Inquisition in Early Islam: The Competition for Political and Religious Authority in the Abbasid Empire 9780755607846, 9781780761640

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To Tammy, Leila, and Alex

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ACK NOWLEDGMENTS

I owe debts of gratitude to a host of friends, family, and colleagues, far too many to mention, without whose aid this book would surely be weaker. It is a happy debt to have incurred. Michael Bonner, Alexander Knysh, Kathryn Babayan, and Rudi Lindner were kind and generous in providing assistance at the beginning of this project when it was my dissertation. I find myself now ensconced among a department and friends on faculty at Colby who have been wonderfully supportive. The dinner-club folks deserve special thanks. It is a pleasure to share this intellectual and life journey together. I must thank the Division of Social Sciences of Colby College for several grants that helped me complete this book. I would like to thank Monique Bernards, Hugh Kennedy, James Montgomery, John Nawas, Shawkat Toorawa, and the members of the School of Abba¯sid Studies, who foster a deeply stimulating environment in which to try out new ideas. The directors of the school are mentors, friends, and above all wonderful shepherds for a young scholar engaging the field. I have benefited immensely from their help and guidance. Michael Cooperson, Steven Judd, Patrick Martin, Larissa Taylor, Rine Vieth, and the students in my Islamic law seminar all read and improved various sections. I thank David Freidenreich for sharing meals, ideas, and comments on an early draft. I am deeply indebted to Reuben Biel and Desiree Shayer for providing invaluable service as research assistants but really as editors. Alissa Surges improved the style immeasurably. I am grateful to my parents,

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who have provided models of humanity that I strive to live up to. Tammy, Leila, and Alex, you have provided me with comfort, solace, laughs, and love beyond measure. As is customary to note, any remaining errors reside with me.

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LIST OF ABBR EVIATIONS

BSOAS CAB CUP EI2 EI3 EQ EUP HUP IJMES ILS JAOS JESHO JNES JRAS JSAI MW OUP PUP REI SI TG TMD ZDMG

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Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies M. Cooperson, Classical Arabic Biography Cambridge University Press Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954–2008 Encyclopaedia of Islam Three. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007– Encyclopaedia of the Qur a¯n. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001–2006 Edinburgh University Press Harvard University Press International Journal of Middle East Studies Islamic Law and Society Journal of the American Oriental Society Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient Journal of Near Eastern Studies Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam Muslim World Oxford University Press Princeton University Press Revue des études islamiques Studia Islamica J. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra Ibn Asa¯kir, Ta rı¯kh madı¯nat Dimashq Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

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NOTE ON NA MES AND DATES

For the convenience of the non specialist reader, I have standardized my use of names. Medieval Arabic names carry a wealth of information about the individual but can be confusing to one unfamiliar with Arabic. They do not take the same form as Western European names, that is, first name followed by a family name. Each person can be referred to by multiple names depending on which referent is most relevant. The name tells us who the person’s father, grandfather, and son were. Ibn means “the son of,” Abu¯ “the father of.” A “b.” is the standard abbreviation for Ibn. This portable genealogy can include the person’s occupation and or geographical origin, usually indicated by an “ı¯” at the end of a word (e.g., al-Dimashqı¯ indicates the person comes from Damascus). Ah.mad Ibn H.anbal, one of the main subjects of this book, can appear as Ah.mad, Ah.mad b. Muh.ammad b. H.anbal (Ah.mad the son of Muh.ammad who was the son of H.anbal), Abu¯ Abdalla¯h (the father of Abdalla¯h), or Ibn H.anbal, even though strictly speaking he is Ibn Muh.ammad. I have chosen throughout to refer to him as either simply Ah.mad or Ibn H.anbal, as this is how he is most often known in both medieval and modern scholarship. Also in the interest of simplification, I refer to the Caliphs by their regnal titles regardless of life stage (al-Mu tas.im throughout instead of Abu¯ Ish.a¯q before he was Caliph). When possible, place names are spelled conventionally (e.g., Damascus instead of Dimashq). In addition, because the Arabic word

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Alla¯h means “The God” and refers to the same God as in Christianity and Judaism, throughout I use the English translation, for to do otherwise draws unnecessary barriers to understanding. As for dates, I give the Hijrı¯ first and the Common Era (ce) date second, for example, 218/833–34. The Muslim calendar, also having 12 months, is lunar based and thus does not line up exactly to the solar one, so the year 218 crosses over the years 833 and 834. The calendars differ by approximately 11 days, which means that the Hijrı¯ months and the holidays with them move through the seasons. When I give only one ce year in the date, the event falls within that year and not the other covered by that Hijrı¯ year.

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GLOSSARY

ahl al-sunna wa l-jama¯ a: “The people of the known practice (Sunna) and the community of consensus,” that is, the Sunni amı¯r al-mu minı¯n: The Commander of the Faithful—the more usual designation for the Caliph al-amr bi l-ma ru¯f wa l-nahy an al-munkar: Meaning “commanding right and forbidding wrong,” it is a Qur a¯nic injunction to enforce good behavior. Whether it is an individual religious obligation incumbent upon all believers or a collective religious obligation that can be satisfied by someone else doing it is contested bid a: Inappropriate, heretical innovation h.adı¯th: Brief accounts of quotes or actions by Muh.ammad that serve as the raw material for discerning Sunna ijtiha¯d: Wrestling with the sources to reach a legal decision Imam: In daily life, he leads the prayers. In the Shı¯ ite context, he is the descendant of Muh.ammad through his daughter Fa¯t.ima and son-in-law Alı¯, who possessed sure knowledge of the faith. Each generation (until the late third/ninth century) had one imam who served as the spiritual guide. The majority of the Shı¯ a had 12 imams, including Alı¯. A third use of imam is applied to the most important legal scholars, after whom the four Sunni legal schools of thought were

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named. Ibn H.anbal is one of those and is occasionally referred to as the Imam Ah.mad istita¯ba: The offer (usually three times) of a chance to repent provided to one accused of heresy madhhab (s.), madha¯hib (pl.): School/s of legal thought, of which four remain in Sunni Islam muh.addithu¯n (pl.), muh.addith (s.): h.adı¯th transmitters mutakallimu¯n (pl.) mutakallim (s.): Practitioners of kala¯m, a style of argumentation and approach to cosmology that can loosely be translated as “dialectical theology” qa¯d.ı¯: judge Shaha¯da: The profession of faith in monotheism and the truth of Muh.ammad’s message—one of the Five Pillars of Islam Sunna: Does not refer to a scripture but simply means “precedented action,” the correct way of doing things. Over time it came to refer exclusively to the actions of Muh.ammad as the Prophet as recorded in the h.adı¯th and served as a guide on the correct path in fulfilling God’s will taqiyya: Pious dissimulation in the face of persecution taqlı¯d: Following the precedent of others more learned in law ulama¯ (pl.), a¯lim (s.): “Those who know,” that is, religious/legal scholars umma: The entire community of Muslims

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Umayyads were the first dynasty to rule the empire that was established in the wake of the Arab conquests from the 630s to the 650s ce. The Caliph (ruler) established Damascus as its capital in 661. The empire stretched from the Iberian Peninsula across North Africa to the far east of the Iranian plateau, from southeastern Anatolia southward to the tip of the Arabian Peninsula. The Umayyads were overthrown by a revolution in the middle of the eighth century, led by the Abba¯sids, who would be a much longer-lived dynasty. The Abba¯sids, ruling from the newly founded Baghdad, expanded the empire and in the ninth century began to decline as an effective force. The fiction of the unity of the empire with an Abba¯sid Caliph at its head was maintained until 1258, when the Mongol army rode into Baghdad, rolled the Caliph into a carpet, and trampled him to death. The Caliphs of the early period have been viewed as the political leaders of the empire devoid of religious authority and for the later period, vice versa. However, late in his reign, the Umayyad Caliph Abd al-Malik ordered the crucifixion of a man named al-H. a¯rith for claiming to be a prophet. The man is remembered as al-Kadhdha¯b (the Liar). Hisha¯m, a son of and successor to Abd al-Malik, ordered one of the Liar’s alleged followers, Ghayla¯n, to be gruesomely dismembered and his body gibbetted as an example for all to see what came of heresy. About a century later, the Abba¯ sid Caliph al-Wa¯thiq wielded a sword, striking

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the first blow, in the execution of Ah.mad b. Nas.r, who had been tried in the Mih.na (inquisition), of which the earlier trial of Ah.mad b. H. anbal is the most famous. Ibn H. anbal was flogged but not killed. The tie between each of these incidents is the forceful Caliphal involvement as a political and religious leader in shaping the norms of correct belief, what it means to be a good, believing Muslim. In this book, I am most concerned with elucidating the point at which the Caliphs were no longer participants in the formulation and articulation of correct belief. The Mih.na stands out in contemporary scholarly discussions as an anomaly. I show it is not. In the following chapters, I will explore the social roles of the Caliph and the ulama¯ , their interactions with heresy, the interrogation and elimination of heretics, and the meaning and importance of the Mih.na. I also examine why this event is viewed as so pivotal, why it began, why it ended, and when the meaning of the Caliphs’ position in society shifted and they lost their ability to assert themselves in defining the boundaries and beliefs of the religion. To answer these questions, I examine how heresy, and thus orthodoxy, was construed and defined, and investigate the social roles and normative guidelines that informed the Caliphs’ and the ulama¯ ’s attempts to justify themselves within their milieu.

What is the Mih.na? Mih.na means “testing” and refers to a specific period of inquisition begun by the Caliph al-Ma mu¯n in 218/833.1 Al-Ma mu¯n’s successors continued the Mih.na until al-Mutawakkil ended it 15 years later, in 234/848 to 849. It is viewed as the pivotal point for the era in question and ultimately for the state of relations between the ruler and the law, which it is not. The test consisted of one yes-or-no question:2 “Is the Qur a¯n created?”3 The test was simple. The consequences were not. At the root is whether God created the Qur a¯n or if the Qur a¯n coexisted, as a part of God, from the beginning. Because the Caliph declared the Qur a¯n was created and it was his test, the “correct” answer was, of course, “Yes!” If a religious/legal scholar answered “no,” that the Qur a¯n was uncreated, he was subject to such penalties as being barred

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from testifying in court, disqualified from judgeship,4 disqualified from h.adı¯th transmission, or even being beaten with the threat of execution.5

The Testers The Caliph al-Ma mu¯n (r. 198/813–218/833) initiated the Mih.na but died almost immediately thereafter. He was well regarded as a strong religious scholar, unlike his successors, who are often portrayed as intellectually inferior.6 After al-Ma mu¯n’s death, his brother al-Mu tas.im (r. 218/833–227/842) took over the office of the Caliph. Al-Mu tas.im’s son al-Wa¯thiq (r. 227/842–232/847) succeeded him and was followed by another of his sons, al-Mutawakkil (r. 232/847–247/861). Al-Ma mu¯n usually bears the blame for the entire episode, with his immediate successors absolved of guilt.7 Although al-Mu tas.im is portrayed as lacking interest in pursuing the Mih.na, al-Ma mu¯n’s will requested he take as his close advisor Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d (d. 240/854), who was acknowledged as being, even by his enemies, a learned man.8 A prominent member of the Mu tazilite school of theological thought, under al-Mu tas.im he became the chief judge and thus was in charge of administering the Mih.na, a position in which he remained until the reign of al-Mutawakkil. Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d and those who supported the createdness doctrine are usually, correctly, associated with the mutakallimu¯n (s. mutakallim), who were the practitioners of kala¯m, a style of argumentation and approach to cosmology that can loosely be translated as “dialectical theology.”9 Within this group is a subset, the Mu tazilites, who have also been called the “rationalists,” because they relied on the tools of Greek philosophy to make their argument in favor of the existence of God. In addition, they would argue God had bestowed on the human intellect the ability to discern whether an act is good or bad, even without knowledge of the Qur a¯n.10 The correct answer to the test—that the Qur a¯n was created— telegraphs three concerns usually associated with the Mu tazilites: avoiding both dualistic beliefs and anthropomorphism while placing emphasis on the justice of God.11 The argument in favor was based

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on the doctrine of divine unicity (tawh.¯ıd), the bedrock tenet of Islam, which declares that only one God exists and His attributes are His alone.12 If the Qur a¯n were uncreated, then it would be placed on an equal level with God, sharing in His attribute of eternal existence analogous to the Christian doctrine of the logos. Believing this would make one a dualist (Manichaean) or, worse, polytheist (shirk).13 If an object shared an attribute with God, then He would no longer be unique, which would be false because of the oneness of God. In addition, because God created all things and the Qur a¯n is a thing, it was created by God. Included in this debate were arguments over the nature of God’s speech and physical attributes, such as, “Does God have a mouth or a voice box?” and “Will God be physically visible to those being judged on the day of resurrection [the beatific vision]?” In Islam, humans were not created in God’s image, but as shall be discussed, the Qur a¯n occasionally uses imagery that might lead one to a different conclusion. A third concern was that the Qur a¯n mentions people by name: thus, if the Qur a¯n were eternal, uncreated, then God would have condemned some to Hell or promised some to heaven from the beginning. Such a predetermined fate would be inherently unjust and contradict human free will and therefore undermine human responsibility for actions.

The Tested The proceedings were a verbal interrogation of judges (qa¯d.ı¯) and witnesses and h.adı¯th transmitters (s. muh.addith, pl. muh.addithu¯n) at the hands of the governor and/or the Caliph in front of an audience including those waiting to be questioned. For the acknowledgments to exert effective social pressure, it was crucial to have observers of the individual’s acquiescence, and it was especially important for the judges and muh.addithu¯n to see and hear their colleagues, assent. The judge was an important point of contact between the government and its subjects.14 As a local mediator, he stood at the nexus of the promulgation of orders by the ruler and rules of the religion as well as their implementation. As a jurist, notable person, and mediator, he had tremendous latitude and prestige.15 He was an expert in law and thus

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religion, for the purpose of religious law is to find how to appropriately apply theology. He was expected to do so through his own erudition or in consultation with a jurisconsult (mufti). Unlike the opinion of the mufti, his decision was not an authoritative statement of the law. Oddly, muftis as a professional group were not explicitly subjected to the Mih.na.16 Witnesses were also a vital component for the regular functioning of law. In the courts, documentation was distinctly local in that it was not systematically or centrally archived. Judgments did not establish broadreaching precedents. Court records were passed from one judge to his successor and formed a repository of precedents but only for that court. As such, witnesses—usually highly regarded notables, seen as models of societal norms—served the necessary function of attesting to the authenticity of documents presented in court, much like a notary public.17 The h.adı¯th transmitters, although not officially part of court proceedings, were defined by their social status based explicitly on what they knew. Because h.adı¯th are accounts of the sayings and deeds of Muh.ammad, who is deemed to be a reliable guide to the straight path, they are essential to the understanding of one’s duty as a Muslim. These accounts were authenticated by the isna¯d (chain of transmission), which traced the transmission of each individual h.adı¯th account from scholar to scholar, back to the earliest point possible. It records the intellectual history of each snippet of information, which certifies its potential as acceptable guidance for Islamic law. The Qur a¯n, although providing some prescriptive law, does not give many of the essential details. For example, although prayer is mandated, how to perform it is not. Descriptions of this essential practice reside in the h.adı¯th and form the raw material from which the Sunna was derived. As a result, h.adı¯th are the primary source material for many laws, even if legal theory places the Sunna derived from it second to the Qur a¯n. Because multiple h.adı¯th could apply to a given situation, a legal scholar sifted through the h.adı¯th, studying and comparing them in an effort to derive the Sunna. Those who collected, preserved, and transmitted the h.adı¯th performed a vital legal function and formed an alternate locus of authority as the vessels of Muh.ammad’s legacy.

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However, it is important to note that in the third/ninth century the collection and transmission of h.adı¯th in the way of the muh.addithu¯n was a relatively new phenomenon.18 During the period of the Mih.na, they had not yet achieved the full potential of the authority vested in their knowledge of and control over the h.adı¯th. There are a vast number of h.adı¯th (thousands), which one person could not hope to memorize, and the contemporaneous attempt to resolve this difficulty through transcription into books had not been finalized. Nevertheless the muh.addithu¯n were an important, if atomized, force in the development of Islam and its law. The authority vested in their knowledge would find a champion in the legal scholar al-Sha¯fi ı¯ (d. 204/820) and his students, who systematized the tools (and hierarchical ordering of sources) in a legal theory that would formally ensconce it. It would take time for those ideas to become standard, and this period of flux is a crucial part of my conclusions. In the late third/ninth and early fourth/tenth centuries, the development of competing forms of legal interpretation began to crystallize around and derive legitimacy from exemplary “founding” figures like al-Sha¯fi ı¯ and Ah.mad b. H. anbal. These would then become the schools of legal thought (s. madhhab, pl. madha¯hib), of which four remain in Sunni Islam.19 Some, but not all, of the muh.addithu¯n countered the createdness question by arguing that God, as an omniscient being, knowing all that was, is, and will be, must have known the Qur a¯n from the beginning of time. As a consequence, when the Qur a¯n was given to Muh.ammad, it was revealed but not created. In accordance, declarations of the createdness of the Qur a¯n presuppose that God was unaware of the Qur a¯n before its creation, thus violating God’s attribute of omniscience, a position subsequently refined that eventually became the “orthodox” take on the Qur a¯n. These muh.addithu¯n were concerned with defending divine knowledge. On another level were muh.addithu¯n who argued that because the Qur a¯n said nothing about createdness or uncreatedness, one was dangerously speculating about things one ought not. The most important member of the opposition was Ah.mad b. H. anbal (d. 241/855).20 Ibn H. anbal was a renowned h.adı¯th transmitter whose status as an eponym of a legal school of thought is intricately tied

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to his role in the Mih.na. During his lifetime he acquired thousands of h.adı¯th, which were collected posthumously by his son Abdalla¯h in the monumental book al-Musnad. The title designates a h.adı¯th collection organized by isna¯d, which places the transmitter, the muh.addith, as the first level of focus. Its structure renders it virtually unusable except by those expert in h.adı¯th transmission. Although Ibn H. anbal is known for his extraordinary piety and for his role as a popular teacher of traditions in Baghdad, he mostly gained fame because, in spite of his ordeal in front of the Caliph, he refused to acquiesce to the doctrine of createdness. This refusal is the foundation of his revered position as a staunch defender of the faith against political encroachments by the rulers and is the basis upon which the school of legal thought bearing his name asserts its credentials.

