tried to subvert British prisoners of war during a visit to Moscow, following British involvement in the Russian Civil War.41 If intelligence officers were alarmed by developments, Labour harboured their own suspicions. In wartime MacDonald had questioned the role of the Secret Vote, the annually approved fund used to pay for the acquisition of intelligence, and, increasingly, the growing intelligence community, drawing attention to the underhand practices of government agents provocateurs sent to spy on workers in the munitions industry.42 In April 1919, during a meeting on intelligence funds, MI5’s first Director General, Vernon Kell, acknowledged the widespread suspicion in the Labour Party that the Secret Vote was used to ‘spy upon Labour in this country’ and that parliamentary opposition would, in his view, be reduced if prominent MPs were privately briefed about his organisation’s ‘work … during the war’, though the proposal was not acted on.43 In government, MacDonald took on the dual role of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, though it appears he was initially kept in ignorance of diplomatic intercepts provided to the Foreign Office by the Government Code & Cipher School. MacDonald’s Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur Ponsonby, who, like MacDonald, had opposed Britain’s involvement in the First World War, had no respect for the ‘dirt’ produced by the intelligence machinery, and, in office, when he mentioned intelligence, officials ‘used to become rigid. I was not allowed to know.’44 MacDonald did, however, have access to the regular reports on revolutionary movements in Britain, produced by Special Branch and its head, Sir Wyndham Childs. In January 1924, shortly after entering office, MacDonald was provided with his first report on the subject but was dismissive, believing that much of the information was already known to ministers and coverage in the reports fairly limited, missing out right-wing groups because of a focus on the left.45 MacDonald’s Home Secretary, Arthur Henderson, saw their value, defending Special Branch when it was attacked by Labour MPs in Parliament, and continuing to read its reports, as well as authorising Home Office warrants on the correspondence of leading communists.46 In spite of his reluctance to see Special Branch material, MacDonald did agree to the formation of a special committee on ‘Industrial Unrest’

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

9

chaired by the Lord Privy Seal, J. R. Clynes, during a meeting of the Cabinet in April, which was formed to look at the role of communist activity in industry.47 Its membership also included Henderson, Sidney Webb (President of the Board of Trade), John Wheatley (Minister for Health) and Thomas Shaw (Minister of Labour), and used Special Branch information to reach its conclusions that the Communist Party posed a subversive threat, though, during a Cabinet meeting in midMay, ministers were divided on the issue of actively countering the issue using official propaganda channels.48 Whatever trust may have existed between Labour and the ‘secret state’ was undermined by the Zinoviev Letter affair later that year. In October, MacDonald’s fragile hold on power had been broken by the abortive prosecution of John Ross Campbell, a British communist and editor of Workers’ Weekly, for incitement to mutiny under the Sedition to Mutiny Act of 1797. The failed prosecution came on top of Labour’s efforts to repair relations with the Soviet Union, with the attempted rapprochement only serving to anger the Conservatives and Liberals. While a draft Anglo-Soviet treaty was agreed, hostile propaganda and the collapse of MacDonald’s government over the Campbell case meant that it was never ratified, with MacDonald and the Labour Party open to allegations of being soft on communism in the run-up to the October 1924 election.49 It was a fear exploited by Labour’s political opponents with the publication of a letter reputedly from Grigory Zinoviev, president of the International Committee of the Comintern, urging the British Communist Party and sympathetic Labour MPs to push for the ratification of the draft Anglo-Soviet Treaty.50 Copies of the letter had been received through SIS channels and had been forwarded to MacDonald, who was travelling the country on the campaign trail. Accompanying the document was a letter drafted by the Foreign Office protesting against Zinoviev’s alleged attempt to subvert the British political system. On seeing the Foreign Office’s draft complaint, MacDonald made significant amendments, toughening the overall tone, and he understood that a final copy of the protest would be sent to him before it was released. However, the Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Eyre Crowe, mistakenly authorised release of Zinoviev’s letter along with MacDonald’s protest. On the same day, Foreign Office officials found out that copies of the letter had been leaked via undisclosed sources to the Daily Mail. The leaking of the letter and its publication by the Conservative-supporting press embarrassed the government and left a lasting impression in Labour circles that the party had been robbed of power in the subsequent election, when the Conservatives won 419 seats to Labour’s 151.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

10

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

For MacDonald, the leak of the letter smelled like a ‘political plot’.51 During a meeting of the Cabinet on 31 October, he authorised a Cabinet committee to examine ‘the authenticity’ of the letter, believing, in private, that he had been the victim of an elaborate plot, though the committee, reporting their findings in early November, were unable to arrive at a definitive answer because of a lack of evidence.52 It was left to the incoming Conservative government under Stanley Baldwin to investigate further and, on 12 November, another Cabinet committee was formed under the chairmanship of the Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain. Based on information provided by SIS, the committee determined that the letter was undoubtedly genuine, a conclusion that failed to dampen suspicions that it was a fake leaked to undermine Labour in the election campaign.53 In the short term, the affair certainly damaged Labour’s relationship with the intelligence community. When MacDonald questioned the head of SIS’s political section, Malcolm Woollcombe, about the affair before leaving office, he refused to speak to Woollcombe face-to-face and, instead, interviewed him from a separate room, with Crowe asking the questions.54 In the Labour Party, too, attitudes towards intelligence were hostile; a think piece produced for the Advisory Committee on International Questions, beyond general reforms to the Foreign Office itself, pushed for the ‘suspension … of all secret service activities’.55 Labour MPs were also vocal in their opposition to intelligence. During a debate on Britain’s diplomatic relations with Moscow when, infamously, intelligence intercepts were quoted at length, undermining Britain’s ability to read Soviet ciphers, Ponsonby, recalling his time in the Foreign Office, spoke openly about the ‘dirt’ produced by British intelligence. He also spoke about the divided loyalties of members of the intelligence community who were, he said, ‘capable of serving two masters, a man whose sense of honour is wholly different from what we understand by honour’.56 In March 1928 the Zinoviev Letter was raised again following allegations of financial malpractice in the Foreign Office. An investigation into the affair led to suggestions that J. D. Gregory, a former head of the Foreign Office’s Northern Department, had leaked the letter, leading to a parliamentary debate during which MacDonald attacked the intelligence services, speaking of the letter as a ‘political weapon’ that was a deliberately planned and devised concoction of deceit, fitted artfully for the purpose of deceiving the public and to influence the Election. That it played a major part in deciding the verdict, no one would deny. That it was a fraudulent one, few would dare to deny.57

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

11

He was right to suspect a political plot. A later report into the Zinoviev Letter affair using material from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and SIS archives found that, while not an institutionalised plot against the Labour government, certain members of the intelligence community, acting on their own political beliefs, leaked the letter in the hope of advancing the ‘Conservative cause in Britain’.58 Many members of the intelligence community viewed Labour with ‘suspicion, alarm and in some cases contempt’ and enjoyed close relations with the Conservative Party.59 In some cases, this relationship went beyond association, with figures such as Joseph Ball, an MI5 officer and, from 1927, a senior figure in Conservative Central Office, actively blurring the lines between party politics and national security. The explosive nature of British politics, linked with the sensitive information collected by organisations including Special Branch and the possibility for future leaks, was recognised, it seems, by Baldwin himself who, according to Sir William Tyrrell, Permanent Under-Secretary in the Home Office, believed the political surveillance carried out by Special Branch ‘might at any point give rise to a scandal, owing to the Labour Party obtaining some plausible pretext to complain that a government department was being employed for party politics’.60 The legacy of the Zinoviev Letter meant that relations between ministers and the intelligence community may have suffered during the initial stages of the second MacDonald government, elected in June 1929. Sir Robert Vansittart, who served as Foreign Office Permanent UnderSecretary, recalled how Henderson, a Methodist teetotaller, was suspicious of intelligence, with the Foreign Secretary seeing ‘Secret Service like hard liquor, because he knew, and wanted to know, nothing of it’. When looking for additional intelligence expenditure Vansittart would slip the estimates among the other papers waiting for Henderson’s signature, which he approved, albeit reluctantly, saying ‘you will be the death of me one day, Van’.61 Henderson’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Hugh Dalton, also believed intelligence expenditure – despite the interwar period being lean years for the intelligence community – ‘excessive’ and the budget in need of further cuts.62 Yet, despite their earlier negative views, ministers used intelligence on a day-to-day basis. Even Dalton wrote in his diary about accessing sensitive diplomatic intercepts, in particular messages between the Japanese naval attaché in London and the Admiralty in Tokyo which showed that the British head of Far Eastern naval intelligence had aired frustration about British government attitudes towards the Royal Navy, which, like other areas of defence, had suffered cuts. This led to a strongly worded protest from Dalton to the Admiralty.63 MacDonald similarly saw

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

12

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

­ aterial produced by GC&CS and used it to further his policy on limitm ing naval expenditure during the London Naval Conference in 1930.64 By the end of his tenure as Prime Minister, MacDonald was chair of a committee authorising the Foreign Office and Treasury to look into providing increased funds for ‘Secret Service’ work on German air estimates.65 The lines between Labour and the intelligence community had also started to blur with the recruitment to SIS of the Labour supporter and former Liberal MP, Lieutenant Commander Reginald ‘Rex’ Fletcher, who worked as part of SIS’s headquarters staff overseeing operations in Europe before leaving in 1935 to become Labour MP for Nuneaton.66 During his time with SIS, Fletcher regularly dined with the former diplomat and banker Robert Bruce Lockhart, providing information about the perilous state of Britain’s inter-war armed services and intelligence, and agreeing to provide ‘the dope’ for news articles attacking government policy.67 During several conversations, Fletcher was rather damning about naval intelligence – particularly its director, Admiral James Troup, who was, Lockhart recorded, an ‘absolute child about intelligence’ – and the Air Ministry, which he attacked, along with several others, in a later pamphlet, The Air Defence of Britain.68 While work in this area is by no means complete, the legacy of Zinoviev was not as damaging as popularly suggested, showing that Labour–­ intelligence relations were on the mend.

Overview Chapter 1 examines Labour involvement in the wartime coalition government and ministerial access to and use of intelligence. It argues that the Second World War provided an important opportunity for future ministers in the post-war government to gain knowledge and experience of handling and using intelligence. Within months of the coalition’s formation, Labour ministers had access to the fruits of British codebreaking. Further, the chapter also suggests that this experience ended any lingering animosity that remained from the Zinoviev Letter affair. The chapter places particular emphasis on Attlee’s wartime experiences and provides examples of his use of intelligence and early views on it. It also looks at Labour involvement with the Special Operations Executive and party attempts to add an ideological facet to British special operations in Europe under Hugh Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare until 1942. Beyond intelligence and special operations, Labour involvement with intelligence and security extended to the domestic front with Herbert Morrison, appointed Home Secretary in November 1940. Already a

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

13

fierce opponent of British communists, he received the product of MI5’s surveillance of the Communist Party of Great Britain and provided the Cabinet with information warning of communist espionage. Chapter 2 looks at ministerial use of, and attitudes towards, intelligence after Labour’s 1945 election victory, drawing on the papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee. While it has been argued that Attlee, a committed internationalist, was opposed to any hostility towards the Soviet Union, the chapter shows that he was kept fully aware of Soviet interests and intentions despite his commitment to renewed Anglo-Soviet relations. In addition to highlighting the role of intelligence in early Cold War crises, particularly the Berlin blockade, it also looks at ministerial doubts about the intelligence community, particularly those of Attlee himself. By 1949 he had grown increasingly critical of the intelligence services and, a year later, ordered a review of the intelligence community by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, which is explored here for the first time. Chapter 3 explores the development of British propaganda policy towards the Soviet Union. While ministers began the process of dismantling the wartime information machinery, the developing threat of the Soviet Union forced them to sanction defensive measures where British interests were threatened. The chapter also looks at discussions on anticommunist propaganda that would ultimately lead to the formation of the Information Research Department (IRD) in 1948. The chapter also shows how, while agreeing to overseas information activities, Bevin resisted calls for Britain to start a Cold War offensive involving subversion and special operations inside the Eastern Bloc. Chapter 4 considers ministerial attitudes towards special operations and the development of covert warfare against the Eastern Bloc. By looking at the example of Operation Valuable, SIS’s abortive scheme to detach Albania from the Soviet orbit, it explores why Bevin, initially opposed to any activities beyond propaganda, endorsed offensive measures. The chapter also examines the development of Britain’s Cold War machinery by looking at the formation and early discussions of the Committee on Communism (Overseas), formed in 1949. It shows that by late 1951 ministers had endorsed proposals for subversion inside the Soviet Bloc with the aim of undermining Soviet rule. The chapter also details ministerial discussions on the development of stay-behind networks in Europe. Chapter 5 studies ministerial reactions to the spy scandals that threatened Anglo-American nuclear exchanges. Considering the cases of Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, it argues that ministers were sensitive to claims from

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

14

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

the United States that Britain was weak in the field of security. After the Fuchs and Pontecorvo scandals, ministers reacted quickly to repair any damage to transatlantic relations by introducing new security procedures known as ‘positive vetting’. The chapter also uses newly released archival material to shed light on ministerial reactions to the disapperance of the Foreign Office diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, in the spring of 1951. Their defection provoked widespread outrage and, once again, prompted a review of security in government, on this occasion the Foreign Office, on the instructions of the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, which is explored here for the first time. Chapter 6 focuses on the government response to communism at home. Shaped by their wartime experiences of intelligence and security, it argues that the popular perception that ministers were suspicious of the intelligence services, particularly the Security Service, is unfounded and based largely upon Labour folklore. In fact, rather than viewing MI5 with disdain, even alarm, ministers in the new government were aware of the need for an internal security body; any changes in the security apparatus were the result of the recommendations made by Sir Findlater Stewart, whose report of November 1945 is examined here for the first time. The chapter also looks at the development of Whitehall security procedures using the minutes and memoranda of the Committee on Subversive Activities (GEN 183). It argues that, as in the field of British policy towards Russia, domestic counter-measures against communists in the civil service were hidden until the spring of 1948 after attempts at Anglo-Soviet rapprochement finally broke down. Despite the introduction and later expansion of vetting, ministers sought to balance anti-communist measures alongside the need for freedom of speech and liberty. Nowhere is this clearer than in discussions for domestic anti-communist propaganda. While the Labour Party and other organisations had participated in the distribution of such material, IRD had no specific mandate to conduct its activities at home. However, after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, ministers authorised a domestic campaign aimed at influential sections of the British public, and this study looks at the early development of this campaign, revealing IRD’s domestic activities in education, industry and the armed forces. Chapter 7 explores government attempts to combat communist influence in and around Britain’s overseas territories and dependencies and the development of security agencies across the Commonwealth. The Attlee era also saw the development of internal security agencies around the Commonwealth modelled on British lines, resulting from Soviet espionage and American fears that Britain’s allies were far from secure. Responding to American threats to cut off secret information

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

15

to Australia, the British government responded by assisting in the development of a new internal security agency, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). This chapter looks at the role played by Attlee and others in Commonwealth security liaison and the role of the Commonwealth Security Conferences of 1948 and 1951, highlighting the political dimension of intelligence and security liaison. Using the recently declassified files of the Colonial Information Policy Committee, the chapter assesses British attempts to direct overseas anticommunist publicity. Chaired by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Patrick Gordon Walker, the committee was formed in the autumn of 1948. The chapter explores the role of the committee and IRD in combating communism in Britain’s African colonies. The book concludes that, while their relationship has often been defined by episodes such as the Zinoviev Letter affair, Labour and the British intelligence services shared common objectives during the Attlee years in countering the threat of communism. Rather than treating MI5 with disdain, as has been previously argued, the study concludes that ministers were eager to use the Service in their own struggle against the Communist Party of Great Britain. It also argues that Attlee and Bevin played a pivotal role in intelligence decision-making, from suppressing intelligence information to the authorisation of special operations behind the Iron Curtain, and dominated the conduct of Britain’s Cold War. One important contributing factor to their dominance was the immense secrecy surrounding intelligence affairs and the complicated committee structure, explained here for the first time. Whether at home, throughout Britain’s overseas territories, or in deciding government policy towards allies or enemies, ministers recognised the importance of intelligence.

Notes   1 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 544.   2 ‘MPs rate the achievements of Clement Attlee the highest of all Prime Ministers since World War Two’, http://www.populus.co.uk/News/MPs-ratethe-achievements-of-Clement-Attlee-the-highest-of-all-Prime-Ministers-sinceWorld-War-Two/ (accessed 24 November 2015).   3 Kenneth Harris, Attlee (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 567; and Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds, ‘Clement Attlee’, in Charles Clarke and Toby James (eds), British Labour Leaders (London: Biteback, 2015), p. 167.   4 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension:

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

16

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Governments and Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1984).   5 See, for example, Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009); Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray, 2001); Michael Smith, The Spying Game: The Secret History of British Espionage (London: Politico’s, 1994).   6 The situation runs parallel to that described by Ferris regarding the history of British signals intelligence, where our knowledge, he suggests, is ‘received wisdom: what we have been told, not what we have learned’ (John Ferris, ‘The Road to Bletchley Park: The British Experience with Signals Intelligence, 1892–1945’, Intelligence and National Security, 17:1 (2002), p. 53).   7 See, for example, Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945–51 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Henry Pelling, The Labour Governments, 1945–51 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984). For a general all-round overview of the Attlee period, see also Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain, 1945–51 (London: Penguin, 2006); Kevin Jeffreys, The Attlee Governments, 1945–51 (Harlow: Longman, 1992); Robert Pearce, Attlee’s Labour Governments, 1945–51 (London: Routledge, 1993).   8 For studies of Attlee, see Harris, Attlee; Trevor Burridge, Clement Attlee: A Political Biography (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985); Jerry H. Brookshire, Clement Attlee (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). Other studies include Robert Pearce, Attlee (London: Longman, 1997); Paul Addison, ‘Clement Attlee, 1945–1951’, in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.), From New Jerusalem to New Labour: The British Prime Minister from Attlee to Blair (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 9–22.   9 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–51 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 10 Email from Lord Morgan, 18 October 2012. 11 Robert Crowcroft, Attlee’s War: World War II and the Making of a Labour Leader (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011). See Francis Beckett, Clem Attlee (London: Politico’s, 2007); and Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds, Attlee: A Life in Politics (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010). 12 Christopher Moran, Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 12. 13 Ferris, ‘The Road to Bletchley Park’, p. 57. 14 Christopher Andrew, ‘Intelligence, International Relations and “Undertheorisation”’, Intelligence and National Security, 19:2 (2004), p. 173. 15 Ibid. 16 For just a selection of the work on Churchill, see Christopher Andrew, ‘Churchill and Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 3:3 (1988); and David Stafford, Churchill & Secret Service (London: Abacus, 1997). 17 On Waldegrave, see Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Did Waldegrave Work? The Impact of Open Government upon British History’, Twentieth Century History, 9:1 (1998).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

17

18 Richard Thurlow, ‘The Charm Offensive: The “Coming Out” of MI5’, Intelligence and National Security, 15:1 (2000), p. 184; and Gill Bennett, ‘Declassification and Release Policies of the UK’s Intelligence Agencies’, Intelligence and National Security, 17:1 (2002), pp. 21–32. 19 ‘October 2015 release of historical MI5 files’, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/ news/news-by-category/historical-material/october-2015-release-of-historical-​ mi5-files.html (accessed 24 November 2015). 20 Peter Gill, ‘Reasserting Control: Recent Changes in the Oversight of the UK Intelligence Community’, Intelligence and National Security, 11:2 (1996); Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 5. 21 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 6. 22 Richard Aldrich, ‘Grow Your Own: Cold War Intelligence and History Supermarkets’, Intelligence and National Security, 17:1 (2002), p. 148; Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 6. 23 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Persuasion? British Intelligence, the History Policeman and Official Information’, in Patrick Major and Christopher Moran (eds), Spooked: Britain, Empire and Intelligence since 1945 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2009), pp. 30–1. 24 Stephen Lander, ‘British Intelligence in the Twentieth Century’, Intelligence and National Security, 17:1 (2002); Peter Jackson, ‘The Politics of Secret Service in War, Cold War and Imperial Retreat’, Twentieth Century British History, 14:4 (2003), pp. 420–1. 25 See Anthony Badger, ‘Historians, a Legacy of Suspicion and the “migrated archives”’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23:4–5 (2012), pp. 799–807. 26 Lander, ‘British Intelligence’, pp. 8–9. 27 Ferris, ‘The Road to Bletchley Park’, pp. 54–5. 28 Ibid., p. 54. 29 John Callaghan and Kevin Morgan, ‘The Open Conspiracy of the Communist Party and the Case of W.N. Ewer, Communist and Anti-Communist’, The Historical Journal, 49:2 (2006), p. 564. 30 Ibid., pp. 559–60. 31 Wesley K. Wark, ‘Communication: In Never-Never Land? The British Archives on Intelligence’, The Historical Journal, 35:1 (1992), p. 201. 32 Freedom of Information Act (Original As Enacted), http://www.legislation.gov. uk/ukpga/2000/36/section/23/enacted (accessed 5 October 2015). 33 Christopher Murphy and Daniel Lomas, ‘Communication: Return to Neverland? Freedom of Information and the History of British Intelligence’, The Historical Journal, 57:1 (2014), pp. 273–87. 34 An indispensable source of information on the private papers of former Cabinet ministers is Cameron Hazlehurst, Sally Whitehead and Christine Woodland, A Guide to the Papers of British Cabinet Ministers, 1900–1964 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 35 For the papers of senior officials, see Chris Cook, Sources in British Politics History, 1900–1951, Vol. 2: A Guide to the Papers of Selected Public Servants (London: Macmillan, 1975).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

18

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

36 Christopher Andrew, ‘Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War’, Review of International Studies, 24 (1998), p. 323. 37 The prominent example has to be John Ferris and Uri Bar-Joseph, ‘Getting Marlowe to Hold his Tongue: The Conservative Party, the Intelligence Services and the Zinoviev Letter’, Intelligence and National Security, 8:4 (2003), pp. 100–37. 38 For further allegations, see Robin Ramsay, Politics and Paranoia (Hove: Picnic, 2008), pp. 176–84. On the Livingstone claims, see Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Col. 285, 10 January 1996. 39 Trevor Barnes, ‘Special Branch and the First Labour Government’, The Historical Journal, 22:4 (1979), p. 941. 40 Gill Bennett, Churchill’s Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence (London: Routledge, 2009). 41 Andrew, Secret Service, p. 298; Ferris and Bar-Joseph, ‘Getting Marlowe to Hold his Tongue’, pp. 126–7. 42 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Col. 656, 8 March 1917. On Macdonald and PMS2, see Nicholas Hiley, ‘Internal Security in Wartime: The Rise and Fall of PMS2’, Intelligence and National Security, 1:3 (1986), pp. 408–9. 43 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 116. 44 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Col. 2258, 26 May 1927. 45 Barnes, ‘Special Branch and the First Labour Government’, p. 945. 46 Ibid., p. 948; Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 147. On the inter-war struggle against Soviet espionage, see Victor Madeira, Britannia and the Bear: The Anglo-Russian Intelligence Wars, 1917–1929 (London: Boydell Press, 2014). 47 All references are to the UK National Archives (TNA) unless otherwise stated: CAB 24/166, C.P. 273 (24), Industrial Unrest Committee: Interim Report, 30 April 1924. 48 CAB 23/48/7, Cabinet 32 (24) minutes of meeting 15 May 1924. 49 On the collapse of the MacDonald government, see John Shepherd and Keith Laybourn, Britain’s First Labour Government (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006). 50 Annex A: Text of the ‘Zinoviev Letter’ was received by SIS on 8 October 1924, in Gill Bennett, “A most extraordinary and mysterious business”: The Zinoviev Letter of 1924’, History Notes, 14 (February 1999), pp. 93–5. 51 Ibid., p. 73. 52 CAB 23/34, Cabinet Conclusions 57 (24), 31 October 1924; CAB 23/48, Cabinet Conclusions 58 (24), 4 November 1924. 53 CAB 23/49/, Cabinet Conclusions 60 (24), 19 November 1924. 54 Christopher Andrew, ‘Secret Intelligence and British Foreign Policy, 1900–1939’, in Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes, Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945 (Exeter: Exeter Studies in History, 1987), p. 20. 55 Labour History Archive and Study Centre (hereafter LHASC), Manchester: Advisory Committee on International Questions: Foreign Office and Labour Governments, August 1925. 56 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Col. 2257, 26 May 1927.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

19

57 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Col. 53, 19 March 1928. 58 Bennett, ‘“A most extraordinary and mysterious business”’, p. 92. 59 Bennett, Churchill’s Man of Mystery, p. 79. 60 FO 1093/71, minutes of meeting held at 3 p.m. on Friday, March 11th. 61 Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession (London: Hutchinson, 1958), pp. 397–8. 62 Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: Guild Publishing, 1985), p. 342. 63 Diary entry for 30 October 1929, in Ben Pimlott (ed.), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1918–40, 1945–60 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), pp. 69–70. 64 See John Ferris, ‘Communications Intelligence and Conference Diplomacy: London, 1930’, in R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson and Len Scott (eds), Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 46, 54. 65 CAB 24/255, C.P. (100) 35, The German Air Programme, 13 May 1935. 66 Andrew and Noakes, Intelligence and International Relations, pp. 20–1. 67 Kenneth Young (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Vol. 1: 1915–1938 (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 204. 68 Ibid., p. 356. See L. E. O. Charlton, G. T. Garratt and R. Fletcher, The Air Defence of Britain (London: Penguin, 1938).

1  Clement Attlee in Downing Street, 1945

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

2  Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary (1945–51)

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

3  Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council (1945–51) and Foreign Secretary (1951)

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

4  Hugh Dalton, Minister for Economic Warfare (1940–42) and Chancellor of the Exchequer (1945–47)

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

5  Sir Stewart Menzies, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (1939–53)

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

6  Sir Percy Sillitoe, Director General of the Security Service (1946–53)

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

7  Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary (1947–64)

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

8  Sir William Strang, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office (1949–53)

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

9  Christopher Paget Mayhew, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1946–50)

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

10  Rt. Hon. Clement Attlee, President Harry Truman and Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King concluding talks on atomic energy, November 1945

11  Clement Attlee and prime ministers at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, October 1948

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

1 Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Wartime apprenticeship: Labour and intelligence during the Second World War What is needed is a new organization to co-ordinate, inspire, control and assist the nationals of the oppressed countries who must themselves be the direct participants. We need absolute secrecy, a certain fanatical enthusiasm, willingness to work with people of different nationalities, complete political reliability.1 Hugh Dalton, 2 July 1940

This chapter will illustrate how the Labour leadership’s involvement with the wartime Churchill government brought ministers into the world of intelligence and security, an area previously overlooked by academics looking at this period.2 From the summer of 1940, Labour ministers were inducted into Britain’s intelligence and security community, enjoying access to some of the most secretive areas of the state. This chapter will show that this experience had two significant effects. Firstly, it continued the process already started during MacDonald’s second government of improving relations between Labour and the intelligence community. Secondly, it constituted useful ‘work experience’ that allowed ministers to handle intelligence and security issues, and become fully acquainted with the complexities of the secret world. Other than receiving the fruits of British wartime intelligence, Labour ministers played an important role in the formation and early development of the Special Operations Executive, the wartime organisation established to inspire resistance in occupied Europe. This chapter shows how Hugh Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare, attempted to develop a new brand of unconventional warfare with Labour at its forefront before his replacement in February 1942. It also shows the important role played by Attlee in supporting Dalton during several battles in Whitehall, and his continued role chairing important meetings of the Defence Committee at which SOE’s future was discussed. The chapter argues that Labour ministers were not averse to special operations, as has been previously suggested, but backed the amalgamation of the organisation with SIS to preserve Britain’s newly acquired special operations capability.3 On the wartime

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

32

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

domestic front, Herbert Morrison regularly received MI5 material as Home Secretary, dealing with the political fallout from the internment of fascists and Nazi sympathisers, along with enemy nationals, as well as information dealing with the activities of the Communist Party of Great Britain. While MI5’s information ultimately failed to influence Churchill to implement vetting in government, the information reinforced the anticommunist leanings of Labour ministers. The collapse of the Chamberlain administration following the debacle of the Norway campaign and its replacement by a coalition government in the summer of 1940 has been considered an important watershed in Labour Party history. For the first time since 1931, Labour ministers were at the heart of government, playing an important role in both domestic and diplomatic affairs.4 Attlee was the only figure, other than Churchill himself, to serve for the duration of the coalition. His importance was recognised in February 1942 when he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister, though he had already acted as Churchill’s stand-in since the coalition’s formation. Having no departmental responsibility, save for his brief tenure as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Attlee made a significant contribution to the running of important Whitehall committees, developing his skills as an experienced chairman. He was a member of the three important wartime committees – the War Cabinet, Defence Committee and Lord President’s Committee, co-chairing the first two and, from September 1943, chair of the third. Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, described Attlee as a proficient chairman who ran meetings of the Cabinet and Defence Committee ‘very efficiently and quickly’.5 While the name of Winston Churchill has become synonymous with the world of intelligence before, during and beyond the Second World War, Attlee fades into the background.6 To some extent this omission could be considered the result of Attlee’s private character. As his daughter-in-law, Countess Attlee, made clear in conversation, intelligence was the most secret subject for an already reserved individual.7 But, now at the heart of government, Attlee became part of an innermost circle of ministers and officials who, in addition to other paperwork, were privy to a stream of intelligence reports.

Inside government: Labour and wartime intelligence Attlee was quick to criticise the intelligence world that he had recently been inducted into. As a member of the War Cabinet, Attlee, along with Arthur Greenwood, Labour’s Minister without Portfolio, received the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Wartime apprenticeship

33

reports of the Joint Intelligence Committee. On 17 May 1940 the JIC was instructed to issue reports on ‘any particular’ strategic development to the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and War Cabinet.8 Within months of the decision, Attlee came to appreciate problems with the machinery of intelligence. In November he wrote to Churchill requesting that the Chiefs of Staff should prepare a report on ‘the organisation’ of Britain’s intelligence apparatus. Completed by November, their report suggested that, while intelligence coordination was far from satisfactory, it ‘seems to us very undesirable that a drastic reorganisation … should be attempted at the moment when we are fighting for our lives’.9 Despite his relative inexperience, Attlee was not afraid to challenge this. ‘The fact that we were completely unaware of the elaborate and detailed plan of the Germans for the invasion of Norway,’ he wrote to Churchill, ‘seems to me to have demanded a thorough overhaul of the Intelligence Services.’10 In fact, the Chiefs of Staff had recommended ‘we should continue to use an inefficient system’. Instead, Attlee wrote ‘It is precisely because we are engaged in a critical war that we ought to do … what should have been done years ago’ and suggested the need for one ‘directing mind’ to oversee and improve intelligence. He would need to ‘be a person of analytic mind, detached from all the Services – without parti pris’.11 Attlee’s forceful letter failed to prompt action. While Churchill agreed that better coordination was necessary, the threat of imminent German invasion prevented swift change.12 The problem was only remedied after the intervention of the Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Francis Davidson, an ‘old friend’ of Attlee who had served with him in the same regiment during the First World War, which led to the formation of a sub-committee of the JIC to coordinate, assess and circulate strategic intelligence.13

Using intelligence Labour ministers were also privy to the fruits of Britain’s prized intelligence asset: codebreaking. Within weeks of the formation of the coalition, cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park, GC&CS’s war station, enjoyed their first major success against the German ‘Enigma’ machine. From May 1940 it was possible to read German traffic almost without a break for the duration of the conflict.14 Within six months, Attlee and three other Labour ministers – Ernest Bevin, Arthur Greenwood and A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty (despite claims he ‘was denied access to the most secret materials’)15 – were among a small group of those entrusted with information derived from this most secret source,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

34

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

known initially as BONIFACE or ULTRA.16 While it is unclear whether they were fully aware of the true nature of the material, the stringent measures used to protect it would most likely have alerted ministers to its great importance.17 In addition, Attlee also received intercepts from the chief of SIS, Sir Stewart Menzies, who had been ‘C’ since 1939. Attlee’s access to the ‘golden eggs’ of Britain’s intelligence community was a direct result of Churchill’s passion for raw intelligence, particularly his decision to request ‘all ENIGMA messages’ on a daily basis in September 1940.18 While he saw only a selection of intercepts after 1941, Menzies continued to send this highly secret source of information to Downing Street in ‘buff-coloured boxes’ that only Churchill could access.19 In the Prime Minister’s absence, Attlee also received signals intercepts.20 During the Atlantic Conference of August 1941, Attlee saw ‘Most Secret’ summaries on Axis operations on the Eastern and Mediterranean fronts.21 Churchill’s increasingly frequent overseas visits meant that Attlee had further access and, in February 1943, with Churchill away at Adana, Turkey, he received intercepts detailing plans by German intelligence to assassinate the Prime Minister. Although the plot would have failed, Attlee immediately warned Churchill that ‘I and my colleagues, supported by the Chiefs of Staff, consider that it would be unwise for you to adhere to your present programme … [it is] essential in the national interest that you … proceed to England’.22 At the end of the year, Attlee also received the intercept of a meeting between Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, and the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, which lasted ‘more than an hour’ during which the latter: thanked [Ribbentrop] for his visit on the 8th and for GERMANY’s entry into the war two years ago in pursuance of the spirit of friendship of the Three-Power Treaty, and I made a suitable greeting. The Minister in his turn expressed, in dignified tones, his congratulations on the victories won by the Imperial Japanese armed forces during the past two years, and affirmed his enthusiasm for cooperation with JAPAN in the prosecution of the war.

Despite the dire situation on the Eastern Front, Ribbentrop optimistically said that ‘there was no great change, operations continuing to be limited to local fighting’, while in Italy, where German forces were in retreat, ‘the position fluctuated from day to day and there was nothing special for him to tell me’.23 A further illustration of Attlee’s use of signals intelligence can be found in May 1943. As Dominions Secretary, Attlee was consulted about the German legation in Dublin and the activities of its resident

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Wartime apprenticeship

35

minister, Eduard Hempel. From early 1943 British officials had been able to read the legation’s diplomatic traffic, codenamed PANDORA, showing that Hempel was coming under increasing pressure from Berlin to communicate intelligence. Although the Irish authorities prevented communications, officials in London were concerned that the Germans could potentially compromise future operations, which led to a meeting in the Dominions Office.24 After the meeting, Attlee wrote a lengthy memorandum for Churchill on the legation, weighing up the pros and cons of allowing its transmitter to remain in place. Writing that the legation had only transmitted once since 1941, he added that Hempel had been pressured to transmit a year later during the Allied invasion of North Africa, but that this had been prevented after the Irish authorities had threatened to confiscate the transmitter. After looking at the available information, Attlee concluded that the intelligence did not, in his view, suggest that the Germans had obtained any intelligence ‘likely to hamper or injure our operations’, and that ‘our interests would be better served’ by taking the risk of the Germans leaking details of Allied operations, ultimately protecting PANDORA and allowing GC&CS to continue reading German diplomatic traffic.25 While he had become an effective consumer, Attlee still had lessons to learn, as seen by Churchill’s response. Unimpressed by Attlee’s handling of sensitive information, the Prime Minister wrote how ‘Your minute … referring as it does to the most secret sources, ought not to have come to me other than in a locked box.’26

Labour and special operations Labour’s involvement in the coalition also brought the party leadership into the realm of special operations. Before June 1940 a number of secret organisations had been formed to conduct irregular warfare, including a small War Office organisation known as MI(R), SIS’s Section D run by the former Royal Engineer Major Laurence Grand, and a small black propaganda body under Foreign Office direction known as Electra House. However, following the collapse of France and the withdrawal of British forces from the continent, steps were taken to unify Britain’s fragmented machinery for special operations.27 In June the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan, proposed that irregular warfare needed to be ‘divorced from SIS’ and placed under the Director of Military Intelligence.28 The proposals met with opposition from Hugh Dalton, Labour’s Minister of Economic Warfare in the coalition.29 Renowned for his love of political gossip, Dalton has been

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

36

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

described as bad tempered, arrogant and overbearing, and as the arch political manipulator.30 During the 1930s he had been the principal architect of Labour’s defence policy and changed the party’s largely pacifist stance to one which, by late 1937, called for rearmament.31 By 1940 he believed fervently in the ‘distinctive political complexion’ of irregular warfare and sought to place Labour at the heart of Britain’s offensive war effort against Germany.32 In discussions on the future of special operations, Dalton complained that Cadogan gave ‘too much to the military’.33 He was not the only person wanting to oversee special operations. Dalton faced opposition from the Director of Military Intelligence, Frederick Beaumont-Nesbitt. During a meeting chaired by Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, Dalton opposed Cadogan’s scheme and, instead, proposed his own distinct brand of political warfare which was ‘likely to be better conducted by civilians than by soldiers’.34 The next day Dalton called for a new organisation headed by someone with ‘fanatical enthusiasm … complete political reliability’ to ‘co-ordinate, inspire, control and assist the nationals of the oppressed countries’.35 In his view, there was only one suitable candidate for the job: himself.36 As Cadogan’s diaries reveal, Dalton had been eager to ‘get a large finger in the sabotage pie’ and believed that Labour, with its numerous contacts among the European left, would inspire the ‘democratic international’.37 In a later conversation with Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, Dalton emphasised his unique political vision for special operations, arguing that it was the political left in France who deserved support and that SOE had a number of agents ‘in touch with the French workers, and that I myself strongly held the view that it was the French Industrial working class on whom we should count’. Questioned further by Mountbatten, Dalton said his views were ‘partly explained because I was a member of the Labour Party and had many acquaintances in French left circles’.38 The argument over wartime special operations continued unabated. On 9 July, Attlee told Dalton it had been agreed he would ‘do something in addition’ to his post as Minister for Economic Warfare.39 Yet he did not hear anything officially, and the Prime Minister remained silent on who would coordinate special operations. Rumours reached Dalton that Brendan Bracken, Churchill’s brash political ‘fixer’ and close confidant, was plotting to have special operations placed under Lord Swinton, a former Secretary of State for Air.40 But Bracken was not the only threat to Dalton’s candidacy and Beaumont-Nesbitt was reportedly ‘pulling every string’ to place irregular warfare under the military, while Churchill was also ‘bothered and reluctant’ to entrust special operations to Dalton. In conversation, Attlee confirmed that there had been a

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Wartime apprenticeship

37

‘strong counter-intrigue’ but reassured Dalton that he intended to ‘stand firm’ in support of him. According to Dalton, it was Attlee’s view that subversion ‘must be done from the Left’.41 Dalton sought support from his ministerial friends, informing them that ‘agitation’ had begun to reverse the earlier decision to place special irregular warfare under him.42 His plan worked; the next day Dalton was informed that Attlee had met the Prime Minister before Cabinet and was ‘very firm’ with him in backing Dalton.43 The Foreign Secretary also backed Dalton at a meeting with Attlee later that day.44 Cadogan also considered Dalton the stronger candidate, writing in his diary ‘I think Dalton the best man’.45 Churchill finally relented. One significant factor in his apparent climb-down was Attlee himself. Desmond Morton, the Prime Minister’s personal intelligence advisor, told Dalton how ‘if C.R.A. digs his feet in he will win’.46 Dalton’s appointment laid, Foot claims, the ghost of Zinoviev to rest, placing ‘one secret service under a Labour Minister’.47 Whether this is true or not, Labour found itself involved in the burgeoning wartime intelligence community. On 16 July Dalton received an invitation from Churchill to take over irregular warfare, which he accepted with ‘great eagerness and satisfaction’.48 ‘He led two lives as a Minister’, recalled Christopher Mayhew, a Labour supporter and future Minister of State in the Foreign Office, who served under Dalton: ‘a “white life”, in charge of normal economic warfare and a “black life” in charge of SOE’.49 The charter of the new organisation, the Special Operations Executive, was accepted by the Cabinet on 22 July. This new organisation was tasked to coordinate overseas sabotage and subversive activities, though it would liaise with other government departments and Chiefs of Staff to ensure that SOE’s actions supported wider British strategy.50 Gladwyn Jebb, formerly Dalton’s Parliamentary Private Secretary during his earlier tenure in the Foreign Office, was appointed Chief Executive Officer, and recalled how Dalton, while difficult to work with, put up a ‘tremendous fight’ whenever SOE was threatened by ‘well established Departments’.51 Despite hopes for a ‘democratic international’, Dalton found it increasingly difficult to fulfil Churchill’s ambitions of setting ‘Europe ablaze’. German success on the continent left Britain with ‘not … one single agent between the Balkans and the English Channel’.52 Bureaucratic infighting and equipment shortages further undermined efforts to establish networks in Europe. Despite several minor successes, notably the overthrow of the pro-Axis Yugoslav regime, in December 1941 Dalton despondently wrote in his diary how ‘Our operations have been few and far between. Our last reports have been almost bare … I am particularly anxious for a successful operation or two.’53

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

38

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

To make matters worse, Dalton became embroiled in a struggle for the control of propaganda. The root cause of the dispute lay with the decision to divide responsibility between SO1 under Dalton, concerning black propaganda, and the Ministry of Information (MOI). Tensions began as early as the summer of 1940 when the Minister of Information, Alfred Duff Cooper, attempted to unify propaganda under his ministry, leading to conflict with Dalton. Despite attempts by the Lord President, Sir John Anderson, to mediate, tensions increased and, in July 1941, a disheartened Duff Cooper left the MOI, leaving a jubilant Dalton to write in his diary that the MOI was a ‘coffin’ for anyone willing to accept it.54 His victory was short lived, however, as Cooper was replaced by Brendan Bracken, a close confidant of Churchill. Bracken had an anti-Labour bias and had, Dalton complained to Attlee, been ‘trying to poison the wells’ against Labour ministers.55 He immediately attempted to remove propaganda from Dalton by proposing the formation of a new department, the Political Warfare Executive (PWE).56 While partially responsible for the new organisation, Dalton found himself increasingly marginalised by Bracken, which forced him to capitalise on Labour’s position in the War Cabinet in an attempt to strengthen his own, now shrinking, empire. Recognising that Churchill had a ‘strong desire’ to avoid upsetting his Labour colleagues, he told Attlee of Bracken’s apparent anti-Labour activities and called for him to defend Labour’s stake in government. ‘The Labour Party,’ Dalton told Attlee, ‘are not in this government as poor relations of the Tories.’57 The attacks continued unabated, however, and Dalton again spoke to Attlee in November, urging that ‘it was important … that one of the Labour Ministers should be in on propaganda’. Attlee, Dalton recorded, ‘warmly agreed’.58 Yet, in spite of Attlee’s support, the conflict with Bracken continued and only ended when Churchill, tired of the continued backbiting, transferred Dalton to the Board of Trade. ‘Handing over SOE twangs my heart strings’, he wrote in his diary.59 Dalton was succeeded by a leading Conservative, Lord Selborne.60 His ‘promotion’ prevented splits in the coalition and placed him in a key position to shape future domestic policy.61 Nonetheless, Dalton’s replacement provoked anger in the Labour Party. James Middleton, its General Secretary, wrote to Attlee that the party’s omission from an ‘important section’ of government activity was a matter of great disquiet. He urged Attlee to ‘make representations’ to solve the problem from Labour’s ‘point of view’.62 Middleton’s plea failed to revive Labour’s involvement with political warfare. Dalton maintained interest in the organisation, occasionally corresponding with Selborne on SOE’s activities. In May 1944 he visited the ‘backroom boys’ at SOE’s London headquarters, later

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Wartime apprenticeship

39

conveying to Selborne his approval of what he considered a ‘first-class show’.63 Others, such as Bevin, Morrison and Alexander, intermittently exchanged correspondence with Selborne on matters ranging from the recruitment of European trade unionists to the provision of supplies and transport for SOE operations overseas.64 Attlee continued to find himself involved in SOE’s affairs.65 In October 1942 Selborne wrote to Attlee about SOE’s plans to fund French trades unions with an ‘initial grant’ of 30,000 francs per month to ‘impede’ the transfer of French workers to German factories, where they had been forced to ‘volunteer’ due to financial hardship. It was also hoped that this plan would allow workers to remain in France to aid the resistance.66 Attlee responded the next day, informing Selborne that he strongly approved of the idea and offered to help ‘in any way I can’.67 During one of Churchill’s frequent visits abroad, Attlee also found himself dealing with the fallout of SOE’s Dutch disaster, the ‘Englandspiel’. In December 1943 news emerged that SOE’s network in the Netherlands had been infiltrated by German counter-intelligence for nearly two years.68 The news resulted in a general review of the organisation’s activities, reviving inter-agency squabbling which threatened SOE’s continued independence.69 On 3 January 1944 the military secretary to the War Cabinet, ‘Pug’ Ismay, told Attlee that ‘closer integration’ of SOE and SIS was ‘essential’.70 In a further letter, Ismay called for a radical overhaul of the control for special operations and for SOE to be placed under the Foreign Secretary.71 In his calm handling of the situation, Attlee resisted any knee-jerk reaction and, at a meeting of the Defence Committee, ruled that SOE’s future would be decided once Churchill returned.72 This decision was important; Churchill sided with SOE, ending all talk about the organisation’s immediate future.73 With the end of hostilities in sight, discussions began regarding SOE’s post-war role. In April Selborne had requested that SOE be represented on the Armistice and Post-War Committee chaired by Attlee.74 This approach, the first of many, was rejected by Churchill who wrote how ‘the part which your naughty deeds in war play, in peace cannot at all be considered at the present time’.75 Undeterred, Selborne wrote to Attlee in September that the Chiefs of Staff had issued a directive on SOE missions in liberated territories and that the organisation had established a mission in Paris to penetrate Germany. Selborne also wrote that Romania and Bulgaria, former allies of Germany, presented further opportunities.76 Eden opposed the scheme, writing to Attlee that the Soviets ‘should not have cause to complain’ that SOE was conducting operations ‘unknown to them’.77 In the midst of the debate on SOE’s future, Selborne wrote to SOE’s vice-chief, Harry Sporborg. According

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

40

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

to Selborne, during a recent conversation Attlee had ‘resolutely set his face against the establishment of anything in the nature of a “British Comintern”’.78 While Attlee’s motives for this are unclear, Selborne subsequently wrote to Churchill dismissing claims that SOE would be a ‘British Comintern’, arguing that its functions would be ‘purely defensive of British interests’.79 SOE’s future as a separate post-war entity had also been raised by a report on SIS by Sir Nevile Bland, chair of a three-man committee looking at SIS’s future. While much of the paper dealt with secret intelligence collection, part of Bland’s report looked at ‘special operations’ and explained that SOE’s unique position in Whitehall was untenable in peacetime. ‘We consider it inconceivable that there should exist in peacetime,’ the report noted, ‘any secret organisation operating in foreign countries that is not responsible to the Foreign Secretary.’ Besides the thorny issue of ministerial responsibility, Bland’s report also pointed to the problems of two separate organisations working independently, and, more importantly, that the limited amount of ‘special operations’ work in peacetime far from justified two secret organisations.80 In November Eden told Churchill that ‘the only sound plan in the ultimate future will be to place “special operations” and the S.I.S. under the same controlling head’81 but, despite the clear calls for SOE’s disbandment, the organisation continued into 1945, when the subject was again raised, in May, by Selborne. He wrote to Churchill arguing for SOE’s retention in light of the ‘Russian menace’ and called for its future to be discussed ‘dispassionately and sanely’, though the Prime Minister, advised by Morton, believed the time was ‘not ripe to make a final decision’.82 Just two days before Selborne’s letter, on 20 May, Labour withdrew from the coalition, forcing a general election for July. SOE’s future would be decided after the election. The subsequent disbandment of SOE has been considered the inevitable outcome of Labour’s election victory. Ministers in the new government were, allegedly, confirmed opponents of special operations and keen to end Britain’s special operations capability with unseemly haste.83 In one account, Selborne pleaded with Attlee, pointing out that SOE had a world-wide network ‘staffed by brave men and women dedicated to friendship with Great Britain: the makings of a priceless intelligence tool’. After listening to Selborne’s passionate argument, Attlee, in typically brusque fashion, replied he had ‘no wish to preside over a British Comintern, and that the network was to end immediately. S.O.E. was promptly closed down at forty-eight hours notice.’84 While certainly interesting, and livening what was, to all intents and purposes, a bureaucratic battle in Whitehall, the account overlooks the fact that

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Wartime apprenticeship

41

Labour ministers, acutely aware of the value of special operations, endorsed a report on post-war special operations capability by an ad hoc committee chaired by Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, chair of the JIC, arguing for a small special operations machinery ‘capable of quick and effective expansion in time of war’. In peacetime, it would carry out ‘unknowledgeable acts in all parts of the world’, keeping alive the ‘art of underground warfare’ and providing ‘covert support to British national interests where threatened’.85 It was considered ‘uneconomical’ for SOE to continue post-war, with the committee recommending that it should be combined with SIS under a ‘common head’ with joint ‘communications, finance and administration’.86 The report was approved by the Chiefs of Staff before being sent to Bevin and Attlee.87 On 21 August Bevin wrote to the latter suggesting that, with the end of hostilities, it would be best ‘to put what will remain of SOE definitely under “C”, as a section of his organisation’, though it would continue on a ‘care and maintenance basis. Its numbers will be small.’88 Attlee replied ‘While I agree as to a single head – that head being “C”, I’d like to discuss the general question of policy with the Foreign Secretary and Lord President before coming to any decision.’89 At the end of the month, SOE’s future was brought before the Defence Committee where, in discussion, it was agreed that a new secret service would be created under a joint ‘executive head’ and ‘separate Special Operations and Secret Intelligence branches with common services’, though plans for a combined service soon collapsed owing to bureaucratic infighting.90 SOE’s existence as a separate, independent agency, which had started under Labour ministers, had now ended. On 11 September Bevin wrote to Sir Colin Gubbins, the organisation’s final executive head, that ministers had approved the amalgamation of SOE and SIS and that its head ‘should be “C”’, thanking him for his ‘distinguished services … [and] valuable contribution to the winning of the war’.91 With his letter, Bevin signed SOE’s ‘death warrant’.92 The same day, Bevin wrote to Menzies that the Prime Minister ‘agrees that the head of the two organisations should be yourself’.93 By a strange twist of fate, Labour ministers had been involved in both the birth and death of SOE, though special operations lived on under the new government.94 The organisation’s demise can be best explained, not by ministerial antipathy towards special operations, but by its wartime remit. Like the Political Warfare Executive, which was wound down and its remnants integrated into the Foreign Office, SOE was a wartime body formed in the summer of 1940 to fuel resistance in Nazi-occupied Europe.95 The same can be said for the multitude of special operations units – referred to, disparagingly, as ‘funnies’ – that had been formed on an

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

42

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

ad hoc basis, particularly the Special Air Service and Commandos. While their wartime feats were rightly lauded, once the war had ended officials believed that the primary function of these specialist units had finished, despite the efforts of some to save them.96 In a speech to the Royal United Services Institute, the Chief of Combined Operations, Major General Robert Laycock, a leading advocate of commando operations, told the audience that, in light of the threat of chemical, biological and atomic weapons, there must ‘be terrific scope for long range reconnaissance raids and sabotage raids carried out by small bodies of adventurous young Englishmen’.97 Not everyone agreed. At an earlier party hosted by the Labour peer Baron Packenham, Laycock and Peter Fleming, brother of Ian, discussed the ‘pros and cons of forming united intelligence and sabotage organisation’ with Attlee and Christopher Mayhew. While the detail of the conversation is unclear, Mayhew noted in his diary how he found himself ‘in line with the P.M. against Laycock and Fleming. An interesting talk.’98 Another reason for SOE’s demise as a separate organisation can be found in the minutes of the ad hoc committee looking into post-war special operations, where it was pointed out that that it was ‘uneconomical’ for separate branches of the Secret Service to continue. At a time of fiscal austerity, with Britain facing a ‘financial Dunkirk’, it was sound advice.99 Even before the end of hostilities, spending on intelligence and related activities had gone into decline, dropping from a wartime peak of £15,021,743 in 1943 to £6,909,210 by 1945. By 1946 funding had been limited to £2.5 million.100

Domestic security Labour’s involvement in the coalition brought Herbert Morrison, Home Secretary from October 1940, into one of the most controversial decisions of Britain’s war effort: the internment of fascists and enemy aliens.101 On 10 May, after a meeting in the Home Office, all enemy aliens in coastal areas were interned, followed, soon afterwards, by the arrest of all remaining enemy nationals. At the same time, the leader of the British Union of Fascists (BUF), Sir Oswald Mosley, and twentyfive prominent supporters were also interned. Soon after the decision, Churchill appointed Attlee and Greenwood to examine the new measures; they met Guy Liddell, a senior MI5 officer. Liddell told both men ‘exactly what [he] thought’, and blamed the ‘old fashioned liberalism’ of the Home Office for delay in the policy. ‘The liberty of the subject, freedom of speech etc. were all very well in peacetime but were no use in fighting the Nazis’, he went on. According to Liddell, both Attlee

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Wartime apprenticeship

43

and Greenwood agreed.102 Whether the investigation had any effect is unclear but, by July, the number of interned fascists had reached a wartime peak of 753.103 Between May and July a further 22,900 German and 4,000 Italian nationals were also interned.104 By the time Morrison became Home Secretary in October the witch-hunt for both fascists and aliens had ended, though the JIC, MI5 and Chiefs of Staff maintained there should be ‘no relaxation’ of present policy. Morrison disagreed, telling the War Cabinet that ‘we could now afford to take a rather less stringent line’.105 Under his watch, a large number of internees were released after advice from an Advisory Committee on Internment under Justice Sir Cyril Asquith.106 The release of fascists proved more controversial. Once the rules were relaxed, internees had the right of appeal to an Advisory Committee. Relations between the committee, MI5 and the Home Office were fractious, and there were numerous clashes on security issues.107 Where MI5 objected to committee decisions, Morrison arbitrated and often sided in favour of internees. Morrison also had access to the fruits of MI5’s surveillance of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Since the Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939, the activities of the party had been a source of growing unease in government. While the party had initially embraced the war as one ‘against fascism’, it was forced to revise its position after instructions from the Communist International and adopted a policy of ‘revolutionary defeatism’.108 In government, ministers reacted by banning the CPGB’s newspaper, The Daily Worker, in early 1941. The Communist Party conducted yet another volte-face after the German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941. While taking the party by surprise, its new position was declared by its General Secretary, Harry Pollitt, who called for a ‘united national front’.109 The CPGB derived some benefit from this reversal. In June membership had stood at 15,000. By the end of the year it had increased to 22,000 and, in April 1942, membership rose to 53,000.110 The party’s change of heart was greeted with scepticism by the authorities and, in July, MI5 established F Branch to investigate ‘subversive activities’.111 The Security Executive also sharpened its watch of the party with the creation of a ‘Committee on Communism’ chaired by A. M. Wall, General Secretary of the London Society of Compositors.112 In 1942 F Branch increased its surveillance and installed monitoring devices in the party’s headquarters, confirming that its long-term goals were ‘unchanged’.113 In government, the threat of communist espionage and subversion was taken seriously by Morrison. In February 1943, prior to an application by the CPGB to affiliate itself with the Labour Party, he asked MI5 for an up-to-date report on its activities. This was circulated a month

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

44

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

later to members of the War Cabinet, alongside a memorandum on the BUF. It reviewed the policy followed by the Communist Party from the  outbreak of war until the German invasion of Russia. Since then, the memorandum reported, the party’s sole aim had been the ‘salvation of the Soviet Union’.114 While MI5 was keen to publish the report as evidence of the party’s divided loyalty, ministers rejected the proposal for fear it would be a source of ‘embarrassment vis-à-vis the Russian Government’ and would increase support for the CPGB in its continued campaign for affiliation with the Labour Party.115 In June evidence of the CPGB’s divided loyalties emerged with the arrest of its national organiser, Douglas Springhall. From a number of Whitehall sources, he had been able to provide the Soviets with a range of sensitive information. Among his sources was a staff officer with SOE, Ormond Uren, and an office clerk in SIS.116 After the case, Morrison circulated a memorandum to the War Cabinet warning of the CPGB using ‘the current sympathy’ for Russia to induce people to betray secrets in the mistaken belief that ‘they are helping the Soviet Union’. Morrison also instructed MI5 to ‘exercise ever closer vigilance’ of the party.117 While the CPGB sought to distance itself from Springhall, the Security Service continued to view communists with suspicion, leading to a review of security in government circles. In October MI5 produced a paper listing fifty-seven known members of the party who had access to ‘information of the highest secrecy’. These included twenty-three in the Ministry of Supply, eighteen in the Army, and eight in universities, including three working on Britain’s atomic project.118 The Springhall case, it was suggested, would allow the government to publicly take action against the party. Churchill provisionally agreed, asking Morrison to pursue the matter further. In November he wrote of the ‘special danger in employing on secret work persons who are members or adherents of the Communist Party’. Central to his argument was the claim that party members, because of their communist doctrine, held ‘no obligation of loyalty to a “capitalist State” and that the duty of serving the Communist Party’s ends overrides any duty of good citizenship’. It was important that all government departments should be warned of the risks of employing ‘adherents of the Communist Party, with a recommendation that every effort should be made to transfer such persons to other branches of national service’. This should be applied proportionately as, Morrison told Churchill, it was important not to ‘see Communists where they do not exist or to assume that because a man was once a Communist he is necessarily one now’. The policy would also apply to fascists who were ‘no less dangerous’. Morrison recommended that:

Wartime apprenticeship

45

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

to do anything effective in the way of stopping the risks of leakage it would be necessary: (a) to bring it home to the Communist Party that their espionage activities do not pay and are likely to discredit the Party, and (b) to make it clear to all Government servants – including those who are attracted to the Communist doctrines by a creditable zeal for social reform – that loyalty to the Communist Party stands on a difficult footing from loyalty to any other political party because loyalty to the Communist Party may entail disloyalty to the State.

It was also important that ‘some public statement’ was needed from the government ‘showing clearly that espionage is known to be part of the policy of the Communist Party’.119 Churchill brushed this suggestion aside.120 On the advice of Morton, he ruled that MI5 should not be responsible for advising departments about alleged communist employees.121 As a result, the government’s response was lacklustre; a secret Whitehall panel was formed to examine individual cases submitted to it by MI5. Unsurprisingly, the Service was unhappy with the new procedure, and the presence of communists in important positions posed a significant risk to security, a point made clear by MI5’s internal history: while the Communist Party remained a very small affair and failed to make any effective appeal, or to obtain any important increase in influence … the situation created by the fact that so many of its members secured important positions gave it a potential importance far greater than that warranted by its numbers.122

Conclusion While Labour ministers were undoubtedly left in the dark about some areas of Britain’s wartime ‘secret state’, its party leadership – Attlee, Bevin, Morrison and Dalton – gained a valuable insight into the activities of Britain’s intelligence community. Labour’s involvement in the coalition served as both a calming and an informative experience. The party leadership’s induction into and interaction with the wartime intelligence services, its leadership and personnel, introduced a new generation of Labour politicians at senior and junior levels to intelligence and continued the ever-improving relationship between the party and intelligence services which started during MacDonald’s second term in office. If a legacy of the Zinoviev Letter affair existed, it had died by the end of the Second World War. When Labour came to power in the summer of 1945, it quickly accepted the need for a peacetime security and intelligence apparatus, albeit with major cuts in its budget as a

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

46

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

‘peace dividend’, and kept some of its leading figures, notably Menzies, in place. By the end of the coalition, Labour ministers had experienced, in some cases, access to intelligence for nearly five years. Attlee’s work at the heart of government, for example, accustomed him to senior intelligence and military officials, as well as giving him access to a stream of intelligence reports, some derived from most secret sources. As this chapter illustrates, the war served as a useful apprenticeship for Attlee: by the end of the conflict he was an experienced intelligence consumer. For others such as Bevin, whose wartime access to JIC material has hitherto gone unnoticed by historians, the stream of intelligence provided a rare insight into Britain’s policy overseas, which would later stand him in good stead as Foreign Secretary in the Attlee governments. In addition, access to intelligence, while shaping various attitudes, also reinforced some preconceived views. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of the Communist Party of Great Britain. Morrison’s role as Home Secretary, as well as Attlee and Bevin’s membership of the War Cabinet, gave all three a front-row seat in viewing MI5’s activities against the CPGB. All three were committed anti-communists as a result of their inter-war experiences, and their view of the CPGB coincided with that of MI5. Once again, this undermines previous interpretations that, when in office, all were ignorant to the threat posed by ‘fellow travellers’. Finally, Labour played an integral role in the formation, and early development, of the Special Operations Executive. Dalton, backed by Attlee, had been ‘midwife’ at the organisation’s formation, placing Labour at the forefront of Britain’s offensive effort against the Axis powers. While Labour’s involvement with irregular warfare diminished following Dalton’s ‘promotion’ to the home front, Attlee, albeit sporadically, continued to be involved in SOE’s life, most notably in the wake of the so-called ‘Englandspiel’, when he defended the organisation from its detractors in Whitehall. By a queer twist of fate, however, he, along with Bevin, would also play a major role in both SOE’s disbandment and the post-war survival of special operations.

Notes 1 M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the Special Operations Executive in France, 1940–1944 (London: Frank Cass, 2006), p. 8. 2 See, in particular, Robert Crowcroft, Attlee’s War: World War II and the Making of a Labour Leader (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 3 Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Wartime apprenticeship

47

Intelligence (London: John Murray, 2001), p. 144; M.R.D. Foot, SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946 (London: Pimlico, 1999), p. 355. 4 On Labour involvement in the coalition, see Kevin Jefferys, The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics, 1940–45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991); and Jonathan Schneer, Ministers at War: Winston Churchill and his War Cabinet (London: Oneworld, 2015). 5 Alex Danchev and Dan Todman (eds), War Diaries, 1939–1945: Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001), p. 211. 6 On Churchill, see Christopher Andrew, ‘Churchill and Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 3:3 (1988); and David Stafford, Churchill & Secret Service (London: Abacus, 1997). 7 Conversation with Anne, Countess Attlee, 4 February 2011. 8 J.I.C. (40) 71 ‘Urgent Intelligence Reports: Directive to the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee’, 17 May 1940, reproduced in F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1979), pp. 513–14. 9 PREM 4/97/11, COS (40)932 (Final), ‘Report: Provision of Intelligence’, 14 November 1940. 10 PREM 4/97/11, Attlee to Churchill, 28 November 1940. 11 Ibid. 12 Bennett, Churchill’s Man of Mystery, p. 267. 13 Hinsley, British Intelligence, pp. 298–9. On Attlee’s friendship, see Bodleian Library, Attlee papers, MS. Eng. 4793, Attlee to Tom Attlee, 1 February 1941; Dalton diaries for 13 December 1940 and 25 March 1941 (Dalton Papers, LSE, Dalton diary, Vol. 23 and Vol. 24). 14 Hinsley, British Intelligence, p. 144. 15 David Howell, ‘Alexander, Albert Victor, Earl Alexander of Hillsborough (1885–1965)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 16 CAB 120/744, ‘Distribution List of the Secret Situation Report as from 8 November, 1940’. The full list included Churchill; Sir Edward Bridges; Major General Hastings ‘Pug’ Ismay; Lord Halifax; Sir Robert Vansittart; Sir Alexander Cadogan; Sir Orme Sargent; Brigadier Stewart Menzies; A. V. Alexander; Admiral Sir Dudley Pound; Rear Admiral Sir Tom Spencer Vaughan Phillips; the Director of Naval Intelligence; Anthony Eden; General Sir John Dill; General Sir Robert Haining; the Director of Military Intelligence; Sir Archibald Sinclair; Air Chief Marshall Sir C. F. A. Portal; Sir Wilfred Freeman; the Director of Air Intelligence; Sir John Anderson; Attlee; Greenwood; Lord Beaverbrook; Bevin; Sir Kingsley Wood; Sir Alexander Hardinge (Private Secretary to King George VI); Col. Capel Dunn, secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee; the officer in charge of ‘secret records’; the Duty Officer at the Central War Room; and Prof. N. F. Hall, Ministry of Economic Warfare. 17 Compiled by the JIC, the ‘Secret Situation Report’ included information not

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

48

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

mentioned ‘in the ordinary intelligence summaries’ and was subject to stringent security measures. Of the twenty-seven copies produced, all but six were destroyed after being read (CAB 120/744, Ismay to Churchill, 18 February 1941). 18 HW 1/1, Desmond Morton to Menzies, 27 September 1940. 19 John Colville, The Fringes of Power; Downing Street Diaries, Volume 1: 1939– October 1941 (London: Sceptre, 1985), p. 348. 20 The National Archives entry for the HW1 file series describes it as containing ‘summaries of selected signals intelligence reports, issued by the Government Code and Cypher School and sent by the head of M16 (“C”) to the Prime Minister (or, in his absence, the Deputy Prime Minister or the Lord Privy Seal)’, HW 1, 1940–1946, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/browse/ C9280 (accessed 7 December 2012). 21 See, for example, HW 1/18, C/7299. ‘C’ to Lord Privy Seal, 10 August 1941; HW 1/22, C/7332. ‘C’ to Lord Privy Seal, 15 August 1941 and HW 1/24, C/7343, ‘C’ to Lord Privy Seal, 16 August 1941. 22 HW 1/1346, Deputy Prime Minister to Prime Minister, 1 February 1943. See also Robin Denniston, Churchill’s Secret War: Diplomatic Decrypts, the Foreign Office and Turkey, 1942–44 (London: Chancellor Press, 2000), pp. 91–5. 23 HW 12/295, Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, reports interview with Ribbentrop, 16 December 1943. An unnamed individual scribbled ‘Copy sent to Mr. Attlee 17/12/43’ at the top right hand of the paper. 24 For a comprehensive account of the legation transmitter affair, see Eunan O’Halpin, Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality during the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 236–8. 25 DO 121/84, Attlee to Churchill, 3 May 1943. 26 DO 121/84, Churchill to Attlee, 5 May 1943. 27 See Charles Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare, 1938–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 16–17; Mark Seaman, ‘A New Instrument of War: The Origins of the Special Operations Executive’, in Mark Seaman (ed.), Special Operations Executive: A New Instrument of War (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 7–14. 28 Seaman, ‘A New Instrument of War’, p. 15. 29 Ben Pimlott (ed.), The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940–1945 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), pp. 50–1. 30 Stephen Howe, ‘Hugh Dalton’, in Kevin Jefferys (ed.), Labour Forces: From Ernie Bevin to Gordon Brown (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 46. 31 Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Party and the World, Vol. 1: The Evolution of Labour’s Foreign Policy, 1900–51 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 126–9. 32 Neville Wylie, ‘Ungentlemanly Warriors or Unreliable Diplomats? Special Operations Executive and “Irregular Political Activities” in Europe’, Intelligence and National Security, 20:1 (2005), pp. 98–120. 33 Pimlott (ed.), The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, pp. 50–1.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Wartime apprenticeship

49

34 Dalton papers, DALTON/2/7/3, record of meeting held in the Secretary of State’s room at the Foreign Office, 1 July 1940. 35 Foot, SOE in France, p. 8. 36 Dalton, in conversation with Attlee on 3 July, revealed his design for irregular warfare, talking of himself as ‘minister responsible’ for any new organisation (William Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940–45 (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2002), p. 68). 37 David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–45 (London: Cassell, 1971), p. 308; Wylie, ‘Ungentlemanly Warriors’, p. 100. 38 LSE, Dalton diary, Vol. 26, entry for 9 January 1942. 39 Ben Pimlott, Hugh Dalton (London: Papermac, 1986), p. 296. 40 Seaman, ‘A New Instrument of War’, p. 17. 41 Pimlott, Hugh Dalton, p. 297. 42 Ibid. 43 Pimlott (ed.), Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, p. 57. 44 Halifax had previously spoke of Dalton having ‘many of the qualities required; the Ministry of Economic Warfare is a good deal concerned with sabotage; and he would have certain Trade Union and Socialist contacts that would be helpful’ (PREM 4/409/1, Halifax to Churchill, 8 July 1940). 45 Dilks, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p. 312. 46 Pimlott (ed.), The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, p. 59. 47 Foot, SOE: The Special Operations Executive, pp. 19–20. 48 PREM 4/409/1, Churchill to Dalton, 16 July 1940; Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931–1945 (London: Frederick Muller, 1957). 49 MAYHEW 3/1, autobiographical account written by Mayhew, March 1942. 50 PREM 4/409/1, ‘Home Defence (Security) Executive; Special Operations Executive. Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council’. 51 Papers of Gladwyn Jebb, Churchill Archives Centre: GLAD 1/1/6, Jebb to Burrows, 23 December 1964. 52 Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London: Methuen, 1965), p. 39. 53 Pimlott (ed.), Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, p. 329. 54 Ibid., p. 234. 55 Kenneth Harris, Attlee (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 190. 56 David Garnett (ed.), The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive, 1939–45 (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2002), pp. 76–7. 57 Harris, Attlee, pp. 190–1. 58 Pimlott (ed.), Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, p. 319. 59 Ibid., p. 379. 60 For Selborne’s later recollections on his appointment, see BOD, Selborne Papers, c. 1017. 61 Pimlott, Hugh Dalton, p. 345. 62 BOD, Attlee papers, MS. Attlee, dep. 5, fol. 33, Middleton to Attlee, 3 April 1942. 63 HS 8/912, Dalton to Selborne, 23 May 1944. 64 On Selborne’s correspondence with Bevin, Morrison and Alexander, see

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

50

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

HS 8/904, ‘Correspondence Right Honourable Ernest Bevin’; HS 8/906, ‘Correspondence with Right Honourable Herbert Morrison MP’, and HS 8/907, ‘Correspondence with Right Honourable A V Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty’. 65 Because of his wartime involvement in SOE’s affairs, Attlee received the relevant passages of SOE in France by M. R. D. Foot (Christopher J. Murphy, ‘Whitehall, Intelligence and Official History: Editing SOE in France’, in Christopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murphy (eds), Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), p. 241). 66 HS 8/900, Selborne to Attlee, 19 October 1942. 67 HS 8/900, Attlee to Selborne, 20 October 1942. 68 David Stafford, Britain and the European Resistance: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive with Documents (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 137. HS 9/900, Jacob to Attlee, 1 December 1943. For details of the affair, see M. R. D. Foot, SOE in the Low Countries (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2001), pp. 76–197. 69 Attlee’s copy of the report can be found in CAB 118/90, JIC (43) 517 (0) Final, ‘SOE Operations in Europe; Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee’, 22 December 1943. 70 HS 9/900, Ismay to Attlee, 3 January 1944. 71 CAB 118/90, Ismay to Churchill, 5 January 1944. The letter was also forwarded to Eden and Attlee. 72 CAB 69/6, DO (44) 3rd meeting (Final), of 14 January 1944. 73 Stafford, Britain and the European Resistance, p. 142. 74 HS 8/281, Selborne to Churchill, 27 April 1944. 75 HS 8/281, Churchill to Selborne, 1 May 1944. 76 HS 8/281, Selborne to Attlee, 14 September 1944. 77 HS 9/900, Eden to Attlee, 17 September 1944. 78 HS 8/281, Selborne to Churchill, 26 September 1944. 79 PREM 4/35/2B, ‘The Future of SOE’, 23 October 1944. For Slessor’s paper, see PREM 4/35/2B, ‘Future organisation of the various existing agencies for secret intelligence, subversive activities, propaganda, deception etc.’, 24 October 1944. 80 CAB 301/48, Future Organisation of the SIS. 81 Keith Jeffery, ‘Wartime Experience and the Future of the Secret Services, 1940–1951’, https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-history/pusd-records/wartime-expe​ rience-and-the-future-of-the-secret-services.html (accessed 29 July 2015). 82 PREM 4/35/2B, Selborne to Churchill, 22 May 1945; PREM 4/35/2B, Morton to Churchill, 23 May 1945. 83 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 144. 84 Foot, SOE: The Special Operations Executive, p. 355. Contrary to Foot’s suggestions, Attlee’s remark on a ‘British Comintern’ was made in the autumn of 1944 (HS 8/281, Selborne to Churchill, 26 September 1944). 85 PREM 8/107, C.O.S. (45) 504 (0), ‘Future of S.O.E.’, 31 July 1945.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Wartime apprenticeship

51

86 PREM 8/107, ‘Future of S.O.E.’, 31 July 1945. 87 Bevin had been advised by Cadogan that it was ‘essential’ for Menzies to head both organisations (Keith Jeffrey, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1949 (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), p. 627). 88 PREM 8/107, Bevin to Attlee, 21 August 1945. 89 Ibid. 90 CAB 69/7, minutes of 4th meeting of the Defence Committee, 1 September 1945. On the failure to create a new Secret Service, see Philip Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 202. 91 FO 1093/198, Bevin to Gubbins, 11 September 1945. Further details can be found in Peter Wilkinson and Joan Bright Astley, Gubbins and SOE (London: Leo Cooper, 1993), p. 235. 92 Foot, SOE in France, p. 389. 93 FO 1093/198, Bevin to Menzies, 11 September 1945. 94 On the post-war legacy of special operations, see Richard Aldrich, ‘Unquiet in Death: the Post-war Survival of the “Special Operations Executive”, 1945–51’, in Anthony Gorst, Lewis Johnman and Scott Lucas (eds), Contemporary British History: Politics and the Limits of Policy (London: Continuum, 1991), pp. 193–217; Philip Davies, ‘From Special Operations to Special Political Action: The “Rump SOE” and SIS Post-War Covert Action Capability 1945–1977’, Intelligence and National Security, 15:2 (2000). 95 For parallels with the field of propaganda, see Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945–51 (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 27. By 1945 only the surreptitiously named Cultural Relations Department remained, and it quickly turned its attention to the threat of communist infiltration of international youth movements (Richard Aldrich, ‘Putting Culture into the Cold War: The Cultural Relations Department (CRD) and British Covert Information Warfare’, Intelligence and National Security, 18:2 [2003], pp. 109–33). 96 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 144. 97 Major General R. E. Laycock, ‘Raids in the Late War and Their Lessons’, RUSI Journal, 92:568 (1947), p. 538. 98 MAYHEW 5/2, entry for 28 October 1946. 99 CAB 129/1, C.P. (45)112, ‘Our overseas financial prospects’, 13 August 1945, reproduced in Documents on British Policy Overseas (hereafter DBPO), Ser. I, Vol. III, No. 6, pp. 28–37. 100 T 165/445 ‘Secret Service, 1949-50: Grants and expenditure in recent years’. 101 For more on internment, see Brian Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention without Trial in Wartime Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); and Richard Thurlow, The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995), pp. 251–7. 102 KV 4/186, entry for 25 May 1940. 103 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 227. 104 CAB 67/8/109, WP(G)(40)309, ‘Internment of Aliens of Enemy Nationality; memorandum by the Home Secretary’, 20 November 1940.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

52

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

105 CAB 65/10/13, WM(40)293, of 21 November 1940. 106 CAB 67/8/109, WP(G)(40)309, ‘Internment of Aliens of Enemy Nationality; memorandum by the Home Secretary’, 20.11.40; Bernard Donoughue and G.  W. Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London: Phoenix, 2001), p. 303. 107 Jennifer Grant, ‘The Role of MI5 in the Internment of British Fascists during the Second World War’, Intelligence and National Security, 24:4 (2009), pp. 499–528. 108 John Curry, The Security Service, 1908–1945: The Official History (London: Public Records Office, 1999), pp. 183–4. 109 Noreen Branson, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1927–41 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985), p. 333. 110 Noreen Branson, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1941–51 (London: Laurence and Wishart, 1997), p. 1. 111 Curry, The Security Service, pp. 349–50. 112 C. A. G. Simkins and F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Security and Counter-Intelligence, Vol. 4 (London: HMSO, 1990), pp. 83–4. For the minutes of the committee, see CAB 93/5. 113 Calder Walton, ‘British Intelligence and Threats to National Security, c. 1941–1951’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2006), pp. 65–7; Curry, The Security Service, p. 350. 114 CAB 66/35/9, ‘The Communist Party of Great Britain: memorandum by the Home Secretary’, 13 March 1943. 115 CAB 65/34/14, WM(43)60, of 28 April 1943. 116 See Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 278; Simkins and Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, pp. 285–6. 117 CAB 66/40/9, ‘Conviction of D. F. Springhall of espionage; memorandum by the Home Secretary’, 3 August 1943. MI5’s relationship with Morrison was by no means intimate. In March 1943, Duff Cooper, the head of the Security Executive, recommended that MI5 should send a monthly report to the Prime Minister. One subject not included in the reports was counter-subversion, due to fears that Churchill ‘might speak to the Home Secretary’. This reluctance to share reports on subversion with Morrison reportedly stemmed from the case of the cartoonist Philip Zec, who had enraged Morrison by publishing a cartoon of a merchant seaman, smeared in oil, waiting to be rescued in the midAtlantic. Morrison wrongly interpreted this as an attack on oil companies profiting from the war effort, and asked MI5 to investigate the matter (Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 289). 118 Simkins and Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, p. 287. 119 KV 4/251, Morrison to Churchill, 9 November 1943. Alexander Maxwell, PUS at the Home Office, wrote that Morrison’s minute expressed the views of MI5 who ‘were in full agreement’ (KV 4/251, Note by Maxwell, 29 December 1943). 120 Simkins and Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, p. 288.

