Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU: Overcoming Mutual Misperceptions (New Perspectives on South-East Europe) 3031322045, 9783031322044

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NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU Overcoming Mutual Misperceptions Edited by Milica Uvalić

New Perspectives on South-East Europe

Series Editors Kevin Featherstone, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK Spyros Economides, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK Vassilis Monastiriotis, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

South-East Europe presents a compelling agenda: a region that has challenged European identities, values and interests like no other at formative periods of modern history, and is now undergoing a set a complex transitions. It is a region made up of new and old European Union member states, as well as aspiring ones; early ‘democratising’ states and new post-communist regimes; states undergoing liberalising economic reforms, partially inspired by external forces, whilst coping with their own embedded nationalisms; and states obliged to respond to new and recurring issues of security, identity, well-being, social integration, faith and secularisation. This series examines issues of inheritance and adaptation. The disciplinary reach incorporates politics and international relations, modern history, economics and political economy and sociology. It links the study of South East-Europe across a number of social sciences to European issues of democratisation and economic reform in the posttransition age. It addresses ideas as well as institutions; policies as well as processes. It will include studies of the domestic and foreign policies of single states, relations between states and peoples in the region, and between the region and beyond. The EU is an obvious reference point for current research on South-East Europe, but this series also highlights the importance of South-East Europe in its eastern context; the Caucuses; the Black Sea and the Middle East.

Milica Uvali´c Editor

Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU Overcoming Mutual Misperceptions

Editor Milica Uvali´c Department of Political Science University of Perugia Perugia, Italy

ISSN 2662-5857 ISSN 2662-5865 (electronic) New Perspectives on South-East Europe ISBN 978-3-031-32204-4 ISBN 978-3-031-32205-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Disclaimer: The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. Cover illustration: Posnov/Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to my family and to my remaining friends in all the countries of former Yugoslavia who share my vision of a better future for the Western Balkans.

Acknowledgements

The publication of this volume has been greatly facilitated by the Jean Monnet project co-funded through the ERASMUS+ programme of the European Union. The project “Through Their Eyes: Perceptions of the EU in the Maghreb and Western Balkans” was prepared in 2019 by professors Anna Baldinetti, Lorella Tosone and Milica Uvali´c (Academic coordinator) from the Department of Political Science, University of Perugia. The part of the project dedicated to the Western Balkans, in addition to the University of Perugia, had as partners the University of Belgrade Professor Jovan Teokarevi´c (Faculty of Political Science), and the University of Zagreb Professor Dejan Jovi´c (Faculty of Political Science). The European Union grant enabled the organisation of a conference in Belgrade in April 2022, where most contributors to this volume participated presenting draft papers. I also gratefully acknowledge additional financial support received from the Soros Foundation Serbia that offered a co-financing grant to help the publication of the book. I would like to thank the European Movement in Serbia for collaboration on this issue. I use this occasion to wholeheartedly thank Dejan Jovi´c and Jovan Teokarevi´c, my colleagues from Zagreb and Belgrade, for their continuous support from the early days when this project was conceptualised, and for their seminal work on public perceptions in the Western Balkans that fundamentally inspired my own interest in the topic. Dejan Jovi´c has also provided very useful comments on most chapters of the book. I would like to thank Ruth Martin for her high-level professionalism in

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

preparing the Index. I also need to express my gratitude to close friends and colleagues for useful comments on parts of the manuscript: Will Bartlett and Renzo Daviddi whom I have worked with since I entered the fascinating world of research, as well as my other colleagues that have helped me sharpen my views by their fresh insights and discussion— Jelena Džanki´c, Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré and Matteo Bonomi. My sister Stamenka has been a continuous support in discussing issues that have been our life-long concerns regarding our former country.

Contents

1

The Perceptions of European Union-Western Balkan Integration Prospects: Introduction and Overview Milica Uvali´c

1

Part I Perceptions from The West 2

3

4

The Drivers of EU Financial Assistance to the Western Balkans: Economic, Altruistic or Democracy Promotion Motives? Will Bartlett

25

Moving the Western Balkans Towards the European Union: The Daunting Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina Renzo Daviddi

55

Yugoslav Partition and Post-war EU Integration: The Role of Italy, 1990–2022 Stefano Bianchini

81

5

The Western Balkans, a German View Franz-Lothar Altmann

6

Imagining Europe in a New and Small State: The Case of Croatia Dejan Jovi´c

105

121

ix

x

7

CONTENTS

The United States in the Western Balkans: Reluctant, Late and Distant Involvement vs. Quick Radical Fix Ivan Vujaˇci´c

143

Part II Regional Perceptions 8

9

10

11

12

The Image of the European Union in the Western Balkans Jovan Teokarevi´c Perceptions and Misperceptions of EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans: A Case of a “Capability-Expectations Gap”? Jelena Džanki´c

171

199

European Union—Western Balkans Misperceptions and Paradoxes Odeta Barbullushi

223

Antithetic Perceptions of Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans Matteo Bonomi and Milica Uvali´c

239

The Foggy Future of the Balkans: In or Out of the European Union? Srd-an Bogosavljevi´c

261

Part III Perceptions in Individual Countries 13

14

15

European Union and the Western Balkans, an Endless Story. The Case of Albania Ditmir Bushati

293

The Role of Mis-coordinated European Integration Mechanisms in Decelerating Progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU Accession Nedžma Džananovi´c, Jasmin Hasi´c, and Margareta Ronˇcevi´c

313

Pro-EU, No Matter What? European Union (Mis)Perceptions in Kosovo Gëzim Krasniqi

335

CONTENTS

16

17

18

19

The Perception of the European Union and Its Policies: A View from Montenegro Gordana Ðurovi´c Reinforcing or Conflicting? European Union Conditionality and Political Socialisation During the 2015–2017 Macedonian Political Crisis Simonida Kacarska Love and Hate Relationship: Media Framing of the Official Political Communication About the European Union in Serbia’s Media Aleksandra Krsti´c Bridging the Perceptions-Based Gap Between the EU and the Western Balkans Dejan Jovi´c and Milica Uvali´c

Index

xi

351

375

399

415

435

Notes on Contributors

Franz-Lothar Altmann German, Dr. rer. pol., is Associate Professor at the UNESCO Department for Interculturality, Good Governance and Sustainable Development, Faculty of Philosophy, Bucharest State University (since 2005, ongoing), (Co-)Editor of Journal for Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Editorial Board Member of International Journal of Balkan Policy Research, of Tirana Observer and of Romanian Journal of Sociology and member of Bertelsmann Transformation Index Board. He also taught at German Air Force Officers’ College, Boston University, Tohoku University, Portland State University. He was author of many publications on East and Southeast European economics and politics, transformation and EU integration and enlargement, and received various research awards and fellowships from prestigious institutions. Odeta Barbullushi is an Albanian foreign policy expert, academic and former diplomat, who served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief of Cabinet to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs from 2015 to 2019. She currently holds the position of Advisor to the Albanian Prime Minister on EU Integration and Regional Cooperation. She also acts as Sherpa to the Prime Minister and is responsible for the preparation of EU-Western Balkans Summit. Prior to her work in government, she was a Full-Time Lecturer and Vice Rector for Research at the European University of Tirana. She received her Ph.D. in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom.

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She currently teaches at the Institute of European Studies, University of Tirana. Will Bartlett is Deputy Director of the Research Unit on Southeastern Europe (LSEE) at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He is Editor-in-Chief of the peer-reviewed journal Economic Annals published by the Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade (Serbia). His research has focused on the socio-economic development of the successor states of former Yugoslavia through the perspective of political economy, publishing papers on post-conflict assistance, education systems, labour markets and private sector development in the region. He has acted as a consultant for the European Commission, European Training Foundation, Regional Cooperation Council, UNDP, UNICEF, European Parliament and bilateral donor organisations. Stefano Bianchini is Professor of East European Politics and History, University of Bologna (Italy). He was Rector’s delegate for relations with Eastern Europe and Director of the Interdisciplinary M.A. in East European Studies (MIREES, a joint diploma with Universities of St. Petersburg, Vytautas Magnus at Kaunas and Corvinus Budapest). He is Executive Editor of Southeastern Europe. He was an adviser to the ICTY in The Hague. His latest publications include Liquid Nationalism and State Partitions in Europe (2017); Eastern Europe and the Challenges of Modernity 1800–2000 (2015); The Challenges of Democratization and Reconciliation in the Post-Yugoslav Space co-edited with Eltion Meka (2020); Rekindling the Strong State in Russia and China, with Antonio Fiori (2020). Srd-an Bogosavljevi´c is senior consultant at Ipsos Western Balkans (2016 ongoing). He is the founder and long-term Director of (Ipsos) Strategic Marketing which after 2009 became part of the global leader in market research Ipsos. He holds a Ph.D. in Mathematical Statistics and is Full Professor of Statistics, University of Belgrade. He has also worked at Yugoslav Institute of Statistics and Statistics Netherlands. He was member of editorial boards of various journals, including Statistical Review and YUJOR and member of Advisory Board or Council Chairman of various organisations (Open Society Foundation, Serbia; Economics Faculty Belgrade; Belgrade University; OSIFE; IAA) and professional associations. He has received various awards, including those from the Yugoslav Statistical Office, Taboo, Serbian Chamber of Commerce,

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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Serbian Marketing Association. His main interest is statistical multivariate analysis and modelling, data analysis, conducting and analysis of statistical surveys. Matteo Bonomi is Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Relations (Istituto Affari Internazionali—IAI) in Rome, working on the “European Union, politics and institutions” programme. His work focuses on European integration and EU enlargement policy. He has been an expert or consultant to a number of organisations and public agencies across Europe. He has published academic and policy papers on various aspects of EU differentiated integration, relations between the EU and the Western Balkans and the political economy of EU enlargement. He is member of the “Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group” (BiEPAG) and of the Editorial Board of the academic journal The International Spectator. He holds a Ph.D. in “Politics, Human Rights and Sustainability” from the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna in Pisa. Ditmir Bushati has served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania (2013–2017), Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania (2017– 2019), member of Parliament (2009–2021), Chair of the Parliamentary Committee for European Integration (2011–2013), Head of OSCE Parliamentary Delegation of Albania (2019–2021) and member of the Joint EU-Albania Parliamentary Committee. He was also Special Coordinator or Head of OSCE missions in parliamentary elections in Moldova, Belarus and Latvia, Special OSCE Representative for South Caucasus and Special Envoy of OSCE Chairperson in Office. Since November 2021, he is member of the high-level Advisory Group of US National Democratic Institute. He is also member of the European Council on Foreign Relations. He holds an M.A. in Public International Law from Leiden University and has lectured at the University of Tirana. His publications are in areas related to international relations. Renzo Daviddi is a former official of the European Commission. He retired from the European External Action Service (EEAS) at the end of 2016 after having been the Deputy Head of the European Union Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Previously, he held positions of Head of the European Union Liaison Office in Kosovo and Head of Political and Economic Section of the EC Delegation in BiH. Before joining the European External Action Service, he worked within the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission

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and at the Maastricht Institute for Public Policy. He has published extensively on transition economics and EU enlargement. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. Gordana Ðurovi´c is a Full Professor in the Faculty of Economics, University of Montenegro, Podgorica, where she teaches economic development, international economic relations, regional economy, environmental economics and EU enlargement policy. She was Deputy Prime Minister and/or Minister for European Integration in the Montenegrin Government from 2004 to 2010, she was Chief negotiator for the Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations and WTO accession, and coordinated the CEFTA 2006 negotiations. She is a Jean Monnet Professor, a member of the Committee for the economy of the MESA, President of the Montenegrin Pan-European Union and a member of the Presidency of the International Pan-European Union. Nedžma Džananovi´c is one of the leading Bosnian experts in diplomacy and EU integration. She is a former diplomat and now Professor at the University of Sarajevo’s Faculty of Political Science. She is a researcher with considerable experience in international research projects, and a member of management committees, team leader and researcher in various projects (COST, Horizon 2020, Jean Monnet). She also served as a Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as a Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She authored three books. Her research foci include international relations and diplomacy, European studies and populism. Jelena Džanki´c is Part-Time Professor in the Global Governance Programme (GGP) at the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. She is Director of GGP Southeastern Europe and Co-Director of the Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT). She holds a Ph.D. in International Studies from the University of Cambridge. She is the author of the Global Market for Investor Citizenship (Palgrave, 2019) and Citizenship in Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, Effects of Statehood and Identity Challenges (Routledge, 2015), and co-editor of Europeanisation of the Western Balkans: A Failure of EU Conditionality (with S. Keil and M. Kmezi´c, Palgrave, 2018).

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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Jasmin Hasi´c works as an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. He is also Executive Director of Humanity in Action Bosnia and Herzegovina, an international non-profit organisation. He previously served as an advisor for multilateral affairs and institutions at the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He holds a Ph.D. in Political and Social Sciences from the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and LUISS Guido Carli of Rome. His research interests include peacebuilding, diaspora studies and demographic changes associated with post-conflict migration. He is co-editor of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Foreign Policy since Independence (with Dženeta Karabegovi´c, Palgrave, 2019). Dejan Jovi´c is Professor of International Relations at the University of Zagreb and Visiting Professor at the University of Belgrade. He is President of the Foreign Policy Forum (Zagreb) and Vice-President of the International Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was Chief Political Analyst in the Office of Croatian President Ivo Josipovi´c (2010 – 2014). He is author of Yugoslavia: A State that Withered Away and of War and Myth: Politics of Identity in Contemporary Croatia. He is one of the editors for the CEU Press book series on Southeast Europe. He was also Editor-in-Chief of Croatian Political Science Review. He received his Ph.D. at the LSE and was Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute. He teaches courses in Politics and Society in Southeast Europe, International Relations of Contemporary Balkans, Disintegration of Yugoslavia and post-Yugoslav Wars, Foreign Policy Analysis and Croatian Foreign Policy. Simonida Kacarska is Director of the European Policy Institute (EPI) in Skopje. She holds a Ph.D. in Politics and International Studies from the University of Leeds and an M.A. in European Politics from the Sussex European Institute, both in the UK. She has 18 years of practitioner and research experience related to the political transformation and European integration of the Balkans with a focus on national minority policies. She has held fellowships at several European universities, including the University of Oxford, Edinburgh University and the European University Institute in Florence. Her publications include both academic and policyrelated research papers. She is a regular media contributor and provides consultancy services to international organisations.

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Gëzim Krasniqi is Lecturer in Nationalism and Political Sociology and Programme Director of M.Sc. in Nationalism in the Global Perspective Programme, at the University of Edinburgh (UK). He is a political sociologist working on politics, nationalism, state-building and citizenship, often with a focus on Southeast Europe. His co-edited book, Uneven Citizenship: Minorities and Migrants in the Post-Yugoslav Space (with D. Stjepanovi´c, Routledge 2015), focuses on the relations between citizenship and various manifestations of diversity, including, but not exclusively, ethnicity. His current research involves the study of old and new state-nation configurations in Southeast Europe and citizenship in contested/liminal polities. Aleksandra Krsti´c Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department for Journalism and Communication and the Chair of the Centre for Media and Media Research at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade. Her research interests are journalism and media, television studies, visual communication, conflict reporting, media ethics, media and migration, media democratisation and EU-media relations. She has authored Media, Journalism and the European Union (University of Belgrade, 2020) and articles in peer-reviewed journals (European Journal of Communication, European Journal of Cultural Studies, Media, War and Conflict, Europe-Asia Studies, Problems of Post-Communism, Journalism). She was awarded by the University of Belgrade for the best scientific article in social sciences and humanities in 2018. Previously, she worked as a TV journalist in the Mreža Production Group in Belgrade. She occasionally writes expert analyses for national daily and weekly magazines. Margareta Ronˇcevi´c holds an M.A. degree in Democracy and Human Rights in Southeast Europe. Her research interests include EU integration of the Western Balkans countries, energy democracy and the just energy transition. Currently, she is based in Brussels and works as a Junior Policy Officer in the energy sector. Jovan Teokarevi´c is Professor of Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, Serbia (since 2002), and Visiting Professor of European Studies at the College of Europe, Natolin Campus, Warsaw (since 2016). He previously taught for many years at the NATO Defense College (Rome) and at M.A. Program of the University of Vienna. His research (published in 7 authored and 12 edited books)

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has focused on post-communist transition, politics in the Balkans, EU and NATO enlargement, and EU-Western Balkans relations. Previously, he worked as a research fellow at the Belgrade-based Institute for European Studies. He was also founder and Director of the Belgrade Centre for European Integration, Serbia’s academic coordinator of the International Master Program in Southeast European Studies (jointly with University of Graz) and Chairman of the Governing Board of the Open Society Foundation Serbia. Milica Uvali´c is Professor of Economics in the Department of Political Science, University of Perugia (Italy), where she has worked since 1992 teaching various courses (Macroeconomics, European Economic Integration, Transition Economics, International Economics). She holds a Ph.D. from the European University Institute. Formerly, she was member of the UN Committee for Development Policy, Public Policy Scholar at Woodrow Wilson Centre (Washington DC) and Assistant Minister in the first post-Miloševi´c government in FR Yugoslavia. She is an expert on the Western Balkans and wider East European region and has published widely on Western Balkans economic development, privatisation, trade, FDI, labour markets, higher education and EU-Western Balkans integration. She has worked as an expert for various international organisations (European Commission, European Parliament, EIB, UNESCO, UNDP, OECD, ILO). Ivan Vujaˇci´c is Professor in the Department of Economics and the Department of Political Science, University of Belgrade (Serbia). He has taught principles of economics, comparative economic systems, economics of European integration and international political economy. He is President of the Fulbright Alumni Association of Serbia. He was a prominent leader of the opposition in Serbia in the 1990s during the Miloševi´c regime. He was a member of the Federal Parliament of Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1996 for the Democratic Party and Faction leader between 1994 and 1996. He was President of the Political Council of the Democratic Party in 2000–2001. He served as ambassador of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United States between 2002 and 2009. He is currently President of the Forum of International Affairs of the European Movement in Serbia.

List of Figures

Chapter 2 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

The predicted margins of ODA shares by export shares (commercial interest) Predicted margins of ODA shares by recipient GDP per capita (altruism)

48 48

Chapter 8 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7

Do you think that the EU membership would be a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad? When do you expect the accession of your economy to the EU to happen? When, in which year do you think [COUNTRY] will be a part of the European Union? Do you think that [COUNTRY]’s membership of the EU would be a good thing, a bad thing or neither good or bad? What would EU membership mean to you personally? Support to EU membership in Serbia, 2009–2019 How would you feel if Serbia gave up the idea of joining the EU and formed an alliance with Russia?

173 176 177 180 185 189 193

Chapter 9 Fig. 1

Balkan Route by nationality, 2015–2022

204

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LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 11 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Intra-regional exports of the Western Balkan countries, 2011–2021 (in million US$ and in % of WB6 total) Western Balkan countries’ exports to EU and WB5, 2011–2021 (relative changes, 2011 = 100) Western Balkan countries’ exports to EU and to WB5, as a share of total exports (in %) in 2021

251 252 254

Chapter 12 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

The evolution of attitudes towards the EU in Montenegro The evolution of attitudes towards the EU in North Macedonia The evolution of attitudes towards the EU in Kosovo The evolution of attitudes towards the EU in Serbia Serbia: EU conditioning First association in Serbia when the EU is mentioned EU and Serbia’s security Kosovo: relevance of EU EU integration—Referendum support (March 2022) Public opinion in Serbia

270 272 273 275 279 281 281 283 284 286

Chapter 16 Fig. 1

Support for Montenegro’s accession to the EU: In your opinion, should Montenegro be a member of the European Union? (in %)

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List of Tables

Chapter 2 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6

ODA to the Western Balkans in 2020 (US$ millions and percent) Bilateral ODA flows from top 9 EU member state donors, 2010–2020 Donor favourites, 2020 Distribution of exports to the region by the top nine EU member state donors, 2020 Democracy index scores, recipients, 2020 Regression model for mean ODA share of donors in Western Balkan countries

31 32 33 40 44 45

Chapter 7 Table 1

US involvement in the Western Balkans, 1990–2020

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Chapter 8 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Expected and desired year of EU membership, Serbia 2006 Timeline of applications for EU membership and EU accession in CEE Timeline of applications for EU membership and waiting times for the Western Balkan countries

177 179 179

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LIST OF TABLES

Chapter 12 Table Table Table Table

1 2 3 4

Ethnic clashes in the region of former Yugoslavia Percentage of the population of Serbia who knows Expected period until Serbia enters the EU Is the EU imposing more and more new conditions on Serbia?

264 278 278 280

CHAPTER 1

The Perceptions of European Union-Western Balkan Integration Prospects: Introduction and Overview Milica Uvali´c

1

Introduction

The main motivation for this book derives from a simple fact: the process of political integration into the European Union (EU) of the six Western Balkan countries—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia—has been extremely (and arguably, unexpectedly) slow. The year 2023 marks twenty years since the EU-Western Balkan Summit in Thessaloniki, when the Western Balkan countries were promised an “EU perspective”. Yet the overall results of EU enlargement policies have been highly disappointing. Among the reasons for slow progress in integrating the Western Balkans with the EU are misperceptions on both sides, which today seem to be wider than ever. The citizens in the Western Balkans often do not understand the

M. Uvali´c (B) Department of Political Science, University of Perugia, Perugia, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_1

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real benefits of their country joining the EU, while in the EU member states, the public opinion often perceives the Western Balkans as a region of conflicts and political risks that can only add further problems to the already fragile Union. These reflections have shaped the principal objectives of this book that are twofold. Firstly, to discuss, in a comparative perspective, what are the perceptions and misperceptions of the EU in the individual Western Balkan countries and, secondly, to understand the perceptions of the Western Balkans in the EU, its member states and in other important strategic actors such as the United States of America (USA). Providing insights about EU-Western Balkan mutual perceptions seemed important some years ago after the Union announced its recommitment with the Western Balkans in early 2018 (European Commission 2018). These issues have gained even greater relevance after the Russian attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022. In view of the emergency caused by the war, the European Council has granted EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova on 23 June 2022. The EU enlargement policy is being reconsidered, so presently there are even greater uncertainties regarding future EU enlargements. This chapter introduces the issue of perceptions, gives a historical background of relations between the EU and the Western Balkans, recalls the main reasons why mutual perceptions have deteriorated in recent years and highlights the economic motives behind such trends despite the region’s strong economic integration with the EU. It also presents the structure of the book and its principal contents.

2

Why Focus on Perceptions?

There is a well-established academic literature on perceptions, analysed by scholars from different disciplines. Political scientists have studied the role and importance of citizens’ perceptions for political processes, trying to explain alternative political outcomes by policy-makers’ attempts to manipulate voters’ preferences through different interpretations of alternative policy proposals (Lau et al. 1991). Other scholars have tried to incorporate uncertainty into the analysis of public opinion and electoral behaviour, by relating uncertainty to citizens’ information costs (Alvarez and Franklin 1994). In the international relations literature, perceptions have been studied in order to discover EU’s image outside the Union. Knowing more about the external image of the EU ought to allow the

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THE PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION-WESTERN …

3

Union to implement more efficient foreign policy, communicate a clearer vision of its role and improve its public diplomacy.1 External perceptions of the EU are important for various other reasons (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010). The EU has continuously been criticised to be a “deaf” global power not being successful in its communications policy, and this motivates a serious consideration of perceptions of the Union in the rest of the world. Moreover, there has been limited research dedicated to investigating how other countries perceive the EU, which has created a highly self-referential image among scholars and in the EU public debate. Since external images of the EU are one of the variables that contribute to shaping a European political identity, it is necessary to strengthen the perceptions of the EU in the eyes of others. There is a growing empirical literature on perceptions of the EU in various parts of the world—the Middle East, Africa, the Pacific, Southeast Asia, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010; Lucarelli 2014; Chaban and Kelly 2017; Chaban 2019). The European Commission has published an extensive study on EU perceptions in ten strategic partner countries: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and USA (European Commission 2015). Available studies have therefore analysed the external image of the EU in a number of countries throughout the world. Yet there has been surprisingly little research on the perceptions of the EU in the Western Balkans, although it is a region geographically located in the heart of Southeast Europe, the Union’s “soft belly” surrounded by EU member states (Bonomi and Relji´c 2017). The recent literature also offers a conceptual model on the external and internal drivers behind perceptions in international relations, based on a tripartite paradigm (Chaban 2019): endogenous factors triggered by actions undertaken by a third country actor without any EU engagement; exogenous factors triggered by the EU’s actions without involvement of a third country; and global factors triggered by actors outside the Union’s and a third country’s control. Perceptions are a complex relational concept, so the interaction between the EU and a third country must be studied in a dynamic context; the erosion of perceptions of the EU over time may shape future judgements and policy decisions (Chaban and Kelly 2017). 1 https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_ web_13.pdf.

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This conceptual framework can be applied to the Western Balkans. Perceptions about the EU are equally important in the Balkan region, since they crucially influence daily decisions of politicians, businessmen, ordinary citizens, the youth. Also in the Western Balkans perceptions about the EU are shaped by endogenous factors (foreign policy priorities of national governments), exogenous factors (EU enlargement policy based on conditionality) and global factors (policies of external non-EU actors) and their interactions. There are, however, some distinguishing features. The Western Balkans are not simply strategic partners of the EU, since they have been involved in a complex relationship with the Union for over twenty years: five out of six countries are candidates for EU membership and four are already negotiating accession. Because of the Western Balkans’ unique relationship with the EU, the explanatory variables of EU perceptions go way beyond the usual factors considered in other regions—such as historic ties with the EU, key issues impacting progress/regress in relations, characteristics of the political system, degree of economic interdependence and cultural ties. In the Western Balkans, the key explanatory variable of perceptions about the EU is the EU accession process itself and the related expected promises of democracy and improvements in living standards. As to the methods of inquiry, scholars have usually relied on public opinion polls to illustrate the perceptions about the EU in democratic societies. In the Western Balkans, however, today considered hybrid democracies with tendencies towards authoritarian regimes (Bieber 2020), the ruling parties have a much stronger role in shaping public opinion—including citizens’ perceptions about the EU—especially considering their control of large parts of the media. This may produce a biased and distorted image of the EU (and of other external actors) in the eyes of the population, strongly influenced by the short-term political interests of key policy-makers. Despite a growing literature on various aspects of the EU-Western Balkans integration process, the issue of perceptions has not been a frequent topic of research. We do have public opinion surveys undertaken regularly by the Western Balkan governments, the Regional Cooperation Council and other organisations such as the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG) that inquire about citizens’ attitudes towards the EU and other related issues. These opinion polls, however, do not provide answers to many specific questions. Only a handful of studies have analysed in greater detail the underlying factors influencing perceptions of the Western Balkan populations about the EU (Jovi´c 2018; Teokarevi´c

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2019a, 2019c). Some recent studies focus on just a few Balkan countries (Markovi´c Khaze 2022), while others are available only in local languages (Teokarevi´c 2019b; Krsti´c 2020). This book is an attempt to fill the gap in the literature.

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The Origins of Diverging Mutual Perceptions

The roots of increasing misperceptions on both sides, the EU and the Western Balkans, lie in the historical events that accompanied the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic (SFR) of Yugoslavia.2 Because of their far-reaching and dramatic impact, these events have remained deeply in the memory of many citizens of the Yugoslav successor states. After Yugoslavia’s break-up in mid-1991, its successor states lost, almost overnight, the excellent starting conditions their former country had in 1989 for implementing the transition to market economy and multiparty democracy, including visa-free travel to all European and many developing countries.3 The next decade brought extreme political instability: five military conflicts—in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federal Republic (FR) of Yugoslavia and North Macedonia. A large part of the region was internationally isolated due to the UN sanctions against FR Yugoslavia (from 1992 to 1996 and again in 1997–1998) and the 11week bombing of the country in 1999 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The Yugoslav successor states also experienced exceptionally unfavourable economic conditions, Slovenia being the only exception. In the early 1990s, they registered unprecedented falls in GDP and historical records in hyperinflation (FR Yugoslavia had a 15-digit 2 The disintegration of Yugoslavia in mid-1991 led to the creation of five new states: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic (FR) of Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Serbia, with its two autonomous regions, Vojvodina and Kosovo), Macedonia (today North Macedonia) and Slovenia. Montenegro split from Serbia after its popular referendum in 2006, while Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. 3 In 1989, Yugoslavia was the most developed country in Eastern Europe and had a number of advantages compared to other East European countries (Uvali´c 2010). It was a more market-oriented economy thanks to many past reforms; it had good international relations with both the East and the West and was one of the founders of the non-alignment movement. Trade and cooperation agreements with the European Economic Community since the early 1970s facilitated its trade orientation towards Western countries, which in 1990 were already responsible for more than 50% of its total trade.

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inflation rate in 1993), while in the second half of the decade economic performance continued to be highly unsatisfactory (Uvali´c 2010). The permanence of political and economic instability in the Western Balkan region for a whole decade had dramatic long-term economic, social and political consequences, including a continuous deterioration in living standards, increasing unemployment and poverty, spread of the informal economy, rising corruption, weakening of the rule of law and inefficiency of state institutions. After the positive turn at the beginning of the new millennium, thanks to more democratic political regimes in two key countries—in Croatia after the death of President Tud-man in December 1999 and in FR Yugoslavia after the end of the Miloševi´c regime in October 2000—many problems proved very difficult to eradicate. Despite the renewed efforts of the Western Balkan governments to accelerate economic and political reforms from 2001 onwards, many problems inherited from the previous decade have not been addressed, yet alone resolved, especially territorial and constitutional issues. Reconciliation among countries has been postponed or deliberately avoided. The highly unfavourable political situation in the region has directly influenced European Community’s policies towards the Yugoslav successor states after 1991. Except for Slovenia, only briefly involved in the military conflict, the other countries were not included in the EU assistance programmes offered to the Central East European (CEE) countries during the 1990s (if not for short periods of time). The continued political instability in the region led the EU to introduce more severe political conditionality in order to influence the behaviour of Western Balkan countries. In 1996, the European Commission promoted the Regional Approach with the aim of stimulating intra-regional political and economic cooperation, but the approach did not lead to any tangible results. The EU therefore introduced, in 1997, additional conditions for improving relations with the EU, specific for the Western Balkan countries: along with the required political, legal and economic reforms, countries have to show readiness to implement regional cooperation and have to fully respect all international treaties (at that time, the most important was cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague). Stricter EU conditionality at that time did little to facilitate the normalisation of relations in the region, due to the lack of commitment on the part of some Western Balkan countries.

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It is the military conflict in Kosovo (February 1998–June 1999) that prompted a radical change in the EU strategy towards the Western Balkans. Given that in the 1990s the Union’s policies in the region were often inconsistent and ineffective, the EU finally decided to launch a new long-term strategy for the Western Balkans—the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). The new strategy offered EU support to the Western Balkans through liberalised access to EU markets, initially through Autonomous Trade Preferences; a specific financial assistance programme, CARDS (Community Assistance for the Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation); various forms of technical assistance; and, for the first time, contractual relations with the EU through Stabilization and Association Agreements that were signed first with Macedonia (in 2001) and last with Kosovo (in 2015). The new EU strategy created expectations among political leaders and citizens in the Western Balkans that their country would be able to become an EU member state in a reasonable amount of time, similar to the experience of the CEE countries a decade earlier. The dynamics of the EU-Western Balkan integration process, however, diverged from initial expectations. Since the launch of the SAP in 1999, only Croatia was able to join the EU, in July 2013. Two countries, Montenegro and Serbia, have started their EU accession negotiations (in June 2012 and January 2014, respectively) and have opened a number of chapters of the acquis, but not many have been closed in the meantime.4 The process has taken even longer in Albania and North Macedonia, since they have been invited to open EU accession negotiations only in July 2022. The last two countries—Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo—have remained “potential candidates” for very long. Only on 15 December 2022 have the leaders of the EU unanimously granted candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Kosovo remains a “potential candidate”, fifteen years after having unilaterally declared its political independence from Serbia. Most Western Balkan countries have, therefore, advanced on their EU accession path at a very slow pace. Contrary to the initial hopes that EU policies would “Europeanise” the Western Balkans by transmitting 4 After eight years of accession negotiations between the EU and Montenegro, all the 33 screened chapters have been opened, of which only 3 have been provisionally closed. By early 2023, Serbia has opened 24 out of 35 chapters, but has provisionally closed only 2.

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the Union’s norms, values and democratic institutions, such expectations have not been fulfilled (Džanki´c et al., 2019). Among the populations of the Western Balkans, this has created a feeling of injustice and widespread disappointment. The multiple and complex reasons behind these delays are frequently not well understood by the citizens in the region. Anti-EU sentiment has also been created by the requirement of visas for travelling to the EU, given that it is only in 2009–2010—thus twenty years after Yugoslavia’s break-up—that visa-free travel to the Schengen area was granted to most Western Balkan countries (Kosovo is still waiting to be granted this right). These are some of the factors that have generated a “mental distance” of the populations in the Western Balkan countries from the EU. There is another historical factor that explains citizens’ perceptions about the EU in the Western Balkans (except in Albania). In 1989, it was clear why the CEE countries, that had suffered decades of isolation, deprivation and forms of authoritarianism, wanted to join a union of countries characterised by democratic values, prosperity and forms of solidarity. In SFR Yugoslavia until its break-up, there were more individual freedoms, possibilities to travel, access to information and higher living standards compared to other countries in Eastern Europe. These differences have undoubtedly influenced citizens’ perceptions about Europe in the successor states of former Yugoslavia, diminishing the role of the EU as a “pole of attraction” after the dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia.

4 Deteriorating Mutual Perceptions Over the Past Decade In recent years, there has been a further deterioration in perceptions about EU-Western Balkan integration prospects. Particularly after the Juncker Commission’s statement in 2014 that there will be no further EU enlargements during its five-year mandate, there was growing disillusionment in the region. Signs of recommitments came only in 2017, when European Commission’s President Juncker stressed the importance of a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans and the European Commission announced a new enlargement strategy in 2018 (European Commission 2018). Interest in EU-Western Balkan integration has also been stimulated by the Berlin Process that since 2014 has promoted stronger connectivity and a regional economic area in the Western Balkans, and by the Berlin Process II that was launched at the

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high-level Summit in Berlin on 3 November 2022. Nevertheless, different views held within the main EU institutions and negative attitudes of some EU member states have strongly contributed to increasing “enlargement fatigue”. Over the years, despite declarative statements of EU officials, very little progress has effectively been achieved in EU integration of the Western Balkans and the lack of a clear perspective about their EU membership has produced growing scepticism. In the meantime, the image of the Western Balkans has also deteriorated, since countries have achieved limited progress in complying with the EU accession criteria. Most countries have had episodes of political instability linked to changes in governments, political scandals associated with corruption, backsliding in democracy and the tendency towards authoritarian regimes (BiEPAG 2017; Keil 2018; Bonomi 2018; Bieber 2020). There has been no progress with the unresolved bilateral issues, particularly the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue (Bonomi and Uvali´c 2019b). Heavy international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo continues to impede the taking over of full responsibility for domestic policies by local politicians. The political elites continue to be verbally supportive of the EU accession process, but their populations are internally heterogeneous and deeply divided (Jovi´c 2018, p. 28). With the passing of time, there has been a loss of credibility that the EU is still willing to enlarge to the Western Balkans. As will be seen from various contributions to this volume, the image of the EU is still very positive in Albania and Kosovo, but it has strongly deteriorated in most other countries, particularly in Serbia. According to a 2022 public opinion poll, an increasing number of citizens thinks their country will never join the EU—ranging from 22% in Albania to 41% in Serbia (Regional Cooperation Council 2022). Despite rising pessimism, in Serbia where the EU image has deteriorated most, a public opinion survey from December 2022 shows that EU membership is still viewed favourably by 43% of its citizens (32% is against), and that 65% of citizens are in favour of implementing the necessary reforms, irrespective of entry in the EU (Ministarstvo za evropske integracije 2022). A number of factors have contributed to a polarised and frequently distorted image of the EU in the eyes of the Western Balkan populations. Insufficient knowledge about EU conditionality, ambiguous and confusing messages of political leaders, lack of transparency about EU negotiations, disinformation about EU policies and the role of other external actors, and inappropriate reporting on EU-related issues by the

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media are among the factors that have strongly contributed to confusing citizens’ views. There is insufficient, and often inadequate, general information about the EU. Ongoing reforms of higher education institutions have often failed to introduce proper quality assurance systems (Bartlett et al. 2016). The heavy involvement of political and business elites in financing newspapers and electronic news outlets has enabled strong control of information (Bartlett et al. 2022). The bulk of fake news in the Western Balkans seems to be produced and disseminated by domestic actors for domestic purposes, provoking an information disorder which has become the symptom of social and political disorder, rather than the cause (Greene et al. 2021). The image of the EU in the Western Balkans has also deteriorated under the impact of recent crises within the EU. Slow economic recovery after the global financial, economic and eurozone crises, the 2015 migration crisis, Brexit, uncoordinated policies during the COVID-19 pandemic and the delayed support with vaccines offered to the Western Balkans have additionally deteriorated EU’s image. The perceptions of the EU and its policies have also been negatively influenced by the recent inappropriate behaviour of some member states, particularly Hungary and Poland. At present, the Russia-Ukraine war is deeply affecting relations between the EU and the Western Balkans, since the only countries in the region that are not NATO members, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have not introduced sanctions against Russia. At the same time, the multiple crises in the EU have strongly affected public opinion in the EU about future enlargements. As suggested by a 2019 survey of the European Council for Foreign Relations, a high percentage of surveyed citizens thought that no Western Balkan country should join the EU in the next decade, particularly in Germany (46%), Austria (44%), France (42%), the Netherlands (40%) and Denmark (37%) (Tcherneva 2019). However, domestic support for EU enlargement in the EU member states seems to have significantly increased after the outset of the war in Ukraine: according to the latest Eurobarometer (winter 2022-2023), the percentage of respondents in favour of enlargement surpassed those against, for the first time since 2010 (European Commission, 2023). It is yet to be seen whether the trend of increasing support for EU enlargement will be maintained.

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5 Economic Reasons for Deteriorating Perceptions Today, there is a high degree of economic integration between the Western Balkans and the EU. After the launch of the SAP more than twenty years ago, the expectations were that, similarly to what happened in CEE in the 1990s, increasing economic integration of the Western Balkans with the EU would improve perceptions on both sides, sustaining economic growth, the creation of enterprise networks and income convergence. The EU policies implemented from 2000 onwards through the SAP, aimed to help ongoing reforms and economic recovery of the region, have indeed led to flourishing economic relations and increasing integration of the Western Balkan countries with the EU economy. Although this process of gradual economic integration has in many ways been beneficial both for the Western Balkan countries and the EU member states, mutual perceptions have nevertheless deteriorated over the past decade for reasons discussed further below. After 2001, the Western Balkan countries have registered fast economic growth and impressive economic recovery. Thanks to the process of substantial trade liberalisation, they have experienced a continuous, sometimes exponential, increase in foreign trade primarily with the EU, and have benefitted from inflows of EU and bilateral financial assistance (Bonomi and Uvali´c 2019a; Uvali´c 2019; Bartlett, Chapter 2). The EU has become the most important trading partner of the Western Balkans, by 2021 accounting for 81% of their goods exports and 57.9% of their goods imports (European Commission 2022). Some non-EU countries, that are sometimes considered to have taken over important spheres of economic influence from the EU, primarily China, Russia and Turkey, are trade partners of minor importance. In 2021, only 3.2% of Western Balkan countries exports was directed towards China, while the share of imports, although higher (11.6%), was still almost six times lower than imports from the EU (58%). The respective shares of Russia in Western Balkan exports and imports were even lower in 2021, 2.7% and 3.9%, respectively. The long-term trend has been one of a continuous increase in EU—Western Balkan trade, and the Union has had a stable surplus in its trade with the region. In 2021, Germany and Sweden were the only countries that had a relatively high trade deficit, while sixteen EU member states had a surplus in their trade with the Western Balkans, especially Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy and Poland (the remaining

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countries had a negligible trade surplus/deficit, see European Commission 2022). Therefore, increasing trade with the Western Balkans has been beneficial for most EU member states, since it has contributed to expanding their export markets and achieving a more balanced trade account. Although the Western Balkans are relatively unimportant trading partners for Germany and Italy, the two countries responsible for the dominant part of the region’s trade with the EU,5 for some other EU member states trade with the Western Balkans in 2021 represented a rather high share of their extra-EU goods exports, especially for Croatia (64.5%) and Slovenia (31%), but also for Greece, Hungary and Bulgaria (around 15–16% each) (European Commission 2022). Similarly, goods imports from the Western Balkans represented a relatively high share of Croatia’s and Slovenia’s extra-EU imports, 40.4 and 19.1%, respectively (European Commission 2022). This suggests that geographical proximity and trade links inherited from the past remain important determinants of trade patterns of some EU member states and the Western Balkans. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has also strongly contributed to EU-Western Balkan economic integration. After 2000, foreign companies were increasingly attracted to the region by fast economic growth, reduced political risk, low labour costs and favourable privatisation deals (Estrin and Uvali´c 2014). By 2019, investors from the EU represented 60.4% of total inward FDI stock in the Western Balkans, originating mainly from Austria (11.7%), Netherlands (10.9%), Germany (6.3%) and Italy (5.3%) (WIIW 2020). Among the investors from non-EU countries (excluding China), the most important have been those from Switzerland, representing 6.8% of total FDI stock in the Western Balkans in 2019, thus relatively more important than those from Russia (4.9%) or Turkey (2.9%). Russia’s share of total inward FDI stock in 2019 was highest in Montenegro (11.7% of total), but substantially lower in Serbia (6.4%) and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (5.4%). Turkey has been an important investor primarily in Albania and Kosovo (7.4% and 11%, respectively, of their total FDI stock), but not in the other countries. Comparable international statistics on FDI from China are not available, since capital inflows from China are usually recorded as loans and not as foreign 5 Germany’s and Italy’s exports to the region represent only 1.1% and 2.3% of their extra-EU exports; similarly, their imports amount to 1.8% and 2.6%, respectively, of their extra-EU imports.

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investments, but China has become a major investor in the region. In Serbia, according to national statistics, China in 2022 was the second most important investor (after the EU), contributing 32.5% of total FDI inflows. Another important channel that has contributed to economic integration between the Western Balkans and the EU is finance. Strong financial links have been created through the privatisation of commercial banks that were sold primarily to EU banks, leading to dominant foreign ownership of banking assets, by 2011 already ranging between 75 and 95% of total (EBRD 2012). The Western Balkans are highly euroised economies, since the dominant part of financial assets of enterprises and citizens is held in euros. Moreover, their official exchange rate regimes mostly link their national currencies to the euro,6 while Kosovo and Montenegro have unilaterally adopted the euro at an early stage of their transition. The analysis confirms a very high degree of economic integration between the Western Balkans and the EU. These processes of fast reestablishment of closer economic relations with the EU were viewed with great enthusiasm in the early 2000s, both by the political elites and by the populations in the Western Balkans. Particularly in a country like FR Yugoslavia, that had been isolated during most of the previous decade, the relaunch of economic reforms and intensified economic relations with the EU brought new opportunities of business contacts and major availability of imported goods, contributing to higher consumption and living standards of the population (Uvali´c, 2010). However, such positive perceptions were not maintained for long, as they started deteriorating under the impact of the global financial and economic crisis in 2007–2008, that had very deep spill-over effects on the Western Balkan economies (Bartlett and Uvali´c eds. 2013). Strong economic integration of the Western Balkans with the EU brought increasing vulnerability of their economies to external shocks coming from the EU. From the last quarter of 2008 onwards, the Western Balkan countries registered a reversal in economic growth, a drop in export demand, a reduction in

6 Bosnia and Herzegovina has a currency board which ties its convertible mark to the euro; North Macedonia has a stabilized arrangement, using the euro as exchange rate anchor; while Serbia has a stabilized arrangement within an inflation-targeting framework, but maintains a de facto exchange rate anchor to the euro; only Albania officially has a floating exchange rate.

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donors’ assistance, foreign investments, workers’ remittances and availability of banking credit. In the aftermath of the global economic crisis, most countries experienced rising unemployment, especially long-term and youth unemployment, lack of adequate systems of social assistance and social protection, rising poverty and inequality, problems that have significantly reduced life satisfaction throughout the region. These developments also negatively influenced perceptions about the EU since the blame was often put primarily on the strong economic dependence of the Western Balkans on the EU economy. More recently, when the region finally showed more permanent signs of economic recovery after 2016, the outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 again pushed all Western Balkan countries into a recession. The multiple economic crises in the EU throughout the post-2008 period were often viewed by policymakers in the region as the primary factor responsible for deteriorating economic performance, without sufficient recognition of domestic factors or inadequate economic policies of their own governments. In reality, the effects of the global economic crisis came on top of many structural problems that the Western Balkan economies had accumulated over the past few decades, including increasing external imbalances due to limited competitiveness on foreign markets, resulting in chronic trade and current account deficits; a strong process of deindustrialisation, more extreme than in the CEE countries; an unfavourable situation on the labour market due to high unemployment, low employment rates and various forms of economic exclusion, resulting in continuous brain drain (Bartlett and Uvali´c eds. 2022). The most fundamental problem is the persistence of a large development gap, since the process of catching up of the Western Balkans with the more developed European countries has been very slow (see Chapter 11). The periods of relatively strong economic growth—primarily 2001-2008 and 2016-2019—have not been sufficient to ensure accelerated economic development. In 2022, the Western Balkans had a GDP per capita (in Purchasing Power Standards) that ranged from 32 percent in Albania to 50 percent in Montenegro of the EU average (without Kosovo as the poorest country, for which accurate data are not available). The model of economic growth, funded strongly by foreign capital inflows—FDI, donors’ assistance, foreign borrowing, workers’ remittances—has not been sufficient to ensure fast convergence of the Western Balkans with the EU. The unsatisfactory economic performance of the Western Balkan countries during most of the period following the global economic crisis has

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therefore further contributed to negative perceptions of the EU. That the EU has become, and will remain, the dominant trade, investment and financial partner of the Western Balkans is a fundamental feature of EU— Western Balkan economic relations, that is unlikely to change in the medium to long term. Somewhat surprisingly, this is frequently not sufficiently acknowledged in the public discourse in both the Western Balkans and the EU member states. Such an underestimation or even neglect of very strong economic links that have been created during the past twenty years additionally contributes to erroneous perceptions about EU-Western Balkan relations. To give an example, there is a huge discrepancy between Serbian citizens’ perceptions of who are the country’s main international providers of financial assistance. According to a December 2022 survey, only 28% of surveyed citizens recognised that the EU has been Serbia’s main donor since 2000, while as much as 25% indicated China, and another 18% Russia, as the most important international donor (Ministarstvo za evropske integracije 2022). This is in sharp contrast to actual facts; according to the same source, the main contributor of grants to Serbia during the indicated period was the EU (59.9%) followed by USA (14.1%), while China provided only 0.6% of the total amount of development assistance (Ministarstvo za evropske integracije 2022).

6

Structure of the Book

The contributors to this volume have been invited to provide their insights about perceptions of relations between the EU and the Western Balkans from different angles.7 The book consists of three main parts, each providing the perspectives of different actors involved in the process of EU-Western Balkan integration—perceptions from the West, perceptions from the Western Balkan region and perceptions from individual Western Balkan countries. The first part focuses on attitudes towards the Western Balkans as perceived by EU’s principal donors, some EU member states—Italy, Germany, Croatia—and the USA. Important external actors have not 7 The book originates from a Jean Monnet project initiated in 2019 by the University of Perugia, financed by the EU Erasmus+ programme. Most contributions are revised versions of papers presented at the Conference on (Mis)Perceptions of the European Union in the Western Balkans held in Belgrade in April 2022.

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been included due to limited space, although their perceptions are also important to the governments and populations of the Western Balkans.8 Greece, for example, has strongly supported EU enlargement to the Western Balkans in the 2000s, but has later impeded the EU accession process by blocking North Macedonia until the name issue was resolved in 2019. Turkey has periodically tried to influence the Western Balkan governments using both diplomatic and economic means and its perceptions are important to most Western Balkan governments, also considering that Turkey is the largest military power in the Southeast European region. China has been increasingly present in the Western Balkans and its loans have financed the construction of costly infrastructure in Montenegro and Serbia as part of the Silk and Belt initiative. Russia has for long maintained its political influence in the region, primarily in Serbia, though with the ongoing war in Ukraine its role may not be maintained. The external perspective of the Western Balkans starts with Will Bartlett’s (Chapter 2) analysis of how perceptions of the Western Balkans in the EU member states influence the allocation of their bilateral financial assistance, taking into account three groups of motives—commercial interests, solidarity-related motives and promotion of democracy—and showing that the economic motives have been the most important. Renzo Daviddi (Chapter 3) argues in favour of a new EU approach to the region and discusses in detail the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, highlighting the main obstacles to its EU accession and possible ways they could be overcome. Stefano Bianchini (Chapter 4) explains how Italian foreign policy has ascribed a strategic importance to the Balkans by promoting a number of multilateral and bilateral initiatives in the region, which, however, have periodically been heavily constrained by Italy’s domestic political and economic problems. In Chapter 5, Franz-Lothar Altmann gives an account of Germany’s perceptions of the Western Balkans since the early 1990s, stressing some of the fundamental problems that are currently blocking EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, primarily the unresolved issue of Kosovo. Croatia’s perceptions of the EU are discussed by Dejan Jovi´c (Chapter 6), who explains the narrative about the EU of the Croatian political elite before joining the EU, that was based on a combination of interest-based and entity-based elements. Ivan Vujaˇci´c 8 There is a growing literature on external actors in the Western Balkans; see Bieber and Tzifakis (2019). For an excellent account on Russia, see Bechev (2017).

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(Chapter 7) recalls the main policy responses of the USA to the multiple crises in the region, showing how its involvement was often reluctant and came late, but was also decisive whenever conflicts increased. The second part of the book addresses perceptions of EU-Western Balkan integration prospects from the perspective of the region. Jovan Teokarevi´c (Chapter 8) analyses various public opinion polls, to show that although the EU remains the most influential external actor in the region, the Union’s image has progressively deteriorated, especially in Serbia, due to the serious crisis of EU enlargement and disillusionment of the population. In Chapter 9, Jelena Džanki´c tries to determine to what extent perceptions and misperceptions about the EU conditionality policy have led to a flawed understanding of the Union’s role in the Western Balkans. In Chapter 10, Odeta Barbullushi discusses elite and public perceptions about the EU in the Western Balkans, drawing attention particularly to the wide gap between the expectations and eroded faith in the EU perspective of the region and the tensions deriving from Union’s pressure on the Western Balkan countries to cooperate regionally. Matteo Bonomi and Milica Uvali´c (Chapter 11) address the issue of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans in a longer-term perspective, recalling why it has so often been contested and suggesting that, in the current phase, a more encompassing EU approach is necessary. This part concludes with Chapter 12, where Srd-an Bogosavljevi´c presents recent public opinion polls in the Western Balkans, showing how EU membership went from initial strong enthusiasm to a phase of profound scepticism and explaining the main reasons behind such patterns of citizens’ preferences. The last part of the book includes perceptions of EU-Western Balkan integration prospects from the perspective of specific problems of each of the six Western Balkan countries. Ditmir Bushati (Chapter 13) explains Albania’s very favourable attitude towards the EU through an analysis of the historical evolution in Albanian-EU relations, giving the main reasons why integration with the EU has been delayed. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s limited progress in EU integration, according to Nedžma Džananovi´c, Jasmin Hasi´c and Margareta Ronˇcevi´c (Chapter 14), is related primarily to the inadequate mechanisms of European integration coordination, particularly the changes adopted in 2016 that have introduced lower levels of government and their veto powers into the process of EU integration. In Chapter 15, Gëzim Krasniqi explains why the perceptions of the EU in Kosovo remain highly positive, despite many unfulfilled expectations regarding internal and external statehood issues and the unclear path

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of EU integration. Gordana Ðurovi´c (Chapter 16) presents Montenegrin perceptions about the EU from 2006 onwards, discussing the main reasons that have influenced citizens’ preferences and showing that for Montenegro the benefits of EU membership are likely to be higher than the costs. In Chapter 17, Simonida Kacarska examines the role of the EU during the political crisis in North Macedonia in 2015–2017, questioning the consistency of EU conditionality and explaining how the country’s important role in the 2015 refugee crisis led to increasing socialisation between the Macedonian political elites and some EU officials. Aleksandra Krsti´c (Chapter 18) examines the framing of political communication of Serbian government’s officials about the EU in the mainstream and social media, reporting the narratives about the EU during the outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. In the concluding Chapter 19, Dejan Jovi´c and Milica Uvali´c give an overview of the main messages of the book, pointing to some of the controversial issues that continue to be perceived differently in the EU and in the Western Balkans. While most authors are academics and/or established experts on the Western Balkans, many of them have also been involved in policymaking—as high-level EU officials (Renzo Daviddi, for many years at the EU delegation in Sarajevo, previously in Kosovo), advisors to politicians (Odeta Barbullushi, advisor to the Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama; Dejan Jovi´c, former advisor to the Croatian President Ivo Josipovi´c), consultants to governments or international organisations (Franz-Lothar Altmann, Will Bartlett, Stefano Bianchini, Nedžma Džananovi´c), themselves ministers (Ditmir Bushati, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Gordana Ðurovi´c, former Minister for European Integration of Montenegro) or diplomats (Ivan Vujaˇci´c, Yugoslav ambassador to the USA from 2002 to 2009). Their contributions to the volume, by providing a combination of scholarly knowledge with policy-makers’ and practitioners’ insights, will hopefully offer a more realistic vision of current problems of EU-Western Balkans relations than the purely academic literature.

References Alvarez, R. M. and Franklin, C. H. (1994). Uncertainty and Political Perceptions. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 56, No. 3, 671–688.

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Bartlett, W. and Uvali´c, M. (eds) (2013). The Social Consequences of the Global Economic Crisis in South East Europe. London: London School of Economics, LSEE (Research on South Eastern Europe). Bartlett, W. and Uvali´c, M. (eds) (2022). Towards Economic Inclusion in the Western Balkans. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bartlett, W., Bonomi, M. and Uvali´c, M. (2022). The Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans: Assessing the Possible Economic, Social and Environmental Impact of the Proposed flagship Projects | Think Tank | European Parliament. Study requested by the AFET committee, European Parliament. PE 702.56, May. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinkt ank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2022)702561. Bartlett, W., Durazzi, N., Monastiriotis, V, Sene, T. and Uvali´c, M. (2016). From University to Employment: Higher Education Provision and Labour Market Needs In the Western Balkans. Brussels, European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/education/sites/education/files/ 2016-higher-education-labour-market-balkans_en.pdf. Bechev, D. (2017). Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe. New Haven: Yale University Press. Bieber, F. (2020). The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature. Bieber, F. and Tzifakis, N. (eds) (2019). The Western Balkans in the World: Linkages and Relations with Non-Western Countries. London and New York: Routledge (Routledge series on Southeast European Studies). BiEPAG (2017). The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy. BiEPAG Policy paper. http://www.biepag.eu/ wp-content/uploads/2017/03/BIEPAG-The-Crisis-of-Democracy-in-theWestern-Balkans.-Authoritarianism-and-EU-Stabilitocracy-web.pdf. Bonomi, M. (2018). The Western Balkans and the European Union. Moving? In the Right Direction? CIFE Policy Paper No. 77. https://www.cife.eu/ Ressources/FCK/files/publications/policy%20paper/2018/CIFE_Bonomi_ WBEU_PPAnnexes.pdf. Bonomi, M. and Relji´c, D. (2017). The EU and the Western Balkans: So Near and Yet So Far. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). https://www.swpberlin.org/en/publication/the-eu-and-the-western-balkans-so-near-and-yetso-far/. Bonomi, M. and Uvali´c, M. (2019a). The Economic Development of the Western Balkans: The Importance of Non-EU Actors. In F. Bieber and N. Tzifakis (eds), pp. 36–58. Bonomi, M. and Uvali´c, M. (2019b). Serbia and the European Union, Oxford Research Encyclopedias in Politics.

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Chaban, N. (2019). Perceptions, Expectations, Motivations: Evolution of Canadian Views on the EU. Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, 45–62. Chaban, N. and Kelly, S. (2017). Tracing the Evolution of EU Images Using a Case-Study of Australia and New Zealand. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 55, No. 4, 691–708. Džanki´c, J., Keil, S. and Kmezi´c, M. (eds) (2019). The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans—A Failure of EU Conditionality? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Estrin, S. and Uvali´c, M. (2014). FDI into Transition Economies: Are the Balkans different? The Economics of Transition, Vol. 22, No. 2, 281–312. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2012). EBRD Banking Survey, London, EBRD. European Commission (2015). Analysis of the Perception of the EU and of EU’s Policies Abroad. Brussels. https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/stories/analysis-per ception-eu-and-eus-policies-abroad_en. European Commission (2018). A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans. 6 February, COM 65 final. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/ communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf. European Commission (2022). Western Balkans-EU—International Trade in Goods Statistics—Statistics Explained. Brussels. https://ec.europa.eu/eur ostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=480316#The_Western_Balkans_ trade_with_the_EU_and_other_main_partners European Commission (2023). Standard Eurobarometer 98—Winter 2022– 2023, February. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2872 Greene, S., Asmolov, G., Fagan, A., Fridman, O. and Gjuzelov, B. (2021). Mapping Fake News and Disinformation in the Western Balkans and Identifying Ways to Effectively Counter Them, Study requested by the AFET committee, European Parliament, PE 653.621. https://www.europarl.eur opa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653621/EXPO_STU(2020)653 621_EN.pdf. Jovi´c, D. (2018). Accession to the European Union and Perception of External Actors in the Western Balkans. Croatian International Relations Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 83, 6–32. Keil, S. (2018). The Business of State Capture and the Rise of Authoritarianism in Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Southeastern Europe, Vol. 42, 59–82. Krsti´c, A. (2020). Mediji, novinarstvo i Evropska unija (in Serbian; Media, Journalism and the EU). Belgrade: University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political ˇ Science, Cigoja Štampa.

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Lau, R. R., Smith, A. and Fiske, S. T. (1991). Political Beliefs, Policy Interpretations and Political Persuasion. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3, 644–675. Lucarelli, S. (2014). Seen from the Outside: The State of the Art on the External Image of the EU. Journal of European Integration, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1–16. Lucarelli, S. and Fioramonti, L. (eds) (2010). Introduction. The EU in the eyes of the others—Why Bother? In S. Lucarelli and L. Fioramonti (eds), External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor. London and New York: Routledge. Markovi´c Khaze, N. (2022). Perceptions of the EU in the Western Balkans Visà Vis Russia and China. European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, 81–108. Ministarstvo za evropske integracije Republike Srbije (2022). Evropska orijentacija grad-ana Srbije. Belgrade, December 2022. www.mei.gov.rs. Regional Cooperation Council (2022). Balkan Barometer 2022. People and Business Viewports. Sarajevo. https://www.rcc.int/balkanbarometer. Tcherneva, V. (2019). Europe’s New Agenda in the Western Balkans, European Council on Foreign Relations, 7 August 2019. https://ecfr.eu/article/com mentary_europes_new_agenda_in_the_western_balkans/. Teokarevi´c, J. (2019a). Of Friends and Foes: Balkan Nations in Serbian Press. ˇ Belgrade: Cigoja Štampa. Teokarevi´c, J. (2019b). Demokratizacija i evropeizacija Balkana (in Serbian; ˇ Democratization and Europeanization of the Balkans ). Belgrade: Cigoja Štampa. Teokarevi´c, J. (2019c). Western Balkans Between Deep Crises and Uncertain ˇ Perspectives. Belgrade: Cigoja Štampa. Uvali´c, M. (2010). Serbia’s Transition. Towards a Better Future. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press. Expanded version translated into Serbian: (2012). Tranzicija u Srbiji. Ka boljoj budu´cnosti. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike. Uvali´c, M. (2019). Economic Integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union: The Role of EU Policies. In J. Džanki´c, S. Keil and M. Kmezi´c (eds), pp. 207–235. WIIW (2020). FDI Report 2020. Foreign Investments Hit by COVID-19 Pandemic. Vienna: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.

PART I

Perceptions from The West

CHAPTER 2

The Drivers of EU Financial Assistance to the Western Balkans: Economic, Altruistic or Democracy Promotion Motives? Will Bartlett

1

Introduction

The European Union (EU) and its member states have a variety of perceptions about the countries of the Western Balkans. An insight into these perceptions can be gained through an analysis of the preferences and interests revealed by the allocation of EU member state bilateral aid to the countries of the region. These interests can be classified under three headings—commercial interests based on perceptions of market opportunities; altruistic interests based on perceptions of economic and social need; and support for democracy promotion to align recipient countries with EU political cultures and practices. The EU formally views the countries of the region through the prism of its accession agenda, which requires candidate countries to meet a set of institutional, legal,

W. Bartlett (B) European Institute (LSEE), London School of Economics, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_2

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political and economic criteria to accede to the Union. EU perceptions are formed through this prism of conditionalities and view the candidate and potential candidate states as falling short of the conditions. In particular, the accession states of the Western Balkans are perceived as failing to meet the conditions related to the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and of not yet being functioning market economies. The EU member states, however, may have different views of the matter. Their perceptions, shaped by their interests, may have a greater appreciation of the real shape of the economies and life conditions of the Western Balkan states. In particular, they may perceive these countries as valuable export markets, while also as less developed countries deserving altruistic support for their economic and social development. The EU member states may be more pragmatic in relation to the candidate countries’ political cultures since they themselves often fail to meet up to the EU’s idealistic formal criteria. This chapter investigates the relationships between the top nine EU member state donors and the six countries of the Western Balkan and explores the interests and motives for their aid allocations to the region. The qualitative and empirical analyses presented show that the commercial interests of the donors are major drivers of aid allocations, mitigated to some extent by donor altruism, while there is little relationship between recipients’ democratic practice and donor aid allocation. Overall, I argue that the current accession limbo suits the commercial interests of both sides of the accession bargain. It enables rent-seeking on the recipient side and profit-shifting on the donor side in an institutional entanglement that would be disturbed by the completion of a rules-based accession process. The chapter is organised as follows. The next section analyses the development of EU assistance to the region and the motivations for it. Section 3 analyses bilateral donor interests and aid allocations. Section 4 looks in more detail at the three large EU member state donors, Sect. 5 looks at three new donors from the transition economies of Central Europe, and Sect. 6 looks at three other member state donors that provide less assistance to the region. Section 7 sets out an empirical model of the determinants of donor aid allocations to the Western Balkans, which provides an insight into donor perceptions. Section 8 gives some conclusions.

2

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THE DRIVERS OF EU FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE …

27

EU Assistance

Recent European Commission communications on enlargement policy identify several problematic features of the Western Balkan societies that should be addressed before their accession can take place (e.g., EC 2022). These include weak democratic institutions, a deficient rule of law, weaknesses in public administration and public procurement processes, and inadequate market economies. Weak democracies are thought to be due to strong political polarisation, hampering the functioning of democratic systems. A deficient rule of law is held to derive from pressures on the judiciary that undermine the principle of equality before the law, alongside a high prevalence of organised crime. Weak public administration is viewed as being caused by embedded politicisation, while public procurement is weakened by the circumvention of EU procurement standards through widespread high-level corruption. The Western Balkans are also thought to have “non-functioning market economies”, although this is a somewhat vaguely defined concept open to opportunistic interpretation depending on the momentum of the enlargement policies (Uvali´c 2019). The kernel of the concept has some force, however, since researchers have shown that entrenched domestic political and economic elites benefit from exclusion from EU membership, since being outside the orbit of EU regulation enables corruption and clientelism to flourish (Richter and Wunsch 2020). Typical practices include offering plum contracts to favoured companies who give kickbacks to the party in power, and the placement of party loyalists in prime positions in state agencies and public enterprises, at both national and local level (Sotiropoulos 2017). The main EU donor programme in the Western Balkans is the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). The first IPA programme ran from 2007 to 2013 and provided grant aid in support of institutional change for accession-related reforms amounting to e11.5 billion. IPA II (2014–2020) provided grant aid totalling e12.8 billion, while IPA III running from 2021 to 2027 envisages assistance amounting to e14.2 billion for the Western Balkans and Turkey. The framework of the IPA programmes has been political conditionality linked to progress with countries’ accession prospects. A carrot and stick approach has been adopted in which countries have been rewarded with progress on the “accession ladder” if they undertook the required reforms, and an absence of progress if they did not (Papadimitriou 2001). While this approach

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proved to be successful in the case of the 2004 enlargement to the countries of Central Eastern Europe and the Baltics, it has proved less effective in the case of the Western Balkans due to the more difficult initial postconflict conditions and lesser engagement of local domestic elites in the process (Pridham 2007; Anastasakis 2008). The core focus of conditionality has been on progress with democratisation, the adoption of the EU legal norms (the so-called “acquis”), progress with judicial reform and improvements to the rule of law, and the fight against corruption. Even tougher conditionality was introduced in the revised enlargement strategy of 2015, which gave renewed emphasis to fundamental reforms in the areas of rule of law, democracy and economic governance (Dimitrova 2016). Yet, empirical evidence that the EU has used its flows of financial assistance to motivate adherence to EU norms in the accession states is weak and partial (Bartlett 2021). Conditionality in relation to democracy has been applied inconsistently, overlooking compliance gaps (Dudley 2020), while conditionality may even have weakened the democratic process by imposing external rules in place of supporting domestic political choices (Richter and Wunsch 2020). Domestic political elites have resisted and rowed back on democracy reforms (Grimm and Mathis 2018) as they find private benefits in more autocratic forms of government, leading to “fake” compliance with conditions by accession states (Noutcheva 2009). Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the process of democratisation has been put into reverse or that semi-authoritarian practices have gained in strength (Bieber 2018b). In response, the EU has prioritised stability over democracy in the region, leading to a change in approach in its international assistance which emphasises economic development over democratisation (Ross Smith et al. 2021).1 Such an approach has been characterised by researchers in this field as support for “stabilitocracies”, implying that stability trumps concerns over growing autocratic tendencies of governments in the Western Balkans (Bieber 2018a). The IPA III thus focuses far more on economic development than previous programmes. Most of its funding—almost e9 billion—is allocated to the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans (Bartlett et al. 2022).2 This 1 For a case study of this switch towards economic over political conditionality, see Hogi´c (2022). 2 The EIP is expected to be additionally funded by international development banks through the Western Balkan Investment Framework (WBIF), which brings together EU

2

THE DRIVERS OF EU FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE …

29

finance is provided in support of major infrastructure projects in the transport, energy and environment sectors, digital infrastructure, private sector development and investments in human capital through education and training, with a focus on youth guarantees to tackle widespread youth unemployment. In part, this new emphasis on infrastructure investment is a response to challenges from China’s Belt and Road initiative, which has led to an increasing level of Chinese infrastructure investments in the region (Markovic Khaze and Wang 2021). In addition, enlargement fatigue has taken hold within the EU, especially following the globalised financial crisis of 2008–2009 and the subsequent crisis of the Eurozone which required the EU to realign its assistance to the weaker EU member states (Wunsch and Olszewska 2022). Divisions have opened up between EU member states on their support for enlargement between the more socially liberal, multicultural and open political parties and the states they govern who are in favour of enlargement and the conservative political parties in EU member states that oppose further enlargement (Bélanger and Schimmelfennig 2021). Meanwhile, investment by EU multinational firms has flourished in the region in response to a range of generous investment incentives. This has enabled EU firms to relocate part of their production processes to the region, in specially favoured special economic zones, boosting their profits by taking advantage of tax breaks and generous employment subsidies (Bartlett et al. 2019; Krasniqi et al. 2022). This has enabled large-scale profit-shifting by EU multinationals, who therefore perceive an advantage in the status quo and have little interest in pushing their home governments to speed up the accession process. The accession process has thus held the Western Balkans at arm’s length from the EU and in a state of semi-permanent exclusion from club membership. This may be a self-reinforcing process, as enlargement fatigue increasingly affects the publics of the EU who are subject to populist alarmism over migration, while enlargement delay undermines public sentiment in the Western Balkans for EU membership. This blockage is held in place by mutual economic and commercial interests as it enables rent-seeking on the recipient side and profit-shifting on the donor side in an institutional entanglement that would be disturbed by the completion of a rules-based accession process. grants and international financial institutions’ loans to finance large infrastructure projects, amounting to some e22 billion so far.

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If the perceptions and motivations of the two sides were instead focused mainly on long-term self-interest, on altruism or on effective democracy promotion, the region might long ago have entered the EU. Even now, an accelerated accession would be mutually beneficial (Uvali´c 2019). However, narrow economic and commercial interests predominate as both sides gain from the ongoing state of limbo. Unfortunately, the analysis of revealed preferences set out below suggests that economic and commercial interests dominate over democracy promotion and are only weakly mitigated by donors’ altruism.

3

Bilateral Donor Development Assistance

Official development assistance (ODA) from bilateral donors is guided by a different set of perceptions than those which guide the EU institutions. While the latter are guided by the formal conditionality criteria and judge the Western Balkan states performance against these criteria, the EU member states have been motivated in their allocation of international assistance and involvement with the region by additional factors such as perceptions of commercial self-interest, historical ties and various degrees of altruism. As suggested above, an insight into donor perceptions can be gained through an analysis of the revealed preferences exhibited by the allocation of EU member state bilateral aid to the countries of the region. This section therefore describes and summarises the international aid provided by the major donor groups to the Western Balkans. The EU institutions, including the EU and the European Investment Bank, are by far the largest aid donors to the Western Balkans, supplying US$ 1,220 million in ODA to the region in 2020 (see Table 1). Germany provided an additional US$ 212 million on its own in ODA, despite its already large contribution to the EU budgetary funds and hence to the EU aid budget. The other EU member states provide an additional US$ 278 million bringing the combined EU contribution to US$ 1.7 billion. The USA is a major non-EU bilateral donor, providing a further US$ 151 million, while Switzerland provided US$ 122 million ODA. Other donors provide additional smaller amounts, not shown in Table 1. Altogether the major donors provided almost US$ 2 billion in ODA to the Western Balkans in 2020. Among the EU member state donors, Germany stands out with the largest aid contribution to the Western Balkans, with 43% of the total aid from the top 9 EU member state donors in 2020 (see Table 2). This was

2

Table 1

THE DRIVERS OF EU FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE …

ODA to the Western Balkans in 2020 (US$ millions and percent)

Donor

Albania Bosnia and Kosovo Herzegovina

EU Institutions Germany

124.3 (42.4%) 64.80 (22.1%) 55.9 (19.1%)

200.8 (53.2%) 60.5 (16.0%) 47.1 (12.5%)

251.8 (65.2%) 37.2 (9.6%) 38.0 (9.8%)

192.7 (96.4%) 2.6 (1.3%) 2.2 (1.1%)

16.0 (5.4%) Switzerland 32.3 (11.0%) Total 293.3 (100%)

47.5 (12.6%) 21.7 (5.7%) 377.5 (100%)

39.0 (10.1%) 20.0 (5.2%) 386.0 (100%)

2.4 (1.2%) 0.0 (0.0%) 199.9 (100%)

Other EU member states USA

31

Montenegro

North Macedonia

Serbia

WB6

210.5 (77.6%) 3.8 (1.4%) 18.0 (6.6%)

240.2 (52.7%) 43.1 (9.5%) 117.2 25.7%)

1,220.4 (61.5%) 211.9 (10.7%) 278.4 (14.0%)

18.5 (6.8%) 20.4 (7.5%) 271.3 (100%)

28.0 151.3 (6.1%) (7.6%) 27.1 121.5 (6.0%) (6.1%) 455.5 1,983.4 (100%) (100%)

Note: ODA from EU MS is from the top 8 EU MS donors. Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD data

followed by Sweden and Austria who provided a further 28% of aid from the top donors. Three Central European neighbouring states (Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) provided an additional 20% of the total, while three other important EU member states (France, Italy and Czech Republic) provided the final 10% of the total. In the aftermath of the globalised financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009, aid from the EU member states decreased by more than onefifth over the period from 2010 to 2015. In the subsequent five years, aid bounced back, although the total amount of aid decreased over the decade by 6%. The real value of aid from six donors fell over the decade, while three donors managed to increase their aid allocations to the region by substantial amounts: Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. These Central European economies have been developing their economic relations with the Western Balkans, especially in the field of labour migration from the region to work in their expanding industrial sectors, while also increasing their trade and investments in the region. The picture is rather different considering the share of each country’s total globalised aid allocated to the Western Balkans. This may give a better indication of the relative importance that each donor attaches to the region. From this perspective, Slovenia has had the greatest interest

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Table 2 Donors

Germany Sweden Austria Hungary France Slovakia Slovenia Italy Czech Republic Total

Bilateral ODA flows from top 9 EU member state donors, 2010–2020 ODA $ million at constant prices

% change

Shares of top 9 donors (%) 2020

2010

2015

2020

2010–2020

253.8 76.9 76.6 4.6 25.7 2.4 6.4 64.0 11.1

225.0 51.0 57.2 3.9 16.8 2.8 11.8 27.0 9.8

211.9 73.6 61.6 54.6 22.8 20.2 19.9 18.3 7.3

−16.5 −4.4 −19.5 1,097.8 −11.6 744.4 210.4 −71.4 −34.4

521.5

405.3

490.2

−6.0

Share of WB6 in each donor’s total ODA (%) 2010–2020

2020

43.2 15.0 12.6 11.1 4.7 4.1 4.1 3.7 1.5

1.1 1.3 4.8 4.9 0.2 4.1 17.2 0.6 4.2

0.7 1.2 4.7 13.1 0.1 14.3 22.0 0.4 2.4

100.0

0.7

0.7

Note: Data are shown in constant prices; WB6 is the Western Balkan six countries. Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD international development statistics

in the Western Balkans, providing 17% of all its international aid to the region over the decade as a whole. The shares of aid allocated to the region by a second group of countries—Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia—amounted to between 4 and 5% of their total aid flows. Germany and Sweden provided just over 1% of their aid budget to the region, while France and Italy allocated only a tiny proportion of their total aid budget to the Western Balkans. However, by 2020, the Central European countries—Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia—had boosted the share of their total aid allocated to the region to between 13 and 22%, while the proportion allocated by Austria remained at almost 5%, and that of the Czech Republic had fallen to just 2.4%. Sweden continued to allocate just over 1% of its aid budget to the region, while the allocation by Germany fell to under 1% and France and Italy continued to allocate very small amounts of their overall international aid budget to the Western Balkans. Overall, therefore, Germany, Sweden and Austria have been, and remain, the largest EU member state donors to the region, although the share of Germany and Austria has fallen over the last decade. A group of relatively small donors have maintained their (low) share of aid to the region—Czech Republic, France and Italy. Another group

2

THE DRIVERS OF EU FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE …

33

of donors, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, have increased the importance they attach to the region. These three new EU member states in Central Europe have dramatically increased their assistance over the decade and now allocate a substantial part of their international aid budget to the Western Balkans. These changes in aid allocations have been driven by changing donor perceptions and interests. Donors have their “favourites” among the recipients reflecting their commercial self-interest and historical relations. The data reveal an uneven distribution of aid by donors across Western Balkan countries. Each donor has its own favourite recipients of aid. The pattern of donor favourites reflects the perceptions and motivations for providing international aid to individual countries (see Table 3). Several donors in the top nine have strong historical ties with particular countries that have been a further motivating force in the provision of aid. In 2020, Serbia was the favourite of eight of the top nine EU member state donors, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a favourite of five donors, Albania of three, Kosovo of one and North Macedonia of one. Montenegro was not a favourite of any donor, having become an “aid orphan”, due in part to its small size, its more advanced progress with Table 3

Donor favourites, 2020 Albania (%)

Germany Sweden Austria Hungary France Slovak Republic Slovenia Italy Czech Republic Grand total

30.6 17.9 17.0 2.4 25.4

Bosnia and Herzegovina (%) 28.5 31.3 33.3 1.8 9.9

Kosovo (%) 17.5 21.7 17.1 2.2 11.4

Montenegro (%) 1.2 0.0 1.9 1.8 1.1

North Macedonia (%) 1.8 9.5 2.9 1.4 7.3

Serbia (%) 20.3 19.5 27.8 90.4 47.1

Grand total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

2.6

2.0

1.3

0.5

1.4

92.2

100.0

1.7 75.7

31.3 16.0

5.9 4.3

5.5 0.8

30.4 1.1

25.2 2.2

100.0 100.0

7.3

65.9

3.2

0.3

1.9

21.5

100.0

22.6

24.8

14.3

1.2

4.4

32.7

100.0

Note: Donors favourites are defined as donors who give more than 18% of their ODA to the Western Balkans to a particular recipient. Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD international development statistics, constant 2020 prices

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EU integration, relatively large receipt of EU funds as well as significant inflows of foreign direct investment (e.g., from Russia). In the next section, I explore the perceptions and motivations of these top nine donors in providing ODA to the Western Balkan countries.

4

The Large EU Member States Bilateral Donors 4.1

Germany: Perceptions and Interests (Favourites: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia)

Germany has been the main provider of bilateral aid to the Western Balkans, reflecting her strong economic ties to the Balkan region. In an early study of German bilateral aid, Davis and Dombrowski (1997) argued that the motivation for Germany’s aid to Central and Eastern Europe was to pave the way for German trade and investment in the East. In their words “much of its assistance is designed to favour German firms” (Davis and Dombrowski 1997, p. 17). German interest in providing aid to the region could thus be related to its strong trade and investment links. Indeed, Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2009) have demonstrated that German aid to all recipients of such aid is associated with an increase in goods exports that is larger than the flow of aid. Novak-Lehmann et al. (2009) came to a similar conclusion and showed that German aid has had a positive commercial rate of return through increased trade flows. Mavromatidis and Leaman (2008) argued that in the case of the Western Balkans, the strong presence of German companies in trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and infrastructural projects has led to an unequal and hegemonic relationship. While German policymakers have reflected these interests in their support for economic development programmes in the region, they have been cautious over promoting the accession process too quickly due to domestic political opposition to further enlargement (Töglhofer and Adebahr 2017). German aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia has increased over the 2011–2020 decade, especially to Serbia, while its aid to Kosovo, Montenegro and North Macedonia has fallen. This has been associated with an increased level of German FDI in Serbia, especially in the special economic zones where foreign investors receive substantial subsidies as an incentive to choose the country as a location (Bartlett et al. 2019).

2

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35

German companies now employ around 78,000 people in Serbia.3 The investment effort has been accompanied by the introduction of Germanstyle dual education in one hundred and fifty Serbian secondary vocational schools under a 2017 law on dual education, aimed at ensuring a supply of skilled workers for German multinationals based in the country. Germany is a strong supporter of Albania’s EU accession process and has given Albania e1.2 billion in financial and technical assistance over the last three decades.4 While Germany provides large amounts of aid to Albania, she also benefits from the emigration of Albanian workers and especially medical personnel to work in German healthcare facilities. Over the last decade, around 1,500 Albanian doctors have left to work in Germany, and around 4% of all doctors in the country leave each year (Druga 2020). This is at a time when Albania already has the lowest number of doctors and nurses per capita in Europe. German authorities recognise Albanian healthcare qualifications and actively promote the emigration of Albanian healthcare professionals. According to German statistics, about 2,000 Albanian nurses emigrated to Germany between 2016 and 2018.5 It would appear that the inflow of German assistance to Albania is likely more than offset by the outflow of Albanian human capital to Germany. 4.2

Sweden (Favourites: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia)

Swedish policy towards the Western Balkans has closely followed that of the EU with a focus on public administration, judicial reforms, democracy, human rights, civil society, economic integration, environment and energy.6 This has been carried out in cooperation with EU efforts within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Instrument and IPA. Sweden’s aid agency, SIDA, supports economic development, the strengthening of democracy, respect for human rights, and environmental and climate change concerns. Sweden has few commercial links 3 https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/195373/multiple-advantages-of-dual-model-ofeducation.php. 4 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/albaniennode/albania/229546. 5 https://exit.al/en/2000-albanian-nurses-left-for-germany-in-two-years/. 6 See, e.g.: https://www.swedenabroad.se/en/about-sweden-non-swedish-citizens/bos

nia-and-herzegovina/development-and-aid/.

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with the region, whether through trade or foreign investment, yet the country provides a fairly large share of EU member state aid to its favourite recipients: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia. Sweden has developed an international reputation as a leader in international assistance programmes, stressing the goals of poverty reduction and emphasising its altruistic motives (Harsmar 2010). Thus, aid to the Western Balkans forms part of this reputational positioning of the country and its traditional role as a leader in international development efforts. The allocation of aid to the region is related to some specific factors. For a start, Sweden has been a destination of migrant workers and refugees from the Western Balkans since the time of former Yugoslavia, with a preponderance from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s due to the war in that country (Schierup 1995). Over the period from 2007 to 2021, there were 53,000 immigrants to Sweden from the Western Balkans, of which 43% came from Serbia and 18% from Bosnia and Herzegovina.7 This may underlie the emphasis of Swedish aid to those two countries, within its broader policy of using international assistance as a form of “soft power” projection. 4.3

Austria (Favourites: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia)

Austria has had strong former colonial ties with Bosnia and Herzegovina following the annexation of the country into the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the late nineteenth century. Due to these close historical ties and recent strong emigration flows, more than half a million Austrian citizens have their roots in the Balkans.8 In line with this tradition of cultural, economic and political relations, Austrian foreign policy attaches particular importance to the Western Balkans9 and has promoted the EU accession of the region even more so following the onset of war in Ukraine.10 Austrian companies invest heavily in the Western Balkans (e5.7 billion in 2021), with about 51% of that investment going to

7 Statistics Sweden, online data; author’s calculation. 8 See: https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/foreign-policy/europe/

southeast-europe/. 9 See: https://www.austria.org/western-balkans-1. 10 See: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/austria-tries-to-force-

feed-western-balkans-to-eu-leaders-biden/.

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Serbia, followed by 22% in Bosnia and Herzegovina,11 these two countries being consequently among Austria’s aid favourites. About 900 Austrian companies operate in Serbia, employing about 22,000 people.12 Following the COVID-19 pandemic which exposed the weaknesses of globalised supply chains, Austrian businesses are interested in developing closer supply chains with and through the Western Balkans, and in particular in establishing a new cargo railway line between Serbia and Austria via Zagreb and Graz.13 Mihailo Vesovi´c, a director within the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia, has identified that “Serbia is becoming more and more interesting for Austrian and other European companies that are thinking about the future of their supply chains, that is, they want to have their suppliers much closer, which is cheaper and safer” and that “Serbia and the Western Balkans are a strategically important point in Europe”.14 All this makes it easy to understand why Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are favourites for Austrian ODA to the region.

5

The Donors from Central European Newcomers 5.1

Hungary (Favourite: Serbia)

Hungary has a keen interest in Serbia for similar historical and postcolonial reasons as Austria does with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Vojvodina region in northern Serbia has a large Hungarian minority, which is a legacy of the inclusion of most of Vojvodina within the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the end of the First World War (Huszka 2017). Many members of this minority have dual nationality and hold the right to vote in Hungary.15 Strong political links between the governments of Hungary’s Prime Minister Victor Orbán and Serbia’s

11 Online data from Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB); author’s calculations. 12 https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/175851/very-good-economic-cooperation-bet

ween-serbia-austria.php. 13 https://en.pks.rs/news/styrian-businessmen-are-looking-for-new-partners-in-serbia. 14 Ibid. 15 See: https://www.rferl.org/a/hungary-serbia-orban-fidesz-no-bid-contract-investiga tion/31994585.html.

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President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c have been supported by Hungary’s international aid projects.16 Their collaboration is based on a common political culture characterised by illiberal, populist and authoritarian approaches to governance (Ivkovi´c and Burazer 2022).17 Both are classified under the Nations in Transit survey as hybrid regimes, positioned between “semi-consolidated democratic” and “semi-consolidated authoritarian” political systems.18 Cooperation between Hungary and Serbia is also based on infrastructure projects, including a high-speed railway link between Belgrade, Novi Sad in Vojvodina and Budapest which is expected to be completed by 2025. The two countries are also cooperating on gas pipelines and energy storage in the context of both countries’ links with Russia.19 Serbia also provides support to Hungarian companies investing in Vojvodina, with 16 of them receiving up to e56 million in subsidies under Serbia’s foreign investment attraction programme.20 As economic ties between the two countries have deepened, Hungary is now Serbia’s 6th largest trading partner, and trade between the two countries increased by 18% between 2020 and 2022.21 Hungary has also recently developed stronger ties with the regional Republika Srpska government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, granting e100 million in economic aid to the entity in July 2022.22 This may reflect a mutual interest in developing economic and political ties with Russia and a shared Eurosceptic approach of their political elites. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that Viktor Orbán has opposed sanctions against Republika Srpska that were mooted by the EU in response to

16 See: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/serbia-hungary-con firm-strategic-partnership/. 17 On 16th September 2022 Viktor Orban was awarded the Order of the Republic of Serbia, the highest state honour. https://standard.rs/2022/09/16/vucic-urucio-orbanunajveci-orden-drzave-srbije/. 18 See: https://freedomhouse.org/countries/nations-transit/scores. 19 See: https://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/press-service/statements/true-friendship-and-con

crete-results-cooperation-between-serbia-and-hungary. 20 https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/185701/concrete-steps-towards-strengtheningeconomic-cooperation-with-hungary.php. 21 https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/190303/stronger-cooperation-with-hungary-infield-of-innovation-new-technologies.php. 22 https://balkaninsight.com/2022/07/01/bosnias-serb-entity-welcomes-hungarys35-million-euros-in-aid/.

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statements by Milorad Dodik (President of Republika Srpska) supporting the secession of the entity from Bosnia and Herzegovina. 5.2

Slovakia (Favourite: Serbia)

Slovak aid to Serbia should be seen in the context of a large wave of migration of Serbian workers who have found jobs in Slovak factories (Stojšin et al. 2021). About 10,000 migrants moved from Serbia to Slovakia between 2010 and 2018, most of whom were medium-skilled workers with secondary level vocational or general education (Arandarenko 2021). The Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs has stated that “In Slovakia, 15 years ago, when it started to develop rapidly economically, and that was especially after its accession to the EU, it happened very quickly that companies were increasingly facing a shortage of labour. At that moment, the economic situation in Serbia was not at all great, and our people began to come to Slovakia in waves to work in industry”.23 This increased economic cooperation in the labour market has also led to increases in trade between the two countries.24 Serbian sources indicate the traditionally close cooperation between Serbia and Slovakia, with a small but important Slovak minority who live in the Vojvodina region being a legacy of the inclusion of both Vojvodina and Slovakia in the former AustroHungarian Empire. Some people in Serbia also admire Slovakia as one of the five EU members states that have not yet recognised Kosovo as an independent country.25 5.3

Slovenia (Favourites: Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia)

Slovenia is in the unusual position of being the only donor among the top nine that was part of the former Yugoslavia, thus having recent experience of common statehood with most of the Western Balkan countries apart from Albania. Slovenia has pushed the EU to grant candidate status 23 https://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/press-service/news/selakovic-slovak-support-serbia-allissues-vital-importance. 24 https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/180418/slovakia-strongly-supports-serbias-eur opean-path.php. 25 https://www.msp.rs/en/press-service/statements/traditionally-friendly-relations-bet ween-serbia-and-slovakia.

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to Bosnia and Herzegovina, an aim that was partly achieved through the European Commission’s recommendation of candidate status for Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 2022.26 Slovenia is the fourth largest investor in Bosnia and Herzegovina and directed one-third of her exports to the country in 2021 (see Table 4). Slovenia also sends about half of her exports in the region to Serbia, along with a large foreign direct investment presence there. North Macedonia is also a favourite of Slovenia, due to the long-standing friendly relations between the two countries since they became independent from former Yugoslavia in 1991–1992. Since they were less affected by the wars of Yugoslav succession (despite a 10-day war of independence on Slovenian territory), they were able to maintain continuous economic relations throughout the conflict period in the 1990s.

Table 4 Distribution of exports to the region by the top nine EU member state donors, 2020

Austria Czechia France Germany Hungary Italy Slovakia Slovenia Sweden

Albania (%)

Bosnia and Herzegovina (%)

Montenegro (%)

North Macedonia (%)

Serbia (%)

All recipients (%)

3.6 4.8 5.2 4.8 2.8 31.9 6.1 2.3 6.1

31.4 14.4 8.1 15.0 14.7 16.0 18.1 33.4 13.2

2.2 1.6 4.2 2.0 1.8 3.0 2.7 3.8 1.6

7.8 10.7 10.3 19.4 13.0 6.3 12.5 9.1 5.4

55.0 68.4 72.3 58.8 67.6 42.8 60.7 51.3 73.8

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Note: No data are available for Kosovo. Source: UNCTAD online database

26 See: https://hr.n1info.com/english/news/slovenian-fm-slovenia-to-present-plan-forgranting-bosnia-eu-candidate-status/.

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6 Among the Top Nine, but Relatively Uninterested 6.1

France (Favourites: Albania, Serbia)

France has been a long-standing friend of Serbia and had developed strong diplomatic links with Serbia before the First World War, with many Serbian politicians and intellectuals studying in Paris (Batakovi´c 2010). In recognition of French support in the war, a Monument of Gratitude to France was raised in a prominent position in the Belgrade Kalemegdan fortress. Before the Second World War, French was the second language in schools in Serbia. French links with Serbia diminished during the Kosovo war of 1999, with the first head of UNMIK being a French politician Bernard Kouchner and the first head of EULEX being the French General Yves de Kermabon. In a recent article, Natasha Wunsch (2017) concluded that France has lacked a national strategic interest in the region. However, more recently, this has begun to change, and France has begun to reconnect its diplomatic relations with Serbia. By 2020, only 11% of French aid to the region went to Kosovo compared to 47% to Serbia. France has also recently begun to strengthen its economic ties in the region, principally with Serbia and has several important trade and investments deals. These include the major investment of Michelin in Tigar Tyres in the Pirot special economic zone in southern Serbia and the award of a concession to manage Belgrade airport to Vinci, a French construction company. The French Development Agency opened an office in Belgrade in 2019 after a visit to the country by President Macron.27 6.2

Italy (Favourite: Albania)

Almost all of Italy’s aid flows to the Western Balkans are allocated to Albania. Italy has long-standing links with Albania as a colonial power, with Albania being briefly a protectorate of Italy at the end of the First World War, and again a de facto protectorate during the rule of King Zog in the inter-war period. Albania was occupied by Italy during the Second World War. Since the downfall of the communist regime, many Albanians

27 https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/185113/president-of-france-committed-to-imp roving-relations-with-serbia.php.

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have migrated to Italy and there is a substantial half-million strong Albanian minority living in southern Italy (Frontini 2017). Italy also has soft security issues with the country due to concerns over the rule of law and the fight against organised crime. Italy is Albania’s largest trading partner, with 42% of Albania’s total exports going to Italy and 24% of imports coming from Italy.28 Albania’s next largest export market is Kosovo (10% of exports). Consequently, the economic links between Albania and Italy are an important driver of Italy’s foreign policy in the region and ODA flows to it. Italy’s FDI in Albania is non-transparent, since as much of a quarter of FDI flows to Albania are listed as “confidential” on the Bank of Albania website, and the origin of these investments is not disclosed. Of those which are disclosed, the largest come from Switzerland, Netherlands, Turkey and Italy. But this does not help much either, since the Netherlands is a tax haven and a conduit for foreign direct investment from other countries, or even from Albania itself through a process known as “round tripping” by which domestic investors gain the subsidies available for foreign investors by basing their companies in a third country such as the Netherlands. 6.3

Czech Republic (Favourites: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia)

The Czech Republic is the smallest of the top nine donors. In recent years, its aid to the Western Balkans as a share of its total ODA has fallen from 4 to 2%. It devotes most of its aid programme in the Western Balkans to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is declared to be one of the Czech Republic’s most important development partners.29 The motivation seems to be based on humanitarian considerations and an interest in Bosnia’s economic development as well as support for its integration into the EU. Although not an immediate neighbour, the Czech Republic has long-standing links with Bosnia and Herzegovina through the co-location of both countries in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire which might inspire flows of international assistance today. The Czech Republic has devoted the second largest share of its ODA to the region to Serbia, with which it has agreed a “Qualified Worker

28 Albania Institute of Statistics online data. 29 http://www.czechaid.cz/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Programme_BaH_Cze

chAid_2018_EN.pdf.

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Programme” designed to enable workers to migrate from Serbia to work in Czech factories. In 2019, an Agreement entered into force between the Czech Republic and Serbia on the settlement of Serbia’s debt to the Czech Republic. Over the last decade, Serbia has been the 8th largest recipient of Czech ODA.