Context and Background Caliphal involvement in shaping the norms and beliefs of the community has a deep history. As a first example, consider: He [the Commander of the Faithful] followed in that [decision] the words of the Messenger of God, peace be upon him, and what the righteous people and the rightly guided imams had agreed upon. He did not allow [as legitimate] what Mu a¯wiya had the audacity to do of what contradicted the Book of God and the Sunna of His Messenger, may God’s blessing and peace be upon him. The Commander of the Faithful was most correct to rule by that and to do by it because of his kinship with the messenger of God and his following in his [Muh.ammad’s] tracks and keeping alive his Sunna and thwarting the customs of others who deviate and outrage [both] the truth and the rightly guided.21 When the Caliph al-Mahdı¯ wrote these words in the year 159/775–76 explaining his reasoning for a decision, he was making a legitimating claim for his social role as Commander of the Faithful. He clearly asserted his right to determine the correct response to a legal problem and his ability to make authoritative pronouncements about the

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meaning of the Qur a¯n and which Sunna to apply.22 His kinship to Muh.ammad granted his opinion higher authority than Caliphs of the previous dynasty. Much like the Ma¯likı¯ school of legal thought argued that the practice of Medina represented and continued the practice of Muh.ammad, al-Mahdı¯ argued that he, as Muh.ammad’s heir, embodied the true practice of the Prophet. Thus, he was a reliable guide and ruler for society and had the power to identify who traveled the straight path to salvation and who did not. Within a century, the Caliphal social role would no longer encompass these functions. It is intriguing that the third/ninth century would be formative for the development of Islamic orthodoxy, whereas the century after (fourth/ tenth) would be seminal for Islamic legal thought. Modern discussions about Islam and politics draw a sharp boundary between the “church” and the “state,” noting that the law, the religion, and the definitions of its principles were and continue to be in the hands of its scholars but not its rulers. However, all acknowledge that, in theory, at the beginning this was not the case. The Mih.na in the third/ninth century is thought of as a significant and major turning point in the legal, intellectual, and theological development of Islam. It is often marked as the final point of rupture between “church” and “state.” To be sure, the idea of a complete rupture between “church” and “state” is a poor analogy because the two concepts of “governing” and “Sharı¯ a/Islam” were never truly divorced from each other in the pre-nationalist era.23 However, if one asks about the Mih.na, then one will be told that a heretic Caliph was kept at bay by the defenders of Muh.ammad’s tradition, thus preserving (or changing, depending on perspective) the character of the religion and ensuring it was (as it had always been) the scholars, not the Caliphs, who inherited the mantle of the Prophet. The scholarly shouldering of this duty explains why the rulers did not promulgate or determine the law that governed their societies: they were merely the executors of the law. Unlike medieval Europe, the Muslim Middle East had no theory of the divine right of kings nor was there a struggle between lay and clerical power. Christian Europe would have its investiture controversy, whereas the Caliphate would have no equivalent because those issues had already been solved.

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Before moving forward we need to provide more nuance to the previous picture. The word sharı¯ a, which is usually translated as “Islamic law,” in its core linguistic meaning indicates the well-known path to a watering hole and potentially covers everything from correct prayer to valid contracts. In the harsh desert environment from whence Muh.ammad sprang, the decision to follow precedented behavior had a life-or-death edge.24 There was strong pressure to choose the “correct” leader, for if one followed the wrong path into the desert and went “astray” (Qur a¯n 1:7), then the odds of survival were poor and spiritual death was assured. The person on the “straight path” (1:6), following the correct leader, would remain safe and eventually go to paradise. That the Caliph is most often referred to as the Commander of the Faithful (amı¯r al-mu minı¯n) is not accidental. The pressure to choose the right leader could trigger atomization and individualism, but there was equally strong pressure to stay together. The community’s chances of survival in its journey were greatly enhanced by its unity, with a strong emphasis placed on umma (the entire community of believers). It is telling that the Muslim calendar does not begin with the birth of Muh.ammad or the onset of revelation but with the Hijra in 622, the point at which Muh.ammad and his followers fully separated themselves and became a distinct community. Because there was only one umma, there could only be one Commander of the Faithful. It is notable that the Umayyad survivors in Spain did not claim to be Caliphs until after the Fatimids did so at the beginning of the fourth/ tenth century. Nonetheless, the inclination toward unity does not mean there were no sects, divisions, disputes, or attempts to exclude; as with any religious system, there were plenty. Yet, as we shall see, the boundaries of inclusion remained larger, and the range of tolerance for difference of belief was much greater than often assumed. Because choosing the leader had possible dire consequences, the individual Muslim, who would be held solely accountable on Judgment Day, either had to engage in learning about the intricacies of the religion or needed to find someone who had learned, or inherently knew, those intricacies. For many, the Caliph was this man. The social role of the Caliph was the seat and manifestation of his charismatically transmitted authority and legitimacy.25 It encompassed his political,

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religious, and military activities. For those who would become labeled the Shı¯ a, their focus was on the Imam. Those who chose to learn as much as they could began to look to their pious forebears for the keys to correct action. As will be discussed, their scholarly activities and assumption of the social role of guardians of Muh.ammad’s legacy were to have tremendous impact and would set the stage for dominance of the law by the scholarly elite. It is important to note that although Christianity—or to be more accurate, the ecclesiastical structure of Christianity—is deeply concerned with correct belief and thus theology, the practitioners of Islam, which lacks an ecclesiastical structure, are concerned with doing one’s duty and thereby fulfilling one’s obligations to God. Why this is will not concern us here. The word Islam means submission to the will of God and a Muslim is one who submits. Islam is not entirely orthoprax—belief matters—but one manifests belief through action.26 Law and theology are inextricably linked.27 As Devin Stewart observes, practice was never the sole indicator of whether one was in “conformity” with religious orthodoxy.28 Committing a sin would not make one an unbeliever, whereas believing a sinful act to be permissible would. He gives the example of drinking. On the one hand, drinking makes one a sinner but not a heretic. On the other, if one believes it was not sinful, then one would be a heretic. Similarly, if one is behaving quietly within acceptable norms, then nothing more can be demanded by anyone but God, because what is in the heart and left unexpressed is between the individual and God.29 In the Christian context, the discipline of theology drew the best and the brightest thinkers; in the Muslim context, the discipline of law did the same. Although notable Muslim theologians certainly existed, theology as a science did not carry the same weight as in Christian circles. For European Christians, enforcing correct doctrine was an expression of ecclesiastical control of the hierarchy of the church and of the believer. In the Islamic context, a distinct tension and synergy exist between the two fields of knowledge with the Ash arite school of theological thought coming to dominate that field in a way no law school could.30 In general terms, a self-subscriptive ethical norm that permeated social relations governed Islamic societies by providing

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normative guidelines and allowing for definitions of inclusion or exclusion with a distinct bias toward the former. During the formative phase of theology and law (third/ninth–fourth/tenth centuries) the impetus toward precedented action shaped that ethical norm. The phrase ahl al-sunna wa l-jama¯ a, meaning “the people of the known practice (Sunna) and the community of consensus,” the selfdesignation of the Sunni majority, was a claim to be on the right path as known by the pious forebears and agreed upon by general consent of the true-believing community. Without some central figure who could endorse and impose a doctrine, like the Byzantine Emperor or the Roman Pope, the reliance on the pious authorities of the past dominated. Because each individual believer was ultimately responsible and accountable on Judgment Day, and because there was no pious authority accepted by a majority, no standard path existed, allowing the faith to develop with diversity. As the Caliphs lost their capacity to enforce definitions of law and determinations of the boundaries of correct belief, authority over those matters devolved to those most capable of making such declarations: the elite of the religious/legal scholars (s. a¯lim, pl. ulama¯ ).

Traditional Outline of Events in the Mih.na In the final chapter we return to a more complete chronology and contextualized analysis, but for now I sketch a basic outline of events. The underlying motivation for initiating the Mih.na is usually located in the manner of al-Ma mu¯n’s ascension to the throne. As with most premodern rulers, Caliphs maintained their independence by balancing interests and loyalties of different groups to avoid becoming too dependent on any one of them.31 During the civil war between the brothers, in which al-Ma mu¯n overthrew his brother al-Amı¯n and seized the throne (195/811–198/813), the abna¯ al-dawla (sons/partisans of the dynasty), stalwarts of the regime in Baghdad, proved unreliable and ineffective for either brother.32 They had established local ties and interests, become independent, and in the process had factionalized but not to the benefit of the Caliph. Once he had won and removed his brother from the throne, al-Ma mu¯n could not merely replace them

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with his new military supporters. Lacking a counterweight he would become dependent upon them and a puppet to military interests, which eventually occurred with the Turkish troops at Samarra.33 In addition, after the founding of Baghdad, in 145/762, the bureaucracy had steadily developed vested local interests and independent means of support and was therefore no longer in a state of dependent loyalty. Thus, according to this framing, al-Ma mu¯n employed the Mih.na out of frustration to bolster his legitimacy, authority, and independence of action. His successor, al-Mu tas.im, responded to similar challenges by importing slave soldiers, most of whom were ethnically Turkish, originating from central Asia.34 A slave soldiery was to be a part of every major military from this point onward. As slaves they lacked permanent social status other than that gained by their connection to the Caliph, which was thought to ensure their loyalty. One should not mistake the term “slave” in this case to indicate powerlessness. These “slaves” were important, powerful, and even rich. They played an increasingly important role in events. The usual account of the Mih.na begins when al-Ma mu¯n announced his belief in the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur a¯n in 212/827, but for unknown reasons waited six years before beginning the Mih.na.35 In 218/833, while on campaign in the Byzantine frontier, he sent a letter to Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m, the governor of Baghdad and a member of the important T.a¯hirid family, which had been vital in stabilizing al-Ma mu¯n’s power after his ascension to the Caliphal seat.36 In the first of a series of five letters, he eloquently argues for the createdness of the Qur a¯n and states it is his duty to ensure proper religious observance.37 He orders the beginning of the Mih.na by saying: . . . and so bring together the judges in your jurisdiction and read to them this letter of the Commander of the Faithful which [I have sent to you] and begin testing [imtih.a¯n] them about what they say, and discover what they believe concerning God’s creation of the Qur a¯n and His production [of it]. Make them aware that the Commander of the Faithful will not seek the aid in his work of one who is not trustworthy in what God appointed him to administer and what He entrusted him of commandments for

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His subjects or of one who is not trustworthy about his religion and the clearness of His unicity [tawh.¯ıd] and the certainty of it. And then when they affirm this and they are consistent with the Commander of the Faithful about it and are on the path of right guidance and redemption then . . . The tone of this passage and its contrast to the subsequent letters— which are more adamant and specific—show that al-Ma mu¯n wrote this as a “trial balloon,” to which he did not expect much resistance.38 He was wrong. In the second letter, he orders that seven specific people be sent to him in Raqqa, near the Byzantine frontier, to undergo personal testing.39 Chosen under the correct assumption they would not present a problem,40 these seven assented to the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur a¯n and upon their return to Baghdad were compelled to make it public.41 Although there are some reports from Egypt and other places, with the order to prosecute the Mih.na being disseminated widely, it seems to have been pursued most vigorously in Baghdad, where Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m administered it throughout its duration. Most gave in, that is, except for Muh.ammad b. Nu¯h. al-Ijlı¯ al-Mad.ru¯b and Ibn H. anbal,42 who were sent to face al-Ma mu¯n in Tarsus.43 Fortunately for them, al-Ma mu¯n died while they were en route. They were then returned to Baghdad, but during the return trip Muh.ammad died. Al-Mu tas.im became Caliph and continued the Mih.na, which, we are told, he did solely because his brother exhorted him to do so in his will. In the most famous encounter of the Mih.na, Ibn H. anbal, when brought before an allegedly reluctant al-Mu tas.im in 220/835, again steadfastly gave the “wrong” answer, for which he was flogged. Most of those tested gave in and provided the “right” answer. It is important for our purposes to note here that some later justified this acquiescence as pious dissimulation (taqiyya). Islamic law allows for Muslims to attest to an abhorrent position without endangering their status as a believer if faced with a physical threat of violence and compulsion.44 They can recant that position when the threat has receded via a claim of having exercised taqiyya as long as they sincerely retained the

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truth in their hearts. The traditional view of the Mih.na holds that Ibn H. anbal was flogged until unconscious, but he maintained his resolve and was released because the populace of Baghdad was on the verge of rioting in reaction to the flogging.45 It is generally considered that following this encounter, al-Mu tas.im no longer involved himself in the Mih.na or theological/legal matters, choosing instead to focus on moving the capital to Samarra and dealing with military issues.46 In addition, his successor, al-Wa¯thiq, followed the directives of his father and uncle to continue the Mih.na but to no avail and without real conviction. Finally, al-Mutawakkil, in an effort to gain the support of the muh.addithu¯n and specifically the H. anbalı¯s, ended the Mih.na and restored Sunnism. Although oft repeated, this chronology misrepresents the events and the motivations of the Caliphs in relation to the Mih.na. In the concluding chapter, I sketch a significantly different chronology that yields a very different assessment.

Previous Interpretations of Its Meanings and Motivations47 One thread of scholarship about the Mih.na explains it as an outgrowth of al-Ma mu¯n’s adherence to a particular religious perspective, either Mu tazilite or Shı¯ ite.48 At its basis is the presumption al-Ma mu¯n was arrogating religious prerogatives that were not his, because religious and political authority had been split upon the death of Muh.ammad. As stated previously, Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d has been categorized as a prominent Mu tazilite, and the createdness of the Qur a¯n later became a shibboleth of Mu tazilı¯ doctrine. Thus, in this view the Mu tazila convinced al-Ma mu¯n he should eliminate the heresy of an uncreated Qur a¯n that would be a separate entity on an equal level with God.49 Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d was able to continue the Mih.na, because al-Mu tas.im and al-Wa¯thiq were distracted by other concerns. However, he was unable to fend off al-Mutawakkil. The argument that al-Ma mu¯n was a Mu tazilite is plausible, but it alone cannot fully account for the Mih.na. The fact that al-Ma mu¯n held a position that agreed with the Mu tazila does not necessarily make him Mu tazilı¯; the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur a¯n was not solely the property of the Mu tazila.50 In reading the doxographies,51 it

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becomes clear that the label of Mu tazila and the ascriptions of beliefs to them do not accurately reflect the individual’s or group’s dogmas (this feature of the doxographies will be discussed). Those who see al-Ma mu¯n as a Shı¯ ite point to a number of his actions as evidence.52 The great historian al-T.abarı¯ (d. 310/923) tells us that in 211/827, al-Ma mu¯n ordered the public cursing of Mu a¯wiya (r. 41/661–60/680), the founder of the Umayyad dynasty and erstwhile opponent of Alı¯ (r. 35/656–40/661);53 other sources mention that the order was never published because his courtiers lobbied successfully against it.54 In 212/827, when he spoke in favor of the createdness of the Qur a¯n, he declared “ Alı¯ was the best of men after the messenger of God.”55 In 216/832, al-Ma mu¯n ordered the troops in Baghdad to pronounce the takbı¯r (alla¯hu akbar, “God is greatest”) during prayer.56 They then said it three times, which conforms to Shı¯ ite doctrine,57 and according to his will five takbı¯rs were to be said at his funeral.58 It is most telling he made Alı¯ al-Rid.a¯, the eighth Shı¯ ı¯ Imam, his heir, perhaps as a move to steal the support this movement might have generated.59 In addition, al-Ma mu¯n made prominent use of the title “Imam” with the ascription of religious function usually associated with the (later) Twelver Shı¯ ite vision of the Imamate.60 While defeating and deposing his brother in the civil war, al-Ma mu¯n, the pretender, proclaimed himself to be the imam al-huda¯, meaning “the Imam who guides along the right path.”61 This seems compelling, but one must distinguish between Alid loyalism and Shı¯ ism. It is possible al-Ma mu¯n thought Alı¯ was the best of men, and as Commander of the Faithful he may have deemed himself to be an Imam; however, this does not prove he was Shı¯ ite. The strains of thought attendant to Shı¯ ism and Mu tazilism indisputably influenced al-Ma mu¯n, but strict categorization does not account for the fluid nature of human beliefs, changing definitions of those categories, and the complex motivations behind actions.62 It also ignores al-Mu tas.im, al-Wa¯thiq, and their continuation of the Mih.na. The Mih.na was not al-Ma mu¯n’s project for long; he died a mere four months after starting it, a tiny fraction of the fifteen years of its implementation, yet no one argues al-Mu tas.im or al-Wa¯thiq were asserting they were Imams.

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Taking a different tack, Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds argue persuasively against the traditional view that political power always resided in the Caliph and religious authority with the h.adı¯th and those who controlled it.63 They find the Caliph was originally similar to the Twelver Shı¯ ite Imam. The Caliphate, through the course of time, lost its religious function and became solely a political office as traditionists slowly usurped religious authority through control over h.adı¯th. Before, the Caliph could promulgate religiously authoritative laws because he was “God’s Caliph” (God’s agent) on Earth. The muh.addithu¯n countered that the Sunna was frozen with the death of Muh.ammad.64 Because laws should be in accordance with the Qur a¯n and the Sunna, the Caliphal ability to promulgate law was limited by the development of a concrete h.adı¯th in the hands of traditionists acquiring and defending their authority. Political realities forced the Caliphs to innovate, thus weakening their religious authority. Crone and Hinds conclude the deciding point of conflict was the Mih.na, which the Caliph lost and the ulama¯ won. They write: The fact that a confrontation did occur, and that it did so under al-Ma mu¯n, had more to do with the corrosive effect of the fourth civil war on Abba¯sid claims to legitimacy than it did with al-Sha¯fi ı¯’s thoughts; the very fact that al-Ma mu¯n chose to force the issue over a question of creed rather than of law militates against the assumption that recent developments in legal theory provoked the conflict.65 Elsewhere Hinds explicitly states the “failure of the mih.na . . . brought to a decisive end any notion of a Caliphal role in the definition of Islam,” which left the Caliph a temporal power devoid of religious authority.66 It is important to note that the question about the status of the Qur a¯n is at the same time both legal and theological in its implications. It was not just a “question of creed” but also explicitly one of law; the choice to question legal officials clearly shows this. That being the case, the manner of asking the question also shows a deep concern with orthodoxy and defining its boundaries. One should also note that the development of a concrete h.adı¯th corpus extended beyond the end

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of the Mih.na with al-Bukha¯rı¯ (d. 256/870) and Muslim (d. 261/875) writing their canonical collections after the Mih.na had ended. Crone and Hinds in many ways are on the right track, but as we shall see, I disagree with their dating of and impetus for that “decisive end.” Wada¯d al-Qa¯d.ı¯ and Aram Shahin have shown that the earliest rulers did not use the title God’s Caliph.67 For our purposes, whether or not it was used in the earliest period is not the point. In practical terms, from at least Abd al-Malik (r. 65/685–86/705) on, the Caliphs behaved as though they were God’s deputies leading the community on the right path. As noted previously, the more usual title for the Caliph was amı¯r al-mu minı¯n, Commander of the Faithful, which has a distinctly Qur a¯nic resonance. As Fred Donner astutely observes, the Qur a¯n calls the followers of Muh.ammad mu minu¯n (believers, faithful) many more times than Muslims.68 In the sources, when they refer to themselves, the Caliphs almost always use the title Commander of the Faithful. Al-Ma mu¯n, in his communiqués, as recorded in a range of sources, repeatedly and almost obsessively deploys the title. Calling oneself the Commander of the Faithful explicitly asserts that one’s followers are the believers and those who oppose him, whether infidel or self-professing Muslims, are by definition not “the faithful,” not members of the community of belief. Differently focused, John Nawas argues that the Mih.na was about defining who were “the legitimate repositories and authentic transmitters of religious knowledge and tradition.”69 He sees a fundamentally religious conflict that is part of the larger political picture with al-Ma mu¯n concentrating authority in his hands.70 The Mih.na was designed to protect Caliphal prerogatives to authority over religion that were paired to those he exercised in the political realm.71 By using force to garner obedience on a point of doctrine, al-Ma mu¯n broke with Caliphal precedent.72 The issue of createdness was chosen because it challenged the religious scholars in their own realm, was hard to refute, and the format of the test only allowed for two possible responses, yes or no.73 What was important was that they acquiesced publicly.74 Nawas admits al-Ma mu¯n was not the first Caliph to try and silence heresy but asserts the Mih.na was the earliest “systematic” effort to root out and eliminate heretical thought.