Wartime apprenticeship

53

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

121 Ibid. Commenting on Morrison’s paper, Morton wrote how ‘MI5 tends to see dangerous men too freely and to lack that knowledge of the world and sense of perspective’. 122 Curry, The Security Service, p. 357.

2 Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence? British intelligence, ministers and the Soviet Union I am not yet satisfied that we get full value for our expenditure.1 Clement Attlee, 8 April 1950 Russia … is probably the most difficult target which has ever been set to an intelligence and counter-intelligence service.2 Sir Norman Brook, 25 October 1950

Now in office, senior ministers had access to a stream of reports on Soviet interests and intentions. While the continuing lack of sources on Cold War signals and human intelligence continues to pose problems for researchers, the available papers of Britain’s Joint Intelligence Committee, which provided the final intelligence product to Whitehall consumers, highlight the JIC’s influence on policymaking during Cold War crises in Iran in 1946 and the later Berlin blockade.3 Throughout their time in office, ministers saw a series of appraisals on the Soviet Union’s strategic interests and intentions that highlighted the threat to British interests both at home and abroad. At times, the assessments also provided political headaches for Attlee and his colleagues, with the views of the JIC being considered unpalatable to some in Cabinet until 1948 and the final breakdown of relations with Moscow. While the reports convinced ministers of the hostility of the Soviet government, they were not satisfied with the level of information received, which led, ultimately, to a major review of Britain’s agencies carried out by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook.

Intelligence at the top The results of the 1945 election were, as James Chuter Ede, Labour MP for South Shields, noted in his diary, ‘unbelievable’.4 Labour won a landslide election victory, with 394 seats to the Conservatives’ 210, and held the reins of power for the first time since 1931. The party’s

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence?

55

manifesto, Let Us Face the Future, had committed the new government to widespread reforms both at home and overseas, notably the nationalisation of key industries and the implementation of the ‘welfare state’.5 The soon to be Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, recalled that the ‘first sensation, tingling and triumphant, was of a new society to be built; we had the power to build it’.6 In some circles, Labour’s success was greeted with pessimism. In the Foreign Office, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Alexander Cadogan, noted in his diary that Churchill’s defeat marked a ‘display of base ingratitude … rather humiliating for our country’ while Sir Orme Sargent, his Deputy Under-Secretary, saw ‘a Communist avalanche over Europe, a weak foreign policy, a private revolution at home and reduction of England to a second class power’.7 Such pessimism may also have existed in the intelligence community. In a report on the post-war organisation of British codebreaking, William ‘Nobby’ Clarke of GC&CS (soon to be officially renamed the Government Communications Headquarters) explained that one ‘potential danger’ to Britain’s ability to read overseas traffic was a future ‘Labour Government. Members of this party are very averse to anything of this sort.’ A veteran of British codebreaking who had started his career in the Admiralty’s Room 40, Clarke saw Labour as a problem as, in his words, ‘our first Director had grave trouble … when the last Labour government was in power’.8 These fears were misplaced. Cadogan, Sargent and others grew to respect their new political masters, and the Foreign Office’s Patrick Reilly, a former Private Secretary to the Chief of SIS, wrote to his parents at the end of July that ‘honestly I don’t think you need to worry. These chaps have proved their worth these last five years and truly I think they are better equipped to bring us through the exceedingly difficult period that lies ahead.’9 Labour’s election victory once again brought Attlee to the heart of government. Among the batches of papers reaching Downing Street were diplomatic intercepts, known in Whitehall as ‘the blue jackets’ or ‘BJs’.10 The surviving archive shows that Attlee regularly received decrypted signals on the dying days of the war in the Far East as well as the diplomatic traffic of former allies and neutrals including Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and France, often revealing their reaction to Labour’s victory.11 Although it is not known how these filtered into Attlee’s policymaking decisions, the intercepts were promptly read and returned to SIS with the blue covering dockets for each batch ticked or signed ‘Seen C.R.A’. Attlee was also the recipient of a ‘weekly report’ from Menzies, probably a legacy of the wartime years when he regularly saw Churchill in private.12 The arrangements for the provision of this information are somewhat unclear, with the sources available

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

56

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

suggesting that Attlee merely received the intelligence from Menzies, not that both men met regularly; the evidence ends in December 1946.13 It is likely that the intelligence flow continued long after this cut-off point, with later assessments, plus a ‘special’ signals intelligence-heavy annex, being delivered to Downing Street.14 Sir Nicholas Henderson, Bevin’s Assistant Private Secretary, explained that ‘All Prime Ministers love intelligence, because it’s a sort of weapon … The intelligence reports used to arrive in special little boxes, and it gave them a belief they had a direct line to something that no ordinary departments have.’15 Attlee was not the only senior government figure to see intelligence. The Foreign Office was a major consumer of diplomatic intercepts and received three sets of ‘BJs’ on a daily basis. One was handed to Bevin and Cadogan for ‘their immediate information’.16 Another recipient was Attlee’s first Colonial Secretary, George Hall, later First Lord of the Admiralty.17 Bevin also received regular reports on Soviet post-war activities and, on coming to office, emphasised the ‘need for secret intelligence about the Soviet Union and her satellites’.18 SIS provided Bevin, as Foreign Secretary, with the ‘full facts of the activities of the USSR in fomenting subversion, sabotage and strikes’ around the world.19 Ministers also had intermittent access to the assessments of Britain’s Joint Intelligence Committee, part of the Chiefs of Staff system and responsible to the chiefs for the organisation, coordination and assessment of secret intelligence.20 While a sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff, the JIC shared a ‘close relationship’ with senior ministers, with several figures in government seeing its assessments.21 Bevin was a ‘keen and careful consumer’ of the committee’s product, which reflected his own view that the Soviet Union was irrevocably hostile to the West.22 By continuing Churchill’s example of serving as his own Minister of Defence, Attlee also had access to JIC papers and authorised their wider circulation, if necessary.23 On 1 March 1946 the JIC reported on the issue of ‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions’. It was the first in-depth appraisal the JIC had produced since December 1944 and offered, in the committee’s words, a ‘fresh review’ of the motives behind Soviet diplomacy. From the outset of its report, the committee was frank about the dearth of intelligence on the Soviet Union’s long-term goals. ‘Any report on Russia’s interests and intentions,’ the JIC warned its consumers, ‘must be speculative, as we have little evidence to show what view Russia herself takes of her strategic interests, or what policy she intends to pursue.’ The assessment was based on the ‘limited evidence’ available, combined with ‘reasonable conjuncture concerning the Soviet appreciation of their own situation’.24 Indeed, the JIC’s assessments owed more to the observations of officials

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence?

57

such as Britain’s chargé d’affaires in Moscow, Frank Roberts, than they did to secret intelligence. In a ‘Top Secret’ communiqué to Roberts on 12 March, one Foreign Office official admitted that the committee’s earlier report ‘was based on your recent despatches and telegrams’ rather than actual hard intelligence.25 In wartime, the committee had enjoyed an almost limitless supply of information on the main target, Nazi Germany, but as the war ended and intelligence priorities turned eastwards, the committee had little secret intelligence to work with. Recent studies of the post-war intelligence community have made it clear that in the fields of signals and human intelligence, Britain enjoyed relatively little success against the Soviet Union. Despite renewing its attack on Soviet codes and ciphers within days of the cessation of hostilities, Britain’s intelligence community had made little headway comparable to that achieved against Germany.26 GCHQ had a hard time against highgrade Soviet codes and ciphers, though success was achieved against low-grade traffic.27 Thanks to their penetration of British intelligence, the Soviets were fully aware of the wartime ULTRA secret, taking precautionary measures to secure high-level communications.28 The Soviets and their satellite allies also extensively used landlines instead of wireless networks, which could be easily intercepted, limiting the amount of information that could be collected by Anglo-American agencies.29 SIS was facing its own acute problems running agents in the new postwar environment. In the spring of 1946 Menzies admitted to the Foreign Office that his service was conducting ‘no secret service activities of any kind’ in the Soviet Union and, in responding to concerns on the political and diplomatic ramifications of intelligence collection, explained that ‘no widespread British organisation has yet been set up’, though SIS did have ‘individual agents who might conceivably be arrested’. However, he was optimistic about developing ‘a far-wider network’ by 1947.30 The greatest problem facing SIS’s efforts against the Soviets was the Foreign Office’s ban on operations inside the Soviet Union. While SIS had formed, in late 1944, its own Soviet counter-espionage section (Section IX), the service was prohibited from conducting operations against the Soviets for fear it would sour wartime Anglo-Soviet relations. In 1945 the Foreign Office reviewed its requirements from SIS and placed the Soviet Union in a ‘special category’. The ban on operations against the  Soviets was removed, although restrictions remained in place; in future, SIS could only try and penetrate Russia from neighbouring states on ‘the outside’ and was still prevented from developing networks inside Soviet territory.31 Unsurprisingly, these constraints were opposed by SIS, with Menzies describing them as an ‘unwarrantable handicap’.32 Foreign Office concerns meant that, even by 1946, with

58

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

tensions with Moscow growing, restrictions on SIS activities continued. Harold Caccia of the Foreign Office’s Services Liaison Department explained to Cadogan that: “C” is doing all in his power to ensure that intelligence of the kind that only he can get will be provided. The main target is, of course, Russia, and in view of the difficulty of piercing the iron ring of Russian controlled territory “C’s” field is wider and task harder than ever before. Three things are necessary from the consumer: patience, support and interest. Patience because it may take years to get an agent into the position of trust from which alone he can supply the information required. Support because the Secret Service will not be able to do the job without the necessary funds. Interest because the test is value to the consumer and it is as old as it is true that you get the Secret Service that you deserve.33

This recognition did not stifle criticism of intelligence in general and, in early 1947, the Minister of Defence, A. V. Alexander, was to complain that firm information on the Soviet Union was ‘very limited’.34 Even as late as 1948 the Foreign Office continued to place limitations on SIS, and Menzies wrote to Sargent, now Permanent Under-Secretary, for the ban on operations inside the Soviet Union to be removed, allowing SIS to appoint its own representative to Britain’s Moscow embassy.35 At a meeting attended by Britain’s Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Maurice Peterson, officials agreed to the easing of restrictions on activities inside Soviet territory, with Sargent writing to Bevin for approval. In his letter, Sargent explained that SIS had great difficulty in acquiring information and that, dependent on Bevin’s approval, Menzies wanted to ‘attach a member of his staff to the Embassy, under suitable cover … This representative would have no direct contact with any agents but would arrange means of passing messages to and from them by the usual underhand methods.’ Possibly anticipating opposition, Sargent added that every precaution would be taken to prevent discovery, but that, owing to the nature of intelligence collection, it could not be guaranteed that the Embassy would not be compromised. Despite attempts to reassure the Foreign Secretary that such actions were necessary, Bevin commented ‘No, I cannot have this attached to the Embassy. It would place us … in the same position as the Canadian case.’36 While not opposed to gathering intelligence on the Soviet Union, Bevin’s opposition stemmed from the ‘Gouzenko Affair’ in the autumn of 1945, when a Soviet military intelligence officer defected to Canadian officials and revealed an extensive espionage network operating from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, a revelation that led to diplomatic problems – Bevin, not surprisingly, wanted to avoid any similar occurrence.37

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence?

59

A change in target was not the only problem facing the post-war intelligence community, with the British government struggling to balance the financial books following the end of the war. Just weeks after coming to office, the new government was warned by Lord Keynes, Chief Economic Advisor to the Treasury, that it faced bankruptcy if it failed to consider the precarious financial situation the country was now in. Britain faced, he warned, a ‘financial Dunkirk’.38 Worse still, the new Labour government was promising to implement expensive social legislation including the National Insurance and National Health Bill. In such circumstances, it was only natural for intelligence expenditure to be cut. By 1946 spending on SIS, while remaining higher than its pre-war levels, had dropped substantially when compared to the almost limitless amounts spent in wartime, with a spending ceiling of £2.5 million imposed on intelligence activities, a figure which only rose in 1950.39 Post-war intelligence deficiencies featured heavily in a report by Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill, formerly Vice-Chief of the Air Staff.40 Evill had been tasked by the Chiefs of Staff to look at ‘all sources of intelligence under [their] control’ to ‘ensure that the acquisition and use of intelligence in peace is brought to the highest pitch of efficiency’. The review had been carried out with the approval of Alexander and Bevin.41 Evill noted that ‘the evidence obtained … in relation to our main objectives is very disturbing’. Knowledge of Soviet intentions, military doctrines and scientific and technical capacity was ‘seriously inadequate’, with Evill blaming the lack of information on the ‘inherent difficulty of the Russian objective and the short time we have been at work on it’. While primarily concerned with defence intelligence, Evill had consulted Menzies who had convinced him that SIS was being expanded to put intelligence on as ‘sound as possible a basis’, but that success would only come after ‘long and careful preparation’.42 An attached appreciation by the JIC supported Evill’s conclusions, noting that the problems facing post-war intelligence were threefold; a lack of intelligence coverage, a dearth of money and a shortage of trained personnel. As a consequence, intelligence on Soviet intentions, mobilisation plans and order-of-battle was ‘very slight’ and the committee was reliant on reports from ‘representatives and agents in Russia and her satellites, the Headquarters of the Russian Zones of Germany and Austria and on the Press of these countries’. Abnormal levels of security meant there was little secret intelligence on these subjects, while there was a ‘serious shortage of up-todate and detailed economic and industrial intelligence’. These shortages, explained the JIC, were ‘largely due to the many changes caused by the war, the discontinuance or non-resumption by most countries of … ­statistical and other factual information’.43

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

60

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Despite the lack of secret intelligence, the JIC was able to provide assessments on Soviet ‘Strategic Interests and Intentions’. In December 1944, with the war entering its final stages, they had taken an optimistic view of Soviet long-term policy, with the Kremlin concerned at ‘achieving the greatest possible measure of security’ and experimenting with post-war international cooperation in the ‘interest of world security’.44 By 1946 Soviet policy towards the West had considerably hardened, with the Kremlin, in the JIC’s view, concerned by the Allied advances into central Europe in the spring of 1945, leading to fears that the Allies would rob the Soviets of ‘the spoils of victory’. The Soviets had also toughened their stance because of the American nuclear monopoly, which worsened diplomatic relations with London and Washington. Finally, there was a belief in the Soviet Union that the Western Allies were weaker than they had been in the summer of 1945. In the case of Great Britain it was recognised that it faced ‘great man-power and financial problems’, while the US had ‘let her military forces disintegrate, and since the death of President Roosevelt has an executive which lacks direction’. Turning to Soviet goals, the JIC concluded that their long-term object was to ‘build … into a position of strength and greatness fully commensurate with her vast size and resources’. In the short term, the Soviet Union would ‘create and consolidate … a belt of satellite states subservient’ to its policy and, behind this, it would rebuild its military and industrial strength. If Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe was threatened, the Soviets would, the JIC warned, retaliate ‘using all weapons, short of major war, to frustrate these attempts’, making use of ‘propaganda … diplomatic pressure and of the Communist parties abroad both to this end and to weaken foreign countries’. The Soviet leadership would also, the committee went on, strive to dominate areas they considered ‘strategically necessary’, with particular attention drawn to Greece and Turkey. While the Soviet Union would avoid areas where it would face ‘combined resistance’ from Washington and London, elsewhere it would ‘adopt a policy of opportunism to extend her influence wherever possible without provoking a major war’. In summary, Soviet policy was described as ‘aggressive by all means short of war’.45 The committee’s assessment was approved by the Chiefs of Staff, and, on 7 March, sent to Attlee, as Minister of Defence, by their secretary, Lieutenant General Sir Leslie Hollis.46 Soon after seeing the paper, Attlee recommended that it should be circulated to members of the Cabinet’s Defence Committee.47 By early summer 1946 the JIC had earmarked the Soviet Union as the primary target for Britain’s intelligence community.48 Soon afterwards, the committee embarked on a number of studies on the Soviet Union’s

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence?

61

interests and intentions in the Middle and Far East. The former had been the focus of the committee during the Iranian crisis during the winter and spring of 1946.49 The crisis started when Soviet troops breached the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1942 by supporting the creation of autonomous governments in the country’s northernmost provinces – Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. In a report to Attlee, dated 16 March, the JIC had expressed concern at the build-up of Soviet forces in northern Persia, warning that ‘the Russians, profiting from the political deadlock and making use of … “Democrat” forces, will seek to stage a political coup in the capital [Tehran] in the near future’.50 In London, ministers were concerned at the turn of events. Dalton recorded in his diary that Bevin was ‘in a great state’, fearing that the Soviets ‘were advancing in full force on Tehran’.51 By spring, tensions had eased following the Soviet announcement that its forces would withdraw. Throughout the crisis the JIC had provided regular intelligence summaries to Attlee. In May the committee reported that ‘The evacuation of Russian forces from all parts of Persia, except Azerbaijan, is now complete’. In Azerbaijan, the Soviets retained a token force for the purpose of ‘clearing up and guarding stores’.52 Soon afterwards the committee informed the Prime Minister that Soviet forces had been withdrawn altogether.53 In its general survey of Soviet interests in the Middle East, the JIC warned of the Soviets’ use of indigenous nationalist forces to stir up trouble for Britain in the Arab world. The committee suggested that the Soviet leadership regarded the region as of ‘particular strategic concern’. It was essential, the report went on, for them to ‘eliminate any strong Power’ from their vulnerable southern flank. The Soviets would achieve this by exploiting the ‘economic backwardness’ of the region through anti-British ‘agitation’ and the Orthodox Church.54 On 15 June a report was sent to Leslie Rowan, Attlee’s Principal Private Secretary, ‘for the information of the Prime Minister’. Copies were also sent to Bevin, George Hall, the Colonial Secretary, and the Secretary of State for India and Burma, Lord Pethick Laurence.55 Another report was completed in September on communist influence across the globe and its direction from Moscow. In the report, the JIC suggested that the earlier disbandment of the Comintern in 1943 had ‘had no effect on the cohesion and discipline of the Communist movement’. In spite of ‘minor tactical differences’, communists across the globe acted as a ‘single whole’ and were attracted to an ‘all-embracing ideology’ which promised ‘a better world free from exploitation and war’. These convictions were misplaced since the Communist Party was ‘dominated by the prestige and influence of the Russian Communists’, and communists everywhere, the committee explained, were ‘­ instruments

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

62

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

of Soviet policy’. Many communists placed ‘loyalty to the party above all other loyalties’ and provided a ‘ready field of recruitment for agents and informants’. In short, communism was the ‘most important external political menace confronting the British Commonwealth and Western Democracies’.56 In late October Churchill wrote to Attlee requesting a meeting to ‘impart … certain information [involving] the safety of the country’ which had been obtained by Swiss military sources.57 On 5 November Churchill, Eden and a former Secretary of State for War, Oliver Stanley, met with Attlee and the First Lord of the Admiralty, A. V. Alexander. Before the meeting, Attlee requested a number of JIC documents, including the earlier paper ‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions’, ‘The Spread of Communism Throughout the World’ and two papers looking at Soviet interests and intentions in the Middle and Far East.58 Another report requested dealt with ‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions in Europe’.59 During the discussion Attlee revealed a view on Soviet policy not too dissimilar to that advocated by the JIC, which, despite its warnings, was ‘noteworthy for [its] caution’ in striking a balance between competing views in Whitehall, informing Churchill that the Soviets were ‘undoubtedly’ playing ‘Power Politics’ and ‘trying to build up a glacis of countries under their influence – Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, etc’.60 Following the meeting Churchill was, at Attlee’s insistence, provided with a ‘Top Secret’ report by the Service Directors of Intelligence on the strength and organisation of Soviet forces, as well as Soviet efforts to widen the gauge of the Czechoslovak railways.61 Beyond showing the close bonds with the opposition frontbench, the meeting also suggests that Attlee, contrary to arguments, particularly by Smith and Zametica, that he was ambivalent about Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, was willing to see the Soviet Union as a threat behind closed doors.62 In private, ministers were fully alive to the Soviet threat but restricted in how they could react, as the minutes of GEN 164 make clear. The formation of this small committee stemmed from a further report by the JIC on the subject of communist activities across the globe and the influence of the Soviet leadership in November 1946. As before, the JIC warned that communism constituted ‘a serious menace’ to British interests, both at home and abroad. This threat would ‘increase’, the committee suggested, if counter-measures were not adopted and, as a result, the committee proposed the formation of a special Cabinet subcommittee to ‘examine’ communist agitation, which was discussed by ministers in a specially convened meeting on 6 January. Known as GEN 164, it was attended by Chuter Ede, the Home Secretary, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Hector McNeil, and Alexander, with

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence?

63

Attlee in the chair.63 Its minutes show that everyone in attendance was aware of the threat posed by communists and fellow travellers. Chuter Ede emphatically agreed with the JIC’s world-view, having ‘received monthly’ reports on all subversive activities in Britain, though he was unsure of how the government should deal with domestic communist activities. ‘It was difficult,’ he suggested, ‘to say how far the membership of the Communist Party implied membership of the fanatical group of fervent devotees of the Communist religion’. Other than maintaining a ‘close’ watch on the Communist Party, it was hard to invoke ‘active counter-measures’ without undermining civil liberties. McNeil warned that communism was of ‘growing concern’, particularly in Italy and the Middle East, though it was ‘difficult’, in his words, to undertake ­‘counter-measures … other than by propaganda and covert assistance’. In future, ‘consideration [should] be given to the methods of disseminating the truth about Russia, both at home and abroad’. Concluding, Attlee said there had been general agreement that a ministerial committee should be formed, consisting of the Ministers of Defence and Labour, and the Foreign and Home Secretaries, to ‘keep under consideration the activities of the Communist Party, at home and abroad’, and to approve counter-measures as ‘desirable’.64 By the middle of 1947, GEN 183 had been formed to carry out the task, though focusing on domestic communism.65 Throughout 1947 Anglo-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate. In May negotiations for a new Anglo-Soviet Treaty collapsed and, two months later, discussions in Paris on the Marshall Plan, a comprehensive aid package for European recovery, broke up when Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, withdrew Soviet delegates. In August the JIC returned to the issue of Soviet ‘Interests, Intentions and Capabilities’. Intelligence deficiencies remained, with the committee reminding its consumers that Soviet ‘standards of security are the highest in the world’. This latest assessment was, it explained, a ‘careful survey’ making use of all the available information. Where it was not possible to use ‘established fact’ the committee had sought to base its assessments on the recognised ‘maxims of Lenin and Stalin’, which, it suggested, should ‘be regarded as the “Mein Kampf” of the Soviet regime’. Turning to the fundamental tenets of Soviet policy, the committee concluded that the Soviet leadership were ‘inspired by the long-term task to hasten the elimination of capitalism in all parts of the world’, replacing it ‘with their own form of communism’, and they were convinced: that the capitalist world, aware of communist encroachment, is likely eventually to resort to force in an attempt to avert its own collapse. This belief

64

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

inspires the immediate aim of the Soviet leaders, which is to ensure by all possible means the security of the Soviet Union.

These dual principles were, the report went on, manifest in Soviet policy by the simultaneous pursuit of five main objectives: the reconstruction of the Soviet economy; the development of a protective belt of contiguous states; the avoidance of major conflict ‘until circumstances are judged to be sufficiently favourable to the Soviet Union’; the worldwide promotion of communism; and the ‘disintegration and weakening of the capitalist world wherever possible’. The committee saw the Soviet leadership as unrelentingly hostile with ‘friction and struggle … only natural’. Soviet tactics would be ‘opportunist and flexible’ and involve, the JIC went on, the use of indigenous communists, as well as disaffected nationalists. This recent assessment should, the committee recommended, receive wide circulation: ‘Copies … should be made available to all members of the Cabinet, the Commonwealth Governments, His Majesty’s representatives in foreign countries and to Commanders-in-Chief at home and abroad’.66 Such views were unpalatable to some in the Cabinet. In September Richard Wood, Alexander’s Private Secretary, wrote that the Minister of Defence had been considering the report. Alexander understood that the Foreign Secretary ‘did not wish to see the circulation extended to members of the Cabinet and Commonwealth Governments, at least until after the forth-coming Foreign Ministers Conference’. As a result, Alexander had instructed that copies should only be seen by the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and ‘a very small number in the Service Departments’, though he was willing to discuss ‘extensive circulation’ at a later date.67 Distribution of the JIC’s assessment was discussed four days later at an informal meeting between Attlee and Bevin following Cabinet, when both regularly discussed foreign affairs and, possibly, intelligence matters once other ministers had left the Cabinet Room. No record of these discussions was ever kept but, according to Attlee’s press secretary, Francis Williams, these discussions ‘played an important part in formulating both men’s views’.68 A scribbled note made by John Addis, Assistant Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, reveals that ‘it was decided that no further distribution should be given to the report’.69 Attlee, according to a later JIC memorandum, ‘ruled that political considerations overrode the military advantages of giving a wider circulation, at least until after the Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers’.70 Even following the launch of the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform, in September, Bevin remained reluctant to see the document widely circulated and wanted to clear up any genuine

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence?

65

areas of mistrust between Britain and the Soviet Union. In August Bevin’s position had been made clear at a meeting of the Russia Committee, an internal Foreign Office body formed in the spring of 1946, when officials were told that the Foreign Secretary would not sanction any policy based on ‘open despair of reaching agreement with the USSR’ before discussions.71 More worrying, perhaps, were the dissenters in Cabinet, with Aneurin Bevan, the outspoken Minister of Health, initially viewing the Soviet Union in a positive light. Even in January 1948, following the collapse of discussions in London, Bevan warned colleagues about the dangers of following an overtly anti-Soviet foreign policy. Government policies, he argued, ‘always commend themselves’ to the right-wing press. ‘That makes me unhappy’, he told colleagues.72 Circulation of the document was once again raised by Alexander in February 1948, though the Chiefs of Staff were against the proposal, as Bevin had circulated a review of Soviet policy to the Cabinet.73 The paper echoed the arguments of the JIC, with Bevin explaining that: The first object of Soviet policy is probably to advance and to hasten their own reconstruction. At the same time they wish to overtake the material prosperity of the West and to draw out of the post-war confusion in the world a number of important advantages for themselves. I do not believe that the Soviet Government would consciously wish to risk a war for this purpose.

Instead, Bevin explained that the Soviet leadership would ‘get what they want by “cold war” methods’. In order to carry out such a policy they could, he warned, ‘rely … on the unquestioning obedience of the agents whom they have trained in the past’.74 The Chiefs of Staff did recommend, however, that the JIC’s report should be passed to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the Chiefs of Staff in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. In his letter, Alexander wrote that ‘he was inclined to agree’ with the Chiefs of Staff, though he sought to gauge the views of Attlee and Bevin. Following a meeting of the Cabinet in late February, circulation was discussed by Attlee, Alexander and Bevin. All three agreed that the Chiefs of Staff should distribute copies of the paper as they had earlier suggested.75 By July 1948 a further report on Soviet interests, intentions and capabilities had been produced. In places, the report was similar to the earlier report of 1947, and talked of the Soviet leadership’s inherent dislike of ‘“reformist socialism” of the British pattern’ which they saw as a ‘dangerous competitor for working class support’. The fundamental Soviet goal remained unchanged – ‘the elimination of capitalism from all parts

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

66

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

of the world’ – and their policy would be implemented in a ‘revolutionary struggle lasting possibly for many years and assisted, should favourable conditions arise, by military action on the part of the Soviet and satellite armed forces’. On this occasion the report received the widest possible circulation, with members of the Cabinet, senior diplomatic and military officials, and the Commonwealth governments all receiving copies.76 The broader circulation of this document can be explained by the changing international context. By 1948 relations with the Soviets had irreparably broken down. In January Bevin had advocated a decisive shift in British foreign policy, warning Cabinet colleagues that the Soviets were threatening the ‘whole fabric of the West’.77 In March anti-communist sentiments in government increased still further when, following a Soviet-backed coup in Czechoslovakia, Bevin circulated a Cabinet paper suggesting that the Soviet leadership wanted the ‘physical control of the Eurasian landmass and eventual control of the whole World Island’.78 By the summer of 1948 tensions had started over the divided city of Berlin. Since the beginning of the year Bevin had predicted trouble over the city and, in the first week of January, he circulated a paper to Cabinet colleagues setting out the situation following the breakdown of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Bevin forecast that inside Germany there would be increasing pressure for the formation of a representative government in the Western Zones. The Soviets, Bevin added, would respond by creating a government in their zone. Bevin warned that the Soviets were ‘most anxious’ to evict the three Western Powers from Berlin. He warned, though, that any attempt to apply ‘direct pressure on our communications or [cut] off our supplies … would be very risky’ since in the long run this would create a serious situation with the Americans which might, in certain circumstances, ‘lead to war’.79 The Soviet closure of the land routes into Berlin in June 1948 caused shockwaves in London. In a later review of assessments made in December 1951, the JIC concluded that they had failed to predict the blockade. The committee blamed this on the fact that it was an administrative decision for which no preparations on the ground were required.80 When news of the blockade broke on 24 June, Bevin was on holiday and had to be urgently brought back to London.81 The next day, the Cabinet were briefed by General Sir Neville Brownjohn, the Deputy Military Governor for Germany, who was pessimistic about the chances of resupplying Berlin by air. Bevin was unimpressed and demanded, as a matter of urgency, advice on how the city could be resupplied, suggesting the formation of a special committee to discuss the situation.82 As a result, GEN 241 (the Committee on Germany) was formed to

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence?

67

take decisions and report them back to the Cabinet. It included Attlee, Bevin, Morrison, Alexander, Stafford Cripps, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Chiefs of Staff.83 At an early point in the crisis the decision was taken to resupply the Western zones of Berlin by an airlift.84 Throughout the ensuing blockade the JIC acted as a ‘calming influence’ for policymakers, particularly Bevin.85 At a meeting in July, Hayter told the committee that he was regularly reporting to the Foreign Secretary about the Soviets’ preparedness for war.86 The JIC was aided, in part, by extensive intelligence coverage in Germany and, in the first weeks of the crisis, General Sir Brian Robertson, Military Governor and Commander-in-Chief of British forces in the country, told the Chiefs of Staff Committee that ‘our intelligence of Russian military movements in the Eastern Zone of Germany was reasonably good’.87 In October the committee reported that there was ‘no conclusive evidence that the Soviet Union is preparing to go to war in the near future’.88 By January the following year, the JIC was continuing with its cautious theme by reporting that military preparations ‘appear to be of a defensive rather than an offensive nature’.89 A week later the committee noted that the Soviet goal was to force the Western Powers to ‘leave Berlin; but they are also undoubtedly anxious to gain a foothold in Western Germany…’ The Soviet leadership had ‘hitherto exercised caution’ and had implemented their blockade ‘piece-meal’. Forecasting Soviet policy, the committee concluded that ‘despite their continued intransigence it is most unlikely that the Soviet Leaders will deliberately take any action in Germany which might precipitate a war’.90 In early 1949 the Soviets, through private discussions with US officials, hinted that their position over Berlin was not entirely inflexible. In the previous months the Soviets had begun to see the blockade as heavily counter-productive. It had failed in its immediate objective of forcing the Western Allies from the divided capital and had also galvanised resistance to the Soviets. On 12 May the blockade was finally lifted. Nevertheless, in spite of the Soviets conceding defeat, it was believed that the situation still offered them ample opportunity to once again pressure the Western zones of Berlin. In October 1949 Alexander sent Attlee a JIC report on ‘Future Soviet Intentions in Berlin’ and the possible measures, short of war, to which they could resort to force the Western Powers to relinquish their sectors of the city.91 The committee was confident that there was ‘little likelihood of a renewed Russian attempt to evict us from Berlin by means of blockade’ in the present circumstances. Berlin remained, though, a ‘serious political embarrassment’ to the Soviets, representing a ‘breach in the Iron Curtain … [and] a standing menace to their position in Eastern Europe’. The JIC warned that ‘the eviction of the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

68

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Western Allies from Berlin must still be the object of Russian policy’. It was not, however, an object that they were prepared to go to war over. Nevertheless, attempts could be made to interfere with Berlin’s extensive sewerage network, water supplies or communications. This would depend, however, on ‘what political risk’ the Soviets were prepared to take.92 In May 1950 a similar report was forwarded to Attlee by the Minister of Defence, now Emanuel ‘Manny’ Shinwell.93 This report, as with earlier ones, disregarded the prospect of ‘violent action … since this would involve … a major international incident, which might lead to war’, with the committee concluding that the Soviets would not ‘attempt to reimpose a full blockade in 1950’.94

Lacking intelligence? While intelligence may have played an important role in defusing Cold War tensions, policymakers were far from impressed with the amount of information provided to them. In early 1947 Alexander had bemoaned the absence of firm information on the Soviet Union’s ‘inner political activities’.95 In the spring of 1951 the Chiefs of Staff and Alexander’s successor, Shinwell, also ‘expressed concern at the lack of reliable intelligence about Russian resources and intentions’.96 These concerns were not just restricted to ministers. In January 1948 Sir William Strang had written to Menzies: I must confess that I am a little perturbed to find that your organisation was unable to give us any warning of the course which events were likely to take recently in Kowloon and Bagdad. The announcement of the Hong Kong Government’s intention to evict squatters from the walled city of Kowloon was made as long ago as November last and it seems that in the event feeing against this decision was steadily mounting until it culminated in the attack on the ConsulateGeneral at Canton a few days ago … Similarly in Baghdad, although we have had occasional hints from you that all was not well in Salih Jabr’s Cabinet, we have had nothing to lead us to expect the outburst of [violence] which is now reported from the Iraqi capital. I cannot escape the conclusion that in both these cases we were entitled to expect more information than in fact we got.

Strang told Menzies that the supply of ‘secret intelligence’ was particularly important as ‘in the coming months we may well be faced with developments of a far-reaching nature throughout Europe, particularly in Italy and France’, and that SIS’s representatives in these countries needed to be fully briefed on the Foreign Office’s requirements.97 Parts

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence?

69

of the intelligence community were also worried about collection. In late 1950 the JIC had drawn a gloomy picture of intelligence on the Soviet Union. In a damning assessment of current intelligence, the committee was ‘seriously concerned about the inadequacy of intelligence on the countries within the Soviet orbit and in particular on Soviet intentions and preparedness for war’.98 The following year, Churchill’s own private source of information Alan Hillgarth, formerly naval attaché to Madrid, told the former Prime Minister that intelligence on the Soviet Union was ‘dangerously poor … We have not broken any important Russian cypher, and it does not look as if we shall, since the Russians are cleverer than the Germans were and the publicity given to this form of intelligence after the last war has naturally made them very careful.’ Signals intelligence had only been able to provide a ‘sketchy outline of an order of battle’ for the Soviet navy and air force.99 Concerns about intelligence also went to the highest level of government. In July 1949 Sir William Strang, by now Permanent UnderSecretary at the Foreign Office, summarised a recent conversation with Bevin. In discussion the Foreign Secretary had, according to Strang, recalled an earlier conversation with Attlee during which both had considered it ‘desirable that an enquiry should be made into the whole of our intelligence services, i.e. naval, military and air intelligence, [SIS] and MI5’. Strang drew Bevin’s attention to the 1943 Bland Report on SIS’s future organisation and the recent Evill Review. The Foreign Secretary mentioned, wrote Strang, that ‘he would like to look at these Reports’. If a new inquiry were to be held, Strang added, it should be carried out by Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, provided ‘he could be spared from his Cabinet duties’. Bevin doubted whether Brook could be ‘spared at present’ and had ‘not yet made up his mind about the enquiry’.100 The next day, after a meeting of the JIC, Hayter spoke about a ‘most unfortunate’ meeting of the Defence Committee where the Harwood Report on future military expenditure was discussed, attended by the three Service ministers, Bevin and Alexander. Considering the restructuring of Britain’s armed forces in light of tight fiscal budgeting, the report had suggested that the ‘maximum practicable effort should be put into intelligence’ and that there needed to be an increase in funding of £4.5 million over three years, in addition to the Secret Vote. Particular emphasis would be placed upon ‘scientific and technical intelligence, radio interception and the collection and improved collation of overt information’, including ‘the press in the satellite countries and Russia, official and semi-official publications, Russian-inspired propaganda and Russian controlled broadcasting’.101 Responding to the recommendation, Bevin and Alexander believed that ‘This is out of the question and

70

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

what do we get from Intelligence anyway?’ According to Hayter, doubts about intelligence led to the suggestion that ‘an enquiry should be made into the whole of Service intelligence, and that M.I.5. & 6 should be included’. Writing about the comments in his diary, Liddell wrote how Hayter: had seen the Secretary of State subsequently and had pointed out to him that he got a great deal from Intelligence. Naturally he did not see all Intelligence reports; there were far too many of them and he would not have time to digest them. As regards the enquiry, he pointed out that there has recently been an enquiry.102

Alexander continued his criticisms and, during a conversation with Kenneth Strong of the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), said that he ‘could not see the justification for heavy expenditure on Intelligence and seemed to complain that people were always bringing up the Russian bogey, but in fact nothing had happened’. Drawing on his personal knowledge, he quoted ‘[Henry] Tizard’s forebodings about the bombing of London immediately war was declared – in fact nothing had happened for six months’. Strong responded that intelligence, despite inadequacies, provided ‘Government with information on which from time to time they could take action’ and that ‘everything the Government did was based on Intelligence’. Increased expenditure on intelligence was, he argued, a ‘mere fleabite’ compared to the costs of conventional defence.103 Doubts about the intelligence services returned in early 1950 following the arrest and conviction of the atomic spy Klaus Fuchs. In March, during a debate on ‘Communists in the Public Service’, the former head of the wartime Security Executive and senior Conservative, Lord Swinton, gave a speech in the House of Lords calling for the amalgamation of Britain’s intelligence apparatus. While out of the machinery of government, and unaware of the particular details of the Fuchs case, Swinton’s views were no doubt shaped by his wartime experience of the intelligence community, when, as chairman of the Security Executive, he was privy to just some of the inter-agency squabbling that had continued unabated in wartime. He called for: the complete pooling of information; it means that the departments and sections, or whatever they are in the organisations, which are all in one way or another concerned in this wide field of intelligence and security, must not work in watertight compartments. If I may so put it, they must try not to be so secretive in the interests of their own security that they keep their secrets from one another. That is a danger to be guarded against, and when the Government answer, I should like to be assured to-day that they

Lacking intelligence?

71

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

are satisfied – the responsibility is theirs; it cannot be anybody else’s – that there is a really effective coordinating policy which ensures that the system works to the best advantage.104

Swinton felt so strongly about the need for better coordination that he wrote to Attlee. This was not unusual. On foreign affairs and defence matters there was a regular exchange of information between the frontbenches of both political parties and, in fact, Attlee occasionally consulted Swinton on defence.105 In a letter on 6 April, Swinton wrote to the Prime Minister on intelligence coordination, telling Attlee that it was, in his view, ‘essential to amalgamate M.I.5. and M.I.6. under a single Chief’. Lord Jowitt, the Lord Chancellor, was, according to Swinton, in favour, having arrived at the ‘same conclusion’. Swinton finished by reminding Attlee: ‘We worked so closely together in all this in the war that I thought that you would like me to tell you fully what is in my mind.’106 Swinton’s concerns about intelligence coordination revived Attlee’s own doubts about the intelligence community, and two days later he responded with the rather frank admission that he was ‘not yet satisfied that we get full value for our expenditure’. Moreover, Attlee admitted that the difficulties in dealing with the Soviet threat were, in his words, ‘far greater than anything which we have had to face before, for the iron curtain is very hard to penetrate’. As a result, he was considering ordering ‘an enquiry into the whole range of our security services conducted by a single individual’. This review would be wide-ranging, with ‘the amalgamation of services … one of the points for consideration’, and Attlee ended by opening the possibility for further discussion, telling Swinton that ‘we should talk after the holidays on the general question’. He signed the letter ‘Clem’, underlining the close relationship between the two.107 On Attlee’s instructions, Swinton was to be provided with a copy of the report ‘before it is considered’.108 While the fallout from the Fuchs case may have sparked the review, Attlee’s long-term doubts about intelligence expenditure and value for money appear to have been crucial. On 20 April Attlee asked to see Brook and ‘said that he had been thinking further about the suggestion (which, it appeared, he had previously discussed with Sir Edward Bridges) that there should be some further enquiry into the security and intelligence services’. Brook tried to satisfy the Prime Minister, citing several previous intelligence reviews, and noted that Attlee was interested in closer intelligence coordination, but ‘also anxious to be satisfied that the money provided for this work was fairly allocated between the different organisations, and that full value was being obtained for the money spent’. At this point, Attlee told Brook that

72

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

he had had a private talk about this with Lord Swinton – who had stressed the need for further enquiry into the question of co-ordination between the various organisations at work in this field. Lord Swinton had also suggested that it might be useful if, as a continuing arrangement, the Prime Minister deputed some other Minister (possibly a Junior Minister) to watch the work of these organisations on his behalf.109

Almost at the same time, intelligence coordination had been under discussion in the Ministry of Defence. In particular, Shinwell had asked Kenneth Strong for a paper on the possibility of ‘a centralisation of intelligence organisations’. Strong had been in favour of the centralisation of all operational intelligence staffs in one building and his paper dealt with the intelligence organisation of the Ministry of Defence and the three Services, not with SIS or MI5. For Strong, the formation of the JIB had eased intelligence overlap between the three Services, though there was room for improvement, and he strongly urged the ‘geographical centralisation in one building of operational intelligence’.110 Shinwell raised the subject with Attlee a month later. In his letter, Shinwell wrote that the recommendations were ‘excellent’ and that he was arranging for the ‘geographical centralisation of the Intelligence Organisation to be examined by the Chiefs of Staff, though I am of course well aware that … it may be very difficult to achieve’. Shinwell also betrayed the motives for his interest in greater intelligence coordination by emphasising the financial savings to be achieved, telling Attlee that the present cost of intelligence, excluding the Secret Service and Security Service, totalled over £3.5 million, of which the War Office accounted for £2,100,000, the Air Ministry £646,000 and the Admiralty £575,000. For Shinwell, ‘If we could secure economies in these figures and an increase in efficiency at the same time by moving in this direction proposed by General Strong, I think we ought to do so.’111 Attlee’s views are unrecorded, though given his concerns about cost effectiveness, he may have sided with his Minister of Defence. In the end, the Chiefs of Staff resisted the pressure. During discussions with Shinwell, they insisted that the present system was ‘working well’, and claimed that, if the current situation was changed, the reforms could be ‘disastrous since intelligence must frequently be acted upon immediately and thus no measures which would cause any delay whatsoever can be accepted’.112 While Brook would eventually carry out the final review of the intelligence machinery, he was not the first choice. Attlee had, initially, wanted Sir Hastings ‘Pug’ Ismay, Churchill’s wartime Chief of Staff and now chairman of the Council for the Festival of Great Britain, to take charge. Despite this, Ismay’s role with the Festival of Great Britain

Lacking intelligence?

73

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

meant the job of conducting the review eventually fell to Brook.113 The choice of Brook was a compromise and came from Sir Edward Bridges, head of the Civil Service. Guy Liddell wrote in his diary of a conversation with Bridges during which: Bridges mentioned that in conversation with the Prime Minister and Bevin, a desire had been expressed for an enquiry on a Ministerial level into the activities of M.I.5. and M.I.6. Although the Fuchs case was obviously the cause of this, the enquiry was to be of a general nature. Bridges stalled on this, as he thought it unnecessary, but had been obliged to compromise suggesting that Norman Brook should conduct the enquiry.114

The review was eventually commissioned in May.115 While there seem to have been no formal terms of reference, Brook gave special attention to three key areas: first, the efficiency of the intelligence community; second, resource allocation between the agencies; and, finally, inter-service relations, including ministerial responsibility for their work.116 The issue of funding was particularly important. In a conversation with MI5’s Director General, Sir Percy Sillitoe, Brook explained that the inquiry ‘is apparently to cover all Intelligence, and the emphasis is apparently more on finance than anything else’.117 Attlee appears to have been an important factor in determining these areas. In May Bridges wrote to the Prime Minister that the organisations to be included should be both the Security Service and SIS, the ‘Y’ Services and ‘the Intelligence organisations of the three Services, which were also inquired into by Air Chief Marshall Sir Douglas Evill in 1947’. Bridges wrote that Attlee had ‘in mind that the inquiry should be carried out on broad lines’ and that it should deal with the three main points outlined above.118 Brook’s review was completed in March 1951, though his tentative conclusions were sent to Attlee on 25 October 1950.119 While he did not expect to ‘recommend any major change’ to Britain’s intelligence apparatus – namely the amalgamation of the three services – Brook did propose a series of reforms. In particular, while he was pleased with the arrangement that ‘the head of SIS should continue to be responsible to the Foreign Secretary, through the Permanent Under-Secretary – while preserving his existing rights of access to the Prime Minister’, he was less than satisfied with the current procedure ‘that MI5 should be responsible only to the Prime Minister’, and suggested that ‘it would be better if MI5 were in the same relation to the Home Office as SIS is to the Foreign Office’, with the Security Service able to call on the ‘advice and assistance’ of a senior Permanent Secretary. In future, the Security Service would be ‘responsible to the Home Secretary’, though he added that the organisation’s Director General would ‘always be able … to

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

74

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

arrange a personal interview with the Prime Minister’. Brook also recommended the formation of an inter-departmental body, consisting of the permanent heads of the Treasury, Foreign Office and Home Office, and sitting with the chairman of the JIC, to consider ‘the distribution of resources between the various intelligence organisations’. This committee, he went on, would become ‘a source of authority and direction for the various intelligence organisations, and an instrument on which the Prime Minister … would come to rely for advice on intelligence matters’. The committee could also, Brook added, provide the heads of the intelligence services with ‘guidance on political and other matters which they are not likely to be able to obtain from the Chiefs of Staff’.120 Brook’s report of March 1951 was, up to this point at least, the most significant review of Britain’s intelligence apparatus. At the end of the war, post-war intelligence planning had become a ‘growth area’ across Whitehall, with Bland’s 1943 report on SIS and a review of ‘The Intelligence Machine’ submitted to the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee in January 1945, which aimed to configure the central apparatus of intelligence. Other reviews considered the future of SOE, the post-war functions and responsibilities of MI5, and naval and scientific intelligence, and a study was also underway that would eventually lead to the creation of GCHQ.121 All of these reviews were single issue, looking at individual agencies, while Brook’s was wide-ranging and focused on Britain’s covert intelligence agencies. After outlining Britain’s intelligence machinery, Brook suggested that any criticisms were unfair for a number of reasons. These are outlined in full here, as they offer a series of frank observations about Britain’s intelligence agencies five years after the end of the war. Brook wrote that: Much of the current criticism of the state of intelligence is based on a comparison with conditions as they existed during the last war. We then had to employ on intelligence work large numbers of exceptionally able people (university dons and the like) whom it would be quite wrong in the national interest to use on this work … Secondly, it is much easier to break into an enemy’s secrets in war, because his communications are more extensive, and therefore more vulnerable, and our agents can do things, and take risks, which are not permissible in peace. Thirdly, we were exceptionally lucky in breaking into German communications at an early stage in the war. And, fourthly, the German intelligence and counter-intelligence services had fallen, under the Nazis, to a relatively low standard of efficiency. Russia, on the other hand, is probably the most difficult target which has ever been set to an intelligence or counter-espionage service. Her secrets are held within a completely closed society, in which an extremely high standard of security is enforced with efficiency.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence?

75

Brook’s rebuttal of many of the criticisms of British intelligence certainly holds true. While the intelligence agencies were receiving increased funding, it was the time factor and the relatively new enemy that determined the amount of available intelligence, with any gaps attributed more to the ‘inherent difficulties of the task than to slackness or inefficiency’. Turning to the agencies themselves, Brook gave the Security Service a clean bill of health, with the organisation staffed by ‘relatively young officers’ who were well resourced. On the other hand, the same could not be said for SIS. Other than several administrative problems, the intelligence on the Soviet Union was, he explained, ‘not satisfactory … the results of S.I.S. activities against Russia and the satellite countries have so far been particularly disappointing’. Essentially, SIS was reliant on what Brook called a ‘lucky break’ – a foreign national volunteering their services – and only time and good fortune would improve the flow of information. In the short term, intelligence consumers rated information from GCHQ higher than that from SIS, with some consumers even suggesting that 90 per cent of all useful intelligence came from the former. Despite problems with reading high-grade Soviet ciphers, GCHQ was able to access lower grade traffic and had started to achieve ‘remarkable results’ from traffic analysis, the study of call signs. However, at a time of fiscal austerity, the organisation had problems in recruiting the necessary staff, developing the necessary specialist equipment and renewing the dilapidated infrastructure, particularly the chain of intercept sites around the country, which were ‘inadequate for peacetime conditions’.122 Attlee received the report in March, though it was only discussed by an ad hoc committee of ministers three months later during a meeting in the Prime Minister’s room in the House of Commons.123 This committee was served by an official committee, known as GEN 374, chaired by Bridges. The ministerial committee was chaired by Attlee and attended by Morrison, by now Foreign Secretary, Shinwell, Chuter Ede and Patrick Gordon Walker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, along with Brook. The committee first discussed Brook’s proposals on ministerial responsibility for the Security Service, before turning to the staffing and organisation of SIS. Recently appointed to the Foreign Office, Morrison was not ‘in a position to form a view on this matter’ though officials saw SIS as ‘an efficient organisation, that the methods of staffing and recruitment … had produced a number of excellent men and that the general level of ability in the Service was now much higher than it had been before the war’, though a review of internal administration was necessary so the organisation would ‘not become too rigid’. The Foreign Office’s support for SIS did not receive backing from Shinwell

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

76

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

who, the minutes reveal, once again raised the question of whether ‘we were getting value for the considerable amount of money spent on the Secret Intelligence Service particularly that devoted to the collection of intelligence by agents in the field’. Brook once again defended SIS, suggesting that, while technical forms of intelligence collection were becoming increasingly valuable, this did not provide evidence that the budget for human intelligence should be ‘cut down’, and he did not ‘agree with those who said that the day of the secret agent was done’. Once again, it was reiterated that the Soviet Union was an ‘exceptionally difficult intelligence target’ and that SIS was ‘still subject to restrictions imposed for valid reasons of foreign policy’.124 Conclusion The JIC played a valuable role during the Attlee years. Contrary to the arguments put forward by Smith and Zametica that he was ambivalent about Soviet policy, Attlee was fully alive to the Soviet threat, thanks, in part, to the assessments of the JIC. As he told Churchill on 5 November, the Soviets were ‘undoubtedly’ playing ‘Power Politics’ and developing a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, while the minutes of GEN 164 show ministerial concern about the Soviets.125 But Attlee, like the JIC, could interpret post-war Soviet policy from the Russian perspective, though his stance was eventually ended by the resistance of Bevin and others.126 In many ways, the early views of Attlee and Bevin – that the Soviets, while threatening, could still be worked with – mirror those of the committee, which continued to argue for a balanced assessment of Soviet policy, even when it became clear that East–West relations had been irreparably damaged. By 1947 the committee and senior Whitehall figures agreed that the Soviets posed a threat, though, on a ministerial level, this viewpoint was still politically risky, as restrictions on the wider circulation of JIC material to ministers shows. Intelligence also played an important, if overlooked, role in several crises during the period. During the Iranian crisis of 1946 and Berlin two years later, the JIC acted as a ‘calming influence’ on policymakers, reassuring them that the Soviets would not threaten war. Ministers also had access to other sources of intelligence, particularly SIS reports and signals intelligence, though, even after the end of the Cold War, the precise nature of this information and its impact is still unclear. Despite the important educative role of intelligence, policymakers in government were far from impressed with the performance of Britain’s intelligence community. Attlee, as his working papers make clear, would

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence?

77

have been fully aware of the post-war intelligence deficiency and, as a wartime consumer, he would have been conscious of the immense success enjoyed by Britain’s codebreakers. In wartime, policymakers had been spoilt by the abundance of information on Germany, but Britain’s intelligence agencies struggled to operate in peacetime conditions and with the new Soviet target. As Prime Minister, Attlee would have been in a perfect position to view the dearth of information on Russia. While expressing unease about the nature of post-war intelligence, ministers were unable to implement short-term fixes to solve the problems. Many of the issues affecting intelligence stemmed from the wartime ban on intelligence operations against the Soviet Union and, as Brook recognised, it would take time to solve the problems identified with SIS. Ministerial grumblings about the state of post-war intelligence, contrary to previous suggestions, show that they recognised the importance of intelligence in government, and sought reforms to the system. Notes 1 Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge (hereafter CAC): SWIN III 4/1, Attlee to Swinton, 8 March 1950. 2 PREM 8/1527, Brook to Attlee, 25 October 1950. 3 The work of the committee has been explored elsewhere, notably in the work of Sir Percy Cradock and Michael Goodman’s official history. For further details, see Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London: John Murray, 2002); and Michael Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume 1, From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). 4 Kenneth Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945–1951 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 41. 5 See ‘Let Us Face the Future: A Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the Nation’, reproduced in Iain Dale (ed.), Labour Party General Election Manifestos, 1900–1997 (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 49–60. 6 Hugh Dalton, High Time and After: Memoirs, 1945–1960 (London: Fredrick Muller, 1962), p. 3. 7 Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p. 772; Piers Dixon, Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon, Don and Diplomat (London: Hutchinson, 1968), p. 166. 8 HW 3/3, ‘Post War Organisation’, 4 January 1945. 9 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Reilly Papers: MS. Eng. 6919, ‘The 1945 Election’. 10 HW 1/3787, ‘Intelligence reports submitted by “C” to the Prime Minister’, July 1945.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

78

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

11 HW 1/3788, ‘Intelligence reports submitted by “C” to the Prime Minister’, August 1945. 12 KV 4/468, entry for 6 December 1946. 13 Information provided by GCHQ historian, 3 December 2012. 14 Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume 1, p. 180. 15 CAC, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (BPOHP), interview with Sir Nicholas Henderson, p. 10. 16 HW 64/80, ‘Distribution and Security of Signals Intelligence in the Foreign Office’, 29 September 1945. On possible use of this material, see Christian Schlaepfer, ‘Signals Intelligence and British Counter-Subversion in the Early Cold War’, Intelligence and National Security, 29:1 (2014), p. 15. 17 HW 64/80, ‘Distribution and Security of Signals Intelligence in the Colonial Office’. 18 FO 1093/447, Sargent to Bevin, 19 October 1948. 19 Magdalen College (hereafter MAG), papers of Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, MC: P2/4/MS/18, ‘1946/8: Resurrection of Special Operations’. 20 On the early development of the committee, see Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume 1, pp. 11–35. 21 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 297. 22 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: A Biography, ed. Peter Hennessy and Brian Brivati (London: Politico’s, 2002), p. viii. 23 Information provided by Michael Goodman, 11 January 2011. 24 J.I.C. (46)1(0) Final (Revise) [N 3388/605/38], ‘Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee on Russia’s strategic interests and intentions’, 1 March 1946, reproduced in; DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. VI, no. 78, pp. 297-301. 25 PREM 8/342, Foreign Office to Moscow, 12 March 1946. 26 Bradley F. Smith, Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941–1945 (Pittsburgh: University Press of Kansas, 1996), p. 254. 27 In particular, see the HW 75 file series at the National Archives containing reports on Soviet Bloc countries from 1945 to 1950 (see Schlaepfer, ‘Signals Intelligence and British Counter-subversion in the Early Cold War’, pp. 1–17). 28 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘GCHQ and SIGINT in the Early Cold War, 1945–70’, Intelligence and National Security, 16:1 (2001), p. 74. GC&CS did enjoy some, albeit limited, success against low-grade Soviet ciphers in the early stages of the Cold War; see Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London: HarperPress, 2010), p. 78; and Matthew Aid, The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), p. 15. 29 Aldrich, GCHQ, p. 108. 30 Jeffery, MI6, p. 705; FO 1093/400, Menzies to Caccia, 8 March 1946. 31 FO 1093/477, Menzies to Sargent, 25 June 1948. 32 Jeffery, MI6, p. 611. 33 FO 1093/400, Caccia to Cadogan, 29 January 1946.

Lacking intelligence?

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

34 35 36 37 38

79

CAB 21/2745, minutes of ad hoc ministerial meeting, 6 January 1947. FO 1093/477, Menzies to Sargent, 25 June 1948. FO 1093/477, Sargent to Bevin, 19 October 1948. On Gouzenko, see Andrew, The Defence of the Realm. CAB 129/1, C.P. (45)112, ‘Our overseas financial prospects’, 13 August 1945, reproduced in DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. III, No. 6, pp. 28–37. 39 T 165/445 ‘Secret Service, 1949–50: Grants and expenditure in recent years’. 40 On the report, see Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume 1, pp. 168–172. 41 CAB 163/7, Annex I, ‘Review of Intelligence Organisation’. 42 CAB 163/7, MISC./P (47) 31, ‘Review of Intelligence Organisations, 1947; Report by Air Chief Marshall Sir Douglas Evill’, 6 November 1947. 43 CAB 163/7, Annex II, 10 July 1947. 44 CAB 81/126, J.I.C. (44)467(0), ‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions from the Viewpoint of Security’, 18 December 1944. 45 J.I.C. (46)1(0) Final (Revise) [N 3388/605/38], ‘Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee on Russia’s strategic interests and intentions’, 1 March 1946, reproduced in DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. VI, no. 78, pp. 297–301. 46 PREM 8/342, Hollis to Attlee, 7 March 1946. 47 Attlee scribbled in red crayon on Hollis’s note ‘Defence Committee’ (PREM 8/342, Hollis to Attlee, 7 March 1946). 48 Jeffery, MI6, p. 649. 49 For details of the affair, see Louise Fawcett, ‘Invitation to the Cold War: British Policy in Iran, 1941–47’, in Anne Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 184–200. 50 PREM 8/346, Ismay to Attlee, 21 April 1946; CAB 81/132, J.I.C. (46)24(0) (Final), Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee; Implications of Recent Russian Movements in Persia, 16 April 1946. 51 Ben Pimlott (ed.), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton: 1918–40, 1945–60 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987), p. 368. 52 CAB 81/133, J.I.C. (46) 48 (0) (Final), ‘Russian troop movements in SouthEast Europe and Persia’, 22 May 1946. 53 CAB 81/133, J.I.C. (46) 62 (0) (Final), ‘Russian troop movements in SouthEast Europe and Persia’, 26 June 1946. 54 CAB 81/132, J.I.C. (46)38(0), report by the Joint Intelligence Committee on Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions in the Middle East, 6 June 1946, reproduced in DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. VII, no. 58, pp. 161-164. 55 PREM 8/343, Ismay to Rowan, 15 June 1946. 56 CAB 130/17, J.I.C. (46)70(0) ‘The Spread of Communism Throughout the World and the Extent of its Direction from Moscow’, 23 September 1946. 57 PREM 8/342, Churchill to Attlee, 27 October 1946. 58 PREM 8/342, Ismay to Attlee, 04.11.46. For copies of the papers see J.I.C. (46)1(0) Final (Revise) [N 3388/605/38], ‘Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee on Russia’s strategic interests and intentions’, 1 March 1946, DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. VI, no. 78, pp. 297–301; CAB 130/17, J.I.C. (46)70(0)

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

80

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

‘The Spread of Communism Throughout the World and the Extent of its Direction from Moscow’, 23 September 1946; CAB 81/132, J.I.C. (46)38(0), Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee on Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions in the Middle East, 6 June 1946, DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. VII, no. 58, pp. 161–4; CAB 81/133, J.I.C. (46) 75 (0) (Final), ‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions in the Far East’, 5 October 1946. 59 CAB 81/134, J.I.C. (46) 85 (0) (T. of R.), ‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions in Europe’, 28 October 1946. Attlee may have seen an earlier version of the assessment as it was not formally circulated until February 1947; see CAB 81/134, J.I.C. (46) 85 (0) (Final), ‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions in Europe’, 14 February 1947. 60 PREM 8/342, notes of meeting held in the Prime Minister’s room at the House of Commons, 4 p.m. 5 November 1946. On the cautious nature of JIC papers, see Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume 1, p. 244. 61 CAC, Churchill Papers, CHUR 2/30, ‘Information Recently Received on the Red Army’, 20 November 1946; CHUR 2/29, Attlee to Churchill, 6 December 1946; CHUR 2/30, Attlee to Churchill, 10 December 1946; CHUR 2/30, Alexander to Churchill, 11 November 1946. 62 On this viewpoint, see Raymond Smith and John Zametica, ‘The Cold War Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered, 1945–7’, International Affairs, 61:2 (1985). 63 CAB 130/17, J.I.C. (46)101(0) ‘The Spread of Communism Throughout the World and the Extent of its Direction from Moscow’, 18 November 1946. 64 CAB 21/2745, GEN 164/1, minutes of ad hoc ministerial meeting, 6 January 1947. Chuter Ede’s assertion is at variance with the suggestion he was ‘not prepared’ to accept advice from MI5 on the subject (Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 127). 65 CAB 130/20, GEN 183/1 meeting, 16 June 1947. See Chapter 6 for more information. 66 CAB 158/1, J.I.C. (47) 7/1 (Final), ‘Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities’, 6 August 1947. 67 PREM 8/893, Wood to Henniker, 4 September 1947; PREM 8/893, Alexander to Attlee, 18 February 1948. 68 PREM 8/893, Addis to Attlee, 8 September 1947. Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, p. 146. 69 PREM 8/893, Note by Addis, 9 September 1947. 70 CAB 158/3, J.I.C. (48) 13 (0), Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities; memorandum by the Joint Intelligence Committee, 6 February 1948. 71 FO 371/66371, Russia Committee meeting, 14 August 1947. 72 CAB 195/6, Cabinet Secretary’s notebook, 8 January 1948. 73 PREM 8/893, Alexander to Attlee, 16 February 1948. 74 CAB 129/23, C.P. (48)7, ‘Review of Soviet Policy: memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 5 January 1948. 75 PREM 8/893, Wood to Hollis, 2 March 1948.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Lacking intelligence?

81

76 CAB 158/3, J.I.C. (48) 9 (0) (Final), ‘Russia’s Interests, Intentions and Capabilities’, 23 July 1948. 77 CAB 129/23, C.P. (48)6, ‘The First Aim of British Foreign Policy: memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 4 January 1948. 78 CAB 129/25, C.P. (48)72, ‘The Threat to Western Civilisation: memorandum by the Secretary of State’, 3 March 1948. 79 CAB 129/23, C.P. (48) 5, ‘Policy in Germany’, 5 January 1948. 80 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 77. 81 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 575. 82 CAB 128/13, C.M. (48) 43, Cabinet Conclusions, 25 June 1948 83 For details see PREM 8/721, ‘Situation in Germany: Note by the Prime Minister’; CAB 130/38, GEN 241/1st meeting, 28 June 1948. 84 On the ‘Berlin blockade’, see Anna Tusa and John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade (London: Coronet, 1989). 85 Craig, ‘The Joint Intelligence Committee’, p. 90. 86 CAB 159/4, J.I.C. (48) 80th meeting (0), minutes of meeting, 30 July 1948. 87 DEFE 4/14, COS (48) 97th Meeting, 12 July 1948. 88 CAB 158/4, J.I.C. (48) 70 (0) (Final), ‘Short term indications of Soviet preparedness for war’, 1 October 1948. 89 J.I.C. (48) 70/1 (Final), ‘Short term indications of Soviet preparedness for war’, 21 January 1949. 90 CAB 158/5, J.I.C. (48) 121 (Revised Final), ‘Possibility of War Before the End of 1956’, 27 January 1949. 91 PREM 8/1153, Alexander to Attlee, 19 October 1949. 92 CAB 158/7, J.I.C. (49) (0) 54 (Final) (Revise), ‘Soviet Intentions in Berlin’, 10 October 1949. 93 PREM 8/1153, Shinwell to Attlee, 25 May 1950. 94 CAB 158/10, J.I.C. (50) 43 (Final), ‘Soviet Intentions in Berlin During 1950’, 5 May 1950. 95 CAB 21/2745, minutes of ad hoc ministerial meeting, 6 January 1947. 96 CAC, CHUR 2/36, Hillgarth to Churchill, 31 March 1951. 97 FO 1093/373, Sargent to Menzies, 30 January 1948. 98 CAB 301/17, ‘The Secret Intelligence and Security Services: Report of Enquiry by Sir Norman Brook’, March 1951. Details about internal attempts to improve intelligence can be found in Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume 1, pp. 250–7. 99 CAC, CHUR 2/36, Hillgarth to Churchill, 31 March 1951. On Hillgarth, see Duff Hart-Davis, Man of War: The Secret Life of Alan Hillgarth, Officer, Adventurer, Agent (London: Century, 2012). 100 Note by Strang, 14 July 1949, obtained using FOIA. 101 CAB 131/7, Misc./P. (49) 6, ‘Report of Inter-Service Working Party on Size and Shape of the Armed Forces, 28 February 1949’. 102 KV 4/471, entry for 15 July 1949. On the Harwood Report, see Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp. 47–51.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

82

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

103 KV 4/471, entry for 11 December 1949. 104 Hansard, HC Deb., 29 March 1950, vol. 166, cols. 607–61. 105 On Attlee’s relationship with Swinton, see John Cross, Lord Swinton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 106 BOD, MS. Attlee dep. 100, fol. 10, Swinton to Attlee, 6 April 1950. 107 BOD, MS. Attlee dep. 100, fol. 12, Attlee to Swinton, 8 April 1950. 108 E. D. R. Harrison, ‘J.C. Masterman and the Security Service’, Intelligence and National Security, 24:6 (2009), p. 780. 109 CAB 301/18, note by Sir Norman Brook of meeting with Prime Minister. 110 CAB 301/18, Strong to Shinwell, 17 May 1950. 111 CAB 301/18, Shinwell to Attlee, 22 June 1950. 112 Richard Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” during the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, 24 (1998), p. 337. 113 CAC, Swinton papers, SWIN III 4/1, Attlee to Swinton, 22 May 1950. 114 KV 4/472, entry for 31 May 1950. 115 CAB 301/17, The Secret Intelligence and Security Services: Report of Enquiry by Sir Norman Brook, March 1951. 116 Ibid. 117 KV 4/472, entry for 16 June 1950. 118 CAB 301/18, Proposed Inquiry into Security and Intelligence Organisations, 25 May 1950. 119 PREM 8/1527, Brook to Attlee, 25 October 1950. 120 Ibid. On the committee, see Richard Aldrich, ‘Counting the Cost of Intelligence: The Treasury, National Service and GCHQ’, English Historical Review, CXXVII:532 (2013), pp. 596–627. 121 See Michael Herman, ‘The Post-War Organization of Intelligence: The January 1945 Report to the Joint Intelligence Committee on “The Intelligence Machine”’, in Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman (eds), Learning From the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), p. 14. 122 CAB 301/17, The Secret Intelligence and Security Services: Report of Enquiry by Sir Norman Brook, March 1951. 123 CAB 301/18, Brook to Attlee, March 1951. 124 CAB 301/23, note of meeting held in the Prime Minister’s room, House of Commons, 5 June 1951. 125 PREM 8/342, notes of meeting held in the Prime Minister’s room at the House of Commons, 5 November 1946. 126 Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume 1, pp. 244–5.

3 Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up: propaganda and subversion, 1945–48 [W]e should launch a sustained, offensive propaganda campaign, aimed at countering the Cominform and weakening communist pressure generally and in particular in France, Germany, Italy, Greece and the Middle East.1 Christopher Mayhew, 1948 The fast increasing threat to western civilisation which Soviet expansion represents impels me once again to examine the extent to which the Soviet Government appear to be achieving their aims, together with the steps we should now take in order to frustrate them.2 Ernest Bevin, 3 March 1948

While the Attlee government started the process of dismantling Britain’s wartime machinery of sabotage and subversion, worsening relations with the Soviet Union forced ministers to authorise a number of measures that culminated in the formation of the Information Research Department (IRD). This chapter documents the development of British anti-communist information policy by studying internal Foreign Office discussions on anti-communist policy and the later debates of the Ministerial Committee on Propaganda (GEN 231). It shows that, while initially reluctant to authorise offensive anti-communist propaganda, Bevin authorised defensive measures aimed at protecting British interests in the Middle East, Germany and a number of other areas. While agreeing to overseas propaganda activities, Bevin resisted wider calls for Britain to start a Cold War offensive involving subversion and special operations in the Eastern Bloc, believing such action, if enacted, would ‘endanger the position’ of allies and unnecessarily provoke the Soviets for little gain.3 Although this opposition was gradually eroded, largely because of Soviet actions and attempts by officials to force a rethink, the moratorium on anti-Soviet activities remained in place until 1948.