7

Link Between EU Member States Aid Allocations and Their Trade Flows in the Western Balkans

In this section, I examine the determinants of the allocation of EU member state ODA to the Western Balkans. In the discussion above, it has been suggested that the EU member states have strong commercial connections to the region through their trade and investment relationships. It has also been documented that some bilateral donors have more altruistic motivations for the allocation of aid, for example through a concern for poverty reduction and economic development to improve lives and living standards. Another major motivation for the allocation of aid to different countries of the region has been a desire to support the EU integration of the region by assisting countries to meet the accession criteria such as democracy promotion, among others. These three main motivations of aid reveal the ways in which the EU bilateral donors perceive the countries of the Western Balkans either as lucrative export markets, underdeveloped poor countries in need of charitable support, or as countries that share the European democratic norms and values and thus as viable candidates for EU membership. Table 4 shows the exports from the top nine EU donors to the countries of the Western Balkans, as a share of their total exports to the Western Balkans (data for Kosovo are not available). Some similarities can be seen with the flow of EU member state aid to those countries. For example, Italy sends 32% of its exports to the Western Balkans to Albania, its favourite destination for ODA. Slovakia sends 61% of its Western Balkan exports to Serbia, its aid favourite, while Hungary sends 68% of its exports to the region to Serbia, which is also its aid favourite. The scores for the democracy index compiled by the Freedom House are shown in Table 5. These show that all the Western Balkan countries are classified within the range of “hybrid” or “transitional” regimes (score

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Table 5

Democracy index scores, recipients, 2020

Albania

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Kosovo

Montenegro

North Macedonia

Serbia

3.82

3.32

3.18

3.86

3.75

3.96

Source: Freedom House: Nations in Transit online data

range 3–4). The least democratic country is Kosovo, the most democratic within this range is Serbia, while others are in an intermediate position. To see more exactly whether the flows of ODA are related to the trade linkages with the countries of the Western Balkans or are based more on altruism or a concern for democracy promotion, we can consider the following regression model which is based on paired data of flows of aid and trade from each individual aid donor to each individual aid recipient in 2020. ODAsharei j = β0 + β1 Expsharei j + β2 GDPpc j + β3 DEM j + εi j

(1)

Here, ODA_share is the share of a donor’s ODA to a Western Balkan country in the total ODA provided by that donor to the Western Balkans; Exp_share is the share of a donor’s exports to a recipient country in the total exports of that donor to the Western Balkans; GDPpc is gross domestic product per capita in the recipient country; DEM is the Freedom House Nations in Transit democracy index for the recipient countries, which takes a value from 1 to 7, with 1 being the lowest level and 7 the maximum level of democracy in a given country. Most of the Western Balkan countries have democracy index in the range 3–4, with a tendency to decline in value within this range over the last decade. Polities within this range are classified as “hybrid” or “transitional” political regimes, between “semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes” and “semiconsolidated democratic regimes”. The empirical model is estimated on cross-sectional data for 9 donors and 5 recipients (Kosovo is excluded for lack of data) in 2020, giving 45 data points in all; εi j is the error term. The regression results for this specification are shown as model 1 of Table 6. Model 1 represented a case in which all donors behave in a similar way when allocating their ODA to the countries of the region. It is, however,

0.4844

0.7499 0.3937

1.54

4.30*** −1.78* −0.71

t-statistic

0.130

0.000 0.082 0.484

P > |t|

0.2053 0.5559

0.4745 1.4851 0.6418

at the mean (dy/dx) 0.1061 0.1246 0.1979 0.000028 0.000041 0.000021 0.1217 0.1743 0.1086

0.000046

0.000072

Marginal effects 0.7674 0.5474 1.2074 −0.000057 −0.000081 −0.000000 −0.0798 −0.2379 0.2366

0.1246 0.000041 0.1742 0.7051 0.2338

Robust standard error

0.5473 −0.000081 −0.2379 −2.3576 0.6601

Coefficient

Model 2

7.23*** 4.39*** 6.10*** −2.04** −1.99* −0.43 −0.66 −1.37 2.18**

2.31** 2.67**

1.56

4.39*** −1.99* −1.37 −3.34*** 2.82***

t-statistic

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.054 0.667 0.516 0.180 0.036

0.026 0.011

0.127

0.000 0.054 0.180 0.002 0.008

P > |t|

THE DRIVERS OF EU FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE …

Note: Significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%. Robust standard errors are used to correct for heteroscedasticity

Exp_share (mean = 0.20) Exp_share; globalised Exp_share; focused GDPpc (mean = US$ 6,537) GDPpc; globalised GDPpc; focused DEM (mean = 3.7) DEM; globalised DEM; focused

0.1706 0.000029 0.1445

Robust standard error

0.7342 −0.000051 −0.1021

Coefficient

Model 1

Regression model for mean ODA share of donors in Western Balkan countries

Exp_share GDPpc DEM Df Exp_share * Df GDPpc * Df DEM * Df Constant Adjusted R-squared

Table 6

2

45

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likely that there is a variety of perceptions and associated behaviours among the donors. As a first hypothesis, I propose that donors with a larger share of their total aid effort allocated to the Western Balkans have a different perspective than other donors. Looking at Table 2, three donors allocated more than 14% of their total aid to the region, a far higher proportion than other donors. I distinguish between this groups of “focused’ donors and the other EU member state donors who allocate aid widely throughout the world and divide them into a “focused” group and a “globalised” group of donors. The model can then be re-written as:  ODAsharei j = β0 + β1 Expsharei j + β2 GDPpc j  +β3 DEM j ∗ D f + εi j (2) where D f is a dummy variable for the focused and globalised group of donors, taking value of 1 and 0, respectively. The regression results for this specification are shown as model 2 of Table 6. In Table 6, the first 4 columns show results for model 1. The results show that EU member state bilateral ODA shares to the countries of the Western Balkans are significantly and positively related to the export share of each donor to the countries of the Western Balkans. This suggests that donors have a strong motivation to supply aid in line with their economic and commercial interests. At the same time, ODA shares are significantly and negatively related to GDP per capita, indicating altruistic behaviour by the donors, who allocate a greater share of their aid to poorer countries. However, there is no significant relationship between ODA shares and the democracy index, indicating that the main EU member state donors do not allocate ODA based on improvements in democracy performance of the recipient countries. The second four columns of Table 6 show the full model (model 2) with the key independent variables interacted with the donor dummy variable (i.e., focused and globalised donors). The overall fit of the model is far better than the previous two models, as shown by the doubling of the adjusted R-squared value. This model shows significant coefficients in the interaction between the export shares, GDP per capita and the donor dummy. As in model 1, the aid allocations appear to be unrelated to democracy performance. However, the full effect of the independent variables on the allocation of ODA cannot be read directly from the coefficient estimates. Instead, we need to inspect the marginal effects at the

2

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47

mean, which are shown in the lower rows of the table. This indicates that an increase of one percentage point in the export share from donor i to recipient j is associated with a 0.78 percentage point increase in aid allocation. Aid allocation is significantly and negatively related to recipient GDP per capita, indicating altruistic motivations for aid allocation by the EU member state donors. The marginal effect at the mean shows that an increase of US$ 1,000 in recipient GDP per capita is associated with a 0.057 percentage point decrease in aid allocations from donor i to country j. Finally, as with model 1, aid allocation is insignificantly related to the democracy index at the mean. Considering the differences in aid allocation between the two donor groups, the marginal effects analysis shows that both groups allocate aid in response to their export shares, but that the focused donors have a greater economic/commercial motivation than the globalised donors in this respect. For the globalised donors, a 1 percentage point increase in export shares gives rise to a 0.55 percentage point increase in aid allocation, while for the focused donors a 1 percentage point increase in export shares gives rise to a 1.21 percentage point increase in aid allocation. While, overall, donors appear to have altruistic motivations indicated by the overall negative relationship between recipient GDP per capita and aid allocations, when this is broken down by donor groups altruism can be seen to be a firm motivation only for the globalised donor group, while the focused donors do not have such motivations in their aid allocation. In response to a $1,000 higher GDP per capita, globalised donors decrease their aid allocation by 0.081 percentage points, while focused donors do not adjust their aid allocation in response to a difference between countries in GDP per capita. The situation is different with respect to aid allocations in response to democracy performance where the analysis of the marginal effects shows that the globalised donors do not allocate aid in response to democracy performance, while the focused donors appear to do so, with a 1 percentage point increase in democracy performance giving rise to a 0.24 percentage point increase in ODA allocation. The visual representation of the regression results over a range of values of the independent variables is shown in Figs. 1 and 2.30 As can be seen from the left-hand side graphs of Figs. 1 and 2, overall, donor aid allocations increase with donor export shares, while they decrease with GDP per 30 Figures are derived using STATA’s margins and marginsplot commands with 95% confidence intervals.

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capita. The right-hand side graphs show the effects for the two different donor groups. While both donor groups increase their aid allocations in line with increased donor export shares, the focused donors allocate more aid to recipients at higher values of their export shares than globalised donors (at very low export shares, aid allocations are about the same). In relation to recipient GDP per capita, globalised donors allocate more aid to recipients with lower levels of GDP per capita than to those with higher levels, while the focused donors do not change their aid allocation between recipients in relation to the level of GDP per capita.

Fig. 1 The predicted margins of ODA shares by export shares (commercial interest) (Note: Graphs show fitted plots of the model with 95% confidence intervals in the vertical bars)

Fig. 2 Predicted margins of ODA shares by recipient GDP per capita (altruism) (Note: Graphs show fitted plots of the model with 95% confidence intervals in the vertical bars)

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The results of this exercise demonstrate that EU member state bilateral donors allocate their aid strongly in relation to the export shares to the region and thus have a revealed commercial interest in the recipient countries as export markets. This effect is stronger for the focused donors from Central Europe than the globalised donors from elsewhere in the EU. However, this commercial interest is tempered by the apparent altruistic motivations of the EU member state bilateral donors, whose aid allocations are sensitive to the needs of the poorer recipient countries, although the focused donors are not motivated by such perceptions of need. In relation to perceptions of democratic performance, the donors’ allocations are not sensitive to the extent of democratic consolidation, while the focused donors from Central Europe are. Donors overall, and in particular the globalised donors including the larger donors such as Germany, Austria and Sweden, are equally responsive to all regimes within the hybrid/transitional spectrum, including both borderline semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes and borderline semi-consolidated democratic regimes, in line with the stabilitocracy hypothesis.

8

Conclusions

The EU member states have multiple perceptions of, and interests in, the countries of the Western Balkans. I have argued that an insight into these perceptions and interests can be gained through an analysis of the revealed preferences exhibited through the allocation of bilateral donor assistance to the countries of the region. These perceptions and interests can be classified under three headings—economic/commercial interests based on the perceptions of market opportunities; altruistic interests based on perceptions of poverty, underdevelopment and social need; and political interests based upon support for democratisation as an underpinning condition for the accession process. The short descriptive snapshots of the perceptions and motivations of each EU member state donor, set out above, provide a qualitative insight into the mix of perceptions and interests of each of the top nine EU member state donors in the Western Balkans. I have identified the “donor favourites” in the region through an analysis of the patterns of ODA allocations to recipients. These snapshots and patterns show a mix of all three types of interests and motivations of aid flows to the region, with a stronger orientation to economic and commercial interests alongside altruistic motivations, but

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with a lesser concern for democratisation among the EU member states than announced and promoted by the European Commission in its own policy approach to enlargement. In the second stage of the analysis, I have pinned down these qualitative observations through a quantitative econometric analysis of the determinants of aid allocations in terms of economic/commercial interests, altruism and level of democracy. Economic/commercial interests have been proxied by trade flows, specifically the export share from donor countries to recipient countries of the Western Balkans. Altruism was proxied by the recipients’ levels of GDP per capita, on the hypothesis that altruistic donors would allocate more aid to poorer countries. Support for democratisation was proxied by the Freedom House Nations in Transit democracy index, testing the hypothesis that donor aid allocations would increase with advances in democratisation as measured by this index. The analysis shows that economic and commercial interests have driven the allocation of international aid to the Western Balkans more than any other factor, especially among the new “focused” donors from the new EU member states of Central Eastern Europe. Altruistic concerns have moderated these effects, especially among the (mainly larger) “globalised” donors with a wider scope of their international aid programmes, less focused on the Western Balkans in particular. Perceptions of democratisation have little effect on aid allocation, reflecting the donor support for “stabilitocracies”, with donors equally willing to allocate aid to countries on the borderline of semi-consolidated authoritarian systems as to countries on the borderline of semi-consolidated democratic systems, although the focused donors are, perhaps surprisingly, more sensitive to this characteristic of recipients. The implications of the above analysis are that the primacy of economic and commercial interests in aid allocation, and by implication the perceptions of EU member states that the region is primarily an export market, is holding the region in limbo as a super-periphery of the EU.31 These perceptions undermine progress with EU accession and lead to enlargement delay, since both sides (donor and recipient) benefit from the hybrid/transitional form of political regimes as a liminal space within Europe for rent-seeking and profit-driven economic and commercial

31 For an application of the concept of the super-periphery to the Western Balkans, see Bartlett (2009) and Bartlett and Prica (2017).

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activities. This liminal space outside the scope of EU regulation benefits both EU investors to the region who are able to make super-normal profits in emerging markets close to shore,32 and domestic political elites who are enabled to skim those profits to bolster their life styles, while leaving the majority of the population in a low-wage high-inequality super-periphery of the EU.33 A realistic policy approach to this situation might be for the European Parliament to adopt a resolution by majority vote to request the European Council to initiate a special procedure to admit the whole region to EU membership in a “big bang” event, bypassing the Commission’s procedural formalities and the vetoes of individual member states. This would serve to break the vicious cycle of diminishing enlargement perceptions, make good on past promises, demonstrate the democratic credentials of the EU and incorporate a region that is already economically, culturally and geographically integrated into the EU orbit.

References Anastasakis (2008). The EU’s political conditionality in the Western Balkans: Towards a more pragmatic approach. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 8(4): 365–377, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683850802556384. Arandarenko, A. (2021). How migration, human capital and the labour market interact in Serbia. Turin: European Training Foundation. Bartlett, W. (2009). Economic development in the European super-periphery: Evidence from the Western Balkans. Economic Annals, LIV(181): 21–44. Bartlett, W. (2021). International assistance, donor interests, and state capture in the Western Balkans. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 29(2): 184–200. Bartlett, W. & Prica, I. (2017). Interdependence between core and peripheries of the European economy: Secular stagnation and growth in the Western Balkans. European Journal of Comparative Economics, 14(1): 123–139.

32 In order to attract foreign investors, several Western Balkan countries have introduced substantial investor incentives in the form of tax breaks and employment subsidies, enabling profit-shifting by EU multinationals who benefit from a subsidy regime unavailable in the EU (see Krasniqi et al. 2022). 33 For an analysis of inequality in one Western Balkans country (Serbia) in comparison with similar EU members states (Croatia and Slovenia), see Žarkovi´c Raki´c et al. (2019).

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Bartlett, W., Bonomi, M. & Uvali´c, M. (2022). The economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans: Assessing the possible economic, social and environmental impact of the proposed flagship projects. PE 702.561. Brussels: European Parliament. Bartlett, W., Krasniqi, B. & Ahmetbasi´c, J. (2019). Attracting FDI to the Western Balkans: Special economic zones and smart specialisation strategies. Croatian Economic Survey (special issue SmartEIZ), 21(2): 5–35. Batakovi´c, D. (2010). French influence in Serbia 1835–1914: Four generations of “Parisians”. Balcanica, XLI: 93–129. Bélanger, M. & Schimmelfennig, F. (2021). Politicization and rebordering in EU enlargement: Membership discourses in European parliaments. Journal of European Public Policy, 28(3): 407–426, https://doi.org/10.1080/135 01763.2021.1881584. Bieber, F. (2018a). The rise (and fall) of Balkan stabilitocracies. Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, 10: 176–185. Bieber, F. (2018b). Patterns of competitive authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. East European Politics, 34(3): 337–354, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 21599165.2018.1490272. Davis, P. & Dombrowski, P. (1997). Appetite of the wolf: German foreign assistance for central and eastern Europe. German Politics, 6(1): 1–22, https:// doi.org/10.1080/09644009708404461. Dimitrova, A. L. (2016). The EU’s evolving enlargement strategies: Does tougher conditionality open the door for further enlargement? MAXCAP Working Paper no. 30. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin. Druga, E. (2020). The intention to stay and labour migration of Albanian doctors and nurses. In: W. Bartlett, V. Monastiriotis & P. Koutroumpis (eds) Social Exclusion and Labour Market Challenges in the Western Balkans, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 61–73. Dudley, D. (2020). European Union membership conditionality: The Copenhagen criteria and the quality of democracy. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 20:4, 525–545, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2020.180 5889. EC (2022). Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. COM(2022) 528 final. Brussels: European Commission. Grimm, S. & Mathis, O. L. (2018). Democratization via aid? The European Union’s democracy promotion in the Western Balkans 1994–2010. European Union Politics, 2018, 19(1): 163–184. Harsmar, M. (2010). Swedish aid: A multi-purpose tool for globalisation? International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 19(3): 38–57. Hogi´c, N. (2022). The European Union’s economic conditionality and Europeanization of the Western Balkans: The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Southeastern Europe, 46: 121–156.

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Huszka, B. (2017). Eurosceptic yet pro-enlargement: The paradoxes of Hungary’s EU policy. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 17(4): 591–609, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2017.1367462. Ivkovi´c, A. & Burazer, N. (2022). Orbán and Vuˇci´c in the 2022 electoral campaign: A mutually beneficial partnership. European Western Balkans. https://centarsavremenepolitike.rs/biblioteka/orban-and-vucic-inthe-2022-electoral-campaign-a-mutually-beneficial-partnership/. Krasniqi, B., Ahmetbasi´c, J. & Bartlett, W. (2022). Foreign direct investment and backward spillovers in the Western Balkans: The context, opportunities and barriers to the development of regional supply chains. Southeastern Europe, 46: 1–22. Markovic Khaze, N. & Wang, X. (2021). Is China’s rising influence in the Western Balkans a threat to European integration? Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 29(2): 234–250, https://doi.org/10.1080/147 82804.2020.1823340. Martinez-Zarzoso, I., Nowak-Lehmann, F., Klasen, S. & Larch, M. (2009). Does German development aid promote German exports? German Economic Review, 10(3): 317–338. Mavromatidis & Leaman (2008). German influence in the Western Balkans: Hegemony by design or by default? Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 16(1): 5–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/096515607017 11612. Noutcheva, G. (2009). Fake, partial and imposed compliance: The limits of the EU’s normative power in the Western Balkans, Journal of European Public Policy, 16(7): 1065–1084, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760903226872. Novak-Lehmann, F., Martinez-Zarzoso, I., Klasen, S. & Herzer, D. (2009). Aid and trade: A donor’s perspective, Journal of Development Studies, 45(7): 1184–1202. Papadimitriou, D. (2001). The EU’s strategy in the post-communist Balkans, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 1(3): 69–94, https://doi.org/10. 1080/14683850108454653. Pridham, G. (2007) Change and continuity in the European Union’s political conditionality: Aims, approach, and priorities. Democratisation, 14(3): 446– 471, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340701303303. Richter, S. & Wunsch, N. (2020). Money, power, glory: The linkages between EU conditionality and state capture in the Western Balkans. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(1): 41–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019. 1578815. Ross Smith, N., Markovic Khaze, N. & Kovacevic, M. (2021). The EU’s stabilitydemocracy dilemma in the context of the problematic accession of the Western Balkan states. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 29(2): 169–183, https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2020.1823823.

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Schierup, C.U. (1995). Former Yugoslavia: Long waves of international migration. The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, 285–288. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2017). Corruption, anti-corruption and democracy in the Western Balkans. Politiˇcke perspektive, 7(3): 7–26. https://doi.org/10. 20901/pp.7.3.01. Stojšin, S., Šljuki´c, M. & Hlavˇca, D. (2021). Characteristics of migration from Serbia to Slovakia (on the example of the municipality of Kovaˇcica). RUDN Journal of Sociology, 21(4): 881–890. Töglhofer, T. & Adebahr, C. (2017). Firm supporter and severe critic: Germany’s two-pronged approach to EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 17(4): 523–539, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 14683857.2017.1397961. Uvali´c, M. (2019). Economic integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union: The role of EU policies. In: J. Džanki´´c, S. Keil, M. Kmezi´´c, (eds), The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans: A failure of EU conditionality? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 207–235. Wunsch, N. (2017) Between indifference and hesitation: France and EU enlargement towards the Balkans. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 17(4): 541–554, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2017.1390831. Wunsch, N. & Olszewska, N. (2022). From projection to introspection: Enlargement discourses since the ‘big bang’ accession. Journal of European Integration, https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2022.2085261. Žarkovi´c Raki´c, J., Krsti´c, G., Oruˇc, N. & Bartlett, W. (2019). Income inequality in transition economies: A comparative analysis of Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia. Economic Annals, LXIV(223): 39–60.

CHAPTER 3

Moving the Western Balkans Towards the European Union: The Daunting Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina Renzo Daviddi

1

Introduction

In a region which is known for “producing more history than it can consume”, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is often portrayed as a “special case”. There are indeed several features that should perhaps be considered when looking at the country. Let us start by recalling a few. The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH) was among the six constituent federal republics forming the Socialist Federal Republic

The reflections presented in this chapter are the result of a long professional and personal exposure of the author to the BiH reality. I would like to thank Emina Kadri´c, Pierre Mirel and Milica Uvali´c for suggestions and comments. Of course, I remain responsible for the opinions expressed in this article. R. Daviddi (B) Vrbanj, Hvar, Croatia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_3

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of Yugoslavia, by far the most multi-ethnic. The 1991 census indicated that out of a total population of 4,377,033, Muslims represented 43.5% of the total, Serbs 31.2%, Croats 17.4%, Yugoslavs 5.5% and others 2.4%.1 What is perhaps interesting to underline is that before the 1992–1995 war different ethnic groups were scattered around the country: Serbs were present on 94.5% of the territory, Bosniaks on 94% and Croats on 70%. The situation clearly changed after the war, when through ethnic cleansing, displacement, deportation or migration, some areas have become much more ethnically homogenous. Nevertheless, multiethnicity is still present in today’s BiH. The war that lasted between 1992 and 1994 caused very heavy loss with estimates of over e200 billion in material damages and a decline of GDP to less than 20% of its pre-war level. Losses of human life are reported by the ICTY in the order of 105,000 people, of which 68,000 Bosniaks, 23,000 Serbs, 9,000 Croats and 5,000 people belonging to other nationalities.2 The economic situation at the end of the conflict was appalling. In its first Report after the end of the war, the IMF noted that “the war’s disruption of transportation and dislocation of much of the population, the hyper-inflation of 1992–1993, the destruction of industry in the Bosniak-majority area, the Bosnian Serb siege of Sarajevo, and the imposition of international economic sanctions in mid-1994 against the RS brought economic activity throughout the country to a virtual standstill by mid-1994” (see IMF 1996). The Fund estimated that GDP in 1994 was less than 20% of its 1990 level in real terms, with total collapse of industrial production, destruction of most large enterprises and civilian employment down to 20–25% of its 1991 level. An extensive literature which includes historical and political accounts of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also documents of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), provides evidence of Serbian and Croatian interests to partition the country. Although many references date back to the war-time period,3 1 Popis stanovništva 1991 – Federalni zavod za statistiku (http://fzs.ba/index.php/ popis-stanovnistva/popis-stanovnistva-1991-i-stariji/). 2 Minimalni broj smrtnih sluˇcajeva vezanih za rat po nacionalnosti – BiH, 1992–1995, Demografske službe Haškog tužilaštva, mart 2011 https://www.icty.org/. 3 The most referred episode is perhaps the drawing of the map of BiH by the Serb and Croat political leaders Miloševi´c and Tud-man at the 1991 Karad-ord-evo meeting.

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the narrative of “secession” is still very much present in the discourse of part of the current political elite. Some of the attempts of the international community first to try to avoid a war and afterwards to end the hostility between 1991 and 1993 are also strongly influenced by the idea of creating one or more ethnic-based entities on the territory of SRBiH. As a result of the peace talks held in Dayton and the ensuing peace agreement, which was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, BiH got an extremely complex state architecture consisting of a central state structure (with limited functions), two entities—the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska—and the Brˇcko District. In turn, the Federation comprises 10 Cantons which enjoy large administrative autonomy. As a result, BiH is probably the only country in the world that counts 14 prime ministers and 16 parliaments, as well as hundreds of ministers and members of various parliamentary assemblies. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) also envisaged a role for a plethora of international actors, some specially created. First, a military presence (IFOR/SFOR/EUFOR) stationed, and is still present, on the territory of BiH to monitor the peace process. The DPA additionally created the Office of the High Representative (OHR), with responsibility for the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement. The country also hosted numerous UN Agencies, a large OSCE mission, the International Financial Institutions, many bilateral Embassies, bilateral and multilateral donors as well as many foreign NGOs. Most of those actors are still present in the country. A process of reconciliation has not taken place during the past twenty years and there is no willingness to arrive to a shared interpretation of the recent past. Quite the contrary, the political discourse is daily characterised by denial of war crime (the most notorious example but unfortunately not the only one is the case of Srebrenica) and often war criminals are glorified (through, e.g., naming streets after some, laying plaques and painting commemorative murals). In the educational system which is divided into 13 different levels of responsibility, the teaching of BiH history continues to be carried out on biased and divergent narratives. This as well as the endurance of the practice of “two schools under one roof” which segregate children, and through this segregation teaches

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them that there are inherent differences between them, are very likely to perpetuate the problem into future generations.4 Like many other countries in the Western Balkans and Southeastern and Central Europe, BiH is experiencing a massive demographic decline that is predicted to continue well into the long term. According to UN projections, by 2050, BiH’s population will have declined to little over 2.5 million.5 The significant emigration and low birth rates (BiH has a fertility rate of 1.26, one of the lowest in the world) of recent years represent the second major blow to its demography following the population losses (casualties of war as well as non-return of refugees) that resulted from the war (1992–1995). In addition, the past decade has seen a significant intensification of migration, especially among the young. According to the United Nations Population Division in 2020, a total of 484.998 emigrated from BiH during the period 2013–2021 alone. The country records the second largest share of native-born population living abroad in the world (34%).6 There are undoubtedly a wide range of reasons why BiH citizens, especially the young, are emigrating. The main reason for emigration is almost certainly economic, be it to secure employment or to increase earnings. This is hardly surprising given that BiH is grabbling with an excessively high youth unemployment rate including of university graduates.7 More generally, many BiH citizens have simply run out of hope that BiH will ever offer them a better future after many years of political stasis. Furthermore, they are probably tired of living in a dysfunctional country characterised by corruption, nepotism, weak rule of law and poor services, as well as endless political gridlock and divisive political rhetoric that all too frequently threatens a future that may turn to be even worse than the present. The economic situation is equally problematic. Like all economies and societies in the world, BiH has been heavily hit by the COVID19 pandemic and the dramatic economic recession that it has generated. 4 On the practice of ‘two schools under one roof’, see the comprehensive OSCE Report—OSCE (2018). 5 https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Probabilistic/Population/. 6 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division

(2020). International Migrant Stock 2020. 7 It is estimated that 38.8% of young people in BiH aged 15–24 were unemployed in 2018 compared to an average 15.2% in the EU 28.

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However, and contrary to what has happened almost worldwide, the response of the BiH authorities to the COVID-19 crisis has been inadequate and poorly conceptualised: it has been slow, insufficient, overly bureaucratic and uncoordinated, as well as lacking in transparency and being characterised by serious allegations of corruption. The COVID-19 crisis has exposed and further exacerbated the critical inadequacy of BiH’s political landscape and institutional set-up. The pandemic came after years of modest economic growth relative to other countries in the region or with similar income levels. GDP per capita is one of the lowest compared to the other countries in the Western Balkans. Modest economic growth is coupled with very high unemployment, a heavily taxed underdeveloped private sector, and poor-quality infrastructure and public services. Inflation has accelerated significantly in the course of 2022. The Central Bank of BiH reports an annual inflation rate of about 11% for the first half of the year, with a forecast rate between 14 and 18% for the year as a whole.8 In addition, the transformation of a post-conflict, centralised economy into a fully-fledged market economy has barely started, let alone completed. The current political elite is neither committed to reforms nor seriously engaging in the process of deep institutional transformation required by the accession to the EU.9 In the socio-political environment which characterises contemporary BiH, systemic reforms are perceived as (and most likely are) a threat to the consolidated system of rent-seeking and perpetuation of power of the political elites. The institutional set-up designed by the Dayton Framework Agreement is fully subservient to a model strongly defiant of change and designed to perpetuate stability, which in BiH likens the status quo. Florian Bieber coined the label “stabilocracy” (BiEPAG (2017), something which in the end might have served well also the need of the international community (to avoid instability and conflicts in the region) and, for different reasons, also local non-institutional actors. Yet, such a system has created and substantially consolidated a perfect equilibrium of rent-seeking and adverse selection. Not only change is 8 See: Inflation for the First Half of the Year 11%, to Slow Down in the End of the Year (https://www.cbbh.ba/press/ShowNews/1454). 9 On the latter, particularly striking is the lack of any progress in addressing the short-term recommendations related to economic governance set out in the European Commission’s 2019 Opinion and Analytical Report and a lack of progress which has been confirmed in every Annual Report since then. More on this below.

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dysfunctional to the system, but the plethora of veto and potential for blackmailing present at every stage of decision-making makes it almost impossible to arrive at a consensual, bipartisan vision of the country’s future. Yet, the economic system manages to produce enough resources which the kleptocratic elite has proved capable of siphoning off to appease its constituencies and get rewarded politically and often economically. For reasons which are quite difficult to understand (but which at least part of the population identifies with the need at all costs to avoid a new conflict), the system has shown resilience even to major external shocks. There seems to be no internal dynamics for advancing change and progress, be it based on electoral processes or driven by civil society. In this gloomy landscape, for the last decade a lot of hope, especially from the younger and better educated part of the population, was represented by the perspective of EU membership. Hope has now turned largely into disillusionment, and the gap in perceptions between the local population and the EU, which has been prominent since the 1990s, has now grown into even more profound cynicism. Perceptions of the population in BiH about the EU have deteriorated to the point that a significant part (35%) of BiH citizens today no longer believes the country will ever enter the EU.10 In parallel, the view that BiH is a dysfunctional state is more and more widespread in the EU and among EU officials. BiH has proved totally unable to change this narrative, especially after the profound political paralysis which has followed the publication of the EC Opinion in 2019.

10 See: Balkan Barometer Welcome (https://www.rcc.int/balkanbarometer/results/2/ ). Recent research conducted using the CATI method, on a sample of 1,200 respondents by the Directorate for European Integration (DEI), indicates that in October 2020 support for EU membership among BiH citizens was still high. About 76% of respondents indicated that would vote in favour of EU membership in the event of a referendum. However, support was much stronger in the Federation BiH (87%) than in Republika Srpska (55%) (Source: DEI October 2020). More recent surveys seems to confirm the downward trend. In May 2021, still 76% of respondents indicated support for BiH’s accession to the EU. However, this declined to 72% (67% BD, 81% FBiH, 54% RS) in December 2021 and to 71% (88% FBiH, 45% RS&BD) in May 2022. The decrease is very marked in the RS public opinion.

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2 A Short Chronology of BiH Relations with the EU11 Since its inception, the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has been rather problematic. The narrative of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s portrays an arrogant European Community unable to take sides or even reach a consensus on a diplomatic proposal to end the conflict in BiH.12 BiH was recognised as an independent state by the (then) European Community on 6 April 1992. Since then, the EU-BiH relationship seems to have ended up being dominated by a dangerous mix of resentment, victimisation and calls for recognition of a special status, exceptions and peculiar procedures. While the imperative of peace-making in the second half of the 1990s has shaped the initial agenda, the subsequent attempts to build effective (post-war) governance in a potential new member state has turned out to be less successful. The lack of a valid institutional counterpart (a governance structure capable of negotiating and even more implementing what was agreed) has led to significant breaks in the process of EU accession and ultimately ended up negatively affecting EU’s credibility on the ground. One could argue that the EU spent excessive political capital in BiH in the last two decades to attempt quick fixes, underestimating the more longer-term nature of nation building. Together with the other countries of the Western Balkans, BiH is part of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) launched by the EU in 2000 and confirmed at the Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkan Summit in June 2003. The “future of the Balkans is within the European Union” read the Conclusions of the Summit. Yet two decades after BiH looks quite far from EU membership. Progress in this process has been painfully slow and characterised by continuous misperceptions and mistakes. BiH has been granted some sort of a “political discount” at each step of the process and allowed to move on re-interpreting, renegotiating or ignoring

11 A complete chronology can be found in: Bosnia and Herzegovina (https://ec. europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/bosnia-and-herzegovina_en). 12 ‘This is the hour of Europe…’—a sentence attributed to the then chair of the EC Foreign Affairs Council, Jacques Poos, at the verge of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia— later became an ironic way of summarising arguably the most significant EU foreign policy failure in its history.

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previously set conditions.13 This is evident when analysing the main steps of BiH “path to EU membership”. The finalisation of negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) stalled in 2005 over the lack of consensus on the Police Reform. It was deblocked after consensus was reached in April 2008 on a much less ambitious blueprint. The SAA was initialed in June 2008. It was ratified by all EU member states by February 2011. However, the Agreement could not enter into force (the alternative would have been an immediate suspension) as BiH was non-compliant with some of the obligations undertaken in the Agreement itself, most notably, constitutional reforms (addressing the 2009 ruling of the ECHR on the Sejdi´c-Finci case, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) House of Peoples and Presidency), the lack of country-wide State Aid Law, the failure to organise and implement a country-wide census and to establish a single body/mechanism within the country to co-ordinate the relations with the EU. In 2014, the High Representative Mogherini and Commissioner Hahn engaged with the political leaders to secure their irrevocable commitment to undertake reforms, most notably to address the constitutional impasse generated by the Sejdi´c-Finci et al. court rulings. An agreement was reached in January 2015 with the signature of a written agreement by the BiH Presidency, followed by ratification by the BiH Parliamentary Assembly. The SAA entered into force in March 2015, i.e., almost 7 years after its initial signing and 4 years after the end of the ratification process by the EU member states. Almost all the commitments undertaken with the signature of the SAA remained dead letter. BiH applied for EU membership on 20 September 2016. BiH was given green light for the application, despite the non-fulfilment of some conditions which had previously been set—most notably, issues

13 The only noticeable exception in terms of respect of commitments by BiH policymakers is in the area of visa free travel to Schengen area for the citizens of BiH. This was granted by the EU in December 2010, and it is the only case in which conditionality has been fully met. Contrary to policy requirements in other areas, a specific set of conditions included visa liberalisation benchmarks which had to be fulfilled in order to be granted visa liberalisation. The process has been subject to regular monitoring and reporting, including ex-post reporting. It is worth underlying that throughout the process and contrary to what has happened in other policy domains, policy-makers were under a very strong pressure to deliver by public opinion and civil society organisations.

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concerning constitutional reforms, ownership of state and military property and the closure of the OHR. The European Council asked the EU Commission to prepare an “Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU membership application” and an Analytical Report which were made public on 29 May 2019. The drafting of the Opinion follows a standard methodology which has been applied to all applicant countries. BiH authorities received 3,897 questions covering all aspects of EU policy. It took 14 months to answer this initial set of questions and another 8 months to answer 655 follow-up questions. The authorities were unable to agree and provide answers to 22 questions, 1 concerning the political criteria, 4 on regional policy and 17 on education. By comparison, the process of completing the Questionnaire took 2 months in Serbia and 3 months in Albania. The EC Opinion (and Analytical Report) identifies 14 key priorities in the areas of democracy/state functionality/governance, rule of law14 ; fundamental rights; and public administration reform. In its initial conception, the priorities had to be fulfilled before the EU Commission could recommend conferring the candidate country status and start of accession negotiations. Almost no follow-up has been given to these recommendations as well as to several key conditionality requirements on which the authorities have repeatedly undertaken commitment at the highest political level. Notwithstanding this, in October 2022, the European Commission recommended that BiH be granted candidate country status by the European Council. The recommendation has been put forward “on the understanding that a number of steps are taken to reinforce democracy, functionality of state institutions, rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, guarantee media freedom and migration management in the country”.15 It is evident that contrary to the conclusions of the 2019 Opinion, the fulfilment of the 14 key priorities is no longer 14 In the area of the Rule of Law in particular, the European Commission tasked an independent senior experts’ group chaired by Reinhard Priebe to analyse the main rule of law deficiencies in BiH and put forward a detailed blueprint for overcoming them. In December 2019, the so-called Priebe Report was presented to the authorities and subsequently became part of the follow-up of the Commission’s Opinion on the EU membership application of Bosnia and Herzegovina. See: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/201612/20150619_recommendations_of_the_senior_experts_group.pdf. 15 See: http://europa.ba/?p=76169.

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considered necessary for this important step, but it is moved forward as a requirement for the Commission “to recommend opening EU accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The recommendation of the Commission is severely mitigated by the tone of the 2022 Report on BiH which has been made public at the same time.16 The wording of the Introduction is almost identical to the previous year. “The public commitment of political parties to the strategic goal of European integration has been further confirmed in Brussels in June 2022 in a political agreement on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path, in line with the 14 key priorities set out in the Commission Opinion. Yet, for most of the reporting period this commitment was not turned into concrete reform actions. Deep political polarisation and disagreement among the main parties of the ruling coalition led to a standstill in the work of the democratic institutions and on reforms on the EU path”.17 The reference to “the strategic goal of European integration” once again seems to misrepresent reality. Policy-makers, most notably in the Republika Srpska (RS) but also in the FBiH, are more and more referring to the lack of “legal legitimacy” of some of the conditions requested for change (including many of those identified by the European Commission in its “Opinion”). In this interpretation, the Dayton framework (which by the way remains subject to divergent and partisan interpretations) is considered “a given”. Pushing this interpretation to the extreme, in the dystopic world of BiH policy-makers, some policies and practices of the EU must be changed to “adjust” to the peculiarity of the BIH institutional framework. The experience of all countries acceding to the EU, above all those in transition in Central and Eastern Europe, shows that the institutional, legal and policy transformation must be modelled on the acquis and cannot diverge significantly from it. What is negotiated in the

16 See: Key findings of the 2022 Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina (https://ec.eur opa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/country_22_6093). 17 See: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/bosnia-and-herzegovina-rep ort-2021_en, page 3. In its 2021 Annual Report, the European Commission concluded that: “The public political commitment of the authorities at all levels of government to the strategic goal of European integration has not been turned into concrete action, as political leaders continued to engage in divisive rhetoric and unconstructive political disputes, which have hindered progress on the 14 key priorities so far”. See European Commission (2021, p. 5).

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end are the modalities of implementation and most notably the timeframe (derogations) for the full implementation of the acquis. On 15 December 2022, the European Council granted EU candidate status to BiH.

3

EU Support for BiH

During the past decades, the EU has devoted a significant amount of resources to BiH. EU financial assistance to BiH between 1996 and 2021 is estimated of the order of e3.5 billion,18 from 1996 to 2007, under the PHARE, OBNOVA and CARDS programmes and subsequently mostly through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). During the past three years, a total allocation of e530 million for the period 2014–2020 has been complemented by e7 million for urgent medical equipment and e73.5 million for socio-economic recovery measures, as part of the response to the COVID-19 crisis. In the same context, the EU also made available e250 million for macro-financial assistance. The EU has also supported BiH in migration management with e80.5 million since 2018 through both IPA and humanitarian funds. The lack or the very poor quality of country-wide sector strategies, among others on public financial management19 and employment, prevents BiH to benefit fully from the IPA multi-country and regional programmes and to participate in three cross-border cooperation programmes, as well as in transnational cooperation programmes. Similarly, under the current institutional arrangements, BiH is very unlikely to receive significant resources from the Economic Investment Plan (EIP) for the Western Balkans, an instrument devised for promoting the longterm economic recovery of the region, support a green and digital transition, and foster regional integration and convergence with the EU. BiH also participates in several other EU programmes, including Horizon 2020, Creative Europe and Europe for Citizens. On a positive note, between 2014 and 2020, over 12,000 participants from BiH took part in student, academic and youth exchanges under Erasmus+.

18 See: EU Projects with Bosnia and Herzegovina | EEAS Website (https://www.eeas. europa.eu/bosnia-and-herzegovina/eu-projects-bosnia-herzegovina_en?s=219). 19 The PFM Strategy was adopted in August 2022. However, it falls short of meeting the requirement of the Financial Framework Partnership Agreement.

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The EU is also BiH’s main trading partner, with an overall trade volume of e13 billion in 2021. BiH exports almost 75% of its goods and services to the EU and imports about 60% of its total imports from the Union. In 2021, Foreign Direct Investment from EU countries in BiH totalled about e230 million, a figure which is not particularly significant and probably reflects the external perception of the country as relatively unstable. Finally, the EU deploys considerable human and financial resources in BiH under the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy. The combined Office of the EU Special Representative and the EU Delegation in BiH is one of the largest EU diplomatic representations in the world. The EUFOR Althea military operation remained deployed in the country, retaining deterrence capacity to support a safe and secure environment. The UN Security Council extended EUFOR’s mandate until November 2022. From 2003 to 2012, the Union also organised a Police Mission (EUPM).

4 Recalibrating the EU Strategy ` vis-a-vis BiH and the Western Balkans The EU seems to be experiencing in BiH a serious problem of credibility. The political underpinnings for granting candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova are clear, but certainly do not resonate well among the citizens of the Western Balkans and invigorate populistic views among policymakers in the region. This is perhaps particularly acute in BiH where for years the EU has been trying to encourage the process of transition, arguing that EU accession is largely based on merit and that a country that engages in a consistent and coherent process of socio-economic transformation will be ultimately rewarded with EU membership. For the past fifty years, EU enlargement has been one of the main political projects and certainly the major tool of foreign policy of the EU. In the current circumstances, however, it seems to have lost (at least in the Western Balkans) most of its meaning and traction. It would be a major mistake not to act swiftly and to correct misperceptions by transferring “words into deeds”. It is imperative to complete the European construction project to close a geographical, political and cultural hole in the middle of Europe; to do this, it is necessary to recognise that the current approach does not work.

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Contrary to what happened in case of the enlargement to the Central East European countries after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the EU has been pursuing rather erratic, at times contradictory and (arguably) not so successful policies towards the Western Balkans. While “Agenda 2000” (EC 1997) constituted an articulated, coherent and sequenced blueprint to guide “the return to Europe” for post-communist countries, EU attitude towards the Western Balkans has been less clear and articulated, definitely not well sequenced. Admittedly, part of the problem of erratic policies could be due to the fact that Western Balkan countries have been overall rather reluctant to do what the EU Commission has been asking them to do in the context of their accession process.20 This is a significant difference with respect to the CEE countries, which instead in most cases were able to translate “words into deeds”. In addition, two initiatives undertaken in the context of EU accession, the so-called Berlin Process and the Western Balkans Regional Economic Area de facto added some parallel processes. Such schemes were mostly aimed at keeping the enlargement dynamic alive in the light of the fiveyear moratorium on enlargement announced by the Juncker Commission at the beginning of its mandate. The Berlin Process is an intergovernmental initiative launched in 2014 at a Conference in Berlin. It brings together the Western Balkans countries and some EU member states.21 Its stated aim is to revitalise the multilateral ties between participant countries, as well as to improve regional cooperation with specific focus on infrastructure and economic development. The Western Balkans Regional Economic Area was launched at the fourth Summit of the Berlin Process held in Trieste in July 2017. The initiative purposes are to deepen regional economic integration, notably by promoting free movement of goods and services, investment and skilled labour among the countries of the region. Indeed, in the region, some expressed fears that such an initiative could run the risk of delaying the process of EU accession. The EU Commission objected that economic integration in the region had to be based on EU rules and principles and could vice versa constitute an “important milestone for preparation for EU accession”. 20 This is a point particularly significant for BiH and will be further analysed below. 21 The initiative includes the six Western Balkan countries and some EU members:

Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Greece, Germany, Italy, Poland and Slovenia as well as the United Kingdom.

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Towards the end of its mandate in 2018, the Junker Commission put forward a proposal for a “new” EU Enlargement strategy. In its communication to the European Council (EC 2018), the European Commission portrays a change of approach concerning EU enlargement to the countries of the Western Balkans. The strategy is largely the codification and the systematisation of practices which have started to emerge during the negotiations for accession of Bulgaria and Romania as well as Croatia, and subsequently in the ongoing negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia. It also contains some new ideas which have been circulating in the practitioners’ domain for a while. The Commission’s document indicated—perhaps with insight rather optimistically—the year 2025 as a potential date for the accession of Montenegro and Serbia to the EU and reiterated that a credible accession perspective is the key driver of domestic transformation in the region (EC 2018, p. 2). In addition to detailing the new negotiating stance of the Commission, the communication refers to intensifying regional cooperation. Drawing on experience gained in the most recent negotiations, the EC identifies three crucial pillars on which to focus negotiations: public administration, rule of law and economic governance.22 An Action Plan in support of the transformation of the Western Balkans is annexed to the communication. The paper refers also to enhanced participation of candidate countries in the European Fund for Southeast Europe 1 and 2 (the so-called Junker’s Investment Plan), as well as access to resources and policies drawn by the Berlin Process, with focus on transport and energy connectivity, a digital agenda, as well as reconciliation. The newly devised EU strategy contains many positive elements, such as clustering the negotiation chapters by sector and envisaging more political guidance by member states. It also introduces a mechanism of benefits and sanctions, which, however, is not sufficiently far reaching (more on this below). In addition, even the new approach appears unable to overcome the lack of a very strong political commitment on both sides of the fence. Enlargement is no longer so popular with the public opinion in some EU member states (in some countries it has never been). At the same time, the “attractive power” of the EU in the eyes of many citizens

22 The three pillars had already been part of the so-called new approach promoted by Commissioner Fuele in 2011.

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in Southeast Europe is at best weak, if not easily transformable into some sort of euro scepticism. In the past few months, with the increased complexity of the international geopolitical situation, the Western Balkans made an important comeback on the agenda of the international community. European leaders and institutions have been advancing proposals which attempt to “square the circle” between the new “geopolitical imperatives” and an agonising enlargement policy, for years considered the most successful policy tool of the EU. On 9 May 2022, during the semester of France’s EU Presidency, at the closing session of the Conference on the Future of Europe, President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech in which he referred to a “European political community”.23 At the same time, Charles Michel, the President of the European Council, made reference to a “Geopolitical European Community”, a concept that looks quite similar to President Macron’s. It is not entirely clear what the concepts entail, but they seem based on the creation of a parallel entity in which loosely tied governments in Europe could cooperate more deeply on some specific policy areas. If the proposal indeed aims at creating a ‘parallel’ set of arrangements, it is difficult to see how this can be compatible with the current enlargement principles whereby countries are called to absorb in full the acquis communautaire, the complex set of laws, regulations and institutions which regulates the EU. It would be important to clarify what exactly the concepts entail and state clearly which countries are supposed to be part.

23 “It’s our historic obligation to respond to that today and to create what I would call a ‘European political community’. This new European organisation would allow European democratic nations adhering to our core values to find a new space for cooperation on politics, security, energy, transport, infrastructure investments and the movement of people, especially the young”. See: Closure of the Conference on the Future of Europe. Élysée (https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/05/09/closure-of-the-confer ence-on-the-future-of-europe). The concept recalls a similar proposal for a “European confederation” which was launched at the end of 1989 by François Mitterrand. His proposal did not get much traction in so far as it tried to include Russia, and because the scheme was clearly interpreted as an alternative to EU enlargement, therefore quite ostracized by the Central East Europeans as well as some EU member states.

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Regardless of different interpretations, any attempt to recalibrate the EU strategy would need to take some factors into consideration: • Acknowledge the responsibilities of the countries aspiring to become EU member states. Especially, the countries of the Western Balkans, those emerging from the dissolution of Yugoslavia as well as Albania, present characteristics that have compounded the complexity of the accession blueprint. State capture, corruption, organised crime, lack of leadership and vision of policy-makers and to a large extent civil society,24 just to mention a few, have contributed heavily to transform an already complex agenda of political, economic and societal transformation into a “mission impossible”. Policy-makers must commit more forcefully to the process, drive it and assume tough policy decisions even under circumstances of domestic political opposition. Citizens and civil society should call them accountable for the failure to deliver and fundamentally to “waste” a couple of generations during this process. • The fact that granting full membership to specific countries of the Western Balkans in an unsynchronised accession timetable (i.e., at different points in time), in a region which still has many unresolved disputes, will easily turn the first comers into spoilers, rather than advocates of the aspirations of those countries whose accession is supposed to follow. • The multiplicity of geopolitical agendas recalled above and the recognition that voids of strategies and ideas can easily turn to the advantage of other political actors. In particular, it is worth considering the changing attitude of important Peace Implementation Council’s (PIC) members, most notably the Russian Federation and Turkey, as well as actors like China.

24 The civil society “awakening”, documented for instance in Džihi´c et al. (2022), seems to be confined to specific themes, failing short of a strategic dimension.

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Tackling the “Fundamentals”

Moving the agenda of EU integration forward in BiH requires tackling at least three bundles of issues: i. The “elephant in the room” must be dealt with. The EU must unequivocally state that the governance structure inherited from the Dayton Peace Accords is not compatible with EU membership. Such a governance structure requires profound changes which should address the dis-functionality of the current constitutional and institutional framework; ii. The EU should become more “normative” in taking responsibility for the definition of an institutional and constitutional framework in line with the EU acquis; iii. Domestic actors, not only policy-makers but also civil society and citizens, should be mobilised to act and take their responsibilities by blaming and shaming, therefore creating incentives, to get rid of opportunism and passivity. These three points are briefly discussed below. 5.1

The Elephant in the Room

The political proposal of the EU, based on the SAP, failed to generate in BiH the same positive dynamic that was seen in Central and Eastern Europe and more recently in most other countries in the Western Balkans. It has collided with the complex political and institutional structures emerged in BiH after the conflict of the early 1990s. The main obstacles in integrating into the EU derive from the severe institutional and governance problems affecting BiH. The system of governance created by the Dayton Peace Accords (most notably Annex IV) is inefficient, dysfunctional and ultimately incompatible with EU membership. A weak and utterly complex state structure, the behaviour of the political elite, corruption and organised crime have for two decades represented, and still represent, the main obstacles to a smooth progress towards EU accession. The power-sharing arrangement delineated in the DPA has become a power-dividing arrangement. Ethnic division is the rule in every ministry, government office and parts of the public administration at all levels of government. Appointments are based on ethnicity

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and party-membership more than competence or merit. People have learned how to identify themselves in ethnic terms and play the card out of pure opportunism, additionally shaping separate societies. The current constitutional structure offers too many possibilities for political obstructionism. Provisions such as “entity voting” are abused (among other reasons due to the lack of a strict definition of the domains in which they should be applied). Rules on quorums allow blockage of parliamentary work and, as in the case of the Federation, even hinder the formation of a government for the entire legislature. Citizens are deprived of their right to vote for more than a decade (e.g., Mostar local elections) without this being sanctioned or even protested against. The degree of “decentralisation” or a clear and proper attribution of competencies to the various jurisdictions making up the state is an unresolved and particularly sensitive issue in BiH. The key problem of the Dayton constitution is that it defines a minimum level of state competences, leaving all others to the entities. The invocation of the “vital national interest” is very often a result of conflicts of competences. Although some 140 competences have been conferred to the state over the past years, several of them cannot be exercised due to the lack of proper institutions and of a budget. Equally significant are the divergent views among the main political parties on the way in which BiH state structure should evolve. The SDA, i.e., the main party among the Bosniaks, in its political programme calls for a unitary, centralised state. HDZ and SNSD, the main parties respectively among the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, argue instead in favour of a loose federative state. This is not a problem unique to BiH. Responses by different countries to the challenge of EU accession, the institutional structure which has emerged, as well as the degree of decentralisation in decision-making, vary from country to country even among EU member states. Yet, it is probably fair to say that none of the new member states has attempted to manage the accession process without a core set of coordinating central institutions and the uniqueness of the internal market. In the case of BiH, both elements are crucially lacking. Decentralisation in BiH often means duplication of institutions, a blurred sharing of competencies, divergent legislative frameworks and policies, motivated much more by political than functionality or efficiency principles. What should be proposed is the evolution of the current institutional structure into some form of a functional federal state with effective line

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ministries, which could consider some of the BiH peculiarities discussed above. Since BiH aspires to become an EU member state, a great number of competences are related to the EU legislation. It would be logical to examine how these competences are shared and exercised in EU federal member states, for instance Belgium and Germany. A final fundamental issue concerns the question of the closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), another instance of EU conditionality which has been revised through time, swinging from being a compelling condition to … oblivion. In 2009, the European Council clearly affirmed that in order to consider BiH’s application for membership, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) would have to be closed.25 The conclusion was based on legal opinions of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission, which convincingly argued that the closure of the OHR is of critical importance for the rule of law and democracy in BiH. The nature of the problem is well summarised in the opinion of the Venice Commission which concluded that: “… it is certainly not a normal situation that an unelected foreigner exercises such powers in a Council of Europe member state and [….] such an arrangement is fundamentally incompatible with the democratic character of the state and the sovereignty of BiH ”.26 A process and a set of conditions that had to be met by the BiH authorities prior to the closure of the OHR had been agreed by the Political Directors of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board in February 2008.27 Given the current international commotion, it is impossible to expect in the short term a constructive and viable solution to this question. However, if not before, this will become an unavoidable theme once BiH starts accession negotiations. Addressing these problems requires the definition of some guiding principles. The process of EU accession offers an opportunity to focus

25 “The Council stresses that it will not be in a position to consider an application for membership by Bosnia and Herzegovina until the transition of the OHR to a reinforced EU presence has been decided”. Council of the EU, “Council conclusions on enlargement/stabilisation and association countries”, 8 December 2009. 26 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), “Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative”, 11 March 2005. 27 Agenda 5 + 2 | Office of the High Representative (http://www.ohr.int/agenda-52/

).

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on the “fundamentals” of the political, economic and ultimately societal transformation, if convincingly reaffirmed as the cornerstone of BiH policy-making. It is obvious, or perhaps not so obvious, for BiH that a country that wants to become an EU member needs to meet the membership criteria. This entails a comprehensive institutional, legal and policy transformation, which extends over a long period of time—as in some areas this transition continues well beyond accession. BiH cannot be an exception. The process of EU integration will assist BiH to build its capacity to adopt and implement EU law, as well as European and international standards more generally. Historically, such a process has proved capable—even for two countries of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia—to provide both guidance to the transition and an ambitious blueprint for the transformation. The very same process contains the necessary leverage (including financial support and conditionality) that is essential to carry out the necessary reforms. EU accession provides a blueprint for steering the process of change as an anchor to expectations that in turn produces positive externalities (Foreign Direct Investment, relocation of firms, etc.). It also provides the conditionality which can help overcome resistance to change. This model can and should be better used to steer the transformation of BiH. 5.2

The Need for a More Normative Approach

It is time to recognise that in BiH the current political elite is neither committed to reforms nor seriously engaging in the process of deep institutional transformation required by the accession to the EU. It is necessary to devise a system which is more explicitly based on conditionality than the current arrangements, but whereby BiH gets access to EU resources (IPA, WBIF, Investment Fund, etc.) de facto on a non-conditional basis. In a recent paper for the Robert Schuman Foundation, Pierre Mirel elaborates on a previous proposal for a staged accession to the EU for the Western Balkans.28 The proposal which is very concrete—“a pragmatic roadmap, with progressive financing based on reforms” in his words—aims at overcoming the dichotomy between limited pre-accession 28 See: Mirel (2022) as well as Mirel (2019) and Lazarevi´c (2018). More recently, in the context of Eastern European associated states, an approach based on a similar principle has been elaborated by Emerson et al. (2021).

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assistance and then massive post-accession funds for the Western Balkans. It articulates on the mechanism of benefits and sanctions (backsliding is financially sanctioned at each stage) already introduced by the new negotiating methodology approved by the Commission in 2020: progress in the implementation of reforms is rewarded by graduated access to structural and cohesions funds. In a nutshell, Mirel envisages three stages. A first stage consists of the implementation of the association agreements and some symbolic reforms. The second step foresees the integration of the country into the internal market. A so-called final stage of consolidation opens upon a positive assessment of the Commission that the criteria for membership are met. Each stage corresponds to a “graduation” of the country in terms of both access to resources, including structural funds, and participation in the various Commission’s and Union’s bodies. What seems particularly appealing in this proposal is that it identifies a consistent and credible path. Benefits are accrued at every stage of the process, in the form of both substantial financial support and gradual involvement in EU decision-making. This is clearly much more encompassing and dynamic than very long, time-consuming and somewhat abstract negotiations whose benefits are supposed to accrue all together at the time of accession in a distant future. The proposal requires perhaps some articulation when it comes to the sanctioning mechanism. First, it would be necessary to define a very detailed and articulated matrix of conditionality covering the substance (what), sequencing (order), the timing (when) and the amount of resources that could be generated by fulfilling conditions. The European Commission should be in charge of monitoring the process, while sanctioning procedures should be automatic and non-negotiable. The Commission should also be mandated to apply direct triggering mechanisms (i.e., not requiring to go back to the European Council) which should be already specified in the conditionality matrix. This of course would entail a massive preparatory work for the EU institutions, partly country specific. However, resources could be drawn from the reconversion of the institutional machinery now geared towards accession negotiations.

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5.3

Drafting an “Agenda for BiH Future”

Two elements are key for moving forward: political will and consensus among key stakeholders, admittedly both rare commodities in BiH. The attempt to change the governance system is particularly challenging: a State which is seemingly fully captured by vested interests will need to find strength to introduce reforms that are running against those very same vested interests. This is not easy, but nevertheless imperative. Hope is not a strategy; there is no alternative to radical change. Generating change will not be easy. Yet, the complexity of the task should not be an alibi for inaction. There have been repeated opportunities for the country’s key political leaders to hammer out agreements on reforms, but this has not worked and there is no conceivable reason why it should work in the future. This is hardly surprising, as calling the small and entrenched political elites to introduce major reforms is tantamount to asking those elites to cut down the branch on which they are sitting. If there is going to be any real chance of generating meaningful change, there must be a transformation of the approach, which should put more emphasis and responsibility on the BiH citizens and not just on the political elite. A possible way to create “pressure from below” and create a constituency for reform is by promoting a large-scale civil society initiative which should aim at drafting “An agenda for the BiH future”. The initiative, which could take the form of a Convention, should bring together intellectuals, academics, NGOs, as well as ordinary citizens and the media, economic associations, social partners and the most successful business sector representatives (including those from the innovative and high value-added sectors such as IT). In November 2021, the EU Office in BiH launched the Citizens’ Assembly, a gathering of a sample of 57 members/BiH citizens who were requested to express their views on constitutional and electoral reform and propose solutions for elimination of the discriminatory provisions in the BiH Constitution and improving the Election Law. The Citizens’ Assembly met over two weekends in February 2022 and elaborated a document containing 17 recommendations which were presented to the BiH Parliamentary Assembly in March 2022. However, the initiative, supported also by the US Embassy and the OSCE, seems to be too

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limited in scope and participation to be able to create the kind of pressure necessary to move the reform process forward.29 As a more comprehensive exercise, the Convention could be based on four/five main thematic clusters (e.g., form of the state/constitutional reforms; circular/green economy; depopulation and (youth) migration; etc.) to discuss both ideas and options that would create, through the consultative process, renewed “demand” for meaningful change. For each cluster, a group of experts could identify the main themes of the debate, lead consultations in person and on electronic media and summarise concrete proposals. A small secretariat could help identify and mobilise the main actors. A very comprehensive and effective communications strategy and media campaign should clearly explain the purpose of the Convention and promote the widest possible public participation. The Office of the EU Special Representative could promote, co-ordinate and finance the initiative, with the support of the international community and main donors.

6

Conclusions

Almost twenty years after having been recognised as a potential candidate for EU membership during the Thessaloniki European Council summit in June 2003, BiH is still stuck at the bottom of the process. Only in December 2022 was the country granted the status of EU candidate. The EU has been accused of pursuing rather erratic, at times contradictory and on the whole not so successful policies towards BiH, but it would be difficult to argue that it is just the EU that should be blamed. BiH clearly presents characteristics that have compounded the complexity of the accession blueprint. State capture, corruption, organised crime, lack of leadership and vision of policy-makers and civil society alike are all factors which have contributed heavily to transform an already complex agenda of political, economic and societal transformation into a “mission impossible”. Yet, the EU cannot afford the luxury to ignore the “BiH problem” for many reasons, ranging from the need to close a thirty-year-old painful historical European chapter, to the recognition that the management of European “issues” (e.g., migration flows/Balkan corridor) requires close 29 See: https://europa.ba/?p=74565; and https://www.skupstinagradjana.ba/images/ Recommendations_for_citizens_report_v6_1.pdf.

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coordination and integration with the countries of the region, including BiH. In addition, learning from recent events in Ukraine, the EU should pay particular attention to a country like BiH, where the potential for hybrid threats, a proxy war or a prolonged frozen conflict right at the centre of Europe is very significant. Already for the past thirty years, the country has been the focus of “games” based on a multiplicity of international geopolitical agendas and played by a variety of different actors (at times even members of the same “club”). The recognition that voids of strategies and ideas can easily turn to the advantage of other political actors calls for renewed and proper attention being devoted by the EU to the country. The brief review of the development of BiH relationship with the EU leads us to conclude that it is time to unequivocally acknowledge that the EU’s power of attraction so far has not been sufficient to generate the progress necessary for the country to move towards EU membership. It is therefore high time for recalibrating the EU strategy vis-à-vis BiH. Such a redefinition should reflect on the two major misperceptions which dominate the EU-BiH relationship, namely: (i) that BiH can become an EU member state under the institutional framework defined by Dayton and (ii) that EU rules will change to accommodate BiH peculiarities and not vice versa. In line with other proposals, the EU ought to revise the current enlargement strategy (not only for BiH but for all candidate countries) by introducing a “staged approach”. In parallel, it is suggested to attempt creating “pressure from below” by empowering new and progressive advocates of reforms though a “Convention” tasked to draft an “Agenda for BiH future”. This process, that could be managed by civil society, would provide a unique, inclusive and public platform for a different voice, forge a legitimate constituency to advocate for change and give citizens and other stakeholders a tool to shape their own future, calling local policy-makers to accountability.

References Barbari´c, D. (2022). Bosnia and Herzegovina, Between the Anvil and the Hammer: An Analysis of the Programs of the Major Ethno-National Parties. Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa. Retrieved from: https:// www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Authors/(author)/Dra%C5%BEen%20Barbari% C4%87.

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BiEPAG (2017). The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy. BiEPAG Policy Paper. Retrieved from: http:// www.biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/BIEPAG-The-Crisis-of-Dem ocracy-in-the-Western-Balkans.-Authoritarianism-and-EU-Stabilitocracy-web. pdf. Bonomi, M. (2018). The Western Balkans and the European Union Moving? In the Right Direction? CIFE Policy Paper No. 77. Retrieved from: https://www.cife.eu/Ressources/FCK/files/publications/policy%20p aper/2018/CIFE_Bonomi_WBEU_PPAnnexes.pdf. Bonomi, M. and D. Relji´c (2017). The EU and the Western Balkans: So Near and Yet So Far. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP), December 2017. Retrieved from: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-eu-and-the-westernbalkans-so-near-and-yet-so-far/. Dizdarevi´c Z. (2001). Bosnia Erzegovina 1992–1993 in Magno A.M. La guerra dei dieci anni Il Saggiatore Milan, pp. 143–197. Dumoulin M. (2022). Wilder Europe: Enlargement and a European Political Community European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/ wilder-europe-enlargement-and-a-european-political-community/. Džihi´c, V., et al. (2022). Unleashing the Potential for Change through Social Movements and Civic Initiatives. BiEPAG Publications. Emerson M. et al. (2021). Balkan and Eastern European Comparisons Building a New Momentum for the European integration of the Balkan and Eastern European associated States. CEPS Brussels, 2 March 2021. Retrieved from: https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Balkan-and-Eas tern-European-Comparisons.pdf. European Commission (1997). Agenda 2000. For a Stronger and Wider Union. Bulletin of the European Union. Supplement #/97 (Various Issues). Retrieved from: https://op.europa.eu/en/search-results?p_p_id= eu_europa_publications_portlet_search_executor_SearchExecutorPortlet_INS TANCE_q8EzsBteHybf&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&language= en&startRow=1&resultsPerPage=10&SEARCH_TYPE=SIMILAR_DOCU MENTS&ORIGINAL_DOCUMENT_ID=10a8c402-d905-448f-8320-1f4 60de6bd66.0010. European Commission (2018). A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Strasbourg, 6.2.2018 COM 65 final. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/ communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf.

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European Commission (2019). Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Application for Membership of the European Union SWD(2019) 222 final. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sys tem/files/2019-05/20190529-bosnia-and-herzegovina-opinion.pdf. European Commission (2021). Bosnia and Herzegovina 2021 Report COM(2021) 644 final. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbour hood-enlargement/bosnia-and-herzegovina-report-2021_en. International Monetary Fund (1996). Bosnia and Herzegovina: Recent Economic Developments IMF Staff Country Reports Volume 1996: Issue 104. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451804751.002 Lazarevi´c, M. (2018). Away with the Enlargement Bogeyman, European Policy Centre, 3 July. Retrieved from: https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/awaywith-the-enlargement-bogeyman/. Mirel, P. (2018). The Western Balkans: Between Stabilisation and Integration in the European Union, European Issues No. 459, January. Retrieved from: https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-eur ope/qe-480-en.pdf. Mirel, P. (2019). European Union—Western Balkans: In Support of a Revised Negotiation Framework. Robert Schuman Foundation, European Issue No. 529, 30 September 2019. Mirel, P. (2022). In Support of a New Approach to the Western Balkans: Step-by-Step Membership with a Consolidation Phase. European Issue No. 633. Retrieved from: https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-iss ues/0633-in-support-of-a-new-approach-to-the-western-balkans-step-by-stepmembership-with-a-consolidation. OSCE (2018). Two Schools Under One Roof—The Most Visible Example of Discrimination in Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/8/404990.pdf. Uvalic, M. (2019). Economic Integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union: The Role of EU Policies. In J. Džankic, S. Keil and M. Kmezi´c (eds), The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans—A Failure of EU Conditionality? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 4

Yugoslav Partition and Post-war EU Integration: The Role of Italy, 1990–2022 Stefano Bianchini

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Introduction: A Subject Barely Under Scrutiny

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, academic research and analytical studies are rather limited regarding the role played by Italy during both the Yugoslav succession wars and, later, the process which is potentially paving the way to the EU integration of Southeast Europe (SEE), Albania included. This observation may seem astonishing, particularly if considered under the lenses of the historical perspective. Admittedly, scholars extensively explored the Yugo-Italian relations during the twentieth century, but only until the Balkan Pact in the midst of the 1950s. The analysis of the events that followed is to a large extent non-existent. Only sporadically some articles have been published, and just one special issue of the “Guide to Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans” (in

S. Bianchini (B) University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_4

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Italian) has focused on this matter (Bianchini and Dassù 2001), in addition to an on-line edited book by Andrea Stocchiero (2007) and a recent article by Andrea Frontini and Davide Denti (2017). However, the Adriatic area has been the subject of intense, although often problematic, bilateral relations during the whole twentieth century and after the new millennium. It is sufficient here to remember that Italian governments opposed the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SHS); border controversies and contested views about the military control over the Adriatic Sea dominated between the two world wars. Subsequently, Italy invaded Yugoslavia, committed atrocities, was bitterly defeated, and still developed a competing policy with the socialist federation in the 1950s. Even the contacts between the two respective communist parties suffered from controversies for decades. All these arguments have been explored systematically by the domestic and international literature. In addition, the international “restrictions” imposed on the Italian foreign policy after World War II were also investigated (Basciani and Ivetic 2021; Bucarelli 2018; Cataruzza 2014; Caroli 2011; Monzali 2007; Di Nolfo et al. 1985; Alatri 1976). Furthermore, in the 1970s, a crucial turning point occurred, when the Osimo Agreement was signed and the cross-border flows between Italy and Yugoslavia improved dramatically. Rome and Belgrade moved from confrontation to cooperation and the two countries appeared to be a pattern of effective coexistence at the Helsinki Conference on European security. Simultaneously, the two communist parties also benefitted from the re-establishment of the political partnership between the Gramsci Institute and the Marxist Centers, strengthening the exchange of views and the mutual knowledge of the respective policies since 1977. The hopes raised by the approach of Eurocommunism also contributed to reinforce opportunities of dialogue and synergies between Rome and Belgrade. These aspects have also been put under scrutiny, although less frequently than those mentioned earlier (Bianchini 2003). As a consequence of the results previously achieved by the diplomacies of the two countries and the respective communist parties, it might have been expected that the post-Tito years and the growing tensions within the socialist federation should have alarmed Italy. The efforts made by the parties to stabilize the Adriatic space were, in fact, increasingly at risk. Nonetheless, despite a couple of collective books and some occasional articles, the events that were gradually precipitating the Yugoslav federation into a bloody conflict were widely underestimated. Indeed, when

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the war exploded, scholars and journalists published a number of books and reportages on the events in the Yugoslav region. As soon as the peace treaties were signed between 1995 and 2001, there was in-depth analysis. However, the scrutiny focused mainly on (1) the domestic situation in the Yugoslav successor states; (2) their bilateral/multilateral relations; and (3) the role of EU, NATO, and other international organizations. Amazingly, however, the role of the Italian foreign policy did not become a target of academic studies, at least in Italy, while analytical articles rarely addressed the issue. How can we explain such a gap in studies of Italian foreign policy, taking into account that the impact of the Yugoslav collapse has been highly relevant for the Adriatic policy of Italy? Did Italy play a modest role in the region? Or was Italy following an alternative agenda (for instance, giving priority to the Mediterranean)? Or, again, have domestic issues diverted Italy from international concerns? To what extent have these aspects encouraged scholars and analysts to pay less attention to the Italian Balkan policy? Most probably, all these reasons (although to different degrees) may have influenced scholars and analysts by discouraging them to carefully look at the strategies put in place by the Italian authorities. Admittedly, the post-cold war crisis of the Italian political institutions has aggravated the country’s traditional weak governance. Based on short-living governments, fragile coalitions, and alternate ministers, it often mirrored a feeling of incoherence. Finally, the Italian foreign policy had suffered from additional shortcomings since the end of World War II. As a defeated country and a US client state, with a huge public debt which has always been treated as a relevant weakness within the European Common Market and, later, in the EU, the attempts to carry forward an autonomous strategy, corresponding to well-identified “national interests,” remained strongly constrained. In the remaining part of this chapter, we will discuss Italian foreign policy in the Balkans in the 1990s, during the 2001–2008 period, and after the global financial crisis, trying to identify some of its salient features. Some conclusions regarding Italy’s perceptions of the Western Balkan region and the most recent developments are given in the last section.

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2 The Italian Foreign Policy in the Balkans: The Potential and the Troubles of the 1990s Despite the limitations of Italian foreign policy mentioned earlier, some important “enlightened” phases marked the actions of the Italian diplomacy, as for example during the 1989–1992 period. On the one hand, in fact, the efforts were directed to operate within multilateral institutions, like the UN, NATO, the OSCE, but above all the European Community, under the firm belief that the inclusive strategy of the latter would have facilitated the achievement of peace, reconciliation, and stabilization among the Yugoslav successor states, reinforcing the international stability of the country. On the other, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs promoted a regional strategy of cooperation, with the aim to pave the way either to an increasingly influential role of Rome in Central and Southeast Europe, or to contribute to the consolidation of the Europeanness of the post-socialist and post-war republics. Furthermore, a series of bilateral initiatives were promoted in a variety of fields, from military and humanitarian assistance to economic development, from cultural cooperation to training and academic education. Substantially, these three goals have been pursued by all Italian governments in the last 30 years, although from time to time their implementation suffered of inconsistencies. These inconsistencies were partly due to the impact of domestic institutional crises, especially between 1992 and 1996. In addition, they partly stemmed from the need to come to terms with the Western allies’ constraints. They also had to cope with diverted geopolitical priorities, and the lack of proper funds, particularly after the 2007/2008 financial emergency. As a result, not always has the Italian foreign policy mirrored an image of continuity and coherence. Therefore, its credibility was affected, despite the commitments of multiple Italian players, from enterprises to civil society organizations, from universities to local administrations, which conspicuously contributed to develop transnational relations and support the diplomatic activities in the Balkans, within the EU, with international organizations like ILO, UNHCR, UNESCO, and other financial institutions (Marcon 2001). Initially, however, an original transnational strategy was launched by Minister Gianni De Michelis while he was in office. Venetian by origin, he had a specific cultural sensitivity toward the Central and East European space. Consistently, he reacted immediately, as soon as the Berlin Wall collapsed. Two days later, on November 11, 1989, he was able to

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promote in Budapest a regional intergovernmental forum called “Quadrangular” with the participation of Italy, Hungary, Austria, and the Yugoslav socialist federation. Practically, he suggested that a cooperation between a NATO country, a Warsaw Pact member, a neutral state, and a non-aligned federation was possible under the new international circumstances created by the radical reforms underway in the socialist camp. Few months later, in early 1990, the Italian and the Yugoslav diplomacies started to elaborate ideas about an “Adriatic Initiative,” with the uncovered aim of attracting a still isolated Albania in a new, dynamic, and regional framework. In both cases, these actions assumed that the Yugoslav federation will be able to manage its domestic disagreements and, in fact, Belgrade represented a firm reference for the Italian diplomacy toward SEE (Pitassio 2021). Even when the war erupted in Slovenia, the Italian government expressed its concern about the risk of the Yugoslav dismemberment, despite the different visions voiced by the President of the Republic Francesco Cossiga and the former Italian communist party (now Democratic Party of the Left). Both of these players were committed to the idea of self-determination and deeply believed that its uncompromising implementation would have quickly led to a peaceful stabilization of the Yugoslav space. Such an illusory approach was to a large extent influenced by both the attitude of Germany, whose political unification had just been achieved, and the persistence of Leninist ideas on secessions in the Italian left. De Michelis, finally, capitulated in September 1991 during a bilateral meeting in Venice with his German counterpart Genscher. Which arguments have been used by the latter to convince the Italian minister that no future existed for the Yugoslav federation, is still unknown. Nevertheless, the outcome of the meeting had far-reaching consequences for the Italian diplomacy. On the one hand, in fact, the “Quadrangular” project was quickly transformed into a “Pentagonal,” with the inclusion of Czechoslovakia. Then, the organization suffered from the dismemberment of the two socialist federations. Only gradually, its membership grew up to 18 member states, by expanding its geopolitical dimension to Central Europe, Ukraine and Moldova, the Yugoslav successor republics, and other Balkan states, but Greece. As a result, its institutional structure was quickly readjusted under the name of “Central European Initiative” (CEI). The Austrian involvement together with Italy in the operational

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activities of the association was relevant in the years to follow, considering the historical links and the financial penetration of both of these countries into SEE. Nevertheless, the new center-right government in Vienna decided to withdraw from the organization after the end of 2018, under the belief that the role of CEI was over and only the EU would have been able to face the regional challenges. This assessment, instead, was rejected by Italy, which guaranteed rather exclusively the CEI financial support since its foundation. In the end, and despite all these adaptations, this macroregional policy based on inclusiveness and prospective integration into the European Community was preserved and determined the Italian strategical approach to the region. On the other hand, by contrast, the project of an “Adriatic Initiative” rapidly evaporated, both because of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and because of the state collapse of Albania (Rama 2020). The latter event had a strong impact on Italy, since thousands of refugees arrived on boats in a few days in the harbors of Puglia. It was August 1991. The breakdown of Tirana’s communist isolation, the massive emigration flows, and their potential impact on the stability of Italy encouraged the authorities in Rome to organize a humanitarian mission under the name of “Pelican intervention.” It took place between 1991 and 1993, providing emergency help and refugees repatriation to Albania (Perlmutter 1998). However, the stabilization of the country was only temporary. In a few years, the failure of the policies adopted by the democratic president Sali Berisha brought the country to the brink of disintegration in 1997. In particular, the huge social and financial crisis generated by the collapse of pyramid schemes was followed by anarchy, assaults on ammunition, and weapons depots by the criminality, leading to a potential military confrontation. At the regional level, the situation was highly risky, since the Kosovo issue was increasingly unstable and the achievements of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina were too recent and fragile. Under these circumstances, the Italian government was able to mobilize international support in order to preserve the integrity of Albania. Subsequently, with the “Alba operation,” Italy successfully led a multinational peacekeeping force with the support of the United Nations, OSCE, and other countries, which reestablished the order in the country between April and August 1997 (Ministero Affari Esteri 1997). Different in nature, but a similar successful participatory experience occurred on the former Yugoslav territory, due to the contribution of at

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least 20,000 volunteers from approximately 1,200 associations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), who manifested openly their solidarity with the war victims. It is sufficient here to recall the generous and systematic efforts made by the Italian Consortium of Solidarity, Agesci, and the Forum of the Third Sector, which operated during the 1990s in the Balkans. Their activities concerned mainly of humanitarian aid and the development of decentralized cooperation, through the mobilization of hundreds of Italian local institutions and regional administrations. Their commitments included twinning programs, training for local managers and officers, building of transnational networks in support of democratization, freedom of media, social economy, and civic education in former Yugoslavia and Albania (Pettifer and Vickers 2009). The role of NGOs, often misrepresented and disowned, had instead a far-reaching impact, since it multiplied the Italian presence in the Balkans, paving the way for the expansion of a diversified plurality of agents interested to transfer their expertise and offer partnerships. In other words, there was a potential for rooting an Italian “country system” in SEE. That is, a system based on a consistent set of public and private actors aimed to implement shared goals in the foreign policy of the country, by supporting prospectively democratization and integration of the Balkans into the EU. Given the increasing number of engaged players, in the political and economic spheres as well as in the social, cultural, and educational domains, such a growing pluralism of interests and purposes required also a strong capacity of harmonization. However, this was the main aspect that Italy missed, since any effort to coordinate the initiatives on the ground was regarded as an intrusion by the state, or other players appointed to carry out this task, into the “freedom of project implementation.” Consequently, the effectiveness of such an Italian comprehensive presence was left disjoined and, ultimately, weakened. In particular, the last decade of the twentieth century was highly problematic politically for the Italian government. This also explains, to a large extent, the limitations suffered by the two aforementioned regional strategies which were elaborated by the Minister De Michelis when he was still in office. The “Mani Pulite” (Clean Hands) judicial investigation, which started in February 1992, discovered how widespread political corruption was in the country. This quickly led to the disappearance of many political parties, affecting the stability of the institutions, their predictability, and strategic performance capacity in a period marked by a deep economic crisis. Under these circumstances, the Giuliano Amato government passed

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a huge financial operation with a retroactive levy on bank accounts in 1992, but could not remain in office for long. Other weak governments followed. This unstable political situation had a long-term effect throughout the whole decade. The image of the Italian “country system,” which was emerging during the first half of the 1990s, suffered subsequently from low credibility and this belief affected various public and private spheres of the country. In addition, a very high public deficit and public debt seriously affected Italy’s fiscal position, so major policy efforts were needed in order to enable Italy to enter the Eurozone. Furthermore, it was under these circumstances that the “Telecom affair” occurred. In 1997, in fact, the company Telecom Italia decided to buy 29% of Telekom Srbija’s shares. This operation involved other foreign firms, such as the Greek OTE, and became possible as soon as the UN sanctions against Serbia had been removed. Consequently, a wave of privatizations was promoted by Belgrade once the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was over. However, the amount paid by the Italian company was soon associated to allegations of bribes to Miloševi´c, aimed to preserve his power and enable him to pay pensions before the elections (Uvali´c 2012). This criticism poisoned further the domestic political life of Serbia. However, it had repercussions in Italy as well. In addition to political recriminations related to the support for Miloševi´c’s regime, a legal investigation suspected some key leaders of the Italian Center-Left of corruption (from Romano Prodi to Piero Fassino, also including some cardinals), on the basis of false documents presented by a schemer. It was only in 2015 that they were all fully recognized as victims of slander. Meanwhile, however, international damage of the role of Italy had been inflicted.

3

Building Multilateral and Bilateral Commitments in the Balkans: The Challenges of the New Millennium

While the domestic situation of Italy remained fragile until the end of the decade, both the post-Yugoslav space and Albania were politically, economically, and territorially debilitated. By contrast, an enlargement agenda had been agreed among the EU member states since 1993. Therefore, an opportunity for a relative, gradual stabilization at the regional

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level was created, but fruitful conditions for a prospective integration of the Balkans had still to be generated. It was only after the NATO bombing of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) because of Kosovo in 1999 and the subsequent Western mediation, which suspended the Macedonian conflict in 2001, that violent confrontations and political turbulences began to calm down significantly. Moreover, Tud-man’s death in Croatia in 1999 and the electoral defeat of Miloševi´c in FR Yugoslavia in October 2000, followed by his imprisonment and transfer to the ICTY in June 2001, contributed to radically change the situation. Meanwhile, a fair degree of government stability was established in Rome. The new state of affairs made the Italian diplomacy able to take again some important initiatives, by relaunching, for example, the project of Adriatic security and transnational cooperation, while the EU embarked on the implementation of a Southeast European Stability Pact. Thus, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to gradually restore those bonds which had marked the plans pursued at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s under De Michelis. The regeneration of its own bilateral and regional policies was carried out in relation to the EU framework perspective. As a result, on the one hand, a broader and more articulated format laid the foundations, in May 2000 in Ancona, of the AdriaticIonian Initiative, which actively also included Greece. The association was initially set up by six countries, but later they grew to ten (Italy, Slovenia, Greece, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia, and San Marino). Meanwhile, in 2010, these countries agreed to set up an EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR). Consequently, a political project was presented to the EU Commission which resulted in the formal establishment of EUSAIR in 2014. At the same time, as will be seen, the CEI reinvigorated its regional activities by promoting, in particular, an annual Economic Forum Summit between 1998 and 2007. On the other hand, this multilayered engagement of the Italian diplomacy had a beneficial impact on the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003, when the resistance of some EU member states was overcome thanks to the Italian contribution. On that occasion, the EU formally expressed the willingness to accept the membership of all Yugoslav successor states and Albania, as soon as the conditions for integration would have been achieved.

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Therefore, limitations and uncertainties marked the policies during the 1990s, both because Rome lost an important regional ally—the socialist Yugoslavia—and because of domestic economic and political shortcomings, which led Italy to passively follow the policies of its allies within NATO and the European Community. By contrast, with the new millennium, an original and comprehensive behavior was strategically implemented by the Italian authorities. There was a U-turn of the Italian diplomatic efforts. Its roots, however, are to be traced back to the first period (the 1990s), whose focus was examined earlier. In addition to previous considerations, in fact, it is crucially relevant to underline that despite the mentioned limitations, some of the main tools which made Italy’s subsequent engagement possible were actually established at the beginning of the 1990s. I am not only alluding to regional strategies, but also to the legal framework that substantially supported the project implementation during the new decade. In fact, it should be noted that when communism collapsed in Europe, between 1989 and 1991, there was only one financial instrument in Italy, the so-called Law 49 of 1987, that was regulating the access to available funds of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, its focus was primarily centered on cooperation for economic development. Therefore, the existing Law 49 was not sufficient and adequate to address the requirements of stabilization and democratization in the Balkans. Nevertheless, before the effects of the “Clean Hands” judicial investigation could be felt in the political and institutional sphere, two other legal instruments were passed by the Parliament in 1992. These instruments were the Law 180 aimed to support peace and humanitarian initiatives, and the Law 212, which established the conditions for financing projects for countries in the Balkans, the CIS, Central Europe, and the Baltics. Subsequently, in 2001, the Parliament passed the new Law 84, which created a specific Fund for stabilization, reconstruction, and development of the Balkans. Furthermore, the Law regulated the funding of the agencies connected with the Ministry of Foreign Trade (e.g., Informest and the Italian Trade Agency ICE), whose task was to promote and assist the internationalization of Italian companies particularly in Southeast Europe, in addition to the implementation of specific priority projects, such as the Pan-European corridors V and VIII (Mameli 2007). In line with these new developments, as soon as the domestic and international conditions permitted to operate in the Balkans at the beginning

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of the new millennium, fresh impetus was given to a variety of actions promoted by civil society associations, NGOs, international organizations, universities, public and private institutions, with the support particularly of the General Directorate of Europe (DG EU) and the General Directorate for Cooperation to Development of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before the 2007 great recession started, an amount of approximately e60 million was spent in 170 projects, 45% of which were spent for economic development purposes, including in-depth research on the trilateral cooperation of Italy, Croatia, and Slovenia about the infrastructural potential of the Pan-European corridor V (Privitera 2009). An Italian “country system” was allegedly now operating. The potential for coordinating the vitality of multiple networks in the Balkans represented once again a necessity, in order to strengthen the role of Italy in the international regional fora and the visibility of its promoted projects. Admittedly, the authority of the Italian representatives in numerous regional institutions and managerial groups was, and still is, appreciated and acknowledged. However, a new attempt of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, limited to monitoring the actions made in support of the inter-ethnic dialogue in the Balkans with the aim to encourage some form of prospective coordination of the players, which were implementing the co-financed projects promoted by the Ministry, failed again in 2008. As a result, the Italian networks engaged in cooperation with Balkan institutions or organizations confirmed their inability, and unwillingness, to act in a systemic perspective. At the same time, the aforementioned financial instruments passed during the 1990s made possible the implementation of CEI training courses on European enlargement for young diplomats in foreign policy and management of Central Europe and the Balkans between 1999 and 2001. Moreover, an international conference held in the Forlì campus of the University of Bologna in 2001, with the participation of 16 teams of experts, consultants, junior researchers, policymakers, and diplomats, produced a policy paper about the challenges and opportunities for the CEI, with a focus on youth, University networks, and regional economic and sustainable development (CEI 2001). Meanwhile, the aforementioned Ancona Conference made possible to carry out the strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region under the new international conditions, after the failure of the first attempt in 1990. Cooperation between police offices, in order to intensify the exchange of information against criminality and in the field of intelligence, was

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arranged. Similarly, interport communication, with its impact on environment and the potential development of tourism, was also included in the initiative’s priorities. Furthermore, in the perspective of reducing post-war tensions and nationalisms, education acquired a key role in the regional programs. As a result, few months later in December 2000, a Rector’s conference was summoned by the Universities of Bologna and Ancona in Ravenna. With the financial support of the Ministry, a regional virtual University called Uniadrion (i.e., “University of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas”) was established, with a rotating chairmanship of the rectors and a permanent secretariat in Ravenna. In a few years, joint masters and specialized courses on tourism, agriculture, and sustainable economy were established. However, despite the initial aims, the financial support to educational activities gradually evaporated. Government priorities did not attribute a crucial importance to training and higher education, even though this was the cheapest area for investments and, at the same time, the most promising of all the relevant impacts and prospective follow-ups in the medium and long term. As a result, the role of Uniadrion declined, and even the interest of the Universities, including the one in Bologna, cooled down. The role of the CEI was, in this respect, different, and to certain extent, more effective. The association was gradually able to catalyze some funds for promoting, in particular, three forms of grants. Small-scale CEI cooperation activities co-financed networking seminars and workshops every year since the beginning of the new millennium. The priority areas concerned mainly science and technology, education, and culture in general terms, but 45 projects on ethnic reconciliation were also cofinanced between 2003 and 2008. In this case, the main beneficiaries were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, and Macedonia. Additional four projects had a regional character (Mameli 2008). Moreover, a CEI Fund was promoted with the EBRD since 1992. This is a bilateral fund operating to support economic transition and EU integration of the Western Balkans, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. So far, the Fund has been subsidized by the Italian government with e56 million. As such, it represents the most relevant instrument through which Italy has backed, with continuity, the Western Balkans. The CEI Fund operates through 2 programs: the technical assistance projects aimed to sponsor EBRD operations; and the Know-How Exchange

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Program, operating to endorse reforms toward EU standards and EU integration. Subsequently, since 2004, the CEI Secretariat hosted the “Permanent Secretariat for Corridor V,” which began to apply for project funding to Interreg programs, and particularly to the Interreg Cross-border cooperation (CBC) Italy-Slovenia program. Although this Secretariat was later dismissed (in 2009), its actions played a crucial role in strengthening the CEI project preparation capacity. Furthermore, the establishment of CEI parliamentary, governmental, and economic dimensions offered new opportunities to officials of the member states to regularly meet and discuss how to implement forms of multilateral cooperation. The fate of Uniadrion was slightly different. As has already been noted, after an intense period of project implementation, a financial decline seriously affected this inter-university association. Under these circumstances, the Marche region—in search of an Adriatic visibility—began to lobby at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the establishment of a Permanent Secretariat of the Initiative in Ancona. Initially, some resistance in Rome expressed concern about an overlapping of competences with the CEI. At the end, however, the Secretariat began to operate in 2008 with a financial support granted only by the Ministry, despite the involvement of the local municipality, the Marche Region, and the Chamber of Commerce. Meanwhile, Uniadrion had moved its premises from the Ravenna Campus of the University of Bologna to the Polytechnic University in Ancona. Still, its activities remained poor and occasional for approximately another decade, while different University networks were relying on the Erasmus and other EU programs. Similar limitations marked the activities of the forum of the Adriatic-Ionian cities and the Forum of the Chamber of Commerce, which were also founded in Ancona, with the aim of expanding the potential of cross-border cooperation. A connection with the EU macroregional strategies was, in fact, still lacking, limiting these initiatives to the local level. Nevertheless, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea was launched in 2009, as the first step toward the creation of the EUSBSR. In 2010, the EU Strategy for the Danube River (EUSDR) was initiated and, as already mentioned, a similar Strategy was finally adopted in 2014 for the AdriaticIonian Macroregion, under the acronym of EUSAIR. The focus was based on four main pillars—connectivity, blue economy, tourism, and environmental protection—under the belief that the transnational cooperation in

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these fields would have strengthened the identification of common interests in the Yugoslav successor states and Albania. This framework offered the opportunity to the Marche region, together with the three AdriaticIonian Initiative fora, to attract the interest of the DG Regio about their AI-NUREEC (Adriatic-Ionian Network of Universities, Regions, Chamber of Commerce, and Cities Initiative) proposal. Co-financed since 2018 by the EU Commission, this project put in place joint synergies for youth, cultural industries, tourism, and capacity building. Consequently, and despite the twisted process which marked the beginning of such activities, the EUSAIR platform and the three fora began to meet regularly every year, by promoting specific initiatives and gradually enhancing the cooperation of the political sphere with the academic and practitioner environments. By contrast, and paradoxically, the CEI in the meantime entered into a deep crisis of identity and scope, which is still ongoing. At the same time, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs promoted directly, or in cooperation with other international institutions, bilateral projects of cooperation and education. Suffice here is to remember its commitment in supporting human rights in SEE with co-financing, since 2001, of the master ERMA (European Regional Master in Democracy and Human Rights in Southeast Europe) in Sarajevo, under the broader program of the Globus Campus of Human Rights based in Venice and with the diploma recognition of the University of Bologna. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was able to rely on the funds provided by the aforementioned laws. Consistently, a team led by UNESCO-BRESCE (Venice) carried out a series of training actions focused on environmental regulations adopted in the European Union and on methodologies to be applied in support of environmental protection. The target of such actions were public administrators and schoolteachers in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The intercultural dialogue, human rights protection, and reconciliation were further lines of intervention, whose beneficiaries were mainly Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia. Some regional projects were also financed by the EU. Among those, a set of projects on democratization in Serbia were encouraged and carried out by local NGOs immediately after the fall of Miloševi´c. In turn, the Directorate of Cooperation for development also broadened its “traditional field of actions,” originally addressed to support infrastructure, the strengthening of small and medium-sized enterprises,

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the healthcare systems, energy, environmental protection, and the protection of cultural legacies. Education, in this context, acquired a new relevance through the promotion of University executive masters’ courses and summer schools for graduate students and activists of the whole region (e.g., the Cervia International Summer School, which lasted from 1995 to 2018 with the additional support of the European Commission and CEI). Under these circumstances, two master programs on EU governance and policies, and one in politics and administration for young students from the Balkans, involved the University of Bologna and lecturers from a wide network of Italian higher education institutions. Other projects were focused on institutional capacity building, for example in Macedonia, with the aim of facilitating the implementation of the Ohrid agreement (also with the participation of UNESCO). In Kosovo, the efforts were concentrated on training the public administration with the transfer of know-how in information technology. The support to local institutions was the priority of Italian investments in Albania. In January 2006, a broad international conference was held once again in Forlì. It was co-sponsored by the Universities of Bologna and Graz, NATO, the Johns Hopkins University, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the participation of the deputy Prime Ministers of Slovakia, Serbia and Macedonia, the Special coordinator of the Stability Pact, the Italian deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, members of the European Parliament, UniCredit officials and eighty experts and scholars. The main concern was the status of the peace treaties in the Balkans, particularly the further impact of the Annex IV of the Dayton agreement (which refers to the fundamental Charter) in relation to the subsequent treaties signed after the Kosovo and Macedonian crisis, also in consideration of the expected results of the Montenegro referendum for independence summoned for May 2006 (Bianchini et al. 2007). In other words, the period between 1999 and 2006 was particularly dynamic, not only in terms of projects supported by the Italian diplomacy and its institutions, either autonomously or in cooperation with international organizations like the World Bank, OSCE, EBRD, EIB, and UN agencies, but also in terms of cooperation with universities, civil society organizations, Italian public and private institutions. In fact, the country was able to promote an intense network of relations, which gave to Italy an insightful visibility in the Balkans, together with Germany and Austria, while promoting projects whose main task was to facilitate the

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process of membership in the EU for the Balkan candidate/potential candidate countries. Regretfully, the subprime mortgage crisis, with the severe contraction of liquidity in global financial markets, triggered a great depression in the EU, which was particularly problematic for Italy due to its high government debt. As a result, all the aforementioned laws were not refinanced by the Parliament and most of the activities launched in the previous years had to be stopped or interrupted.

4 Italy and the Balkans After the Financial Crisis and New Emergencies To sum up, until 2007–2009, the Italian governments and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite some domestic ups and downs, backed consistently the EU integration of the Balkans, either bilaterally or by fostering regional cooperation. The support offered to the CEI, the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (1999–2008) are some effective examples. However, since 2007–2009, a set of financial difficulties and unexpected emergencies (from the migration crisis to the pandemic) radically changed the international context (Chiodi and Devole 2005). In particular, regional cooperation, as a prerequisite for EU integration of the Balkan candidate and potential candidate countries, was affected by reorganizations and suffered from the differentiation of EU priorities. On the one hand, the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was closed in 2007 in order to be replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council in 2008 in Sarajevo. The aim was to encourage the ownership of regional cooperation policies by the local Balkan governments and a rationalization of the multiple initiatives under implementation, by absorbing and coordinating dozens of regional projects operating in a variety of fields. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the EU in 2009 started to encourage macroregional strategies, while the Italian financial resources were diminishing and/or allocated to other priorities (specifically, the South Mediterranean Sea). As a consequence of the new EU plans, the Italian-led regional organizations started to lose their scope and attractiveness (the CEI quickly, while the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative after the establishment of EUSAIR in 2014). As a result, although the financial support to both the CEI and the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative did not vanish, the Italian approach identified new mechanisms and targets for regional cooperation. In particular, Italy became a significant donor of the RCC

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and the main donor of the Interreg Adrion program which supports the implementation of the EUSAIR. In the meantime, the EU had to face the expected consequences of the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and the long renegotiations of the Lisbon Treaty which entered into force on December 1, 2009. Under these circumstances, the EU public declarations about an “enlargement fatigue” met quickly the request of some member states to apply austerity measures and a serious surveillance of the Greek debt, whose government was forced to implement a draconian package of measures. Restrictive economic policies were also imposed to other countries, including Italy. Consequently, the government in Rome, as many others, had to adapt both budgets and strategies to the new framework. Therefore, the process of EU enlargement was in the meantime delayed. Only Croatia, after Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, was able to join the Union in 2013. Affected by the turmoil in the South Mediterranean and Middle East as well as the growing migration flows from North Africa and Turkey, the other Balkan countries remained waiting for further EU integration without significant incentives, while the EU conditionality was declining in stimulus. Despite summits and promises, the launch of the Berlin process, and recurring references to macroregional policies, only EU Interreg programs de facto remained active, in addition to the main financial assistance program (IPA) and those offered by Erasmus to the universities (but covering the whole EU area) (Wollrad and Cortellese 2021). Nevertheless, the Italian Cooperation Program was able to offer e 250.000,00 to Macedonia in 2015, in addition to a previous amount of e 200.000,00 to help the implementation of the UN refugee plan and the reception facilities for migrants crossing the Balkan route. At the same time, Italy established a new Agency of cooperation for development (AICS), with the web page Openaid—AICS which reports all projects that have been financed. Moreover, an AICS operational center was created in Tirana in 2014. However, since priorities are decided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the destabilization in North Africa soon “downgraded” the Balkans, the competencies of the AICS Agency in Tirana were limited to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and partially Kosovo, restricting significantly, therefore, the areas of intervention (Longo and Rossi 2019). The CEI, in turn, began to promote workshops and annual conferences on migration in the Balkans between 2016 and 2018, while a recent

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International Organization for Migration (IOM) proposal on migrations and diasporas in North Macedonia has been approved under the framework of the CEI Know-how Exchange Program. In 2020, the worsening of the institutional crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the persistent difficulties recorded in the so-called BeogradPriština dialogue prompted the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to allocate additional resources aimed to help regional stabilization. In this case, the priority was not cooperation to help economic development, but regional reconciliation, youth, and EU agendas. Consequently, 1.5 million euro has been earmarked for a number of small projects to be implemented during 2021–2022, while a new call was to be published by the end of 2022. As a result, this investment appeared to give fresh stimulus to peace and reconciliation in the Western Balkans. By publicly supporting a new set of projects, the Ministerial initiative could have been regarded not only symbolically, but also substantially, an important indication of the resumption of the EU enlargement negotiations with the candidate or potential candidate countries in the Balkans, after years of delays and skepticism. Nevertheless, consistency of these positive actions seems to have failed in the meantime.