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Nimrod Hurvitz is not as interested in al-Ma mu¯n as he is in Ibn H. anbal and the spheres that both represented.75 The primary motivating force for the Mih.na was a conflict among different theological perceptions, between the muh.addithu¯n and the mutakallimu¯n, who had differing worldviews concerning the legitimacy and putative certainty of the theological enterprise. Hurvitz adds the corrective notion that al-Ma mu¯n supported the mutakallimu¯n generally and their style of argumentation specifically, which would include but was not exclusive to the Mu tazila.76 Thus the Mih.na was a power play by rationalists who wished to engage in dialectical theology, how the basis of theology was to be determined, and how one gained such knowledge. As such, the mutakallimu¯n would accept that the createdness question was a legitimate topic of discussion, something the traditionists could not. This difference in perception left these two parts of the scholarly community unable to communicate. The Mih.na was an effort to shore up the mutakallimu¯n, who were losing the battle but had found an ally in al-Ma mu¯n. Hurvitz’s work has the advantage of positing a good reason for why the Mih.na continued. He writes that after al-Ma mu¯n died, Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d and the other like-minded ulama¯ took over the Mih.na.77 Al-Mu tas.im allowed them to do so because he was not interested in the issues involved and was content to follow his brother’s wish to rely on Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d. He argues implicitly that the Caliph was largely irrelevant to the imposition and pursuance of the Mih.na. Both sides saw, and wished to portray, al-Mu tas.im as a neutral observer because it served their purposes; for the Mu tazila, the Mih.na was instituted, so it appears their arguments were more compelling to the Caliph;78 the H. anbalı¯s wanted to keep the Caliph’s image unsullied, and thus the Caliph was removed from any direct involvement.79 As we shall see, that principle will become more imperative as their school of legal thought formalized and drew closer to the Caliphal court. Muh.ammad Zaman also considers religious divisions in society as an explanation for the Mih.na. He sees three main groups in the early Abba¯sid milieu: Shı¯ ism, proto-Sunnism, and the zana¯diqa.80 He argues that the Caliphs cooperated with and endorsed the policy pronouncements of the proto-Sunni ulama¯ and the Mih.na was an

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aberration that neither changed nor separated religion and politics.81 He concludes that the Mih.na failed because of the opposition and authority of the ulama¯ and because the state could not project power effectively.82 Zaman compares the persecution of the zana¯diqa by al-Mahdı¯ (r. 158/775–169/785) to the Mih.na and concludes that the two were very different because the persecution of the zana¯diqa was directed against heretics, whereas the Mih.na was directed against “those who defined themselves in opposition to ‘heretics,’ ‘innovators.’ ”83 This ignores the fact that al-Ma mu¯n, al-Mu tas.im, and al-Wa¯thiq defined resistance to the Mih.na as heresy. Zaman argues that al-Ma mu¯n questioned the proto-Sunni ulama¯ ’s orthodoxy to undermine their legitimacy as authoritative.84 In doing so, al-Ma mu¯n asserted he was more orthodox than the ulama¯ and he had the power to enforce his definition of orthodoxy and as such was its defender. What made al-Ma mu¯n’s actions so horrendous to the proto-Sunni ulama¯ was less the doctrine and more so the act of forcing dogma on them. After al-Ma mu¯n died, claims to religious authority fell by the wayside, and his successors continued it because of the powerful Mu tazilite cadre and because they blindly followed al-Ma mu¯n’s directive in his will.85 Zaman has three major disagreements with those who came before him: other than al-Ma mu¯n, the Abba¯sid Caliphs did not claim religious authority over the ulama¯ ; the Mih.na did not end “the caliph’s participation in religious matters,” and before the Mih.na “the protoSunni ulama¯ ” were not the enemies of the Abba¯sid Caliphs.86 My discussion of the naming of heretics and then of heresy trials in the following chapters show why I disagree with his first objection, accept his second, and assert that his third needs significant modification. Although consideration of the Mih.na is only one part of his larger argument, Michael Cooperson adds a key element to our toolkit for interpreting it. He considers the historiographical purposes for the presentation of information by focusing on the ways groups manipulated and adapted biography to fit various needs.87 In discussing Ibn H. anbal, he argues that h.adı¯th transmitters act as a direct connection to the Prophet and derive their authority from this position.88 For their social roles, in order to establish the authority of the transmitter

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as a point of access to knowledge of the divine, it was necessary to highlight attributes such as strict adherence to the Sunna as contained in the h.adı¯th, acuity of insight into their meaning, and extraordinary verbatim recall of the h.adı¯th. In addition to demonstrating that each of these traits are emphasized in Ibn H. anbal’s biography, Cooperson shows the development and progression of the narrative of the beating of Ibn H.anbal to serve specific needs. The Mih.na presented the H.ana¯bila, the followers of Ibn H. anbal who formed a school of legal thought, with two distinct difficulties.89 First, his avowed quietism sharply contrasts with his public and vehement rejection of the Caliphal pronouncement that the Qur a¯n was created. Second, Ibn H. anbal was released, suggesting he may have capitulated during the trial. The various narratives detailing the encounter with al-Mu tas.im are molded and improved upon to explain these problems and in part to remove blame from al-Mu tas.im and place it on those who surrounded him and on al-Ma mu¯n.90 Recognizing the process of shaping the record to change its focus and rehabilitate or enhance the status of an individual will occupy us in Chapters 4 and 5 and is essential for our discussion of the development of the schools of legal thought in Chapter 6.

The Mih.na in a New Framework Although the third/ninth century was a formative period in the development of Islamic orthodoxy, the fourth/tenth was equally important for the development of Islamic law, as it was in these centuries that the schools of legal thought formed and formalized.91 The discussion of the Mih.na and some of the explanations for it are the backdrop for an examination of that period of development. What follows is an examination of Caliphal interactions with and attempts to limit dissent. In looking at those we will gain a more complete understanding of the events of the period and the Caliph and ulama¯ s’ social positions relative to power, authority, and themselves. Almost all scholarship concerned with the Mih.na focuses on the motivations of al-Ma mu¯n and on the personality of Ibn H. anbal, ignoring the relationship of the Mih.na to the contemporary milieu, its continuing relevance and application during the reigns of al-Mu tas.im and al-Wa¯thiq, and its

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end under al-Mutawakkil. The common assumption is that al-Ma mu¯n stepped outside the normal course of events, breaking entirely new ground, and his actions were not motivated by concerns that reached beyond the war between the brothers (195/811–198/813). The question of why his successors saw to its continuance has been all but ignored. It is assumed al-Mu tas.im continued the policy because he was not smart enough to do otherwise and al-Wa¯thiq did so to emulate his father. On the one hand, the surrounding milieu exerted influence on al-Ma mu¯n, al-Mu tas.im, al-Wa¯thiq, and al-Mutawakkil. On the other hand, it should be acknowledged these Caliphs were shrewd actors and their political needs and exigencies played a role in their decisions. All were subject to and operated within the same dialogic context as al-Ma mu¯n. That background and the needs and concerns of the Caliphs have been dismissed far too readily—although they listened to their advisors, the Caliphs had not yet become puppets. Why did al-Mu tas.im and al-Wa¯thiq allow the Mih.na to continue? These were activist Caliphs. The Mih.na had only been in force for a few months when al-Ma mu¯n died; it could and most likely would have been retracted if al-Mu tas.im had not seen value in the proceedings. Al-Ma mu¯n was not aberrantly claiming prerogatives over and above the ulama¯ . Al-Mu tas.im, al-Wa¯thiq, and al-Mutawakkil as well as Umayyad and Abba¯sid Caliphs before them claimed and exerted those same prerogatives. By examining and comparing the labeling and prosecution of heretics, I show the Mih.na fits earlier patterns of defining the boundaries of orthodoxy. It was precedented and did not signal a radical departure from previous practice. In addition, the Mih.na was one among many assertions of Caliphal authority and did not represent the culmination of tensions between the ulama¯ and the Caliphs. Later figures portray it as such for polemical purposes. It is clear the Abba¯sid Caliphs attempted to be a part of and play a role in religious affairs by making a claim for possession of religious knowledge. However, the expression of this claim and active role in the religious life of the community was not limited to the Abba¯sids nor was it limited to the role of a rubber stamp. In Chapters 2 and 3, examining the reasons for pursuing heretics and the vocabulary of naming dissent in doxographies in comparison to al-Ma mu¯n’s Mih.na letters

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will shed significant light on the continuities in the rhetoric deployed. In Chapters 4 and 5, the discussions of the trials show the attempt at narrative shaping to manipulate the reader’s perception of the figure being lauded (or whose stature is being increased). Al-H.a¯rith and Ghayla¯n’s trials were part of defining what it meant to be a Muslim, and the narrative manipulation seeks to soften and redirect credit for that definition. Their trials are of particular interest because they occur at the end of periods of acute crisis that had provoked a reshaping and redefining of Islam as a community of believers. Abd al-Malik had successfully defeated Ibn al-Zubayr, restoring unity to the empire, and Hisha¯m sought to maintain it after the empire had endured four intervening Caliphs in 19 years. Narrative manipulation for similar reasons and under similar circumstances occurs with the trials of Ah.mad b. H. anbal and Ah.mad b. Nas.r al-Khuza¯ ¯ı. Because their trials are normally considered to be the most important of the Mih.na, they are particularly worthy of scrutiny. As a result of that scrutiny we learn that the separation of “church and state,” with the ulama¯ becoming the arbiters of orthodoxy and the Caliph excluded, did not come with the Mih.na or its end. Rather, it came with the end of the Caliph as a credible, authoritative competitor upon the assassination of al-Mutawakkil in 247/861 and the ensuing vacuum that consumed and distracted the power elite at the center of the Caliphate. When combined with the advent of the canonical h.adı¯th manuals of al-Bukha¯rı¯ et al., that turn of events left the scholars with both the raw material to make authoritative claims to fill the void and uncontested religious authority. The Mih.na was not implemented ex nihilo and was very much connected to the events surrounding it. We must step outside the accepted paradigm and consider the patterns of earlier interactions with heresy to approach a more complete understanding of what occurred, why, and its significance. The first step on that path is to examine heresy, the nature of labeling it as such, and the effect on the labeler’s social role.

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CHAPTER 2 THE POLEMICS OF NA MING AND THE R HETOR IC OF HER ESY

Introduction Heresy and the definition of heresy shaped the identity and social role of all of the religious elite, including the Caliph.1 Heresy and heretics were marginalized as the center defined normativity and orthodoxy. Through the marginalization we are able to see more clearly the ulama¯ and the Caliph’s acquisition and exercise of political and charismatic religious authority in an environment that explicitly recognized diversity.2 They defined themselves as orthodox by sketching their distance from heresy and their occupation of the center of normativity. These strategies pervaded the roots of the madha¯hib (schools of legal thought) as their founding members sought to legitimize the position of their eponyms and the necessity for taqlı¯d (following the precedent of others more learned) within the school. The development of the madha¯hib had a profound impact on the perception of the Mih.na and the il/legitimacy of Caliphal action. Doxography, the “description of beliefs” of an Other, provides a window through which to view the development and defense of social roles and normativity, allowing us to understand the ulama¯ s’ need to claim the mantle

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of the Prophet and the Caliphal need to assert his social role as the Commander of the Faithful.3 Ultimately, every Caliph, upon accession, needed to legitimize his acquisition and exercise of political and charismatic religious authority. Like anyone else, his social role provided the framework for his actions. By the late ninth century ce the ulama¯ solely controlled, yet competed among themselves over, the formulation of orthodoxy, law, legal theory, and its application. Why and when did the Caliph and the political leadership lose the ability to dominate orthodoxy and law? Unlike European Christianity, Islam lacks a clergy that grants absolution, a single canon law, and a church hierarchy with a pope presiding over the promulgation of dogma. However, in its earlier version, given the social roles claimed, the Caliphate closely resembled the theory of the Papacy as advocated by the reform popes Gregory VII through Innocent III.4 Caliphs played their social role as Commander of the Faithful, by ensuring the fard. kifa¯ya (collective religious obligations like jihad) were fulfilled, believers could perform the fard. ayn (individual religious obligations like prayer), and by charting the correct path through the uncertainties of life toward the certainties of death.5 Caliphs behaved as if they were the guide on the path laid out by God and a person’s obedience or disobedience to him determined inclusion or exclusion from the community.6 In short, the Commander of the Faithful possessed both coercive power and charismatic authority. Why a role with these attributes did not become like the Pope as the papal reform movement envisioned or like the caesero-papist Byzantine emperor is a compelling question. Such a role was not structurally necessary in any way, but asking the question focuses our attention on discerning more clearly why and when the Caliph loses his ability to intervene in dogma. The loss will be tied intimately with the diminution of his political power. Al-Ma mu¯n’s initiation of the Mih.na, as noted in Chapter 1, has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Most have not considered the broader context in which he was operating; he was neither inventing a vocabulary of persecution nor acting divorced from a milieu of meaning. The Umayyads, Abba¯sids, and most of the ulama¯ understood the Caliph’s social role as the Commander of the Faithful, leader of the

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community on the right path, and dissent against him was equated with rejection of the community and normative orthodoxy.7 Of importance, disobedience to the Caliph, even if nonviolent, still meant stepping outside of the religion.8 Although rebellion as a religious dissenter automatically branded one a heretic, not all those labeled as heretics were rebels.9 As the early Abba¯sids staked a claim to reviving the true way and adherence to the pious example of the first Caliphs, it was part of their ideology to loudly claim they were more faithful to that model and that the Umayyads had strayed from the straight path.10 To prove this assertion they pursued heretics. It is often overlooked that the Umayyads had behaved similarly.11 Like the Umayyads, Abba¯sid Caliphal involvement against “doctrinal deviance” was not unprecedented, and was not solely a political act. Caliphs participated in this process all along, and the patterns, policies, and rhetoric were familiar. Punishing heretics deploys a polemic of naming within a rhetoric of heresy inherently concerned with defining orthodoxy and belonging.12 These were also the tools of doxography. Authors developed and adapted their sources to suit their polemical needs for asserting their interpretation of the boundaries of correct belief. Doxographic rhetoric of heresy did not merely provide accounts of heretics and heresy. Through it authors argued for their perception of the world and for their place at the center of normal. In so doing they defined the limits of normative orthodoxy. The Caliphs, in pursuing heretics, were doing the same. Categorizing heretics habituates knowledge into usable, recognizable forms in ways that, through repetition, reinforce the identity of the labeler and reader as part of a self-subscribed “we.”13 The focus on the difference of the Other serves to elide the differences among “us.” Thus the rhetoric of heresy is concerned not with the heretic, important though he may be, but rather with the orthodox and how and by whom that is defined, and, of most importance, who is included within that label. By its nature the rhetoric establishes a vocabulary that defines and bounds the framework within which future discussions occur.14 It imposes limits that color the way the world is interpreted and allows for “valid” categories of knowledge and forms the frame of reference for further interactions with ideas or groups, allowing the interpreter to make sense of reality

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and cotravelers within it. As such, heresy occupies two convergent, yet distinct, threads: the intellectual act of defining and categorizing it as a knowable threat and the act of containment, most often through persecution or exclusion. In this chapter I sketch my framework for examining the dialogic context surrounding heresy, which will be the backdrop for comparing the rhetoric of heresy in Ash arite doxography to the Mih.na letters of al-Ma mu¯n contained in the history of al-T.abarı¯. I consider the definition, naming, and labeling inherent in an accusation of heresy and the meanings and motivations behind that process. Determining why people were labeled “heretics” sheds light on the process of heresy, which then leads us to conclude that Caliphs, in persecuting heresy, also were engaged in defining the boundaries of orthodoxy. Through this we can see similar normative forces that compel many of the arguments made by legal scholars to justify the existence of their madhhab. The understandings derived will underpin many of the conclusions reached in Chapter 6.