84

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

‘Defensive-offensive’: Britain strikes back By late 1945 Britain’s machinery to conduct both propaganda and special operations had been scaled back. Almost simultaneously, officials started to air concerns about Anglo-Soviet relations. In the spring of 1946 the JIC identified the Soviet Union as the pre-eminent threat to British interests, warning that, if its hegemony over Eastern Europe was threatened, the Kremlin would make full use of ‘propaganda … ­diplomatic pressure and of the Communist parties abroad’ to fight back.4 British representatives started to report a tirade of anti-Western propaganda from the Soviets. Frank Roberts, chargé d’affaires in Moscow, reported that increasing attention was being ‘devoted to the renewed Marxist-Leninist ideological campaign’, which had a particular antiBritish tone. Britain was the prime target of Soviet hostility as the ‘home of capitalism, imperialism and now of social democracy’ and, moreover, anti-British propaganda was ‘directed against us’ from across Europe. This hostility stemmed from a ‘certain fear of our inherent strength’ and, at a recent meeting of the United Nations Organisation, Soviet delegates became aware that ‘the whole world, with a few exceptions, ranged on our side under your own [Bevin’s] moral leadership’. Labour’s electoral success posed a direct threat to the Soviet leadership which, Roberts wrote, viewed Labour as ‘a progressive force’ with ‘equal and possibly greater attraction than their own Communist system’.5 It was in the context of growing East–West tension that Britain’s broader strategy to counter Soviet propaganda was set out by Christopher Warner, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. Taking an ideological viewpoint, Warner argued that the Soviets intended to play an ‘aggressive political role’, simultaneously ‘making an intensive drive to increase its own military and industrial strength’. The Russian leadership were carrying out, he went on, the ‘most vicious power politics in the political, economic and propaganda spheres’, and intended to cause ‘mischief’ by stirring up ‘trouble for His Majesty’s Government’ in a number of ways, including the use of indigenous nationalist movements in Britain’s overseas territories; the weakening of Britain’s allies abroad; and the formation of communist regimes to threaten Britain’s interests. This campaign would ‘continue indefinitely’. In the face of such hostility, ‘concessions and appeasement’ would only serve to undermine Britain’s position, with Warner recommending that Britain needed a vigorous ‘defensive-offensive’ policy, opposing Soviet propaganda and providing social democrats, liberals and other ‘friends’ with as much ‘moral and material support as is possible’. Britain would act as the driving force behind a ‘world-wide anti-Communist campaign’.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up

85

In c­ oncluding, Warner wrote that the Russians had ‘decided upon an aggressive policy, based upon militant Communism and Russian chauvinism. They have launched an offensive against Social Democracy and against this country.’ In light of this ‘we must’, he recommended, ‘at once organise and coordinate our defences against all these and that we should not stop short of a defensive-offensive policy’.6 Warner’s proposals were discussed by the Russia Committee, an internal Foreign Office body formed in the spring of 1946 to review Soviet policy and provide policy recommendations to officials, which Bevin took ‘much interest in’.7 On the whole, the committee agreed with Warner’s proposals and the need for a ‘defensive-offensive’, writing draft guidelines for a counter-attack.8 In the meantime, Bevin sent a copy of Warner’s memorandum to Attlee on 10 April.9 Nearly two weeks later, the Prime Minister approved a shortened version of the paper for a selection of the Cabinet. Those with left-leaning sympathies – Dalton, Bevan and Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade – were denied access.10 Lord Addison, Labour leader in the House of Lords and a close confidant of the Prime Minister, wrote of his wholehearted approval of Warner’s ideas, suggesting ‘use might be made, in an appropriate way … of the Roman Catholic Church’ – an idea promptly turned down by Attlee.11 The Prime Minister’s position was clarified by Sir Orme Sargent who, on 20 May, told the Russia Committee they were ‘covered by the Secretary of State’s approval, endorsed by the Prime Minister, of Mr. Warner’s original theme’.12 A further indication of Attlee’s support can also be found in July, when he instructed that Warner’s paper should be circulated to the government’s representatives in the Far East to forewarn of Soviet ‘tactics’.13 Following a discussion in the Russia Committee, Ivone Kirkpatrick, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, was asked to draw up plans for a propaganda counter-offensive. Kirkpatrick had experience of wartime information work and had been made controller of the European services of the BBC in October 1941, later being appointed to the Allied Control Mission for Germany in September 1944. On his return to the Foreign Office, Kirkpatrick saw the Soviets as ‘aggressively expansionist’.14 In thinking about Britain’s propaganda counter-­offensive, he started his paper by listing several factors that would ultimately shape British policy. First, the government, unlike the Russians, did not control the press and were ‘dependent on the goodwill of British publicists’. Second, British propaganda would only succeed if it was sustained domestically by politicians. Finally, American support would be essential. Kirkpatrick envisaged a long-term campaign which saw the ‘steady drip’ of propaganda. Domestically, the BBC Home

86

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Service would be involved, and the Foreign Office would attempt to ‘influence’ the press ‘in the right direction’. Overseas, the BBC Foreign Service would produce ‘suitable material’ showing ‘what we are doing in the field of industrial welfare [and] social services’, as well as attacking communism. Visits to Britain by foreign trade unionists and politicians would also be arranged. Kirkpatrick undermined his proposals by drawing on wartime experience when: We parachuted men, money and arms into occupied territory. We were not inhibited by fear that the Germans would find out what we were doing, or that they might react or that we might be criticised. Propaganda on the larger scale was co-ordinated with our policy. The result was a success.15

The scheme was rejected immediately by Bevin who, still eager to maintain cordial Anglo-Soviet relations, found an ‘all-out propaganda offensive’ too ‘alarming a picture’.16 The Foreign Secretary minuted: ‘The more I study this the less I like it.’17 At the time, Bevin still believed that open East–West confrontation could be avoided and, as a result, resisted sanctioning an aggressive anti-Soviet propaganda offensive.18 Instead, British propagandists would ‘provide a steady stream of information about British life and culture’, particularly social legislation such as the new National Insurance and National Health Bill. However, in an attempt to defend Britain’s interests where threatened. Bevin approved strictly ‘defensive action’ against specific attacks in key areas.19 The first testing ground for British ‘defensive action’ was Persia, where East–West tensions had climaxed during the winter and spring of 1946. Despite the Soviet announcement that its forces would withdraw from the country, British officials believed that the internal situation in Persia offered the Russians the opportunity to expand their influence. Britain’s Ambassador to Tehran, Sir John Le Rougetel, considered the local Tudeh Party an ‘integral part of the Communist machine’ and, in May, reported an intensification of ‘anti-British feeling’ and the spread of communist influence to ‘every corner of the country’.20 In the next two months, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s refinery at Abadan and the surrounding oil fields experienced a series of strikes in which Tudeh activists were prominent. In a report in June, the JIC warned that the Middle East was a ‘particular strategic concern’ to the Soviets and that they saw it as ‘essential to eliminate any strong Power’ from the region. This would be achieved by exploiting the ‘economic backwardness’ of the region, through anti-British ‘agitation’ by Arab nationalists and the Orthodox Church. Russian policy was considered ‘opportunist’ and would be implemented ‘by all means short of war’.21 Later that month, the Russia Committee forwarded proposals to Bevin urging him to resist

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up

87

the growth of the Tudeh Party, and to consider the prospect of using pro-British tribes in south-west Persia to form a secessionist movement to protect Britain’s vital interests.22 In spite of his concern, the measures horrified Bevin who wrote: ‘I do not like the methods suggested … the Russians will be able to beat us by the suggested steps’. Instead, drawing on his experience as a union leader, the Foreign Secretary spoke of the need to counter Tudeh influence by convincing the AIOC to carry out a ‘vigorous’ social reform programme and to reach out to employees on an equal basis.23 In October Kirkpatrick set out a dual campaign to project Britain as a nation which the peoples of the region could ‘look to for guidance and support’, while challenging the ‘Russian campaign of mis-representation’. The campaign would present Britain’s policy as ‘progressive’ by highlighting recent ‘social reform’ and make clear that it would use its influence to ‘introduce social reforms and to raise the standard of life’. Britain would ‘ram home’ its ‘interest in the independence, security and prosperity of the Middle East’ while countering the ‘falsehoods’ behind Soviet policy, drawing attention to ‘the real state of affairs in Russia’. In concluding, Kirkpatrick wrote that this anti-communist facet of the campaign would take a back seat. Its prime goal would be to project the positive side of ‘the new Britain’.24 The AIOC would also ‘put out statements … about their activities’ and, in particular, publicise the company’s positive approach to labour welfare, comparing the conditions of AIOC workers to those in ‘Soviet controlled enterprises’. The BBC would then broadcast these stories to the Soviet Bloc.25 Bevin also asked the Minister of Fuel, Emanuel Shinwell, the Minister of Labour, George Isaacs, and Cripps to deal ‘rapidly and favourably’ with all requests from the AIOC for assistance in their development programme.26 Elsewhere, ministerial backing was also given to anti-communist measures in Germany and Austria.27 In Germany, British officials planned a ‘campaign of enlightenment’ to publicise Russian breaches of the Potsdam Agreement, with particular attention drawn to the manufacture of military equipment in the Soviet zone.28 In neighbouring Austria, ministerial backing was given to a campaign highlighting Soviet attempts to gain an economic stranglehold over the country while, at home, Foreign Office officials would attempt to influence the British press to ‘take an interest in Austrian questions’.29 Despite approving defensive measures, Bevin resisted further calls for the campaign to be broadened.30 In the summer of 1946 the Russia Committee reconsidered Kirkpatrick’s initial campaign, drawn up in May, but concluded that no further action should be taken.31 Later that summer, Bevin’s own position was made clear to the committee by

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

88

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

its chairman, Gladwyn Jebb, who revealed that the Foreign Secretary would not sanction any policy based on ‘open despair of reaching agreement with the USSR’ before the Council of Foreign Ministers scheduled for December.32 In Britain, public opinion remained, on the whole, sympathetic to the Soviets, in part due to the Red Army’s resistance on the Eastern Front, while communism was also received favourably, in spite of the Communist Party’s poor showing in the 1945 election.33 In the British press, a large number of editors and newspaper proprietors were unprepared to change from a policy of ‘conciliation and accommodation’ to one of ‘confrontation’. Even among the more conservative, traditional right-wing press, there were those who were sympathetic to the Soviets.34 The growing divide between propaganda at home and overseas was a cause of concern in the Foreign Office. In August 1946 Robin Hankey, head of the Northern Department, responsible for the Soviet Union, warned that ‘we are not educating our own people’. Kirkpatrick agreed, suggesting that ‘lack of proper publicity at home is hampering our efforts’.35 Attempting to redress the balance, the Russia Committee recommended a series of proposals intended to mould public opinion. It was felt that Attlee and Bevin could play an important role by contacting national newspapers, informing proprietors that they would personally ‘welcome publicity being given to Russian misdeeds’.36 Already, Bevin had pressured the editor of The Times, Robert Barrington-Ward, to stop the ‘jellyfish attitude’ of his paper on ‘important matters of foreign policy’, particularly the pro-Soviet articles by the Marxist writer Edward Hallett Carr.37 Foreign Office officials also briefed journalists about the need to counter Soviet propaganda, and, by September 1946, the Russia Committee could claim to have provided a ‘considerable amount’ of material based on official sources to the press.38 Another important concern was the divisive debate about foreign affairs in the Labour Party.39 At least until late 1947, Bevin faced a series of attacks from his own backbenchers forcing him to ‘abstain as far as possible from giving his critics further material for their opposition’.40 In October 1945 fifty-eight MPs wrote personally to Attlee condemning Britain’s support of French and Dutch colonial interests in Indochina and the Dutch East Indies.41 The following year, two Labour MPs put down a Commons motion asking for Attlee to renounce Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech at Fulton, Missouri, which was supported by over a hundred others.42 In November the government faced its first serious challenge when Richard Crossman, Labour MP for Coventry East, tried to amend the King’s Speech, pushing the government to provide a ‘democratic and constructive’ middle way between the extremes of American

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up

89

capitalism and Soviet totalitarianism.43 While subsequently withdrawn by Crossman, the amendment was supported by former members of the Independent Labour Party (ILP), leading to around one hundred Labour abstentions.44 Disaffection on Labour’s backbenches continued into the spring of 1947 when the ‘Keep Left’ group published an influential pamphlet asserting that ‘the world wants neither Russian or American domination’ and calling for the government to ‘Seize the opportunity for the leadership in the United Nations which a Socialist Britain is offered’.45 These attacks led the US Embassy in London to report that every statement on foreign affairs had to be ‘carefully considered and planned’ to protect Bevin from ‘Labour party rebels’.46 In August Warner informed members of the Russia Committee that, because of divisions in the Labour Party, ‘no directives or public statements’ on Soviet policy could be expected in the short term.47 Not surprisingly, the situation needed to be countered and, helped by several Labour MPs, Foreign Office officials tried to influence the debate. In July 1946 regular Foreign Office reviews of the Soviet press were distributed to the House of Commons library with the help of Kenneth Younger, a former MI5 officer and Parliamentary Secretary to Philip Noel-Baker, Minister of State in the Foreign Office.48 More significant were the close links developed between the Foreign Office and the International Department of the Labour Party under Denis Healey, international secretary of the party, from its headquarters in Transport House. In his own words, Healey had the difficult job of explaining government ‘foreign policy to the Party and the world’.49 While studying at Oxford, he had joined the Communist Party in 1937, believing that they stood ‘unambiguously against Hitler’, but left shortly after the fall of France, serving with distinction in the Royal Engineers. Leaving with the rank of major, Healey joined the Labour Party and delivered a firebrand left-wing speech at the 1945 party conference in Blackpool, attacking the ‘upper classes’ as ‘selfish, depraved, dissolute and decadent’.50 For all his left-wing views, though, Healey quickly became a ‘willing participant’ in Foreign Office propaganda policy and, according to Mayhew, played a ‘key role’, being ‘exceptionally well-informed about anti-Soviet propaganda’.51 Healey strongly believed that ‘since Soviet communism treated social democracy as its main enemy, it was part of his duty, as Labour’s international secretary, to do his best to disseminate the truth about Stalinism’.52 In November 1946 ministers and officials discussed ways for distributing material to the Labour Party. During a meeting attended by Sargent, Hector McNeil, who had succeeded Noel-Baker as Minister of State, said that the ‘exchange of information with the Labour Party was

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

90

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

easily arranged through [Healey]’. Christopher Mayhew, then UnderSecretary at the Foreign Office, would ‘maintain a personal contact with Mr. Healey communicating to him such information as seemed likely to be most useful to the Labour Party’.53 Following the meeting, Sargent sent a strictly confidential internal minute to the heads of department about the distribution of information to the Labour Party. Sargent wrote that ‘Mr. Healey would be glad to receive, on a confidential basis, any information about foreign affairs’. Bevin was said to be ‘anxious that Mr. Healey should be kept as well informed as possible’. Heads of department would pass to Richard Heppel of the Foreign Office any information ‘they think could usefully be shown to Mr. Healey, whether for his general background information on the international situation or on current questions of importance’. Information from ‘secret sources’ would not be suitable for distribution, though material of an ‘especially confidential nature’ could be, pending approval by Mayhew. Sargent believed there were ‘matters in which the Labour Party’s Central Office can assist the Foreign Office, e.g. in arranging suitable contacts among the Labour Party for foreign representatives here or foreign visitors of importance’. In these instances ‘Mr. Healey will be the right person to approach and such matters should be brought to Mr. Mayhew’s attention’.54 Healey was subsequently provided with a ‘Weekly Survey of the Soviet Press and Radio’ by the Foreign Office’s Information Department.55 Replying to Miss Turner, Mayhew’s private secretary, Healey thanked the Foreign Office for ‘the weekly Survey of the Soviet Press and Radio. I would be grateful if I could receive copies of subsequent numbers.’56 Healey’s close relationship continued throughout the Attlee government and, as late as 1951, before attending a socialist peace rally in Brussels, he phoned the Foreign Office to ask ‘if there is anything that Mr. Davies would particularly like him to say to the Belgians’.57 The relationship went both ways; Healey and the Labour Party became an important source of information on international labour affairs.58 In his autobiography, Healey recalled the unique importance of the Labour Party for socialists overseas, which enjoyed ‘a prestige and influence it never enjoyed before or since’.59 Links were maintained with socialist parties all over Europe, particularly in the east where they were increasingly threatened by Soviet communism.60 While contact was less frequent, Transport House also had links with socialists outside Europe. In the case of Burma, the Foreign Office actively tried to use the Labour Party to cultivate ‘parliamentary socialism’. In April 1948 officials raised concerns about the danger of ‘Communist extremism’ and the need to support democratic socialists in Burma with information about

The Cold War heats up

91

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

the ‘theoretical background and practical achievements’ of the Labour Party: It seems therefore desirable that the British Labour Party be asked to make direct contact with U Ba Swe General Secretary of the Burma Socialist Party … U Ba Swe is also Secretary of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League, the coalition of political groups which is at present in power in Burma … He could be asked by the Labour Party to recommend organisations and bookshops which would be interested in Labour Party literature and also to suggest ways in which British socialism can help its Burmese counterpart. It would also be advisable for the Labour Party to contact the General Secretary of the People’s Volunteer Organisation (Ba Min Kaung …)

Labour’s influence with the Trades Union Congress (TUC) would also be used to encourage them to work with their Burmese counterparts. Britain’s Ambassador in the Burmese capital, Rangoon, had also requested to be kept informed of ‘important correspondence … and to have a list of material supplied’ which could be arranged through the Foreign Office’s Far Eastern Department.61 In June Mayhew wrote to Healey asking about ‘what relations the Party has with the Burmese Socialist Party’ and underlining the need for ‘good Socialist contacts between the two countries’ as a ‘useful stabilising factor’.62 Later that month the Foreign Office was able to inform Britain’s representatives in Rangoon that Labour were ‘establishing contact with Burma Socialist Party. Morgan Phillips is sending a message of good will and a gift of suitable literature. Further literature will be sent from time to time.’63 Healey also provided Foreign Office officials with the contact details of several leading European socialists who Healey ‘primed’ as recipients for future anti-communist propaganda at the London meeting of the Committee of International Socialist Conferences.64 The close relationship between the Foreign Office and Transport House started to bear fruit. In early 1947 Gladwyn Jebb drew up a memorandum summarising the major diplomatic developments since the end of the war, called ‘Stocktaking II’. Following a discussion at the Foreign Office, Bevin suggested that Jebb’s arguments could be used in a Labour Party pamphlet to refute those put forward by the ‘Keep Left’ movement, and instructed Jebb to contact Healey on the basis that ‘cooperation was kept very dark’.65 In April Healey wrote to McNeil that ‘someone should present a realistic and honest defence of our foreign policy’ unrestrained by ‘the diplomatic evasions imposed on official spokesmen’ and attached a draft defence of Labour Party policy.66 McNeil ‘greatly enjoyed’ the paper. ‘I think it distinguished,’ he wrote, ‘not only by its honesty, but by its appearance of honesty – honesty like

92

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

justice always needs a little good dressing.’67 The resultant pamphlet, drafted by Healey and approved by McNeil and Mayhew, was distributed to all delegates at the 1947 party conference and sought to defend government policy by drawing attention to the Soviets’ ‘sustained and violent offensive’ against Britain.68 In the face of this, the government had resisted ‘every temptation to regard Russian policy as final’.69 Bevin, pleased that someone else in the party had argued his case, endorsed its conclusions during his speech to conference.70

Britain’s new propaganda policy: Christopher Mayhew, Bevin and Attlee By the autumn of 1947 Soviet policy had finally undermined any hope Bevin might have had of reaching friendly relations with the Soviets.71 In July, discussions in Paris on the Marshall Plan, a comprehensive aid package for European recovery, had broken up when Molotov withdrew the Soviet delegation. Two months later, Andrei Zhdanov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, formed the Cominform to coordinate the activities of communist parties and resist Western ‘imperialism’.72 On 25 November, prior to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Bevin told Cabinet colleagues he was ‘not optimistic’ about a successful end to discussions and, in the event they broke down, he intended to present a ‘fresh approach’ for British foreign policy, including the aggressive use of publicity.73 Bevin was made fully aware of the dangers and merits of propaganda from both official and unofficial sources. During confidential meetings with Douglas Dodds-Parker, Conservative MP and former mission planner with the SOE, he learnt about the ‘methods used’ to destabilise authoritarian states, taking notes of the meetings and passing them to Foreign Office officials, without citing the source of the conversations.74 The real impetus for an alternative approach came from Christopher Mayhew, the Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. At face value, Mayhew seemed an unlikely Cold War warrior; a left-winger, social democrat and, later, Labour MP, he had the hallmarks of someone opposed to anti-Soviet activities. Born in June 1915, he was educated at Haileybury, something he shared with Attlee, before going to Christ Church, Oxford, in 1934. While he had opposed communism during his first year, Mayhew found himself drawn increasingly to the ‘left’ and, during a debate at the Oxford Union, spoke in favour of a motion that ‘this house prefers the Red Flag to the Union Jack’.75 Despite this, while some his generation turned to communism, Mayhew increasingly

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up

93

became a vocal anti-communist as president of the Oxford Union and a leading figure in the Oxford University Labour Club, formed in 1919.76 It was Mayhew’s knowledge of communist tactics at the ballot box – the practice, he recalled, of ‘rigging elections’ – that drew out his anticommunist tendencies.77 This hatred of communism developed further during a visit to the Soviet Union in 1935, accompanied, ironically, by Anthony Blunt, the art historian, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and future MI5 officer turned Soviet agent. Unlike Blunt, who blanked out the horrors of the Soviet regime, Mayhew received an ‘object-lesson in the dangers of the will-to-believe, of self persuasion’. While sleeping and eating comfortably in a Moscow hotel, Mayhew was aware of the contrast outside where ‘political prisoners were being tortured and shot … a mile or two away’. Inside Stalin’s Russia, he later recalled: hundreds of thousands of innocent people were being arrested, wives and husbands separated and children orphaned by the agents of a paranoid tyrant. And at the same moment of time I sat at a stone-topped table … listening to light music played by a quartet in dinner jackets, completely convinced I was visiting a splendid new socialist society. Much of my later bitterness against western communists and fellow-travellers sprang, I am sure, from shame at my own obtuseness during that first visit.78

It was an experience he did not forget. Mayhew, like many in the Labour Party, abhorred communism.79 While it has been suggested that the later Attlee government was ‘hoodwinked’ or conned into implementing anticommunist measures, many figures in the Labour Party had a ‘symbiotic and dialectical’ relationship with the ‘secret state’ in which both recognised the need to oppose communism.80 Following his studies, Mayhew went on to work for the New Fabian Research Bureau and was selected as Labour’s parliamentary candidate for South Norfolk; however, with the outbreak of war, he enlisted as a gunner with the Surrey Yeomanry. After being invalided home, he was invited to become Dalton’s link with SOE and later saw service as part of a small force infiltrating allied agents behind German lines.81 Reflecting on his time in SOE, Mayhew wrote that he had achieved practically nothing. ‘I can point to no operation planned or executed by me’, Mayhew wrote. ‘My job throughout the period was that of a “bottlewasher” … But this meant that I saw a lot of what was going on.’ He was given a variety of jobs including looking at ways to sabotage agricultural production and to try and use left-wing movements as part of the European resistance, though the plans were violently opposed in the Foreign Office. Like several senior figures in the Attlee government, Mayhew was, on account of his ‘reputation for discretion’, inducted into the decryption of German

94

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

signals traffic and, in an autobiographical account intended for, although never posted to, his family, he wrote that: the papers I dealt with were not ordinary secret service reports or foreign office telegrams, but documents so secret that I will not even venture to write them down here. Sufficient to say that these documents would tell us, among other things, how much the Germans knew about us and the movements of our agents abroad. [My] job was to follow closely the movements of our agents and our own operations, and to pick up any evidence that the Germans had got wind of them from the marvellous intelligence papers which were fed to me.82

Mayhew was just one of many young Labour supporters drawn into Britain’s burgeoning wartime intelligence community. The Political Warfare Executive included the future Commonwealth Secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, and even Richard Crossman, a critic of Bevin’s post-war policy.83 In the case of Crossman, much of his work involved ‘white’ propaganda and the production of leaflets and radio broadcasts, though some of his work moved inevitably into what he called ‘black magic’.84 In a January 1949 paper on the principles of psychological warfare, Crossman described himself as ‘one who served as a propagandist for five long years, first as director of political warfare against the enemy in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, and then as a member of the joint Anglo-American Psychological Warfare Section of General Eisenhower’s Staff’.85 In 1945 Mayhew was elected MP for South Norfolk and appointed Morrison’s Parliamentary Private Secretary, but, shortly afterwards, he moved to the Foreign Office, where he grew increasingly disillusioned with the Soviets. In 1947, as part of a British delegation to the UN in New York, Mayhew witnessed the success of Soviet propaganda which had, he recalled, ‘an impact, especially in the Third World, and needed to be answered’.86 Mayhew recalled how, unchallenged by Western governments, ‘scores of communist and communist-front organizations maintained a relentless war against Western governments’. Moscow was presented as ‘the exact antithesis of the West, that is as the true enemy of fascism, the champion of colonial peoples against imperialism, the ally of all peace-loving people and the shining example of a workers’ state in which capitalism had been abolished and where the workers prospered and were free’.87 The Labour Party was also the focus of frequent attacks. Summaries of statements in the Soviet press claimed that the ‘right-wing socialists’ in Britain made every effort to hide ‘the predatory essence of imperialist policy under the mask of democracy and Socialist phraseology’.88

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up

95

Returning from the United States, Mayhew drafted a paper for Bevin arguing that the time had come for a rethink in policy, suggesting that, in future, British officials should go to UN meetings ‘well prepared for a propaganda counter offensive’. If the forthcoming Council of Foreign Ministers meeting broke up without agreement ‘we should’, wrote Mayhew, ‘launch a sustained, offensive propaganda campaign, aimed at countering the Cominform and weakening Communist pressure generally and in particular in France, Germany, Italy, Greece and the Middle East’. The campaign would be ‘as positive as possible’ and ‘should sell social democracy as strongly as we attempt to discredit communism’.89 Bevin agreed with the memorandum and told Mayhew to discuss it with senior officials in the Foreign Office. On 18 November Mayhew met with Sargent, Kirkpatrick and Warner to discuss a future counter-offensive. The minutes of the meeting are interesting in that they show differences among those in attendance over how the campaign should be conducted. Sargent believed that the new offensive should include attacks on communism combined with a positive presentation of Britain, while Warner, taking a more negative line, suggested that the aim should be to ‘stress the horrors of Communism so vividly that men would be inspired to fight to the death … We should make the Socialists realise what they stood to lose under Communism.’ In contrast to Warner, Mayhew believed the policy should ‘be as positive as possible, laying stress on the merits of Social-Democracy’ and should ‘attack capitalism and imperialism along with Russian Communism’. He continued this positive theme by suggesting that civil liberties needed to be: the main plank of our counter propaganda. He thought that in many countries propaganda about civil liberty was much less effective than was sometimes thought. It appealed largely to intellectuals and the middle class who were already converted. The all-important thing was to win the confidence of the masses of workers and peasants. He thought that the best way of doing this was to show that there was more social justice and better living conditions for ordinary people under Social Democracy than under Communism. Soviet Russia should be portrayed as a backward country, a land of poverty for the masses and privilege for the few.

Instead, Warner placed the emphasis on gloomier themes, including ‘concentration camps, police terror and the manifest difficulty of getting rid of totalitarianism once it was established’.90 As the minutes reveal, Mayhew was at odds with some in the Foreign Office over the principal line of attack; as he recalled, officials believed that dictatorship should be the main line while Mayhew, lacking experience in his own words, saw living standards as ‘more important’.91

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

96

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Following the meeting, Mayhew drafted a long memorandum for Bevin, entitled ‘Third Force Propaganda’. The objective of the propaganda campaign was, wrote Mayhew, to ‘oppose the inroads of Communism’ with a ‘Third Force’ composed of ‘all democratic elements which are anti-Communist and, at the same time, genuinely progressive and reformist, believing in freedom, planning and social justice’. Social democracy would be presented as ‘offering the best and most efficient way of life’. By contrast, ‘we should attack the principles and practice of Communism, and also the inefficiency, social injustice and moral weakness of unrestrained capitalism’. Nevertheless, criticism of the latter would be limited as the campaign would not ‘attack or appear to be attacking any member of the Commonwealth or the United States’. The main target of the campaign was to be the ‘broad masses of workers and peasants in Europe and the Middle East’. The campaign would be twofold. It would emphasise the strengths of social democracy, particularly the ‘higher living standards’ it produced, in contrast to the ‘extremely low’ standard of living in Soviet Russia, while drawing ‘analogies between Hitlerite and Communist systems’. Soviet foreign policy would also be represented as a ‘hindrance to international co-operation and world peace’ with the Soviet Bloc portrayed as ‘Russia’s new colonial empire’ which served Moscow’s ‘strategic and economic interests at the cost of freedom and living standards’. The campaign would be carried out by a new ‘Communist Information Department’ working closely with the Foreign Office’s Northern Department.92 Despite broadly agreeing with the proposed counter-offensive, Foreign Office officials were uneasy about several aspects of Mayhew’s plans. Warner, newly responsible for all information work, wrote that it was ‘impossible to follow Mr. Mayhew’s paper precisely in suggesting that the term “Third Force” can be used … for the anti-Communist forces to which we are anxious to lead’. It was ‘quite impossible and inappropriate’, Warner added, to apply the term extensively as it had a ‘specific connotation’ in French politics and ‘could not … be taken over by us’. The term would also be ‘badly viewed in Canada, and once we have started using it, it would be very awkward to have to slither out of it, supposing that the close association in policy with the U.S.A. which our security and our material needs force upon us was found to make it inappropriate’.93 Sargent had further concerns that Mayhew’s proposed ‘Communist Information Department’ would be too small to work effectively.94 Mayhew himself was aware of the problems involved, writing to Bevin that: one of the main dangers involved in the scheme proposed arises from the fact that as soon as the campaign is launched we become officially

The Cold War heats up

97

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

r­esponsible for a number of controversial anti-communist and anti-­ capitalist statements put out by our publicity machine. From time to time mistakes may be made and a statement may be put out which can be effectively refuted. One or two such refutations by our opponents in the House could seriously discredit the campaign in the early stages.95

Any unease about the wording of Mayhew’s document, or the controversies of starting a propaganda counter-offensive, was overtaken by the failure of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Writing in his diary on 21 December, within days of its conclusion, Mayhew confided to his diary ‘Well, the CFM’s over … the conference has been a complete failure. Always knew it would be.’96 Despairing of Soviet behaviour, Bevin approved Mayhew’s paper before sending it to Attlee. On 27 December Mayhew travelled to Chequers, the Prime Minister’s countryside retreat, to discuss his proposal with Attlee who, Mayhew wrote in his diary, had ‘no criticism to make of my paper at all, from what I can see, he adds a few suggestions of his own. He thinks we should stress that throughout history Russia’s strength has always been overestimated.’ For Mayhew, Attlee gave the impression he was ‘more ready’ to take the lead in the counter-offensive than Bevin, with Mayhew asked to draft a paper on the subject for Cabinet.97 A week later, Attlee talked with Mayhew about his upcoming New Year’s broadcast. Writing in his diary, Mayhew wrote that the speech was ‘strongly “Third Force” … hits out against Russia and is ruder to the USA than even I think wise’. At the request of Attlee, he agreed to ‘take it [the speech] away and mess it about’.98 In spite of Mayhew’s concerns, Attlee’s broadcast the following evening set the tone for a sea change in propaganda policy. At the outset the Prime Minister sought to draw attention to the contrasting attitudes towards open political debate between East and West. In Britain, the BBC provided a platform for ‘free and unfettered controversy’ unimpeded by government or private influence, but, by contrast, in Russia and the satellite countries ‘the voice of criticism is silenced’ and ‘one view … allowed’. It was ironic, Attlee remarked, that ‘the absolutists who suppress opposition much more vigorously than the Kings and Emperors of the past, masquerade under the name of upholders of democracy’. Inside Russia, he went on, ‘“privilege of the few” is a growing phenomenon, and the gap between the highest and lowest incomes is constantly widening’. Soviet communism, Attlee explained, also threatened the welfare and way of life of the other nations of Europe with ‘a new form of imperialism – ideological, economic and strategic’. At the other end of the scale from Soviet Russia and her satellites, Attlee placed the United States with its commitment

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

98

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

to individual liberty and the maintenance of human rights. Despite Mayhew’s disquiet, he attacked American capitalism, which, in his view, had an ‘extreme inequality of wealth in its citizens’. It was the role of Great Britain – geographically, economically and politically between ‘these two continental states’ – to ‘work out a system of a new and challenging kind’ which combined ‘individual freedom with a planned economy, democracy with social justice’.99 The speech was, Mayhew recorded, a ‘tremendous success’.100 A week after Attlee’s broadcast Bevin circulated a number of papers to Cabinet which argued for a decisive shift in British policy. Alongside a paper on ‘Future Foreign Publicity Policy’ – based on Mayhew’s earlier draft – there were others on ‘The First Aim of British Foreign Policy’, ‘Policy in Germany’ and a ‘Review of Soviet Policy’.101 In ‘The First Aim of British Foreign Policy’, Bevin explained that the Soviet government had ‘formed a solid political and economic bloc … from the Baltic along the Oder, through Trieste to the Black Sea’ and, from behind this, the Russians were ‘exerting a constantly increasing pressure’ threatening the ‘whole fabric of the West’.102 Britain’s response was set out in ‘Future Foreign Publicity Policy’. The paper noted that Soviet propaganda had carried out ‘a vicious attack against the British Commonwealth and Western democracy’. Based on the ‘vital ideas of British Social Democracy and Western civilisation’, Britain could ‘give a lead to our friends abroad and help them in the anti-Communist struggle’. The new policy would be implemented by a small section of the Foreign Office which would collect and disseminate information on communist policy, tactics and propaganda. In addition, the fullest cooperation of the BBC Overseas Services was deemed ‘desirable’. Britain could ‘no longer submit passively to the Communist offensive’ and, instead, ‘we must attack and expose Communism and offer something far better’. Britain offered an alternative to communism and laissez-faire capitalism with the ‘progressive ideas’ of social democracy. The remainder of the paper set out at some length the guiding principles of Britain’s new publicity policy. In spite of Warner’s and Sargent’s reservations, the anti-capitalist facet of Mayhew’s original paper remained. ‘We should attack … the principles and practice of Communism’, it read, as well as the ‘inefficiency, social injustice and moral weakness of unrestrained capitalism’. This would be done, however, without attacking members of the Commonwealth or the United States.103 The paper did not enjoy an easy ride in Cabinet. Concerns were raised by Aneurin Bevan, who argued that an overly anti-Soviet campaign would fail ‘to rally the Socialist forces in Western Europe’ and alienate the countries of Eastern Europe, which, ‘though dominated politically by Communists, still had

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up

99

a western outlook’. Responding, Bevin said it would be ‘impossible for him to give an effective lead without being critical of Soviet policy’, but it was his intention to concentrate on ‘the positive and constructive side of the proposals’. Following the rebuke, the Cabinet approved the new propaganda policy.104 Details of the new propaganda policy were discussed by the Russia Committee. In a general review of the policy outlined by Cabinet, the controller of the BBC’s European Services, Ian Jacob, emphasised the need for ministerial speeches and enquired whether anti-communist material was being supplied to the TUC, with the Deputy UnderSecretary of State in the Foreign Office, Sir Edmund Hall-Patch, who had played an important role in Britain’s response to the Marshall Aid proposals, asking about the difficulties of circulating material in the Middle East, particularly given the focus on ‘workers and peasants’. The committee raised problems with the ‘Future Foreign Publicity Policy’ document, particularly Esler Dening, later Britain’s first Ambassador to Tokyo, who pointed out the danger of informing the ‘Japanese … there was no difference between Communism and the parties of the right’ which would, he told the committee, ‘commend Communism to many in Japan’. Roger Makins, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who had recently returned from a posting as minister in the British Embassy in Washington, highlighted the phrase ‘unrestricted capitalism’ and asked whether this applied to the US, leading Warner to reply that special mention had been made in the Cabinet paper of not attacking ‘any member of the Commonwealth or the United States’.105 Attlee’s message was reinforced by Morrison during a speech to Labour’s East Midlands Regional Council at de Montfort Hall, Leicester, on 11 January. In the opening of his speech, Morrison lamented the breakdown in relations with Moscow since 1945, but added, without naming the Soviets directly, that it was ‘sad and depressing’ that some countries which had ‘suffered for great human causes’ had turned against them in the post-war period. After paying tribute to Bevin, Morrison used the speech to define British foreign policy. First and foremost, the government would promote ‘international action, through the United Nations for preference, to prevent any war in the future’ and, secondly, support economic cooperation around the world to increase the ‘prosperity and security of all peoples and all nations’. The crux of the speech was a forceful denunciation of Soviet foreign policy and the break-up of Anglo-Soviet relations. Despite widespread goodwill towards the Soviet Union in the British labour movement, Morrison laid the blame for the failure in post-war relations squarely with the Soviets and the ‘untruthful and malicious attacks’ directed against the British government,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

100

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

which, he continued, could not ‘be happy when country after country in eastern and south-eastern Europe find themselves subject to undemocratic and unrepresentative Communist governments’. The Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe was marred by wholesale arrests and executions of non-communists, with Morrison, in a clear attempt to draw parallels with the pre-war threat of fascism, attacking communism as an ideology of ‘the Right’. Turning to the Soviet rejection of Marshall Aid, Morrison stressed to his audience that the Soviet government had resorted to the ‘old and evil doctrine that the more misery there is in the world, the better it is for revolutionary Communist success’. In short, communism was an ‘evil doctrine’.106 The speeches by Attlee and Morrison helped launch Britain’s new policy towards the Soviet Union. Bevin added his own weight to the government line during his contribution to the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 22 January. The speech had been written by Bevin while on holiday but was far from polished, with the Foreign Secretary, Mayhew noted, having ‘struggled long hours … putting everything he’s got into it’. The first drafts of the speech had failed to impress Mayhew, who was, he confided to his diary, ‘deeply shocked and alarmed at its emptiness, vast length, unoriginality and lack of style’, combining a tirade against the Soviets, limited details on France and the Low Countries and ‘gushing praise of U.S.A. and Marshall’. On the morning of the speech it was too late to make the necessary changes – ‘cut, rehash, [and] refill the whole thing’ – and only minor corrections were made, including the insertion of passages on the consolidation of Western Europe.107 During the speech, Bevin talked about Soviet policy since the end of the war, emphasising the ruthless nature of communist policy in Eastern Europe and, more worryingly, the Soviet expansion to ‘Stettin, Trieste and the Elbe’. Despite this expansion, the Soviet government was far from satisfied and there were numerous points of contention across Europe, particularly in Germany. Like Morrison before him, Bevin also drew on the experiences of Hitler and Mussolini to warn of the ruthless Soviet ‘police state’ and, against protests from the Communist MP Willie Gallagher, claimed that the Soviets were turning Eastern Europe into a ‘self-contained bloc under the control of Moscow’. The speech countered claims from the Labour left that the US was dividing Europe, with Bevin, to the concern of some on Labour’s backbenches, referring to the US as a country of ‘young, vigorous, democratic people’ and rubbishing claims that Marshall Aid was overtly political. Bevin called for the ‘spiritual union’ of Western Europe based around ‘all the elements of freedom for which we all stand’ and forcibly made the point that Britain would not:

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up

101

be diverted, by threats, propaganda or fifth column methods, from our aim of uniting by trade, social, cultural and all other contacts those nations of Europe and of the world who are ready and able to cooperate. The speed of our recovery and the success of our achievements will be the answer to all attempts to divide the peoples of the world into hostile camps. I may claim for myself, at least, that my whole life has been devoted to uniting people and not dividing them. That remains my objective and purpose now. That is the object and purpose that His Majesty’s Government, of which I am the instrument, seek to promote in dealing with other countries.108

Bevin’s speech was generally well received. In replying for the opposition, Eden welcomed the ‘very important’ contribution and warned of the need to respond to the Soviets for fear of losing the ‘ideological struggle that is the third world war’, with opposition MPs lining up to support the government.109 Bevin’s speech provoked, unsurprisingly, outrage from the left-wing MP for Gateshead, Konni Zilliacus, and, in a heated exchange, the former Secretary of State for War and Labour MP for Chester-le-Street, Jack Lawson, intervened, telling the House that Zilliacus ‘does not speak for the majority of his party, nor does he speak for the working classes of this country’.110 The speech was also welcomed by the national press, even though, in private, Mayhew believed it to be a ‘massive’ flop: I honestly think that without the Western European bit, Ernest’s stock would have slumped irretrievably. Apart from anything else, the P.L.P. would not have lain down under the anti-Russian bits except for this positive side. The debate on the whole was on a very high level, and the results not unsatisfactory. We can expect the Crossmanites to abstain from their opposition to us now, which should offset the still more frenzied attacks we can expect from the Cripptos [sic].111

Bevin’s points were reinforced by Attlee during his closing remarks on the debate, when he echoed calls for European integration; they also reflected the line of his broadcast at the beginning of the month.112 At first, the Prime Minister used the speech to counter adverse criticism of Bevin, acknowledging the ‘large measure of agreement’ on both sides of the House. After discussing the merits of government policy, Attlee turned to those on the left, particularly in his own party, who continued their support for the Soviet Union. In forceful denunciation of the extreme left, the Prime Minister talked of the reverence members of the Labour movement had for individuals fighting for increasing freedom. ‘It is curious’, he told the Commons, that there should be people who claim to be on the Left, and who deny those rights to their fellows. It is still more curious that there should be

102

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

some would-be ­Left-wingers who shut their eyes to the absence of human rights when they look to Eastern Europe. Those people who deny human rights have no right to claim that they are in the van of human progress. The only van they are in is the police van, and in the field of human rights today Russia and Eastern Europe are right at the back end of the queue.113

Attlee’s intervention was ‘a great success, warmly cheered by the boys behind. He sat down to quite an ovation’ but, despite the support from his backbenches, Attlee was characteristically modest. ‘A bit scrappy I’m afraid’, he told Mayhew.114 The same day as Attlee closed the debate on Foreign Affairs, a Foreign Office circular was sent to all diplomatic posts abroad informing them of the new policy, and inviting them to contribute material which would be of any value.115 A month later, Sargent sent another circular to all home and overseas departments informing them of the new machinery formed to carry out the policy. Mayhew’s ‘Communist Information Department’ came to life as the Information Research Department of the Foreign Office. Its first head, Ralph Murray, had served in the Political Warfare Executive. Though initially modest, the number of staff in the new department was soon to expand and, by the summer of 1948, Murray was looking for more staff, including editorial staff, reference section assistants and readers for the Iron Curtain Press. Part of the funding was also transferred to the Secret Vote, enabling a more flexible use of money and allowing Murray to avoid unwelcome scrutiny of operations.116 In time, the organisation would develop a large network of politicians, trade union officials and journalists to disseminate its publicity material. Some of the first recipients of IRD’s product included ‘Ministers and friendly Labour MPs to help them in combatting Communistinspired opposition at Labour Party and Trade Union meetings’. In the past material had been provided on an informal basis, but Mayhew suggested a series of ‘Speakers Notes’ containing ‘facts and debating points on the familiar Communist themes’. The topics would include American imperialism (a theme that, no doubt, produced concern in the Foreign Office), Soviet expansion, Soviet inflexibility and the ‘low living standards’ inside the Soviet Union.117 Shortly afterwards, Murray noted that Mayhew had ‘asked [urgently] for a number of briefs (which Mr. Warner has instructed should be made out in the form of stock personal letters) which he can give to Ministers and Labour M.P.s on matters of foreign policy’.118 A month later, Murray forwarded Mayhew the draft of a paper on ‘Soviet expansionism and the territorial aggrandisement already achieved by Russia’.119 During a discussion with Warner,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up

103

Mayhew said that he intended to approach Bevin and obtain permission for IRD papers to be sent to ‘all Cabinet Ministers’ to use in public speeches, for ministers to receive ‘anti-communist talking points’ and for IRD to receive copies of all speeches containing anti-communist opinions to be circulated if they were not mentioned in the national press.120 The proposal that all ministers should see IRD material was violently opposed by the Minister of State, Hector McNeil, who minuted ‘There should be no general circulation to Ministers. Select our Ministers by all means and let them have the stuff on a personal basis. But a general circulation would be highly dangerous.’121 McNeil may have been alluding to the divergent opinion in Cabinet on anti-Soviet publicity, and, as Mayhew himself recognised, there ‘were MPs in Westminster – some of them open or secret members of the Communist Party – who could and would have attacked our campaign’ if knowledge of IRD’s secret activities were generally known.122 Despite reservations about all Cabinet ministers seeing IRD material, Mayhew was keen to involve senior members of the government. In June Warner had explained to Mayhew that: Ministerial speeches and pronouncements are in many cases the best – and indeed essential – material of our foreign publicity. This applies particularly to important current international issues of the moment, and also to long-term subjects – especially anti-Communism … We are at present not getting much of this kind, except when a statement has to be made in the House, and even then they often are, and have to be, very conservatively phrased. And of course we seldom, if ever, get a good anti-Communist statement made in the House.123

In July, prompted by Warner’s call for ‘Ministerial ammunition’, Mayhew wrote to Attlee, Bevin, Morrison and Alexander to co-opt them in IRD’s propaganda. As he explained, ministers would play an important role because their speeches would, thanks to the BBC’s overseas broadcasts, explain the ‘Government’s attitude on an essential theme, in the way that explanations by Heads of Missions and the work of our Information Officers in the field can seldom, if ever, achieve’.124 Attlee replied a few days later that he was ‘glad to lend all the assistance in my power to our overseas anti-Communist publicity campaign’ and, referring to an already existing procedure, explained how ‘my private secretaries give the Foreign Office copies of any speeches I make which are likely to be of interest to them, and no doubt they show you any passages that might interest you’.125 Mayhew himself attempted to use a speech to the United Nations Economic and Social Council in October 1948 to draw attention to the Soviet forced labour system, a subject first identified by the Russia Committee earlier that year.126 The speech drew

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

104

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

on information collected through IRD and, more embarrassingly for the Soviets, speeches by Molotov and Vyshinsky, to draw attention to Soviet Russia’s ‘monstrous system of oppression’ which, said Mayhew, made ‘a mockery of the claim that that country is a democratic or a socialist state’.127 The broad outlines of Britain’s new anti-communist publicity drive had been set out earlier in March 1948, just weeks after a Soviet-backed coup in Czechoslovakia.128 Responding to calls for Britain to adopt a more aggressive propaganda policy, Bevin circulated a paper on ‘The Threat to Western Civilisation’ in which he warned of the growing threat of Soviet expansion and outlined the steps that Britain could take to combat it. It was clear that the Soviets were ‘actively preparing’ to extend their hold in Europe and, subsequently, the Middle and Far East. In short, the Kremlin wanted nothing less than the ‘physical control of the Eurasian landmass and eventual control of the whole World Island’. In a relatively short space of time, the Soviets could achieve significant political and material advantages, leading to the establishment of a world dictatorship or, more likely, to the collapse of organised society around the globe.129 To combat the threat, ministers accepted a proposal that ‘propaganda must be used to the full’. While the ‘higher moral and spiritual values of Western civilisation’ would remain an integral part of the campaign, discussions turned to the area of political warfare and it was suggested that ‘some organisation on the lines of the Political Warfare Executive’ might be required to coordinate the campaign. It was also suggested that the Labour Party, rather than the government, could play a role in ‘strengthening and advising the social democratic Parties in Western Europe’.130 Following the Cabinet’s acceptance of the new line, Brook told Attlee that several of the points raised would require further ministerial decision. The Cabinet was not, he explained, a suitable body to maintain ‘continuing supervision’ of propaganda due to its size and varying commitments, though it would be consulted on ‘questions of major policy’. Instead, what was needed was a small group of ministers, with varying membership, to which ‘senior officials’ and the Chiefs of Staff could be invited. The proposed committee would permanently have as its chair the Prime Minister ,with Bevin as his deputy.131 Others, such as the Home Secretary or Minister of Labour, could be brought in when needed. ‘If you approve this procedure’, Brook wrote, the first of such a series of meetings might be held this week. You might then decide how various suggestions thrown out [by the Cabinet] … should be pursued – and, in particular, whether they should be remitted to existing

The Cold War heats up

105

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Committees (Ministerial or Official) or whether groups of officials should be constituted.132

Before the new committee could meet, the issue of ‘political warfare’ had to be resolved. In a letter to Attlee, Brook raised concerns that before ‘we can decide whether any organisation is needed … we need to know more precisely what is meant by “political warfare”’. In wartime, Brook noted that the term had been used to describe a ‘wide range of activities’ for countering ‘enemy propaganda, to weaken the German will to victory, to buttress confidence in the Allied cause’ and to ‘undermine German administration in occupied countries’. Such activities were conducted ‘overtly and covertly’. It was ‘dangerous’, Brook told Attlee, to apply the lessons of wartime to the present situation.133 The matter was dealt with on 12 March by an informal meeting attended by Attlee, Bevin, Alexander and Cripps, now Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was agreed that the phrase ‘political warfare’ would ‘not be used in any description of our publicity policy’, and there was no reason to form any organisation akin to the wartime Political Warfare Executive. Bevin would continue to be solely responsible for overseas publicity policy, deciding ‘the extent to which “black” propaganda methods are to be applied in particular countries’. In addition, he would report the progress of the campaign to a ‘small group’ consisting of himself, the Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Minister of Defence.134 The ministerial committee, called the Committee on European Policy or GEN 226, met for the first time on 13 April 1948. Chaired by Attlee, the committee also included Morrison, Bevin, Cripps, Alexander, Chuter Ede, Isaacs and, interestingly, Bevan, who had earlier criticised the government’s anti-communist propaganda policy, but had hardened his stance towards the Soviets following the Czech coup and his growing hostility to Soviet policy in Eastern Europe.135 The committee had before it a revised version of Bevin’s January paper on future publicity policy. Despite the arguments put forward by some Cabinet colleagues and the Chiefs of Staff, Bevin wrote that it was his ‘considered view that we should not incite the peoples of the Iron Curtain countries to subversive activities’. Drawing parallels with wartime political warfare, Bevin recalled that ‘we discouraged resistance movements from activity until our arms were at hand’. It was ‘clearly undesirable’ to encourage widespread resistance if ‘we can give … no help against the sanguinary reprisals’ regimes would inflict on their populace. If Britain did, Bevin added, ‘we should be doing ourselves and our friends a grave disservice if our publicity now urged them to active resistance’. Instead, British publicity would publicise ‘political social aims and achievements’. In the Soviet

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

106

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Bloc, propaganda would be restricted to official pronouncements carried by the BBC. In peacetime, Bevin felt that overt propaganda offered a cheaper and more viable alternative to covert means. Focusing on overt publicity, Bevin went on to explain the three main channels by which the material would be disseminated. First, ministerial speeches, official and semi-official statements by government spokesmen, and articles in the British press would be circulated in the foreign media. In order to be effective, ministerial and official pronouncements would need to be ‘carefully framed with the new publicity in mind’. In addition, McNeil and Mayhew were frequently in touch with Morgan Philips, the Labour Party’s General Secretary, and Denis Healey to coordinate overseas publicity. Further discussions were taking place between the Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff to consider ‘pronouncements on service matters with a view to their effect abroad’. The BBC and London Press Service would also play an important role, with Bevin telling the committee that he had arranged for the BBC’s day-to-day overseas output to be examined ‘in greater detail … to see whether it is in line with our present policy’. Nevertheless, Bevin rejected calls for the relationship between government and the BBC to be re-examined to allow ‘official direction’ to be given on the contents of BBC broadcasts. ‘It would raise very serious issues here’, he explained, ‘and might diminish the influence and reputation in foreign countries of the BBC’s broadcasts’. The third channel of distribution was via Britain’s overseas diplomatic missions. These had been instructed to base their publicity on the line laid down in the recent Cabinet paper, and efforts were being made to supply the missions with the ‘special type of material they require’.136 As the minutes of the committee suggested, senior government figures were regularly in contact with the Labour Party on overseas anticommunist propaganda. In May, Mayhew had informed Warner of a recent meeting with Morrison, Bevan, Healey and Morgan Philips to ‘discuss the possibilities of increasing the influence of the Labour Party in countering Communism in other countries’. One of the proposals discussed involved the adoption of towns in Italy and France and an expansion of the Labour Party’s programme of visits, with the meeting agreeing, in principle, that the party should encourage more visits, but that town-to-town adoption should continue on a non-party basis, and that Mayhew would write to Bevan about the proposals, offering Foreign Office help in finding suitable countries, towns and individuals. The subject of developing Labour’s own overseas publicity machinery was also discussed and, though the party’s own National Executive Committee had agreed to provide more resources, Mayhew suggested that more assistance could be given to Labour MPs travelling abroad

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up

107

and that Healey’s International Department should be expanded. The option of organising visits by foreign socialists to Britain was rejected by Morgan Philips, who believed, based on recent experiences, that the results were not worthwhile, and the final part of the meeting focused on publicising ‘British achievements’ through organisations including the British Council. During the meeting, the BBC was criticised for not being ‘sufficiently integrated’ into British foreign policy, a problem Mayhew was ‘looking into’.137 Shortly after the meeting, Mayhew informed Bevin that he had been unsuccessful in trying to persuade the NEC to commit more funds to overseas visits, but that progress was being made with Bevan in developing the ‘adoption’ of foreign towns on a strictly nonparty basis and that, following discussions with George Isaacs, special arrangements had been made with the TUC’s publicity officer, Herbert Tracey, for the circulation of anti-communist material in the unions.138 But the meeting overlooked the use of covert propaganda in Britain’s new campaign, something that concerned Morrison, who, following the meeting, had approached Brook, telling him that he was ‘disturbed … nothing whatever was being done on the “black” [propaganda] side’. Brook replied that, contrary to what had been said, such activities were ‘going on to a limited extent’ but were kept especially secret. Knowledge of these activities was, at the request of Attlee and Bevin, kept to as small a circle as possible. Morrison quite appreciated, Brook later told Attlee, the need for keeping knowledge of these matters within a narrow circle, and thought it would have been inexpedient to reveal this to a wider audience.139 The need to discuss such covert matters led, in May, to the formation of the Ministerial Committee on Anti-Communist Propaganda (GEN 231). This new body was once again chaired by the Prime Minister and included the Foreign Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Minister of Defence. Left out were George Isaacs and Bevan.140 At its first meeting ministers discussed covert propaganda. After circulating a copy of his paper on ‘Anti-Communist Publicity’, Bevin again reiterated the limitations of ‘covert propaganda’. At present, he argued, there were two ‘main limiting factors’. First, the amount of money available for all propaganda purposes was ‘limited’ and, in the present circumstances, he argued, ‘open propaganda paid a better dividend, pound for pound, than covert…’ Secondly, it was ‘unprofitable to encourage resistance’ in the Eastern Bloc when Britain was ‘unable to afford any practical support’. Such a policy would, he explained, ‘endanger the position of our friends’. Unlike the earlier meeting of GEN 226, Bevin revealed that, within limits, ‘there was room for the use of covert propaganda’. In fact, such activities ‘were already being pursued’ and more could be done, he said, ‘to secure the publication of suitable

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

108

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

news and articles in foreign newspapers – though he would prefer to proceed by paying for the inclusion of suitable material in foreignowned newspapers rather than by buying newspapers outright’, with the committee endorsing the use of covert propaganda in a ‘limited’ number of cases.141 Although specific details of the campaign were not raised, an earlier letter by Warner revealed that ‘Certain black propaganda has been carried out in the Middle East for over a year, dating from the Secretary of State’s decision that anti-Communist propaganda should be carried out … This black propaganda has been carried out by means of a wireless station organised by “C” and under our disguised control.’142 Conclusion The chapter has examined the development of British propaganda and offensive Cold War policy from the end of the Second World War to the spring of 1948 and the implementation of anti-communist propaganda under IRD. Attempting to maintain cordial Anglo-Soviet relations, Bevin rejected calls for an aggressive anti-communist offensive as originally envisaged by Kirkpatrick, though both he and Attlee recognised the need for a ‘defensive-offensive’ to protect British interests overseas, particularly in the Middle East. Internal Labour Party differences over the Soviet Union, as well as broader public opinion, a hangover from the wartime alliance, also prevented a vigorous anti-communist offensive. It was only after the breakdown of Anglo-Soviet relations that Bevin, now free from these constraints, authorised a clear change in British policy, helped by Christopher Mayhew and others. An important element of the new policy were ministerial speeches, starting with Attlee’s New Year broadcast of 1948 in which he attacked the Soviet Union for ‘a new form of imperialism – ideological, economic and strategic’, and a followup speech by Bevin in the House of Commons.143 While anti-communist, the new campaign promoted ‘progressive ideas of British social democracy’ and refrained from stoking subversive activities in the Eastern Bloc aimed at undermining Soviet rule.144 Despite increasing pressure from the Chiefs of Staff, Bevin was reluctant to endorse special operations and subversive propaganda and, like many in the Foreign Office, believed that such activities in the Eastern Bloc were unwarranted. As he told GEN 226, Britain would be ‘unable to afford any practical support’ and any activity, rather than undermining Soviet control over Eastern Europe, would ‘endanger the position of our friends’.145 As a hardheaded realist, Bevin also appreciated that that Britain would be unable to manage subsequent events and would be ‘letting loose forces difficult

The Cold War heats up

109

to control’, though, later, he authorised covert activities if the conditions were opportune.146

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Notes 1 Christopher Mayhew, A War of Words: A Cold War Witness (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), p. 15. 2 CAB 129/25, C.P. (48)72, ‘The Threat to Western Civilisation: memorandum by the Secretary of State’, 3 March 1948. 3 FO 1093/375, Sargent to Bevin, 30 March 1948; CAB 130/37, GEN 231/1st meeting, Cabinet: Anti-Communist Propaganda: minutes of meeting, 11 April 1948; FO 1093/375, Sargent to Bevin, 30 March 1948. 4 J.I.C. (46)1(0) Final (Revise) [N 3388/605/38], ‘Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee on Russia’s strategic interests and intentions’, 1 March 1946, reproduced in DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. VI, no. 78, pp. 297–301. 5 Mr. Roberts (Moscow) to Mr. Bevin, 14 March 1946, reproduced in DBPO, ser. I, Vol. VI, No. 80, pp. 305–12. For more information on Roberts and his despatches, see Sean Greenwood, ‘Frank Roberts and the “Other” Long Telegram: The View from the British Embassy in Moscow, March 1946’, Journal of Contemporary History, 25:1 (1990), pp. 103–22. 6 ‘The Soviet campaign against this country and our response to it’, 2 April 1946, reproduced in DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. VI, no. 88, pp. 345–52. 7 Ibid., p. 328. For further information, see Ray Merrick, ‘The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War, 1946–47’, Journal of Contemporary History, 20:3 (1985), pp. 453–68; Lord Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 227. 8 Merrick, ‘The Russia Committee’, p. 458. 9 FO 800/501, Bevin to Attlee, 10 April 1946. 10 PREM 8/346, Rowan to Dixon, 20 April 1946. 11 PREM 8/346, Addison to Attlee, 12 April 1946; FO 371/56784, Brimelow to Hankey, 23 April 1946. 12 Merrick, ‘The Russia Committee’, p. 458. 13 FO 371/56886, note by Lambert, 26 July 1946. 14 Ann Lane, ‘Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone Augustine (1897–1964)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 15 FO 930/488, P449/1/907, memorandum by Ivone Kirkpatrick, 22 May 1946. 16 FO 371/56788, memorandum by Lambert, 22 August 1946. 17 FO 930/488, P449/1/907, memorandum by Ivone Kirkpatrick, 22 May 1946. 18 Schwartz, Political Warfare against the Kremlin, pp. 29, 33. 19 FO 371/56784, Warner to Denning, 20 July 1946; FO 371/56788, memorandum by Warner, 5 August 1946. 20 DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. VII, p. 165. 21 CAB 81/132, J.I.C. (46)38(0), Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee on

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

110

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions in the Middle East, 6 June 1946, reproduced in DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. VII, no. 58, pp. 161–64. The report was sent to Leslie Rowan, Attlee’s Principal Private Secretary, on 15 June, for the information of the Prime Minister (PREM 8/343, Ismay to Rowan, 15 June 1946). 22 Merrick, ‘The Russia Committee’, p. 458. 23 Minute from Bevin to Sargent, 23 June 1946, reproduced in DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. VII, no. 60, p. 169. 24 CAB 130/17, ‘Russia in the Middle East: Publicity Policy’, 17 October 1946. 25 FO 371/56911, meeting on propaganda to Persia, 15 August 1946. 26 Minute from Howe to Bevin, 13 July 1946, reproduced in DBPO, Ser. I, Vol. VII, no. 63, p. 177. 27 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, pp. 44–5. 28 FO 371/56886, Russia Committee Meeting, 30 July 1946. 29 FO 371/56886, meeting in the Foreign Office to consider the means of counteracting Russian activities in Austria and Germany, 31 July 1946. 30 Raymond Smith, ‘A Climate of Opinion: British Officials and the Development of British Soviet Policy, 1945–7’, International Affairs, 64:4 (1988), p. 641. 31 FO 371/66371, Russia Committee Meeting, 31 July 1947. 32 FO 371/66371, Russia Committee Meeting, 14 August 1947. 33 See Anne Deighton, ‘Britain and the Cold War’, in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1: Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 124; John Callaghan, ‘Towards Isolation: The Communist Party and the Labour Government’, in Jim Fyrth (ed.), Labour’s Promised Land: Culture and Society in Labour Britain, 1945–51 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1995), p. 89. 34 Alan Foster, ‘The British Press and the Coming of the Cold War’, in Anne Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), pp. 27–8. For Foreign Office concerns, see FO 371/56886, Russia Committee meeting, 13 August 1946; FO 371/56886, Russia Committee meeting, 30 July 1946. 35 FO 371/56786, note by Hankey, 7 August 1946; FO 371/56786, note by Kirkpatrick, 11 August 1946. 36 FO 371/56886, Russia Committee meeting, 30 July 1946. 37 Caroline Anstey, ‘The Projection of British Socialism: Foreign Office Publicity and American Opinion, 1945–50’, Journal of Contemporary History, 19:3 (1984), p. 434. 38 Tony Shaw, ‘The British Popular Press and the Early Cold War’, History, 83:269 (1998), p. 77; FO 371/56886, Russia Committee Meeting, 3 September 1946. 39 Jonathan Schneer, ‘Hopes Deferred or Shattered: The British Labour Left and the Third Force Movement, 1945–49’, Journal of Modern History, 56:2 (1984). 40 Saville, The Politics of Continuity, pp. 60–1. 41 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 63. 42 On Churchill’s Fulton speech and Attlee’s response, see David Reynolds, From

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up

111

World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt and the International History of the 1940s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 261. 43 Hansard, HC Deb., 13 November 1946, vol. 430, col. 526. 44 Bill Jones, The Russia Complex (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), p. 141. 45 See Richard Crossman et al., Keep Left (London: New Statesman and Nation, 1947), p. 47. 46 Peter Weiler, Labour and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 157. 47 FO 371/66371, Russia Committee meeting, 14 August 1947. 48 FO 371/56886, Russia Committee meeting; Publicity Sub-Committee, 29 July 1946. 49 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 97. 50 Ibid., p. 67. 51 Hugh Wilford, The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune? (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 53; Mayhew, A War of Words, p. 40. 52 Mayhew, A War of Words, pp. 40–1. 53 FO 371/67613, meeting held in Minister of State’s room, 5 November 1946. 54 FO 371/67613, circular by Sargent, 11 November 1946. 55 LHASC, Healey Papers, Box 9, J. F. Turner, Foreign Office, to Healey, 25 March 1947; CAB 134/53, C. (49) 3, ‘Foreign Office Information Activities With Special Reference to Anti-Communist Propaganda’, 31 May 1949. 56 LHASC, Healey Papers, Box 9, Healey to Turner, 27 March 1947. 57 FO 371/95962, note by R. H. Mason, 2 January 1951. Ernest Davies was the Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of State. 58 Wilford, The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War, p. 55. On Healey’s relationship with the later Information Research Department, see Jenks, British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War, pp. 83, 104–5. 59 Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 76. 60 See Edward Pearce, Denis Healey: A Life in Our Times (London: Little Brown, 2002). 61 MAYHEW 4/2, ‘Anti-Communist Publicity in Burma’, 30 April 1948. 62 MAYHEW 4/2, Mayhew to Healey, 1 June 1948. 63 MAYHEW 4/2, Foreign Office to Rangoon, 22 June 1946. 64 Thomas J. Maguire, ‘Counter-Subversion in Early Cold War Britain: The Official Committee on Communism (Home), the Information Research Department, and “State Private Networks”’, Intelligence and National Security, 30:3 (2015), p. 646. Information may also have been shared with MI5. In a diary entry for January 1950, MI5’s Guy Liddell wrote that, following a visit to the Imperial Defence College, Mayhew had recognised an unnamed ‘University acquaintance … whom he described to Admiral Daniel, the Commandant, as a “fellow traveller”’. At a later visit by Graham Mitchell, the head of MI5’s F Division, Mayhew had ‘expressed regret’ at making the statement, but would contact Denis Healey who had known the unnamed individual well. According

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

112

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

to Liddell’s diary: ‘Healey said that [REDACTED] had been a member of the Communist underground. When Mayhew asked him how he knew, he said that he had been a member himself! The Admiral, who is purple at the gills, has been calmed down on the understanding that we will conduct a careful investigation.   On looking up [REDACTED] records it appears that his real name is [REDACTED] and that his father was of Russian origin, naturalised British, and that his mother was nee [REDACTED] (a Latvian name).   [REDACTED] is now employed at the I.D.C., dealing with administration matters and seeing most of the papers that go through the institution.’ (KV 472, entry for 28 January 1950). 65 Saville, The Politics of Continuity, p. 226. 66 LHASC, Healey Papers, Box 11, Healey to McNeil, 25 April 1947. 67 LHASC, Healey Papers, Box 11, McNeil to Healey, 25 April 1947. 68 Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 106. 69 Cards on the Table: An Interpretation of Labour’s Foreign Policy (London: The Labour Party, 1947). 70 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp. 398–9. 71 Merrick, ‘The Russia Committee’, p. 463. On Healey’s role in Cards on the Table, see Pearce, Denis Healey, pp. 82–95. 72 Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 30–5. 73 CAB 128/10, C.M. (47)90 Cabinet conclusion, 25 November 1947; ‘IRD: Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Office Information Research Department, 1946–48’, FCO History Notes, 9 (August 1993), p. 4. 74 MAG, MC: P2/4/2MS/18, ‘1946/8: Resurrection of Special Operations’. 75 Mayhew, Time to Explain, p. 23. 76 Ibid. 77 Mayhew, A War of Words, p. 9. 78 Mayhew, Time to Explain, p. 26. 79 On anti-communist attitudes within the party, see Darren Lilleker, Against the Cold War: The History and Political Traditions of pro-Sovietism in the British Labour Party, 1945–89 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 45. 80 Thurlow, The Secret State, p. 286. 81 Mayhew, Time to Explain, pp. 55–83. 82 MAYHEW 3/1, autobiographical account written by Mayhew, March 1942. 83 Wilford, The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War, p. 55. 84 Victoria Honeyman, Richard Crossman: A Reforming Radical of the Labour Party (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 21. 85 FO 1110/220, C.I. (49) 4, ‘Principles of Psychological Warfare’, 11 January 1949. 86 Mayhew, A War of Words, p. 18. 87 Ibid. 88 LHASC: Labour Party International Department, Box 151, ‘Examples of Communist Anti-Labour Party Propaganda’.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The Cold War heats up

113

89 Mayhew, A War of Words, pp. 20–2. 90 MAYHEW 4/2, record of meeting held on 18th November to discuss a possible propaganda counter-offensive, 20 November 1947. 91 Mayhew, A War of Words, p. 21. 92 FO 953/128, Third Force Propaganda, 6 December 1947. 93 MAYHEW 4/2, Warner to Bevin, 1 January 1948. 94 Schwartz, Political Warfare against the Kremlin, p. 41. 95 MAYHEW 4/2, Mayhew to Bevin, 6 December 1947. 96 Mayhew, A War of Words, p. 21. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 FO 953/144, ‘The Prime Minister’s New Year Broadcast, 1948’, 3 January 1948. 100 MAYHEW 5/2, entry for 23 January 1948. 101 CAB 129/23, C.P. (48)8, ‘Future Foreign Publicity Policy: memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 4 January 1948; CAB 129/23, C.P. (48)6, ‘The First Aim if British Foreign Policy: memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 4 January 1948; CAB 129/23, C.P.(48)5, ‘Policy in Germany: memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 5 January 1948; CAB 129/23, C.P.(48)7, ‘Review of Soviet Policy: memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 5 January 1948. 102 CAB 129/23, C.P. (48)6, ‘The First Aim of British Foreign Policy: memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 4 January 1948. 103 CAB 129/23, C.P. (48)8, ‘Future Foreign Publicity Policy: memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 4 January 1948. 104 CAB 128/12, C.M. (48) 2nd conclusions, conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, 8 January 1948. Further details on Bevan’s contribution can be found in CAB 195/6, Cabinet Secretary’s notebook, 8 January 1948. 105 FO 371/71687, minutes of meeting, 15 January 1948. 106 LHASC: Labour Party International Department, Box 151, Misc AntiCommunism: speech by Herbert Morrison to East Midlands Regional Council, de Monfort Hall, Leicester, 11 January 1948. The speech is mentioned in Donoghue and Jones, Herbert Morrison, p. 433. 107 MAYHEW 5/2, entry for 24 January 1948. 108 Hansard, HC Deb., 22 January 1948, vol. 446, cols. 383–409. 109 Ibid., col. 413. 110 Ibid., col. 447. 111 MAYHEW 5/2, entry for 24 January 1948. On the general response to the speech, see Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, p. 68. 112 MAYHEW 5/2, entry for 24 January 1948. 113 Hansard, HC Deb., 23 January 1948, vol. 446, cols. 529–622. 114 MAYHEW 5/2, entry for 23 January 1948. 115 FO 1110/1, circular telegram No. 6, 23 January 1948. 116 IRD, FCO History Notes, p. 7. For just some of the other literature on

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

114

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

the development of IRD, see Lyn Smith, ‘Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department, 1947–1977’, Millennium: The Journal of International Studies, 9:1 (1980), pp. 67-83; Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War, 1948–1977 (Stroud: Sutton, 1998). 117 MAYHEW 4/2, Mayhew to Warner, 24 March 1948. 118 MAYHEW 4/2, note by Murray, 14 April 1948. 119 MAYHEW 4/2, note by Murray, 12 May 1948. 120 MAYHEW 4/2, note by Warner, 16 June 1948. 121 MAYHEW 4/2, Warner to Reddaway, 13 July 1948. 122 Mayhew, A War of Words, pp. 43–4. The secretive handling of memoranda worked both ways. In a letter to Sir Orme Sargent, Mayhew admitted that anticommunist publicity policy was ‘handicapped by the very restricted circulation of Cabinet papers in the office which only reach me when I ask for them, and the very existence of which is sometimes unknown to me’ (FO 71687, Mayhew to Sargent, 19 January 1948). 123 MAYHEW 4/2, Warner to Mayhew, 15 June 1948. 124 See MAYHEW 4/2, Mayhew to Alexander, 17 July 1948. Mayhew’s letter to Bevin can be found in MAYHEW 9/1/1, Mayhew to Bevin, 9 July 1948. 125 MAYHEW 4/2, Attlee to Mayhew, 20 July 1948. 126 See Jenks, British Propaganda and News Media, p. 137. 127 Mayhew, A War of Words, p. 136. 128 For its impact on the Labour Party, see Defty, Britain, America and AntiCommunist Propaganda, p. 71. 129 CAB 129/25, C.P. (48)72, ‘The Threat to Western Civilisation: memorandum by the Secretary of State’, 3 March 1948. 130 CAB 128/12, C.M. (48)19th, conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, 5 March 1948. 131 CAB 21/2745, Brook to Attlee, 6 March 1948. 132 Ibid. 133 CAB 21/2745, Brook to Attlee, March 1948. 134 CAB 21/2745, notes of an informal meeting. 135 See Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds, Nye: The Political Life of Aneurin Bevan (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), pp. 173–4. 136 CAB 130/37, GEN 231/1, ‘Anti-Communist Publicity’, 30 April 1948. 137 MAYHEW 9/1/1, Mayhew to Warner, 6 May 1948. 138 MAYHEW 9/1/1, Mayhew to Bevin, 11 May 1948. 139 CAB 21/2745, Brook to Attlee, 17 April 1948. 140 CAB 195/6, Cabinet Secretary’s notebook, 8 January 1948. 141 CAB 130/37, GEN 231/1st meeting, Cabinet: Anti-Communist Propaganda: minutes of meeting, 11 April 1948. 142 FO 1093/375, Warner to Bevin, 12 March 1948. 143 FO 953/144, ‘The Prime Minister’s New Year Broadcast, 1948’, 3 January 1948. 144 FO 953/144, C.P. (48)8, ‘Future Foreign Publicity Policy: memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 4 January 1948.

The Cold War heats up

115

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

145 CAB 130/37, GEN 231/1st meeting, Cabinet: Anti-Communist Propaganda: minutes of meeting, 11 April 1948. 146 FO 1093/375, Sargent to Bevin, 30 March 1948.