5

Concluding Remarks

We can determine a potential chronological subdivision in Italian foreign policy in the region of Southeast Europe, which suggests the identification of at least three relevant periods. The first one concerns the whole decade of the 1990s, which was initially marked by the outlining of an adequate policy for radical geopolitical changes, followed by the sharp decline of the Italian Cold War institutions. The second period, which lasted until the international crisis of 2007–2008, was characterized by Italy’s increasing diplomatic engagement in the region, based on the implementation of tangible projects due to available funds and the commitment of institutional structures. The third period, which lasts to date, preserved the will of supporting the consolidation of regional stability and democratization in the Balkans, but suffered from four major international crises which have particularly affected Europe: (1) the consequences of the 2007– 2008 liquidity contraction of global markets; (2) the migration crisis due to flows from Africa and across the Balkan route; (3) the coronavirus pandemic; and (4) the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

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Nevertheless, since 1989 and for over three decades, the Italian authorities—as well as the public opinion and civil society organizations—have ascribed a strategic importance to the Balkan region. Despite domestic difficulties from time to time, the Italian policymakers have perceived South-Eastern Europe as an area of crucial national interests, both in terms of security and economic and financial cooperation, and for its cultural proximity. This perception strengthened particularly after 1975, when the Osimo agreements put an end to the decade-long controversy over the borders between Italy and Yugoslavia. Irrespective of some initial resistance in the Trieste province, the bilateral relations flourished in the years to come. Tourism became a strong lever of mutual knowledge, bilaterally encouraging a positive view of the respective societies. Therefore, the collapse of Yugoslavia was perceived as a tragedy by a large part of the political arena and the public opinion, which frequently expressed their shock for the brutality of the war. This also explains the wide sense of solidarity that has been manifested in Italy toward refugees and displaced people. Such feelings persisted after the end of the military confrontations among the Yugoslav successor states. The geopolitical stability of the region was (and still is) very relevant for Italy to participate actively in peace-building missions of the UN, but also to develop wider economic, financial, and educational relations, promoting multilateral organizations and projects thanks to the role played by CEI, AII, Universities, public administrations, and a variety of EU structural commitments where Italy is involved. As a result, the positive perception of the Western Balkans in Italy is shared by a large part of the political and social arena, even though media and public statements often inadequately refer to the post-war Balkan developments. Such a contradictory stance risks to find Italy unprepared, whenever radical events occur worldwide and impact on the fragile stability of the Western Balkans. For example, the migration flows along the Balkan route since 2015, as well as the pandemic after early 2020, have significantly contributed to downgrade the Italian perceptions of the persistent unsettled status of the region. Consistently, the growing tensions in the Western Balkans were (and are) underestimated in the public perceptions and in political behavior. Moreover, the war in Ukraine and the escalating number of sanctions imposed on the Russian federation and Belarus have radically changed the European context—politically, militarily, and economically— after February 24, 2022. This occurred when the funds of “New

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Generation EU” were to be transferred to the member states, with the aim of both encouraging a fast economic recovery after the coronavirus pandemic and the reduction of the climate change impact. However, the confrontation with Moscow is going to absorb a huge amount of resources, shaping prospectively the development of government policies of both the EU and the United States. In particular, the solidarity toward the Ukrainian government facing the Russian invasion has acquired quick and unexpected connotations, with far-reaching consequences for the EU normative behavior and the reliability of its enlargement policy. The decision of the European Council of June 24, 2022, to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, leaving aside the long-term procedures adopted so far with other candidate or potential candidate countries, represents a U-turn in EU conduct. Admittedly, such developments might lead to unpredictable disappointments, if not profound irritations in the Balkans. On that occasion, furthermore, the Italian government quite surprisingly abandoned the traditional strategy aimed at giving priority to further EU enlargement to the Balkan candidate or potential candidate countries. As mentioned earlier, Italian authorities have frequently reported (though not always consistently), ever since 1989, in public statements and declarations, that the “national interest” of Italy lies in the stabilization of the Balkans in the East, and in the Mediterranean in the South. Instead, quite unexpectedly, Draghi’s government did not raise its voice in June 2022 in support of granting candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina and opening negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. Italy also did not confront with Bulgaria when Sofia justified its veto on Skopje’s opening of accession talks by resorting to arguments which were never before included during previous negotiations with other candidates. In other words, the role of Italy unexpectedly seems to have evaporated, while France, Germany, The Netherlands, and Bulgaria, for different reasons, decided to again postpone further EU enlargements. The so-called Western Balkans were left alone. This was a severe blow for the region, which suffered substantially from its isolation and the deep indifference, if not underestimation, of the EU member states of the Southeast European unstable context. The subsequent frictions recorded in the whole region between June and August 2022 could be a severe warning that a new phase of destabilization might come. Meanwhile, the earlier Italian contribution to the development of regional strategies and

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its efforts to consolidate the Balkans by operating either within multilateral institutions or bilaterally, suddenly weakened. As a result, the role of Italy in the European Council was also downgraded. Manifestly, the old constraints stemming from the “client role” of Italy, its huge public debt and its dependencies on the US and the most powerful EU members, are still in place. They exert considerable pressure on Italy’s behavior, downsizing its ability to protect the “national interest.” The fragility of its governmental coalitions is not helping either. Therefore, in the light of the July governmental crisis, Draghi’s resignment and the call for early parliamentary elections, it remains to be seen whether the uncertainties produced by the domestic crisis, or international impediments that in the past decades marked the Italian ups and downs conduct, recently aggravated by the aforementioned lack of government’s performance at the EU Summit of June 2022, might prevail in the years to come, by crucially affecting the strategic national interests of Italy—the inclusion of all the Balkan countries as full EU members states as soon as possible.

References Alatri, Paolo (1976). Nitti, D’Annunzio e la questione adriatica, Feltrinelli, Milano. Basciani, Alberto and Egidio Ivetic (eds.) (2021). Italia e Balcani. Storia di una prossimità, Il Mulino, Bologna. Bianchini, Stefano (2003). Sarajevo, le radici dell’odio, Edizioni Associate, Roma. Bianchini, Stefano and Marta Dassù (eds.) (2001). Le strategie dell’Italia in Europa Centrale, Orientale e Balcanica. Problematiche e Opportunità, special issue in Stefano Bianchini e Marta Dassù, Guida ai paesi dell’Europa Centrale, Orientale e Balcanica, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 49–118. Bianchini, Stefano, Joseph Marko, Craig Nation and Milica Uvali´c (eds.) (2007). Regional Cooperation, Peace Enforcement and the Role of the Treaties in the Balkans, Longo, Ravenna. Bucarelli, Massimo (2018). La questione adriatica nella politica estera italiana del Novecento, in Rivista italiana di storia internazionale, 4, n. 2, pp. 205–234. Caroli, Giuliano (2011). L’Italia e il Patto balcanico, Angeli, Milano. Cattaruzza, Marina (2014). L’Italia e la questione adriatica, Il Mulino, Bologna. CEI (2001). CEI Facing the Challenges and Opportunities of the New Europe. Ideas for a Programme, Ge. Graf, Bertinoro.

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Chiodi, Luisa and Rando Devole (2005). Albanian Migrants in Italy and the Struggle for Recognition in the Transnational Public Sphere, in Luisa Chiodi (ed.), The Borders of the Polity. Migrations and Security Across the EU and the Balkans, Longo, Ravenna, 2005, pp. 169–188. Di Nolfo, Ennio, Romain H. Rainero and Brunello Vigezzi (eds.) (1985). L’Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa 1938–1940, Marzorati, Milano. Frontini, Andrea and Davide Denti (2017). Italy and EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: The Europeanization of National Interests?, in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 17, n. 4, pp. 571–589. Longo, Francesca and Rosa Rossi (2019). L’Italia e la crisi dei Balcani: il caso del Kosovo, in Pierangelo Isernia e Francesca Longo, La politica estera italiana nel nuovo millennio, Il Mulino, Bologna. Mameli, Simona (2007). L’impegno italiano nei Balcani, IECOB-Ministero degli Esteri, Roma. Mameli, Simona (2008). La Cooperazione italiana nei Balcani. La ricostruzione della pace e del dialogo inter-etnico e il sostegno alla stabilizzazione della regione balcanica. Case study: gli interventi della DGEU , IECOB-Ministero degli Esteri, Roma. Marcon, Giulio (2001). La cooperazione italiana con i paesi dell’Europa centrale, orientale e balcanica: il ruolo della società civile e degli enti locali, in Stefano Bianchini e Marta Dassù, Guida ai paesi dell’Europa Centrale, Orientale e Balcanica, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 101–106. Ministero Affari Esteri, Roma (1997). Albania. Strategia e linee d’azione della diplomazia italiana, Ministero Affari Esteri, Roma. Monzali, Luciano (2007). Attilio Tamaro, la questione adriatica e la politica estera italiana, in Clio, 43, n. 2, pp. 229–253. Perlmutter, Ted (1998). The Politics of Proximity. The Italian Response to the Albanian Crisis, in The International Migration Review, 32, n. 1, Spring, pp. 203–222. Pettifer, James and Miranda Vickers (2009). The Albanian Question. Reshaping the Balkans, Tauris, London. Pitassio, Armando (2021). La federazione perduta. Cronache e riflessioni sulla dissoluzione della Jugoslavia, Morlacchi ed., Perugia. Privitera, Francesco (ed.) (2009). Per un Polo di Sviluppo dell’Alto Adriatico. La cooperazione trilaterale Italia-Slovenia-Croazia nell’ambito dell’attuazione infrastrutturale del Corridoio Pan-europeo V , IECOB-Ministero degli Esteri, Roma. Rama, Shinasi (ed.) (2020) The End of Communist Rule in Albania. Political Change and the Role of the Student Movement, Routledge, Abingdon.

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Stocchiero, Andrea (ed.) (2007). Alla ricerca del sistema Italia nei Balcani occidentali, Cespi, Roma. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/56901/ricerche.06-All aRicercaDelSistema.pdf. Uvali´c, Milica (2012). Tranzicija u Srbiji, Zavod za udžbenike, Beograd, pp. 107–108. Wollrad, Kea and Claudio Cortellese (2021). Il processo di Berlino dal 2017 ad oggi, CeSPI, Roma. https://www.cespi.it/sites/default/files/documenti/ rapp_fin_il_prcesso_di_berlino_-_2021.pdf.

CHAPTER 5

The Western Balkans, a German View Franz-Lothar Altmann

1

Germany’s Balkan Policy in the 1990s

The fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 marked an important turning point in German foreign policy. Gone were the good old days when the Federal Republic and the then GDR occupied their fixed place at the interface of the East–West antagonism on the world’s political fault line, a place they could not influence themselves. Neither part of Germany was expected to pursue an independent foreign policy, at least not with an intensity comparable to that of other European states. Basically, this represented a relatively comfortable position for Bonn, which could see itself as well embedded in the Western alliance on the essential issues of foreign policy. German, and especially West German, foreign policy had attracted critical attention, if any, only in connection with its attempts at détente with the Soviet Union and Poland. Thus, any unilateral action by Bonn in the context of the Ostpolitik of the 1970s and 1980s was bound to prompt immediate suspicion among the Western partners, since the

F.-L. Altmann (B) University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_5

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well-balanced equilibrium between East and West in Central Europe was seen to be at risk. However, the Federal Republic had long since become the strongest Western foreign trade partner of the socialist countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe again, which meant that at least German economic influence had returned to the region, where a long tradition of economic relations had already existed before the war. Especially between the two world wars, there had been a very strong connection of Southeastern Europe to the German Reich after the great World Economic Crisis. Around 1940, the German Reich conducted almost a quarter of its foreign trade with Southeastern Europe; conversely, the respective import and export shares of the German Reich in total imports or exports of the Southeastern European countries showed astonishing dependencies. Today, the reunified Germany is the strongest power in Europe in terms of economic strength and population, if one leaves out Russia, which has a larger population but is economically not comparable to Germany. Claims and expectations, but also a skeptical distance to Germany had to increase in view of the now suddenly central position of the new Federal Republic in Europe, both among its Western partners and its Eastern neighbors. The catchphrase of the economic giant being a political dwarf was suddenly interpreted in very different ways, sometimes challenging, sometimes critical-skeptical, as if Germany wanted to concentrate only on its economic strength and was not prepared to assume political responsibility as well. Such criticism was voiced, for example, when Germany—in a manner practiced for many years—largely held back in the Gulf crisis. The situation in the latter case in particular was not easy for West German foreign policy, because rather contradictory signals were coming from the Western partner countries, since they themselves were not yet clear about a new, more self-confident foreign policy for Germany. The signals from the countries of Southeastern Europe toward Bonn, similar to those from Central Eastern Europe, became clear very soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Now reunified Germany was seen as the most interesting economic partner, having built up considerably more competence concerning the East and Southeast over the years in both the old and the new federal states than any other country in Western Europe. New Germany was also assumed to have a particular commitment to the political integration of the transition countries into the enlarging and integrating Europe.

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At the latest since the Copenhagen EU summit in 1993, which defined the general criteria for enlargement candidates, the aspiration to become a member of the European Union has been the main goal of foreign policy in all neighboring countries to the East and Southeast. The fact that Germany, which together with France was in any case driving the integration motor most strongly, became the first point of contact for supporting the respective membership aspirations was a matter of course for the potential accession countries. In all Eastern and Southeastern European capitals, it was repeatedly reiterated to the German diplomats, but also to all other representatives of public life, that the time had now come for Germany to take greater care of its immediate Eastern and Southeastern neighborhood, and that this was most certainly also in its own interest. The German language received new interest, especially in Southeastern Europe, and clearly became the second most important means of communication with foreign countries after the English world language. Almost stereotypically, it was emphasized again and again in the countries of Southeastern Europe that among the Western Europeans basically the Germans (and certainly also the Austrians) understood the problems of Southeastern Europe best, and that it was time to revive the former traditional cultural, political, but above all economic traditions and ties. These considerations went in line very well with the already ongoing integration development in Western Europe (from EC to EU) that now also wanted to include the East central and Southeastern countries of Europe. A critical situation came about when the Yugoslav army in 1991 attacked Slovenia and Croatia after the two countries had declared their independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in June 1991. During the summer and fall, the discussion in the European Community (EC) went on whether to recognize the facts. Germany and Denmark were in favor, France hesitated. The British government was opposed, as were most other EC members and Washington. Nevertheless, on December 17, 1991, at Germany’s urging, the EC foreign ministers agreed in principle to recognize the independence of the two hard-pressed republics on January 15, 1992. Germany after this decision could have waited for the joint declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia until January, but in fact, the SFRY had existed by then only on paper. The war was raging in Croatia, Dubrovnik and other cities were being shelled by the Serbian/Yugoslav military. All that remained of the city of Vukovar was a pile of rubble. Fighting had also taken place in Slovenia,

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and war was being prepared in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Martens 2012). So the German cabinet decided on December 23, 1991, to recognize the two countries, a step that was technically a fast-forward one. Germany could have waited until mid-January, but in essence this was in conformity with the decision of the EC ministers of Foreign Affairs of December 17, 1991. Germany thought that the recognition would bring the ongoing war earlier to an end which in fact was the case for Croatia, but could not prevent the outbreak of the longer-lasting war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Germany from the very beginning became a strong promoter of EU enlargement toward the Balkans, in particular after the heavy inflow of refugees from the Balkan wars in the first half of the 1990s. Germany had hosted already before the greatest number of Yugoslav guest workers and became in the 1990s the primary destination for refugees from the Western Balkans. EU enlargement to the Southeast European countries was then broadly accepted among politicians and the normal citizens in Germany.

2 German Initiatives Concerning the Western Balkans Germany was, therefore, very interested and supportive when after 1999– 2000, the EU has increasingly become the main actor for the reconstruction and stabilization of the Western Balkans. The EU launched the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe on June 10, 1999, in Cologne with Bodo Hombach becoming the first Special Coordinator, and opened EU membership prospects for the region through the Stabilization and Association Process (Altmann 2001). When the successor organization to the Stability Pact, the Regional Cooperation Council, with the seat since 2008 in Sarajevo, did not bring about the wished progress in regional cooperation among the Western Balkans, on August 28, 2014, German Chancellor Angela Merkel initiated the Conference of Western Balkan States in Berlin which became the starting event for the so-called Berlin Process, an intergovernmental cooperation initiative aimed at revitalizing the multilateral ties between the Western Balkans and selected EU member states. Improvement of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans in the areas of infrastructure

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and economic development is regarded as an important tool for preparing the countries of the region for future membership in the EU.1

3

Principles of EU Enlargement Policy

Since the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 between the European Union and the countries of the Western Balkans,2 it has been regularly recalled, especially by the latter, that a quasi-promise was made at that time for the perspective membership of the remaining states of Southeastern Europe. This standpoint was clearly supported from the very beginning by Germany. However, in the course of the 20 years that have passed since then, from the region only Slovenia and Croatia managed to become EU members in 2004 and 2013, respectively. The remaining six Western Balkan countries are divided into candidate countries (Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), and now only one potential candidate (Kosovo). In the first group, Montenegro and Serbia, as recognized candidates for accession, have already been able to open some of the 35 negotiating chapters, with Montenegro having so far opened around twice as many as Serbia. For Albania and for North Macedonia, the European Council decided in March 2020 to open accession negotiations—in the case of Albania subject to the fulfillment of several conditions—but the respective negotiations did not start for more than two years. In the case of North Macedonia, the start of negotiations was blocked by Bulgaria. It was only in July 2022 that the EU’s 27 member states agreed to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia.

1 For a recent discussion on the Berlin Process see Vulovi´c (2022) and Altmann (2020, pp. 51–52). 2 The term “Western Balkans” was officially introduced by the EU in 1997 as a terminus technicus for the countries of Southeastern Europe, which were to be the next enlargement target after the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania. Following the membership of Slovenia and Croatia, the term “Western Balkans” now covers the six states of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia.

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4 Intermediate EU-WB Engagement Instead of Enlargement The European Union-Western Balkan Summit of October 6, 2021, adopted a “Resolute EU Strategic Engagement for the Region.” Given the current infectious situation, support to address COVID-19 was offered: e3.3 billion in emergency assistance, as well as access to safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines through COVAX, with 2.9 million doses of vaccine. Under the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III for 2021–2027 and the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, there is a commitment of substantial funding of e12.9 billion (in 2018 prices). IPA III is to be used more strategically: programmed on themes and priorities, less on countries, and flexibility and coherence are to be improved. The main part of IPA III, e9 billion, is earmarked for the Economic and Investment Plan, which includes ten so-called Flagship Initiatives, including the areas of transport and energy, environment and digital transformation, strengthening the competitiveness of the private sector, support for health and social protection, education and special measures to create jobs for young people. In addition, a new Western Balkans Guarantee Fund of one billion euros was launched to mobilize investments of e20 billion. Intensified cooperation was agreed in a number of areas, including security, as well as the commitment of regular meetings between the EU and the representatives of the Western Balkan countries. All this is clearly supported by Germany, but people say that it is a kind of excuse policy when enlargement policy proper is getting slower and slower.

5 Fundamental Problems of EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans In all countries of the Western Balkans, one finds clear democracy deficits. However, it must be noted that this is unfortunately also increasingly the case in some EU member states: Hungary and Poland must be mentioned in this context. Mutual support for autocratic systems strengthens skepticism about EU enlargement in the other member states. Hungary basically supports enlargement to promote its own economic interests and to strengthen an illiberal political circle of friends. At the same time, the Commissioner for Enlargement, Várhelyi, is Hungarian; he became Commissioner on the “Orbán ticket.” Moreover, there are

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anyway different attitudes of the member countries to the Western Balkans enlargement—with indications not only of possible new, dubious alliances, but also of the problems that are evident with the most recently entered members Bulgaria and Romania. The idea that after the accession of Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, presidents such as Vuˇci´c or Dodik would have a say in the European Council on European policy issues, especially on common foreign and security policy, is seen by the majority as unacceptable. In The Netherlands and France, in particular, restraint on the enlargement issue is evident. But also in Germany, the views differ in Parliament (the Bundestag) and in the public as well. The official Berlin (government) standpoint still confirms that the Western Balkans must be included into the European integration, whereas in the public skepticism is voiced again and again, in particular when the Serbian President Vuˇci´c is oscillating with his statements: one day he confirms that the future of Serbia is clearly in the EU, the other day he says that he has no trust in the EU and that his best friends are still Moscow and Beijing. Even more anti-EU are remarks coming from Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivica Daˇci´c. Of course, in the UN Security Council Moscow and Beijing are supporting Belgrade in the Kosovo case, but it is not very diplomatic to indirectly tell Brussels that Serbia wants the money but otherwise is not willing to integrate completely. Even worse is what comes from Banja Luka where Milorad Dodik still mainly plays the Russian piano obstructing any Western initiated attempts to reform the inefficient frozen constitutional setup of BiH, and voicing anti-EU statements repeatedly. In Germany, there have been strong voices promoting the convoy principle, i.e., taking all Western Balkan countries at once into the EU. However, for this approach, the present official policies of Serbia and Republika Srpska (RS) are counterproductive. They block the proceedings for all Western Balkan countries, making them to some extent hostage to Vuˇci´c and Dodik. In the German public, parallels are often drawn to the behavior of Hungary’s PM Orbán and Poland’s strong man Kaczynski, ´ arguing that two bad children are already too many. Thus, the regatta principle is seen as the only possibility to support the accession process for Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia, leaving aside Serbia as long as there is no final agreement with Kosovo (the EU will not take in another member with unresolved border and status questions like Cyprus), and BiH as long as the RS politics remains so

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outspokenly anti-Western. Kosovo, on the other hand, is extremely proEuropean (very understandable given the standing confrontation with Russia-backed Serbia and the dire economic situation), but will not even get the status of official candidate as long as five EU member countries have not recognized its independent sovereign state status.

6

Geostrategic Aspects and Interests

Geostrategic aspects and interests play an important role in the EU enlargement discussion. In EU geography, the Western Balkans represent a black hole with a myriad of security, social and migration problems. Unresolved internal tensions (Serbia-Kosovo, Republika Srpska—Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) can lead to developments that, additionally fueled from the outside (Russia), generate turbulences in the immediate neighborhood of the EU, up to civil war-like conflicts. One needs only to recall the border violations at the Slovenian-Austrian border by fighter pilots of the Yugoslav People’s Army during the 10-Days War in 1991 or the refugee flows from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992– 1995. Moreover, the Western Balkans is one of the transit regions for illegal migration. In terms of energy policy, the Balkans are important as an alternative supply route for importing natural gas from non-Russian regions.3 So far, however, the opportunities offered by the EU-SEE Energy Community, which was established in 2005, have not been realized (Altmann 2008, pp. 4–15). After the end of the Trump/Grenell era, the USA have returned to the region with positive interest. Undisputedly, they are still, or again, seen as having the strongest position of influence, positive especially in countries with a majority Albanian population as well as in North Macedonia, negative in Serbia and in Republika Srpska. The EU needs the USA primarily to support its stability policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In principle, the USA supports the European enlargement policy in the Balkans, also as a hedge against the increasing attempts of Russia and the People’s Republic of China to increase their influence in Southeastern Europe. The Bondsteel military base in Kosovo has gained importance as a so-called forward operating site vis-à-vis Russia and the Middle East after NATO member Turkey became an uncertain partner.

3 See the interesting new FES study by Kuhar et al. (2021).

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On January 12, 2022, former NATO General Erhard Bühler announced in a Deutsche Welle interview that the USA intend to establish a “Special Forces Command” in Albania, primarily as a training center. This is intended to demonstrate to the region the political, military and strategic importance that the new US administration attaches to it.4 Russia’s main interest in the Western Balkans lies in weakening the EU and preventing further NATO expansion into the region: Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro have already become NATO members. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are, therefore, possible remaining candidates, Kosovo being already a quasi-NATO-member. Moscow feels increasingly deprived of its former cordon sanitaire and at the same time wants to restore former spheres of influence: Southeastern Europe and Turkey represent a strategically significant flank for Russia. Moreover, Moscow is eager to strengthen its global position. Its attempts at direct or indirect intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro are intended to demonstrate this global importance. How duplicitous Moscow’s policy plays in this regard is shown by the different argumentation in the cases of Crimea and Kosovo. For the annexation of Crimea, a dubious referendum for self-determination and detachment from Ukraine had to serve as a justification, but the Kosovars are denied this self-determination. It also seems to have been forgotten how Russia militarily supported and secured the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, the same applies to Transnistria and now to the two separatist regions in Ukraine’s East. The aggression against Ukraine proper is using similar arguments like Serbian nationalists: Russki Mir and Srpski Svet. For Serbia, Russia is still an important ally for the Kosovo issue, although a very questionable one. Moscow claims the right to self-determination for the Crimea and the Donbass but denies the same for Kosovo. This double standard is mainly due to Moscow’s intention to prevent Serbia from joining the EU (and NATO): as long as the Kosovo question is not resolved, Serbia has no chance to get EU membership. Unlike Russia, the People’s Republic of China does not seem to have political strategic interests in the Western Balkans, but it does have economic strategic interests. Investments in infrastructure are welcome in the region, especially since China does not impose environmental and 4 www.dw.com/de/us-st%C3%BCtzpunkt-in-albanien-dem-frieden-verpflichtet/a-604 14040.

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labor law requirements comparable to those in the EU. The actual, purely financial loan conditions are also more favorable than those set by the EU, but they remain repayable in any case and thus place the recipient countries in a situation of dependency, which China can dissolve in exchange for transfers of ownership or special concession rights. The fact that China is also on Serbia’s side in the Kosovo issue can be explained very simply by its own concerns of possible separatist efforts in Tibet or Xinjiang. However, China could soon enter into a special conflict in the case of the separatist efforts of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian constituent entity Republika Srpska. Should it support its Bosnian Serb friends or insist on its principled anti-separation policy that serves its own internal interests?

7

Serbia as a Special Case

Serbia, as the most important, central country in the Western Balkans, is subject to special scrutiny, especially because it is already negotiating chapters in the EU accession process. That is why a provocative statement by Serbian Interior Minister Aleksandar Vulin in July 2021 on the creation of an already mentioned “Srpski Svet” (“Serbian World”) caused a stir: all Serbs, especially in the Western Balkan neighborhood, should become part of a common political sphere, i.e., a political union of all Serbs, including those in Republika Srpska, in northern Kosovo, in northern Montenegro, but also in other peripheral areas (in North Macedonia, Eastern Croatia, Western Bulgaria, etc.). Central to the Serbia-EU relationship, however, is the Kosovo problem. On the part of the EU, there still exists the non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence by five member states. It is worth noting that the EU Special Representative for the Kosovo-Serbia talks and other Western Balkan matters, Miroslav Lajˇcak, and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, are both citizens of one of the five non-recognition EU countries. In general, the EU is unable to adopt a unified and clear position on many issues concerning Serbia and Kosovo. For example, there are no sanctions for non-implementation of agreements from the Brussels Talks, there is no final clear position of the EU regarding the formation of the (institutionalized?) Community of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo, and there are also different points of

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view in the assessment of the Vetëvendosje! (Kurti) government,5 which makes a unified Kosovo policy difficult. Without a workable agreement between Pristina and Belgrade, i.e., the recognition of Kosovo’s independence or a basic treaty comparable to the 1972 German-German one, EU membership is not conceivable neither for Serbia nor for Kosovo. It should be clear for Belgrade that Kosovo is lost, and that Pristina will never return under Belgrade’s rule. Germany has experienced territorial losses with Alsace and in particular Upper Silesia, where predominantly Germans had lived and where after World War I, at the popular referendum initiated by the League of Nations, its citizens voted for Germany. After World War II, this territory was then given to Poland, and East Prussia to the Soviet Union. So Germany understands what it means to lose territory. After the defeat in World War II, 12 million Germans were expelled from areas where they lived in majority over centuries. Germany had to accept the defeat and the consequences of its policies, so now the understanding of the Serbian position concerning Kosovo is limited in Germany after Miloševi´c had lost his war over a territory where most inhabitants by far are Albanians. Germany has nowadays good experience with its own German minorities in Southern Denmark or Western Belgium, as well as in Polish Silesia, and at the same time with the Sorb community in Eastern Saxony or the Danish minority in Northern Schleswig–Holstein. These examples prove that goodwill can produce political solutions without territorial disputes, but can enable sustainable relations. Of course, that is easier when both parties are members of the EU with open borders. Therefore, Germany recognized the self-declared independence of Kosovo expecting that finally a document will be signed that acknowledges the reality and opens for both the door into the EU. For that purpose, also the so-called French-German proposal (which Josep Borrell wants to call a proposal of the EU) was elaborated of which the last version was sent to Belgrade and Pristina on December 5, 2022. A leaked version was published earlier by EURACTIV on November 9, 2022, exposing a new dialogue framework (agreement) between Kosovo

5 The Vetëvendosje! party emerged victorious from the last elections in 2019, and Kurti is the current prime minister. Its political orientation is considered by some (e.g., Trump government) to be left-wing socialist and nationalist (supporting Greater Albania). Others claim that the newly formed government is handling the fight against corruption more decidedly than the previous ones. See Altmann (2021, pp. 437–438).

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and Serbia. In nine articles, it is, e.g., proposed that no party shall represent the other in the international sphere nor act on its behalf; in addition, the exchange of permanent missions at the respective government’s seats is foreseen. In essence, it would imply that Serbia accepts the existence of Kosovo’s independence without recognizing it formally (Brzozowskiet al. 2022). In return Brussels, backed by the USA, indicates that it would accelerate the membership procedure for Serbia. Should such an agreement be signed (which, however, has initially been rejected vehemently by Belgrade), then it would also put pressure on the five EU non-recognizing countries to change their position. For Germany, it is clear that those five countries are not supporting Serbia, but are only afraid of possible separatist movements in their own countries. But when reflecting on Serbia’s possible full membership in the EU, what still remains is its present internal political situation and external orientation. Autocratic nationalist governments like Poland and Hungary are repeatedly voicing sympathy concerning Serbian domestic (Poland) and also external politics (Hungary). A Serbia under Vuˇci´c is expected to join the obstructive and democratically illiberal club of Poland and Hungary and to support nationalistic right-wing movements of Marine Le Pen or Giorgia Meloni in the European Parliament. Also, in the European Council, an unreformed Serbia would certainly veto any move against Poland or Hungary in case they violate core values of the EU like freedom of press, independence of the judiciary and fight against corruption. And here also clear deficiencies are still seen for Serbia, and to a lesser extent for the other Western Balkan countries.

8

Conclusions from a German Viewpoint

The European Union faces too many different perceptions on the enlargement issue to expect its members to adopt a unified position of unconditional support for Western Balkans enlargement policy. The EU Commission is anxious to keep the enlargement process moving forward; the member states are rather hesitant to dismiss it and are looking for possible interim solutions without losing credibility regarding the 2003 Thessaloniki promise. It is questionable whether political and economic pressure can lead to détente and progress in the case of the three “problem countries”—Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (in this case primarily the RS). However, completely excluding these countries from the European integration policy is not a solution either,

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in particular in times of increased Russian attempts to split the Western camp by accelerating its influence in the Balkans, hereby concentrating on Serbia and the RS in BiH. Europe, represented mainly by the EU, cannot risk having a Russian stronghold in its middle—the Western Balkans are completely surrounded by EU member states. Granting candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova is a clear signal (although it was a pure political decision not backed by solid reform achievements and fulfillment of Copenhagen criteria), but Chancellor Scholz stressed that the countries of the Western Balkans deserve the same answer.6 And in fact, Bosnia and Herzegovina received the candidate status in mid-December 2022 as the last Western Balkan country—if we let Kosovo with its unresolved status for the moment apart. EU enlargement is currently a geopolitical necessity from Berlin’s perspective, but it makes institutional reforms in the EU itself a pressing issue. “We must make the European Union capable of enlargement. This requires institutional reform. And we should use this reform to strengthen democracy and the rule of law in the European Union as well,” as stressed by Chancellor Scholz.7 This seems now to be the main quasi-condition for further enlargement voiced by Berlin, whereby institutional reform also includes the abolition of the unanimity voting. This has been also addressed at the “Conference of the Future of Europe” in early May 2022, where French President Emmanuel Macron also pushed for a convention that could lead to treaty changes, while Spain also seems to be keen to reform the bloc. When at that conference Germany mentioned that the development of the EU should finally move toward the creation of a federal state, considerable resistance came from Nordic and Eastern European member states. On the other hand, it is irritating that the member states most critical of EU reform are also the keenest to accelerate the accession of the Western Balkans as well as Ukraine and Moldova. But that could open up gateways for institutional reform and potential packaging deals, if the largest states like Germany, France, Italy and Spain insist on internal reforms before enlargement (Noyan 2022a). Oliver Noyan, Senior Editor in Germany of EURACTIV, is rightly commenting that bringing together 27 member states to decide on treaty change will be a lengthy and challenging process—especially since the main drivers behind

6 Government statement in the Bundestag on June 22, 2022. 7 Government statement in the Bundestag on June 22, 2022; also see Noyan (2022a).

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the push are all Western European countries. This is why Frank Schimmelfennig, Professor and Chair of the Center for European Politics at the ETA Zurich, argued that “major treaty reform is rather unlikely” (Noyan 2022b). Half a year later, Jörg Kukies, State Secretary at the Federal Chancellery and top adviser to Chancellor Olaf Scholz, became more outspoken at a EURACTIVE event: “Germany will only agree to the accession of new member states if this process is accompanied by a reform of the EU in order not to jeopardize the bloc’s ability to act” (Noyan 2022c).In the meantime, Berlin has appointed a Special Envoy of the German Government for the Western Balkans, the former Green Party MP Manuel Sarrazin, who also is President of the Südosteuropa Gesellschaft, a German NGO that concentrates on Southeast European affairs, including culture, history, economics and politics. This NGO has promoted enlargement of the EU toward the Western Balkans since long. German government officials repeatedly underline that the Western Balkans belong to Europe and therefore must be taken into the EU, but even now they refrain from giving a time horizon. In the German Parliament and even more in the public, the views are more skeptical, but at the end Germany will remain one of the strongest promoters of EU-Western Balkan integration. Germany’s interests are of political (stability in the Southeast neighborhood) as well as economic nature. Germany’s economy is the most active from the EU in the region regarding investment and trade. Given the uncertain time perspective and the widespread, though not officially acknowledged reluctance concerning full membership of the Western Balkans, perhaps the discussion about alternative offers needs to be revived. Now that various groupings have been formed within the EU itself, where one can certainly recognize gradations in the willingness of cooperation and integration, a slimmed-down offer to those waiting should also be considered—although the existing conditionalities should not be abandoned here either. It does not have to be full membership with all rights and obligations from the very beginning. But a stronger inclusion of the Western Balkans into the EU core programs, in the distribution of funds (structural and cohesion funds) instead of just IPA grants, could promote economic development in the region. In doing so, full membership should not be definitively questioned, but the EU would be protected from imported political instabilities by the formation of such an outer ring until certain conditions of both domestic (rule of

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law, corruption, administration) and intergovernmental (Serbia-Kosovo, RS-Bosnian Federation) nature are met. Such an approach should also be accepted by the affected Western Balkan countries and would address the strongly spreading EU fatigue in the region, since it would indicate that enlargement is in fact moving forward. It must be sold as a further step into full EU membership, as long as unanimity voting still remains valid for most of the issues to be decided within the Union for domestic as well as external policies. It is remarkable that a recent survey by the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG) showed, for example, that Serbian citizens would now prefer economic integration without full EU membership (BiEPAG 2021). That indicates that such an outer ring of a preliminary “Membership Light” (or a multi-speed Europe) might be acceptable for the countries concerned, reducing the growing EU fatigue there and alleviating at the same time the acceptance of further integrational steps in the EU itself.

References Altmann, Franz-Lothar (2001). Economic Reconstruction in Southeast Europe: A Western View. In: Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 114–118. Altmann, Franz-Lothar (2008). Die Energieversorgung als Zukunftsfrage (Südost-)Europas. In: SOM, 3/2008, pp. 4–15. Altmann, Franz-Lothar (2020). A Little Balkans Schengen Area? In: Tirana Observatory, Vol. 2, No. 1, Winter, pp. 51–52. Altmann, Franz-Lothar (2021). Kosovo. In: Werner Weidenfeld, Wolfgang Wessels Europe (eds), Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2021, Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp. 437–438. BiEPAG (2021). Public Opinion Poll in the Western Balkans on the EU Integration, 9 November. Brzozowski, Aleksandra, Alice Taylor and Georgi Gotev (2022). Leak: FrancoGerman Plan to Resolve the Kosovo-Serbia Dispute. EURACTIVE.com, 9 November. Deutsche Welle. www.dw.com/de/us-st%C3%BCtzpunkt-in-albanien-dem-fri eden-verpflichtet/a-60414040. Kuhar, Miljenka, Anja Vulinec and Marija Horvat (2021). IETO, Inclusive Energy Transition in Southeast Europe as an Opportunity, December. https:/ /library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sarajevo/18759.pdf. Martens, Michael (2012). Anerkennung Sloweniens und Kroatiens vor 20 Jahren: „Oder es wird zerfallen“. FAZ, 15 January.

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Noyan, Oliver (2022a). Germany Pushes to Tie Together Enlargement and EU Reform. EURACTIV, June 22. Noyan, Oliver (2022b). Enlargement Could Be a Bargaining Chip to Trigger EU Reform. EURACTIV, 16 May. Noyan, Oliver (2022c). German Top Aide—No EU Reform, No Enlargement. EURACTIV.de, 22 November. Vulovi´c, Marina (2022). Der Berliner Prozess: Große Ideen für den Westbalkan, schwierige und langsame Implementierung. SWP-Aktuell N-80, December.

CHAPTER 6

Imagining Europe in a New and Small State: The Case of Croatia Dejan Jovi´c

1

Introduction

In 2023 Croatia marked the tenth anniversary of its membership in the European Union (EU). It remained the last new EU member state, since no further enlargement (or “territorial consolidation” as some call it, to clarify that accession of the Western Balkans would not change any external border of the EU further to East or South) happened in the last ten years. In this chapter, we analyse the case of Croatia’s accession to the EU, not only because this was the last case so far, but also because it is relevant for the current state of relationship between the Union and the Western Balkans. With growing EU-indifferentism or even open rejection of EU in a large share of public opinion in the remaining candidate countries, it is relevant to see how Croatian political leadership and other identity-designers have overcome similar trends in their own country prior to 2013. In addition, this chapter analyses fundamental

D. Jovi´c (B) Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_6

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change of direction in Croatian foreign policy after 2013. Unable—and also unwilling—to escape from the Western Balkans open issues, Croatia now uses its EU membership to enhance its influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro by using the political infrastructure available to EU member states. This has been particularly encouraged by becoming a member of Eurozone and Schengen area in 2023. In this chapter, we first look at historical debates on EU membership in Croatia prior to its joining the Union. Then we look at Croatian policy towards Western Balkans prior to 2013 and after 2013. The first policy we call “to Europe via the Balkans” and the latter—“via Europe to the Balkans”.

2

Imagining Europe in a Historical Context

In the dominant imaginary of the Croatian politics in the 1990s, Europe was seen as the place to which Croatia used to belong while in AustroHungarian Empire, but from which it was detached in 1918, when it became part of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (as of 1929 Yugoslavia). Yugoslavia—which in the new interpretation of history that emerged in the 1990s and has been upgraded and developed ever since—was synonymised with the Balkans and thus portrayed negatively, with not an insignificant degree of negative Orientalism and all prejudice and stereotypes that it usually carries with itself—thus becoming a signifier for a historical obstacle that ought to be removed in order for Croatia to “come back home”, to Central Europe (Zambelli 2010). De-Yugoslavisation and de-Balkanisation were two concepts that became synonyms with Europeanisation and Sovereignisation. Unlike in most of Western Europe, where the concepts of European unity conflicted with nationalism and sovereigntism, in the case of Croatia the identitydesigners insisted on their closeness and inseparability. By becoming independent from Yugoslavia, Croatia—this narrative argued—was making the first but essential step towards the West, to Europe. This process in Croatia was, however, similar to that of other East European countries that saw the end of the Cold War, and thus also the Soviet limitation to national sovereignty as a new chance for more—not less—sovereignty and thus used the accession to EU to solidify domestic nationalism. In Slovenia secessionism and independentism merged with the pro-European foreign policy orientation led under the slogan “Europe Now!”. In Hungary and Poland, as evident in recent political developments in these two countries, the motivation for 1989

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was not only in liberal character of major changes of the international order, but also in a chance for more sovereignty that was made possible by firstly leaving the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe and then by joining a powerful Western association, the European Union. In Slovakia, as well as in the Baltic states, the pro-Western narratives were also easily reconciled with separatist policies of leaving the previous states: Czechoslovakia and the USSR. In the whole of Eastern Europe, joining the West was seen not only as beneficial in the economic and security sense, but as an important step in reconstruction of national identities. By “becoming Western” the small states of former Eastern Europe were—in their own imagination—joining the Winner of the Cold War. They saw themselves as being “on the right side of History”. This chapter thus emphasises the identity dimension of political transformation that followed the collapse of the Cold War order in Europe. We argue that Europeanisation was not only about economics, but also about key markers of new national identities for small states in Eastern Europe, Croatia included. Still, unlike most other countries (Slovakia being an exception), Croatia was rather sceptical towards the European Union itself (Štulhofer 2006). It took a while—in fact the whole decade of the 1990s—for it to unequivocally announce its intention to join the Union (Jovi´c 2006). Croatian foreign policy as well as its politics of identity were in the 1990s decisively shaped by President Franjo Tud-man, himself a non-believer in multi-ethnic political entities, be it Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina or European Union. The more EU was being built as a quasi-state (a federation of Europe), the more he opposed it. Tud-man criticised EU for its alleged hesitation to support Croatia more decisively in 1991–1995 and instead praised the role of the United States in providing support for territorial reintegration of the country in 1995. Following the successful ending of the “Homeland War” (1991– 1995), Tud-man claimed that Croatia needed no new Yugoslavia but should instead remain independent and fully sovereign, forever. In the second half of the 1990s, he was attacking liberal forces and all sorts of internationalism and supranational politics whom he identified as potential new obstacles to full implementation of the project of independence. He was a nationalist and an authoritarian leader, a predecessor to what would later be called—illiberal democracy. In particular, Tud-man was against the concept of the Western Balkans, and thus of reconciliation and political cooperation with other countries of former Yugoslavia, which was

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being requested by the European Union as one of the key conditions for forthcoming accession. In 1997, the Croatian Constitution was changed in order to explicitly prevent any joining of a regional association(s) that might result in a renewal—in any form—of a Balkan or Yugoslav association of states, into a new Yugoslavia. Since EU made cooperation with post-Yugoslav neighbours one of the conditions for starting accession talks, Croatia turned towards the United States, and at some point in 1998–1999, it seemed that it had found a new sponsor, this time in the other side of the Atlantic. But the United States were also critical of Tud-man’s policy towards ethnic Serbs, and in particular of his decision to not allow massive return of Serb refugees to Croatia (Blitz 2005; Jenne 2010). Croatia ended the 1990s on the verge of isolation from the West. It failed to make any significant progress towards the EU. Still, in 1996, it signed an Agreement on normalisation of relations with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) (Ponoš 2021). Following the death of Franjo Tud-man in 1999 and political changes that followed the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections, the course has changed and Croatia finally—with a delay of one decade compared to other Central East European states—embarked on the road to full integration into the European Union. It was too late to catch the other ten candidates (eight from Eastern Europe, Malta and Cyprus) who joined the EU in a big bang of 2004. The delay in cooperation with the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia—the Hague Tribunal ) made it impossible even to join in 2007, with Romania and ´ 2003; Bulgaria (Lamont 2010; Pavlakovi´c 2010; Peskin and Boduszynski Jovi´c 2009). Still, the country finally joined the EU in 2013 on its own, becoming the last country to do so until these days. In this chapter, we shall explain two issues: first, what counter-narrative to Tud-man’s scepticism on EU was invented and promoted by postTud-manist political and social elites in 2000–2013; and second, what has changed in the dominant narratives and also in approaches to Western Balkans and European Union in Croatian foreign policy once Croatia joined the EU in 2013. We see these two phases as being distinct. Before 2013, Croatia faced significant—and in some aspects very specific—obstacles to its sovereignty, due to an obligation (imposed by EU itself) to deal with the consequences of the war of the 1990s. The EU promoted reconciliation and stabilisation in the region of the Western Balkans. It also requested democratisation in the post-Tud-manist period. For all these reasons, the EU became an external tutor that Croatia willingly accepted

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in this role, especially after 2000. However, this acceptance was only temporary and out of necessity—as a necessary condition for joining the Union. Its sovereignty was limited in real terms by intrusive interventions into its domestic affairs, such as the need to cooperate fully with ICTY and to fulfil all criteria for EU membership, some of which were tailor-made for this specific case. Growing Euroscepticism in Croatia—higher than in any other candidate-state with a possible exception only of Slovakia before 2004—was a reaction to what many in Croatia saw as an undesirable limitation of sovereignty by the EU. To this, the political elite responded by promoting a sovereigntism-friendly pro-EU narrative that had already existed in the first years of the 1990s. It invented a narrative based on the notion that membership in the EU would in fact increase the level of real sovereignty, as it would turn Croatia away from being an object of EU-policies of interventionism and would provide grounds for Croatian interventionism in other candidate countries in the postYugoslav area in the future. By inventing a counter-narrative in the period of de-Tud-manisation (2000–2013), the elites succeeded in overcoming scepticism and replacing it by EU-indifferentism, as explained in some previously published papers (Jovi´c 2011, 2012a, b). The second question we address here refers to the new post-2013 policy that aimed at turning EU from a goal of Croatian foreign policy into an instrument of that policy. In other words, the challenge after 2013 was how to use EU membership in order to empower Croatia where it matters to her—in order to achieve some specific national interests in bilateral relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. In both of these phases, the new narratives were shaped along the axis Europe vs. The Balkans, only that, in the first phase, the policy was led under the slogan To Brussels via the Balkans, while in the second the direction was reversed into to the Balkans via Brussels. Croatia still wants to detach itself from the Balkans and to fully integrate in all European and Euroatlantic structures. Still, after it became a member of the EU, it now also wants to play a major role in the Balkans, the region it claims it does no longer belong to. It wants to be an external tutor—either directly (for which it still does not have sufficient power) or as an influential initiator and constructor of EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans. In the first phase, it was returning to Europe, whereas in the second phase it somehow—ironically—is returning to the Balkans, now more powerful

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and often by attempting to engage the whole of the EU for objectives that are specifically its own. Europe and the Balkans are thus two signifiers much used in this double reconstruction of the new Croatian national identity. Both are used to create an image of Self and that of the Other. Europe is now a constituent part of the notion of Self, and Balkans remains the Other. This Other (the Balkans) is now treated as a Croatian own Past, but also as a Close Neighbourhood in which Croatia tries to project its new power. By doing this, Croatia in fact wants to become a Small Power—in opposition to a Small State. This process is of major importance in finding a niche for itself, as well as in gaining confidence that was—as claimed by the identity-designers in Croatia—lacking in the past and thus preventing the country from becoming sovereign in real terms.

3

Returning to Europe via the Balkans

When on 1 July 2013 Croatia became the 28th member of the European Union, the leading Croatian newspaper, Veˇcernji list, had on its front page a large title: Back to Europe. This conservative notion—that the present and future are in fact constructed via returning to the past— indicates that Croatia viewed its joining of the EU as the end of an almost a century-long (1918–2013) period in which it was taken away from Europe. It now came back to the beginning—to where it departed from—to where it belonged in its own new self-imagination. The dominant national narrative as conceptualised after 1990 claims that this had happened without Croatia’s own will—though this conclusion is more a myth than fact-based. The post-Yugoslav period (1992–2013) was in this narrative seen as an extension of being in Yugoslavia or at least in a shadow of Yugoslavia, in a sub-period of post-Yugoslavia. As of 1997 this post-Yugoslavia (also sometimes called the Yugosphere) had a name: the Western Balkans. Fear that it might remain permanently stuck in a postYugoslavia, as a former Yugoslav Republic, was one of the main motivators for joining the EU as soon as possible. During the 2000–2013 period, Croatia was ready to do what it takes—ideally as little as it must—to leave the (Western) Balkans. It opposed any idea that it should be grouped with other countries of the Region and insisted on a regatta principle, a “merit-based” approach in the accession, by which countries should join the Union at their own pace, once they fulfil all criteria as defined by the EU.

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It involved reforming but also simulating reforms (Boduszynski ´ 2010) to a level that would be recognised by the external actor that took the role of supervisor and assessor of reforms, the European Union, as satisfactory. It also included full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal—a policy orientation that was unpopular and that clashed with the narrative of the Homeland War which in 2000 was officially declared as being just and justified as a war of liberation. It had to show that it is ready to guarantee the rights of the ethnic minorities—via implementation of the Erdut Agreement on peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranya and Western Sirmium to its legal structure (Petriˇcuši´c 2015; Pedersen 2022; Šimunovi´c 1999). It had to improve its democracy credentials and to develop and protect a fully pluralistic political framework. And it had to show that it is ready to conduct the policy of reconciliation with other post-Yugoslav states, including Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to prove as a credible partner of the EU in securing peace and stability of the Western Balkans. Some of these new requirements were not only unpopular domestically, but were also controversial from the point of view of its consequences. For example, in 2008 Croatia recognised Kosovo—the decision that was closely linked with the invitation to join NATO that it received simultaneously. By doing so, it, however, violated the Agreement on Normalization of Relations it signed with Serbia and Montenegro (then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) in 1996, which included a clause on mutual recognition of two countries in their borders as they were before the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. Thus, for the sake of achieving one of its major foreign policy objectives, membership in NATO (which it joined in 2009), Croatia risked to worsen its relations with Serbia, at the moment when it seemed that some positive steps have already been made. In addition, compliance with ICTY requests for extradition of several Croatian generals radicalised the political scene in Croatia, which after 2000 was moving into the direction of de-Tud-manisation. But in many other aspects, the decade of accession to EU (2004– 2013) resulted in positive effects for both inter-ethnic relations in Croatia and for stabilisation of bilateral relations between Croatia and its neighbours. The inter-ethnic relations in the country were improved—although not irrevocably, as it would be evident after 2013—by the coalition that was formed between Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the main party representing the Serb minority, Independent Democratic Serb

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Party (SDSS) in 2003, under the Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. The coalition was successful in winning elections in 2007, which was a positive sign as it proved that a coalition with Serbs does not need to be an insurmountable hurdle in terms of popularity for major political parties. An SDSS’s representative, Slobodan Uzelac, became the Deputy Prime Minister (2007–2011), and the party was allocated several positions of State Secretaries (deputy Ministers) in Sanader’s government. Largely due to requests from the European Union, the rights of ethnic minorities were enhanced and guaranteed by the Constitutional Law on National Minorities (2010) (Petsinis 2013). The Prime Minister already in 2003 attended the manifestation organised by the Serb National Council on the occasion of Orthodox Christmas (7 January) when he greeted the Serbs with their traditional Christmas salute Christ has Arisen!. As of 2003, members of ethnic minorities elect their own representatives in councils that represent the minorities. They also have guaranteed eight seats in Croatian Parliament. This all contributed to relaxation of tense relations, between Croats and Serbs in particular. In bilateral relations with Serbia (then still Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in 2003–2006 renamed into State Union of Serbia and Montenegro), the first positive signs of cooperation appeared already in 2000, following the end of a decade-and-a-half long rule by Slobodan Miloševi´c. In the period of 2004–2008, two Prime Ministers, Ivo Sanader and Vojislav Koštunica, established a fruitful communication in order to address concrete issues related to succession of former Yugoslavia. During the 2000–2011 period, the highest state officials of two states have exchanged 11 public statements that included expression of regret (not full apologies though, as they would be legally binding and might result in requests for financial and other compensation) for acts of violence committed by “some members” of their respective nations against “some members” of the other nation (Krsti´c 2021). This was all possible because both Croatia and Serbia were closely monitored by the EU which required signs of reconciliation and postwar normalisation of relations. Croatia in particular, having been in a more advanced position with regard to EU enlargement—especially after the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Ðind-i´c in 2003, which slowed down Europeanisation of Serbia by demonstrating that forces of the old regime are still powerful and dangerous—felt that it had to initiate such statements and processes and to keep nationalist anti-Serb rhetoric under control (Bošnjak 2022).

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Similarly, positive were developments with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatian President, Stjepan Mesi´c (2000–2010), criticised Tud-man for his actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war that involved conflicts not only between Serbs and Croats but also between Croats and Bosniaks in 1993–1994. He emphasised the need to fully respect territorial and political integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was seen as a positive figure by Sarajevo. Croatia kept separatist tendencies among Croats in Herzegovina under control. Mesi´c’s successor, Ivo Josipovi´c, expressed regrets for crimes committed by Croatian units against Bosniaks and accused a “conglomerate of bad policies”, including that led by Zagreb, for violence and crimes against ethnic Others.1 The policy of reconciliation was in particular evident in joint visits to sites of war crimes by Serbian and Croatian Presidents in 2010–2012, Boris Tadi´c and Ivo Josipovi´c. The Croatian President even attended conferences and supported initiatives by NGOs active in countering the consequences of the war, such as Documenta and the Humanitarian Law Centre. The Croatian Parliament in this period declared publicly that even when Croatia joins the EU it would continue to act constructively and would become the force of Europeanisation. It promised to refrain from placing new obstacles to any of the remaining states that want to join the EU from the region, and promised to assist in the process of accession of these countries. In short, the long decade 2000–2012 raised hopes that post-Yugoslav countries, in particular Croatia and Serbia, were ready to constructively engage in turning the page in their bilateral relations from war to peace and from conflict to cooperation. However, three events have changed this course of events for worse. First, two countries decided to sue each other for genocide in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Croatia sued Serbia already in 1999, in the last year of Tud-man’s government, for alleged genocide committed during the four war years (1991–1995). Serbia responded ten years later, in 2009 (when it was clear that Croatia—despite positive developments— had no intention of withdrawing charges), when it sued Croatia for the alleged genocide committed against ethnic Serbs during the Operation Storm in 1995. In a way, this was also a response to Croatian recognition of Kosovo a year earlier. Both accusations were rejected by the ICJ 1 https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/josipovic_bih_prva_posjeta/2011674.html. Accessed: 3 August 2022.

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in 2015. However, the fact that the two countries sued each other for genocide in front of an international court presented a serious obstacle to the policy of reconciliation. In as much as their presidents and prime ministers issued “statements of regret” for the role of their own side during the 1990s, these statements were not taken seriously and thus not trusted, since at the same time two countries sued each other. This is the main reason for today’s prevalent belief that nobody apologised for anything in the past—despite the fact that there were 11 expressions of regret between the leading Serbian and Croatian politicians (Krsti´c 2021). The ongoing procedures in front of the ICJ placed serious limitations on how far two countries could go in addressing the issues of transitional justice. For as long as the court cases were active, they hesitated in raising charges against their own officials in front of domestic courts, since this could potentially worsen the position of their country in these two cases. Second, the final verdict in the case of Ante Gotovina and others by which they were in November 2012 acquitted of any responsibility in committing crimes against ethnic Serbs in Croatia during the Operation Storm (1995), derailed attempts by Croatian President Ivo Josipovi´c to promote a more self-critical view on the dark side of Croatian role in the war of the 1990s. From then onwards it was difficult, if not impossible, to address crimes committed by Croats during the early 1990s in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, the policy of joint visits to sites of memory, as well as the policy of mutual expression of sorrow for violence applied against the members of the other ethnic group, were discontinued. Most Croats felt that accusation against their generals, heroes of the Homeland War, was also an accusation of Croatia grosso modo. Acquittal of Gotovina and others was thus an acquittal of Croatia for its role in the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration.2 Third, in presidential elections in May 2012, Boris Tadi´c lost to Tomislav Nikoli´c, who was seen by many Croats as representative of radical extremist policies that directly led and contributed to the war against Croatia. In addition, the newly formed Serb Progressive Party (SNS) entered the government as the strongest party of the governing coalition in 2012. This party was formed in 2008 by former members of Vojislav Šešelj’s Serb Radical Party (SRS) who decided to promote a pro-EU narrative and to move closer to political mainstream. However,

2 On Gotovina as a symbol in Croatian politics see Pavlakovi´c (2010).

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in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the new party was perceived primarily as an offspring of Šešelj’s Radicals, and Šešelj was a symbol of anti-Croat politics during the war. In Croatia, the results of Serbian elections were seen—not without reason—as a return of nationalism and radicalism in Serbian politics. Croatian nationalists, being critical of any cooperation with Serbia, took it as a proof that Serbia cannot be a reliable partner but would forever remain hostile to Croatia. Whereas Boris Tadi´c, who was in opposition to Slobodan Miloševi´c during the whole decade of the 1990s, was perceived as an acceptable partner for a new policy of friendship and cooperation, this was not the case with his successors, the new Prime Minister Ivica Daˇci´c, the First Deputy PM Aleksandar Vuˇci´c and the new President, Tomislav Nikoli´c. In fact, the coalition between SNS and Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) reminded many of the old Socialist-Radical coalitions of the 1990s. The results of the 2012 elections were also a defeat of the policy of the 5th October (2000) that led to the overturn of the Miloševi´c regime, and thus seen as a return to old times of Slobodan Miloševi´c, only this time without him and with a perhaps only somewhat more moderate new generation of Serbian nationalists in power. Croatia, which bases its new national identity on the notion of victimhood and victory in the Homeland War (Jovi´c 2017), judges and assesses Serbian leaders in relation to their role in the 1990s. In addition, having already signed the EU Accession Treaty, Croatia felt more self-confident and thus less willing to pursue the politics of reconciliation, which it treated as something that needed to be done because of EU accession. From December 2011 on, when Croatia successfully finished its negotiations with EU over membership in the Union, the EU officials refrained from criticising Croatia or indeed tutoring it in matters of domestic and foreign policy. The end of negotiations was possible only because the EU positively assessed Croatian policies in all fields that were important for accession. Domestic non-governmental organisations, who remained critical of “simulated reforms” and especially of the rise of nationalist rhetoric, following the three landmark events described above, lost support by Brussels. The EU did not want to hear that the country that was about to join the Union is now less, not more, interested in promoting regional cooperation. Neither did they want to hear much about the new challenges to minority rights, media freedom and anti-corruption policies.

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In 2012–2016 in particular, Croatia became more nationalistic than it was in the 2000–2012 period. The acquittal of the generals by ICTY meant the end of “undesirable intrusion” into judicial sovereignty, whereas the successful ending of EU negotiations removed the obligation to satisfy the key external actor/arbiter such as Brussels. Largely in response to these trends, in 2012 Tomislav Karamarko, whose political profile was more right wing than that of his predecessors, Ivo Sanader and Jadranka Kosor, became the leader of HDZ. He announced the need for the party—that considers itself as the creator of the new Croatia—to return to its Tud-manist roots, thus ending the period of deTud-manisation in Croatian politics. With Croatia ending its negotiations with EU in 2011 and voting at a referendum in 2012 for accession to EU, the external pressure was now out of picture. The magnet that influenced domestic reforms and encouraged reconciliation in the previous decade had lost its interventionist power. It was now time, Karamarko’s new HDZ claimed, to go back to Croatian nationalism and sovereigntism. By criticising Mesi´c and Josipovi´c for being too soft on Serbia and for not protecting national interests but making unnecessary and harmful concession to Serbia, HDZ re-introduced anti-minority (and in particular anti-Serb) rhetoric as part of its own but also of the country’s mainstream discourse. In attempting to gain votes from the right wing of Croatian politics, Karamarko promoted a number of politicians who belonged to fringe parties of radical right and who now joined HDZ. The new HDZ was hostile to non-governmental organisations promoting reconciliation and to defenders of minority rights. Karamarko then announced that his party would never again form a “humiliating coalition with SDSS”. A much more self-confident and soon (as of July 1, 2013) more powerful Croatia made a U-turn. This was quickly evident in the increase of incidents against minorities and in the rise of hate speech in Croatia (Bošnjak 2022; Blanuša and Kulenovi´c 2018). In these new circumstances, immediately after it joined the EU, Croatia increasingly looked as a new Hungary or new Poland, a country that wanted to join the EU not for liberal character of the Union but primarily because this would enable it to return to the old sovereigntist policy, which gained popularity in these two other East European countries, especially following the migration crisis of 2015. However, what happened in 2016 changed again the course of Croatian politics— this time in the opposite direction, largely due to the strength of civil

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society, independent media and state institutions that proved to be resistant enough to challenges from the anti-systemic right-wing forces. Under the pressure of massive public protests and liberal-oriented media, Karamarko was replaced as Party leader in 2016 and replaced by Andrej Plenkovi´c, a moderate pro-EU leader who legitimised his new position by winning the elections in 2016. Plenkovi´c’s HDZ realigned with SDSS and rejected extremism. His focus was on the EU. From treating EU as an objective it began to treat it as an instrument of its own policy, more sovereigntist than it was in the period of de-Tud-manisation, but not as extreme as it was in Karamarko’s time. The key objective of its new interventionism was in the Balkans. Paradoxically, the new Croatian policy claimed that it no longer belonged to the Balkans—but it wanted to be present in the Balkans more than ever.

4

Returning to the Balkans as an EU Member State and as an Interventionist Small Power

As the newest EU member state, Croatia needed to reinvent itself in terms of its foreign policy identity. In 1990–2013, its foreign policy could be explained with a metaphor of a triple jump. It had three phases, and in each of these one major objective (a single-item foreign policy), that was defined as its national interest. In the immediate period after 1990, the key national interest was to achieve independence and its recognition by relevant international actors. This was—at least nominally—achieved already in 1992. However, as previously explained, Croatian independence was largely symbolic since it remained limited in major ways by— from the Croatian point of view undesirable—intrusions from abroad. Croatia was recognised on three conditions: to sign a peace agreement with the Yugoslav Army (which it did in January 1992 in Sarajevo), to allow presence of UN forces (UNPROFOR) in territories that unilaterally declared independence and tried to secede from Croatia (UNPAs in self-declared Serbian Krajina, 1991–1995), and to enact a special Constitutional Law on protection of ethnic minorities, especially Serbs, that at some point (before 1995) included a promise for a territorial autonomy in designated—but never materialised—Kotars (counties) of Glina and Knin. Although it agreed to all three conditions, Croatia saw them as a significant limitation to its own sovereignty. It viewed reintegration of territories without any territorial autonomy for Serbs as its priority, and

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thus as the key national objective in the second phase, that successfully ended in 1995 by a combination of diplomatic and military interventions that secured such integration. In this phase, Croatia relied more on the United States than on the EU. The most it agreed on was the Erdut Agreement of 1995, which guaranteed cultural autonomy of Serbs via their organisations such as Serb National Council and Joint Council of Municipalities (in Eastern Slavonia), which Croatia saw as a temporary solution, although the UN still views it as a valid document in terms of international law (Pedersen 2022). In the third phase, the key Croatian national interest was—to join NATO and EU. By achieving these two memberships in 2009 and 2013, respectively, Croatia turned symbolic into a meaningful sovereignty, since membership empowered it and turned it from being more of an Object (although nominally and symbolically a Subject ) into becoming a proper Subject of international politics. No member of EU has ever collapsed, disintegrated or ended in a civil war, due to either internal disputes (secessionism and inter-ethnic disputes) or external challenges (irredentism, security threats by neighbouring countries)—both of which were part of Croatia’s immediate experience during the 1991–1995 period. In this respect, joining of NATO in 2009 was of particular importance as it provided strong protection of territorial integrity, achieved in real terms only in 1995. It significantly reduced fears that the country might again be exposed to hostile actions by its neighbours, or that it might suffer from security crisis in the Restern Balkans.3 In addition, EU and NATO membership—just as previously the desire to achieve independence and territorial reintegration—were the key instruments of consolidating political (in particular in terms of foreign policy) unity of the nation, which became more ethnically homogeneous after 1995 than it had ever been in its entire history. Before joining the EU, political pluralism in Croatia was to some degree suspended, due to an agreement the governments and opposition had made on understanding that they share the same foreign policy objectives. This agreement (an Alliance for Europe, as it was informally named in 2005)

3 I have developed the concept of the Restern (rather than Western) Balkans to name the new situation in which by Croatian joining of the EU, the Western Balkans lost one member-state and was further reduced to 6 states: see Jovi´c (2015): https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2015/07/29/instead-of-enlarg ement-restern-balkans-in-consolidation/. Accessed: 3 August 2022.

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explains a remarkable degree of political stability in the country, in which two major political parties, HDZ and SDP (Social-Democratic Party), were managing to secure between 50 and 60% of total votes at each election, parliamentary and presidential. The opposition promised not to challenge or oppose any political decision that relates to EU membership of the country—which de facto meant, for the whole 2005–2012 period, all major political decisions, since all of them were somehow related to this objective. With EU membership in 2013, this consensus was challenged and the political scene became more pluralistic, with third parties challenging the two major actors. In response to these challenges, the HDZ in particular moved further to the right and returned to Tud-manism, by starting an ideological war against “former Communists” and “Yugoslavs” as well as by re-introducing an anti-Serb rhetoric and politics. However, once they discovered that moving further to the right means also losing support at the political centre, HDZ returned quickly to the centrist politics, trying to re-establish a strong centre, this time without SDP. In order to prevent further destabilisation and to invent a new focus for its new foreign policy, the moderate forces within the HDZ—led by Andrej Plenkovi´c—were shaping and constructing a new identity for European Croatia. This identity was focused on the notion of turning the EU from being an objective into becoming an instrument of Croatian foreign policy. In order to achieve this, Croatia had to find a niche, an area of specialisation that would be distinct enough to secure a foreign policy role for the new European Croatia. HDZ, which by 2016 was led by Plenkovi´c, first tried with Ukraine. Plenkovi´c, himself personally involved in Ukraine in his previous role of member of European Parliament and chairperson for monitoring of 2014 Ukrainian elections, proposed that the Croatian model of peaceful reintegration (Erdut Agreement) is applied to Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, this idea was immediately rejected by Russia, which claimed that it was in fact an attempt to also promote a military reintegration as happened via the Operation Storm, which was a precondition for the later Erdut Agreement. Croatia then proposed and conceptualised the Three Seas Initiative promoted by Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovi´c, who in 2015 became the President of the Republic. The Initiative referred to closer connection of countries of the Easter Corridor of EU, linking the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Sea, primarily for the purpose of improving transportation links, economic investments but also for coordinating foreign policy

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approaches. This idea—jointly conceptualised with Poland’s President Andrej Duda—was also a response to Russian taking over of Crimea in 2014, and met with support by the United States, whose President, Donald Trump, attended its summit in Warsaw in 2017. It was the first successful Croatian foreign policy initiative following its accession to EU. The identity aspect of the idea was to reorient Croatian foreign policy from its former West-Southeast axis (Europe vs. the Western Balkans) into a North-South orientation. At the same time, the Three Seas Initiative, somewhat paradoxically given the history of the Cold War which was to be left behind, was re-creating in a political sense the former Eastern Europe that has in the meantime become fully integrated into the West. As a small state, the newest member of the EU, Croatia now became allied with Poland, the largest and most ambitious country in Eastern Europe. This was its attempt to become a Small Power, a country that punches above its weight within the European and Euroatlantic structures it just joined. However, there was no consensus within Croatia on the usefulness of the Three Seas Initiative. The SDP—and especially its former leader, Zoran Milanovi´c, who in 2020 defeated Grabar-Kitarovi´c in presidential elections —rejected this idea,4 which is still—to this day—supported by HDZ and Prime Minister Plenkovi´c. When these two new ideas met with external and internal opposition, the Western Balkans remained the only other issue that could still provide consensus over the question of the niche for Croatian foreign policy. The Western Balkans returned through the main doors, the same one through which they were happily escorted in 2013. The Western Balkans thus remained an inevitable focal point of Croatian foreign policy even after the country joined the EU. This was due also to external actors’ interest in the Croatian role in the region. Foreign dignitaries who visited Croatia would almost always ask about Croatian views on the neighbouring countries, such as Serbia, Montenegro, and in particular, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even when and if Croatia wanted to remain detached from the region, it could not really remain silent on issues that were more than just bilateral but remained—even 30 years after the war—major issues of European and global security politics. This became particularly the case with the growing “external influences” (by new Chinese initiatives such as the Belt 4 For Milanovi´c’s views see: https://www.novilist.hr/novosti/hrvatska/milanovic-pro tiv-tri-mora-nepotrebno-i-potencijalno-stetno/. Accessed: 23 August 2022.

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and Road, new Turkish role sometimes described as Neo-Ottomanist, and especially the new role of Russia that tried to prevent countries of the Western Balkans becoming members of NATO), which were sometimes also called “malign” (Jovi´c 2018). At present, Croatian foreign policy is focused on two major issues. One is—to improve its position within European Union and related organisations, by nominating (rather successfully) its candidates for the posts, such as Secretary General of the Council of Europe (Marija Pejˇcinovi´c-Buri´c as of 2019) and Vice-President of the European Commission (Dubravka Šuica, elected also in 2019). In line with this objective, Croatia has in January 2023 joined the Eurozone and the Schengen area. By these events Croatia wants to move from being at the periphery, closer in the political sense to the centre of the EU. Andrej Plenkovi´c in particular seems to be interested in playing a major role within the European People’s Party and in the future European Commission. If successful, this would further justify Croatian pro-EU foreign policy and reduce EU-indifferentism in the country, strong at the moment of the 2012 referendum on EU. The second focus is on the Western Balkans, from which Croatia singles out Bosnia and Herzegovina as a “special case”. For Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina is strategically and politically the most important country in the region, due to a large presence of ethnic Croats who are one of the three “constituent nations” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but faced with challenges to the Dayton agreement-based internal structure. The Croatian largest Embassy is in Sarajevo (Jovi´c 2022). Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) are as of 2013 a majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina and request changes to the Dayton Agreement in order to turn the country into a more unitary state, in which majority should make decisions. Many Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, fully supported by Croatia, see in this attempt a threat to their status in particular if this new demographic situation would mean that they might be treated by Bosniaks as ethnic minority, not the one of an equal nation to a much larger Bosniak community. Unlike on other issues discussed above, on the issue of the need for Croatia to protect the rights of ethnic Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a consensus in Croatian politics. President Milanovi´c is in particular vocal in his criticism of Bosniaks and demands a more interventionist position from the Croatian government, led by Andrej Plenkovi´c.

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Such an interventionist politics towards Bosnia and Herzegovina would be also in line with the old Tud-manist narrative, based on scepticism towards all multi-ethnic states, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular. Tud-man argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina is no more than a “small Yugoslavia” and that its future is thus uncertain. Symbolical “rehabilitation” of Tud-man after 2013 has thus opened the doors for worsening of bilateral relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia now wants to use its membership in EU and NATO to convince its partners and allies in these institutions to support its bilateral policy towards this country. At the same time, the same approach is applied to relations with Serbia— still led by Aleksandar Vuˇci´c—which Croatia will condition on its road to EU with resolving open issues that originate in historical disputes, not least those that escalated during the Homeland War. One of these is Serbia’s accepting of responsibility for war and for the remaining more than 1,400 missing persons from that war. It now leads a policy “to Western Balkans via Brussels”. Having joined not only EU and NATO but also the Eurozone and Schengen area, Croatia now feels more selfconfident and more powerful than ever before. It wants to capitalise on its new status, primarily by achieving its national objectives in the Western Balkans.

5

Conclusions

Small states often have ambiguous views about joining large supranational organisations. On the one hand, they see them as protectors. Membership in such organisations is seen as an important element of recognition on the international scene. On the other hand, however, there is scepticism about the ambition of larger states to dominate within international organisations and structures, and to control them. Small states also fear that they would lose their own identity and remain invisible and permanently on the periphery. This is especially the case with states that became independent only recently, and via a conflict that is fresh in the memory of its citizens. In order to justify accession, citizens need to be convinced that they will be more protected if their state joins such structures/organisations than if it remains outside. They also need to be convinced that by joining a larger structure their country will enhance—and not reduce—the real power it has in the international arena. The new independent state— by definition still under the influence of sovereigntists —is being cautious

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when asked to transfer a portion of sovereignty to supranational bodies. It needs to construct a story, a narrative, that may convince it and its citizens that the benefits of joining are greater than the costs. This is possible if there is a visible increase of power for the state that joins the Union. In the case of Croatia, there were doubts about this. Additional effort was needed due to the Tud-manist sovereigntist narrative, which claimed that independence from Yugoslavia was achieved by autonomous will and action of the Croats and against a millennium-long history of being part of multinational empires/states, which limited or denied national sovereignty. The official narrative in Croatia responded to such fears and scepticism by presenting the NATO and EU membership as an instrument of empowerment of the new and small states. In no other issue, this could be evident more clearly than in foreign policy that would try to capitalise EU/NATO membership when it comes to specific national interests towards neighbouring countries of the Western Balkans. This is how Europeanisation was linked with sovereigntism—and this is also how Europeanisation feeds nationalism in foreign policy for small states with complex historical and identity issues. The Balkans simply cannot disappear from mental mapping and thus also from foreign policy orientation of Croatia. The remaining question, however, is whether it can be used constructively or destructively for international relations in the region.

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Jovi´c, Dejan (2006). Croatia and the European Union: A Long-Delayed Journey. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 8 (1): 85–103. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/14613190600595598. Accessed: 23 August 2022. Jovi´c, Dejan (2011). Turning Nationalists into EU Supporters: The Case of Croatia. In Rupnik, J (ed), The Western Balkans and the EU: ‘The Hour of Europe’, 33–47. Paris, Chaillot Papers. Jovi´c, Dejan (2009). Croatia After Tud-man: The ICTY and Issues of Transitional Justice. In Batt, Judy and Obradovic–Wochnik, Jelena (eds), War Crimes, Conditionality and EU Integration in the Western Balkans, 13–29. Paris, Chaillot Papers. Jovi´c, Dejan (2012a). Euroravnodušna Hrvatska. Politiˇcke analize, 3 (9): 63–65. Jovi´c, Dejan (2012b). Hrvatski referendum o cˇ lanstvu u Europskoj uniji i njegove posljedice za smanjeni Zapadni Balkan. Anali HPD, 9 (1), 163–182. Jovi´c, Dejan (2017). Rat i mit : politika identiteta u suvremenoj Hrvatskoj. Zapreši´c, Fraktura. Jovi´c, Dejan (2018). Accession to European Union and Perceptions of External Actors in the Western Balkans. Croatian International Relations Review, 24 (83): 6–32. Jovi´c, Dejan (2022). Hrvatsko-bosansko-hercegovaˇcki odnosi, Online version available here: https://fcjp.ba/images/Dejan_Jovic-Hrvatsko-bosanskoherc egovacki_odnosi.pdf. Accessed: 23 August 2022. Krsti´c, Milan (2021). Strategije destigmatizacije u spoljnoj politici država: studija sluˇcaja spoljne politike Republike Srbije od 2001. do 2018. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade. Lamont, Christopher K. (2010). Defiance or Strategic Compliance? The PostTud-man Croatian Democratic Union and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Europe-Asia Studies, 62 (10): 1683–1705. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2010.522425. Pavlakovi´c, Vjeran (2010). Croatia, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and General Gotovina as Political Symbol. Europe-Asia Studies, 62 (10): 1707–1740. Pedersen, Mark (2022). Doing the Difficult: Implementing Autonomy Agreements. Unpublished paper, 1–73. Peskin, Victor and Mieczysław P. Boduszynski ´ (2003). International Justice and Domestic Politics: Post-Tud-man Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Europe-Asia Studies, 55 (7): 1117–1142. https://doi.org/10.1080/0966813032000130710. Petriˇcuši´c, Antonija (2015). Non-Territorial Autonomy in Croatia. In Malloy, Tove H; Osipov, Alexander and Vizi, Balázs (eds), Managing Diversity Through Non-Territorial Autonomy: Assessing Advantages, Deficiencies, and Risks, 53–69. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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Petsinis, Vassilis (2013). Croatia’s Framework for Minority Rights: New Legal Prospects Within the Context of European Integration. Ethnopolitics, 12 (4): 352–367. Ponoš, Tihomir (2021). Kako smo se normalizirali: 25 godina od Sporazuma o normalizaciji odnosa izmed-u Republike Hrvatske i Savezne Republike Jugoslavije. Tragovi, 4 (2): 122–145. Šimunovi´c, Pjer (1999). A Framework for Success: Contextual Factors in the UNTAES Operation in Eastern Slavonia. International Peacekeeping, 6 (1): 126–142. Štulhofer, A. (2006). Euroscepticism in Croatia: On the Far Side of Rationality? In Ott, J (ed), Croatian Accession to the European Union. Vol. 4, The Challenges of Participation, 141–160. Zagreb, Institute of Public Finance. Online version: https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/ 6130. Accessed: 23 August 2022. Zambelli, Nataša (2010). Izmed-u Balkana i Zapada: problem hrvatskog identiteta nakon Tud-mana i diskurzivna rekonstrukcija regije. Politiˇcka misao, 47 (1): 55–76.

CHAPTER 7

The United States in the Western Balkans: Reluctant, Late and Distant Involvement vs. Quick Radical Fix Ivan Vujaˇci´c

1

Introduction

A question is often posed in Washington D.C. and an answer provided to describe the workings of the US Congress. The question is: “What does Congress do?”. The answer is: “Nothing! And then it overreacts.” The answer reminds of the US involvement in the Balkans during the long period of the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and its aftermath. A huge literature that deals with the subject has been produced over the years. This literature containing analysis, academic articles, documents and memoirs cannot be surveyed here.1 Instead, this article will use a broad 1 An ambitious attempt to survey the literature is Sabrina P. Ramet (2005). The book was critically reviewed by Aleksa Djilas which prompted a further exchange; see A. Djilas (2007).

I. Vujaˇci´c (B) Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_7

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brush to illustrate the general reluctance and lateness of US involvement accompanied by a certain distancing from the region with this dominant approach being rapidly substituted at specific points in time with the intention of finding quick, radical and sometimes flawed solutions regarding crucial issues. In a nutshell, the involvement of the US came in waves and was more a reaction to events than a part of a thorough, focused and committed strategy. There are three major reasons for this. One is that the US had to formulate its position within an ongoing dialogue with the EU (or at least with the countries that the US saw as the major players in Europe—UK, Germany, France). In other words, given the geographical position of the Balkans and the role of the EU as well as specific interests of some of the countries, this dialogue sometimes led to an impasse that was difficult to overcome. At other times, this led the US in the direction of taking unilateral steps to push for solutions that it preferred or to set up the diplomatic dialogue in such a way as to insure an outcome. Secondly, the change in US administrations led to shifts in policy that runs contrary to the belief that changes in policy are difficult to attain due to the cumbersome bureaucratic process through which such changes are achieved. Finally, the major reason for drifts in policy as a reaction to events is that the US has not had a major strategic interest in this part of the world at least since the time of the rapprochement between the US and the USSR under Regan and Gorbachev. To most citizens of the region of the Western Balkans, the description of US involvement in their part of the world as reluctant, late and distant, would be surprising to say the least. Most probably, they would tend to see the US as the most influential actor with hegemonic influence in the region. This type of role is undeniable and was most obviously (but not only) evident during the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. In spite of all this, the general conclusion of this chapter is that even in those instances the US was ready to distance itself leaving the implementation of solutions to the EU. The only exception is the expansion of NATO in which the US played a major role and which was a part of a long-term approach that was aimed not only to enhance NATO capabilities, but also to pacify potential conflicts in the region in the future. This US goal evolved after the end of the wars of the break-up of Yugoslavia.

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2 The Beginning of the End of Yugoslavia---Reluctant and Distant The major reason for the US being reluctant, late and distant in its approach to the region became obvious even before the Yugoslav crisis deepened to a point when violent break-up became almost inevitable. The reason, simply put, is that the US had no substantial interest in the region even before the fall of the Berlin wall. As the last US ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann made clear on his arrival in 1989, he had instructions to “deliver a new message: Yugoslavia no longer enjoyed the geopolitical importance that the US had given it during the Cold War” (Zimmerman 1995, p. 2). In other words, given what was happening in Eastern Europe where Soviet political and military dominance was eroding, Yugoslavia lost the special place it held in the US foreign policy agenda. This came at a time when Yugoslavia was heading for crisis and collapse. The reluctance to get more deeply involved should be seen against the background of the US involvement in engaging with the Soviet Union in order to manage the decline of communism and simultaneously building coalition that would support the coming Gulf war with Iraq (after its occupation of Kuwait). By the time the Secretary of State James Baker arrived in Belgrade to hold meetings with the leadership of the Federal and Republican governments it was too late. Furthermore, the US had previously distanced itself from the coming conflict within Yugoslavia by trying to square the circle with a policy mantra that sounded hollow from the very start. In the words of Warren Zimmermann, it read as follows: “the US could only support unity in the context of democracy; it would strongly oppose unity imposed or preserved by force” (Zimmermann 1995, p. 3). An identical message was delivered by James Baker during his visit before the break-up with an added warning that leaving the federation would have to be negotiated and that unilateral breakaway would not be recognized (Friedman 1991). It was obvious that the last-ditch effort came too late. The breakup itself evolved into a combination of civil wars and wars of secession

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as described by David Owen (1995, p. 3),2 the EU co-chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The mock war with Slovenia ended quickly, while the war in Croatia escalated after unilateral declarations of independence of the two republics. The US took a back seat, leaving the EU (then still the European Community—EC) in the lead to deal with the evolving situation. In spite of a unified EC and US policy that held back recognition until a negotiated settlement was achieved (with a major concern being the preservation of a ceasefire in Croatia), Germany moved to recognize the two former republics. It did so in opposition to the advice of the US, the UN Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance, the UN envoy to Yugoslavia and Lord Carrington, the chair of the Yugoslav peace conference at the Hague.3 The European countries followed shortly, while the US refrained and did so at a later date. Aside of other pressing issues, the other reason that the US was reluctant to get involved was the assertiveness of the European leaders that the crisis was a way to establish the EC as a viable international actor (Baker 1995, p. 636; see also Gompert 1996). The break-up of Yugoslavia, as already noted, also came with war in Croatia (for an overview, see Bjelajac and Žune 2009). Here, after war broke out in 1991, a ceasefire brokered by the UN was put into effect with UN peacekeeping forces engaged to enforce it until a political solution was found for the status of Serb-dominated breakaway parts of Croatia. The US was the last of the Western nations to recognize Croatia in April 1992, after the ceasefire was agreed to in January 1992. This was the result of the previously discussed policy principles set at the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis. As the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina escalated, the US was mostly engaged with Croatia in an effort to form a Moslem–Croat alliance in Bosnia in order to put an end to the fighting between the Moslem and Croat forces within the country. These efforts resulted in the formation of the Federation within Bosnia between the Moslems and Croats, an entity that along with the Serbian entity (Republika Srpska) established by the 2 This description, which I find to be most accurate, has been contested and has been instead branded as “wars of aggression” by the breakaway entities of Yugoslavia, as it best suited their political narrative, and is an issue beyond the scope of this inquiry. An early example can be found in Norman Cigar (1995). 3 For some explanations see Hodge (1998, pp. 1–18) and Crawford (1996, pp. 482– 521).

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Dayton Accords, later formed the constitutional arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina that remains in effect to this day. During the 1990s, the US was also engaged with other UN, EU and Russian diplomats to work out a plan for a political settlement between the Croatian government and the Serbian minority in Croatia with the goal of ending the frozen conflict and peacefully reintegrating the breakaway Serb held territories into Croatia. This was the Z-4 plan drafted by late 1994. Three rounds of negotiations failed. However, the US was aware that Croatia was preparing a mass offensive on the Serb forces in Croatia in August of 1995. The US did not try to forcefully protest the upcoming operation, viewing it as a means to put pressure on the Serbs to sign a peace agreement in Bosnia. As mentioned, the operation in which there were serious atrocities committed by the Croat Army led to the exodus of an estimated 180 000 Serbs, thus reducing their total number in Croatia during 1991–2001 from 540.000 to around 180.000. This was done as last-minute efforts were made to negotiate the Z-4 plan. In other words, the major efforts of the US during the 1990s in Croatia were influenced by the war in Bosnia that took center stage.

3 The War in Bosnia and the Dayton Accords as a Dysfunctional Solution In April 1992, the US position on the upcoming recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina was radically different from the one taken previously at the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia. In this case, against the background of the war in Croatia where a ceasefire was implemented with the deployment of UN peacekeepers in four “protected areas,” the US took a forceful and leading position pushing for swift recognition of Bosnia. According to James Baker, the policy was based on the analysis (with Warren Zimmermann in agreement) that quick recognition would deter the participation of the Yugoslav Army from entering the conflict and thus minimize levels of possible violence (Baker 1995, p. 640). Needless to say, this is precisely what it did not achieve. Swift recognition of the results of the referendum on independence became a substitute for pursuing a policy of prior negotiated independence. In an effort to ensure a peaceful transition to independence, the Carrington–Cutileiro peace plan was drawn up, negotiated and signed by all three parties (Serb, Croat, Bosniak). However, following a meeting

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with the US ambassador Warren Zimmermann, Alija Izetbegovi´c, the Bosniak leader withdrew his signature. Warren Zimmermann later denied that he had in any way encouraged Izetbegovi´c in this regard, but there must have been a misreading of the conversation or a misrepresentation of what were deemed to be signals from the US that recognition would inevitably follow even after the Bosniak withdrawal from the plan. Interestingly, this episode is ignoredin James Baker’s memoirs, as is the Carrington–Cutileiro peace plan. The US policy of recognition that the European actors agreed with was the one that, without a prior negotiated settlement between the three dominant ethnic groups (Bosniak, Serb, Croat), added fuel to the fire. Needless to say, this does not absolve the leaderships of the three local ethnic groups of their share of responsibility for the outbreak of war. As the war in Bosnia broke out, there were several efforts by the EC and the UN to come up with a viable peace plan. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was set up and co-chaired by former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance representing the UN, and David Owen former foreign secretary of the UK, representing the EC. In early 1993 the first Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia was drawn up as a starting point for further negotiations. It took an energetic and hectic activity of the two co-chairmen to negotiate the plan and keep all the local and international actors consulted, informed and on board. This time, however, the change of the administration in the US led to a significant shift. The Clinton administration, for various reasons, decided not to support the plan (Clinton 2004, p. 436).4 It took a great deal of diplomacy to get the US back on track to support it. Although Miloševi´c backed the plan in order to get a lifting of sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and although Radovan Karadži´c the leader of the Bosnian Serbs had signed the agreement, the assembly of the Bosnian Serbs at the prompting of Ratko Mladi´c rejected it in May 1993. The main reason that the Vance-Owen plan failed lies in the fact that it could not be imposed without US backing and commitment of military force.5 Furthermore, even those that have written about the Dayton 4 A confirmation of the lack of support for the plan can be found in Daalder (2000, pp. 7–11). Also, Owen (1995) discusses at length the undermining of the plan by the US. 5 For a thorough account of the intervention in Bosnia, see Burg and Shoup (1999); on the undermining of the Vance-Owen plan, see pp. 234–235.

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Accords in a self-congratulatory tone admit that the Clinton administration has no clear policy and called the war in Bosnia “the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930s.”6 Obviously, mixed signals from the Clinton administration were unfavorable for the negotiations of the plan. Also, public attention, lobbying and mass media in the US portrayed the plan as a capitulation to the Bosnian Serbs, which it certainly was not. The original plan left the Bosnian Serbs less territory than was allotted to by the Dayton Accords. In other words, the US was again reluctant to engage and missed an opportunity to end the hostilities by giving strong and unequivocal support for the Vance-Owen plan. We have no way of knowing how it would have worked, but its implementation would certainly have stopped the bloodshed that went on for another two and a half years. In the aftermath of the demise of the Vance-Owen plan, the Contact group emerged consisting of the US, Russia, Germany, France and the UK as a forum for formulating policy with UNPROFOR as a peacekeeping force. The various developments that took place both diplomatically and on the ground are too complex for the scope of this paper. Finally, it was the US that eventually took the lead and hammered out a peace agreement embodied in the Dayton Accords.7 The Dayton Accords were reached against the background of the Croat Army offensive “Storm” in August 1995 which banished 180 000 Serbs from Krajina (in Croatia) who fled to Serbia. This offensive came as a result of two policies led by the US. One was a reaction to an offensive by Bosnian Serbs on the city of Biha´c which led the US to tolerate a planned offensive by the Croatian Army. Using the Biha´c operation as an excuse to cleanse the Serb populated Krajina in Croatia, the goal of the Croat government of unifying this part of breakaway territory in a frozen conflict with Croatia was achieved. All in all, the offensive changed the perception of the Bosnian Serb military as unbeatable. It also came after the Srebrenica tragedy with evidence beginning to come out that over 8000 Bosniak males were killed by Bosnian Serb forces after conquering

6 Albright (2003, p. 180); the quote is from Richard Holbrooke’s article (1995, p. 40). 7 Two major accounts of the process of negotiating the Dayton Accords are Daalder

(2000) and Holbrooke (1998).

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it. Finally, the promise of lifting sanctions on Serbia induced Serbian President Miloševi´c to obtain the position of chief negotiator taking it away from the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs. The Dayton Accords did stop the war and were drawn up with closer resemblance not to the original Vance-Owen plan that was ditched, but to the later Owen-Stoltenberg plan which divided Bosnia into three entities. The constitutional setup of Bosnia, however, entrenched the divisions and have been an impediment to reforms that would make for a more functional state and enable significant movement to EU accession. In other words, the hope of gradual change to a more functional constitutional arrangement faded after 2005, when it was the Bosniak politicians who sabotaged constitutional reform that would have provided for a more functional state.8

4

(North) Macedonia---Containment and Neglect

Another troubled part of the former Yugoslavia in which the US was involved was the Republic of Macedonia. Interestingly, according to the Badinter Commission (set up by the EC to provide legal guidance for the dissolution of Yugoslavia), Macedonia and Slovenia were the only two countries that met the criteria for recognition of independence (Pellet 1992, pp. 178–185). Instead, Slovenia and Croatia were recognized. The Republic of Macedonia, as it declared its official name after it proclaimed independence, was able to avoid armed conflict through skilful diplomacy. However, Greece was extremely hostile to the use of the official name claiming irredentist aspirations on the part of Macedonia due to the fact that Macedonia as a geographic area also included most of Northern Greece. In fact, there are historical roots for this concern that are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that whatever reasons for the Greek attitude might have existed, after the break-up of Yugoslavia reasons to fear territorial claims on Greece stemming from Macedonia were without any realistic foundation. The fact is that the issue became a topic for inflammatory rhetoric used in internal politics of Greece and thus became a major concern for Greek 8 For an appraisal of the Dayton Accords on their twentieth anniversary see Bildt (2015). Bildt claims that contrary to myth, the preceding US bombing in Bosnia did not bring Bosnian Serbs to table, but helped Holbrooke convince the Bosniaks to accept the plan.

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governments. Thus, although the Republic of Macedonia was recognized under that name by a majority of countries, the dispute with Greece was temporarily resolved under the auspices of the UN in 1995. Under this agreement the official name of Macedonia that would be used in international organizations and other international bodies would be the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) until the resolution of the dispute. This proved to be a major stumbling block and turned into an agonizing impediment for the integration of Macedonia into both the EU and NATO, an aspiration and political choice of all governments and political parties. Over the years, this dispute ignited nationalist feelings in Macedonia that populist governments used in order to obtain political support. Thus through the appropriation of ancient Greek symbols and names, Macedonian governments exacerbated the dispute further radicalizing Greek positions. Matthew Nimetz, the US and then the UN mediator in the dispute, was involved in the negotiations over the name over the years. Finally, the dispute was settled in 2018 with the Prespa Agreement. From then the official name has been the Republic of North Macedonia.9 The US had recognized the country in 1994. It also began using its official name, the Republic of Macedonia, in 2004. It is really somewhat surprising that both the US and the EU could not put enough pressure on both sides to reach an agreement sooner. It seems obvious that an agreement should have been more forcefully pursued if one takes into account the volatility of both political and ethnic strife in the country and the fact that it acquired EU candidate status in 2005. One should remember that various peacekeeping missions and troops were deployed in North Macedonia, starting in 1992 when the UN Security Council established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR—Macedonia consisting of 1100 troops disbanded in 1995) to prevent the outbreak of violence between ethnic groups within the country. After UNPROFOR was disbanded the UN Security Council established the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) to monitor developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability of the country. This was a smaller mission and was aimed at preventing the potential spill-over of conflicts from Serbia, Albania and Kosovo. 9 For an account of the negotiations, see Nimetz (2020, pp. 205–214). See also the memoirs of Christopher Hill (2014).