Theoretical Basis for the Discussion As a starting point let us briefly touch on the “group” zana¯diqa. In modern parlance a zindı¯q means a “freethinker,” and in the earliest iterations it indicates specifically a Manichaean.15 For some scholars the Umayyads’ persecution of heretics was as a result of their disloyalty to the regime.16 Thus, they incurred the wrath of a “political” state, whereas under the Abba¯sids, the zindı¯qs persecuted by al-Mahdı¯ (r. 158/775–169/785) were a threat to Islam and were countered on pious grounds (sincere or not). At work here is the model of the Umayyads as an Arab kingdom and the Abba¯sids as an Islamic regime. The paradigm assumes the Umayyads cynically used the convenient label of heretic to more effectively eliminate political rivals. In contrast, the Abba¯sids persecuted heretics because they represented a significant and dire threat to the faith. At the root is a problem of definition: what is a zindı¯q? Many assume the zana¯diqa was a cohesive movement of Manichaean origin. On the contrary, when one considers the primary sources’ use of the term zindı¯q, it is difficult to identify any

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commonly held beliefs that might tie the zana¯diqa together; rather, the label is applied loosely, pejoratively, with intent to malign, and over time increasingly becomes an expletive. We must then ask why they were grouped together at all and, further, why they were persecuted. Al-Mahdı¯ explicitly sought to eliminate dualism by enforcing belief in divine unicity (tawh.¯ıd). It is telling he concurrently called for some to be questioned about the problem of qadar.17 In identifying a unified threat, a group with deep roots, and in enforcing these doctrinal positions, the Caliph described and limited the boundaries of normative orthodoxy, and placed himself firmly at its center. Al-Mahdı¯ s actions, and the four trials examined in Chapters 4 and 5, show that al-Ma mu¯n and the Mih.na, although distinct and more clearly defined, were not aberrations from earlier or later interactions with heresy. Although the Caliphs did not monopolize the formulation of orthodoxy and doctrine, they were not merely rubber stamps for the opinions of the ulama¯ . The majority of the ulama¯ did not resist or even condemn the Mih.na or other Caliphal attempts to implement doctrines. There was some resistance but not to the extent usually posited, as the extremely low number of deaths associated with the Mih.na attests. The ulama¯ were not a monolith, with many acting in support of and in concert with the Caliphal goals. The Caliphs, both Umayyad and Abba¯sid, actively participated in the process of defining the boundaries of orthodoxy and prosecuting those who were left out; they did not do so reactively (i.e., reining in heretics who had deviated from orthodoxy) but, rather, proactively (i.e., attempting to define the boundaries of orthodoxy and prosecuting those who refused to comply). In Islam there is a great deal more concern generated by what a person does rather than by what he or she thinks. The manifestation of obedience, submission to God (isla¯m), is what matters. For al-Mahdı¯ (and, as we shall see, for Abd al-Malik, Hisha¯m, al-Ma mu¯n, al-Mu tas.im, al-Wa¯thiq, and al-Mutawakkil) refusal to obey the Caliph was equated with refusal to isla¯m. Robert Moore posits that orthodoxy in medieval Europe inscribed itself by defining heretics while reinforcing its own power structure (i.e., ecclesiastical) by forcing obedience to it.18 Inherently there is a power relationship of knowledge and definition with competing knowledges

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but unequal power.19 In the early church, when the Pope was not yet the leader of Christendom, the power relations were more equal. It was through consolidating control over the ecclesiastical hierarchy that the Pope came to dominate European Christianity. Lacking an ecclesiastical structure, within medieval Islamic lands, the competition of knowledges between advocates of particular interpretations remained relatively equal. In their quest for self-definition they jockeyed with each other for inclusion in or dominance over the normative (orthodoxy) with limited powers of exclusion. Both before and after the shift in the Caliphal position that precluded his intervention, the boundaries flexed in response to the continual rise of new ideas and the need to incorporate or reject them.20 The social order was composed of an interconnected web of individual identities struggling to define their knowledge and beliefs within a limited range of acceptability, which was under constant negotiation by a community of believer–scholars in concert with and conflict among themselves and with the Caliph.21 The Caliph stood at the apex of this system because he could deploy physical coercion as long as he participated with legitimacy. Upon loss of that legitimacy, as no one else could assume the Commander of the Faithful’s role as representative of the unity of the umma, the ulama¯ , an amorphous grouping at best, took over the mantle of the Prophet as the inheritors and implementers of his tradition. The tendency toward multiple competing interpretive centers was institutionalized. This diffused power structure explains the acceptance of legal and theological diversity within Islam. In the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries, some perceived Ash arism, as a school of theological thought, to be a threat because it was redefining the tools of theology. Therefore its members had to defend it against the attacks of competitors while defining itself within the limits of acceptable discourse.22 The Ash arites ultimately had to argue that they and their theological toolkit were not innovatory but actually orthodox.23 One of the ways its followers engaged in this struggle was through the writing of doxography. Credit for Ash arism’s eventual overwhelming success is hard to place solely with the doxographers, but their contribution was tactically and strategically important. One of the significant facets of this observation, especially

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for the Mih.na, is the struggle for place within the society’s norms, which provides the context for the inquisition and its later interpretation. Bernard Lewis states that “orthodoxy meant the acceptance of the existing order, heresy or apostasy, its criticism or rejection.”24 However, until a “legitimate” authority determines the existence of heresy and acts to eliminate it, a set of beliefs is not heresy; holding a belief did not make one a heretic.25 Whether the authority’s declaration had an effect on the popular consciousness of heresy is difficult to discern, but we can observe repercussions. Some Sufi movements encountered widespread resistance once their ideas became widely known as “heretical” whereas previously they had practiced unmolested.26 In the medieval European context, disobedience and the ability of the power structure to enforce obedience were the triggers for labeling and punishment.27 In essence, heretics and dissenters were defined and punished when the ruler or bishop had the capacity to effectively project power and did so to legitimize and reinforce that capacity. This approach can help explain the timing of the persecutions, of al-H.a¯rith by Abd al-Malik, Ghayla¯n by Hisha¯m, and of the initiation of the Mih.na but does not explain the shape they take. For that, we must focus on the idiom, the rhetoric of heresy, and draw connections previously impeded by a narrow understanding that attacks on heresy were solely connected to the application of violence. Doing so allows us to see the broader context for Caliphal actions. It also allows us to see clearly the maintenance of a social role defined as orthodox through the labeling of heresy. In addition, the act of defining oneself as orthodox illuminates the process by which the schools of legal thought competed for legitimacy. For medieval Europe, in most cases, the “preachers of heresy” were popular and represented unlicensed, uncontrolled authority that could become an alternative to the ecclesiastical hierarchy.28 Generally speaking the agents of persecution neither acted on the basis of the “collective beliefs” and “sentiments” of the community nor as a result of a popular mandate but rather were following the interests of a narrow elite while claiming to work for the greater good.29 But elite involvement does not preclude popular support for their work. After the stereotyping of heretics has been established in the popular imagination, then popular sentiment drives persecution, as evidenced

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by our example of the Sufis. Eventually the persecution becomes a norm and even a means for mobilizing popular support. This is seen in the historical development of inquisitions. Before the king or ecclesiastical authorities could effectively project their power, cases and disputes were resolved by mediation and through interpersonal negotiation on a local level. As the ruling elite began to assert greater power over the community, they established courts and enforced laws that became increasingly impersonal.30 At the same time the state arrogated to itself a monopoly over legitimate violence. In doing so, it defined criminals and criminality in manners that fundamentally differed from earlier methods.31 The enforcers were not necessarily focused on the beliefs of heretics but on whether they obeyed the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Thus, elite interest in heresy was actually a catalyst for an increase in discovering heresy.32 The same holds true for the Islamic world. The Caliph Hisha¯m (r. 105/724–125/743) was not responding to a rash of heretical eruptions; rather, he sought to enforce conformity and eliminate nonconformative individuals and doctrine and found himself increasingly able to do so.33 Disobedience triggered persecution. In a similar vein, by persecuting the zana¯diqa, in addition to developing orthodoxy, al-Mahdı¯ brought in more ulama¯ as clients.34 Of most importance, the threat was largely imagined for the purposes of being seen doing something.35 In the Islamic context, like the European one, heretics are declared heretics not just because they believed differently, but also because the declaration served the needs of the accuser. As noted previously, in the early Islamic world, unlike Europe, ecclesiastical centralization did not occur. A plurality of orthodoxies continued to coexist within an indefinite normative theological space, constantly defined and redefined by highlighting those beyond the boundaries and in doing so, indicating those who were not.36 The clearest evidence for this is the existence of the four Sunni madha¯hib who extended mutual recognition to each other;37 of course, assertions of the correctness of their own beliefs continued. Orthodoxy is always refined, clarified, and defined by arguing against something.38 What is portrayed as a static past from the perspective of the orthodox in many ways resembles an unresolved tournament.39 As time passes,

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teams are eliminated from the field of competition until only a few remain, and each surviving team becomes more focused and their ideas honed. As the number of competitors decreases, the attack and defense against opposing teams becomes stronger and more specific, and as a consequence, the need to assert difference becomes more urgent. There were many accusations and counteraccusations of heresy and multiple claims to possession of the only correct way. The realm of normative orthodoxy was neither a monolith nor was heresy a branch of it; to be more accurate, it was distilled from multiple proto-orthodoxies. Therefore, its boundaries are fluid and sometimes unclear. Without a dominant figure, as in Catholicism, to proclaim singular positions on dogma, a plurality was forced to coexist and agree on a vague statement of principals (i.e., the five pillars). Before the death of al-Mutawakkil, the Caliph could use force to assert his precedence. Afterward, because none of the actors involved could claim absolute supremacy, all parties recognized a range of dissent in order to gain acceptance on the field of social discourse.40 This state of affairs had been in development for quite some time, but no one had been able to fully consolidate their position. For comparison, in Western Christianity, it took quite some time, arguably into the ninth century, for the Pope to be acknowledged as the arbiter of dogma. He was successful where the Caliph was not. By the same token, as much as members of the ulama¯ may have wished to exclude opponents from the community, there was general recognition that without the aid of a powerful ally they remained unable to do so. However, a lack of hard power did not prevent them from exercising soft power by exerting social pressure to boycott those deemed unsavory. But there were limits to the boycott. Doxographers, as they accounted for the varieties of belief, appear to be reluctant to exclude those professing to be Muslims.41 In early Islam there was a dispute about Murji ism, a line of thought, usually a group in the doxographies, that believed faith was what counted, but judgment of another person’s faith was God’s prerogative, not man’s. One could not expel another Muslim from the community of believers on the basis of sin. The Murji ites believed declaring oneself a Muslim through the profession of faith (shaha¯da) was sufficient. This doctrine was formed in

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response to Kha¯rijite exclusionary practices. The Kha¯rijites were a series of notoriously fractious groups that rejected much of the majority as grave sinners and thus as non-Muslims. As such, they alienated the umma, and most deemed the Kha¯rijites deeply heretical. Although the Murji ites would also be declared heretical, ultimately a moderate form of their stance on the position of the grave sinner would gain acceptance among the mainstream: people could be considered nominally Muslim yet destined for Hell for holding incorrect and deviant beliefs. The paradigmatic status of this stance reveals a lack of a coercive mechanism for expelling “wrong” believers from the community. In addition, the doxographers must have recognized that asserting their belief as the only correct one without controlling the levers of coercion risked being labeled as an extremist. Doctrinal extremism, not necessarily violent, was viewed with suspicion and would ultimately be excluded. Wael Hallaq asserts this is essentially what happened to the H.ashwiyya, a scriptural literalist h.adı¯th-oriented group.42 Their refusal to accede to the applicability of ijtiha¯d led to their exclusion from Sunnism. The H.ana¯bila, who emanated from the same milieu as the H.ashwiyya, moderated their stance and became firmly mainstream. As a result of this type of sentiment, a normative range developed. There was room for diversity and disagreement. By being within this range, one could assert oneself and one’s positions as within orthodoxy.

Social Roles and the Creation of Normativity It is important to understand that heretics do not call themselves unbelievers or bad believers or even heretics—they think they are correct. The label of heresy is a matter of categorization by an “Other” observer.43 As we saw with the zana¯diqa, although a person or a belief may be labeled as heretical and fit with others into a category based on the labeler’s definition of orthodox, before that point he/she and it did not have an existence other than as an individual holding a belief.44 One of the motivations for persecuting heretics is to define and maintain a social role. One’s social role deeply informs decision making by coloring the lens through which data is interpreted. It is also

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fluid and must be actively justified at regular intervals. Maintenance of social role and definition as being within the range of the normative form a vital part of understanding how the Caliph and the ulama¯ viewed their place in society and participation within it. When those social roles shifted, the Other was positioned to fill the gap. To elucidate this point further, we must briefly explore the establishment of norms, normative categories, and normative behavior—this is, after all, what defining “orthodoxy” seeks to address. John Gillis writes, “Identities and memories are not things we think about, but things we think with.”45 Each individual in society places himself or herself within society by fulfilling assigned societal expectations relating to the position that individual holds within a field of social options. Each of these positions has a concomitant cloud of expectations that the holder must fulfill to maintain the adjacent social role.46 An individual has multiple social roles and positions that generate different facets of identity.47 Each of these facets generates “reasons” for behavior and “obligations” underlying that behavior, which further reinforce the matrix of identities that guide the individual’s choices and define identity. Thus, al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ (d. 568/1153) was a man, a scholar, an Ash arite, an orthodox believer, and most likely a husband and father. In order to fulfill the obligations to justify continued possession of a role, he was required to behave according to normative expectations for that role. Meeting those expectations helps the individual fill his social role and maintain his place in society. Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ maintained three of his roles by writing doxography in which, by describing what he is not, he clearly inscribes his beliefs as normative and orthodox. For the same reasons, the H.ana¯bila or the Ash arites, or any nascent grouping, adamantly defended their eponym’s place as a leader among the orthodox, because doing so defined their own social roles as also orthodox. There is a balance. Examples of deviant actors assist in defining the norm by characterizing the antithesis. In addition, a movement needs a model for correct behavior.48 But definitions of deviancy are also made to establish a unity, with the definer representing the mainstream of it.49 It is an assertion that there is an orthodox group. For example, al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ reifies orthodoxy and mainstreams himself when he

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asserts “just as, going to one of two sides [as opposed to remaining in the middle] is objectionable.”50 There he resides, in the middle. The perception of the stasis of norms and orthodoxy facilitates the rationalization and codification of behavior outside of them. In reality, norms are in flux and are continually adapted and changed incrementally through application.51 As stated earlier, the process of writing a doxography defines the normative. By describing a violation of a norm, one describes the norm and implicitly asserts one is in compliance with it and all other norms. On the one hand, if one violates a significant norm, then in theory one has stepped outside of society, become a rebel, even if not a militant one, and should be excluded. However, someone else must recognize the behavior as a significant transgression, label it as such, and have enough legitimacy to make the label adhere. On the other hand, if one defines one’s social role as distinctly within the bounds of orthodoxy, then one must corroborate this claim.52 Labeling and categorizing heresy was one method used by doxographers for doing so. Thus the definition of heresy is as much about the labelers themselves as it is about any “incorrect” beliefs.53 Each individual is a complex of identities that seeks and needs to define his or her own inclusion in a community. Like the doxographers, the Caliphs were people dealing with multivalent pressures to fulfill and justify their own social roles and positions.54 There are many reasons for persecution. One cannot discount belief in righteousness as one of them but the place of social roles in a web of interaction can help discern why an individual would feel the need to do something about it.

Labeling Heresy and Organizing Doxography In an early Islamic context, it is impossible to separate the political entirely from the religious: events and the accounts of them are intrinsically bound by both.55 A separation between political and religious motives, much less one subordinate to the other, rests on modern post-Enlightenment understandings of these issues.56 The perception of a split leads to the erroneous conclusion that al-Ma mu¯n was the first Caliph to pursue a religious policy and that the Mih.na was an

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aberration.57 This conclusion has led to the broader misunderstanding of al-Ma mu¯n’s initiation of the Mih.na as a manipulation of religion for political ends. To claim that religious rhetoric only masks cynical political motives is misrepresentative. This does not mean that individuals acted without political motivation, but by the same token, one cannot set aside the use of religious language as duplicitous grandstanding. As evidence, consider al-Mahdı¯’s enforcement of the tawh.¯ıd doctrine in his pursuit of the zana¯diqa. In directly intervening by delineating orthodoxy, the Caliph’s actions were neither wholly political nor wholly religious. Statements of religious authority and concurrent actions were affirmations of the legitimacy of the authority and social role of the Caliph as Commander of the Faithful. The process and reasoning are unavoidably circular. The Caliphs maintained and justified their social roles as Commander of the Faithful by fulfilling the obligations and expectations attached to that role. The fulfillment of those obligations and expectations asserted forcefully the legitimacy of their possession of that role.58 It is important to remember that without a routinized system of succession each Caliph needed to demonstrate from the outset of his reign and at regular intervals that he was indeed Commander of the Faithful. Equally, charges of heresy were not meaningless as a religious accusation. Although the charge may have little resonance in our society, at the time heretics were proof of a widespread satanic conspiracy that needed to be vigilantly countered.59 In reality, some individuals, by most measures, were heretical deviators. In the European context, the bishops and the ecclesiastical structure defined the deviators, labeled them, and organized them from diverse individuals with varied beliefs into condensed packages as clear, manageable threats.60 Without that ecclesiastical structure in Islam, doxography performed those functions. The doxographers were tasked with explaining and accounting for dissent, deviation, rebels, and rebellion.61 They labeled heretics as belonging to specific groups as a way of making them comprehensible, manageable, and as fitting within an existing category.62 While they did so the doxographers molded, divided, and combined heretical groups to fit the famous prophetic h.adı¯th that the Muslim community would be divided

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into 73 sects, only one of which would be saved from the flames of perdition.63 This pattern grounded their arguments in texts that allowed for the extrapolation of these categories of knowledge from known cases to the unknown. Heretics were often identified using the descriptions contained in earlier texts.64 For example, in 180(796–797), Alı¯ b. ¯isa¯ b. Ma¯ha¯n is quoted as declaring that Amr b. Muh.ammad al- Amrakı¯ was a zindı¯q and leader of the Muh.ammira.65 The epithet Muh.ammira, “those who wear red,” was later applied to the followers of Ba¯bak in his important rebellion (201/816–17–222/837).66 A connection that likely did not exist prior was drawn between two groups to categorize and understand the later group.67 The listener will understand what Ba¯bak “really” was. As Henri Laoust observes, al-Baghda¯dı¯ divides the as.h.a¯b al-sunna wa l-jama¯ a (what we would call Sunni) into eight large categories, “with a syncretism” that those grouped together would “find surprising.”68 This is because, as al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ explains, “when the questions which are at the base of divergence are recognized, then the basic divisions between the sects become clear.”69 If an individual asks the “right” questions, then the divisions will show themselves. Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ and al-Baghda¯dı¯ decide what the fracture lines should be and divide accordingly. Doxographers group individuals based on a schema relevant to themselves but not to their subjects. The fact these individuals agreed on one categorizable variable does not mean they conceived of themselves as a group/sect. Heresies were not mere phantasmic imaginings of the authors; rather, the information they relayed was heavily interpreted. Doxographers were not just collecting data about heretics, they were also providing a guidebook that would help recognize and classify future occurrences of misguided belief with themselves as the benchmark for normativity.70 Labeling and naming does not eliminate the differences within those grouped together nor does it unify them as a group. However, for the intended audience of the accusation, any internal differences and disunity (within both audience and accused) are elided, which positions the audience on the same “side” as the doxographer and obscures differences between them. Labeling and defining heresies determined and limited the categories while providing a homogenizing repertoire of accusations

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against heretics/dissenters.71 In a religious community based on a revealed book, the codes, patterns, and forms of discourse in language are molded by the parameters established by that holy codex.72 This symbolic palette fostered a sense of shared symbols, knowledge, and assumptions. Normative orthodoxy and heresy were defined within this idiom; orthodoxy’s adherence to the symbols and code of the discourse community and to the boundaries of the normative necessitated that the information with which it was presented had to adhere (or not) to that code in order to be comprehensible.73 Driven by a desire to forcibly fit individuals within a category and justify exclusion, doxography tended to make the groups appear as extremist as possible. Thus, their apparent threat to the community was heightened, and the question was not whether they should be eliminated but how and by whom.74 Embedded in the discussion was the assumption that heresy, like Satan, could not be eliminated from the world but that its evil effects could be mitigated if individuals were shown the truth. Equally important, those on the right path were to avoid heretics lest they be led astray.75 In the doxographies, the groups described are usually eponymized; an individual is identified as the founder around whom adherents congregated. However, many groups appear to have no constituents. This appears to be the case with the Jahmites; Jahm b. Safwa¯n seems to have existed, whereas his “group” did not.76 In addition, when closely examining those labeled as zindı¯qs, it becomes apparent no cohesive group of zana¯diqa existed, only a diversity of individuals charged with a variety of malfeasances and misbeliefs.77 In the latter instance the group name serves as a catchall category for individuals and ideas the doxographer was uncertain how to classify. In the former, the logic of the 73 saved sects is paramount. For the labelers, the relevant variable was the perceived threat, not a shared cosmology.78 The grouping of disparate people under one heading was an interpretive act by a doxographer trying to relate novel deviations to known, manageable deviators. For example, al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, on the one hand, sought to demonstrate that al-Naz.z.a¯m had impiously innovated stating, “verily he added to the [Mu tazilı¯] position on qadar . . . ”79 On the other hand, he shows the innovation is categorizable, known, and

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recognizable and thus adds “however, he [al-Naz.z.a¯m] took this doctrine from the ancient philosophers . . . ”80 Thus al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ links al-Naz.z.a¯m’s innovation to a known set of unbelievers.81 His beliefs are ancient yet current, wrong yet comprehensible, and both heretical and threatening.82 The doxographers used a blanket heading labeled as a group, with a cursory definition broad enough to include a range of beliefs/ideas that could not be categorized elsewhere. Hence, doxographers create an authoritative eponym to be cast as an arch-heretic, or if you will, founder of a perverse madhhab of heresy, demanding taqlı¯d in deviance by its adherents. This process is similar to, but directed to the opposite purpose of, the process of categorization of knowledge and information surrounding the eponyms of the orthodox madha¯hib, which will inform much of the discussion of Chapter 6.