4 Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive: ministers, subversion and special operations, 1948–51 If properly handled, the situation in Albania would pay dividends, though an initial outlay in gold would no doubt be required.1 Ernest Bevin, 4 March 1949 I should like an appreciation of Albanian personalities. Are they not possibly for sale?’2 Clement Attlee, 28 March 1949

While Bevin had previously rejected calls for special operations and subversive activities inside the Soviet Bloc, sanctioning, instead, a new information policy, the gradual worsening of Anglo-Soviet relations meant that by 1949 he had authorised Operation Valuable, SIS’s scheme aimed at driving communist Albania away from Soviet influence. Rather than this being ‘forced on him’ by pressure from the Chiefs of Staff, as has previously been suggested, the Foreign Secretary gave his wholehearted support to the plan, believing that, on a strictly limited basis, operations could play an important role in eroding the Soviet Bloc.3 Beyond Bevin, any wider ministerial reluctance to engage in covert activities started to erode as the Cold War began, particularly following the Berlin Crisis of 1948–49.4 Other than Valuable, Bevin also approved subversive activities inside the Soviet zone of Germany aimed at undermining relations between East German officials and Soviet forces, leading to recommendations that such tactics could be used in the Soviet Bloc as a whole. This challenges existing accounts that he decisively opposed special operations and subversive warfare.5 Beyond Valuable and the small number of subversive activities now publicly acknowledged, the Attlee government developed a machinery for overseas Cold War activities with the highly secret Ministerial Committee on Communism (Overseas), a high-level steering group for Britain’s offensive Cold War activities, and its associated committee of officials, successively chaired by the Foreign Office officials Gladwyn Jebb and Pierson Dixon. While the work of the ministerial body remains shrouded in secrecy, new archival releases

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

117

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

have made it possible to detail the development of Britain’s overseas Cold War strategy, approved by ministers in December 1950. In clear contrast to US policy, which relied heavily on paramilitary operations, Britain adopted a policy of subversion, black propaganda and minor ‘pinprick’ operations to undermine the Soviet stranglehold on Eastern Europe.6

Britain’s Cold War offensive emerges Despite endorsing the formation of IRD, Bevin had firmly opposed calls for an all-out campaign involving black propaganda and special operations, believing it was ‘unprofitable to encourage resistance’ in the Soviet orbit when Britain was not in a position to help.7 Bevin’s opposition angered senior military figures who, believing that the Cold War was being lost through a lack of coordination, pressed for decisive action involving sabotage and subversion.8 In the main, the problem resulted from confusion over the term ‘Cold War’ and who, in fact, was actually responsible for overseeing British policy. While the Foreign Office rightly saw the Cold War as largely diplomatic, the military saw it as an armed conflict, with the differences in outlook recognised by Mayhew who, writing to Sargent, acknowledged: The Chiefs of Staff seem to assume that the Foreign Office is authorised and willing to fight the cold war, without restraint or inhibition, e.g. by special operations beyond the Iron Curtain and by economic warfare. They are critical of us both because we are not yet fighting this kind of war and because we have not set up the machinery to do it.9

In private, the Foreign Office’s Esler Dening was scathing of the military, writing that the Chiefs of Staff ‘have not the faintest notion of how the Foreign Office works, how foreign affairs are conducted and what problems they present’.10 One of the more vigorous backers of an offensive Cold War strategy was Air Vice Marshall John Slessor, formerly RAF Commander-in-Chief Middle East and Mediterranean who, in 1944, had vigorously argued for a unified post-war special operations capability. In 1947 he was still enthusiastic about special operations, writing to the military theorist Basil Liddell Hart that Britain needed a ‘fifth column of freedom’ embracing special operations and political warfare.11 The following year, Slessor discussed his plans with senior figures in Whitehall, and, in January, approached Menzies on the subject. Writing to Air Marshall Sir James Robb, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, Slessor wrote of his d ­ isappointment

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

118

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

at what he had listened to. According to Slessor, Menzies had stated how ‘everything depended on whether the Government would cough up the money required to enable him to operate effectively’ and that this would entail a ‘formidable addition to the Secret Service vote’. Slessor believed the figure needed to be £10 million a year, and was alarmed at the relatively small amount of money mentioned by Menzies – just £500,000, a figure Slessor considered to be ‘derisorily inadequate’. In his view, Parliament should be asked for £10 million and ‘told frankly what it was for’, though the figure was clearly out of proportion with the government’s broader preparations for the Cold War.12 At the time, the Secret Vote stood at £2.5 million and a substantial increase in agency funding was unlikely, especially for a cash-strapped government.13 The Chiefs of Staff also pushed for a change in policy and, in April, issued a damning indictment of government policy, arguing that ‘if judgement by results is any criterion, the Soviet Union is still on the attack’ while Britain’s position was ‘worse than … a year ago’. Current government policy was ‘ineffective’ and lacked ‘unity or purpose’.14 The Chiefs forcefully repeated their criticism of government policy during a meeting with Alexander in September. In the immediate post-war period, relations on the Chiefs of Staff committee were far from friendly. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshall Montgomery, detested all committees and despised his colleagues, who felt the same about him. They were unified in their belief that Britain was unprepared for the Cold War, and in their dislike of Alexander.15 Montgomery’s relationship with the Minister of Defence was particularly strained following attempts to have Alexander sacked.16 While respectful in writing about Montgomery, Attlee later referred to his ability to ‘behave almost like a child’.17 During the meeting, the Chief of the Air Staff, Lord Tedder, chairing the committee, explained to Alexander that government policy was ‘completely inadequate’. The Cold War required ‘the employment of all our resources, short of actual shooting, and a proper organisation to co-ordinate them’. Alexander agreed that a ‘moral and spiritual offensive’ was essential but, concerned by Bevin’s possible reaction, tried to tone down their proposals, suggesting instead that a ‘better approach’ would be for the military to tell the Foreign Secretary that they were ‘concerned at the continued spread of Communism’.18 Montgomery pushed for the paper to go to Bevin in its original form so that the views of the Chiefs were made ‘absolutely clear’ to the Foreign Secretary.19 The next day, relations between Alexander and the Chiefs of Staff sank to a new low during a meeting about recruitment to the armed services. During the meeting, insults were openly bandied around, resulting in a

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

119

‘first-class row’ during which Montgomery attacked Alexander as ‘too cowardly’.20 On the same day that he was being insulted by Montgomery, Alexander submitted his revised version of the paper to Bevin. Attempting to deflect potential criticism, he explained that the Chiefs of Staff, rather than attacking the Foreign Office, shared ‘precisely the same objective’ and would be ‘the last to criticise or embarrass you’. Despite ruling out the revival of the Political Warfare Executive, Alexander wrote that ‘our present efforts to win the Cold War were lagging behind … not only against Communism but in putting over the positive aspects of our own system of democracy’.21 In the attached memorandum, ‘Higher Defence Policy for the “Cold War”’, the Chiefs of Staff argued that the Soviets posed a ‘formidable threat … it is against this that we must now be prepared, at the same time TAKING EVERY POSSIBLE STEP TO PREVENT IT’ by defeating ‘Russian directed Communism’. The Soviets had at their disposal a highly centralised system allowing for ‘quick coordination’ while, in contrast, British officials had ‘failed to clarify our thinking’ on Cold War policy.22 On 17 September Bevin replied that the Chiefs of Staff raised several ‘important issues’ and sent Kirkpatrick to see the military.23 At a meeting on 29 September, Kirkpatrick told the Chiefs that Bevin had been ‘interested’ in their views, but thought they had a tendency to ‘overlook certain factors’. In particular, they were ‘incorrect’ that IRD was the ‘only body prosecuting the Cold War’, explaining that the responsibility for carrying out ‘all other measures’ was with the Russia Committee. Unaware of the committee, Tedder asked for a representative of the Chiefs of Staff to be invited and, during the rest of the meeting, Kirkpatrick defended the Foreign Office, saying that it was difficult for Britain to wage an all-out offensive against communism as ‘some of the Cold War tactics open to the Russians were not … open to ourselves’. Although a ‘great deal of thought’ had been given to special operations, such activities ‘had gone wrong on two or three occasions’ and Bevin, Kirkpatrick said, personally believed they ‘would not pay a dividend’.24 The meeting ended amicably with the Chiefs of Staff making two recommendations. First, they suggested that a senior official from the Ministry of Defence should attend the Russia Committee, and, second, that a small working party should be formed, consisting of Sir William Hayter of the Foreign Office, promoted to Assistant Under-Secretary of State in early 1948, Kenneth Strong from the Joint Intelligence Bureau and Menzies, to examine ‘the state of our intelligence regarding Russia, and if necessary make recommendations for the improvement of the machinery’. Bevin scribbled ‘I agree’ next to each proposal.25 On 3 November

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

120

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

the Chiefs of Staff met Hayter, Strong and Menzies to discuss intelligence requirements, though special operations were discussed. Once again the meeting showed that intelligence on the Soviet orbit was far from satisfactory, though Strong was optimistic about the available information, saying that the JIB had been monitoring Soviet industrial capacity, concluding they were incapable of ‘a major war of long duration’. Menzies was also optimistic, believing there was ‘every prospect of an improvement’ but, when pushed on the issue of special operations, he said that ‘it would be premature to stage active subversive operations in Russia or the Satellite countries at the present time’ as they would prejudice ‘such sources of information as we possessed’. Hayter told the meeting that Bevin had given ‘considerable thought’ to special operations, but had concluded that ‘the time was not opportune’.26 Bevin took an alternative, less provocative line to Soviet Russia than the Chiefs of Staff. Before January 1948 he had tried to ‘provide a steady stream of information about British life and culture’ as an alternative to Soviet communism.27 In the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia, Bevin believed that ‘the provision of information on British life and culture is probably our most effective single means of preventing them from being absorbed … into a Soviet sphere of influence’ and, even after the launch of IRD, he maintained that British publicity should be largely positive.28 Tensions with the Chiefs of Staff had started again in December 1947 after the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) suggested that Germany and Austria were a ‘fertile area’ for special operations. The JPS believed it was important to undermine the morale of Soviet officials and armed forces, spreading ‘rumours of rape and loot by the slave-workers at home and the severity of re-indoctrination courses’ as well as inducing mistrust of higher authority by ‘plants, fictitious indiscretions, suspicious telephone calls’.29 Writing to Sargent, the secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Group Captain Stapleton, warned that, if communist influence remained unchecked, it would be harder to ‘avoid war with the Soviet [sic] in the future, and then if it happens, to win it’. Once political warfare had started, the Chiefs of Staff believed ‘every weapon’ needed to be used, including special operations and deception, important components of political warfare.30 Responding to pressure from the military, Sargent asked Menzies to explore the possibilities for ‘planting stories detrimental to Communism … in the European press’ and for possible options for peacetime special operations; Menzies reported on 20 January.31 In considering possibilities for ‘Clandestine Propaganda’, Menzies wrote that SIS was restricted to ‘comparatively mild’ activities in the Middle East and India involving the control of a newspaper in Iraq and the use of news agencies,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

121

though future actions could involve the covert control or setting up of new media outlets, the spreading of rumours and attempts ‘to subvert Russian and Satellite armed forces’.32 In an attached paper, Menzies also outlined the potential for special operations which, by their very nature, would be ‘unacknowledgeable’ and require ‘extreme care in the security of their execution’. Possible options included the ‘“framing” of diplomats and other officials by planted evidence’ leading to ‘their removal and possible liquidation’, and the economic disruption of the Eastern Bloc by ‘fostering “go-slow” movements’ in factories or ‘petty acts of carelessness and sabotage’. The campaign would be a ‘nuisance generally’ and, hopefully, ‘raise the morale of anti-Communists everywhere’, with Menzies also considering violent methods such as the ‘kidnapping of high-ranking Communist personalities’, accidents to ‘Russian military trains’ and liquidation of ‘selected individuals’.33 At the end of March Sargent wrote to Bevin that, while ‘the Russians have not been surreptitious in the choice of weapons … we have refrained from replying in kind’, recommending that SIS should be given a free hand to carry out special operations to ‘dislocate the economy and administration’ of the Soviet Bloc, keeping the Soviets on ‘tenterhooks’. While special operations would not liberate Eastern Europe, they offered ‘significant nuisance value’ and would ‘increase the state of tension and mutual suspicion … forcing the Russians to concentrate to some extent on the consolidation at home rather than expansion’.34 Like the earlier Kirkpatrick proposals, Bevin rejected the scheme outright, scribbling on the paper: ‘I have grave objections to this. We are letting loose forces difficult to control … I did not regard it was too successful in the war.’35 Shortly afterwards, following a meeting with Kirkpatrick, Bevin ruled that ‘nothing should be done on the above lines’.36 The Foreign Secretary was not the only opponent. Commenting on the earlier paper by Menzies, Warner wrote that the scheme was ‘rather confused and repetitive’ and ‘that it would be of little use to do anything in the “Iron Curtain” countries’. Any covert activities would lead to ‘an enormous increase in terrorism’ and the sacrifice of pro-Western elements ‘for the sake of a possible delay in the efficient organisation of these countries’.37 Britain’s approach to covert operations has been described as ‘muddled’, with an absence of ‘clear policy guidance from the top levels’.38 This was not, in fact, the case. Bevin had clearly made his views on special operations known to those around him and, generally, officials knew of the Foreign Secretary’s opposition to applying them ‘to the whole Soviet orbit’ although, like other senior figures in government, he had stated his clear opposition to communism.39 While he remained concerned about endorsing a policy of liberation, Bevin

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

122

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

was willing to sanction specific operations behind the Iron Curtain if the conditions were favourable.40 One example is the case of Operation Valuable, aimed at Albania, where success, Bevin believed, would ‘have an enormous effect on the Soviet orbit’, encouraging defections from the pro-Soviet camp.41 Albania was considered an ideal testing ground for offensive measures: British relations with the Hoxha government had ended in 1946 after the mining of two Royal Navy destroyers in the Corfu channel, which killed forty-three servicemen. By 1948 the country had been further isolated after a dispute between Yugoslavia and Moscow, leading to political and economic seclusion.42 Evidence of Bevin’s nuanced approach emerged during the spring of 1949, when he considered that any counter-offensive by us in the ‘cold war’ should be concentrated where it would be most effective. He had been impressed by M. Bebler’s [Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister] statement to the Minister of State that the situation in Albania was now worse than ever before and that the Russians were giving Albania much less assistance than Yugoslavia had given her in the past. If properly handled, the situation in Albania would pay dividends, though an initial outlay in gold would no doubt be required.43

The idea of conducting operations against Albania was first raised at a meeting of the Russia Committee in November 1948. The committee had examined a paper by Robin Hankey, head of the Foreign Office’s Northern Department, proposing that British policy should go over to the offensive, but stop short of ‘hot war’. In discussion, Kirkpatrick believed that, due to the current financial climate and public opinion, it would be best to restrict offensive operations to a small area, suggesting Albania as an ideal target because of its geographical isolation and ‘opposition to the present regime’. Others expressed unease, with Jebb pointing out that United Nations observers in neighbouring Greece would ‘hear of any operations … with possibly unpleasant consequences’, while Roger Makins doubted the ‘value of underground’. Towards the end of the meeting Tedder, attending for the first time, optimistically called for Britain to ‘aim at winning the “cold war”’ by overthrowing the Soviet state in five years, proposing the formation of a ‘small permanent team … which would consider plans’ to be carried out in conjunction with the Americans. While the committee failed to arrive at any concrete proposals, they agreed to the formation of a Russia Committee ‘sub-committee’ on Cold War policy. This reported in December, recommending the need, in wartime, to tie up Soviet conventional forces by making the whole of the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

123

Eastern Bloc ‘a dangerous area’, weakening the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe and, in time, helping countries there ‘regain independence’. In order to oversee this new approach to British policy, the sub-committee recommended the creation of a small permanent committee chaired by the Foreign Office, linked to the Russia Committee, and attended by members of the Foreign Office, Chiefs of Staff and other organisations, though the plans came to nothing.44 While the Foreign Office agreed to reform the Russia Committee system, leading to the creation of a long-term planning staff under the Permanent Under-Secretary, the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee, the proposals for a lasting system to plan a holistic approach to Britain’s Cold War were side-lined in the short term.45 Concrete proposals were put in place on Albania. At the end of the year, Bevin instructed Sargent to ‘study … the possibilities of harassing’ the Hoxha regime and SIS was given the task of planning the operation.46 By March 1949 plans for an Albanian operation were ready and forwarded to Attlee.47 Another minister aware of the scheme was Hector McNeil.48 In a memorandum to Attlee, Strang outlined SIS’s plans to build an ‘intelligence system which would confirm whether conditions were favourable for further operations and, if these were embarked upon, provide the requisite flow of information’. The network would be based in southern Albania and comprise ‘Albanian or Albanian-speaking W/T operators’. If the results were encouraging, instructors in ‘modern guerrilla warfare’ would be infiltrated to ‘recruit, arm, feed, clothe and train anti-Communist supporters’ with the possibility of extending operations to northern Albania. Commenting on the plan, Strang wrote that the Hoxha regime was isolated and a tempting target to be ‘wrested from the Soviet grip’. In Albania itself there was ‘great discontent’ which could lead to ‘open revolt in certain areas’ and, even if the plan’s ultimate object of dislodging the regime failed, the disruption of supplies to rebels in neighbouring Greece would be a ‘very valuable’ objective. Although there was ‘some risk’ of the operations being discovered, and of the Soviets making ‘political capital’ in the UN, Strang wrote that this could be rebutted ‘without great difficulty … as the United Nations would be on our side’. The project was ‘admittedly … venturesome’ but the ‘situation was particularly favourable’ and the ‘prizes to be won are worth the risk involved’.49 In an attached note, Menzies warned of the dangers by explaining it was ‘not worth incurring the effort and potential loss of life entailed by the preliminary operations, unless we are prepared to follow them up by striking as hard as possible at any sensitive point we may find’, which might ‘involve fairly extensive supply operations at a later date’.50

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

124

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Political clearance for the operation has been the subject of some debate.51 In one account, Bevin begrudgingly gave his consent, which had been ‘forced on him’ by pressure from the British military.52 Other accounts have claimed that Bevin, a dedicated anti-communist, believed the Cold War ‘had to be fought by all available means’ and ‘sanctioned more [special operations] … than any other post-war Foreign Secretary’.53 As always, the answer lies somewhere between the two viewpoints. Although reluctant to ‘set Europe ablaze’ – to use the earlier words of Churchill – Bevin gave his full backing to the operation. Even Attlee, often seen as opposed to such activities, asked about potentially undermining the Hoxha regime through bribery, scribbling at the top of Strang’s covering letter ‘I should like an appreciation of Albanian personalities. Are they not possibly for sale?’54 In early April Strang replied that ‘The leading members of the present Albanian regime are fully, and quite probably irrevocably, committed to the Soviet camp’, though there were ‘a number of time-servers and opportunists in the Government who might be encouraged to defect’. It was doubtful whether any of these could be won over ‘unless there were overt resistance to the regime which was clearly counting on outside support and achieving some success’, and that the lack of ‘information about, let alone contact with, individuals inside Albania, makes it impossible to suggest any possible names’. Strang wrote that the scheme could bring out useful intelligence, providing a basis ‘for calculating the possibilities of bribery’.55 Attlee ‘ticked’ the paper with approval.56 The final authorisation for the operation came in mid-April, after Bevin had returned from signing the North Atlantic treaty in Washington. On 14 April Strang minuted that the need for action was urgent because of the deteriorating situation in neighbouring Greece, where rebels had started large-scale attacks ‘across the Albanian frontier in the Grammos sector … The Greek Government have informed all friendly governments … that these attacks were made with Albanian support and with full use of Albanian territory.’ It was in these circumstances that ‘a ­decision should now be reached approving the scheme for initiating intelligence and subversive activity inside Albania’. Bevin replied ‘I Agree’.57 Later that month his Private Secretary, Roderick Barclay, informed his opposite number in Downing Street, Laurence Helsby, that ‘Mr Bevin has again examined the papers and has now authorised the scheme’.58 It is not known whether the operation was discussed in private by Bevin and Attlee, though Strang conveyed the former’s approval to Menzies later that month on 28 April.59 It is likely that US officials were approached soon afterwards. During a meeting of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, officials agreed

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

125

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

to launch operations to establish an ‘anti-Communist and pro-western’ regime.60 The operation was also discussed during talks between Hayter and US officials later that month. At the end of May, Roger Makins informed Bevin that: The plan which you approved shortly before you left for Washington is being put into effect, and the necessarily rather lengthy preliminaries (establishment of contacts, preliminary reconnaissance and organisation of bases) are in hand. No major difficulties have yet arisen, but we are at a very early stage. Contact has been made with the Americans. They were found to have plans of a much more ambitious character than ours, but no action had been taken to put them into effect. It is hoped to keep American action under control through a joint committee in Washington.61

The next month, Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the Director of Central Intelligence, wrote to Menzies of his pleasure that ‘we have reached agreement to collaborate on a joint basis in one specific operation. It is my opinion that both our services will greatly benefit.’62 Operations in Albania were also raised in Washington before the first meeting of the North Atlantic Council during September. The minutes of the meeting are interesting in that they provide evidence of Bevin’s support for Valuable as well as the attitudes of both sides of the transatlantic alliance. During talks in the State Department between Bevin and the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, the former explained how it was ‘important to maintain very strong pressure on the present Albanian Government’. Bevin added that, in his view, ‘There should be no question of holding out any hope that if they [the Albanian government] mended their ways we should be prepared to take a more lenient view’, believing that the State Department ‘had been inclined to think that the present regime … might be won over by offers of improved relations with the West if they were to turn over a new leaf’. Acheson replied that ‘there was not much difference of opinion on this point and he confirmed that in the opinion of the State Department it would be right to seize any opportunity of bringing down the Hoxha regime’, adding ‘If there was any difference between the American and the British attitudes, he thought it was that the former were less inclined to take active steps at the present moment to precipitate trouble in Albania’. After suggesting that the British were increasingly hostile towards the Hoxha regime, Acheson admitted that the State Department ‘were a little nervous lest this might encourage the Greeks and Yugoslavs to rush in and partition the country’. Bevin also revealed that he had been asked to approve a base in Cyrenaica ‘for operations in Albania’ but had rejected this proposal as ‘he was afraid that this would be bound to leak out and would

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

126

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

cause trouble with the United Nations’.63 Bevin was particularly concerned about the CIA’s use of émigré organisations, particularly the Free Albania Committee comprised of anti-communist Albanians, reportedly asking the Americans ‘Are there any Kings around that could be put in? … a person we could handle was needed’.64 Llewellyn Thompson of the US State Department replied that he ‘agreed with Mr. Bevin’s estimate of the Free Albania Committee … the State Department had no firm views and were not committed’.65 In the event, the results of the operation were far from positive.66 During the early autumn, twenty-six operatives (‘Pixies’), divided into six groups, were landed in southern Albania. Three groups were forced to withdraw to Greece, another was ambushed and destroyed, with the fifth managing to successfully evade detection for over two months, before withdrawing after failing to find winter quarters. The fate of the final group was ‘unknown’.67 British officials were nonetheless optimistic and, in November, the Assistant Under-Secretary (Eastern Europe), Sir Charles Bateman, summarised the intelligence from three of the six parties that had returned. Bateman noted that the dire economic conditions and internal repression had produced ‘widespread resentment’, with the solidarity of the Communist Party ‘doubtful … many members seem to be apathetic in their allegiance’. Future success would depend on ‘outside assistance, particularly the supply of arms and ammunition’.68 In a further memorandum, it was agreed that preparations for the second, insurrectionary phase of the operation would ‘continue without interruption’ but any final decision over whether to proceed further would be left to the following spring.69 By the end of 1949 doubts about the operation had started to emerge. Rather than any aversion to special operations, these doubts resulted, ironically, from the quickly changing situation in and around Albania, in particular Soviet threats to communist Yugoslavia. At the end of November, Britain’s Ambassador to Belgrade, Sir Charles Peake, reported details of a conversation with Tito during which the Yugoslav leader had warned: The Albanians were all out to provoke frontier incidents and to do everything in their power to lure Yugoslavia into some action which could be represented as aggression … There was some danger that some coup might be deliberately engineered and described by Moscow as having taken place on foreign instigation. He did not rate this very high but it was a risk. Any overt foreign interference in Albania at this time would of course be highly dangerous. The best policy for us all to pursue towards Albania was to let her stew in her own juice.70

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

127

By now British policy was aimed at driving a wedge between Moscow and the satellite states. Support for this ‘wedge strategy’ was dependent on the survival of Tito’s regime, with Anglo-American policy aimed at protecting, rather than undermining, the survival of an independent Yugoslavia.71 The subject of a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia was also the focus of several reports by the JIC. While it had ruled that an invasion was unlikely, the committee advised that ‘Politically, the stage is set for aggression, motives have been manufactured’.72 Concerns about undermining Albania and antagonising the Soviets into acting against Yugoslavia were underlined by Strang who, in writing to Bevin, explained that, while it was desirable to disrupt Albanian support for guerrilla forces in neighbouring Greece, the setting up of a pro-Western regime in Albania would not be advantageous and could, in fact, provide the Soviets with the pretext to attack. Strang went further, writing: I am doubtful of the wisdom of stirring up the situation in Albania at this particular moment. Albania is a delicate point for Tito. If things happen there, he may feel bound to intervene. If he intervenes, he may give the Russians the very excuse they are waiting for. Next spring will be a critical time in Tito’s affairs, and there is a general expectation that the Russians will take new action against him then.

Attention was also drawn to the intelligence coming out of Albania. While the reports did show some disaffection, intelligence confirmed that the Hoxha regime was ‘surprisingly well served by its counterintelligence system’.73 Valuable’s failure has often been attributed to Kim Philby, but in fact the operation had already been blown through lax security as ‘the Greeks, the Italians and the French’ had ‘extensive knowledge’ of it. All this led Strang to conclude that subversive activities should be put on hold, a view endorsed by Bevin.74 Reflecting on the operation, SIS concluded that it was ‘almost impossible’ to maintain special operations in Albania, with the results deemed insufficient to justify the insertion of a ‘shock force’ of Albanians the following year, and Bevin quickly ruled that any future British involvement would be limited to supporting the Committee for Free Albania, propaganda, economic warfare and the recruitment of a ‘small reserve’ of Albanians for future operations, as well as supporting US operations; Britain would ‘not seek the collaboration of the French, Greek and Italian Services’.75 The decision was forwarded by Patrick Reilly, Hayter’s successor as Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, to Frederick HoyerMiller of Britain’s Washington Embassy in early January. Once again, it was policy towards Yugoslavia that was at the forefront of the decision, with Reilly explaining:

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

128

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

The reasons for this decision are probably obvious to you. The situation has completely changed in that part of Europe, since our plans were originally made. Not only has our primary objective of helping the Greeks with their difficulties on their northern frontier disappeared, but we now have Tito’s changed position to consider, which is most relevant to the operation. Albania is a delicate point for Tito. If things happen there, he may be bound to intervene. This might give the Russians the very excuse they want. Next spring will be a critical time for Tito, and the Russians are generally expected to take new action against him then. Furthermore, as we rather feared with a para-military operation of this kind, complete security of our activities has proved impossible.76

An alternative approach? Anti-communist activities and the ministerial Committee on Communism While Washington continued to believe in paramilitary operations in the Soviet orbit, officials in London tried to develop a less provocative strategy involving subversion and black propaganda.77 It has been suggested that this climbdown from covert guerrilla activities may have resulted from the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, although it also appears that, as in the case of Valuable, local conditions in the Eastern Bloc and the lack of success in special operations played an important role.78 The origins of this previously neglected campaign stemmed from the re-emergence of tensions between the Chiefs of Staff and ministers in the spring of 1949. In March Alexander wrote to Attlee informing him of growing disquiet among the military at the apparent inadequacies of Britain’s ‘organisation for conducting the cold war’. In particular, they recommended that ‘something should be done to stiffen the present Russia Committee’. Alexander aired his own view that ‘We have not yet secured sufficient co-ordination in our conduct of cold war strategy and tactics and there is a need to examine the matter afresh’ to ensure ‘a proper tying up of loose ends between military and political action’. To rectify the matter he asked for a ‘Staff Conference’ with Attlee, Bevin and the Chiefs of Staff.79 Alexander also attached a paper by Slessor, now the outgoing Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, which argued that Britain needed to take the ‘offensive on a far more serious scale than present’ and that the existing machinery for fighting the Cold War should be ‘expanded and put on a higher level, in close touch with the Chiefs of Staff and with advisory, planning and co-ordinating functions’. The proposed machinery would allow Britain to ‘take the initiative’ and, in concluding, Slessor called for the formation of a ‘Cold War Committee’.80 The Prime Minister responded the next day, noting his

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

129

approval of Alexander’s recommendations and suggesting that a staff conference should be held, sending a copy of Slessor’s paper to Bevin.81 On 23 March Strang wrote a summary of Slessor’s paper for the Foreign Secretary, who was about to visit Washington to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. Thomas, later Lord, Brimelow described Strang as a ‘top flight civil servant; clear; bright; meticulous … He was also in Russia before the war and had no illusions about the Russians at all.’82 In countering the military, Strang wrote that ‘Slessor’s zeal … [had] outrun both his discretion and his knowledge’ and suggested that Slessor’s paper should receive a ‘reasoned answer’.83 Brook also aired his concerns about Slessor’s paper and the ‘many flaws’ in the arguments of the military. In particular, they had been misled by the term ‘Cold War’ and believed, he explained, ‘it was their business, when in fact it is foreign policy and not their business at all’.84 The following month, Bevin circulated a memorandum tackling the suggestions made by the military to Attlee and Alexander. Written by Strang in Bevin’s absence, the paper had been circulated to Mayhew and ‘others concerned in the Foreign Office’.85 After summarising the view of Slessor and the Chiefs of Staff, the paper noted how both betrayed a ‘misconception of the nature of politicians’ and displayed some of the ‘errors which follow on any attempt to conceive … political action in military terms’. All had been ‘misled by that convenient but misleading term “the cold war”’. In response to calls for a ‘“Cold War” department of the Foreign Office’, the paper urged caution. This would replicate internal Foreign Office machinery and ‘cause confusion’. Rather than avoiding responding to Soviet and communist attacks, the Foreign Office had ‘continuously’ adjusted its Cold War policy and taken the lead by forming IRD and the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee (PUSC).86 Chaired by the Permanent Under-Secretary, the committee included the Parliamentary Under-Secretary and other ‘senior officials’ in the Foreign Office, and was tasked with considering long-term policy issues – not intelligence, as has been suggested – before its disbandment by the Churchill government in 1951.87 The PUSC had no relation to the Permanent UnderSecretary’s Department (PUSD), formed on 1 October 1949, which absorbed some of the most sensitive parts of the Foreign Office, with Hayter as superintending Under-Secretary. This department had taken over the work previously done by the Services Liaison Department and the Private Secretary to the Permanent Under-Secretary.88 Rather than a ‘sleight of hand’ to hide Cold War planning from the military, both bodies were purely an administrative arrangement and Bevin played no part in their formation.89 Indeed, the Chiefs of Staff and Ministry of Defence were to have a leading role in the development of Britain’s new

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

130

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

offensive strategy, with Brook writing in the mid-1950s that it had been formed to provide the military with ‘a forum in which they could air their views’.90 Strang’s memorandum also challenged the view of the military that Russia had grown in strength while British resolve had weakened. In recent years, the Soviet Union had ‘suffered repulse after repulse’, while the Western powers had ‘gained strength and coherence’. In the United Nations, Britain had given a ‘firm lead in the ideological war’ and, more recently, a paper had been submitted to Attlee ‘studying the possibilities of action in Albania’. For Strang there were two points for consideration: ‘whether any modification of, or change in emphasis in, our present policy was required’, and whether any ‘fresh interdepartmental and ministerial machinery’ would be needed to carry out any new policy. The paper proposed the formation of a small secret committee comprised of a senior representative from the Foreign Office with another from the Ministry of Defence. Its purpose would be to review ‘existing policy and machinery with regard to our action, offensive and defensive, against the Soviet and Communist menace in all spheres, political, military, economic and social, at home and abroad’. It would then be for the government to decide what further apparatus would be required.91 Strang believed that its terms of reference would need to be ‘carefully circumscribed’ as he did not want ‘recommendations for subversive action on a large scale’ or suggestions which would undermine ‘H.M. Government’s accepted policy in the political, economic, information and other spheres’.92 The ad hoc committee would prepare, for submission to Bevin, a ‘statement of existing policy and machinery for action, offensive and defensive, against the Soviet and Communist menace in all spheres’. Ministers would then decide whether to modify existing policy, and, if necessary, formalise the ad hoc arrangements. The committee would be chaired by Jebb, then Assistant Under-Secretary and chair of the Russia Committee, who was no stranger to covert political warfare having been SOE’s first Chief Executive Officer.93 Rather than being sidelined, the military were included from the outset, with Sir Maurice Dean, DeputySecretary at the Ministry of Defence, Air Marshall Sir Arthur Sanders, and the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Templer, representing the Chiefs of Staff.94 At Attlee’s insistence its work was to be ‘kept secret’.95 As with all aspects of Attlee’s government, the world of spies and secrets was dominated by bureaucracy and the numerous Cabinet committees that made up government machinery. This was ‘government by committee – hundreds of them, more than any other post-war prime minister’.96 Attlee’s machinery for fighting the Cold War overseas was warfare by committee.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

131

In subsequent weeks, Jebb’s unofficial body carried out a number of interviews with senior Whitehall figures on the conduct of the Cold War. On 7 June, at a meeting in the Cabinet Office, the committee met with Hayter who explained ‘what machinery’ was available to prosecute ‘the “cold war”, as against both Soviet and Communist activities’, focusing on SIS which, while ‘primarily concerned with intelligence’, could ‘take action in certain limited spheres’. The Service had retained, he said, a ‘small nucleus’ to ‘keep alive the purely technical skills of S.O.E.’ and plan special operations in the event of war. In addition, this nucleus could also ‘undertake such minor tasks’ as allocated to it by the government.97 Two days later Menzies told the committee that, while his organisation lacked ‘a big’ organisation for actually fighting the Cold War, SIS had ‘substantial machinery in readiness for a possible real war’, and was training staff and foreign services in the essentials of ‘S.O. work’.98 SIS was also engaged in activities to entice defectors from the Russian zone of Germany and had been given ‘carte blanche’ to secure defectors ‘if of high intelligence value’. Menzies added that, if asked, SIS could ‘discredit members of Russian diplomatic missions’, and that attempts were being made to establish ‘deception lines’.99 By July the committee had finished its first paper examining the existing mechanisms for combating communism both at home and abroad, concluding that current policy lacked direction.100 The report was shrouded in secrecy; in a note to Bevin, Jebb wrote: ‘I have … been asked by my colleagues to draw your attention to the fact that if our report is circulated to any Minister other than the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, it will be necessary to eliminate all references to M.I.6. and the “London Controlling Section”’.101 Attlee, Bevin, Alexander and Hector McNeil saw the report, though it is unclear whether the document was circulated further.102 A second report, completed in November, was considered a month later at a meeting of GEN 231, the Cabinet Committee on Propaganda, chaired by Attlee, and was restricted to as small a circle as possible. Bevin, Morrison, Cripps and Alexander were the only ministers, other than Attlee himself, to receive it, and strict precautions were put in place to restrict knowledge of it to this inner circle. It was not listed on the agenda for the meeting, with the paper ‘described simply as “General Policy and Machinery” and no mention of any papers will be made’.103 It explained that, during the past eighteen months, Britain had continually reiterated its determination to check ‘the further inroads of Communism’. At the United Nations Assembly in New York, British delegates had launched ‘powerful attacks on Soviet methods and machinations’, and, in the field of publicity, the Foreign, Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices had been authorised

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

132

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

to undertake anti-communist publicity, assisted by IRD, though there were ‘certain limitations’ on anti-communist publicity overseas. Despite instructions to ‘oppose the inroads of Communism’, ministers had specifically forbidden subversive propaganda in or near the Soviet orbit that was aimed at stimulating subversive activities. Officials wanted to remove the ban, assuring ministers it would not lead to ‘an unlimited campaign of subversive propaganda behind the Iron Curtain’.104 In discussion, ministers realised that there were ‘sound reasons for caution’ as wartime experience had shown it was ‘dangerous to encourage … premature development of subversive activities’. The proposal to lift the current ban on propositions for special operations was not considered to be a ‘widespread departure from existing policy’, but one that would ‘enable particular proposals’ to be submitted to the Foreign Secretary or ministers. As a result, the committee agreed to remove the ban on anticommunist activities overseas, on the condition that ‘particular proposals for action would be submitted for Ministerial approval’.105 Another recommendation, that the current ad hoc arrangements be formalised, was also accepted, with Jebb’s unofficial group becoming the Committee on Communism (Overseas) to ‘stimulate and coordinate … all anti-Communist activities (including those relating to information) overseas’.106 This new body superseded the Russia Committee, which, while continuing to meet regularly, was restricted to reviewing and forecasting Soviet policy.107 After Foreign Office objections, membership of Jebb’s committee was amended to include Warner, Dean and Air Marshall Sir Arthur Sanders. The committee was also joined, in February 1950, by Patrick Reilly and Menzies himself.108 Following his appointment as the British representative to the United Nations in New York, Jebb was succeeded by Britain’s former Ambassador to Prague, Pierson Dixon, and the committee became informally known as the ‘Dixon Committee’. Dixon was ideally suited to the role, having witnessed at first hand communist subversive activities during the takeover of Czechoslovakia, and, after his time in Prague, he had a clear view of ‘how tense East–West relations had become’.109 Lord Brimelow recalled how he was ‘Very quiet; scholarly; not thrusting … He got on easily with people and knew how to get them to do things without rubbing them the wrong way.’110 The reports of the official committee were sent to a ministerial group chaired by Attlee and including Bevin, Morrison, Cripps and Alexander, who would exercise ‘general supervision’ on ‘matters of major policy’.111 The work of both the official and ministerial committees was ‘kept especially secret’.112 While ministers accepted the need for a formalised committee to examine anti-communist measures overseas, they were hesitant to adopt a further recommendation that a

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

133

specialist body should be set up to examine domestic counter-measures as, from the constitutional point of view, it would be ‘difficult for … Government to take official action’ against the Communist Party while it was represented in Parliament.113 It was only in early 1951, following concerns about domestic communist activities, that Jebb’s proposal was fully accepted. The attitude of the Chiefs of Staff towards these developments was reported to Churchill by a close confidant, Alan Hillgarth, formerly the British naval attaché to Madrid, who had been asked by disaffected officers to keep the former Prime Minister informed. In July Hillgarth wrote that the Chiefs were ‘less disturbed than they were, because of the progress this Committee is making’. Bevin had agreed to ‘more firm action in future’, though it was unclear what this would involve owing to the desire not to ‘provoke the Russians in any way’. Several suggestions had already been made, including ‘a quiet programme of denial to Russia of key materials’, but there remained areas of contention, as the government, wrote Hillgarth, was reluctant to endorse proposals to combat communist activities at home. Hillgarth went on to bemoan the ‘lamentably weak’ intelligence on Russia, writing that: Our knowledge of the Russian air force is out of date. There is no real knowledge of atom bomb progress or stocks … As a small example, it was only recently learnt that 800 miles of new railway now exist in Northern Siberia, although this had taken 2½ years to build. During this time no whisper had reached us.

This was partially the result of the ‘fear that we might so easily provoke Russia’.114 While the new committee had started off ‘energetically enough and took a lot of evidence’, no recommendations had appeared and its report was much overdue.115 In a later diary entry, following a meeting about helping foreign security services fight communism, MI5’s Guy Liddell came away from the official committee ‘with my usual impression of its futility … nobody on the Committee had formulated any very sensible views: they rather took the attitude that S.I.S. and ourselves wanted them to give us their assistance and blessing, and that we in fact were responsible for the original proposals’.116 Although officials met on average three times a month, it was not until December that they presented ministers with proposals for specific anti-communist measures in Europe which were endorsed during an off-the-record discussion after a meeting of the Defence Committee on 21 December.117 The proposals, set out in a memorandum titled ‘Anti-Communist Activities in Europe’, envisaged ‘intensified covert anti-Communist’ measures in the Eastern Bloc, with the aim of adding to Soviet ‘­ difficulties’

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

134

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

in the occupation of the satellites. In particular, the proposals would ‘stimulate’ the flow of intelligence from behind the Iron Curtain and develop ‘resistance movements’ for any future conflict. The proposals would not, the committee reassured ministers, lead to a sudden deterioration in East–West relations, result in ‘untimely’ uprisings, or compromise members of HMG’s diplomatic missions abroad.118 Particular attention was drawn to the fact that the proposals did not contemplate ‘violent action’ of the type undertaken in wartime by SOE.119 Such activities had been discussed by a special meeting of the Dixon Committee, attended by various heads of department in the Foreign Office. The committee discussed a still-classified paper by Menzies ‘on Cold War possibilities in Europe’, which listed ‘subversive elements in various Communist controlled countries’, and showed organisations ‘which might make resistance movements possible’. Geoffrey Harrison, head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, added a note of caution. Before encouraging resistance, ‘we must be sure’, he suggested, ‘of our objective … we must not encourage premature explosions which would endanger the lives of the opponents of the regimes’. For Harrison there were three alternatives: the direct backing of resistance movements; the encouragement of ‘various long-term trends’, including nationalism; or minor ‘pinprick’ operations. He quickly dismissed the option of encouraging resistance as ‘it would be impossible to effectually conceal the supply of arms’ and risk open war, while the second option was also unattractive as Soviet security was ‘more powerful than any previous organisation in history’. The third option, pinpricks, received little mention. Anthony Rumbold, the head of the Foreign Office’s Southern Department, pointed out that ‘the satellite Governments believed we were engaged in subversive activities in their countries and although this was not the case, the suspicion that we were doing gave them disproportionate trouble’. If Britain actually began to conduct such activities, he suggested, ‘they would … pay disproportionate dividends’. He pointed out that in Bulgaria ‘spectacular purges’ had decimated the Communist Party, making it ‘open to discontent’. At the meeting it was agreed that ‘minor practical activities’ would be worthwhile and, if successful, would ‘throw grit into the machine of the Communist regimes’, resulting in further disruption. The committee invited Reilly to form a working party ‘including representatives of Sir Stewart Menzies’ organisation and of the Northern, Southern and Economic Relations Departments of the Foreign Office, to investigate practical possibilities on the lines suggested’.120 In its report, Dixon’s committee considered that a ‘carefully managed’ anti-communist campaign would not involve ‘grave risks’. During the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

135

previous two years Bevin had approved two ‘important subversive operations’ which had been carried out ‘without embarrassing consequences’. The first of these was most likely Valuable.121 The second was a modest campaign in the Soviet zone of Germany aimed at discrediting leading individuals of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), formed in early 1946, in the ‘eyes of their followers and of the Russians’.122 The operation had been initially held up owing to ‘certain American activities in Berlin’, though the plan was eventually given the go-ahead and aimed to nurture internal dissent within the SED, to foster distrust ‘in the minds of the Russians’, and to undermine other communist organisations by circulating stories of ‘a “notional infiltration”’. Menzies had been initially cautious as ‘recent efforts to stimulate defection in the Eastern Zone had met with little success’.123 It was claimed that the campaign had destabilised the party, leading to a ‘number’ of highlevel defections, although little evidence can be found to substantiate these claims. Bevin had also given the go-ahead for a third operation, again in the Soviet zone, aimed at weakening the newly formed East German police. The committee wanted to build on the work already done, proposing a number of ‘whispering campaigns’ in Austria and Germany to compromise communist officials and sow dissent, encouraging defections. Subversive propaganda would also ‘worsen relations’ between the satellites and the Soviet Union and ‘maintain the morale’ of dissident movements. The proposed schemes were to be carried out with the US to ensure ‘the most economical use is made of our resources’. The cost of the scheme was estimated to be £50,000, possibly increasing to £100,000 if the plans were ‘fully developed’.124 While little is known about subsequent developments, in mid-1951 Dixon reported that operations in Eastern Germany had started and that, in Czechoslovakia, anti-communist propaganda was being disseminated to maintain the ‘spirit of resistance’ and sow mistrust between local communist officials and the Soviets.125 At the same time as approving these counter-measures, approval was also given to the dropping of agents into selected areas of Eastern Europe, following a Chiefs of Staff recommendation to improve ‘intelligence about Soviet intentions’. While little is known about the operations, the proposals were submitted to ministers by C and agreed by a committee including Attlee, Morrison (now Foreign Secretary), the Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State for the Air. As a result, four agents had been dropped into Poland with a further two parties of five and six agents dispatched to the Ukraine by RAF aircraft with ‘no noticeable reaction’. While the agents in Poland and one of the teams sent to Ukraine had been caught soon after landing, the third team had ‘succeeded in establishing radio

136

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

communication with London’ leading to further recommendations for operations in 1952.126

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Stay-behind and preparations for ‘hot war’ As Britain started a Cold War offensive in Eastern Europe, preparations for ‘hot war’ were also made. SIS had been keen to plan for hostilities since 1947, and had started to develop plans to conduct a range of activities in the event of war. In Turkey, the Service planned to carry out coup-de-main operations and demolitions, and to organise escape lines if the Soviets invaded, though it was prevented from making preparations because of Foreign Office concerns about diplomatic repercussions.127 Only after a foreign intelligence agency had requested help could plans be implemented, with SIS helping the Danes develop stay-behind parties with their consent. In November 1948 Menzies wrote to Strang requesting permission to overturn the existing ban, fearing that the CIA, which had recently refused joint approaches to foreign agencies, could independently provide ‘guidance, assistance and money’, causing ‘friction between the C.I.A. and ourselves’. He believed that Turkey and Greece, in a position to make a ‘considerable contribution’ in wartime, should be ‘provoked’ to request help as it would be inadvisable for Britain to allow the control of resistance in both countries to ‘be entirely, or even mainly American. Dollars already weight the scales heavily against us, and I, therefore, urge that I be afforded to approach the Turks and Greeks.’128 Whether this proposal was accepted is unknown, although proposals to set up similar stay-behind networks in Germany faced opposition. In January 1949 Menzies had written that the ongoing Soviet blockade of Berlin had increased the likelihood of an armed European confrontation. While SIS had been able to develop plans with Dutch intelligence, plans in Germany, considered strategically important, had been restricted by a ban on preparing special operations. In order to develop a network, it was proposed that SIS would contact ‘selected “natives”’ and prepare ‘hideouts’ of special operations stores.129 In an attempt to obtain Bevin’s approval, Kirkpatrick wrote that: the position of Germany and Austria is of great strategic importance. In particular, Germany has a large potential of resistance and her situation makes it probably the most important S.O. area in Europe … An S.O. organisation could offer important support to our armed forces in the first phases of an attack, and if Germany were over-run it would have a vital role to play in reporting on and hampering Russian preparations for further attacks in the West.130

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

137

While Bevin’s precise views are unclear, a note by Frank Roberts, his Principal Private Secretary, recorded that, following a private discussion on the matter, the Foreign Secretary and Attlee were ‘both very doubtful’ but wanted to discuss the matter further with Alexander and Kirkpatrick at a meeting in Downing Street.131 The issue of stay-behind networks was discussed twice, with the decision eventually reached that ‘no … action should be taken for the present’.132 Further proposals for wartime special operations were brought before ministers in early 1950. In February Bevin wrote to Attlee informing him of a recent letter from Alexander calling for the formation of an inter-departmental committee to provide guidance on ‘policy for clandestine sabotage operations in war’. The role of the committee would, Bevin wrote, be twofold: to formulate, subject to approval by ministers, a policy for sabotage in the event of war, and to give guidance on ‘target priorities’.133 In the attached letter, Alexander wrote that the Chiefs of Staff had recently raised the question of sabotage, which fell under the remit of SIS. The military were concerned that there was at present no inter-departmental body from which they could obtain the necessary guidance and authorisation, and recommended such a body, consisting of representatives from the Foreign Office, Directors of Plans, SIS and JIB, to be chaired by Menzies. Alexander sought to dispel Bevin’s concern that preparations ‘for further clandestine operations in wartime … might in any way be a source of embarrassment to us abroad at the present time’. It was imperative, Alexander argued, that the Chiefs’ recommendation should be adopted. The establishment of a committee would not, he added, commit the government to ‘a more active policy as regards preparations for clandestine operations’, but would merely ensure that SIS’s wartime planning was ‘considered within the framework of our military preparations in general’.134 Bevin was inclined to ‘agree that the proposed Committee would be useful’ and asked Attlee to ‘agree to its establishment’.135 The next day, 11 February, Attlee simply scribbled ‘No mention’ on Bevin’s letter.136 SIS preparations for hot war were the subject of further discussions in the autumn. Fears that the Korean War might lead to general hostilities elsewhere led the government to embark on a major rearmament programme. This was accelerated following fears that war could possibly break out in Europe by 1952.137 In mid-October Shinwell, Alexander’s successor as Minister of Defence, wrote to Attlee detailing recent discussions between Menzies and the Chiefs of Staff on preparations for hot war. Menzies had warned that ‘If war occurred suddenly in the near future, the extent to which the Secret Service would be able to carry out its clandestine role … would be limited both in the field of Secret

138

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Intelligence and Special Operations’, adding that ‘it would not be possible to run any British-run clandestine escape lines’. In order to rectify this, Menzies required £1.5 million spread over two years, divided equally between open and secret votes. Alternatively, he proposed a number of lesser measures to allow his Service to: a. maintain a limited number of Special Intelligence stay-behind ‘cells’ on which to build up further clandestine organisations on the outbreak or clear imminence of war; b. to recruit some key agents for Special Operations where a reasonable dividend could be expected; c. to provide facilities (particularly equipment which would be buried under ground in peacetime) to make possible the continuing function of current sources.

Menzies explained that ‘One of the gravest difficulties the Secret Service have to overcome is what amounts to a ban on preparations for Special Operations in the British Zones of Germany and Austria as well as in the Russian Zones of these two countries.’ SIS was also banned from planning operations in Poland and Czechoslovakia. ‘If this ban was lifted,’ he argued, ‘it would enable plans to be carried out in the early stages of a war.’ Due to the expense and risk involved, the Chiefs of Staff recommended that the ‘lesser measures’ should be adopted ‘as an insurance against general war’. The additional cost would be £1 million over two years. In relation to the ban on preparations for special operations, the Chiefs noted ‘there is a strong case for lifting this ban’. Shinwell was inclined to agree, telling Attlee: ‘in order to permit the Secret Service to take the necessary steps for the conduct of Special Operations … we should now agree in principle to these preparations being made’.138 The proposals concerned Brook. In a letter to Attlee, he explained that ‘C’s proposals, and their cost have not been discussed with the Foreign Office or the Treasury’. Menzies was, Brook went on, probably of the opinion that the financial implications of his proposals could be examined at a later date. Brook was sceptical of Menzies’ plans, particularly their cost, telling Attlee, ‘C has told the Chiefs … that, in order to be ready for war within two years from now, he would have to spend [£1.5 million] over two years’. After considering this, the Chiefs of Staff had ‘recommended that he should be authorised to take “a number of lesser measures”’. These would cost £1 million over the first two years – ‘two thirds of the amount required’. Brook noted that this was completely ‘out of scale with our preparations’, which were not proceeding ‘on the assumption that war is inevitable, or even likely, within the next two years’. If that were the case, Brook told Attlee, ‘we ought to have turned

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

139

over to a war economy – and we ought to be spending millions on civil defence’. It was even ‘questionable’ whether an increase in SIS’s budget would deter Soviet aggression in Europe, as its activities were, by their very nature, ‘covert and [of] no deterrent value’. Despite pouring scorn on Menzies’ proposals, Brook backed the withdrawal of the ‘existing ban on preparations for Special Operations in Germany, Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia’.139 Two days later, Attlee’s Principal Private Secretary, now Denis Rickett, wrote to Brook conveying ministers’ reaction to the proposals. Rickett wrote that ‘no decision of principle has been taken … and that therefore it will be open to the Foreign Office and the Treasury to discuss them with “C” without any feeling that they are bound by a ruling already given by Ministers’. The Foreign Secretary, he added, was ‘by no means enamoured’ with the proposals.140 Following the meeting it was agreed that any plans would be considered by a committee of officials chaired by Reilly, including Burke Trend, Under-Secretary at the Treasury, Dean and Brook. Their report was completed in December and submitted to Attlee by Bevin.141 The committee noted that ‘there is a real danger of general war within the next few years’. In Washington, the US and British Chiefs of Staff had recently agreed that there was a ‘real danger of war in 1952 and that all possible preparations should be made to meet this eventuality’. The committee accepted, therefore, that ‘it might be right to aim at something approaching a state of preparedness …’ As a result, SIS’s preparations ‘in those areas where new Soviet pressure seems most likely’ were described as ‘soundly based’ and officials were ‘impressed’ that ‘adequate preparations for both secret intelligence and special operations’ were necessary. The committee’s talks with Menzies had convinced them that such a course was necessary. In discussion, he had explained: if it had been possible to make adequate preparations in territories that were occupied during the last war, the task of creating organisations for intelligence and special operations in enemy occupied territory would have been greatly simplified and much effort, expense, and loss of life would have been saved.

Pressure for ‘current intelligence’ had prevented SIS from devoting a ‘substantial part of their resources’ to preparations for future war. Part of this burden had been alleviated by SIS’s ‘greatly improved’ relationship with the CIA, though it was ‘not possible for S.I.S. to leave wholly to the United States any task which is of vital importance … since we cannot be confident that the United States organisations have the skill and experience to execute them competently’. The committee also recommended that, for Menzies to ‘exert the maximum influence and

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

140

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

guidance over the operations of the United States organisations, it is essential that he should be able to participate substantially in preparations of the kind now contemplated’. Three recommendations were made: first, ministers should give ‘general approval’ to C’s proposals; second, the financial aspects of the proposals should be considered by the Treasury for SIS’s 1951/52 budgets; and, finally, Menzies should be authorised to submit to the Foreign Office ‘any of his proposals which require approval from the point of view of foreign relations’. In a covering letter, Bevin backed the proposals, suggesting that the report ‘should be approved and that “C” should be authorised to proceed accordingly’. Similar letters were sent to Shinwell and Hugh Gaitskell, Chancellor of the Exchequer since October 1950, who was ‘quite content with the proposals’.142 The next day, Attlee scrawled ‘I Agree’ in red crayon.143 While there are no further documents to show how the measures were implemented, the proposals formed part of a joint US–UK scheme to develop a European-wide underground movement in anticipation of hostilities.144

Conclusion By 1951 the government had embarked on an offensive aimed at undermining Soviet control over the Eastern Bloc. While initially reluctant to authorise special operations and subversive activity, by 1949 Bevin had given the green light for operations in Albania and the Soviet zone of Germany as well as authorising the formation of a small group of officials tasked with overseeing the development of anti-communist policy. Along with Attlee, Morrison and Alexander, Bevin formed part of the ministerial committee exercising ‘general supervision’ on ‘matters of major policy’.145 Bevin’s change of heart about special operations resulted from the changing nature of the Cold War. Initially reluctant to embark on aggressive anti-Soviet measures, the final collapse of East– West relations and conflict over Berlin finally led ministers to realise that counter-measures were required. Although it has been claimed the Albanian operation had been forced on him by the Chiefs of Staff, Bevin gave his wholehearted support, challenging the view that he was a confirmed opponent of special operations. Although he strongly opposed calls for widespread liberation activities in Eastern Europe, rightly believing that the British would be unable to help, he took a more nuanced approach to special operations than previously acknowledged and, like his officials, saw Albania as a tempting target for British covert activities. Success in Albania, Bevin believed, ‘would have an enormous

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

141

effect on the Soviet orbit’ and ‘pay dividends, though an initial outlay in gold would no doubt be required’.146

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Notes 1 FO 1093/452, ‘Extract from record of meeting held with the Secretary of State on March 4th’. 2 FO 800/437, ‘Policy Towards Albania’. 3 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 164. 4 I would like to thank Gill Bennett for her observation on government attitudes towards special operations (email to the author, 11 October 2010). 5 See, for example, Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 144; and Foot, SOE: The Special Operations Executive, p. 355. 6 Some details have appeared in Rory Cormac, ‘The Pinprick Approach: Whitehall’s Top-Secret Anti-Communist Committee and the Evolution of British Covert Action Strategy’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 16:3 (2014), pp. 5–28. 7 CAB 130/37, GEN 231/1st meeting, Cabinet: Anti-Communist Propaganda: minutes of meeting, 11 April 1948. 8 See for example FO 1093/375, J.P. (47) 118 (FINAL), ‘Special Operations’ report by the Joint Planning Staff, 17 December 1947. 9 LSE: MAYHEW 4/1/2, Mayhew to Sargent, 14 December 1948. 10 FO 371/70272, relations between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff, 26 November 1948. 11 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 145. 12 AIR 75/116, Slessor to Robb, 21 January 1948. On Menzies earlier paper, see FO 1093/375, ‘The Capabilities of S.S. in Peace in Support of An Overall Political Plan’, 20 January 1948. 13 T 165/445 ‘Secret Service, 1949-50: Grants and expenditure in recent years’. I would like to thank Dr Jim Beach for this paper. 14 CAB 21/2745, ‘The “Cold War’, 24 April 1948. 15 Vincent Orange, ‘Tedder, Arthur William, first Baron Tedder (1890–1967)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 16 Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Field Marshall, 1944–76 v. 3: Life of Montgomery of Alamein (London: Sceptre, 1987), pp. 715, 718, 720. 17 ‘Montgomery: My Assessment’, in Frank Field (ed.), Attlee’s Great Contemporaries: The Politics of Character (London: Contiuum, 2009), p. 48. 18 DEFE 4/14, Chiefs of Staff Committee: minutes of a Staff Conference, 9 September 1948. 19 Diary of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, September–October 1948, ‘Section D – The Cold War’, Montgomery Papers, BLM 186/1, Reel 18, Imperial War Museum, reproduced in Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

142

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

1945–1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), p. 183; Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 150. 20 Hamilton, Monty, pp. 715, 718, 720. 21 FO 371/70264, Alexander to Bevin, 10 September 1948. 22 FO 371/70264, Higher Defence Policy for the ‘Cold War’. 23 FO 371/70264, note by Bevin, 17 September 1948. 24 DEFE 4/14, COS (48) 134th Mtg., Min. 2, Confidential Annex: meeting, 29 September 1948. 25 FO 371/70264, Kirkpatrick to Bevin, 29 September 1948. 26 FO 1093/370, COS (48) 134th Mtg., Min. 2 Confidential Annex, 3 November 1948. 27 FO 371/56784, Warner to Denning, 20 July 1946; FO 371/56788, memorandum by Warner, 5 August 1946. 28 CAB 129/23, C.P. (48)8, ‘Future Foreign Publicity Policy: memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 4 January 1948. 29 Alban Webb, London Calling: Britain, the BBC World Service and the Cold War (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 35; FO 1093/375, J.P. (47) 118 (FINAL), ‘Special Operations’ report by the Joint Planning Staff, 17 December 1947. 30 FO 1093/375, Stapleton to Sargent, 23 December 1947. 31 FO 1093/375, Sargent to Stapleton, 9 January 1948; FO 1093/375, Menzies to Sargent, 20 January 1948. 32 FO 1093/375, ‘The Capabilities of S.S. in Peace in Support of An Overall Political Plan’, 20 January 1948. 33 FO 1093/375, ‘Special Operations Other Than Clandestine Propaganda’. 34 FO 1093/375, Sargent to Bevin, 30 March 1948. 35 Ibid. Bevin’s comment can be found scribbled on Sargent’s letter. 36 Ibid. 37 FO 1093/375, Warner to Sargent, 24 February 1948. 38 Cormac, ‘The Pinprick Approach’, p. 23. 39 CAB 134/53, ‘Committee on Communism: Report to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’. 40 FO 371/77616, meeting to discuss Russia Committee paper on Policy Towards Russia, 2 February 1948. 41 Ibid. 42 Beatrice Heuser, Western Containment Policies in the Cold War: The Towards Yugoslav Case, 1948–53 (London: Routledge, 1989). 43 FO 1093/452, extract from record of meeting held with the Secretary of State on March 4th. 44 FO 371/70272, report of the sub-committee set up to examine the problem of planning in relation to policy towards the Soviet Union and the Soviet orbit, 14 December 1948. 45 Sargent made no mention of the Cold War planning staff in a paper to Bevin on 30 December 1948 (FO 371/70272, Sargent to Bevin, 30 December 1948). 46 FO 371/71687, Russia Committee minutes, 24 November 1948; FO 800/437, Strang to Attlee, 26 March 1949. On the ‘Cold War’ sub-committee, see

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

143

FO 371/71687, ‘Terms of Reference for “Cold War” Sub-Committee’, 24 November 1948. 47 FO 800/437, Strang to Attlee, 26 March 1949. 48 McNeil’s name can be found on the distribution list for the record of a meeting between Bevin and Acheson in September, 1949 (FO 800/437, ‘Record of a meeting held at the State Department on September 14th, 1949’). 49 FO 800/437, ‘Policy Towards Albania’, 21 March 1949. 50 FO 800/437, Menzies to Strang, 4 March 1949. 51 Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying, p. 219. 52 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 164. 53 Anthony Verrier, Through the Looking Glass: British Foreign Policy in an Age of Illusions (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), p. 53; Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), p. 42. 54 FO 800/437, ‘Policy Towards Albania’. 55 FO 800/437, Strang to Attlee, 5 April 1949. 56 FO 1093/452, copy of minute by the Prime Minister, 6 April 1949. 57 FO 1093/452, Strang to Bevin, 14 April 1949. 58 Information supplied by Gill Bennett. 59 Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1949 (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), p. 714. 60 Beatrice Heuser, ‘Covert Action within British and American Concepts of Containment, 1948–51’, in Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–51 (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 70. 61 FO 1093/452, Makins to Bevin, 30 May 1949. 62 FO 1093/563, Hillenkoetter to Menzies, 20 June 1949, accessed using FOIA. Details of these discussions can also be found in KV 4/471, diary entry for 10 June 1949. 63 FO 800/437, ‘Record of a meeting held at the State Department on September 14th, 1949’. Instead, training was conducted in Malta. 64 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 163. Bevin’s opposition to the use of Cyrenaica as a base for operations was relayed to the Foreign Office by Hoyer Millar, who reported: ‘Mr. Bevin again refused to sanction the use of Cyrenaica for training purposes … He considered the risk of detection too great, especially when Cyrenaica is under discussion at the General Assembly. In view of this, Malta appears the only possibility’ (FO 1093/452, Hoyer Miller to Hayter, 22 September 1949). 65 FO 800/437, ‘Record of a meeting held at the State Department on September 14th, 1949’. Like the majority of officials in the Foreign Office, Bevin was sceptical of émigré organisations and, in 1950, opposed calls for the Eastern European Section of the European Movement, founded and chaired by Harold Macmillan, to form ‘the nucleus of a revised P.W.E. to be taken over at the right moment by someone like Sir R. Bruce Lockhart’. At a meeting of the official committee, Dixon revealed that Bevin was ‘not prepared … to approve the proposal that [HMG] should take over responsibility for the European refugee groups at present maintained by Mr. Macmillan’, while the Northern

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

144

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Department’s Geoffrey Harrison was similarly disparaging, writing that ‘from the practical point of view, I think that they are a wasting asset and that there is little or no tangible contribution they can make … it is problematical whether we shall ever want to employ them on Special Operations’ because of their ‘perpetual bickering and scrapping’ (CAB 134/4, meeting, 16 October 1950; CAB 134/4, ‘Foreign Office views on possible uses of Eastern European Refugees’, 27 July 1950). 66 For accounts of the operation, see Nicholas Bethell, The Great Betrayal: The Untold Story of Kim Philby’s Greatest Coup (London: Coronet, 1984); Peter Grose, Operation Rollback: America’s Secret War behind the Iron Curtain (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), pp. 154–9. 67 Jeffery, MI6, pp. 715–16. 68 FO 1093/453, ‘Albania: Intelligence Summary’, 16 November 1949. 69 FO 1093/453, Strang to Bevin, 22 December 1949. 70 FO 1093/453, FROM BELGRADE TO FOREIGN OFFICE, No. 1035, 2 November 1949. 71 Marc J. Selverstone, Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain and International Communism, 1945–1950 (Cambrdige, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 72 FO 1093/561, J.I.C. (49) 73 FINAL, ‘Possibility of Russian Armed Action Against Yugoslavia’, 3 September 1949. 73 FO 1093/453, Strang to Bevin, 22 December 1949. 74 FO 1093/453, Strang to Bevin, 22 December 1949. 75 Jeffery, MI6, pp. 715–16. 76 FO 1093/453, Reilly to Hoyer Millar, 2 January 1950. 77 On US operations elsewhere, see Sarah-Jane Corke, US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, the CIA and Secret Warfare (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). 78 Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” during the Cold War’, pp. 338–40. 79 PREM 8/1365, Alexander to Attlee, 7 March 1949. 80 PREM 8/1365, ‘The Cold War: Note by the Commandant of the I.D.C.’, 20 July 1949. 81 PREM 8/1365, Attlee to Bevin, 10 March 1949. 82 CAC, GBR/0014/BIMO, ‘Interview with Lord Brimelow, 20–21 April 1982’. 83 FO 371/77616, Strang to Bevin, 23 March 1949. 84 PREM 8/1365, Brook to Attlee, undated. 85 FO 371/77616, Strang to Bevin, 13 April 1949. 86 PREM 8/1365, Bevin to Attlee, 19 April 1949. 87 For a useful overview of the committees’ work, see CAB 134/53, C. (49) 2, ‘Foreign Office Committees’, 30 May 1949. 88 Information provided by Gill Bennett. Reilly provides an excellent summary of the organisation’s role in his unpublished memoirs: ‘The P.U.S.D. had taken over the traditional responsibilities of the Private Secretary to the P.U.S.D. for Foreign Office relations with the S.I.S. and the cipher-breaking organisation,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

145

now known as the Government Communications Headquarters … The major part of the work of the P.U.S.D. consisted, however, in providing the F.O. contribution to the Chief of Staff’s organisation as built up during the war, the Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C.) with its Joint Intelligence Staff and the Joint Planners’ organisation of the Directors of Plans. The Under-Secretary was ex-officio Chairman of the J.I.C. and F.O. Representative with the Directors of Plans’ (BOD, MS. Eng. 6920, draft memoir ‘Maclean: Burgess: Philby’). See also Sir Arthur de la Mare, Perverse and Foolish: A Jersey Farmer’s Son in the British Diplomatic Service (Jersey: La Haule Books, 1994), pp. 98–9. 89 FO 1093/382, ‘Office Notice’, 29 September 1949. 90 PREM 11/1582, undated paper by Brook. 91 PREM 8/1365, Bevin to Attlee, 19 April 1949. 92 FO 371/77616, note by Strang. 93 On Jebb, see Sean Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign Office: Gladwyn Jebb and the Shaping of the Modern World (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). 94 FO 371/77617, C. (49) 1, Composition and Terms of Reference, 24 May 1949; CAB 134/53, C. (49) 1, Composition and Terms of Reference, 24 May 1949. 95 FO 371/77617, Brook to Strang, 12 May 1949. 96 Peter Hennessy and Andrew Arends, ‘Mr. Attlee’s Engine Room: Cabinet Committee Structure and the Labour Government, 1945–51’, Strathclyde Papers on Government and Economics, 26 (1983), p. 9. 97 CAB 134/53, C. (49) 3rd meeting, 7 June 1949. 98 SIS provided information and training to post-war Norwegian intelligence on the development of ‘stay-behind’ networks; see Olav Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945–1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 34–54. 99 CAB 134/53, C. (49) 4th meeting, 9 June 1949. On the encouragement of defections, see Paul Maddrell, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945–1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 77–81, 176–204. 100 C. (49)14, Committee on Communism: Committee’s Report, 19 July 1949. Copies of the report can also be found in CAB 134/53. 101 Jebb to Bevin, 12 July 1949, released under FOIA, 9 August 2012. 102 FO 1093/563, Strang to McNeil, 30 July 1949. 103 CAB 124/80, Bevin to Downes, 10 December 1949. 104 C. (49)16, Committee on Communism: Committee’s Second Report, 30 November 1949. Document released under FOIA, September 2011. 105 CAB 130/37, GEN 231/3rd meeting, minute 1: Confidential Annex, 19 December 1949; CAB 134/53, C. (49) 17, ‘The Committee’s Second Report: Ministerial Decisions’, 21 December 1949. 106 CAB 134/3, A.C. (0) (49)1, Official Committee on Communism (Overseas); Composition and Terms of Reference, 31 December 1949. 107 Examples of Russia Committee discussions can be found in FO 1093/587, Russia Committee (RC): Minutes of Meetings, 1951. 108 CAB 21/2992, Helsby to Brook, 14 February 1950. SIS became known as ‘Mr. Reilly’s friends’ (BOD, MS. Eng. 6920, draft memoir ‘Maclean: Burgess: Philby’).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

146

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

109 N. Piers Ludlow, ‘Dixon, Sir Pierson John (1904–1965)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 110 CAC, GBR/0014/BIMO, ‘Interview with Lord Brimelow, 20–21 April 1982’. 111 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (49)1, ‘Ministerial Committee on Communism: Composition and Terms of Reference’, 31 December 1949; CAB 130/37, GEN 231/3rd meeting, minute 1: Confidential Annex, 19 December 1949. By 1951, membership of the committee had changed to Attlee, Morrison (Foreign Secretary), Hugh Gaitskell (Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Emanuel Shinwell (Minister of Defence). 112 PREM 11/174, ‘Request by the Prime Minister for a List of All Committees in Whitehall’, Brook to Churchill, 20 November 1951. 113 For details on domestic developments and the formation of the Committee on Communism (Home), see Chapter 7. 114 CAC, CHUR 2/36, Hillgarth to Churchill, 15 July 1949. 115 CAC, CHUR 2/36, Hillgarth to Churchill, 24 November 1949. On Hillgarth’s access to post-war secrets, see Hart-Davis, Man of War, pp. 323–7, and Stafford, Churchill & Secret Service, pp. 373–9. 116 KV 4/473, entry for 7 March 1951. 117 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (50) 2, ‘Anti-Communist Activities in Europe: Note by the Secretary’, 22 December 1950; PREM 8/1365, Brook to Attlee, 18 January 1951. 118 Proposals to economically disrupt the Soviet Bloc were rejected as Britain was heavily reliant on trade with Eastern Europe for its ‘economic rehabilitation’. Any attempt to disrupt the flow of trade would result, officials believed, in a ‘drain’ of dollar reserves and ‘hamper our own economic development’ (CAB 134/4, A.C. (0) (51) 8th meeting, 15 March 1951). For more, see Huw Dylan, Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain’s Joint Intelligence Bureau, 1945–1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 70–6. 119 CAB 21/2750, A.C. (0) (50)52 (Third Revise), ‘Official Committee on Communism (Overseas): Proposed Activities Behind the Iron Curtain: memorandum by the Committee’, November 1950. 120 CAB 134/4, meeting, 15 February 1950. For a detailed account of the purges in Eastern Europe, see Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe (eds), Stalinist Terror in Eastern Europe: Elite Purges and Mass Repression (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011). 121 CAB 134/53, C. (49) 13 (Revise), Revised Draft Report, 11 July 1949. 122 CAB 21/2750, A.C. (0) (50)52 (Third Revise), ‘Official Committee on Communism (Overseas): Proposed Activities Behind the Iron Curtain: memorandum by the Committee’, November 1950. 123 CAB 134/4, Meeting, 12 April 1950. The lack of success in encouraging defections from behind the Iron Curtain may have led to the creation of a working party on Russian and satellite defectors and refugees in April 1950 (CAB 301/136, RSD/P(50)1, ‘Working Party on Russian and Satellite Defectors and Refugees’, 18 April 1950).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Britain’s secret Cold War offensive

147

124 CAB 21/2750, A.C. (0) (50)52 (Third Revise), ‘Official Committee on Communism (Overseas): Proposed Activities Behind the Iron Curtain: memorandum by the Committee’, November 1950. 125 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (51) 4, ‘The work of the official committee on Communism (Overseas); Memorandum by the Chairman of the Official Committee’, 23 June 1951. Parts of the subversive strategy outlined by the Dixon Committee appeared in 1952 PUSC paper on ‘Future Policy Towards Russia’. See ‘P.U.S.C. (51) 16 (Final), “Future Policy Towards Soviet Russia”, 17 January 1952’, reproduced in John Young, ‘The British Foreign Office and Cold War Fighting in the Early 1950s: PUSC (51) 61 and the 1952 “Sore Spots” Memorandum’, Leicester University Discussion Papers in Politics, No. P95/2 (April 1995). Cormac provides a particularly good overview of the proposals (Cormac, ‘The Pinprick Approach’, pp. 12–18). 126 FO 800/820, Eden to Churchill, 16 April 1952. In 1952 these further proposals advocated the dropping of agents around Lvov, Romania and Turkmenistan. Despite the risks involved, the operation was approved by Eden and Churchill. 127 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 154–5. 128 FO 1093/313, Menzies to Strang, 2 November 1948. One example of SIS’s hot war preparations can be found in the case of Norway; see Olav Riste, ‘With an Eye to History: The Origins and Development of “Stay-Behind” in Norway’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 30:6 (2007), pp. 997–1024. 129 FO 1093/475, Menzies to Hayter, 24 January 1949. 130 FO 1093/475, Kirkpatrick to Bevin, 8 February 1949. 131 FO 1093/475, Roberts to Kirkpatrick, 15 February 1949. 132 FO 1093/475, Note by Roberts, 4 April 1949 133 PREM 8/1282, Bevin to Attlee, 10 February 1950. 134 PREM 8/1282, Alexander to Bevin, 22 December 1949. 135 PREM 8/1282, Bevin to Attlee, 10 February 1950. 136 Ibid. 137 Eric Grove, ‘The Post War “Ten Year Rule” – Myth and Reality’, The RUSI Journal, 129:4 (1984), p. 52; and David French, Army, Empire, and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy, 1945–1971 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 27–8. For details regarding the Government’s rearmament programme and its political implications, see Morgan, Labour in Power, pp. 456–60. 138 PREM 8/1527, Shinwell to Attlee, 13 October 1950. 139 PREM 8/1527, Brook to Attlee, 25 October 1950. 140 PREM 8/1527, Rickett to Brook, 27 October 1950. 141 PREM 8/1527, Bevin to Attlee, 4 December 1950. 142 PREM 8/1527, Bevin to Attlee, 4 December 1950; PREM 8/1527, Armstrong to Barclay, 19 January 1951. 143 See, PREM 8/1527, Bevin to Attlee, 4 December 1950. 144 For just some of the literature on stay-behind, see Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe (New York: Frank Cass, 2005); Riste, ‘With an Eye to History’; Dick Engelen,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

148

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

‘Lessons Learned: The Dutch “Stay-Behind” Organization, 1945–1992’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 30:6 (2007), pp. 981–96; Leopoldo Nuti, ‘The Italian “Stay-Behind” Network – The Origins of Operation “Gladio”’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 30:6 (2007), pp. 955–80. 145 CAB 134/2, A.C.(M)(49)1, ‘Ministerial Committee on Communism: Composition and Terms of Reference’, 31 December 1949; CAB 130/37, GEN 231/3rd meeting, minute 1: Confidential Annex, 19 December 1949. 146 FO 371/77616, meeting to discuss Russia Committee paper on Policy Towards Russia, 2 February 1949; FO 1093/452, ‘Extract from record of meeting held with the Secretary of State on March 4th’.

5 Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship? Ministers, atomic espionage and Anglo-American relations [P]recedents did not mean a great deal, since we were living in an unprecedented age.1 Clement Attlee, 1950 The Tories, knowing that Guy at least has expressed left-wing views in the past, are trying to make political capital out of it [and] some are calling for a witch hunt.2 Kenneth Younger, 1951

The Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ was an important dimension of Attlee’s foreign and defence policy. Stemming from wartime collaboration, relations with Washington were fraught and served to provide the Labour government with a series of headaches, particularly in the field of atomic energy. While transatlantic cooperation in atomic developments had started in wartime, American threats to preserve their nuclear monopoly, cutting Britain out of peacetime joint development, forced British policymakers to begin a long and anxious process to restore close and continual collaboration. Attempts to revive atomic liaison were continually upset by spy scandals in Britain which, on top of a ‘socialist government’ being in power, served to undermine American confidence in post-war British security, moving Britain’s goal of accessing US atomic secrets further away. While the Attlee government saw the peacetime development of intelligence exchanges on both sides of the Atlantic, it was in the field of Anglo-American atomic development that ministers took an active interest. With each security lapse, senior government figures were forced to actively defend the British system to maintain the trust of their US counterparts, adopting what could be called a ‘damage limitation’ effort after the defection of Igor Gouzenko, the discovery of the Soviet spy Klaus Fuchs, and, most notably, in the wake of the defection of the Foreign Office diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean. This chapter does not offer a detailed look at each of the spy cases or Anglo-American nuclear relations during the period, but looks instead

150

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

at ministerial involvement, an aspect which is largely absent from existing studies.3 In each case, ministers sought to play down apparent lapses in security and responded to US pressure for a series of security reviews which would, ultimately, lead to the implementation of ‘positive vetting’ and growing trust in the ‘special relationship’.

The special relationship On 5 March 1946 representatives of the British and American signals intelligence communities met to sign the ‘British-US Communication Intelligence Agreement’. The arrangement, referred to as BRUSA, was the ‘most important’ intelligence agreement of the post-war period, covering the bilateral exchange of ‘communication Intelligence’ between the UK and US SIGINT organisations.4 Under its terms, both sides agreed to the complete and unrestricted exchange of all forms of intelligence ‘product’ and, though a caveat did allow for some exemptions, the agreement was, Sir Stewart Menzies told delegates at a later UK–US Technical Conference, an ‘important milestone’ in transatlantic collaboration.5 Ironically, at the same time BRUSA was being signed, Churchill delivered the most celebrated speech of his political career at Fulton, Missouri, warning of a solidifying ‘iron curtain’ across Europe and the need for a post-war transatlantic ‘special relationship’ which, in the face of cooling Anglo-American relations, would help maintain post-war peace.6 This ‘special relationship’ had developed in wartime and saw unprecedented cooperation in the areas of military, diplomatic, financial and scientific work, as well as intelligence collaboration, a relationship actively encouraged by Churchill.7 The 1946 BRUSA agreement and continued signals intelligence cooperation represented the post-war solidification of a series of ‘special’, highly compartmentalised intelligence relationships spanning the fields of human intelligence, signals intelligence, counter-intelligence, special operations and analysis, which burgeoned in the post-war period and which, because of their specialised nature, were resistant to wider tensions in transatlantic relations.8 The compartmentalised nature of these intelligence relationships, while protecting their long-term viability, also cut out senior ministers who were unaware of the specific day-to-day workings of intelligence liaison. Attlee was certainly conscious of post-war intelligence exchanges, having been a leading signatory of the ‘Explanatory Instructions and Regulations concerning the handling of Signals Intelligence’ (IRSIG) required for the sharing of communications intelligence between the US, Britain and the Dominions, but he was not intimately involved in the

The special relationship?

151

development of transatlantic intelligence sharing, unlike his predecessor.9 Instead, Attlee often became embroiled in the private and, at times, very public fallout resulting from Soviet atomic espionage which threatened British atomic collaboration with the US.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Gouzenko In the summer of 1945 Attlee was introduced to the new, and highly destructive, power of the atomic bomb. In wartime, although he was certainly aware of the transatlantic nuclear relationship, Attlee had no real knowledge of ‘Tube Alloys’ research, having been on the outside of Churchill’s nuclear inner circle, only briefed about wartime developments by Truman during the Potsdam Conference in 1945.10 While only recently made aware of atomic power, the bomb had a significant effect on Attlee who, having returned from Potsdam shortly before the Japanese surrender, had written to President Truman that atomic weapons had forced a reappraisal of international relations and carried the alarming potential to ‘destroy civilisation’. He suggested that both leaders needed to meet to discuss the impact of atomic development.11 Attlee also set out his thoughts in a paper prepared for his newly created Cabinet Committee on Atomic Energy (GEN 75), warning that the power of atomic weapons made British strategic thinking ‘obsolete’ and that a ‘new World Order’ and closer cooperation between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union was needed to ease international tension, ensuring the ‘survival of civilization and possibly of life in this planet’.12 Truman responded favourably to Attlee’s call for a meeting and, during a speech to Congress in early October, he announced discussions ‘first with our associates in this discovery, Great Britain and Canada, and then with other nations, in an effort to effect agreement on the conditions under which co-operation might replace rivalry in the field of atomic power’.13 Discussions on the post-war control of atomic energy were complicated by events in Canada where, in early September, a Soviet cipher clerk named Igor Gouzenko had left the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, defecting to the West and providing documents about a major spy ring run from the Soviet Embassy by Colonel Nikolai Zabotin and Soviet military intelligence, the GRU.14 At first, the defection had not gone according to plan, with Gouzenko initially turned away by the Canadian authorities. It was only two days later, following attempts by the Soviets to find him, that Gouzenko was finally taken into protective custody and questioned by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, assisted by SIS’s Washington

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

152

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

r­epresentative, Peter Dwyer.15 News of the defection was sent to Sir Alexander Cadogan by Norman Robertson, Permanent Under-Secretary in the Canadian Department for External Affairs, on 9 September. The initial debrief had revealed, Robertson reported, that Soviet agents had access to the Department of External Affairs and the office of Sir Malcolm Macdonald, the UK High Commissioner, particularly the contents of secret telegrams between Ottawa and London.16 Shortly afterwards, Macdonald provided details of Gouzenko’s background and, more worryingly, information that a British nuclear scientist, Alan Nunn May, had been working for Soviet intelligence. Nunn May had been sent to Canada in January 1943 to participate in joint Anglo-Canadian research, but, according to Gouzenko’s papers, he had provided ‘useful and valuable information’ to the Soviets on atomic developments, including samples of Uranium 235, and was due to return to Britain to take up a post at King’s College. The gravity of the claims, and their likely impact on transatlantic relations, was recognised by Macdonald who warned, ominously, that ‘H.M.G. will be liable to criticism’ from US circles over the leakages if they were found to be true.17 In London, Bevin was informed by Cadogan in a handwritten note on 11 September, while Attlee was briefed personally by Menzies two days later.18 SIS played a central role in the ensuing case, largely because of security concerns about messages from the UK High Commission, with all important traffic rerouted through SIS’s British Security Coordination in New York to its London headquarters at Broadway. This traffic also passed via the head of SIS’s Soviet counterespionage branch, H.A.R. ‘Kim’ Philby.19 Gouzenko’s alarming allegations threatened to derail discussions about the future international control of atomic weapons.20 In August 1945 the British government had pushed for international cooperation on the development of this new technology through a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.21 In the United States, the Truman administration was deeply divided on the issue of international control. In government, opposition to sharing came from the Secretary for the Navy, James Forrestal, while those in favour included the Under-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, the Secretary for Commerce, Henry Wallace, and the newly retired Secretary of State for War, Henry Stimson, who, in a lengthy memorandum to Truman, had warned of a post-war atomic arms race with Moscow. While publicly committed to sharing secrets, the Truman administration privately maintained that international control could only happen if the Soviets accepted a new global system dominated by US political and financial institutions. The hawkish Secretary of State, James Brynes, proposed to use the nuclear monopoly to force concessions from the Soviets.22

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

153

Beyond the politics of the bomb, the diplomatic effort focused on what to do with the suspects identified by Gouzenko. The position of the British government was set out by Cadogan in a letter to Bevin who, in late September, made it clear that, in his view, if ‘we can proceed to arrests – and trials – we should do so … one should follow the ordinary, straight-forward, regular course’. In bellicose terms, Cadogan added that, if a spy network had been uncovered, ‘we should smash it by legal means’ and that policymakers needed to prevent ‘any further harm’ and to ‘avert as much as possible of future mischief’. Cadogan was: not in the least afraid of ‘diplomatic’ repercussions. If the Russians get caught out spying on us – and that must become known, even if the trials are in camera – that will do the Russians (and us) quite a lot of good. I don’t like any of the other alternatives. Let us go straight ahead, if we are on sure ground. It will be the Russians who will have to explain themselves – not we.23

Because of the transnational nature of the issue, Cadogan sought clarification of US and Canadian policy. In a telegram to Britain’s Ambassador in Washington, attempting to ascertain the response of the Truman administration to a quick solution, Cadogan explained that there would be ‘some leakage and publicity’ should arrests occur which could, potentially, impact on Anglo-Soviet relations, though the British government was ‘prepared to accept this consequence’.24 The American response was lukewarm. During a meeting with Halifax on 25 September, Truman had shown unease at the growing tensions with Moscow and said he was ‘thinking very hard of sending another special emissary to Marshall Stalin’.25 Beyond Truman’s desire to cool tensions, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had uncovered another Soviet spy ring operating in the US from Elizabeth Bentley, a one-time member of the ring who provided information to the FBI, and it needed time to investigate the claims.26 A greater stumbling block came from Canada where the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, had been initially unwilling to believe Gouzenko’s allegations, and, in spite of his long-standing mistrust of the Soviets, believed that revealing the extent of Soviet espionage would ‘destroy all prospects of better relations with Russia’. King held out for a ‘change of heart’ in the Kremlin.27 Like their US counterparts, the Canadian RCMP also had limited resources and there were concerns about the permissibility of Gouzenko’s evidence in court.28 As a result, Macdonald reported to London that, following a discussion with Robertson and King, the Canadian government based their approach around three principles: that action would be coordinated with London

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

154

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

and Washington, that ‘political and diplomatic questions must be paramount’ and that police action must conform to ‘diplomatic and political policy’.29 In London, Attlee and Bevin were both at odds with their transatlantic counterparts. On 28 September Bevin minuted that he was ‘in favour of prosecution’ while Attlee, typically concise, scribbled ‘I agree’.30 The differences in policy were highlighted by Tom Bromley, Cadogan’s Principal Private Secretary, who explained that the Canadians were ‘rather doubtful’ about whether some of the individuals highlighted by Gouzenko could be arrested and, on the subject of relations with the Soviets, that King wanted the ‘political heads of the United States and United Kingdom [to] inform Stalin … secretly that they knew of what was going on’. It was proposed, rather naively, that the Soviets would be asked to ‘abandon all these activities’ and the story would be kept secret, with only the principal agents arrested. By contrast, Attlee and Bevin believed that the straight-forward course should be followed, namely that any network uncovered should be broken by ordinary legal means as would be done if a network of any other nationality were uncovered. It was also agreed that we should not fear diplomatic repercussions and that any resultant publicity would do the Russians good.31

In conversation, Attlee even told King that a ‘show down’ with the Soviets was favourable.32 Despite the British wanting to arrest those involved, Washington and Ottawa prevented any unilateral action and discussions continued into October, when Nunn May, now returned from Canada and about to take up his academic post in London, was set to meet a Soviet contact outside the British Museum. While officials in London believed that he could be caught red handed, the opportunity to catch him, thus uncovering further Soviet activities, had gone, in part thanks to Philby, but also due to the lacklustre response to Gouzenko’s revelations. Nunn May failed to turn up at his rendezvous and remained at liberty in the short term. The transatlantic response to Gouzenko’s claims remained deadlocked and discussions between King and Truman failed to find a solution. Despite pressure from MI5, follow-up talks in London attended by King and Robertson were similarly unsuccessful, with Robertson telling a meeting at the Dominions Office that he feared that public opinion, including the Canadian Parliament and the [US] Congress, would be so stirred by the story of this Russian network stealing our secrets that prejudice would inevitably be brought both to the possi-

The special relationship?