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Finally, after the NATO bombing and conflict with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 was over and hundreds of thousands of Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo, North Macedonia experienced armed ethnic conflict between government forces and the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) that modeled itself on the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The armed rebellion which began in February 2001 led to around 250 deaths. It ended in August 2001, when representatives of the government and ethnic Albanians signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Skopje, which was mediated by US Special Envoy James Pardew and EU Special Representative Francois Leotard. This was certainly a joint effort and NATO troops were flown in to disarm the NLA. North Macedonia did become a member of NATO in 2019, after the name dispute had been reached and Greek objections to membership removed. In spite of acquiring candidate status for EU membership in 2005, negotiations did not start for long; only on July 19, 2022, was the opening of negotiations announced by the European Commission. Even after the name dispute with Greece was resolved, France and the Netherlands blocked the opening of negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania in October 2019. In March 2020, the European Council approved the opening of negotiations, only to be blocked by Bulgaria for reasons stemming from historical identity issues. In July 2022 negotiations were approved, after North Macedonia had to accept a humiliating compromise urged by the EU (French proposal) that makes identity issues (made to appease Bulgaria) a part of the negotiation process. All in all, the US involvement was basically crisis-driven as in its efforts to work out the Prespa Agreement and also naturally to encourage the country to join NATO. The disappointing record on coming to a solution to the name dispute, and the sorry state of the EU accession process along with military deployment to prevent ethnic conflict at times, testifies to the deep neglect of North Macedonia by both the US and the EU, with most of their efforts aimed almost solely at preventing potential conflict.

5

Serbia and Kosovo---The Rollercoaster

It is safe to say that the highest level of US engagement was with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), later Serbia and Montenegro and then Serbia. In the very beginning as the armed conflicts were unfolding,

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the major focus was on establishing ceasefires and freezing conflicts so as to later bring them to a peaceful settlement. In this regard, the major attention of the international community was centered on the leader of the entity that was thought to control the Yugoslav Army and that was Miloševi´c, the president of Serbia. The US was obviously a part of this joint effort, as already described, and had a series of special envoys to deal with these issues. The efforts mostly consisted of a combination of threats of tightening sanctions or using military options, on the one hand, and the promise of the lifting of the sanctions that had been put in place, on the other. At some point, in face of serious demonstrations in Belgrade in 1992, Miloševi´c tried to broaden his legitimacy by appointing Milan Pani´c, an American citizen and businessman as prime minister of the FRY and had his party elect ´ c, a renown author and a former dissident, as president of Dobrica Cosi´ FRY. Aside of broadening his support and diffusing the support for the opposition, he was also able to take a back seat to international negotiations while retaining power. According to very reliable sources, he had also promised to step down and let Pani´c become president of Serbia. Soon, however, he backtracked on this promise and won against Pani´c in an election (highly suspect in terms of vote tampering and outright fraud) for president of Serbia in late 1992. In early 1993 his party impeached ´ c. Dobrica Cosi´ After huge efforts and after overcoming the obstinate refusal of the Bosnian Serb leadership, Miloševi´c got the upper hand and took over as chief negotiator for the Serbs in Dayton. An outer wall of sanctions was lifted and instead of being labeled the “butcher of the Balkans” (a description that he acquired prior to the Dayton Accords) he became a “factor of peace and stability” in the Western press that generally (but not always) towed the foreign policy line of their governments. The US and the EU had generally not cared much for the state of democracy in Serbia, but had kept close ties with the opposition as had EU embassies. The criticism on the state of democracy was left mostly to the Western press. Diplomats tried to walk a fine line as to not offend Miloševi´c in order to get him to cooperatively engage in the peace process. On the other hand, civil society organizations were being helped through a broad range of programs and funding by various Western donors, not least by ones from the US. After Dayton, Miloševi´c became confident that his position of a cooperative partner had been enough

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to completely rehabilitate him in the eyes of the West. This overconfidence led him to try to annul the results of the local elections held in November 1996. Massive demonstrations over election fraud broke out in Belgrade and then in the rest of Serbia, lasting for months. The US with the rest of the EU was engaged in defending the election results by providing a special OSCE mediator in the person of Felipe Gonzalez. The “Gonzalez report” led to the reversal of the annulment of the election results, which enabled the opposition to assume power in a large number of cities and towns throughout Serbia, including Belgrade. This was the first time that the US government started recognizing the opposition as a potential partner in the transformation of society to a Western type democracy. Soon there emerged bickering in the opposition (reasons cannot be addressed here for lack of space). Be that as it may, the opposition retained power in the local governments all the way till the overthrow of Miloševi´c when he again tried to annul the results of the election. Throughout this time, the Kosovo issue was in the background. Miloševi´c had made his name when, as the President of the Communist League of Serbia, he radicalized the issue of Kosovo. This he did because of complaints by Kosovo Serbs (over a prolonged period of time) of being mistreated by the Albanian majority in Kosovo. By prioritizing the position of Serbs in Kosovo Miloševi´c gained massive support in a populist fashion and won the power struggle that ensued within the Communist League of Serbia. In the years preceding the break-up of Yugoslavia, he pushed for constitutional amendments that would modify the status of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina by stripping them of some of their powers. This led to mass resistance, demonstrations and strikes in Kosovo whose Albanian ethnic majority saw this as a major setback for their collective national rights. From then on, they created parallel structures and commenced to proclaim the goal of independence. Certainly, there was repression on the part of the government of Serbia. However, it would be unfair to try to portray this movement for secession from Serbia as a human rights issue the way it was often portrayed throughout a large part of the Western world (and especially in the US Congress). Rather, the legitimate claims of human rights violations were used to promote a secessionist agenda that has been openly voiced since as

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early as 1968 and more vocally in 1981 (at that time as a pro-communist movement for the Albanian style of communism).10 This is easy to deduct from the fact that the opposition in Serbia acknowledged the trampling of human rights in Kosovo, since human rights were also a problem in Serbia proper. The major appeal of the opposition in those days to Western diplomats, including those from the US, was to convince the Albanians in Kosovo to vote and take their seats in the Serbian parliament. If they did not want to participate in lawmaking activities, they could simply walk out. With the Albanian boycott of elections, all those potential seats from Kosovo went to the Miloševi´c party. Denying those seats would have changed the parameters of the whole political game and could have led to meaningful negotiations on minority rights and perhaps at some point a government forged by the opposition with Albanian parties. This option was never accepted by the Albanians in Kosovo, although allegedly the US and others recommended this approach. How heavily this was pushed remains unknown to this day. In any case, the obstinate refusal by the Albanian side certainly strengthened their conviction that they would achieve the goal of independence by refusing even the possibility of compromise. In other words, secession was the ultimate goal and not autonomy and reconciliation within Serbia; they assumed correctly that both the US and the EU would recognize one fait accompli after another. Until 1998 the US threatened the use of force against Serbia in case of violence in Kosovo only once, in late 1992. After that, given the preoccupation with other issues (especially the war in Bosnia), the US and the EU had put Kosovo on the backburner. As the conflicts in Bosnia were winding down, the Kosovo issue was resurfacing. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was coming to the forefront through its armed activities in which it targeted and killed both Serbs in Kosovo and Albanians considered to be “collaborators” of the Serbian institutions. As its goal it proclaimed the unification of Kosovo and Albania. Not until late 1997 was it recognized as a factor, even by the undisputed leader of the Kosovo Albanians Ibrahim Rugova. In early 1997, the implosion of the government in Albania due to pyramidal schemes in the banking sector led to the massive trade in weapons through the porous border between Albania and Kosovo. It is widely

10 For a sound discussion see Mrdalj (2020, pp. 42–60).

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considered that the funds of the KLA to purchase weapons and smuggle them across the border were obtained through contributions by the Albanian diaspora, Swiss businessmen of Albanian descent and the sale of narcotics. Originally, Robert Gelbard, President Clinton’s special envoy to the Balkans, during a press conference characterized the KLA as “without any question, a terrorist group” (Gelbard 1998). In only a few months, the US position had radically changed and Gelbard himself had backtracked. This was really an unexpected reversal of policy which led to confused and often contradictory policy aims. In 1998, with Serb police activity against the KLA being stepped up in Kosovo due to their greater presence and activity, the US started shifting its position, recognizing the KLA as a factor that needed to be included in the process of the pacification of the conflict. This was highlighted by Richard Holbrooke being photographed with the KLA fighters, which were at that point unrecognized as a part of a potential negotiating process. This, needless to say, undercut the pacifist political leadership and authority of Ibrahim Rugova. Thus, the official US policy was to pressure the Miloševi´c regime to withdraw some of the troops engaged in fighting the KLA to bring down the level of violence. In the view of the US policymakers, the Serb forces were responding with an overwhelming and unnecessary force. Partial withdrawal of the Serb forces over the summer led to the escalation of KLA activity which then led to a return of Serbian forces. The growing pressure on the Serbian side to scale down its forces was an incentive for the KLA to step up its activities. In short, while denying the Albanians in Kosovo the right to independence, the US also put pressure on the Serbian side to cease its counterinsurgency efforts. The only longer term effect was to embolden and strengthen the KLA as an insurgent guerilla force, thus shifting the dynamics on the ground and at the political level providing the KLA with legitimacy. As the violence escalated in the late summer and autumn of 1998, under threat of NATO military intervention, the FRY government agreed to a withdrawal of its major forces and to international monitors. The familiar cycle of KLA increased guerilla activity and led to reengagement of the Serbian forces bringing up the level of violence by January 1998. All this led to the Rambouillet (France) negotiations in which the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian side were presented with an interim agreement that would have provided for substantial autonomy and selfgovernment for Kosovo inside Yugoslavia, protected by a strong NATO

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presence on the ground, disarmament of the KLA and a huge reduction of the presence of Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces. The final status of Kosovo was to be worked out in three years time by an international conference. The Albanian delegation at first refused to sign and did so only reluctantly (postponing the final signature for two weeks) after explicitly being told that the US would abandon their cause if they refused. It is obvious from all accounts of the negotiations that the US took the lead and that it basically sidelined its European partners including Russia.11 It is extremely difficult to see how this agreement could have been signed by the FRY delegation. The idea that there could be a legal secession after an interim period of three years, given the purposely ambiguous language used, was hardly acceptable. The second impediment was the deployment of NATO troops within a sovereign country as a peacekeeping force. The combination of the conditions made the agreement unacceptable. Last minute threats by Richard Holbrooke did not move Miloševi´c to sign, which led to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. The bombing violated the UN charter since no UN resolution approved it. Furthermore, the NATO charter did not justify it, as no NATO member was attacked. In fact, the Rambouillet negotiations, which included military threats, can also be considered dubious as nations should not be threatened while negotiating. There have been polemics over this issue, but one has to say that efforts to find legal justifications for the NATO bombing have produced highly suspect and tenuous conclusions at the very best. One can confidently say that this act by NATO was not legal according to international law. The other argument for the justification of the bombing was the existence of a fictitious plan whose codename was Horseshow, which was supposedly the Miloševi´c’s regime to expel the Albanian population from Kosovo.12 To date, no evidence has been produced whatsoever that such a plan existed at all.

11 The most obvious account comes from Madeleine Albright herself (2003, pp. 397– 408); see also Hill (2014), Chapter 10. 12 See, for example, Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, p. 12). Furthermore, during the bombing campaign, the number of Albanian civilian deaths, refugees and alleged atrocities by Yugoslav forces was vastly exaggerated; see Weymouth (2001, pp. 142–162). A more critical evaluation of the Western (especially American) media coverage of the Yugoslav crisis including the Kosovo war is Sremac (1999).

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The belief that Miloševi´c would fold and sue for peace in a few days after the commencement of the bombing, held at the highest levels of the US government, proved to be completely wrong and was obviously a failure of both analysis, competence and intelligence. The bombing went on for 78 days bringing much damage to civilian infrastructure all over the country. The Yugoslav Army left Kosovo with all its hardware almost unscathed, an incredible accomplishment given the intensity of the NATO bombing and the sophisticated resources for reconnaissance. The end of the bombing was sealed with UN SC resolution 1244, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army, the entrance of NATO troops and a mass exodus of Serbs from Kosovo, a great many of them leaving under threat and becoming permanent refugees. In the aftermath of the downfall of Miloševi´c, the US and some European countries were involved in providing a contingent of troops for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) that was to provide for peace and the protection from ethnic violence against the Serbs in Kosovo.13 The new president and new government of the FRY, with the Serbian opposition to the Miloševi´c regime forming the Serbian government in Serbia, got off to a good start by reestablishing its diplomatic ties to the US and EU countries. The economy began to recover, a major write-off of the debt was achieved and the transition to a market economy and a democracy was on the way. Later (2006), the dissolving of the FRY went smoothly through a referendum in Montenegro. What remained was the unsettled status of Kosovo. The province became a sort of a protectorate with a provisional government made up of the Albanians in Kosovo. The original plan was to upgrade local institutions so that they would meet or come close to European standards, thus providing for the protection of minorities, the functioning of a trustworthy judicial system and an executive that would be constrained by parliament and the rule of law. This policy was labeled as “Standards before Status,” meaning that the issue of the status of Kosovo would be reached after the minimum standards of good governance would be met. Basically, this meant a slow state-building process before the final status would be determined. However, the riots by Albanians in Kosovo, triggered by false rumors spread through Kosovo Albanian media, led to the destruction of 39 13 Most of the authors cited so far justify the NATO war, but many are critical; see Carpenter (2000).

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Serb Orthodox churches, some of them from the Byzantine period, over 900 injured and wounded and 19 dead. Furthermore, 750 non-Albanian homes were burnt and thousands of Serbs were driven from their homes.14 A firm stand and prosecution of perpetrators were announced which never really materialized.15 On the contrary, there was a shift in policy (UN Secretary General 2004). The “standards before status” became “standards and status,” finally turning to “status before standards.” This shift was strongly endorsed by (and most assume stemmed from) US policymakers. Needless to say, after exercising its dominant role in NATO and its use of military power in the Kosovo conflict, the US (just as it did in similar circumstances in the war in Bosnia) assumed a leadership role in forcing the path to what was thought to be a lasting solution. The reasons for this shift are many. It seems that when it comes to the US, several are dominant. The first has to do with general ideological reasons. Having proclaimed to be the standard bearer of democracy in the world, the US in most of its full-scale military interventions has been in a hurry to provide legitimacy to new political and state structures. Thus, elections are quickly held (Iraq, Afghanistan) to supposedly endow the emerged post-conflict elites with legitimacy. Thus, “ownership” of institutions and processes is bestowed on the domestic political elites.16 In other words, it would not have been consistent for the US to deny self-governance to the Kosovo Albanians for a prolonged period of time. The second and the more immediate answer is that by 2004, the US was involved militarily (along with some of its EU allies) in Iraq and Afghanistan, thus being somewhat stretched to militarily ensure a prolonged protectorate status for Kosovo until the final settlement. Finally, the massive acts of violence committed during the Albanian mass riots exposed the inability and incompetence of most KFOR troops

14 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United NationsInterim Administration Mission in Kosovo. April 30, 2004 S/2004/348. 15 Four years later, the OSCE evaluated the enforcement of the rule of law in regard to these riots as deficient and inadequate; see OSCE in Kosovo (2008). Paradoxically, this report came out after the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo and after the US and most EU states recognized Kosovo as an independent state; see UN Secretary-General (2004). 16 That this approach is deeply flawed has been argued a long time ago by one of the leading American political scientists, Samuel Huntington (see Huntington 1968, pp. 6–7).

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(excluding American) to really engage in protection and peacekeeping, which constituted the core of their mission in Kosovo. The consequence was a quick move led by the US to settle the status of Kosovo beginning in late 2005 with the appointment of Martti Ahtisaari as the UN general secretary’s special envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. It was clear from the start that negotiations were structured in such a way that there was no possible outcome but independence, to which the Serbian side could not agree, insisting on its part on the broadest possible autonomy and international law.17 Essentially, the “negotiations” were a formality for public relations purposes. Since there was no middle ground for compromise from the very start—there was really nothing to negotiate about. The Kosovo Albanians unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo in February 2008. The US and most of the EU states recognized Kosovo as an independent state within days and weeks. In support of independence (secession?) of Kosovo, the US argued that Kosovo was a sui generis (unique) case and that its independence would not be a precedent. Therefore, it could not derail the international order and would not abrogate international law. However, this was not how a large number of nations saw it, which led to the result that approximately a little less than half of UN members have not diplomatically recognized Kosovo, including five member states of the EU. This has created an impasse in the European integration process in the Western Balkans, with the US basically withdrawing and leaving the EU to handle further negotiations between Belgrade and Priština. Since this did not produce results, the US again took an active role during the Trump administration. The US encouraged both sides to define a possible agreement that would incorporate elements of a mutually acceptable solution. This led to justified speculations that the potential agreement included border changes or “territorial adjustments.” The consequence was that the EU, suspecting that this was the case, quickly prevented this type of arrangement from even being considered. The Trump administration then initiated what was called the Washington Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo. This Agreement boiled down to separate letters of intent signed independently by the two parties in the presence of the US president. Most of what was signed had either

17 For an overview of the negotiation process, see Weller (2008).

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been agreed before, dealt with some economic issues or addressed matters totally unrelated to the dispute between the parties. In fact the central feature of the Washington Agreement is that it dealt with the diplomatic recognition between Israel and Kosovo. Given that the meeting at the White House occurred before the presidential election, the whole episode can be justly considered to be a publicity stunt for the Trump reelection bid. As the Biden administration took office, the US once again assumed the role of backing the Belgrade-Priština negotiations under the auspices of the EU. After serious misunderstandings and some open conflicts between the US and the EU during the Trump administration, the current administration is eager to minimize potential tensions with the EU especially against the background of the war in Ukraine. Thus it perceives its role as supportive of EU efforts in the Belgrade-Priština dialogue to reach a solution that would be lasting and would pacify potential conflict. The major role for the US would then consist of using its influence and leverage over the Albanian leaders in Kosovo to accept a solution that would include an Association of Serbian Municipalities (in which they are the majority) in Kosovo as part of the settlement, an issue which turned out to be a major, but not the only impediment for the dialogue to move on to a positive outcome. This is an important role, as the EU utterly lacks influence over the Kosovo leadership.

6

Conclusions

The US was involved in the Western Balkans in two vastly different modes. At times it was late, reluctant and distant in its involvement, the prime example being at the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis. At other times it was quick to move to (often flawed) diplomatic solutions after radical use of its military power. Even then, as in the case of Bosnia, it varied between these two modes of conduct. Finally, radical shifts in these two modes occurred in the case of Kosovo. Table 1 gives an overview of the different periods and modes of US involvement in the Western Balkans. The US has had different perceptions of the Western Balkans during the different periods, corresponding to changing priorities in its foreign policy. Diverse have also been the US attitudes toward problems of different countries in the Western Balkan region. The perceptions of the US administrations were transferred into the public sphere through the

SFR Yugoslavia Distant, Wars of break-up: Slovenia—mock war 1991, Croatia—1991–1995, Bosnia and 1989–1991 reluctant, Herzegovina—1992–1996, FR Yugoslavia—NATO bombing 1999 late in the Yugoslav crisis Slovenia (1989–1991): Distant, reluctant, Joins EU in 2004 late, opposed to unilateral Joins NATO in 2004, with US support independence. Postponed recognition Croatia (1989–1991): Distant, reluctant, late, (1991–1994): UN 1995: US & EU work 2000s: Croatia joins opposed to unilateral independence. ceasefires with on Z-4 political NATO with US solution for Serb support in 2008 Postponed recognition Peacekeeping forces in breakaway areas. US breakaway parts. US Croatia joins the EU (radical quick recognizes Croatia last, in 2013 fix) supports Croat in April 1992 offensive against Serb breakaway parts of Croatia

US involvement in the Western Balkans 1990–2020 and major developments in individual countries

US involvement in the Western Balkans, 1990–2020

New States of former Yugoslavia

Table 1

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Serbia & Montenegro

Federal Republic Yugoslavia

(continued)

2018:Prespa accord signed in 2018, ends name dispute. North Macedonia joined NATO in 2020 (1996–1997): US and (1998–1999): US 2000:Downfall of EU push for recognition threatens military Miloševi´c regime. FRY of local election results action over violence in restores diplomatic in Serbia. Miloševi´c backs Kosovo. US led NATO relations with US and down bombing of Serbia West. Revives (1999) after failure of membership in negotiations in international Rambouillet. Radical organizations with US fix support (2003–2006): FRY renames itself to Union of Serbia & Montenegro in 2003. In 2006, after an agreed to referendum, Montenegro and Serbia become independent states thus dissolving the Union

2004: US uses official name of Macedonia. Macedonia gets candidate status for EU

2000s: Effort to make amendments to Dayton |Agreements. Sabotaged by Bosniak parties in 2005

(1989–1994): Distant, reluctant, late. Macedonia recognized by US in 1994. Preventive UN force deployed in 1991 continued. Name dispute with Greece (1992–1995): US supports sanctions against FRY. Negotiates with Miloševi´c on peace settlement in Bosnia Dayton Agreement reached in 1995. Outer wall of sanctions on FRY lifted

1995: Commits military support. Leads initiative on working out Dayton Agreement. Quick radical fix

North Macedonia

(1992–1994): Distant, reluctant and late, undermined Vance-Owen peace plan. Lack of will to commit. Pressures to form Bosniak-Croat Federation in Bosnia produces results 2001: Armed conflict between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians. Ohrid Agreement signed

(1989–1991): Distant, reluctant, late, opposed to unilateral independence

Bosnia and Herzegovina

(1992): US goes for quick recognition as deterrent of civil war. (Counterproductive)

US involvement in the Western Balkans 1990–2020 and major developments in individual countries

New States of former Yugoslavia

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Montenegro

Kosovo

2006: Becomes independent

2008: Ongoing diplomatic confrontation with Serbia over multiple issues relating to Kosovo. US backs dialogue Joins NATO with US support in 2017

(2017–2020): Negotiations of Kosovo government with Belgrade (encouraged by US) include territory swaps. Undermined by EU First change of government through democratic elections in 2020

(2017–2020): Belgrade–Priština talks with possible territorial swaps encouraged by US. Rejected by EU 2020 onwards: US supports ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, but leaves leadership role to EU

(2020): New govt. in Kosovo does not remove tariffs on Serbian imports (in spite of US urging). Govt. loses confidence vote, but is reelected Minority government formed in 2022. Priority is EU integration

(2010–2017): US-Serbia relations become routine with differences over Kosovo independence

(2000–2005): US-Serbia relations experience upward trend in all segments 2008: Gets recognition by US and all but five EU member states

Serbia

(2007): Serbia joins (2008–2010): Diplomatic Partnership for Peace quiet confrontation with with US support US and most EU countries over recognition of Kosovo

US involvement in the Western Balkans 1990–2020 and major developments in individual countries

(continued)

New States of former Yugoslavia

Table 1

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US media, which were more than ready to tow the official line. Thus, Serbia was depicted as the aggressor in spite of the fact that what was unfolding was a combination of a civil war and a war of secession within a previously unified, recognized and respected country, a member of the UN and signatory of the Helsinki Accords. In an ironic twist, this description is very similar to the way in which the Confederacy depicted the Civil War in the US as “the war of northern aggression.” Aside of the Serbs who were branded as the aggressors, all the other participants were, more or less, portrayed as victims in spite of discriminatory practices and atrocities committed against minorities on their territory (mostly, but not only, Serbs). A prime illustration of these shifts can be seen in the radically different portrayals of Miloševi´c whose image in the US media went from “butcher of the Balkans” to “factor of peace and stability” after the Dayton Accords to “war criminal” after the commencement of the NATO bombing of the FR Yugoslavia. This example should not be taken as an attempt to exonerate Miloševi´c in any way. It should rather be seen as confirmation of a long tradition of mainstream media in the US closely following the policy positions of the US administrations. This is especially true in regard to conflicts in which the US has no strategic interest or is not involved with troops on the ground in an ongoing war. Furthermore, this approach is in line with the general trust of media reporting and analysis that requires short and mostly clear answers to complex issues. That the depiction of certain states and nations in a simplistic and therefore, necessarily biased way, can have long-lasting effects on relations between the US and those states and nations, seems not to perturb the media. Although in the eyes of the Western Balkan populations the USA has always been perceived as an extremely important actor, the Western Balkans effectively have not been in the central focus of US policies unless there was a burning crisis. As of the late 1980s, the US did not deem Yugoslavia of strategic importance and therefore, did not have a longterm strategy. The consequence was a lack of engagement. As conflicts escalated, the US approach was mostly guided by events in which it finally had to devote vast diplomatic and military resources. Following settlements, the US again mostly took a back seat leaving the EU to deal with the region, hoping that the prospect of integration into the EU would pacify the region and advance prosperity. Thus, the partnership with the EU, with all its ups and downs over various policies in the region, is the main reason for the US to mostly chose to take a secondary role. The only consistent US strategy in the Western Balkans was its advocacy of

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NATO membership for the countries of the region, after that policy was implemented for the former Warsaw Pact countries. The US did have a vision for Europe after the end of the Cold War. It was captured in the memorable phrase: “Europe whole, free and at peace.” After playing a major role in putting the end to violent conflict, no matter how we evaluate the success or failure of the US-led solutions, the US basically retreated to allow for the leadership role of the EU in encouraging, supporting and managing the EU integration process of the countries in the region. A look at the region after more than twenty years is disappointing. Only two countries, Slovenia and Croatia, have joined the EU with the latter being far from a success story. The rest of the region has seen backsliding on democracy and has experienced the rise of authoritarianism and state capture. The EU integration process is dead in the water. Bosnia remains a dysfunctional state. The Belgrade-Priština dialogue is stalled. North Macedonia and Albania have not opened negotiations until July 19, 2022, in spite of acquiring candidacy status much earlier. If we add to that the constant rekindling of nationalism by political elites for electoral purposes, the level of corruption and crime, the degradation of institutions, the pressure on media, we end up with deeply flawed democracies more appropriately labeled hybrid regimes. It is hardly a picture that is compatible with the vision of constant progress led by the EU accession process. This was the promise of the EU perspective for the Western Balkans at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003. However, obviously, the responsibility does not lie primarily with the US, but foremostly with the political elites of the countries involved and the EU. The EU has contributed to the sorry state in the region through transactional formalistic policies and fundamental neglect. The EU engagement in the region is outside the scope of this chapter, but its failure in the region is a challenging topic for another.

References Albright, Madeleine (2003). Madam Secretary—A Memoir, Miramax Books, New York. Baker, James (with Thomas M. Defrank) (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace 1989–1992, G. Putnam’s Sons, New York. Bildt, Carl (2015). Dayton revisited: Bosnia’s peace deal 20 years on, ecfr.eu.

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Bjelajac, Mile and Žunec, Ozren (2009). The War in Croatia, 1991–1995. In Charles Ingrao and Thomas Emmert (eds.), Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies—A Scholars’ Initiative, Purdue University, Lafayette. Burg, Steven L. and Shoup, Paul S. (1999). The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, M.E. Sharpe, New York. Carpenter, Ted (ed.) (2000). NATO’s Empty Victory, Cato Institute, Washington, DC. Cigar, Norman (1995). Genocide in Bosnia, Texas A&M University Press, College Station. Clinton, Bill (2004). My Life, Alfred A. Knopf, New York. Crawford, Beverly (1996). Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral Recognition of Croatia. World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 4 (July): 482–521. Daalder, Ivo H. (2000). Getting to Dayton—The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy, Brookings, Washington, DC. Daalder, Ivo and O’Hanlon, Michael (2000). Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC. Djilas, Aleksa (2007). The Academic West and the Balkan Test. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 3 (December): 323–333. Friedman, T. (1991). Baker Urges End to Yugoslav Rift. New York Times, June 22. Gelbard, Robert (1998). US Special Representative Press Conference Pristina, Serbia and Montenegro, February 22, 1998 (2/22/98 Press Conference: R. Gelbard (state.gov). Gompert, David (1996). The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars. In Richard Ullman (ed.), The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars, Council on Foreign Relations, New York. Hill, Christopher (2014). Outpost—A Diplomat at Work, Simon and Schuster, New York Hodge, Carl C. (1998). Botching the Balkans: Germany’s Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12 (March): 1–18. Holbrooke, Richard (1995). America, a European Power. Foreign Affairs, March/April, p. 40. Holbrooke, Richard (1998). To End a War. New York: Random House. Huntington, Samuel (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven. Mrdalj, Mladen (2020). From Pararepublic to Parastate: International Leverage in Shaping Kosovo’s Secession. Nationalities Papers, Vol. 48, No. 1: 42–60. Nimetz, Matthew (2020). The Macedonian “Name” Dispute: The Macedonian Question—Resolved? Nationalities Papers, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2020). OSCE in Kosovo (2008). Four Years Later—Follow up of March 2004 Riots Cases Before the Kosovo Criminal Justice System, July.

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Owen, David (1995). Balkan Odyssey, Harcourt Brace, New York. Pellet, Alain (1992). The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples. European Journal of International Law, No. 3: 178–185. Ramet, Sabrina P. (2005). Thinking About Yugoslavia—Scholarly Debates About the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Sremac, Danielle S. (1999). War of Words, Praeger, Westport, CT. UN, Security Council (2004). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations-Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. April 30th 2004 S/ 2004/348. UN Secretary General (2004). Report on the situation in Kosovo—Summary and Recommendations, S/2004/932. Weller, Marc (2008). Negotiating the final Status of Kosovo, Chaillot paper no 114, EUISS. Weymouth, Anthony (2001). The Media: Information and Deformation. In Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds.), The Kosovo Crisis, Reuters, Pearson. Zimmermann, Warren (1995). The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2.

PART II

Regional Perceptions

CHAPTER 8

The Image of the European Union in the Western Balkans Jovan Teokarevi´c

1

Introduction

The image of the European Union (EU) in countries that want to join it is an important topic in academic and policy areas of research. Without a clear view of the evolving public perception of the EU in aspirant countries, it is impossible to understand the effects of changes in the external and internal contexts, as well as the very dynamics of their EU integration paths. The topic of perceptions of the EU outside of the Union has not been often and systematically researched, and the same is true for the Western Balkan region (good exceptions include Jovi´c 2018; Markovi´c Khaze ˇ 2022; Cavoški 2022; Skoko 2006). By and large, surveys in this region have dealt mostly with issues of EU popularity, reasons for affirmative or negative attitudes towards EU accession and predictions concerning the dates of accession. These data are certainly very important, but they often

J. Teokarevi´c (B) University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_8

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lack genuine conclusions about the contours of the image(s) of the EU. In this chapter, I will try to offer precisely this missing content. While it is of course interesting and important to look for images of the EU in any country, the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) present a very special case indeed. The whole region has had a slow and unsuccessful two decades long EU integration, the end of which is still not in sight. Ever since all countries in the region officially proclaimed EU membership as their strategic goal in the aftermath of the 1990s military conflicts, and especially since the EU explicitly promised them membership at the EU-Western Balkans Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 (but once they meet the criteria) (European Commission 2003), the perception of the EU has undergone significant changes in each society of the region. In order to understand and explain this, two dominant images of the EU in the Western Balkan countries will be identified and compared: the initial one from the early years of EU integration, and the later one that came as a result of a serious crisis of EU enlargement in the region. Relying on results of public opinion polls and other analyses, I will show why and in what ways has the EU image become different and certainly much worse than before. The analysis will proceed in several steps. First, the shifts in the popularity of the EU in the Western Balkans throughout the last two decades will be presented and explained. This will make some generalizations possible concerning the already mentioned comparison between the early and the late dominant images of the EU. Moving further, the image of the EU will be briefly compared with perceptions of its non-Western competitors in the Balkans (Russia, China, Turkey). Finally, the analysis will in its concluding part focus on the specific alienation of Serbia from the EU, particularly since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

2

EU Slowly Losing Popularity

A superficial look at the surveys-based data on the popularity of the EU in the Western Balkans might indicate that no significant change has occurred since the EU integration began two decades ago: the region as a whole seems still determined—although with less dedication—to continue its long path towards EU membership. Even the partial exception of a highly Eurosceptic Serbia does not contradict this general trend,

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since the official goal of joining the EU has not been replaced by some other goal in this country. Although the influence of EU competitors in the region is higher than before, the EU is still the most popular external actor in the Western Balkan region as a whole. Its “transformative power” has been reduced, but has not completely vanished. There are, however, important differences between the very enthusiastic pro-EU years of the first decade of this century, and to some extent also, between a different next decade, on the one side, and the present situation, on the other. All public opinion polls testify about the significant drop in the popularity of the EU. This is clearly visible in the most recent Balkan Barometer 2022 (see Fig. 1)—a survey with similar results as all other polls done at the same time, in the middle of 2022. The average support for EU membership (the answer “EU is a good thing”) in the Western Balkan region is 60%, while only 11% of respondents think that EU membership is “a bad thing”. In other words, there is a clear, albeit not convincing, majority for the EU option in the region as a whole. This level of the predominant sentiment was made possible primarily because of the traditionally high inclination towards the Union in Albania (89%) and Kosovo (73%), despite the opposite results in Serbia, where in 2022 only 38% of citizens think of the EU as a “good thing”, while more than half put it in the category of “bad” (22%) or “neither good nor bad” (36%).

Fig. 1 Do you think that the EU membership would be a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad? (Source: Balkan Barometer 2022)

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In the other countries of the region (other than Albania, Kosovo and Serbia), the good picture of the EU is shared by a tiny majority, which is smaller than the average result for the whole region. Extremely high support for the EU has been a constant feature in Albania and Kosovo throughout the past twenty-year period. It was a rather peculiar result, since both states have been and still are very far away from the membership in the Union: Kosovo, considered by the EU as only a potential candidate state, has not even officially applied for membership, while Albania finally began accession negotiations in July 2022, after a period of 8 years since it had become an official candidate. The solution of this enigma is quite simple: it speaks mostly of the lack of knowledge on EU enlargement. The stable high results in favour of the EU in Albania during the last several years, despite a declining support for the EU everywhere else in the region, is owed mostly to the expected beginning of delayed accession negotiations. Although the European Commission had suggested the beginning of negotiations in 2020, they did not begin until 2022, because several member states were against. In addition, Albania was supposed to begin membership negotiations together with North Macedonia, but Bulgaria has blocked the decision on North Macedonia for two years and this affected Albania, too. If compared with other states at this moment, the 73% support for EU in Kosovo seems very high indeed, but a decade ago more than 90% of its citizens were in favour of EU membership. The significant drop occurred mainly because Kosovo citizens have still not been given a visa-free regime with the Schengen Area, unlike all the other Western Balkan countries which managed to get it in 2009–10. Kosovo’s citizens have also been increasingly disappointed by the lack of support within the Union for their state independence (obtained in 2008 via a unilateral secession from Serbia), as five of its member states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) have not yet recognized Kosovo’s sovereignty. The decrease of EU’s popularity in North Macedonia (which, by the way, seems higher in other public opinion polls) is essentially a reaction to the stalled EU integration of this candidate country (status obtained in 2005!) that has been prevented until July 2022 to begin accession talks twice. First it was done by Greece until the 2018 bilateral Prespa Agreement was concluded, according to which the country even had to change its name for the sake of future membership in NATO and the EU. After that, Bulgaria has prevented North Macedonia to begin accession negotiations since 2020, because of similar identity-based reasons . In Bosnia

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and Herzegovina, the EU has also lost a good deal of clout despite its application for membership in 2016, due to expectations that the EU would help find solutions for many serious problems of this chronically divided and dysfunctional country. The reluctance of the Union to give the country a candidate status, even after Ukraine and Moldova got such a status through a fast procedure in late June 2022, led to further disappointments with the EU. It is safe to guess that the EU option would have gotten even worse results in new polls in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the aftermath of the mentioned EU decision. Bosnia and Herzegovina finally got “candidate status” in December 2022. In most previous years, despite fluctuations, the Montenegrin society used to appreciate EU membership more than it does now, because the EU accession and the expected benefits from it seemed closer before. With all negotiating chapters opened (but only a few closed), the country leads in the region in accession negotiations that began in 2012. With many problems and years left for further negotiations, Montenegro is certainly better-placed than Serbia, which began accession negotiations in 2014, with a much slower pace, more outstanding problems (normalization of relations with Kosovo, non-harmonized foreign policy with the EU, de-democratization, etc.) and certainly more years ahead in negotiations. The special case of the Eurosceptic—and now even anti-EU—Serbia will be dealt with separately, at the end.

3

No Fast EU Accession Any More

We now turn to another set of data from the same Balkan Barometer 2022 survey that sheds additional light on the worsened image of the EU in the region. As can be seen from Fig. 2, citizens of all Western Balkan states ceased to believe in fast EU accession in the years to come. In contrast to optimistic and probably naive hopes from before, they are now much more realistic. In the region as a whole, only every fifth citizen thinks that this will happen by 2025. There are again major differences between countries: while only 10%, 12% or 14% of Bosnian, Serbian and Montenegrin citizens, respectively, expect this, the same is true for every second citizen of Kosovo and every fourth citizen of Albania. The next suggested date of accession in this survey—the year 2030—is a more popular option for between a third and a little more than 40% of respondents, depending

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on the country. The most worrying part concerns the third expectation, on “never in the EU”. This option has never been so popular in the past and one can notice its steady rise during the last few years. In the Spring of 2022, 28% of the respondents in the region as a whole, on average, believed that their country will never become part of the European Union! The corresponding figure for Serbia is of course the highest—41%—while this profound pessimism is shared by 35%, 32% and 27% of citizens of Bosnia, North Macedonia and Montenegro, respectively. Here lies the biggest change in comparison with previous years, when the “never” option practically did not exist and a much faster inclusion into the EU used to be taken for granted. In the meantime, the optimism began to fade away and was replaced by pessimism that has recently culminated. An appropriate way to present differences between previous and current predictions of the region’s citizens concerning possible dates of their countries’ accession to the EU would be to show now the survey results from a decade ago for the whole region. As one can see in Fig. 3, in 2010 the dominant prediction in the region was that all countries of the region would become EU members in the next 6 to 7 years.

Fig. 2 When do you expect the accession of your economy to the EU to happen? (Source: Balkan Barometer 2022)

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Fig. 3 When, in which year do you think [COUNTRY] will be a part of the European Union? (Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010)

Expectations about fast accession were also an important part of the EU image in Serbia during the early days of EU integration. Table 1 presents results from a public opinion poll in Serbia from November 2006 about the expected and desired year of EU membership. From today’s completely different mindset of Serbia’s citizens, it is difficult to understand that at the end of 2006 they expected EU membership to happen relatively soon. More than three quarters of respondents at that time thought it would happen by 2019 (and most of them chose much closer dates), while the remaining quarter predicted “2020 and later”. The desired dates, on the other hand, were of course much more optimistic, including the wish of almost every second respondent that accession would happen in the same year (2006) or a year after. Optimistic expectations about early EU accession of the countries in the region were present in all of them at that time. Few years later, not only in the Western Balkans but also in many EU member states, the accession of new members from the Western Balkans was expected to Table 1 Expected and desired year of EU membership, Serbia 2006

Expected

Desired

Before 2009: 17.3% 2010–2014: 34.5% 2015–2019: 24.8% 2020 and later: 23.4%

2006: 12.4% 2007: 32.4% 2008–2010: 33.9% 2011 and later: 21.2%

Source: Serbian European Integration Office (2006)

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be completed without big delays. The year 2014 was often mentioned then as a possible moment of accession for all or most countries in the region, as a kind of symbolic end to the division in Europe one century after the outbreak of World War I which in fact started in the Balkans. It was soon realized that this would be an over-ambitious goal for the post-conflict Western Balkans, still full of specific problems that Central East European (CEE) post-communist countries had not had to deal with when joining the EU (in enlargement waves of 2004 and 2007), in a much more favourable context closer to the end of the Cold War. Predictions were thus changed and ambitions reduced, and 2020 then began to appear in public debates as the most pessimistic deadline for the EU accession of all or most countries in the region, with the exception of Croatia which was expected to become part of the Union long before that (and indeed, it did join the EU in 2013). In the meantime, the same year 2020 had become a symbol of the most optimistic option, which could have been valid for only one or two countries in the region that wanted to get a membership card of the EU. It quickly turned out that this prediction was impossible to materialize as well. The hope, however, came in 2018, with the renewal of EU interest in the Western Balkans, when the European Commission carefully pointed out 2025 as the indicative deadline for Serbia’s and Montenegro’s membership. In the meantime, again, it became clear that due to the worsening results in the fields of rule of law and democracy, these two leading countries in the region had no chance of becoming EU members perhaps not even by the end of the 2020s, while for all the others the date of accession was moved in unofficial plans to an even further future. In June 2022, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis suggested that the integration of all Western Balkans should be completed by 2033, thus 30 years after the EU-Western Balkans Thessaloniki summit that had once opened the membership perspective for the whole region. “An ambitious but achievable deadline”, the Greek PM commented (Mitsotakis 2022). Whenever the EU accession of the Western Balkan countries may end, it will without any doubt have taken much longer than was the case with all post-communist CEE states. This can be concluded from the Tables 2 and 3 that offer detailed data on the time needed between a country’s application and accession to the EU in the CEE and the Western Balkan states. As can be seen from Table 3, even Montenegro as the most advanced Western Balkan country in the EU accession process, has spent already

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Timeline of applications for EU membership and EU accession in CEE

Country

Date of application for EU membership

Beginning of accession negotiations

Date of EU accession

Years between application and accession

Hungary Poland Romania

31 March 1994 5 April 1994 22 June 1995 27 June 1995

1 May 2004 1 May 2004 1 January 2007 1 May 2004

10 10 11.5

Slovakia Latvia

13 October 1995

Estonia Lithuania

24 November 1995 8 December 1995

Bulgaria

14 December 1995

Czechia Slovenia Croatia

17 January 1996 10 June 1996 21 February 2003

31 March 1998 31 March 1998 15 February 2000 15 February 2000 15 February 2000 31 March 1998 15 February 2000 15 February 2000 31 March 1998 31 March 1998 3 October 2005

9

1 May 2004 8.5 1 May 2004 8.5 1 May 2004 8.5 1 January 2007 1 May 2004 1 May 2004 1 July 2013

11 8 8 10

Source: WIIW and Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022)

Table 3 Timeline of applications for EU membership and waiting times for the Western Balkan countries Country

Date of application for EU membership

Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro North Macedonia Serbia

28 April 2009 15 February 2016 15 December 2008 22 March 2004 22 December 2009

Beginning of accession negotiations

Years since application for EU membership 12.5 5.5

29 June 2012 21 January 2014

13 17.5 12

Source: WIIW and Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022)

more time by now (13 years by mid-2022) without getting close to EU membership, than any CEE country has spent between application and accession. Serbia, North Macedonia and Albania, as much slower performers, will naturally have even worse results.

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The obvious slowing down of EU integration in the Western Balkans has had serious effects on the image of the EU in the region. This can be seen from Fig. 4 that presents results of Gallup Balkan Monitor surveys done in relatively early days of EU integration, between 2006 and 2010. The decline of EU approval among citizens during these four years is clear in all states except in Albania and Kosovo. Croatia is in this regard a special case, because only 25% of respondents opted in this survey for the answer “EU is a good thing”, while an additional 38% thought that it was “Neither good nor bad”. This is usually interpreted as a special case of Croatia’s indifferentism, rather than opposition to the EU, in a situation when the country’s EU membership was already certain. Two years later, in 2012, at the referendum for inclusion in the EU, Croatian citizens showed a similar lack of enthusiasm for the EU, with 66.67% of votes in favour, but with a low turnout of 43.51%. Croatia joined the EU in 2013 (see more in Jovi´c 2012).

Fig. 4 Do you think that [COUNTRY]’s membership of the EU would be a good thing, a bad thing or neither good or bad? (Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010)

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Previous Images of the EU

During the first (“enthusiastic”) years of Western Balkans’ integration into the EU, in the early 2000s, the image of the Union was being constructed in all the region’s states in harmony with three main factors at play at that time: high EU involvement in the region, high determination of all societies and governments to join the EU and high expectations from the EU. Regarding the high EU involvement in the region, unlike in many other aspirant countries, this involvement extends from the usual policy of conditionality to direct engagement in some areas previously unusual for the EU enlargement policy. The most important are the following: the Union’s engagement in stabilizing the situation in the region in the post-conflict period through direct constitutional and legislative interventions; state building as part of the EU enlargement “member state building”; mediation in conflicts (e.g. the Union’s unprecedented mediation in negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo on the normalization of mutual relations); direct interventions in the internal political life of the countries of the region (in practically all states in cases of severe political crises); EU security role (maintaining peace with NATO and keeping post-conflict civilian missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). The second factor—high determination to join the EU—did exist in the early phase of EU integration of the Western Balkans, despite the fall of EU popularity in most countries (except in Albania and Kosovo). Governments did not change the official pro-EU course even if voters in their countries lost to some extent the enthusiasm for EU membership. As for the third factor that used to determine the perceptions of the EU—high expectations that Western Balkan governments and societies had from the Union—it probably had the most direct effect on the EU image. There were three main expectations and consequently three main images of the EU. The first one used to see the EU as an indispensable problem-solver or “fixer”. Each state in the region was namely burdened with multiple economic, social and political problems originating from the violent dissolution of former Yugoslavia, or from the ongoing transition, or from disputes with neighbours (some of them from the EU). The region’s governments were either incapable or unwilling (or both) to deal with these problems, and they turned for help to one external actor that had already shown both the ambition and ability to engage in the region

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beyond the standard levels of the EU enlargement framework. In some cases, local actors pretended they could not find the solution to challenges, because they wanted the EU to take the responsibility for some sensitive solutions that might endanger the popularity of governments. This often led to situations in which local governments justified some unpopular decisions they made by the pressure exerted on them from the EU. Such interpretations increased to some extent the capability of local governments to manipulate both the EU and their own electorate, at least for a limited time. The second major expectation from the EU, or consequently the second image of the EU, was that the EU was a role model and anchor for reforms. Burdened with problems that demanded fast and efficient solutions, governments of Western Balkan states could not in earnest find a better role model for reforms than the one of the EU itself. This model offered solutions for permanent peace and security through transformative integration with other European countries, but also for under-developed economies and unconsolidated democracies. During previous accessions in all these areas the EU proved successful and was practically without competition, as it helped improve living standards of the population as well as the democratization of previous non-democratic regimes. There was an additional advantage of following the EU model: the EU provided suggestions but also tangible incentives for reforms through its conditionality policy. In a way, the Union was not only an external ally of the region ‘s governments and citizens, but an internal political ally too, that used to help pro-European orientation of the country and political forces behind it. The best and at the same time the most extreme example of the decision to emulate completely the EU as a role model was the so-called Belgrade Agreement between Serbia and Montenegro from 2002 (European Council 2002), which laid the basis for their future union of states (State Union of Serbia and Montenegro). The conclusion of the Agreement was mediated by the EU’s High representative for Foreign Policy and Security, but most importantly, the EU was explicitly mentioned in the document as: the aim, the standard, the guarantor, the monitor and the arbiter in the new Serb-Montenegrin state that existed only for three years, between 2003 and 2006. The wish to copy the EU, in this explicit or in many implicit ways, also indicated that the governments and citizens of aspirant countries from the region believed they were ready in those years to embrace the values the

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Union was founded on. In other words, the motivation for membership was not purely pragmatic, i.e. connected primarily with economic gains in return for accomplished reforms that the Union demanded. It seemed that it included also the understanding that the Western Balkans belonged to Europe not only in terms of geography, but that the region shared common history, traditions and values with the EU member states too. Finally, the third image of the Union in these early years of EU integration in the Western Balkans, that corresponds to the last general expectation from the EU, is that the EU is an instrument of development and modernization, seen as a kind of ATM—a cash machine. The logic behind this expectation/image is simple: the EU is not only the best possible model for reforms, it is—or rather it was expected to be—the main provider of financial assistance for development and modernization of the Western Balkan countries. The idea was that the EU should be a kind of “Eldorado” for the region, because it had acted as such in previous cases of accession, by supporting poor members through lavish aid. The described initial three images of the EU have changed for worse in the meantime, as was shown earlier. Three serious “Ds” (disappointment, disillusionment and disenchantment with the EU) have intervened in the EU image during the last several years. Reasons for reduced support for EU integration in the Western Balkans include several factors. Firstly, the Union lost its “magnetism” because of its own multiple crises and inability to resolve them, and because of their serious spillover effects in the region. Secondly, EU membership began to seem not only “a moving target”, but also as a target impossible to reach. Thirdly, conditions for EU membership have been strengthened for the least prepared region. Disappointment has spread not only among Eurosceptic parts of Western Balkan societies, but within the pro-EU circles, too. Enlargement has been sidelined for at least a decade, the region was marginalized within the EU policies, and EU ceased to be a democracy promoter, as it began to trade stability (with authoritarian leaders) for democracy through the so-called stabilitocracy phenomenon (see more in Zweers et al. 2022). Negative results came from both sides of the accession process: on the one side, there was enlargement fatigue in the EU, and on the other there was a reform (or accession) fatigue in the region, and these two tendencies were mutually strengthening each other. The prevailing feeling in the Western Balkans began to be expressed in the following way: “They pretend they want us in, and we pretend that we are doing something

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about it”. Many previously Europhile governments and citizens came to think that the EU was less perfect and less useful for them, as it takes more efforts and more time to obtain its membership than was previously thought, if membership would ever become possible at all. Three important messages have become obvious from recent public opinion polls. First, as was already shown, while the majority of people in the region still supports EU membership, an increasing number believes it will never happen. Second, in most countries of the region the EU ceased to be the most positively appreciated external actor (Tzifakis 2021), having been replaced on top either by the USA or by the Union’s non-Western competitors (Russia, China and Turkey). Third, Western Balkan governments and citizens are now moving away from perceiving EU enlargement as transformative and are beginning to see it instead as more of a transactional process (Stratulat et al. 2021). In other words, the first two out of three previous images of the EU (a fixer and a role model) are giving way to the third one: an instrument of development/ modernization (or a cash machine). To be sure, the third image did not appear only recently. On the contrary, it has been always present, with more or less equal intensity, ever since the beginning of the two-decade long EU integration of the Western Balkans. Its relevance has, however, increased during the last decade as a result of the reduced significance of the first two images. This can be seen from the main personal reasons for EU membership presented in practically all surveys, including the most recent Balkan Barometer 2022, to which we turn again in Fig. 5. The main personal reasons for (or expectations from) EU membership, on average for the whole region, are: economic prosperity (37%), freedom to study and/or work in the EU (32%), freedom to travel (25%) and peace and stability (21%). These preferences are not equally distributed across the region, but they nevertheless dominate over other reasons or expectations. The reason mentioned last, peace and stability, is naturally more pronounced in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, countries still dealing with serious consequences of the 1990s military conflicts. Judging from the recent reluctance of the region’s governments to fully follow the requirements of the EU that are supposed to lead to membership, one can safely conclude that they share this transactional image with their citizens. In other words, having lost faith in imminent and quick accession to the EU, both the governments and the citizens of the Western Balkans now tend to prioritize less ambitious but more

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Fig. 5 What would EU membership mean to you personally? (Source: Balkan Barometer 2022)

pragmatic goals—namely economic gains either through EU financial aid or through emigration to the Union. Emigration from the region, in legal or illegal ways, has been on the rise in recent years. During the last two decades, a quarter of the region’s population has left, mainly to the EU member states. This is one of the most important obstacles to much needed economic growth (Judah 2019). The described shift in priorities of governments and even more so of citizens of the Western Balkans towards a more pragmatic approach to the Union is a good indicator of the abandonment of initial expectations that used to put more emphasis on the values of the EU that the region was expecting to embrace during the accession process, in harmony with the presumed shared history and traditions with the EU member states. Put simply, as the Union ceased to be the role model and fixer, its main role was reduced to being a cash machine, as much as possible. With this turn, the EU lost most of its transformative power—once hailed as the main added value of its enlargement policy—and began to be seen and understood as a practical, transactional tool.

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All this was augmented by the corresponding change in the EU perspective of the Western Balkans. In recent years the EU namely ceased to emphasize common history and traditions as a factor that would facilitate integration of the Western Balkans. Instead, it began to look at the region primarily through the geopolitical lens, particularly because of the 2015 refugee crisis (Prodromidou and Gkasis 2019) and the growing influence of EU’s competitors, Russia, China and Turkey, during the last several years. This time around, the Union understood the Western Balkans as its own external border, where both refugees and malign influence of non-Western competitors should be countered in order to prevent them from entering the EU. The mentioned change of perspective was made possible because the incumbent European Commission defined itself as “geo-political” (Petrovic and Tzifakis 2021). Even before its appointment in 2019, the new Commission with some member states realized that it was high time for the Union to try to bring the Western Balkans back on the enlargement track and away from previous marginalization within its policies. That is why in 2018 an innovative idea was launched and was repeated many times afterwards, according to which the accession of the Western Balkans was “in the security, political and economic interest of the EU”. In 2020, the European Commission reiterated the same thesis, mentioning in addition “geostrategic” reasons for the region’s future in the EU: “A credible enlargement policy is a geostrategic investment in peace, security and economic growth throughout Europe, especially at a time of growing global challenges and divisions. A solid prospect of full EU membership for the Western Balkans, based on merit, is in the very political, security and economic interests of the European Union” (European Commission 2020a). Following the same new course, two years later the EU adopted a new edition of EU enlargement policy (European Commission 2020b). It introduced a phased approach to membership (Mirel 2022) that was to be accompanied by both rewards in financial aid and status in case of good performance, and by sanctions if the expected reforms would not materialize. It is still too early to estimate the effects of this new enlargement methodology. In order to complete the story about the EU image in the Western Balkans, we should briefly compare it with the images of the Union’s non-Western competitors in the region—Russia, China and Turkey. Their popularity and influence have been on the rise during the last years, in parallel with the drop of EU popularity and influence.

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A growing body of academic and policy literature has been trying to answer lately the question how and why is it possible that some far away countries can win so many hearts and minds in a region that has been in the EU’s “inner backyard” for the last two decades, a region economically strongly integrated with the EU that has received so much help from it (see among many others, Bieber and Tzifakis 2020; Bechev 2017; Vangeli 2022)? A simple but correct answer would be that these other countries can provide the region with public goods the EU has not been able or willing to offer: namely energy security (Russia and Turkey) and investment in infrastructure (China), but also the sense of protection and comfort based on shared identity (Turkey among Muslims, or Russia among Orthodox Christians in the region), regardless of how genuine these shared identities are. And although the Balkans is not a priority in their foreign policy agendas, as it still is—at least officially—in the Union’s, their engagement is relatively easy and cheap, as it falls on a fertile ground of many failed EU promises to the Western Balkans and its weakened “transformative power”. The competitors’ economic engagement in the region is many times less important than the one of the EU. The Union is by far the biggest economic partner of the Western Balkan countries, with 68.6% of trade, while the corresponding figures for China, Turkey and Russia are 7.8%, 4.8% and 3.8%, respectively (Eurostat 2022). Yet, the rising influence of the three EU competitors is appreciated in the region’s public opinion much more, because of their involvement in the mentioned areas that the EU has neglected. In the long run, however, Russia’s, China’s and Turkey’s weaknesses will be hard to win over the EU’s deciding influence in the region. While the Western Balkans might be important for all three countries, their strategic priorities are on other sides and exit is a very realistic option. Exit will be, however, a must if the region’s countries become EU members, when free trade agreements and strategic partnerships with the mentioned trio will not be possible any more. Even if they remain important partners of the region, as is to be expected, they can hardly be role models for European countries in the long run: they are all non-democracies of different kinds, and their business models breed corruption and endanger the rule of law. Equally important, their soft power is much smaller than the one of the EU, taking into account strong cultural, economic and other relations the region’s countries have with the EU, not least via

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many economic migrants, organizations, media, etc. And they are effectively “terra incognita” for domestic public opinion. All this means that the EU transformative power might be reduced, but it is still relevant, particularly in comparison with its competitors.

5

Eurosceptic Serbia

It is also of interest to document and interpret the growing trend of Euroscepticism in Serbia, a country where support of the EU is the lowest among all Western Balkan countries. Figure 6 presents a parallel decrease of support for EU membership and increase of resistance to it during a whole decade, between 2009 and 2019, based on data of the Serbian Ministry for EU integration. This 10-year period is characteristic, because it shows the trajectory from the highest level of support of the EU in Serbia, to its recent very low popularity. At the beginning, in 2009, almost three quarters of Serbian citizens were in favour of EU membership—the highest support ever (the same result appeared for the first time in 2006). During the next year and a half, and through some ups and downs, the support remained high, a little above or a little below 60%, after which a serious decline occurred, in most years. During this period the EU remained the desired choice for just over half of citizens, while a few times the support for EU membership dropped under 50%. The period ended in mid-2019 with a slight majority (53%) of citizens in favour of EU membership. During the next few years, until 2022, as illustrated earlier through data of the Balkan Barometer 2022, the majority in favour of EU accession in Serbia was replaced by the majority against it. Between 2009 and 2019, the resistance to EU membership kept growing, though with some oscillations. In most cases, the recorded ups and downs of EU popularity in Serbia had to do with either the way in which some EU policies in Serbia were understood, or with changes in EU-related attitudes of the country’s governing elites. Public perception of EU policy towards Serbia was mostly related to conditions for EU membership. Two conditions made the greatest impact on Serbia’s attitudes towards the EU: first, Serbia’s obligation, imposed by the EU, to bring to justice persons indicted for war crimes committed in the military conflicts in the 1990s; and, second, EU’s requirement for Serbia to normalize relations with its former autonomous province Kosovo that had seceded unilaterally from Serbia in 2008. The former issue dominated the

Fig. 6 Support to EU membership in Serbia, 2009–2019 (Source: Ministry of European Integration 2019)

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Serbian EU agenda during the first decade of EU integration, while the latter came on top in the second decade and has remained there ever since. Serbia was struggling for years to meet the demand of processing persons indicted for war crimes in domestic courts or of transferring them to the International Hague Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Despite the fact that it promised and legalized its cooperation with ICTY, Serbia was very reluctant and inefficient in meeting these demands, due to a high level of resistance in domestic public opinion which, like in Croatia at that time, denied war crimes of its nationals and even glorified them as national heroes. Because of lack of cooperation in these cases of unpunished gross violations of human rights, Serbia’s EU integration was suspended and delayed on two occasions: before the final signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2008, and before Serbia got a candidate status in 2012 (Euractiv Serbia 2011). While this obstacle to further integration of Serbia with the EU was finally removed in 2011, the Kosovo issue has remained high on the agenda until now. Serbia agreed to proceed with normalization of relations with Kosovo that was supposed to end with a “bilateral legally binding agreement by the end of Serbia’s accession negotiations with the EU”, as was defined in the Negotiating Framework adopted by the Council of the EU in December 2013 (Council of EU 2014). This in turn made possible the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia in January 2014. During the next eight and a half years (until mid-2022), Serbia has managed to open 24 out of 35 negotiation chapters and to provisionally close only 2. This result pales in comparison not only with Montenegro that opened all chapters two years faster, but even more in comparison with most CEE countries that completed their accession negotiations during the same amount of time. The significance of the Kosovo issue for Serbia’s progress towards EU membership is seen in the fact that Chapter 35 (“other issues”), never used before in cases of other countries’ accession, is dedicated completely to the normalization of relations with Kosovo. The EU’s role was additionally high because it has been moderating Serbia-Kosovo negotiations since 2011 and has also appointed a special representative for this issue. The normalization process has progressed very slowly, with negligible results obtained only after pressure from Brussels, with hesitations and obstructions from both sides. Perhaps the main consequence in the context of Serbia’s EU integration was that the will for the solution and real progress kept evaporating as time went by. Neither side was obviously

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motivated enough to proceed boldly and offer compromised solutions. The promised EU membership as the indicated reward for both, at the end of this arduous undertaking, was becoming less realistic, while there was also rising enlargement fatigue within the EU, coupled with uncompromising demands from their societies, very often engineered by governments of both states. Playing a double game, negotiators from Serbia and Kosovo pledged the alleged dedication to negotiations, while at the same time they followed but also manipulated domestic public opinion. That is why, despite breakthroughs in several areas, no significant change of initial positions could be achieved. For their part, Serbian governments kept insisting on illegality of Kosovo’s unilateral secession, on the basis of which it was not possible to change the status of Kosovo as Serbia’s autonomous province. The Kosovo issue had a formidable influence of Serbia’s EU path and the image of the EU in Serbia. After initial expectations that further EU integration would somehow continue to be possible with the unresolved Kosovo issue, the public became increasingly aware that Serbia would have to recognize Kosovo’s independence in return for EU membership. This was also, in more open ways, confirmed by many representatives of the EU and some of its member states, in contrast to the former emphasis on normalization of relations with Kosovo, as was formulated in the negotiating framework for Serbia. Serbian leading political forces radicalized their counter-rhetoric, too, claiming that the EU membership is not worthy of recognizing Kosovo’s independence and the public followed suit, heavily influenced by the newly changed priorities expressed in the ruling parties’ ideologies and spread in controlled media outlets. It is important to understand that this did not represent the birth of Euroscepticism in Serbia, but rather its continuation, now in a much more powerful form. A good part of Serbia’s political forces has never prioritized EU membership over Kosovo’s independence. They were, however, for some time, by the end of the 2000s, in minority in predominantly pro-European and reform-minded Serbia’s Assembly and Government, because the parties in power continued with their pro-EU agenda, regardless of the rising influence of the opposite political camp. When the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), led by Aleksandar Vuˇci´c, took power in 2012, it won with the platform that combined pro-EU and nationalist goals, in almost the same way in which previous Serbian governments did. Soon after, however, the pendulum moved from the

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EU to the nationalist agenda and the image of the EU began to deteriorate. Serbia began slowly but certainly to alienate from the EU. The new Government was simultaneously adjusting to the Eurosceptic values of its voters and amplifying them through controlled media. During the next several years, Euroscepticism became the mainstream narrative in Serbia (Antoni´c 2013), although the official pro-EU orientation of the country did not change and Serbia kept negotiating its future membership with the EU, slowly opening the negotiating chapters. With the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it seems that the Serbian society has taken a big step towards an open support for Russian aggression for which it accused NATO and the West. It was an undeniable act of human, moral and political debacle and a clear sign of an orientation against all values of the EU. While the Serbian Government joined the majority in the UN General Assembly in condemning Russian aggression twice at the very beginning of the war, it has never imposed sanctions against Russia because of aggression (as many states have done). Serbia thus again, and more importantly than before, defied growing demands from the EU to harmonize its foreign and security policy with the EU. This behaviour was, however, in tune with the majoritarian view of the Serbian society. All public opinion polls from mid-2022 noted very precisely a resolute pro-Russian and anti-Western (including anti-EU) turn in Serbia. Russia was once again chosen as the most important foreign political partner (40% of respondents), followed by the EU (30%) and China (24%) (Demostat 2022). Three months into Russian aggression in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin was still, as many times during the last several years, chosen as a foreign leader that Serbia’s citizens have the best opinion on. Asked about issues more directly connected with the EU, respondents said that Serbia did not have to harmonize its foreign policy with the Union (56% vs. 33% that said it had to do so), and that in order for Serbia to prosper, it has to decline entry to the EU (43% vs. 30% with the opposite answer). The most decisive answer was about the choice between the recognition of Kosovo and EU membership: 64% of respondents think that there should be no compromises concerning Kosovo’s status, even if that would make EU membership impossible (17% were in favour of a compromise with the EU) (Demostat 2022). Another recent survey revealed an equally determined choice of the Serbian society of Russia over the EU. As demonstrated in Fig. 7, 40% (up from 34% a year and a half earlier) of respondents would be happy

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Fig. 7 How would you feel if Serbia gave up the idea of joining the EU and formed an alliance with Russia? (Source: CRTA 2022)

if Serbia would give up the idea of joining the EU and form an alliance with Russia, while 26% would be worried (CRTA 2022). These results stand in sharp contrast to the dominant orientation of EU citizens. As the Eurobarometer survey from Spring 2022 shows, they do, with significant majority, support the actions taken by the EU since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, while the crisis has at the same time further strengthened public support for the Union, that since 2007 has never been so high (Eurobarometer 2022). In a critical moment, the Serbian society has thus decided to alienate itself from the EU, unlike its neighbours in the Western Balkans. And although it seems as a genuine point of no return for Serbia’s EU accession, its political elites might be perhaps able in the future to change this anti-EU orientation. Judging by what has been reported in this chapter, it will be anything but easy. Much will also depend on the readiness of the EU to introduce institutional and policy changes in its enlargement policy following Russian invasion, thus easing the future accession of the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership countries within a new geopolitical context.

6

Conclusions

In the early (“enthusiastic”) days of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, the Union was simultaneously seen as an indispensable problemsolver (fixer), as an anchor and role model for reforms and as an instrument of development/modernization (ATM—cash machine). In later years, due to the combined effect of enlargement fatigue in the EU and the reform fatigue in the Western Balkans, the popularity of the

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Union has been reduced in all countries except Albania and Kosovo, and a growing number of people in the region began to think that accession will not only be further delayed, but that it might never happen. This led to a significant deterioration of the first two images of the EU, and the Union consequently ceased to be perceived primarily as a normative power in the Western Balkans. It began instead to be seen in a transactional context that puts more emphasis on immediate and mostly economic benefits. This change that occurred within the region corresponds to some degree to the change in the EU perspective of the Western Balkans during the last several years that has turned into a geopolitical perspective. Although the EU still remains the most popular and most influential external actor in the region, the comparison between the EU image and the image of its non-western competitors (Russia, China and Turkey) revealed the main reasons for their rising influence. They profited from the lack of EU will and capability to engage more in some areas of great importance for the Western Balkans, including energy security, investment in infrastructure and a sense of protection. Finally, a detailed analysis of an enduring Euroscepticism in Serbia showed the key importance of the EU stance on the Kosovo status for Serbia’s attitudes vis-à-vis the Union. In contrast to EU member states and other countries in the region, the Russian aggression in Ukraine only intensified Serbia’s Euroscepticism and elevated it to another level—towards an unprecedented anti-EU turn, coupled with radicalized pro-Russian sympathies. And although the Serbian society’s alienation from the EU seems a genuine point of no return for Serbia’s EU accession, its political elites might perhaps be able to change this anti-EU orientation in the future. This will be anything but easy. Much will also depend on the readiness of the EU to introduce institutional and policy changes in its enlargement policy following the Russian invasion, thus easing the future accession of the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership countries within the new geopolitical context.

References Antoni´c, Slobodan (2013). O ’debriselizaciji’ biraˇca: evroskepticizam u javnom mnenju Srbije“. Nacionalni interes 1. Bechev, Dimitar (2017). Rival Power. Russia’s Influence in Southeast Europe. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

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Bieber, Florian and Tzifakis, Nikolaos (eds) (2020). The Western Balkans in the World. Linkages and Relations with Non-Western Countries. Routledge. ˇ Cavoški, Aleksandra (2022). Perceptions of the European Union in Serbia. https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2013/12/perceptions_of_ the_eu_in_serbia.pdf. CRTA (2022). Democracy on the Margin of the War. https://crta.rs/wpcontent/uploads/2022/06/Democracy-on-the-margin-of-the-war-_-survey_CRTA_2022.pdf. Council of the EU (2014). EU Opening Statement for Accession Negotiations. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/AD%201%202014% 20INIT/EN/pdf. Demostat (2022). Spoljno-politiˇcke orijentacije grad-ana Srbije. Beograd. https:/ /demostat.rs/upload/Prezentacija%2029062022%20Demostat.pdf. Euractiv Srbija (2011). Koˇcenje procesa evropskih integracija: sluˇcaj Mladi´c. https://euractiv.rs/2-srbija-i-eu/110-dosije/1945-koenje-procesa-evropskihintegracija-sluaj-mladi. Eurobarometer (2022). EP Spring 2022 Survey: Rallying around the European Flag—Democracy as Anchor Point in Times of Crisis. https://europa.eu/eur obarometer/surveys/detail/2792. European Commission (2003). EU-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ PRES_03_163. European Commission (2020a). Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-10/ 20201006-communication-on-eu-enlargement-policy_en.pdf. European Commission (2020b). Enhancing the Accession Process. A Credible EU Perspective for the Western Balkans. https://neighbourhood-enlarg ement.ec.europa.eu/enhancing-accession-process-credible-eu-perspective-wes tern-balkans_en. European Council (2002). Agreement on Principles and Relations between Serbia and Montenegro with the State Union. https://www.consilium.europa. eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/sg/69898.pdf. Eurostat (2022). Western Balkans-EU—International Trade in Goods Statistics. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Wes tern_Balkans-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics&oldid=526493. Gallup Balkan Monitor (2010). Insights and Perceptions, Voices of the Balkans. http://reforma.bezbednost.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/ 09/2010-Balkan-Monitor-Insights-and-Perceptions-Voices-of-the-BalkansGALLUP-i-European-Fund-for-the-Balkans.pdf. Jovi´c, Dejan (2012). Croatian Referendum on EU Membership and Its Consequences for the Reduced Western Balkans. Anali hrvatskog politološkog društva 1.

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Jovi´c, Dejan (2018). Accession to the European Union and Perception of External Actors in the Western Balkans. Croatian International Relations Review 83. Judah, Tim (2019). Bye-Bye Balkans: A Region in Critical Demographic Decline. Balkan Insight. https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/14/bye-bye-balkans-aregion-in-critical-demographic-decline/ Markovi´c Khaze, Nina (2022). Perceptions of the EU in the Western Balkans vis a vis Russia and China. European Foreign Affairs Review 1. Ministry of European Integration, Republic of Serbia (2019). Support to EU Membership. https://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_d okumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjenja/ijm_dec_19.pdf. Mirel, Pierre (2022). In Support of a new Approach with the Western Balkans: Staged Accession with a Consolidation Phase. Foundation Robert Schuman/ European Issues. No. 633. https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questi ons-d-europe/qe-633-en.pdf. Mitsotakis, Kyriakos (2022). It’s time to Get European Enlargement Back on Track. Politico, June 10. https://www.politico.eu/article/balkans-europe-enl argement-track/. Petrovic, M. and N. Tzifakis (eds) (2021). EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: The Geopolitical Turn or Another Postponement? Journal of Contemporary European Studies 2, Special issue. Prodromidou, Alexandra and Gkasis, Pavlos (eds) (2019). Along the Balkan Route: The Impact of the Post-2014 ‘Migrant Crisis’ on the EU’s South East Periphery. Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung. Serbian European Integration Office. Republic of Serbia. Government (2006). European Orientation of Citizens of Serbia. Public Opinion Poll, 2006. https://www.mei.gov.rs/srp/informacije/javno-mnjenje/istraziva nje-javnog-mnjenja/. Regional Cooperation Council (2022). Balkan Barometer 2022. https://www. rcc.int/balkanbarometer/. Skoko, Božo (2006). Percepcija Europske unije u hrvatskoj javnosti. Anali hrvatskog politološkog društva 1. Stratulat, Corina et al. (2021). Escaping the transactional Trap: The Way forward for EU Enlargement. Biepag. https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2021/Esc aping-the-transacional-trap.pdf. Tzifakis, Nikolaos et al. (2021). Geopolitically Irrelevant in Its ‘Inner Courtyard’. The EU Amidst Third Actors in the Western Balkans. Biepag. https://balkan fund.org/pubs/uploads/Geopolitically_irrelevant_in_its.pdf. Vangeli, Anastas (ed) (2022). The Role of China in Southeast Europe. Athens: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. WIIW and Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022). The Long Way Round: Lessons from EU-CEE for Improving Integration and Development in the Western

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Balkans. https://wiiw.ac.at/the-long-way-round-lessons-from-eu-cee-for-imp roving-integration-and-development-in-the-western-balkans-dlp-6194.pdf Zweers, Wouter et al. (2022). The EU as a Promoter of Democracy or ‘Stabilitocracy’ in the Western Balkans? Clingendael Institute. https://www.clinge ndael.org/pub/2022/the-eu-as-a-promoter-of-democracy-or-stabilitocracy/ .

CHAPTER 9

Perceptions and Misperceptions of EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans: A Case of a “Capability-Expectations Gap”? Jelena Džanki´c

1

Introduction

The year 2023 marks 20 years since the Thessaloniki European Council meeting, when the heads of state and prime ministers of the European Union (EU) member states made a political commitment to ensure “the future of the Balkans” within the EU (European Council 2003). While the outlook of EU that we had known in 2003 has changed dramatically as a result of the great Eastern enlargement in 2004, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, Croatia in 2013 and the departure of the United Kingdom in 2020, the so-called Western Balkan Six—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are still nowhere near full EU membership.

J. Džanki´c (B) European University Institute, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_9

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Stalled and protracted negotiations have been the outcome of two mutually reinforcing dynamics: (1) the perpetuation of multiple political, economic and security crises within the EU; and (2) the rise of illiberal politics in both the post-communist EU member states and in the Western Balkan countries. The combination between the internal EU crises and democratic backsliding in the Western Balkans over the past decade (Repucci and Slipovitz 2021) poses a serious challenge to any previous assurance that the region will have a “future” within the Union. This challenge is further reinforced by the use of enlargement as a geopolitical tool in context of the Russian aggression on Ukraine (Anghel and Džanki´c 2023). Against this backdrop, the main objective of this chapter is to seek a conceptual framework that can help us to unpick why the European route of the region has become tangled and uncertain and assess to what extent have the perceptions and misperceptions of the EU and its conditionality mechanism led to a flawed understanding of the EU’s role in the Western Balkans and EU integration as a process. So far, scholarship has looked at the EU conditionality in the context of enlargement through the different iterations of the “external incentives model” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020). The model, based on a rational choice framework, explains that whether a country will successfully adapt to the requirements of EU accession will depend on four key elements—the cost of adopting and implementing the required conditions, the strength of conditions, the speed and size of rewards and the credibility of the process itself. Yet, the model has been often criticised for its limited applicability to the Western Balkan states (Džanki´c et al. 2019), where the adaptation to the requirements for EU accession needs to be assessed against the broader nation-building processes, a troublesome political and economic transition, the changing nature of the EU and the inevitable transformation of the enlargement process. To address the analytical limitations of the dominant theoretical models for understanding the dynamics of EU integration of the Western Balkans, this chapter builds on the idea of a “capability-expectations gap” developed to study the EU’s foreign policy (Hill 1993). It reinterprets Hill’s (1993) model in the context of enlargement and applies it to the accession of the Western Balkan states. Above all, it reframes the “capability” dimension to reflect the tension between the inward political shift in the EU’s priorities as a result of a series of predicaments, and its continuing interests in and strategies for the EU accession of the region. Such an

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approach is intended to account for the challenges that the EU is facing in (a) committing to a credible enlargement agenda, given the internal tensions after Brexit and the security watershed posed by the conflict in Ukraine; and (b) presenting itself as a credible “democratizing” factor, in view of the rise of illiberal politics across the member states. It then reconstructs the notion of “expectations” of the EU and the enlargement process among the stakeholders in the Western Balkans. It addresses to what extent have the normative expectations of what the EU “should do” in the region caused a flawed perception of EU’s conditionality, which in turn allowed a greater margin for domestic elites to reinforce their grip on the weak and captured Western Balkan states. The focus on the perceptions and misperceptions of both the capabilities of the EU and the expectations of the Western Balkan states is central to understanding the outcomes of EU’s 2021 Enlargement Strategy, which highlights the significance of “a credible enlargement process”, seen as “a two-way street…. Our partners need to address them, in the interest of their citizens and to advance on the EU path. And they need put aside their differences. On the EU side, we need to deliver on our commitments” (European Commission 2021). For the Balkan states, these outcomes will be framed against the uneasy post-conflict environment, where political elites guard the strongholds of their power, and a development gap persists, caused by weak economies dependent on aid, loans and remittances, and prone to high levels of state intervention. As a result, the capacity of the EU to arrange an efficient enforcement of its substantive conditions in a structurally flawed environment will be limited, despite the high expectations of the Union in this respect. The following sections address this “capability-expectations” gap in the context of Western Balkan enlargement, arguing that closing this gap is possible only by a realistic assessment of the roles that the EU and the aspiring members have in the process, against the context of illiberal politics and flawed transitions, where rational political choices are overshadowed by political interests vested as identity questions.

2

A “Capability-Expectations Gap” in EU Enlargement

Since the 1990s, scholarship has discussed as to whether the EU is an effective international actor (Buzan 1993) as regards its capacity to show a unified stance and affect international politics and events. Its failure

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to exhibit “actorness” in this regard has been discussed at large in the context of the Gulf wars, as well as in relation to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which had shown the limits of the EU’s capacity to act as a powerful force in reshaping the international state system (Radelji´c 2016). It is therefore remarkable that the perception of the EU’s role regarding the Western Balkans has been talked up to the degree that substantively exceeds the capabilities of the Union and creates unrealistic expectations of (a) its normative potential to instil democratic values in transitional contexts (“what the EU should do”); and (b) transformative power to change “the ways of doing things” in countries aspiring to membership (“what the EU can do”). This “capability-expectations gap” (Hill 1993) in the enlargement policy misconceives the EU’s functions in international relations and reinforces misperceptions of its role among the stakeholders in the region. It equally challenges the EU’s new methodology in relation to the Western Balkan accession, where A credible accession perspective is the key incentive and driver of transformation in the region and thus enhances our collective security and prosperity. It is a key tool to promote democracy, rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights, which are also the main engines of economic integration and the essential anchor for fostering regional reconciliation and stability. Maintaining and enhancing this policy is thus indispensable for the EU’s credibility, for the EU’s success and for the EU’s influence in the region and beyond - especially at times of heightened geopolitical competition. (European Commission 2020)

Challenges to the credible accession perspective emanating from the level of the EU and its member states are related to the Union’s capacity to commit to another enlargement in the near future and its ability to promote democracy in its Southeast European neighbourhood. 2.1

Multiple Internal Crises and Challenges to the Enlargement Agenda

Since its great Eastern Enlargement, the EU has gone through several internal crises, which have detracted the focus from further accession and turned the attention away from the Western Balkans and towards the internal situation in the member states. The internal EU’s structures

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have not adequately been adapted to the nearly doubled membership after the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargements, which is reflected in the current debates on “differentiated integration”, “two-track” or “twospeed” Europe (Koenig 2015; Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2020). In the context in which integration of the former socialist countries has remained incomplete and major political, social and economic differences exist with “the East” and the “West” within the EU, developing a credible narrative of a future enlargement is a core challenge for the Union. Multiple, and often overlapping, crises—including the eurozone crisis, migration crisis, Brexit and the current war in Ukraine—that the EU has experienced over the past two decades pose a further barrier to this endeavour. The multiannual sovereign debt crisis, which has taken place in several Eurozone member states (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus), has substantively reshaped the economic outlook of the Union. It caused a major structural shock to the common market, paradoxically caused by the common market itself. The crisis was sparked by the cessation of foreign capital influx in those countries that had significant deficits and were contingent upon foreign lending. In a context of stark macroeconomic differences among the countries before the adoption of the euro, debt accumulation was caused by excessive borrowing by Southern European countries from the North European ones due to ostensibly low interest rates. The absence of fiscal policy coordination caused imbalanced capital flows and other market failures arising from risky financial transactions (Laine 2012). Further to a lasting economic impact, and the ensuing political impact on the ruling governments in ten member states, the Eurozone crisis has shown the limitations of an unbalanced integration, both internally and externally. In particular, the predicament of Greece has deeply affected the Balkan economies, which by 2012 had already been severely affected by the exposure to the global economic crisis of the previous four years (Nuti 2009; Bonomi and Uvali´c 2019). In all of the Western Balkan states, economic development had notably slowed down, which had a twofold effect. First, the deceleration of economic growth reinforced the structural economic problems, including imbalances on external accounts due to high trade and current account deficits; labour market predicaments caused by widespread shadow economy, growing inequality and unemployment rates ranging between 9.5% in Serbia and 25.6% in Kosovo and brain drain (RCC 2022); unbalanced deindustrialisation and poorly regulated growth of service sector. As a result, the

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Western Balkan states remain far from catching up with the EU member states in terms of the GDP per capita (Fig. 1). Moreover, the refugee crisis that the EU has faced since 2015 has further contributed to the “inward look” of the Union, changing its policy priorities to migration and asylum. The conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, particularly the wars in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, have led to the movement of people seeking shelter towards Europe. During the crisis, a large share of refugees embarked upon the so-called Balkan route, which entailed crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece, and a land route through the Western Balkan states to the Central and East European (CEE) members of the EU. The fact that neither the Balkan states nor their CEE neighbours were prepared to the large movement of refugees and asylum seekers have placed the relationship between the Union and its aspiring Balkan members in the spotlight. In particular, it has highlighted the need for enhanced collaboration and a coordinated approach to the region by the EU, which would go beyond the short-term technical and financial issues and establish a lasting agenda 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000

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that would equip these countries with governance tools that would be harmonised with the EU asylum measures (Lilyanova 2016). Yet, this harmonisation, which would have been integral to a credible enlargement agenda, has further been destabilised by the political, institutional and economic consequences of the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU. In particular, the UK had traditionally championed widening and expansion of the EU, seeing it as a means to prevent a deeper political integration (Ker-Lindsay 2016). The UK’s relationship with the Western Balkans had been most significant in the context of post-war reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In late 2014, the UK and Germany created a “New Strategic Approach” to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession process to reassure the candidate country of the EU’s commitment to its prospective membership. The two countries have also “been keen to see an enhancement of Kosovo’s EU integration prospects” (Ker-Lindsay 2016). Despite this commitment, the UK’s concerns over free movement and governance issues in the region have somewhat decreased its role as champion of enlargement to the Western Balkans in the years prior to Brexit. In practice, the combination of the UK’s exit from the EU and its nonetheless waning commitment to the region in the context of enlargement have reconstituted the Union’s vision of the process, as a tool for management of relations in its neighbourhood rather than a desired outcome for Europe. This represented a strong symbolic message for the Western Balkans, for which decades of being in the “waiting room” (Belloni and Brunazzo 2017) have contributed to democratic backsliding and captured states, economies and societies (Džanki´c 2018). Finally, the current conflict in Ukraine will have an important impact on the EU’s enlargement agenda in the Western Balkans, questioning its credibility as well as the Union’s commitment to the region. The grant of candidacy to Ukraine and Moldova has unequivocally shown unity among the member states in view of Russia’s westward ambitions. While being a strong symbolic political message, the expansion of the promise of a European future has not been accompanied with a strategy on how (or when) the EU will enlarge. Among the Western Balkan states, this has posed a further challenge to credibility of the enlargement agenda.

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2.2

“Democratizing” Agenda on Thin Ice

Ever since the fall of communism, the EU had been seen as a strong external democratiser for countries seeking accession (Agh 1999). In the context of the 2004 Eastern enlargement, the potential of the EU to take up this role has been most manifest in (a) the perception of the Union as the community of values that represent freedom and democracy; and (b) conditions of accession and substantive financial aid directed towards democracy promotion (Fagan 2015). The external democratisation in the context of EU accession has thus had a normative meta-element, but also a pragmatic one, mirrored in the very “carrots and sticks” of EU accession. Yet, the capacity of the EU in both domains has changed since 2004, placing the Union’s democratising agenda on thin ice, and undermining its credibility to perform this role in the Western Balkans. The meta-narrative of the EU as the community of freedom and democratic values is enshrined in article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, stipulating that The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the member states in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

This meta-narrative has suffered significant setbacks after the Eastern enlargement, especially as regards the rise of illiberal politics in several new member states (Kapidži´c 2020). Yet, the crisis of European “values” has been inherent in the EU for decades before 2004. In 2000, the EU had activated, for the first time, diplomatic sanctions against a member state. Sanctions of the fourteen EU members at the time had been a reaction to the Joerg Haider’s extreme right-wing Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ—Austrian Freedom Party) entry into the Austrian government and consisted of an interruption of bilateral relations with Austria, and—more symbolically—exclusion of Austrian diplomats and candidates for office from Union-level politics. Importantly, these sanctions had been narratively underpinned by statements of the then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer that the EU is a “community of shared values”, of the EP President Nicole Fontaine that the Union must unequivocally refuse the “insulting, anti-foreigner and racist utterances of Joerg Haider”, and the EU Foreign Policy Representative Javier Solana who highlighted that

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the EU needs to implement sanctions and deliver “clear signals, a type of symbolic policy” (Schwarz 2000). The sanctions, abolished in September 2000, had two effects in the context of future enlargements. First, in the long term, the sanctions did not prove to be a mechanism that could prevent coalitions between far right and conservative parties (Karlhofer and Sickinger 2001). In the ensuing decades, there has been an increase in popular support for far right parties across the member states, and such parties have been part of governments inter alia in various EU countries, including Hungary, Italy and Poland. In Austria, the FPÖ has been in power since 2017. At a symbolic level, this rise in and acceptance of nationalism indicates that what “European values” are remains a field of contestation in the EU itself. Second, the 2000 sanctions against Austria had been introduced without a clear treaty basis. The large backslash in the public sphere across different countries against sanctions resulted in treaty revision, which introduced article 7 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (Giorgi et al. 2006). Article 7 has been designed as a procedural safeguard of the EU’s values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, whereby in cases of “existence of a serious and persistent breach by a member state” of such values, “certain rights” of that member state would be suspended. In December 2017, the procedure against article 7 has been used for the first time in response to the situation regarding the rule of law in Poland, where the rule of law is jeopardised by the subjection of the judicial system to the ruling party. In September 2018, the same procedure was initiated against Hungary, where civil society has been suppressed under the rule of Viktor Orban. In both countries, minorities—including sexual minorities—are discriminated against and are a frequent target of verbal abuse and physical violence (Strand 2021). Even so, the procedure under article 7 has so far proven inefficient and has shown a lack of consensus within the member states on what constitutes “a clear risk of a serious breach” of the EU’s common values that would trigger potential EU action. This lack of consensus has been reaffirmed by the absence of the French delegation from the European Parliament plenary, despite the country’s commitment to “resolutely contribute to strengthening the rule of law” in the EU during its presidency in 2022. Even so, Hungary and Poland are not the only new EU member states where the presumed EU values are put into question. Over the last decade, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta have been under the scrutiny of European institutions for offering their passports, alongside the attached

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EU citizenship, in exchange for investment (Džanki´c 2019). In October 2020, the European Commission has started infringement proceedings against Cyprus and Malta for violating the principle of “sincere cooperation” among the member states; in September 2022, the Commission filed a court case against Malta. Hence, the lack of consensus over what constitutes democracy and democratic values within the EU has left a deep mark on the meta-narrative of what the European values are within the Union itself. The fact that the values presumed under article 2 have been brought into question by “new” EU member states has also had repercussions on the Union’s capacity to “practice what it preaches” in the context of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans. Moreover, the EU’s role as an external democratiser has been put on thin ice by the low level of political and economic engagement with the Western Balkan region, beyond matters of security and stability. Political conditionality, with the exception of the 2009 visa liberalisation process, has had rather weak transformative effects (Kacarska 2015). While formally engrained in the conditions for allocating economic and development assistance by means of benchmarks for various stages of accession negotiations, in practice the system of “carrots and sticks” has been detangled from financial support for democratisation. EU financial assistance remains low: the allocations of Instrument Pre-Accession Aid funds for the Western Balkans amount to 14.2 billion euros for the period between 2021 and 2027 (European Commission 2021). Standing at 507 euro per capita, these funds have been deemed insufficient for sustaining the development of democratic institutions in the region (Bonomi 2021). While such low investment reinforces the “stabilitocracy” narrative (Bieber 2018)—whereby the EU is more interested in the region’s stability than in its transformation—it also raises the fundamental question of the Union’s commitment to democracy promotion at a very practical level. That is, it calls into question the EU’s capacity to act as an external democratiser not only at the meta-level of the narrative of European values, but also in terms of its actual capacity to transform the region by successfully pegging the economic aid to the region to meeting the accession conditions.