Conclusions Orthodoxy needs to be perceived as the heir to the original truth and tradition. Invariably those speaking for orthodoxy assert the newness of their opponents’ ideas as opposed to the divinely revealed guide that the orthodox possess. This always conflicts with the assertions that heresy is knowable through its long-standing past and connection to Satan. Those establishing orthodoxy must define and demonstrate that they hold the historically and theologically unchanged and unchanging truth; as a corollary, any opposition must be as illegitimate innovators who divide the community of faith by diverging.83 Those we know as the orthodox make this claim, calling themselves ahl al-sunna wa l-jama¯ a, “the people of the known practice (Sunna) and the community of consensus.” Al-Baghda¯dı¯ states that even though the 73rd division was the saved sect, it had subdivisions: The jurisprudents [fuqaha¯ ] of these [two] divisions and their Qur a¯n reciters, and their muh.addithu¯n and the mutakallimu¯n of the ahl al-h.adı¯th from [among] them, all of them agreed on one doctrine about the unity of the Creator and His attributes and His justice and His wisdom . . . 84

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The appellation mutakallimu¯n of the ahl al-h.adı¯th is a fair description of the Ash arites. Although al-Baghda¯dı¯ includes himself among the ahl al-sunna wa l-jama¯ a, he asserts they agree on the fundamentals and only differ in areas of permitted interpretation. As a further example, Ibn al-Murtad.a¯ (d. 840/1437), in defending the Mu tazila, traces the doctrines of Wa¯s.il b. At.a¯ back to the Prophet.85 This counters al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, who identifies Wa¯s.il as the founder of the Mu tazila and the originator and transmitter of ideas to Zayd b. Alı¯ (the Alid) instead of the other way around,86 thus assuring the reader the Mu tazilites were not heirs of the Prophet. The doxographers wished to assert their own beliefs were precedented by those of the early pious figures (salaf) and their opponents/critics were unfounded. Though doxographers were concerned with advertising their roots as the unchanged truth, in most cases, those who most vigorously claimed orthodoxy were innovating. Alexander Knysh notes that the traditionists’ treatment of h.adı¯th was no more traditional than the Mu tazilı¯ treatment of reason.87 Al-Ash arı¯ (d. 324/935) and Ash arite scholars were accused of innovation, because al-Ash arı¯ had been a Mu tazilı¯ and because they were using Mu tazilite methods.88 To maintain their social identities, roles, and positions, the Ash arites defined themselves and their eponym as remaining within the confines of normativity.89 They did so by asserting, by comparison, they were not innovating.90 For example, al-Baghda¯dı¯ states they are named the “Mu tazila because of their disassociation (from) the words of the community. . . . ”91 Underlying this description is the need to distance himself and the Ash arites from their Mu tazilı¯ roots. He accomplishes this by underlining their differences with the Mu tazila while explicating their own similarities to and inheritance from the early pious figures. At the same time, in order to maintain use of tools derived from the Mu tazila, he justifies the Ash arites and their differences to their opponents, among whom were the H.ana¯bila. Al-Baghda¯dı¯ also needed to maintain links to Ibn H.anbal, the eponym of the H.anbalı¯ school, and the individual whom al-Ash arı¯ claimed as his own shaykh. Statements, like those of al-Baghda¯dı¯, should be considered in conjunction with the continual assertion of the divisions between the deviators. These manifest the divisive nature of the deviators and their

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beliefs while highlighting and reinforcing the perceived unity of the community. When the “extremist,” “innovating” Mu tazila are compared with the “middle of the road” Ash arites, as highlighted by the connection to the early pious figures, then al-Ash arı¯, the Ash arites, and consequently al-Baghda¯dı¯ are clearly orthodox.92 It also asserts on an implicit level that the Ash arites should be in charge or at the very least followed. Regarding medieval Europe, Jeffrey Russell comments, “the more firmly societal order was defined, the more dissenters were defined as heretics.”93 He assumes those who defined were ecclesiastical elites who had access to the whips of coercion. However, elements other than the application of force can frame societal order. The power of normativity achieves the same outcome without a government’s active implementation. To exclude someone from the community when the community sees excommunication as legitimate does not require physical compulsion to be an effective sanction. Fame and infamy were powerful concepts in the knowledge economy of medieval Islam. Shunning a scholar was a very serious sanction.94 The Caliph, as Commander of the Faithful, differs from the doxographers in that he can exercise hard power to enforce a definition, whereas the scholars are limited to the soft power of social exclusion. But in the Mih.na, most individuals acquiesced without having to be threatened. In interpreting the rhetoric of heresy and the consequent connectivities, heresy can be thought of as two converging processes: the naming of heresy and prosecutory action, the former theological and the latter juridical. Examining heresy as two distinct phases highlights a different set of motives for each process. One set of concerns was behind naming, and an additional set triggered prosecution. A certain set of motives/triggers must be present to take the step from phase one to phase two, which typically hinges on involvement by an authority figure vested with coercive power. Polemics of naming, the rhetoric of heresy, occur in one moment, whereas implementation of physical sanctions due to naming takes place in a later moment. Although these two moments can be combined, the naming of heretics was not always contingent upon the ability or even desire to prosecute.95

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From this perspective, the Caliphs, in their respective antiheretic activities, assert they: 1) are part of the normative orthodoxy, 2) define the boundaries of normative orthodoxy, and 3) defend that normative orthodoxy. The first phase of the process of heresy takes care of assertions one and two, and the second phase takes care of assertion three while reinforcing one and two. The assertion of one and two was facilitated by defining heretics and could not be made by the prosecution of heresy alone; otherwise it was simply unconnected brutality, an illegitimate use of coercive force. The Caliph modified the boundaries of orthodoxy by using normative discourse, and those who refused to accede were prosecuted. This perspective also leads us to understand the assertions of exclusion as a tool used in defining inclusion. In particular, exclusion categorized the definer and his school of thought as orthodox. The rhetoric of heresy established a vocabulary of persecution and an idiom for interpreting it that allowed for the expression and assertion of legitimacy through the application of normativizing discourse that at one and the same time reinforced the social role and the possessor’s hold on it. In examining the nature of doxography, doxographers, social roles, and the development of normativity, we come to understand the Caliphal need to assert and maintain claim to his social role as Commander of the Faithful and to legitimize his acquisition and exercise of political and charismatic religious authority. One prominent way to do that was to engage in the normative shaping and definition of orthodoxy associated with inquisition. Al-Ma mu¯n and his successors recognized this and maintained the Mih.na as a vehicle for their self-legitimation. The same impetus underlies the development of the madha¯hib. In the next chapter we compare Ash arite doxographies to the Mih.na letters in order to situate al-Ma mu¯n’s actions more firmly within this dialogic context.

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The categorization and naming of heresy and definition of norms established the vocabulary of persecution through which a person could define orthodoxy and reinforce and legitimize their own social role. From this perspective, heretics were not of necessity deviants from an objective truth but were defined as such for specific reasons as orthodoxy was refined. Through a comparison of Ash arite doxography and the Mih.na letters of al-Ma mu¯n, we can understand and contextualize al-Ma mu¯n’s actions. Al-Ma mu¯n neither invented the vocabulary of persecution nor did he aberrantly apply it. Although chronologically widely separated, the comparison fruitfully addresses two main issues. First, examining the mechanics of exclusion helps to discern the motives behind the initiation of the Mih.na, its continuance after al-Ma mu¯n’s death, and its cessation by al-Mutawakkil. Second, it illustrates one method by which a school of thought habituates knowledge in promoting its own legitimacy, orthodoxy, and ability to shape normativity. This process also strengthens the status of the school’s eponym, raising the stature of the school as a whole. How and why a story is told, particularly in connection to heresy, tells us a great deal about those efforts. In Chapter 6, we see the impact of this in relation to the competition between the madha¯hib of al-T.abarı¯ and Ibn H.anbal

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and between the intellectual heirs of Ibn H.anbal (among whom were the Ash arites), which has profound implications for the narrative presentation of the Mih.na.

Ash arite Doxography At first glance, the Ash arites’ preoccupation with doxography seems odd. Although they are known as the dominant orthodox school of theology, three of the most famous doxographies were written within that tradition, by the eponym al-Ash arı¯ (d. 324/935), al-Baghda¯dı¯ (d. 429/1037), and al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ (d. 568/1153).1 The key is that al-Ash arı¯ started as a mutakallim (rationalist theologian) and later became traditionist oriented. Through claiming connection to Ibn H.anbal and by wedding traditionist tendencies like those of Ibn H.anbal to the rationalist theologians’ methodologies, al-Ash arı¯ created an elegant solution to problems unresolved by either approach alone.2 In doing so, he, and his followers, exposed themselves to attack from both parties. The traditionalist muh.addithu¯n rejected the rationalist methods as impious innovation, while the rationalists found the traditionalist to be inscrutably dense. Neither side was happy—both attacked, and the Ash arites, using doxographies, mounted a vigorous defense of their position, activities, and methods. The effect and intent of recording this two-front war was to place themselves squarely in the middle of two extremes, exactly where they wished to be: normal, normative, and orthodox. As a rule, modern secondary literature presents these doxographers as compiling a list of heretics without much interpretive thought. Although some had more vitriol than others, all shared the same basic purpose of simply listing the nonorthodox. Sourdel is convinced al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ in his Milal wa l-nih.al is “preoccupied more with description than with apologetics.”3 But he notes, as Laoust highlights, that al-Baghda¯dı¯ is equally concerned with “underlining the degree of heterodoxy” and ranking heretics in a hierarchy of reliability.4 Sourdel, and it seems Laoust as well, assumes that for the most part al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ is trustworthy in claiming that he presents an evenhanded account of the sects.5 As discussed in the previous chapter,

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the doxographers, by illustrating their antithesis, presented their interpretation of the boundaries of normative orthodoxy. For the three aforementioned doxographers, the viewpoint taken and the vocabulary used in conjunction with the order of presentation of the groups serve to privilege the author’s implied views as the orthodox position by presenting it as the norm and the others as deviations from it.6 Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ portrays the views of those he deemed unacceptable in such a way that they could be nothing but unconvincing. He plays around with the words and shades of meaning just enough to trigger doubts and disbelief without appearing to completely misrepresent the views; thus, he appears to be objective while making clear the unorthodoxy of those views. Al-Ash arı¯, in spite of his protestations, also engages in this process.7 In doing so, each author maintains the appearance of merely listing groups and their beliefs as catalogued by earlier figures, which explains the usual characterizations of their works. For moderns, as the Ash arite theological school has essentially become the orthodox one, the doxographers’ rendering has been confirmed. To facilitate our exploration, a brief word about the organization of these doxographies is in order. In his Maqa¯la¯t al-isla¯miyyı¯n, al-Ash arı¯ categorizes according to ten large groups.8 Al-Baghda¯dı¯’s Farq bayn al-firaq divides sects into three large categories:9 the saved, those still Muslim but on the wrong path and condemned to Hell, and those clearly outside. Al-Baghda¯dı¯’s discussion of the saved lists their essential beliefs, which happen to track exactly those of the Ash arites.10 Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ criticizes his predecessors (including al-Baghda¯dı¯ and obliquely al-Ash arı¯) for their lack of clear and coherent organizational schemes.11 He acknowledges two basic approaches to listing deviations.12 The first compartmentalizes by describing a theological point and under each question listing those who were in agreement. The second approach, which al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ follows, discusses deviations based on individuals who were the eponyms of sects. He outlines the positions held by each sect on what he deems to be the relevant theological issues. Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯’s Milal wa l-nih.al is divided into two large sections. The first recounts the sects within Islam. The second deals with other religions. It is telling that, these authors do not feature

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the Ash arites prominently, yet in not doing so they give considerable insight into their beliefs.13 Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ in particular does not want to sharply differentiate the Ash arites from the rest of the S.ifa¯tiyya, the ahl al-sunna wa l-jama¯ a, whom he defines as most connected to the pious, early leaders of the community. To mark too prominent a place would set them apart. They need to be distinguishable in order to command obedience but not so much as to seem impiously innovative. To reinforce their position at the center of the normative range of orthodoxy, he, like the other doxographers, deploys several tools as part of the rhetoric of heresy. A doxographer’s first action is to assert he possesses the necessary qualifications for determining what constitutes heresy.14 For example, al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, in arguing for his qualification to know, emphasizes the connectedness of his shaykh, al-Ash arı¯, to the pious ancestors and therefore al-Ash arı¯’s piety, which underlines his own. He comments: As a result of this argument al-Ash arı¯ separated off to join this group [the (pious) ancestors (salaf)] and he confirmed their doctrine through kala¯m methods. And this became a method [madhhab] for the ahl al-sunna wa l-jama¯ a, and the name of the S.ifa¯tiyya was conveyed to the Ash ariyya.15 One could not hope for a clearer statement that al-Ash arı¯ and thus his methods and followers were deeply rooted, accepted as orthodox, and dominant. However, this assertion of acceptance and dominance deviates from the reality that while al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ was writing, they were not conclusively thought to be so. Al-Baghda¯dı¯, in an earlier era, does much the same by stating that his purpose in writing his book is “to help you with your request about the correct religion and the straight path and distinguishing it from the degraded (heretic) tendencies and the degenerate views.”16 To assist with this goal, he compiles a list of “true views.”17 The contention that he is simply helping by compiling information establishes that al-Baghda¯dı¯ is a reliable source and stands as an inheritor of orthodox tradition. To ensure the author’s viewpoint is recognized as orthodox, doxographers also connect an opponent’s ideas to those of a known miscreant

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whose ideas are odious and thus transfer the stain of the reprehensible ideas to the author’s opponent. In doing so, the adversary’s ideas will be automatically understood as deviant and heretical because of guilt by association. This process reinforces the author and his views as the center of normal and the reader as desiring to hew to it. For example, al-Baghda¯dı¯ comments that “their statement about the permissibility of God’s beginning . . . because of this innovation everyone who does not accept this doctrine about God declared them to be an unbeliever [ka¯fir].”18 The reader, wanting to avoid the title of ka¯fir, has no other option than to join in declaring them to be unbelievers. This method, which frames the opponents as unremitting extremists, is most effective when paired with a series of contrasts. To make clear the difference the author sketches two extreme and opposing positions with his own firmly and moderately between the two.19 A useful way of thinking about this is that when considered in toto the oppositional pairs listed form points on the circumference of a circle that, when connected by a line through the center, converge on and intersect at the Ash arites. As an example of the transitive property, al-Baghda¯dı¯’s description of al-Naz.z.a¯m (d. 219/835 or 230/845) highlights this strategy of characterizing the extremity of one person to denigrate another: Al-Naz. z.a¯m is a Mu tazilı¯. Al-Naz. z.a¯m believes x, y, and z, which are horrible innovations. Al-Ja¯h.iz. (d. 255/869) is a Mu tazilı¯. Al-Ja¯h.iz. is a follower of al-Naz.z.a¯m.20 Al-Ja¯h.iz. is a Mu tazilı¯ who tries to cover-up the Mu tazilı¯ connection to al-Naz.z.a¯m. 6. All Mu tazilı¯s wish to cover up their connection to al-Naz.z.a¯m. 7. All Mu tazilı¯s know that they are heretics like al-Naz.z.a¯m, who believes x, y, and z, and their attempt to hide this fact only exacerbates the momentousness of their perfidy.21

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Notice the subtle manner in which al-Baghda¯dı¯ addresses the role of al-Naz.z.a¯m and his relationship to al-Ja¯h.iz. and the Mu tazila. Given al-Baghda¯dı¯’s presentation, the Mu tazila are put on the defensive to

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prove they are not all like al-Naz.z.a¯m even in spite of his admission that most Mu tazilı¯s disagreed with al-Naz.z.a¯m.22 In this way, al-Ja¯h.iz., the Mu tazila, and al-Naz.z.a¯m are inextricably linked to the horrible innovations of x, y, and z. As a further example, al-Baghda¯dı¯, in a series of statements that at first glance appears to be a diatribe against al-Ja¯h.iz., uses a string of pronouns that turn out to be denoting al-Naz.z.a¯m.23 By beginning the diatribe with mention of al-Ja¯h.iz., the reader is easily led into assuming that the author is attacking either al-Ja¯h.iz. or al-Naz.z.a¯m or both. The ambiguity blurs the lines between the two, momentarily merging them semantically before releasing them as separate entities that are nonetheless linked in the reader’s mind as being the same. As mentioned previously, this strategy could be used to link groups by connecting individuals encoded as representative of their respective groups. For example, al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ writes, “And the (pious) ancestors vehemently rejected him [Jahm], and they tied him to the outright denial of all of God’s attributes.”24 Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ tagged the Mu tazila as holding this position, stating, “He [Jahm b. S.afwa¯n] agreed with the Mu tazila about denying the eternal attributes, and he added to them [doctrines].”25 Note the order of primacy: the Mu tazila must have preceded Jahm and deviated first for him to have added to their beliefs. Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ pointedly mentions Jahm was put to death for his adherence to determinism, a heretical innovation at variance with “the (pious) ancestors” who would have rejected him and therefore his forebears, the Mu tazila.26 In this way, he tars the Mu tazila for supporting those doctrines and applies the feathers of heresy without explicitly making such a statement. The author triggers a negative response in the reader, who thereby internalizes that the author and reader, in solidarity, are different from those criticized. Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ also uses this technique to draw a link between Wa¯s.il b. At.a¯ and Ghayla¯n al-Dimashqı¯. He states that Wa¯s.il, one of the founding figures of the Mu tazila, derived his beliefs on qadar from those of the arch-heretic Ghayla¯n, whose trial and execution we will discuss in detail in Chapter 4.27 Describing a person as utterly debased and as an absolute reprobate was another strategy in the rhetoric of heresy that justified the