155

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

bility of sharing with the Soviet government on terms some of our atomic secrets, and to the general prospect of financial and economic cooperation with Soviet Russia … Robertson felt the extreme desirability of not risking a show-down with the Soviet Government, unless the Allied Governments concerned were assured of the overwhelming support of their own public opinion, and he was doubtful of whether their unanimity could be secured until after an offer of collaboration in these questions had been made to the Soviet Government which the latter had either accepted or rejected.33

The reluctance of the Canadian government to act decisively and, in particular, King’s suggestion that the case should be hushed up led Bevin to write scathingly that it was ‘not difficult to imagine what sort of reply the Russians would give to an invitation to abandon their espionage system’. He emphasised that the network should be broken by ‘ordinary legal means and that we should not be afraid of diplomatic repercussions’.34 But, during a meeting with King the following evening, Attlee changed his views on the immediate need for police action, telling King that the matter needed to be handled with the ‘greatest care’.35 Attlee’s volte-face may have stemmed from his growing concerns about the future control of the atomic bomb.36 In late September he had told Truman that the bomb would dramatically alter the nature of warfare, and that, ominously, if production continued without changing international ‘political relationships … sooner or later these bombs will be used for mutual annihilation’. Only the US and Britain had the knowledge to develop further weapons, with the Americans being the only country capable of producing them, although neither could guarantee that knowledge about their production would not spread. With the transatlantic atomic monopoly only temporary, Attlee was ‘most anxious’ to discuss the implications of atomic weapons with Truman.37 During discussions with King, Attlee had suggested that ‘no steps should be taken … until I had had a reply to my letter from the President’, with King agreeing that the case needed to be ‘handled with the greatest care’ and that it would be inadvisable to break it prematurely.38 Truman replied on 13 October, a day after the meeting with King, thanking Attlee for his ‘thoughtful letter’ and agreeing to a future meeting on the issue, with talks set for November.39 In the short term this prevented action against Nunn May, who remained at large, leading an exasperated Bevin to write that ‘we are dealing too tenderly with these people’.40 Joint talks in Washington led to a three-power declaration on the atomic bomb which stated that, while the sharing of information to all nations would be unwise, information on industrial applications could be shared with members of the UN, with calls for a special United

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

156

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Nations Commission to help eliminate the ‘use of atomic energy for destructive purposes’.41 The joint response to Gouzenko’s revelations was also discussed and, in a letter to Cadogan before the meeting, Butler maintained that Britain should adopt a policy of ‘firmness and frankness’.42 While there was agreement on the wider issue of atomic energy, there were still deep divisions over the spy case and, though the Canadians had changed their stance and drafted a joint Anglo-Canadian statement calling for ‘appropriate police action’, the Americans continued to be a stumbling block.43 Writing to Cadogan after the talks, Butler explained that Truman, following advice from the FBI, wanted a pause to allow the Bentley allegations to be investigated, while the US Secretary of State was ‘reluctant to throw any pebble that would disturb United States–Russian relations’.44 During a conversation with Roger Makins, Acheson had explained that ‘no action should be taken for a period of 14 days from Friday November 16’.45 Now an incredulous Bevin wrote that the response ‘makes me despair’.46 Despite their aim, the Washington talks had failed to settle a joint response because of the FBI’s investigations and Brynes’ attempts to negotiate with the Soviets. In a meeting with Lord Halifax, Brynes talked of his wish to raise the ‘atomic energy matter’ with the Soviets before the upcoming meeting of the UN Security Council, hoping that progress on the bomb would, perhaps, lead to cooperation in other areas still deadlocked after the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.47 Once again, the response was stalled. By early December Canadian attitudes had changed once again, prompted by the imminent departure of the Soviet Ambassador to Ottawa, Georgii Zarubin, who had been recalled. Zarubin’s departure came as a surprise and King wanted to make a ‘forceful representation’ about Gouzenko’s revelations before he left.48 In a telegram to Cadogan, Macdonald reported that King wanted to approach Zarubin about the ‘Russian espionage activities’ and request the recall of Zabotin and his GRU colleagues, with the Canadians wanting ‘firm diplomatic action’. At the same time, Canadian officials would interview civil servants implicated by Gouzenko, but no arrests would be made due to the limited evidence, except where individuals had confessed.49 However, as soon as the message was received, the Canadians informed London that they would have to ‘abandon the plan’ because of pressure from the RCMP, while King personally believed that the case would take ‘several weeks, if not months’. In spite of his earlier view that a ‘forceful representation’ was needed, he said nothing about Gouzenko during his face-to-face meeting with Zarubin, talking instead of a ‘cordial friendship’ between both countries.50 Not surprisingly, the Foreign Office was

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

157

far from impressed, with Butler branding Canadian policy ‘pathetic’.51 By now, the case, acknowledged Butler, had become ‘rather stuck’.52 Soviet espionage was raised before the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in London. On 4 January Macdonald reported that King had been considering the ‘CORBY question’ and wanted the Minister of Justice, Louis St Laurent, and Humphrey Hume Wrong, senior official in the Canadian Department of External Affairs, who had travelled to London to attend the UNO meeting, to discuss joint action with Bevin and Brynes.53 In a minute to Bevin, Cadogan explained that, after arriving in London, Wrong, along with representatives of MI5 and SIS, had spoken to him and that King was willing to take action independently, if necessary, and wanted to set up a Royal Commission to examine Gouzenko’s claims. King wanted Bevin to speak to Brynes, now also in London, about his views on the action required, and Bevin scribbled ‘I agree. First meeting’ next to the proposal.54 During a meeting chaired by Bevin and attended by Brynes, St Laurent, Cadogan and Sir John Stephenson of the Dominions Office, the US Secretary of State gave the go-ahead for police action and believed that ‘political or publicity considerations should [not] stand in the way’. Bevin agreed with the proposed course of action and St Laurent was cleared to inform King that there was ‘no objection to the action proposed’.55 The Canadians were prompted into action by a series of press statements by the American journalist Drew Pearson who, following a leak, revealed details of Gouzenko’s revelations.56 The allegations gave ‘unexpected impetus’ to the case and, on 6 February, the Canadians passed an Order of Action setting up a Royal Commission. In the early hours of 15 February, RCMP officers carried out simultaneous arrests of thirteen individuals implicated in Soviet espionage.57 Gouzenko himself was interrogated by the Royal Commission and a copy of his statement was sent to Bevin by the Department of External Affairs, to the annoyance of Philby, who wrote to Bromley that as this ‘is the only copy which will be sent to this country we would be grateful to have a look at it when the Foreign Secretary has finished with it’.58 In London, Alan Nunn May was interviewed in the offices of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Ministry of Supply, on 16 February and denied the allegations against him. However, at a second interview four days later, he admitted to passing sensitive nuclear information to an unnamed Soviet source in Canada to ensure that ‘the development of atomic energy was not confined to the U.S.A’.59 In the short term Nunn May was allowed to remain at liberty and, on the suggestion of the Canadian authorities, he was only to be arrested

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

158

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

once the Royal Commission had reported. However, at a meeting in the Foreign Office attended by representatives of MI5 and SIS, Macdonald and Theobald Mathew, the Director of Public Prosecutions, it was agreed that any delay in arresting him would be unacceptable and lead to ‘considerable criticism’.60 On the same day, Sir Orme Sargent, who had taken over from Cadogan, sought Attlee’s approval for an arrest to take place on 6 March, earlier than the Canadians expected. Attlee’s approval was given the next day.61 Nunn May was arrested, and upon conviction was sentenced to ten years’ hard labour, serving six and a half years of his sentence. He later took up an academic post in Ghana in 1961 before he returned to the UK in 1978. Details of Soviet espionage in Canada were laid bare during the subsequent Royal Commission, with copies of the report sent to London. In July Nevile Butler wrote to officials that the report highlighted the ‘uncanny success’ enjoyed by Soviet intelligence in recruiting Canadian citizens to betray their country, the importance of the Communist Party as a vehicle for espionage activities and, ominously, how the Soviets had been able to acquire a range of important information on atomic energy and weapons research.62 In the Foreign Office the report was considered an ‘instructive document’ and, while too long for general reading – running to over seven hundred pages – it was thought that it could be useful as an educational tool, with Bevin, writing from the Paris Peace Conference in August, believing that copies of the report, known as the ‘Blue Book’, should be circulated to several trades unions in a ‘plain sealed wrapper’ from the Foreign Office, with the addresses of senior union officials obtained from Labour’s Transport House.63 The Foreign Secretary was also keen to see copies of the Soviet defector Victor Kravchenko’s book, I Chose Freedom, circulated to inform readers of the horrors of the Soviet system, with Foreign Office officials pushing for ‘influential people’ to pressure the publisher Robert Hale to release copies of the book earlier.64 In September, following discussion with Bevin, Dixon noted that a sufficient number of copies of the Canadian ‘Blue Book’ should be distributed by the Stationery Office, with copies sent to overseas missions and to a select list of individuals authorised by the Foreign Secretary. Copies of Kravchenko’s memoir were to receive similar distribution.65 Despite the propaganda value of the case, details of Nunn May’s activities reinforced the already isolationist tendencies of many individuals in the US administration who preferred to protect the American atomic monopoly. While Britain may have acted as ‘midwife’ to atomic research, wartime work in the field had been far from cordial and the post-war relationship between Britain and America was, in many ways,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

159

one of mutual suspicion, with both parties emerging from the war as ‘allies of a kind’.66 General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, considered that Britain should not be given classified information as, in his view, it could not be trusted to keep the information safe.67 In Britain’s Washington Embassy, Makins recognised the implications for British–American exchanges, writing on 21 February that the recent espionage case had brought the issue of access to US information to prominence. ‘I need not emphasise the effect all this is likely to have’, he wrote, recognising that ‘US reluctance to give us what we want is bound to be greatly increased’.68 These fears proved correct and, in the summer of 1946, Congress passed the McMahon Act forbidding the transfer of classified atomic information to any foreign country, including Britain.69 The impact on transatlantic collaboration was clear: Anglo-American nuclear relations simply ‘disintegrated’.70 For Britain, the American decision to terminate atomic exchanges reinforced the need for an independent British-made bomb, though Britain still required American technological and industrial help, with ministers and officials refusing to accept that the McMahon Act permanently closed the door to future collaboration.71 In 1948 British attempts to renew access to US nuclear secrets started to bear fruit. In January a modus vivendi was signed in which American officials, in return for receiving access to supplies of uranium ore from overseas, agreed to share some technical information, including intelligence.72 Ironically, another important milestone in efforts to revive nuclear collaboration was the Soviet detonation of their first atomic device. The first evidence of the successful test – known as Joe-1 – had been collected by an American long-range detection flight on 3 September 1949, with further British and American flights in the ensuing weeks confirming the unwelcome news. Intelligence officials on both sides of the Atlantic had been taken by surprise by the events; in London, the JIC had forecast a year earlier that the Soviets may ‘possibly produce their first atomic bomb by January 1951, and that their stockpile of bombs in January 1953 may be in the order of 6 to 22’.73 The detonation took place at another fraught time in the transatlantic relationship with the Attlee government, following a sudden downturn in export markets that inflated the trade and dollar deficit, leading to the decision to devalue the pound. In early September Bevin and Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, were sent to Washington to inform the US government of the decision.74 Shortly after arriving, both were personally informed by Truman that the Soviet Union had tested its first atomic device.75 Attlee was told during a meeting at Chequers by Menzies and Michael Perrin, the Deputy Controller for Atomic Energy at the Ministry of Supply, on 18 September.76 That evening Britain’s

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

160

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, was summoned to the State Department to attend a meeting with James Webb, the UnderSecretary of State, Admiral Sidney Seuers, Executive Secretary to the National Security Council, George Kennan, the Director of Policy Planning, and the nuclear physicist Robert Oppenheimer.77 Franks was informed that, after considering the available information, Truman believed ‘an atomic explosion had occurred in the U.S.S.R. and that it was probably caused by a plutonium bomb’. In Truman’s view, Franks explained to Attlee the next day: it is impossible to keep this information secret. By law the verdict of the scientists must go to the Atomic Energy Commission who are obliged to communicate it without delay to the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee … The President therefore considered it essential to issue a statement.78

Now in New York, Bevin communicated his own views to Attlee that he was ‘not inclined to act in panic’. If the US authorities were obliged by law to tell the Atomic Energy Committee the information should be sent in secret, though if a public statement was needed, it should be limited to a ‘bare statement of fact’.79 Responding to Bevin, Attlee also disagreed with a public statement, but there was, he told Bevin, no ‘reason to be perturbed if Russia should make a statement themselves’. Attlee’s reluctance to publicise the success of Joe-1 stemmed, in part, from concerns about the source of the intelligence. By releasing news of the test, Britain and America would tell ‘the Russians that evidence has been obtained by scientific means and not through other secret service channels’ and the Russians needed to be ‘kept in the dark about our methods of detection’. If a statement was needed Attlee, with characteristic terseness, suggested: ‘As announced by the President we have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.’80 Franks met Webb the following day to convey Attlee’s view, with Webb revealing that no statement would be made ‘unless the Russians made an announcement or there was a leak in Washington’ because, in Franks’ view, the ‘pressures on the White House against issuing a statement are momentarily in the ascendant’.81 Just days later, Bevin revealed a change of heart. After discussing the matter with Acheson, it was clear that the Americans were ‘unlikely to keep the secret much longer’ and there was ‘every likelihood of a leakage’ as Truman had told Senator McMahon, chair of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy who had immediately called a meeting of the committee. Due to circumstances, there was ‘little point in maintaining our strong pressure … to refrain for making any statement’. Franks,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

161

Makins and Sir John Cockcroft, director of Britain’s Atomic Energy Research Establishment, who had been in the United States with British assessments, were promptly called from Washington. Cockcroft was of the opinion that there were ‘no longer any doubts about what had occurred’ and, at a further meeting in the early hours of the morning, the British representatives were joined by Pearson and Acheson to work out a joint statement which was, Bevin told Franks, a ‘compromise between a short draft prepared by us and a much longer statement prepared by the Americans’.82 At 11 o’clock Truman publicly announced that an atomic explosion had ‘occurred in the U.S.S.R.’ but, at Attlee’s insistence, it said nothing about the date, location or type of explosion that had occurred, with news of the detonation released soon afterwards in London.83 The test of the Soviet bomb worked both ways. While the detonation led to an increase in isolationist tendencies from some, it was also recognised, officials in Washington reported, that the US should ‘obtain all the allies and assistance that they can in atomic energy development’.84 Soviet success spurred talks to resume on the transatlantic sharing of technical information.85 The results of these discussions were conveyed to ministers by Makins during a meeting of the Committee on Atomic Energy on 1 November. Makins explained that, while purely exploratory, the talks had been promising. Agreement had been reached on the exchange of material and, more importantly, a ‘satisfactory paper’ had been produced on the form of any future technical collaboration if the McMahon Act were successfully bypassed.86 Another round of talks in November gave further hope of future collaboration. Under the proposals, Britain would produce plutonium but send it along with its scientists to the United States, who would produce weapons alone. In early December Makins told ministers that the present policy of adopting a ‘firm but patient attitude’ was paying off, with the prospect of an agreement favourable to Britain ‘very good’. Although there were potential stumbling blocks, it looked as though transatlantic relations were on the mend.87

Klaus Fuchs Talks to resume Anglo-American atomic exchanges were undermined by the discovery of another spy, Klaus Fuchs, a naturalised German scientist sentenced for passing nuclear secrets to the Soviets in March 1950.88 Fuchs fled Germany to Britain in 1933, fearing Nazi persecution, but, despite being given an unlimited residence permit, he was

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

162

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

interned as an enemy alien and deported to Canada in July 1940. Due to a wartime shortage of scientists, he was recruited by Sir Rudolf Peierls to work on the ‘Tube Alloys’ project and granted British nationality in 1941. In 1943 he joined a British team sent to work as part of the wartime Manhattan Project where he remained until 1946, when he was appointed head of theoretical physics at the newly created Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell, only to fall under suspicion of spying for the Soviets in late 1949. In August 1949 American codebreakers on the VENONA programme managed to identify Fuchs as a source of information for Soviet intelligence codenamed Charles in decrypted diplomatic cables.89 It was not the first time that questions about Fuchs’s loyalty had been raised; in 1946, following the Nunn May case, MI5 had investigated him but the results were inconclusive and, given his importance, he was given security clearance to continue his work. VENONA brought this assessment into doubt. By September MI5 had informed Michael Perrin in the Ministry of Supply about the suspicions, and agreed that Fuchs was to be watched by Harwell’s security officer, Henry Arnold, though officials had to move cautiously in building their case.90 Despite the strong evidence, the VENONA material was a closely guarded secret and known to only a handful of individuals on either side of the Atlantic. In the highest echelons of government, Truman was kept in the dark for the first three years of his presidency, while Attlee had only been briefed about the breakthrough in late 1947.91 Because of the secrecy of the information, and the need to obtain further evidence, Fuchs was placed under surveillance, though in the end he undermined his own position by telling Arnold that his father had been appointed to a chair at the University of Leipzig in East Germany, leading MI5 to push for an interrogation.92 During a meeting in the offices of Lord Portal, the controller of atomic energy in the Ministry of Supply, Sillitoe, Perrin and other senior MI5 officials discussed what to do next. While Cockcroft stressed the ‘extreme’ importance of Fuchs, it was recognised that he should be ‘removed’ from his post – though the option of keeping him if he was ‘no longer a threat’ was discussed – and that MI5 should be asked to interrogate.93 Attlee was told of the decision soon afterwards; following an unrecorded meeting with the Prime Minister, Sillitoe told Attlee’s Principal Private Secretary, Lawrence Helsby, that the Prime Minister had agreed ‘that interrogation should take place’ and that the Ministry of Supply should be told. Given the sensitive nature of the case, Attlee was to be kept informed of developments by Liddell, who would be standing in for Sillitoe, who was away on a visit to South Africa to discuss security reforms.94

The special relationship?

163

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Fuchs was eventually interviewed by William ‘Jim’ Skardon, a former Special Branch officer and MI5’s interrogator. On 21 December Skardon travelled to Harwell to interview Fuchs. In the first of seven interviews, Fuchs protested his innocence, although, in private, Skardon believed ‘we have selected the right man’.95 In a second interview, Fuchs maintained his innocence and, according to Skardon, displayed little nervousness.96 On 2 January 1950 Liddell briefed the Prime Minister that: what Fuchs had said was really consistent either with his guilt or with his innocence. We had, however, reviewed all the evidence in the light of this interrogation in conjunction with Lord Portal, Mr. Perrin, and Sir John Cockcroft. Lord Portal seemed to take the view – although no final decision had yet been reached – that the security risk of maintaining FUCHS at Harwell could not be accepted, and that some post should therefore be found for him at one of the Universities. We should hold a further meeting with Lord Portal before any action was taken.97

Three days later, at another meeting in Portal’s office, it was agreed that Fuchs would not be employed at Harwell because of his father’s post, but that he could continue in the short term to carry out a ‘hand-over’.98 The option of allowing Fuchs to move to a university post was also kept open, though this option became increasingly unlikely when, inexplicably, Fuchs confessed his activities to Skardon at another interview, during which he revealed that he had given the Soviets a substantial amount of material, including ‘the full design of the atom bomb’. Fuchs was arrested and charged on 3 February 1950.99 Not surprisingly the case had major ramifications. During a meeting in the Foreign Office, Portal told Perrin, Makins, Liddell and MI5’s Dick White that the case might ‘have far-reaching consequences’ in the atomic field.100 In Washington, Fredrick Hoyer-Millar in the British Embassy reported that Acheson, while recognising the seriousness of the case, could do little to handle the affair, however ‘unpleasant … the consequences’.101 When news of the arrest was made public, Washington reported that the case had sparked adverse comment, with many Congressmen ‘justifying the McMahon Act’ and urging the legislature to maintain a ‘strong attitude against sharing atomic secrets’.102 Paul Gore-Booth, head of the British Information Services, reported an increase in criticism, writing that the discovery had provoked an ‘outburst of opposition to any sharing of atomic information’ as British security was ‘hopelessly lax’.103 The adverse comment threatened nuclear cooperation; Hoyer-Millar stated that Acheson, despite wanting to maintain transatlantic cooperation, believed that talks should be dropped completely, with the Fuchs case having ‘completely wrecked

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

164

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

things … between us and the Americans’.104 In London, ministers and officials were fully alive to the gravity of the case, with Air Chief Marshall Sir William Elliott explaining that, while good progress had been made towards ‘full integration’ with the US programme, ‘it can … be assumed that the two main objects of our conversations with the Americans – complete interchange of information and an earlier stockpile of bombs in this country – will now be more difficult to obtain’.105 In early February members of the Official Committee on Atomic Energy were informed that Bevin had expressed concern at the possible ‘general repercussions’ of Fuchs’s treachery. 106 In London, ministers tried to talk down the security lapse to protect future transatlantic exchanges. In the midst of growing tensions, Attlee requested information on the ‘early background of Dr. Fuchs, and the circumstances in which he was naturalised’. Five days after Fuchs was arrested, Sillitoe handed Helsby a paper on the case, telling him that when Fuchs was first employed there was ‘considerable pressure to give up “witch-hunting” so that every possible means of winning the war might be used’.107 The paper contained many inaccuracies, leading to suggestions that MI5 had misled Attlee.108 The document gave the impression that MI5, as early as 1941, had foreseen the potential security risk and had warned the Ministry of Supply. Among other mistakes, including the omission of some of Fuchs’s communist connections, Attlee was also led to believe that MI5 had acted swiftly to identify Fuchs and had pursued enquiries ‘to their present conclusion’.109 This report formed the basis of a speech delivered to the House of Commons nearly a month later, which aimed to restore confidence in MI5. Attlee’s motives for the speech were revealed to Sillitoe three days earlier, with Liddell writing in his diary that: The D.G. saw the P.M. … He told us that the P.M. was in clearly fighting form and that he proposed to defend the department, and that the occasion would probably arise during the debate on the King’s speech. He had no intention of allowing an enquiry into the activities of the Security Service and was entirely satisfied with the work of the department.110

During his speech to Parliament, Attlee described the case as ‘most deplorable and unfortunate’ and rubbished suggestions that MI5 knew of Fuchs’s communist past, stating that any such information had been provided by the Gestapo. In fact, Fuchs was a ‘brilliant scientist’ and had an unblemished record. News of a security leak had first come to the attention of the US authorities during the autumn of 1949, though it did not ‘point to any individual’, and, once informed of the breach, MI5 had conducted the investigation with ‘great energy’ and were ultimately ‘suc-

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

165

cessful’ in identifying the chief suspect. Attlee said he was satisfied that, unless Britain had a ‘kind of secret police’, there was little MI5 could have done differently and that, overall, there was nothing ‘that can cast the slightest slur on the Security Services; indeed, I think they acted promptly and effectively as soon as there was any line which they could follow’. Perhaps in an attempt to deflect criticism from the Opposition benches, Attlee linked the Fuchs affair with the wartime government, suggesting that blame should not be attached ‘to the Government of the right hon. Gentleman opposite or to this Government or to any of the officials’. The Fuchs case was ‘extraordinary and exceptional’.111 Before the speech, Attlee had briefed Sir John Anderson who, Attlee reported, believed there was ‘no case against the Security Service’ and said he would ‘have a word with Churchill’.112 While undoubtedly containing several errors, Attlee’s statement to Parliament was necessary to bolster confidence in British security and to  offset tensions in the transatlantic relationship.113 There was very little that could have been done in the circumstances; confidence needed to be restored in MI5, although, in private, Attlee may have been seething about the case, with the Service having come under scrutiny several days before the Commons statement. On 3 March Makins referred to recent discussions between Bevin and Attlee, with the former advising the Prime Minister to ‘refuse all suggestions for an enquiry’ into MI5’s conduct, believing it wrong for the FBI to come over ‘to give us advice on how we should conduct our security arrangements’. In the Commons, Bevin explained, Attlee should make it clear that he was unconcerned ‘in any way with security matters at the time when Fuchs was investigated in 1943, but that he was now looking into all the facts of the case’.114 While the motives behind the conversation are unclear, Attlee had also vented his frustration at MI5 during a briefing attended by Sillitoe and White when the Prime Minister, according to the latter, had said that the Service’s failure to collect incriminating evidence on Fuchs was ‘a reflection upon the investigators [and] not the evidence’.115 The case also impacted on transatlantic counter-intelligence liaison. Behind closed doors, requests by the FBI to interrogate Fuchs raised awkward questions with the Home Office, which refused to allow American officials to question him during the ongoing legal process.116 The Home Office was also concerned by the possible ‘awkward precedent’ that ‘might be created if the representative of a foreign power was allowed to interview one of our prisoners’.117 An intervention by Sillitoe failed to solve the problem and was rejected by the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Frank Newsam, to the exasperation of US officials, who continued to criticise the British. In late April an exasperated

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

166

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Sillitoe approached Attlee on the Home Office position that allowing members of the FBI to interview Fuchs would set an ‘awkward precedent’. Somewhat remarkably, Attlee, according to Liddell’s notes, claimed that he ‘would not have paid too much attention to [the Home Office ­position] … and would have, in fact, granted the interview at the outset. He remarked that precedents did not mean a great deal, since we were living in an unprecedented age.’ While reluctant to become directly involved in what was a Home Office issue, Attlee made it clear to Sillitoe that MI5’s representative in Washington, Geoffrey Patterson, could be given advance information to pass to the FBI and, following the meeting, a telegram was dispatched informing the Americans that British officials had ­‘re-considered’ the earlier decision to oppose allowing FBI representatives to see Fuchs.118 Formal Home Office approval was granted soon afterwards, though tensions in the MI5–FBI relationship continued.119 The case also raised uncomfortable questions in Parliament. If Attlee had intended to deflect criticism about MI5, he was unsuccessful. On 15 March, nearly a fortnight after his earlier statement, Downing Street learned of a proposed Parliamentary Question by Henry Strauss, Conservative MP for Norwich South, about allegations that the Canadian government had passed information to the British regarding Fuchs which had been ignored. The next day Sillitoe wrote to Paul Osmond, Attlee’s Private Secretary, that the response was ‘No, Sir’ and that the question, he believed, arose from an earlier newspaper report quoting a Canadian journal which had claimed that, following the Gouzenko affair, the RCMP had passed on information to MI5 that Fuchs was a communist. The information, Sillitoe wrote, was found in the diary of Israel Halperin, a suspected Soviet agent, but that information was of ‘doubtful significance’.120 Attlee gave his response of ‘No, Sir’ on 20 March – a statement that caused concern in Canada.121 On 28 March Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, Britain’s High Commissioner, reported that the Canadians were ‘disturbed’ by Attlee’s statement and that Fuchs’s name had, in fact, appeared in the Halperin notebooks which MI5 had been given ‘full access’ to. Attlee’s response would give the impression that the Canadian government had had information ‘but failed to pass it on’.122 The warning went unheeded; the following day, Viscount Jowitt delivered a statement in the House of Lords exonerating MI5. In a statement largely echoing Attlee’s, Jowitt claimed that the Security Service had received information about Fuchs in 1949 and MI5 had ‘completely uncovered’ his activities. Explaining why Fuchs had not been identified sooner, Jowett claimed that he had been beyond the reach of MI5 for over two years because of his work in the United States and that

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

167

his eventual detection was a ‘brilliant achievement’. Jowitt, without knowing all the information, said that there was ‘no truth’ in the claims that Fuchs was ‘associating with spies’ in 1946, that the ‘Canadian or American authorities’ had shared sensitive information about his background, or that Fuchs had been a long-term communist. As in Attlee’s earlier statement, MI5 was cleared of any wrongdoing and had nothing to ‘apologise for in this case – and I myself have gone into everything – I am quite satisfied that they have every reason to be proud of the work they did’.123 Jowitt’s blanket denial caused some embarrassment and, on 1 April, Attlee wrote to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Patrick Gordon Walker, berating him for not passing on the earlier information from Ottawa. ‘If I had had this I could have warned the Lord Chancellor’, wrote Attlee. ‘This is not the first time that the Commonwealth Relations Office have failed to pass telegrams to me.’124 In light of the mistake, the Lord Chancellor was forced to deliver a further statement, this time cleared by the Canadian government, stating that Fuchs’s name had, in fact, appeared in the notebook of a known communist and that the information was available to MI5, although it had been overlooked and ‘Subsequent events have, of course, attached significance to the name’.125 The confusion soured, albeit temporarily, relations with Downing Street; in discussion with Sillitoe, Attlee admitted that he was ‘peeved’ about not being told all the information on Fuchs sooner.126 The case also raised political concerns about a ‘socialist’ Labour government in US circles, particularly after the appointment of a former communist, John Strachey, as Secretary of State for War. Strachey had been attacked in the Evening Standard as having ‘never disavowed Communism’ and, misleadingly, was claimed to have been involved in the reform of MI5 following the Fuchs case, a claim repeated in the Beaverbrook press.127 In fact, as senior government figures were keen to point out, Strachey was not involved in any review, though the claim was repeated by the Washington Post – a paper usually supportive of Britain – which had been critical of his appointment in a sensitive position.128 The cumulative effect of Nunn May and other spy cases had, explained the Washington Embassy, made Americans ‘think that no man who has ever been a Communist or has professed Marxist views, is to be trusted, even if he publically recants his Communist beliefs’, and while the rumours died down, reports that the US government had pressured their British counterparts to remove Strachey continued, with the claims only serving to undermine confidence about the state of security in Britain.129 Despite efforts to limit its effects on both sides of the Atlantic, the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

168

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Fuchs case destroyed British hopes for a quick resumption of the atomic partnership. In May, during discussions in London, Acheson told Attlee and Bevin that it was unlikely that an agreement, even if reached, could come into force before mid-1951 owing to the ‘sensitive state’ of opinion in the US.130 One way to ease the situation would be to tighten British security measures. Earlier discussions in Washington had led to the suggestion of an Anglo-American-Canadian security conference, with Franks reporting that the proposed meetings were, in his view, ‘the most helpful’ and, perhaps, the only way of ‘getting ahead sometime with the tripartite talks’.131 In London, ministers were quick to endorse the discussions. During a meeting of the official Atomic Energy Committee on 21 March its chairman, Makins, relayed ministerial approval to the committee. Attlee had given the go-ahead for ‘special discussions’ to take place between British, Canadian and American representatives to establish universal security standards in the field of atomic energy. The talks were necessary, he explained, to secure support in Washington for future talks on the resumption of atomic exchanges and to ‘re-establish relations of confidence’ with the US authorities.132 Ministerial concerns about security also led to further discussions in Whitehall. At a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Subversive Activities, GEN 183, chaired by the Prime Minister on 5 April, it was agreed that an official committee on ‘positive vetting’ should be formed. Under the chairmanship of John Winnifrith, a senior Treasury official, the committee would examine the ‘risks and advantages’ of improved vetting procedures. At the meeting Sillitoe reported that MI5, while having an almost full membership list of the Communist Party, was receiving 2,500 vetting requests each week and that the ever-increasing workload was placing a great burden on the Service. In discussion there was general agreement with the suggestion that, while vetting should continue as at present for the large number of cases, further thought should be given to more focused enquiries for a small number of sensitive posts. Pressure for the adoption of positive vetting procedures came during security talks in Washington.133 At a meeting of the Official Committee on Atomic Energy, it was reported that the talks had been ‘generally satisfactory’ and that a genuine agreement had been reached that US ‘standards of security in the atomic energy field, both personal and physical, were comparable’. American officials were puzzled, however, by the decision not to ask Fuchs about his political affiliations, and pressure was applied for the adoption of a questionnaire as in the US system.134 In November Winnifrith completed a report identifying an ‘inner circle of special secret posts’ to which the new form of vetting would apply. The American system, run by the FBI, was considered

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

169

too elaborate and ‘repugnant to British thinking’. Instead, he proposed an alternative process which would involve the relevant government department augmenting the existing screening procedures with ‘positive enquiries’, though Winnifrith was sceptical about its ultimate value. The new procedure would not yield ‘substantial results’ as even the more stringent enquiries would ‘fail to detect the really dangerous crypto-communist’. Nonetheless, the detection of even a small number of ‘unreliable persons’ would, Winnifrith suggested, ‘counter-balance any disadvantages in the system’.135 At a meeting of GEN 183 on 13 November, Shinwell welcomed the report and argued that ‘the country could not afford to take the risk of neglecting any practicable measure for increasing security’. Attlee, summing up, explained that Whitehall departments needed to ‘confirm the reliability of holders of key posts’.136

Bruno Pontecorvo Even after ministers had approved the tightening of security, transatlantic relations continued to be threatened by spy scandals. In late October 1950 news broke that Bruno Pontecorvo, another former Harwell employee, had disappeared while on holiday with his family and was believed to be behind the Iron Curtain. Attlee was briefed about the case on 23 October by Liddell, who said that there had been no adverse record against Pontecorvo in MI5’s files before he was employed at Harwell. Although information had, allegedly, been received from the US through SIS’s British Security Co-ordination in New York, no trace of it could be found and, in Liddell’s view, the information was insignificant, alleging merely that Pontecorvo had connections with a known communist. News of his communist affiliations only came in March 1950 from SIS sources in Sweden and, after questioning, Pontecorvo admitted that several relatives were communists, although he and his wife were not. Arrangements were subsequently made, with Pontecorvo’s agreement, to find him a non-sensitive academic position at Liverpool University, and he had travelled abroad for a family holiday before taking up this new post. Since his disappearance, Pontecorvo had been traced as far as Helsinki, where he had arrived on 2 September, though no concrete evidence had been obtained to suggest his present whereabouts and, despite press speculation that he had defected to the Soviet Union, his location was unconfirmed. Aware of the implications of the case, Attlee asked whether Pontecorvo had access to vital information, with Liddell replying that the Department of Atomic Energy believed that he had hardly any contact with secret work, although, during the earlier stage of his

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

170

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

appointment, he had been involved in atomic research. On the information available there had been ‘no grounds for bringing Pontecorvo before the purge committee’, and attempts had been made to remove him ‘amicably to avoid, if possible, the course which he has now apparently taken’.137 The British response, as in the Fuchs episode, was to minimise the security aspect.138 In the wake of his disappearance, British officials were concerned that, if it became widely known that Pontecorvo had limited access to sensitive information, Anglo-American nuclear relations would further slide.139 The timing of the affair also concerned officials; Senator McCarthy had begun his virulent attacks on the State Department, and officials were concerned that he might criticise Britain.140 In the ensuing days a joint strategy was worked out on either side of the Atlantic by Oliver Franks and officials in London to talk down the security lapse, a strategy that enjoyed success.141 In Washington, the US press and Congress, mostly preoccupied by the upcoming midterm elections, made little of the story. On 2 November, almost a fortnight after the disappearance, Franks informed the Foreign Office that, in Washington, press and radio commentators had been largely quiet and ‘We have escaped the critical reaction in the press which, after the Fuchs case, I thought was likely to develop.’ It was important, wrote Franks, to ‘let sleeping dogs lie’ to ensure that the case ‘shall not blight the prospects of the negotiations’.142 In London, too, ministers sought to play down the case in a series of speeches. On 23 October, during a briefing to Parliament, the Minister of Supply, George Strauss, stated that Pontecorvo’s access to secret work had been ‘very limited’ – a claim Strauss repeated in early November.143 While successful in minimising any further harm to transatlantic relations, the strategy failed to deflect criticism of MI5 at home and, coming so soon after the Fuchs case, Attlee was far from impressed that a second security lapse had happened. On 1 November Sillitoe, who had recently returned from a visit to the US, explained that relations between MI5 and the FBI had soured.144 According to Sillitoe, Attlee ‘showed himself to be rather critical’ of MI5’s conduct, asking why he had not been informed about SIS’s information that Pontecorvo and his wife were avowed communists, which forced Sillitoe on the defensive. While he acknowledged that Attlee had not been told, Sillitoe explained that MI5 had taken immediate action in light of the report. Attlee also asked why Pontecorvo had not been detected earlier, with Sillitoe arguing that MI5 had not seen the information provided by the FBI and that even if it had, the evidence was far from damning, since it merely referred to the presence of communist literature in Pontecorvo’s house, which, Sillitoe

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

171

stated, could have been found in the ‘houses of a large number of people in 1943’. Attlee also enquired as to what the case ‘really meant and why it happened’. On the basis of the information, Sillitoe surmised that Pontecorvo had not intended to defect but was blackmailed – a ‘typical technique of the Russian Intelligence Service’ – about his communist connections and forced to flee. Attlee was ‘impressed’ by the explanation and was, Sillitoe wrote, ‘prepared to accept it’.145 In the wake of Pontecorvo’s disappearance, Attlee informed Sillitoe that he wanted to be ‘kept informed of any cases of people holding positions of great importance about whom there were unusual security doubts’.146 Under this arrangement, in January 1951 the Prime Minister was told about Boris Davison, Harwell’s Senior Principal Scientific Officer. Davison was an unusual case; he had been born in Russia to third-generation British parents, graduating from the University of Leningrad in 1931, and had left the Soviet Union following the nonrenewal of his residence permit in 1938. A brilliant mathematician, he joined Peierls at Birmingham University and worked in Canada on the joint United Kingdom-Atomic Energy Project at Chalk River, Canada, before returning to Britain to work at Harwell.147 Unsurprisingly, Pontecorvo’s disappearance drew adverse comment in US circles, reviving earlier fears about lax British security. In March 1951 an official at the Washington Embassy remarked that the Fuchs case ‘keeps popping up … I must say that we are doing ourselves a great deal of harm by being officially silent on it.’148 Further pressure mounted with the release of a highly critical pamphlet on atomic espionage by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. It was, Perrin believed, an attempt to ‘throw all the blame’ on Britain.149 ‘You will see,’ another official explained, ‘that the Joint Committee has ingeniously nominated the three non-U.S. people as the most dangerous.’150 The document provided an almost endless supply of ammunition for those opposed to greater US–UK collaboration.151 Cockcroft was scathing of the paper, writing on 16 April ‘I think it is time we prepared some document rebutting this charge of short-comings by British counterespionage’ and highlighting those of the FBI during the Fuchs case.152 In London, such calls gained increasing support and, on 30 April, Perrin replied that ‘some official document’ was needed.153 The proposal was finally discussed at a meeting on 3 May, attended by Perrin, Cockcroft and White, where it was agreed that a statement was needed which set out the facts ‘in the right sort of perspective’, though it would ‘avoid starting a controversy between ourselves and the Americans’.154 Backing from the Prime Minister was sought in July, with Makins writing to Denis Rickett, Attlee’s Private Secretary, who quickly replied that

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

172

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Attlee fully agreed with the project and would ‘like to have a sight of the document when it is available’.155 The journalist Alan Moorehead, formerly the Chief Information Officer at the Ministry of Defence, was co-opted to take part in the project which was discussed on 18 July at a meeting attended by Moorehead, and including Sir Robert Fraser, Director General of the Central Office of Information, White and Roger Hollis, an MI5 officer specialising in Soviet counter-espionage, among others.156 In due course these discussions resulted in the publication of The Traitors in 1952.157

The missing diplomats – Burgess and Maclean While efforts were made to address concerns about British security, yet another scandal threatened to throw the transatlantic relationship into further turmoil. In March 1951 British officials discussed the state of Anglo-American affairs in the Foreign Office, with Makins questioning whether the Americans ‘were … treating us on a partnership basis’ and pointing towards the growing ‘disparity’ in the relationship, although just weeks later, during a visit to the US on 25 May, Makins wrote optimistically that relations were not as bad as they looked from London.158 Unbeknown to Makins, events on the other side of the Atlantic were threatening to undermine relations still further, as two Foreign Office diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, boarded a ship at Southampton bound for France, having been tipped off about an ongoing investigation into their communist past. Maclean, a former First Secretary at Britain’s Washington Embassy and, embarrassingly, head of the American Department of the Foreign Office, had recently fallen under suspicion as a security risk following a joint Anglo-American investigation into claims that a Soviet agent inside the embassy, codenamed HOMER, had been able to leak information on a wide range of topics, including high-level policy discussions between Washington and London. Information about the leak came from VENONA sources and, while the initial information provided few clues to their identity, the list of suspects narrowed as more information became available. Maclean had become the principal suspect although these suspicions were not confirmed until the spring of 1951, on the basis of further VENONA material.159 Maclean’s associate, Guy Burgess, had joined the Foreign Office in 1944 and held a series of positions including Private Secretary to McNeil. An open homosexual, he had gained a reputation for his outlandish behaviour and had been sent home from his final posting in Washington due to complaints from the State Department, pending disciplinary action.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

173

In London, knowledge of Maclean’s treachery reached Sir William Strang from the head of Foreign Office security, George Carey Foster. The affair, Strang later recalled, preoccupied his work in the coming weeks to the detriment of almost everything else.160 According to Patrick Reilly, Strang quickly convened a series of meetings with Sillitoe and officials in the Foreign Office where future action was ‘laid down’.161 Morrison, now Foreign Secretary, was briefed personally on 17 April, and told of the decision, taken during an earlier meeting that day, to place Maclean under surveillance, a course of action he endorsed.162 Up to this point, Morrison later recalled, the investigation had been carried out over ‘the head of the Foreign Secretary and known only to the Prime Minister’.163 The subsequent delay in questioning Maclean about his activities should not be attributed to Morrison or the Foreign Office. Instead, responsibility lay ‘entirely with MI5’ who were, Reilly later recalled, reluctant to interrogate Maclean owing to the nature of the evidence against him. As with earlier cases, it was believed that VENONA evidence, while conclusive, could not be used in court and that a confession was needed, which required ‘closer knowledge of Maclean’.164 Surveillance began on 23 April, and, in subsequent days, MI5 officers interviewed former associates, though no ‘significant results were obtained’.165 Morrison received MI5’s provisional conclusions on 25 May, shortly after another meeting chaired by Strang, and agreed that Maclean should be interviewed some time between 18 and 25 June, with the timetable influenced by the fact that Maclean’s wife was ‘due to have a baby on or about the 17th June’.166 On the evening of 25 May, Maclean and Burgess fled to France. Morrison was not informed of their disappearance until four days later, in part because of the near paralysis in the Foreign Office following the disappearance. He was told by Sir Roderick Barclay, his private secretary, at 4 p.m. on 29 May. On hearing the news, the Foreign Secretary instructed that ‘vigorous action’ should be taken, though the trail had gone cold and, on 6 June, Strang recommended that the order should be withdrawn.167 Interestingly, Morrison appears to have been kept in the dark about suspicions that Maclean had been tipped off by his friend Kim Philby, SIS’s Washington representative, who had been ruled ‘persona non grata’ by Walter Bedell Smith, the Director of Central Intelligence, and sent home in disgrace.168 Similarly, unlike his successor, Eden, Morrison was not informed of the ongoing investigation into Philby’s background or, significantly, the attempt by senior figures in SIS to try and clear his name in the mistaken belief that he was the victim of an MI5 witch-hunt, despite evidence to the contrary.169 In July Philby resigned from SIS having received a financial settlement – once again, startlingly, information not provided to Morrison.170

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

174

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Despite efforts to suppress news of the disappearance, the story began to filter to the national press; on 6 June the Daily Express, via a leak from French sources, found out that the search was on for two Foreign Office diplomats who had fled Britain, and the next day, eager to make the most of the scoop, the newspaper published the story with the headline ‘Yard Hunts Two Brits’.171 As in earlier cases, the initial response was to underplay the story, with the Foreign Office reluctantly issuing a statement acknowledging that two of its staff had been missing ‘since May 25’ and were believed to have travelled to France ‘a few days ago’. Maclean, the Foreign Office acknowledged, had suffered a breakdown due ‘to overwork’ but nothing was said about his left-wing views, and all overseas missions were instructed to remain silent about the case.172 Unsurprisingly, the defection had ramifications across the Atlantic where the news, according to the Washington Embassy, had ‘created a major sensation’. Jebb, Britain’s representative to the United Nations, feared ‘the worst’.173 While several newspapers presented the affair in a ‘reasonable manner’, others drew disparaging conclusions, with the Washington Post asking why two officials of ‘known dubiety’ had been given positions of responsibility. The paper also linked the incident with the Fuchs and Pontecorvo cases, on top of the appointment of John Strachey as Minister of War. ‘Mr. Attlee’s government,’ it read, ‘ought to be reminded that at this touchy point in Anglo-American relations lack of confidence in British security precautions merely feeds hysteria here.’174 For Makins, the affair did an ‘enormous lot’ of harm and had a ‘serious effect on our reputation at a time when we were negotiating for a resumption of atomic collaboration. It was very bad. The great argument was: the British aren’t secure.’175 In London the implications of the affair were clear. Days after the defection, Attlee scribbled a note for Morrison requesting ‘a report on these men and their careers’. It was clear that their ‘characters were unsatisfactory’ and Attlee asked whether ‘any particular consideration [was] given to these matters’ before they were placed in positions of responsibility. The affair would, Attlee anticipated, result in ‘a lot of public criticism’.176 A day later the subject was raised in Cabinet, with Morrison announcing that he intended to speak in the Commons later that afternoon. ‘Maclean has done [very] well in F.O.’, explained the Foreign Secretary. ‘All we know is that this man disappeared.’ No mention was made about the investigation into Maclean, although Morrison revealed that there ‘May be a security aspect’. As with his earlier note, Attlee raised concerns about the ‘Doubtful moral characters’ of both men and asked Morrison ‘Aren’t F.O. a bit easy over this?’ The Prime Minister, himself committed to the virtues of public service,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

175

questioned whether the ‘standard of conduct in [Foreign] Service’ was ‘high enough’, and, after a short discussion, it was agreed that a ‘formal enquiry into the circumstances in which the two officers had left the country’ was necessary. This would provide, the Cabinet were told, ‘an opportunity for restating the principles which govern the standards of personal conduct of officers in the Foreign Service’.177 Once again, government strategy aimed to play down security lapses. During his statement to the Commons, Morrison, mindful of American reaction, added nothing new to what was already known. Foreign Office officials only became aware of Maclean and Burgess’s disappearance on 29 May, with Maclean granted ‘permission to be absent from duty, for private reasons’. Burgess was on leave ‘pending a decision as to his future’. Once their absence was noted, the Foreign Office had acted quickly to ascertain their whereabouts but had received no concrete information. Every effort was made to downplay the importance of both individuals. Burgess was portrayed as a junior Foreign Office official, despite his earlier work for McNeil. The security aspect of the case was ‘under investigation’, though it was ‘not in the public interests to disclose them’. Rather than embarrass the Foreign Secretary, Eden asked whether MPs would be informed of any future developments and asked about Maclean’s mental state, later defending him as ‘very good indeed’.178 Nevertheless, the affair caused the government severe embarrassment, with Kenneth Younger, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, writing in his diary about the ‘minor work’ in responding to Parliamentary Questions, with the trickiest ‘arising out of the extraordinary incident of the disappearance of Guy Burgess [and] Donald Maclean … The Tories, knowing that Guy at least has expressed leftwing views in the past, are trying to make political capital out of it [and] some are calling for a witch hunt.’179 In response to the crisis, Morrison appointed a committee of inquiry to investigate the disappearance and its broader implications for the Foreign Office. As Morrison had already told Attlee, events posed the significant problem of how to ‘adequately check’ an individual’s career without adopting a system of screening ‘repugnant to our traditions’.180 On 21 June, nearly a month after the disappearance, Morrison wrote to Attlee that an inquiry was necessary due to the ‘disturbance in the public mind at home’ and broader transatlantic relations. Separate to MI5’s investigations, the inquiry would consider ‘security checks applied to members of the Foreign Service’ and the ‘existing regulations and practice of the Foreign Service in regard to any matters which have a bearing on security’. Because of his knowledge of the Foreign Office, the committee of inquiry was placed under Sir Alexander Cadogan, who

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

176

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

would be aided by Sir Norman Brook and Sir Nevile Bland, formerly British Ambassador to The Hague.181 Formed on 7 July, news of the Cadogan committee was relayed to all heads of mission by Strang, who acknowledged that recent events had caused ‘some disturbance in the public mind and may have embarrassing results on our relations with the United States’, forcing a review of internal security procedure.182 The review was not completed until November 1951, just weeks after the Conservatives were returned to office, and found ‘nothing radically wrong’ with internal Foreign Office security.183 Cadogan gave it lukewarm backing, writing in his diary: ‘I’m afraid it doesn’t help much very effectively’.184 Embarrassingly for the Foreign Office, the report showed that there was a wealth of personal knowledge on the sordid details of the case – drunkenness, violent behaviour and sexual promiscuity – but a marked lack of official knowledge due to a culture of not telling tales. Alongside recommending relatively minor changes to relations between the security and personnel departments and changes to the system of internal reporting, the report focused on the ‘character defects’ of Burgess and Maclean and particularly their ‘homosexual tendencies’. In future, homosexuals should be seen as having the potential to ‘bring discredit on the Service’ and, because homosexuality was illegal in Britain and other countries, homosexuals were ‘especially liable to blackmail, and on this account … a serious security risk’. As such, homosexuals needed to be ‘watched’.185 While the committee suggested no ‘hard-andfast rules’ on the issue, Foreign Office officials were quick to put forward specific guidance to protect the reputation of the Foreign Service from future scandals involving homosexuals, which was approved in May 1952. In the most serious cases, homosexuals would be dealt with under disciplinary regulations and, most probably, removed from the Foreign Office owing to the risk of scandal.186 While Cadogan’s report did not result in any serious changes to security outside the Foreign Office, the Burgess–Maclean affair accelerated the onset of positive vetting and led to a further tripartite Conference on Atomic Energy in London during July 1951. During the conference it was recommended that, in future, ‘no one should be given access to classified atomic energy information unless he has passed an open enquiry into his loyalty, character and background’.187 The recommendations, including a questionnaire into an individual’s background, had previously been seen as objectionable by ministers, but American pressure eventually led to their consideration. In August the proposals were the subject of a report by Winnifrith, who told ministers that they might want to ‘satisfy themselves’ that there were good and valid reasons for a change in policy. The difficulties facing ministers if revised screening

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

177

mechanisms were adopted were manifold, he advised. Communism was not illegal and there were ‘many people who still believe – or say they believe – that adherence to the Communist creed is not incompatible with loyalty to their own country’. In light of the McCarthyite witchhunts taking place across the Atlantic, the new screening procedures could be seen, he warned, as an ‘un-British inquisition’. On the other hand, if the new measures were not adopted Britain would face the ‘risk (we are told the virtual certainty) of losing any chance of American co-operation … in the Atomic Energy field’.188 Faced with the cut-off of US secrets, ministers accepted the new proposals during one of the final Cabinet meetings of the Attlee government on the afternoon of 4 September, though Attlee himself was wary of the measures. The Prime Minister, according to the minutes of the meeting, doubted whether more stringent measures were needed, as the existing ones were ‘as effective as [the] American’ which, in his view, had a ‘tendency to disregard the liberty of the subject’. Despite the concerns it was made clear that, while the adoption of the new procedure would not overturn the McMahon Act, its implementation would ‘improve the atmosphere’. With the nuclear relationship in the balance, ministers agreed in principle to the measures, which were finally adopted by the returning Conservative government in January 1952.189

Conclusion Rather than re-tread the well-covered ground of Nunn May, Fuchs, Pontecorvo, and Burgess and Maclean, this chapter has explored the hitherto neglected facet of ministerial reaction to the espionage scandals. In each case, ministers responded by attempting to play down perceived lapses in British security, in particular defending the activities of MI5 from the organisation’s numerous detractors on both sides of the Atlantic. During the Fuchs and Pontecorvo cases, Attlee and several senior government figures exonerated the Service of any wrongdoing as part of a strategy to restore confidence in British security practices and regain access to the ultimate prize of US nuclear technological and industrial collaboration. After the US McMahon Act of 1946 which banned the transfer of classified atomic information to any foreign country, ministers and officials refused to acknowledge that the Act permanently closed the door to future access. Instead, they ceaselessly sought access to US secrets and, by 1949, were on the verge of obtaining agreement with the US government – an outcome only ended by the case of Klaus Fuchs. After Fuchs, ministers faced a series of crises that

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

178

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

gradually eroded US confidence in Britain’s ability to maintain secrets and undermined the potential for further talks. While partially successful, the British strategy to counter claims of MI5’s incompetence was not enough. Pressure from the US forced a rethink in British vetting procedures after the Anglo-American-Canadian security conference of June 1950. During the final days of the Attlee government, despite concerns about stringent vetting procedures, ministers were eventually forced to accept ‘positive vetting’ in principle, though it was not adopted until 1952. This chapter has also argued that, in each case, there is little evidence to justify attacks on ministerial handling of the successive crises. While it is unclear whether ministers learned to manage each crisis more effectively than the last, they reacted decisively and attempted to restore confidence in British security measures.

Notes 1 KV 4/472, entry for 24 April 1950. 2 Geoffrey Warner (ed.), In the Midst of Events: The Foreign Office Diaries and Papers of Kenneth Younger, February 1950–October 1951 (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 75–6. 3 On Soviet atomic espionage, see Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (London: Penguin, 2000); and John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 33–143. 4 Aid, The Secret Sentry, p. 11. 5 HW 80/5, minutes of inaugural meeting of US-British Signal Intelligence Technical Conference, 11 March 1946. For the actual agreement, see HW 80/4, British-US Communication Intelligence Agreement, 5 March 1946. 6 ‘The Sinews of Peace (“Iron Curtain Speech”)’, 5 March 1946. 7 Andrew, ‘Churchill and Intelligence’, p. 192. 8 On the development of the relationship, see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press); and Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” during the Cold War’, p. 336. 9 During a meeting of the London Signals Intelligence Board in January 1947, Menzies told members of the committee ‘not only that the PM had approved IRSIG but had himself agreed to sign’. (c) Crown Copyright, used by permission of Director GCHQ. 10 See Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, p. 72. On ministerial knowledge, see Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952, Vol. 1: Policymaking (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 5. 11 See Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, pp. 97–101.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

179

12 CAB 130/3, ‘The Atomic Bomb: Memorandum by the Prime Minister’, GEN 75/1, 28 August 1945, reproduced in Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 36–8. 13 ‘Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy’, 3 October 1945, http:// trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=165 (accessed 5 October 2015). 14 For a detailed overview of the case, see Amy Knight, How the Cold War Began: The Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2005); and J. L. Black and Martin Rudner (eds), The Gouzenko Affair: Canada and the Beginnings of Cold War Counter-Espionage (Manotick: Penumbra Press, 2006). 15 KV 2/1425, MacDonald to Cadogan, 10 September 1945. 16 FO 1093/538, Robertson to Cadogan, 9 September 1945. The Soviet source, Kathleen or ‘Kay’ Willsher, codenamed Elli, was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in March 1946 for breaches of the Official Secrets Act. For details, see KV 2/1420, ‘Kathleen (Kay) M. Willsher, cover name “Elli”’. 17 FO 1093/538, Macdonald to Cadogan, 10 September 1945. 18 FO 1093/538, note by Cadogan, 11 September 1945. See also the note by Bromley, dated 13 September 1945. 19 SIS’s involvement concerned individuals in MI5, who believed that the Security Service should take the lead given that events were unfolding in a Commonwealth capital. See KV 2/1421, Hollis to Philby, 19 February 1946. 20 See Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). 21 Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, pp. 36–8. 22 Craig and Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb, pp. 112–13. 23 FO 1093/538, Cadogan to Bevin, 27 September 1945. 24 FO 1093/538, Cadogan to Halifax, 26 September 1945. 25 FO 800/512, The Earl of Halifax (Washington) to Mr. Bevin (received 26 September, 5.27 a.m.), reproduced in DBPO, Series I, Vol. 2, p. 367. 26 See Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America (New York: Random House, 2000). 27 C. P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Vol. 2: 1921–1948. The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 394; KV 2/1425, telegram: GXG 389, 27 September 1945. 28 For an extensive study of the Canadian viewpoint, see Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945–1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). 29 FO 1093/538, Macdonald to Cadogan, 26 September 1945. 30 See the comments scribbled on FO 1093/538, Cadogan to Bevin, 27 September 1945. 31 FO 1093/538, Bromley to Butler, 2 October 1945. 32 Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada, p. 39. 33 FO 1093/538, note on meeting in the Dominions Office, 9 October 1945. 34 FO 1093/538, Bevin to Attlee, 11 October 1945.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

180

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

35 FO 1093/538, note by Attlee, 12 October 1945; Mark Kristmanson, Plateaus of Freedom: Nationality, Culture, and State Security in Canada, 1940–1960 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 153. 36 Michael Jago, Clement Attlee: The Inevitable Prime Minister (London: Biteback, 2014), p. 178. 37 ‘Letter from Mr. Attlee to President Truman’, 25 September 1945, reproduced in DBPO, Series I, Vol. 2, pp. 544–7. 38 FO 1093/538, note by Attlee, 12 October 1945. 39 Jago, Clement Attlee, p. 172. 40 FO 1093/538, Bevin to Attlee, 21 October 1945. The delay also angered senior MI5 officers, particularly Roger Hollis (KV 2/1425, No. 648, Hollis to MI5, 2 November 1945). 41 PREM 8/117, ‘Agreed Declaration by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of Canada’, reproduced in DBPO, Ser. 1 Vol. 2, pp. 618-620. 42 FO 1093/538, Butler to Cadogan, 6 November 1945. See also FO 1093/538, ‘The Corby Case’. 43 FO 1093/538, Butler to Attlee, 13 November 1945 and FO 1093/538, Draft agreement on procedure for dealing with the ‘Corby’ case. 44 FO 1093/538, Butler to Cadogan, 21 November 1945. 45 FO 1093/538, Macdonald to Cadogan, 22 November 1945. 46 FO 1093/538, Butler to Cadogan, 21 November 1945. 47 Craig and Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb, p. 119. 48 Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada, p. 50. 49 FO 1093/538, telegram: New York No. 855, 2 December 1945. 50 FO 1093/538, telegram: New York No. 860, 3 December 1945. 51 FO 1093/538, note by Butler, 6 December 1945. 52 FO 1093/538, Bromley to Cadogan, 21 December 1945. 53 FO 1093/539, NEW YORK, 4 January 1946. 54 FO 1093/539, Cadogan to Bevin, 9 January 1946. 55 FO 1093/539, note by Bromley on the Corby case, 22 January 1946. 56 See Benjamin Ficher, ‘The Gouzenko Affair, the Beginning of the Cold War, and American Counterintelligence’, in Black and Rudner (eds), The Gouzenko Affair, p. 79. 57 FO 1093/539, Macdonald to Cadogan, 13 February 1946. 58 FO 1093/539, Philby to Bromley, 20 February 1946; FO 1093/539, Bromley to Bevin, 21 February 1946. 59 KV 2/2212, statement of Alan Nunn May, 20 February 1946. 60 FO 1093/539, Bromley to Butler, 1 March 1946. 61 FO 1093/539, Corby Case, 1 March 1946. 62 FO 371/56912, Butler to Sargent, 22 July 1946. 63 FO 371/56912, Dixon to Henniker, 22 August 1946. 64 FO 371/56912, minute by Warmer, 30 August 1946. 65 FO 371/56912, note by Dixon, 19 September 1946. 66 The phrase was used by Christopher Thorne to describe British-American

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

181

relations in the Far East; see Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan 1941–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 67 Brian Cathcart, A Test of Greatness: Britain’s Struggle for the Atom Bomb (London: John Murray, 1994), p. 20. 68 CAB 126/303, J.S.M. Washington to Cabinet Office, 21 February 1946. 69 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Public Law 585, 79th Congress, http://www.osti. gov/atomicenergyact.pdf (accessed 30 April 2012). 70 Timothy Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945–1958 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 23. 71 Margaret Gowing, ‘Britain, America and the Bomb’, in Anne Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), p. 41. 72 Botti, The Long Wait, p. 34. 73 CAB 158/3, JIC (48) 9 (0) (Final), ‘Russian Interests, Intentions and Capabilities, 23 July 1948. 74 CAB 128/16, C.M. (49) 53, meeting on 20 August 1949. 75 Michael Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 49. 76 H. Montgomery Hyde, The Atom Bomb Spies (London: Sphere, 1982), p. 144. 77 On Franks, see Michael F. Hopkins, Oliver Franks and the Truman Administration: Anglo-American Relations, 1948–1952 (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 78 FO 115/4477, Franks to Attlee, 19 September 1949. 79 FO 115/4477, Bevin to Franks, 20 September 1949. 80 FO 115/4477, Attlee to Bevin, 20 September 1949. 81 FO 115/4477, Franks to Attlee, 21 September 1949. 82 FO 115/4477, Bevin to Franks, 23 September 1949. 83 FO 115/4477, ‘Statement by the President’, 23 September 1949. 84 CAB 134/22, A.E. (M) (49) 7, ‘Anglo-American-Canadian Talks on 20 September to 3 October, 1949’, 28 October 1949. 85 Norman Moss, Klaus Fuchs (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1987), p. 168; Michael Goodman, ‘With a Little Help from My Friends: The Anglo-American Intelligence Partnership, 1945–1958’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 18:1 (2007). 86 CAB 134/22, A.E.(M)(49)2nd meeting, minutes 1 November 1949. 87 CAB 134/22, A.E.(0)(49)72, Anglo-Canadian-United States tripartite talks, 7 December 1949. 88 For more on the case and wider context, see Michael S. Goodman, ‘Grandfather of the Hydrogen Bomb? Klaus Fuchs and Anglo-American Intelligence’, Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 34:1 (2003), pp. 1–22. 89 Mike Rossiter, The Spy Who Changed the World (London: Headline, 2014), p. 241. On VENONA, see John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

182

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

90 See Michael S Goodman., ‘Who Is Trying to Keep Secrets from Whom and Why? MI5–FBI Relations and the Klaus Fuchs Case’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 7:3 (2005), p. 126. 91 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 367. 92 KV 2/1247, Arnold to Robertson, 24 October 1949. For more details, see Rossiter, The Spy Who Changed the World, pp. 275–6. 93 PREM 8/1279, meeting to discuss the case of Dr Fuchs. 94 PREM 8/1279, note by Helsby, 24 November 1949. 95 KV 2/1249, ‘Emil Julius Klaus FUCHS’, 22 December 1949. 96 KV 2/1249, Emil Julius Klaus FUCHS – Second interview’, 2 January 1950. 97 KV 4/472, entry for 2 January 1950. 98 KV 4/472, entry for 5 January 1950. 99 A full copy of his confession can be found in KV 2/1249. 100 KV 4/472, entry for 2 February 1950. 101 PREM 8/1520, Hoyer-Millar Makins, 2 February 1950. 102 FO 371/82902, Hoyer-Millar to Foreign Office, 3 February 1950. 103 FO 371/82902, ‘Reaction to the Fuchs Case’, 8 February 1950. 104 FO 371/82902, Hoyer-Millar to Foreign Office, 8 February 1950. 105 CAB 301/108, note by Elliott, 9 February 1950. 106 CAB 134/22, meeting, 8 February 1950. 107 On McCarthyism, see David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978). 108 See Michael S. Goodman and Chapman Pincher, ‘Research Note: Clement Attlee, Percy Sillitoe and the Security Aspects of the Fuchs Case’, Contemporary British History, 19:1 (2005). 109 Ibid., pp. 67–77. 110 KV 4/472, entry for 3 March 1950. 111 Hansard, HC Deb., 6 March 1950, vol. 472, col. 72. 112 PREM 8/1279, note by Attlee, 3 March 1950; Graham Farmelo, Churchill’s Bomb: A Hidden History of Science, War and Politics (London: Faber and Faber, 2013), pp. 355–6. 113 Goodman and Pincher, ‘Research Note’, p. 98. 114 FO 371/82903, note by Makins, 3 March 1950. 115 Bower, The Perfect English Spy, p. 97. 116 Goodman, ‘Who Is Trying to Keep Secrets from Whom’, p. 134. 117 KV 4/472, entry for 28 April 1950. 118 KV 4/472, entry for 28 April 1950. 119 KV 4/472, entry for 2 May 1950. On MI5–FBI relations, see Goodman, ‘Who Is Trying to Keep Secrets from Whom’. 120 PREM 8/1279, Sillitoe to Osmond, 16 March 1950. 121 Hansard, HC Deb., 20 March 1950, vol. 472 col. 1545. 122 PREM 8/1280, Leisching to Clutterbuck, 28 March 1950. 123 Hansard, HC Deb., 29 March 1950, vol. 166, cols. 656–8. 124 PREM 8/1280, Attlee to Gordon Walker, 1 April 1950. 125 Hansard, HL Deb., 5 April 1950, vol. 166, col. 817.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

183

126 KV 4/472, entry for 28 April 1950. 127 Michael Newman, John Strachey (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), p. 120. 128 FO 371/81635, Hoyer Miller to Wright, 6 March 1950. On US concerns, see Goodman, ‘Who Is Trying to Keep Secrets from Whom’, p. 143. 129 FO 371/81635, Burrows to Wright, 4 April 1950; FO 371/80671, from Rabat to Foreign Office, 5 April 1950. For further details, see Ken Young, ‘Cold War Insecurities and the Curious Case of John Strachey’, Intelligence and National Security, 29:6 (2014). 130 CAB 134/23, ‘Note of an informal meeting held at 1, Carlton Gardens, S.W.1., on Tuesday, 16 May, 1950’. 131 CAB 126/148, Franks to Makins, 7 March 1950. 132 CAB 134/23, A.E. (M) (50) 6, ‘Resumption of Anglo/American/Canadian Talks’, 21 March 1950. 133 Peter Hennessy and Gail Brownfeld, ‘Britain’s Cold War Security Purge: The Origins of Positive Vetting’, The Historical Journal, 25:4 (1982), p. 969. 134 CAB 134/31, A.E. (0) (50) 8th meeting, 5 July 1950. 135 CAB 120/30, P.V.(50)11, Committee on Positive Vetting; Report, 27 October 1950. 136 CAB 120/30, GEN 183/6, minutes of the Cabinet Committee on Subversive Activities, 13 November 1950. 137 PREM 8/1273, ‘Note on Captain Liddell’s interview with the Prime Minister 23.10.50 regarding the case of Pontecorvo’. 138 For details of the case, see Simone Turchetti, The Pontecorvo Affair: A Cold War Defection and Nuclear Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Frank Close, Half Life: The Divided Life of Bruno Pontecorvo, Physicist or Spy (New York: Basic Books, 2015). 139 PREM 8/1273, B.J.S.M. to Cabinet Office, 21 October 1950. 140 Goodman, ‘The British Government and the Challenge of McCarthyism’, p. 67. 141 Simone Turchetti, ‘Atomic Secrets and Governmental Lies: Nuclear Science, Politics and Security in the Pontecorvo Case’, British Journal for the History of Science, 36:4 (2002), p. 406. 142 FO 371/84837, Franks to Makins, 2 November 1950. 143 Hansard, HC Deb., 23 October 1950, vol. 478, col. 2488. See also Hansard, HC Deb., 6 November 1950, vol. 480, cols. 567–9. 144 On MI5–FBI relations and the Fuchs case, see Goodman, ‘Who Is Trying to Keep Secrets from Whom’, pp. 124–46. 145 KV 2/1888, note of meeting between Sillitoe and Prime Minister, 1 November 1950. 146 KV 2/1526, Sillitoe to Rickett, 12 January 1951. 147 On Davison, see Willi Hager, Hydraulicians in Europe: Volume 2, 1800–2000 (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009), p. 1375. 148 KV 2/1257, Perrin to Hill, 12 March 1951, cited in Goodman and Pincher, ‘Research Note’, p. 145.

184

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

149 150 151 152 153 154

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Goodman, ‘MI5–FBI Relations and the Klaus Fuchs Case’, p. 144. AB 16/1065, Longair to Perrin, 10 April 1951. CAB 126/160, Marten to Makins, 10 April 1951. AB 16/1065, Cockroft to Perrin, 16 April 1951. AB 16/1065, Perrin to Cockcroft, 30 April 1951. CAB 126/148, meeting with Mr Perrin, Sir John Cockcroft and Mr White on 3 May, 1951. 155 AB 16/1065, Rickett to Makins, 19 July 1951. 156 FO 371/93224, record of meeting, 18 July 1952. 157 See Alan Moorehead, The Traitors: The Double Life of Fuchs, Pontecorvo and Nunn May (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952). 158 FO 371/90931, note of conversation between Sir O. Franks, Sir R. Makins and Sir P. Dixon, 20 March 1951; FO 371/90931, ‘Impression of America’, 25 May 1951. 159 Record of meeting, 31 July 1951, obtained using FOIA. 160 Hopkins, Oliver Franks and the Truman Administration, p. 209. 161 BOD, MS. Eng. 6920, ‘Maclean: Burgess: Philby’. 162 LSE, MORRISON/8/5, memorandum titled ‘Burgess and Maclean’, 19 July 1963. A full transcript of the meeting chaired by Reilly and attended by MI5 can be found in KV 6/142, ‘Washington Leakage’, 17 April 1951. 163 Herbert Morrison, Herbert Morrison: An Autobiography (London: Odhams, 1960), p. 276. 164 BOD, MS. Eng. 6920, ‘Maclean: Burgess: Philby’. 165 ENQ/9 ‘Mr. Maclean and Burgess’, obtained using FOIA; record of meeting, 31 July 1951, obtained using FOIA. 166 KV 6/143, ‘Record of a meeting held in Sir William Strang’s office on May 24 1951’. 167 LSE, MORRISON/8/5, memorandum titled ‘Burgess and Maclean’, 19 July 1963; KV 6/143, ‘Record of action taken in the investigation into the Washington leakage on the 28th and 29th May, 1951’. 168 KV 4/473, entry for 14 June 1951. 169 A paper on the case, prepared and submitted to Eden, can be found in FCO 158/27, ‘The Peach Case’. 170 PREM 11/4457, ‘The Philby Case’; LSE, MORRISON/8/5, memorandum titled ‘Burgess and Maclean’, 19 July 1963. 171 Christopher Moran, Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 115–16; Robert Cecil, A Divided Life: A Biography of Donald Maclean (London: Coronet, 1990), p. 213. 172 Barrie Penrose and Simon Freeman, Conspiracy of Silence: The Secret Life of Anthony Blunt (London: Grafton, 1986), p. 387. 173 Jebb to Strang, 8 June 1951, obtained under FOIA. 174 PREM 8/1524, Washington to Foreign Office, 8 June 1951; FO 371/90931, ‘Missing Diplomats’, The Washington Post, 8 June 1951. 175 Anthony Glees, The Secrets of the Service: A Story of Soviet Subversion of Western Intelligence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987), p. 365.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The special relationship?

185

176 PREM 8/1524, Attlee to Morrison, 10 June 1951. 177 CAB 195/9, Cabinet Secretary notebook, 11 June 1951; CAB 128/19, C.M. (51) 42nd conclusions, 11 June 1951. 178 Hansard, HC Deb., 11 June 1951, vol. 488, cols. 1668–75. 179 Warner (ed.), In the Midst of Events, pp. 75–6. 180 PREM 8/1524, Morrison to Attlee, 13 June 1951. 181 PREM 8/1524, Morrison to Attlee, 21 June 1951. 182 LSE, MORRISON/8/5, memorandum titled ‘Burgess and Maclean’, 19 July 1963; circular telegram by Strang, 19 July 1951, obtained under FOIA. 183 Note by Strang, 3 November 1951, obtained under FOIA. 184 CAC, ACAD 1/14, diary entry for 11 October 1951. 185 CAB 301/20, report of Committee of Inquiry. 186 FCO 158/177, Homosexuality in the Foreign Service. 187 CAB 130/20, GEN. 183/12, ‘Atomic Energy Security; Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet’, 15 August 1951. 188 CAB 130/20, GEN. 183/12, ‘Report: Atomic Energy Personnel Security’, 15 August 1951. 189 CAB 128/20, C.M. (51) 58, Cabinet conclusions, 4 September 1951.

6 Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm: Labour ministers, vetting and subversion1 The Communists have no right to the name of socialists or Communists. They are Stalinists. Whatever Stalin says is right for them … The British Communist Party is in fact merely the dummy of the ventriloquist Stalin and if someone were to replace Stalin with another policy they would swing round without a murmur. They have in fact surrendered their liberty.2 Clement Attlee, January 1940

Despite their involvement in the wartime coalition government, it has been argued that the Labour leadership were suspicious of the Security Service when they entered office in the summer of 1945. In fact, rather than viewing the Service with disdain, Labour ministers saw MI5 as an important instrument of government. While it has been suggested elsewhere that ministers were largely ambivalent about the threat of communist espionage and subversion, any reluctance to implement overt vetting before 1948 was the result of political constraints. In spite of political pressure, the Attlee government secretly planned and, later, implemented extensive vetting in the Civil Service, first ‘negative’, and then ‘positive’, as well as changes in industry aimed at combating communist influence. While largely focused on vetting, ministers also, despite their initial reservations, authorised domestic anti-communist propaganda work, leading to the formation of the Committee on Communism (Home) in response to fears of communist agitation aimed at sabotaging British economic recovery and damaging rearmament efforts following the start of the Korean War in June 1950. Once again, ministers faced a difficult balancing act between implementing anti-communist measures and freedom of expression and civil liberties.