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3 Expectations: Three Levels of Flawed Perceptions The unrealistic expectations of the EU and the enlargement process have certainly contributed to the perceptions of the Union’s inefficiency in the context of the Western Balkan accession at three interrelated levels: in the policy community, in the institutions of knowledge production and in the public sphere. At neither of these levels has there been a critical engagement with the substance of the enlargement process, which entails understanding the political, social and economic adaptation to the conditions of accession, but also the mechanics of internal workings of the EU, its institutions and member states. As a result, the role of the different actors in the context of enlargement has generated flawed perceptions, which are having a different impact at the three spheres of societies in the Western Balkans. 3.1

(Mis)perceptions of the EU Among Domestic Political Elites

The message of the 2018 Enlargement Strategy for the Western Balkans has been that the EU will engage substantively with the region, aiding its democratic development and economic reforms (Mirel 2018). It clearly reaffirmed that “an investment in the Western Balkans is an investment in Europe”’ (European Commission 2018: 12). Even so, most of the Western Balkan states in queue for accession are captured states, in which democracy has been on a downward slope for at least a decade, and especially since 2018 (Džanki´c and Keil 2019; Richter and Wunsch 2020). In a context of protracted political and economic transition, the perception of the EU among the policymakers of the region, as a committed political counterpart, has weakened. This, in turn, has enabled the rent-seeking elites to use commitments to the “European values” and the relationship with the EU as a means to vindicate their own policies that would otherwise cause a pushback from the electorate. At the same time, the political elites use a combination of mixed messages from the different institutions and the member states for “blameshifting” on the EU for stalled accession. These dynamics are most manifest in the political landscapes of Serbia and Montenegro, the first two countries that started negotiating EU accession. In Serbia, the political landscape changed substantively with the breakup of the populist and extreme right-wing Radical Party in 2008,

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and the subsequent establishment and ascent on power of Tomislav Nikoli´c and Aleksandar Vuˇci´c as leaders of the new Progressive Party. Having departed from the Radical Party associated to the extreme nationalism of Vojislav Šešelj, Nikoli´c and Vuˇci´c openly proclaimed their support for Serbia’s accession to the EU. Likewise, parties previously associated with Slobodan Miloševi´c’s regime also reinvented themselves as champions of EU integration. This was particularly true of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), under the leadership of Ivica Daˇci´c. This reinvention of the former nationalists as pro-European was particularly significant in the context of Serbia’s political development, as it challenged the only consistently pro-European (then) President Boris Tadi´c. The pro-European agenda of Tadi´c was mirrored mostly in affairs related to foreign policy, the issues of collaboration with the ICTY and relations with Kosovo—the combination of which allowed Serbia to file a formal membership application. However, Tadi´c had not been able to contain the growing domestic discontent for “concessions” to the EU that had been interpreted as “giving away” Serbia’s national identity, without any obvious gain in the context of EU accession (Petsinis 2021). The domestic discontent was also linked to the state capture that occurred under the Democratic Party after 2004, including the growth of a local oligarchy and scarce economic reforms (Peši´c 2007; Vachudova 2019). Such a combination of factors led to the demise of the Democratic Party in the 2012 elections to a coalition government of the Progressive Party and the Socialist Party, which by then had successfully arranged the marriage between nationalism and a pro-European agenda. The agreement between Kosovo and Serbia concluded in April 2013, that integrated the North Kosovan institutions into the official institutions of Kosovo, brokered by Vuˇci´c, was subsequently rewarded with a starting date for opening the accession negotiations in the country in 2014. The delays in the process and the continuation of the tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, however, have subsequently been engrained in Vuˇci´c’s discourse, which continuously highlights how “Serbia is completely devoted to agreements that have been concluded under the leadership of the EU” (BBC, 30 September 2021). In so doing, the Progressive Party has managed to instrumentalise the accession process and create a deep misperception of the EU, while sliding back into illiberal politics (Pavlovi´c 2021). Declarative commitments to EU integration in Montenegro have been present in the political discourse of the country’s long-standing President/Prime Minister Milo Ðukanovi´c ever since his split with Miloševi´c

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in 1997. As a result of a series of political arrangements, including an EU-mediated referendum on independence (Vuˇckovi´c 2021), the political landscape in Montenegro had developed under the idea of the country being “the leader in EU integration”. The country officially was awarded candidate status in 2010 and opened accession negotiations in 2012. Even so, despite having opened all the negotiation chapters, Montenegro has provisionally closed only three in the ten years of accession talks. The lack of progress has often been associated with the near thirty-year dominance of the Ðukanovi´c’s Democratic Party of Socialists, which faced its first electoral defeat, since its establishment in 1992, only in August 2020; similar to the case of Serbia, the combination of a pro-European agenda and nationalism was crucial to both the electoral success of Ðukanovi´c and to his demise. The instrumentalisation of the EU by Democratic Party of Socialists had been successful in that it vindicated numerous political choices regarding the country’s independent statehood, choices that had subsequently allowed Ðukanovi´c to capture not only the institutions of governance, but also the country’s economy (Džanki´c 2018). Yet, the pro-European discourse was insufficient when confronted with the core issue of contested national identity in the form of a Law on Religious Freedoms, which foresaw nationalisation of property of religious communities but mainly targeted the Serbian Orthodox Church. The broad pro-Serbian coalition that led to Ðukanovi´c’s demise equally capitalised on a pro-European rhetoric for populist purposes, and its own resource-capture system. Yet in the case of North Macedonia and Albania—whose negotiation talks had reached an impasse due to different objections from the member states—the misperception related to the EU among the policymakers is the difficulty of disentangling the accession process sustained by the EU institutions from the interests of individual member states. While both countries have long been deemed by the Commission to be prepared to start the accession talks (North Macedonia had been given candidate status in 2004, Albania in 2014), the negotiation chapters remain intact. North Macedonia, which consented to changing its name in 2019 to meet the demands of the neighbouring Greece in the long lasting “name dispute” (Vangeli 2011) has since been blocked by the neighbouring Bulgaria and the subsequent “language dispute”. Albania’s stalemate is conversely blocked by wider concerns (led by France) over the shape of the EU after the enlargement to the Western Balkans, especially in view of the democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland. As the opening of the

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accession talks of the two countries has been pegged to one another, the domestic political elites have developed a pessimistic view of the enlargement process. The current President of North Macedonia, in the context of the country’s prospects for EU accession, noted: I am not very optimistic and I’m not saying that with happiness. But the trends are suggesting, amongst the population, a slightly different opinion stands on the European Union of today. Not because of these blockages by Bulgaria and before that by Greek side, but because of not enough presence of Europe and not enough of the efforts, initiatives of the European Union in the Balkan region. (Euronews, 29 April 2022)

The Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama described the situation as “absurd” and called for a detachment of the accession procedures for Albania and North Macedonia, emphasising his country has been held “hostage” to Bulgarian demands (Semini 2021). Hence, the failure of disentangling the different aspects of the process and the leverage of different institutional actors and the member states caused a flawed perception of the process as linear. Even when ultimately resolved—as was the case with Albania and North Macedonia when negotiations were launched in July 2022—such a misperception might be used to feed into domestic discontent with the enlargement process. As such, a misperception of the enlargement as a straightforward and linear process can potentially be abused for reinforcing illiberal politics in those Western Balkan states that comply with the EU’s requirements, but face blockages caused by member state interests or procedural issues. 3.2

(Mis)perceptions in Knowledge Production

So far, no theory of enlargement can fully explain the workings of the accession process in the Western Balkans. Conceptual thinking about EU enlargement as a process had been developed in the context of the socalled Eastern enlargement, which was structured around a functioning system of incentives and sanctions and a credible “reward” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Initiated after the 1993 Copenhagen summit, the Eastern enlargement provided an opportunity for ten Central and East European states to realise what Milan Kundera in 1984 referred to as the “return to Europe”; as well as for Malta and Cyprus to join the European family. Accession talks had been opened shortly thereafter,

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and with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, who were given three years to meet the outstanding conditions, all other candidates for accession joined the EU on 1 January 2004. This was the case even with Slovakia, which had been described as “a borderline case between that of more advanced Central European and lagging South-East European countries” (Szomolanyi 2000, 16). Theoretical framing of this enlargement was largely based on the different interpretations of the institutionalist logic that drew on the conditions and mechanisms engrained in the accession process (Börzel and Risse 2000; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). These conditions and mechanisms served as a means of “domestic adaptation to regional European integration” (Graziano and Vink 2006) or Europeanisation. The degree of Europeanisation was linked to the degree of the EU’s engagement in the process (Vachudova 2005). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) combined these approaches in the external incentives model, based on rational bargaining among independent actors who negotiate in order to obtain their desired outcome based on their bargaining power. They distinguish between political conditions (e.g. Copenhagen criteria) and regulatory conditions (acquis commaunautaire), highlighting that the aspiring members will focus on rewards from meeting these conditions as they are accountable to their domestic electorate. Criteria that determine to what extent will conditionality be effective include the size and speed of rewards, the determinacy of the conditions, the credibility of the conditionality and the size of the adoption costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 12–17). However, the external incentives model cannot explain the dynamics of EU accession of the Western Balkans. Džanki´c et al. (2019) noted that the framing of broader nation-building processes is inherent in the accession process for these states, and that the interplay between nationbuilding and EU accession in these states is far more significant, primarily due to issues of contested statehood. For instance, from among the 2004 enlargement countries, only Slovenia had a short experience of conflict and border disputes after the fall of communism. From among the current aspiring members from the Western Balkans, Albania is the only country where national identity and state’s borders remain relatively stable, and—equally—the only country that has not been involved in armed conflict. War had ravaged Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1996, leaving the country torn constitutionally, politically and severely impoverished economically; Kosovo’s post-conflict statehood has

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been contested at different levels; Montenegrin national identity is challenged both internally and externally and the country participated in the wars of Yugoslav disintegration alongside Serbia (while part of FR Yugoslavia); different aspects of statehood and identity of North Macedonia have long been disputed by Greece and Bulgaria; and Serbia does not recognise Kosovo’s independence, and thus, cannot settle its own borders. While these circumstances indeed illustrate convincingly that the structural conditions for EU accession in the Western Balkans differ significantly from those in Central and East European states (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020), the respective conceptual framework has not been adjusted to account for them. A further development that remains only tangentially touched upon is the credibility of EU accession. Beyond the issues discussed in the previous section and the Union’s recent experience with democratic backsliding, a large expectation of the process remains, despite the fact that substantial bilateral disputes between member states and aspiring members cause blockages of the process. Notably, North Macedonia has started its accession process in 2004, a year before Croatia that joined the EU in 2013. Even Croatia’s EU accession had been blocked by Slovenia, due to a border dispute. In other words, for as long as scholarship misperceives the accession process as linear and dependent solely on the relationship between the candidates and the Union as a whole, the production of knowledge in this domain will reflect the unrealistic expectations of the accession process. Similar is true also of the “stabilitocracy” argument, which implies that the EU has prioritised “stabilitocracies”—or regimes that include “considerable shortcomings in terms of democratic governance, yet enjoy external legitimacy by offering some supposed stability” (Bieber 2018)— over political transformation and the rule of law. The argument of “stabilitocracy” is a perfect description of a domestic environment of flawed and imperfect transitions to democracy and external support for it (Kmezi´c 2017). However, while it explains “why the countries of the Western Balkans did not transform” it is weak in enhancing our understanding of “why has the EU prioritised stability over democratization and enlargement”. Similar accounts of shortcomings of the accession process due to prioritisation of peace and stability may represent an exaggeration of the EU’s “normative power” (Grabbe 2006) and an overestimate of its transformative power to transfer “rules, norms and ways of doing things” (Radaelli 2003) to the legal, economic and political systems of Western

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Balkan (potential) candidate countries. As such, the stabilitocracy account alone may have as an unintended consequence a major misunderstanding as to what the EU, its different member states and institutions should do in the accession process, as opposed to what they realistically can do. The outcome of this commonly leads to the projection of an unrealistic expectation of the EU in academic literature as regards its role in “Member State building” (Keil and Arkan 2015). 3.3

Misperceptions Among the Public

In countries aspiring to EU membership, the views of the Union are generally favourable and related to the popular perception that accession will eventually lead to a “better and richer life” (DW 2017). This opinion is well reflected in the most recent edition of the Balkan Barometer (2022), in which 60% of citizens of the region believe that EU membership would be good for their country’s economy. This belief is by far highest in Kosovo and Albania, where 89 and 73% of citizens, respectively, link the EU membership to economic prosperity; it is the lowest in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, where only 50 and 38% of citizens, respectively, share this view. Such results are unsurprising when related to personal views of EU membership among the region’s citizens, half of whom associates being a member state with economic well-being and freedom to travel. These perceptions of EU membership reflect, to a large degree, how the Union is presented in the region, and indeed they resonate the benefits that citizens could gain through accession. Yet at the same time, attitudes towards what is understood as the “loss of sovereignty” reveal that citizens have scarce understanding of the substance of integration, especially as regards the economic domain. Paradoxically, only 1 and 4% of Kosovans and Montenegrins, who recently restored their independent statehood, associate EU membership with the loss of economic sovereignty (Balkan Barometer 2022). Such concerns are highest in the cases of Serbia and North Macedonia, where 12 and 9% of respondents, respectively, feared that entering the EU would challenge their economic sovereignty. This difference is mostly due to the fact that the concept of sovereignty in the region is related to independent and recognised statehood; pooling sovereignty for economic regions and entering a common governance arrangement is perceived as a part of “being a sovereign state”. For this reason, there is scarcely any association of EU accession

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with the loss of sovereignty in Montenegro and Kosovo, where independence movements also supported pro-European agendas and were successful. By contrast, concerns over the loss of sovereignty are much higher in Serbia and North Macedonia, where specific elements of EU accession were conditioned by what was perceived in the discourse as “loss of sovereignty” or the “loss of national identity”. In Serbia, this relates to the EU’s involvement in the normalisation of the relationship with Kosovo, which has been described as “playing with fire” (Kartsonaki 2020), while in North Macedonia the linkage of the “loss of sovereignty” is a grievance caused by the demands of its neighbours related to the name of the country and its language. The combination of grievances and misperceptions of the meaning of EU membership at different levels, the dissatisfaction with the integration impasse and the rising influence of Russia and China in the region (Keil and Stahl 2022), has already led to the decline of support for EU accession in Serbia. A survey conducted by Ipsos (April 2022) has shown that only 35% of the citizens of Serbia support joining the EU, while 44% oppose it (see Bogosavljevi´c, this volume). Recent statements of the Serbian President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c corroborate how this decline is linked to Serbia’s concerns over sovereignty. Commenting on the decrease in support for EU accession, he highlighted that “Serbia has a place in the European Union, I believe that we should continue our European path and that we should fight for our dignified path to Europe. We should keep our independence in decision-making, at least until we become a member of the EU” (Euractiv, 24 April 2024). Similar polls are yet to be conducted in the other Western Balkan states, especially since the conflict in Ukraine has put back into limelight questions related to EU enlargement.

4

Conclusions

This chapter does not aim to explain in detail the process and dynamics of EU accession in the Western Balkans. Rather, it seeks to enquire as to why the current analytical frameworks that have been used to explain why the region’s countries have perhaps resulted in misperceptions—at different analytical levels—of what the enlargement process entails, who the key actors are and what contextual factors need to be taken into consideration to account for the accession impasse. It also suggests that Christopher Hill’s (1993) “capability-expectations gap” might offer a useful analytical

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toolbox for understanding why this enlargement round differs so much from the earlier ones; why it is taking so much longer; and why—despite declarative commitments to EU accession—the “future of the Balkans” in Europe is very much uncertain. Empirical work on this topic mainly seeks a comparative angle with the events, processes and actions that had taken place during the 2004, 2007 and 2013 eastwards expansions of the EU. In so doing, scholars use the frameworks developed to study these enlargements, such as the “external incentives model” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005), which have limited explanatory power in the context of the Western Balkans. This shortcoming is precisely due to different structural conditions in which the relationship between the EU and its current and prospective member states is unfolding. On the contrary, the “capability-expectations gap” analytical lens can help understand these structural differences at two levels. First, the capability of the EU to absorb new member states is very much conditioned by the “state-of-the-art” of the EU at present. The question of the “credibility” of the enlargement agenda has frequently been called into question by the region’s leadership. However, “credibility” is very much related to the Union’s capacity to create a functioning relationship with prospective members, at the time when the EU is still adapting to a series of endogenous shocks, including the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, the departure of the UK from the EU, the energy supply crisis and—above all—the rise of illiberal politics in the postcommunist member states. This adaptation is also taking place amidst the seminal moment in Europe’s twenty-first century—the conflict in Ukraine and return of “old wars” to the “old continent” (Kaldor 2013)— which has revived the question of enlargement (including the prospects of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), as well as the much larger subject of what is at the essence of the EU and what role does the EU have in Europe (and beyond). The combination of these two factors inevitably raises the question of the EU’s capability in the context of accession. Second, the expectations of the enlargement process are inconsistent with the capabilities of the EU to put it into practice at three levels: (1) political; (2) institutional knowledge production; and (3) the public. Rather than considering what the EU can do, these expectations are based on an assumption of what the EU “should do” for the region. This assumption is then translated into outcomes at each corresponding level. For the Balkan political elites, the simultaneous juggling with

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the conflating narratives of Europe as a place of wealth and prosperity, and Europe that “is not doing enough for us”, has become a tool for cementing their strongholds over the weak and captured Western Balkan states. For knowledge production, it created frameworks and arguments that have a marginal value added for understanding the many layers of relationships between the various EU institutions engaged in the enlargement process, interests and strategies of its member states (within the EU and vis-à-vis the prospective candidates) and the region’s countries. For the public, high (and unmet) expectations from the EU have started to shift the public opinion and lower the support for membership, which might cause future pushbacks. Hence, avoiding the misperceptions that can be caused by the “capability-expectations gap” rests on a careful evaluation of the dynamics of enlargement, the actors who take part in it, as well as of the changing context in which the relationships between the EU and the aspiring members take place. Such an evaluation requires an understanding of the backdrop of flawed transitions and illiberal politics in the Western Balkans and in the EU, both of which have experienced how rational and expected political choices can become distorted by political interests vested as “national” questions.

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Vachudova, M. A. (2019). EU Enlargement and State Capture in the Western Balkans. In The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans (pp. 63–85). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. Vangeli, A. (2011). Nation-Building Ancient Macedonian Style: The Origins and the Effects of the So-Called Antiquization in Macedonia. Nationalities Papers, 39(1), 13–32. Vuˇckovi´c, V. (2021). Europeanizing Montenegro: The European Union, the Rule of Law, and Regional Cooperation. Rowman & Littlefield.

CHAPTER 10

European Union—Western Balkans Misperceptions and Paradoxes Odeta Barbullushi

1

Introduction

The Western Balkans and the European Union (EU) are slowly coming out of a period imbued with mistrust, frustration and lack of faith. Since the proclaimed “break from enlargement” in 2014,1 to the rise of enlargement fatigue in the public opinion among many EU member states following the migration crisis in 2015, and the most recent 2-year long blockage of accession process of Albania and North Macedonia, the relationship between the region and the EU has been deeply scarred. This long period of mistrust has led to a number of (mis)perceptions framing the debate regarding the relationship between the EU and the region. In this chapter, I will endeavor to identify some of the most 1 I take as a reference point the statement of the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker in the European Parliament in 2014, that “no further enlargement will take place over the next five years”.

O. Barbullushi (B) University of Tirana, Tirana, Albania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_10

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prevalent misperceptions existing currently in the public debate in the region about the EU and how they mirror some of the misperceptions entrenched in the EU’s policies vis-à-vis the region. I hold that there are two key paradoxes which currently frame the EU-Western Balkans debate. The first paradox lies in the mismatch between the very high expectations in the region vis-à-vis the EU, combined with weak faith in the EU and its power, next to other actors and powers. The second paradox lies in the mismatch between high expectations on the part of the EU regarding regional cooperation, on the one hand, and EU’s limited investment, both political and financial, in regional cooperation, on the other. I will argue that much of the current mistrust and criticism from the region directed to the EU derives from the delays in the EU accession process, combined with a perceived lack of a comprehensive socialeconomic convergence strategy for the region on the part of the EU. Because of the stumbling accession process, the EU accession is often seen in the region as a secondary priority in comparison with economic growth and development. However, the duality between “accession” and “economic prosperity” is largely misplaced as economic development and growth cannot be a substitute of the EU integration path. Instead, as I will argue in the second part of the chapter, it is only through EU accession and a gradual and sectorial integration of the Western Balkan countries into EU policies and programs, parallel to individual EU accession trajectories of the Western Balkan countries, that the region will experience real social and economic transformation. In a similar fashion, various countries in the region regard regional and intra-regional cooperation with caution, fearing it might be a substitute for EU accession and the only option they will be left with. On the other hand, there is too much talk on the part of the EU for the countries of the region needing to cooperate more; yet, incentives provided for regional cooperation remain few, particularly when compared to Western Balkans-EU cooperation. It must be underlined that despite these misperceptions, the current geopolitical moment created by the Russian aggression in Ukraine, on the tail of the pandemic crisis, has reinvigorated the enlargement process and paved the way for more pragmatic and enhanced cooperation between the region and the EU. In the last section, I will sketch a few proposals which can contribute to dismantling misperceptions between the EU and the region and build trust between the two.

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Great Expectations and Little Faith

Perceptions of the EU in the region are largely shaped by the pace and impact of the accession process as well as by EU’s engagement in the region in moments of critical juncture. In a recently published survey comparing enthusiasm for the EU among the Western Balkans, Albania rated at top place with 97%, followed by Kosovo with the high percentage of 93%, Montenegro came third with 73%—but only behind the new candidates Ukraine and Moldova (91% and 83% respectively)—followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina with 76%, North Macedonia with 74% and Serbia with the ever lowest rate of 34%, just after Island, a non-EU country (Western Balkans Fund 2020). These rates confirm what experts of the region already know: that the EU enjoys a high level of enthusiasm among Albanians both of Albania and Kosovo, that Serbia remains an outlier in the region regarding its lack of enthusiasm for the EU and that enthusiasm for EU accession has dampened across the region in the past few years (Regional Cooperation Council 2022). For the first time since 2015, the average enthusiasm for EU integration has fallen by 2%, from 62% in 2021 to 60% in 2022 (Regional Cooperation Council 2022). One can safely argue that the credibility and standing of the EU in the region has suffered a blow from 2014 onward (Schimmelfennig 2015), most recently due to the inability to start accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia and of granting visa liberalization to Kosovo, despite the fulfillment of all technical criteria on the part of the Western Balkans partners as per above. The stumbling of the accession process and its prolongation—as in the case of Serbia and Montenegro— has made the EU enlargement process less transformative and politically less viable (see also ESI 2020). A new strategy for an enhanced relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans was indeed launched in 2018 (European Commission 2018) and a first EU-Western Balkans Summit after the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 was organized by the Bulgarian Presidency in 2018. However, these gestures did not provide a meaningful political impetus to the EU accession path of the region. The strategy did indicate that by 2025 the Union can become larger than 27 members (European Commission 2018, p. 2), but it did not go beyond giving a hopeful view of the process. There are only a few years left to meet this timeline, and none of the “frontrunners” of the EU accession process, namely

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Serbia or Montenegro, seem to be anywhere close to the finish line. A new methodology on EU accession of the Western Balkans was proposed in 2020, with the view to inject more predictability and political steer into the process, while removing any reference to anticipated date or timeline (European Commission 2020a). Undoubtedly, the unpredictability of the enlargement process from 2017 until 2022, when the EU opened the accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, has harmed not only the credibility of enlargement policy, but also EU’s standing in the region. For example, the inability of the EU member states to come to a consensual decision to grant Kosovo visa-free travel has weakened EU’s standing in Kosovo, and created a sense of frustration and cynicism, despite the declaratively high enthusiasm for EU accession process. A 2016 survey of the Kosovo Institute for Security Policies shows that despite the overall positive public perceptions in Kosovo in relation to the EU integration process—94.4% of the respondents think that Kosovo should join EU—when asked how constructive the EU has been toward Kosovo, only 28.1% of respondents lean on the “constructive side” (KCSS 2016, pp. 24–25). Moreover, from a comparative perspective, results show that the difference between membership in the EU, and the strategic partnership with the USA and Turkey, is rather small from the respondents’ perspective (94.4% and 92.6% and 81.1%, respectively) (KCSS 2016, p. 23). The Berlin Process, launched in 2014 by former Chancellor Merkel, served as a bridging platform of the region to the EU and underlined the importance of the EU accession process for the transformation of the region, with an emphasis on rule of law, reconciliation between the Western Balkans parties, and economic convergence, with a special focus on improving infrastructure. However, as the enlargement process stumbled particularly after 2018, and with the stalled dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia between 2019 and 2021, the Berlin Process was reduced to the implementation of the Regional Economic Area, revamped as the Common Regional Market in 2020. Regional cooperation was thus uncoupled from the perspective of EU accession and it was often portrayed as an end in itself. This led many in the Western Balkans to question whether regional cooperation was indeed all that the EU could offer to the region. In addition, the delays in the EU accession process have led to a widespread lack of faith in the finalité of the process. In North Macedonia, for example, 28% of the respondents believe that membership in the EU

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will never happen, whereas another 23% answer that they do not know when it will happen (KAS 2022). In a broader perspective, the percentage of citizens across the region thinking that EU accession will never happen has risen proportionally from 22% in 2021 to 28% in 2022 (RCC 2022). With the accession process becoming less politically viable, the leverage of the EU to solve bilateral issues and transform bilateral relations in the region also has shrunk. The impact of the EU’s efforts in solving bilateral disputes in the region is directly linked to the credibility and impact of the EU’s enlargement policy as well as engagement in the region. In Kosovo, for example, perceptions demonstrate a lack of belief in the imminent membership of Kosovo in the EU and lack of trust in the EU as a solution broker for the dialogue with Serbia. As a recent survey of the Western Balkans Security Barometer (WBSB) shows, only 4% of the surveyed answered positively the question whether they trusted the EU to facilitate alone the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia (Fetiu and Balaj 2022, p. 10). Instead, 35% think that the EU must facilitate the dialogue together with the US, and a sheer half of 50% of those surveyed put trust in the US for facilitating the dialogue. This hesitation can be linked to the fact that five EU member states do not yet recognize Kosovo as an independent state. In the specific case of Kosovo, it is safe to suggest that the negative perception regarding the success of the dialogue (“fully satisfied” rates between 3–4% for all categories, including the question on “how your country is treated”) correlates with the level of trust put in the EU as a facilitator of the dialogue. Admittedly, some last-minute fixes proposed by the EU member states regarding bilateral issues, with the view to unblock the accession process, are not always supported in the region. In this vein, the so-called French proposal, which was the prerequisite for lifting Bulgaria’s veto for the start of North Macedonia’s negotiations with the EU, was rejected by 57.1% of the respondents in a recent survey on North Macedonia’s foreign and security policy in the past 30 years (KAS 2022). The opening of accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania in 2022 has brought new energy to the process. But after a twoyear long deadlock, in the face of the Russian aggression in Ukraine and the subsequent multiple security crises, these steps are still perceived as too little and too late in themselves. Therefore, a more enhanced and institutionalized engagement with the Western Balkans will need to be combined with the individual accession process of each country.

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In the end, perceptions and misconceptions about EU in the region do not float freely but in an increasingly competitive geopolitical context. The competition is not just about external actors or third powers, such as Russia and China, but also about different models of governance, specifically about rule of law and accountability, as well as different sets of norms and values. In the recent years, the Western Balkans has seen an increased footprint of China, primarily economically and through the exertion of soft power. Chinese investment in four countries of the region (except for Albania and Kosovo), during 2005–2020, was US $15.4 billion, with Serbia heading the list with US $10.5 billion (Zeneli 2022). Combined investments from China, Russia and Turkey amount to more than US $9.36 billion and are lodged in strategic sectors such as energy, banking, telecommunications and transport (Hoxhaj 2022, p. 315). Geopolitical competition, combined with a seemingly endless accession process which does not bring immediate political wins, does little to motivate all Western Balkan countries to follow Brussels’ lead regarding sanctions over Russia (Bechev 2022). That is particularly the case where there is a strong pro-Russian sentiment among the public opinion and no significant domestic pressure to align with EU and Euro-Atlantic policy (Bieber and Nechev 2021, p. 27).2 In addition, perceptions are created and consolidated primarily in moments of crisis and junctures. One of these junctures is the immediate outbreak of the pandemic, when the EU was found unprepared to respond both internally and vis-à-vis its partners, namely the Western Balkans. The elites of the countries of the region, alongside the civil society, have repeatedly suggested that the stalemate in the EU accession process would indeed allow for third parties in the region, like Russia, China or even Turkey—considered by many in the region as a Western Balkans power and not an outsider—to exert greater influence throughout the region. However, this argument rang hollow at the advent of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Faced with shortages of vaccines supplies, countries like Serbia were the first to accept the Chinese offer of vaccines. The Albanian government followed suit by purchasing a pivot supply package of Chinese vaccines through Turkey. The way the 2 According to Bieber and Nechev (2021, p. 27), unlike other Western Balkan countries who would rely on a Western country or block for their national security, 47% of the public opinion in Serbia would rely on Russia for their security.

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vaccines crisis was managed by the EU, by leaving the Western Balkans outside the joint mechanism of purchases and supply, created a sense of resentment between the EU and the Western Balkans, and was often used as an explanation by the elites of the region for the rising anti-Europeanist sentiments. This initial moment of slow response was quickly overcome by the EU; yet, as Florian Bieber and Zoran Nechev have argued, the timing rather than the real quantity of assistance mattered. In other words, the question in these circumstances is who jumps first to help (Bieber and Nechev 2021, p. 5). Finally, the EU accession process, particularly its bureaucratic and administrative dimension, is not obviously associated with economic benefits in the eyes of the public opinion. And, were the two to be compared, people in the region across all six countries view economic development as a greater priority than EU integration. As surveys have clearly shown, the ratio of support among public opinion for EU membership on the one hand, and economic development on the other, is significant, ranging from 9 to 74% in Serbia, to 37 to 39% in Kosovo, respectively (Bieber and Nechev 2021, p. 13). This means that in the public eye, the EU accession process is at times half as important as economic development, a trend which is to be expected particularly in the context of the post-pandemic and the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. The next section delves deeper into the (mis)perceptions concerning economic prosperity and EU’s investment in the region, in conjunction with expectations and realities of regional cooperation.

3

Regional Cooperation and the Unfulfilled Promise of Economic Convergence

The EU has deployed a number of instruments in order to bridge the economic and development gap between the region and the EU and to help prepare the region for integration into the Single Market, primarily through its national and multinational pre-accession funds (IPAs). Whereas the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and the accession process are supported primarily by national pre-accession funds (IPA) allocated to each country, regional cooperation is supported by the IPA multinational instrument channeled through the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) and the secretariat of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).

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In addition, the EU has deployed a number of instruments to bring the region closer to the Single Market and enhance economic relations with the region. The Bilateral Free Trade agreements between the EU and the individual Western Balkan countries have proved successful in expanding trade between the two sides and so has the instrument of CEFTA (Grieveson et al. 2021, pp. 3–24). As economists point out, the EU remains the only game in town in terms of trade ties and partnerships, despite the fact that the Western Balkans have a combined GDP of about e95 billion, or about half the GDP of Greece (Hanzl-Weiss et al. 2020, p. 5). However, despite EU’s dominant position vis-à-vis the region in trade and economic relations, the prevalent perception in the region is that the gap between the EU and the Western Balkans remains unbridged. This perception is underpinned by the fact that the difference between the region and even the surrounding Southeast European neighbors, new EU member states like Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, have increasingly broadened, as their income levels are much higher than those of the Western Balkans countries (Hanzl-Weiss et al. 2020, p. 2). One main (mis)conception is that regional cooperation alone can change the game and transform the economies of the region to the point of making them fully prepared for integration into the EU Single Market. This has not yet proven to be the case, even in the context of the most structured EUbacked initiative such as the Berlin Process, where incentives, political leverage and additional funding has been limited or missing. 3.1

Regional Cooperation as a Contested Ground

Regional cooperation has been a key pillar of EU enlargement policy visà-vis the Western Balkans since 2001. However, fully-fledged regional cooperation of all Western Balkans countries became a possibility only following the agreement on Kosovo’s regional representation in 2012 and was given a more structured platform with the launch of the Berlin Process in 2014 (BPRG 2021, p. 6). The Berlin Process was indeed the first full-fledged platform of political engagement between the EU Commission, EU member states and the Western Balkans, which comprised a strong economic dimension too. As far as its economic dimension, it aimed at improving economic convergence and preparing the region for integration into the Single Market

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through a semi-sectoral approach and a focus on removing administrative and political bottlenecks to intra-regional trade, as well as improving intra-regional and inter-regional connectivity and providing support for the EU accession process of the six Western Balkan countries (WB6). From 2014 to 2020, in the course of seven summits and through a broad range of institutional and semi-institutional instruments, the policy agenda of the Berlin Summit expanded, but without a separate budgetary allocation from the pre-accession funds (IPA) (BPRG 2021, p. 13). In addition, the EU funding allocated to the Connectivity Agenda, a total of e1 billion from 2015 to 2020, was drawn from the IPA II package which, despite its size, left national governments of the Western Balkans largely unsatisfied (Balkans Group 2018, pp. 3–4). In addition to the size of the financial allocation, the main contention in the region is related to the lengthy duration of the project cycle, from the projects’ approval by the Western Balkans Investment Fund (WBIF) to the actual start of implementation, which can take up to six years. The Economic and Investment Plan, launched at the Sofia Summit in 2020, is poised to inject e9 billion from the package of pre-accession funds for the period 2021–2027 along six thematic pillars, namely sustainable transport, clean energy, environment and climate, digital future, human capital and private sector. The Commission presented the package as a vehicle which would mobilize an additional e20 billion investments in the region in the next decade (European Commission 2020a, b). However, for the public opinion in the region, these huge sums remain too large to break down into real actions which impact their lives and can change their daily state of affairs. Therefore, clearer and more practical communication on both the EU and national governments side is required in order to produce a more tangible and realistic EU in the region. Born amid the pandemic, the Common Regional Market was launched at the Sofia Summit in 2020 as an instrument which would potentially bring an additional 6.7% of GDP growth to the region (RCC 2020). However, the regional cooperation agenda of the Berlin Process, and consequently the implementation of the Common Regional Market, were impeded by political deadlock, most prominently of the bilateral dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. These factors, combined with the lack of mutual trust of the two parties and reservations regarding governance (Hoxhaj 2022, p. 322), have led to a two-year long deadlock of the process. In addition, the fact that the process had no timeline and was

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launched at a moment of a “break” from the EU enlargement policy, made many in the region cautious that this may be a substitute rather than a stepping stone toward EU accession (Hoxhaj 2022, p. 322). It was in the context of the stalled EU accession process and stumbling cooperation among WB6 that Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia launched the trilateral Open Balkans in June 2020. The initiative, a continuation of the so-called mini-Schengen Initiative, has sought to show that cooperation in the region can work and bring practical deliverables, despite or independently from the pace of the EU accession process. It has also highlighted the necessity of regional ownership of the regional cooperation agenda. Admittedly, there are still reservations on the part of the EU as far as the initiative is concerned, the main arguments being that it duplicates the Berlin Process. A lot of energy has been spent, both by the EU and the Western Balkans, on trying to prove the efficiency and rationale of one initiative over the other. However, the energy is largely misplaced because the main debate ought to be how both initiatives can have a transformative economic impact on the region and create a new social and economic reality, which would also be conducive to addressing the pending bilateral issues. In truth, in addition to implementing some practical and highly beneficial commitments of the Berlin Process agenda, the Open Balkans has created additional political pressure on all the WB6 countries to cooperate, and has generated an intense debate and interest—on the part of EU member states, too—in regional cooperation (Hoxhaj 2022, p. 326).

3.2

Subverting the Narrative: A Common Economic Area with the EU

It is important to note that, notwithstanding ongoing forms of regional and intra-regional cooperation and despite much emphasis on bridging the divergence between the EU and the region, the gap between the two remains wide and uneven in various policy areas, particularly regarding connectivity in transport and energy. As Dušan Relji´c has shown in relation to the Economic Investment Plan, when compared to the budget allocated to the EU as part of the post-pandemic recovery fund, citizens of the region will receive ten times less than EU citizens per capita for the 2021–2027 period (Relji´c 2021, p. 37). This disparity is more pronounced when comparing the income per capita of the Western Balkan

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countries to the GDP of even surrounding countries, now EU members, such as Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania (Hanzl-Weiss et al. 2020, p. 6; see also Bonomi et al. 2020). In addition to the asymmetries between the region and the EU, including neighbors from Central and Eastern Europe, outward migration from the Western Balkans to the EU and EFTA countries continues to be the dominant trend, whereas intra-regional mobility constitutes only one fourth of the total mobility in the region (Hanzl-Weiss et al. 2020, p. 28). This means that the countries of the region are net contributors to the EU in human resources and skills, due to EU-oriented migration (Relji´c 2021, p. 36). Despite the expectation and the logic that the countries in the region should have a high degree of economic exchange with each other, their exchanges with EU have grown quicker than among themselves (CDI 2020, p. 4). In the context of this asymmetry, the narrative that regional cooperation comes first and that integration into the European Single Market will follow suit, is neither beneficial nor reflects any longer the dynamics on the ground and the needs of the economies of the region. In fact, it often feeds the perception in the region that the EU is unwilling to enhance economic relations with the WB6. This perception is matched by a growing confidence among the Western Balkan businesses that their products, goods and services can compete well with those from the EU (RCC 2022). On the other hand, an entrenched belief seems to prevail among the EU member states and the EU institutions, that the region is not yet ready for greater sectorial integration and access to EU programs and structural funds. Therefore, a new paradigm of development and of economic convergence is needed to change the game in the Western Balkans and to forestall the influence of other competing powers.

4 Conclusions: Changing Narratives and Strengthening Trust On the part of the region, particularly its elites, there is a growing consensus that while the EU accession process may take a long time and is no longer politically viable, political engagement and economic ties with the EU must be strengthened in the meantime. New formats like the

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European Political Community, a revitalized EU-Western Balkans political dialogue through the biannual joint Summits and a re-launched of Berlin Summits are all useful tools to that end. However, without a renewed commitment on the part of the EU to include the region increasingly into EU programs and enhanced political capital, as well as additional financial instruments invested into regional cooperation, the key misperceptions between the EU and the Western Balkans will persist, to the risk of further eroding trust between the two sides. The region resists strongly the idea that any other political or economic project may substitute the EU accession process, be that phasing-in integration, regional cooperation or the European political community (see Rama and Rutte 2022). To counter these fears, both sides must emphasize that regional cooperation is not an objective in itself or a substitute to EU accession, but that it can be used as an instrument for gradual integration and increasing preparedness of the region for the Single Market. Another way to forestall fears and misperceptions in the Western Balkans would be to include the region in joint response mechanisms to the crisis caused by the war in Ukraine, as well as in EU programs and policies in the areas of energy, food and agriculture, higher education and innovation, and in particular, include the WB6 into the European green and digital transition (Rama 2021). This also includes engaging with the region in a number of other policy areas which are of interest to the countries of the region and do not just mirror the “crisis agenda” of the EU member states. This includes working closer with the WB6 partners to de-securitize migration and to envisage new proposals with regard to EUWestern Balkans labor mobility. It also means supporting and encouraging regional and intra-regional cooperation stemming from the countries of the region, such as Open Balkans, the Green Lanes established bilaterally with the neighboring EU countries, and the like. Ultimately, what is necessary is to invest political capital and additional financial instruments to scaffold regional cooperation and reforms related to democratic reform in the WB6. The latest agreement of all the Western Balkans countries to sign three regional agreements on mobility at the Berlin Summit on November 3, 2022, after two years of standstill, shows that momentum can be formed and trust can be forged when there is serious and concrete engagement with the region and a commitment backed up with political capital on the part of the EU and its member states.

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References Balkans Group (2018). The Berlin Process for the Western Balkans: Gains and Challenges for Kosovo. https://balkansgroup.org/en/the-berlin-process-forthe-western-balkans-gains-and-challenges-for-kosovo-2/. Balkans Policy Research Group (2021). Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans. Regional Economic Area, the Mini-Schengen and the Common Regional Market. Regional-Cooperation-in-the-Western-Balkans_ Regional-Economic-Area-the-mini_schengen-and-the-Common-RegionalMarket-WEB-2.pdf (balkansgroup.org). Bechev, D. (2022). What Has Stopped EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans? Carnegie Europe, Available from: https://What Has Stopped EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans? - Carnegie Europe - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Bieber, F. and Nechev, Z. (2021). Media Briefing. Public Opinion Analysis on Citizens’ Perception About the European Union, External Actors and Trust: Focus on North Macedonia. Media-Briefing_ Public-Opinion-Survey-on-EU-External-Actors-and-Citizens-Trust-ThePerspective-of-North-Macedonia.pdf. Bonomi, M., Hackaj, A. & Relji´c, D. (2020). Avoiding the Trap of Another Paper Exercise: Why the Western Balkans Need a Human Development Centered EU Enlargement Model. IAI Papers, No. 20, Rome. Cooperation and Development Institute (CDI) (2020). Report Sofia Summit 2020, Takeaways and Lessons learnt, December 2020. SOFIA-SUMMITTakeaways-and-Lessons-Learnt.pdf (cdinstitute.eu). European Commission (2018). A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans, 6 February. communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf (eur opa.eu). European Commission (2020a). Enhancing the Accession Process—A Credible EU Perspective for the Western Balkans, 5 February. Enhancing the accession process—A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans (europa.eu), 5 February 2020. European Commission (2020b). Western Balkans: An Economic and Investment Plan to Support the Economic Recovery and Convergence, 6 October. Western Balkans: An Economic and Investment Plan to Support the Economic recovery and convergence (europa.eu) European Stability Initiative (2020). Hamster in the Wheel: Credibility and EU Balkan Policy. Hamster in the Wheel – Credibility and EU Balkan policy | ESI (esiweb.org).

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CHAPTER 11

Antithetic Perceptions of Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans Matteo Bonomi and Milica Uvali´c

1

Introduction

Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans has been on the policy agenda for several decades, but it has received new attention in recent years due to the “Berlin Process” and the renewed engagement of the European Union (EU) after 2018 with the six countries—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia (European Commission 2018). In addition, Russia’s aggression of Ukraine in February 2022, that led to the almost immediate granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, has reopened the question of EU enlargement and its conditionality policy. These recent developments thus also raise the question of regional cooperation, as one of the

M. Bonomi (B) Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] M. Uvali´c University of Perugia, Perugia, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_11

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official criteria that continues to be used for assessing progress of the Western Balkan countries (European Commission 2022). A number of recent studies have, in fact, examined the achievements and limitations of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, drawing different conclusions (e.g. Bertelsmann Stiftung—WIIW 2020; Bertelsmann Stiftung— WIIW 2022; Ðurovi´c ed. 2022; BiEPAG 2023). In this chapter, we will recall the main reasons why regional cooperation has been promoted in the Western Balkans from 1996 onwards, how it has assumed an even more important role at the beginning of the new millennium, and why it has been perceived with a lot of scepticism by the Western Balkan policy-makers (Sect. 2). We discuss more specifically regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries in the economic sphere by focusing on the trade liberalisation initiative, recalling some of the controversial issues and reporting its overall results (Sect. 3). We then examine in greater detail the developments over the past decade, trying to explain why there has been a discrepancy between the high expectations from recent initiatives on regional economic cooperation and the actual results—some Western Balkan countries have been much more successful than others in further reorienting their trade towards primarily the EU, rendering the regional market less important (Sect. 4). This raises the question of whether the EU policy of conditionality in the Western Balkans—primarily the criterion of regional economic cooperation—should not be reconsidered (Sect. 5). The current EU policies towards the region may require a different, more variegated, approach, that would take into account the diversity of Western Balkan countries’ economies today and the growing urgency to integrate the whole region into the EU.

2

The Origins of Misperceptions About Regional Cooperation

Regional cooperation has been promoted in the Western Balkans since the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the initiative of the EU, the European Council welcomed the “Declaration on the Process on Stability and Good-Neighbourliness in Southeast Europe” adopted on 13 December 1995 in Royaumont accompanying the implementation of the Paris/Dayton Peace Agreement that was to promote stability and good-neighbourliness by encouraging dialogue, contacts and cooperation at all levels in Southeast Europe. Soon after, in 1996, the European

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Commission announced its Regional Approach for the Western Balkans, intended to facilitate political stabilisation and economic reconstruction in a war-destructed region. The main motivation was the desire to promote regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries, drawing on the post-World War II experience of cooperation and integration in Europe from the early 1950s onwards. Indeed, this has been part of a common approach among West European countries, where stronger cooperation, particularly regarding economic policies, was expected to deliver improvements in political relations among countries—an approach especially associated with German foreign policy under the so-called Wandel durch Handel (“change through trade”) doctrine. In line with such an approach, the European Council decided to introduce two new groups of criteria in 1997—regional cooperation and the respect of all international obligations (such as cooperation with the International Crime Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY) —to the list of conditions that the Western Balkan countries have to fulfil in order to improve their relations with the EU, in addition to providing results in the field of political, legal and economic reforms (Council of the European Union 1997). Regional cooperation was to stabilise the region by improving bilateral relations among the Western Balkan countries and help economic reconstruction. At that time, however, the political conditions prevented any meaningful regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries, also because the Federal Republic (FR) of Yugoslavia was not included, for political reasons, in most of these initiatives (Lopandi´c 2001; Uvali´c 2001). Instead of increasing cooperation, the region experienced further conflicts—in Kosovo, that led to the NATO intervention in FR Yugoslavia in 1999, and the short civil war in Macedonia in 2001. A more decisive support of regional cooperation started to emerge during the last days of the Kosovo war, in the context of a wider EU and international mobilisation for providing a longer-term strategy for the Western Balkan region’s stabilisation and reconstruction. To this end, the EU launched the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans on 26 May 1999 (European Commission 1999). The SAP was explicitly built upon the 1996 Regional Approach and required the implementation of regional cooperation as part of broader EU conditionality towards the region, which also included for the first time the prospects of future EU membership for the Western Balkan countries. Moreover, through the SAP, the EU was backing a wider

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multilateral engagement in the region through the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. Indeed, the Stability Pact was launched at the international summit of Cologne on 10 June 1999, on the same day that the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 ended the military conflict in Kosovo, with the participation of the EU, OSCE, G8, NATO, the most important international financial institutions, as well as a large number of states (US, Russia and most other European countries). The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe brought a new emphasis on regional cooperation. Through its Regional Table which coordinated the work of three Working Tables—for economic reconstruction, democratisation and security—the Stability Pact was to complement the bilateral policies of the EU, by initiating regional projects in the Westsern Balkans and mobilising funding of international donors. The new EU strategy for the Western Balkans therefore strongly relied on regional cooperation as one of the fundamental instruments for achieving political stability and economic development in the region. Regional cooperation has thus become a central part of EU accession conditionality towards the Western Balkans (in addition to the 1993 Copenhagen accession criteria). Within such a context, support for regional cooperation has allowed the EU to pursue a “two-track strategy” towards the Western Balkans (Lavenex 2011), complementing EU bilateral relations and enlargement conditionality for individual potential candidate countries, with the promotion of EU standards through EU-sponsored parallel structures and multilateral intra-regional initiatives. These two processes of economic integration—with the EU and with the other countries in the region—were intended to be mutually reinforcing, since regional integration among the Western Balkan countries was to prepare them for a smoother future integration with the EU. The Western Balkan countries were expected to demonstrate the willingness to implement regional cooperation with neighbouring countries for both political and economic reasons. In addition to the preservation of peace and political stability, regional cooperation was to facilitate economic recovery after a decade of economic decline and extremely poor economic performance. The intensification of trade and other economic links among the Western Balkans was expected to stimulate economic growth and the creation of a larger regional market, in this way attracting badly needed foreign direct investment (Uvali´c 2001). In spite of the expected benefits, the perceptions about regional cooperation were not positive among Western Balkan political elites at that

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time (Anastasakis and Bojiˇci´c-Dželilovi´c 2002). Although a different political climate was created in the region after 2000 due to important political changes (more democratic political regimes introduced in Croatia and in FR Yugoslavia) and especially due to the new EU strategy for the Western Balkans, there were still many unresolved bilateral issues between the Western Balkan countries. Given that the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 confirmed the offer of EU membership prospects to all Western Balkan countries, the general expectations were that the process of EU integration would proceed relatively quickly. Recalling the experience of the Central East European (CEE) countries that signed Association Agreements with the EU in just three years (from 1993 to 1996), the new enthusiasm brought hopes that the Western Balkan countries would also be able to sign Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the EU soon after. Such optimistic expectations often diverted attention from regional cooperation, rendering it a much less important goal in the eyes of local stakeholders, than integration with the EU. During the 2001–2005 period, within the CARDS programme of financial assistance for the Western Balkans, the 10% of resources that were intended for regional projects was often not utilised because of lack of adequate project proposals. From the outset, therefore, the Western Balkan countries hoped to be able to intensify their relations primarily with the EU and were reluctant to implement regional cooperation initiatives. The vision of parallel integration—with the EU and with neighbouring countries—was not shared by the region’s policy-makers for the fear that regional cooperation would delay their integration with the EU. The initiatives of regional cooperation were regarded with suspicion, despite their clear political and economic importance. Moreover, the political atrocities from the previous decade could not be easily forgotten, while many bilateral political issues were not yet settled. Political instability in the Western Balkans, in fact, did not end in 2000. There was further disintegration of the region: FR Yugoslavia was transformed into the Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, Montenegro split from Serbia after the popular referendum in 2006, and Kosovo unilaterally declared its political independence in 2008. Even after the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was transformed into the Regional Cooperation Council in 2008 with headquarters in Sarajevo, with the aim of ensuring “policy ownership” of the Western Balkan countries in devising their own joint projects of regional cooperation, political

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obstacles have continued to hamper relations among the Western Balkan countries. Consensus regarding regional plans has often remained only declarative, as the lack of political will and the still unresolved bilateral disputes have continued to impede their full implementation.

3

The Contested Rationale of Economic Cooperation

In addition to political reasons why regional cooperation was (and continues) to be viewed with suspicion, there has also been a lot of scepticism regarding specifically economic cooperation among the Western Balkan countries. These issues remain relevant for today’s discussion on regional cooperation in the region. The criticism has usually been based on misperceptions about regional cooperation, as was the case also in reference to the CEE countries in the 1990s, when the question was posed whether there were justified reasons for regional groupings among the former socialist countries. One of the main points of criticism of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) signed in 1992 by the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary (later extended to other CEE countries) was that initially, it had a marginal impact on intraregional trade. As the CEE countries feared that regional arrangements would postpone their accession to the EU, similarly the Western Balkan countries questioned whether a regional grouping was justified. As the CEE countries did not want any arrangements reminiscent of the former Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), so the Western Balkan countries did not want anything that resembled former Yugoslavia (Uvali´c 2009). This was indeed Croatia’s position in 2001 that accepted the initiatives of regional cooperation with great suspicion (Bartlett 2001). The most important initiative on regional cooperation in the economic sphere promoted by the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe from early 2001 was the process of trade liberalisation. A Memorandum of understanding on trade liberalisation was signed in June 2001 by foreign trade ministers of eight Southeast European (SEE) countries,1 which led to the 1 The initiative included five Western Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FR Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (today North Macedonia), as well as Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova. After joining the EU—Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013—these countries are no longer parties to the CEFTA.

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conclusion of bilateral free trade agreements that envisaged the progressive elimination of trade barriers. In order to harmonise trade regulations, these bilateral free trade agreements were transformed into a multilateral agreement in 2006—the CEFTA 2006 (CEFTA, from now onwards).2 These agreements enabled a very substantial liberalisation of trade in goods among the Western Balkan countries in industrial and agricultural products, more recently extended to various other areas (trade facilitation measures, trade in services, etc.). Nevertheless, in the early 2000s, scepticism had been expressed regarding the economic rationale of trade liberalisation in SEE, based on the argument that there was very little trade among the Balkan countries. In one of the few papers available at that time on trade in the Balkans, Gligorov (1997) had argued that the Balkans are not a region at all in terms of trade and economic integration and that they do not fulfil the conditions for regional integration. Through a matrix reporting the relative shares of intra-regional trade, Gligorov had shown that for many Balkan countries the other Balkan countries were not important trading partners and that trade with the EU was by far more important for every single Balkan country (Gligorov 1997, p. 3). In several reports of the European Commission in 2002 and 2003, similarly, assessments were made that regional trade was disappointingly low and that the SEE region was not integrated economically. However, this was a simplified vision of the region. Regional trade had remained important for a part of the SEE region, primarily the successor states of former Yugoslavia, even before the initiative on trade liberalisation was launched in 2001. These countries continued to trade with neighbouring countries because some of them had been isolated for long from global markets due to international sanctions, and thus relied on trade linkages inherited from their former country.3 2 The CEFTA 2006 was signed on 19 December 2006 by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on behalf of Kosovo (in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244). 3 In the early 2000s, the frequent perception was that economic links in the region

have been disrupted by the military conflicts in the 1990s. During the 1990s, however, the successor states of former Yugoslavia did not live in autarchy, they still traded with other countries in the region, often illegally, even during the difficult years of international sanctions. Calculations of regional trade in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s, using a combination of IMF and national statistics, have shown that regional trade

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There are several methodological issues that need to be recalled that explain the differences in interpretations (Uvali´c 2006). These issues are also relevant for today’s assessments of intra-regional trade of the Western Balkans. First, foreign trade statistics of the Western Balkan countries were highly unsatisfactory in the early 2000s and remain imperfect, also today. There is still no single source of international foreign trade statistics which is complete for all countries. Part of the problem derives from changes in countries’ names (Montenegro and Serbia separated in 2006, Kosovo declared independence in 2008). National statistics are also incomplete: Serbia’s statistical office does not publish data on foreign trade with Kosovo, since it is still considered internal trade due to its non-recognition as an independent state. This implies that we do not have a complete, fully accurate and consistent data set on regional trade in the Western Balkans over a longer period of time. A final issue that hampers accurate calculations of regional trade is that existing statistics usually include only trade in goods, not in services, which represents a significant part of overall trade of some countries (Albania, Kosovo and particularly Montenegro). Second, average figures on intra-regional trade hide substantial differences on the importance of regional trade. Averages hide not only huge differences among the trade patterns of individual Balkan countries, but also about the different relative weight of exports/imports in their overall trade. At the time when the trade liberalisation initiative was launched in the early 2000s, intra-regional trade in SEE was much more important for the four countries of former Yugoslavia than for the other countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania). The high dependence of some countries on intra-regional trade was present primarily regarding exports, and much less regarding imports, since all countries were already importing mainly from the EU. A related issue is the actual importance of “regional trade”, which obviously depends on the definition of the region. Gligorov’s definition of the SEE region (Gligorov 1997) included ten, sometimes eleven countries—in addition to the Western Balkan countries, Bulgaria and Romania, also Greece, Hungary, Slovenia and Turkey, countries for which regional trade was negligible. Including a larger number of countries in the region, had remained quite important primarily for FR Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Uvali´c 2001, 2006).

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particularly those that trade little with neighbouring countries, decreases significantly the average share of intra-regional trade.4 A lot of discussion has also taken place about whether there is potential to increase trade in the Western Balkan region. This has produced a number of studies in the early 2000s based on gravity models that tried to estimate the divergence of SEE countries actual from potential trade. However, the results were very sensitive to model specifications and often contradictory, providing inconclusive results (Uvali´c 2006). This issue has lost much of its relevance, since the potential for expanding trade was obviously there—regional trade in the Western Balkans has substantially increased since the early 2000s. From today’s perspective, there is no doubt that trade liberalisation among the Western Balkan countries has been beneficial for their economic recovery and has greatly contributed to regional trade expansion. A number of recent studies have identified beneficial effects of trade liberalisation among the Western Balkan countries and the positive impact of CEFTA. The bilateral free trade agreements already had a positive impact on intra-regional trade; CEFTA has been even more successful since it has increased intra-regional trade by 37.7%, and the positive impact rises to 70% if Serbia (as an outlier) is excluded (Bertlesmann Stiftung—WIIW 2020, p. 9). A very positive assessment is also provided in another recent study that reports the estimated contribution of CEFTA to the increase of exports in the region during 2006–2021 to be between 40 and 80% (Ðurovi´c ed. 2022, pp. 18–19). Therefore, particularly since the signing of CEFTA, intra-regional trade in goods has been steadily increasing. One of the problems in evaluating the results achieved through regional cooperation initiatives in the Western Balkans is that the political and economic objectives are often considered jointly, while the results regarding these two groups of objectives have effectively been very different. In the case of European countries in the post-World War II period, economic cooperation and integration proved to be a successful instrument for sustaining peace and political cooperation in Europe. In the case of the Western Balkans, economic cooperation and trade 4 The new Bertlesmann Stiftung—WIIW study (2022) also seems to somewhat underestimate the methodological problems that derive from focusing primarily on aggregate statistics for different regions (CEE, Baltics, Western Balkans), since they hide enormous differences between the individual countries.

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liberalisation did not substantially contribute to improved political relations, since key political issues have not been resolved up to the present days—primarily relations between Kosovo and Serbia (Bonomi and Uvali´c 2019). Moreover, beyond the technical dimension, economic and trade policies have become increasingly politically salient over recent years and can hardly be perceived as neutral. In this regard, it is not by chance that trade has been one of the most relevant areas of recent confrontations between Belgrade and Pristina within the so-called trade war between Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2018–2019. Although trade liberalisation has undoubtedly been beneficial for the economies in the region, it has not been sufficient to ensure the expected fast economic development and convergence of the Western Balkan countries with EU incomes. However, the relatively low level of economic development of the Western Balkan countries cannot be attributed to limitations of regional economic cooperation. Rather, it is necessary to consider some of the specific structural features of the Western Balkan economies that have determined variable economic performance and trade orientation on external markets. These issues are further analysed in the next section.

4

Different Outcomes of Regional Economic Cooperation in the Western Balkans

Support for regional cooperation, and intra-regional economic integration in particular, has received renewed attention in recent years thanks to the so-called Berlin Process, an intergovernmental initiative of engagement with the Western Balkans launched in 2014 by Angela Merkel and joined by Austria, France, Italy, UK, Poland and others countries. The initiative emerged primarily in response to the dramatic impact of the 2007 global financial and economic crisis and its aftermath, which has also had very strong spillover effects on the Western Balkan economies, the renewed geopolitical and geoeconomic competition in Europe and the overall preoccupation for the state of play of EU enlargement policy. Starting from the last quarter of 2008, there was a turnaround in economic performance of the Western Balkans. All countries registered negative or much lower GDP growth rates in 2009, along with a strong drop in exports, foreign direct investment, remittances, donors’ assistance and availability of bank credit (Bartlett and Uvali´c, eds. 2013). The economic crisis has brought to the surface a number of structural weaknesses of the Western Balkan economies that remained in

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the shadow of fast economic growth before the crisis, including low external competitiveness determining chronic trade and current account deficits, slow adjustments on the labour markets (high unemployment, low employment rates), strong processes of deindustrialisation (Damiani and Uvali´c 2018), inadequate structure of foreign direct investments that initially were directed primarily towards non-tradeable services—retail trade, banking, telecommunications and real estate—rather than manufacturing, with limited spillover effects on these economies (Uvali´c 2010; Estrin and Uvali´c 2016). At the same time, the global economic crisis has also affected the EU enlargement policy, by contributing to cement resistance within the EU towards the accession of new members. Indeed, after the successful closure of accession negotiations with Croatia in 2011 (formally a member since 2013), the EU enlargement process went into crisis due to rising scepticism in some European capitals about the entry of new members. This situation was certified by the keynote speech at the European Parliament of the then new president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker (Juncker 2014), which at that time seemed to many observers as having suspended the enlargement process. Against this backdrop, the Berlin Process tried to offer a different narrative and provide a positive agenda for the region, by placing a strong emphasis on further progress in regional integration of the Western Balkans. From 2014 onwards, this led to the adoption of two projects on regional economic integration in the Western Balkans: the Multi-annual Action Plan on the Regional Economic Area 2017– 2019 (MAP REA) adopted at the Trieste Summit in July 2017 and the Common Regional Market 2021–2024 Action Plan adopted at the Summit in Sofia in November 2020. These ambitious new plans for regional economic integration had a medium-term objective that should have helped foster the enlargement agenda in the Western Balkans on the basis of the EU’s four market freedoms (goods, services, capital and labour), at the same time promoting regional connectivity. The initiatives should also have helped these countries’ alignment with the EU acquis, along with improving external competitiveness and promoting economic development. Thus, the Berlin Process was meant to relaunch economic growth, promote employment and establish better connectivity in the region. In a situation of a supply shortage regarding EU membership, the weak incentives of a distant and uncertain carrot of EU membership were supplemented with

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the offer of promoting faster economic growth and wellbeing, expected from more integrated markets and major interconnectivity. In reality, there has been a notable discrepancy between the high expectations from recent initiatives on regional economic cooperation and the actual results. Some Western Balkan countries have been much more successful than others in implementing export-led growth and have continued to further reorient their exports towards primarily the EU, which has rendered the regional market less relevant. In part, this is due to the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) that the EU has concluded with all the Western Balkan countries. The SAAs have created a free trade area between the Western Balkan countries and the EU, stimulating the increase in their mutual trade under highly liberalised trade conditions. However, given that the SAAs were signed at very different times—with North Macedonia in 2001, but with Kosovo only in 2015—this has determined very different positions of individual countries regarding their trade regimes, and consequently also the degree of trade integration, with the EU. So whereas the objectives of trade liberalisation have remained similar ever since the initiative was launched in 2001, the trade orientation of individual Western Balkan countries has significantly changed in the meantime. This will be illustrated further through an analysis of trade performance of the Western Balkan countries over the past ten years. We will focus primarily on exports, as the most relevant variable that determines a country’s trade performance and competitiveness on external markets.5 If we compare the six Western Balkan countries exports of goods, as a share of their total exports in 2011 and in 2021, the share has declined - from 23.1% in 2011 to 15.5% in 2021 (see Fig. 1, right scale). However, the decline in the share of regional exports is observed only until 2018, since the trend has been reversed thereafter, with a mild increase recorded over the last three years. It is of interest to supplement this analysis by looking at Western Balkan countries exports of goods to the other countries in the region in value terms (million US$). In this case, after a period of variable performance due to the long-lasting effects of the global economic and eurozone crises in 2011–2015, regional exports of the six countries started gradually recovering, increasing from US$ 4,490 million in 2015 to US$ 7,482 million in 2021, thus by almost 5 We have relied on IMF statistics, though statistical problems with trade statistics in the Western Balkans stressed earlier render our own calculations subject to minor errors.

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67% over the 2015–2021 period (Fig. 1, left scale). Serbia, as the largest economy with the highest value of exports among the Western Balkan countries (around 50% of the total), has contributed most to such an upward trend in regional trade. There are large differences in the relative importance of the regional market for the individual Western Balkan countries today, as well as in their overall trade performance and related changes in trade orientation over the past ten years. In Fig. 2, we present, for each country, the trends in the relative changes (variations) in the value of exports to the two groups of trading partners: the EU and the other five Western Balkan countries, taking 2011 as the base year (2011 = 100). These trends, in fact, illustrate enormous differences in countries’ trade performance and changes in their trade orientation after 2011. Some countries have strongly increased their exports primarily to the EU, or both to the EU and the regional market. Other countries have been far less successful in increasing exports to the EU, but have relied more on exporting to the regional (intra-Western Balkan) market. Looking into the specific situation of each country, North Macedonia has steadily increased its exports of goods towards the EU after

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Fig. 1 Intra-regional exports of the Western Balkan countries, 2011–2021 (in million US$ and in % of WB6 total) (Source: Authors’ elaboration based on IMF statistics available on-line)

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Fig. 2 Western Balkan countries’ exports to EU and WB5, 2011–2021 (relative changes, 2011 = 100) (Source: Authors’ elaboration based on IMF statistics available on-line)

2011, along with a slight reduction, followed by stagnation, of exports to the other countries in the Western Balkan region. Serbia has similarly registered an almost continuous increase in its exports to the EU, while its exports to the regional market have stagnated until 2019, though they are starting to increase thereafter. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s exports have been rather volatile throughout the ten-year period: after an initial decline in 2012 to both the EU and the Western Balkans,

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exports registered a gradual recovery during 2015–2018 but another decline to both markets thereafter, until 2021 when there was a sharp increase in exports to both groups of trade partners. Albania has registered a gradual increase in its exports to the EU and to the region during the whole period, but after 2016 exports to the other Western Balkan countries have been increasing faster than those to the EU. In Kosovo and Montenegro, similarly, exports to the regional market have tended to increase faster than those to the EU, but with remarkable differences. Kosovo, after a period of stagnation of exports to both markets during 2011–2015, has registered a parallel increase in its exports to the EU and to the region, but exports to the Western Balkan countries have recovered faster. Montenegro’s exports to the other Western Balkan countries have been extremely volatile during 2011–2015, starting to steadily increase only after 2016, while its exports to the EU have recorded a strong and continuous decline during the 2011–2015 period, followed by stagnation or only mild recovery thereafter.6 The analysis therefore shows that some countries are much more dependent on the Western Balkan market for their goods exports than others. Kosovo has not succeeded in substantially increasing its exports to the EU over the past decade, although an upward trend has been present in recent years, while Montenegro has registered a trend of almost continuous decline in its exports to the EU until 2015, followed by stagnation or marginal recovery. For these two countries, the regional export market in the Western Balkans remains more important than the EU market, quite contrary to the other four countries that today prevalently export to the EU (as can be observed from Figure 3). If we consider the relative shares of their trading partners in 2021, 37% of Kosovo’s goods exports was directed to the other Western Balkan countries (31% to the EU) (see Fig. 3). Montenegro’s relative share of goods exports to the regional market is even higher, 43% of total exports (compared to 31% to the EU). Despite the reported wide differences among the Western Balkan countries regarding the importance of intra-regional trade, there is no doubt that the process of regional trade liberalisation has brought benefits to all countries, as reported earlier. Although trading with neighbouring 6 It should again be recalled that exports of Albania, Kosovo and especially Montenegro are dominated by services, so trade in goods is much less important than in the other Western Balkan countries.

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Fig. 3 Western Balkan countries’ exports to EU and to WB5, as a share of total exports (in %) in 2021 (Source: Authors’ elaboration based on IMF statistics available on-line)

countries has often been regarded as a “second-best” solution, in case of limited competitiveness of a country’s products on the EU or other international markets, having the possibility to export to the regional market was—and remains—an important opportunity (Uvali´c 2006). Serbia benefits most from intra-regional trade, since it is the only country that has had a surplus in its trade with other partners in the region (see Ðurovi´c, ed. 2022). Yet for all the other Western Balkan countries, having alternative, more liberalised, markets in the region has been beneficial— it has stimulated a further expansion of exports, thus enabling a better overall trade performance than otherwise would have been the case. These trends also suggest that the initiatives aimed at creating a more integrated regional market in the Western Balkans, by removing barriers to the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, have achieved only partial and very uneven results. The analysis shows that some countries have after 2011 increased their exports further primarily towards the EU, integrating even more with the EU economy, while other countries have not been as successful on EU markets and have therefore relied more on exporting to the regional market. The initiatives promoting

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stronger regional economic integration have therefore, paradoxically, led to quite opposite results in the individual Western Balkan countries. Since such substantially different trade outcomes are the result of the promotion of the identical policy objectives aimed at creating a more integrated regional market in the Western Balkans, we can conclude that the reasons of diverging trade performance have not been directly related to the initiatives of regional economic cooperation. The differences in trade performance and the current trade orientation derive from other factors, primarily each country’s specific features—such as economic size, sectoral economic structure, degree of competitiveness, trade openness, exchange rate regimes or industrial policies applied over the past decade (e.g. incentives to attract foreign investors, measures to increase the competitiveness of SMEs, policies of re-industrialisation or support of innovative firms).7 The earlier (or later) trade liberalisation with the EU through the signing of SAAs, which took place within a relatively long time span of 14 years (between 2001 and 2015, as indicated earlier), has probably also had an important impact on the trade orientation of the individual Western Balkan countries, since it has facilitated some countries’ exports to the EU market earlier than in the case of others. Overall, the recent initiatives of regional integration, in addition to their variable impact on trade patterns of the single countries, have not significantly accelerated economic development of the Western Balkan countries and contributed to reducing the gap in GDP per capita with respect to the EU. In 2022, the Western Balkans had a GDP per capita (in Purchasing Power Standards) that ranged from 32% in Albania to 50% in Montenegro of the EU average (without Kosovo as the poorest country, for which data are not available). The newest Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans launched in October 2020 will provide e9 billion of grants to the region over the 2021–2027 period and guarantees to attract another e 20 billion of investments, but this may not ensure a major push in economic development. The planned amount is only 0.45% of the allocations planned within the Multi-annual Financial Framework and the Next Generation EU for 2021-2027, extremely low if compared to allocations planned for some EU member states. There is, therefore, a risk of further divergence, rather than the aspired convergence, of the Western Balkans with the EU member states (Bartlett et al. 2022). 7 Serbia has tried to implement a more efficient industrial policy that seems to have contributed to improved trade performance in recent years (see Uvali´c 2021).

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The persistence of the EU - Western Balkans development gap is due to many reasons that are not directly linked to regional cooperation initiatives. The blame is not to be put on limited regional cooperation, but on the lack of other policies and instruments, both of the EU and national governments, that could help the Western Balkan countries develop faster in order to bridge the development gap vis-à-vis the EU. Regional economic cooperation (or lack of it) does not explain why some countries have economically done better than others.

5

Redefining the EU Approach Towards the Western Balkans

Regional cooperation has remained an important criterion for evaluating progress of the Western Balkan countries in their EU integration process up to the present days (European Commission 2022). Regional cooperation is meant to prepare the Western Balkan countries for their future entry into the EU, in parallel with the development of bilateral relations with the EU through the SAP. This is the EU two-track approach, implemented for more than two decades. Given that after twenty years of the SAP only Croatia was able to become an EU member state, perhaps it is time to reconsider the role of regional cooperation as an important element of EU conditionality. The experience with regional cooperation in the Western Balkans has been very different than the experience in post-II World War Europe. At that time in Europe, there was determination to resolve all the political issues and move forward, and this went hand in hand with economic development and trade liberalisation among the six West European countries, founding members of the European Economic Community. This was in line with the Wandel durch Handel doctrine, which saw in economic integration and cooperation the main driver for improved political relations. In the Western Balkans, on the contrary, political and economic cooperation have moved at very different speeds and sometimes in different directions, not producing satisfactory results. The economic objectives that motivated regional cooperation in the early 2000s were similar to the ones promoted today, but the trade features and trade orientation of individual Western Balkan countries have considerably changed in the meantime. The political objectives of regional cooperation, mainly connected with the normalisation of political relations and resolution of bilateral issues, have also remained very similar to those of twenty years

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ago, but these objectives have not benefitted substantially from increasing economic cooperation. The economic aims and instruments of regional cooperation have not contributed fundamentally to the attainment of the key political objectives in the Western Balkans. Therefore, it would probably be wise to reflect on a different, more variegated, overall strategy for the Western Balkan countries, that would include some additional instruments. In order to draw lessons from twenty years of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans it is useful to distinguish between two distinct periods. The first period started with the SAP in 1999 or even earlier, when regional cooperation in the Western Balkans was to serve as a response to military conflicts and high political and economic instability in the region in the 1990s. Regional cooperation was to support weak economic and institutional capacities of the Western Balkan countries and help them prepare for future membership in the EU. This is why EU conditionality was reinforced with additional EU accession criteria. At that time, the EU offer was EU membership prospects, but the demand side was weak: the Western Balkans were at a low level of economic development, their institutions were weak, they had limited capacity to integrate with the EU economy and to sustain competitive pressure on the EU market. During this initial phase, given the still volatile and unstable political environment, it was necessary to implement various regional projects, although the impression was that regional cooperation would delay the entry of the Western Balkans into the EU. The second period came after the strong impact of the global financial and economic crisis and the renewed emphasis on regional cooperation through the Berlin process. The expectations were that regional economic integration in the Western Balkans would help economic recovery, lead to more integrated regional markets and increase the level of economic development. It was assumed that the liberalisation of movements on the four markets—goods, services, capital and labour—would facilitate strong economic integration, leading to a better functioning of the regional market and improved economic performance of the Western Balkan countries. This should have also strengthened EU conditionality in a context of the weakened supply of EU membership, given that the Union’s earlier offer was in the meantime hampered by rising reluctance of some EU member states to allow the entry of new members. In reality, the results of regional cooperation initiatives in the Western Balkans over the past decade have been disappointing. Despite various

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agreements that have been concluded (e.g. on Regional Roaming or the protocols on Recognition of Academic Qualifications), regional integration initiatives have not led to the fulfilment of many of their initial objectives. After 2009, most Western Balkan countries have gone through deep recessions or have registered much slower economic growth rates in comparison with the pre-crisis years; they have experienced stagnation, or only minor convergence with EU income levels; while a few countries seem to have lost competitiveness (instead of the promoted strengthening) on EU markets. Some countries have been able to increase trade and integration both with the EU and neighbouring countries, but others have been much less successful. At the same time, many political issues have remained unresolved, even after more than thirty years since Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Perhaps only now, with new international pressure put on Serbia and Kosovo to normalise their relations through the new EU (German–French) plan, can regional political cooperation hopefully move forward. Our analysis also suggests that the criterion of regional cooperation, as a general condition by which all countries in the Western Balkans are assessed by the European Commission, ought to be reconsidered. What should be taken into account, on the one hand, is the growing urgency to integrate the whole region into the EU and, on the other, the diversity among the Western Balkan economies. It would also be useful to better distinguish between political and economic objectives pursued through regional cooperation, considering the increased politicisation of economic and trade policy over recent years. Within such a context, the EU enlargement policy ought to provide a better alignment of Western Balkan policies with the common policies of the EU, that in recent years have been increasingly interlinked and of crucial importance for both regions—in the areas of migration, security, energy, climate, transport and the environment. The EU measures of regional cooperation need to be adjusted to this new phase of EU—Western Balkan relations. Regional cooperation ought to be better incorporated into the policy areas that have become of common interest, rather than be promoted as a parallel objective aimed to prepare these countries for their future entry into the EU. Additional measures are also necessary to sustain accelerated economic development of the Western Balkan countries, by providing higher amounts of EU financial assistance and more diversified instruments of support. Since in the current phase, most Western Balkan countries have become strongly integrated primarily

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with the EU economy, while four of the six countries have also started EU accession negotiations, promoting regional cooperation as a goal may have lost part of its initial scope and relevance.

References Anastasakis, Othon and Bojiˇci´c-Dželilovi´c, Vesna (2002). Balkan Regional Cooperation and European Integration. The Hellenic Observatory, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London. Bartlett, Will (2001). Regional co-operation in South-East Europe: Panacea or Dysfunction?, Banka magazine, Zagreb. Bartlett, Will, Bonomi, Matteo and Uvali´c, Milica. Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans: Assessing the Possible Economic, Social and Environmental Impact of the Proposed Flagship Projects. Study requested by the AFET committee, European Parliament, May 2022. https://www.europarl. europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2022)702561. Bartlett, Will and Uvali´c, Milica (2013). The Social Consequences of the Global Economic Crisis in South East Europe. London: London School of Economics, LSEE: Research on South Eastern Europe. Bertelsmann Stiftung—WIIW (2020). Pushing on a String? An Evaluation of Regional Economic Cooperation in the Western Balkans. https://www.bertel smannstiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/Pushing_on_a_string.pdf. Bertelsmann Stiftung—WIIW (2022). The Long Way Round: Lessons from EU-CEE for Improving Integration and Development in the Western Balkans. https://wiiw.ac.at/the-long-way-round-lessons-from-eu-cee-for-imp roving-integration-and-development-in-the-western-balkans-dlp-6194.pdf BiEPAG (B. Ba´ca, B., F. Bieber, M. Bonomi, R. Grieveson, M. Kmezi´c and Z. Nechev) (2023). Through the Labyrinth of Regional Cooperation: How to Make Sense of Regional Integration in the Western Balkans, February. https:/ /biepag.eu/publication/through-the-labyrinth-of-regional-cooperation-howto-make-sense-of-regional-integration-in-the-western-balkans/ Bonomi, Matteo and Milica Uvali´c (2019). Serbia and the European Union, Oxford Research Encyclopedias in Politics. Council of the European Union (1997). Conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 29/30 April, Brussels. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/pressc orner/detail/en/PRES_97_129. Damiani, Mirella and Milica Uvali´c (2018). Structural change in the European Union and its periphery: Current challenges for the Western Balkans. Southeastern Europe, 1, 32. Ðurovi´c, Gordana (ed.) (2022). Regional Economic Cooperation in V4 and WB6: sharing experience and knowledge in the context of common regional market and post-covid recovery. Montenegrin Pan-European Union, Podgorica.

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Estrin, Saul and Uvali´c, Milica (2016). Foreign Direct Investment in the Western Balkans: What role has it played during transition? Comparative Economic Studies, 58, 455–483. European Commission (1999). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Stabilisation and Association process for countries of South-Eastern Europe. Brussels, 26.05.1999, COM (1999) 235 final. European Commission (2018). A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans. COM/2018/65, 6 February 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= CELEX:52018DC0065 European Commission (2022). Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. COM (2022) 528 final. Brussels: European Commission. https://neighbour hood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/2022-communication-eu-enlargement-pol icy_en. Gligorov, Vladimir (1997). Trade in the Balkans. WIIW Monthly Report no. 3, Vienna. Juncker, Jean-Claude (2014). A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission. Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 15 July 2014, p. 11. https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/d/political%20guid elines%20-%20juncker%20commission.pdf. Lavenex, Sandra (2011). Concentric Circles of Flexible ‘European’ Integration: A Typology of EU External Governance Relations. In Comparative European Politics, 9, n. 4–5, pp. 372–393, https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/. Lopandi´c, Duško (2001). Regional Initiatives in South Eastern Europe. Belgrade, European Movement in Serbia. Uvali´c, Milica (2001). Regional Co-operation in Southeast Europe. Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies, 1, n. 1, pp. 64–84. Uvali´c, Milica (2006). Trade in Southeast Europe: recent trends and some policy implications. European Journal of Comparative Economics, 3, n. 2, pp. 171– 195. Uvali´c, Milica (2009). Regionalism in Southeast Europe. In Pompeo Della Posta, Milica Uvali´c and Amy Verdun (eds.) Globalization, Development and Integration: A European Perspective, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 176–194. Uvali´c, Milica (2010). Serbia’s Transition—Towards a Better Future.Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan and New York, St. Martin’s Press. Expanded version in Serbian: (2012). Tranzicija u Srbiji—Ka boljoj budu´cnosti, Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike. Uvali´c, Milica (2021). Industrial Policies in Serbia: Towards Major Reliance on Internal Sources of Growth. Belgrade, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. https://library. fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/belgrad/18411.pdf.

CHAPTER 12

The Foggy Future of the Balkans: In or Out of the European Union? Srd-an Bogosavljevi´c

1

Introduction

European Union (EU) membership is the preferred goal of the Western Balkans, but there is an increasing number of disappointed pro-Europeans and the EU is becoming less relevant in everyday life. The pro-EU mood grows whenever the EU is set as a partner, but also decreases whenever the perception is created that promises have been betrayed or new conditions are imposed. Without the EU, the Western Balkans cannot fix years of economic and other types of backwardness caused by wars, sanctions, or unresolved conflicts.

The views expressed in this paper are the author’s views and are not affiliated with Ipsos, on the basis of whose data the paper was mainly written. S. Bogosavljevi´c (B) University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_12

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These are the starting assumptions of this chapter that analyzes the perceptions of the EU in the Western Balkan countries. In order to better understand the attitude of the region’s population and policymakers towards the EU, it is important to first recall the historical context regarding the break-up of Yugoslavia (Sect. 2). This is followed by a comparative analysis of public opinion polls about the EU in the individual Western Balkan countries (Sect. 3) and a more detailed insight into the case of Serbia as the country where support of the EU has declined most (Sect. 4). The chapter concludes with a few final remarks.

2

Historical Context

The context in which Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) ceased to exist in the 1990s plays an important role in the behavior of the countries of the Western Balkans, and especially in Serbia’s relations with the EU, as well as in the policies of the EU towards the countries of the Western Balkans. Yugoslavia formally existed as a state entity with that name until 2003, when it changed its name into Union of Serbia and Montenegro which reflected the factual situation—while Montenegro acted independently even from that Yugoslavia, whose full name was the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), as well as from “Union of Serbia and Montenegro” as a state entity. The disintegration process of SFRY was thus completed.1 While the end of the process was easy to recognize, it is very difficult to determine the beginning. For some, it is the attitude of Titoist Yugoslavia towards the two great upheavals provoked by the Croatian MASPOK (Mass Movement) in 1971,2 and by the Serbian liberal movement in 1972. Both movements were created within and/or with the support of the official leadership of the communist organizations in those Republics, and both were very efficiently suppressed—the first one by having its leaders punished, and the second one by conducting mass purges not only of the political but also of the economic elite (Laki´cevi´c 2011) in 1 Although the question of Kosovo status remains unresolved, the disintegration of Yugoslavia ends there; achieving full independence of Kosovo would be a new process that could be called the disintegration of Serbia. 2 See the entry “Croatian Spring” in Hrvatska Enciklopedija (Croatian Encyclopedia), online edition (2021).

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Serbia. Decisions on the balance of payments positions of the Republics set by the 1974 Constitution,3 which provided the economic basis for the independence of the Republics, are also often mentioned. These decisions were used in 1990 for incursions into the country’s monetary system, which culminated in Serbia’s “loan”4 of 18.2 billion dinars. That was the end of the SFRY single economic area, which was formalized by the introduction of the Slovenian currency (tolar—on 8 October 1991) and the Croatian currency (Croatian Dinar—on 23 December 1991). Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia officially declared their independence from the SFRY in the summer of 1991, and Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence in 1992. The independence consolidation process for Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina ended with the Dayton Agreement in 1995. Montenegro declared its independence after its referendum in 2006. Finally, as an autonomous province within Serbia, Kosovo also declared its independence in 2008, but it remains a special case because its independence has not been accepted by many countries, including five EU member states. Kosovo is still not a member of the UN. The complicated situation became even more complex after the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against FR Yugoslavia, which ended with a “military-technical agreement in Kumanovo” under which NATO in fact does not recognize its victory, and from which UNSC Resolution 1244 emerged, keeping a kind of sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo. After 2008, there was a mass recognition of Kosovo as a state. However, only a bit over 50% of all countries in the world, led by the United States and most of the EU, have recognized Kosovo’s independence so far. In fact, the last country to emerge from the former Yugoslav Republics was Serbia, not because the idea of Serbia’s independence was gaining ground, but simply as a result of the process of achieving independence (“liberation”) of the other Republics—Serbia was the country that was left over (Table 1).

3 The Constitution of Serbia from 1989 is also mentioned as the date that rounded off the assumptions for the disintegration of SFRY (https://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raspad_ SFR_Jugoslavije). 4 Since there were National Banks and Ministries of Finance of the Republics and Provinces, each entity could create money and transfer the cost to the others through inflation.

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The SFRY disintegration process happened through a series of ethnic wars, namely through the following war conflicts:5 ,6 • • • • • •

War conflict in Slovenia (27 June—6 July 1991); War conflict in Croatia (1991–1995); War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995); Bosniak-Croat conflict (1992–1994); Kosovo war (1998–1999); and Conflict in Macedonia (2001).

These conflicts can be identified with eight pairs of ethnic clashes (Bogosavljevi´c 2018): The conflicts were accompanied by numerous deaths and displaced persons. The number of victims has not been officially determined, but according to estimates it was certainly over one hundred and twenty thousand.9 According to an experiment done before the war started, based Table 1

Ethnic clashes in the region of former Yugoslavia Serbs Croats Bosniaks Albanians Montenegrins7

Serbs Croats Bosniaks Albanians Montenegrins Slovenians N. Macedonians

X X X X

X X

X

Slovenians8 N. Macedonians X

X

X X X

X X

5 In Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Yugoslav People’s Army was treated as if it was fighting on behalf of Serbia and the Serbs, and not as protecting the SFRY constitutional order. 6 The term “war conflict” is used to denote larger-scale conflicts with the use of serious military war techniques, although wars were not formally declared. 7 Primarily on the Dubrovnik battlefield. 8 The conflict in Slovenia was between the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and the

Slovenian Territorial Defense. 9 E.g., the Humanitarian Law Fund states that at least 130,000 people lost their lives in the former Yugoslav region in the 1990s.

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on an ideal mathematical and statistical boundaries of separation in the case of ethnical division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, over one million and two hundred thousand would remain as misclassified. At the end of the war, more than three million people left their permanent places of residence, while some sources claim even up to 4 million (Bogosavljevi´c 1991). The dramatic picture is completed by the fact that the war conflict took place along the borders of the greatest ethnic mixing (Bogosavljevi´c 1992), primarily in the urban areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, parts of Croatia traditionally inhabited by Serbs, and in Vojvodina in Serbia, precisely the areas with the highest concentration of mixed marriages. In SFRY in 1991, there were over 700,000 mixed marriages.10 The disintegration of Yugoslavia was experienced differently within the Yugoslav federation (Bubonji´c and Vujatovi´c 2021). Most of the Republics, namely the majority of ethnic groups in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina,11 identified disintegration with liberation (from Serbia, Serbs, communism, etc.). Aggression is often mentioned—ranging from the aggression by the JNA (Yugoslav Army) and the aggression by Serbia, to e.g., “Serbian-Chetnik” aggression against those Republics, which is also a response to the accusations that those were separatist movements of these Republics aimed at violently overthrowing the constitutional order of SFRY. This is somewhat less pronounced in the case of Macedonia and Montenegro. In contrast, Serbia insisted on the overthrow of the constitutional order and the threatened position of Serbs, especially in Croatia and Bosnia (and in Kosovo, but in a different context).12 The entire rhetoric concerning the relations in the region got mixed up with the memories of unsettled scores from the past.13 To understand the misunderstanding of the roles in the war-driven ending of Yugoslavia, we should recall the fact that significant ethnocentric migrations had been recorded in Yugoslavia since 1961. The 1991

10 Census 1991, Republican Institute of Statistics (database), 1993. 11 It is similar with Kosovo, but that process is not complete and communism is rarely

mentioned—everything comes down to Serbia and Serbs. 12 Based on a series of public opinion surveys by Ipsos on the attitude towards the EU and the disintegration of SFRY, from 2000 to 2010. 13 Especially the attitude within the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) towards the Serbs in the past (in Serbia), and the strive for independence from Yugoslavia which turned into achieving independence from Serbia and/or communism (in Croatia and in Kosovo).

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census in Serbia registered almost half a million citizens born in Kosovo, and almost half a million born in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, having permanent residence in Serbia. The first half a million citizens originating from Kosovo were selling their properties for many years (at prices above the market prices) and moving to central Serbia with their entire families, leaving behind only emotions in Kosovo. The other half a million citizens coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina and partly from Croatia emmigrated to Serbia mostly to study, and their education level is significantly higher not only than the education level of those originating from Kosovo but also compared to the average education level of the population in Serbia. Their relationship to their homeland is not only emotional, but they also have clear interests (property, relatives, etc.), and the influence they have in the Serbian society due to their education and the careers they built is not negligible. However, both groups were witnesses to the suffering of Serbs in the wars in the former SFRY territory, while the crimes committed in the name of Serbs or Serbian interests are not mentioned, primarily because these groups do not have enough information about those crimes. The situation with the other ethnic groups is similar, as there are much more persons who are well informed about the suffering of their own people, but with very little or no knowledge of the crimes committed on behalf of their ethnic group. It is in such conditions that public opinion is formed, guided not only by interests and facts but also by a series of misconceptions. When it comes to the territory of Kosovo, it should be recalled that the period after 1958 was particularly significant for the current circumstances, when the municipalities of Lešak, Leposavi´c, and Zubin Potok14 became part of Kosovo.15 Kosovo and Metohija finally obtained the status of an autonomous province (within Serbia) in 1966.16 Of course, if the time horizon is pushed a little further back into the past, it shows a series of ethnically motivated conflicts between Serbs and Albanians, as well as centuries-long problems in their relations, resulting, among other 14 All added municipalities were ethnic Serbian municipalities. 15 Until then, the term “Kosovo and Metohija” or Kosmet was used, and it remained

so until 1966. 16 The autonomous region of Kosmet was established in 1963. At the end of 1968, Metohija was omitted from the name, and the 1974 Constitution gave Kosovo the status of a federal unit that is at the same time part of Serbia; see “History of Kosovo”. https:/ /sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historija_Kosova.

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things, in a negligible number of mixed marriages (according to the 1991 SFRY Census), even though Serbs and Albanians shared the same territory.17 Historical tensions of similar proportions also exist in the relations between Serbs and Croats, but in this case the two peoples practically speak the same language (with significant regional differences, but practically without any ethnic differences among the population from the same area). Therefore, the number of not only mixed marriages, but also of all other relations, whether private or business ones, was huge.18 In parallel with the tragic disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Berlin Wall fell, symbolically destroying the Eastern-Western Bloc division and creating a united Europe. For the countries of the former Yugoslavia, which was in many ways closer to the Western civilization than to Russia, the momentum was lost. Subsequently, and with a delay vis-à-vis their readiness before 1990, Slovenia (in 2004) and Croatia (in 2013) became members of the EU.19

3 The EU and the Balkans – Parallel Desire for Membership and Mistrust20 For the Western Balkan countries, the EU is the goal without exception, and there is a high degree of referendum commitment to it. However, in the eastern part of the Western Balkan countries, there is a split between the “EU” referendum preference and the EU’s approval rate (based on

17 The number of Serbs in Kosovo decreased from over 50% of the total population to currently slightly below 10%, according to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS) estimates, given that the population census in Kosovo was boycotted to a greater or lesser extent. 18 There were tensions with other ethnic couples in conflict as well, but on a smaller scale and having shallower roots than the Serbian-Croatian and Serbian-Albanian relations. 19 From the region, Romania and Bulgaria also became members (in 2007), but after 2013 no country has become an EU member state. 20 Hereafter, data are used which the company Strategic Marketing, i.e., Ipsos Strategic Marketing since 2009, collected in a series of surveys, most often based on the data of the Monthly Political Omnibus, which has been done every month since 1998 on a random representative sample of 1,000 + respondents, with a marginal sample error of ± 3.3 (with a calculated design effect of 1.2 to 1.3). In addition to Serbia, Ipsos Strategic Marketing conducts Omnibus surveys in Montenegro, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania (but with occasional interruptions and with a later start compared to Serbia).

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the data for Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia).21 The public opinion of Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Albania is always “FOR the EU”, to a greater or lesser extent. All countries that emerged from the former Yugoslavia experienced an economic collapse, most of them presented the process of disintegration as liberation, and Serbia and Serbs mostly saw it as a betrayal by others. The result of these processes is a serious loss of momentum for joining the EU (except for Slovenia and to some extent Croatia). Although this process began in various forms, from the initial enthusiasm it came to a phase of expressed skepticism, which can be easily seen by comparing the data on the referendum mood for the EU with the data on the approval rate for the EU, or the expectations when the country will join the EU, which was for the majority “immediately” or “in the next 5 years” at the beginning of the 2000s, while in 2022 the majority responded with “never” or “in twenty years”. In that context, Serbia is no exception, but it is an outlier with the most pronounced differences in these two parameters. It is very easy to notice the fact that public opinion is largely event-driven—there is a more positive attitude to the EU when relations with the EU are closer to partnership, and there is distancing from the EU when they feel a new condition is being imposed or if their expectations have not been fulfilled. Based on the data obtained by BiEPAG (2020, 2021) (field research by Ipsos), when asked a question formulated using a slightly milder wording than e.g., “Would you vote FOR joining the EU?”, the support for joining the EU is high in the entire region—82.5% out of the total adult population. Here, Serbia stands out the most, with the majority population for the EU, but when you look only at those whose voting preference is YES or NO, then the majority is NO, and with a movement in time that is extremely “event-driven”. However, in all the countries in the eastern part of the Western Balkans,22 sooner or later, there is a divergence between the referendum preference “FOR the EU” and the approval rating for the EU. Along with Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia also have significant differences in the number of those supporting EU

21 Fully consistent data series for Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Kosovo were obtained from the Ipsos Monthly Political Omnibus, while for Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina such data series were not available on this occasion. 22 East of the Drina—the area of the former Yugoslavia and Albania.

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membership, i.e., who would vote for the EU in a referendum, and those who give a positive approval rating of the EU. Montenegro’s voting preference is FOR when it comes to supporting membership or “YES” at a referendum, which has been growing throughout 2020—a time of very fierce political campaigns and daily protests motivated by the conflict between the government led by Milo Ðukanovi´c’s DPS party and the Serbian Orthodox Church which was supported by the opposition, especially the pro-Serbian opposition, but also a large part of Montenegrins who declare themselves as followers of the Serbian Orthodox Church and speak Serbian. After the elections on 30 August 2020, which brought a change in the several-decades-long government led by Milo Ðukanovi´c, the coalition that led to the fall of the government failed to organise itself into a functional Government throughout 2021 and 2022 (up until the moment of writing this text) (Fig. 1). Along with the difficulties in forming and maintaining the government, very frequent news about the interference of other countries in the politics of Montenegro, along with the fight against the pandemic without having any serious support, resulted in the divergence of these two pro-European indicators in 2020, and a new pattern was created that began to resemble the pattern in Serbia: namely, that a far smaller number of citizens have a positive opinion about the EU than the number of those who are for joining the EU. North Macedonia has an even more significant difference between the positive ratings and the desire to join the EU,23 where the opinion is widespread that the government of North Macedonia has done everything that its partners from the EU requested, without receiving any concessions. The population of North Macedonia has been disappointed in the EU on several occasions, mainly due to the expectations created by the rhetoric of the Macedonian and the EU political officials. The turnout in the 2018 Referendum24 which was 37%, did not meet the constitutionally required threshold of 50% and this was already an indication that 23 Ipsos Monthly Political Omnibus – N. Macedonia. 24 The referendum was held on 30 September 2018, without the simple majority voting

in favor which is required by the Constitution, but it was recognized as valid both in Macedonia and in the world. The referendum resulted in changing the state name into

25 Ipsos Monthly Political Omnibus - Montenegro.

© 2022 Ipsos

Election August 2020 Change of government Difficulties in functioning of the government

Positive attitude towards the EU

Support in the referendum

Fig. 1 The evolution of attitudes towards the EU in Montenegro25

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

MONTENEGRO

Nov 2013 Jan 2014 Mar 2014 May 2014 Jul 2014 Sep 2014 Nov 2014 Jan 2015 Mar 2015 May 2015 Jul 2015 Sep 2015 Nov 2015 Jan 2016 Mar 2016 May 2016 Jul 2016 Sep 2016 Nov 2016 Jan 2017 Mar 2017 May 2017 Jul 2017 Sep 2017 Nov 2017 Jan 2018 Mar 2018 May 2018 Jul 2018 Sep 2018 Nov 2018 Jan 2019 Mar 2019 May 2019 Jul 2019 Sep 2019 Nov 2019 Jan 2020 Mar 2020 May 2020 Jul 2020 Sep 2020 Nov 2020 Jan 2021 Mar 2021 May 2021 Jul 2021 Sep 2021 Nov 2021 Apr 2022 Jun 2022 Aug 2022

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the population of Macedonia at the time was not satisfied even with the referendum question: “Would you support the European Union and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?”. The majority of citizens supported only the first part of the question. The citizens have not seen any steps towards the realisation of the first part of this question yet, only the name of the country was changed, so although they still support joining the EU, the gap between the approval rating for the EU and EU support in the referendum continues to grow (Fig. 2). Kosovo and Albania are on the opposite side compared to Serbia, with an unreserved preference for the EU—over 90% support for joining the EU and a minimum number of strong opponents (BiEPAG 2020). Oscillations in the referendum preference in Albania are very small. A definite and probable FOR in the referendum asked monthly, e.g., from September 2017 to September 2019, varies by only ten index points.26 There are even fewer oscillations in Kosovo, less than 5 percentage points.27 However, there has been a drop in positive ratings for the EU in Kosovo since February 2021, signaling the beginning of disappointment, although enthusiasm about joining the EU has not decreased. Kosovo expressed a high referendum preference for the EU (as is the case in Albania), which varies very little and has long been at a high level. However, positive attitudes towards the EU are consistently becoming weaker—and this loss is easily linked to the events that Kosovo citizens perceive as unfulfilled expectations, in particular expectations regarding the EU’s absolute support to their approach to normalization of relations with Serbia, but also related to daily life, visa-free regime, work-related rights for Kosovars in the EU, investments, economy, co-operation (Fig. 3). Serbia is an outlier in this group of countries according to most parameters of the relationship with the EU, even though it is also dominated by

North Macedonia; but after the referendum, there were no significant steps taken towards the EU. 26 Ipsos Monthly Political Omnibus - Albania. 27 Ipsos Monthly Political Omnibus - Kosovo.

© 2022 Ipsos

Positive attitude towards the EU

May 2019

Mar 2019

Feb 2019

Jan 2019

Dec 2018

Aug 2018

Jul 2018

Jun 2018

28 Ipsos Monthly Political Omnibus - N. Macedonia.

Fig. 2 The evolution of attitudes towards the EU in North Macedonia28

40

50

60

70

80

Support in the referendum

Sep 2018

90

Oct 2018

100

May 2018

NORTH MACEDONIA

Nov 2018

48

74

272 ´ S. BOGOSAVLJEVIC

Dec 2019

Nov 2019 Oct 2019

Sep 2019 Aug 2019

Jul 2019 Jun 2019

© 2022 Ipsos

Positive attitude towards the EU

Support in the referendum

Fig. 3 The evolution of attitudes towards the EU in Kosovo

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

KOSOVO

Jan 2020 Feb 2020 Mar 2020 Apr 2020 May 2020 Jun 2020 Jul 2020 Aug 2020 Sep 2020 Oct 2020 N ov 2020 Dec 2020 Feb 2021 Mar 2021 Apr 2021 May 2021 Jun 2021 Jul 2021 Aug 2021 Sep 2021 Oct 2021 N ov 2021 Dec 2021

90

54

Jan 2022

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THE FOGGY FUTURE OF THE BALKANS: IN OR OUT …

273

274

´ S. BOGOSAVLJEVIC

similar tendencies and the recently expressed referendum preference for the EU (Fig. 4). Public opinion about the EU in a large part of the Western Balkans (the territories of Montenegro, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia) is characterized by a significant change in the belief that the EU can be reached quickly, and that margin is moving from “immediately” from twenty years ago, to “never” today. According to the BiEPAG survey findings, there is optimism only in Montenegro and Kosovo, where the largest number of citizens expect to join the EU in the next 5 years; in Albania, the expectations are to join in the next 10 years, while in North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia the predominant response is “in 20 years” or “never”. In this regard, a decline in optimism is particularly noticeable in Serbia when it comes to the question “Do you think the EU accession will happen over the next 5/10/20 years or never?” (BiEPAG, Dec. 2020). This has led to a new paradigm in understanding the future of the Western Balkans in Europe, which could be described by the following quotes:29 • “We want to join the EU if anyone ever asks us, but no one offers us anything, no one asks us anything, although the EU is at least talked about, and we know that geographically, economically, and historically we are Europe and we are tied to Europe”;30 • “Personally, we do not really believe that it will happen, and certainly not soon”;31 • “I do not really understand what the EU brings me, do I personally benefit from it… but no alternative is offered to me either…”.32 This kind of attitude, seen in all polls in the Western Balkans, shows that the region has gone down the path from having unrealistically high expectations to unrealistically low expectations. In those attitudes, the EU has

29 The quotes are taken from a series of focus groups conducted during 2022 by Ipsos Strategic Marketing. 30 Qualitative surveys by Ipsos in the period from 2018 to 2022 in the entire region. 31 Quantitative survey by Ipsos in the period from 2000 to 2022 (Ipsos Monthly

Political Omnibus - Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo). 32 Qualitative research by Ipsos in the period from 2018 to 2022.

ition

21

35

THE FOGGY FUTURE OF THE BALKANS: IN OR OUT …

33 Ipsos Monthly Political Omnibus – Serbia.

© 2022 Ipsos

Kosovo is not perce ived as co nd

Positive attitude towards the EU

Support in the referendum

Fig. 4 The evolution of attitudes towards the EU in Serbia33

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

SERBIA

Jun 2002 Mar 2003 Aug 2005 Nov 2005 Feb 2006 May 2006 Sep 2006 Dec 2006 May 2007 Aug 2007 Nov 2007 May 2008 Aug 2008 Nov 2008 Feb 2009 May 2009 Aug 2009 Nov 2009 Feb 2010 May 2010 Aug 2010 Nov 2010 Feb 2011 May 2011 Aug 2011 Nov 2011 Feb 2012 May 2012 Aug 2012 Nov 2012 Feb 2013 May 2013 Aug 2013 Nov 2013 Feb 2014 May 2014 Aug 2014 Nov 2014 Feb 2015 May 2015 Aug 2015 Nov 2015 Feb 2016 May 2016 Aug 2016 Nov 2016 Mar 2017 Jun 2017 Sep 2017 Jan 2018 Apr 2018 Jul 2018 Oct 2018 Jan 2019 Apr 2019 Jul 2019 Oct 2019 Jan 2020 Apr 2020 Jul 2020 Oct 2020 Jan 2021 Apr 2021 Jul 2021 Oct 2021 Jan 2022 Apr 2022 Jul 2022

12

275

276

´ S. BOGOSAVLJEVIC

evolved from a means for solving all problems to an irrelevant institution for the current problems in the region. This sense of EU irrelevance is further reinforced by the pessimistic statements of local officials and often by commanding and blackmailing statements of the EU officials, especially given by those who are not directly responsible for the relationship between the Balkans and the EU, and even more so by all kinds of media. It is not hot news that the majority of Serbian citizens do not have a positive opinion about the EU, although they are largely FOR EU membership. Such a mood has been prevailing for years, unrelated to the media discourse that is often provided as an explanation for the negative sentiment towards the Union. Despite this negative sentiment, a large number of Serbian citizens approached European integration rationally, so there was constantly about 20%, i.e., about a million citizens of Serbia, who would vote affirmatively in a possible referendum, regardless of the fact that they personally do not have a very positive attitude towards the EU. When we add to those rational citizens also people who had a positive sentiment and support Serbia’s European integration, there was always a larger number of citizens who would vote for the accession of Serbia to the EU in a referendum. Therefore, support for integration into the EU does not only have an emotional component, but the rational component is equally or even more pronounced. However, the period with a two-thirds majority of support in the general population ended at the moment when the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state appeared for the first time as a precondition for Serbia’s entry into the EU. Consequently, in 2010 and 2011, the number of people opposing European integration doubled in Serbia, and in the following years, the growth trends of support for European integration would be interrupted by the announcements of new conditions being imposed, whether coming from our own or from the European politicians, or even from those having nothing to do with European integration of Serbia. After the decline in support during the first few months of 2014, despite the oscillations, there was a positive trend until the declaration of the pandemic in March 2020. Thereafter, a new sudden decline was recorded, and there was almost an equal number of people for and against Serbia joining the EU. The decline can be interpreted differently from this point in time, but it is certain that at that moment of general fear and uncertainty, the EU did not meet the expectations of the Serbian citizens. Following the first few months of the pandemic, the supporting

12

THE FOGGY FUTURE OF THE BALKANS: IN OR OUT …

277

trend was recovering along with the already usual oscillations caused by the daily political events, until the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. As of March 2022, for the first time since Ipsos has been monitoring trends related to European integration,34 data show that a greater number of Serbian citizens would not vote for EU accession in a possible referendum, compared to those in support of EU integration. At that moment, a sharp increase is noticeable in the number of opponents of the EU in a possible referendum on joining the EU, followed by a slight decline in the number of people supporting EU integration. The following months brought a continuation of those tendencies, with an even sharper decline in the number of people supporting European integration. In June 2022, there were 34.9% of citizens in Serbia who would support Serbia joining the EU in a referendum, while 43.8% would vote against it. This change can be unequivocally linked to the war in Ukraine. As much as Serbia was successful in balancing its international policy in the previous years, the circumstances have changed and the daily pressures for Serbia to choose between Russia and the EU do not favor the pro-EU mood in Serbia. Admittedly, in the period from 2000 to 2010/11, when it was not communicated to the public whether the independence of Kosovo was by default a precondition for joining the EU, the pro-EU referendum FOR dropped by twenty percentage points if the question was formulated with that precondition included. Even more pronounced is the negative response when asked explicitly whether they would be ready to vote for the independence of Kosovo if it would speed up EU integration and would mean the economic improvement of Serbia.