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persecution or at least condemnation of the Other.28 Declaring someone was a drunkard, a usurer, or weak in his religion automatically downgraded the acceptability of any view such a person might proffer.29 The person might still nominally be a Muslim, but neither he nor anyone following him is destined for heaven. The declaration also implies the author is, of course, not one who engages in such things. For example, al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ describes the Thuma¯miyya as: The companions of Thuma¯ma b. Ashras al-Numayrı¯, who altogether between weakness of religion and immorality of [his] soul, believed that the grave sinner [fa¯siq] (will) forever be in the Fire if he dies a sinner, unrepentant and he, while living, is in the intermediate position.30 In the end, Thuma¯ma’s logic condemns him to Hell, because he neither recognizes nor repents for his “sins.” The intended conclusion is if Thuma¯ma’s morality is so suspect, then how can one accept any of his views?31 This strategy works because to even engage in a defense is to admit guilt on some level. Regardless, al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ can only argue for avoidance of that group. He cannot advocate for their violent suppression, although much of his presentation leads the reader to this conclusion. Al-Baghda¯dı¯ employs the same method for denigrating al-Naz.z.a¯m, stating, “Verily al-Naz.z.a¯m in addition to what we related of him of his deviations was the most deviating of the creations of God in committing major sins, and the most addicted to drinking intoxicating beverages.”32 Once the doxographer establishes the culprit is deviant, the next step is to imply he has strayed so far from the straight path he no longer worships the same God. Al-Baghda¯dı¯ claims the Mu tazila lie about “their lord and their prophet.”33 He also writes that al-Naz.z.a¯m denies “. . . the immutability of a miracle from our Prophet, upon him peace, just as he rejected his miracle. . . .”34 The pronouns imply Muh.ammad was not his Prophet and therefore was not a Muslim. As a nomenclature strategy, this appears in nondoxographic sources as well. For example, according to al-T.abarı¯, among the artifacts discovered in al-Afshı¯n’s house were idols and “many of the books, which contained

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his religion by which he used to worship his lord.”35 Of course, al-Afshı¯n had been convicted of and executed for apostasy.36 Of equal importance, the rhetoric of heresy requires that, in contrast to the doxographer, those being set apart as the Other are unlawfully innovating. Through this comparison the author shows he is more firmly rooted in the truth than his rivals. Al-Baghda¯dı¯’s book is a litany of heresy, which reveals all heretics are identical and the orthodox are united in opposition.37 This tactic is intimately tied to, and sometimes inseparable from, the first tool mentioned: that of possessing the qualifications to discern what is heresy. Again we turn to al-Baghda¯dı¯ when he states that the founder of the Mu tazila, Wa¯s.il b. At.a¯ , “differed about predestination and about the intermediate position and Amr b. Ubayd b. Ba¯b joined him in his innovation, and then al-H.asan [al-Bas.rı¯] drove them both away from his majlis.”38 With this in mind, consider al-Shahrasta¯nı¯’s assertion that al-Ash arı¯ left the Mu tazila when he recognized their deviations and “returned” to the S.ifa¯tiyya.39 Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ expends a great deal of energy describing the deviance of the Mu tazila and thus how different they are from the Ash arites. These statements rationalize al-Ash arı¯’s connection to the Mu tazila. Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ presumably intends to prevent his reader, who is certainly not as gifted as al-Ash arı¯, from repeating al-Ash arı¯’s mistake and becoming trapped in heresy. The benefit for the Ash arites is that al-Ash arı¯’s righteousness is highlighted while allowing them to continue using kala¯m methods. In addition, consider al-Shahrasta¯nı¯’s comment that Bishr b. al-Mu tamir “was one of the best of the ulama¯ of the Mu tazila, and it was he who invented the statement on the generated effects and he exceeded the proper bounds in it.”40 He emphasizes two details: Bishr is “one of the best” of their ulama¯ , and he is an innovator. In al-Shahrasta¯nı¯’s discussion of the S.ifa¯tiyya, by contrast, he names them as both pious and early, thereby fostering the impression they are and always have been the holders of correct belief.41 He subdivides the S.ifa¯tiyya into three groups, Ash arites, Mushabbiha, and Karra¯miyya.42 Of greater importance, that he discusses the Ash arites first and devotes approximately half of the discussion of the S.ifa¯tiyya to the Ash arites suggests they contributed disproportionately in rank and value to the S.ifa¯tiyya.43

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In fact, approximately half of the discussion of the orthodox is devoted to the Ash arites. In addition to asserting the Others were innovators, a doxographer must show that heretics represent an existential threat to the survival of the community and its continuation upon the “correct” path.44 The ultimate example of this portrayal is al-Shahrasta¯nı¯’s identification of Satan as the originator of the Mu tazilites (along with all other deviating schools).45 Al-Baghda¯dı¯ lists the heresies of al-Naz.z.a¯m, thus heightening the perception of a threat from him and his beliefs to the religion and to the community. He states that he recounts only “the most well known” of al-Naz.z.a¯m’s innovations but proceeds to list 21.46 Although this is by far the largest number of heresies he attributes to any one individual, he implies more exist. The number and length of errors recounted create the impression that society, orthodoxy, and the reader must be vigilant against an ever-present threat. The doxographies cannot be read as a mere catalog of heretics and heretical beliefs: to do so misses the underlying purpose behind such an accounting.47 By defining deviants and deviancy, they carved out their own positions as the norm from which the Other had strayed. Both the condemnation of the Mu tazila and the explicit linkage of al-Ash arı¯, Ash arites, and thus themselves to the early pious figures distanced al-Ash arı¯ and Ash arism from their Mu tazilite roots and claimed the center of normative orthodoxy.48 To assert the orthodoxy of their position, they labeled, attacked, condemned, and explicitly delineated their differences from the Mu tazila. They counted the Mu tazila as heretics and included them among other figures deemed to be equally reprehensible while criticizing those on the other extreme, the traditionalist muh.addithu¯n, as anthropomorphists. They not only highlighted and defined heretics, but also defended their own inclusion within the plurality of acceptable doctrines. Neither the accusations of unbelief and deviance nor the standard accusations of misbehavior were gratuitous. The rhetoric of heresy and, the polemics of naming, implant, affirm, and solidify the notion the beliefs of the reader and the author are within the same domain of normative orthodoxy while providing a mechanism for categorizing difference and ways to ascertain who must be avoided. This was the machinery

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of exclusion. Understanding the description of heresy in the doxographies sheds light on heresy accusations and prosecutions as reported in other sources such as al-T.abarı¯. The process of the struggle for inclusion by the Ash arite school and recognizing the idiom that provided the vocabulary and rhetorical tools with which to draw the boundaries of orthodoxy, heresy, inclusion, and exclusion allows us to examine the actions of al-Ma mu¯n and his Caliphal predecessors and successors in a different light. It also illuminates the mechanism by which the madha¯hib will argue for their places of authority.

The Letters of al-Ma mu¯n49 The Mih.na letters offer explicit evidence of al-Ma mu¯n engaging in the rhetoric of heresy using the same strategies as those of the doxographers. Al-T.abarı¯’s inclusion of the Mih.na letters reveals the issues he thought pertinent concerning the episode, the Caliph and those tested.50 Most scholars consider them to be mere polemical justification for the Caliphal inquisition, which they are in part.51 However, in these letters, al-Ma mu¯n uses the rhetoric of heresy in a manner comparable to that of the doxographers. His use of these rhetorical devices was part of, but served a different purpose from, the second prosecutory phase, which is alluded to in the letters. The first phase (defining, labeling, and naming) asserted the Caliph’s position was within the normative milieu: he is the defender of normative orthodoxy, definer of its boundaries, and namer of dangerous deviants and recalcitrant innovators deserving of punishment.52 The deployment of rhetorical strategies recognizably part of the dominant idiom was an explicit justification of his social role as Caliph. As a result of coming to the throne via rebellion, al-Ma mu¯n spent the majority of his reign establishing dominance over the Caliphate and asserting his legitimacy as Commander of the Faithful. Here, in these letters, we see him continuing to do so all the way up to his death. In order to trace the outlines of his argument in the letters, a road map is helpful. First al-Ma mu¯n establishes that he, as the Commander of the Faithful, is the most qualified to discern and correct deviants.53 Then he shows that deviants pose a widespread threat to the

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community’s religious welfare and require immediate action. Having proven the legitimacy of the Caliphal action against the heretics, he charges they are reprehensible men and guilty of unrighteous innovation. He then places the heretics in clusters and links the clusters to denigrate them further and to reinforce the immensity of the threat. Although the letters neither strictly follow this order, nor does each include every element, thinking of the doxographers’ methods helps understand the connections between the parts and the argument they form. The letters importantly differ from the doxographies in that each one was read aloud to an assembly of witnesses and those tested. In this case, the defense and maintenance of social roles by both the namer and the named was on full view. Let us now examine these letters. From the outset, al-Ma mu¯n asserts he is the most qualified to judge correct knowledge, discern deviancy, and apply strategies of abatement.54 According to him, the subjects of inquiry are “a people ignorant of God and blind about Him, and straying from the truth of His religion, His unicity [tawh.¯ıd], and faith in Him. They deviate about the visibleness of His road and the necessity of His path . . .”55 In contrast to the ignorance of the masses and those who purport to lead them, the Caliph, the Commander of the Faithful, possesses sure knowledge and understanding. As a result, the audience is to infer al-Ma mu¯n is able and required to give correct guidance.56 This is explicit in the language used and in his characterizations of the (minority of) scholars (mis)leading them. Few of those tested resisted the Caliph’s position, which underlines his point. One may also note that throughout the letters he continually and repeatedly refers to himself as the Commander of the Faithful and not as al-Ma mu¯n.57 He refers to himself as the Commander of the Faithful nine times in the first letter, seven times in the third, and thirty-six times in the fourth.58 The dramatic increase in references may be explained by the unexpected resistance by some in the round of questioning following the third letter. In the fourth letter al-Ma mu¯n singles out named individuals for opprobrium and in doing so explicitly uses his title to cast aspersions on the recalcitrant. Increased resistance is met with increased deployment of his title (52 times in 15 pages of text). Of importance, all but two of the recalcitrant capitulate.

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The terminology used by al-Ma mu¯n reinforces the ideal Caliphal role of leading the community along the straight path to salvation. The unfaithful, those who do not follow him, are destined for Hell.59 In the fourth letter, al-Ma mu¯n states that God designated him, while his opponents are “those who have raised themselves up for giving juridical decisions.”60 Immediately before, he notes they “have been referred to as the jurisprudents” and “have been known for the sittings [viz., transmission of h.adı¯th].” He implies, then, that those classifications and recognitions originated from humans, whereas he and his forebears arose to leadership by divine appointment. The underlying contention is that his opponents have usurped a social role for which they were unqualified and incompetent. By calling them nabat.¯ı (literally, “sprouters” or “new growth”), by pointing out they improperly innovated, and by placing them into a category of known deviators, al-Ma mu¯n asserts he was legitimately fulfilling his Caliphal role in correcting them.61 Let us return to al-Mahdı¯ s letter, quoted in Chapter 1. In that letter, al-Mahdı¯ cites Qur a¯n 38:26 for the purpose of establishing the legitimacy of his action as the most qualified to judge: “And He said to David, indeed he had given him judgment, the prophecy, wealth and the caliphate, ‘O David, verily We have made you a deputy [khalı¯fa] on the earth’ to the end of the verse.”62 “To the end of the verse” assumes the reader knows the Qur a¯n by heart and only needs the beginning of a verse to know that the whole verse applies. The rest of the verse is “So judge thou between men in truth (and justice): Nor follow thou the lusts (of thy heart), for they will mislead thee from the Path of God: for those who wander astray from the Path of God, is a Penalty Grievous, for that they forget the Day of Account.” David’s qualification as judge comes directly from God, who designated him khalı¯fa, Caliph. Al-Mahdı¯ is arguing Caliphs are similarly designated as deputies of God on Earth. Although the specifics of al-Mahdı¯’s case do not concern us here, it is important he asserts that Mu a¯wiya (r. 41/661–60/680) was mistaken in granting Ziya¯d familial status in contravention to the Sunna of the Prophet.63 This establishes 1) that al-Mahdı¯, as the Commander of the Faithful, was qualified and capable of determining correct practice; and 2) the Umayyads were incapable and did so incorrectly when they tried. Al-Ma mu¯n similarly

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begins the third letter by referring to the Commanders of the Faithful, and thus himself, as “His [God’s] deputies [khulafa¯ ] on His earth” and proceeds to paraphrase Qur a¯n 38:26.64 Al-Ma mu¯n’s letters had a precedent as did his claim to being the most qualified to discern orthodoxy. After establishing he, as Commander of the Faithful, could interdict heresy, al-Ma mu¯n asserts the justness of correcting it. In his first letter he comments: How fitting it is to call a liar [kadhdha¯b] in his speech and the forger of deception in his testimony one who lies about God and His revelation and does not know God’s well-known truth. Verily those who are most deserving of the rejection of their testimony concerning the judgments of God and His religion are those who reject God’s testimony about His book and mixed God’s truth with his own falsehoods.65 Kadhdha¯b as an epithet appears multiple times in the Qur a¯n and was applied early on to the anti-Prophet Musaylima. Labeling them as he does justifies stripping those who oppose the Caliph of their ability to act as juridically competent individuals. This penalty would profoundly impact those whose livelihoods derived from their participation in juridical processes, that is, those who were the focus of the Mih.na. The letters also placed uncomfortable stress on the muh.addithu¯n to justify their positions as trustworthy transmitters by exerting pressure on their social roles. In most cases, the pressure alone obviated the need for physical coercion given the extraordinarily limited resistance. The first letter opens the argument by asserting that those who hold the belief of an uncreated Qur a¯n have stepped outside the bounds of normative orthodoxy.66 The Mih.na was initiated under the umbrella of saving the community from a dire internal threat, preserving it from: those ignorant ones [who] have increased, through their position on the Qur a¯n, the gap in their religion and the defect in their

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faithfulness and they have made easy the path for the enemy of Islam and they have confessed to the [illegitimate] substitution [of verses] [tabdı¯l] and deviation [ilh.a¯d] against their own hearts.67 Compare this to the zindı¯q targeted by al-Mahdı¯, who were construed to be sappers intending to undermine Islam. The difference, however, was that the internal threat came not from converts but from Satan’s legions, who were already inside the walls and attempting to lead the rabble. The rhetorical parallel suggests al-Ma mu¯n consciously acted on and deployed precedent. After establishing the threat, al-Ma mu¯n had to insist this heresy represented a widespread danger. In the first letter, he paints the picture of the community led astray by a few leaders engaged in a satanic conspiracy to undermine Islam: the “milestones of lies and the tongue of Iblı¯s [Satan] talking through his companions terrorizing his opponents among the people of God’s religion.”68 Those who might oppose him and hold to the notion of an uncreated Qur a¯n are the minions of Satan and serve as guides on the path to perdition, while he is the “imam who guides along the right path [ima¯m al-huda¯].”69 Notice “they” terrorize “the people of God’s religion,”70 a statement that alone demands action. However, al-Ma mu¯n also contends these leaders spread their lies in the form of h.adı¯th: And from what the Commander of the Faithful made clear to himself by his reflection and made plain by his thoughts so that he proved the greatness and momentousness of the danger which returns to the religion from corruption and filth which Muslims are passing around among themselves about the words of the Qur a¯n which God established as an imam for them and the traditions from the messenger of God and His chosen one Muh.ammad are for them a continuing [legacy].71 He also declares himself to be the proper guide on the path to salvation. Although not discussing the Mih.na, Francesco Gabrieli observes that in general the Mu tazila were fundamentally defending the doctrine

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of divine unicity (tawh.¯ıd) against the dualists (by which he means Manichaeans and Zoroastrians).72 Al-Ma mu¯n’s argument against the uncreated nature of the Qur a¯n is also, at its base, an argument against dualism.73 The language describing the uncreatedness of the Qur a¯n encodes it as a dualist theology, which implicitly ties this argument to al-Mahdı¯’s action against the zana¯diqa. Al-Mahdı¯’s process is similar to that sketched in the letters of al-Ma mu¯n, even down to the threats of decapitation. Al-Ma mu¯n also pursued Manichaean zindı¯qs.74 The overarching rhetorical connection is the elimination of dualism as an intolerable challenge to the community of believers, a theme that runs through each of the Mih.na letters. The opponents, the Other, are catalogued as a known and previously encountered danger that could produce disastrous consequences if left unchecked. While warning that the deviators were a threat, the Caliph had to establish they were in immediate need of correction and/or excision. To this end, al-Ma mu¯n liberally defames the character of his opponents to show that those who hold the Qur a¯n to be uncreated are reprehensible. For example, some of the harshest criticism meted out in these letters is reserved for three figures mentioned together: Muh.ammad b. H.a¯tim b. Maymu¯n, Muh.ammad b. Nu¯h., and Abu¯ Ma mar. Al-Ma mu¯n writes: Tell them that they are too preoccupied with taking usury to understand about the divine unicity and that if he [al-Ma mu¯n] regarded as lawful to despoil them for God and to launch a jihad against them only for their [taking] usury and that which was sent down to him [in] the Book of God about those like them, [then] surely he would have found that lawful. How then is it for them now [that] they have gathered together with the usury, polytheism and have become similar to the Christians?75 As in the doxographies, highlighting errors in other areas strengthens the impression the accused also deviated in asserting the uncreatedness of the Qur a¯n. He states explicitly, “He who is ignorant concerning his religion, that which God commanded him about His oneness, is even more sunk in ignorance concerning other things.”76 As with

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the doxographers, al-Ma mu¯n wishes his audience to infer that, because the individual has engaged in such reprehensible behavior, all of that individual’s beliefs should be considered iniquitous. One of the fundamental purposes of the rhetoric of heresy is to prove those named as heretics have diverged from the preexisting, eternal truth. Heretics are heretics because they have diverged from the truth as held by the community and as represented by the Caliph. The Caliph only draws attention to the obvious. Consider al-Ma mu¯n’s accusation of malfeasance and unwarranted innovation: As for al-Dhayya¯l b. al-Haytham, tell him that the food which he used to steal in al-Anba¯r and what he used to take for himself in power of the city of the Commander of the Faithful Abu¯ al- Abba¯s is what should preoccupy him [in terms of the afterlife] and that if he were a follower of the path of his ancestors, traveling in their ways and keeping to their road, [then] he would not leave into polytheism after [having] faith.77 His accusation that they (and by extension all who opposed him) strayed from the well-trod path (i.e., the Sunna) was particularly an affront to a scholar like Ibn H.anbal, whose entire social role was tied up in his collection of and adherence to the traditions of the Prophet in an effort to stay on the path of truth. Al-Ma mu¯n also uses guilt by association, either to implicate those for whom he has insufficient direct evidence to declare them heretical deviators or to intensify the perception of their deviation. Again, like the doxographers, he accomplishes this by relating one figure to another already shown to be deficient in order to denigrate the former. Consider al-Ma mu¯n’s accusation that Abu¯ H.assa¯n al-Ziya¯dı¯ is associated with Ziya¯d b. Abı¯hi, the same Ziya¯d mentioned in al-Mahdı¯’s reference to David (see previous): “As for al-Ziya¯dı¯, inform him that he is alleging a connection with the first false claimant over lineage in Islam [i.e., Ziya¯d b. Abı¯hi], in whose case the Messenger of God’s judgment was replaced. It is fitting that he behaves as he does.”78 Al-Ma mu¯n overtly alludes to al-Mahdı¯ as the arbiter of correct practice and belief. For a more apposite example, in the fourth letter,