The Labour government and MI5 Labour’s landslide victory in the summer of 1945 reportedly posed problems for MI5 which had experienced an ‘uneasy relationship’ with

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

187

the party since the Zinoviev Letter affair.3 Like other members of government, Attlee was, allegedly, ‘suspicious’ of MI5 and, influenced by his wartime experiences, believed that it ‘was a secret conservative group with a historic mission to destabilise the Left’. Now in office, he tried to ensure that the organisation was friendly to ‘Labour’s cause’.4 The party’s sensitivities were, supposedly, revived during the election campaign by a broadcast by Churchill in which he argued that, if elected, a Labour government would introduce a Gestapo to ‘nip opinion in the bud’.5 According to several accounts, the speech prompted the new government to keep ‘tight control of MI5’ with Attlee appointing Sir Percy Sillitoe – a ‘candidate of his choice’ – as Director General.6 For senior MI5 officers, including Dick White and ‘Tar’ Robertson, the appointment was a vote of no confidence; both believed that MI5’s internal candidate, Guy Liddell, should have been given the job.7 In private, White believed that Sillitoe was ‘frequently wrong’ while J. C. Masterman, recently retired from MI5, saw the appointment as a ‘disaster’.8 Disappointed not to become Director General, Liddell himself confided to his diary that: the appointment seems to me to be a bad one for the following reasons: (1) it is a mistake to appoint a policeman since the work of this office is entirely different from police work. (2) It puts the stamp of the Gestapo on the office. (3) It creates a false impression in the minds of police forces generally and of the Services that MI5 is a kind of police dept. (4) It generally down-grades the office.9

Menzies told Liddell that the appointment ‘constituted a down-grading of MI5 and was undesirable in that it gave it a police stamp’.10 Nonetheless, while some on Labour’s backbenchers may have harboured suspicions, the party leadership fully appreciated MI5’s value.11 While Sillitoe’s appointment has often been seen as a case of prime ministerial patronage, the appointment, in fact, came at the end of a lengthy interview process in which Attlee played no part. In October 1945, following the decision of Sir David Petrie, MI5’s Director General since 1942, to retire, Attlee authorised Sir Edward Bridges to ‘arrange for a small committee to make recommendations as to who should be Petrie’s successor’. Bridges subsequently wrote to several departments, including the Home Office and War Office, to collect the names of potential nominees and, in early November, Sir Alexander Maxwell, Permanent Under-Secretary for the Home Office, wrote to Sillitoe asking whether he could be considered for the position.12 Other candidates included Sir Archibald Hordern, Chief Constable of Lancashire Police; Major General Francis Davidson, formerly Director of Military

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

188

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Intelligence; and Major General Sir Walter Cawthorn, Director of Military Intelligence at General Headquarters, India. The shortlist was narrowed down in early November during a meeting chaired by Bridges, attended by Petrie, Cadogan and others. Petrie used the meeting as an opportunity to circulate a paper on the necessary qualifications for the job, based on an earlier note by his predecessor, Sir Vernon Kell, suggesting that a successful candidate needed awareness of all three armed services, knowledge of the powers and duties of the civil police, immigration and custom authorities, general legal knowledge and practical experience of defence and police intelligence, with the armed services and colonial police seen as a fertile area for candidates.13 During the meeting Hordern, Davidson and several others were removed from the list and a new, revised set of candidates was compiled, including Sir Denys Pilditch, until recently director of the Delhi Intelligence Bureau; Major General Sir William Penny, formerly Director of Intelligence, South-East Asia; Kenneth Strong, Eisenhower’s one-time intelligence chief; Air Marshall Victor Goddard, formerly of South East Asia Command; Sillitoe; and, contrary to popular belief, Liddell.14 The list was narrowed down during subsequent interviews. On 9 November a panel consisting of Bridges, Cadogan and Ismay met Penny and Strong.15 Cadogan wrote in his diary that the latter was ‘the better, but didn’t much plump for either of them’.16 Five days later, on 14 November, the panel, now joined by Sir Findlater Stewart, formerly of the Security Executive, again met to interview several other candidates, including Liddell who was asked ‘what I had done during the last 25 years’.17 Sillitoe was also interviewed. ‘We were unanimous’, Cadogan wrote, ‘in choosing Sillitoe’ who, interestingly, fitted the job specification set out by Petrie.18 Having been a senior police officer, Sillitoe had all-round knowledge of the powers and duties of the civil police, legal expertise and, importantly, overseas experience, having served in the British South African and Northern Rhodesia police, and as a political officer in Tanganyika (1916–20).19 Returning to Britain, he had become Chief Constable for Sheffield in 1926 and, five years later, for Glasgow, where he had clamped down on violent knife crime. He received his final police appointment in 1943, as Chief Constable for Kent, before taking over as Director General in the spring of 1946.20 Liddell was overlooked for practical rather than political reasons, being appointed deputy Director General. As his wartime diary reveals, it was believed that he was ‘more suited’ to intelligence work than ‘the administrative’ side and was, even by his own admission, ‘not a very good organiser’.21 Within MI5 there was, Liddell frankly admitted, ‘nobody else’.22 Claims that the Labour leadership were ‘anti-intelligence’ are hard

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

189

to support, though MI5 officers may have been concerned by a Labour government. In the inter-war period, MI5 had carried out blanket surveillance of the leadership of the Communist Party, its membership and associated organisations, including the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement, Friends of the Soviet Union and the Independent Labour Party.23 As a result, files had been made on several Labour backbenchers and, more embarrassingly, ministers in government, including John Strachey, Attlee’s Under-Secretary of State for Air. In August 1945, realising the sensitive nature of the file, one MI5 officer noted ‘there is now no longer any justification for its continued existence … The retention of his file would therefore seem to be justifiable only on a historical extreme case’ though the file remained in MI5’s registry.24 Another prominent member of the government with an MI5 file was Sir Stafford Cripps, appointed President of the Board of Trade in July 1945, and a wartime Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who had earlier called for a ‘united front’ with the Communist Party and ILP, leading to his expulsion from Labour in 1939. The file had been opened in 1932 and covered his support for the Popular Front Movement and close contact with the Communist Party.25 Concern about MI5’s counter-subversive remit, particularly its political ramifications, were aired by Sir Findlater Stewart, who had been asked to review MI5’s post-war activities. During a conversation in May 1945, Stewart had told Liddell about his concern that ‘Dalton or someone even more to the Left might insist on examining’ MI5’s records and, if these ‘were not confined strictly to people advocating the overthrow of the constitution by violence’, MI5 would be in ‘serious trouble’. In trying to ease Stewart’s concerns, Liddell explained that Labour were ‘more interested’ in using MI5’s resources ‘than the Conservatives’.26 By all accounts, Attlee had an excellent working relationship with the new Director General. Sillitoe had a direct right of access to Downing Street and saw the Prime Minister more frequently than any of his successors.27 The cause of this relationship is unclear, though Attlee developed a close interest in MI5, even writing the foreword to Sillitoe’s autobiography, Cloak Without Dagger. Attlee was also the first Prime Minister to visit MI5’s headquarters, and during his visit he was ‘in extremely good form, firing questions at everybody and telling stories’.28 In December 1948 Bridges also wrote that the Prime Minister took ‘great interest in the Security Service’.29 Contact was regular. In a diary entry for February 1946, Liddell wrote that the Director General would see Attlee ‘at least once a fortnight’ and Sillitoe’s right of access to Downing Street was subsequently confirmed by a directive issued in May 1946.30 One of these meetings was documented by Liddell, who

190

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

often stood in for Sillitoe. ‘I went to see the P.M. at 9.30’. Attlee was ‘in the Cabinet Room huddled up in his chair and, I thought, in a somewhat exhausted condition’, having recently dealt with a backbench rebellion against government foreign policy. During the meeting Attlee lived up to his terse character, with Liddell writing: I found the P.M. an extremely difficult man to talk to. He was, of course, tired, but he hardly ever responded. You say your piece and when you come to the end there is a long pause – you then begin the next item on the agenda. I think it is to some extent due to his curious shyness, which he radiates, and, indeed, imparts on his visitors. He does not often look you in the face… After I had finished my piece there was a further pause …31

After another meeting with the Prime Minister, Liddell wrote ‘Generally speaking he was his usual self, uncommunicative and unresponsive, but quite pleasant.’32 A subject of particular interest to Attlee was communist penetration of Parliament, particularly the Labour Party. Following the 1945 election, it has been claimed that ‘a dozen of the 393 Labour MPs were either secret CP members or were close to the CP’.33 On the morning after the election, the editor of the Communist Party newspaper the Daily Worker, Douglas Hyde, received a call from one communist who ‘announced himself as the new Labour member for his constituency’. Hyde estimated there were ‘at least eight or nine cryptos’ in the House of Commons, with two publicly acknowledged Communist MPs, Willie Gallagher and Philip Piratin.34 In November 1946 Liddell recorded that Attlee wanted any ‘positive information’ that a Member of Parliament was part of a ‘subversive organisation’. Liddell believed that Attlee felt a responsibility to the ‘country to see that such members did not get into positions where they might constitute a danger’.35 Under this arrangement, in 1947 Liddell gave Attlee: the names of [John] PLATTS-MILLS, [Lester] HUTCHINSON, Leah MANNING and Mrs. [Elizabeth] BRADDOCK. He was not surprised to hear about HUTCHINSON, and had already taken for granted that PLATTS-MILLS was a C.P. member. He was, however, considerably shaken to hear of Leah MANNING and Mrs. BRADDOCK. He then volunteered the information to me that he thought [Norman] DODDS was a C.P. member; that [Stephen] SWINGLER probably was, and that D.N. PRITT almost certainly was.

At the end of the meeting, Liddell disclosed that MI5 had ‘positive proof’ in the cases of Platts-Mills, Hutchinson, Manning, Braddock and Geoffrey Bing, even if some of the information was circumstantial.36

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

191

MI5’s evidence against Elizabeth ‘Bessie’ Braddock was weak; she had been a member of the Communist Party, but her flirtation was brief. In 1924 she re-joined Labour and was selected as candidate for Liverpool Exchange, being elected in 1945; ironically in light of the allegations, she was attacked by constituents for being too ‘right wing’.37 Similarly, the information on Manning was feeble. She had been elected MP for Islington East but had lost her seat at the 1931 election, serving on Labour’s National Executive Committee. She was an active anti-fascist and had become the joint secretary of the Co-ordinating Committee against War and Fascism with John Strachey, angering Morrison who believed she was a ‘member of the communist party’.38 Like many on the left, she had visited the Soviet Union but returned to Britain at the start of the Spanish Civil War, becoming secretary of the Spanish Medical Aid Committee, formed in August 1936. Manning was elected MP for Epping at the 1945 election.39 Attlee’s evidence against Norman Dodds, MP for Dartford, was similarly weak, and it is unclear whether MI5 took these concerns any further.40 A follow-up note by MI5’s Graham Mitchell informed Sillitoe that there was ‘no reasonable doubt’ that ‘John PLATTS-MILLS, Geoffrey BING and Stephen SWINGLER’ were involved in the Communist Party. MI5 sources indicated that PlattsMills was ‘still in the Party’ while Bing was ‘known to be a subscribing member as late as the beginning of 1945’. The evidence against Swingler was less convincing; he had been a ‘member as late as June 1943’.41 Platts-Mills was later removed from the party and along with other suspected ‘crypto-communists’ – Lester Hutchinson and Leslie Solley – voted against Marshall Aid, taking the Communist Party line on the Yugoslav-Soviet split before standing as Independent Labour candidates in 1950.42 Geoffrey Bing, Labour MP for Hornchurch, was a particular concern. Bing had read history at Lincoln College, Oxford, and had been called to the Bar in 1934, coming to MI5’s attention because of his work for the National Council for Civil Liberties. In 1938 he was a member of the CPGB’s secret legal group, but, in wartime, he served with the Royal Signals, rising to the rank of major. There was ‘no real evidence of any subversive attitude or propaganda’.43 In May 1945 Bing’s communist past prevented him from working in army education, and MI5’s Desmond Orr, referring to Bing, suggested that Attlee, in the dying days of the wartime coalition, should be told that ‘certain Communists were now seeking Parliamentary representation in the guise of genuine Labour candidates’, although Orr believed ‘the protection of the Labour Party fortress was … no concern’ to MI5.44 Bing served briefly as a junior whip, though unsurprisingly his communist past was the focus of

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

192

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

renewed attention from MI5 and, this time, Attlee when, in late 1946, the Foreign Office received information about his past.45 The allegations were subsequently brought to the attention of the Secretary of State for War, Fredrick Bellenger, in a note from Attlee suggesting ‘that BING had abused his position during the war in giving away military information to the Communists’.46 During a meeting with Bellenger, Liddell expressed his shock that MI5 had not been directly consulted on the matter by the Prime Minister, though, at a later meeting, Bellenger was provided with details on Bing’s wartime service and MI5’s information which showed he had not ‘abused his position as an officer to communicate information to the Communist Party but that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that he was actually a member of the C.P.’47 Another Labour MP with a hidden past was Wilfred Foulston Vernon, MP for Dulwich, formerly of the RAF and Royal Aircraft Establishment, who had been spying for Soviet intelligence. Vernon was a suspected pro-Soviet MP and had been included on a list of so-called ‘Lost Sheep’ by Labour’s General Secretary.48 In October 1937 he had been removed from his position at RAE and charged under the Official Secrets Act after failing to take ‘reasonable care’ of secret documents, but by 1948 MI5 had obtained new information that possession of these documents was ‘part of a far more sinister design’. Evidence of Vernon’s duplicity came from a former spy, Ernest Weiss, who admitted during interrogation to having passed aircraft blueprints to his Soviet handler, though he ‘was frequently taken to task … for the poor quality of the information’.49 When briefed about the allegations, Attlee was ‘shocked at its contents’ which came as a ‘complete surprise’ to him.50 MI5 also held files on other Labour MPs, though it is unclear whether Attlee was ever told about their existence. Embarrassingly, the Service received Special Branch reports on Labour’s chair, Harold Laski, who had frequently clashed with Attlee on party policy, while another target of ‘considerable security notice’ was Fenner Brockway, a life-long left-wing activist with close connections to the Communist Party, who re-joined the Labour Party in 1947, being elected MP for Eton and Slough in 1950.51 The Prime Minister also received information on the general activities of communists.52 In November 1947 Attlee informed Sillitoe of his anxieties about the communists: ‘he thought’, Liddell recorded, ‘they were deliberately promoting strikes to sabotage the Royal Wedding’.53 During a meeting at Downing Street, Sillitoe told the Prime Minister that MI5 ‘had quite a number of agents in the Communist Party who were well placed … The P.M. seemed particularly pleased about this.’54 Another major concern also appears to have been the post-war revival

Defending the realm

193

of fascism, which Attlee raised on several occasions.55 In a diary entry in March 1948, Liddell wrote that the Prime Minister had:

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

asked about the Fascists. I told him there was really little to report. Mosley was surrounded by entirely insignificant people, although he himself still had certain powers as an orator … I then told him about the attempt by the Jews in America to provoke Mosley into some financial arrangement with American big business. The P.M. was quite amused by this.56

Almost a year later, in February 1949, Attlee again raised the issue with Sillitoe who, Liddell noted, reported that the Prime Minister was anxious to know about Mosley’s ‘recent activities’.57 The impetus for reform of MI5 came not from Attlee or his ministerial colleagues, but from a review carried out by Findlater Stewart.58 The review originated from a report on SIS’s post-war organisation by Sir Nevile Bland, which drew attention to the ‘duplication’ of counterintelligence work between MI5 and SIS, and suggested that a ‘special inquiry’ was needed to resolve the issue.59 Stewart’s report looked at far more than inter-service liaison, discussing a variety of subjects including oversight, surveillance and MI5’s own substantial records.60 Completed in November 1945, copies of the report were restricted to the ‘smallest number of people’ including Attlee, Bevin, Morrison and the new postwar Home Secretary, Chuter Ede.61 The majority of the report looked at the post-war functions of the Security Service, with Stewart suggesting that, while it had worked well in wartime, MI5 needed to be ‘used for one purpose, and one purpose only – “the Defence of the Realm”’ to avoid any future political scandal. The statement became the guiding principle of the Service, later reiterated by the Conservative Home Secretary, David Maxwell Fyfe, in 1952.62 Another focus for Stewart was ministerial responsibility. It was ‘constitutionally right’ that MI5 should have a ‘responsible Ministerial head’ with the report suggesting that, given the focus on ‘defence’, the Service needed to be responsible to the ‘Minister of Defence, or, if there is no Minister of Defence, the Prime Minister’.63 The report was not discussed at a ministerial level until March 1946, prior to Petrie’s retirement. The minutes of the meeting contradict suggestions that ministers were inherently opposed to the Security Service or that officials had, according to one source, to ‘fight hard for MI5’s corner’.64 During the meeting, Attlee said there was ‘general agreement’ with Stewart’s suggestion that an organisation was required to ‘detect attempts to penetrate our defence organisation’, unconnected with the general machinery of government or police, and ‘free from any connection with political parties’. His comments received ‘general agreement’

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

194

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

from those present, though Bevin, responsible for SIS, raised objections to suggestions that MI5 could raise the subject of setting up overt counter-intelligence contacts with foreign countries, insisting that on matters affecting ‘the Foreign Office or SIS, no action should be taken except after consultation’.65 It was also agreed that Attlee, continuing Churchill’s precedent of serving as his own Minister of Defence pending reorganisation of the three Service ministries into a combined Ministry of Defence, would become ministerial head of the Service.66 Following the meeting, a directive was issued to Sillitoe setting out MI5’s functions. The document went through numerous drafts, with Attlee giving Bridges ‘various suggestions’ on the final wording of the paper.67 The edits show that the Prime Minister took great care in defining MI5’s role and its relationship with Downing Street. In one suggestion, Attlee explained that the Director General should ‘keep the Prime Minister constantly informed of subversive activities likely to endanger the security of the State’, while in another, clearly drawing on Stewart’s report, Attlee told Bridges: It is essential that the Security Service should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or political influence. It is concerned with the Defence of the Realm as a whole. No action should be taken that would give colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular section.

The directive also stressed that MI5 would not become involved in ‘criminal matters’.68 The document was sent to Sillitoe once he became Director General. Dated April 1946, this final directive underlined that Sillitoe was ‘responsible to the Prime Minister’ and that MI5’s role: is the Defence of the Realm as a whole, from external and internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of persons and organisations, whether directed from within or without the country, which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the State. In consultation with the Colonial Office you will be responsible for similar work in Colonial and other British territories overseas.

Sillitoe would be required to take ‘special care’ to ensure that MI5’s work was limited to ‘what is necessary for the purposes of this task, and that you are at all times fully aware of the extent of its activities’ and the Service’s archive would need to be weeded of all unnecessary material. It was also important that the Service be ‘kept absolutely free from any political bias’ and avoid any activity leading to allegations that it was ‘concerned with the interests of any particular section of the community’.69

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

195

At times Attlee was in danger of breaching his own guidelines. In May 1946 Liddell wrote in his diary that the Prime Minister wanted MI5 to investigate the leaking of Cabinet papers, with the security of Cabinet documents a particular concern of his.70 Liddell recorded in his diary that the leaks covered ‘iron and steel reports and the 3rd related to atomic research’, with Attlee reportedly ‘very concerned’. The Lord Chancellor had been asked to investigate, with MI5 called in to help. While it was the only organisation equipped to investigate, Liddell wrote that the request was a ‘pretty wide interpretation of the PMs new directive’ and that the Service should be given a note from the Cabinet Office requesting that the leaks be investigated, though it is unclear whether any investigation took place.71 Attlee’s responsibility for MI5 was only questioned in 1948 when it was suggested that responsibility should be transferred to the Ministry of Defence, following MI5’s objections to not being consulted over plans to abolish visas for American citizens. While strongly opposed, the Service had ‘no opportunity to express their views’ before the policy was approved and pressed for access to the Cabinet agenda, a request that was subsequently turned down as it was considered unwise for MI5 to pick and choose areas of policy that concerned them.72 In the short term, Bridges resisted change by arguing that the arrangement worked ‘very well’, though questions about Attlee’s continued control of MI5 returned following Sir Norman Brook’s review of Britain’s intelligence agencies in 1951.73 At home, Brook believed there was ‘practically nothing’ wrong with MI5.74 Operationally, the Service was in a ‘healthy condition’ and there was an ‘atmosphere of vigorous and purposeful direction’, but Brook was less than impressed with ministerial oversight, suggesting, instead, that control of MI5 needed to be transferred to the Home Secretary as ‘the functions of the Security Service are much more closely allied to those of the Home Office’. MI5 would also receive ‘advice and assistance’ from a Permanent Under-Secretary, which it had lacked under Attlee, although, as Brook recognised, the Director General could always arrange a personal interview with the Prime Minister to ‘discuss the general state of his work’.75 The proposals met opposition during the first and only meeting in his room in the House of Commons of GEN 371, Attlee’s committee to discuss the Brook report. Attlee repeated one of Brook’s arguments that it was a ‘disadvantage that the Prime Minister should be drawn directly … into Parliamentary discussion of such failures and mistakes by the Security Service’. Supported by the Home Secretary, Attlee criticised the proposal, as:

196

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

[o]ne advantage of the present arrangements was that the Prime Minister in answering Questions in Parliament about the Service could quite properly refuse to be drawn into questions of detail. Moreover, it was the business of the Home Secretary, as the protector of the rights of citizens under the law, to consider with an independent mind requests from the Security Service for action to be taken by the Police. He could not discharge this function so well if he were also responsible for the Service making the request for action.76

Attlee’s opposition may have stemmed from more than just his ability to defend MI5. By 1951 he had developed a close working relationship with Sillitoe and took ‘great interest’ in MI5’s work.77 Attlee may have aired his concerns about relinquishing responsibility to Brook himself. In May Brook had written a private letter for Attlee setting out his argument that MI5 should be moved to the Home Secretary, but adding that ‘I am a little worried lest you should think that I put forward a formal recommendation to this effect in my Report … without taking adequate steps to ascertain your own views on a matter involving your personal jurisdiction’.78 Details of Attlee’s continued opposition to Brook’s proposal remain scant; during a discussion on ministerial responsibility in March 1951, Sillitoe told Liddell he was seeing Attlee on the issue and that ‘if the P.M. said that he wished the Department to remain under himself, that would be the end of the matter’.79 Brook’s proposal was ‘not welcomed’ by Sillitoe.80 Following the discussion, Sillitoe saw Attlee with a paper setting out the ‘main point – that we [MI5] did not wish to be departmentalised, since we had business with all Departments’. According to Liddell’s note of the meeting, Attlee was ‘receptive and, generally speaking, in agreement’.81 In the event, ministerial responsibility for MI5 was not changed until after the General Election, and it fell to the incoming Conservative government to implement Brook’s suggestion. In November, shortly after Churchill had entered Downing Street, Brook wrote to the Prime Minister that the issue had sparked ‘a certain amount of argument’ but that, given his ‘pre-occupations’, he ‘should not retain responsibility’.82 Churchill informed his Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, of the change in February 1952, with Maxwell-Fyfe left to issue a directive placing the Service under Home Office control.83

Fascists and communists On coming to office ministers feared the re-emergence of the pre-war threat of fascism.84 In December, responding to a large meeting of fas-

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

197

cists addressed by Sir Oswald Mosley, ministers approved the formation of a committee on fascism, GEN 110, chaired by the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Jowitt..85 During its first meeting in January 1946, Emanuel Shinwell, after reading an MI5 assessment, told the committee that the movement ‘was split into a large number of factions, which seemed, fortunately, to be at loggerheads with each other’, although the increase of fascist agitation was worrying because of its impact abroad. Chuter Ede was invited to arrange for MI5 to give ‘special attention’ to the collection of information on fascist organisations, their leading personalities and sources of income and, in April, the committee completed a report which was submitted to Cabinet.86 Based on MI5’s information, it reported there was ‘no single fascist movement’ but a series of small organisations with limited membership which were, due to their extreme policies, unlikely to receive broad support, with the report concluding that fascism, rather than posing a significant threat, would be a source of public disorder.87 By contrast, communism was a growing concern. The ‘red menace’ had dominated the work of Britain’s internal security agencies for much of the inter-war period and, in wartime, despite the wider Anglo-Soviet alliance, had continued to be a concern for MI5. Morrison had recognised the threat as a long-standing opponent of the Communist Party, and had circulated reports to the War Cabinet based on MI5’s information, though calls to tighten security standards in government following the Springhall case fell on deaf ears. Ministers in the new government were also aware of the threat of Soviet-inspired espionage following the defection of Igor Gouzenko, which provided evidence of Soviet intelligence operations in the West. The threat of Soviet espionage was further highlighted in a report by the JIC in September 1946 which stressed that the disbandment of the Comintern in May 1943 had had ‘no effect on the cohesion and discipline of the Communist movement’. While there were ‘minor tactical differences’, the communist movement acted as a ‘single whole’ with party members considered as ‘instruments of Soviet policy, if necessary at the expense of their own “bourgeois” Governments’. Communist parties provided a ‘ready field of recruitment for agents and informants prepared to serve the Soviet Union’, and communism, the committee stressed, was the ‘most important external political menace confronting the British Commonwealth and Western Democracies’. In Britain, the party was relatively strong in the labour movement, enabling activists to ‘obtain high positions in a number of Unions’ with a further assessment suggesting that, in the event of war, communists in industry would be a willing ‘fifth column’.88 Several members of the executive committee

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

198

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) were avowed communists and the party was well represented among shop stewards.89 As a former head of TGWU, Bevin was fully aware of the threat and kept a ‘list of leading Communists on the clandestine role, including some MPs’ in his desk drawer at the House of Commons.90 Beyond industry, the CPGB had considerable presence in ‘the Government Machine’, including ‘a few civil servants’, who could pass on official information and could potentially turn into a ‘source of danger’.91 In its September assessment the JIC believed it was ‘essential that some immediate counter-action should be taken’.92 Overseas, Bevin and Attlee gave tacit support to propaganda in important areas threatened by Soviet propaganda, particularly Persia, Austria and Germany, as well as ‘defensive action’ against specific attacks, by publicising the progressive social policies of the Labour government, both at home and overseas.93 Domestically, efforts were made to protect Britain’s ‘secret state’ from the prying eyes of communists and ‘fellow travellers’.

Negative vetting The JIC’s analysis of the threat posed by communists prompted ministerial discussion. On 6 January 1947 Attlee chaired a one-off ad hoc committee, GEN 164, which included Chuter Ede, McNeil and Alexander, which agreed that a working party of officials should be formed to advise a special ‘Cabinet Committee on Subversive Activities’.94 Known as GEN 183, this committee met for the first time in June under the chairmanship of Alexander and discussed a report which considered the introduction of vetting procedures in government.95 Its attention was drawn to fact that Soviet-inspired espionage was by no means new; MI5 believed ‘the Communist organisation, which has foreign support, and is subservient to a foreign power, at present constitutes the principal dangers’.96 During the war, CPGB membership had increased from 22,000 at the end of 1941 to 53,000 some four months later, before slowly tailing off afterwards.97 This dramatic expansion posed a significant problem, with membership broadening to the ‘professional classes’, including scientists and civil servants, giving the CPGB access to ‘more secret information’ than the pre-war membership.98 Party membership was estimated to be 43,500, with a further 2,000 members of the Young Communist League, plus an unknown number of ‘secret members’. Most were concerned with ‘domestic policy’, with the party largely seen as ‘political’, conducting ‘subversive and conspiratorial’ activities to a ‘secondary degree’. For MI5 it was the minority – the ‘brains of the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

199

Communist Party’ – made up of ‘University students and graduates, civil servants and members of the professions’ which posed a threat, sharing the ‘ideological conception of international communism’.99 While there was no hard evidence, officials presumed that the Soviets had tried to develop an intelligence network on similar lines to the one uncovered during the Gouzenko affair.100 The Springhall case had also highlighted the threat of ‘Communist and Russian-inspired espionage’ with the conviction of Nunn May showing that the Soviets were interested in a ‘range of information’ including military secrets, scientific information and industrial intelligence.101 Present security measures were far from watertight. Current vetting was reliant on MI5’s records, which, while extensive, were not considered ‘exhaustive’, containing many gaps, particularly regarding information on the Young Communist League. Checks using MI5’s records would only reveal whether an individual had come to the attention of MI5 or not, and government departments were vulnerable to ‘undercover’ members of the CPGB. As a result, ministers were told that security screening needed to be ‘considerably tightened up’, though this would, naturally, pose problems, as CPGB membership was not illegal and there would be considerable objections to a peacetime policy of penalising individuals who had been, or were, members of the CPGB. In trying to guide ministers, officials devised a new definition of loyalty, placing emphasis on loyalty to ‘the State’ which had ‘a right – indeed the duty to protect itself by ensuring that its interests are not endangered by the employment of persons who may not accept this view of their obligations’. While not all communists would be actively disloyal, recent events in Canada had ‘demonstrated … the only safe course’ was to decide that ‘a member of the Communist Party is not to be employed on work where he may have access to secret information’. In future, Whitehall departments would be placed into ‘safe’ or ‘unsafe’ categories, shielding departments engaged in sensitive or highly classified work, though officials recognised that, whatever the procedure adopted, the safeguards would not be wholly watertight.102 During the first meeting of GEN 183, ministers generally agreed that communists ‘should not be employed on work where they might have access to secret information’, with discussion turning to the areas where the non-communist rule would apply and how the new procedures would be presented to the Civil Service unions.103 It was decided that fascists would also be banned, with ministers agreeing that ‘members of all subversive organisations of the Right or Left should continue to be subject to security scrutiny and should not be employed on work involving access to secret information’. The measures discussed were calm

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

200

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

and rational, countering suggestions that the government was somehow ‘obsessed by the red menace’.104 There was not to be, as happened in the United States, a McCarthyite witch-hunt, and a ‘no martyrs’ policy limited the number of civil servants sacked from their posts, with communists found ‘work which was entirely non-secret, e.g. in some of the Accounting and Stores branches’. Only in a limited number of cases would individuals be sacked.105 Ministers later rejected proposals from Sir Waldron Smithers, the Conservative MP for Orpington, that a committee on ‘Un-British Activities’ be formed for a McCarthyite ‘showdown’.106 The vetting arrangements were described as ‘rudimentary, almost naive’, balancing an employee’s rights along with the need for security.107 Although the system undoubtedly had its flaws, remaining heavily reliant on MI5’s records, the mould that was to shape vetting for the remainder of the Cold War had been formed and the threat to Britain’s ‘secret state’ identified. In late December Alexander forwarded GEN 183’s conclusions to Attlee, writing that ministers agreed with ‘many of the ideas in the report’. However, he thought that in ‘some respects’ the recommendations went ‘too far … at the present time’, although the government would ‘have to take a stronger line at a later date’. Essentially the proposals were that ‘no civil servant … known to be a member … of parties countenancing subversive activities should be employed on work on which he has access to really secret information’.108 Attlee gave his unequivocal backing to the plans the following day, writing: ‘We cannot afford to take risks here, and the general public will support us. Fellow travellers may protest, but we should face up to this. Action should be taken in regard to Fascists as well as Communists’ – a statement clearly at odds with the suggestion that he ‘brooded’ over the matter ‘for some months’.109 Like many of his ministers, Attlee had a deep-rooted suspicion of ‘fellow travellers’ and had attacked the CPGB as the ‘dummy of the ventriloquist Stalin’ during a speech to Labour Party activists in 1940.110 In 1953, angered by criticisms of Labour’s security record, Attlee wrote that the party had ‘nearly forty years [experience] of fighting Communism in Britain’.111 Labour had been at the forefront of the fight against communism throughout the inter-war period, and, since the 1920s, had sought to minimise the influence of the CPGB, rejecting successive attempts by the party to affiliate with Labour.112 As Sillitoe himself acknowledged, the Labour Party was ‘strongly opposed to Communism’.113 In 1946 Labour rejected calls by the CPGB leadership for a ‘progressive alliance’ by publishing a pamphlet titled The Secret Battalion, attacking the CPGB as ‘a conspiracy’.114 Attlee resisted affiliation by claiming that the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

201

‘aims and methods of the Communist Party’ were substantially different from Labour’s and aimed ‘at the “Dictatorship of the Proletariat”’.115 Senior party figures were also wary; Labour’s General Secretary, Morgan Phillips, kept a ‘Lost Sheep’ file on alleged pro-Soviet Labour MPs, with several – Bing, Swingler, Hutchinson and Vernon – having already come to MI5’s attention.116 In December 1947, during a meal with Mayhew, Attlee suggested that ‘about six of our cryptos should be sacked’.117 In 1949 several left-wing MPs were thrown out, including Konni Zilliacus, the outspoken MP for Gateshead.118 Despite his own assertion that he was not affiliated to the CPGB, Zilliacus was sympathetic to Soviet policy and frequently attacked the government for taking ‘the American lead’ and ‘betraying the workers of Europe at the bidding of American big business’.119 In 1951, when Zilliacus was attempting to gain readmission to the party, Bevin requested information on ‘what ZILLIACUS had been doing since he was expelled from the Labour Party, and the extent of his connection with the Communist Party’, though it is unclear what information, if any, MI5 was able to provide.120 The introduction of government vetting was announced in the House of Commons on 15 March 1948.121 While suggesting that the government was defending Whitehall from right and left extremists, Attlee made it clear that ‘membership of, and other forms of continuing association with, the Communist Party may involve the acceptance by the individual of a loyalty, which in certain circumstances can be inimical to the State’.122 The new procedure provoked intense hostility from many on the left; Harry Pollitt, the General Secretary of the CPGB, unsurprisingly denounced the purge as a ‘political measure carried out for political ends, to win the approval of the Tory Party and Wall Street’, while Harold Davis, the left-wing Labour MP for Leek, attacked the policy as ‘witch hunting’, with forty-three Labour MPs supporting a motion condemning the policy as a ‘departure from the principles of democracy’.123 While Attlee received broad support from the national press and the Conservative Party, a debate on the ‘purge procedure’ was forced on the government a few days later, during which Willie Gallacher, the Communist MP for West Fife, attacked the policy, claiming that the government was selling out to the ‘Big Dollar boys of America’. This provoked Attlee to dismiss the speech as ‘the usual Communist statements’.124 There would be no ‘general purge’ and a board of retired civil servants would be formed to protect the rights of the accused, with the policy implemented with ‘the greatest possible tenderness for the individual, consistent with the security of the community’. However, Attlee’s reassurances failed to comfort many, with the Civil Service Clerical Association (CSCA) continuing to oppose the new

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

202

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

measures.125 Despite the opposition, Britain did not embark on an anticommunist witch-hunt and, compared to the United States, the policy was ‘controlled and even genteel’, sparing Britain from the ‘excesses and embarrassments that resulted from American fervour’.126 Information provided by Attlee shows this to be the case. In January 1949, responding to questions in the House of Commons, he reported that seventeen cases had been brought before the three-man advisory tribunal chaired by Sir Thomas Gardiner, of which eleven had seen government officials removed from sensitive work while in the remainder no further action was taken.127

The industrial purge While communists in the Civil Service were subject to the new screening procedures, official measures to combat those in industry were not discussed until the next meeting of GEN 183 in the spring of 1949. CPGB strength in the labour movement had been reported by the JIC as early as the autumn of 1946, and ministers and officials in Whitehall were acutely aware of the threat.128 Attlee had already told a meeting of the Defence Committee in 1947 that steps should be taken to remove CPGB members from ‘areas of secret work’.129 Information on communist activities almost certainly came from MI5. During a briefing with Liddell, both he and Attlee ‘discussed the penetration of the Trades Unions. I gave him something of the facts and figures.’130 Brook had also told Attlee that MI5 was ‘anxious’ to extend the ‘purge procedure’ to private firms on secret government work, as it was ‘illogical to remove untrustworthy persons from Government establishments’ while leaving others in industry ‘where they may have access to equally important information’.131 In 1948 MI5 warned officials that the CPGB wanted to ‘establish itself as the leader in all sectors of industrial activity’ by capturing ‘each individual union and, through the unions’ the General Council and Annual Assembly of the Trades Union Congress. Despite the relatively small number of communists in industry, they had ‘made considerable progress toward attaining this aim’ and dominated the Association of Scientific Workers, the Electrical Trades Union and had a ‘strong position’ in the Transport and General Workers Union.132 While aware of communism in industry, ministers were reluctant to implement a new round of screening because of the considerable opposition to the earlier reforms. In the spring of 1949 Chuter Ede warned that while industrial vetting was necessary, it was ‘politically impossible’ due to the ‘present temper of Parliament’.133 An examination of the minutes

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

203

of GEN 183 reveals that ministers were mindful of the potential backlash they faced from the unions and associated bodies if a purge was fully implemented. While relations between the government and the ‘big guns’ of the union movement were generally good, the Attlee years witnessed a high level of unofficial stoppages, with the period described as one of ‘exceptional conflict’, particularly as a result of the government’s wage-freeze proposals.134 The lack of an official policy did not prevent an ‘under the counter’ purge of communists from taking place.135 During the committee’s first meeting, Alexander explained that the ‘interests of employers and security’ had coincided for some time and individuals had been removed as a result of government pressure. The pre-existing mechanism was largely ad hoc; the Security Service having ‘direct contact, on behalf of the contracting Departments [in practice usually the Ministry of Supply], with contractors’, and it was ‘frequently … possible’, as a result of the ‘willing co-operation of employers’, to ‘avert the transfer of Communists to secret work or to remove them from it’. Alexander explained that, from ‘their long-standing contacts with … important contractors’, the Security Service had identified ‘which key men were unreliable’.136 One source of this information was the unions themselves.137 George Isaacs, the Minister of Labour, a trade unionist and former member of the TUC’s National Executive, informed Attlee’s Cabinet Committee on European Policy (GEN 226) that the TUC were ‘well aware’ of Communist infiltration and that ‘more active measures were … being taken to combat this’.138 Despite a general reluctance to adopt a formal policy in industry, Alexander told a further meeting of GEN 183 that the ‘international situation’ meant that ‘existing practice must be strongly reinforced’. The spread of ‘Communists among scientists’ in the defence industries, particularly those developing aircraft and aero-engines, also made action necessary, though employers were reluctant to combat the threat owing to ‘risks of labour trouble’. Alexander set out the case for a change in industrial policy in February 1949, arguing that communists employed on secret work outside the public service were ‘just as dangerous as the employment of persons of doubtful loyalty in Government Departments’, as contracts issued by the service departments for the development of weapons and other equipment often gave contractors knowledge of Britain’s ‘most secret devices’. These new measures would require the ‘fullest consultation’ between the state and private industry, with MI5 maintaining ‘direct contact with contactors’, persuading them ‘to remove undesirable employees’. If a contractor appeared reluctant to act, MI5 would ‘place the facts before the Authority’ who would then

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

204

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

‘assess the weight … given’ to ‘various factors’ and, where the ‘security risk’ was considered ‘most important’, the Ministry would exercise its ‘contractual right’ to ensure that the employee in question had ‘no access to … the secret aspects of the contract’. As with the government’s purge of the Civil Service, the rule would apply to both communists and fascists. Speaking about potential disputes, Alexander argued that the industrial ramifications of the policy should be faced and that, under the circumstances, ‘Ministers should be prepared to justify their action as necessary for the defence of the State’. It was deemed impractical to follow the Civil Service precedent of referring cases to an advisory board, though this would ‘magnify’ an employee’s grievance.139 Ministers agreed that Alexander’s arguments were ‘right in principle’ and ‘should, subject to Cabinet approval, be adopted’. Only a small number of ‘highly skilled technicians’ would be affected, the vast majority of workers being allowed to continue in their line of work. In such cases, the committee agreed, the government would have the full support of union representatives. It was anticipated that the small number of ‘higher grade’ scientists would pose the ‘greatest political trouble’, as it would be difficult for them to find other suitable work. A further difficulty was encountered when GEN 183 turned its attention to the legal aspects of industrial vetting; the possibility that a firm ‘may not be legally protected against [an] employee if he claimed damages on … grounds [such as] wrongful or premature termination of employment’. Once again, while many of those in attendance recognised the need for an ‘industrial purge’, the ramifications of such a policy prevented a final decision. Alexander accepted that the matter was ‘clearly one which needed to be brought before the Cabinet’, suggesting that officials needed to consider the possibility of applying the advisory body system to industry ‘as a matter of urgency’.140 At the end of March the committee returned to the industrial purge. The Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, Sir Harold Parker, drew the committee’s attention to the number of cases likely to be involved in any future screening methods, anticipating around thirty cases of individuals who held ‘important, if not key’ positions and could not be ‘disposed of quietly as others had been in the past’. All were known to MI5. If there were to be ‘new measures’, Parker believed that ‘some public statement … would be required’, though this would be controversial. Sillitoe told the committee that MI5 ‘felt strongly that, if secret information’ was ‘confided to an increased number of outside persons’, the risk to the safeguarding of MI5’s sources would increase and ‘result in a considerable area of their work being compromised’. If ministers ‘decided that some form of advisory body should

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

205

be established’, MI5 would have little objection to the small number of cases being considered for submission to the ‘Three Wise Men’. The ensuing discussion went on to reveal divisions between policymakers, who recognised the implications of sanctioning a purge of industry, and MI5, eager to reduce the threat of Soviet espionage. In particular, it was the government’s legal officers who objected to extending the purge to industry, with the Treasury Solicitors Department suggesting that, whether or not an advisory body was formed, the government would face legal challenges to its policy. Sir Frank Soskice, the Solicitor General, agreed with the paper, suggesting that government would be subject to legal action for forcing employers to break contracts ‘without lawful justification’ and ‘for slander or libel’. His argument brought a swift response from Sillitoe, who remarked that, whatever happened, there ‘were risks’ and that he ‘would prefer to see the Minister’ exercise the ultimate responsibility for the firing of ‘unreliable’ employees. Chuter Ede similarly agreed the ‘present methods’ were ‘not sufficient’, though industrial screening would provoke a parliamentary backlash. In summarising the discussion, Alexander spoke of the need for the First Lord of the Admiralty and Minister of Supply to ‘exercise their contractual’ rights to ‘require a contractor to exclude from secret Government work any person’ deemed ‘undesirable’; that persons affected should have the right to appear before an advisory body to rebut allegations against them; and, finally, that the body itself would be ‘limited by its terms of reference to purely advisory functions’.141 This was the line taken by the Cabinet, and an announcement regarding the employment of communists and fascists on secret government work was planned for late July, prior to the summer recess.142 However, this policy met resistance from the most unlikely of quarters. In May the Cabinet invited the Minister of Labour, George Isaacs, to obtain the support of the National Joint Advisory Council, a body made up of representatives of the TUC and British Employers Confederation.143 Here the proposals met with ‘considerable opposition’.144 The irony was that it was union representatives, tasked to protect the rights of workers, who opted for a covert purge for fear of industrial disputes. Vincent Tewson, the TUC’s General Secretary, considered that the policy would ‘cause controversy out of all proportion’, while Sir Alexander Ramsey of the Employers’ Confederation believed it was ‘better for action … to be undertaken ad hoc between Government Departments and the contractors concerned’. Any arrangements for dealing with ‘untrustworthy persons’ on secret government work would be ‘successfully dealt with by administrative action’, rather than an advisory council. No public statement by the Prime Minister should be made.145 These recommendations were

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

206

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

‘accepted … with some reluctance’ by Alexander and Isaacs, though Attlee was ‘inclined to agree’ with the Council.146 In future, the Admiralty and Ministry of Supply would ‘proceed as proposed’, albeit with a warning about the ‘risk of public outcry’. In December Sir Norman Brook warned Attlee that the risk of ‘hardship [was] even greater’ in the field of industry, where among ‘scientists … there may well be cases where removal from secret work is impracticable and the man has to be dismissed altogether from his firm’. He added that ‘Some men may find … great difficulty in finding another job’. If ministers agreed there was a risk of ‘political outcry’, they ‘may wish to ask’ the First Lord of the Admiralty and Minister of Supply to move ‘cautiously’ and not give MI5 ‘a free rein in hounding out suspects from contractors works’.147 The resultant policy, which became known in Whitehall as the ‘industrial purge’, was never publicly announced, with employees – unlike their Civil Service counterparts – having ‘no right of appeal’.148 So far the number of employees removed from their position as a result of the purge remains undisclosed, though the authorised history of MI5 suggests that sackings were ‘rare’.149

Positive vetting Calls for a more intensive and focused system of screening – ‘positive vetting’ – gained impetus in early 1950, largely because of pressure from across the Atlantic. The minutes of GEN 183 reveal that ministers and senior Whitehall officials were aware of the impact of the Fuchs case and other security lapses on transatlantic relations and were keen to make amends in return for access to American secrets. At a meeting of GEN 183 chaired by the Prime Minister on 5 April, it was agreed that an official committee on ‘positive vetting’ should be formed under the chairmanship of the Treasury’s John Winnifrith to examine the ‘risks and advantages’ of improved vetting procedures.150 Completed in October 1950, their report identified an ‘inner circle of special secret posts’ to which the new form of vetting would apply. This was heavily influenced by MI5’s argument that the number of posts should be kept to a minimum if the process of vetting was to work efficiently. As a result the new procedure would apply to no ‘more than 1000 posts’ across the whole of the public service. Winnifrith wanted to strike a balance between the present ‘negative’ system, considered ‘not sufficient’, and the methods being employed in the United States, seen as ‘repugnant to British thinking’. As with the introduction of ‘negative’ vetting, Britain’s answer to the threat of communist espionage and subversion was bal-

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

207

anced. Winnifrith’s middle way would involve the relevant government department augmenting the existing screening procedures with ‘positive enquiries’, making ‘a conscious effort to confirm the officer’s reliability before appointing him to a post on the vital list’. These enquiries would take ‘the simple form of a careful study of his records … combined with enquiries within or without the Department’. It would also be the duty of the department to maintain the personal records of prospective candidates for ‘vital posts … more fully than at present’. Regular reviews would also be undertaken to ascertain ‘that nothing has occurred since his appointment to cast doubt on the initial presumption as to reliability’.151 In early November the proposals were discussed at a meeting in the Prime Minister’s room at the House of Commons.152 The need for a tightening of screening procedures was made all the more imperative by the Pontecorvo disappearance and, in light of recent events, Winnifrith’s recommendations were quickly accepted. Shinwell argued that ‘the country could not afford to take the risk of neglecting any practicable measure for increasing security’, with, ironically, the former communist John Strachey, the Minister for War, and Arthur Henderson, the Secretary of State for Air, commenting that the number of posts to be vetted ‘were not full enough’.153 Further calls for a tightening of screening methods resulted from the defection of Burgess and Maclean in the spring of 1951. Once again it was American pressure that led to improved security. At a tripartite conference in July, it was recommended that ‘in future no one should be given access to classified atomic energy information unless he has passed an open enquiry into his loyalty, character and background’.154 These recommendations were the subject of a further report by a committee once again under the direction of Winnifrith. In future ‘any candidate’ employed on Britain’s atomic energy project would be subject to a security check. What was new was the scope of the proposed screening methods. The procedure would apply ‘to all new candidates for employment anywhere in the Atomic Energy Division of the Ministry of Supply’, in addition to ‘any university specialists or employees of contractors’ engaged on secret government work. It was ‘difficult to say exactly how many people would be affected’, wrote Winnifrith. The Atomic Energy Division was 11,000 strong, though ‘only a portion’ would be subject to the planned procedures as new candidates. While the GEN 183 working party could not give an exact figure for the number of people affected, it was estimated that ‘several thousands’ would be screened for as long as the atomic project required an annual intake of ‘large numbers of new staff’. The sheer scope of the new procedure could not be kept secret, Winnifrith warned, and it would be ‘desirable’ for ministers to

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

208

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

issue a public statement, though he recognised that they might ‘wish to satisfy themselves that there are good and valid reasons for the change in policy’. As Winnifrith recognised, communism was ‘not unlawful in this country and there are many people who still believe – or say they believe – that adherence to the Communist creed is not incompatible with loyalty to their own country’. The procedure could also be regarded as an ‘un-British inquisition’ into the ‘politics and private lives of individuals’, though, if they decided not to implement improved vetting, ministers faced ‘the risk (we are told the virtual certainty) of losing any chance of American co-operation’ by not tightening security measures.155 During one of the final Cabinet meetings of the Attlee government, it was this fear of losing access to American secrets that prompted a change, though Attlee himself remained sceptical whether this would bring about ‘higher standards of security’. Ministers agreed in principle to the measures, which were left to Churchill’s Conservative administration to announce in January 1952.156

Britain’s domestic counter-offensive The Attlee government’s domestic anti-communist campaign originated from the formation and initial recommendations of the Committee of Communism chaired by Gladwyn Jebb. This Cold War body had been created with Bevin’s support to examine anti-communist activities, and, in July 1949, had produced a highly critical report on domestic anti-communist activities, arguing that the separation of foreign and domestic activities was illogical as communism was an all-­ pervasive threat requiring ‘aggressive action’, which was as necessary ‘in Birmingham as in Bucharest’.157 In Britain, the Foreign Office had no mandate to conduct domestic propaganda; Warner informed Jebb that it would provoke ‘considerable opposition’.158 Other departments took an impartial line, with the Home Office arguing that communism was ‘not illegal’ and it was their policy to ‘let people say what they liked, to hold the ring’ hoping the ‘truth would prevail’.159 As in the case of the BUF in the 1930s, officials took a ‘liberal’ attitude and acted as a ‘conservative brake’, protecting freedom of expression.160 This policy of impartiality was replicated across Whitehall, with the Ministry of Labour having no anti-communist policy as it was, in the words of Sir Harold Wiles, its Permanent Under-Secretary, not the policy of the department ‘to combat Communism in the Trade Unions, offensively or defensively’. Instead, officials would ‘strengthen the hand of the proper trade union leadership’.161 The Ministry of Education adopted a similar policy and the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

209

Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir John Maud, told Jebb that there was ‘no kind of political test’ for teachers, with the profession having an inherent tradition of not imparting ‘their own views’, though he believed teachers played an important role in ‘educating children in a non-Communist way of life’.162 Foreign Office officials found a policy of impartiality ‘disconcerting’. Other than the purge procedure, government did little to combat domestic communism as it was regarded as a ‘political movement’. Jebb’s committee argued the contrary, explaining that it was ‘the declared policy of the Communists to wreck this country’s vital economic recovery programme by every means’, and it was argued that, while combative measures at home could be regarded as the first step towards totalitarianism, the present policy of ‘inaction’ was unacceptable, as communists had ‘no respect’ for the parliamentary system, using it to ‘provide opportunities and immunity for themselves’. In future, the government needed to ‘discredit the Communist Party in the eyes of the people’ in a ‘campaign of educative publicity’ through ministerial speeches reported by the BBC Home Service and the national press. In terms of carrying out the campaign, the Home Office, given its objections to the campaign, would not be represented, but a committee was needed under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary, with membership drawn from the Foreign Office, Treasury and Ministry of Labour.163 Unsurprisingly, the proposals provoked opposition. In a letter to Cripps on 12 December, Bridges wrote they were ‘rather difficult’, while the omission of the Home Office would weaken any campaign.164 Ministers were also unhappy, exhibiting a ‘split personality’. While hostile to communism, they attempted a delicate balancing act between combating subversion and ‘maintaining freedom of expression’.165 Although endorsing further overseas measures, they were unanimous that, constitutionally, the financing of anti-communist publicity with public money was objectionable as long as the CPGB remained a ‘legal political organisation’. Chuter Ede remarked that the Jebb proposals, if adopted, would place the Home Office in an awkward position, while Brook, writing to Attlee, suggested that any campaign needed to be ‘postponed until after the election’ due to concerns about government involvement in domestic politics.166 Nevertheless, while opposed to a state-sponsored attack on communism, it was agreed that the Labour Party, trades unions and Co-operative movement could play a vital role in anti-communist publicity.167 Calls for a domestic anti-communist offensive returned in 1951 following an increase in international tensions. Since the campaign had been last considered, communists had tried to wreck Britain’s economic

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

210

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

recovery, block the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty and damage British rearmament, though they had achieved only limited success.168 Senior military officials were also concerned and, during a meeting in January 1951, Sir John Slessor pushed for restrictions on the CPGB, while the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence), Air Vice Marshall Neill Ogilvie-Forbes, believed ‘the time has now come for a definite anti-Communist propaganda campaign … The Communist Party should no longer be recognised as “just another political party” but should be publicly exposed as … a subversive revolutionary movement.’169 Attempts to overturn the earlier ban had started in November 1950 when Dixon had approached Brook on whether proposals for anti-communist measures in Britain could, once again, be brought before ministers. Brook replied that the situation was increasingly favourable, with ministers now in ‘a mood when they seemed likely to be more receptive of proposals to take a more vigorous line against Communism’.170 Seizing the initiative, officials again argued for a vigorous approach at home, suggesting that there was a ‘compelling need’ for a committee to monitor Soviet-inspired communism and propose counter-measures. Once again, attention was drawn to the monolithic nature of communism (‘a world-wide force directed from the centre in the interests of Russian imperialism’) and the threat it posed to ‘national survival’, with Dixon claiming that communist activities could only be countered by ‘well-briefed opponents’ for ‘the dangerous years ahead’.171 The new proposals were discussed by ministers in early February. Dixon explained that his committee, while having no mandate to discuss domestic anti-communist measures, believed it was impossible to detach domestic activities from the ‘main Soviet threat’. Shinwell revealed that the Service ministers were also worried about communism in the armed forces, and had set up a committee comprised of the parliamentary secretaries to provide suitable educational material. Once again, Chuter Ede spoke of the Home Office dilemma. The Communist Party was not illegal; it was Home Office policy to afford it equal opportunities, provided it refrained from subversive activities, though the position would be helped if the party was proscribed. Morrison welcomed the report. While the Communist Party was in no position to gain power, it posed significant problems, fomenting strikes and spreading ‘false ideas and untrue pictures of nation policy’, and it was necessary to refute communist propaganda by using an official machinery to spread information, not political parties as had been used previously. In discussion it was suggested that, as with overseas propaganda, any campaign would publicise the ‘positive achievements’ of British social democracy, and

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

211

Morrison was invited to produce specific proposals for a new committee on domestic communism.172 The eventual development of an ‘official machinery’ to counter communism at home can now be told in greater detail due to the release of material by the Cabinet Office. By the end of March Morrison had completed his memorandum, setting out the case for an inter-departmental body to ‘keep a continuing watch’ on domestic communist activities, make recommendations, and, under the supervision of ministers, coordinate anti-communist activities. This group, like its sister, overseas committee, would be kept secret, with the numbers of people involved kept to a minimum, though it would draw on the advice of a few ‘outsiders’.173 It would be chaired by Brook and comprise representatives from across Whitehall, including MI5.174 By June the new committee, the Official Committee on Communism (Home), was constituted, with Brook in the chair, and including Warner, Winnifrith, White and others, to ‘focus all available intelligence about Communist activities’ and ‘coordinate any anti-Communist activities’ pending ministerial approval.175 The available material, covering July 1951 to October 1952, shows that the body examined a range of issues, from the Soviet use of the TASS news agency to domestic anti-communist propaganda. Another project considered was a ‘Sociological Study of the Soviet Union’, an ‘authoritative work’ which, according to Warner, would appeal to ‘the educated public who, though small in numbers, had an important influence on public opinion’.176 Interestingly, despite the committee’s cross-Whitehall composition, many of the memoranda for its attention originated in the Foreign Office, which had a disproportionate effect on how domestic communist activities were viewed. Unlike officials in the Home Office, those in the Foreign Office were inclined to view communism as a monolithic entity directed from Moscow, drawing its inspiration from events overseas. As Soviet intentions towards Britain were ‘identical with those employed elsewhere’, officials planned an increased role for IRD, which, while not authorised to conduct domestic propaganda, had previously provided information to a number of bodies, including the Labour Party, Conservative Central Office and the TUC.177 The TUC’s publicity officer, Herbert Tracey, received IRD material, as did the TUC’s deputy General Secretary, Vic Feather.178 Labour’s Denis Healey was another consumer of IRD material. In 1951 the Foreign Office suggested a multifaceted domestic campaign to demonstrate to the ‘public as a whole (a) the fact that the Soviet Union is really intent on world domination; (b) the way in which the Soviet Union is trying to do it; (c) the fact that the Soviet Union can be stopped’. Special approaches would be made to

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

212

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

institutions threatened by communist infiltration, including the unions, schools and universities, enlightening them as to ‘the aims and methods of the Soviet Government’.179 The proposals for increased anti-communist publicity at home were discussed in June. Sir Robert Gould of the Ministry of Labour thought that, to be successful, anti-communist activities should focus on several influential groups, particularly workers, who should be shown that the CPGB was using them ‘for their own ends’. With the right information ‘it should be possible to immunise labour against Communist activities’, providing ‘general material … particular illustrations, showing the whole chain of command from the Kremlin’. The committee saw the need for an organisation to focus all intelligence about communism at home and to disseminate it where appropriate. It was suggested that a ‘Home Desk’ needed to be added to IRD, helped by officials from the Ministry of Labour and Education.180 In July the committee arranged for officials from the Ministry of Labour to pass cuttings from the provincial press to IRD, though the organisation would also collect its own intelligence on the home front, and it became ‘the focus for the collection and dissemination of intelligence about communist activities’.181 In October 1951 it was reported that the ‘Home Desk’ had been formed and that ‘useful contacts’ had been made, with an accurate intelligence picture built up, primarily via cuttings from the ‘provincial press’.182 Other than the union movement, another cause of concern for the committee was communism in schools and universities. The threat had been considered during the earlier meetings of the Jebb Committee in the summer of 1949.183 In its first report, the committee had warned of the threat to education; the Communist Party, ministers were told, attached great importance to penetrating the education system, with 775 teachers already party members.184 In 1951 the committee, now chaired by Dixon, warned again about communist penetration. There were a number of confirmed communists at universities, particularly in the field of ‘extra-mural studies’, and the number of CPGB members in the teaching profession was placed at 2,000, a figure the Home Secretary thought ‘about right’.185 Several cases of communist infiltration had also emerged; in one example, a Ministry of Education inspector reported one teacher for circulating a ‘great deal of insidious Communist propaganda’.186 During the committee’s third meeting, Warner claimed that the ‘old theory’ of impartiality was ‘no longer valid’. It was reported that IRD was ready to prepare a paper showing the activities of fellow travellers in education.187 A subsequent paper by the ‘Foreign Office’, most likely IRD, said that communists were keen to show themselves as ‘good teachers’ and would ‘reserve their main political efforts’ for

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

213

the National Union of Teachers. Although communist activities in the classroom were restricted to ‘a few impressionable young people’, the paper still regarded communists as a serious threat.188 Communism in education was again on the agenda during the committee’s fifth meeting, attended by the Permanent Under-Secretary for Education, Sir John Maud, who appeared ‘very anxious’ to help but objected to suggested political tests for teachers. Rather than conduct propaganda in the classroom, it was agreed that IRD could issue select material to hand-picked inspectors and Directors of Education, and, in March 1952, Maud informed the committee that the chief inspectors ‘were ready to receive’ any information.189 Another area of concern was the armed forces. During an earlier meeting of the Ministerial Committee (Overseas), Shinwell had told colleagues that the Service ministers were concerned by communist infiltration in the military; there were, he said, around 250 known communists, though many more servicemen were former members of the party. Such concerns led the Chiefs of Staff to rule that Points at Issue, an IRD pamphlet, should be issued to senior officers, and that lectures by ‘specially trained’ individuals should also be used.190 The subject of anti-communist ‘educational matter’ in the forces was also examined by a committee consisting of the parliamentary under-secretaries of the three Service departments, Michael Stewart, Walter Edwards and Adrian Crawley. This committee reported in December 1950 that, while communist influence was ‘pretty light’, material was needed on ‘British defence policy and the British way of life’. With the help of the Central Office of Information and the Foreign Office, the committee sought to arrange the publication of a pamphlet, Why Britain Re-Arms, and, at a later stage, suitable leaflets and articles suitable for ‘widespread distribution’.191 In July, at a meeting of the Committee on Communism, it was reported that the Service ministers were reluctant to endorse further propaganda, not because they were opposed to the proposals, but because of the ‘novelty of the subject’. Morrison, now Foreign Secretary, was also concerned that the covert source of Points at Issue would be revealed, suggesting, instead, that the Services should produce their own booklet, the Defence Digest, assisted by IRD, a suggestion that was approved by Attlee.192 In August Shinwell reported to the Ministerial Committee (Overseas) that anti-communist activities took the form of ‘normal Service education and current affairs discussion’ and that any pamphlets would be available to education officers.193

214

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion By October 1951 the defences of Britain’s Cold War ‘secret state’ had been largely formed. While it appears that the Labour government was initially slow to react to the internal subversive threat, its leading figures such as Attlee, Bevin and Morrison were fully aware of the threat posed by communists on the domestic front. Bevin’s enduring loathing of fellow travellers has been well documented, while Morrison’s hatred of fellow travellers was reinforced by his position as wartime Home Secretary. During a meeting with Liddell, Morrison had said ‘he would be very grateful to have a list of “fellow travellers” from us [MI5], as he intended to “smoke them out” of the Labour Party’.194 Even Attlee, often portrayed as placid by academics, could be violent in his denunciation of communists.195 This was not, as suggested by numerous left-wing historians, mere red-baiting. Instead, ministers were well aware of the threat of communist espionage and subversion, and were regularly supplied with information on the threat by a number of bodies including the JIC, MI5 and the GEN 183 working party. Any delay in the implementation of screening procedures was not, as previously suggested, the result of inaction on the part of Labour ministers. Instead, as in the case of domestic propaganda, ministers were held back by a combination of factors including developments within the Labour Party and broader concerns about British public opinion. For the formative years of the Cold War, Labour ministers were restrained by the views of their own backbenchers and wider public opinion which was openly opposed to anti-Soviet and anti-communist policies. Even in the spring of 1948, following the announcement by Attlee of a ‘purge procedure’ in the Civil Service, the government faced a tirade of anger from MPs on its own backbenches who perceived the measures as a ‘witch-hunt’. It was only as a result of the rapidly changing Cold War context, made clear by the detonation of the Soviet Union’s first atomic device in 1949, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the uncovering of the atom spy Klaus Fuchs that same year, that a change in the nature of Whitehall’s defences took place. Unlike the United States, the measures implemented were not akin to McCarthyism, as figures obtained by Peter Hennessy show. After the announcement of the first ‘purge procedure’, twentyfive Whitehall officials were dismissed for security reasons, twentyfive resigned, eighty-eight were transferred to non-sensitive work and thirty-three were later reinstated. By contrast, in the United States 9,500 federal civil servants were sacked and a further 15,000 resigned as a result of investigation.196 Similarly, in the field of domestic propaganda the Attlee government took a balanced approach. Until 1951, ministers

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

215

refrained from authorising a Foreign Office backed campaign against the Communist Party of Great Britain. Once again, ministers were reluctant to contemplate active counter-measures, not because they were ambivalent towards communist subversion, but because they sought to strike a balance between such counter-measures and the need to protect freedom of expression. It was only after communist subversive activities increased, particularly following the outbreak of the Korean War, that they were willing to authorise the formation of the Committee on Communism (Home) and allow IRD to intervene domestically. Notes 1 Some details of this chapter appeared in Daniel W. B. Lomas, ‘Labour Ministers, Intelligence and Domestic Anti-Communism, 1945–51’, Journal of Intelligence History, 12:2 (2013), pp. 113–33. 2 BOD, MS. Attlee dep. 1, Fol. 41, speech in Blackburn, January 1940. 3 Calder Walton, ‘British Intelligence and Threats to National Security, circa 1941–1951’ (unpublished PhD, thesis, University of Cambridge, 2006), pp. 136–7. 4 For a selection of the literature putting forward this view, see Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 94; Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 323; Bower, The Perfect English Spy, p. 76; E. D. R. Harrison, ‘J. C. Masterman and the Security Service, 1940–72’, Intelligence and National Security, 24:6 (2009); Thomas Hennessy and Claire Thomas, Spooks: The Unofficial History of MI5 (Stroud: Amberly, 2009), p. 508; Smith, The Spying Game, p. 106; Stafford, Churchill & Secret Service, p. 360; Nigel West, A Matter of Trust: MI5, 1945–72 (London: Coronet, 1983), p. 27. 5 Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1994), p. 265. 6 Walton, ‘British Intelligence and Threats to National Security’, pp. 136–7; Calder Walton, ‘British Intelligence and Threats to National Security after the Second World War’, in Matthew Grant (ed.), The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Bomb, 1945–1975 (London: Continuum, 2009), p. 145. While the speech did not force Attlee to keep tight control of MI5, it did, wrote Liddell, make him ‘afraid that the Opposition might accuse him of running a Gestapo’ (KV 4/467, entry for 28 June 1946). 7 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 322. 8 Bower, The Perfect English Spy, p. 138. The ‘disaster’ claim comes from John Masterman (KV 4/467, entry for 28 December 1946). For further information on Masterman’s views, see Worcester College (hereafter WOR), Masterman papers, PRO 10/1/75, Butler to Masterman, January 1952. 9 KV 4/467, entry for 17 December 1945. Liddell had been told of the appointment by Desmond Orr on 10 December (KV 4/467, entry for 17 December 1945). 10 KV 4/467, entry for 31 December 1945.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

216

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

11 KV 4/196, entry for 29 May 1945. 12 WO 258/91, Bridges to Speed, 31 October 1945; WO 258/91, ‘Qualifications for Director-General, Security Service’. 13 WO 258/91, ‘Qualifications for Director-General, Security Service’. 14 WO 258/91, ‘Director of Security Service: List of names suggested for consideration’. 15 Ismay was not a candidate for the job as suggested in Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 321. 16 CAC, ACAD 1/14, Cadogan diary, entry for 9 November 1945. In January 1946, Bridges laid the groundwork for Strong to become head of the new Joint Intelligence Bureau by suggesting that the role ‘should be a military appointment’ (WO 258/92, Speed to VCIGS, 8 January 1946). 17 KV 4/466, entry for 14 November 1945. 18 CAC, ACAD 1/14, entry for 14 November 1945. 19 WO 258/91, ‘Qualifications for Director-General, Security Service’. 20 See Sillitoe’s personnel file: WO 335/6, ‘SILLITOE, Sir Percy Joseph (latterly, Director-General Security Service)’, 1946–63. 21 KV 4/192, entry for 1 July 1943 and 2 July 1943. 22 KV 4/192, entry for 8 July 1943. 23 James Smith, British Writers and MI5 Surveillance, 1930–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 14. 24 KV 2/787, Marriott to ADF, 5 August 1945. On the file, see Ken Young, ‘Cold War Insecurities and the Curious Case of John Strachey’, Intelligence and National Security, 29:6 (2014), pp. 915–17. 25 KV 2/668: ‘Richard Stafford CRIPPS’. 26 KV 4/196, entry for 29 May 1945. 27 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 323. 28 KV 4/471, entry for 16 March 1949. 29 CAB 21/2734, Bridges to Brook, 30 December 1948. 30 KV 4/167, entry for 26 February 1946. On the directive, see PREM 8/1520, ‘Draft Directive to Sir Percy Sillitoe’, 19 March 1946; KV 4/467, entry for 25 April 1946. 31 KV 4/467, entry for 19 November 1946. 32 KV 4/470, entry for 14 April 1948. A similar description can be found in KV 4/472, entry for 2 January 1950. 33 Francis Beckett, Enemy Within: The Rise and Fall of the British Communist Party (London: Merlin Press, 1998), p. 104. 34 Douglas Hyde, I Believed: The Autobiography of a Former British Communist (London: William Heinemann, 1950), p. 201. 35 KV 4/467, entry for 19 November 1949; Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 411. 36 KV 2/3812, note, 21 May 1947. 37 Elizabeth Vallance, ‘Braddock, Elizabeth Margaret [Bessie] (1899–1970)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

217

38 Leah Manning, A Life for Education: An Autobiography (London: Victor Gollancz, 1970), p. 108. 39 Evidence of MI5’s file on Manning can be found in KV 2/1064 – Denis Nowell PRITT. The reference PF 43614 can be found in KV 2/1064, note by B1A, 28 June 1948. 40 Dodds had angered the party leadership by accepting an invitation to visit Greece from a front organisation linked to the Communist National Liberation Front (EAM), though there is little evidence to suggest he was a ‘crypto’ (see George Maude, ‘The 1946 British Parliamentary Delegation to Greece: A Lost Opportunity?’ Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 11:1 (1984), pp. 5–24). 41 KV 2/3812, Mitchell to Sillitoe, 21 May 1947. 42 Phillip Deery and Neil Redfern, ‘No Lasting Peace? Labor, Communism and the Cominform: Australia and Great Britain, 1945–50’, Labour History, 88 (2005), p. 77. 43 KV 2/3812, Geoffrey Henry Cecil BING, 30 October 1946. 44 KV 2/3812, Orr to Hollis, 19 May 1945. 45 KV 4/468, entry for 4 November 1946. 46 KV 4/468, entry for 18 November 1946. 47 KV 4/468, entry for 19 November 1946; KV 2/3812, note by Liddell, 19 November 1946. 48 LHASC, LP/GS/LS, ‘Lost Sheep’. 49 KV 2/996, note shown to Prime Minister, 25 May 1948. 50 KV 2/996, note by Marriott, 5 October 1948. On the case, see Graham Macklin, ‘Britain Hid Spy Data from US’, BBC History, 6:1 (January 2005). 51 Laski’s file starts in 1930 and runs to two volumes, KV 2/4078 and KV 2/4079. For Brockway, see KV 2/1920, Archibald Fenner BROCKWAY: British. 52 KV 4/471, entry for 21 February 1949. 53 KV 4/469, entry for 17 November 1947. 54 KV 4/471, entry for 27 May 1949. 55 KV 4/467, entries for 22 May 1946 and 9 September 1946. 56 KV 4/470, entry for 24 March 1948. 57 KV 4/471, entry for 22 February 1949. 58 For a detailed look at the review, see Daniel Lomas, ‘“ … the Defence of the Realm and Nothing Else”: Sir Findlater Stewart, Labour Ministers and the Security Service’, Intelligence and National Security, 30:6 (2015), pp. 793-816. 59 CAB 301/48: ‘Future Organisation of the S.I.S.’, 12 October 1944. 60 CAB 301/31: ‘The Findlater Stewart report and Prime Minister’s directive to the Director General of the Security Service’. 61 PREM 8/1520, Bridges to Rowan, 27 November 1945. This limited circulation may have resulted from the report’s references to the wartime use of ‘double agents’ and the breaking of enemy ciphers. 62 ‘Report on the Security Service by Sir Findlater Stewart’, 27 November 1945, obtained using FOIA, 11 November 2011. 63 See Lomas, ‘… the Defence of the Realm and Nothing Else’.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

218

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

64 This extraordinary claim can be found in Walton, ‘British Intelligence and Threats to National Security’, p 137. 65 PREM 8/1520, ‘Cabinet; Minutes of an ad-hoc meeting of Ministers held at No. 10 Downing Street’, 7 March 1946. 66 CAB 21/2734, minute to Brook, 8 December 1948. Attlee later explained: ‘As the Japanese war was still on it was from our angle mainly naval I appointed Alexander to the Admiralty taking myself as is usual in wartime the additional post of Minister of Defence’ (CAC, ATLE 1/17, draft autobiography). 67 CAB 301/31, Bridges to Drew, 19 March 1946. 68 CAB 301/31, ‘Points put to me by the Prime Minister to incorporate in the Draft Directive’. A version of this draft can be seen in PREM 8/1520, DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO SIR PERCY SILLITOE, 19 March 1946. 69 CAB 130/20, DIRECTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, SECURITY SERVICE, 20 April 1946. 70 See CAB 66/67/49, C.P. (45) 99, Cabinet Procedure: Note by the Prime Minister, 8 August 194 and CAB 129/4, C.P. (45) 282, Secrecy of Cabinet Proceedings: Note by the Prime Minister, 9 November 1945. 71 KV 4/467, entry for 10 May 1946. 72 CAB 301/128, Brook to Bridges, 15 December 1948. 73 PREM 8/1527, Brook to Attlee, 25 October 1950. 74 KV 4/472, entry for 27 July 1951. 75 CAB 301/17: ‘Secret Intelligence and Security Services: Report of Enquiry by Sir Norman Brook’, March 1951. 76 CAB 301/23, note of a meeting held in the Prime Minister’s room, House of Commons, on Tuesday, 5 June 1951 at 5.30 p.m. 77 CAB 21/2734, Bridges to Brook, 30 December 1948. 78 CAB 301/23, Brook to Attlee, 11 May 1951. 79 KV 4/473, entry for 19 March 1951. 80 CAB 301/128, Brook to Churchill, 9 November 1951. 81 KV 4/473, entry for 4 May 1951. 82 CAB 301/23, Brook to Churchill, 9 November 1951. 83 See CAB 301/128, Churchill to Maxwell-Fyfe, 20 February 1952 and ‘DIRECTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE SECURITY SERVICE’, 24 September 1952. 84 For information on the possible post-war revival of fascism, see Richard Thurlow, Fascism in Britain: From Oswald Mosley’s Blackshirts to the National Front (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998). 85 CAB 128/2, C.M. (46) 63, conclusions, 17 December 1945. The committee included two MI5 representatives, Roger Hollis and Graham Mitchell. 86 CAB 130/8, GEN 110/1st meeting, 3 January 1946. 87 CAB 128/5, C.M. (46) 31, conclusions, 8 April 1946. 88 CAB 130/17, J.I.C. (46)70(0) ‘The Spread of Communism Throughout the World and the Extent of its Direction from Moscow’, 23 September 1946. See also CAB 81/134, JIC (66) 101, ‘The Spread of Communism Throughout the World and the Extent of its Direction from Moscow’, 18 November 1946.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

219

89 Willie Thompson, The Good Old Cause: British Communism, 1920–91 (London: Pluto Press, 1992), p. 76; John Callaghan, ‘The Plan to Capture the Labour Party and its Paradoxical Results, 1947–91’, Journal of Contemporary History, 40:4 (2005), pp. 709–11. 90 MAG: MC: P2/4/2MS/18, ‘1946/8: Resurrection of Special Operations’. 91 CAB 81/134, JIC (66) 101, ‘The Spread of Communism Throughout the World and the Extent of its Direction from Moscow’, 18 November 1946. 92 CAB 130/17, JIC (46) 70 (0) ‘The Spread of Communism Throughout the World and the Extent of its Direction from Moscow’, 23 September 1946. 93 See Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, pp. 40–53. 94 CAB 130/16, GEN 164/1, minutes of ministerial meeting, 6 January 1947. 95 In attendance were Bevin; Chuter Ede; the Minister of Labour and National Service, George Isaacs; George Strauss, Minister of Supply; the First Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount Hall; Bridges; and Sillitoe. 96 Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst, 1945–2010 (London: Penguin, 2010), p. 89. 97 Branson, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, p. 10. 98 KV 4/251, undated note on the Communist Party. 99 CAB 130/37, ‘Annex: The Communist Party; Its Strength and Activities: Its Penetration of Government Organisations and the Trade Unions’, 1 April 1948. 100 CAB 130/20, ‘The employment of civil servants exposed to Communist influence’, 17 June 1947. 101 CAB 130/17, ‘The employments of civil servants, etc. exposed to Communist influence; Report by the working party’, 1 May 1947. 102 CAB 130/17, ‘The employments of civil servants, etc. exposed to Communist influence; Report by the working party’, 1 May 1947. 103 CAB 130/20, ‘The employment of civil servants exposed to Communist influence’, 17 June 1947. 104 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 437. 105 CAB 130/20, ‘The employment of civil servants exposed to Communist influence’. 106 Peter Hennessy and Gail Brownfeld, ‘Britain’s Cold War Security Purge: The Origins of Positive Vetting’, The Historical Journal, 25:4 (1982), p. 965. 107 Ibid., p. 967. 108 PREM 8/946, Alexander to Attlee, 20 December 1948. Cripps, now Chancellor, had also raised concerns about communists in government service. In a diary entry for 5 December, Liddell wrote that ‘the D.G. has also seen Alexander who produced a document drawn up by Cripps on the question of C.P. membership of Government employees. Cripps has ruled that C.P. members are not to be employed on secret or secret work’ (KV 4/469, entry for 5 December 1947). 109 PREM 8/946, Attlee to Alexander, 21 December 1947; Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 383. 110 BOD, MS. Attlee dep. 1, Fol. 41.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

220

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

111 ‘Mr. Attlee Attacks Mr. McCarthy’, The Times, 14 December 1953. 112 Beckett, The Enemy Within, p. 24. 113 KV 2/1920, Sillitoe to T. V. W. Finlay, 14 January 1947. 114 See John Callaghan, ‘Towards Isolation: The Communist Party and the Labour Government’, in Jim Fyrth (ed.), Labour’s Promised Land: Culture and Society in Labour Britain, 1945–51 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1995), p. 89. 115 Jago, Clement Attlee, p. 180. 116 LHASC, LP/GS/LS, ‘Lost Sheep’. The full list includes John Mack, Sydney Silverman, Lester Solley, Bernard Stross, William Warbey, Konni Zilliacus, Geoffrey Bing, Stephen Swingler, George Wigg, Herschel Lewis Austin, G. Cooper, Harold Davies, Ian Mikardo, Julius Silverman, C. G. P. Smith, Lester Hutchinson, Wilfred Vernon and R. Chamberlain. 117 MAYHEW 5/2, entry for 13 December 1947. 118 Zilliacus had been thrown out of the party alongside John Platts-Mills, Leslie Solley and Lester Hutchinson. 119 LHASC: LP/GS/LS, ‘The Labour Party’s Dilemma’; LP/GS/LS, Sam Watson to Philips, 22 February 1949. 120 KV 4/473, entry for 27 March 1951. For details of MI5’s information on Zilliacus, see Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 412. 121 Liddell read Attlee’s statement before it was delivered to the House of Commons (KV 4/470, entry for 4 March 1948). 122 Hansard, HC Deb., 15 March 1948, vol. 448, cols. 1703–4. 123 Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p. 220; Hansard, HC Deb., 25 March 1948, vol. 448, cols. 3392–4; Hansard, HC Deb., 18 March 1948, vol. 448, col. 2305; Harris, Attlee, pp. 310–11. 124 Hansard, HC Deb., 25 March 1948, vol. 448, cols. 3391–406, 3418. 125 Ibid., cols. 3421–3. See Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, pp. 219–28. 126 Karen Potter, ‘British McCarthyism’, in Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie (eds), North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), p. 154. 127 Hansard, HC Deb., 24 January 1949, vol. 460, cols. 556–7. 128 CAB 130/17, J.I.C. (46)70(0) ‘The Spread of Communism Throughout the World and the Extent of its Direction from Moscow’, 23 September 1946. 129 Peter Shipley, Hostile Action: The KGB and Secret Service Operations in Britain (London: Continuum, 1989), p. 112. 130 KV 4/470, entry for 12 March 1948. 131 PREM 8/946, Sir Norman Brook to Attlee, 7 December 1949. 132 CAB 130/37, ‘Annex: The Communist Party; Its Strength and Activities: Its Penetration of Government Organisations and the Trade Unions’, 1 April 1948. 133 CAB 130/20, GEN. 183/4th meeting, ‘Committee on Subversive Activities’, 30 March 1949. 134 Richard Hyman, ‘Praetorians and Proletarians: Unions and Industrial Relations’, in Fyrth (ed.), Labour’s High Noon, p. 180. 135 Hennessy and Brownfeld, ‘Britain’s Cold War Security Purge’, p. 967.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

221

136 CAB 130/20, GEN. 183/3 (Revise) ‘Safeguarding secret contracts placed with outside industry by the Admiralty and Ministry of Supply: Memorandum by the Minister of Defence’, 21 February 1949. 137 On the trade union leadership, see Nina Fishman, ‘The Phoney Cold War in British Trade Unions’, Contemporary British History, 15:3 (2001). 138 CAB 130/20, GEN 226 2nd meeting: minutes of meeting held on 1 June 1948. 139 CAB 130/20, GEN. 183/3(Revise) ‘Safeguarding secret contracts placed with outside industry by the Admiralty and Ministry of Supply: Memorandum by the Minister of Defence’, 21 February 1949. 140 CAB 130/20, GEN. 183/3rd meeting, ‘Committee on Subversive Activities’, 9 March 1949. 141 CAB 130/20, GEN. 183/4th meeting, ‘Committee on Subversive Activities’, 30 March 1949. 142 PREM 8/946, Parker to Padmore, 27 July 1949. 143 Robert Taylor, The TUC: From the General Strike to the New Unionism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 79. 144 PREM 8/946, Isaacs to Attlee, 3 November 1949. 145 PREM 8/946, ‘National Joint Advisory Council: Employment of Communists and Fascists on Secret Government Contracts’. 146 PREM 8/946, Isaacs to Attlee, 3 November 1949. 147 PREM 8/946, Brook to Attlee, 7 December 1949. 148 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 385; CAB 130/20, GEN. 183/12, ‘Atomic Energy Security; Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet’, 15 August 1951. 149 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 937. 150 CAB 130/20, GEN. 183/5th meeting ‘Cabinet Committee on Subversive Activities’, 5 April 1950. 151 CAB 130/20, P.V. (50) 11, Committee on Positive Vetting; Report, 27 October 1950. 152 CAB 130/20, GEN 183/8, ‘Cabinet Committee on Subversive Activities: Positive Vetting, Note by the Joint Secretaries’, 3 November 1950. 153 CAB 130/20, GEN 183/6th meeting, 13 November 1950. 154 CAB 130/20, GEN. 183/12, ‘Atomic Energy Security; Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet’, 15 August 1951. 155 CAB 130/20, GEN. 183/12, ‘Report: Atomic Energy Personnel Security’, 15 August 1951. 156 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 393. 157 C. (49) 14, Committee on Communism; Committee’s Report, 19 July 1949. 158 CAB 134/53, C. (49) 2nd meeting, 1 June 1949. 159 CAB 134/53, C. (49) 11th meeting, 1 July 1949. 160 Thurlow, The Secret State, p. 186. 161 CAB 134/53, C. (49) 10th meeting, 29 June 1949. 162 CAB 134/53, C. (49) 9th meeting, 27 June 1949. 163 C. (49) 16, Committee’s Second Report, 30 November 1949. 164 PREM 8/1365, Bridges to Cripps, 12 December 1949.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

222

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

165 Thurlow, The Secret State, p. 287. 166 CAB 130/37, GEN 231/3rd meeting, Confidential Annex, 19 December 1949; CAB 134/53, C. (49) 17, ‘The Committee’s Second Report: Ministerial Decisions’, 21 December 1949. On Brook’s views, see PREM 8/1356, Brook to Attlee, 16 December 1949. 167 CAB 130/37, GEN 231/3rd meeting, Confidential Annex, 19 December 1949. 168 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (51) 1, ‘Communism in the United Kingdom’, 19 January 1951. Concern about domestic communist activities increased after an explosion at the Royal Naval dockyard in Portsmouth in July 1950. The First Lord of the Admiralty believed the explosion was an act of sabotage to disrupt the supply of material to British forces in Korea (CAB 128/18, C.M. (50) 49, Cabinet conclusions, 24 July 1950). 169 DEFE 4/39, C.O.S. (51) 2nd meeting held on Wednesday, 3 February 1951, ‘Confidential Annex: Communism in the United Kingdom’; AIR 19/797, Ogilvie-Forbes to Private Secretary to the Under Secretary of State, 2 March 1951. 170 CAB 21/2750, note for record, 28 November 1950. 171 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (51) 1, ‘Communism in the United Kingdom’, 19 January 1951; PREM 8/1365, Brook to Attlee, 5 February 1951. 172 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (51) 1, meeting, 6 February 1951. 173 PREM 8/1365, Morrison to Attlee, 9 February 1951. CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (51) 2, ‘Communism in the United Kingdom’, 22 February 1951. 174 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (51) 2, ‘Communism in the United Kingdom’, 22 February 1951. 175 CAB 165/432, A.C. (H) (51) 1, ‘Constitution and Terms of Reference of the Committee’, 7 June 1951. Hillgarth erroneously reported to Churchill that the committee was chaired by Morrison (CAC, CHUR 2/36, Hillgarth to Churchill, 31 March 1951). 176 CAB 134/737, A.C. (H) (51) 1st meeting, 15 June 1951. 177 Lashmar and Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War, pp. 106, 108; CAB 134/737, Annex D Combating Communism in the UK: Tactics, Material and Machinery. 178 Mayhew, A War of Words, p. 41; Wilford, The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War, pp. 66–7. 179 CAB 134/737, Annex D Combating Communism in the UK: Tactics, Material and Machinery. 180 CAB 134/737, A.C. (H) (51) 2nd meeting, 22 June 1951. 181 CAB 134/737, A.C. (H) (52) 2nd meeting, 24 March 1952. 182 CAB 134/737, A.C. (H) (51) 5th meeting, 2 October 1951. IRD’s domestic activities have been looked at by Maguire; see ‘Counter-Subversion in Early Cold War Britain’. In a study of IRD’s activities, the Foreign Office official Norman Reddaway explained that IRD’s Home Desk was able to produce a series of papers on the ‘harm the Communists were doing to British industry’. At first, IRD’s domestic mandate was restricted to collecting information, not its exploitation, despite the ‘newsworthiness of their findings’.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Defending the realm

223

This changed when Douglas Dodds-Parker, Parliamentary Under-Secretary (1953–54), created a four-man committee chaired by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, to combat communist activities in industry. MI5 would provide IRD with information on CPGB activity and, with the approval of the Foreign Office, a ‘publicity outlet’ would be found to release information to the national press (MAYHEW 9/1/1, The Information Research Department, 1948–1977). 183 CAB 134/53, meeting, 27 June 1949 184 C. (49) 14, Committee’s Report, 19 July 1949, accessed using FOI. 185 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (51) 2, meeting, 6 February 1951. 186 CAB 134/737, A.C. (H) (51) 6, ‘Communism in the Schools and Universities’, 27 June 1951. 187 CAB 134/737, A.C. (H) (51) 3rd meeting, 10 July 1951. 188 CAB 134/737, A.C. (H) (51) 9, ‘Communist Teachers in the United Kingdom’, 13 July 1951. 189 CAB 134/737, A.C. (H) (51) 5th meeting, 2 October 1951; CAB 134/737, A.C. (H) (52) 1st meeting, 12 March 1952. 190 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (51) 2, meeting, 6 February 1951. 191 AIR 19/797, Preliminary Report by the Parliamentary Secretaries’ Committee, 18 December 1950. 192 CAB 134/737, A.C. (H) (51) 13, ‘Distribution of “Points at Issue”’, 31 October 1951; CAB 134/737, A.C. (H) (51) 5th meeting, 2 October 1951; LAB 13/697, PRO, F.C. Mason, Foreign Office, to A. Greenhough, Ministry of Labour and National Service, 18 October, 1951, reproduced in Aldrich (ed.), Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain, p. 188. 193 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (51) 6, Indoctrination of the Armed Forces, 28 August 1951. 194 KV 4/471, entry for 21 February 1949. 195 BOD, MS. Attlee dep. 1, fol. 41–3. 196 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 102.