4

Public Opinion in Serbia

It is of interest to report further evidence on public opinion in Serbia, as the country where support for the EU has declined most. Recalling the historical context is again highly relevant for understanding the attitudes of the Serbian population. As mentioned earlier, in the public opinion of Serbia, the disintegration of SFRY was experienced as a loss, injustice, or betrayal—which can 34 Ipsos Monthly Political Omnibus in Serbia has been monitoring the pro-EU mood since 2001.

278

´ S. BOGOSAVLJEVIC

be seen from the direct answers, but also from the negligence towards one’s own identity symbols. In 2022, 16 years after the creation of Serbia under its current name, solely because the other Republics left SFRY one by one, and then left FR Yugoslavia,35 a large number of Serbia’s citizens do not know the order of colors on the flag, their country’s Statehood Day, the appearance of the Coat of Arms, or the lyrics of the anthem (Table 2). In contrast, a lot of enthusiasm was generated after the political changes in FR Yugoslavia in October 2000. Along with a series of optimistic expectations, hope (that turned out an illusion as well) was created that Serbia would be accepted as a member of the EU very quickly. That illusion was increased by very optimistic statements of the local officials, but also by a number of EU politicians (Table 2 and 3).

Table 2

Percentage of the population of Serbia36 who knows

The order of colours on the flag Statehood Day Anthem

Table 3

2008

2009

2022

5% 12% N/A

43% Na 28%

49% 56% 69%

Expected period until Serbia enters the EU

SERBIA up to 5 years up to 10 years up to 20 years 20 + Never Don‘t know

September 2006

March 2015

November 2016

April 2022

34 25 20 21 – –

31 26 14

20 26 12

14 15

32 10

13 17 8 7 43 12

35 FR Yugoslavia consisted of Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegro declared its independence after the referendum of 21 May 2006, with 55.5% of votes in favor of independence; the requirement was a minimum of 55% of those who voted out of the number of registered voters, and the turnout was 86.3%. 36 Ipsos Monthly Political Omnibus - Serbia: 2008, 2009, 2022.

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THE FOGGY FUTURE OF THE BALKANS: IN OR OUT …

279

During the first years after the regime change in 2000, a great majority of citizens expected a very quick entry into the EU (in 5, maximum 10 years). At the same time, a large increase in standards, a liberal visa regime, and several other tangible benefits for citizens were expected.37 Poor communication about the conditions, along with the otherwise not very clear conditions and prospects for Serbia’s accession to the EU specifically led to a decline in enthusiasm for the EU. The terminological confusion initiated with the term “negotiations” regarding the Chapters to be harmonized with the EU, which was more understood as bargaining instead of talking about adjusting the procedures, had a particularly bad result by translating the vaguely set and communicated conditions into a very negatively perceived “conditioning” by adding more and more new conditions. The public opinion data confirm this (see Fig. 5). The belief that neither negotiations are being conducted nor that Serbia is adapting to the EU, but that the Union is imposing more SERBIA: EU CONDITIONING The EU will set new conditions The EU will not set any new conditions Don't know

72

86 72

72

21

23

8

6

67 62 57

54

35 28 22 6 Nov 2011

29 23

10

10

Apr 2012

Apr 2013

14

Feb 2014

11

Oct 2015

Jan 2016

Nov 2016

9 5 Mar 2022 March 2022

© 2022 Ipsos

Fig. 5 Serbia: EU conditioning

37 Strategic Marketing survey for the European Commission and the Office for Cooperation with the EU in the period 2001–2010.

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´ S. BOGOSAVLJEVIC

Table 4

Is the EU imposing more and more new conditions on Serbia? Gender

Age

Total Male Female 18– 29 YES 86 NO 5 DK 9

88 6 7

84 4 12

81 3 16

Education 30– 39

40– 49

50– 65

66 Elementary Middle University + and lower

89 4 7

89 3 8

88 5 7

80 9 11

78 7 15

88 5 7

88 5 8

and more new conditions is deeply rooted in the perception of Serbian citizens—both those who are for and against EU membership. Demographics also demonstrate the uniformity of that perception, with the minimum exception of the most uneducated population (see Table 4). There are practically no socio-demographic differences among the Serbian population in the answer to the question of whether they expect new conditions for Serbia from the EU. The first associations when the EU is mentioned have changed dramatically in Serbia. In the early 2000s, they were mostly positive, related to higher personal standards, higher standards of health and education, the rule of law, freedom of movement, employment opportunities, etc. Twenty years later, indifference is predominant, as well as negative associations to the EU, to a greater extent. An alarming indicator of that indifference towards the EU is the large percentage of those who say “Don’t know” (27.4%), in addition to 1.2% that declared “Nothing”. There was a small percentage of positive associations, recognized as a group of attitudes, a total of 26,8% cases, against 25,8% of negative associations, along with 18,8% of very different associations which cannot be grouped (though more negative than positive associations). In a survey conducted in September 2006,38 when asked the same question, only 22% of citizens had negative associations and 10% had no association, while “better standards”, “freedom of movement and travel”, “security” were predominant responses (Fig. 6).

38 European orientation of citizens of Serbia, Strategic Marketing, 2006.

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THE FOGGY FUTURE OF THE BALKANS: IN OR OUT …

10.2

Negative associations (evil, thieves, lies, enemies...) Progress/ we should be part of the EU/ a better place/ access to funds/ economic development

7.8 POSITIVE (26.8%)

7.4

Better standard of living/ higher wages/ better life

NEGATIVE (25.8%)

6.4

Freedom of movement/ travel/ open borders

Domination of the stronger/ interference in politics/ less freedom/ control in all fields

OTHER (18.8)

5.7 5.4

Bombing/ NATO/ war

5.2

Orderliness/ rule of law/ stability/ democracy/ culture They are blackmailing us/ looking only at their own interest/ unequal relationship/ blackmailing regarding Kosovo

4.5 18.8

Other Nothing

281

1.2

27.4

Dont know

Fig. 6 First association in Serbia when the EU is mentioned

In addition to the fact that Serbian citizens have lost their confidence that the EU can (or will) bring a better life to them personally, the EU has also lost its relevance when talking about security (see Fig. 7).

EU AND SERBIA'S SECURITY Question: What is the best way for Serbia to protect itself and its interests?

Don't know 10% Joining NATO 1%

Dec 2000 To join EU

48

53

Cooperation with everyone, when it suits us, but without joining any alliance 52%

Joining the EU 13%

57

24 13

Dec 2000

Oct 2001

Dec 2003

Apr 2016

Cooperation with Russia 24%

Mar 2022

March 2022 © 2022 Ipsos

Fig. 7 EU and Serbia’s security

282

´ S. BOGOSAVLJEVIC

In less than twenty years, the EU has gone from being the main security umbrella for almost two-thirds of Serbian citizens, to being that to only one out of eight citizens. Lack of understanding and misunderstandings about Kosovo, Serbia, and the EU are a big problem in looking at the EU future of Serbia— both by the political elites (practically all those who have any significant percentage of support) and by the citizens. Although there is no feasible algorithm39 for Serbia to recognize Kosovo, this topic is constantly present in the statements of the EU officials. Even though there is awareness in the public opinion, to a significant extent, that Serbia has no influence in Kosovo, whenever that topic was investigated there was always a big difference in the expected outcome compared to the desired one: a significant number of people, over 30%, assess that “Kosovo is lost”, but a negligible number see it as a desirable outcome—on the contrary, the majority wants some kind of autonomy for Kosovo. One of the slogans that has long been remembered as desirable for Kosovo is “more than autonomy, less than independence”.40 When it comes to conditioning, the most often mentioned condition was the one regarding Kosovo. However, even when it was not pointed out so often, one-third of the adult citizens of Serbia believed that the accession negotiations should not be continued if conditioned on Kosovo recognition. After a series of messages were sent by very differently positioned politicians and analysts and formulated in different ways, it became obvious that Kosovo’s independence is a condition for Serbia’s EU accession. Certainly, the declaration of Kosovo’s independence at the beginning of 2008 and the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010 brought the topic back into focus. In the period after that, the number of people saying that Kosovo’s independence is an unacceptable condition for joining the EU was growing, and in March 2022 it reached almost half of the citizens of Serbia (Fig. 8). 39 The Constitution of Serbia includes Kosovo in the definition of the territory, and Resolution 1244 of the UNSC Serbia states that Kosovo was not lost in the war/ intervention of NATO forces in Kosovo in 1999. It is necessary to amend the Constitution in the part related to the definition of the territory, and in a new referendum (or in parallel), citizens of Serbia should be asked to declare themselves if the political decision on changing the status of Kosovo should be approved—and all this without any guarantees or advantages for Serbia, and with a very negative attitude towards this by a significant part of Serbian citizens. 40 Slogan of Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and Vojislav Koštunica.

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KOSOVO: RELEVANCE OF EU Question: Should Serbia continue with the European integration process even if the condition for recognizing Kosovo as an independent state is set? YES, without any restrictions 11%

DK 12% DK 22% YES 46% NO 32%

© 2022 Ipsos

February 2008

NO 49%

YES, only if there is full autonomy and protection for Serbs in Kosovo 28%

March 2022

Fig. 8 Kosovo: relevance of EU

An interesting finding is that in the voting preferences of citizens, when they decide for which party to vote, the EU does not play an important role. According to the Ipsos post-election survey41 from March 2022, which was conducted before the effects of the Ukrainian crisis, most citizens were in favor of the EU (46% FOR versus 41% AGAINST). However, as in all surveys over the last ten years, the parties do not clearly articulate their position towards the EU or Russia either—therefore, all parties have voters who are both FOR and AGAINST the EU. The ruling SNS party, the party with by far the highest rating, has half of all proEU voters,42 while the explicitly pro-EU electoral lists43 contributed with only 6 percentage points, due to their overall low rating. Even the clearly anti-EU parties have voters who would vote for the EU, and none of the lists that entered the Parliament in 2022 have homogeneous voters in that

41 Ipsos Monthly Political Omnibus – June 2022. 42 23 percentage points out of a total of 46% of those who would vote for the EU in

the referendum. 43 Political party “Moramo” (“We Must)” and the party “Ujedinjeni za pobedu Srbije” (“United for the Victory of Serbia”).

284

´ S. BOGOSAVLJEVIC

regard, which is just an additional testimony of the loss of importance of this topic (see Fig. 9). After the Ukrainian crisis, there was a decline in support for the EU, but there was no change in the structure when looking at the party preferences. There is not a single electoral list that entered the Parliament (without being a minority) in which the electorate is unanimously voting about the EU, which is a new piece of evidence that the EU is not a topic dividing the population of Serbia at the moment. In addition to the fact that the long-term process of joining the EU is not yielding any tangible results, and the crises shaking the EU (from Brexit and the disunity at the beginning of the fight against the COVID19 pandemic, to the reactions and (non) coping with the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis), internal political circumstances in Serbia play quite an important role.44 There are clear signals when the pro-EU sentiment is increasing and when it is decreasing, depending on the attitude and EU INTEGRATION – REFERENDUM SUPPORT Question: If a referendum about our country’s EU integration was held next week, how would you vote? I would vote in favor of EU integration Jul 2022 Total Mar 2022 Total Jul 2022 vote Jul 2022 I would definitely Total Mar 2022 vote Mar 2022 I would definitely

…Party/coalitions in Parliament

I would definitely vote

© 2022 Ipsos

Mar 2022

48 41

46 48

37

40

46

Jul 2022 Mar 2022

Jul 2022 Ujedinjeni za pobedu Srbije Mar 2022 Ujedinjeni za pobedu Srbije Jul 2022 Ujedinjeni za pobedu Srbije Jul 2022 Moramo Mar 2022 Mar 2022 Moramo Jul 2022 Moramo Jul 2022 SNS lista Mar 2022 Mar 2022 SNS lista Jul 2022 SNS lista Jul 2022 Zavetnici Mar 2022 Mar 2022 Zavetnici Jul 2022 Zavetnici Jul 2022 2022 SPS Mar Mar 2022 SPS Jul 2022 SPS Jul 2022 Nada za Srbiju Mar 2022 Mar 2022 Nada za Srbiju Jul 2022 Nada za Srbiju Mar 2022 blok Jul 2022 Dveri - POKS - Patriotski Jul 2022 2022 Dveri - POKS Dveri -Mar POKS - Patriotski blok - Patriotski blok Mar 2022Other Jul 2022 2022Other MarJul 2022 Other MarUndecided 2022 Jul 2022 Jul 2022 Mar 2022 Undecided Undecided 2022 JulMar 2022 Refusal Jul 2022 Mar 2022 Refusal Refusal Mar 2022 Jul 2022 Wouldn’t vote Jul 2022 Wouldn’t voteMar 2022 Wouldn’t vote

I would vote against EU integration

35

21 24 26 25

74 66 69 75 45

34

34

49 66

26 72

17 20

58 61

25 68

17 90

10 10

72 74

26

59

34 32

64 59

21

42 47 50 45

38 24 32 30 56

23

Fig. 9 EU integration—Referendum support (March 2022)

44 For example, the events regarding the procurement of vaccines during the pandemic, or energy sources in the midst of the crisis due to the shortage and increase in the price of energy due to the Ukrainian crisis, along with the definitely unavoidable problem of Kosovo.

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285

measures provided by the EU and the communication between Serbia and the EU. It ought to be recalled that the Serbian public entered a multi-party democratic order by having gone through times of serious turbulences on various occasions. The entire thirty-year-long multi-party parliamentarianism has been accompanied by great oscillations in the party preferences of citizens and the creation and disappearance of parties: they either disbanded, as the G17 party which was the most popular party at one point in time; or they were completely marginalized, as the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) which were strong parties in the last decade of the last century; or they were greatly reduced in size, as the extremely popular Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) in the 1990s and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) in the early 2000s; or they were fragmented by further division, as was the case with the Democratic Party (DS). At the same time, during certain periods, some parties emerged and quickly became popular (G17, or the currently ruling Serbian Progressive Party, SNS). Precisely due to the lack of experience with such parties, public opinion is in principle very sensitive to events, and therefore also to the events related to the relationship with the EU. Practically all ups and downs in EU’s popularity in Serbia can be linked to the events accompanying relations with the EU. Particularly noticeable is the growth of voting preference for the EU in a possible referendum whenever there are signs demonstrating a partnership and/or a very specific benefit for Serbia. There are a number of events that have positively influenced public opinion in Serbia (see Fig. 10): for example, the signing and adoption of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, obtaining a visa-free regime with the EU, cooperation and assistance regarding floods or the migrant crisis, EU assistance regarding the resolution of misunderstandings with Croatia or Kosovo (Trump’s initiative), top-level meetings with Angela Merkel or Emmanuel Macron, who provided clear support to Serbia’s EU path. At the same time, negative reactions are not directly related to the EU—such as the decisions of the Hague Tribunal, economic and political crises, initial problems related to COVID-19, or the Ukrainian crisis. People are certainly not political or economic analysts to delve into the often objective reasons of some political measures—for example, lack of EU support—so their first associations are often those of fans, proving to be incorrect. It is even more difficult for them to react to economic

03.05.2006. Breaking off negotiations with the EU

01.03.2008. Hague verdicts

29.04.2008. SAA + Fiat + Eurovision

05.2008. Parliamentary and presidential elections

15.03.2003. Đinđić funeral

17.02.2008. Independence of Kosovo

16.10.2014. Military parade

16.11.2012. Gotovina and Markač released

Visa regime

05.2012. Elections in Serbia 01.07.2013. 22.01.2012. Croatia’s joining Referendum the EU in Croatia

26.05.2011. Arrest of Mladić

09.2008. SAA ratified, T. Nikolić supported SAA

03.2008. ZES: Start of of the election campaign

21.07.2008. Arrest of Karadžić

07.07.2008. Pro-European government formed

Event driven public opinion...

© 2022 Ipsos

Fig. 10 Public opinion in Serbia

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

PUBLIC OPINION SERBIA:

Ebd of Cratia – Serbia „duty“ war Macron in Belgrade; about EU integratio ns

COVID 19; bez vidljive EU pomoći

Vučić in UN, lot of meetings

Macron in Belgrade; speech in Serbian lenguage

A positive opinion about EU...

Ukraine

Mercerl ferwell visit

Jun 2002 Mar 2003 Aug 2005 Nov 2005 Feb 2006 May 2006 Sep 2006 Dec 2006 May 2007 Aug 2007 Nov 2007 May 2008 Aug 2008 Nov 2008 Feb 2009 May 2009 Aug 2009 Nov 2009 Feb 2010 May 2010 Aug 2010 Nov 2010 Feb 2011 May 2011 Aug 2011 Nov 2011 Feb 2012 May 2012 Aug 2012 Nov 2012 Feb 2013 May 2013 Aug 2013 Nov 2013 Feb 2014 May 2014 Aug 2014 Nov 2014 Feb 2015 May 2015 Aug 2015 Nov 2015 Feb 2016 May 2016 Aug 2016 Nov 2016 Mar 2017 Jun 2017 Sep 2017 Jan 2018 Apr 2018 Jul 2018 Oct 2018 Jan 2019 Apr 2019 Jul 2019 Oct 2019 Jan 2020 Apr 2020 Jul 2020 Oct 2020 Jan 2021 Apr 2021 Jul 2021 Oct 2021 Jan 2022 Apr 2022 Jul 2022

286 ´ S. BOGOSAVLJEVIC

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287

messages—such as those stating that over three-fifths of Serbia’s foreign trade is carried out with the EU and another significant part with Serbian neighbors, and not with the countries that are perceived as friendly countries; or that the top-quality foreign investments come from the West, bringing both high technology and higher salaries. They react to the symbolic gestures negatively—when the expected help regarding vaccines is missing (and the vaccine manufactured in China does arrive, admittedly with the help of the EU), or when the EU does not react clearly enough to the introduction of taxes by Kosovo for the Serbian goods. Of course, it is far-fetched to say that better communication can and should resolve any problem, but if all parties are trying to find a solution, then they should find more serious communication strategies than the ones currently in use.45

5

Instead of Conclusions

The EU is the goal of the Western Balkans, including Serbia, while the Western Balkans and Serbia are desirable members of the EU (at least according to what the EU administration officials and many EU leaders are saying). The road towards achieving this goal is difficult and is becoming increasingly problematic due to the events and instability in the EU itself. It is not an impossible path, but in addition to adapting to the EU requirements, the specific positions of the Western Balkan countries also require a better understanding of the situation on the part of the EU. The positive effects of the achieved partnership relations and the communication that accompanied them are very inspiring in this regard. Kosovo is an illustrative example, although all the other examples are also very clear, from the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the past and current developments in Macedonia on its path to the EU, including getting a new name of North Macedonia. Imposing ultimate requirements on either Serbs or Albanians (even on other nations in the Western Balkans), in a situation where no one can clearly offer a

45 Bad and biased communication about the EU in Serbia, both by officials and by the media (of all orientations), has not been analyzed here, because the topic of the EU is mostly put in the media in the context of internal political confrontations between the government and the opposition.

288

´ S. BOGOSAVLJEVIC

series of achievable steps towards reaching a solution (i.e., a feasible algorithm), prevents the finding of a solution which could indeed accelerate the region’s path towards the EU. A clear definition of the path, through a series of possible steps, would restore the relevance of the EU for the citizens of the Western Balkans, as a basic prerequisite to go through the difficult road of adapting to the EU, while at the same time fighting all local difficulties. Until then, it seems that the starting assumptions of our analysis were correct: =⇒

The EU is the preferred goal of the Western Balkans

=⇒

but there is an increasing number of disappointed pro-Europeans

=⇒

and the EU is becoming even less relevant to everyday life

=⇒

The pro-EU mood grows whenever the EU is set as a partner

=⇒

but also decreases whenever the perception is created that promises have been betrayed or new conditions are imposed The WBs cannot fix, without the EU, the years of economic and other backwardness caused by wars, sanctions, unresolved conflicts…

=⇒

√ YES √ YES √ YES √ YES √ YES √ YES

References Beogradska Otvorena Škola (BOŠ) (2022). Hronologija odnosa republike Srbije sa Evropskom Unijom, Belgrade. https://eupregovori.bos.rs/hronologijaodnosa-srbije-i-eu.html. BiEPAG (2020). Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Public Opinion and the EU Integration in the Western Balkans. December. https://biepag.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/Between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-English-1.pdf. BiEPAG (2021). Outta Trust (Post)—Pandemic Trust and Democratic Resilience in Western Balkans, December. https://biepag.eu/publication/outta-trustpost-pandemic-trust-and-democratic-resilience-in-the-western-balkans/. BiEPAG (2022). Public Opinion Poll in the Western Balkans on Trust, EFP/ BiEPAG, Belgrade, January. https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/ 01/13/public-opinion-poll-in-the-western-balkans-on-trust/. Bogosavljevi´c, Srd-an (2018). Perception of Post-Conflict Reality in Western Balkan states, Conference on Balkan States’ Experience in Peaceful Conflict Resolution, Ukraine Forum, Zagreb. Srd-an Bogosavljevi´c; Conference on

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Balkan States’ Experience in Peaceful Conflict Resolution, Ukraine Forum, Zagreb. Bogosavljevi´c, Srd-an (1991), Kako uništiti Jugoslaviju (How to destroy Yugoslavia), Ekonomska politika, n. 2050, Belgrade, 15 July. Bogosavljevi´c, Srd-an (1992). Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mirror of statistics, in D. Janjiˇc and P. Shoup (eds.) Bosnia and Herzegovina Between War and Peace, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade. Bubonji´c, Mladen and Vujatovi´c, Ðord-e (2021). Media Image from the Breakup of Yugoslavia Until Today. Sarajevo, Belgrade. Domachowska, Agata (2021). The Status of the European Integration Process of the Western Balkan countries. Studia Europejskie - Studies in European Affairs 24(4):67–82 -December. European Commission (2020). New methodology for EU accession of Western Balkans proposed: More credibility, predictability, dynamism and political steer. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/new-methodology-eu-accession-wes tern-balkans-proposed-more-credibility-predictability-dynamism_en Fraenkel, Eran (2016). The EU and the Western Balkans: Do they Share a Future? Notes internacionals CIDOB 145, Barcelona. IAN International (2016). Life in Post-War Communities. Aid Network. Hrvatska Enciklopedija (Croatian Encyclopedia) (2021) online edition. Miroslav Krleža Institute of Lexicography, Zagreb. Krastev, Ivan (2017). After Europe. University of Pennsylvania Press. Karatev, Ivana (2018). With Faith and Distrust. Clio, Beograd. Kovaˇcevi´c, Miladin, Gavrilovi´c, Dušan, Popovi´c, Dragan, Stevovi´c, Milena, Sekuli´c, Ljiljana, Stanˇci´c; Katarina (2018). What is Kosovo’s Price (Koja je cena Kosova), Open Society Foundation, Belgrade. Laki´cevi´c; Mijat (2011). Ahead of time (Ispred vremena), Open Society Foundation, Belgrade. Tzifakis, Nikola, Delevi´c, Milica, Kmezi´c, Marko, Nechev, Zoran (2021). Geopolitically Irrelevant in its Courtyard? BiEPAG, December.

PART III

Perceptions in Individual Countries

CHAPTER 13

European Union and the Western Balkans, an Endless Story. The Case of Albania Ditmir Bushati

1

Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of relations between the European Union and Albania from the early 1990s until today. It explains the specific position of Albania in the early 1990s; the different starting point compared to the neighbours and Central East European countries due to the unprecedented isolation; and recalls the main phases in the relations between Albania and European Union. The first section analyses the main challenges faced by Albania in its path towards EU membership. The second section is related to the perception of citizens about European integration process. The third section is focused on the impact and the evolution of the enlargement process over years. Finally, the last section calls for a new rhythm and quality in the EU path for the Western Balkan countries, given the security context Europe is facing as a result of Russia’s

D. Bushati (B) Adriatic Security Forum, Balkans, Albania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_13

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aggression against Ukraine, as this is mutually beneficial for our region and EU too.

2

Lost Opportunities

Albania’s steep road to the EU is first and foremost linked to the democratic state-consolidation process. It reflects the weaknesses of the democratic system and the extreme polarization of political life in the country. Albania’s path to the EU is a clear illustration of Hegel’s words that “the only thing that we learn from history is that we learn nothing from history”. 2.1

Different Starting Points

At the outset, Albania had a different starting point compared to the Central East European countries that were part of the communist bloc. At the end of the 1980s, Albania was the only country in Europe that had no political or economic ties with the European Community (EC), which, in turn, at that time was involved in an internal market consolidation process. Consequently, Albania’s possibility of economic partnership with various EC members was limited, also due to the latter’s commitments at that time in the internal European integration process. Faced with numerous political and economic difficulties and the impact that followed the changes in Central Eastern Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Albanian Government, on 4 May 1990, sent its formal request for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the European Community. Diplomatic relations were established in June 1991, a few months after the first multiparty elections in Albania. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation was signed in May 1992, accompanied by the signing of the Joint Political Declaration, which marked an important step in Albania’s relations with the EC. Given the historical context, this Agreement is considered important as it outlines for the first time the potential prospect of Albania for EU association, based on the fulfilment of the necessary criteria. Furthermore, the agreement paved the way for the inclusion of the country in a preferential trade system with the EC, known as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). At the same time, due to the economic

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and social emergency, Albania benefited from the EU’s PHARE Assistance Programme, which until then was dedicated to assisting Central East European countries. Thereafter, the EU gradually restructured its assistance to the countries of the region and Albania, depending on the priority areas. 2.2

Towards a Sui Generis Agreement

Based on the implementation of the Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation and on Albania’s request, the European Commission (EC) undertook in 1995 an assessment on the possibility to open negotiations and reach a classic association agreement. However, the Commission concluded that a standard European agreement could not be reached at that moment, particularly due to economic reasons (see EC 1998a). In January 1996, the General Affairs Council invited the Commission to submit a formal proposal for a new sui generis agreement with Albania.1 The negotiating directive was drafted by the Commission, but a formal recommendation was not adopted due to the contested parliamentary elections of May 1996, along with the deep financial and social crisis that followed in 1997 with the collapse of the pyramid schemes (see EC 1999). As a result, Albania lost a unique opportunity to move into a more advanced phase in its relation with the EU that would have allowed the signing of a new contractual agreement similar to that concluded with the countries of Central Eastern Europe. Embarking on this process would have separated Albania from the other Balkan countries, which later were included by the EU in the Western Balkans package. 2.3

Entry in the Western Balkans Package

In parallel with the abovementioned developments, on 26 February 1997, the General Affairs Council adopted a regional approach for the SouthEast European countries. Furthermore, the Council set out the political and economic conditions to be met by the countries of South-East Europe as the basis for a coherent policy towards the development of 1 The General Affairs Council meeting of 13 May 1996, in its conclusions, highlighted that such an agreement should compose an important step towards a sui generis Association Agreement.

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bilateral relations in the field of trade, financial assistance and economic cooperation (see EC 1998a). In addition to the EU accession criteria formulated for the Central East European countries in 1993, two groups of conditions were added for the Western Balkan countries: countries must demonstrate their willingness to implement regional cooperation with neighbouring states; and countries must fulfil all their international obligations. In April 1998, the Commission drafted the first report assessing the performance of the South-East European countries on the basis of the conditions set by the Council (EC 1998b) a year earlier. Up until 2000, five evaluation reports were drafted by the Commission for the SouthEast European countries. In the case of Albania, the reports generally indicated difficulties in consolidating its democracy and the rule of law. Designed to strengthen democracy and rule of law related reforms in South-East Europe, the regional approach policy proved to deliver some of the expected results. However, in order to boost the democratic consolidation in line with the needs of the countries in the region, in May 1999 the EU adopted the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). In November of the same year, the European Commission presented a feasibility report for opening negotiations with Albania for a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). The Commission concluded that Albania had not yet fulfilled the criteria to start the negotiation process for such an agreement and urged Albania to meet a number of requirements setting deadlines for their implementation. These demands were mainly related to strengthening of public order and security, improving governance, law enforcement and continuing structural reforms (see EC 1999). The Stabilization and Association process for countries of South East Europe was formally introduced in November 2000 during the EU Western Balkan Summit in Zagreb. The adopted document emphasized the linkage between the progress of these countries towards democracy, rule of law, reconciliation and regional cooperation on one hand, and the perspective towards EU membership on the other. The Council decided to intensify the cooperation with Albania through the establishment of a Joint High Level Steering Group. This High-Level Group held several meetings in Tirana, at the conclusion of which the European Commission drew up an evaluation report identifying the progress made and areas where improvements were still needed.

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Meanwhile, in June 2003, the Thessaloniki Summit confirmed the European perspective of the countries in the region, as well as the Stabilization and Association process as the political framework of their path towards EU membership (see EC 2003), accompanying this journey with some instruments that until that time were used only for the EU candidate countries.2 2.4

Bumpy Road Towards the Stabilisation and Association Agreement

In 2001, the European Commission considered that the prospect of opening negotiations was the best way to maintain the pace of political change and economic reforms in Albania, committing itself to prepare the recommendation for the start of negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement, although there was still a lot to do in terms of meeting the criteria (see EC 2001). Praising the country’s developments and efforts in implementing some of the required reforms towards EU membership, the Council urged the Commission to submit a draft mandate for the opening of negotiations with Albania before the end of 2001. This unprecedented move by the Council before the parliamentary elections was widely considered as an encouragement for Albania to hold elections in line with international standards and as a guarantee for starting the SAA talks. In the meantime, the 2001 parliamentary elections were marred by irregularities, which put into question the numbers of the parliamentary majority, but not the majority per se. Once again, Albania was immersed in an internal political crisis. This situation directly impacted Albania’s progress in the European integration process. The European Commission tried to gain time and in December 2001 introduced the draft negotiation mandate for the SAA with Albania. Furthermore, given the peculiarities of the political situation, the EU-Albania Consultative Group was established to assist Albania in the negotiations of the SAA. On 21 October 2002, the EU General Affairs Council decided to start SAA negotiations with Albania, which were officially launched in Tirana by the President of the European Commission on 31 January 2003. The first round of negotiations took place on 12–13 February 2003. 2 Such as, for example, the TAIEX Programme, the visa facilitation process, the Community Programmes, European Partnerships.

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The long period of time to approve the start of SAA talks from the Commission to the Council was mostly related to the political crisis in Albania. Due to the crisis, the country lost two more years in relation to the European integration process. The Commission gave the green light for the start of the SAA negotiations only after the 2002 political compromise, which paved the way for the election of a President accepted by all political parties represented in the Parliament. The negotiation process for the SAA was extended beyond any prediction, setting thus a new precedent compared to other countries in the region. Notwithstanding the optimism expressed at the outset of this process, it took three years to conclude the negotiations. Following the conclusion of the ratification procedures, the SAA entered into force on 1 April 2009. The SAA remains the main contract between Albania and the EU. The agreement provides a ten-year period for the implementation of the commitments that would enable Albania to prepare for EU membership. The long period of time spent on the negotiating table for the finalization of the SAA is linked to the quality and speed of the reforms as well as to the lack of political seriousness for carrying out necessary reforms during this process. 2.5

The Saga of Application for EU Membership

On 28 April 2009, Albania submitted its formal application for EU membership. A few months later, the General Affairs Council requested the Commission to prepare an Opinion on this application. European Commission published its Opinion on Albania’s application for membership of the EU in November 2010, identifying 12 key priorities to be addressed by Albania in order to mark progress in its European path (see EC 2010). The priorities included important areas for the functioning of a democratic society, starting from political dialogue and the functioning of the Parliament, the electoral reform based on OSCE-ODIHR recommendations, an independent judicial system, fight against corruption and organized crime, and the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups’ rights. The Commission published in 2011 the Enlargement Package, which consisted of the Enlargement Strategy along with the annual reports for

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each country. In its report, for the second consecutive year, the Commission noted that Albania was not ready to be granted the candidate status and open the accession negotiations (see EC 2011), simplifying thus the decision for the EU member states. In its 2012 report, the Commission adopted a conditional approach, linking the recommendation for the candidate status with the adoption of key measures in the areas of judicial reform and public administration, and the revision of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (see EC 2012). Moreover, it was stressed that the June 2013 parliamentary elections should be conducted in line with international standards. These, in everyday political discourse, are known as the “three important laws” which needed to be adopted in order for Albania to take a step towards the candidate status. Once again, the response from the political class was disappointing. Following the adoption of the three laws and the June 2013 elections, on 16 October 2013 the Commission recommended to the Council to grant Albania the candidate status, with the understanding that the country would pursue reforms, mainly regarding the fight against organized crime and corruption (see EC 2013). Also, the list of 12 priorities was reduced to 5 by the Commission. The fulfilment of the remaining 5 priorities was linked to the kickstart of membership talks. More precisely, the priorities included: public administration reform; strengthening the independence, efficiency and accountability of the judiciary; fight against corruption; fight against organized crime; protection of human rights, including the Roma and anti-discrimination policies, and respect of property rights. To advance reforms and ensure an inclusive process, the High-Level Dialogue on Key Priorities between Albania and the EU was launched in November 2013. This process was led by the European Commission and the Albanian Government, with the participation of the opposition and independent institutions. Thus, a special platform was created for Albania, in line with the country’s needs on political understanding and consensus on the European integration process. Although the Commission recommended that Albania be granted the candidate status, the EU Council, at its December 2013 meeting, did not adopt this recommendation, seeking more convincing evidence regarding the reforms undertaken by Albania. The Council committed itself to address this issue again in June 2014 and requested the Commission to prepare a new report focusing on the implementation of anti-corruption

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and judicial reform strategies, as well as proactive investigations and prosecutions, including those in the field of organized crime (see Council of EU 2013). Based on the Council’s request, the Commission published a report on 4 June 2014, clearly confirming the recommendation to grant Albania the candidate status (EC 2014). At its meeting on June 24, the General Affairs Council decided to grant Albania the candidate status, which was endorsed by the European Council on 27 June 2014 (Council of EU 2014a). The Council’s decision also encouraged Albania to pursue its reforms, especially those related to combating organized crime and corruption, as well as strengthening the independence, transparency and accountability of the judiciary. Moreover, the Council requested a close monitoring of the abovementioned reforms by the European Commission. Hence, a monitoring mechanism was introduced for the first time after a country was granted candidate status. Until then, a monitoring mechanism had been used for countries like Bulgaria and Romania at the time of their EU membership negotiations, in order to monitor the implementation of the reforms and commitments they had undertaken. Once again, Albania needed more time to overcome this important step towards EU integration. More precisely, it took more than four years from the moment of application until the status of the candidate country was granted. The 2015 European Commission Report praised Albania’s achievements, but stressed that a number of key priorities had to be addressed in order for the Commission to recommend the start of the accession talks. The European Commission’s 2016 Report was published a few months after Albania had adopted the Justice Reform, which came along with huge constitutional changes. Conscious of the exigencies of the member states, which always want to see how the adopted laws are being implemented, the Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations with Albania, with the understanding that Albania would implement the Justice Reform and, more specifically, the vetting law (see EC 2016). The Commission’s conditional recommendation did not set any high expectations for a swift decision by the EU member states to start talks with Albania. In February 2018, the European Commission adopted the strategy for “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans” (EC 2018). This document was received with

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great interest in the region, as it was coming from the Juncker Commission which made clear from the beginning of its term that there would not be any enlargement within the duration of its five-year mandate. However, the Strategy was criticized on two accounts. First, some of the Western Balkan countries pointed out the lack of necessary instruments to ensure the enlargement process in a smooth manner; and second, countries were sceptic about the indicative deadlines set. Following the publication of the new Enlargement Strategy on 7 April 2018, the Commission recommended to start accession talks with Albania. On 26 June 2018, the EU member states decided to respond positively to the Commission’s recommendation. Furthermore, the member states set out the path through a preparatory process towards opening accession negotiations in June 2019 and organizing the first Intergovernmental Conference by the end of 2019. However, it took another three years for the EU to launch the accession process for Albania. The launch of accession talks on 19 July 2022 marks an important moment in Albania’s journey towards the European family. This act ends an exhausting and previously unknown precedent in the EU enlargement process. Although EU member states outlined the path to the negotiating table since June 2018, they were unable to formalize this process: initially, due to the opposition of the French President Macron, who made the enlargement process conditional on the further reform of the EU; and later, due to the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, where Albania was unfortunately held as collateral.

3

Perceptions About the EU Integration Process

Although expectations and high hopes of Albanians have not been fulfilled yet, it should be noted that due to the start of the EU accession talks, the hope of the Albanians that the country is heading towards the EU path has increased. According to the survey conducted by “Barometer in Euronews Albania” in December 2022 (www.euronews.al), 35.9% of Albanians believe that the country might join in five years, which is a rather promising figure compared to 2021 when only 16.4% of Albanians believed this. Those who think that Albania will join the EU in 10 years also slightly increased, from 29.3% in 2021 to 32.2% in 2022. On the other hand, the number of pessimists has decreased. Those who thought that Albania will need more than 15 years to join the EU, from 14.1% in 2021 have become 9.5% in 2022. In drastic contrast, there

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are also those who think that the doors of the EU will never be opened for Albania: from 23.6% in 2021, they dropped to only 3.5% in 2022 (20.1% less), whereas 53.3% of Albanians think that Albania is closer to EU membership. 95% of Albanians support membership in the EU. For 95% of Albanians EU membership is a very important one. Such exceptionally high level of support for EU membership is very encouraging and should be exploited accordingly while it lasts. However, the very magnitude of this support level raises important doubts on the understanding of the EU integration process as a whole. It begs the question: Does such support result from ignorance on or knowledge of the benefits and drawbacks of the EU integration process as a whole? It is difficult to find the source of such a high level of optimism regarding Albania’s EU integration process, besides lack of information and/or political propaganda on the process. No matter what the source of optimism, it is important to note that there was a correlation between such optimism and the way in which respondents perceived the EU decision to finally start accession talks with Albania. The more optimistic they were on speed of the integration process, the more positively they perceived EU and Albania’s benefits from EU membership. Therefore, once the membership timetable for Albania becomes clear, it is very probable that perceptions on EU might deteriorate and expectations of membership benefits drop.

4

Enlargement Process Impact Over the years

The enlargement policy has served as an important instrument of the EU’s policy of widening its influence and emerging as a global actor. Although the establishment of the common market and the promotion of peace within the European continent were the starting points of the European project, rule of law and the consolidation of democracy are the prerequisites for peace, stability and sustainable social and economic development. These topics became more important after the fall of the Iron curtain. It should be stressed that the enlargement process is essentially an intergovernmental process, where the decision-making role of the member states is irreplaceable. While the European Commission acts on behalf of member states by going through a fine-tuned process of reforms in the country aiming at EU membership, the member states make extensive

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verifications on the quality and impact of the reforms through various missions of expertise. Through successive enlargements and the pursuit of this policy, the EU has invested in strengthening democratic systems alongside economic development in countries wishing to become members of the EU. It is a well-known fact that because of this process, the EU has grown from 6 to 27 member states. 4.1

Enlargement Typologies

Analysing the EU enlargement process over the years which has been developed according to the political circumstances of the time, two typologies of the methodology used by the EU can be identified: the one before and the one after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which symbolized the starting point of the reunification of the European continent. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War in Europe, the EU had not set any strict standards for membership. In 1993, the Copenhagen criteria were established, which paved the way to the 2004 enlargement, setting up rules and procedures for the countries aspiring to become EU members. Moreover, unlike the pre-Copenhagen period which mainly coincides with the Cold War period, where the candidate country had to meet the conditions of accession and present achievements, in the case of countries that had just emerged from the communist regimes the EU embarked on a more active role, asking the European Commission to closely assist the countries seeking membership. In this way, the Commission’s periodic opinions and monitoring reports on each potential and candidate country further detailed the Copenhagen criteria. At the same time, the reform process in candidate and potential candidate countries was assessed against the backdrop of meeting these criteria. The process that Western European countries went through3 was more natural and faster, with countries seeking membership largely going through a process of alignment with the acquis and the EU policies. In the meantime, the EU itself had to adapt its structures to accommodate countries that shared more or less the same values and histories. Nevertheless, even within this group, there was a difference in the approach in the

3 The first, second and third round of enlargements.

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case of membership of South European4 countries which suffered from a democratic deficit, due to their experiences with totalitarian regimes. Therefore, the EU accession contributed to the strengthening of the democratic process and further economic development, owing to the benefits of cohesion policy and multiple financial instruments. On the other hand, the Central and Eastern European countries have had a longer and more bitter totalitarian past. These countries benefited from signing the Europe Agreements, which formed the legal framework for the gradual accession process of these countries into the European family.5 In other words, there was a need for preparation in the political, economic and social field, as well as for a longer time to face the challenges of the EU accession process. Consequently, the Copenhagen criteria, known as the criteria to be met in order to join the EU, were adopted. Furthermore, the Copenhagen Council, for the first time, also emphasized the necessary condition of the Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration (Council of EU 1993). The Madrid Council in 1995 added another criterion which was related to strengthening the administrative capacities as a precondition for the implementation of European standards in practice (Council of EU 1995). Hence, the Central and East European countries needed an average of 10 years from the time of submission of their application until full EU membership, whereas Romania and Bulgaria needed 12 years. Despite the transformation that these countries experienced during the EU accession process, from the economic standpoint, only a few of them, mainly those with a more favourable geographical and geopolitical position, such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia, or the Baltic countries, have achieved the living standards of the poorest countries in Western Europe (see Bonomi and Relji´c 2017). One of the most criticized accessions was the one of Romania and Bulgaria, mostly because of the shortcomings of these countries in the reform process. Therefore, to ensure the implementation of European standards, a post-monitoring mechanism was introduced for both countries. Nevertheless, the application of these instruments did not bridge

4 Greece, Spain and Portugal. 5 Malta and Cyprus signed association agreements with the EU respectively in 1970

and 1972.

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the gap between the West and the East, nor between the North and the South. In addition to the differences in the economic and political realm, different points of view in relation to the values that the Union should promote were evidenced with the unprecedented refugee crisis in 2015 and the state of democracy and the rule of law in some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 4.2

The Drama of (Non) Enlargement to the Western Balkan Countries

The transition from communism to the establishment of a democratic system was more dramatic for South East Europe than Central East Europe. The first decade was marked by the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the bloody conflicts that accompanied it, while Albania slipped into chaos in 1997 and experienced several waves of migration over the decade due to lack of stability and any future prospects. The second phase found South East Europe somewhat more stable, which was also reflected in the EU’s new strategic approach to the Stabilization and Association Process and its instruments. Nevertheless, there was no comparison to the economic situation and the functioning of state structures and institutions with the countries of Central East Europe which, contrary to South East Europe, were strongly involved in the EU accession process. Taking these features into account, EU has adopted a more reinforced approach as regards the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria by the Western Balkan countries. This was reflected in the Enlargement Strategy of November 2006, where the Commission for the first time introduced the benchmarks as an instrument to improve and monitor the quality of reforms during the accession process (see EC 2006). Moreover, an integral part of this Strategy was the special report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members, which emphasized that enlargement should not hinder the EU’s ability to deepen the integration process and increase the efficiency of its institutions. As a corollary, for the first time in the Negotiation Framework for Croatia and Turkey, a separate chapter was introduced, Chapter 23— the Judiciary and Fundamental Rights (EC 2005)—which together with Chapter 24—Justice, Freedom and Security—cover a wide range of issues related to the rule of law, mainly judicial reform, the fight against organized crime and corruption. In this way, the introduction of benchmarks

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proved to be effective for Croatia, becoming the first country to face the new approach and successfully conclude EU accession talks. The importance of Chapters 23 and 24 was reinforced by the European Commission in its 2011 Enlargement Strategy, which prioritized further rule of law related reforms (EC 2011). According to the Strategy, rule of law issues were considered a priority. Therefore, it was decided that Chapters 23 and 24 should be opened first and closed last, thus accompanying the entire membership process. This enables the Commission to report regularly on these issues at all stages of the process, based on action plans. Montenegro was the first country to start the negotiation process based on the new EU approach. In the case of Serbia, the EU introduced in the negotiation framework elements related to the normalization of relations with Kosovo. Consequently, the talks began with Chapter 35, attaching great importance to the process of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. However, the whole negotiation process was slowed down. Montenegro has been in accession negotiations for ten years, but only three chapters have been provisionally closed. Meanwhile, Serbia which started accession negotiations in 2014 is no better-off. It has closed provisionally only two chapters. Turkey, which started accession negotiations in 2005, has managed to provisionally close only one chapter. Since 2015, the European Commission has changed the reporting and evaluation system by enabling timely comparisons across different areas and between the Western Balkan countries themselves. These comparative assessments show that the position of the countries in the negotiating process have not changed much (ESI 2020). Moreover, differences between the countries in the region are rather small (ESI 2020). Albania, as analysed earlier, was faced with preconditions at an earlier stage compared to Montenegro and Serbia. The European Commission’s recommendation to start EU accession talks was closely linked to the “surgical intervention” of the justice system. The profound reform was accompanied by the side effects that were not foreseen at the time of its planning.6

6 The Constitutional Court and the High Court became non-functional because most of the judges could not pass the vetting test. One cannot still accurately say what would be the impact of the vetting process in other levels of justice.

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The EU renewed its commitments towards the region at the Sofia Summit in 2018, by adopting a new Strategy for Enlargement (EC 2018). It also launched six initiatives, namely transport, energy connectivity, digital agenda, economic and social development, the rule of law and security and migration, with the aim of strengthening cross-sector cooperation, therefore taking forward the projects that were launched within the framework of the Berlin Process in 2014. Hence, besides the classical vertical structure of the enlargement process, it is noteworthy to mention that the Berlin Process added horizontal elements such as transport, energy and the regional economic area (on this argument, see also Delevi´c and Prelec 2019). The new enlargement strategy adopted by the European Commission on 5 February 2020 brought new elements into the accession process, by grouping the negotiation chapters by sector and introducing more political leadership by the member states, a rewarding and sanctioning mechanism. However, the new strategy lacks clear commitments about structural funds during the pre-accession phase, not offering a powerful incentive for reforms. The gap between the countries of the Western Balkans7 and those of Central and Eastern Europe speaks louder than any strategy for the revival of the EU enlargement process. Whether they are at the negotiating table or awaiting to start the accession journey, all the Western Balkan countries suffer from lack of a governance system based on the functioning of the rule of law (see Kmezi´c 2019), which may also be considered a precondition for convergence with the values of liberal democracy.

5

A New Rhythm and Quality in the EU Path

The start of the EU accession journey of Albania and North Macedonia, given the security context Europe is facing as a result of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, is a meaningful political message for the future of the six Western Balkan countries within the EU. Prioritization of a meritbased EU enlargement with six Western Balkan countries is mutually beneficial for our region and EU too.

7 The only exception is Croatia, which submitted its application in 2003, started negotiations in 2005 and closed the negotiations in 2011, becoming an EU member in 2013.

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It is therefore vital that the EU follows Winston Churchill’s famous commitment to “never let a good crisis go to waste”, consolidate its peace and prosperity project by embarking the Western Balkans into the EU within a reasonable timetable. As the EU accession process lost its transformative power in recent years, serious engagement with the region requires a strict but fair, predictable, tangible and motivational accession process for citizens, tackling the rule of law, demographic depletion and development gap between our region and EU. The common denominator of citizens of all Western Balkan countries is the desire to join the EU.8 At the same time, the EU is seen as a model for living standards. No matter how much the influence and presence of third parties in the region is analysed, it is a fact that debate about the future of enlargement to the Western Balkans is taking place only in the EU and not in Russia, Turkey or China. Despite weaknesses of EU’s policy towards the Western Balkan countries and the consolidation of the status quo in the region, the EU still remains an attractive pole with an established policy for the countries of the region. The discussions currently raised regard the effectiveness of this policy and the conclusion of the unification process of our continent. If this will not happen, the EU may lose the region, but it is hard to say that third parties can win it. If, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the prevailing idea was that geopolitics was losing its importance and that a new world order was emerging, in the security context Europe is facing today it is clear that geopolitics is back. As the European Commission considers itself a “geopolitical commission”, it is the right moment to demonstrate this in practice. Therefore, rather than focusing on unrealistic alternative paths, it is important that the EU enlargement process is credible, predictable and tangible to the citizens, and that it produces a different quality and pace of the European path. This means that the EU must win the “geopolitical battle” first and foremost in its own backyard. Regardless of the harsh criticism from different pundits, French President Macron has the merit for triggering a debate which was due since a long time. The sclerotic EU enlargement process needed a new approach. This requires a new engagement mechanism that combines economic and 8 Various studies show that the citizens of Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are optimistic, the citizens of Serbia are sceptical, while the citizens of Montenegro and North Macedonia are indifferent regarding the EU membership process.

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social development with the fulfilment of rule of law reforms, as these two go hand in hand. In their book Why Nations Fail—the Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that there is a strong link between the functioning of political institutions, on one hand, and economic and social prosperity, on the other (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). According to the authors, “engineering” rule of law or economic development from the outside is never an effort that guarantees undisputable success. Therefore, positive political developments require the right timing and they are fruits of a sustainable economic development. Prosperity helps to create functional and sustainable political institutions, which, in our case, are still lacking. Unfortunately, current EU financial assistance is not designed as a development instrument for the Western Balkan countries. A sustainable model of economic development, which goes hand in hand with the political and institutional development, bridging the existing gap between the Western Balkan countries and the surrounding neighbours that are already EU members, is still needed.9 It is important that the application of the new methodology of the EU enlargement process does not fall into stagnation or empty rhetoric. Instead of encouraging “stabilocracy”, the new methodology should show the citizens with actions rather than words what can be the impact of the application of European standards on everyday life. The European Commission’s annual reports should detail the measures, level of compliance and recommendations in fulfilling European standards,10 thereby creating a critical positive mass in public opinion and ensuring the engagement of non-state actors, as well as healthy competition and motivation among the countries of the region. This would make the process more merit-based and encourage real political change and economic and social convergence with the EU. At the same time, it would put policymakers under public pressure.

9 For example, about e 8 billion were allocated to Croatia and about e 11,5 billion were allocated to Bulgaria for the 2014–2020 EU Budgetary Programme. In the meantime, a total of e 11,7 billion were allocated for all the Western Balkan countries. 10 An experience worth noting are the detailed reports that were drafted in the case of North Macedonia, known as the “Priebe Reports” of the European Commission on key reform pillars.

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Civil society should be more involved in the monitoring of the reform process, especially on key issues. National parliaments and the European Parliament must be involved at every stage of this process to provide the necessary political support. Horizontal cooperation should also be extended to other areas in order to prepare Western Balkan countries for the challenges of the accession process. Involvement in the EU digital market, the roaming agreement and gradually the climate change deal are some of the areas that will have an impact on the further economic development of the region, in addition to the implementation of the commitments made under the Berlin Process which has just been relaunched on November 3 in Berlin. Cooperation in the field of education and research (Horizon 2020, Erasmus) should focus on the region’s needs for sustainable development. Above all, the EU accession process of the Western Balkans should be considered a responsible policy, rather than a burden. The EU should act in a creative manner and consider its role within the new international context, in order to operate independently in this new environment and strengthen its capacities. The accession process will continue for many years, so the EU will have enough time to harmonize its reform process with the finalization of the accession process of the Western Balkan countries.

References Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2012). Why Nations Fail—The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London: Profile Books Limited. Bonomi, Matteo and Relji´c Dušan (2017). The EU and the Western Balkans: So Near and Yet So Far. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). https://www. swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-eu-and-the-western-balkans-so-near-andyet-so-far/. Council of the European Union (1993). European Council in Copenhagen 21– 22 June 1993. Conclusions of the Presidency. https://www.consilium.europa. eu/media/21225/72921.pdf Council of the European Union (1995). Madrid European Council 15 and 16 December 1995 Presidency Conclusions. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ summits/mad1_en.htm Council of the European Union (2013). Council conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process. General Affairs Council meeting. Brussels, 17 December 2013. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/140142.pdf

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Council of the European Union (2014a). Council conclusions on Albania. General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 24 June 2014. https://www. consilium.europa.eu/media/21900/143354.pdf Council of the European Union (2014b). Council conclusions on Albania. General Affairs Council meeting Luxembourg, 24 June 2014. Progress Report on https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21900/143354.pdf Delevi´c, Milica and Tena Prelec (2019). Flatter and Faster: New Western Balkans Pathways to the EU, 24 October 2019, European Council of Foreign Relations. www.ecfr.eu European Commission (1997). 2003rd Council meeting—General Affairs, Luxembourg, 29/30 April 1997. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/pressc orner/detail/en/PRES_97_129 European Commission (1998a). Relations EU—Albania. Memo 98/89: 4 December 1998. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ MEMO_98_89 European Commission (1998b). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Operational Conclusions. Regional Approach to the Countries of South-Eastern Europe: Compliance with the Conditions in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. COM(1998b) 237 final, 15 April 1998. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= CELEX:51998DC0237&from=EN European Commission (1999). Report from the Commission on the Feasibility of Negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania, COM( 1999) 599 final, 24 November. https://op.europa.eu/en/public ation-detail/-/publication/80162fb8-b003-48ce-90a6-8bedbafe00cf/lan guage-en?_publicationDetails_PublicationDetailsPortlet_source=search European Commission (2001). Commission Report addressed to the Council and the European Parliament: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/ rep/1/2001/EN/1-2001-300-EN-F1-1.Pdf European Commission (2003). http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_ process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thessalon iki_agenda_en.htm European Commission (2005). Croatia Negotiating Framework. Luxembourg, 3 October 2005. https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/croatia_ec_negotiation_fram ework_2005.pdf European Commission (2006). Regional Strategy Paper. CARDS, Assistance Programme to the western Balkans—Regional Strategy Paper—2002–2006 (https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2018-12/ regional_strategy_paper_en.pdf)

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European Commission (2010). Analytical Report accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Commission Opinion on Albania ‘s application for membership of the European Union. Brussels, 9.11.2010 SEC(2010) 1335 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= CELEX:52010SC1335&from=nl European Commission (2011). https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa. eu/system/files/2018-12/al_rapport_2011_en.pdf European Commission (2012). Key Findings of the 2012 Progress Report on Albania. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_ 12_763 European Commission (2013). https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlarg ement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/strategy_paper_ 2013_en.pdf European Commission (2014). https://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vjkchk5vqeyl/nie uws/eu_albania_3nd_high_level_dialogue European Commission (2016). Albania Strategy Paper. https://ec.europa.eu/nei ghbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20161109_strategy_paper_en.pdf European Commission (2018). A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkan Countries. (COM/ 2018/65), 6 February. European Stability Initiative (ESI) (2020). Hamster in the Wheel—Credibility and EU Balkan policy, Berlin, Brussels, Istanbul. https://www.esiweb.org/ sites/default/files/reports/pdf/ESI%20-%20Hamster%20in%20the%20W heel%20-%2015%20January%202020_0.pdf Kmezi´c, Marko (2019). Rule of Law and Democracy in the Western Balkans: Addressing the Gap Between Policies and Practice, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2 October.

CHAPTER 14

The Role of Mis-coordinated European Integration Mechanisms in Decelerating Progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU Accession Nedžma Džananovi´c , Jasmin Hasi´c , and Margareta Ronˇcevi´c

1

Introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) integration with the European Union (EU) started in the early 2000s, but for over 20 years the country has not been able to secure the status of EU candidate. The key problem reemerging in practice is that the EU institutions and governments of most member states have decided to deal with the “Bosnian case” by

N. Džananovi´c (B) Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina e-mail: [email protected] J. Hasi´c Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_14

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applying traditional enlargement criteria, rather than creating a separate “realistic accession package” tailored to the country’s specific constitutional set-up, with clear, easily understandable, and attainable requirements (Hasi´c and Dedi´c 2019). The most notable benchmarks that BiH has managed to fulfill on its EU integration path is the successful conclusion and entry into force of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2015, and submission of the official application for full EU membership in 2016, followed by a long-lasting process of completing the EC’s Questionnaire until the end of 2019. The status of EU candidate was finally granted to BiH only in December 2022. Aside from post-conflict legacies, structural deficiencies of the highly complex political and legal system in BiH, and the extremely low EUoriented reform culture of the ruling political establishment, one of the principal reasons why the authorities have been unable to fulfill their EU accession tasks relates to the inadequately designed European integration coordination mechanism. While the system’s design was intended to ameliorate BiH’s integration process into the EU and harmonization of the country’s system with the EU acquis, the practical effects of the coordination mechanism adopted in 2016 have been detrimental to the entire process. The BiH authorities are not the sole culprits, however. The EU shares the responsibility for pushing the ill-designed coordination mechanism changes in 2016, and for not considering the potential effects of the highly decentralized system that follows an overly complicated constitutional structure. The adoption of the coordination mechanism was facilitated by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations and later by the EU Delegation in Sarajevo, through meetings held outside the institutional framework. The system that the EU Special Representative/EU Delegation (EUSR/ EUD)1 office in Sarajevo advocated introduced a plethora of veto players,

M. Ronˇcevi´c Sarajevo Open Centre, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 In addition to the regular Delegation of the EU to BiH, the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy also appointed an EU Special Representative, with the practice that one person performs both duties since 2012. Before the changes introduced in the EU foreign policy by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had a Head of the Delegation of the European Commission in BiH along with the double-hatted High Representative of

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which only created additional layers of decision-making gridlocks and cemented the inability of already weak institutions to make headway in the EU integration process, contributing to the slowing down of BiH’s accession process. This chapter aims to analyze the role of the EU in supporting the adoption of the current European integration coordination mechanism. It provides an in-depth exploration of the coordination mechanism’s architecture and alignment with the set goals of EU integration. The aim is to uncover whether the EUSR office and other Brussels-based agents were aware of the potential consequences the 2016 coordination mechanism could generate in terms of weakened EU norm adoption and limited absorption of the EU policies in BiH. The chapter posits that norms and desired changes prescribed in the SAA could not be practically implemented in BiH as such, because they are not compatible with the recent coordination mechanism adopted at a later stage as an EU-sanctioned political compromise of local political elites that was needed to unlock the process of the EU candidacy status application process. The research, undertaken during the summer and autumn of 2021, was based on a thorough investigation of available official documents and publications of the European Commission (EC) and BiH institutions, as well as an online survey that consisted of semi-structured interviews with government and public officials, including high-ranking officials of the BiH Directorate for European Integration (DEI) in Sarajevo, coordinators in charge of the EU integration process in various cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and others.2

the international community and an EU Special Representative performed by one person nominated by the EU. The change of role and structure of the then EC’s Delegation affected the change in mandates of all three positions. The High Representative now wears one hat, while the head of EU Delegation is double-hatted and acts as EUSR as well. 2 A total of 8 interviews have been conducted. The interviewees were officials from various institutions and governance levels of BiH who have been working on the European integration process for years. All of them actively use the coordination mechanism (CM) in their work. Three of them represent cantonal level of governance, two the entity level, while three work for institutions whose work is based around the EU process, Directorate for European Integration and Delegation of the European Union in Sarajevo. The topics discussed included: (1) Historical context of the CM; (2) The functionality of the CM; (3) The issue of consensus; (4) The issue of quorum; (5) Personal experiences with the use of the CM; (6) Opinion on potential amelioration of the EU approach towards BiH.

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The chapter addresses and unearths perceptions about the local dimensions of EU’s communication deficits and its role in adopting the current dysfunctional European integration coordination mechanism in BiH. The objective is to uncover the leading perceptions in the elite and expert public discourses and the impact these images and perceptions have on EU-related policy-making. By studying this type of institutional involvement, the chapter hopes to contribute to bridging the knowledge gap between the EU’s growing international capabilities on the one hand, and expectations regarding the EU on the part of non-EU countries on the other.

2

The Issues of EU Accession and Coordination

The EU employs its normative power through political conditionality to “stipulate transformation in aspiring countries” (Wunsch 2019, p. 9). The EU has effectively merged the conditionality and membership perspectives, as rare and desired commodities, into the foreign policy normative structure it intended to diffuse across the region. In this sense, the EU’s enlargement policy pursued in the Western Balkans has become the only real and measurable foreign policy objective that the EU was able to engage in (Hasi´c et al. 2020). The conditions, guidance, and principles set by the EU have not always been clear and consistent, which is reflected in the increasing divergence in evaluation by EU institutions and some member states (Wunsch 2019, p. 9). The Union’s approach to the accession of new member states is very “asymmetrical” in its nature, as “the possibility to negotiate the norms and rules to be adopted is very limited” (Dimitrova 2002). The EU still enjoys an admirable reputation as an institution that nurtures democratic values and principles (Tzifakis 2012). Consequently, applicant countries are left with little choice but to indulge in the conditions set by the EU. The accession of BiH has been observed as a “ticking the box” technocratic process (Grabbe 2002, p. 253), which proved to be more challenging than initially expected, while the technical approach by the EU remained unchanged with since the previous enlargement waves (Grabbe 2002, p. 253). However, the last two decades have demonstrated that there is a huge gap between the set goals and their implementation, and this affects the accession process and questions the credibility and accountability of the actors involved (B˘arbulescu and Troncota 2013, p. 69).

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The bureaucratic nature of the EU assumes a certain level of economic and political development that can handle the integration process. Countries in transition and with complex political and administrative structures experience beyond standard struggles to implement the reforms and fulfill the conditions in a manner expected from the EU (B˘arbulescu and Troncota 2013). In its current form, the decision-making system in BiH has demonstrated its inefficiency, unsustainability, and suscepˇ tibility to diverging political elite interests (Colakhodži´ c 2017, p. 89). Consequently, the dissonance between the bureaucratic approach and the complex political reality of BiH hinders the prospects of European integration (Börzel 2011, p. 7). The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and BiH was negotiated in 2005, signed in 2008, then ratified and entered into force in 2015. The BiH negotiation team for SAA consisted of civil servants and officials from state-level institutions, and their work was coordinated horizontally. Institutions from lower levels of government were not involved directly in the process. The EU has focused on building and strengthening the capacity of BiH state-level institutions to deal with the EU integration process. The new coordination mechanism for the EU integration process adopted in August 2016 expanded the scope of agents, institutions, and levels of government involved in the process, adding representatives of entities and cantons as the official members of the BiH delegation with veto powers. The institutions and civil servants at lower levels of government and administration were not ready to take on the challenges imposed by the SAA, since they were not trained to deal with EU matters. Up until then, most of the interactions between the EU and BiH were coordinated between the BiH state-level institutions, and almost all communication, transfer of knowledge, and training from the EU counterparts were directed towards BiH state-level agents involved in the process. In the meantime, lower levels of government, who quite unexpectedly became involved in the process, gained veto power and prominence on EU accession issues, but they were not ready to adequately respond to the tasks imposed by the coordination mechanism. In addition, the coordination mechanism did not establish any functional form of vertical or horizontal synchronization and harmonization between the parties involved in the process. All parties are treated as equal and independent in the process by their respective constitutional competencies, which practically diminished the overall capacity of BiH to effectively manage the process.

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The key problem was that since the SAA was negotiated and signed in 2008, well before the adoption of the integration coordination mechanism in 2016, it could not be changed to accommodate the newly introduced coordination mechanism. However, the legal obligations prescribed in the SAA could not be implemented, since the new integration coordination mechanism required: first, additional time, money, and efforts to educate and train the civil servants at lower levels of government about the EU integration process; second, achieving a political compromise regarding the key political challenges under conditions where there are many veto players; third, establishment of patterns of cooperation between different levels of government; and fourth, work on adoption of EU acquis in the national context(s) at all levels. The EU expected that BiH would speak with “one voice” in the EU integration process and would proceed in a more coherent and “power concentrated” fashion. The BiH coordination mechanism has effectively slowed down the entire process, since most of the agents in the newly formed coordination structure were not prepared to deal with EU matters and/or willing to find compromise on some key political issues.

3

European Integration Coordination Mechanisms in BiH in Retrospective

Each country aspiring EU membership has been developing its own mechanism of coordination of relations with the EU partners. A welldesigned and functioning coordination mechanism demonstrates the administrative capability of a country to be an EU member state, since the administration works on the transposition and implementation of the Union’s policies and laws within the national legislation (Vanjskopolitiˇcka inicijativa BH 2015). Even though parallels between the existing coordination systems can be made, each country is an individual case, as coordination mechanisms are set within the domestic politics of each aspirant. What follows is an overview of the three periods of development of the European integration coordination in BiH, before the one adopted in 2016: (1) from 1997 until 2009; (2) from 2010 until 2014; and (3) from 2015 until 2016.

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The Initial Institutional and Policy Adaptation Mechanism (1997–2009)

The EU defined its approach towards BiH, as well as Albania, Croatia, FR Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro), and North Macedonia, in the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in May 1999, within a framework for EU negotiations. At the Zagreb Summit in November 2000 and Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, these countries confirmed their commitment to SAP (B˘arbulescu and Troncota 2012), which led to the development of the contractual relationship between an aspiring member and the EU, known as the SAA. The framework combines the Europeanization and conditionality already applied in Central and Eastern Europe with an upgraded approach devised to address the specific needs of the Western Balkans (Džananovi´c 2020). The SAA is arranged around a mutually agreed set of formal reform mechanisms and timelines designed to bring BiH closer to the EU standards. The SAA was signed on June 16, 2008 and entered into force in 2015. The Council of Ministers (CoM) of BiH took several formal decisions on the formation of various bodies whose target was to implement change according to the acquis and coordinate the EU integration process. All these executive decisions together formed a framework of the coordination mechanism at the time. The first CoM’s Executive Decision on “the execution of coordination in the EU accession process of Bosnia and Herzegovina” was adopted on December 31, 2003 (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003). The CoM defined the ways of horizontal and vertical coordination of institutions of BiH in the realm of the EU integration process. Horizontal coordination referred to the coordination at the level of state institutions of BiH, while vertical referred to the coordination of state-level institutions versus the institutions of the entities and Brˇcko District. It defined the newly founded Directorate for European Integration (DEI) as the body responsible for the coordination and monitoring of the activities and tasks in the process of integration of BiH into the EU at all levels of governance (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003). The executive decision was later replaced by another one entitled “Executive Decision on establishing the Commission for European integration within the system of Temporary committee for stabilization and accession” (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008) on November 17, 2008. The twenty members of this Commission included

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the director of DEI and some of the assistants, various ministers, and government officials. Their tasks included coordination of the work of working groups for European integration at all governmental levels, the coordination and monitoring of tasks regarding the SAP as well as of the implementation of tasks and measures, and regular reporting to the Council of Ministers of BiH (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008). On April 2, 2009, the CoM adopted another executive decision on the formation of working groups for the European Integration (EI) process of BiH (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009). The principal function of these working groups was to ensure effective coordination and representation of the various levels of government. They entailed officials from different ministries from governments of both BiH entities, the Brˇcko District and the state, DEI officials, and independent advisors. In total, there were 5 groups and 170 officials now included in the process (B˘arbulescu and Troncota 2012). At various points and together with other actors, the mechanism included state and entity levels of governance, but not the cantons. Consequently, the number of people included was still relatively small in comparison to the new coordination mechanism introduced in 2016. 3.2

High-Level Dialogues (2009–2014)

From 2009 until 2014, there have not been any executive decisions adopted by the CoM regarding the European integration coordination mechanism. BiH found itself amid altering regional politics and internal struggles. In June 2014, the BiH officials did not attend the summit of the EU and Western Balkan countries. BiH did not meet the conditions set for closing the Office of the High Representative (OHR). BiH was unable to submit a membership application and the ratification of the SAA was delayed as well (B˘arbulescu and Troncota 2012). The global economic crisis contributed to levels of unemployment and overall economic hardship in the country. Combined with the high level of corruption among the politicians, general dissatisfaction of the public escalated into riots, labeled “the Bosnian Spring” by the Western media in 2014. BiH was also strongly affected by extreme floods in 2014, which caused great material and other damage (International Sava River Basin Commission 2014). One of the most pressing issues was the Sejdi´cFinci case which deals with a change of the electoral law that would

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allow people, who are unable or unwilling to affiliate with one of the constituent people, to achieve full democratic and electoral rights. These people belong to “Ostali”, namely “the Others”, that under existing rules are unable to stand for high posts such as Presidency and House of the Peoples. The case reached the European Court of Human Rights and was ruled in favor of the applicants. In October 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH set in a motion for constitutional reform, but there has been no significant further developments (Human Rights Watch 2011). In preparation for reigniting the European integration in BiH, the framework for the next step of ratifying the SAA was put in place. This period is marked by the High-Level Dialogues, which were all held in either Brussels or Sarajevo between the representatives of political authorities of BiH and the EU Enlargement office with Štefan Füle as the main facilitator, who repeatedly emphasized the need for submitting a credible membership application (European Commission 2012b), and the need to re-establish a functioning coordination mechanism that would ensure that positions communicated to the EU institutions reflect the discussions with all competent institutions and authorities in BiH (European Commission 2012a). The coordination mechanism was defined as a crucial tool that would enable progress towards accession of BiH and effective use of preaccession assistance (European Commission 2012b). Within the country, different competencies are divided between the state, entities, and cantons, some of them are shared, but some are exclusive to one of the three administrative capacities. The EU maintained that it does not interfere with the way an applicant country transposes the acquis, nor the number of channels it passes through within the country, on the condition that it becomes implemented (Džananovi´c 2020, p. 6). Regardless of the internal structure of the country, the state level remains the sole legal entity answerable to the EU (European Commission 2012b). The Road Map to EU membership was also formed and October 31st of the same year was defined as the due date for agreement on the coordination mechanism (European Commission 2012b). Reporting to the EC presented by commissionaire Füle through the Enlargement Package 2012 and key findings of the 2012 Progress Report on BiH were overall not positive. What kept being emphasized is the low political will and agreement between BiH’s politicians, which remarkably slowed down the progress (European Commission 2012c). Given the complexity of the work it requires for its establishment, the coordination

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mechanism was not defined by the date set in the Road Map. The second High-Level Dialogue held on November 27, 2012 in Sarajevo essentially reiterated the same aims and purposes. Little progress was achieved on all the issues (European Commission 2012d). Dissatisfaction with the slow and complicated development was present on both sides. The CoM concluded that the existing regulatory framework that builds the coordination mechanism is insufficient to fulfill all the obligations required by the EU that were defined during the second High-Level Dialogue. The main unfulfilled obligation that the CoM referred to was for BiH to have a unanimous voice towards the EU. Great disunity among the relevant political participants on the core issues of the mechanism was highlighted as a great contributing factor to these delays. The core problems referred to the inability to resolve the question of inclusion of cantons and ministry conferences; defining to which bodies of mechanisms the principle of consensus should be applied; the inclusion of independent political advisors and operating of the working groups. In the concluding part of this document, the CoM reported their call for the organization of the next session of the High-Level Dialogue to the Delegation of EU in Sarajevo. The third High-Level Dialogue was prolonged with two meetings in Brussels. The first one, held on October 1, 2013, was attended by seven leaders of the main political parties of BiH. This meeting concluded that the parties agree to finalize modalities for the establishment of an effective and efficient coordination mechanism on EU matters by respecting the principles of inclusion based on competencies, enshrined in the constitutions in BiH, to be presented on 10th of October (European Commission 2013). On October 10, 2013, the creation of the coordination mechanism was yet again delayed. For BiH, this prolonged the deadlock in the integration process in which the country has been for years already and conditioned the funding under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). The laws between the two entities regarding agriculture were different, which affected the process and choice of the beneficiaries of IPA funds. These laws were supposed to be standardized by the EU acquis through the coordination mechanism. As this never happened, the funds were limited and finally suspended since, for the same reasons, entities did not come to an agreement that disabled the possibility of harmonization of the incentives and strategies for the development of agriculture (Sijah

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2013). While no breakthrough has been reached, encouraging statements were made in the EC’s report, as was the case earlier (European Commission 2014). 3.3

Facilitation Outside the Official Institutions (2015–2016)

In 2014, BiH faced many issues that steered the attention away from the European integration coordination mechanism. On November 1, 2014, Johannes Hahn became the new Commissioner for EU Enlargement. With the change in leadership, the approach towards BiH slightly changed course. No High-Level Dialogues were planned or held anymore. The renewed approach towards BiH was formalized in December 2014, when the EC invited the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President and the new Commissioner “to engage with the political leaders to secure their irrevocable commitment to undertake reforms towards EU accession” (European Commission 2019). The EU Council determined that BiH qualified for the next step of the integration process (European Commission 2019). With the ratification of SAA on June 1, 2015, almost 7 years after it was signed, the decisions on the coordination mechanism effectively stopped being in place (Anonymous interview, July 16, 2021). The deadline for applying for EU membership was set to be February 15, 2016 (Al Jazeera 2016). Thus, it was even more pressing for BiH to finally find a solution. After the ratification of SAA, attempts were made again to formulate the coordination mechanism. Certain deadlines posed by the CoM in the second half of 2015 were, once again, broken. The Council managed to formalize the coordination mechanism at a meeting held on January 26, 2016 (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016e). The way this was done lacked transparency and it ignited a wave of political arguments and discussions that lasted for months. The meeting was never announced on the public website (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016f). The public learnt about it only 15 days later, when the conclusions were announced in the “Official Gazette of BiH”. Since BiH now fulfilled the condition on the establishment of the coordination mechanism, BiH used a momentous breakthrough after a ˇ 2019, p. 75), long stalemate and applied for EU membership (Cepo ˇ which Dragan Covi´c, the Chairman of the Presidency at the time, did on February 15, 2016, and thus put BiH back on the EU integration road (Sijah 2016).

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Another round of negotiations and meetings started where officials from different levels of governance in BiH discussed the aspects of the ˇ c, leader mechanism that since 2012 were problematic. For Dragan Covi´ of the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) and Croat member of the Presidency at the time, the biggest issue was the lack of inclusion of cantons in the mechanism. Cantons were not a part of any of the highest bodies defined by the coordination mechanism, which meant they would be left out of the discussion in cases of disagreement. As most of the Croat population in BiH lives in cantons from which their political repreˇ c and HDZ this meant that Croats had a sentatives are chosen, for Covi´ lower inclusion level and access to the European integration process (Jelin Dizdar 2016). One of the officials, who works for DEI and actively participated in attempts made for resolving this issue, claims that they suggested solutions like the previous Commission. Based on their solutions, cantons would not have been systematically included in the mechanism, but through the coordinating role of the Federation of BiH (FBiH) (Anonymous interview, July 16, 2021). This coordinating role is defined by the FBiH’s Constitution (Chapter 3) (Constitution 1994). As appropriate, the responsibilities in Chapter 2 may be exercised jointly or separately, or by the Cantons as coordinated by the Federation Government. This especially refers to responsibilities shared between cantons and FBiH, but these proposals were not accepted. The act was agreed upon in January 2016 and was confirmed by Milorad Dodik, president of the Republika Srpska (RS), and Bakir Izetbegovi´c, a member of the BiH Presidency, during a meeting organized by the then ambassador of the EU Delegation, Lars-Gunnar Wigemark. The meeting was held on July 31, 2016, outside the official institutions of BiH, and with no official transcript of the meeting (Dnevni Avaz 2016). ˇ c, the coordination mechanism could not Without the support of Covi´ have been approved by the Council of Ministers (Novi 2016). After another set of meetings, the coordination mechanism was finally accepted in its entirety, with no objections, by the Council of Ministers on August 23, 2016 (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016d). The support from the EU officials was immense, facilitated by the EU Head of Delegation/Special Representative (HoD/SR) Wigemark, and endorsed by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini (European Commission 2016). This change of the approach, moving from the official institutional framework to appeasement with the party

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leaders, is a clear indication of the “misfit approach”, where the Europeanization process is influenced by the domestic situation in the applicant country. It is somewhat surprising that an institution which thrives on democracy and transparency, supports the holding of a meeting of such importance on an issue that has been unresolved for years, in such a casual environment. An issue that is crucial for the EU integration of BiH was resolved at a meeting facilitated by the EU ambassador, even though not all the highest state representatives were present.3 Regardless of the failure of the previous attempts in accelerating European integration, reflected through the material incentives and dialogues, this type of involvement of the EU is questionable. 3.4

The 2016 Coordination Mechanism: Under Scrutiny

The 2016 coordination mechanism follows the internal structure of BiH and assures the involvement of all levels of government. Coordination of European integration processes in BiH is based on “respect of the existing legal and political structure of BiH, and protection of jurisdictions of all levels of government and their institutions included in the EI as defined by the constitution, ensuring the visibility of responsibilities of all levels of governance for timely and effective fulfilment of obligations from the EI processes that are in their jurisdiction” (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016c). The mechanism defines the vertical and horizontal coordination of the institutions. Horizontal coordination refers to the coordination of one level of governance, which is defined by the specific level of governance according to its institutions and capacities. Vertical coordination defines coordination between different levels ˇ of governance (Colakhodži´ c 2017, p. 87). The coordination mechanism also defined four basic bodies: Collegium for European Integration (COI), ministry conferences (MCs), Commission for European Integration (CEI), and working groups (WGs). The COI was set up as the body of the highest political authority of the coordination mechanism, which ensures coordination of key political and strategic stances regarding European integration, and, if needed, eliminates potential stagnations in the process. The members of COI include the chairman of the CoM of BiH and their deputies, prime ministers of 3 Covi´ ˇ c of HDZ was either never invited or unable to attend. No one attended the meeting in his name either.

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FBiH and RS entities, two members of FBiH and RS governments each, the mayor of Brˇcko District, and prime ministers of cantonal governments (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016a, b). This body was effective immediately with the ratification of the coordination mechanism, as it consists of already existing officials. However, most of the ministry conferences, which consist of state, entity governments, cantonal ministers, and representatives from Brˇcko District’s government, were yet to be founded (Anonymous interview, September 9, 2021). Most of the ministry conferences were not founded during the time of answering the Questionnaire, so their work was transferred to the highest body of the coordination mechanism. Moreover, 33 working groups, whose work was crucial in answering the Questionnaire, were formed on May 12, 2017 (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2017), five months after receiving the Questionnaire. On the official site of the DEI it is stated that 1083 officials were included in the process of answering the Questionnaire. With this many people involved, each of them with a right to veto, given that the coordination mechanism is based on the principle of consensus, the process was bound to become extremely complicated and time-consuming. On December 9, 2016, the EC handed over its official Questionnaire to BiH. The deadline for submitting the answers was January 31, 2017. This was the first time the coordination mechanism was operational, and it took over a year to prepare the answers. The speed at which BiH managed to reply and deliver its answers was off the charts and was highly criticized. Each working group defined by the coordination mechanism corresponded to one of the chapters. The first 33 groups tended to be the same as in the application phase for each applicant country, and they dealt with the same questions on the freedom of movement, free market, taxes, and so on. The rest were tailored to a specific applicant country. In the case of BiH, 3 more working groups—for political criteria, reform of public administration, and economic criteria—were formed on June 6, 2017 (Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2017) with the responsibility of answering the questions. They were reporting to the coordinators, i.e., members of the CEI, who oversaw collecting, modifying, discussing, and approving the answers. CEI was formed before the working groups, on October 21, 2016, and apart from the 10 coordinators who represent cantons, members include the director of DEI, one representative each from the

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entity’s governments, and the District of Brˇcko, and a secretary named by DEI. Personal experiences of the interviewed officials who were actively involved in the process testify that the number of people involved, and the complex system of decision-making, effectively slowed down the process of answering the Questionnaire. Some questions were framed unclearly, which prompted the members of working groups to demand clarification from the CEI, which then had to examine the question and communicate with higher bodies if it needed more assistance. Not all the working group members understood the extent of the work that had to be done, so they approached it with leisure (Anonymous interview, July 8, 2021). Meetings that were held sometimes could not be attended by everyone, even though DEI aimed to organize them in such a way that they do not collide. Several meetings had to be postponed or delayed because the quorum was not reached. All these problems, normally, slowed down progress (Anonymous interview, July 8, 2021). It also took a long time for BiH to translate more than 20,000 pages of answers and to collect all the answers from all levels of governance (Klix 2017). The EC sent 655 additional questions on June 18, 2018, as they needed clarification (“BiH dobila dodatna pitanja od Evropske komisije” 2018). Additionally, 23 of these questions remained unanswered (Klix 2021). Inclusion of everyone in every aspect of the process meant that people from cantons had to attend and contribute to questions, which constitutionally are out of the cantonal domain of competencies.4 The question of the inclusion of cantons is always raised when discussing the principle of consensus in the coordination mechanism. One of the interviewees claims that consensus provides a sense of safety and security. And even if it may seem ludicrous to have so many people with the right to veto, it appeared necessary for BiH (Anonymous interview, July 16, 2021). An alternative proposed was to use the principle of the qualified majority, which would also reflect the “EU’s modus operandi”. However, because of the political situation, its implementation was impossible (Dilberovi´c interview, 2021). One of the officials from the cantonal level explained that because of the political situation in BiH, they were always afraid that the two (ethnic groups) would not team up against the third (Anonymous interview, July

4 For instance, the questions on foreign policy.

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8, 2021). Even so, most of the interviewees agreed that, given the political and administrative structure of BiH, the principle of consensus was the optimal solution, and the inclusion of cantons is a positive aspect of the mechanism, as they also have to adopt parts of the acquis through their governments. In the European Commission’s Opinion on BiH in 2019, in the part that discussed political criteria, it was written: BiH needs to bring in line its constitutional framework with European standards and ensure the functionality of its institutions to be able to take over EU obligations. While a decentralized state structure is compatible with EU membership, BiH will need to reform its institutions to be able to effectively participate in EU decision-making and to fully implement and enforce the acquis. (European Commission 2019, p. 6)

Questions that specifically target state-level competencies were supposed to be exempt, but because of the principle of consensus, other levels of governance were included. The state-level institutions are unable to control such situations as the Constitution itself is framed in such a way that it can be interpreted differently by various officials. This is why there is no control or regulation over the spillover of competencies through different levels of governance. This institutional gridlock is ˇ extremely damaging to the EU integration process of BiH (Colakhodži´ c 2017, p. 90). It is contradictory to demand reform of the institutions while simultaneously facilitating the act that defines the coordination of the European integration processes in a way that the same criticized infrastructure is fortified. BiH is working on the program for the adoption of the acquis, which should have been completed by the beginning of 2022 (European Western Balkans 2020). Usually, a national program for the adoption of the acquis precedes the coordination mechanism. In BiH, the process was reversed because of “the lack of political will” (Dilberovi´c interview, 2021). Experts consider this program to be one of the most important documents in the integration process because it enables monitoring of the government’s progress, especially of the bodies of executive power. Citizens of BiH would experience progress through the acquisition and implementation of the acquis, particularly by improving economic and jurisdiction segments and acquiring financial investment (Maglajlija 2018). The EC’s Opinion presented after the Questionnaire identified

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14 crucial priorities for BiH to achieve to reach the next step of the integration process and the coordination mechanism has been used for fulfilling these priorities (Dilberovi´c interview, 2021). This also tends to be a problem, since when working on sectoral state strategies, certain political actors insisted on using the coordination mechanism as the main point of reference, even though it is a tool and not a law. As such, it is meant to fill in the gaps and enable coordination between all levels of governance (Dilberovi´c interview, 2021). Chapter 70.4 of the SAA between BiH and EC clearly states that: “Bosnia and Herzegovina shall also define, in agreement with the European Commission, the detailed arrangements for the monitoring of the implementation of approximation of legislation and law enforcement actions to be taken”, which refers to the implementation of the integration program and 14 key priorities (European Commission 2015). Some provisions serve directly to the local elites and politicians, as they can use the ethnic-nationalistic rhetoric and framework to their advantage. For example, priority 4(f) states: “Ensure equality and non-discrimination of citizens, notably by addressing the Sejdi´c-Finci ECtHR case law” (European Commission 2019). It is difficult to accept that these priorities will be fulfilled until the implementation of the integration program, because these issues have been on the agenda for decades. Priorities that require constitutional change are much more difficult to achieve considering the political situation of BiH. Any potential change of the Constitution is viewed with resistance. The issue here is that “the carrot” is extremely uncertain, as it is the EU member states that make the final decision (Tilev et al. 2021).

4

Conclusions

BiH has finally been granted EU candidate status in December 2022. During all these years, the conditions, guidance, and principles set by the EU have not always been clear and consistent. Bosnian politicians repeatedly failed to speed up the process, and were also more than capable to contest the EU and make it ready to renegotiate its own conditions. As our in-depth analysis of the coordination mechanism’s architecture and its outcomes shows, by supporting the ill-designed coordination mechanism in 2016, the EU undermined the existing moderately efficient mode of interaction of institutions and agents, in favor of an even more complex, larger in size, and heavily politically influenced one. Thus the response

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to the EU Questionnaire has taken much longer in BiH than in other countries. While the sheer size of the team was significant as it included representatives from all levels of government, the main problem turned out to be lack of knowledge and experience in the EU integration process. By unintentionally disregarding the BiH constitutional structure in the past, during the SAA negotiations, and by “overemphasizing” the capacity building at the BiH state level to deal with EU matters, the EU did not pay much attention to developing capacities at lower levels of governance for implementing the SAA. Thus, some constitutional complexities of BiH were overlooked and as a result, the SAA could not be implemented easily. The EU-sanctioned compromise of local political elites, needed to unlock the EU candidacy application of BiH, introduced several new veto players and created practical effects that are detrimental to the entire process. Under the current coordination mechanism, BiH cannot effectively deal with the SAA obligations and upcoming EU integration tasks. The new players did not participate in negotiations and adoption of the SAA. They have not been educated or trained to deal with the set goals, so apparently they are unable and unequipped to fulfill their “technocratic” tasks. They are also expected to find political compromises in highly uncompromising situations, or refer the unresolved issues to higher political decision-makers. The analysis shows how the expectations on the part of the EU have been unrealistic and misperceived. The EU officials have clearly underestimated the existing power imbalances and normative dimensions of the coordination mechanism’s function in the overall EU integration process. The evidence also shows that top-down diffusion of EU norms on relevant EU-related matters cannot be fully domesticated in all its applicatory elements, and the implementation-related deferrals can hinder the overall reform process and other aspects of societal transformation in BiH.

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CHAPTER 15

Pro-EU, No Matter What? European Union (Mis)Perceptions in Kosovo Gëzim Krasniqi

1

Introduction

The main European states and the European Union (EU) itself have played a crucial role in the formation of the Kosovar polity, as has become evident through the EULEX Mission, the pre-accession assistance and the facilitation of the dialogue with Serbia. However, Kosovo’s relations with the EU are highly complicated; Kosovo was the last country in the Balkans to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in October 2015 as well as the last one to be granted visa-free travel to the Schengen Area. Moreover, despite the expectations that the EUfacilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia will help Kosovo solve its internal problems, normalise relations with Serbia and advance towards EU membership, Kosovo has still not solved its internal and external statehood issue nor does it have a clear and guaranteed path towards EU membership.

G. Krasniqi (B) University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_15

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Yet, albeit Kosovo’s EU prospects are distant, EU integration remains very high on the political agenda. EU integration is one of the main aspects that brings together all ethnic parties in Kosovo. Regardless of their attitude towards Kosovo’s independence, such as in the case of the main Serb party, Srpska Lista (Serb List) which largely follows Belgrade’s position, non-Albanian parties actively support Kosovo’s EU integration. Likewise, popular support for EU integration in Kosovo remains, together with Albania’s, by far the highest in the region. So, what explains this (paradoxically) unwavering political and popular support for EU integration in Kosovo, despite of the new country’s complex relations with the EU and the dim prospects of joining it any time soon? The chapter argues that EU’s highly positive perception in Kosovo can be explained by two main factors. First, Kosovo’s EU membership is widely seen as being constitutive of statehood. Moreover, over the past three decades, the self-conception about Kosovo came to be closely linked to the concept of “Euro-Atlantic” integration and values. Second, almost 1/3 of Kosovo’s citizens already reside/live in Europe (mostly in EU countries) with many more emigrating for study, work or family (re)union every year. The Kosovo diaspora plays an immense role in daily lives of Kosovar citizens in the form of remittances, the “Western” spirit they bring along with their visits and engagement in circular migration and business investment. As a result, the EU is commonly associated with higher economic standards, welfare benefits and freedom of movement, with most people and politicians giving little consideration to the challenges that EU integration entails. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first and main part focuses on Kosovo’s relations with the EU and its key member states, addressing this relationship from three key perspectives: (a) EU’s indispensable role in state-building in Kosovo; (b) political positions and perceptions in Kosovo towards the EU; and (c) citizens’ (mis)perceptions about the EU. The second section focuses on the impact of emigration to the EU and the role of diaspora in Kosovo. A few concluding remarks are drawn at the end.

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Kosovo and the EU: A Close but Perplexing Relationship EU’s Indispensable Role in State-Building

Since the end of the war in Kosovo in 1999, the EU has been assuming ever greater responsibility regarding the political, judicial and economic and security spheres, thus gradually becoming the main international actor in Kosovo. The EU’s omnipresence in Kosovo is a result of more than two decade-long period of direct involvement in stabilisation and reconstruction of the country, as well as in state-building. The main European states and the EU itself have played the role of “external constitutive actors” (Oklopcic 2009) in the formation of the Kosovar polity, as is becoming evident through the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), the pre-accession assistance and the facilitation of dialogue with Serbia. In other words, the EU role in Kosovo has been threefold: (a) as an external state-builder; (b) as an anchor of political reforms through conditionality; and (c) as facilitator of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue (Krasniqi and Musaj 2015). Although EU’s role in Kosovo has increased significantly since 2008, because of the lack of consensus on Kosovo’s status within the UN and the EU (Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia still refuse to recognise Kosovo’s independence), Kosovo’s relations with the EU remain confined within EU’s formula of “creative ambiguity” and “status neutrality”. Over the years, this has become a thorn in EU’s relations with Kosovo. While Serbia has effectively used the Brussels dialogue to make significant advances on its EU path, Kosovo’s gains from the process have been far more modest (ICG 2021). In October 2015, Kosovo and the EU signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), the first step towards closer cooperation with the EU and eventual membership. However, the failure of the EU to speak with a single voice has hindered Kosovo’s EU perspective, evidenced by the sluggish progress with the visa liberalisation process. Even though Kosovo formally fulfilled all the criteria set by the European Commission (EC) in 2018, visa liberalisation was approved only in April 2023 with the visa-free travel for Kosovar passport holders entering into force on 1 January 2024. Kosovo also remains the only country in the Western Balkan region that still has the status of EU “potential candidate”, given that Bosnia and Herzegovina was finally granted candidate status in December 2022.