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Ibra¯hı¯m b. al-Mahdı¯ is accused of iniquity by way of his association with Bishr b. al-Walı¯d—no specific accusations of wrongdoing are made against him other than being an associate of Bishr.79 However, Ibra¯hı¯m b. al-Mahdı¯, al-Ma mu¯n’s uncle, was a rival Caliph during the period of turmoil in Baghdad after al-Amı¯n s death but prior to al-Ma mu¯n’s arrival in the capital. Thus it stands to reason that al-Ma mu¯n had a desire to force public obeisance on Ibra¯hı¯m as a former and potential future opponent. The message to the Abba¯sid family is unmistakable.80 The preceding discussion allows us to place the doxographies and the letters of al-Ma mu¯n in their correct dialogic context. It is important to recognize heretics not as deviants from a central core truth but rather as those who were defined for specific reasons as being outside the community. The discussion also allows us to discern in them not heresy but rather the author’s perception of orthodoxy. Using this lens we can understand more fully the politics, polemics, rhetoric of naming heresy, and some of the motivations for this activity. The definition and categorization of heresy was a product of an individual or group defining itself as orthodox and as an arbiter of orthodoxy. Centralizing authority defined orthodoxy and correct belief in order to solidify political power and ideological control. Moreover the act of defining orthodoxy was to claim a single orthodoxy existed and the definer was a member of that milieu. The Caliphs, not just al-Ma mu¯n, actively participated in this multivalent discussion and exercised their authority as Commander of the Faithful, the arbiter of correct belief. Al-Ma mu¯n’s claim that he could determine correct belief and punish those who disobeyed and the opposing claims that Ibn H.anbal was the steadfast defender of the orthodoxy were inherent declarations an orthodoxy existed and that each one’s version, as that of the steadfast defender, was orthodoxy. Of equal relevance, the debate suggests the argument over orthodoxy was ongoing. This chapter highlights the process behind the naming of heresy and thus the dialogic context for the letters of al-Ma mu¯n. Comparing the letters of al-Ma mu¯n to the Ash arite doxographers allows us to see the mechanics of defining orthodoxy. This in turn helps us to discern the motivations for beginning, continuing, and ending

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the Mih.na. Of equal importance, the examination shows the methods used to promote a school or individual’s legitimacy, stature, and orthodoxy, particularly as those aspects relate to the eponym of a legal school of thought. The following chapters show the continuities in the pursuit of heretics. Al-Ma mu¯n’s actions were neither unprecedented nor extraordinary. He behaved within the parameters of the polemics of naming and of his role as Commander of the Faithful.

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CHAPTER 4 HER ESY TR IALS AND CONTINUITIES: THE UM AY YADS

In Chapter 2, I contend heresy is the convergence of two processes: the process of defining, labeling, and naming heresy and the process of prosecution, to which I now turn. Previously, I noted that an event, typically disobedience to an authority figure, must trigger the transition from the first to the second phase. As stated in Chapter 2, in prosecuting heresy, the Caliphs asserted they were part of the normative orthodoxy, they could define its boundaries, and they were its defenders. By investigating heresy and its manifestation in society as a method for labeling and exerting control, we can explain the Mih.na and show it was firmly rooted in precedent. The heresy trials considered here illustrate the deployment of Caliphal power in conjunction with the authority vested in their role as the commander of the community of believers on the right path. In this and the following chapter, I examine the heresy trials of four individuals in order to identify the nexus of the discourse of religion, authority, and power. I consider the trials of al-H.a¯rith b. Sa ¯ıd (79/698 or 80/699) and Ghayla¯n al-Dimashqı¯ at the hands of Umayyad Caliphs and Ibn H.anbal (218/833–220/835) and Ah.mad b. Nas.r al-Khuza¯ ¯ı (231/846) under the Abba¯sids during the Mih.na. By comparing multiple versions of each trial, I seek to detect patterns in

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Caliphal interactions with dissent and interpretations made about that behavior. The comparison also shows how the narratives were manipulated as part of a legitimating discourse to erase or elide problematic elements while enhancing or diminishing an individual’s contribution. In this we can discern the motivations for the representation of the Mih.na and its narrative used as a tool in an argument for or against Ibn H.anbal’s status as a worthy eponym of a school of legal thought. The denigration or elevation of a person is a key element in the argument for the orthodoxy of a legal school of thought. The discussion will also show the sources’ continuity and consistency in form and presentation across both the late Umayyad and early Abba¯sid periods. The Caliph’s participation was a normal function of his social role. In Ibn Asa¯kir’s (d. 571/1176) accounts of the encounters with the heresy of al-H.a¯rith and Ghayla¯n, we see the rhetoric of heresy utilized (in layers) by both the original narrators and by Ibn Asa¯kir himself. One key facet of the information he conveys is that all of the narratives presume legitimate Caliphal involvement in the naming, labeling, and exclusion of heretics and thus in defining orthodoxy. Whether the narrative seeks to diminish or enhance or even shift the Caliph’s role, this presumption underlines that the Caliph’s role had to be narratively contained, explained, or shifted to a more appropriate individual. If the converse were true, then the opposite effort would be on display: attempts to explain away Caliphal involvement. The trials of al-H.a¯rith and Ghayla¯n were acts of boundary drawing that shaped what it meant to be a Muslim. They were not the only ones persecuted, but the timing and the record of their encounters provide an especially fruitful window through which to view the authority and power of the Caliph and authorial interventions in the narrative. In the exploration of these two trials, we observe the rhetorical strategies of naming heresy deployed in the fashion of the doxographies for the same reasons, layered on top of interactions with heretical figures that necessitated explanation. There is a fine distinction between rebellion and heresy: both were dissent amounting to treason. As I noted previously, defiance of the Caliph represents defiance of the community, that is, rejection of the religion, a punishable offense.1 On the one hand, the sources

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unambiguously state that neither al-H.a¯rith, nor Ghayla¯n, nor Ibn H.anbal intended a revolt. On the other hand, the sources identify Ah.mad b. Nas.r as a rebel, which clarifies that although rebellion and heresy are not the same, heresy is encoded as a form of rebellion even if no swords are raised. All four were prosecuted for their disobedience to Caliphal directives. In each of the trials, the Caliph explicitly asserted his social role as Commander of the Faithful, an identity assumed by all involved to be valid. As such, Caliphs were not taking prerogatives which did not belong to them. Rather, they asserted their social role to define the boundaries of orthodoxy in a legitimating idiom that explicitly tied them to their roots as the inheritors of the mantle of the Prophet.

Introduction In order to understand the trials of al-H.a¯rith and Ghayla¯n, the motives for trying them, the charges against them, and the general concern with shaping the community of believers exhibited by pursuit of heretics, we must also understand the historical context for them.2 As a matter of course, Abd al-Malik tried and executed al-H.a¯rith for claiming prophecy and hints of dualism. The trial emphatically asserted that Muh.ammad was the seal of prophecy. Hisha¯m tried Ghayla¯n for being a proponent of free will. At the core of that trial is a conception of divine justice. Is it just for God to condemn someone to Hell when he had been foreordained to transgress? This will be one of the underlying issues in the argument over the createdness or uncreatedness of the Qur a¯n. Following the disputed succession to Mu a¯wiya (d. 60/680), the first Umayyad Caliph, Ibn al-Zubayr, an opponent of the Umayyads, became de facto and de jure Commander of the Faithful, with the Umayyad family only retaining sway over Damascus.3 During the next nine years the Umayyads would claw their way back to the top, with Abd al-Malik taking control of the family in 65/685. He defeated Ibn al-Zubayr in 73/692 and as a result was generally recognized as Commander of the Faithful. In addition to the challenge from Ibn al-Zubayr, Umayyad legitimacy confronted the potent claim of

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H.usayn, whose followers assert that if a familial dynasty were to be established, then H.usayn, as the son of Alı¯ and Fa¯t.ima and grandson of Muh.ammad, should be the ruler. His movement was crushed in 61/680, but his challenge would have long-lasting consequences. It is telling that a concurrent revolt was not against the Umayyads but in opposition to Ibn al-Zubayr, who would ultimately crush it. It was led by a man named Mukhta¯r in the name of a different son of Alı¯ (by a different mother) and would later spawn the Abba¯sid movement. Even though both Alid revolts were suppressed, they represented a powerful alternate locus of authority. Once he became head of the family Abd al-Malik faced several threats that cut at the cord of his and the family’s legitimacy. As he began to gain the upper hand in the civil war against Ibn al-Zubayr, he built the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem (completed 73/692) in an effort to solidify his religious credentials and legitimacy. Following Donner, if one considers the temporal and geographic context in connection with the polemical inscriptions on the Dome that emphatically assert God has no sons, then one can read the Dome itself as an act of definition designed to narrow the boundaries of who counted as a Muslim by explicitly excluding Christians.4 In addition to including the earliest datable Qur a¯nic texts, the inscriptions in the Dome are equally the earliest non-Qur a¯nic description of the religion as Islam. This is not to say Abd al-Malik invented the term. However, because the Qur a¯n refers most frequently to the community of believers (mu minu¯n, the Faithful) and not nearly as often to Islam or Muslims, the denotation on the Dome of the Rock is surely significant.5 Abd al-Malik was emphasizing the differences between Christianity and Islam to ensure the exclusion from the community of those who may have harbored “improper” ideas about the nature of Jesus. It is important to note the inscriptions in question are written in Arabic, are difficult to see, and are inside the dome. The audience for the message was not the general populace but those who were already part of the community of believers. Why would Abd al-Malik feel compelled to send this message in this way? As an answer, in realistic terms, the Umayyads had lost the Caliphate to Ibn al-Zubayr, and only the historiographic logic of dynasty causes us to think otherwise.

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Abd al-Malik did not become Caliph in 65/685.6 He merely became head of the family. Abd al-Malik was a rebel against Ibn al-Zubayr and needed to justify himself. For Abd al-Malik to take up the position of Caliph, he needed to show Ibn al-Zubayr was never the true Commander of the Faithful. Abd al-Malik was compelled to assert and prove that he was the legitimate leader on the path to salvation and that Ibn al-Zubayr was the rebel, not he. To claim the social role of the Commander of the Faithful as his, he needed to visibly and forcibly act as though he was. One way of doing this was to shape the boundaries of the community and belief. The Dome of the Rock and the persecution of al-H.a¯rith, among others, communicated publicly that he was not only the leader of the Umayyad clan, but also the Commander of the Faithful. Even Abd al-Malik’s name indicates his struggle for legitimacy, as it stands out for its overt piety. Abd al-Malik means the “servant of the Lord” (meaning God), and he is the only Umayyad with a name that in any way marks a pious position. Whereas all of the Abba¯sids will choose regnal titles that indicate in some way their standing within the faith (e.g., al-Mans.u¯r, the Victorious, al-Ma mu¯n, the Trustworthy, etc.), all of the Umayyads, with the exception of Abd al-Malik, are known simply by regular names (e.g., Marwa¯n, Hisha¯m etc.). Abd al-Malik’s famous administrative reforms (including the adoption of Arabic as the language of the bureaucracy) and changes to the coinage are also manifestations of centralization of control and narrowing the boundaries of the elite. The coins, now entirely epigraphic and in Arabic, often were inscribed with many of the same polemical messages about the nature of Jesus. As with the Dome of the Rock, the audience for these messages was clear: those who knew Arabic and were either Believers or had regular enough contact with the Believers to know their language. Although available to nonbelievers, it was not a message primarily targeted at them. Four sons and a nephew succeeded Abd al-Malik. As one of the sons and the fifth in that group, Hisha¯m ascended to rule after a period of rapid turnover. The preceding three Caliphs ruled only nine years among them. Al-Walı¯d (r. 86/705–96/715) faced fewer difficulties claiming to be the Commander of the Faithful, because the transition following his father’s death was smoothed by

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the continuing intimidating presence of al-H.ajja¯j (governor of Iraq 75/694–95/714), whose loyalty and ferocity were unquestioned.7 His successor, Sulayma¯n (r. 96/715–99/717), also a son of Abd al-Malik, sent armies in the hopes of conquering Constantinople. Umar II (r. 99/717–101/720), the nephew, famously emphasized his piety as qualifying him to be Commander of the Faithful. He was so successful that even the Abba¯sids acknowledged him as unobjectionable and spared his tomb from desecration when they took over. The third son, Yazı¯d II (r. 101/720–105/724), also emphasized his piety, but his behavior rendered the effort null. The rapid turnover of Hisha¯m’s (r. 105/724–125/743) predecessors (among other factors) left the empire and his office vulnerable to assault. He needed to assert himself quickly and forcefully in order to preserve his position as Commander of the Faithful and keep the empire intact. Ghayla¯n, among others, would bear the brunt of this. All of these Caliphs faced opposition and resentment from those who asserted loudly they had no claim. Each had to vigorously counter with evidence that showed him to be the legitimate Commander of the Faithful. As we saw in Chapter 2, the act of defining correct belief reinforces the legitimacy and authority of the one doing the defining. The impetus to prosecute and label heresy does not arise from an increase in the number of heretics but rather from an increase in the ability of the definer to do something about them. Abd al-Malik and Hisha¯m defined and prosecuted al-H.a¯rith and Ghayla¯n as part of a strategy to enhance and enforce their social role as Commanders of the Faithful. These two were not the only ones subjected to persecution, but their trials allow for exploration of narrative shaping and the expression of legitimacy and authority. The trials also exemplify direct Caliphal involvement in defining the boundaries of normativity as described in Chapters 2 and 3. Al-H.a¯rith was tried once Ibn al-Zubayr had been defeated and Abd al-Malik had solidified his position. His fearsome ally al-H.ajja¯j took several years but eventually subdued Iraq. It was only in the year before al-H.a¯rith’s trial that al-H.ajja¯j defeated the last major opposition movement and gained full control of Iraq. Abd al-Malik was now in a position to shift from defending his social role as Caliph to strengthening it by behaving as Commander of the Faithful

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not only in war, but also in belief. Hisha¯m tried Ghayla¯n at the beginning of his reign to assert he was in full charge as Commander of the Faithful. It is interesting that none of his successors was able to do the same, and within seven years of his death, the Umayyad family was overthrown by the Abba¯sid revolution.

The Trial of al-H.a¯rith b. Sa ¯ıd “al-Kadhdha¯b” (79/698 or 80/699) Let us now turn to the specifics of the trials. Abd al-Malik executed al-H.a¯rith b. Sa ¯ıd al-Kadhdha¯b in the year 79/698 or 80/699 because of his claim to be a prophet.8 His moniker, al-Kadhdha¯b, not only means “the liar,” but it also indicates “the denier” of either God or the Qur a¯n. Al-H.a¯rith shares this designation with Musaylima, a “false prophet” in the time of Muh.ammad. Thus, his appellation does not merely signify untruthfulness, but also ties him to the “lie” of the earliest enemies of Islam.9 The secondary literature has not taken much notice of al-H.a¯rith.10 He is, after all, an obscure figure hidden in the mists of Umayyad history; however, he is significant enough to merit the application of such a uniquely odious title in the primary sources. Al-H.a¯rith is one of the earliest figures executed over a point of dogma.11 The traditional sources connect al-H.a¯rith to Ghayla¯n al-Dimashqı¯, both of whom had a Christian background. Some have concluded from this that the Qadarites also had Christian roots.12 Steven Judd determines that the connection between Ghayla¯n and al-H.a¯rith is included to categorize and label al-H.a¯rith and to impugn Ghayla¯n through guilt by association.13 Sean Anthony argues that the accounts of al-H.a¯rith are riddled with topoi borrowed from accounts of prophecy intentionally designed to cast him as an anti-prophet. The problem with topoi is we, as human beings, live our daily lives through them.14 To borrow James Montgomery’s example, when a loved one dies, the funeral director gives you a narrow range of options for burial; this makes neither the death nor the funeral any less real for fitting a familiar narrative pattern. By the same token, by paying attention to how these devices are deployed, the layering of the material, and the nuances they are given through presentation, we can learn much about normalcy,

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normativity, and changing perceptions of legitimate engagement of social roles. The entry in Ibn Asa¯kir’s (d. 571/1175) biographical dictionary for al-H.a¯rith includes four separate versions of his activities and demise, with each highlighting the Caliph’s active intervention as Commander of the Faithful.15 The first report is short:16 al-Qa¯sim b. Mukhaymı¯ra informs the judge, Abu¯ Idrı¯s al-Khawla¯nı¯, he encountered al-H.a¯rith preaching he was the “Messenger of God.” Al-Qa¯sim immediately decries what has been said and tells al-H.a¯rith he is one of the deceivers foretold by the Prophet. Abu¯ Idrı¯s reports this to Abd al-Malik, who has al-H.a¯rith arrested and crucified (s.alabahu).17 Action is swift, and no attempt at interrogation is made. As with all of the trials considered in this and the next chapter, the individuals who discover heresy go directly to the Caliph or to an individual with direct access and inform him of the indefensible behavior of the accused.18 The Caliph deals personally with the accused. The second version of al-H.a¯rith’s execution is more brief, stating he appeared in front of Makh.u¯l and Abdalla¯h b. Abı¯ Zakariya.19 If this report were to be read independently, then the reasons for the condemnation and execution would be ambiguous. However, because it follows the first version, we are led to assume he was executed because al-H.a¯rith claimed prophecy. In this report, he has a heated discussion with Makh.u¯l and Abdalla¯h, and at the end they call him a liar before sending him away and going directly to Abd al-Malik. Recognizing the danger, al-H.a¯rith flees to Jerusalem. When Abd al-Malik finds him, he kills him without interrogation (the narrator does not indicate the method of execution). The third version of Abd al-Malik’s encounter with al-H.a¯rith fleshes out the details of the first account and combines it with information from the second.20 The narrator begins by telling us al-H.a¯rith was a pious ascetic before he started having visions.21 The possibility of these visions emanating from Satan troubles him greatly. Looking for advice, he appeals to his father who tells him not to worry because Satan only appears to liars and sinners; because he is neither, it must not be the evil one.22 Al-H.a¯rith takes this to heart and begins to preach in the mosque, gathering followers and extracting their oaths