7 Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

With the opening of, as it were, a new phase of espionage marked by the disclosures made by Gouzenko … the security arrangements of countries of the British Commonwealth apart from the United Kingdom became a matter of great concern to MI5. Previously the dominions had been regarded as reasonably immune from subversive activities, but now they were vitally concerned in cooperating with the United Kingdom in defence measures and in scientific research to protect our common interests, it was obvious that they had become a fruitful field for espionage.1 Sir Percy Sillitoe, MI5’s Director General

In the imperial sphere, the Labour government pursued a policy of ‘conservatism decked out to appear … progressive’.2 Retreat from the Indian subcontinent led to renewed attempts to preserve British influence throughout the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa as ministers and officials attempted to redevelop the Empire along new lines. While numerous studies have focused on colonial development and Britain’s wars of decolonisation, the role of intelligence and the end of Britain’s Empire has started to gain ever-increasing prominence.3 This chapter examines the role of ministers in intelligence affairs across the Empire and Commonwealth, exploring the work of Whitehall in developing ties across the globe aimed at improving security. It shows that the imperial dimension posed problems for the Attlee government. In Palestine, the British government faced a Zionist insurgency aimed at establishing an independent Jewish state, requiring ministers to resort to extreme measures to implement British policy. The chapter also shows how the Cold War became a major influence on British imperial policy. From London, Attlee oversaw the development of security in the Commonwealth, starting with Australia. Lax security required intimate cooperation between Britain and Australia that ultimately led to the formation of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), with Attlee playing an important role in the development of close inter-­Commonwealth ties. While Britain sought to improve secu-

Empire, Commonwealth and security

225

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

rity across the Empire and Commonwealth, the threat of communist subversion required a robust response. From Whitehall, Patrick Gordon Walker and a committee of ministers from the Foreign and Colonial Office, known as the Colonial Information Policy Committee, oversaw the development of British propaganda across the Empire, though their plans, in the face of growing financial pressure, were ultimately undermined through a lack of money.

Imperial security By the summer of 1945 the Security Service had developed an Empirewide network of officers. Since its formation, MI5 been given a global mandate and, in 1934, reflecting this, its deputy Director General had declared that ‘Our Security Service is more than national; it is Imperial’.4 In wartime, counter-intelligence liaison between SIS and MI5 had been complicated by the expansion of SIS’s Section V, leading to inter-service rivalries, but by 1945 MI5 had gone on to expand its global network and had a chain of twenty-seven Defence Security Officers to liaise with colonial and Commonwealth governments.5 Deteriorating East–West relations added fresh impetus to MI5’s global remit and, as details of Soviet espionage started to emerge, security became a vital concern for the British government, especially given increasing Commonwealth liaison in defence and scientific research.6 The Security Service’s global remit was reaffirmed by Findlater Stewart’s November 1945 report, which suggested that MI5 should be responsible for the collation and appreciation of all intelligence on ‘espionage or subversive movements aimed at Empire’. Elsewhere, such activities would be the responsibility of SIS, but, anticipating cordial inter-agency relations, each organisation would ‘keep the other informed by periodical summaries or oral contacts’. The arrangement would eradicate much of the friction that had developed in wartime and it was ‘accepted whole-heartedly’, though MI5 could, if it was necessary, raise the ‘question of setting up overt counter-intelligence contacts with foreign countries’ with SIS.7 These recommendations were approved during a meeting at Downing Street in the spring of 1946, chaired by Attlee. The outgoing Director General of MI5 believed the arrangements would ‘work smoothly’ and ministers found the proposals generally acceptable, though Bevin, responsible for SIS, insisted that on matters affecting foreign intelligence ‘no action should be taken except after consultation with him’.8 The recommendations formed part of a directive issued to Sillitoe at the request of Attlee, defining MI5’s role

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

226

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

as ‘the Defence of the Realm’ which, eventually, because of MI5’s overseas links became the ‘Nicene Creed’ of the Commonwealth intelligence community. In consultation with the Colonial Office, MI5 would also be responsible for ‘similar work in Colonial and other British territories overseas’, though the omission of a special reference to the Foreign Office provoked a protest from Sir Orme Sargent to Sir Edward Bridges.9 While Bridges remained opposed to singling out the Foreign Office (it would ‘imply that the Director-General is not under any obligation to consult the War Office and the Admiralty on matters that affect them’), a section was added that MI5 would need to consult ‘other departments … on matters affecting the Foreign Office or the responsibilities of SIS, no action should be taken, except after consultation with the Foreign Secretary’.10 While the recommendations seemed straightforward, Britain’s gradual withdrawal from the Empire raised further problems with post-war spheres of responsibility, leading to what became known as the ‘Attlee Doctrine’.11 In March 1947, with the British government committed to Indian independence, it became necessary to revise the existing arrangements for collecting information on the subcontinent. The difficult job of working out future intelligence liaison with an independent India was addressed by Sir David Monteath, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the India Office. In a letter to Attlee, Bridges wrote that it had been proposed that Indian Political Intelligence (IPI), responsible for monitoring threats to British India, would be disbanded and its remnants integrated into the Security Service, while SIS would be free to conduct covert operations for the collection of ‘secret intelligence’. While these proposals ran counter to Attlee’s earlier directive, they would not, Bridges wrote, do any real injury to the basic division of responsibility … and seem to represent a practical solution of an awkward situation. It is impossible to foresee what the state of our relation with India is likely to be in June, 1948, and the present arrangement and division of functions between the Security Service and S.I.S. have, therefore, been reached, without prejudice to any possible modification of the existing Directive.12

In the short term the proposals proved satisfactory, but further questions were raised in September 1948, following a meeting between Attlee and Britain’s new High Commissioner to India, General Sir Archibald Nye, who believed that SIS’s presence was unnecessary. In discussion, Nye argued that liaison with the Indian authorities should be supervised by the existing MI5 Security Liaison Officer (SLO). Attlee was astonished ‘that C had any representatives in India and said that

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

227

this must stop’.13 Not surprisingly, the decision provoked alarm inside the Foreign Office, which had fought hard to preserve SIS’s interests. In discussions with Bevin, Sargent talked about the ‘gap in our intelligence which the closing down of C’s organisation in India would cause’ and, in a further letter, suggested that ‘it seems desirable that a skeleton organisation should be build up, with the utmost caution, to prepare for the possibility’ of India leaving the Commonwealth, while collecting information on ‘Communist activities’.14 In the end, Attlee concluded that SIS should be withdrawn, establishing what became known as the ‘Attlee doctrine’, which prevented the agency from conducting clandestine activities in Commonwealth countries without the knowledge of the government concerned.15 In a letter to Menzies, Sargent explained that, despite arguments to the contrary, Attlee was ‘determined on the closing down of covert activities in India and there is, I am afraid, nothing more that we can do for the time being. I should be grateful, therefore, if you would take the necessary steps to disband your organisation in India, and let me know in due course of the action you have taken.’16

Palestine While the Cold War and the threat of communism was an overriding priority for MI5, the Service was also involved in efforts to combat terrorist groups in the Mandate of Palestine. Britain had been granted administrative control over the former Ottoman Arab territories, but the drive to establish an independent Jewish state resulted in a violent armed struggle against British forces in the region and provided policy headaches for the government. The threat posed by the militant Zionist groups, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Lehi or Stern Gang, was significant, and in August 1944 the High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Ronald MacMichael, narrowly escaped being killed. During an attack in November 1944, Britain’s Minister of State to the Middle East, Lord Moyne, was assassinated by members of the Lehi. With the end of the war in Europe these groups were joined by the legally established armed forces of the Jewish Agency, the organisation responsible for promoting Jewish immigration to the Mandate; the Haganah; the elite Palmach; and the Jewish Resistance Movement. Despite the Agency’s repeated assurances that it was not involved with the terrorist activities of the other groups, intelligence indicated that this was not the case. In Palestine, these groups attacked railways, raided military camps and damaged bridges, with the campaign taking increasing numbers of British lives. Overseas, the Irgun attacked British forces in Germany, attempted to blow up the Colonial

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

228

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Office in London and bombed the British Embassy in Rome.17 Both the Irgun and Stern Gang were also reported to be plotting to assassinate ministers, and, in January 1946, Liddell reported that ‘We have now had a … report from Palestine, suggesting that the Foreign Secretary was a possible object of the Stern Group’s attentions’.18 In August Sillitoe reported to Attlee that Jewish Agency representatives were an important source of information for MI5, and had warned of the ‘Indiscriminate shooting of British officers and soldiers’ and ‘selected V.I.Ps’. The Irgun and Stern Gang had also decided to ‘send 5 “cells” to London to work on I.R.A. lines … to “beat the dog in its own kennel”’.19 Other ministers were briefed about the insurgency in Palestine. Shortly after becoming Colonial Secretary, George Hall was told about MI5’s activities in the Mandate, with the same information provided to Attlee, Bevin, Dalton, Alexander, 1st Viscount Stansgate (William Wedgwood Benn), the Air Secretary, and the Secretary of State for War, Jack Lawson.20 During the summer of 1946, Liddell wrote that ‘We have prepared a brief for the Colonial Office for the Prime Minister’ which included information from ‘Top Secret sources’ showing Jewish Agency control over the Haganah and its involvement in ‘illegal activities and acts of violence’.21 Jewish Agency involvement in the campaign, despite its repeated denials, was a point of contention. During a meeting with representatives of the Agency in November 1945, Bevin had pointed out cooperation between the Haganah and the insurgents, accusing the Jewish Agency of collusion in the violence. The meeting was relatively stormy and Bevin, it was later reported, spoke with ‘great anger and tension, a muscle at the side of his mouth giving a warning signal’.22 News of Jewish Agency support for the violent campaign forced the British government to release information in Parliament. In July 1946 Liddell and Sillitoe attended a meeting called by Attlee to ‘discuss what evidence can be given to the House in support of the Government’s action in Palestine’. Hall, ‘Pug’ Ismay and Menzies, responsible for the London SIGINT Board, were in attendance. The available evidence included ‘statements made by the Jewish Agency liaison officer to our [Defence Security Officer] in Palestine, which were of a decidedly compromising kind, and statements by informants’. During a further meeting, Morrison, Hall, Ismay, Sillitoe and others discussed the ‘question of blowing secret sources … and a telegram which we had received from Palestine was read out. This telegram expressed the anxiety of the [General Officer Commanding] lest he should find himself entirely deprived of intelligence sources.’23 In spite of the threat to intelligence collection, it was decided to produce a paper that, Liddell explained:

Empire, Commonwealth and security

229

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

set out on the basis of the three main incidents – those of October, 1945, February, 1946, and June, 1946. We began by a statement on the events as reported and the damage done, and this was followed by a [statement] showing the complicity of the Jewish Agency and the co-ordination of activity by the Agency to include the IRGUN and STERN groups.24

Some of the evidence came from secret sources known only as ISTRA and, while the exact nature of this information is not clear, the material may have come from GC&CS which enjoyed some success against Zionist communications, providing ‘considerable assistance’ to MI5.25 The decision to include this sensitive information came from Attlee who, Liddell wrote, ‘refused to take out the words about ISTRA – referring to their being interpreted’. Despite Attlee’s insistence on the publication, SIS believed the blame for ISTRA’s leakage lay with the Security Service and, in the short term, inter-service animosity ensued, with MI5’s Alex Keller complaining that SIS had started a ‘whispering campaign … ­suggesting that M.I.5. had rather let the side down’.26 The release of the pamphlet was announced by Morrison on 24 July, just two days after the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which killed ninetyone people.27 It utilised a variety of sources, including information ‘which has been obtained showing that between the 23rd September, 1945, and the 3rd November, 1945, seven telegrams passed between London and Jerusalem’.28 One of the documents showed that Haganah representatives had ‘come to a working arrangement with the dissident organisations’, while a message from Moshe Sneh of the Jewish Agency showed that the ‘Stern Group have expressed their willingness to join us … on the basis of our programme of activity’.29 Oliver Stanley, the former Colonial Secretary, told the Commons that ‘the Government’s charge is proved’ and that it was a matter of great regret that a policy of violence, which before was followed merely by a small and dissident minority, should have received the approval of a body such as the Jewish Agency, which represents so very much in the whole Jewish community in Palestine. I feel that the incident at the end of October, and the exchange of telegrams in connection with that incident which are published in the White Paper, show quite clearly that a definite planned outrage was undertaken by members of the Jewish Agency, and that in that outrage they were acting in the closest cooperation with the Irgun Zvai Leumi and with the Stern group.30

Soon after the release, the Haganah’s collaboration with other terrorist groups ended as the Jewish Agency sought to distance itself from the Irgun and Stern Gang after the bombing of the King David Hotel.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

230

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Another particular concern was illegal Jewish immigration to the Mandate. Mindful of the views of the Arab majority and the likely results of unchecked Jewish immigration on Britain’s relations with the Arab states, the British authorities had imposed strict limits on the number of immigrants permitted to settle in Palestine. In 1939 the government had released a White Paper restricting the total number of Jews to just 75,000 over five years. In Europe, the increasing persecution of Jews within Nazi Germany, and the drive by pro-Zionists in the United States to create a Jewish homeland, led to renewed pressure for increased immigration, which only intensified once the full horrors of the Holocaust started to emerge. Despite this, unchecked immigration remained a headache for the British government. In April 1947 Attlee wrote to Hector McNeil in the Foreign Office that it was ‘essential that we should take all possible steps to stop this traffic at source’, looking at ‘what practical measures might be taken in each country to prevent the departure of illegal immigrants’.31 The next month, an official committee was formed under the chairmanship of the Permanent Under-Secretary for the Colonies, Sir Thomas Lloyd, to coordinate departmental policy and ‘consider all possible methods by which the traffic might be stopped at source’, which included officials from the Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty and Security Service.32 Using intelligence sources the committee ‘prepared a complete list of the 50 to 60 ships suspected of being destined for the illegal immigrants’ and their discussions were forwarded to a Ministerial Committee on Illegal Immigration chaired by Bevin (GEN 180).33 The committee discussed ways of halting illegal immigration, including the diversion of ships to Cyprus, interception of traffickers by the Royal Navy and diplomatic solutions to the problem, with the use of ‘white’ and ‘black’ propaganda also considered. The subject was discussed at a meeting of GEN 180 in June 1947 and prompted by a paper written by Lloyd for a ‘full-scale propaganda campaign to the Jews in Europe’. During the meeting, Lloyd said the campaign would include ‘white’ and ‘black’ propaganda, although, he acknowledged, the latter could, unless carefully managed, prove ‘embarrassing’.34 The proposed ‘black’ campaign would include ‘introducing leaflets to [Displaced Persons] Camps by agents, spreading rumours, and … secret radio stations’, with a small steering group needed to manage the campaign.35 Lloyd’s proposals were brushed aside by ministers, however, who concluded that it was not advisable to set up a ‘black’ propaganda machinery, with the committee responding more favourably to publishing reports that ‘there were some 5,000 Jews in Palestine who wished to return to Europe’.36 The government also resorted to more extreme counter-measures,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

231

with senior government figures consulting SIS about interrupting the flow of immigrants. In response, the Service recommended a programme of ‘intimidation’ that would only be effective ‘if some members of the group of people to be intimidated actually suffer unpleasant consequences’.37 The plan to sabotage the flow of illegal shipping was a legacy of Britain’s wartime special operations and fraught with danger, with even Menzies recognising that attempts to blame the attacks on Arab groups would ‘increase tension’ in the Mandate. The Eastern Department’s Peter Garran, recognising that such operations were justified in wartime, believed the plan would undermine Britain’s diplomatic relations with the countries involved and be ‘highly embarrassing’.38 Despite the inherent difficulties of the plan, the Foreign Office, after apparently receiving ministerial approval, gave the go-ahead as long as there was ‘no risk of casualties being involved’ and with the proviso that attacks ‘must be arranged … when the ship is empty’.39 The project, ironically, was codenamed ‘Embarrass’. The scheme involved the use of limpet mines, readily available after the war, and the operatives selected were provided with cover stories including business visits, holidaying and Mediterranean yachting. During the course of the operation, five ships were attacked in Italian ports, with one described as a ‘total loss’ and another two damaged.40 At the same time, despite concerns about stoking inter-community tensions in the Mandate, propaganda was distributed by SIS from a notional group called the Defenders of Arab Palestine, blaming the Soviets for the flow of illegal immigrants and warning that they would ‘carry the fight into those lands where the troubles have their roots’. Unsurprisingly, the propaganda side of the  operation failed to have any impact, while the operation against Jewish shipping was not enough to halt the flow of immigrants. Against the backdrop of increasing American opposition to British policy in the Mandate and financial problems at home, pulling out was the only option available to the government.41 Withdrawal in the spring of 1948 marked a significant defeat for Britain, though ‘Embarrass’ showed that special operations could be conducted within clear guidelines.

Commonwealth security Another problem was the different standards of security across the Dominions and Britain’s overseas dependencies. As a result, during the Attlee government, MI5 and other security organisations helped export what has been termed a ‘British intelligence culture’.42 The first real test of this came in Australia in 1948, when decrypted cables between

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

232

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Moscow and Canberra, part of the top-secret VENONA programme, revealed a security leak in the Australian government. This sensitive information showed that, after the Soviets had established an embassy in Canberra in 1943, highly sensitive material had been passed to Soviet intelligence, including reports by the British Post Hostilities Planning Staff.43 This was not the first time Australian security had been a cause for concern; in early 1947 US government officials had been ‘worried’ about the security of information provided to the Australians, with the US Navy threatening to limit the amount of material to ‘that of the most immediate value’.44 In Washington, the leaks caused increasing concern and, in January 1948, the Director of Central Intelligence, Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoeter, reported details of the leaks to Truman.45 While primarily concerned about security, the leaks also revived US fears about Australian politics, particularly the Labor government of Ben Chifley, Prime Minister since 1945. As the head of the Foreign Office’s Far Eastern Section, Ester Dening, who had visited Australia in May to discuss regional security at Bevin’s request, told Liddell, the Americans were distrustful of Australian Labor politicians, especially Herbert Evatt, the Minister of External Affairs, who, while trying to develop an independent foreign policy, appeared in US circles to be ‘disposed too favourably’ towards the Soviets.46 Concerns about lax security led to an embargo on the communication of all secret technical information to Australia, alarming both the British and Australian governments, which had been involved in the development of rocket technology at Woomera, in southern Australia.47 Given the impact on British-Commonwealth defence arrangements, Attlee was personally informed of the security breach by Sillitoe in late 1947.48 During a subsequent meeting attended by Sillitoe, Menzies, Bevin and the Prime Minister in January 1948, efforts were made: to try and find some way out of the present deadlock which has been reached owing to a refusal by the Americans to pass any information to us on guided missiles unless we give an absolute guarantee that it would not reach the Australians. It was disclosed at the meeting that the P.M. had just had a letter from Chifley stating that [Frederick] Shedden [Secretary of the Department of Defence] was paying a visit to this country to renew his former contacts and discuss, amongst other things, the question of security.49

Chifley was not informed of the leak until later that month, when Attlee wrote to him that he had authorised Sillitoe to visit Australia to ‘explain orally a most serious matter’. Knowledge of the visit would be ‘confined to the fewest people as possible’.50 By early February

Empire, Commonwealth and security

233

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

MI5’s Director General, accompanied by Roger Hollis, had arrived in Australia. During their first meeting with Chifley in Sydney on 12 February, Sillitoe stressed to the Australian Prime Minister that there was ‘definite evidence’ of Russian espionage and, in order to hide VENONA material, Chifley was told that the information came from ‘a high-grade source, whose future security might be in danger if his identity became known to [the] Soviet authorities’. Chifley: was shown the extract from the X Report and the two documents therein mentioned. He examined the first document and said repeatedly that neither he nor any other Minister had seen it. The D.G. immediately explained to him that no suspicion rested on any particular individual, and that the purpose of his visit was merely to inform the Prime Minister of Australia that there was a leak somewhere, and to request that he would give instructions that the matter should be investigated. Chifley then examined the second document. He considered that it did not constitute very strong evidence of a leakage, since the matter was common talk in Australia at the time.

In a message to Menzies, Liddell reported that Chifley had ‘accepted’ the cover story ‘without any question’ and had promised Sillitoe a ‘full investigation’ into the matter.51 In private, the Australian Premier aired his scepticism and told Shedden ‘There is a fellow here with a bloody silly name – Sillitoe. As far as I can make out he is the chief bloody spy – you had better have a look at him and find out what he wants.’52 Sillitoe remained in Australia until 20 February, when he left for New Zealand for a further visit to overhaul security, leaving Hollis behind to help with the ongoing investigation. Not surprisingly, the investigations met with little success. One investigation by Brigadier Fred Chilton, the Controller of Joint Intelligence, identified the distribution of the British papers leaked, while another by Shedden identified one suspect in the Department of External Affairs, though the inquiries were still ongoing when Sillitoe returned to Australia in March.53 MI5’s Director General quickly realised that the cover story was counter-productive and proposed that a select few Australian officials should be given the full information, a proposal turned down by London due to ‘international complications’.54 By now MI5’s cover story had come under intensive scrutiny. In April, during a meeting attended by Hollis, Chifley, Evatt and the Minister of Defence, John Dedman, Evatt had suggested that ‘it would be reasonable Russian cover to attribute a leakage to Australia in some other part of the Empire, and that if defector accepted … the attribution of the leakage to Australia, no amount of examination’ by MI5 would go any further

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

234

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

than to ‘establish that [he] genuinely believed what he had been told’. Hollis recognised that Evatt’s comment was ‘unanswerable’ because of the cover story, confiding to colleagues that Evatt may have suspected that the British knew ‘a great deal more’.55 Evatt was right to suspect the cover story. On 7 June Chifley gave Attlee an update on the investigation and, after describing its current state, explained that ‘in the absence of full particulars … we are placed at some disadvantage in dealing with the matter’. Like Dedman, Chifley doubted whether a leak had happened in Australia, suggesting instead to Attlee that the Russians ‘may have doubted [the informer’s] reliability and … purposely mentioned Australia to cover up the true source’.56 In London, both Attlee and Bevin were ‘extremely concerned’ and recognised that something needed to be done to restore confidence.57 At Attlee’s request, Sillitoe was sent on another ‘highly secret mission’ to Washington to obtain American permission to reveal the true source of the information. In May the US State-Navy-Air Force Cooperating Committee had taken a harsh line on sharing secret material with the Australians, stating that because of ‘political immaturity, a leftish government greatly influenced by infiltrated labor organizations … Australia is a poor security risk’.58 During a meeting of the US Communications Intelligence Board on 1 June, Sillitoe, in the face of strong opposition from officials, defended Chifley as a man of ‘the utmost integrity’, with the board finally agreeing that British officials could tell Chifley about the VENONA material, provided no reference was made to the US.59 Despite this apparent success, Sillitoe faced opposition to the proposal that Evatt and Dedman should be told, which only ended at the end of the month, following the intervention of George Marshall, the US Secretary of State, though security restrictions remained in place.60 Australian security was discussed when Chifley visited Britain for financial talks in early July. At a meeting on 8 July, Chifley discussed economic issues but also pointed to reports that the US government was reluctant to send ‘specially secret information’, with the Australian Prime Minister telling his British counterparts that he was willing to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ to ease US concerns.61 The next day, during an informal meeting at Chequers, Attlee also raised the ‘security question’.62 Although no records of what was discussed are available, a top secret brief prepared by Sargent on the Australian leaks provided the necessary information for Attlee. During the meeting at Chequers, Attlee was to divulge to Chifley that he had not been given the ‘full story’ and, on the condition that the true source would not be revealed to anyone except Evatt and Dedman, Chifley was told that ‘the source was communications sent by the Soviet Embassy in Australia to Moscow, the authen-

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

235

ticity of which has been fully verified beyond question’. No mention was made of the wider VENONA programme, but the Americans had no objection to passing information to ‘Australian officials engaged in the investigation’. Chifley would also be told that, if he agreed, Hollis would return to Australia to brief officials on the ‘details available’, though he was not authorised to reveal the actual source.63 Although the meeting was held behind closed doors, confirmation that Attlee disclosed details of the decrypted cipher traffic to Chifley can be found in Liddell’s diary. In an entry for 9 July, Liddell recorded a conversation with Sillitoe, during which MI5’s Director General recalled that he: saw the P.M., but missed Chifley, whom he is to see on Monday. He cross questioned the P.M. as to what he had said, and the P.M. was definite he had told Chifley about the American connection; the origin of the information, and the undesirability of communicating any details by wire to Australia.64

Chifley was also pressed to ‘tighten up security’ by Alexander, with the security issue again raised by Sillitoe during a meeting with Chifley on 12 July. Once again, details of the conversation do not survive, although Sillitoe, as a brief for the meeting makes clear, tried to resolve liaison issues with the Australian government, and Chifley was told that MI5’s information indicated a spy network ‘on the lines of the Canadian case, though not necessarily of that size’. Hollis would return to Australia accompanied by Robert Hemblys-Scales, appointed as MI5’s liaison officer to Melbourne, and both men, explained Sillitoe, would have personal access to Chifley ‘when they consider it necessary’.65 In early 1949 the Australian Defence Committee recognised that a reorganisation of Australian security was needed, and suggested the creation of a new security organisation. During a meeting on 8 February, Chifley formally agreed to the new security service.66 The next month, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) was created when Chifley issued a directive to Justice Reed, the organisation’s first Director General, heavily influenced by the earlier Findlater Stewart report and Attlee’s 1946 directive to Sillitoe. ASIO was tasked with ‘the defence of Commonwealth from external and internal dangers’. As with MI5, ASIO would be ‘absolutely free from any political bias or influence’ and, in keeping with the bipartisan nature of the new organisation, ministers would not ‘concern themselves with the detailed information which may be obtained by the Security Service in particular cases’.67 In all, it had taken almost thirteen months from the arrival of Sillitoe in early 1948 to set up the new security organisation, with ASIO’s formation coming at the end of intensive discussions between London,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

236

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

Washington and Canberra on the perilous state of Australian security and ways to improve it. But the formation of ASIO proved key to the development of the ‘Commonwealth intelligence culture’ and, as Attlee wrote to Truman, helped restore ‘the old confidence which existed between the United States of America, Australia and ourselves over the handling of defence secrets of all kinds’.68 In time the organisation developed along MI5 lines and rapidly expanded – from just fifteen staff in July 1949, to 141 under a year later – devoting a large proportion of its resources to what became known as ‘the case’ and Australian efforts to root out Soviet spies in government.69 British security became the benchmark for other Commonwealth countries. In the five years he was Director General, Sillitoe visited Canada, Palestine, Egypt, Kenya, Rhodesia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaya, South Africa and New Zealand.70 As the example of Australia shows, efforts to improve security across the Commonwealth were far from straightforward and reforms in South Africa were problematic.71 While the country was strategically important, the election of the Afrikaner National Party under Daniel Malan in 1948, which was committed to implementing racial segregation, posed a significant problem for Attlee. While at variance with London’s aim for an all-inclusive Commonwealth, the racial policies of the South African government were also problematic for the field of security-intelligence relations. Following a series of reports stressing the ‘weakness’ of the South African Special Branch, Sillitoe visited the country to discuss improving security measures, holding several meetings with the Minister of Justice, Charles Swart, and Major du Plooy, head of the country’s Special Branch. Before the visit, Sillitoe had aired his concerns to Attlee that it would be ‘too much to hope’ that a reformed system would ‘remain immune from political influences’, and that the South African government would be able, potentially, to use the Special Branch ‘against the Parliamentary Opposition or members of the British community’ who opposed Nationalist policy. Worse still, the government would use the Special Branch to ‘keep down the black races’ and, in these circumstances, Sillitoe would be open to criticism that he had ‘assisted the Boer nationalists in implementing their extremist political programme by actively helping in the creation of a Gestapo’. Despite concerns over the possible use of a reformed internal security organisation, Sillitoe believed the broader considerations of ‘Imperial strategy and defence planning’ were more important, requiring the South African government to take its place in ‘Commonwealth councils’ and receive vital US–UK secret information. In order to prevent MI5 becoming involved in the ‘political intrigues of the Union’, Sillitoe suggested that any future head

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

237

of South African security should be seconded to London for a period of training, while Sillitoe himself, during discussions with Malan, would emphasise that any organisation needed to be kept ‘free from any political bias’. Naively, Sillitoe believed that Malan would ‘recognise the correctness of such a directive and copy it’.72 Discussions on security matters were not simply bilateral and the period saw the introduction of a series of Commonwealth Security Conferences starting in 1948. In July, at the request of MI5, Attlee wrote to the premiers of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa to suggest that they should bring the heads of their respective security services to a special conference during the forthcoming Commonwealth conference in London. The letters were drafted by the Commonwealth Relations Office and forwarded to Downing Street to be signed off.73 The aim would be to determine ‘how our respective security authorities could assist each other in relation to the infiltration problem’. Attached was a memorandum, written by Attlee, on ‘Russia Infiltration’. It stated that the experience of the British government ‘is that the Russian ­technique … is to infiltrate their sympathizers into key positions into all circles … to influence policy, [and] collect information’. The Russians had been ‘remarkably successful’, Attlee continued, and ‘it was essential to develop effective precautions’ while ‘doing everything possible to maintain democratic liberties’. In the long term, Russian encroachment would be countered by ‘the establishment of a high standard of living’ and a ‘positive faith in the moral and spiritual values of our way of life’. However, these measures would ‘take time to produce effective results’ and, in the meantime, he recommended ‘internal administrative and publicity measures’, in particular stringent vetting procedures in government circles. Attlee proposed that ‘there should be a general discussion of the problem’.74 During discussions, Commonwealth security representatives agreed that each country should possess a ‘counter-espionage organisation’ capable of carrying out a multiplicity of functions, including the surveillance of a ‘hostile intelligence organisation or organisations’. There would be the ‘fullest exchange … of information’ and, to assist cooperation, ‘periodic visits by members of one service to another’ were regarded as ‘desirable’. Domestically, each country would also ‘possess a section devoted to the study of the indigenous Communist Party’ and compile a comprehensive set of records. As in Britain, it was agreed that all participants would encourage their government departments ‘to maintain a high standard of security’.75 The success of this conference led to a further meeting in 1951 to which representatives from India, Pakistan and Ceylon were also invited. While useful in determining

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

238

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

security across the Commonwealth, Liddell privately noted in his diary that ‘we are making a rather heavy weather over this Conference; it is only really a meeting of experts – so called – and I should have thought it would have been better kept on that level with as little formality as possible’.76 The presence of representatives from the new members of the Commonwealth alarmed Malan, who, according to Sir Evelyn Baring, British High Commissioner to South Africa, had ‘expressed some alarm at the idea of Asiatic Dominions being represented’.77 While welcoming the conference, Malan was fearful that lax security in India, Pakistan and Ceylon would lead to the proceedings being leaked.78 Malan’s concern about security regarding the new members of the Commonwealth was not part of his ‘extremist political programme’ and was shared by officials in London. During a meeting of the Russia Committee in August 1947, the communication of information to India and Pakistan was discussed, with officials telling Sir Maurice Peterson, Britain’s Ambassador to Moscow, to restrict information to his Indian counterpart because of security concerns.79 By September officials were so concerned about Indian security that they were passing the ‘lowest minimum’ secret information to Delhi, creating a two-tier system for Commonwealth liaison.80 One particular concern was the appointment of Vengalil Krishanan (V. K.) Krishna Menon as India’s High Commissioner to London in July 1947, as well as the political affiliations of employees working in the High Commission itself.81 Born in Calicut, India, in May 1897, Menon had travelled to Britain to study at the London School of Economics, and had become a leading figure in the campaign for Indian self-rule. Despite his aspirations to become a Labour MP, he developed ties with the Communist Party and was deselected as the parliamentary candidate for a seat in Dundee. Although he was readmitted to the Labour Party in 1945, he maintained a close, if at times fractured, relationship with the Communist Party. The appointment of Menon was opposed by Sillitoe, who had only found out about the posting from an official in the India Office, and he proposed sending the Indian government a ‘friendly warning’ about Menon’s background. Following the meeting, an irritated Sillitoe told the JIC that Menon had close contacts with the Communist Party and was, in his view, a ‘first class intriguer’ with a ‘bad moral record’. He called for the restriction of material to the Indian High Commission.82 While his links to the Communist Party started to fade, Menon remained, paradoxically, a security concern, with Liddell writing, in May 1949, that, whatever his politics, he was ‘dishonest, immoral, an opportunist, and an intriguer … it would be better to cut our losses and get rid of MENON’. However, he remained High

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

239

Commissioner, with his position only being challenged in the spring of 1951 following the appointment of Patrick Gordon Walker as the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.83 During a meeting on 17 April, Sillitoe met Gordon Walker in the Commonwealth Relations Office and showed him a paper on Menon, along with an ‘annexed list of Communists and Communist sympathisers in the Indian High Commission’. While it acknowledged that he was never a member of the Communist Party, the note emphasised the ‘intimate’ relationship between Menon and the CPGB and, in particular, the influence of Rajani Palme Dutt, the party’s leading theoretician. Beyond questions about Menon’s political affiliations, concerns were raised about his financial contacts in London and the employment of several communists in the High Commission. The paper finished with the assessment that Menon: is an intriguer. His own wants are few, but he entertains liberally; he is pro-Russian, but not a communist; he is no lover of the British, but he did all he could to keep India in the Commonwealth … Taking everything into account, Menon and the office of the Indian High Commission represent a security risk.84

During the meeting, Gordon Walker was, Sillitoe noted, ‘very much struck by our information and shewed himself to be entirely convinced by our report’. The Secretary of State believed the final assessment was ‘very fair’, and he took note of Menon’s apparent fraudulent activity, adding that ‘he himself suspected MENON of taking drugs’. News of communists and fellow travellers in the Indian High Commission was particularly worrying, and Gordon Walker regarded Menon as a ‘serious menace to security’, telling Sillitoe that he wanted to ask Sir Archibald Nye to approach the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, on the subject.85 Sillitoe held another meeting with Gordon Walker on 1 May and, three days later, briefed Attlee on Menon and the Indian High Commission. Attlee was, Sillitoe explained, ‘very interested … especially with regard to the Communists and Fellow Travellers on MENON’s staff’.86 In the end, the approach to Nehru was sidelined on the advice of Nye who, concerned about the impact of revealing the allegations to Nehru, instead suggested an approach to Rajaji Rajagopalachari, the Minister for Home Affairs. During a meeting with Nye in mid-June, Rajagopalachari was given details of the allegations against Menon and his staff, with Nye suggesting that sensitive information should be directly forwarded to Delhi, bypassing the High Commission, though Rajagopalachari asked for details of communists working in London. Despite opposition from his own government and in London, Menon

240

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

remained High Commissioner until the end of his tenure, later serving as Indian Ambassador to the United Nations.87

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Nationalism and communist subversion in the colonies Britain’s security agencies played an increasingly important role in combating nationalist or communist-inspired independence movements. In the case of MI5, the Service ‘helped’ influence policymakers by playing down reports that indigenous nationalist movements were Kremlinbacked stooges.88 In the case of Kwame Nkrumah, the future first President of independent Ghana, the Service concluded that personal ambition and African nationalism were prime driving factors. According to MI5, Nkrumah’s interest in communism stemmed only ‘from his desire to enlist aid in the furtherance of his own aims’.89 Referring to West and East Africa in December 1949, Guy Liddell told the JIC that ‘there was no evidence of Communism as it was understood in Europe’ but, instead, a lot ‘of nationalism which received considerable encouragement from all sorts of people’.90 In the wake of riots in the Gold Coast in early 1948, the Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech-Jones similarly suggested that claims of ‘Communist incitement’ were overly simplistic, with the underlying causes of the unrest largely political and economic.91 The Security Service was not the only source of intelligence, with local police forces forming an essential part of the colonial administration.92 As Creech-Jones explained in August 1948, there were two main avenues through which colonial governments could collect intelligence: ‘the Defence Security Officer [MI5] and the Special Branch’. These were complementary and each served as a ‘valuable cross check’ on the other.93 The central importance of police in intelligence-gathering duties was underlined in 1949 by Sir Henry Gurney, British High Commissioner to Malaya, who explained that the local forces were the ‘only Force which has the information and intelligence necessary’ due to their local contacts.94 In many cases, local forces were underdeveloped and starved of resources, since Whitehall expected colonial administrations to pay for their own security organisations. The result was that many colonial police forces were ‘small, underequipped, and under-trained’.95 The situation only started to change following riots in the Gold Coast and the declaration of a state of emergency in Malaya, which led CreechJones to try to overhaul colonial policing and intelligence. In a series of despatches, Creech-Jones emphasised the need for colonies to examine their own machinery for intelligence collection. Drawing attention to the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

241

security situation in Malaya, he explained that it was imperative that all ‘possible means should be taken to prevent similar happenings in other colonial territories’ and that all colonial authorities should examine the ‘state of efficiency, in numbers, organisation, [and] equipment’ of the security forces and report on the ‘existence or otherwise of intelligence and special branches’. Creech-Jones wrote that while it was ‘impossible to lay down in general terms a framework to the organisation of these services to all Colonies’, experience had shown that, ‘whatever the structure of the particular intelligence organisation, it is essential that the central coordination of reports from the various sources shall be in the hands of a political officer of high calibre’. It was important to use this information to build a ‘general picture of conditions as a whole’, allowing ‘individual events and trends’ to be ‘properly assessed and the central government to be suitably advised’. In some cases this was the existing arrangement, but intelligence reform was vital.96 Standardisation of police practices across the colonies was helped by the appointment of William Johnson as Colonial Police Advisor in November 1948.97 As with its role in the development of Commonwealth security, MI5 also played an important role in developing Special Branches across the Empire and, a month after the Accra riots, Alexander Keller, head of MI5’s E Branch, was despatched to the Gold Coast to advise on security.98 Following the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency, Keller was also sent to Malaya to recommend intelligence reform.99 Changes overseas took place alongside the formation of separate desks in the Colonial Office to oversee defence, security and intelligence, with renewed energies put into inter-departmental cooperation with the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence.100 During a discussion at the Colonial Office in October 1948, Creech-Jones emphasised the need to develop ‘some kind of central intelligence department to watch outside events for possible repercussions in Colonial territories’ which would provide ministers with ‘information and advice on particular problems’.101 In 1948 the Colonial Office began to receive its own feed of intelligence from the colonial governments rather than having to rely on other intelligence channels, particularly the JIC which was marginalised by the reforms.102 Relevant information would then be sent to other Whitehall departments, including the Foreign Office, though further reform was necessary.103 By 1948 the Cold War had become an important factor in British imperial policy. While sanctioning Britain’s retreat from parts of Empire, Attlee and Bevin sought to re-establish British influence, particularly in Africa, where they emphasised Britain’s strategic and economic interests. While Bevin’s vision of a revived British Empire, linked

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

242

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

to other European colonial powers and free of financial dependence on the US, remained a vision rather than serious long-term policy, Africa was an important focus for government policy.104 By 1948 British colonialism was the focus of unrelenting attacks by the Soviets. In January Sir Maurice Peterson drew attention to an earlier article in the Soviet press discussing the reaction of imperial powers, particularly Britain, to nationalist movements in ‘backward territories’. Until recently, Britain had been able to manipulate ‘the half-hearted bourgeois Liberation Movements’, though, in the face of growing unrest, the ‘bankruptcy of … imperialism was becoming ever more clearly revealed’, with Britain trying to preserve its ‘tottering control over their Empire’.105 A month later the British Representative to the United Nations reported a recent speech by the Soviet delegate attacking the ‘low living standards in the Colonies’. Although agreeing with the argument that ‘the time for Colonial mastery has passed’, it was necessary, he argued, for the UN to be reminded that the Soviet Union itself was ‘an expanding imperialist power’.106 In April Creech-Jones sent a circular to HM Representatives explaining the need for greater propaganda to refute Soviet attacks. In the colonies, Soviet propagandists lost ‘no opportunity of attacking the Western powers on the grounds of colonial exploitation’. They succeeded only because their propaganda appealed to individuals who wished ‘to change the established order’, and it was essential, CreechJones wrote, to ‘underline the positive achievement of the established order’ and convince the indigenous populace that ‘development of the Colonies is in their own interests, and … not designed solely to relieve the economic crisis in this country’.107 Sub-Saharan Africa was a particular concern. While the region was not a priority for the Soviets, officials believed that communism posed a major threat to British interests across the region, exploiting local discontent.108 One Colonial Office report on ‘Communism in Africa’, while acknowledging that the communist movements were in their ‘early stages’, warned that the Soviets intended to ‘foment trouble and unrest’ rather than a seizure of power. Soviet representatives were reportedly active in disseminating communist propaganda to nationalist and local trade union organisations, with ‘almost all’ African independent trade union groups ‘infected by Communism’. The situation was ‘particularly serious’ in Algeria and South Africa, though, as the report acknowledged, communist efforts to cultivate nationalist leaders were mixed. Communist influence was reportedly advanced in ‘all territories in French and British West and Equatorial Africa’, and South Africa’s ‘extreme racial policy’ provided a fertile recruiting ground for communists and was the ‘chief political breeding ground for Communism’ on the continent.109

Empire, Commonwealth and security

243

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Imperial propaganda By the spring of 1948, with Britain adopting a new publicity policy in Europe, a coordinated effort was being made to develop propaganda in Britain’s overseas territories. The emphasis came from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Patrick Gordon Walker, who had entered Parliament in October 1945 as MP for Smethwick, rising rapidly through the government. In Attlee’s view he was ‘extremely able’ and moved to the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1947.110 Gordon Walker was, like Mayhew, anti-communist and, while at Oxford, was one of the ‘few left-wing dons brave enough to resist the communistled “unity” campaign’.111 In wartime he had been involved in BBC broadcasts to Germany, and was seconded to the wartime Psychological Warfare Division.112 The broad outlines of Gordon Walker’s proposed campaign were set out in a paper entitled ‘Imperial Propaganda’. Recently, the Soviets had succeeded in their colonial propaganda with, he argued, the ‘almost universal acceptance of the idea that there is no colonial or racial oppression under Soviet rule; that backward peoples are benefitted by the Russian system’. Although they had failed to win ‘world opinion’, the Soviets had achieved ‘100% success’ in the ‘enlightened treatment of backward peoples’ and, as a result, had succeeded in ‘spreading the idea that Britain … is an exploiting colonial power’. This was now a ‘point of accepted faith’ and afforded the Soviets a ‘great initial advantage in almost all parts of the world’. Although it would it would take time to challenge this view, a counter-offensive was needed to ‘fight for world public opinion’. Like the European campaign pushed by Mayhew, colonial propaganda would focus on the merits of Britain while countering Soviet propaganda, showing that ‘Russia does in fact exploit its own subject peoples … We want to show that the leaders of the subject peoples have been purged and executed.’ By contrast, British colonial administration would be portrayed as ‘enlightened, progressive and realistic’. Drawing on his wartime experiences, particularly his belief that propaganda should contain an element of truth, the new campaign would avoid painting a ‘black and white picture’ and, instead, would ‘mix the bad with the good’. The campaign would use BBC broadcasts and ministerial speeches (‘the necessary peg on which the propaganda can be hung’) with the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office all playing their part.113 Mayhew was ‘favourably impressed’ while Morrison, Gordon Walker noted in his diary, also ‘liked it’.114 Ralph Murray similarly found the scheme ‘sound in general’, having written a note on ‘lines of attack’ against Soviet pretensions to perfection in territories similar to the colonies.115

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

244

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

On 23 April a meeting was held in the Commonwealth Relations Office, chaired by Gordon Walker, to discuss colonial propaganda, attended by Mayhew, Murray, Warner and others. It was felt that ‘close cooperation’ between the Commonwealth Relations Office, Foreign Office and Colonial Office was needed to ‘settle the main lines of attack and to co-ordinate the detailed preparation of material’. The BBC and Central Office of Information would be involved, with those attending in agreement that Britain’s colonial campaign needed to be ‘both negative and positive’. Negatively, British propaganda would ‘expose Soviet exploitation of colonial peoples’, while, positively, British officials needed to ‘explain our own Colonial administration by way of contrast’.116 Following the meeting Gordon Walker, with the assistance of Mayhew and David Rees-Williams, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies, wrote a further paper setting out future publicity policy, arguing that ‘Russia and the Communists have had great success … in painting a picture of Britain as the reactionary exploiter and Russia as the progressive liberator in this field’. Britain would adopted a dual campaign showing that the British colonial system was ‘progressive and the best in the world’ while, negatively, British propagandists would give ‘a true picture of Russia’s conduct in Eastern Europe and in its own territories’. Overseas, inter-departmental cooperation was necessary, while, domestically, the British public would need to be enlightened ‘by the Press, the B.B.C., and public speeches’ about the merits of colonial development. A ‘small body’ would be needed to achieve ‘the necessary co-ordination of the collection and the presentation of material’ for the colonies.117 By June a copy of the paper had been seen and approved by Bevin, Creech-Jones and Philip Noel-Baker, in charge of the Commonwealth Relations Office. Morrison, responsible for government publicity services, was also consulted, while Attlee also saw a copy of the paper.118 Before a meeting of GEN 231, the Cabinet Committee on Propaganda, Brook explained that the paper had been generally approved, though Cripps, Brook revealed, had ‘doubts about it, and he may suggest that no action should be taken to inaugurate any systematic propaganda campaign’.119 In general, the committee, chaired by Attlee, was positive about the proposed course of action and saw the need for a new ­‘committee … to invigorate and control our Colonial propaganda generally’. It was noted, however, that ‘general caution would be required in handling any criticism of the Soviet treatment of subject peoples’, while, in some instances, Soviet achievements were ‘remarkable’, comparing ‘very favourably’ with British development. As with the European campaign, doubts were also raised about the merits of allowing ‘negative

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

245

anti-Soviet material to bulk too large in British propaganda’ and, in the main, it was suggested that British propaganda needed to convey the positive advantages and achievements of the ‘British way of life’. Bevin informed the committee that he proposed to distribute new instructions to the information departments of the Foreign Office and the committee approved, in principle, the formation of a body to coordinate colonial propaganda.120 This new body, the Colonial Information Policy Committee (CIPC), would be chaired by Gordon Walker and included the parliamentary under-secretaries from the Foreign and Colonial Offices, Mayhew and Rees-Williams. As Brook informed Attlee, the title of the committee was a ‘misnomer … a cover for its anti-Communist work’, with its terms of reference being to ‘coordinate the collection and presentation of publicity material regarding British colonial policy and administration’.121 In November its terms were expanded ‘to stipulate and concert the dissemination of publicity designed to counter Communist propaganda in countries overseas, especially in the selfgoverning and Colonial countries of the Commonwealth and neighbouring territories’.122 The committee was served by an inter-departmental working party chaired by Murray, with IRD providing much of the material. In August a directive for ‘Counter Propaganda on Colonial Issues’ was distributed to HM Overseas Missions. Signed by Bevin, it set out the ‘lines along which a counter-attack against Soviet behaviour’ might be carried out. ‘Soviet propaganda has for many years’, it argued, ‘attacked our colonial administrations’, leading to ‘a complete misrepresentation of our colonial policies’ while, at the same time, distorting perceptions about the ‘backward areas of the former Tsarist empire’. The time had come to counter Soviet propaganda, presenting the ‘true facts of our colonial achievements; and on the other hand by the exposure of Soviet behaviour’. An attached directive suggested that the counter-attack should ‘expose the exploitation and enslavement of weaker countries by Soviet imperialism’.123 Essentially, the campaign would contrast ‘the progress of peoples under British aegis from backward status to independence’ with the regression from self-determination to oppression characteristic of the central Soviet system. Further attention would be given to the Baltic States which, in spite of ‘long cultural traditions’ of political independence, were being ‘steadily ground down by the usual elimination of civil liberties’.124 Despite the aim of countering Soviet propaganda in the colonies, the work of the committee was far from positive. In November Murray wrote, frankly, that it was ‘wasting time and failing to entirely organise its work’.125 In spite of regular meetings, the committee saw few ­tangible

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

246

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

results. One exception was the development of a comprehensive publicity policy for Africa where the Soviets wanted to ‘foment trouble and unrest’.126 C. A. L. Cliffe, secretary to the committee, described the situation as ‘pretty frightening’, while Gordon Walker, summarising the situation a year later, wrote that the Soviets aimed at exploiting ‘racial and other grievances’ in the colonies.127 Communist propaganda was widely distributed and in the Gold Coast, for example, measures advocated by the Communist Party of Great Britain were frequently put forward by the United Gold Coast Convention People’s Party. Likewise, in Kenya, communist propaganda was being circulated, with the Daily Worker, Labour Monthly and African Newsletter of the Communist Party secretly distributed around the colony.128 Rees-Williams told the committee that Soviet propaganda was ‘having some success in African Colonial territories’.129 Following a tour of East and Central African territories, Kenneth Blackburne, Director of Information Services in the Colonial Office, explained there was a need for propaganda, as literate Africans were certainly ‘talking about Communism’, and more, in his view, needed to be done to combat ‘the development of conditions in which Communist propaganda can flourish in future – bad race relations, dissatisfaction with British rule’.130 In the summer of 1949 officials developed a wide-ranging propaganda scheme. In addition to British territories, the paper looked at possible measures in the colonies of France, Belgium and Portugal. In British possessions, the focus of all information and propaganda work would be the ‘literate African population – the people by virtue of their ability to read, can lead the mass of the African population into bad ways’. These would be influenced by both indirect and direct means. Indirectly, the Colonial Office could resort to a number of measures, including the provision of ‘good “positive” reading material’ and the furnishing of ‘adequate facilities’ to access it. Further efforts would be made to develop broadcasting and expand the activities of the British Council. Directly, anti-communist propaganda would be provided to all British colonial governments in East and Central Africa. It was recommended that ministers should back plans for the development of a new propaganda machinery in the colonies, based around regional information offices in East, West and Central Africa. These organisations would, it was anticipated, study ‘the Communist propaganda reaching the region through the press’ and maintain ‘close contact with the security authorities in regard to the activities of Communist agents in the region’. They would also produce anti-communist material, including pamphlets, articles and broadcasts, which was ‘suitably angled’ for the varying African audiences. Liaison with the authorities of other colonial powers would

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

247

also be maintained.131 Details of the plan were presented to colonial governors by Creech-Jones in September. The proposed establishment of regional propaganda agencies was favourably received by officials in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Uganda and Zanzibar, but opposed by officials in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia.132 By May 1950 officials were able to report that IRD had supplied a series of press articles and reference material with the aim of countering Soviet propaganda, contrasting ‘conditions under Communist rule with those in “free” countries’. The necessary funds had been made available to establish a series of information offices to edit, produce and distribute direct anti-communist propaganda, though the plan was compromised because of a lack of suitable candidates to staff the proposed agencies.133 The committee faced further problems in carrying out its work. Significantly, efforts to develop a comprehensive scheme of broadcasting in the colonies were weakened by financial stringencies, particularly following the devaluation crisis of 1949. Originally, the committee, at Bevin’s insistence, had developed a three-year plan for the expansion of overseas broadcasting which had been completed in July. Overall, the paper proposed a ‘well-directed overseas information and propaganda’ campaign to directly challenge the ‘deliberate Communist campaign … directed with considerable effect’ against the Empire and the Commonwealth. An integral part of any campaign would be ‘positive propaganda’, and past experience had shown that ‘information, particularly in the form of films and radio, can do a great deal to persuade Africans to improve and raise their own standard of living’, while British officials would also publicise the new ‘social democratic Britain’. Beyond countering communism, the publicity would also help advertise British produce, facilitating ‘the sale of our goods in overseas markets’ and, particularly in the battle for global influence, maintain Britain’s authority by matching the ‘rapid and marked increase of United States propaganda’. The Commonwealth Relations Office also proposed a ‘considerable expansion’ of the information services in India and Pakistan, the beginnings of an information service in Ceylon and an increase in the overseas work of the British Council. For its part, the Colonial Office put forward proposals for a scheme to train twelve ‘Colonial Journalists annually in the United Kingdom’, the distribution of specially produced literature and films to combat communist propaganda in the colonies and a sharp increase in the work of the Information Department of the Colonial Office and British Council.134 The plan met with opposition from Cripps who, having to balance the books, told ministers that he ‘was not greatly impressed’ by the value of propaganda in the promotion of British overseas trade, except, possibly,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

248

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

in North America. The plan should, he suggested, concentrate on ‘the anti-communist side of overseas publicity’, resulting in the abandonment of ‘certain spheres of operation altogether, e.g. Latin America’. Attlee fully agreed with his Chancellor; expenditure should concentrate on ‘the most dangerous areas’ and information work could, perhaps, be abandoned altogether in the Scandinavian countries and substantially reduced in the older Commonwealth countries. Gordon Walker responded, suggesting that information work in India and Pakistan was important, especially as the Soviets were active in disseminating communist propaganda, though, in spite of the protest, it was agreed that the overseas ministers would revise their plans ‘to restrict expenditure … to as low a figure as possible between £10 and £11 millions’.135 The compromise did little to ease the pressure on Britain’s overseas information services. While they had so far avoided similar cuts to those at home, even receiving a slight net increase, rising annual costs, Soviet countermeasures and ageing equipment for broadcasting remained a constant threat to plans to counter Soviet propaganda, ultimately causing the failure of the three-year plan.136 In the face of financial pressure, the director of the BBC’s Overseas Services, Ian Jacob, presented his personal view to the CIPC that the BBC provided one of the ‘most effective instruments’ for fighting the  Cold War and that the budget for overseas publicity was ‘insignificant’ compared to the £700 million spent on defence. In Jacob’s view, the budget devoted to conventional military capability would have been ‘poured out in vain’ if the Cold War was lost.137 Jacob’s argument was taken up by the CIPC and, in July, it considered a report pushing the point that information work cost less than maintaining the armed forces; in line with military expenditure, funding for overseas propaganda needed to be increased and was, at present, fractional, constituting ‘little more than a 70th part of what the fighting services cost us’. While the Treasury was trying to cut information work in areas not directly linked to the Cold War, the worldwide nature of the Soviet threat made it dangerous, the overseas ministers argued, to concentrate on areas immediately threatened. Publicity was needed to combat defeatism in Western Europe, and communism in the Caribbean and British possessions generally. In a passage likely to anger the Treasury, it was argued that Britain’s effort needed to be on a ‘comparable scale’ to that of the US.138 Yet the arguments for an increase in expenditure were the direct opposite of Treasury demands for overseas publicity to be curbed and, in November, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell, informed ministers that, rather than increasing funding, he wanted a substantial decrease, matching savings elsewhere in government, fol-

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

249

lowing Britain’s extensive rearmament programme in the wake of the Korean War.139 In February 1951, during a meeting of the Information Services Committee chaired by Morrison and attended by Gaitskell, Ernest Davies, who had replaced Mayhew as Under-Secretary of State, sympathised with the Chancellor, even accepting that an overall reduction was needed in overseas expenditure, but forcibly argued that any significant cutbacks would undermine the ‘British point of view’ and leave Britain wholly reliant on US propaganda, while also undermining ‘our position in the event of war’. James Griffiths, now Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Lord Ogmore from the Commonwealth Relations Office echoed these views, with the Minister of Defence, Shinwell, forcibly arguing against cuts when ‘Communist propaganda was being greatly intensified’. Morrison replied that much of the British Council’s work was ‘rather fanciful’ and ‘not strictly relevant’ to Cold War fighting, though, faced with growing opposition, Gaitskell agreed to a minor increase in funding from the original figure he had projected, though he strongly opposed any further rise. In the end, it fell to Morrison to tell the overseas ministers that they would be ‘well advised’ to accept the latest offer of £10.15 million, down considerably from the estimate of £11.9 million for 1950/51.140 Despite protests from the overseas ministers, the cut in foreign expenditure was confirmed by the Cabinet in April, with Morrison telling colleagues that he had ‘discussed this matter further with the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and Commonwealth Relations, and had persuaded them to accept the lower figure proposed by the Chancellor’.141 While there had been minor successes, the attempt to create a comprehensive scheme for overseas propaganda in the Empire and Commonwealth had ended in failure, resulting in cuts to foreign information work, particularly in the BBC’s transmissions, which saw reductions to the General Overseas Service in English and drops in output to Latin America, South Africa and other areas.142

Retreat in the Middle East By 1951 Britain’s imperial strategy was facing numerous challenges, particularly in the Middle East. In Iran, Britain’s prized asset, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, was being increasingly threatened by Iranian nationalism. The company was of great importance to the British economy, providing the British Exchequer with £50 million in taxes for 1950 alone.143 In April the Iranian Parliament nationalised the company. Tensions soon increased following the election of the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

250

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

nationalistic Mohammed Mossadeq as Prime Minister, and by June the Iranian flag was flying over the company’s headquarters. In London, ministers and officials were bewildered by the turn of events. Kenneth Younger, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, was especially critical of British intelligence in the ensuing crisis, writing despondently of intelligence shortcomings and that throughout the crisis the ‘sources of intelligence were … inadequate and our assessment of the situation faulty’. In particular, he added that he had ‘never been fully satisfied’ that Britain’s representatives in Tehran had given ‘a satisfactory picture of the Persian scene’ or provided the necessary information to adequately assess ‘the strength of the various political forces operating’ there. In part, this stemmed from the inability of embassy officials to move beyond a ‘limited circle’ of personalities in Tehran, with both the Foreign Office and SIS not ‘capable of doing the work which H.M.G required’. Younger also believed a ‘careful review … of our diplomatic and intelligence representatives’ throughout the Middle East was necessary, with Iran not ‘the first Middle Eastern country in which we have made miscalculations since the war’.144 In Whitehall, ministers were divided on how best to meet the situation. Writing in his diary, Younger noted that numerous colleagues had approached the crisis in an ‘emotional way’ and had wanted ‘“strong action”, i.e. a military expedition’.145 Morrison was at the forefront of this group and, throughout the crisis, adopted a bellicose response, bemoaning government policy as being too ‘United Nations-y’.146 Others, including Attlee, held ‘a sounder view’.147 Bevan had ‘advised that the strength of political feeling should be taken very seriously and that we should at least make a “deep bow to nationalisation” – the policy later adopted by the Americans’.148 The lack of a military option to retake the oil fields was highlighted by Sir William Slim, Chief of the General Staff, who suggested that unless Britain backed up its rhetoric with troops, intervention would ‘be disastrous’. Without the Indian Army, concluded the Chiefs of Staff, Britain lacked the means necessary for a military show of force.149 Divisions in Cabinet, moreover, ruled out military action. At a decisive Cabinet meeting on 27 September, Attlee led the Cabinet in deciding against a military response, fearful of American reactions.150 Having failed to secure the military option, Morrison and Foreign Office officials resorted to covert means to pull Mossadeq down and install a pro-British figure.151 Christopher Woodhouse, head of SIS’s Tehran station, recalled: ‘It was an anomaly that the idea of organising the downfall of Mossadeq was first formulated by the Foreign Office itself rather than entrusted to its so-called Friends [SIS]. Still stranger

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

251

was the fact that it was launched under a Labour government.’152 In June 1951 E. A. Berthoud of the Foreign Office’s economic department discussed the situation in Persia with Ann Lambton, formerly of the British Embassy in Tehran. According to Berthoud, Lambton believed it possible to undermine Mossadeq ‘by covert means’. She thought it might be possible, through an information officer at the British Embassy in Tehran, to change public opinion and thereby increase opposition to Mossadeq. Lambton had recommended that Robin Zaehner, a lecturer in Persian at Oxford, would be ‘the ideal man’ to carry out the operation.153 Zaehner was an experienced figure in the field of covert activities. Formerly of the wartime Political Warfare Executive, he was ‘extremely successful’ in covert propaganda and had remained in Tehran until 1947 under the cover of press attaché, to manipulate the Persian press.154 It appears that Lambton’s recommendations were adopted. According to Kenneth Younger, SIS sent out ‘some gifted amateurs from England to handle the situation’ in Tehran.155 Zaehner returned to Tehran in 1951, quickly establishing contact with a family of wealthy merchants, the Rashidian brothers, known simply within SIS as ‘the Brothers’. The Rashidians had been in contact with Zaehner during the war and had gone on to develop an agent network which remained largely intact. Apart from their wealth, ‘the Brothers’ had considerable influence and could mobilise street mobs. The Rashidians were also supported by the SIS station in Tehran, run by Woodhouse. It was composed of ‘Three or four able young men’ specialising in ‘intelligence on Iran and the Communists’. One officer also ‘cultivated leading Iranians … hostile to Mossadeq’, and another liaised with the local ‘chief of the Security Police, who was well informed about the Tudeh Party’.156 Younger was highly critical of the plans, writing that officials had, in his view, ‘under-estimated the determination with which the Persians were likely to pursue their nationalisation plans and have always rated too highly the possibilities of replacing Mossadeq by a personality with whom it would be easier to reach agreement’.157 The so-called ‘Zaehner Mission’ eventually formed a key part of the later 1953 joint SIS and CIA backed coup that eventually toppled Mossadeq.158

Conclusion As previous studies have shown, intelligence played an important role in British imperial history. In Whitehall, ministers received and regularly used intelligence in the defence of the Empire and took significant steps in developing special security links between Britain and the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

252

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

s­ elf-governing Dominions. In the case of Australia, Britain was able to export its own intelligence culture, helping form the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation in the spring of 1949. More than simply preserving links, British assistance in the reform of security and intelligence across the Empire also played a part in restoring the confidence of US officials in the Dominions, paving the way for increased defence and intelligence cooperation. Almost simultaneously, as a result of riots in the Gold Coast and the declaration of a state of emergency in Malaya, the Colonial Office sought to overhaul policing across the Empire. Other than the primary role of policing, local forces were, as Creech-Jones made clear in 1948, a major source of intelligence due to their local contacts. Beyond the security field, ministers were at the forefront of Britain’s response to Soviet efforts to undermine overseas territories and dependencies. While not a major concern for the Soviets, British officials believed that conditions in the colonial dependencies offered them ample opportunity to intervene. By 1948 British colonialism was the focus of unrelenting and hostile propaganda attacks by the Soviets. As a result, ministers and officials sought to develop a new publicity policy with the dual goal of attacking Soviet policy and broadcasting British achievements in the colonies. A central figure in the campaign was Patrick Gordon Walker, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, chair of the Colonial Information Policy Committee. Formed in the summer of 1949, the committee was at the forefront of Britain’s struggle in the colonies. Nonetheless, its influence, particularly efforts to develop a comprehensive publicity scheme, was lessened by Britain’s financial predicament, particularly following the devaluation crisis of 1949, and the growing pressure on the government to balance the books following the outbreak of war in Korea and increasing conventional defence expenditure.