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Non-recognition of Kosovo as an independent state by all EU member states and the Union itself poses a fundamental challenge not only in terms of Kosovo’s EU integration prospects but also in terms of the broader relations between the two. Of all the EU institutions, only the European Parliament has a clear stance on Kosovo’s statehood, treating it as an independent and sovereign state. On the other hand, the European Council and the European Commission continue to abide by the practice of status neutrality which, as of 2012 when Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement1 on regional representation, means using an asterisk (*) next to Kosovo’s denomination with the following footnote: “This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ (International Court of Justice) Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence”. Although hailed by EU leaders as a major achievement, this formula, which references two documents with diametrically opposing views on Kosovo’s status, has neither helped Kosovo join important international organisations such as the UN, OSCE, CoE, nor increase cooperation with Serbia. Moreover, it has not provided the EU itself with leverage to effectively deal with the issue of (non)recognition of Kosovo. The key problem is, as Bechev (2022) put it, that the “European policy is reactive, and Kosovo is not a priority unless the security situation deteriorates”. Importantly, as a result of EU’s strategy, the process of state-building in Kosovo has been inherently linked to the EU integration process and the “normalisation” of relations with Serbia. Yet, there is a growing frustration both in Kosovo but also internationally that a decade-long EU-mediated process on “normalisation of relations” between Kosovo and Serbia has failed to reach any meaningful degree of normalisation, with the two countries remaining mired in mutual non-recognition, with deleterious effects on both (ICG 2021). The Brussels dialogue has neither ensured a meaningful integration of Kosovo Serbs—especially the ones in northern Kosovo—into the country’s political and social system, nor managed to dismantle and replace Serbia’s institutions in Kosovo. On the contrary, Serbia’s presence has been normalised and even strengthened in some parts of Kosovo. Importantly, Brussels has accepted an arrangement whereby Serbia speaks on behalf of Kosovo Serbs, thus leading to a total monopolisation of the political life of Kosovo Serbs by the 1 EU Press Statement 5455/12 PRESSE 9, Brussels, 24 February 2012. https://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/128138.pdf.

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Belgrade government through the Srpska Lista party (a product of the Brussels dialogue itself), which in practice has acted as an extension of Serbia’s strongman and president, Aleksandar Vuˇci´c, in Kosovo (Krasniqi and Prenkaj 2020). EU’s inability to solve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute is, in fact, a symptom of its failure to assert itself as a “strategically autonomous actor” in the Balkans (Bonomi 2021). Nevertheless, it leaves Kosovo in an impossible position, being unable to both get (in)formal recognition from Serbia anytime soon as part of the Brussels process, and advance on its EU integration path without an agreement with Serbia. This was made clear by the German Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock during her visit to Pristina in March 2022. Reiterating Germany’s support for the Brussels dialogue and Kosovo’s EU perspective, Baerbock clearly stated that Kosovo should reach an agreement with Serbia before it can even apply for EU membership (KOHA 2022). However, despite the promise to push for an agreement on full normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, the EU barely managed to secure the two parties’ verbal consent on the so-called “Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia” in February/March 2023. Despite the fanfare and EU leaders’ belief that this will be an “important milestone in the process of normalisation of relations among them [Kosovo and Serbia] and certainly creates a new status quo in the Dialogue”,2 EU’s lack of both ambition in the dialogue and a bold vision for the region leaves little room for optimism in Kosovo-Serbia relations and the region’s future in Europe. Notwithstanding its complex relationship with the EU, Kosovo’s relations with key EU states have strengthened over time at the political, diplomatic and economic level. The EU is by far Kosovo’s main trading partner. In the framework of IPA I, IPA II and other EU instruments, from 2007 to 2020, the EU has invested in Kosovo more than e1.5 billion in reconstruction, public administration reform, rule of law, sustainable economic reform, education, agriculture, social development, civil society and media. In 2021 alone, the EU’s Foreign Direct Investment in Kosovo reached e208 million and the volume of trade in 2 EEAS Press Release: Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue: EU Proposal—Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia, Brussels, 20 March 2023. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-repres entativejosep-borrell-press-conference-0_en.

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goods with the EU was e1.8 billion (European Commission 2021). So, although there is no clear EU path for Kosovo, the EU involvement and role in Kosovo has continued to increase with time. 2.2

Political Positions and Perceptions in Kosovo Towards the EU

Despite of the fact that Kosovo’s EU prospects are distant, at a discursive and policy level EU integration remains very high on the agenda of the country’s key political actors. In fact, it has been enshrined in both the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo (2008) and the Preamble of Kosovo’s Constitution: For reasons of culture, geography and history, we believe our future lies with the European family. We therefore declare our intention to take all steps necessary to facilitate full membership in the European Union as soon as feasible and implement the reforms required for European and Euro-Atlantic integration. (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo 2008a) With the intention of having the state of Kosovo fully participating in the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration …. (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo 2008b)

These unambiguous formulations at the same time reveal the perceptual complementarity of the Kosovar state and Europe and their concrete plans to achieve EU membership. In many respects, Kosovo’s leaders perceive adherence to European values and eventual EU membership as an added value to the state itself (Koneska et al. 2022). This unwavering political support for EU integration in Kosovo is largely explained by the fact that Kosovo’s EU membership is widely seen as being constitutive of statehood. Despite complex relations, the EU, together with the US, remains indispensable foreign actors in Kosovo. Kosovo’s recent history as well as its statehood are inextricably linked to the role of the great powers, primarily the US and the EU. Moreover, since the early 1990s, Albanian nationalism in Kosovo was closely connected to the concept of Euro-Atlantic integration and European values. Indeed, Kosovo’s historical leader, Ibrahim Rugova, and the elite at the helm of the “Kosovan Alternative” in the early 1990s, projected the Kosovar question within the wider framework of European democratisation and integration processes. In Rugova’s words, “We can’t

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allow to be disassociated from the European idea of peace, democracy and cooperation. If we do so, we will end up like the Serbian regime, which has been isolated by the world” (Çelaj et al. 1990, p. 10). Kosovo Albanian leaders of the early 1990s were restless in their attempts to present Kosovo Albanians as European, peaceful and pro-democracy oriented people, much in the same way as post-independence leaders initiated a nation-branding campaign “Kosovo: Young Europeans” that was aimed at placing “newborn” Kosovo firmly within the family of nations in Europe and beyond (Wählisch and Xharra 2010). The ideal of EU integration, which is shared among all major ethnic Albanian political parties in the wider region, has become a new political mantra and in many ways has also transformed the Albanian nationalism in the Balkans. In general, mainly due to international intervention and administration, the main Albanian political parties in Kosovo moved from the concept of “one nation – one state”, to that of “one nation – two states”. The majority of Kosovo Albanians see themselves simultaneously as an indivisible part of the Albanian nation in the Balkans and Kosovar citizens. Even the “Self-Determination Movement” (LVV), which for more than a decade had run a campaign that was based on a future unification with Albania and dismissed Kosovo’s new state symbols as “nonAlbanian”, has moderated its position following their election victory in 2019 and 2021. Following LVV’s 2019 election victory, its leader and the then premier-designate, Albin Kurti, suggested that building Kosovo’s state was more of a priority than moves to join Albania (Hopkins 2019). The old goal of national unification (of all Balkan Albanians in one state) has gradually faded away from public discourse, being replaced by the new discourse of “unification in Europe”. Furthermore, EU integration is one of the main aspects that brings together all ethnic parties in Kosovo. Regardless of their attitude towards Kosovo’s independence, such as in the case of the main Serb party, Srpska Lista which largely follows Belgrade’s position, non-Albanian parties actively support Kosovo’s EU integration. For instance, when the Kosovar Parliament voted to ratify the SAA agreement with the EU in 2015, Serb MPs from Srpska Lista voted for the bill, which according to one of their members marks an important achievement for Kosovo’s economy, democracy and rule of law (Maliqi 2015). In sum, Kosovo is a rare case in the region with a strong and unwavering support for EU integration across ideological and ethnic divide. Despite the challenges stemming from EU’s inability to speak

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with one voice when it comes to Kosovo’s recognition and the latter’s dim prospects of advancing on its EU path, Kosovo’s foreign policy orientation as well as the predominant political discourse regarding EU integration remain unchanged. This is due to EU’s role in state-building and economic development, but also, importantly, high popular support for EU integration that we discuss below. 2.3

Citizens’ (Mis)Perceptions About the EU

In many ways Kosovo is a paradox, as the country with the highest (together with Albania) consistent popular support for EU integration, despite of the fact that it has the least feasible EU membership prospects. For many years in a row, popular support for EU integration in Kosovo has ranged between mid-80% and mid-90%. This has been confirmed by recent surveys conducted by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC 2021) as well as the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG 2021), which show that 91% and 90% of Kosovars, respectively, view membership as a positive development or are in favour of the country joining the EU. Another poll conducted in Kosovo by the International Republican Institute (IRI) demonstrates strong support among Kosovars for the United States (US), the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Notably, 93% of respondents had a favourable opinion of the US, 89% supported joining NATO, and 91% supported joining the EU (IRI 2021). What this shows is that due to historical factors and external states’ role in state-building and consolidation, Kosovo is firmly oriented towards European (EU) and transatlantic (NATO) structures. However, not all ethnic groups in Kosovo share the same enthusiasm when it comes to supporting EU membership. According to an IRI survey (IRI 2022, p. 177), while 90% of Albanians in Kosovo would vote to join the EU, only 36% of Kosovo Serbs would vote to join the EU with a relative majority (38%) being against it. While it is hard to know whether this is a result of developments in Kosovo itself or a spill-over effect from the growing anti-EU discourse within pro-government media in Serbia, it clearly demonstrates that ethnic Serbs in Kosovo are at odds with the political representatives from the Serb List when it comes to supporting Kosovo’s EU membership. The EU is commonly associated in Kosovo with higher economic standards, welfare benefits and freedom of movement, with most people

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and politicians giving little consideration to the challenges that EU integration entails. When it comes to perceived advantages that EU membership could bring, 71% of Kosovo respondents consider as an advantage freedom of movement, 39% higher living standards, 35% peace and security, 46% social welfare, 27% democracy and 14% access to EU funding (BiEPAG 2021). Being the only country in the region that is yet to benefit from visa-free travel with the EU, it is not surprising that the overwhelming majority of Kosovo people associate EU membership with freedom of movement. In addition to being a regional champion when it comes to support of EU integration, Kosovo’s citizens also score higher than anyone else in the region when it comes to optimism about the future in general and the likelihood of joining the EU. When confronted with the question “when do you think the country will join EU”, 45% of respondents think that Kosovo will join the EU in the next 5 years, 31% within 10 years, 11% within 20 years and only 7% think that Kosovo will never join the EU (BiEPAG 2021). This is truly remarkable and perplexing, given Kosovo’s, or Western Balkan’s, dire prospects of joining the EU block any time soon. It is also interesting to note that support for EU integration in Kosovo continues to be widespread among various social segments of the Kosovo (Albanian) society. For instance, although the post-war transformations in Kosovo and heavy presence of various foreign religious organisations and agendas have given rise to a more assertive (Muslim) religious elite in Kosovo (Krasniqi 2011), EU support remains strong even among religious actors. The EU is often referred to as a good standard of religious freedom. For instance, the EU is frequently invoked in debates about the right to wear hijab (headscarf) in public schools, with various imams invoking religious freedom enjoyed “in Europe” in their campaign to lift the ban on headscarf in Kosovo schools (Sadriu 2015). Albeit various EU countries have expanded affirmative provisions that guarantee religious rights and freedoms for their Muslim minorities, these (mis)conceptions about “European rights” do not necessarily comply with the reality on the ground in many EU states that have experienced rising populism and Islamophobia (Pickel and Öztürk 2021). Moreover, persistent, and seemingly unconditional, support among Kosovo citizens for EU integration is in sharp contrast with attitudes within the EU about Kosovo and its potential membership. According to a YouGov (2022) poll, out of the four biggest EU states (France, Germany, Spain and Italy),

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only in the case of Spain a majority is in favour of Kosovo’s membership; in France, 44% are against versus 19% in favour; 41% of Germans are against versus 27% that are in favour; 27% of Spaniards are against versus 35% in favour; and 35% of Italians are against Kosovo’s EU membership versus 33% who support it (Smith 2022). Paradoxically, although Spain has opposed Kosovo’s independence from the outset, its people seem to have a more favourable view of Kosovo with a relative majority supporting its membership, than citizens of Kosovo’s key European allies. Kosovo may be the country with the highest support for EU integration in the Western Balkans, but the EU is not the most popular external actor in Kosovo. The US, which played the key role in NATO’s intervention, as well as in steering the political process that helped Kosovo’s post-war reconstruction, establishment of its self-governing institutions and march towards independence (Phillips 2002), is even more popular. The continued American political, military and economic investment in Kosovo since the 1990s has turned it into an indispensable actor on the ground. As a result, Kosovo continues to have strong emotional, political and economic bonds to the US, with many surveys suggesting it has the highest approval of US leadership globally (Dezfuli and Sullivan 2018). This has also created a misconception about the US being the biggest foreign donor to Kosovo. According to an IRI poll, 62% of respondents in Kosovo think that the US is the biggest donor to Kosovo, compared to 15% who think EU is the major donor (IRI 2022, p. 68). In reality, the EU is, by far, the single largest donor to Kosovo. Unique as it is in terms of the high support for EU integration despite deem prospects of membership, Kosovo is not fully isolated from the wider regional trends that indicate that the Balkans is losing hope of progress on EU membership (Sekularac and Emmott 2022). This disillusionment with the EU, which in the case of Kosovo is primarily related to EU’s prolonged decision to grant visa liberalisation and its inability to have a unified stance on Kosovo’s statehood, has had an impact on the popular support for EU integration. A 2022 IRI poll suggests that the percentage of people in Kosovo that would vote in favour of joining the EU is 85%, which is 8% lower than in 2020 (IRI 2022, p. 175). Similar trends were recorded by the RCC’s (2022) Balkan Barometer, according to which 86% of respondents believe that Kosovo’s accession to the EU is a positive step, which is 5% lower than in 2021. A growing number of Kosovars feel left out and isolated especially at a time when non-Balkan countries like Ukraine and Moldova have become official EU candidates,

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and their citizens have long been travelling visa-free in the EU (Bechev 2022). While it is hard to make any firm conclusions about a steady drop in support for EU integration in Kosovo based on these latest polls, the recent trends are important in terms of demonstrating that despite EU’s central role in state-building in Kosovo, the popular support for EU integration is not unconditional. Rather, it is contingent on the ever involving but perplexing relations between the EU and Kosovo. Notwithstanding these complex relations and Kosovo’s dim prospects of EU membership any time soon, Kosovo citizens are “voting with their feet”, with an ever-growing number migrating to EU countries.

3

Emigration and the Role of Diaspora

Closely related to the issue of perceptions of the EU in Kosovo is the process of continuous emigration. Successive waves of migration that continue to this day have turned Kosovo into an emigrant state. It is estimated that between 800,000 and 1 million people from Kosovo live abroad, mostly in the EU. That is roughly 1/3 of the entire population that originates from Kosovo. The bulk of the diaspora is made of “Gastarbeiter” labour force from the 1960s and 1970s, political dissidents and exiles from the 1980s and 1990s, and Kosovo war refugees from the late 1990s (Haxhikadrija 2009). In the 1990s, Kosovar Albanian diaspora played an important role in sustaining the “parallel society” in Kosovo as well as in mobilising to garner international support for Kosovo (Koinova 2021). Yet, very few migrants returned to Kosovo after the war. In fact, out-migration has gathered pace again. A struggling economy, corruption and a sense of powerlessness among young people in post-war Kosovo, has pushed many younger Kosovars looking to build a future beyond the country’s borders. A growing number of people emigrate to EU countries for study, work or family (re)union every year. Kosovo diaspora plays an immense role in daily lives of Kosovar citizens in the form of remittances, the “Western” spirit they bring along with their visits and engagement in circular migration and the business investment. Remittances per annum are estimated to be over e1 billion, which is roughly 1/3 of Kosovo’s government annual budget or 1/5 of its GDP. According to Kosovo’s Central Bank (BQK), in 2021, remittances from diaspora reached e1.44 billion, 40% of which came from Germany (Shala 2022). It is estimated that since 2008, diaspora sent some e13.5 billion

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to Kosovo. This amount is almost ten times more than the money that the EU invested in Kosovo over the same period of time. While diaspora remittances are a mainstay of the family economy, equally important is the money that they spend in shops, cafes and restaurants during their extended holidays in their homeland. Most members of the diaspora maintain active family ties in Kosovo and tend to visit the country regularly. In the summer and winter holiday months, the Kosovo border (air and land) authorities record unusually high influx of entries to and exit from the country (Bami 2021). This makes Pristina Airport the second (after Belgrade) busiest airport in the post-Yugoslav region (EX-YU Aviation News 2022). Importantly, most of these people are EU (permanent) residents or citizens. According to the data provided by the Ministry of Interior, some 5,000 citizens renounce their Kosovar citizenship each year as a result of naturalisation in a foreign (mostly EU) country, bringing the number of people who lost Kosovar citizenship since 2009 to over 50,000 (KosovaPress 2022). Out migration has been aided by labour-hungry parts of Europe like Germany, making it easier for citizens of non-EU countries to get work permits. This is part of a wider regional trend, where migration coupled with low birth rates is leading to huge population declines (Judah 2020). The trend of migration of young people is particularly worrying for Kosovo. For instance, in December 2021, 56,639 people applied at the German Embassy in Kosovo for 460 available slots for work visas (Shabani 2022). This is as much as 30% of all applications for work visas from the Western Balkan countries. Only in 2019, the German Embassy issued more than 15,000 long-term visas that include work-visas, family reunion or study-visas. This growing interest to migrate is also reflected in various surveys. An IRI (2021) poll found that when asked if they would take the opportunity to go abroad for a period longer than a vacation, 78% of Kosovars between the age of 18 and 35 responded “definitely yes” or “probably yes”. The ever-growing Kosovar diaspora in the EU has become a crucial financial source for Kosovo, but also an important political and cultural bridge that connects the country with major EU member states. Importantly, while Kosovo’s EU prospects remain hindered by the status dispute and EU’s enlargement fatigue, a growing number of Kosovars already live in the EU, with many enjoying the rights and privileges of European citizenship. As a result of this reality, where almost 1/3 of Kosovars live abroad (mostly in the EU), as well as their close ties with the country

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of origin, the EU is not considered by Kosovars simply as a “promised land”. Rather, in a society where every second person has a close relative or friend in the EU, there is an element of indirect “lived experience” of “Europe” even for those who are still residing in Kosovo and cannot travel visa-free.

4

Conclusions

This chapter has analysed the factors that explain the high support for EU integration in Kosovo, despite the country’s complex relations with the EU and its distant prospect of joining the block. It shed light on the two key factors that explain EU’s highly positive perceptions in Kosovo. First, Kosovo’s EU membership is widely seen as being constitutive of statehood. Due to EU’s role in state-building and consolidation, but also due to the fact that Albanian nationalism in Kosovo since the early 1990s has been closely connected to the concept of Euro-Atlantic integration, Kosovo’s leaders perceive adherence to European values and eventual EU membership as an added value to the state itself. Therefore, although there might be a sense that the EU can be harsh, unfair—as is the case with its prolonged decision to grant Kosovo visa-free travel—and paternalising, nonetheless the EU remains indispensable for Kosovo to consolidate its statehood. Second, despite lagging behind the region in terms of EU integration, EU has become part of the living experience of a large part of the population. Roughly 1/3 of Kosovo’s citizens already reside/live in EU countries, with many more emigrating for study, work or family (re)union every year. Kosovo diaspora continues to play an immense role in daily lives of Kosovar citizens in the form of remittances, the “Western” spirit they bring along with their visits and engagement in circular migration and business investment. Although many migrants from Kosovo have renounced their Kosovar citizenship to be naturalised in EU countries, roughly half a million EU citizens of Kosovar origin consider Kosovo their first or second “home”. Through their close family connections and networks as well as regular visits, they have contributed to erecting important bridges with various EU countries and societies. To conclude, Kosovo, together with the EU and Serbia, are caught up in a political and legal quagmire about statehood that has become frustrating for Kosovars but impossible to escape. In many ways, Kosovo

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lacks both alternatives and leverage that could be used to force a positive change in its relations with the EU. Yet, there is a growing sense among politicians and people that the EU is unfair. Thus, while it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict any major shift in the popular attitudes towards the EU soon, there is a risk that the actual or perceived EU unfairness and double standards could be used by new political actors for their own populist/nationalist/authoritarian interests, similarly to what recently happened in North Macedonia under Nikola Gruevski. The more realistic scenario, though, is that any even symbolic step towards membership in the near future or imminent visa liberalisation, can reinforce the “Euro-Atlantic integration” political discourse, not least because Kosovo’s EU membership is seen as being constitutive of statehood. In sum, Kosovo’s EU membership remains highly desirable, yet probably impossible, at least for the time being.

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EX-YU Aviation News (2022). Former Yugoslavia’s 24 Airports Handle 13.8 Million Passengers. EX-YU Aviation News, 27 August. https://www.exyuav iation.com/2022/08/former-yugoslavias-24-airports-handle.html?m=1. Haxhikadrija, A. (2009). Diaspora as a Driving Force for Development in Kosovo: Myth or Reality? Pristina: Forum for Democratic Initiatives with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Hopkins, V. (2019). Kosovo ‘Enslaved from Within’ by Corruption, Says Incoming PM. Financial Times, December 12. https://www.ft.com/con tent/ddc2f794-060e-11ea-a984-fbbacad9e7dd. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2021). Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue, Report 262. Europe & Central Asia, 25 January. https://www.cri sisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/262-relaunching-kosovoserbia-dialogue. International Republican Institute (IRI) (2021). Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Kosovo. https://www.iri.org/resources/iri-kosovo-poll-shows-strongdesire-among-youth-to-leave-dim-views-on-economy-and-corruption-strongsupport-for-western-institutions/. International Republican Institute (IRI) (2022). Western Balkans Regional Survey 2022. https://www.iri.org/resources/2022-western-balkans-regional-surveyjanuary-february-2022/. Judah, T. (2020). Emigration and Low Birth Rates Are Affecting the Balkans. The Economist, 17 November. https://www.economist.com/the-worldahead/2020/11/17/emigration-and-low-birth-rates-are-affecting-the-bal kans. KOHA (2022). Baerbock: Kosova e ka kryer punën e saj për vizat [Baerbock: Kosovo Has Done Its Part for Visas]. Koha, 10 March. https://www.koha. net/arberi/315111/kurti-siguron-ministren-baerbock-kosova-partnere-e-qen drueshme-e-gjermanise/. Koinova, M. (2021). Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Koneska, C. Huski´c, A. and Krasniqi, G. (2022). Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo: Contested Statehood and the EU. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. KosovaPress. (2022). A Large Number of Young People Renounce Kosovo Citizenship, KosovaPress. https://kosovapress.com/en/a-large-number-of-youngpeople-renounce-kosovo-citizenship/. Krasniqi, G. (2011). The ‘Forbidden Fruit’: Islam and Politics of Identity in Kosovo and Macedonia. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, 191–207. Krasniqi, G. and Musaj, M. (2015). The EU’s ‘Limited Sovereignty—Strong Control’ Approach in the Process of Member State Building in Kosovo. In The EU and Member State Building: European Foreign Policy in the Western

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Balkans, edited by Soeren Keil and Zeynep Arkan. London: Routledge, 140– 162. Krasniqi, G. and Prenkaj, A. (2020). US and EU Policy on Kosovo is in Disarray. Balkan Insight, 17 June. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/06/17/us-andeu-policy-on-kosovo-is-in-disarray/. Maliqi, B. (2015). Lista Serbe Përkrah MSA-në [Serb List supports SAA]. Kallxo, 2 November. https://kallxo.com/shkurt/permbledhje-lajmeve/listaserbe-perkrah-msa-ne/. Oklopcic, Z. (2009). Populus Interruptus: Self Determination, the Independence of Kosovo, and the Vocabulary of Peoplehood. Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, 677–702. Phillips, D. L. (2002). Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and US Intervention. Cambridge: MIT Press. Pickel, G. and Öztürk, C. (2021). The Varying Challenge of Islamophobia for the EU: On Anti-Muslim Resentments and Its Dividend for Right-Wing Populists and Eurosceptics—Central and Eastern Europe in a Comparative Perspective. In Illiberal Trends and Anti-EU Politics in East Central Europe, edited by A. Lorenz and L.H. Anders. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) (2021). Balkan Barometer 2021: Public Opinion. Analytical Report. Sarajevo. https://www.rcc.int/pubs/122/bal kan-barometer-2021--public-opinion. Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) (2022). Balkan Barometer 2022: Public Opinion. Analytical Report. Sarajevo. https://www.rcc.int/balkanbarometer/ home. Sadriu, B. (2015). Rhetorical Strategies of Kosovo’s Imams in the Fight for ‘Women’s Rights. In The Revival of Islam in the Balkans. The Islam and Nationalism Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Sekularac, I. and Emmott, R. (2022). Balkans Losing Hope of Progress on EU Membership. Reuters, 22 June. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/bal kans-losing-hope-progress-eu-membership-2022-06-22/. Shabani, N. (2022). Mbi 56 mijë kosovarë aplikuan për terminë, për viza pune në Gjermani. KOHA, 6 January. https://www.koha.net/arberi/304658/mbi56-mije-kosovare-aplikuan-per-termine-per-viza-pune-ne-gjemani/. Shala, F. (2022). Emigrantët dërguan 1.44 miliardë euro në Kosovë në 2021. Monitor.al, 10 February. https://www.monitor.al/emigrantet-derguan-1-44miliarde-euro-ne-kosove-ne-2021/. Smith, A. (2022). Net Support for Ukraine Joining EU in Key European Nations. YouGov, 28 March. https://yougov.co.uk/topics/international/ articles-reports/2022/03/29/net-support-ukraine-joining-eu-key-europeannation. Wählisch, M. and Xharra, B. (2010). Public Diplomacy of Kosovo Status Quo: Challenges and Options. Pristina: Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation. https://library. fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kosovo/07845.pdf.

CHAPTER 16

The Perception of the European Union and Its Policies: A View from Montenegro Gordana Ðurovi´c

1

Introduction

The European Union (EU) commitment to enlargement continues to represent a strategic investment in peace, democracy, prosperity, security and stability in Europe. Recalling the Thessaloniki Agenda and the Sofia, Zagreb and Brdo Declarations, the General Affairs Council again reiterated the EU’s unequivocal support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans in December 2021. The EU will further strengthen and intensify its engagement at all levels to support the region’s political, economic and social transformation, not only through continued assistance based on tangible progress on the rule of law and socio-economic reforms, but also through partners’ adherence to EU values, rules and standards (GAC 2021). This was the official EU approach towards the enlargement countries since the first Stabilization and Association Report in April 2002.

G. Ðurovi´c (B) University of Podgorica, Podgorica, Montenegro e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_16

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After 22 years, only Croatia has successfully completed the process, while the other countries cannot be satisfied with the dynamics of association or accession talks. The main challenges remain in the areas of the rule of law, economic governance, low competitiveness, public administration reform and utilization of pre-accession assistance. They are followed by country specific constraints. A complex process of relations normalization between Belgrade and Priština is key, given that a strong spillover effect is spreading through the region and causing destabilization, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia. Thanks to this sensitive issue, WB6 “enlargement countries” became in all recent declarations only “partners” from the Western Balkan region. Instead of “enlargement countries”, they became “administrations” or simply “economies”. The enlargement portfolio was a separate Directorate General (DG) only in the first Barosso Commission (2004–2010) and later became DG for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy (2010–2014), expanding responsibility to six countries of the Eastern European Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). In the Juncker Commission (2014–2019), DG for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations expanded responsibility to the southern neighbours (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia). The wider the portfolio became, the lower the enlargement policy was on the list of priorities. Instead of the usual wording of “the accession negotiations” in line with Article 49 of the Treaty of the EU, the novelty of “the enlargement negotiations” means, in fact, that the focus of the process was reallocated from the candidate countries to the EU itself and internal EU relations related to lack of consensus on further enlargement. Today, we have DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (2019–2024) with a serious slowdown in the dynamics of integration. One can almost talk about the blockade of the process, especially in reference to North Macedonia and Albania. Only on 19 July 2022 did the EU start the opening phase of the accession negotiations with these two countries. Partners from the Western Balkan region failed to “deliver measurable results”, while the EU defends itself with new methodologies and clusters, buying time for some new commission. On 28 February 2022, as Russian tanks and artillery advanced on Kyiv, Ukraine signed an application to join the EU and requested for a special admission procedure, as a call for help in fighting this dreadful war. The

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Council has acted swiftly and invited the Commission on 11 March 2022 to submit its opinion on that application in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties. “Ukraine belongs to our European family”—it is stated in the Versailles Declaration (European Council 2022). At the same time, Georgia and Moldova submitted their applications and the Council has also invited the Commission to submit its opinions. With this approach, the EU sent a signal of solidarity and support to the people of Ukraine. After Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova submitted their applications for EU membership, the previously evident differences among Western Balkan aspirants, with a clear European perspective given in Thessaloniki in 2003, and Eastern neighbours without that promise, are somehow disappearing. At its historic summit in Brussels in June 2022, the European Council decided to open the prospects of EU membership to the “Associated Trio” of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Ukraine and Moldova have also been granted accession candidate status. A new report from the Commission was prepared in the meantime. The question is how the increase in the number of potential candidates and candidates for EU membership will affect the position and integration dynamic of the Western Balkan partners.

2

Support for EU Integration in Montenegro

Today, the European integration vision remains the same as 70 years ago—peace, prosperity, stability and a system of values. These values are becoming especially important for small, open, and at the same time, multi-confessional and multi-ethnic communities, such as Montenegro. This year, Montenegro will mark a decade of EU accession negotiations. Citizens’ support for European integration has fluctuated: from the postreferendum euphoria in 2006 with over 82% support, through a gradual downward trend after facing the first serious obstacles in the accession negotiations (Fig. 1). The first significant dip in EU support was registered between the decision on candidate country status and the struggle for the opening date of the accession negotiations with the Union in 2011, while the second dip

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354 85 80 75 70 65 60 55

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75.976.1 72.8 73.9 72.4 70.8 70.4 70.3

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67.9 63.7 63.3 63 61.7 6161.6

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Fig. 1 Support for Montenegro’s accession to the EU: In your opinion, should Montenegro be a member of the European Union? (in %) (Source: www.cedem. me)

came with the slowdown in integration dynamics due to lack of progress in the rule of law and unofficial activation on the balance clause1 in 2017. Negotiations dragged on, the Union became less visible in the country, so support for integration in August 2020 was only 54%. It was the lowest level ever recorded since such research has been conducted in Montenegro. However, only a year later, after major political changes in Montenegro, support has grown sharply, to over 70% and this trend continues today. According to DeFacto public opinion polls in January 2022, support is around 75% (DeFacto 2022). This turn towards the Union is not the result of the dynamics of integration, on the contrary, it is the result of an evident slowdown on the EU path. The evident insufficient presence of the EU in the region has worsened the overall relations between neighbouring countries and has led to the growth of external influences such as those of Russia and China, whose

1 An overall balance in the progress of negotiations across chapters should be ensured

with a focus on progress in chapters 23 & 24. The balance clause, as part of the General EU position for negotiations with Montenegro (2012) and Serbia (2014), is applied in cases when the reform process in the rule of law area is lagging far behind the process of alignment with the EU as a whole. In that case, no further chapters will be opened and/ or closed until this imbalance is addressed.

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effects are especially evident in Montenegro. In its 2021 Report, the EC confirmed that “Bilateral relations with Serbia were marked by tensions, allegations of external influence during electoral periods and in connection with issues and events linked to the Serbian Orthodox Church, leading to an increase in nationalistic rhetoric” (European Commission 2021). In addition, the EU enlargement countries in the Western Balkans are already being hit particularly hard by attacks in the form of foreign interference and disinformation campaigns stemming mostly from Russia, but also within neighbouring countries. The European Parliament already expresses its concern regarding “Russia’s efforts to exploit ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans in order to inflame conflicts and divide communities, which could lead to the destabilization of the whole region” and “concern about the attempts by the Orthodox Church in countries such as Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in its entity the Republic of Srpska, to promote Russia as a protector of traditional family values and fortify relations between state and church” (European Parliament 2022). Still deep in the COVID-19 pandemic, Montenegro has found itself divided between strategic foreign policy priorities, foreign interferences, deep domestic divisions, weakened institutions, unstable Government and a deepening political and security crisis. Hence, support for the EU is growing as political, security and economic conditions deteriorate. In the conditions of growing uncertainty and deep divisions within Montenegrin society, the EU is perceived as the only right path. And only in that way, Montenegro can return to the path of political stability and economic prosperity.

3 European Integration of Montenegro SWOT Analysis We will now summarize the main effects and costs of integration based on the current European path of Montenegro. We apply the modified European integration SWOT analysis,2 in order to determine: (1) strengths of integration, (2) weaknesses—economic challenges and investments in 2 SWOT analysis is a strategic planning technique that provides assessment tools. Identifying core Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats leads to fact-based analysis and future perspectives of an organization, industry, initiative, or process.

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the integration process, (3) opportunities for more dynamic democratic and economic reforms and (4) risks during the membership negotiations process. 3.1

Strengths of Integration

• The general benefits of integration have remained unchanged: peace, stability, prosperity and European values. They are strongly promoted in the country that is negotiating EU membership; • Montenegro establishes institutional ties with the EU, from the full harmonization of common foreign and security policy positions (CFSP), through gradual harmonization of legislations with the Acquis, the establishment of new institutions in the country, to the improvement of the business environment and gradual adoption of the European standards in all spheres of everyday life; • Strengthening of the key enlargement pillars in the country: rule of law, economic governance and public administration reform; Rule of Law • More efficient judiciary—one of the key areas for the integration process, the subject of special attention in the accession talks between Montenegro and the EU; • Stronger protection of the fundamental rights, along with better protection of property rights; • Stronger fight against corruption at all levels, including high level political corruption, fight against organized crime, money laundering and financing terrorism; • Support for dynamic democratic reforms with focus on the election legislation; • Visa liberalization and gradual growth of mobility of all factors, with focus on free movement of persons; • Cooperation in the area of judiciary, human rights protection, police and customs; • IPA support for democratic reforms, media freedom and stronger voice of the CSOs.

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Economic Governance and Raising Competitiveness • Harmonization of legislation improves the overall legal system in the country, including transparency, predictability and property rights protection that improve the local business environment for domestic and foreign companies/investors; • Trade liberalization and introduction of the EU standards of custom, foreign trade and investment promotion policy encourage economic cooperation with the EU companies including FDI inflows, facilitating trade and creating preconditions for export growth to the EU market (trade creation, trade diversification and FDI); • Economic and financial dialogue between the EU and Montenegro strongly supports fulfilment of the economic accession criteria (a functioning market economy in place that has the capacity to withstand competitive pressure inside the EU single market), common annual monitoring and steer of the economy through the Mediumterm Economic Reform Programme (ERP). The fundamentals first approach to the EU enlargement encourages aspiring members to tackle economic fundamentals first: macroeconomic stability, a welcoming business environment, functioning labour and financial markets, good levels and quality of education, infrastructure, innovation and economic integration with the EU and the world; it is the so-called WB6 Light European Semester as a specific method of preparation for future participation in the European Semester; • The ERP programmes support prioritization of investment and focus on key structural reforms; the ERP cycle produces the annual EC evaluation with policy guidance for the next midterm cycle; • Market opening puts pressure but, at the same time, encourages the growth of competitiveness of domestic companies, in order to remain present in the domestic market, but also to gain access to the EU market; • Economic and financial dialogue between the EU and Montenegro also supports better public debt management through development and common monitoring of the Public Finance Management programme, the Mid-term Public Debt Management strategy and the Fiscal strategy; • Use of valuable European currency (euro) in Montenegro since 2002;

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• Following the EU Green Deal agenda and developing of sustainable and climate neutral country by 2050; • Research, science and education sectors at all levels have a special benefit—participation in the Union programmes, especially in the European Higher Education Area initiatives, which encourages an increase in competitiveness, further reforms of the education sector, student and teacher mobility, strengthening the research base of the Montenegrin institutions and internationalization of curricula in all fields of science; • European standards are introduced in all spheres of economic policies and sectors of economic activities, strengthening innovation policy and encouraging technology transfer; • European standards are particularly valuable in the areas of environmental protection, product safety, consumer protection, competition and state aid, intellectual property rights protection and other common EU policies; • Better supply of the domestic market (and tourist offer) with quality and more affordable products from the EU countries, which is a benefit for consumers and tourist industry; • More economic opportunities provide more opportunities for GDP growth: the possibility of cooperation, networking and connecting with stronger industries and availability of new technological, organizational and managerial knowledge; • Growing pre-accession financial assistance (national, regional, crossborder and transnational) strongly supports overall democratic and economic reforms in the country (national IPA was up to 1.1% of GDP per year in key sectors in the period 2007–2020)— through the programming and implementation of the IPA projects. The administrative capacities of Montenegro’s administration are strengthened, which is a necessary precondition for the preparation of absorption capacities for the EU cohesion policy. The Western Balkan Investment Framework and the Connectivity agenda support construction of the regional infrastructure with a concentration of the IPA support and European banks’ loans to the regional project of common interests (“bankable projects”); inclusion in European transport and energy networks; • Crisis support, especially the new health and economic crisis caused by the pandemic COVID-19. The EU has provided significant support to the region and Montenegro, not only financial but also

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technical, and inclusion in the so-called Green lanes for fast procurement of valuable medical equipment and easier cross-border trade, especially at the very beginning of a pandemic. Public Administration Capacities • Administrative capacity building and functioning within the European administrative space: strengthening the administrative capacities of Montenegrin institutions, which are trained to cooperate with the EU institutions and agencies, Member State’s institutions and to function in a complex decision-making process in the Union; • Better public services: through the process of transferring knowledge, digitalization, institutional memory and understanding of the EU supranational system, it is possible to improve the work of Montenegro’s institutions, which thus become a better provider of public services to citizens and businesses; • Strengthening local self-government units and their administrative and financial capacities, while balancing the decentralization level.

3.2

Weaknesses—Economic Challenges and Necessary Investments in the Integration Process

• Open market for EU and CEFTA companies in the medium term: no customs duties on all industrial products and the majority of agricultural products. There are customs duties up to 50% of their level for third countries only for the group of most sensitive agricultural products, namely 353 out of 3324 AGRI tariff lines, or 10.6% in the SAA since 2012; the CEFTA 2006 trade was fully liberalized in 2014 (SAA 2007). Trade liberalization is good from the point of view of consumers and better supply, but not from the point of view of local producers due to their low level of competitiveness; more attractive and high-quality goods of European companies have arrived, conquering the space of domestic goods and services providers on the local market. In this way, the pressure coming from the large markets on the growth of competitiveness of domestic companies is at the same time the benefit of integration, but also a risk for those companies that cannot become competitive, to get into a serious problems of placement of goods on the domestic market.

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It is obvious that a number of local SMEs will cease to operate. The longer the accession process, the greater is the risk of closing down less competitive firms. There is strong support for these small firms and farms as part of the EU cohesion policy and CAP for the member states, especially for undeveloped and sparsely populated areas. Short term effects of trade liberalization: These effects have already been paid, especially in the industrial sector through the further de-industrialization and de-agrarization process. Numerous less competitive companies, mostly privatized, have been closed in the metal sector, mining, textile sector, shipyards, wood processing industry, food processing industry and construction sector. On the other side, some new SMEs have been established, but mostly in the service sector. These trends have led to the deepening of structural problems of the Montenegrin economy, namely to an extremely high degree of vulnerability of the import-dependent economy to external shocks, high dependence on tourism and related services, a gap between labour market needs and education sector supply, less competitive agricultural and food processing sector and negative internal migration from the underdeveloped north region to Podgorica and the Coastal region. The participation of agriculture and industry sector in the BDP is 8% and 12%, respectively, while 82% employees are in the service sector in 2020 (MONSTAT 2022). Unemployment risk and negative internal migrations: Average company life has shortened. Continuous adjustment to the tough conditions of growing competition is required, leading to unemployment growth and strong migration flows from the North to the Central and the Coastal regions. External labour force migrations: The local labour market is increasingly experiencing seasonal labour force shortages in tourism, construction and agriculture, as well as serious labour force deficits in the health and ICT sectors. High costs of economic reform, establishment of institutions and harmonization of legislation: The costs of strengthening administrative capacity and necessary investments in adopting the EU standards for a small country such as Montenegro are relatively higher, amounting to 2–4% of GDP per year, based on the experience of previous enlargement countries (e.g. Slovenia). Particularly,

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large allocations are necessary for environmental protection. In addition, it was necessary to establish dozens of new institutions and bodies, but this led to a dynamic growth of employment in the public administration. • Risk of effective use and potential misuse of pre-accession funds : EU funds must be withdrawn, i.e. spend, according to the strict EU rules and it is necessary to fulfil the commitments under IPA projects. Potential risks include the following: unwillingness of the country/ underdeveloped administrative capacity to withdraw funds, possible misuse of IPA funds, freezing of funds because of some backsliding in democratic reforms, risk of non-withdrawal due to a modest strategic planning capacities and lack of spatial planning documents, fulfilment of the obligation to provide co-financing (in conditions of reduction of public spending and underdeveloped multi-annual budget planning). The IPA projects should be prepared in a timely manner (project documentation, clear ownership relations, plans and cost estimates) following the “n + 2” rule.3 The project documentation must be kept for at least seven years, in order to ensure the possibility of control. There is a risk of reimbursement in case of misuse, even after several years. The AFCOS—the office of the first level of control over the spending of IPA funds—started to work with limited administrative capacities, as well as the independent audit body responsible for control of managing of IPA funds, support accountability and transparency in the use of funds by making audit recommendations and directly reported to the Commission. Montenegro has already faced a reduction in IPA II (2014–2020), due to withdrawals in the areas of competitiveness, environment and IPARD funding. Disclosure of this data could have a very negative impact on citizens’ support for the country’s European integration. • Undeveloped infrastructure and lack of funds for infrastructure investments: IPA can provide only about 10% of the necessary investments in infrastructure, but also the adoption of EU standards in

3 N + 2 rule relates to financing rules for the annual allocation of money from the European Structural and Investment Funds and accordingly applies to the IPA. If the funding in question has not been spent by that date, the Commission can “decommit” future budget allocations. Automatic decommitments are made if funding is not spent, or requests for payments are not made, by the end of the second year (n + 2).

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various areas (including the construction of various laboratories, with qualified and trained staff), while for other investment plans the country must find additional sources of financing for development projects, in accordance with sustainable public finance management.

3.3

Opportunities for More Dynamic Democratic and Economic Reforms

• An informal “non-aggression pact” of political parties regarding EU priorities: All issues of special importance for the dynamics of integration and European commitment should be discussed by the legislative power as soon as possible (i.e. proposals of harmonized legislation marked with the EU flag); this was a good practice of the previous waves of enlargement. In the case of Montenegro, this possibility has not yet been used. • Consensus on the EU : A political consensus on the EU will encourage consensus on the country’s development strategy, speeding up economic development. • Improving the dialogue in the country between different actors: The EU mediates sensitive reforms such as judicial reform or electoral legislation reform and even proposes constitutional reforms. In politically unstable times, representatives of the EU institutions may also be authorized to facilitate dialogue between the country’s political parties, especially in the preparation of elections or of a referendum (as was the case in Montenegro in 2006). • Strong EU support for democratic reforms and strengthening of democratic institutions: Democracy needs strong and accountable institutions and participatory processes, centred around the national parliament. Transparent, accountable and effective public administration is vital and it means professionalization and de-politicization of the civil service; strengthening of the independence and effectiveness of key bodies (Ombudsman, State Audit Institutions, Anti-Corruption Agency, etc.) need to be ensured and their recommendations appropriately followed-up. • A stronger role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): It is crucial to strengthen participatory democracy and increase focus on the needs of citizens and firms. The CSOs’ projects support the growing importance of the involvement of various stakeholders in

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the dialogue on the country’s European integration perspective. A more inclusive dialogue and public debate on reform priorities and strategic investment is needed, an issue that the EU insists on. Stronger protection of fundamental rights : It is important to develop a climate of tolerance and respect where every citizen is treated without discrimination on the basis of gender, racial or ethnic group, religion or belief, sexual orientation, disability or age. With the EU support, the country strongly respects freedom of assembly and expression, as well as media freedom and values on which the EU project is built. A more efficient governance and “Europeanisation” as an engine of changes: More efficient governance is being introduced through the mechanism of the European Semester for the candidate countries that includes the regular adoption of the Economic Reform Programmes based on the Commission’s recommendations and joint monitoring of its implementation—analysis of macroeconomic situation and trends in the country, control of fiscal indicators, sustainable public finances, prioritization of the structural reforms, etc. European economic integration: The process of economic integration enables the strengthening of economic cooperation among countries through trade growth, FDI inflows and increase in business opportunities. Strengthening the role of local communities and greater support for agriculture and rural development: This is another opportunity that ought to enable knowledge transfer, training, market research, technical support mechanisms, the establishment of European integration units within the local self-governments, thus support to all local actors in the preparation of EU project proposals, as well as cross-border partnerships in areas of common interest (application and implementation of EU-funded projects). More opportunities for reduction of the regional development gaps: Another opportunity lies in strengthening the economic, social and territorial integration of the country and the integration of statistical regions into a single national development plan, which could also imply preparing the development directions of Montenegro as a medium-term development strategy, the Smart Specialization Strategy, sector strategies, strategic documents on climate changes and green and digital development.

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• The EU pre-accession assistance: EU financial support is a powerful instrument of fostering democratic and economic reforms in the country; it is likely to have a positive impact on the mobilization of funds for investments from both domestic and international sources (public and private), as well as through mixed forms of mobilization of financial resources for development. All these forms of cooperation regarding the additional mobilization of funds for investment contribute to the further institutional strengthening of the Montenegrin administration, and vice versa.

3.4

Threats—Risks During the Accession Negotiations Process

• Weak communication strategy, especially in the final phase of the accession process: The action plan and the budget of the communication strategy are never sufficient. Mobilizing resources for these activities is key to bringing the idea of integration and the “life” of Montenegrin citizens within the Union closer to everyone—not just those who really want it, but especially those who do not understand the process or are afraid of the changes it brings (which might be negatively reflected in one’s way of life, sources of income and overall living environment). • Hidden resistance to integration as fear of “de-sovereignization”: Montenegro regained independence after 88 years, in 2006. Despite the prevailing opinion that we do not have declared Euro-sceptics in political groups or among key actors in the country, there is a possibility of latent resistance to dynamic integration, as a reaction to growing “interference” of Brussels on key political and economic issues in the country, already at an early stage of the accession process. • Turning to populism: After 22 years of the Stabilization and Association process and 10 years of EU accession negotiations, it is not an easy task to save the enthusiasm for integration and credibility of the EU enlargement strategy. The long duration of the process and the weak presence of the Union in the Western Balkans in recent years negatively affect citizens’ support for deeper democratic and economic reforms. Rising income and wealth inequality as well as economic insecurity fuels popular resentment of the political elites and influences their return to populist rhetoric. The speeches of local

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politicians are “full” of Europe and European integration commitments, not as an incentive for reforms but rather as an acceptable story for election campaigns and public appearances (verbal abuse of the “vocabulary” of the EU agenda is used as a cover for postponing essential reforms by political elites). The commitment fatigue in the region, including Montenegro, is a reaction to the enlargement fatigue in the EU. In addition, the growth of populism, nationalism, phenomena such as “post-truth”, “fake news” and “hate speech” on social networks, strongly affect all countries of the world, especially small countries such as Montenegro. • Endangering the concept of civic state, electoral engineering and the growth of ethnic distance: Since regaining independence in 2006, the growth in the number of municipalities in Montenegro is evident, many of which are ethnically homogeneous municipalities with a predominant minority population (e.g. Bosniaks in the municipality Petnjica, or Albanians in municipality Tuzi). In addition, the number of newly established political parties is also growing, and the majority of them are political parties representing minorities (using the “principle of the affirmative action”, Art. 79 of the Constitution), which in the long-run has a negative impact on the civic concept of the state (“Montenegro is a civil, democratic, ecological and state of social justice, based on the rule of law”, Art. 1 of the Constitution). Ethnic distances are growing with the participation of a number of political parties with a national sign, with a declining trend of support to the civic parties; Recently, it has been recognized as the “Bosnianization” of Montenegro’s society (Vujovi´c 2022), i.e. division established on ethnicity, especially with the mentioned pronounced growth in the number of municipalities dominated by political parties or coalitions created on an ethnic basis. Under conditions of many years of political crisis and unstable Governments, deterioration of the security situation in the country, serious foreign interference in internal affairs, pro-Serbian and traditional minority parties (representing Albanians, Bosniaks and Croats) seek to homogenize their electoral body. On the other hand, given that there is no majority ethnic group in Montenegro, this causes the strengthening of the pro-Montenegrin ethnic dimension among other parties, which further strengthens the ethnic distance between Montenegro’s citizens. This is room for a stronger EU presence in the country and support in preserving the valuable heritage of

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Montenegrin society as a civic state, in which there is a space for all confessions, ethnic groups and cultural diversity. Throughout its centuries-old history, Montenegro has been an example of multiethnic and multi-confessional harmony that can be called “Europe in small”, and it should remain so. • Reduction of Government’s discretion power in conducting economic policies: The discretion rights of Governments of candidate countries in conducting economic policy is significantly and gradually reduced, especially in the field of debt management and subsidies (the EU pays special attention to issues of competition and state aid). In this context, it is necessary to negotiate transitional periods for all policy changes carefully and have a reasonable explanation for decisions and actions in these areas. Processes are becoming more transparent and key information needs to be published. Sometimes, the Government’s intention is to postpone this reduction of discretion power. • The surplus of “conditionality”(s) as a consequence of weak institutions and lack of citizen’s trust: This can be presented on the example of EU’s insistence on changing the highest legal act in the early phase of the integration process: we have witnessed many years of “soft” pressure from the EU to change the Constitution, as the highest legal act, in the early stages of the integration process, in order to encourage more transparent reforms in the judiciary (changes in the procedures for the election of key positions in the judiciary, the election and competencies of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, the position of the Constitutional Court, etc.). All high-ranking European officials sent “messages and recommendations” to change the Constitution, as this is a condition for opening key negotiating chapters in the rule of law area (chapters 23 and 24). Since gaining the status of candidate for membership in the Union (December 2010), this set of recommendations was first officially presented to Montenegro’s authorities. Through many years of difficult negotiations and with the support of several opinions prepared by the Venice Commission, the Montenegrin Parliament finally adopted a set of constitutional amendments on 31 July 2013 (Constitution 2013). In the following years, it turned out that a two-thirds majority in the Parliament of Montenegro was an almost impossible mission to achieve and even three-fifths majority is rarely possible for the appointments of the Head of Supreme State Prosecutor, half of

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the members of the Judicial Council and judges of the Constitutional Court. Instead of faster judicial reforms, Montenegro entered into a deep political crisis. These positions are without appointments or with acting positions, and political parties started openly to trade with these issues, putting the party interests above the public interest. The first signs of small progress in these appointments were in February 2022, but the ongoing and deep political crisis makes this process extremely uncertain. The second example is the EU recommendation in the case of complete decriminalization of defamation in 2009. Time has shown that it was premature for steps in this direction, given the overall situation in the country and the region. Instead of improved political dialogue on the public scene, there has been a deterioration in the quality of public dialogue, especially dialogue in the Parliament of Montenegro. The lessons learned from these examples can be summarized as follows: any EU recommendation should be carefully analysed and implemented into the national legal framework, taking into account the local context, potential risks and misuse of these changes for the political parties’ interests. Not all recommendations are based on the principle “one model suits all”, while some are not even applicable as such. It is important to listen to the EU recommendations, but not to underestimate their essence and timing. • Loss of clear boundaries between the executive and legislative power: In the numerous recommendations of the EU institutions, during the negotiation process transfer of competencies from the Government to the Parliament is often recommended, in order to make the processes more transparent, which makes the division between the executive and the legislature unclear. The executive loses some of its competencies but remains formally fully responsible for the quality of reforms required by the EU agenda; on the other side, the role of the Parliament is stronger, it seems beyond the limits of its Constitutional roles, where sometimes the control function exceeds the basic legislative function. According to the Constitution of Montenegro, “Power is regulated by the principle of division of power into legislative, executive and judicial. The relationship of power is based on balance and mutual control” (Article 11 of the Constitution of Montenegro); consequently, and in relation to the previous risk, there is a strengthening of various forms of overt or covert forms of political “trade” when it comes to the important

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legal acts and deadlines for their adoption. The abovementioned issues undermine the essence of reforms and trust in institutions. • Undeveloped institute of lobbying: There is poor representation of Montenegro before the EU institutions and member states, which needs to be significantly strengthened in the coming period. • Risk of “unprepared” entry: The first phase of the accession process creates the impression that it is going fast and at the same time increases the readiness for membership, which does not have to be the case (experiences of Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia). If the country does not strengthen its institutions and administrative capacities in parallel, the risk of formally concluding negotiations increases, although there is essentially no administrative capacity (strong institutions with trained people) to allow the country to be able to function effectively in the EU. Some EU funds and projects may be omitted because of the unprepared state and local administrations that do not know how to withdraw resources from (open) structural and investment funds. On the other side, contributions to the EU budget are fixed, so the net balance of receipts and allocations to the EU budget must be considered. That is why the key message here is to get ready for membership: “quality before speed”. • Unclear reading of the EC reports: Although Montenegro was a regional “integration leader” for years, economic and democratic reforms need to be more dynamic and measurable. Often, different domestic actors read the Commission’s assessments differently, so there is no consensus on the assessment and quality of conducted reforms in the country. The EC made some effort in the enlargement reports with the introduction of a standardized descriptive form of assessment by negotiating chapters in 2015 (assessment of the overall level of achievement of EU standards in an area and assessment of progress between the two reports in that area), and in 2020 with clustering of the chapters and developing stricter negotiation methodology, that brings preventive and corrective action if the country lags behind or backslides in key areas of reforms. We hope that the new approach will help to make a more realistic assessment of the progress made, and, in that sense, bring a better focus on key areas of reform. This would also establish a balance between assessing progress, the membership perspective and the very control of expectations—what membership brings. Montenegro significantly reduced the average mark of progress between the two reports in

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the EC 2021 Report (from 3.06 to 2.74) as a result of the radical changes of senior management and negotiation structure within the Government after the August 2020 elections (OECD 2021). • EU’s problem with respecting fundamental European values in some member states: We are also witnesses that in the Union itself there are countries that openly oppose the long-standing recommendations of the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament, regarding the respect of basic European values given in Art. 2 of the EU Treaty. The so-called nuclear clause, art. 7 of the EU Treaty, was initiated against Poland and Hungary (2017 and 2018, respectively), due to the deterioration of the system of fundamental European values in these countries. From the point of view of a candidate country that is required to make clear and unambiguous progress in these areas as a condition of future membership, concessions to these countries and the postponement of serious sanctions are perceived as a fall of confidence in the strength of the EU institutions and raises doubts about the possibility of defending fundamental democratic values in the Union itself (Priebus 2022). Confidence in the accession process and its credibility will depend on further developments in this area in the Union itself and its capacity to deal with them. Analysing the benefits and opportunities, subtracting the costs and carefully considering the risks that accompany a country’s integration process into the EU, we firmly believe that Montenegro, despite all the risks, should remain with the same strategic commitment. Our conviction is based primarily on three facts: 1. The general benefits of integration outweigh its risks and costs; 2. There are no reasonable alternatives, in today’s circumstances. The country has developed a strategic partnership with the Union after the regaining of independence. The EU remains a rational choice and a strategic foreign policy priority to be pursued. 3. Last but not least, Montenegrin citizens have quite positive expectations from the EU accession process and the support for EU membership is clear and growing. The EU accession is not only a strategic foreign policy commitment of Montenegro but also

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an optimal development strategy for the country, where membership is seen as a confirmation of a well-chosen path of constant societal changes and improvements, which does not end with the full-fledged membership. Therefore, with dedicated work, and with good communication with citizens, key actors in the process should continue to achieve this valuable goal—that is, Montenegro’s membership in the European Union.

4

Conclusions

The war in Ukraine changed the perception of Europe as a space of peace, prosperity and stability, where common European values are being created and protected. Instability, uncertainty, political tensions, military threats, energy crisis, inflation and disruptions in global value chains affect all European countries, including Montenegro. However, the ongoing war in Ukraine could not produce significant effects in favour of accelerating the process of European integration of Montenegro. There are no shortcuts. The main reason lies in the fact that the internal factors are already slowing down the process and stalling integration, and together with the tightening of EU accession criteria, they contributed to Montenegro receiving one of the worst reports on the European integration process last year. Failure to meet the interim benchmarks in the rule of law chapters had almost led to a blockade of the process. In addition, with the change of Government on 30 August 2020, the negotiating structures in the administration itself were disrupted as the new Government changed more than two-thirds of senior management in ministries and implementing agencies after a year. Instead of prioritizing the EU agenda, there were mostly intra-party conflicts in the ruling coalition, discussions on the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church in society, long and useless debates in the Montenegrin Parliament that slowed the adoption of European laws and put the integration process in the background. The Government’s economic policy has been reduced to mere populism and flattery towards potential voters of the emerging new political party. A few “apostolic” ministers openly used the name of the Government fiscal reform programme “Europe Now” as the logo for

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developing a new (own) party. In anticipation of the expected extraordinary parliamentary elections, the founding congress of the “Europe Now” movement has been announced for September 2022. A few months before the fall of the Government, on 24 January 2022, after sharp criticism from the EU, a new round of hyper-production of the European policies’ action plans began. As it could be expected, a vote of no confidence in the Government slowed down their implementation. At least, progress began to be made in the area of judicial reform (work of the Prosecutorial and the Judicial Council, the election of the Chief Special Prosecutor, a significant number of appointments of judges, etc.). Work on the next steps towards the EU is left to a new coalition Government appointed on 28 April 2022. However, the administration led by the leader of the green movement URA, Dritan Abazovi´c, became the Government with the shortest period in power in Montenegrin political history and fell on 19 August 2022, after only 114 days. The reason for the second voting no-confidence in 2022 was changing priorities and putting the contested agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church before the EU integration priorities. Starting from the still official EU Agenda 2025, the Government in technical mandate or a new, transitional one responsible to prepare the elections and the one with full legitimacy after the inevitable early parliamentary elections, is obliged to continue fighting for the EU integration goal, which is in the interest of all Montenegrin citizens. In short, this means that the Montenegrin Government should accomplish the following tasks: • By the end of 2022 or in early 2023, consolidate the negotiation structure with the line ministry responsible for the European integration process and meet the conditions for obtaining the Interim Benchmarks Accession Report (IBAR) for rule of law chapters, conducting work of the Electoral reform committee and its sub-committees in the Parliament; • In the first half of 2023, close cluster II (Internal Market) and cluster III (Competitiveness and Inclusive growth); in the second half of 2023, close cluster V (Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion); • In the first half of 2024, close cluster IV (Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity), and in the second half of 2024, close the remaining cluster I (Fundamentals). At the same time, certain deviations from this plan are possible because the new methodology does

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not prescribe the obligation to close a chapter in a cluster. Finally, during the second half of 2024, the negotiations on Chapters 34 and 35 should also be completed (Djurovi´c 2022). If Montenegro does not take advantage of this small window of opportunity related to the EU Agenda 2025, the Western Balkan convoy awaits us with all the risks that delaying the integration process carries, especially those related to security, political and economic issues. European integration is a necessary component of the consolidation of Montenegrin society, its peace, prosperity, security and affirmation of European values. The necessary cohesion of Montenegrin society, which has been seriously damaged in recent years, should be restored.

References CEDEM (2021). Istraživanje politiˇckog javnog mnjenja (https://www. cedem.me/component/jdownloads/category/29-politicko-javno-mnjenje?Ite mid=129, accessed on 15 March 2022). Constitution (2007). Amendments from I to XVI to the Constitution of Montenegro, “Official Gazette of Montenegro” no. 38/13, 02/08/2013 Parliament of Montenegro. DeFacto (2022), Stavovi gradjana o evropskim integracijama i procesu pristupanja Crne Gore Evropskoj uniji (https://www.defacto.me/aktuelnosti/pre zentovani-nalazi-istrazivanja-stavovi-gradana-o-evropskim-integracijama-i-pro cesu-pristupanja-evropskoj-uniji/, accessed on 20 March 2022). Djurovi´c, Gordana (2022). War in Ukraine and implications for Montenegro’s EU Membership, ACM Briefs April 2022, Atlantic Council of Montenegro (https://ascg.me/en/publications/, ongoing). European Commission (2007). Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part, 2007, Official Journal of the European Union, L108/I, 29/04/ 2010 (https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/stabilisation-andassociation-agreement-saa-montenegro_en, accessed on 1 March 2022). European Commission (2021). Montenegro 2021 Report, SWD (2021) 293 final/2, Strasbourg, 19.10.2021(https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/montenegro-report-2021_en, accessed on 1 March 2022). European Council (2022). Versailles Declaration, Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government, 11 March 2022 (https://www.consilium.europa. eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/11/the-versailles-declaration-10-1103-2022/, accessed on 23 March 2022).

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European Parliament (2022). European Parliament resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation, 2022/20064 (accessed on 26 March 2022). General Affairs Council (GAC) (2021). Council Conclusions on the Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process, Brussels, 14 December 2021, 15033/21 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 2021/12/14/council-conclusions-on-enlargement-and-stabilisation-and-ass ociation-process/, accessed on 22 March 2022). MONSTAT (2022). Annual GDP and Employment data (https://www.monstat. org/cg/page.php?id=19&pageid=19, accessed on 1 April 2022). OECD, SIGMA (2021). Monitoring report Montenegro, 31 November 2021 (https://www.sigmaweb.org/bycountry/montenegro/, accessed on 1 March 2022). Priebus, Sonja (2022). Watering down the ‘nuclear option’? The Council and the Article 7 dilemma, Journal of European Integration (https://doi.org/10. 1080/07036337.2022.2052055, accessed on 3 April 2022). Vujovi´c, Zlatko (2022). Mnoštvo nacionalnih i poneka grad-anska partija je scenario ve´c vid-en u BiH, Pobjeda, 04/04/2022 (https://www.pobjeda.me/ clanak/vujovic-mnostvo-nacionalnih-i-poneka-gradanska-partija-je-scenariovec-viden-u-bih, accessed on 4 April 2022).

CHAPTER 17

Reinforcing or Conflicting? European Union Conditionality and Political Socialisation During the 2015–2017 Macedonian Political Crisis Simonida Kacarska

1

Introduction

Studies on transition and democratic consolidation for more than two decades have recognised the role of international actors in democratisation processes (Pravda 2001; Smith 2002). As a result, it has been broadly accepted that political developments are the result of interactions between domestic and international actors (Schmitter 2001). Amidst the multitude of international actors engaged in the Western Balkans region, the European Union (EU) has gained prominence due to its extensive requirements for accession related to democracy and rule of law. Although

S. Kacarska (B) European Policy Institute, Skopje, Macedonia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_17

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formally directed at assisting the democratisation of the respective countries, the dynamics and outcomes of the process of EU accession in this region are not necessarily following this trajectory. In fact, the experience of both the previous 2004/2007 enlargement and the current Western Balkans example show that the EU accession process is not a guarantee for the development of substantive democracy. Theoretically, this question of impact of the EU on non-member states has been mostly analysed through the rational choice model of conditionality, with significant emphasis on the role of the European Commission in these processes. At the same time, the role of political socialisation has been rather understudied, although the literature has supported the integration of both perspectives in the study of the impact of Europe (see for example Olsen 2002). This chapter combines the two approaches by studying the operation of formal EU political conditionality and the role of political socialisation in the case of Macedonia during the 2015/ 2016 political crisis, as the only case when the Commission froze the recommendation for the start of the accession negotiations of a candidate country. Combining the two approaches, the chapter also aims at unpacking the perception of the EU in the acceding countries built through the actions of both the EU as an organisation, its institutions and member states, as well as filtered through domestic processes and actors. In the course of the period under examination, the Republic of Macedonia went through one of the biggest political crises in its history, due to a major wiretapping scandal implicating the entire state apparatus. In response, the EU intervened with a mediation exercise and the publication of a separate experts’ report criticising the state capture and corruption in the country.1 Acting as a guarantor to a political agreement on the ground, the European Commission obtained a prominent role in this agreement, including its substantive implementation as a condition for the country to regain the recommendation for the start of the accession negotiations suspended in view of rule of law concerns. At the same time, the refugee crisis increased the political socialisation of the national and EU leaders in relation to managing the flow of people from 1 Recommendations of the Senior Experts’ Group on systemic rule of law issues relating to the communications interception revealed in Spring 2015, Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/news_corner/news/news-les/20150619_recomm endations_of_the_senior_experts_group.pdf. Council of the EU.

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the region (including Macedonia) to the EU, creating a parallel channel of engagement. In light of the above, the chapter analyses the operation of the official EU conditionality as stipulated by the European Commission and the Council’s conclusions, along with statements of political leadership in the EU member states at the time, focusing on the potential reinforcement and/or opposition between the two. Doing so, the analysis includes both the formal conditionality encompassed in the EU documents, and “informal” conditionality as conceived in the statements and actions of representatives of EU member states, which act as socialising agents in this case. The chapter utilises qualitative methodology and tracing of EU documents in order to analyse the role of official EU conditionality, in combination with an analysis of statements of EU and member state officials in the course of 2015 and 2016, supplemented by interviews with the expert community in the country, including academia, CSOs and political representatives.2 The structure of the chapter is the following. It first provides a theoretical discussion of Europeanisation and conditionality, including an examination of the underpinning logics of the operation of conditionality and socialisation, in view of building the perceptions of the EU on the part of the candidate countries. Second, the chapter provides a contextual overview of the Macedonian case study and its key features in the period under examination. Third, the chapter goes on to examine the operation of conditionality through the official EU documents and the statements of key EU officials, but also EU member states representatives acting as socialising agents, in order to analyse the relationship between the two as well as the impact on the perceptions of the Union during the 2015/ 2017 political crisis. Fourth, the chapter provides a short update on key developments in the aftermath of the political crisis, with a short overview of trends in public opinion in the country. Last, the chapter summarises the main conclusions and reflects on the significance of this case study for the study of EU conditionality and Europeanisation overall.

2 A total of 7 semi-structured interviews were conducted in late 2017 for this chapter, including CSOs, state officials and academics.

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2 Europeanisation Through Conditionality and Socialisation---Theoretical Background Research examining the link between EU accession and the candidate countries has traditionally been framed in a Europeanisation and/or conditionality framework. In its broadest terms, Europeanisation for the purposes of this chapter is understood as “domestic adaptation to European regional integration” (Vink and Graziano 2007, p. 7). The majority of studies have addressed the conditions under which Europeanisation takes place, as well as its impact on policies, polity and actors, in the first instance on the EU member states (Risse et al. 2001). While originally developed in relation to EU member states, after 2000 the concept of Europeanisation has been extended to the analysis of the impact of the EU on the candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Grabbe 2006). In his overview of the Europeanisation literature in new member and candidate states, Sedelmeier (2006) argues that the Europeanisation of applicant states has been slowly established as a separate sub-field of this broader research agenda. Similarly, Grabbe (2006) underlines the need for an “analytical framework similar to that used to analyse the EU, but one that takes into account the particular characteristics that were critically different for CEE” (p. 45). Héritier (2005) describes these differences in terms of their inclusion of top-down and bottomup processes. Hence, she argues that while Europeanisation of member countries is concerned both with the top-down and bottom-up processes, the focus of the analysis in the case of candidate countries is on the former (p. 207). Moreover, the literature is largely in agreement on the specific conditions that have affected the specific form of Europeanisation in the candidate countries, such as the transition and democratic consolidation of these countries and the link of Europeanisation with accession negotiations (Héritier 2005, p. 203). Authors have commonly used a range of theoretical approaches to supplement the Europeanisation concept, most prominently through the variants of new institutionalism, ranging from rational choice institutionalism to sociological institutionalism. These approaches, which commonly compete for the understanding of the EU impact on both member and non-member states, make new institutionalism indispensable for understanding the theorisation of Europeanisation (Bulmer 2007, p. 51). Rational choice institutionalism has been mostly used for the analysis of both rule adoption and rule implementation. The internalisation of

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EU norms has been analysed through the constructivist approach of socialisation and social learning advocated by authors such as Checkel (1999). Both approaches respectively use the logic of consequences and appropriateness originating in the work of March and Olsen (1998). The “consequential frame sees political order as arising from negotiation among rational actors pursuing personal preferences or interests in circumstances in which there may be gains to coordinated action” (March and Olsen 1998, p. 949). Through the logic of appropriateness, “actions are seen as rule-based [and] human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations” (March and Olsen 1998, p. 951). Börzel and Risse (2000) have argued that the two logics, despite their analytical differences, can operate at the same time, which is a position also adopted in this chapter. Similarly, Olsen (2002) has proposed that “the way ahead lies in integrating perspectives on institutional dynamics, rather than choosing among them” (p. 944). The use of conditionality is the essential feature that distinguishes the processes of Europeanisation of the member states and the candidate countries, and thus is of interest to this research. The mechanism of conditionality was most extensively developed in the study of the Eastern enlargement of the EU, since prior to the 1990s there was no proper monitoring of conditions for accession to the EU, especially in relation to the political criteria (Pridham 2007). Similarly, “conditional accession following the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria” has been the “main thrust of EU policy in the [Balkans] region” (Elbasani 2009, p. 5). Political conditionality, which is at the core of our analysis, emphasises “respect for and the furtherance of democratic rules, procedures and values” (Pridham 2002, p. 956). More specifically, political conditionality has also been defined as a mechanism that entails the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid, trade concessions, cooperation agreements, or international organisation membership) to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles. (Smith 2001, p. 37)

Whereas the literature commonly uses both terms, democratic and political conditionality, Anastasakis (2008) in his work on the Western Balkans supports the use of the term political conditionality instead of democratic conditionality. The objective of the use of this specific terminology

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is to underline the importance of the political transformation without the unquestionable inclusion of the democratisation aspect. Anastasakis (2008) also highlights that “EU political conditionality can run counter to democratisation, at least in the short term, when some of the prescriptions prioritize law and order instead of elections and/or civil society development” (p. 366). Taking into account these debates and the official terminology adopted by the EU, our analysis, for the purpose of consistency, accepts the term political conditionality. Along similar lines, Richter (2012) argues that “the EU’s approach, which enforces both security and democracy through one instrument, namely political conditionality, has yielded only limited success and has contributed to the emergence of a conflict of objectives”. Theoretically, similarly as Europeanisation, conditionality is commonly studied with the use of rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, linked, respectively, with the logic of consequences and appropriateness originating in the work of March and Olsen (1998) discussed above. Rational choice studies commonly follow the logic of consequences, linked to the perceived benefits of conditionality. From this perspective, EU conditionality is “a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, p. 662). The success of conditionality from this standpoint depends on the high credibility of EU conditionality and the low domestic costs of rule adoption (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). On the other hand, authors like O’Brennan (2006) have recognised the importance of the logic of appropriateness, stressing that “normative explanations of the enlargement prove much more compelling than either geopolitical or economic-centred arguments” (p. 177). According to this logic, the actors are motivated by internalised values and norms. March and Olsen (1998, p. 951) argue that “appropriateness need not attend to consequences, but it involves cognitive and ethical dimensions, targets and aspirations”. As to the relationships between the two logics, March and Olsen (1998) develop four scenarios, the first of which “assumes that a clear logic dominates an unclear logic” (p. 952). For them, “when preferences and consequences are precise and identities or their rules are ambiguous, a logic of consequences tends to be more important” (p. 952). On the other hand, “when identities and their implications are clear but the implications of preferences or expected consequences are not, a logic of

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appropriateness tends to be more important” (p. 952). In any case, the authors emphasise the need to take into consideration both logics when analysing the operation of international organisations and their orders. In an analysis of the relative impact of membership conditionality incentives and socialisation, Kelley (2004) concludes that “combining both socialisation-based efforts and conditionality appears not only effective, but also wise” (p. 453). At the same time, she shows that “the question remains as to the relative impact of socialization efforts visà-vis conditionality when both efforts are used simultaneously” (Kelley 2004). This research recognises the importance of both logics and thereby emphasises the need for simultaneous examination of literature from both strands for the study of this mechanism and its impact. In a similar conceptual understanding relevant for this study, conditionality is understood as a process, which “includes not only the formal technical requirements on candidates but also the informal pressures arising from the behaviour and perceptions of actors engaged in the political process” (Hughes et al. 2005, p. 2). Analysing formal benchmarking, but also the informal guidance the countries received from the European Commission, this understanding of conditionality highlights the importance of the latter and thus seeks to uncover the unintended and indirect consequences of EU conditionality (Sasse 2009). At the same time, the study of conditionality and socialisation has not focused on political parties, which for Vachudova are “arguably the most important and most proximate source of domestic policy change—and thus of compliance or non-compliance with EU requirements” (Vachudova 2014, p. 128). The study of the operation of the logics of consequences and appropriateness of the Union in the candidate countries carries significance for the image of the EU outside its borders. The rationale for studying the external image of the EU is built on the need to challenge the EU’s own self-representation, to understand the impact of these images on the building a European identity, as well as their relevance for the broader understanding of the EU’s role in the world, including the conditions in order for the EU’s policies to be effective (Lucarelli 2014). Against this background, understanding the image of the EU in the acceding countries, such as the Western Balkans, carries a specific importance, as it is likely to have an impact of the future Union itself. As noted by Ole Elgström (2007), there is a close relationship between external images, legitimacy, effectiveness and distinctiveness: the tendency to follow the

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EU increases if the Union’s policies are seen as coherent and consistent and if they are considered legitimate. The joint operation of the two logics above is essential for the continued appeal of the Union as an anchor of stability and a normative power for transformation. Similar arguments have been made by Panagiotou (2013) as to the need to maintain the EU’s hitherto undisputable symbolic role as an “anchor” of stability, as a one-way path to prosperity and as a goal to be aspired to, to maintain the credibility and appeal in the Western Balkans. Based on the above discussion, the objective of this chapter is to examine the operation of the logic of conditionality and socialisation, foremost through the actions of the European Commission on the one hand and the socialisation of political actors on the other. While the former is easily discernible from EU documents, the impact of socialisation is approached through the actions of EU and member states representatives that have most commonly reacted in relation to events in the country under examination. The joint interactions between the two logics have a bearing on the perception of the Union in North Macedonia, as the country under examination.

3 The Macedonian Case---contextual Background of the 2015 Political Crisis The Republic of Macedonia became a candidate for EU accession at the end of 2005 and held a recommendation for the launching of the accession negotiations conditional upon a resolution of the name dispute with Greece between 2009 and 2015.3 Thereafter, between 2015 and 2017, the domestic political landscape was marked by numerous scandals and undermining of the rule of law, ranging from a revelation of a major wiretapping scandal, a (revoked) presidential pardon in April 2016, extraordinary elections at the end of 2016 and finally culminating in a difficult transfer of power and parliamentary violence in early 2017. In all of these processes, the EU was extensively engaged both in mediation efforts and as a guarantor and monitor of signed political agreements.

3 A breakthrough on the EU accession front was made possible with the signing of a historic agreement in Prespa (hereinafter Prespa Agreement) in June 2018 between Macedonia and Greece by renaming the former to North Macedonia, thus ending the 27-year dispute.

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Due to the unravelling of a major wiretapping scandal in 2015, the Commission “froze” the recommendation for accession negotiations, linking it to credible reforms in the rule of law (EC 2015a). While between 2009 and 2015 the launching of the accession negotiations was dependent solely on the resolution of the name issue, in 2015 this was no longer the case. Within the framework of its enlargement policy, the European Commission in its 2015 annual report linked extending its recommendation to open accession negotiations with the Republic of Macedonia to the “continued” implementation of the June/July political agreement and “substantial progress in the implementation of the Urgent Reform Priorities”, more specifically (EC 2015a). In the next year, in 2016, the Commission conditioned the recommendation to start the negotiations with: progress in the implementation of the Pržino Agreements, primarily organising credible elections; and significant progress in the implementation of the urgent reform priorities (EC 2016). Between 2015 and 2017, it repeatedly called for systemic reforms in the rule of law, due to capturing of the state by political parties in power (see EC 2016). Due to the magnitude and public nature of the scandal and the significant democratic backsliding, the European Commission outsourced the assessment of the political situation in Macedonia to an independent senior rule of law experts group, led by retired Commission Director Rheinhard Priebe. The report, issued in June 2015 following an on-theground assessment, has been colloquially known as the Priebe Report. The report has identified significant shortcomings in five areas: the interception of communications, judiciary and prosecution services and external oversight by independent bodies, elections and the media.4 This is not an exception, as the European Commission usually does outsource its conditionality to the Council of Europe and the OSCE, for example, in relation to the protection of national minorities or the assessment of

4 Recommendations of the Senior Experts’ Group on systemic rule of law issues relating to the communications interception revealed in Spring 2015. Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/news_corner/news/news-les/20150619_recomm endations_of_the_senior_experts_group.pdf. Council of the EU (15 December 2015).

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elections.5 Interviews conducted for this research have shown that interviewees largely agreed that the move towards an independent experts’ assessment was necessary, given the serious concerns about the rule of law issue. An additional concern raised was also whether, due to member states pressures, a critical assessment from the European Commission would have been possible in the given circumstances.6 The political crisis in question largely coincided with the inflow of more than one million asylum seekers into the EU in the course of 2016, a significant number of which passed through Macedonia. In fact, since late 2015, the Balkan route, passing through Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, became the primary one for the migrants headed towards the EU. At the EU level, over time, two conflicting approaches as to how to deal with the crisis emerged, one supported by Germany and one by the Visegrad group (Šelo Šabi´c and Bori´c 2016). Both of these approaches, but predominantly the latter one pressuring for the closing of the borders along the Western Balkans route, depended on the cooperation from the authorities and governments in the Balkans, including Macedonia. That placed Brussels in an awkward position, as European Commission officials pressed for accountability on the Skopje government, while at the same time depended on its cooperation to halt the migrant inflow.7 The political crisis elaborated above overshadowed the migration crisis and largely was a “possibility to score a few additional supporters among its public and abroad” (Šelo Šabi´c and Bori´c 2016). In these conditions, the EU was at the same time pressuring for democratic reform in Macedonia through its instruments of political conditionality elaborated above, but also depended on the cooperation from the Macedonian government, and especially the border police, thereby undermining its own political conditionality.

5 On the former see Kacarska (2013). The Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities in the EU accession process—the case of the Republic of Macedonia. In Gordon, Kmezic & Opardija (eds.) (2013). Interdisciplinary studies on Central and Eastern Europe. 6 Interview 1 with CSO representative, April 2017. 7 https://www.ft.com/content/50bcc1fa-c024-11e6-9bca-2b93a6856354.

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4 Operation of EU Conditionality and Political Socialisation During the 2015/2017 Political Crisis The analysis that follows traces and examines the operation of the official EU conditionality stipulated through the official EU documents and visits of the EU Commissioner, and the informal role of representatives of EU member states specifically in relation to the political crisis of 2015/2017. The analysis is divided in two sections related to the holding of the 2016 elections as a critical juncture. 4.1

Conditionality and Political Socialisation Prior to the December 2016 Elections

By signing the Pržino Agreement in June 2015, the four largest Macedonian political parties agreed “to implement all recommendations to be issued by the European Commission in relation to systemic rule of law issues”.8 Doing so, the political parties agreed to implement the Commission’s “Urgent Reform Priorities” (URPs) even before their publication, already in June 2015. Within the framework of its enlargement policy, the European Commission linked extending its recommendation to open accession negotiations with the Republic of Macedonia with the “continued” implementation of the June/July political agreement and “substantial progress in the implementation of the Urgent Reform Priorities” (EC 2015b). While it may be clear what the implementation of the political agreement entails, it is far from clear as to what “substantial progress in the implementation of the Urgent Reform Priorities” means (European Policy Institute 2016). Towards the end of 2015, with significant mediation on the EU side, elements fulfilled from the formal EU conditionality were the following: appointment of a special prosecutor in charge of the illegal acts linked to the wiretapped materials, agreement to hold early elections in the country and a pending resignation of the Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski significantly implicated in the wiretapping scandal. The (non) implementation of the agreement was constantly marked by various types of pressures from the EU, in addition to the regular visits of the Commissioner Hahn and attempts at coordinated efforts from the EU member 8 See 5372.

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_15_

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states. The peak of international pressure and conditionality was reached with a joint ambassadorial statement of US, France, Italy, UK, Germany and EU over the political stalemate in Macedonia directed towards the right-oriented party in power VMR0-DPMNE.9 The ambassadors “urged VMRO-DPMNE to demonstrate the required commitment and to implement the agreement in a constructive and urgent manner and with good faith”.10 On the same day, the Prime Minister Gruevski was in Madrid at an annual congress of the European People’s Party and was presented in terms of having friendly meetings with the representatives of the EU, including the Commission’s President.11 For my interviewees, this specific example illustrated early on the undermining of the operation of European Commission conditionality, since the strongest ambassadorial statement targeting specifically the party in power and supporting official EU conditionality had been undermined by the socialisation and the conveyed image of support for the party that was targeted with the ambassadorial statement mentioned above.12 For Chryssogelos (2017), “the Europarties act as sub-contractors of EU conditionality towards political elites”, and in this context in the given period the European People’s Party has largely been seen as undermining formal EU conditionality, as pointed by my interviewees. As a result, the image of inconsistency in EU actions has been reinforced, thereby questioning the commitment of the EU as a factor of stability in the country and more broadly in the region. In 2016, the divergent operation of the formal and informal EU conditionality can be seen on the one hand in the conditions stipulated by the European Commission, and on the other, in the statements of key EU member states, in many aspects linked and/or affected by the migration crisis. The European Commission, for example in its 2016 report, emphasised that the Pržino Agreements represent “an opportunity for the country’s leaders to finally overcome the long-lasting crisis, address systemic rule of law issues and put the country firmly back onto the EU

9 https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/joint-statement-on-politicalcrisis-in-macedonia. 10 Ibid. 11 See http://telma.com.mk/vesti/gruevski-vo-madrid-razgovarashe-so-junker-i-han. 12 Interview no. 2, university professor, and interview no 1. civil society representative. See http://telma.com.mk/vesti/gruevski-vo-madrid-razgovarashe-so-junker-i-han.

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path” (EC 2016). Similarly, in the 2016 report, the European Commission stipulates urgent priorities for the country to fulfil in the area of rule of law as a condition for “reclaiming” the recommendation for the accession negotiations. Despite these sombre assessments of the European Commission as a formal element of EU conditionality, the political messaging from the EU member states did not always follow suit. Prior to the 2016 elections, the support given to VMRO-DPMNE was clear from Hungary and Austria, and individual support from members of the sister party CDU. On occasion of one of the rare official visits to the EU, the Hungarian prime minister declared that “during the premiership of Mr. Gruevski, Hungarian-Macedonian relations had reached a level never experienced before”, and “a genuine and sincere friendship was built between the two nations”.13 According to my interlocutors, the support of Hungary, and specifically of Prime Minister Orban, has been commonly considered as a key pillar of the support that the European People’s Party has given to VMRO-DPMNE throughout the political crisis in the last two years.14 During the same month of 2016, in the midst of the campaign ahead of the much-delayed December elections, the foreign minister of Austria Sebastian Kurz appeared on a rally of the governing party VMRODPMNE. During the rally, he stated the following: “The refugee crisis was a major challenge for Austria. I’m very grateful that you supported us in this very difficult situation”.15 In this case, it was evident that the cooperation of the government at the time in view of the management of the refugee crisis had precedence over its record of a democratic backslider. Thus, minister Kurz also came under fire for saying that Macedonia is on the right path towards EU integration—an opinion which starkly contradicted the last European Commission’s report on the country.16 Not surprisingly, the visit was subject to significant discontent among the pro-European public and media in the country. In response to the public outburst of criticism for this action, Kurz clarified that “he attended the 13 http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/hungary-supports-macedo nia-S-eu-and-nato-membership. 14 Interview no. 1 and Interview no. 3, both with civil society representatives. 15 https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2016/11/29/kurz-I-attended-the-rally-as-A-

member-of-A-sister-party-and-there-is-nothing-controversial-about-that/. 16 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/critics-slam-kurz-S-support-for-macedo nia-S-ruling-party-11-28-2016#sthash.Ubj0uru6.dpuf.

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Macedonian political rally as a member of a sister party and there is nothing controversial about that”.17 This visit was the most visible form of support of Macedonia, which was largely limited at the time to Hungary and Austria, although representatives of Christian Democratic Union (CDU) also expressed support, albeit in a more sombre manner. For example, Bundestag CDU member Thornsten Frei visited the country shortly before the start of the election campaign, expressing milder support for their sister party, underlining in a statement its pro-Western orientation.18 These different messages sent from the European Commission and the representatives of the EU member states, in addition to undermining the operation of political conditionality, have in turn contributed to the public perception of the Union as an inconsistent foreign policy actor. 4.2

Conditionality and Political Socialisation After the December 2016 Elections

The December 2016 elections at which VMRO-DPMNE won two MPs more than its rival SDSM were an additional challenge for EU’s consistency between the various actors.19 The response to the December 2016 elections was a clear example of this. In a joint statement with Mogherini, the EU Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn adopted a neutral language, along the following lines: We look forward to a swift formation of the new parliament and of the new government and to the implementation of reforms to address systemic rule of law issues, also through the Urgent Reform Priorities. Government and opposition need to continue implementing previous political agreements in full, including supporting the work of the Special Prosecutor’s Office.20

17 https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2016/11/29/kurz-I-attended-the-rally-as-Amember-of-A-sister-party-and-there-is-nothing-controversial-about-that/. 18 https://goo.gl/QDoVbZ. 19 VMRO-DPMNE won 51 out of 120 mandates in Parliament, whereas SDSM

obtained 49. Both of them needed the support of the rest 20 MPs of the Albanian political parties to form a government. 20 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/16997/joint-statem ent-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-and-commissioner-johannes_fr.

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At the same time, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as a VMRODPMNE’s supporter, called for VMRO-DPMNE and the Democratic Union for Integration to form a government as soon as possible, largely undermining the call of the EU institutions for the much needed reforms in the country.21 With VMRO-DPMNE failing to form a coalition with the Albanian political parties, President Gjorgje Ivanov asked the political leaders to provide proof that they have obtained a parliamentary majority in order to give the mandate for government formation. The Social Democratic Union of Macedonia in the meantime managed to obtain a parliamentary majority and the president declined to give the mandate due to expressed concerns about the unitary nature of the state and potential violation of the Macedonian constitutional order. With this move, by large interpreted as resisting transfer of power, the EU representatives’ response was marked by further visits and statements of Commissioner Hahn and Commission vice President Federica Mogherini. At the latter’s visit in March 2017, she noted a move towards stricter political messaging towards the president, “as a friend who cares about this country and its citizens to indicate what worries us in this moment and what we believe will be a serious break of the democratic principles, of the democratic experience, of the Constitution of this country”.22 Following this visit, VMRO-DPMNE and the president have started pressing for new elections as a way out of the crisis, which were once more supported solely by Hungary as an EU member state.23 These circumstances created a situation once again of divergent messaging from the EU and the political leadership of the member states contributing to the perception of the EU as an incoherent policy actor. These inconsistencies have been highlighted already in the literature: Vachudova has argued that in Macedonia, inconsistent conditionality has compounded problems of legitimacy and has also given scope to political parties for reversing political reforms (Vachudova 2014). Finally, in early April 2017, in the midst of a very serious political turmoil, EU Council President Donald Tusk visited Macedonia and met up with the president on an announced visit primarily related to the 21 http://english.republika.mk/szijjarto-vmro-dpmne-and-dui-kept-majority-in-parlia ment-should-form-political-government-as-soon-as-possible/. 22 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_sl/21847/High%20R epresentative/Vice-President%20Federica%20Mogherini%20in%20Skopje. 23 On the Hungarian response, see http://www.slobodnaevropa.mk/a/28380750.html.

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migration crisis. His statement following the meeting with the Macedonian President highlighted the intertwining role that the migration crisis has played in the resolution of the political crisis in the country, underlining that: You are best placed above all to say how important it was to close the Western Balkan route and to regain control of the borders and as a result, the stability in the region. [...] We want to make sure that this mutually beneficial cooperation continues in the future.24

The emphasis on the need to resolve the political crisis came secondary in a period when the statements of all EU officials were closely monitored by the domestic public. This statement illustrated well the intertwining of official EU conditionality with the role the country played in the migration crisis as well as the intertwined nature of these two processes.

5 The Aftermath of the Crisis and the Perceptions of the Union The political crisis of 2015/2017 was a prelude to the breakthrough on the EU accession front for the country made possible with the signing of a historic agreement in Prespa (hereinafter Prespa Agreement) in June 2018 between Macedonia and Greece, that renamed the former to North Macedonia, thus ending the 27-year dispute (see Kacarska and Lokoski 2019). This development was possible due to the strong pro-European orientation of the Skopje government that took office in mid-2017, after the political crisis. The politically costly agreement has been hailed as an example of incredible political will and readiness to tackle seemingly intractable disputes in a region that has been known to produce conflicts instead of solutions.25 The passing of the Agreement has been anything but smooth at the national level. Overall, the signing of the Agreement in 2018 was a concession made by the government for opening the much

24 https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/04/04/tusk-after-meeting-ivanovunity-is-needed-in-macedonia/. 25 See Joint statement by President Jean-Claude Juncker, High Representative/VicePresident Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn on the adoption of the Prespa agreement by the Hellenic Parliament, available at: https://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_STATEMENT-19-704_en.htm.

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awaited EU accession negotiations and this was also reflected in the question posed to the public at the referendum held on 30 September 2018.26 Contrary to what was expected, the Prespa Agreement did not lead to the start of accession negotiations, as the Council in June 2018 and 2019 did not decide on this matter.27 In view of this inability of the Union to make a clear decision, Chryssogelos and Stavrevska (2019) have argued that “rather than a foreign policy success, the Prespa Agreement is a reminder of the persistent tension between the clashing logics of integration and representation both inside and outside the EU”. In March 2020, after the French demand for a new, more complex methodology for accession was met,28 the Council of the EU finally adopted a conclusion to open accession negotiations with the Republic of North Macedonia,29 albeit without setting a date for the first intergovernmental conference. What followed has been another two-year long limbo due to Bulgarian objections linked to historical and linguistic issues. The Bulgarian veto and the public disillusionment with the EU accession process were part of the underlying factors for the resignation of Prime Minister Zoran Zaev at the end of 2021. The veto. was preliminarily lifted in 2022, when North Macedonia started the accession negotiations formally with several caveats in its negotiating framework. The continuation of the accession negotiations beyond the initial screening phase is conditional upon including the Bulgarian

26 The question the citizens were asked was “Are you in favour of European Union and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?”. While the clarity of the question was highly contested, the intention of the government was to make sure that the name change is understood by the public as a precondition towards EU and NATO membership, both of which enjoy overwhelming public support. 27 General Affairs Council, Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process— Council conclusions 10555/18(26 June 2018) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ meetings/gac/2018/06/26/. 28 French president Macron in autumn 2019 demanded that the European Commission introduces a stricter approach to the enlargement process, incorporated in a proposal adopted by the European Council in February 2020. See: Enhancing the accession process—A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0057&from=EN. 29 General Affairs Council, Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Proces— Council conclusions 7002/20 (25 March 2018) https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ document/ST-7002-2020-INIT/en/pdf.

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community, officially representing less than 0.2% of the country’s population according to the latest census, in the national constitution, in addition to other specific requests (see Kacarska 2022). The inability of the Union to start the accession negotiations for more than a decade, due to bilateral disputes despite the numerous concessions by North Macedonia, has inevitably eroded its overall image at the national level and in the region. The Macedonian public traditionally over the years has been very supportive of the Union, as well as the country’s accession process. The EU through its conditionality has in general been perceived as an entity that can assist the country in its economic and democratic transformation. Yet, between 2005 and 2020, the repeated postponements of the accession negotiations have taken their toll on the public support for EU accession, which currently stands at around 68%, from the initial 90% (see Damjanovski 2022). While support for membership has been steady, the protracted accession process has affected the trust in the Union which has been decreasing, including the increase in the number of people who think that the country will never become a member of the EU. The question regarding the EU’s influence was hit the worst, as in 2021 only 9.47% of the respondents considered the EU to be the most powerful foreign policy actor in the country, compared to 44.80% in 2019 (Velinovska et al. 2022). In these circumstances, the discordant EU response to the political crisis and the refugee migration crisis has only further contributed to the public questioning of the reliability of the EU as a normative and unitary actor.

6

Conclusions

This chapter has analysed the operation of EU political conditionality in Macedonia in the course of the 2015 political crisis, when the country was marked by the wiretapping scandal and the suspension of the recommendation to start EU accession negotiations. The chapter simultaneously studied formal conditionality as stipulated in the key documents for Macedonia, as well as the socialisation efforts through the statements of key EU member states and representatives. The theoretical starting point of the analysis is the relationship between rational choice institutionalism and social constructivist understandings of conditionality, i.e. understandings of this mechanism as reinforcement by reward, or as results of norm socialisation. While these two approaches originating in the work of March and Olsen understand conditionality from different perspectives,

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the relationship between the two has been understudied. At the same time, conditionality as a mechanism has focused on the operation of the European Commission (i.e. European institutions), while neglecting the role of inter-party relationships between political actors in the acceding country and their European counterparts. Macedonia was taken as a case study due to the extensive EU involvement in the political crisis of 2015/2017, as well as the parallel events and socialisation efforts that emerged with the migration crisis in Europe in which the country was heavily involved. The discordance within the Union on the underlying approach for dealing with the refugee crisis has contributed to the image of the Union as a divided actor, also willing to compromise on its own principles of democracy in view of ensuring stability. These circumstances provided fertile ground for the study of the relationship of the logics of consequences and appropriateness. The analysis was based on the official EU conditionality contained in EU documents and reports, as well as statements of key representatives of the EU institutions, including representatives of EU member states that have been engaged in the attempts to resolve the 2015/2017 Macedonian political crisis. In addition, interviews with stakeholders have provided information on the local understanding of EU conditionality. The chapter analysed the operation of conditionality before and after the early parliamentary elections held in the country in late 2016, noting the evolution of both formal and informal EU conditionality. In relation to the period prior to the holding of the December 2016 elections, the chapter illustrates the diverging roles that the formal EU conditionality and the informal socialising dimension have played. While the EU was a guarantor and a mediator to the Pržino Agreement, its implementation was rather weak. During this period, despite the efforts of local EU member state representatives to act in a coordinated manner regarding joint statements, the socialisation with representatives at the EU level, including outright support by key EU member states of political actors that are targets of EU conditionality, has undermined its effectiveness. The logic of socialisation, which diverged from the official (formal) EU conditionality, dominated the relationship with the political actors in the country. In addition, the discordance within the Union on the underlying approach for dealing with the refugee crisis has contributed to the image of the Union as a divided actor, also willing to compromise on its own principles of democracy in order to ensure stability.