Notes 1 Sillitoe, Cloak Without Dagger, pp. 10–11. 2 D. K. Fieldhouse, ‘The Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth’, in Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945–1951 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), p. 106. 3 Calder Walton and Christopher Andrew, ‘Still the “Missing Dimension”: British Intelligence and the Historiography of British Decolonisation’, in Patrick Major and Christopher Moran (eds), Spooked: Britain, Empire and Intelligence since 1945 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2005), pp. 73–96;

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

253

Philip Murphy, ‘Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: The View from Central Africa, 1945–1965’, Intelligence and National Security, 17:3 (2002), pp. 131–62. 4 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 138. 5 Jeffery, MI6, pp. 485–9. 6 Sillitoe, Cloak Without Dagger, pp. 10–11. 7 ‘Report on the Security Service’, 27 November 1945. For further details, see Lomas, ‘“… the Defence of the Realm and Nothing Else”’. 8 PREM 8/1520, ‘Cabinet; Minutes of an ad-hoc meeting of Ministers held at No. 10 Downing Street’, 7 March 1946. 9 PREM 8/1520, ‘Draft Directive to Sir Percy Sillitoe’, 19 March 1946. On the ‘Nicene Creed’ remark, see Philip Murphy, ‘Exporting a British Intelligence Culture: The British Intelligence Community and Decolonisation, 1945–60’, Political Studies Association (2004), p. 4. I would like to thank Professor Murphy for permission to use this. 10 CAB 301/31, Bridges to Sargent, 16 April 1946. 11 Jeffery, MI6, p. 639. 12 FO 1093/439, Bridges to Attlee, 7 March 1947. 13 FO 1093/439, Street to Halford, 13 October 1948. 14 FO 1093/439, Sargent to Bevin, 18 October 1948. 15 Jeffery, MI6, p. 639. 16 FO 1093/439, Sargent to Menzies, 21 October 1948. 17 For more on Labour’s policy in Palestine, see Michael Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers 1945–1948 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982). 18 KV 2/3428, Liddell to Canning, 15 January 1946. The Stern Gang also passed a ‘sentence of death’ on Christopher Mayhew (MAYHEW 2/1/1, Stern Gang to Mr. Mayhew, 5 December 1946). 19 KV 3/41, notes for Director General’s meeting with the Prime Minister. While undated, the paper has scribbled on it ‘Read by P.M. 28/8/46’. 20 Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame: Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 23–4. 21 KV 4/467, entry for 8 July 1946. 22 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 128. See also Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame, pp. 5–6. 23 KV 4/467, entry for 11 July 1946. 24 KV 4/467, entry for 20 July 1946. 25 KV 4/190, entry for 23 September 1943. 26 KV 4/467, entry for 23 July 1946; KV 4/467, entry for 30 July 1946. 27 Hansard, HC. Deb., 24 July 1946, vol. 426, col. 41. 28 Cmnd. 6873, ‘Palestine: Statement of Information Relating to Acts of Violence’ (July 1946), p. 3. 29 ‘Telegram No. 5 To London from Jerusalem – 1st November 1945’, cited in ibid., p. 5; ‘Telegram No. 1 To London from Sneh Jerusalem – 23rd September 1945’, cited in ibid., p. 4.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

254

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

30 Hansard, HC. Deb., 31 July 1946, vol 426, cols. 975–6. 31 PREM 8/624, Attlee to McNeil, 23 April 1947. 32 PREM 8/624, Murrie to Addis, 2 May 1947. 33 CAB 130/20, GEN 180/1 (Also I.I.P. (47) 11), ‘Palestine – Illegal Immigration: Progress Report by the Chairman of the Official Committee’, 9 May 1947. The records of the committee can be found in CAB 130/20. 34 CAB 130/20, GEN 180/3, 3rd meeting, 9 June 1947. 35 CAB 130/20, GEN 180/4, propaganda to Jews in Europe, 2 June 1947. 36 CAB 130/20, GEN 180/3, 3rd meeting, 9 June 1947. 37 Jeffery, MI6, p. 691. 38 FO 1093/420, Menzies to Hayter, 19 December 1946. 39 FO 1093/420, Hayter to Menzies, 24 February 1947. Political authorisation for the operation would probably have come from Bevin (information provided by Gill Bennett). 40 Jeffery, MI6, p. 692. 41 On the propaganda dimension, see ibid., p. 693. 42 Murphy, ‘Exporting a British Intelligence Culture’, p. 1. 43 Read Frank Cain, ‘Venona in Australia and its Long-term Ramifications’, Journal of Contemporary History, 35:2 (2000), pp. 231–48. The leaked documents were CAB 81/46, P.H.P. (45) 6 (0), ‘Security in the Western Mediterranean and the Eastern Atlantic’ and CAB 81/46, P.H.P. (45) 15 (0) (Final), ‘Security of India and the Indian Ocean. 44 David Horner, The Spy Catchers: The Official History of ASIO, 1949–1963 (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2014), pp. 42–3. 45 Frank Cain, ‘Missiles and Mistrust: US Intelligence Responses to British and Australian Missile Research’, Intelligence and National Security, 3:4 (1988), p. 13. 46 KV 4/451, note on meeting with Dening by Hollis, 22 June 1948. For more information see Frank Cain, The Australian Security Intelligence Organization: An Unofficial History (London: Frank Cass, 1994). On Evatt, see Horner, The Spy Catchers, p. 36. 47 Horner, The Spy Catchers, p. 56. 48 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 369. 49 KV 4/471, entry for 7 January 1948. 50 KV 4/450, Attlee to Chifley, 21 January 1948. 51 KV 4/450, Liddell to Menzies, 13 February 1948. 52 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 369; Horner, The Spy Catchers, p. 58. 53 Horner, The Spy Catchers, p. 60. 54 Ibid., p. 61. 55 KV 4/450, draft record of meeting. 56 KV 4/451, Chifley to Attlee, 7 June 1948. 57 KV 4/451, brief account of Sir Percy Sillitoe with USCIB, 2 June 1948. 58 Horner, The Spy Catchers, p. 64. 59 KV 4/451, brief account of meeting of Sir Percy Sillitoe with USCIB, 2 June 1948.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

255

60 KV 4/451, Washington to Director. On the restrictions, see Horner, The Spy Catchers, p. 66. 61 Horner, The Spy Catchers, pp. 67–8. 62 CAB 21/1793, Brook to Attlee, 7 July 1948; CAB 21/1793, Proposed Timetable of Talks with Mr Chifley. 63 KV 4/451, final brief for P.M. for his conversations with Mr Chifley, 6 July 1948. 64 KV 4/470, entry for 9 July 1948. Liddell erroneously dated his entry 9 April. 65 Horner, The Spy Catchers, p. 68; KV 4/451, brief for D.G’s talk with Mr Chifley, 12 July 1948. 66 David McKnight, Australia’s Spies and their Secrets (St Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994), p. 19. 67 Ibid., pp. 19–20. 68 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘“The Value of Residual Empire”: Anglo-American Intelligence Co-operation in Asia after 1945’, in Richard J. Aldrich and Michael Hopkins (eds), Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World (London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 244. 69 On ‘the case’ and ASIO’s early activities, see Horner, The Spycatchers, pp. 122–45. 70 Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire (London: HarperPress, 2013), p. 125. 71 Ritchie Ovendale, ‘The South African Policy of the British Labour Government, 1947–1951’, International Affairs, 59 (1983), pp. 41–58. 72 PREM 8/1283, memo from Sillitoe for Attlee, 14 November 1948. 73 PREM 8/1343, Cumming Bruce to Helsby, 29 July 1948. 74 PREM 8/1343, Russian Infiltration, 30 July 1948. 75 PREM 8/1343, undated record of discussions. 76 KV 4/473, entry for 15 May 1951. 77 PREM 8/1343, Baring to Commonwealth Relations Office, 8 March 1951. 78 PREM 8/1343, Malan to Attlee. 79 FO 371/66371, minutes of meeting held on 14 August 1947. 80 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 114. 81 Paul M. McGarr, ‘“A Serious Menace to Security”: British Intelligence, V.K. Krishna Menon and the Indian High Commission in London, 1947–52’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 38:3 (2010). 82 KV 2/2512, statement to be made by D.G. at J.I.C. meeting, 1 August 1948. 83 KV 2/2512, note by Liddell, 31 May 1949. 84 KV 2/2512, V.K. Krishna Menon. 85 KV 2/2512, note by Sillitoe, 17 April 1951. 86 KV 2/2512, Sillitoe to D.O.S., 7 May 1951. See McGarr, ‘A Serious Menace to Security’, p. 18. 87 See, McGarr, ‘A Serious Menace to Security’. 88 Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. 271. 89 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, pp. 452–3. 90 Ibid., p. 452.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

256

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

91 Ronald Hyam, ‘Africa and the Labour Government, 1945–51’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 16:3 (1988), p. 154. 92 See David Killingsray and David Anderson, ‘An Orderly Retreat? Policing the End of Empire’, in David Killingsray and David Anderson (eds), Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917–65 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 1. 93 Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945–80 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 195. 94 CO 537/4773, No. 3. Doc. 189. [Insurgency and counter-insurgency]: despatch no. 5 from Sir H. Gurney to Mr Creech Jones, 20 May 1949, reproduced in A. J. Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B, Vol. II: Part II, The Communist Insurrection, 1948–1953 (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 135. 95 David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 16. 96 Sinclair, At the End of the Line, pp. 198–9; French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, p. 20. 97 On Johnson, see Sinclair, At the End of the Line, pp. 62–5. 98 Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. 279. 99 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 448. 100 Rory Cormac, Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2013), p. 57. 101 CO 537/2758, no. 4. Doc. 148. [Communist infiltration of the colonies]: note by I. H. Harris of a CO internal discussion (18 Oct), 21 Oct 1948, reproduced in Ronald Hyam (ed.), The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945–51: Part II, Economics and International Relations (London: HMSO, 1992), p. 335. 102 Cormac, Confronting the Colonies, p. 57. 103 Sinclair, At the End of the Line, p. 197. On further reform, see Cormac, Confronting the Colonies, p. 58. 104 Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 136. See also John Kent, ‘Bevin’s Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa, 1945–49’, in Michael Dockrill and John Young (eds), British Foreign Policy, 1945–56 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989). 105 FO 1110/5, British Embassy, Moscow, to Foreign Office, 20 January 1948. 106 FO 1110/5, No. 339, New York to Foreign Office, 4 February 1948. 107 FO 1110/5, ‘Publicity Policy in Regards to Communism’, 2 April 1948. 108 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 425. 109 CAB 134/101, C.I. (49)61, Communism in Africa, 5 July 1949. 110 CAC, ATLE 1/17, draft autobiography. 111 Mayhew, Time to Explain, p. 37. 112 See Robert Pearce, Patrick Gordon Walker: Political Diaries, 1932–1971 (London: The Historians Press, 1991), p. 14.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Empire, Commonwealth and security

257

113 FO 1110/20, ‘Imperial Propaganda’, 30 March 1948. 114 FO 1110/20, Reddaway to Warner, 5 April 1948; Pearce (ed.), Patrick Gordon Walker, p. 174. 115 FO 1110/20, minute by Murray, 8 April 1948; FO 1110/20, Colonial Propaganda, 8 April 1948. 116 FO 1110/20, record of meeting, 23 April 1948. 117 CAB 130/37, Anti-Soviet and Pro-British Colonial Propaganda. 118 PREM 8/1341, Brook to Attlee, 15 June 1948. 119 PREM 8/1341, Brook to Attlee, 21 July 1948. 120 CAB 130/37, GEN 231/2nd meeting, 22 July 1948. 121 PREM 8/1365, Brook to Attlee, 9 August 1948; Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, p. 83. 122 FCO History Notes: IRD: Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Office Information Research Department, 1946–48, p. 14. 123 FO 1110/20, Circular No. 0121, ‘Directive Regarding Counter-Propaganda on Colonial Issues’, 17 August 1948. 124 FO 1110/20, ‘Directive for Propaganda Countering Soviet Attacks on “Colonialism” and Colonial Administrations’. 125 FO 1110/21, minute by Murray, 16 November 1948. 126 CAB 134/101, C.I. (49)61, Communism in Africa, 5 July 1949. 127 CAB 21/1691, Cliffe to Gordon Walker, 20 July 1949; CAB 134/102, C.I. (50) 3rd meeting, 24 May 1950. 128 CAB 134/101, C.I. (49) 76, ‘Communism in Africa’, 12 September 1949. 129 CAB 134/99, C.I. (49) 6th meeting, 5 April 1949. 130 CAB 134/101, ‘Anti-Communist Propaganda in the East and Central African Territories’, 30 May 1949. 131 CAB 134/101, C.I. (49) 70, ‘Communism in Africa – Recommendations for Counter Publicity; Note by the Working Party’, 19 July 1949. 132 CAB 134/102, C.I. (50) 16, ‘Communism in Africa – Propaganda Policy’, 19 May 1950. 133 Ibid. 134 CAB 21/1691, C.I. (49)66, Three-Year Plan for the Expansion of Publicity Services in Commonwealth Countries and the Colonies; note by the Committee, 17 July 1949. 135 CAB 130/37, 3rd meeting, 19 December 1949. 136 Webb, London Calling, p. 106. 137 CAB 134/102, ‘The Overseas Services of the B.B.C.’, 19 June 1950. 138 CAB 134/102, C.I. (50) 32, ‘The Case for an Increase in Overseas Information Expenditure’, 21 July 1950. 139 CAB 134/102, C.I (50) 45, ‘Overseas Information Expenditure’, 23 November 1950. 140 CAB 134/460, I.S. (51)1st meeting, 12 February 1951. 141 CAB 129/19, C.M. (51) 23rd conclusions, 2 April 1951. 142 Webb, London Calling, p. 110. 143 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

258

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

­World-System, 1830–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 557. 144 See Appendix: ‘Kenneth Younger’s Minute on the Persian Oil Dispute’, 6 October 1951, in Warner, (ed.), In the Midst of Events. 145 Ibid., p. 89. 146 Donoughue and Jones, Herbert Morrison, p. 497. 147 Warner (ed.), In the Midst of Events, p. 89. 148 Ibid. 149 William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–51: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 666. 150 CAB 128/20, C.M. 60 (51), 27 September 1951. 151 Warner (ed.), In the Midst of Events, p. 90. See also Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), pp. 113–14. 152 Christopher Woodhouse, Something Ventured (London: Granada, 1982), p. 111. 153 Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, pp. 659–60. 154 Ibid., p. 660. 155 See Warner (ed.), In the Midst of Events, p. 90. 156 Woodhouse, Something Ventured, p. 110. 157 Warner (ed.), In the Midst of Events. 158 For more information, see Darioush Bayandor, Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mossadeq Revisited (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2010) and Christopher de Bellaigue, Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Very British Coup (London: Bodley Head, 2012).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion: intelligence and the Labour governments, 1945–51 This book has explored the attitude of the Attlee governments towards intelligence and security, both at home and overseas. It has shown that, contrary to existing views of the relationship, ministers enjoyed what could be described as an excellent working relationship with the intelligence community, using it to combat Soviet and communist activities at home, throughout Britain’s overseas territories and in the Eastern Bloc. Several key themes have emerged throughout this book, offering new insights into the interaction between the intelligence community and politicians during the post-war Labour governments: relations between Labour and Britain’s intelligence agencies, secrecy, the use of committees and ministerial attitudes towards intelligence and special operations.

Labour and intelligence This study has made a significant contribution to our understanding of relations between the British Labour Party and the intelligence community. Although the relationship undoubtedly produced flashpoints, particularly the Zinoviev Letter affair of 1924, there is nothing to suggest that any particular animosity was present during the Attlee years. In fact, though some in the party may have been suspicious of the intelligence agencies, new archival releases show that Attlee, Bevin and others fully valued the newly inherited intelligence machinery, in part thanks to the experience gained during the Second World War. Rather than intelligence novices, many senior figures in the Attlee government were experienced intelligence consumers, having used intelligence products in office. In the case of MI5, Labour ministers proved eager to employ the Security Service in their own long-standing struggle against British communists, with abundant evidence found in Liddell’s post-war diaries. In particular, Liddell had tried to reassure those concerned by the political nature of MI5’s records by suggesting ‘the Labour Party were far

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

260

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

more interested to make use of our services than the Conservatives’.1 While it has been argued that ministers were disdainful of the Service, appointing their own Director General supportive of Labour’s political outlook, the archival material shows, once again, that the traditional interpretation is hard to support, with Attlee playing no such role and, in fact, telling Bridges simply to find a successor after Petrie’s decision to retire.2 The eventual appointment of Sir Percy Sillitoe came, not after the intervention of Attlee, but at the end of a lengthy interview process, in contradiction of conventional accounts of the transition. Other than Liddell, candidates from within MI5 were ignored, not for political reasons, but because there was simply ‘nobody else’, while Liddell, by his own admission, was ‘not a very good organiser’ and was unsuited for the role.3 Attlee’s decision to appoint himself as minister responsible for the Service has also been seen as the end product of his alleged animosity towards MI5.4 In reality, an examination of Sir Findlater Stewart’s report and associated material reveals that Attlee merely accepted its recommendations, maintaining regular contact with Sillitoe and taking ‘great interest’ in MI5’s work, becoming the first Prime Minister to visit its headquarters.5 Ministers took a pragmatic attitude towards intelligence and security issues. Rather than viewing MI5 with disdain, they fully recognised that the Service could play an important role against the CPGB and, like many in their party, Bevin, Morrison and even Attlee were vociferous in their opposition to British communists. The minutes of GEN 164 show that even Chuter Ede, considered ambivalent on the issue, was fully aware of the danger, though he opposed the introduction of ‘active counter-measures’ to the detriment of civil liberties.6 The minutes of the committee neatly summarise the problems facing the Attlee government in the domestic Cold War. From 1945 to 1951 ministers attempted to maintain a balancing act between opposing communism and maintaining ‘freedom of expression and maximum possible civil liberties’.7 While authorising the formation of GEN 183 in early 1947, it was not until the spring of 1948 that Attlee announced a purge procedure against communists and fascists in the Civil Service. Rather than a reluctance to act against communism, government policy was carefully implemented and took into consideration broader issues, including backbench opposition in the Labour Party and public opinion regarding overtly anti-­communist measures. Even with discussions on ‘positive vetting’ in 1951, ministers were reluctant to rush into implementing security changes, not because of their general hostility, but because of specific objections about whether improved screening would be better than that already in place. As the minutes of the meeting show, the measures were

Conclusion

261

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

approved ‘in principle’ during one of the final Cabinet meetings of the Attlee government.8 The Attlee government’s balancing act between security and civil liberties is also apparent in discussions about domestic anti-communist propaganda. In 1949 ministers rejected the proposals of the Jebb Committee on domestic activities as long as the Communist Party of Great Britain was a ‘legal political organisation’.9 Ministerial opposition only declined after the Korean War and an increase in communist agitation, leading to the Committee on Communism (Home).

Secrecy and committees A recurrent theme throughout the book has been secrecy. While often seen as the archetypal exponent of Cabinet, Attlee was also a firm believer in closed government. As numerous individuals have noted, he was, by temperament, the ‘least loquacious’ of prime ministers, and, by experience, had been influenced by his wartime involvement in government.10 A fortnight after taking office, he made it clear to ministers that Cabinet discussions were of ‘no concern’ to Parliament or the public. In short, the ‘strictest discretion’ was needed.11 Disclosures in the press forced him return to the subject three months later in a ‘top secret’ paper on the ‘Secrecy of Cabinet Proceedings’. Leaks would undermine confidence in government and, he wrote, the ‘efficiency of our administration’. Outside the small group of ministers entrusted with ‘important aspects of Government policy … knowledge of these matters should be confined to those, whether Ministers or officials, whose duty it is to assist in the formation of the particular policy concerned’.12 In the field of atomic energy, the need for secrecy ‘overrode the claims of Cabinet government’ and a series of momentous decisions were taken by Attlee’s secret sub-committee GEN 75, the Cabinet Committee on Atomic Energy, and the one-off GEN 163, to make a formal decision to produce an atomic bomb in January 1947.13 In both cases, policy decisions were ‘not reported to the full Cabinet but were … shrouded in secrecy’.14 In the dimension of intelligence affairs, too, decisions were taken by a small minority of trusted ministers without the knowledge of the broader Cabinet. Important for the maintenance of secrecy were the series of standing and ad hoc committees that expanded rapidly under Attlee. In an earlier study, Hennessy and Arends produced a list of 148 standing committees and 306 ad hoc committees, known as GENs (for General), though some remained a mystery under sections 3(4) and 5(1) of the Public Records Act.15 The release of material on some of these bodies, including GEN 374, Attlee’s secretive committee formed to

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

262

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

discuss Brook’s report, have started to fill in some missing parts of the jigsaw. Attlee’s secret Ministerial Committee on Communism (Overseas) provides a clear example of his belief in extreme secrecy. Even before its formation, the work of Jebb’s ad hoc working party was ‘kept secret’ at Attlee’s insistence.16 At a meeting of GEN 231, the Cabinet Committee on Propaganda, measures were taken to restrict knowledge of Jebb’s recommendations; his report was not mentioned on the agenda and was ‘described simply as “General Policy and Machinery” and no mention of any papers will be made’.17 Other than Attlee, the only ministers presented with the paper were Bevin, Morrison, Cripps and Alexander.18 The immense secrecy surrounding the report continued once Jebb’s group became the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas). Beyond restricting knowledge on intelligence and security, one reason for the growth in secrecy was the internal politics of the Labour Party. Throughout the early stages of the Attlee government, vociferous support for the Soviet Union inside the party was a serious cause for concern, as discussions over the Warner memorandum illustrate. A memorandum by Oliver Harvey, then Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, quoted Edmund Hall-Patch as saying that ‘some Ministers … took the line that it would be wrong to consider Russia to be “hostile” to this country, that we should not treat the Soviet Union as an “enemy” and so on’.19 Another example where political expediency overrode Cabinet government can be found in the circulation of JIC papers. As late as autumn 1947, prior to the final collapse of Anglo-Soviet relations, divisions in Cabinet, particularly the views of the left-leaning Aneurin Bevan, prevented the wider circulation of the committee’s assessment on ‘Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities’, with Attlee ruling that ‘political considerations overrode the military advantages of giving [the document] a wider circulation’.20 In the event, the distribution of a similar JIC document only took place in the summer of 1948 after the Labour government embarked on a new policy towards the Soviet Union.21 It was for this reason that intelligence and other related matters were kept to as small a circle as possible. The files of GEN 231 and the Ministerial Committee on Communism (Overseas) show that four of the so-called ‘Big Five’ – Attlee, Bevin, Morrison and Cripps, plus Alexander – formed the inner circle of ministers trusted with discussing overseas anti-communist activities. Dalton, forced to resign the Chancellorship in 1947, was not part this group, occupying the relatively minor post of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, although, after the resignation of Cripps and the death of Bevin, this inner circle was reconfigured to include Gaitskell, now Chancellor, and Emanuel Shinwell. Discussion of intelligence affairs was largely restricted to Bevin and

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion

263

Attlee, who played ‘their cards very close to their chests whenever there was any intelligence involvement’.22 As Foreign Secretary and the heavyweight of the Cabinet, Bevin was a mainstay of the government. In his memoirs, Francis Williams recalled that Bevin ‘adopted a strongly protective attitude [towards Attlee] like an uncle with a clever but sensitive youngster’, and Attlee himself revealed that his ‘relationship with … Bevin was the deepest of my political life’.23 Frank Roberts, Bevin’s Principal Private Secretary, recalled how he would consult Attlee on all areas of policy.24 Bevin was Attlee’s ‘principal confidant’, wrote Sir Roderick Barclay, and both men regularly discussed confidential matters after Cabinet, including foreign affairs, intelligence and political warfare.25 While strictly off the record, the details of several of these discussions can be found in the minutes of officials close to Bevin. One such example took place in the summer of 1949 regarding a possible successor to Sir Stewart Menzies. ‘The present incumbent has done well’, wrote Sir William Hayter. ‘But he has held the appointment for about 10 years now, and it is perhaps time that there was a new approach to the questions involved.’26 A list of possible candidates was sent to Bevin by Sir William Strang and, after he had discussed the matter with Attlee, Strang minuted: ‘The S. of S. has discussed this with the P.M. and the question of C’s retirement is to remain … for the moment.’27 After a further discussion with Bevin on the matter, Strang noted that Attlee ‘was thinking that it might be desirable that an enquiry should be made into the whole of our intelligence services’.28 Another example can be found in the Fuchs case. During a discussion with Attlee, Bevin laid particular emphasis on the ‘demand for an enquiry into the workings of M.I.5. and the line which the Prime Minister should take’, advising Attlee to ‘refute all suggestions for an enquiry’. Bevin counselled the Prime Minister to inform the Commons that he was unconcerned with security matters and that he was looking at ‘all the facts of the case’.29

Attlee and Bevin: new perspectives By the end of his premiership in October 1951, Attlee was an experienced intelligence consumer, having received and used intelligence reports for over a decade. The most important factor complicating research in this area has been Attlee’s terse and retiring personality and legendary working style. Douglas Jay, Attlee’s economic advisor, recalled how he would ‘never use one syllable where none would do’.30 His abrupt manner was reflected in his handling of government papers. Evan Durbin, a one-time assistant to Attlee as Deputy Prime Minister,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

264

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

described him as having ‘a voracious appetite for papers and telegrams. He consumes them like a boa-constrictor.’31 One distinguished civil servant familiar with Attlee’s working procedure recalled that he was ‘orderly, regular, efficient and methodical’. His staff believed that during an average day Attlee would read 90 per cent of the paperwork that reached his desk.32 Unlike Churchill and other prime ministers, who enjoyed drafting minutes and memoranda, Attlee would add only a few lines to a long memorandum, leading Hennessy to observe that he ‘ran Britain … with a red crayon and a tiny vocabulary’.33 Much of the material consulted conforms to the personal traits and working style previously outlined. One important trait confirmed by the files is Attlee’s quick-mindedness and broad knowledge of government. Sir George Mallaby recalled how, in the Cabinet Room, he buzzed like a wasp ‘in your face and stung you hard’ if you were ill-briefed or long-winded.34 Attlee’s impressive grasp of government machinery meant he could quickly find fault. In December 1949, after receiving a memorandum on the reorganisation of scientific intelligence from A. V. Alexander, he scribbled in his red crayon ‘I had not been made aware that the Scientific Intelligence Organisation has been functioning inadequately. If this was so I ought to have been informed.’35 As his earlier wartime critique of the organisation of intelligence makes clear, he was not averse to criticising intelligence matters and, from the material available, Attlee appears as one of the foremost critics of Britain’s intelligence services during the early stages of the Cold War. While there are no lengthy memoranda available outlining his views about intelligence in detail, Attlee’s doubts appear in several sources. In the summer of 1949 he had already told Bevin of the need for ‘an enquiry … into the whole of our intelligence services i.e. naval, military and air intelligence, C’s organisation and M.I.5.’.36 He was also less than impressed with MI5’s performance in the cases of Klaus Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo, both damaging to Anglo-American relations. In April 1950, after a letter from Lord Swinton, Attlee admitted that he was ‘not yet satisfied that we get full value for our expenditure’ on intelligence, despite acknowledging ‘that the difficulties in dealing with communist activities are far greater than anything which we have had to face before, for the iron curtain is very hard to penetrate’. His response was to propose a wideranging inquiry ‘into the whole range of our security services conducted by a single individual … the amalgamation of services will be one of the points for consideration’.37 Part of Attlee’s criticism of British intelligence may have resulted, as Brook recognised, from an unfair comparison to conditions during and after the Second World War.38 Already experienced in handling intelligence and security issues thanks to his

Conclusion

265

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

wartime learning curve, Attlee was not afraid to challenge perceived inefficiencies in the intelligence system. In November 1940, within six months of the formation of the wartime coalition, he attacked the Chiefs of Staff for their defence of an inefficient intelligence system. Nearly a decade later, now as Prime Minister, he again questioned British intelligence. Unlike in 1940, when his critique was ignored, Attlee’s doubts led to the Brook review of 1951, suggesting that, in contrast to his predecessor, he was not in awe of the world of spies and special operations.

Cold War warriors Another area where the intelligence dimension can make an important contribution is to existing debates on Attlee’s anti-Sovietism. Since his death in 1967, there has been much debate about his anti-communist credentials. It was Attlee himself who initially sought to depict himself as a vocal opponent of the Kremlin. In discussion with an earlier biographer, Francis Williams, he recalled how ‘Stalin [at Potsdam] was genial enough … But I was under no illusions as to his readiness to cooperate or as to his liking for us.’39 Harris similarly adopted the line of Attlee as a ‘Cold War warrior’.40 It is not wholly clear from Harris’s biography when anti-Sovietism became an ‘inflexible postulate’ of Attlee’s thinking, though it must have been, writes Saville, during the war years as, from the beginning of his own government, Attlee emerges as a ‘Cold War warrior’.41 In contrast, Smith and Zametica, drawing on released files, actively questioned these earlier interpretations, presenting Attlee as a ‘committed internationalist … open minded about the aims of Soviet foreign policy’.42 As always, the reality is somewhere in between. Attlee’s working files show that he was a consumer of JIC papers and, like the committee, initially took a cautious stance towards the Soviets, despite telling Churchill they were ‘undoubtedly’ playing ‘Power Politics … trying to build up a glacis of countries under their influence – Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, etc.’43 Attlee’s anti-communism developed in government and by 1948, responding to events in Europe, he had become an ardent opponent of Soviet communism. His New Year broadcast in January 1948 set a sea change for British propaganda policy, attacking recent Soviet actions as ‘a new form of imperialism – ideological, economic and strategic’.44 Contrary to the image of him as an ardent opponent of special operations, he was, like Bevin, not afraid to use covert methods to upset Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. In the spring of 1949 he endorsed plans for anti-communist activities in Albania, even suggesting bribery to undermine the Hoxha regime.45 Similarly, he did

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

266

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

not baulk at the decision to authorise the recommendations of the Dixon Committee in December 1950, sanctioning ‘whispering campaigns’ to compromise communist officials and sow dissent in the Eastern Bloc, while maintaining the morale of dissident movements.46 Archival sources also give new insight into Bevin’s attitude towards intelligence and special operations. First-hand knowledge of his attitude towards intelligence can be found in the papers of Sir Douglas DoddsParker, a former member of SOE and Conservative MP, who regularly met Bevin at the House of Common to discuss anti-communism and testified to Bevin’s receipt of SIS intelligence on the Soviets.47 Other than SIS reports, Bevin also saw diplomatic intercepts and was an avid reader of the papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee.48 During the Berlin Crisis, he received regular reports about Soviet preparedness for war, which helped to convince him that military confrontation was unlikely.49 New material has also shed light on Bevin’s attitude towards special operations. While often presented as having an intense dislike of covert activities, quickly disbanding the wartime Special Operations Executive and rejecting proposals for a revival of political warfare, Bevin did authorise targeted special operations in the Eastern Bloc following the start of the Cold War, most notably in Albania where success, he believed, would have ‘an enormous effect on the Soviet orbit’. In March 1949 Bevin also believed the Albanian operation would ‘pay dividends’ if handled correctly.50 While quickly ruling out widespread activities aimed at liberating the Eastern Bloc, he was, nonetheless, willing to authorise special operations elsewhere if conditions were right. Bevin approved ‘two important subversive operations’ in Germany aimed at undermining the Socialist Unity Party and newly formed East German police, as well as forming part of the inner circle of ministers who authorised the Dixon Committee proposals in December 1950.51 During the Attlee years, ministers enjoyed a close relationship with Britain’s intelligence community. In the field of special operations, for example, any ministerial aversion to covert warfare was quickly undermined by the deterioration of East–West relations. By the end of the Attlee government, ministers and senior officials had established a complicated mechanism for fighting the Cold War that was subsequently adopted by successive Conservative governments. While intelligence deficiencies remained, as Attlee recognised, senior Labour figures fully appreciated the information supplied by the British intelligence services, utilising it to develop policy on a range of issues from protective security to Cold War fighting in Eastern Europe. Knowledge of intelligence activities was kept to as small a circle as possible. Attlee and Bevin were at the centre of this circle, though others including A. V. Alexander and

Conclusion

267

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Stafford Cripps were consulted. These restrictions largely resulted from Labour Party differences over Cold War policy. The central importance of both Attlee and Bevin underlines the significance of their relationship to the Labour government in general and the subject of intelligence in particular. Both were experienced intelligence consumers and rank alongside Churchill for their expertise in the field. Intelligence formed an integral part of the government machinery between 1945 and 1951, informing policymakers of events both at home and overseas.

Notes   1 KV 4/196, entry for 29 May 1945.   2 See WO 258/91, ‘Director of Security Services: applications for appointment’, October to November 1945.   3 KV 4/192, entry for 8 July 1943; KV 4/192, entry for 2 July 1943   4 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 323.   5 CAB 21/2734, Bridges to Brook, 30 December 1948.   6 CAB 21/2745, GEN 164/1, minutes of ad hoc ministerial meeting, 6 January 1947.   7 Thurlow, The Secret State, p. 286.   8 CAB 128/20, C.M. (51) 58th conclusions, 4 November 1951.   9 CAB 130/37, GEN 231/3rd meeting, Confidential Annex, 19 December 1949. 10 David Vincent, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832–1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 213. 11 CAB 66/67/50, C.P. (45) 100, ‘Miscellaneous Questions of Procedure’, 8 August 1945. On details surrounding the memorandum, see Peter Hennessy and Anthony Seldon, Ruling Performance: British Governments from Thatcher to Blair (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 52. 12 CAB 129/4, C.P. (45) 282, ‘Secrecy of Cabinet Proceedings: Note by the Prime Minister’, 9 November 1945. 13 Paul Addison, ‘Clement Attlee, 1945–1951’ in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.), From New Jerusalem to New Labour: British Prime Ministers from Attlee to Blair (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 20. 14 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Vol. 1: Policymaking (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 20. 15 Hennessy and Arends, ‘Mr. Attlee’s Engine Room’, p. 9. 16 FO 371/77617, Brook to Strang, 12 May 1949. 17 CAB 124/80, Bavin to Downes, 10 December 1949. 18 The distribution list included Attlee, Morrison, Bevin, Cripps, Alexander, Brook, Pierson Dixon and Cliffe. 19 FO 371/56784, ‘Russian Policy of the Cabinet’, reproduced in Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War (Sevenoaks: Sceptre, 1988), pp. 795–6.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

268

Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51

20 CAB 158/3, J.I.C. (48) 13 (0), Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities; memorandum by the Joint Intelligence Committee, 6 February 1948. 21 CAB 158/3, J.I.C. (48) 9 (0) (Final), ‘Russia’s Interests, Intentions and Capabilities’, 23 July 1948. 22 I would like to thank Gill Bennett for this observation (email to the author, 11 October 2010). 23 Francis Williams, Nothing So Strange: An Autobiography (London: Cassell, 1970), p. 222. 24 Frank Roberts, ‘Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary’, in Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, p. 39. 25 Roderick Barclay, Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office, 1932–1969 (London: Latimer, 1975), p. 39. 26 FO 1093/379, ‘Head of the Secret Service’, 30 April 1949. 27 FO 1093/379, note by Strang, 8 July 1949. 28 FO 1093/379, note by Strang, 14 July 1949. 29 FO 371/82903, note by Makins, 3 March 1950. 30 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 149. 31 Thomas-Symonds, Attlee, p. 143. 32 Harris, Attlee, p. 404. 33 Hennessy and Arends, ‘Mr. Attlee’s Engine Room’, p. 28. 34 George Mallaby, From My Level: Unwritten Minutes (London: Hutchinson, 1965), p. 59. 35 PREM 8/952, note by Attlee, 3 November 1949. 36 FO 1093/379, note by Strang, 14 July 1949. 37 BOD, MS. Attlee dep. 100, fol. 12, Attlee to Swinton, 8 March 1950. 38 CAB 301/17, The Secret Intelligence and Security Services: Report of Enquiry by Sir Norman Brook, March 1951. 39 Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, p. 71. 40 Harris, Attlee, p. 292. 41 John Saville, ‘C. R. Attlee: An Assessment’, The Socialist Register, 20 (1983), p. 158; Saville, The Politics of Continuity, p. 119. 42 Smith and Zametica, ‘The Cold War Warrior’. 43 PREM 8/342, ‘Notes of Meeting held in the Prime Minister’s Room at the House of Commons 4 p.m.’, 5 November 1946. 44 FO 953/144, ‘The Prime Minister’s New Year Broadcast, 1948’, 3 January 1948. 45 FO 800/437, ‘Policy Towards Albania’. 46 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (50) 2, ‘Anti-Communist Activities in Europe: Note by the Secretary’, 22 December 1950; CAB 21/2750, A.C. (0) (50)52 (Third Revise), ‘Official Committee on Communism (Overseas): Proposed Activities Behind the Iron Curtain: memorandum by the Committee’, November 1950. 47 MAG: MC: P2/4/2MS/18, ‘1946/8: Resurrection of Special Operations’. 48 HW 64/80, ‘Distribution and Security of Signals Intelligence in the Foreign Office’, 29 September 1945.

Conclusion

269

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

49 CAB 159/4, J.I.C. (48) 80th meeting (0), minutes of meeting, 30 July 1948. 50 FO 371/77616, meeting to discuss Russia Committee paper on Policy Towards Russia, 2 February 1949; FO 1093/452, ‘Extract from record of meeting held with the Secretary of State on March 4th’. 51 CAB 134/2, A.C. (M) (50) 2, ‘Anti-Communist Activities in Europe: Note by the Secretary’, 22 December 1950; CAB 21/2750, A.C. (0) (50)52 (Third Revise), ‘Official Committee on Communism (Overseas): Proposed Activities Behind the Iron Curtain: memorandum by the Committee’, November 1950.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Select bibliography

Private papers

Albert Victor Alexander (CCC) Clement Attlee (BOD) Ernest Bevin (CCC) Lord Brimelow (CCC) Sir Alexander Cadogan (CCC) Sir Winston Churchill (CCC) Sir Stafford Cripps (BOD) Hugh Dalton (LSE) Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker (MAG) Lord Healey (LHASC) Sir Gladwyn Jebb (CCC) Sir Roger Makins (BOD) John Cecil Masterman (WOR) Christopher Mayhew (LHCMA) Herbert Morrison (LSE) Morgan Philips (LHASC) Sir Patrick Reilly (BOD) Lord Selborne (BOD) Sir William Strang (CCC) Lord Swinton (CCC) Major repositories of unpublished government documents at the National Archives, Kew

AB 16 – Ministry of Supply and United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, Atomic Energy Division and London Office: Files AIR 19 – Air Ministry, and Ministry of Defence, Air Department: Private Office Papers AIR 20 – Air Ministry, and Ministry of Defence: Papers accumulated by the Air Historical Branch AIR 40 – Air Ministry, Directorate of Intelligence and related bodies: Intelligence Reports and Papers AIR 75 – Marshal Sir John Slessor: Papers

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Select bibliography

271

AVIA 56 – Ministry of Supply: Establishment, Registered Files (Series 1) AVIA 65 – Ministry of Supply and successors: Registered Files BT 11 – Board of Trade and successors: Commercial Relations and Exports Department and predecessors: Registered Files and other records CAB 21 – Cabinet Office and predecessors: Registered Files (1916 to 1965) CAB 65 – War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes (WM and CM Series) CAB 66 – War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda (WP and CP Series) CAB 67 – War Cabinet: Memoranda (WP(G) Series) CAB 69 – War Cabinet and Cabinet: Defence Committee (Operations): Minutes and Papers (DO Series) CAB 79 – War Cabinet and Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes CAB 80 – War Cabinet and Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Memoranda CAB 81 – War Cabinet and Cabinet: Committees and Sub-committees of the Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes and Papers CAB 93 – War Cabinet and Cabinet: Home Defence Committees: Minutes and Papers (HD and other Series) CAB 113 – War Cabinet and Cabinet: Home Defence Executive: Secretary’s Files CAB 118 – War Cabinet and Cabinet: Various Ministers: Private Office Files CAB 120 – Cabinet Office: Minister of Defence Secretariat: Records CAB 121 – Cabinet Office: Special Secret Information Centre: Files CAB 124 – Offices of the Minister of Reconstruction, Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science: Records CAB 126 – Tube Alloys Consultative Council and Combined Policy Committee (Atomic Energy): Minutes and Papers CAB 127 – Cabinet Office: Private Collections of Ministers’ and Officials’ Papers CAB 128 – Cabinet: Minutes (CM and CC Series) CAB 129 – Cabinet: Memoranda (CP and C Series) CAB 130 – Cabinet: Miscellaneous Committees: Minutes and Papers (GEN, MISC and REF Series) CAB 131 – Cabinet: Defence Committee: Minutes and Papers (DO, D and DC Series) CAB 134 – Cabinet: Miscellaneous Committees: Minutes and Papers (General Series) CAB 158 – Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office: Central Intelligence Machinery: Joint Intelligence Sub-committee later Committee: Memoranda (JIC Series) CAB 159 – Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office: Central Intelligence Machinery: Joint Intelligence Sub-committee later Committee: Minutes (JIC Series) CAB 161 – Cabinet Office: Committee Organisation Books CAB 163 – War Cabinet, Ministry of Defence, and Cabinet Office: Central Intelligence Machinery: Joint Intelligence Sub-committee, later Committee: Secretariat: Files

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

272

Select bibliography

CAB 165 – Cabinet Office: Committees (C Series) Files CAB 169 – War Cabinet: Cabinet Committee Lists CAB 195 – Cabinet Secretary’s Notebooks CO 537 – Colonial Office and predecessors: Confidential General and Confidential Original Correspondence CO 967 – Colonial Office: Private Office Papers CO 968 – Colonial Office and Commonwealth Office: Defence Department and successors: Original Correspondence DEFE 4 – Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes DEFE 5 – Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Memoranda DEFE 7 – Ministry of Defence prior to 1964: Registered Files (General Series) DEFE 11 – Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Registered Files DEFE 28 – Ministry of Defence: Directorate of Forward Plans: Registered Files DO 35 – Dominions Office and Commonwealth Relations Office: Original Correspondence DO 121 – Dominions Office and Commonwealth Relations Office: Private Office Papers FO 115 – Foreign Office: Embassy and Consulates, United States of America: General Correspondence FO 366 – Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service Administration Office: Chief Clerk’s Department and successors: Records FO 371 – Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906–1966 FO 800 – Foreign Office, Private Offices: Various Ministers’ and Officials’ Papers FO 817 – Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Embassy, Czechoslovakia: General Correspondence FO 930 – Ministry of Information and Foreign Office: Foreign Publicity Files FO 953 – Foreign Office: Information Policy Department and Regional Information Departments: Registered Files FO 1093 – Foreign Office: Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department: Miscellaneous Unregistered Papers FO 1110 – Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Information Research Department: General Correspondence (PR and IR Series) FCO 158 – Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Records relating to Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean (known KGB spies), and subsequent investigations and security arrangements HO 213 – Home Office: Aliens Department: General (GEN) Files and Aliens’ Naturalization and Nationality (ALN and NTY Symbol Series) Files HS 8 – Ministry of Economic Warfare, Special Operations Executive and successors: Headquarters: Records HW 1 – Government Code and Cypher School: Signals Intelligence Passed to the Prime Minister, Messages and Correspondence

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Select bibliography

273

HW 3 – Government Code and Cypher School and predecessors: Personal Papers, Unofficial Histories, Foreign Office X Files and Miscellaneous Records HW 12 – Government Code and Cypher School: Diplomatic Section and predecessors: Decrypts of Intercepted Diplomatic Communications (BJ Series) HW 14 – Government Code and Cypher School: Directorate: Second World War Policy Papers HW 25 – Government Code and Cypher School: Cryptographic Studies HW 75 – Government Communications Headquarters and predecessor: Soviet Bloc reports HW 80 – Government Communications Headquarters and predecessor: Records relating to the development of the 1946 ‘UKUSA’ Agreement KV 2 – The Security Service: Personal (PF Series) Files KV 3 – The Security Service: Subject (SF series) Files KV 4 – The Security Service: Policy (Pol F Series) Files KV 6 – The Security Service: List (L Series) Files PREM 3 – Prime Minister’s Office: Operational Correspondence and Papers PREM 4 – Prime Minister’s Office: Confidential Correspondence and Papers PREM 8 – Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1945–1951 PREM 11 – Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1951–1964 T 199 – Treasury: Establishment Officer’s Branch: Registered Files (EO and 2EO Series) T 215 – Treasury: Establishment General Division: Registered Files (EG and 2EG Series) T 220 – Treasury: Imperial and Foreign Division: Registered Files (IF series) T 273 – Treasury: Papers of Lord Bridges WO 106 – War Office: Directorate of Military Operations and Military Intelligence, and predecessors: Correspondence and Papers WO 258 – War Office: Department of the Permanent Under Secretary of State: Private Office Papers Printed primary documents

Aldrich, Richard, Rory Cormac and Michael Goodman (eds), Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1936–2013 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014). Colville, John, The Fringes of Power; Downing Street Diaries, Volume 1: 1939– October 1941 (London: Sceptre, 1985). —— The Fringes of Power; Downing Street Diaries, Volume Two: 1941–April 1955 (London: Sceptre, 1987). Dalton, Hugh, The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931–1945 (London: Frederick Muller, 1957). Danchev, Alex, and Daniel Todman (eds), War Diaries, 1939–1945: Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

274

Select bibliography

Dilks, David (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–45 (London: Cassell, 1971). Dixon, Piers, Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon, Don and Diplomat (London: Hutchinson, 1968). Garnett, David (ed.), The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive, 1939–1945 (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2002). Harvey, John (ed.), The Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1941–1945 (London: Collins, 1978). Hayter, William, A Double Life (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1974). Healey, Denis, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin, 1990). Hyam, Ronald (ed.), The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945–1951, Pt. 1: High Policy and Administration (London: HMSO, 1992). Hyde, Douglas, I Believed: The Autobiography of a Former British Communist (London: The Reprint Society, 1952). Ismay, Hastings Lionel, 1st Baron Ismay, The Memoirs of the General Lord Ismay (London: Heinemann, 1960). Jebb, Hubert Gladwyn, 1st Baron Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972). Mallaby, George, From My Level: Unwritten Minutes (London: Hutchinson, 1965). Mayhew, Christopher, Time to Explain: An Autobiography (London: Hutchinson, 1987). —— A War of Words: A Cold War Witness (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998). Morrison, Herbert, Herbert Morrison: An Autobiography (London: Odhams Press, 1960). Pearce, Robert (ed.), Patrick Gordon Walker: Political Diaries, 1932–1971 (London: The Historians’ Press, 1991). Pimlott, Ben (ed.), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton: 1918–40, 1945–60 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986). —— The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940–1945 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986). The Security Service, 1908–1945: The Official History (Kew: The Public Record Office, 1999). Sillitoe, Percy, Cloak Without Dagger (London: Pan Books, 1955). Sweet-Escott, Bickham, Baker Street Irregular (London: Methuen, 1965). Warner, Geoffrey (ed.), In the Midst of Events: The Foreign Office Diaries and Papers of Kenneth Younger, February 1950–October 1951 (London: Routledge, 2005). Williams, Francis, Nothing So Strange: An Autobiography (London: Cassell, 1970). —— A Prime Minister Remembers (London: Heinemann, 1961). Woodhouse, Christopher, Something Ventured (London: Granada, 1982). Young, Kenneth (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Vol. 1: 1915–1938 (London: Macmillan, 1973).

Select bibliography

275

Secondary sources

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Books and monographs Addison, Paul, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1994). Aid, Matthew, The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency (New York: Bloomsbury, 2009). Aldrich, Richard, British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War (London: Routledge, 1992). ——  GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London: HarperPress, 2010). ——  The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray, 2001). Aldrich, Richard, and Michael Hopkins (eds), Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World (London: Frank Cass, 1994). Andrew, Christopher, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5 (London: Allan Lane, 2009). ——  Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: Guild Publishing, 1985). Barker, Elizabeth, The British between the Superpowers (London: Macmillan, 1983). Beckett, Francis, Clem Attlee (London: Politico’s, 2007). ——  Enemy Within: The Rise and Fall of the British Communist Party (London: Merlin, 1998). Bennett, Gill, Churchill’s Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence (London: Routledge, 2009). Bethell, Nicholas, The Great Betrayal: The Untold Story of Kim Philby’s Greatest Coup (London: Coronet, 1984). Black, J. L., and Martin Rudner (eds), The Gouzenko Affair: Canada and the Beginnings of Cold War Counter-Espionage (Manotick: Penumbra Press, 2006). Black, Robert, and William Roger Louis (eds), Churchill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Bower, Tom, The Perfect English Spy: Sir Dick White and the Secret War, 1935–1990 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995). Branson, Noreen, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1927–41 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985). ——  History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1941–51 (London: Laurence and Wishart, 1997). Brookshire, Jerry, Clement Attlee (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). Bullock, Alan, Ernest Bevin: A Biography, ed. Peter Hennessy and Brian Brivati (London: Politico’s, 2002). ——  Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

276

 The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Vol. II: Minister of Labour, 1940–45 (London: Heinemann, 1967). Burridge, Trevor, Clement Attlee: A Political Biography (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987). Cain, Frank, The Australian Security Intelligence Organization: An Unofficial History (London: Frank Cass, 1994). Cecil, Robert, A Divided Life: A Biography of Donald Maclean (London: Coronet, 1990). Clark, Ian, and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1955 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Clarke, Charles, and Toby James (eds), British Labour Leaders (London: Biteback, 2015). Corke, Sarah-Jane, US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, the CIA and Secret Warfare (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). Cradock, Percy, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London: John Murray, 2002). Cruickshank, Charles, The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare, 1938–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). Darwin, John, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988). ——  The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Davies, Philip, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (London: Frank Cass, 2005). Defty, Andrew, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945–53 (London: Frank Cass, 2004). Deighton, Anne (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990). Donoughue, Bernard, and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London: Phoenix, 2001). Dorril, Stephen, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations (London: Fourth Estate, 2001). Dylan, Huw, Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain’s Joint Intelligence Bureau, 1945–1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Foot, M. R. D., SOE in France (London: Frank Cass, 2006). ——  SOE in the Low Countries (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2001). ——  SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946 (London: Pimlico, 1999). French, David, Army, Empire, and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy, 1945–1971 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Ganser, Daniele, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe (New York: Frank Cass, 2005). Gilbert, Martin, Churchill: A Life (London: Minerva, 1992). Goodman, Michael, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). ——

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Select bibliography

Select bibliography

 Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). Gorst, Anthony, Lewis Johnman and Scott Lucas (eds), Contemporary British History, 1931–61: Politics and the Limits of Policy (London: Pinter, 1991). Gowing, Margaret, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–52, Vol. 1, Policymaking (London: Macmillan, 1974). Greenwood, Sean, Titan at the Foreign Office: Gladwyn Jebb and the Shaping of the Modern World (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). Grob-Fitzgibbon, Benjamin, Imperial Endgame: Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Harris, Kenneth, Attlee (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982). Hart-Davis, Duff, Man of War: The Secret Life of Alan Hillgarth, Officer, Adventurer, Agent (London: Century, 2012). Haynes, John, and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999). Hennessy, Peter, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). ——  Never Again: Britain, 1945–51 (London: Penguin, 2006). ——  The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2001). ——  The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst, 1945–2010 (London: Penguin, 2010). Heuser, Beatrice, Western ‘Containment’ Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948–53 (London: Routledge, 1989). Hinsley, F. H., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1979). Hinsley, F. H., and C. A. G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Vol. 4, Security and Counter-Intelligence (London: HMSO, 1990). Hopkins, Michael, Oliver Franks and the Truman Administration: AngloAmerican Relations, 1948–1952 (London: Frank Cass, 2003). Horner, David, The Spy Catchers: The Official History of ASIO, 1949–1963 (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2014). Hyam, Ronald, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Hyde, H. Montgomery, The Atom Bomb Spies (London: Sphere, 1982). Jago, Michael, Clement Attlee: The Inevitable Prime Minister (London: Biteback, 2014). Jeffery, Keith, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1949 (London: Bloomsbury, 2010). Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri, and Andrew Lownie (eds), North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991). Jenks, John, British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006). Killingsray, David, and David Anderson (eds), Policing and Decolonisation: ——

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

277

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

278

Select bibliography

Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917–65 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2008). Knight, Amy, How the Cold War Began: The Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2005). Lashmar, Paul, and James Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War, 1948–1977 (Stroud: Sutton, 1998). Leffler, Melvyn, and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1: Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Louis, William Roger, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–51: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). Maddrell, Paul, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945–1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Madeira, Victor, Britannia and the Bear: The Anglo-Russian Intelligence Wars, 1917–1929 (London: Boydell Press, 2014). Major, Patrick, and Christopher Moran (eds), Spooked: Britain, Empire and Intelligence since 1945 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2005). Moran, Christopher, Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Moran, Christopher, and Christopher Murphy (eds), Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). Morgan, Kenneth, Labour in Power, 1945–51 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). O’Halpin, Eunan, Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality during the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Ovendale, Ritchie, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945–51 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984). Pimlott, Ben, Hugh Dalton (London: Papermac, 1986). Prados, John, Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From World War II Through to the Persian Gulf (Chicago: Elephant, 1996). Quinlan, Kevin, The Secret War between the Wars: MI5 in the 1920s and 1930s (London: Boydell Press, 2014). Ramsey, Robin, Politics & Paranoia (Hove: Picnic Publishing, 2008). Reynolds, David, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt and the International History of the 1940s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Riste, Olav, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945–70 (London: Frank Cass, 1999). Rossiter, Mike, The Spy Who Changed the World (London: Headline, 2014). Saville, John, The Politics of Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government, 1945–46 (London: Verso, 1993). Schwartz, Lowell, Political Warfare against the Kremlin: US and British Propaganda at the Beginning of the Cold War (London: Palgrave, 2009).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Select bibliography

279

Seaman, Mark (ed.), Special Operations Executive: A New Instrument of War (London: Routledge, 2006). Sinclair, Georgina, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945–80 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006). Smith, Michael, The Spying Game: The Secret History of British Espionage (London: Politico’s, 2003). Stafford, David, Churchill & Secret Service (London: Abacus, 1997). Thomas-Symonds, Nicklaus, Attlee: A Life in Politics (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010). ——  Nye: The Political Life of Aneurin Bevan (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014). Thorpe, Andrew, A History of the British Labour Party (London: Palgrave, 2008). Thurlow, Richard, The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Vickers, Rhiannon, The Labour Party and the World, Vol. 1: The Evolution of Labour’s Foreign Policy, 1900–51 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). Webb, Alban, London Calling: Britain, the BBC World Service and the Cold War (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). Weiler, Peter, British Labour and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988). ——  Ernest Bevin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). West, Nigel, The Friends: Britain’s Post-War Secret Intelligence Operations (London: Coronet, 1990). ——  A Matter of Trust: British Security Service Operations, 1945–1972 (London: Coronet, 1985). Wilkinson, Peter, and Joan Astley, Gubbins and SOE (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 1993). Young, John, Winston Churchill’s Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War, 1951–1955 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). Zametica, John (ed.), British Officials and British Foreign Policy, 1945–50 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990).

Journal articles Aldrich, Richard, ‘Did Waldegrave Work? The Impact of Open Government upon British History’, Twentieth Century History, 9:1 (1998). ——  ‘GCHQ and SIGINT in the Early Cold War, 1945–70’, Intelligence and National Security, 16:1 (2001). ——  ‘“Grow Your Own”: Cold War Intelligence and History Supermarkets’, Intelligence and National Security, 17:1 (2002). ——  ‘The Waldegrave Initiative and Secret Service Archives: New Materials and New Policies’, Intelligence and National Security, 10:1 (1995), pp. 192–7. Andrew, Christopher, ‘The British Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet Relations in the 1920s Part 1: From the Trade Negotiations to the Zinoviev Letter’, The Historical Journal, 20:3 (1977).

280

 ‘The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the AngloAmerican Connection’, Intelligence and National Security, 4:2 (1989). ——  ‘Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War’, Review of International Studies, 24 (1998). Barnes, Trevor, ‘Special Branch and the First Labour Government’, The Historical Journal, 22:4 (1979). Bennett, Gill, ‘Declassification and Release Policies of the UK’s Intelligence Services’, Intelligence and National Security, 17:1 (2002). ——  ‘“A most extraordinary and mysterious business”: The Zinoviev Letter of 1924’, History Notes, 14 (February 1999). Cain, Frank, ‘Venona in Australia and its Long-term Ramifications’, Journal of Contemporary History, 35:2 (2000). Callaghan, John, and Kevin Morgan, ‘Communication: The Open Conspiracy of the Communist Party and the Case of W.N. Ewer, Communist and AntiCommunist’, The Historical Journal, 49:2 (2006). Cormac, Rory, ‘The Pin-Prick Approach: Whitehall’s Top Secret AntiCommunist Committee and the Evolution of British Covert Action Strategy’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 16:3 (2014), pp. 5–28. Davis, Philip, ‘From Special Operations to Special Political Action: The “Rump SOE” and SIS Post-War Covert Action Capability 1945–1977’, Intelligence and National Security, 15:2 (2000). Deery, Philip, ‘“The Secret Battalion”: Communism in Britain during the Cold War’, Contemporary British History, 13:4 (1999). Ferris, John, ‘The Road to Bletchley Park: The British Experience with Signals Intelligence, 1892–1945’, Intelligence and National Security, 17:1 (2002). Ferris, John, and Uri Bar-Joseph, ‘Getting Marlowe to Hold his Tongue: The Conservative Party, the Intelligence Services and the Zinoviev Letter’, Intelligence and National Security, 8:4 (1993). Goodman, Gloria, ‘The British Government and the Challenge of McCarthyism in the Early Cold War’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 12:1 (2010). Goodman, Michael, ‘Grandfather of the Hydrogen Bomb? Anglo-American Intelligence and Klaus Fuchs’, Historical Studies in the Physical and the Biological Sciences, 34:1 (2003). ——  ‘Who is Trying to Keep Secrets from Whom and Why? MI5–FBI Relations and the Klaus Fuchs Case’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 7:3 (2005). ——  ‘With a Little Help from My Friends: The Anglo-American Atomic Intelligence Partnership, 1945–1958’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 18:1 (2007). Goodman, Michael, and Chapman Pincher, ‘Clement Attlee, Percy Sillitoe, and the Security Aspects of the Fuchs Case’, Contemporary British History, 19:1 (2005). Grant, Jennifer, ‘The Role of MI5 in the Internment of British Fascists during the Second World War’, Intelligence and National Security, 24:4 (2009). Harrison, E. D. R., ‘J.C. Masterman and the Security Service, 1940–72’, Intelligence and National Security, 24:6 (2009). Hennessy, Peter, and Andrew Arends, ‘Mr. Attlee’s Engine Room: Cabinet ——

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Select bibliography

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Select bibliography

281

Committee Structure and the Labour Government, 1945–51’, Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics, 26 (1983). Hennessy, Peter, and Gail Brownfield, ‘Britain’s Cold War Security Purge: The Origins of Positive Vetting’, The Historical Journal, 25:4 (1982). Hyam, Ronald, ‘Africa and the Labour Government, 1945–51’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 16:3 (1988). Kelly, Saul, ‘No Ordinary Foreign Office Official: Sir Roger Makins and AngloAmerican Atomic Relations, 1945–55’, Contemporary British History, 14:4 (2000). Kerr, Sheila, ‘Roger Hollis and the Dangers of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942’, Intelligence and National Security, 5:3 (1990). Lomas, Daniel, ‘“ … the Defence of the Realm and Nothing Else”: Sir Findlater Stewart, Labour Ministers and the Security Service’, Intelligence and National Security, 30:6 (2015). ——  ‘Labour Ministers, Intelligence and Domestic Anti-Communism, 1945–51’, Journal of Intelligence History 12:2 (2013), pp. 113–33. Macklin, Graham, ‘Britain Hid Spy Data from US’, BBC History Magazine (2008). Maguire, Thomas, ‘Counter-Subversion in Early Cold War Britain: The Official Committee on Communism (Home), the Information Research Department, and “State Private Networks”’, Intelligence and National Security, 30:5 (2015). McGarr, Paul, ‘“A Serious Menace to Security”: British Intelligence. V.K. Krishna Menon and the Indian High Commission in London, 1947–52’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 38:2 (2010). McKnight, David, ‘The Moscow–Canberra Cables: How Soviet Intelligence Obtained British Secrets through the Back Door’, Intelligence and National Security, 13:2 (1998). Merrick, Ray, ‘The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War, 1946–47’, Journal of Contemporary History, 20:3 (1985). Murphy, Philip, ‘Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: The View from Central Africa, 1945–1965’, Intelligence and National Security, 17:3 (2002), pp. 131–62. ——  ‘Exporting a British Intelligence Culture: The British Intelligence Community and Decolonisation, 1945–60’, Political Studies Association (2004). Paul, Kathleen, ‘“British Subjects” and “British Stock”: Labour’s Postwar Imperialism’, Journal of British Studies, 34:2 (1995). Riste, Olav, ‘With an Eye to History: The Origins and Development of “StayBehind” in Norway’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 30:6 (2007). Saville, John, ‘Ernest Bevin and the Cold War, 1945–50’, Socialist Register (1984). Schlaepfer, Christian, ‘Signals Intelligence and British Counter-subversion in the Early Cold War’, Intelligence and National Security, 29:1 (2014). Scott, Len, ‘Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence: A British View’, Intelligence and National Security, 22:1 (2007).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

282

Select bibliography

Scott, Len, and Peter Jackson, ‘The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice’, Intelligence and National Security, 19:2 (2004). Shaw, Tony, ‘The Information Research Department of the Foreign Office and the Korean War, 1950–53’, Journal of Contemporary History, 34:2 (1999). Smith, Lyn, ‘Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department, 1947–1977’, Millennium: The Journal of International Studies, 9:1 (1980). Smith, Raymond, and John Zametica, ‘The Cold War Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered, 1945–7’, International Affairs, 61:2 (1985). Stafford, David, ‘The Detonator Concept: British Strategy, SOE and European Resistance after the Fall of France’, Journal of Contemporary History, 10:2 (1975). Stewart, Duncan, ‘“Of Historical Interest Only”: The Origins and Vicissitudes of the SOE Archive’, Intelligence and National Security, 20:1 (2005). Thurlow, Richard, ‘The Charm Offensive: The “coming out” of MI5’, Intelligence and National Security, 15:1 (2000). Walton, Calder, ‘British Intelligence and the Mandate of Palestine: Threats to British National Security Immediately after the Second World War’, Intelligence and National Security, 23:4 (2011). Weiler, Peter, ‘British Labour and the Cold War: The Foreign Policy of the Labour Governments, 1945–51’, Journal of British Studies, 26:1 (1987). Wildy, Tom, ‘From MOI to COI – Publicity and Propaganda in Britain, 1945–51: The National Health and Insurance Campaigns of 1948’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 6:1 (1986). Wylie, Neville, ‘Ungentlemanly Warriors or Unreliable Diplomats? Special Operations Executive and “Irregular Political Activities” in Europe’, Intelligence and National Security, 20:1 (2005). Young, John, ‘The British Foreign Office and Cold War Fighting in the Early 1950s: PUSC(51)16 and the 1952 “Sore Spots” Memorandum’, Leicester University Discussion Papers in Politics, No. P95/2 (April 1995).

Unpublished theses Craig, Alexander, ‘The Joint Intelligence Committee and British Intelligence Assessment, 1945–56’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2000). Walton, Calder, ‘British Intelligence and Threats to National Security, circa 1941–1951’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2006).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index

Note: Page references followed by ‘n’ give the number of the relevant note on that page Acheson, Dean 125, 152, 156 Addison, Christopher, 1st Viscount Addison 85 Alexander, Albert Victor 33, 39, 58, 62, 64–5, 67–8, 69–70, 103, 105, 118–19, 128, 131–2, 137, 198, 200, 203–6, 228, 235, 262, 264, 266 Anderson, Sir John 38, 47n16, 165 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) 224, 235–6 Bedell Smith, Walter 173 Bellenger, Fredrick 192 Benn, William Wedgewood, Viscount Stansgate 228 Berlin blockade 66–8 Bevan, Aneurin 65, 85, 98, 105–7, 250, 262, Bevin, Ernest 6, 33, 39, 41, 46, 47n16, 49n64, 51n87, 65–6, 66–7, 83, 90–1, 92, 98, 104, 164, 165, 168, 193–4, 241, 265 anti-Communism 198, 201 Commonwealth Security 232, 234 and Gouzenko case 152–61 and intelligence 56, 58–9, 60–1, 64, 69, 73, 227, 259–60, 262, 264, 266 Labour Party criticism of 88–9 and MI5 165 and Palestine 228, 230 and propaganda policy 85, 86–7, 90, 92, 95, 97–9, 100–1, 103, 105–8, 117, 120, 225, 244–5, 247 relationship with Attlee 261, 263 relationship with the Chiefs of Staff 118–19 and special operations 120, 121–2, 123, 124–6, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132–3, 135, 140, 143n65, 266 and stay-behind networks 136–7, 139–40 Bing, Geoffrey 190–2, 201 see also crypto-communists

Blackburne, Kenneth 246 Bland, Sir Nevile 40, 176 Bland Report 40, 69, 74, 193 Blunt, Anthony 193 Bracken, Brendan 36, 38 Bridges, Sir Edward 47n16, 71, 73, 75, 187–9, 194–5, 209, 216n16, 219n95, 226, 260 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 85, 86, 87, 97, 98, 99, 103, 106, 107, 209, 243–4, 248, 249 British Council 107, 246–7, 249 British-US Communication Intelligence Agreement (BRUSA) 3, 150 Brockway, Fenner 192 Brook, Sir Norman 54, 69, 71–7, 104–5, 107, 129–30, 138–9, 176, 195–6, 202, 206, 209, 210–21, 222n182, 244–5, 262, 264–5 Burgess, Guy 6–7, 172–7, 207 Burma 90–1 Caccia, Sir Harold 58 Cadogan, Sir Alexander 35–7, 55–6, 58, 152–4, 156–8, 175–6, 188 Carey Foster, George 173 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 65, 126, 136, 139 Chiefs of Staff 33–4, 37, 39, 41, 43, 59, 60, 65, 67–8, 72, 74, 104–6, 108, 116–20, 123, 128–30, 133, 135, 137–40, 213, 250, 265 Chifley, Ben 232–3, 234–5 Churchill, Winston 3, 7, 31–40, 42, 44–5, 47n6, 52n117, 55–6, 62, 69, 72, 76, 129, 133, 147n126, 150, 165, 187, 194, 196, 208, 222n175, 264–5 Chuter Ede, James 54, 62–3, 75, 80n64, 105, 193, 197–8, 202, 205, 209–10, 219n95, 260 Clarke, William ‘Nobby’ 55

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

284 Clutterbuck, Sir Alexander 166 Cockcroft, Sir John 161–3, 171 Committees Colonial Information Policy Committee 15, 245–8 Committee for Free Albania 127 Committee on Communism (Home) 211–13 Committee on Communism (Overseas) 116, 128–36, 261–2 GEN 75 (Cabinet Committee on Atomic Energy) 151, 261 GEN 110 (Committee on Fascism) 197 GEN 164 62, 76, 198, 260 GEN 180 (Ministerial Committee on Illegal Immigration) 230 GEN 183 (Cabinet Committee on Subversive Activities) 63, 168, 198–208, 214, 260 GEN 226 (Committee on European Policy) 105–8, 203 GEN 231 (Cabinet Committee on Propaganda) 107–8, 131–2, 244–5, 262 GEN 241 (Committee on Germany) 66–7 Commonwealth Security Conferences 237–8 Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 5, 43–4, 46, 191, 198–201, 202, 209–10, 212, 222n182, 239, 260 Council of Foreign Ministers 64, 66, 88, 92, 95, 97 Cripps, Sir Stafford 67, 85, 87, 105, 131–2, 159, 189, 209, 219n108, 244, 247, 262, 267 crypto-communists 191–2 Crossman, Richard 88–9, 94, 101 Dalton, Hugh 6, 11–12, 31, 35–8, 45–6, 49n36, 49n44, 55, 61, 85, 93, 189, 228, 262 Davies, Ernest 111n57, 249 Dedman, John Johnstone 233–4 Dening, Ester 99, 117, 232 Department of Atomic Energy 169 Dixon, Pierson 116, 132, 134–5, 143n65, 158, 210, 212, 266 Dodds-Parker, Douglas 92, 222n182, 266 Eden, Anthony 39–1, 62, 101, 147, 175 Elliott, Air Chief Marshall Sir William 164 Evatt, Dr. Herbert 232–4 Evill, Air-Chief Marshal Sir Douglas 59, 69, 73 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 153, 156, 165–6, 168–1 Fletcher, Reginald ‘Rex’ 12 Foreign Office 10, 14, 35, 37, 41, 55, 156–8,

Index 163, 170, 192, 194, 226–7, 230–2, 241, 243, 245 and Burgess and Maclean 172–7 on the Cold War 117 and domestic counter-subversion 208–9, 211–13, 215 and intelligence 8, 11- 12, 56–8, 65, 68–9, 74–5 Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee (PUSC) 129 Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department (PUSD) 4, 129 and propaganda policy 84–8, 88–6, 98–9, 102–3, 106–8 release of records 3–7 and special operations 119, 122–3, 127, 129–30, 132, 134, 136–40, 143n65, 250–1 Zinoviev Letter Affair 9–11 see also Russia Committee Franks, Sir Oliver 160–1, 168, 170 Freedom of Information Act (2000) 1, 6 Fuchs, Klaus 2, 13–14, 70–1, 73, 149, 161–9, 170–1, 174, 206, 214, 263–4 Gaitskell, Hugh 140, 146n111, 248–9, 262 Gold Coast 240–1, 246–7 Gordon Walker, Patrick 15, 75, 94, 167, 239, 243–6, 248, 252 Gore-Booth, Paul 163 Gouzenko, Igor 58, 151–4, 156–7, 166, 197, 199, 224 Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) 12, 33–5, 55, 78n28, 229 Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 3, 57, 74–5 Gubbins, Sir Colin 41 Gurney, Sir Henry 240 Halifax, Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, Lord 36, 47n16, 49n44, 153, 156 Hall, George 56, 61 Hankey, Sir Robin 88, 122 Hayter, Sir William 67, 69–70, 119–20, 125, 129, 131, 263 Healey, Denis 89–92, 106–7, 111n64, 211 Helsby, Laurence 124, 162, 164 Henderson, Arthur 8–9, 11 Henderson, Sir Nicholas 56 Hillenkoetter, Rear-Admiral Roscoe 125 Hillgarth, Alan 69, 133, 222n175 Hoyer-Miller, Frederick 127 Hyde, Douglas 190 Indian Political Intelligence (IPI) 226 Information Research Department (IRD) 13–15, 32, 83, 102–4, 106, 113n116,

285

Index

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

117, 119–20, 129, 132, 211–13, 215, 222n182, 245, 247 Irgun 227–9 see also Palestine Ismay, General Hastings Lionel ‘Pug’ 39, 47n16, 72, 188, 216n15, 288 Jacob, Sir Ian 99, 248 Jebb, Sir Gladwyn 37, 88, 91 domestic anti-communism 208–9, 212, 261 special operations 116, 122, 130, 131–3, 174, 262 Jewish Agency 227–9 Johnson, Sir William 241 Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) 70, 72, 119–20, 137 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) 2, 33, 41, 43, 46, 47n17, 54, 56, 59–67, 69, 74, 76, 84, 86, 127, 159, 197–8, 202, 214, 238, 240–1, 262, 265 Joint Planning Staff 120 Jowitt, William Allen, 1st Earl Jowitt 71, 166–7, 197 Kell, Sir Vernon 8, 188 Kennan, George 160 King, William Mackenzie 153–7 Kirkpatrick, Ivone 85–8, 95, 108, 119, 121–2, 136–7 Labour Party 2, 32, 36, 38, 88–9, 94, 108, 167, 201, 238, 262, 267 and anti-communism 43–4, 93–4, 200–1 crypto communists 189–92, 201, 214 propaganda 89–2, 102–4, 106, 158, 209, 211 relationship with the intelligence services 7–12, 186–8, 259–61 Lawson, Jack 101, 228 Liddell, Guy 42, 70, 73, 111n64, 133, 162–4, 166, 169, 187–90, 192–3, 195–6, 202, 214, 215n6, 219n108, 220n121, 228–9, 232–3, 235, 238, 240, 259–60 Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry 117 Lloyd, Sir Thomas 230 MacDonald, James Ramsay 2, 7–12, 31, 45 Macdonald, Sir Malcolm 152–3, 156–8 Maclean, Donald 172–7 Makins, Roger 99, 122, 125, 156, 159, 161, 163, 165, 168, 171–2, 174 Malan, Daniel François 236–8 Malta 143n64 Manning, Leah 190–1, 217n39 Mayhew, Christopher 42, 111n64, 117, 129, 201, 243 anti-Soviet propaganda 83, 89–92, 94–8, 100–4, 106–8, 114n122

and colonial propaganda 243–5, 249 early life 92–3 in wartime 37, 93–4 Maxwell, Sir Alexander 52n119, 187, 193 Maxwell-Fyfe, Sir David 196 McCarthy, Senator Joseph 170, 177, 200, 214 McMahon Act (1946) 159–61, 163, 177 McNeil, Hector 62–3, 89, 91–2, 103, 106, 123, 131, 143n48, 172, 175, 198, 230 Menon, Vengalil Krishanan (V. K.) Krishna 238–9 Menzies, Major-General Sir Stewart 34, 41, 46, 47n16, 51n87, 55–9, 68, 117–21, 123–5, 131–2, 134–40, 141n12, 150, 152, 159, 178, 187, 227–8, 231–3, 263 Monteath, Sir David 226 Montgomery, Field Marshall Sir Bernard Law 118–19 see also Chiefs of Staff Moorehead, Alan 172 Morrison, Herbert 67, 75, 94, 145, 193, 228, 229 anti-communism 42–5, 191, 197, 210–11, 214, 260, 262, 267n18 anti-communist propaganda 99–100, 103, 105–7, 131–2, 243, 244, 249 as Foreign Secretary 135, 146, 173–5, 213, 250–1 as wartime Home Secretary 12, 14, 32, 39, 42–6, 52n117, 53n121 Morton, Desmond 37, 40, 45, 53n121 Mosley, Sir Oswald 42, 193, 197 Mossadeq, Mohammed 250–1 Murray, Sir Ralph 102, 243–5 Nehru, Jawaharlal 239 Newsam, Sir Frank 165 Nkrumah, Kwame 240 Noel-Baker, Philip 89, 244 Nunn May, Alan 152, 154–5, 157–8, 162, 167, 199 Nye, General Sir Archibald 239, 266 Operations Operation Embarrass 231 Operation Valuable 116, 122–8 Osmond, Paul 166 Palestine 227–31 Palme Dutt, Rajani 239 Palmer, Roundell Cecil, 3rd Earl of Selborne 38–40 Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee 129, 147n125 see also Foreign Office

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

286 Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department 4, 129 see also Foreign Office Peterson, Sir Maurice 58, 238, 242 Petrie, Sir David 187–8, 193, 260 Philby, Harold Adrian Russell ‘Kim’ 127, 152, 154, 157, 173 Phillips, Morgan 91, 201 Platts-Mills, John 190–1, 220n118 Political Warfare Executive (PWE) 38 Pollitt, Harry 43, 201 Ponsonby, Arthur 8, 10 Pontecorvo, Bruno 169–71, 174, 207, 264 Portal, Lord 162–3 Rees-Williams, David 224–46 Reilly, Sir Patrick 6, 55, 127, 132, 134, 139, 173, 184n162 Rickett, Sir Denis 139, 171 Roberts, Sir Frank 57, 84, 137, 263 Robertson, Norman 152–5 Russia Committee 65, 85–9, 99, 103, 119, 122–3, 128, 130, 132, 238 see also Foreign Office Sargent, Sir Orme 47n16, 55, 58, 85, 89–90, 95–6, 98, 102, 114n122, 117, 120–1, 123, 158, 226–7, 234 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) 34–5, 39–41, 55–9, 68–9, 72–7, 108, 116, 120–1, 123, 127, 131–2, 136–40, 145n98, 147n128, 151–2, 157–8, 169–70, 173, 179n19, 193–4, 225–7, 229, 230–1, 250–1 Security Service (MI5) 3–5, 7–8, 11, 32, 42–6, 52n117, 52n119, 53n121, 69, 72–4, 80n64, 89, 111n64, 154, 157–8, 162–70, 172–1, 175, 177–8, 179n19, 180n40, 186–208, 211, 214, 215n6, 217n39, 218n85, 220n120, 222n182, 224–9, 231–41, 259–60, 264 see also Liddell, Guy; Sillitoe, Sir Percy Shedden, Frederick Geoffrey 232–3 Shinwell, Emanuel ‘Manny’ 68, 72, 75, 87, 137–8, 140, 146n111, 169, 197, 207, 210, 213, 249, 262 Sillitoe, Sir Percy 73, 162, 164–8, 170–1, 173, 200, 204–5, 219n95, 224–5, 228, 232–9 attitudes towards 187 and Attlee 189–90, 193–4, 196 background 188 appointed Director-General 187–9, 260 Skardon, William ‘Jim’ 163

Index Slessor, Air-Vice Marshall John 50n79, 117–18, 128–9, 210 Slim, Field Marshal Sir William Joseph 250 South Africa 236–7 Special Branch 8–9, 11, 163, 192 Special Operations Executive (SOE) 2, 35–42, 44, 46, 50n65, 74, 92, 93, 130, 134, 266 Springhall, Douglas 44, 197, 199 Stanley, Oliver Frederick George 62, 229 Stern Gang 227–9 see also Palestine Stewart, Sir Findlater 14, 188–9, 193–4, 225, 235, 260 Strachey, John 167, 174, 189, 191, 207 Strang, Sir William 68–9, 123–4, 127, 129–30, 136, 173, 176, 263 Strauss, George Russell 170, 219n95 Strong, Major-General Sir Kenneth 70, 72, 119–20, 188, 216n16 Swinton, Philip Cunliffe-Lister, 1st Earl of Swinton 36, 71–2, 264 Tedder, Lord Arthur William 118–19, 122 Templer, Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald 130 Trades Union Congress (TUC) 91, 99, 107, 203, 205, 211 Trend, Sir Burke 139 Truman, President Harry S. 151–6, 159–61, 162, 232, 236 ULTRA (BONIFACE) 34, 57 Vansittart, Sir Robert 11, 47n16 VENONA 162, 172–3, 232–3, 234–5 Vernon, Wilfred Foulston 192, 201, 220n116 Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government 3 Warner, Christopher 84–5, 89, 95–6, 98–9, 102–3, 106, 108, 121, 132, 208, 211–2, 244, 262 White, Dick 163, 165, 171, 172, 187, 211 Williams, Francis 64, 263, 265 Wilson Plot 3, 7 Winnifrith, Sir John 168–9, 176, 206–8, 211 Younger, Kenneth 89, 149, 175, 250–1 Zarubin, Georgii 156 Zilliacus, Konni 101, 201, 220n116, 220n118 Zinoviev Letter Affair 2, 7, 9–12, 37, 45, 187, 259