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The period following the December 2016 elections has been marked by a shift towards a more coordinated approach of the EU towards following the formal lines of conditionality, although the lack of a unified approach has undoubtedly undermined its success. In this respect, the leadership of Hungary as a key EU member state, with its statements and actions, stood in sharp contradiction with the formal requirements from the EU. Still, given the lack. of stronger socialisation efforts that would counter the formal requirements from the EU, during this period the formal line of conditionality, or the consequential logic, has prevailed as dominant, in opposition to the earlier period. On a broader scale, the analysis of the 2015/2017 Macedonian political crisis focusing on the diverging operation of the logics of consequences and appropriateness is of relevance for the conceptual understanding of conditionality from three perspectives. First, it supports the argument presented in the theoretical discussions that the study of conditionality needs to encompass both logics, as they are essential for its operation, including its successes and failures. Second, this case study underlines the need to unpack and distinguish between the multitude of actors engaged in its (non) implementation, both at the EU and national level. As evident from the above analysis, these include the responses from the different EU institutions, but also statements and actions of EU member states and European political families. Last, the conflicting messages from the variety of actors engaged in EU conditionality in the case of North Macedonia during the political crisis in 2015/2017 and in its aftermath undermine the image and perception of the Union as an influential foreign policy actor and a desired membership destination.

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CHAPTER 18

Love and Hate Relationship: Media Framing of the Official Political Communication About the European Union in Serbia’s Media Aleksandra Krsti´c

1

Introduction

Serbia has been on a long road to the European Union (EU). It has been more than twenty years since the country’s fresh start of the transition to democracy in October 2000, but it has not yet become a full EU member state. The EU integration of Serbia has always attracted more or less attention of the national media. Informing the public in Serbia about the EU has been one of the top priorities of different governments and relevant ministries in the past 20 years. Media representation of the EU in Serbia’s media has also attracted attention of a group of scholars who have examined the issue from various angles in the field of media studies and

A. Krsti´c (B) Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_18

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journalism, including media framing of EU topics; media representation of specific EU policies, events and crises; journalistic perceptions about EU reporting; the role of media in informing the public about the EU; public opinion about the role of the media in providing information about the EU. However, only a few studies have examined how media frame official political communication about the EU. This type of research can offer a better insight into the relationship between media and politics and provide answers to how media drive the overall narrative on the EU in a specific socio-political context. This chapter looks into the specific aspect of relations between Serbia and the EU in times of crisis, namely the health crisis triggered by the outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic in Serbia in March 2020, examining specific media framing of political narratives driven by high state and government officials. The chapter starts with theoretical considerations of EU-media relations and the role of media and journalism in reporting on EU topics, moving on to a brief sketch of the EU reporting practices in the Western Balkans and Serbia. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the case study on Serbia, ending with some main conclusions.

2

EU-Media Relations: Existing Problems and (Mis)perceptions

The EU has established numerous channels for communicating with citizens and journalists, through traditional and digital media, social media platforms, diversified platforms of many EU institutions, as well as via specialized broadcast channels. The important role of the media in communicating on EU politics, institutions, traditions and values, has been highlighted in the EU regulatory framework since the 1980s, and has been recognized as one of the most important ways of bringing the EU closer to its citizens. However, the media coverage of the EU news is perceived as boring, too protocol, often not understandable and uninteresting for the wider audience (Krsti´c 2020). The EU has often been recognized to suffer from information, communication and democratic deficit (Morgan 1995; Meyer 1999; Price 2002) and the EU as a whole remains an abstract term, distant from its people. The complex and problematic EU-media relationship stems from the 1980s; despite many regulatory and institutional changes, problems have remained over the last decades (Krsti´c 2020).

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Various studies have shown that the communication strategies towards media have been very important for the EU (Beyers 2004), as media have been considered the main communication channel for EU politics and its institutions. The EU reporting in the news has usually been described as nationally focused, rarely found on the daily agenda of many European media outlets (de Vreese 2002; Price 2002). Topics often depend on the moment and social context of reporting. Moreover, some authors have recognized a certain paradox in the EU news reporting—at the same time, the EU is invisible in the overall news, but when it appears in the specific news programme it gets to be covered as a highly important topic and the main headline (Peter et al. 2003; Krsti´c 2015). Usually, the EU media reporting depends on the nature of editorial policy, financial sources of the news outlet, news selection processes (de Vreese 2001), specific needs of the audience, organizational culture and newsroom structure (Statham 2006) and many other factors. The media visibility and representation of the EU have been interconnected with many indicators which shape the EU coverage. For example, the political system in a certain country and the government’s political orientation pro or contra EU integration can significantly set the overall media agenda and the tone in the EU reporting (de Vreese 2001). Academic literature has also recognized the journalistic approach to EU topics as highly polarized between transnational topics (EU politics and EU institutions) and national perspectives (Heikkilä and Kunelius 2006), which deepens the complex relationship between the EU communication strategies and their interpretations in journalism. Specific EU topics in the European media have been derived from various “crises”, for example the “migrant crisis” where the EU has often been portrayed as a “fortress” (Maneri 2009), or the Eurozone crisis which was highly covered in the media reporting around the debt crisis and the overall image of the EU (Capelos and Exadaktylos 2015). The Brexit crisis influenced the media portrayal of migrants and Europe as a whole (Clarke et al. 2017), where negative media representation of specific political leaders and the EU dominated the media coverage (Cammaerts et al. 2016; Schlosberg 2016). Euroscepticism and populism, as political phenomena attached to the study of EU media coverage, and particularly “the spiral of Euroscepticism”, has highlighted the fact that the negative news about the EU and the public discourse have been influenced both by the media autonomy and media selection of EU topics and information (Galpin and Trenz 2017).

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The role of journalists has been particularly important in the contemporary discussions about the EU-media relations and the EU representation in the media. Journalists have performed the dual role in the EU reporting: they have acted as mediators between institutions and citizens, and at the same time as commentators of EU politics and therefore creators of public opinion (Statham 2006). Statham (2006, p. 4) identified the main factors that impact the decision-making of journalists in print media about their EU reporting: the public need for information, the influence of collective actors on the framing of topics, the organizational culture and structures of newsrooms, the way journalists gather and select information and the placement of topics on the media agenda. Looking into the contemporary scholarship about the EU-media relations, many authors have considered the journalistic perspectives and examined what journalists think about EU institutional communication. They usually conclude that journalists perceive the EU communication as informative and promotional, but also as ineffective, bureaucratized, complex, unclear and often confusing (Valentini 2007). Some also think that the EU communication strategies have not adapted to the logic of media reporting (Bijsmans and Altides 2007). Journalists often complain that Brussels correspondents from small newsrooms from Eastern and Central Europe get unequally treated in comparison to correspondents from “rich” countries and “big” media (Lecheler 2008). Correspondents from Eastern and Central European states working in Brussels are often faced with limited financial and staff resources, and with the lack of interest of news editors and journalists from their home countries (Lecheler 2008). According to journalists around Europe, the main problems in the EU reporting have been the news selection, reporting on complicated issues in an understandable way, insufficient EU knowledge of journalists, as well as the perception of the EU as a political centre which cannot be reported interestingly enough (Balˇcytiene˙ and Vinci¯uniene˙ 2010). Journalists also perceive EU institutions as rather closed and complex institutions, which have been addressed throughout the past decades in many negative and problematic terms. For example, the Council of the EU has been described to have been working under “the secret veil” (Davis 1998, p. 121). The EU Parliament has been criticized not to be visible enough because of its complex structure, complicated procedures and lack of debates (Sonntag 1983). The EU Council is criticized for failing to manage to adapt to the media logic (Laursen and Valentini

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2013), although the improvement of communication has been noted after the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The increased transparency of EU institutions has also been affected by the accelerated development of ICT technologies and social media platforms—all EU institutions have official websites and inform the public through various online and social media platforms (Laursen 2012). Still, one of the main problems in the EU-media relations that has been stressed is the lack of collaboration between TV journalists and EU institutions’ spokespersons, who sometimes do not collaborate due to a large degree of misinterpretation: “You need to explain all the time—because technocratic language is not understandable and you have to explain again and again” (journalist of Liberation) (Lloyd and Marconi 2014, p. 80). Another study which researched the views of print media journalists on EU reporting (Menendet Alarcón 2010) showed that journalists are more likely to publish Eurosceptic views, which is actually the result of their belief that national governments have more power to address key issues than the EU itself. On the other side, journalists and media have the power to construct the image of each EU institution. For example, the European Parliament is most often reported in light of the elections to the European Parliament (Boomgaarden et al. 2010) and less frequently on other occasions. Another important angle in the discussion of the complex relationship between the EU and the media are the effects of EU coverage on citizens’ perceptions. Citizens’ perceptions about EU integration have been shaped by evaluative media content, such as the attitudes and opinions expressed in the media (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006). Also, the EU news can influence different levels of “European identity” (Bruter 2009) and dominant media narratives can impact the attitudes about various EU issues (Clement 2015; Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2011). National media outlets are found to have a positive impact on citizens’ knowledge about EU policies (Scharkow and Vogelgesang 2010), while negative evaluations in the news can have a negative impact on citizens’ perceptions about EU democracy (Desmet et al. 2015). Particularly, when the EU is framed as a “crisis victim”, positive public attitudes are derived, but when the EU is framed as “responsible for crisis”, strong negative attitudes are expressed (Koehler et al. 2019). One of the few studies analysing the effects of media messages in the EU in the context of the European elections (Desmet et al. 2015) indicates several important things. First, it shows that the more citizens are

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exposed to negative evaluations of the EU in the news, the more negative will their attitude be towards democracy in the EU and its institutions. Also, media messages that show a one-sided, but positive evaluation of the EU, have a positive effect on citizens’ attitudes. Interestingly, the authors conclude that the effects of a positive tone are stronger than the effects of a negative tone in the EU media, from which the EU can draw some lessons and turn towards more proactive public and media relations (Desmet et al. 2015).

3

EU Coverage in the Western Balkans and Serbia

Media outlets in the Western Balkans have a similar coverage of EU topics, mostly derived from the common media market, similar media systems, shared political and historical legacy and the overall political orientation of the countries in the region towards integration with the EU (Krsti´c 2020). Authors which have examined the media coverage of EU topics across the former Yugoslav states have found that the media in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Serbia usually focus on the broad topic of Europeanization. However, the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina rarely report on the EU (Turˇcilo and Buljubaši´c 2013), Montenegrin media focus mostly on EU enlargement (Ruži´c and Rabrenovi´c 2013), while North Macedonian media primarily broadcast statements from the government and the state officials (Donev et al. 2013). The academic research in the Western Balkan region suggests that there is a great similarity among the media outlets regarding their coverage of Europeanization, EU issues and European integration. The process of European integration is reported dominantly as a political issue, and citiˇ zens are almost completely absent from the EU media coverage (Cengi´ c and Miji´c 2007; Milinkov et al. 2013; Pralica 2013). The media of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, as well as the Serbian media, most often cover the topics of enlargement and accession of their countries to the EU. In general, the topic of Europeanization is the main focus in all mainstream media in the region, but most frequently only through the lenses of political and economic issues. In Serbia, the EU has been reported through traditional media outlets, specialized TV shows and informative web portals like EurActiv, European Western Balkans, etc. According to the Ministry for EU integration

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(2020), the most frequent topics in the Serbian media regarding the EU integration process are the Kosovo status, daily politics, EU funds and EU negotiations. The tone of the coverage was usually positive or neutral during the first decade of the country’s EU integration process (Krsti´c 2020), which marked the period of the country’s new start in transition to democracy and overall reforms, that reflected the main political agenda directed towards the EU. However, the EU media coverage lacked a critical perspective and analytical approach. Authors who have examined the EU topics in Serbian media in the past two decades have argued that the coverage has been mainly focused on the political protocol, without in-depth analysis and rarely focusing on problems and lives of ordinary citizens. The key topics in Serbia’s media have been dominantly political (e.g. Kosovo status, EU negotiations, etc.) and politicized, the tone of the coverage is usually one-sided, while the EU itself has been rarely criticized and mostly represented as a powerful decision-maker (Krsti´c 2020). The main actors in the Serbian media coverage are the state institutions, the president, prime minister, government ministers, etc. (Pralica 2013; Krsti´c 2015, 2020). In recent years, the media approach to EU integration and EU officials in charge of Serbia’s accession has visibly changed. The EU-related topics have become more covered by highly circulated tabloid newspapers under the control of the political establishment and largely discussed on social media platforms. Tabloid press, along with highly viewed commercial pro-regime TV stations, use sensational headlines, misinformation and unverified sources to cover issues on EU integration, often diverging topics into a specific direction or to spread smear campaigns against specific EU officials. For example, in January 2020 just before the COVID-19 pandemic hit Serbia, the pro-regime tabloid published the Serbian President’s statement, where he questioned the expertise of Tanja Fajon, a member of the European Parliament and its representative for relations with Serbia: “And how exactly does she represent our country?”. The President’s statement fuelled the pro-government media framing of Tanja Fajon as “a close associate of opposition leaders Djilas and Šolak” (Informer 2020), “not a very serious politician, just an instrument used for perpetrating anti-Vuˇci´cism” (Pink TV), and someone who “has not accepted that the war from 1991 in Slovenia was over, because she continues to wage that war by criticizing absolutely everything coming from the ruling Serbian Progressive Party” (Nedeljnik 2020). More recently, amidst the war in Ukraine in 2022,

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Serbian tabloids have frequently accused Brussels for being the “usual suspect” working to separate Serbia from Russia (Informer 2022) or for being the main “hypocrite” regarding its approach to Serbia and the status of Kosovo (Alo 2022). The overall EU coverage in Serbian media has influenced the public opinion on the country’s EU integration process. Polls show that 44% of citizens think they are not sufficiently informed about the EU and that they expect EU information from the media (36.1%), the government (26.4%) and the EU (10%) (IEP 2020). Some recent polls (RTV 2022) show a significant decline in the public support for the EU integration process—only 44% are pro-EU. Young people in Serbia, aged 15–30, show growing EU-scepticism, as only 33% of the youth supports EU integration (KOMS 2020).

4

A Case Study from Serbia

Many problems regarding the official state communication about the EU in Serbia became more visible with the public health crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. The ways of communicating about the EU in Serbia in this particular period is important to discuss, because the crisis context helps us to understand the many layers of relations between Serbia and the EU and the role of media in transmitting the main political messages about the EU. As soon as the pandemic hit Serbia and the first official statements from the government announced the state of emergency in March 2020, the media largely reported about the efforts of the state, particularly of the president Aleksandar Vuˇci´c, to get all the possible medical help and necessary equipment from around the world to help the citizens. The medical and technical supplies as well as doctors and nurses arrived from China, but also from the EU and other international organizations and countries. The Swedish diplomat Carl Bildt criticized Serbia’s president on Twitter for showing more gratitude for the help of China than the EU: “When China sends an aircraft with help to Serbia, President Vuˇci´c made a great show of it. But when far more substantial (EU) aid arrives there is no fanfare and no President in sight”. This tweet triggered the harsh reaction of the Serbian government, and the Prime Minister (PM) Ana Brnabi´c, using the official Twitter account, disputed with other EU officials and accused both Carl Bidlt and the EU ambassador in Serbia, at that

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time Sam Fabrizzi, for spreading “fake news”. The mainstream media, and particularly the pro-regime tabloids, published sensational headlines in the following days, framing the official political communication about the single Tweet as an “attack” aimed at the President: “They attacked Vuˇci´c for receiving China’s help! Bildt and Fabrizzi are spreading fake news, the PM Brnabi´c answered them sharply” (TV Pink); “The EU attacked Vuˇci´c for the help from China, the PM reacted immediately! She taught them a lesson—Bilt and Fabrizzi are spreading fake news” (portal Srbija danas); “Twitter burning after the dispute between Carl Bildt and Ana Brnabi´c! Swedish diplomat raised objections regarding Serbia, Brnabi´c told him to stop spreading fake news” (Blic national daily). Soon after the reaction from the Prime Minister and the government, the President of Serbia addressed the public and commented about the reaction of the Swedish diplomat in a different, calmer way than Brnabi´c did. The President’s thoughts were extensively covered in the mainstream and social media: “Vuˇci´c about Carl Bildt’s tweeting—He probably stumbled upon fake news and did not understand what was in the aircraft” (Kurir daily); “I won’t say anything bad about Fabrizzi or Bildt, thanks to the EU, but…the President replied to the Union: We respect every help we get, but if you’re changing the rules of the game, we will play it equally!” (Informer daily); “Let Bildt know that the aircraft from the Arab Emirates is landing soon…thousands of people are dying across Europe and he has nothing better to do than to count airplanes!” (Informer daily). This event and its media coverage revealed many problematic aspects of the official state communication about the EU and layers of confusion, that were additionally complicated by pro-regime tabloids and media outlets under strict government control. Bildt’s tweet was interpreted by all the tabloids and mainstream media as a reaction from the EU as a whole, and not as an individual statement and opinion expressed on Twitter. Moreover, it was framed as an attack of the EU against Serbia’s President and it was condemned by the highest political officials of Serbia, namely the Prime Minister and the President. The interplay of the Prime Minister as a “bad cop” and the President as a “good cop” in the media coverage regarding the reactions to Bildt’s and Fabrizzi’s tweets were linked with “fake news” in the headlines, which showed the President’s efforts to justify and not to condemn such tweets. This has caused a lot of confusion, because the media in Serbia simultaneously framed the single

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and personal opinion tweet as an attack from the whole EU on the President of Serbia, who was depicted as the only one who has worked hard with all countries and partners to help Serbia in fighting the COVID-19 crisis; and also as an attack of the state of Serbia against the EU, that was depicted as uncapable to look after itself and after its own member states on occasion of a serious public health crisis. Moreover, Serbia was at the same time framed in the media as a country strong enough to deal with much stronger states, and backed up by even stronger partners, e.g. China and Russia. The Serbia-EU media coverage got even more complicated when domestic headlines were hit with the statement by Serbia’s President that the “EU solidarity is a fairytale” that also highlighted China as “the only one who can help Serbia”.1 These events, which occurred at the beginning of the pandemic outburst in March 2020, received an extensive analysis by foreign media outlets. The Deutsche Welle wrote about the immediate, “quick damage management” of the Serbian government, which was reported to have started sending pictures and statements highlighting the importance of the EU funds and EU donations. The foreign media approach was aimed at analysing not the “twitter war” between the EU and Serbian officials, but the aspect of Serbia’s efforts to try to recover its image and relations with the EU after such a biased, sensational and reckless approach by the state officials and the pro-regime media. Radio Free Europe (2020) argued that president Vuˇci´c “used the divisions in the EU to insult the 27states block and to legitimize his politics and his courting to authoritarian partners like China, Russia and United Arabic Emirates”. However, the damage management and dispersed pro-EU narrative fostered by the government and the pro-regime media in Serbia did not have many results. Already in mid-April 2020, Tanja Fajon, member of the European Parliament, criticized the governments of the Western Balkan states on Twitter for poor maintenance of the constitutional role of their parliaments in relation to measures taken to fight COVID-19, adding that “the suspension of democracy is not an option”. Fajon’s tweet triggered reactions from high political officials and members of the Serbian Parliament, whose statements were largely covered by the mainstream media and pro-regime tabloids. Serbian MP Vladimir Ðukanovi´c stated: “Tanja Fajon is an idiot. Writes just like that. She is not taken 1 https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2020&mm=03&dd=21&nav_cat egory=11&nav_id=1668487.

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seriously even in Slovenia, or in the EU or the European Parliament…” (Espreso.rs 2020). As shown in the previous section, pro-regime tabloids and pro-regime social media accounts, with armies of bots, lead the spread of hate speech, insults and smear campaign against specific EU officials who question the state of democracy in Serbia. In the official annual Progress Report published in October 2020, the European Commission (EC 2020, p. 3) criticized the Serbian government’s communication about the EU during that year, particularly the statements made by high-ranking officials which were not in line with the country’s strategic commitment to the EU: “The Serbian authorities overall need to place more emphasis on objective and unambiguous positive communication on the EU, which is Serbia’s main political and economic partner”. At the same time, the 2020 Progress report showed that the EU was worried about Serbia’s official state communication and its leaning on China, expressing the following statement: “Cooperation with China increased during the Covid-19 crisis and was marked by pro-China and EU sceptical rhetoric by high-ranking state officials” (European Commission 2020, p. 7).

5

Conclusion

The EU-sceptical rhetoric of the Serbian government in the pro-regime tabloids and mainstream Serbian media often report how populist political communication has been growing in all parts of Europe, even in the EU candidate countries which have a long-term pro-EU political agenda. Anti-EU voices coming from the top state officials around Europe have been associated with populist rhetoric, where the EU became a kind of a “punching bag, easy target and the prey of populist rhetoric” (Buti and Pichelmann 2017, p. 4). This is also visible in other examples, like in the EU representation of its treatment of migrants, where the Union has been often treated as “the enemy”, threat to democracy and economic prosperity (Dijkstra et al. 2018). In the context of Serbia, the populist ideology of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party and the messy EU rhetoric maintained by its highest political officials has been very confusing and problematic. Previous research identified the public differentiation between EU integration, which is usually addressed affirmatively, and Brussels as a political centre, which is addressed negatively and often criticized for anti-Serbian attitudes (Stojiljkovi´c and Spasojevi´c 2018). It should also be noted that

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the media usually reflect the main consensus on Serbia’s foreign politics. When there is no consensus, the media reflect different perspectives in light of the game of power between the key political players and their ability to influence the media and spin information (Vladisavljevi´c 2016). As Vladisavljevi´c (2016) argues, “it’s less important whether certain attitudes in the media have been based on credible information, it’s more important who supports those attitudes and if influential political players oppose them”. Moreover, in the context of COVID-19 and the crisis of public health in 2020 in Serbia, communication is the central element of every political and public discussion about how the state manages the crisis (Nielsen et al. 2020). Public discourse and state communication about the EU within crisis communication in 2020 in Serbia was problematic, confusing and politicized, tabloid and sensational, fuelled by the media controlled by the political regime and distributed quickly on social media. The anti-EU rhetoric was often spilling over from social media to traditional mainstream media outlets with the highest viewership and high circulation, as well as through personalized opinions and biased analyses dominating the public discourse, driving misperceptions and misinterpretations about the EU representatives and the EU as a whole, followed by a poor state damage management and confusing crisis communication that had almost no effects on public opinion.

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Scharkow, M. and Vogelgesang, J. (2010). Effects of domestic media use on European integration. Communications 35(1): 73–91. Schlosberg, J. (2016). Should He Stay or Should He Go? Television and Online News Coverage of the Labour Party in Crisis. London: Media Reform Coalition. Sonntag, N. (1983). Media coverage of the European Parliament: A comparative study. European Journal of Political Research 11(2): 215–222. Statham, P. (2006). Political Journalism and Europeanization: Pressing Europe? EurPolCom Working Paper 13/06. Stojiljkovi´c, Z., and Spasojevi´c, D. (2018). Populistiˇcki Zeitgeist u “proevropskoj” Srbiji. Politiˇcka misao 55(3): 104–128. Turˇcilo, L., and Buljubaši´c, B. (2013). Izvještavanje bosanskohercegovaˇckih medija o evropskim integracijama i ideji Evrope. In: Vali´c Nedeljkovi´c, D. and Kleut, J. (eds.), Evropa ovde i tamo: analiza diskursa o evropeizaciji u medijima Zapadnog Balkana, Filozofski fakultet, University of Novi Sad, (pp. 81–90). Valentini, C. (2007). EU-media relations: views of Finnish and Italian Journalists. Global Media Journal—Mediterranean Editions 2(2): 82–96. Vladisavljevi´c, N. (2016). Mediji, “indeksiranje” odnosa snaga i sloboda štampe posle Petog oktobra. U: Vrani´c, B. and Dajovi´c, G. (eds.), Demokratska tranzicija Srbije: (re)kapitulacija prvih 25 godina. Beograd: Law Faculty, University of Belgrade, (pp. 216–230).

CHAPTER 19

Bridging the Perceptions-Based Gap Between the EU and the Western Balkans Dejan Jovi´c and Milica Uvali´c

1

The Persistence of Mutual Misperceptions

In this concluding chapter, we present the most important messages that emerge from the contributions to this book. The idea about (mis)perceptions on both sides—the European Union (EU) and the Western Balkans—has been the inspiring motive of this project, deriving from the conviction that wrong beliefs, false images or even ignorance and prejudices represent an important stumbling block to faster accession of the Western Balkan countries to the EU. The Western Balkans and the EU have both developed strong “feelings” about each other over the past decades. Today, it looks as if they blame each other—at least partially and temporarily—for the failure in achieving their main objectives.

D. Jovi´c (B) University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected] M. Uvali´c University of Perugia, Perugia, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1_19

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On the part of the European Community (EC), most EC member states and the EC institutions were initially caught by surprise by the political developments in SFR Yugoslavia and thus reacted late, at a time when Europe was confronted with epochal changes (fall of the Berlin Wall, first multi-party elections in Eastern Europe, German reunification, break-up of the Soviet Union). As James Gow argued already in 1997, the challenging reality of the Yugoslav crisis was met with the “triumph of the lack of will” on the side of the EU (Gow 1997). It is because of the war in former Yugoslavia that integration of this part of the continent into EC/EU was delayed for decades. This left Europe unconsolidated or— as Blanuša and Krajina say—“unfinished”. Post-Yugoslav political events, and in particular the war through which the country collapsed, were a major—if not the main—cause of EU’s failure to construct a united Europe. EU is now, more than 30 years since 1989, still an “unfinished project”, it is a “Europe Unfinished” (Blanuša and Krajina 2016). This is due not only to diverse visions of what the “finished Europe” should look like, but it is also a consequence of a (maybe fatal) delay caused by the return of war to Europe in 1991, when Europe did not expect it. The Yugoslav wars denied and challenged the vision of a peaceful, democratic, liberal and progressive Europe that was at the very core of the European post-Cold war identity, as conceptualized by the key identity-designers of the 1990s. In addition, the EU has good reasons to blame the Western Balkans for providing a “back door” for other external actors to arrive and remain in Europe and thus to act as “spoiler powers” (Bechev 2017) towards the project of European integration. These external actors are not only Russia and China, but also USA, the Arab states, Turkey and perhaps some others (e.g. Israel). For a long time—from 1989 until the Russian war against Ukraine in 2014 and from 2022 onwards—the Western Balkans were the main potential cradle for some new, bipolar or even multipolar competition in Europe. It was a “land in between”, available for policies that wanted to harm the European project and to project alternatives. This is another reason why the EU remained sceptical and cautious about the Western Balkans. In the 1990s, with the war raging throughout this region, EU made efforts primarily to contain the conflict within the boundaries of former Yugoslavia in order to prevent spillovers. In the 2000s, with the global return to politics of securitization—first because of September 11, then because of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, followed in the 2010s in Syria—the Balkans remained somewhat sidelined in major

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strategic considerations. Still, the first Russian intervention in Ukraine (over Crimea in 2014) and the migration crisis of 2015 brought the Balkans back to the agenda because both events raised security concerns on EU borders. The global financial crisis of 2007–09 slowed down the process of EU accession, recently followed by new initiatives for additional European institutions, such as French President Macron’s initiative for a European Political Community, the German-led Berlin Process and the Slovenian-Croatian Brdo-Brijuni Process. It seemed that the enthusiasm for enlargement—or consolidation of the achieved eastward expansion of the Union—had gone. Things may be changing once again, after Russia’s second aggression on Ukraine in February 2022 (see below). On the part of the Western Balkans, the progressive and anti-war forces in the region remained disappointed with EU’s hesitation and its lack of capability to react to disintegration and war. They expected European states to protect peace and to be much more engaged in sanctioning extreme secessionists, violent extremists and warmongers among Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav political actors. US interventions which ended the war in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, and which then contributed to another war (over Kosovo) through the NATO bombing of FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999, were a strong challenge to the EU itself. They suggested that USA is still the main guardian of “Western values” and Western political presence globally, also on the European soil. American interventions exposed the weakness of Europe, ultimately made the USA stronger and a more autonomous EU difficult. The Russian war in Ukraine made it impossible. In addition, some political parties, civil society and non-governmental organizations that actively advocated EU membership remained disappointed by both the slow pace of the enlargement process, and by support that the authoritarian leaders in practically all candidate countries received from some EU member states. It was difficult to explain, for example, to Macedonians, why not only Greece but more recently also Bulgaria (two EU member states), instead of helping to remove obstacles for North Macedonia’s road to EU, actually imposed new ones. As to nationalist actors in the Western Balkans—who prevailed in the 1990 and remained strong up until these days—some of them were sceptical of the liberal, antinationalist and Enlightenment-based vision of Europe and opposed “Europeanization”. Some remained unfriendly towards a multi-national home of states and nations. These forces now claim that they were a vanguard for the rise of nationalism in Europe,

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not only in the Western Balkans. Still, as some authors in this volume claim (Krasniqi, Jovi´c), many nationalists supported EU accession of their country since they saw it as an instrument of nation-state building. Only once they joined the EU, small states of the Western Balkans would feel protected. Just like Hungary—whose special links with Serbia, Republika Srpska and North Macedonia (at the time of Prime minister Gruevski) were in contradiction with the proclaimed EU objectives of Europeanization through liberalization of Western Balkans—the Western Balkans also have broader goals. They see the EU not just as a provider of security and economic progress, but also as a framework for advancing their own specific objectives based on the notion of national interests, of which some might be incompatible with the concept of “European values” and practices. The European project is thus sometimes instrumentalized for nationalist purposes. However, the main reason why the Western Balkans are today profoundly disappointed and angry with the EU is the Union’s hesitation to live to its own promise—that membership of all countries in the Western Balkans is the end-objective of the whole process of long and complicated “transition to democracy”. Even 20 years after the Thessaloniki Summit, there is no “European perspective” in sight (only Croatia joined the Union in 2013). Thus, the people of the Western Balkans feel rejected, excluded, humiliated and deeply unhappy with the EU, as explained by authors of several contributions to this volume.

2

Distinct Perceptions About the EU

The contents of this volume confirm that there are wide differences in perceptions about the EU and the prospects of its enlargement to the Western Balkans. There are some common points regarding the EU that emerge from the contributed chapters, as well as country-specific differences. The effectiveness of EU conditionality policy is contested by several authors, from different angles. The role of the media in shaping perceptions about the EU is also discussed, as well as the policies towards the region of the most important external actors.

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Deteriorating Perceptions About the EU and Western Balkan Accession Prospects

The perceptions about the EU accession prospects of the Western Balkans have clearly deteriorated in recent years. A widespread view in public opinion of the region is that the EU is primarily responsible for the very slow pace of EU integration of the Western Balkans. The explanatory variables in both the political discourse and public opinion are often placed on exogenous factors—the EU and its conditionality policy that continues to add new requirements—not sufficiently recognizing the role of endogenous factors, primarily the slow progress in implementing key reforms that are necessary to comply with EU accession criteria. To what extent has the slow pace of EU accession influenced the decline in popularity of the EU among populations in all the Western Balkan countries is illustrated by Jovan Teokarevi´c’s analysis of various public opinion surveys (Chapter 8). Although public opinion is still predominantly in favour of EU membership, an increasing number believes it will never happen. This decline in EU popularity is related to a “3D phenomenon”—disappointment, disillusionment and disenchantment with the EU—which is a direct consequence of unfulfilled promises and high expectations that were not met with regard to completion of the process of EU enlargement, which even the worst pessimists hoped would happen by now. Citizens’ frustration is being used by right-wing anti-EU parties to create an even higher wall between the Western Balkans and the EU. Teokarevi´c argues that the EU is now primarily seen as a “cashmachine”, having lost its influence over issues of internal democratization and as a provider of solutions to the remaining unresolved issues, after its unsuccessful mediation in the Belgrade-Priština dialogue. The deteriorating image of the EU in the Western Balkans is confirmed by a number of other public opinion polls. Some of these are analysed in detail by Srd-an Bogosavljevi´c (Chapter 12), only to detect a gap between growing criticism and negative perceptions of the EU, and the readiness to still vote to become a member of the EU. It appears that citizens of countries in the region have moved from an unrealistically optimistic, to an unrealistically pessimistic, position towards the EU. Yet, if they were offered the opportunity to vote, citizens would still vote for joining the EU, although there is an increasing number that no longer believes that membership will happen any time soon.

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2.2

Variable Perceptions in the Individual Balkan Countries

Although the EU has lost much of its attractiveness in the Western Balkan region, the main factors responsible for declining citizens’ enthusiasm and the level of support of the EU are actually quite different in each country. Albania and Kosovo are the countries where the image of the EU remains very positive, which is in sharp contrast with limited progress these countries have achieved in the EU accession process. Albania opened its accession negotiations only in July 2022, while Kosovo remains the only country in the region that has not yet obtained candidate status or visafree travel for its citizens to the Schengen area, and its status remains contested both in the EU and in some countries of the region. In the other Western Balkan countries, the slow pace of EU accession has been one of the principal reasons of the deteriorating image of the EU. In Albania, as shown by Ditmir Bushati (Chapter 13), support for EU accession is the highest in the region, yet the country has advanced towards its main objective—full EU membership—rather slowly. Bushati explains some of the main factors that have contributed to the slow dynamics of EU accession by looking into the historical relationship (or the lack of it) between Albania and the West during the Cold War, the economic crisis in 1997 and other specific domestic obstacles, such as corruption and inadequate public administration reforms. Nevertheless, as argued by Bushati, the EU is also responsible for its slow and undecisive—and also in some aspects inadequate—policies of enlargement. This is particularly the case after the war in Ukraine, when the EU failed to implement its own announcement that it would become a more geopolitical Union in its approaches to external policy issues. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, perceptions about the EU have strongly deteriorated over the years under the impact of highly disappointing results of the EU integration process—in fact, the country obtained the status of candidate only in December 2022. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s case is discussed by two groups of authors that present somewhat different views about the principal causes of such delays, although both are very critical of EU policies. Renzo Daviddi (Chapter 3) calls for a new approach of the EU to the Western Balkans, by urging to deal with the “elephant in the room” namely the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He argues that the EU must unequivocally state that the governance structure and institutional arrangements inherited from the Dayton Peace Accords are not compatible with EU membership. Despite significant investments

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and EU political support for the consolidation of peace after 1995, the Union has lost its credibility. EU policies have often been erratic and contradictory and have not delivered the expected results. More critical of EU approaches in Bosnia and Herzegovina are Nedžma Džananovi´c, Jasmin Hasi´c and Margareta Ronˇcevi´c (Chapter 14). They argue that the gap between EU’s ever more demanding requirements and the country’s lack of capabilities to reform along the line of these requirements, results in an impasse that is impossible to overcome. The new mechanism of EU integration coordination introduced in 2016 (sanctioned by the EU) has been particularly damaging for the EU accession process, since it has empowered lower levels of governance that can veto decisions, yet they are not equipped for decision-making on EU-related issues. The new EU integration coordination mechanism, that was to define a unified position of Bosnia and Herzegovina on reforms that would lead to EU membership, has been highly inefficient, putting the country in an institutional gridlock. That perceptions of the EU can stay extremely positive despite minimal progress in the EU integration process is well illustrated by Kosovo’s case. Gëzim Krasniqi (Chapter 15) explains the reasons for very high support of EU accession in Kosovo by two major factors. Firstly, Kosovans see EU membership as being constitutive of the building and consolidation of their country’s statehood; and secondly, one third of Kosovans already live in the EU and thus promote positive perceptions about the Union, also by contributing their earnings and economic well-being. Yet, Kosovo remains the only country from the region that is still an EU potential candidate, whose citizens cannot freely travel to the Schengen area, and that has not been recognized by all EU member states. Although EU remains an important actor in domestic processes in Kosovo, mostly via the EULEX mission, but also as an external constitutive power, as the facilitator of the Belgrade-Priština dialogue and a factor in democratization, the EU has not been very successful in accomplishing these objectives. The lack of unity within the EU on the issue of Kosovo, as well as high popularity of USA (higher than of EU) are reasons for the growing sense of disappointment—even in Kosovo, the champion of proEU sentiments of the population—which then results in a very high rate of emigration. To many Kosovans, it seems impossible to wait for the moment when Kosovo becomes a member of the Union, inasmuch as they would like this to happen as soon as possible.

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In North Macedonia, the expectations of EU accession have been deceived for a very long time, in this way strongly contributing to increasing lack of trust in the EU, as explained by Simonida Kacarska (Chapter 17). Although Macedonia was the first country to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in 2001 (even before Croatia), the opening of accession negotiations has been continuously delayed up until July 2022. Although the Macedonians have traditionally been very supportive of the EU, the repeated postponements of the accession negotiations have strongly influenced declining public support for EU accession. Despite numerous concessions made by the Macedonian government, the inability of the Union to make a clear decision and start accession negotiations due to negative attitudes of Greece and Bulgaria has led to increasing public disillusionment with the EU accession process, inevitably eroding EU’s overall image at the national level. Montenegro is yet another specific case, where the popular attitudes towards EU enlargement have been continuously changing under the impact of both external and internal political developments. As illustrated by Gordana Ðurovi´c (Chapter 16), the support for EU accession was highest after the proclamation of independence in 2006 but has thereafter declined, despite Montenegro being the frontrunner among the Western Balkan Six, namely the first country to have opened EU accession negotiations. However, support of EU accession has again increased when the country entered the phase of instability, following the change of the government in 2020 and the failure of two successive governments to improve the process of negotiations with the EU. The author claims that the very strong increase, of almost 20%, in positive attitudes towards the EU, that occurred after the first post-Yugoslav change of the political direction in Montenegro, is considered to be, paradoxically, a reaction by the general public to the slowdown in the process of EU enlargement. In Serbia, where support for EU membership is currently the lowest, citizens would still support the country’s joining the Union for pragmatic and interest-based reasons (Bogosavljevi´c, Chapter 12). The deteriorating image of the EU has led to a strong decline of those supporting the country’s accession to the EU, since for the first time the share has fallen to below 50%. The reasons for diminishing enthusiasm among Serbia’s citizens and the gradual loss of EU’s attractiveness can be attributed primarily to two processes (Teokarevi´c, Chapter 8): the request to punish key perpetrators of violence in the 1990s via their extradition to the

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Hague Tribunal in the early 2000s; and issues linked to the recognition of unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo after 2008. The EU engagement in the Belgrade-Priština dialogue, considered unsuccessful, is the key reason for the further deterioration of the Union’s image in Serbia. Pro-Russian views remain very strong, even after the Russian intervention in Ukraine in February 2022. Interestingly, the dividing line between being in favour or against EU membership is not necessarily determined by differences in political parties’ ideologies; according to a recent survey (July 2022), within Vuˇci´c’s SNS party, as much as 49% of its members would vote in favour of Serbia’s membership in the EU, while 34% against (Bogosavljevi´c, Chapter 12). 2.3

Contesting EU Conditionality

The degree of success of EU conditionality in the Western Balkans has increasingly been contested in the recent literature (Džanki´c et al. 2019). In comparison with the Central East European countries, the Western Balkans have had to comply with additional conditions linked to the respect of international agreements and regional cooperation, while the procedures for advancing in the EU integration process have been longer and more demanding. Considering the limited progress achieved in the “Europeanisation” of the Western Balkans, EU conditionality has often been considered a failure. Several chapters address issues dealing with EU conditionality policy, questioning its effectiveness in the Western Balkans and pointing to some main inconsistencies. The methodology that has been implemented in the process of assessment of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans is challenged by Jelena Džanki´c (Chapter 9). In particular, she puts in the spotlight the idea of the EU being an external game-changer for the candidate countries. The EU itself has changed very much over the last 30 years, largely under the influence of various crises and challenges it has faced. Much of the analyses that are critical of EU’s limited impact on countries of the Western Balkans are based more on the perceptions of what the EU should do, than what it realistically—in the new circumstances—can do. The gap between high expectations and limited capabilities of the Union in the present situation is one of the reasons for dissatisfaction, which in turn produces frustrations on both sides of this relationship. Džanki´c thus calls for a new, more realistic approach in academic scholarship on this topic.

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The consistency of EU conditionality policy is also questioned by Simonida Kacarska (Chapter 17), on the example of North Macedonia. She provides a detailed account of the political transition in Macedonia during the 2015–2017 period, with a particular emphasis on the role that the EU played in this process. She argues that the EU was rather divided, which was evident from support that Hungary, but also some parties of the EPP group, offered to the outgoing Prime Minister Gruevski. This is considered as evidence of an unprincipled and often controversial policy of the EU towards the issue of democratization. To a certain degree, similar divisions occurred after the signing of the Prespa Agreement with Greece in 2018, when some EU member states (for example, France) temporarily delayed opening of the accession negotiations, resulting in increased disappointment. Such a position can also be explained by the important role North Macedonia had in regulating the influx of migrants via the Balkan route in 2015 that placed stability and security issues above those of democracy and the rule of law. The Macedonian case illustrates the lack of coordination—but also different and sometimes contradictory political interests—between the EU representatives on the ground and some EU member states. An important element of EU conditionality for the Western Balkan countries is the requirement of intra-regional cooperation. There are misperceptions about regional cooperation on both sides, as argued by Odeta Barbullushi (Chapter 10). Two main problems are stressed: first, the huge gap between the large expectations from the EU and the declining degree of trust in the EU by the Western Balkans; and second, candidates’ mistrust of EU initiatives on intra-regional cooperation, since most view it as a replacement and “consolation price” for the lack of EU membership. Barballushi argues that this is a false dilemma, since the EU has not offered the right incentives to enhance regional cooperation. Even some locally-owned and conceptualized initiatives for economic cooperation, such as the Open Balkans, have not been sufficiently supported by the EU. As a result, the economic gap between EU and Western Balkans is widening instead of narrowing, producing new waves of emigration and brain-drain that benefits some countries of the developed West, but has had devastating effects for the region. There are other reasons why regional cooperation has been contested in the Western Balkans, as discussed by Matteo Bonomi and Milica Uvali´c (Chapter 11). Although viewed with scepticism throughout the past decades, it is argued that some initiatives stimulating regional cooperation

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have helped achieve their main objectives. In the area of economic cooperation, bilateral trade liberalization agreements concluded in the early 2000s and the CEFTA have greatly facilitated an increase in intra-region trade, in this way sustaining the economic recovery of the Western Balkans after 2001. However, during the past decade, instead of the promoted stronger economic integration of the region, there has been a notable divergence in trade performance of the Western Balkans. Some countries—primarily North Macedonia and Serbia—have been more successful than others in directing their exports increasingly towards the EU, rendering the regional market relatively less important. In view of such circumstances, EU conditionality policy in the region ought to be reconsidered, since the raison d’être of regional economic cooperation as an accession criterion may have lost its relevance. 2.4

Perceptions of the Balkans by Selected EU Member States and USA

Perceptions and attitudes towards the Western Balkans by the EU member states and other external actors have been shaped by various country-specific factors, including key features of a country’s foreign policy, political and economic interests in the Balkan region, and national priorities caused by internal crises or major changes in the international environment. For Italy, the collapse of Yugoslavia was a surprise and was viewed as a tragedy. Italy has for many decades regarded the neighbouring Balkan region as a key national priority, but internal economic and political issues have often diverted the government’s attention away from the region towards the resolution of more urgent internal problems. As illustrated by Stefano Bianchini (Chapter 6), some initiatives that Italy conceptualized and promoted in the late 1980s and early 1990s (such as the Central European initiative) were seriously undermined because of domestic problems, especially during the 1992–1996 period (e.g. temporary departure of the Lira from the European Monetary System in 1992, important anti-corruption reforms, the difficulties in complying with the Maastricht criteria for entering the European Monetary Union). The approach to the Western Balkans changed after 2000, when Italy took various new initiatives to help the region, increased financial assistance and supported civil society organizations, although such policies were again interrupted by the global financial crisis of 2007. Italy has played a secondary role

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compared to other major EU states, despite being the closest one to the region. This may change in 2023, as a consequence of ambitious foreign policy objectives of the new Italian government. Germany has been a key player in Southeast Europe throughout the last three decades, as illustrated by Franz-Lothar Altmann (Chapter 5). Altmann interprets Germany’s role in 1990 and 1991 in the region as justified, arguing that Germany saw earlier than others that Yugoslavia no longer could function as a state. However, he also acknowledges that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia—on insistence of Germany under Chancellor Kohl —did not prevent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After 2000, Germany has been a strong supporter of EU enlargement, recently through the Berlin process I and II. In the current phase, however, there are various problems of EU enlargement on both sides, in the EU and in the candidate countries. In Germany, the views about enlargement differ within the Parliament, as well as among the public. The government’s official standpoint still confirms that the Western Balkans must be included into the EU, but the public is sceptical particularly because of Serbia’s inconsistent position, oscillating between commitment to the EU and reliance on other external actors such as Russia and China. The key obstacle to Serbia’s joining the EU is the unresolved issue of Kosovo. Serbia’s policies are considered a blocking factor for the remaining candidates from the Western Balkans. If Serbia was to change its policy, the possibility for all the Western Balkans to join the EU at the same time would be much more likely. By this explanation, Altmann’s chapter helps us to understand current perceptions of Western Balkans by official Berlin. A particularly important case is Croatia, being a country that has shared a common history with the Western Balkans for many decades. From being eager to leave the Balkans as soon as possible, the dominant position during the first two decades after independence, Croatia returned to exert its influence in the region after joining the EU in 2013. As explained by Dejan Jovi´c (Chapter 6), Croatia initially used the policy of cooperation with other countries in the Western Balkans in order to convince the EU that it is mature to become admitted to the Union. However, its membership in the EU increased self-confidence and resulted in bigger ambitions, including that of being no longer a “small state” but a “small power”, with influence in the Western Balkans. Thus, paradoxically, Croatia remains involved in the Western Balkans from which it wanted to escape, but it now sees its role as one of the

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intervening actors (in coordination with others in the EU). The Croatian case shows that nationalists and even former secessionists might find in EU membership a key motivation for enhancing sovereignty of their countries, by turning the “nominal” into “near-real” sovereignty at the moment of joining the Union. The perceptions of the EU member states about the Western Balkans are also the principal determinants of their financial assistance to the region. Will Bartlett’s analysis (Chapter 2) identifies the main bilateral donors and investors from the EU in the Western Balkans, in order to determine their main motivations. On the basis of a detailed analysis of financial aid and econometric tests of its determinants, the findings show that it is primarily strong economic interests of the EU member states based on positive perceptions of market opportunities that are the diving force of financial assistance, whereas solidarity and altruistic motives, and in particular the desire to democratize these countries, remain secondary. Therefore “stabilitocracy”, even if it involves the perpetuation or preservation of non-democratic or illiberal practices, does not seem to hamper the pursuit of economic interests by EU member states. The primacy of economic interests is therefore keeping the candidate countries in a limbo with regard to the final objective of membership in the EU. The US government has changed its attitudes continuously towards the Western Balkans during the past thirty-five years. As illustrated by Ivan Vujaˇci´c (Chapter 7), the US government expressed a reluctant, distant and late involvement in times of relative stability in the region, but reacted swiftly and resolutely in times of crisis, yet without a clear vision of what it actually wanted to achieve. The US policy towards the Yugoslav crisis was inconsistent. The initial formula was one of “united and democratic” Yugoslavia, but then it left to the EU to take the lead in attempting to prevent conflicts. When the EU failed, the USA decisively intervened and influenced the outcome of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similarly in 1999, the USA led the NATO intervention against FR Yugoslavia, paving the way for secession of Kosovo. Since the recognition of Kosovo’s independence was far from universal, this is considered another failure of US foreign policy in the Western Balkans. Similarly problematic was the perception of key political actors, in particular Slobodan Miloševi´c, first considered a major interlocutor and peace-maker in Dayton, but then perceived as the key villain and instigator of aggression, and a war criminal after the war over Kosovo. US

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foreign policy often clashed with that of the key European actors, which also explains the long delays in EU accession processes. 2.5

Strong (and Inadequate) Influence of the Media

Another conclusion that emerges from this volume’s contributions is that misperceptions about the EU in the Western Balkans have been strongly influenced by the media that remains under very strong control of the political elites. The media outlets in the Western Balkans bear a particular responsibility for diffusing misperceptions about the EU among the public, as confirmed by many recent studies. In the EU member states, there is also a strong relationship between politics and the news outlets, but in the Western Balkans the role and responsibility of the media for the frequently inappropriate image of the EU presented to the public is much higher. Many recent assessments of various organizations show the very low ranking of the Western Balkan countries regarding media freedoms. To what extent media outlets can be detrimental for the EU image in the Western Balkans is illustrated by Aleksandra Krsti´c (Chapter 18) on the case of Serbia. Krsti´c analyses the role of the news outlets in Serbia during the first months of the outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis looks at the way the image of the EU has been shaped in Serbian local media during the early days of the COVID-19 crisis, by promoting positive images of Russia and China and negative ones of the EU, especially regarding support that these actors had offered (or had not offered) in the form of providing vaccines during the first wave of the pandemic. Since the mass-media (especially the tabloids) are under strong control of the government, they have followed largely the politics promoted by President Vuˇci´c. At the same time, we can also question how successful has EU communications policy been in the Western Balkans, whether it did a good job in using the various crises (pandemic, migration crisis, Brexit) to present itself in a more positive light.

3

Key Misperceptions

There are three groups of misperceptions that are particularly important for the current debate about EU enlargement to the Western Balkans. The first concerns the strong belief in some Western Balkan countries that there may be better options than to join the EU. The second misperception is that the EU should let the Western Balkans enter the Union

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because of altruistic and solidarity-related reasons. The third misperception is that the EU cannot afford enlargement to the Western Balkans because this would imply very high costs. 3.1

Alternatives to the EU

There is a misperception that the Western Balkans can turn increasingly towards other non-EU countries as political partners, such as China, Russia, Turkey, Gulf countries and possibly others. Although most of these countries are bound to continue to be present in the region, both economically and politically, in the long run for the Western Balkans there are no better or more natural alternatives but to become members of the EU. The Western Balkans are geographically located on the European continent and today represent the “soft belly” of the Union, surrounded by EU member states (Bonomi and Relji´c 2017). Most countries are “leftovers” of former Yugoslavia, but whereas Slovenia and Croatia have been EU member states for quite some time (nineteen and ten years, respectively), the others have been in the queue to enter for over twenty years. It is time to close a geographical, political and cultural hole in the middle of Europe, but this requires more efforts and determination on both sides. The key political actors in the Western Balkans ought to show that they are serious when requesting membership in the EU by implementing the necessary reforms. At the same time, the policymakers in the EU ought to bring back the focus on the accession of the Western Balkan states and take into account not only stability, but also democracy and the rule of law. Without firmer prospects for the Western Balkans of entering the Union, stability will hardly be sufficient to accelerate ongoing reforms. Although the Russian aggression of Ukraine has provoked strong proRussian sentiment in some Western Balkan countries—understandable, since most countries are linked to Russia through history, culture and some also through religion—this does not mean that their citizens do not condemn the Russian attack on Ukraine. Serbia has voted in favour of UN Resolutions denouncing Russia over the Ukraine invasion (March 2022) and suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council (April 2022) and has also condemned Russia’s annexation of the four Ukrainian regions (October 2022), although it is not willing to introduce sanctions against Russia. Yet, Vuˇci´c may be forced to finally take sides in favour of the EU due to increasing international pressure to proceed with normalization of

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relations with Kosovo (Uvali´c 2023). This could facilitate a faster entry of all the Western Balkans into the EU. The war in Ukraine has reduced Russia’s political leverage in the region. As of recently, all countries of the Western Balkans, except for Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, are members of NATO. Thus, proRussian and anti-Western forces in the Balkans now seem to be losing touch with new realities, as the region is already in the Western security embrace. Whereas to advocate closer links with Russia before February 2022 was perhaps a legitimate choice, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine this policy became politically much more difficult. There is another reason why the choice between the EU and other external actors is a false dilemma for the Western Balkans that derives from increasing economic interdependencies. The Western Balkans have become strongly interlinked with the EU economy through increasing trade, investments, financial and banking integration. The EU is the Western Balkans’ main economic partner today and the trend of increasing economic integration is likely to continue, irrespective of when these countries may join the EU. 3.2

Altruistic and Solidarity-Based Motives

There is a misperception that the EU should open its doors to the Western Balkans because of altruistic and solidarity-related motives, without recognition that today there are many policy areas where the two regions have increasing common interests—including security, migration, environment, trade, energy, transport infrastructure and climate—that can best be pursued through joint and coordinated sectoral policies. The EU should openly recognize that the Western Balkans full integration with the EU is a geostrategic investment into a stable Union, for the sake of its own political, security and economic interests. Given that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has provoked major risks for the entire Western Balkan region, there is a need to strengthen the participation of all countries in the strategic reflection on European security. With three more countries from the Eastern neighbourhood— Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia—knocking on the doors of the EU, the EU enlargement policy is naturally being reconsidered. Recent events could act both in favour and against the acceleration of Western Balkans’ accession to the EU (Uvali´c 2023). Some positive steps have already been taken, such as the start of EU accession negotiations with Albania and

19

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431

North Macedonia and the granting of candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but other factors could further delay the process and we are still far from a well-defined timetable of future enlargements. 3.3

High Costs of EU Enlargement to the Balkans

Another misperception is that the EU cannot afford enlargement to the Western Balkans, among other reasons because of its high overall costs. What is not taken into account is that the benefits of Western Balkans joining the EU are likely to be much greater than the costs. The potential economic benefits of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans are well-known from previous EU enlargements—including the contribution of new (less developed) members to faster economic growth, increasing trade, creation of enterprise networks and stronger financial links. As to the costs, the entry of the Western Balkans into the EU would have marginal decision-making implications, given that the Western Balkans are mostly very small countries, representing a total population of 18 million inhabitants (or 4% of the current EU population). Moreover, the financial impact of Western Balkan countries’ membership for the EU budget would be negligible. Recent simulations suggest that the total cost of redistribution of European Structural and Investment Funds, once the Western Balkans join the Union, would be very modest, around 1/3 of funds going to Poland (Daviddi and Uvali´c 2019). Other calculations have shown that EU enlargement to the Western Balkans would represent a financially insignificant burden for the current EU member’s states, ranging from 0.014 to 0.026% of member states’ GNI, or between e 1.6 and e 10.8 per capita per year (Rant et al. 2019).

4

The Way Forward

With the second Russian war in Ukraine (2022), EU enlargement is being once again reconsidered. The EU would be safer and more powerful had it completed the process of its enlargement to the Western Balkans. However, the priority is now linked with united action in support of Ukraine, which became in 2022 an EU candidate country. Can the Western Balkans use this new situation in order to draw attention to itself, without creating or becoming a new problem to the Union? The war in Ukraine has created a new mental map in Europe, at least in its core. If the border between the European collective Self and the

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Others is now in Ukraine, this should mean that the Western Balkans firmly belong to Europe. Geopolitically, the region is surrounded by members of NATO and the EU, and it has been waiting for long to join the Union. In these new circumstances, the Balkans are no longer the “borderland” between Europe and non-Europe. It should thus—as some authors in this volume argue—join the Union as soon as possible. In this respect, a number of authors here argue for a new thinking on the side of the EU. They criticize current approaches, but also offer new solutions. Crucially, the EU should stop acting as if it is still “offended” by events in the Western Balkans thirty years ago. At the same time, Western Balkans should also stop blaming the EU for its own destiny. One of the open issues is whether the Western Balkans should enter the EU jointly or separately. Though it may seem wise to continue with the merit-based approach that takes into account each country’s progress, there are also strong reasons to sustain that the Western Balkan countries should join the EU together. Despite differences in the current status of individual countries, all of them have for years been adopting laws in conformity with the EU acquis. If the EU is to remain attractive, it should open its doors to all countries with no further delay (Jovi´c 2018). Facilitating EU membership of all the Western Balkan countries is the only way to avoid further divisions and political instability in the region. Leaving some countries behind for future rounds of EU enlargement could have negative repercussions, as suggested by the experience gained over the last 20 years. The continuous postponement of EU membership of most Western Balkan countries has caused backsliding in democracy, rule of law and other ongoing reforms. Delays could make EU enlargement in the future even more difficult. Despite the persistence of misperceptions on both sides, mutual perceptions can change for the better. The best way to start changing these perceptions is to allow the Western Balkans to become EU member states as soon as possible. We hope this vision of a united Europe can be realized soon, to the benefit of both the EU member states and the Western Balkans.

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References Bechev, D. (2017). Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe. New Haven: Yale University Press. Blanuša, N., and Krajina, Z (2016). EU, Europe Unfinished: Mediating Europe and the Balkans in a Time of Crisis. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Bonomi, M., and Relji´c, D. (2017). The EU and the Western Balkans: So near and yet so far why the region needs fast-track socio-economic convergence with the EU. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), SWP Comments 53, December. Daviddi, R., and Uvali´c, M. (2019). Doing the right deeds for the right reasons. Costs and benefits of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans. Paper presented at the 13th International Conference “Challenges of Europe” organised by the University of Split in Bol (Croatia), May. Džanki´c, J., Keil, S., and Kmezi´c, M. (2019). The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans. A Failure of EU Conditionality? Palgrave Macmillan. Gow, J. (1997). Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War. New York: Columbia University Press. Jovi´c, D. (2018). Accession to the European Union and perception of external actors in the Western Balkans. Croatian International Relations Review, XXIV (83), pp. 6–32. Rant, V., Mrak, M., and Marinˇc, M. (2020). The Western Balkans and the EU budget: The effects of enlargement. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 20 (3), pp. 431–453. Uvali´c, M. (2023). The uncertain impact of the Russian—Ukraine war on the Western Balkans. In A year later: war in Ukraine & Western Balkan (geo)politics, (eds.), Džanki´c, J., Keil, S. and Kacarska, S. EUI Press, Florence.

Index

Note: The page numbers followed by ’n’, ’f’ and ’t’ represents footnotes, figure and table. A Abazovi´c, Dritan, 371 Accession to EU. See EU accession of WB states Acemoglu, Daron, 309 Adriatic Initiative, 85, 86 Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, 89, 96 Ahtisaari, Martti, 160 Albania bilateral aid provision to, 33, 35, 40t, 41–42 COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese vaccines use, 228 democracy level, 44t emigration from, 35, 86, 305 EU candidacy. See Albania, EU candidacy exports from (to EU and WB region), 252–253, 251–252f exports to, 40t, 42, 43

Italian-led foreign policy initiatives, 85, 86 Kosovo war, role in, 155–156 Open Balkans initiative, 232, 234, 424 US interests in, 113 Albania, EU candidacy application, 298–301 conditionality requirements, 306–307 early EU-Albania diplomatic relations, 294–297 introduction to study, 293–294 progress, 7, 109, 152, 166 public opinion, 9, 173f, 174, 176f,, 180f, 185f, 211–212, 271, 274, 301–302, 420 Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations, 297–298 Albright, Madeleine, 148–149

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Uvali´c (ed.), Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU, New Perspectives on South-East Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32205-1

435

436

INDEX

Amato, Giuliano, 87–88 Anastasakis, Othon, 379–380 Austria exports to WB states, 40t EU sanctions against, 207 financial aid to WB states, 30–33, 32–33t, 36–37 North Macedonian wiretapping crisis response, 387–388

B Baerbock, Annalena, 339 Baker, James, 145, 147, 148 Balkan wars. See Yugoslav wars Bechev, Dimitar, 338 Belgrade Agreement between Serbia and Montenegro, 182 Berisha, Sali, 86 Berlin Process aims, 67, 108–109, 248–250, 257 Berlin Process II (November 2022), 8 horizontal elements, 307 lost momentum, 226, 230–232 See also Regional cooperation by WB states Biden administration, US, 112–113, 161 Bieber, Florian, 59, 229 Bilateral aid to WB states Central European Initiative Fund, 92–93 comparative data, 30–34, 31–32t competing motivations, balance between regression model, 44–45, 45t, 48f, 49 competing motivations, balance between, 27, 30–31, 43, 49–51 specific donors’ motivations Austria, 36–37

Czech Republic, 42–43 France, 41 Germany, 34–35 Hungary, 37–39 Italy, 41–42 Slovakia, 39 Slovenia, 39–41 Sweden, 35–36 Bildt, Carl, 406–408 Bondsteel military base, Kosovo, 112–113 Borrell, Josep, 114, 115 Börzel, Tanja A., 379 Bosnia and Herzegovina bilateral aid provision to, 33–34, 31t, 33t from specific states, 34, 35–37, 39–40, 42 Bosnian war. See Bosnian war (1992–95) constitutional framework, 57, 59–60, 64–65, 150 reform proposals, 71–74, 137–138 democracy in, 44t, 59–60, 72, 76–77 economic situation, 58–59, 320 electoral reform controversy, 320–321 emigration from, 58 EU candidacy. See Bosnia and Herzegovina, EU candidacy EU financial assistance to, 65–66, 322–323 exports from (to EU and WB region), 251–253, 252f, 254f exports to, 40t international institutional presence in, 57, 66, 73 post-war recovery, 57–58, 129 Republika Srpska. See Republika Srpska

INDEX

rule of law in, 58, 63n14, 71–72 Bosnia and Herzegovina, EU candidacy application. See Bosnia and Herzegovina, EU candidacy application conditionality requirements, 63–65, 62n13, 73, 316–317, 329 financial assistance, 65–66, 322–323 media discourse, 404 political division impeding, 111, 329 public opinion, 60–61, 66, 173f, 175, 176f, 177f, 180f, 185f, 274 strategy reform proposals, 70–71, 77–78, 205, 420–421 civil society and citizen engagement, 70, 76–77 governance system reforms, 71–74 normative approach, 74–76 Bosnia and Herzegovina, EU candidacy application coordination mechanism adoption (August 2016), 317–318 coordination mechanism development 1997–2009, 61–62, 318–320 2009–14, 62, 320–323 2015–16, 323–325 criticism of EU, 329–330, 420–421 EU acquis adoption programme, 328–329 granted (December 2022), 7, 63–65, 117, 314, 329 institutional framework, 325–326 introduction to study, 313–316 questionnaire on accession readiness, 63, 326–328, 330

437

Stabilisation and Association Agreement, 62, 315, 317–318, 319, 320, 323, 329, 330 Bosnian war (1992–95) Dayton Accords, 57, 95, 149–150, 153, 263 impact, 55–57 narratives applied to, 57–58, 130, 265 US response, 146–147, 147–149 Brˇcko District (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 57 Brexit, 205, 401 Brnabi´c, Ana, 406–408 Bühler, Erhard, 113 Bulgaria EU accession, 304–305 EU financial assistance to, 309n9 North Macedonia’s EU accession veto, 152, 174, 212, 227, 301, 391–392, 417 rule of law in, 207–208 Serbian nationalism in, 114 Buti, Marco, 409

C Carrington-Cutileiro peace plan, 147–148 CEFTA 1992 (Central European Free Trade Agreement), 244 CEFTA 2006 (Central European Free Trade Agreement), 230, 244–245, 247, 425 Central European Initiative, 84–86, 89, 91, 92–93, 94, 96, 97–98 CFSP (common foreign and security policy) of EU, 66, 111 Checkel, Jeffrey T., 378–379 China COVID vaccines supply to WB states, 228, 287, 406–407, 409

438

INDEX

investment in WB states, 12–13, 16, 29, 113–114, 136–137, 186–188, 194, 228 trade with WB states, 11 Chryssogelos, Angelos S., 386, 391 Churchill, Winston, 308 Clinton administration, US, 148–149 Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of EU, 66, 111 Common Regional Market (formerly Regional Economic Area), 67–68, 226, 231–232 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS), 7, 65, 243 Conditionality requirements for EU accession Albania, 306–307 benchmark approach, 305–306 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 62n13, 63–65, 73, 316–317, 329 credibility of. See EU accession of WB states, credibility challenges Croatia, 124–125, 127, 128–129, 131–132, 305–306 General Affairs Council’s regional approach, 295–296 generally, 6–7, 25–26, 27, 28, 302–305, 316 Kosovo independence recognition. See Kosovo independence Montenegro, 366–367 proposed reassertion of, 307–310 regional cooperation. See Regional cooperation by WB states Serbia, public concern over, 279–280, 279f, 280t “stabilitocracy” hypothesis. See “stabilitocracy” hypothesis

Stabilization and Association Process, 7, 61–62, 229, 241–242, 296–297, 305, 319 theoretical analysis, 378–382, 392–393 Ukraine and Moldova, unconditional candidacy offers, 2, 66, 100, 117, 175, 205, 345–346, 352–353 war crimes trials. See War crimes trials See also Democracy levels of WB states; Rule of law in WB states Corruption in WB states, 27, 58, 70, 71–72, 320 ´ c, Dobrica, 153 Cosi´ Cossiga, Francesco, 85 ˇ c, Dragan, 323–324, 324 Covi´ COVID-19 pandemic EU credibility impact, 10, 96, 228–229, 269, 276–277, 284 Serbian media discourse, 406–409, 410, 428 EU response, 224, 358–359 WB region impacts, 37, 58–59, 99 Crimea, annexation by Russia, 113, 136 Croatia EU accession. See Croatia’s accession to EU EU financial assistance to, 309n9 ICTY, cooperation with, 124, 127, 132 inter-ethnic relations, 128, 132–133, 133–134 NATO membership, 127, 134, 138, 139 post-war reconciliation initiatives, 130, 131 Serbian nationalism in, 114, 130–131 trade with WB states, 11–12

INDEX

439

Croatian war (1991–95) EC and German responses, 107, 123, 146 narratives applied to, 127, 129–130, 138, 265 Operation Storm, 129, 130, 135, 149–150 US response, 123, 146, 147 Croatia’s accession to EU ’Back to Europe’ pro-EU narrative, 122–123, 124–125, 126–127, 138–139 conditionality requirements, 124–125, 127, 128–129, 131–132, 305–306 introduction to study, 121–122 policy in WB region facilitated by, 125–126, 132–138, 426–427 public opinion, 180, 180f Slovenia blocking, 214 Tud-manist euroscepticism, 123–124, 132–133, 135 Cyprus, 111, 124, 174, 203, 207–208 Czech Republic exports to WB states, 40t financial aid to WB states, 30–33, 31–32t, 42–43

Bosnia and Herzegovina, 44t, 59–60, 72, 76–77 EU accession, anticipated benefits, 362–363 EU Member States’ concerns, 110–112, 116 North Macedonia, 44t, 383–384 populism threat, 364–365, 401–402, 409 regional assessments, 27, 28, 43–44, 44t Serbia, 38, 44, 44t, 116, 209–210 “stabilitocracy” hypothesis. See “stabilitocracy” hypothesis See also Conditionality requirements for EU accession; Rule of law in WB states Desmet, Pieterjan, 403–404 Dimitrova, Antoaneta, 316 Ðind-i´c, Zoran, 128 Dodik, Milorad, 38–39, 111, 324 Dombrowski, Peter, 34 Draghi, Mario, 100, 101 Duda, Andrej, 136 Ðukanovi´c, Milo, 210–211, 269 Ðukanovi´c, Vladimir, 408–409 Džanki´c, Jelena, 213

D Daˇci´c, Ivica, 131, 210 Davis, Jacki, 402 Davis, Patricia, 34 Dayton Accords, 57, 95, 149–150, 153, 263 Declaration on the Process on Stability and Good-Neighbourliness in Southeast Europe 1995, 240 De Michelis, Gianni, 84–85, 85, 87 Democracy levels of WB states bilateral aid, link to (regression model), 44–45, 45t, 48f, 49

E Economic and Investment Plan for WB region (EU), 28–29, 65, 231–232 Economic situations of WB states Bosnia and Herzegovina, 58–59, 320 emigration. See Emigration from WB states EU accession, economic benefits anticipated, 357–359 questioned, 13–15, 224, 229, 232–233

440

INDEX

EU accession, economic costs (anticipated), 359–362, 431 euroisation, 13 financial aid. See Bilateral aid to WB states; EU financial assistance to WB states global and Eurozone crises, impact of, 13–14, 203 regional cooperation. See Regional cooperation by WB states trade and investment. See Trade and investment, WB region wars, economic impact, 5–6 Education and research programmes EU initiatives, 65–66, 95, 358 Uniadrion (University of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas), 92–93 Elbasani, Arolda, 379 Elgström, Ole, 381–382 Emigration from WB states Albania, 35, 86, 305 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 58 ethnocentric migrations to Serbia, 265–266 generally, 185, 233 Kosovo, 336, 345–347 Montenegro, 360 visa liberalisation. See Visa liberalisation Erdut Agreement, 127, 134–135 EU accession of WB states Berlin Process. See Berlin Process conditionality requirements. See Conditionality requirements for EU accession credibility challenges. See EU accession of WB states, credibility challenges Croatia. See Croatia’s accession to EU

EU’s geostrategic interests in, 112, 186, 200, 302–305, 308, 351–352, 430–432 IPAs. See IPA (Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance) programmes Member States’ positions. See EU accession of WB states, Member States’ positions perceptions analytical framework, 2–4, 415–416 key misperceptions, 428–431 public opinion on. See EU accession of WB states, public opinion regional cooperation strategy. See Regional cooperation by WB states specific states. See under State name Stabilization and Association Process, 7, 61–62, 229, 241–242, 296–297, 305, 319 strategy for, 7, 68–69, 186, 225–226, 300–301 reform proposals. See EU accession of WB states, strategy reform proposals Thessaloniki Summit (June 2003), 61, 77, 89–90, 109, 166, 199, 243, 319 timeline of applications, 178–180 US position, 112–113, 166 visa liberalisation. See Visa liberalisation EU accession of WB states, credibility challenges Brexit, 205, 401 capability-expectation gap (analytical framework), 199–201, 216–218, 423–424 COVID-19 pandemic, 10, 96, 228–229, 269, 276–277, 284

INDEX

Serbian media discourse, 406–410 delays and lost momentum, 7–9, 66–67, 77, 109, 166, 177–178, 199–200, 225–226 economic benefits questioned, 13–15, 224, 229, 232–233 economic costs (anticipated), 359–362, 431 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, 29, 96, 203–204f, 401 flawed theoretical expectations, 212–214, 217 illiberalism of Member States, 37–38, 110, 116, 205–208, 369, 417–418, 424 Kosovo problem. See Kosovo independence loss of public support. See EU accession of WB states, public opinion migration crisis. See Migration crisis, EU narrative manipulation by political elites, 184–185, 209–212, 223–224 North Macedonian wiretapping crisis. See North Macedonia, wiretapping crisis (2015-17) “stabilitocracy” hypothesis. See “stabilitocracy” hypothesis strategy reforms to address. See EU accession of WB states, strategy reform proposals Ukraine and Moldova, unconditional candidacy offers, 2, 66, 100, 117, 175, 205, 345–346, 352–353 Ukraine war. See Ukraine war (2022–) Yugoslav wars, EC response perceived as inadequate, 417

441

EU accession of WB states, Member States’ positions Austria, 36 Bulgaria, 152, 174, 211, 227, 301, 391–392, 417 commercial incentives for delay, 26, 29–30, 50, 427 enlargement fatigue, 9–15, 29–30, 68, 97, 183, 223 France, 69–70, 152, 211, 301 Germany, 35, 107, 108–109, 111–112, 115–118, 205, 339, 426 Greece, 16 Hungary, 110 illiberalism concerns, 110–112, 116, 211 Italy, 89–90, 100–101 Netherlands, 152 Slovenia, 39–40 Spain, 343–344 UK (before Brexit), 205 EU accession of WB states, public opinion Albania, 9, 174, 211–212, 271, 274, 301–302, 420 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 60–61, 66, 174–175, 274 early enthusiasm, 181–183 economic benefits questioned, 229 expectations of eventual accession, 9, 175–176, 177–178, 274–276, 419 data on, 176, 177, 178–180, 226–227, 268 introductions to studies, 171–172, 261–262 Kosovo. See Kosovan public opinion on EU accession media discourse affecting. See Media relations with EU

442

INDEX

Montenegro. See Montenegrin public opinion on EU accession negative attitudes, 183–184, 193–194, 215–216, 418–420 North Macedonia, 173, 176, 177, 180, 185, 211–212, 226–227, 269–271, 274, 392, 422 opinions of Russia, Turkey and China compared with, 186–188, 226, 228–229, 277 personal hopes/expectations, 184, 185 positive attitudes, 172–175, 180, 225, 267–269, 308 research on, 4–5 Serbia. See Serbian public opinion on EU accession summary of, 288 EU accession of WB states, strategy reform proposals bloc accession, 50–51, 111 conditionality requirements, reassertion of, 307–310 European Political Community, 69–70, 233–234 for Bosnia and Herzegovina. See under Bosnia and Herzegovina, EU candidacy for Kosovo problem, 115–116 for regional cooperation, 234 partial membership, 118–119, 432 prerequisites for, 70–71, 233–234, 285–288 progressive accessions, 74–76, 111–112 EU financial assistance to WB states CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation), 7, 65, 243 Economic and Investment Plan, 28–29, 65, 231–232

generally, 6, 30, 183, 258, 309, 430 IPAs. See IPA (Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance) programmes misperceptions about, 15 specific WB states. See under State name Western Balkans Guarantee Fund, 110 Euroisation of WB states, 13 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, 29, 96, 203, 401 EUSAIR (EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region), 89–90, 93–94, 96–97 Exports. See Trade and investment, WB region

F Fabrizzi, Sam, 406–408 Fajon, Tanja, 405, 408–409 Fake news, 10, 365, 406–408 Financial aid. See Bilateral aid to WB states; EU financial assistance to WB states Fontaine, Nicole, 206 Foreign direct investment in WB states. See Trade and investment, WB region Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. See North Macedonia France exports to WB states, 40 EU accession process, position on, 69–70, 152, 211, 301 financial aid to WB states, 30–33, 41 Frei, Thornston, 388 Füle, Štefan, 321

INDEX

G Gelbard, Robert, 156 Georgia, 217, 353 German policy in WB region EU accession process, position on, 35, 107–109, 111–112, 115–118, 205, 339, 426 financial aid, 30–35 German reunification, impact on, 105–107 trade, 11–12, 34, 40 Yugoslav wars response, 108, 146 Germany, emigration from WB states to, 35, 346 Gligorov, Vladimir, 245–247 Global financial crisis (2008–09), 13–14, 29, 31, 320 Gonzalez, Felipe, 154 Gotovina, Ante, 130 Gow, James, 416 Grabar-Kitarovi´c, Kolinda, 135–136 Grabbe, Heather, 378 Greece EU accession process, position on, 16 Macedonia name dispute, 150–151, 174–175, 211, 269–271, 382, 390–391, 424 migrant crisis, WB route to, 97, 99, 112, 204f–205 sovereign debt crisis, 203 Gruevski, Nikola, 348, 385–386

H Hahn, Johannes, 62, 323, 385, 388 Haider, Joerg, 206 Hegel, Georg W.F., 294 Héritier, Adrienne, 378 Hill, Christopher, 200, 216 Holbrooke, Richard, 156, 157 Hoxha, Enver, 155

443

Hughes, James, 381 Hungary democratic backsliding, 37–38, 110, 116, 207, 418 EU accession, background to, 122–123 exports to WB states, 40t, 43 financial aid to WB states, 30–33, 32t, 37–39 North Macedonian wiretapping crisis response, 387, 389, 394, 424 Republika Srpska, support for, 38–39 Huntington, Samuel, 159n16 I ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) cooperation requirement of EU, 6, 241 Croatian cooperation with, 124, 127, 132 Gotovina acquittal, 130 Serbian cooperation with, 188–190, 210 Intra-regional cooperation. See Regional cooperation by WB states Investment in WB states. See Trade and investment, WB region IPA (Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance) programmes Bosnia and Herzegovina, aid via, 65 generally, 27–28, 35, 231, 358 IPA III, conditionality relaxed, 28, 110, 208 sufficiency of funds, 231, 361–362 withdrawal risk, 361 Italian policy in WB region Albanian relations, Italian-led initiatives, 85, 86

444

INDEX

chronology, 98 exports, 12, 40t, 42 financial aid, 30–33, 32t, 41–42 via multilateral initiatives, 90, 97, 98 multilateral initiatives, participation in, 88–96 post 2007–09 financial crisis, 96–98 public opinion, 99–100 scholarly neglect of topic, 81–82, 83 weakened influence, 87–88, 100–101, 425–426 Yugoslavia, relations with, 81–82 Yugoslav wars, Italian-led policy missions, 84–87 Ivanov, Gjorgje, 389 Izetbegovi´c, Alija, 147–148 Izetbegovi´c, Bakir, 324

J Josipovi´c, Ivo, 129, 132

K Karadži´c, Radovan, 148 Karamarko, Tomislav, 132–133 Kelley, Judith, 381 Kermabon, Yves de, 41 Kohl, Helmut, 426 Kosor, Jadranka, 132 Kosovan public opinion on EU accession anticipated benefits, 185f, 342–343, 343 EU support, paradox analysed, 174, 215, 335–336, 347–348, 421–422 expectations of eventual accession, 176, 177, 274, 343

general data, 173f, 180f, 271, 273f, 342–343, 420 Kosovo diaspora influencing, 346–347, 347 specific concerns independence non-recognition, 226, 227 visa liberalisation delay, 344–345 Kosovo Albanian nationalism in, 158–159, 340–341, 342 bilateral aid provision to, 31t, 33–34, 33t, 35–36 democracy level, 44, 44t emigration from, 336, 345–347 EU candidacy. See Kosovo, EU candidacy EU financial assistance, 340, 344 exports from (to EU and WB region), 253 independence. See Kosovo independence institutional capacity-building in, 95, 337 Kosovo war (1999), 7, 41, 154–158 Serbian nationalism in, 114–115, 336, 338–339, 342 US interests in, 112–113, 344 US, public support for, 342, 344 Kosovo, EU candidacy euro adoption, 13 financial assistance, 339–340, 344 independence non-recognition implications for candidacy, 111–112, 114–116, 190–191, 338–339, 426 public opinion on, 226, 227 Member States’ concerns, 343–344 political support for, 340–342, 347 public opinion. See Kosovan public opinion on EU accession

INDEX

Stabilisation and Association Agreement, 337 visa liberalisation, 174, 225, 226, 335, 343, 344–345 Kosovo independence China’s position, 114 Croatia’s position, 127 EU’s position, 338–339 generally, 9, 263 historical context, 266–267 Kosovo’s EU accession implications for, 111–112, 114–116, 190–191, 338–339, 426 public opinion on, 226, 227 Russia’s position, 113 Serbia’s EU accession implications for, 111–112, 113, 114–116, 192, 306, 426 public opinion on, 190–191, 276–277, 282–283, 283f Slovakia’s position, 39 US position, 158–161 Koštunica, Vojislav, 128 Kouchner, Bernard, 41 Kukies, Jörg, 118 Kundera, Milan, 212 Kurti, Albin, 341 Kurz, Sebastian, 387–388

L Lajˇcak, Miroslav, 114 Leaman, Jeremy, 34 Leotard, François, 152

M Macedonia name dispute, 150–151, 174, 211, 269–271, 382, 390–391, 424. See also See also North Macedonia

445

Macron, Emmanuel, 41, 69–70, 117, 301, 308–309, 391n28 Malta, 124, 207–208 March, James G., 379, 380–381, 392–393 Martinez-Zarzoso, I., 34 Mavromatidis, Fotis, 34 Media relations with EU generally, 400–404, 409 Serbia case study. See Serbian media discourse on EU WB states generally, 9–10, 404, 428 Menendet Alarcón, Antonio V., 108, 403 Mesi´c, Stjepan, 129, 132 Michel, Charles, 69–70 Migration crisis, EU EU credibility impact, 97, 204–205, 384–387, 389–390, 393 media coverage, 401, 409 WB region routes, 99, 112, 204–205, 384–385, 424 Milanovi´c, Zoran, 136, 137–138 Miloševi´c, Slobodan downfall, 89, 131, 153–154 Kosovo war, role in, 154–158 peace negotiations, role in, 148, 150, 152–153 ’Telecom affair’ scandal, 88 Western media portrayal, 153, 165, 427 Mirel, Pierre, 74–76 Mitsotakis, Kyriakos, 178 Mitterrand, François, 69n23 Mladi´c, Ratko, 148 Mogherini, Federica, 62, 324–325, 388–389 Moldova, EU candidacy offer, 2, 66, 100, 117, 175, 205, 344–345, 353–354 Montenegrin public opinion on EU accession

446

INDEX

anticipated benefits, 185f, 369–370 expectations of eventual accession, 176f, 177f, 274 general data, 173f, 180f, 215, 264f, 269, 353–354, 354f, 422 media discourse, 404 negative influences on, 354–355, 364–366 Montenegro Belgrade Agreement with Serbia, 182 bilateral aid provision to, 31, 33–34 democracy level, 44 ethnic tensions, 365–366 EU candidacy. See Montenegro, EU candidacy EU financial assistance, 358, 361, 364 exports from (to EU and WB region), 252f, 254f exports to, 40 rule of law in, 370–371 secession from Serbia, 158, 210, 262 Serbian nationalism in, 114, 355 Montenegro, EU candidacy conditionality requirements, 366–367 euro adoption, 13 financial assistance, 358, 361, 364 progress, 7, 68, 109, 175, 190, 210–211, 306, 370–372 public opinion. See Montenegrin public opinion on EU accession SWOT analysis conclusions of, 369–370 opportunities, 362–364 strengths (anticipated benefits), 356–359 threats, 364–369 weaknesses (economic costs), 359–362

Multinational firm investment in WB states, 29

N NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, 157–158, 263 NATO expansion in WB region Croatia, 127, 134, 138, 139 Kosovo membership, public support for, 342 North Macedonia, 151, 152 Russian response, 113 US position, 144, 165–166 Nechev, Zoran, 229 Netherlands, 42, 152 Nikoli´c, Tomislav, 131, 210 Nimetz, Matthew, 151 North Macedonia armed conflict (2001), 152 bilateral aid provision to, 31, 33, 34, 40–41 democracy level, 44, 383–384 EU candidacy. See North Macedonia, EU candidacy exports to, 40 name dispute, 150–151, 174, 211, 269–271, 382, 390–391, 424 NATO membership, 151, 152 Open Balkans initiative, 232, 234, 424 rule of law in. See North Macedonia, wiretapping crisis (2015–17) Serbian nationalism in, 114 UN presence in, 151 US policy in, 151, 152 North Macedonia, EU candidacy application and grant, 7, 390–391 Bulgarian veto, 152, 174–175, 211, 227, 301, 391–392, 417

INDEX

freezing of recommendation for. See North Macedonia, wiretapping crisis (2015–17) media discourse, 404 public opinion, 173f, 176f, 177f, 180f, 185f, 212–212, 226–227, 270–271, 272f, 274, 392, 422 North Macedonia, wiretapping crisis (2015–17), 378 contextual background, 382–385 EU conditionality and political socialisation after 2016 elections, 388–390, 394 before 2016 elections, 385–388, 394 EU conditionality, theoretical analysis, 378–382, 392–393 introduction to study, 375–378 wider relevance of study, 394, 424 Novak-Lehmann, F., 34 Noyan, Oliver, 117–118 O O’Brennan, John, 380 Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 57, 63, 73 Olsen, Johan P., 379, 380, 392–393 Open Balkans initiative, 232, 234, 424 Operation Storm (Croatian war), 129, 130, 135, 149–150 Orbán, Viktor, 37–39, 111, 207, 387 Organised crime in WB states, 27, 42, 70 Osimo agreements, 82, 99 Overseas development assistance. See Bilateral aid to WB states; EU financial assistance to WB states Owen, David, 145–146, 148

447

P Panagiotou, Ritsa, 382 Pani´c, Milan, 153 Pardew, James, 152 Pejˇcinovi´c-Buri´c, Marija, 137 Perceptions analytical framework, 2–4 Pichelmann, Karl, 409 Plenkovi´c, Andrej, 133, 135, 136, 137 Poland Croatia, relations with, 136 democratic backsliding, 110–111, 116, 207 EU accession, background to, 122–123 Poos, Jacques, 61n12 Populism, 364–365, 401–402, 409 Post-war reconciliation initiatives, 57–58, 127–130, 131 Prespa Agreement, 151, 152, 174, 390–391, 424 Pridham, Geoffrey, 379 Priebe Report, 63n14, 309n10, 383–384 Putin, Vladimir, 192

R Rama, Edi, 212 Reconciliation initiatives, post-war, 6, 57–58, 127–130, 131 Refugee crisis. See Migration crisis, EU Regional cooperation by WB states early EU strategy promoting, 240 introduction to study, 240 lost momentum, 226, 230–232, 255–257 Open Balkans initiative, 232, 234, 424 Regional Cooperation Council, 96, 243

448

INDEX

Regional Economic Area (later Common Regional Market), 67–68, 226, 231–232 scepticism and misperceptions, 224, 232–233, 244–247, 424–425 strategy reform proposals, 234 trade and economic effects, 247–251, 251f variations between states, 251, 252f See alsoTrade and investment, WB region Relji´c, Dušan, 232 Republic of Macedonia. See North Macedonia Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina) establishment, 57 euroscepticism, 60n10, 64, 111, 114 separatist movement, states supporting, 38–39, 114, 117 Serbian nationalism in, 114 Research programmes. See Education and research programmes Richter, Solveig, 380 Risse, Thomas, 379 Robinson, James, 309 Rugova, Ibrahim, 155, 156, 340–341 Rule of law in WB states Bosnia and Herzegovina, 58, 63n14, 71–72 capacity-building initiatives, 94–95, 337 corruption, 27, 58, 70, 71–72, 320 generally, 27, 70, 356–357 Kosovo, ’standards before status’ plan, 158–159 Montenegro, 370–371 North Macedonia. See North Macedonia, wiretapping crisis (2015-17) organised crime, 27, 42, 70

See also Conditionality requirements for EU accession; Democracy levels of WB states Russia Crimea annexation, 113, 136 investment in WB states, 12 Kosovo independence non-recognition, 113 policy in WB region, 15, 16,, 113, 116–117, 355 public opinion in WB states towards, 186–188, 192–193, 193f, 194, 228–229, 405–406 public opinion in WB states towards Serbia, political links with, 38, 111 trade with WB states, 11 war with Ukraine. See Ukraine war (2022– )

S Sanader, Ivo, 127–128, 132 Sarrazin, Manuel, 118 Schimmelfennig, Frank, 118, 380 Scholz, Olaf, 117 Sedelmeier, Ulrich, 378, 380 Selakovi´c, Nikola, 39 Serbia Belgrade Agreement with Montenegro, 182 bilateral aid provision to, 31t, 33–34, 33t from specific states, 34–35, 35–36, 36–39, 40–41, 42–43 COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese vaccines use, 228 Croatia, ICJ proceedings against, 129–130 democracy level, 37–38, 44t, 116, 209–210 ethnocentric migration to, 265–266

INDEX

EU candidacy. See Serbia, EU candidacy; Serbian public opinion on EU accession EU financial assistance to, 15 exports from (to EU and WB region), 252, 252f, 254f exports to, 40, 43–44 ICTY, cooperation with, 188–190, 210 Kosovo independence non-recognition. See Kosovo independence Kosovo Serbs, influence over, 336, 338–339, 341 Miloševi´c era. See Miloševi´c, Slobodan Montenegro’s secession from, 158, 211, 262 Open Balkans initiative, 232, 234, 424 post-war reconciliation initiatives, 128–129, 129–130 Russia, political links with, 38, 111 Serbia, EU candidacy background to, 209–210, 277–278, 278t financial assistance, 15 Kosovo independence non-recognition implications for candidacy, 111–112, 113, 114–116, 192, 306, 426 public opinion on, 190–191, 276–277, 282–283, 283f media discourse. See Serbian media discourse on EU Member States’ concerns, 111, 116 progress, 7, 68, 109, 306 public opinion. See Serbian public opinion on EU accession Serbian media discourse on EU

449

in COVID-19 pandemic, 406–409, 410, 428 EU-media relations generally, 400–404, 409 introduction to study, 399–400 public opinion, impact on, 406 topics and tone, 404–406, 409–410 Serbian nationalism Croatia, 114, 130–131 Kosovo, 114–115, 336, 338–339, 342 Montenegro, 114, 355 Serbian public opinion on EU accession domestic political preferences, relationship with, 284–285, 284f expectations of eventual accession, 9, 176f, 177f, 177t, 273f, 274, 279 first associations when EU mentioned, 280, 280f general data, 9, 173f, 180f, 185f, 188, 189f, 193f, 216, 271–274, 275f, 276, 406, 422–423 media discourse affecting. See Serbian media discourse on EU opinion of Russia compared with, 15, 192–193, 193f, 277, 405–406 regional economic integration, preference for, 119 scope for change, 193, 285–287 specific concerns, 285, 285f conditionality requirements, 279–280, 279f, 280t Kosovo problem, 190–191, 276–277, 282–283, 283f security, 281f, 282 sovereignty loss, 215–216 specific events affecting, 285, 285f

450

INDEX

Šešelj, Vojislav, 210 Slovakia EU accession, 123, 213 exports to WB states, 40t, 43–44 financial aid to WB states, 30–33, 32t, 33t, 39 Kosovo independence non-recognition, 39 Slovenia Croatia’s EU accession blocked by, 214 EU accession, 122, 213 financial aid to WB states, 30–33, 32t, 33t, 39–41, 49 independence recognised, 107–108 trade with WB states, 12, 40t Smith, Karen E., 379 Solana, Javier, 206 Sovereign debt crisis, Eurozone, 29, 96, 203, 401 Spain, Kosovo’s EU accession opposed, 344 Srpska Lista, 336, 338–339, 341 Srpski Svet, 113, 114 Stabilisation and Accession Process (EU), 7, 61–62, 229, 241–242, 296–297, 305, 319 “stabilitocracy” hypothesis bilateral aid without link to democracy, 26, 44–45, 45t, 48f, 50, 427 EU credibility threatened by, 59–60, 183, 208, 214, 309 IPA III, conditionality relaxed, 28, 110, 208 Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (EU), 89, 96, 108 State bilateral aid. See Bilateral aid to WB states Stavrevska, Elena B., 391 Storm offensive (Croatian war), 129, 130, 135, 149–150

Šuica, Dubravka, 137 Sweden financial aid to WB states, 30–33, 35–36 trade with WB states, 11, 40t Switzerland financial aid to WB states, 31t investment in WB states, 12 T Tadi´c, Boris, 209–210 ’Telecom affair’ scandal, 88 Thessaloniki Summit (June 2003), 61, 77, 90, 109, 166, 199, 243, 319 Three Seas Initiative, 135–136 Trade and investment, WB region bilateral aid, link to (regression model), 44–48, 45t, 48f Chinese investment, 13, 16, 29, 113–114, 137, 186–188, 194, 228 Chinese trade, 11 Economic and Investment Plan (EU), 28–29, 65, 231, 232 EU as trading partner, 11, 66, 187, 230, 339–340, 357, 359–360, 430 EU financial assistance supporting. See EU financial assistance to WB states EU Member States exports, 11–12, 34, 40, 40t, 42, 43 investments, 12, 34–38, 41, 42, 66, 95 foreign trade statistics, deficiencies of, 246 multinational firms’ investments, 29 regional cooperation. See Regional cooperation by WB states Russian investment, 12 Russian trade, 11

INDEX

Turkish investment, 12 US investment, 30, 344 Trump administration, US, 112, 115n5, 136, 160–161 Tud-man, Franjo, 6, 89, 123–124 Turkey EU candidacy, 305, 306 investment in WB states, 12 policy in WB region, 16 public opinion in WB states towards, 186–188, 194, 226, 228–229 Russian policy towards, 113 Tusk, Donald, 389–390 U Ukraine Crimea, annexation by Russia, 113, 136 Erdut Agreement, proposed extension to, 135 EU candidacy offer, 2, 66, 100, 117, 175, 205, 344–345, 352–353 Ukraine war (2022– ), 11, 113, 224, 239, 277, 417 EU accession of WB states, potential implications negative, 10, 239, 370, 417 positive, 36, 99–100, 193, 224, 429–430, 431–432 Russian aims, 113, 200 Serbian government condemnation, 428–431 Serbian public opinion, 192, 277, 284, 405–406 UK’s withdrawal from EU (Brexit), 205, 401 Uniadrion (University of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas), 92, 93 US policy in WB region Albania, 113

451

Bosnian war and Dayton Accords, 147–150, 152–153 Croatian war, 123, 146, 147 EU accession of WB states, position on, 112–113, 166 financial aid, 31t, 344 introduction to study, 143–144 Kosovo, 112–113, 154–158, 158–161, 344 NATO expansion, position on, 144, 151, 166 North Macedonia, 152 Three Seas Initiative support, 136 timeline (1990–2020), 162t Yugoslav wars response generally, 145–147, 152–153, 161–165, 417, 427–428 Uzelac, Slobodan, 128

V Vachudova, Milada Anna, 381, 389 Vance, Cyrus, 146, 148 Várhelyi, Olivér, 110 Vesovi´c, Mihailo, 37 Vetëvendosje!, 114–115 Visa liberalisation Bosnia and Herzegovina, 62n13 generally, 8, 208, 356 Kosovo, 174, 225, 226, 335, 343, 344–345 Vladisavljevi´c, Nebojša, 410 Vojvodina region, Serbia, 37, 39, 154 Vuˇci´c, Aleksandar EU, fluctuating support, 111, 191–192, 209, 210, 429–430 Kosovo Serbs, influence over, 338–339 media relations, 405, 406–408, 428 political stance, 38, 131

452

INDEX

W War crimes trials cooperation requirement of EU, 6, 241 Croatian cooperation with ICTY, 124, 127, 132 genocide claims to ICJ, 129–130 Gotovina acquittal, 130 Serbian cooperation with ICTY, 190, 210 Western Balkans Economic and Investment Plan, 28–29, 65, 231, 232 Western Balkans Guarantee Fund, 110 Western Balkans regional cooperation. See Regional cooperation by WB states Western Balkan (WB) states. See Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo; Montenegro; North Macedonia; Serbia Wigemark, Lars-Gunnar, 324 Wunsch, Natasha, 41, 316 Y Yugoslavia disintegration of, 5, 8, 262–264 Italian relations with, 81–82 negative Western perception of, 122

Yugoslav wars border violations during, 112 Bosnian war. See Bosnian war (1992–95) conflicts and casualties, 264t, 264–265 Croatian war. See Croatian war (1991–95) economic impact, 5–6 EC response, 61, 107–108, 123, 146, 148 European integration project, impact on, 416 German response, 108, 146 Italian-led policy missions, 84–86, 86–87 Kosovo war (1999), 7, 41, 154–158 NATO bombing campaign, 157–158, 263 post-war reconciliation initiatives, 6, 57–58, 127–130, 131 US response. See under US policy in WB region war crimes trials. See War crimes trials Z Zaev, Zoran, 391 Zimmermann, Warren, 145, 147–148