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of loyalty. As his followers grow in numbers, he attracts the notice of al-Qa¯sim. The narrator tells us al-Qa¯sim approaches al-H.a¯rith, stifles his revulsion, and pledges loyalty. Al-Qa¯sim’s revulsion indicates he knows such an oath is heresy. As a narrative device, this provides the reader with an “insider view” while maintaining the trustworthy, nonheretical nature of our informant. The narrator does not quote al-H.a¯rith claiming prophethood, but he tells us of al-Qa¯sim’s vehement denunciation of al-H.a¯rith’s beliefs, saying, “You lie, O enemy of God, you are not my Prophet.”23 As a rhetorical strategy, this phrasing draws a distinct barrier between the speaker and the opponent’s false prophecy. As in the first version, al-Qa¯sim immediately leaves to inform the judge, Abu¯ Idrı¯s, who in turn goes directly to Abd al-Malik. Naturally, he dispatches a force to arrest al-H.a¯rith. In the meantime, al-H.a¯rith has already fled for Jerusalem, where he hides. Once there, he begins to proselytize through his followers, which is how our next informant, an unnamed Bas.ran, comes into contact with him. One of al-H.a¯rith’s followers approaches the Bas.ran and invites him to a theological disputation session (kala¯m). The Bas.ran likes what he hears until al-H.a¯rith says he is a prophet. As with our earlier witness, the Bas.ran conceals his disgust but makes his excuses and leaves. He returns to the kala¯m sessions on several different occasions, each time with the intention of infiltrating their organization. After learning the secrets of their hideout and al-H.a¯rith’s patterns of movement, he requests a posting to Basra as a proselytizer. Upon receiving permission, he goes directly to Abd al-Malik’s tent in S.innabra, shouting he brings a dire warning (nas.¯ıh.a).24 In this version the intermediary has been removed. The Bas.ran takes the warning directly to the Caliph because he can be trusted to recognize the heresy and simultaneously has the power to exorcise it. Eventually, he is let into the presence of the Caliph and asks the Caliph to clear the room. He then informs him about al-H.a¯rith and his actions. Abd al-Malik becomes agitated, rises from his throne, and demands to know al-H.a¯rith’s whereabouts. The Bas.ran explains his story, and the Caliph dispatches him with a troop of soldiers from Fargha¯na specifically chosen because they speak Arabic poorly and thus will not understand kala¯m.25 An important feature to note is

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that the narrative (and its author) registers a concern that people will be infected upon even hearing al-H.a¯rith’s blasphemy. This is a subtle example of the editorial content of these narratives. The persuasive power of kala¯m is underlined so as to signal its inappropriateness for those unqualified to analyze it. To an Ash arite like Ibn Asa¯kir, kala¯m is not the problem: its misuse is. Abd al-Malik dispatches the Bas.ran and his troop to Jerusalem. Once there, he sends people throughout the city with candles, with instructions to light them on his order. Then he goes alone to al-H.a¯rith’s hideout in the dark of night and knocks on the door, insisting he be allowed to see al-H.a¯rith. The gatekeeper tells him al-H.a¯rith is asleep and that he should return in the morning.26 The Bas.ran is emphatic on his extreme urgency, so the gatekeeper wakes al-H.a¯rith, who sends for the Bas.ran. When the gatekeeper lets him in, the Bas.ran shouts, “Light!” All of the candles around Jerusalem are lit, and the city becomes as bright as daylight.27 The metaphor is unmistakable, if a bit heavy handed. The Caliph’s agent, a good Muslim, shines the light of truth to pierce the darkness of heresy that had descended upon Jerusalem. With the light, the Bas.ran and his cohort enter the house to search for al-H.a¯rith. When they do not find him, his followers insist “the prophet of God” has been lifted to heaven.28 However, the Bas.ran eventually finds him and pulls him out of an underground passage.29 As the Fargha¯nı¯ soldiers bind him, he pleads, “(Would) you kill a man because he said: ‘God is my lord’”?30 They reply, in predictably mispronounced Arabic, “This is our Kura¯n, so where is your Kura¯n?”31 (Note that Ibn ‘Asa¯kir preserves the mispronunciation by misspelling “Qur a¯n” and differentiates between “our” and “your” Qur a¯n.) The Bas.ran delivers al-H.a¯rith to Abd al-Malik, who tries and crucifies him.32 Here, the narrative clearly alludes to Jesus.33 Given that Muslims accept Jesus as a divinely appointed prophet, this allusion subtly questions the legitimacy of Abd al-Malik’s response. Once crucified, the Caliph orders a man to stab al-H.a¯rith in the side with a lance. However, the blow almost miraculously glances off, and al-H.a¯rith’s supporters shout that harming prophets is impossible. The claim infuriates a “man from [among] the Muslims,” so he grabs a spear and stabs and kills al-H.a¯rith.34 Ibn Asa¯kir adds that Kha¯lid

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b. Yazı¯d b. Mu a¯wiya, a fellow Umayyad, goes to Abd al-Malik and criticizes him for the execution, stating al-H.a¯rith was possessed by a demon (meaning mental illness) and could have been cured.35 Thus, Kha¯lid b. Yazı¯d b. Mu a¯wiya, a potential rival Umayyad claimant to the throne, questions the Caliph’s knowledge and his execution of a heretic who was mentally ill. This possibility, as we will see, also appears in the trial of Ah.mad b. Nas.r.36 Like the third version of al-H.a¯rith’s encounter with Abd al-Malik, the fourth questions the legitimacy of Abd al-Malik’s actions on the basis of his interpretation but does not question his authority to do so.37 It begins after al-H.a¯rith’s arrest in Jerusalem. He is in chains, with his hands tied to his neck, an allusion to the Qur a¯n: “Make not your hand tied (like a miser’s) to your neck.”38 As he is escorted from Jerusalem on his way to Abd al-Malik,39 al-H.a¯rith and his minders reach the top of a steep hill overlooking the city, and he recites from the Qur a¯n: “Say: if I am astray, I only stray to the loss of my own soul; but if I receive guidance, it is because of the inspiration of my Lord to me; it is He who hears all things, and is (ever) near.”40 The chains instantly fall away, and the shocked guards immediately lunge for him. Al-H.a¯rith does not even try to escape. However, proceeding on their journey, the same event recurs—only this time the narrator tells us he forgot which verse was recited.41 The party finally reaches Abd al-Malik, who imprisons him and orders the men of jurisprudence (ahl al-fiqh) and scholarly knowledge ( ilm) to talk to him. In dealing with heresy and heretics, normal procedure provides the accused with a chance to repent (istita¯ba). Although this practice is absent from the other three versions, this version rectifies that omission.42 They admonish al-H.a¯rith “to instill the fear of God in him”43 and to show him he was the misguided tool of Satan, as he had feared in the beginning of the third narrative. However, he remains recalcitrant, and Abd al-Malik orders his crucifixion. In this version, the order to stab him with a lance is dropped. Rather, an onlooker grabs a lance and stabs him out of pious zeal. As before, the blow glances off his body, the crowd shouts, and a soldier fatally spears him. Ibn Asa¯kir, through an unnamed narrator, adds that when Abd al-Malik is informed about

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the blow missing its mark, he asks whether the stabber mentioned the name of God as he did it.44 The reply is that although he did not the first time, he did during the successful attempt, thus establishing the correctness of the verdict and al-H.a¯rith’s perfidious pact with Satan. This serves as the antidote to the Christ allusion and to the criticism for condemning a mentally ill person. Ibn Asa¯kir’s narratives consciously attempt to draw a connection between al-H.a¯rith and Ghayla¯n. In his account for Ghayla¯n, an underground passage is also encountered and connects the two.45 A man (Yah.ya¯) in Jerusalem comes into the underground lair of al-H.a¯rith. Ghayla¯n sits with him as his companion, and a man asks how Ghayla¯n corrects his student’s notes (s.ah.¯ıfas). Ghayla¯n responds the notes are lifted to heaven at the end of the day, where they are corrected before being sent down by morning; of course, the man is offended. The account ends here, but it is tempting to assume Yah.ya¯ is the unnamed Bas.ran who goes to Abd al-Malik, triggering al-H.a¯rith’s arrest, an inference Ibn Asa¯kir perhaps wishes the reader to draw. In addition, between the third and fourth reports of al-H.a¯rith’s interaction with Abd al-Malik, Ibn Asa¯kir includes a brief account of Ghayla¯n al-Dimashqı¯’s trial, in which he is asked a question but not given a chance to respond.46 Ghayla¯n is told he is a “reprehensible Qadarite” and a H.a¯rithı¯ (i.e., belonging to al-H.a¯rith’s deviationist sect). This report recurs in the entry for Ghayla¯n but does not fit easily into the framework in either location and may be a later interpolation intended to denigrate both figures.47 Using only the information presented in the other reports, it would be impossible to characterize al-H.a¯rith’s beliefs. By asserting that Ghayla¯n, a known Qadarite, was a follower of al-H.a¯rith, the narrator implies al-H.a¯rith was also a Qadarite. In his biographical dictionary, Ibn H.ajar explicitly connects the two by stating “Ghayla¯n was from among the companions of al-H.a¯rith the liar, and when al-H.a¯rith was killed Ghayla¯n replaced him.”48 Both figures are condemned by their association with each other, and this information aids in solving one of the difficulties with the execution of Ghayla¯n. Let us now turn our attention more fully to Ghayla¯n.

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The Trial of Ghayla¯n al-Dimashq¯ı49 Ghayla¯n al-Dimashqı¯ was executed on charges of heresy, and the question of when and by whom has generated much discussion. The sources generally point to two possible parties: Umar b. Abd al- Azı¯z, often referred to as Umar II (r. 98/717–101/720) and Hisha¯m b. Abd al-Malik (r. 105/724–125/743). An isolated report also credits Yazı¯d II, who ruled for four years between Umar and Hisha¯m (101/720– 105/724). Scant biographical data exist about Ghayla¯n, but we do know he was once the head of the Damascus mint and was otherwise highly placed at Umar’s court.50 The sources disagree about his label and the categorization of his heresy. The historical and biographical sources label him as a Qadarite, whereas the doxographical sources usually list him as a Murji ite.51 Al-Baghda¯dı¯ and al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ are torn between cataloguing him as a Murji ite or Qadarite.52 Both of the terms, Murji ite and Qadarite, are used in a way not necessarily congruent with their standard definitions. In many cases the word qadar is used almost generically to mean some form of deviation. As with zindı¯q, each narrator defines the word differently and largely uses the term to cast aspersions in an ambiguous manner.53 Regardless, most of the sources portray him as an arch-heretic. Montgomery Watt states Ghayla¯n and Ma bad al-Juhaynı¯ were rebels and implies the imputation of Qadarism was a device to delegitimize both.54 However, Ghayla¯n initially appears in the company of many individuals considered to be paragons of Islam.55 From sifting through the material, we learn Ghayla¯n’s doxographical persona was molded and shifted in an effort to cleanse those around him.56 As Judd observes, later historians needed to explain why Ghayla¯n, who was so famously tried and executed for heresy, was so prominently placed in Umar’s court and why those paragons had anything to do with him.57 The narratives about Ghayla¯n are of three types: those which relate the interaction between him and Umar, those between him and Hisha¯m, and those in which both Umar and Hisha¯m play a role. The overwhelming majority of the reports in Ibn Asa¯kir are of the first type. The reasons given for why and how Ghayla¯n angered the Caliph vary.58 He is said to have disparaged the legitimacy of Hisha¯m’s

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authority, which, precisely because they were attacks on his legitimacy, required a ferocious response. I agree with van Ess that the narratives asserting that Umar interrogated Ghayla¯n are forgeries.59 Most of the reports are ambiguous as to who actually executed him. If read independently, then these reports, by design, suggest Umar killed him, but in other versions Hisha¯m bears responsibility. Given the complete presentation in Ibn Asa¯kir, there seems to be little reason to doubt that Hisha¯m executed him, a version confirmed by al-T.abarı¯.60 No matter how much he insinuates, Ibn Asa¯kir only once claims otherwise.61 As van Ess observes, the Umar reports are included to show Umar opposing the heretic, effectively removing credit for killing Ghayla¯n from Hisha¯m. Later Abba¯sid era sources portray Umar as the only good and pious Umayyad, and, thus, giving Hisha¯m credit for killing Ghayla¯n was problematic. Judd notes the early authors could have interpreted Hisha¯m’s execution of Ghayla¯n in two possible ways.62 They could have assumed Umar had a heretic as a close associate, but Umar’s reputation for piety makes this unlikely. In contrast, Hisha¯m could have executed one of Umar’s close allies. Because neither was a particularly attractive notion, the sources draw a “rift” between Ghayla¯n and Umar. As much as he may have wanted, Ibn Asa¯kir could not alter the fact that Hisha¯m ordered Ghayla¯n’s execution. To distance Umar, the narrators fabricated his interrogation and condemnation of Ghayla¯n. If Umar interrogated Ghayla¯n first, and warned him of the consequences of relapse into heresy, then Hisha¯m’s execution of him became merely the fulfillment of Umar’s prescription. Such a narrative deprives Hisha¯m of any pious motives. Ibn Asa¯kir provides fourteen versions of Ghayla¯n’s trial, which fall into the three types previously described.63 In the interest of brevity, I discuss representative versions from each of the three and then one anomalous account that commands attention. I contrast these with versions from other sources to highlight the continuities in the narratives and to render the narrative shaping more visible. As with the narratives surrounding al-H.a¯rith, the legitimacy of the Caliph’s intervention in enforcing normative belief is assumed. Because one can easily become lost in the details of these narratives, I now sketch a general road map of events to provide a foundation. The Caliph Umar

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is informed Ghayla¯n is preaching about Qadarism without explaining the meaning of the term. Umar demands an audience, during which he subjects Ghayla¯n to an inquisition. The Caliph shows Ghayla¯n he has strayed from the straight path, and Ghayla¯n repents but later relapses into heresy. As a result, he is brought before the new Caliph, Hisha¯m, who requests help from the famous legal scholar al-Awza¯ ¯ı (d. 157/774), who successfully prosecutes the case. Ghayla¯n is executed in compliance with the decision rendered by Umar. [A] Umar as Sole Prosecutor Amr b. Muha¯jir, the captain of Umar’s guard, recounts the third, fourth, and fifth (of the fourteen) trial narratives.64 The fifth elaborates and expands upon the prior two. As mentioned previously concerning al-H.a¯rith, the Caliph’s notable concern and involvement is always present in these reports. Umar is told Ghayla¯n and an unnamed accomplice preach qadar.65 After sending for them, Umar questions them, asking, “What is this matter that you are proclaiming about?”66 The two respond they only say what God says.67 Of course, Umar asks what God says,68 and they respond by reciting three verses from the Qur a¯n (76:1–3), which are also quoted in all three accounts. Umar feels they have not recited enough and says, “Recite!” They continue until they reach the thirtieth verse; thus, they recite ten times as many verses in the refutation.69 These verses vividly recount the reward for those choosing to obey and the punishment awaiting those who do not. Hence, it is a strong Qur a¯nic support for the doctrine of free will. To counter this impression, when Umar asks them to interpret, they do and “exceed all bounds . . . and he [becomes] intensely angry.”70 At this point, the narrative rewinds to the beginning. The suspects enter the room, and the questioning begins anew. Umar asks about God’s foreknowledge of events, using the example of His command to Iblı¯s (Satan) to prostrate himself before Adam.71 In the first version of the trial, the narrator makes a menacing gesture at the suspects.72 This detail has changed, and the violence has been removed; the narrator merely shakes his head. The alteration makes it appear that the strength of the Caliph’s argument and not the strength of

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his arms convinces Ghayla¯n and his companion.73 This is similar to trial accounts examined in the next chapter. The Caliph asks a third question, about Adam and Eve and their eating of the forbidden fruit. Again, the narrator shakes his head as the suspects affirm the Caliph’s position. As a result, Umar orders Ghayla¯n and his companions be removed, and their fate is left unclear. Next, Umar writes a letter to the army districts concerning qadar, presumably forbidding its discussion or at least warning about it but does not dispatch it because he falls ill. Although the narrator does not report his death, one assumes Umar wrote the letter shortly beforehand, which provides an intriguing parallel to the end of al-Ma mu¯n’s life. In the eighth trial narrative, Umar summons Ghayla¯n because he reportedly teaches qadar.74 Ghayla¯n denies the charges, claiming that people lie. Umar orders him to recite from the Sura Ya-Sin (Qur a¯n 36), and he complies by reciting verses one through ten.75 The verses and the Sura cited in this narrative differ from the preceding ones, and Umar, in making his case, resorts to the Qur a¯n before Ghayla¯n. Sura Ya-Sin is often a component of funerary proceedings because of its meditation on death and has strong predestinarian overtones. The argument being made is explicitly opposed to free will. When Ghayla¯n reaches the tenth verse, he has an epiphany and states, “By God, O Commander of the Faithful, it is as if I had not recited it before today.”76 This version is unique: the Caliph does not ask him a question, and the merits of the case on either side rest on the implicit meaning of the verses from the Qur a¯n. Ghayla¯n’s beliefs are not discussed, but he states he repents to God about what he said about qadar. There is no indication of punishment, only of his repentance in front of Umar, acting in his capacity as the Commander of the Faithful. Al-Zuhrı¯ narrates the eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh trial reports.77 The obvious divergences in the accounts allegedly from the same source emphasize Ibn Asa¯kir’s role as editor choosing what to include. The eleventh account is an anomaly whose inclusion must have been to resolve a specific problem. The narrator walks into the room to find Ghayla¯n standing before Umar, who remains passive throughout.78 Ghayla¯n expounds upon his ideas, which, unfortunately, are not

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mentioned. Al-Zuhrı¯ retorts Ghayla¯n is a liar (kadhdha¯b) and says to Umar, “You will not stop him until you give him a taste of the heat of the blade or the sword’s edge,”79 to which the narrator adds that Umar dies before he can act on this advice. Next we are told Yazı¯d b. Abd al-Malik becomes Caliph. Once again, al-Zuhrı¯ enters a room and sees Ghayla¯n standing in front of the new Caliph. In this account, Ghayla¯n remains passive. When the Caliph tells him to stick out his hand, he complies, and the Caliph lops it off. When he tells Ghayla¯n to stick out his foot, he does so, and the Caliph lops it off and then gibbets him.80 Note the Caliph wields the sword and exacts the punishment in this account.81 The narrator mentions this is Umar’s prescription, and in recognition of the anomalous character of this report, Ibn Asa¯kir adds that another individual reported Hisha¯m gibbeted him. This version resolves the question of Ghayla¯n’s activities between Umar and Hisha¯m’s reigns: he unrepentantly backslid. Although Umar planned to kill him, he died, leaving Yazı¯d II no choice but to follow through. As we will see in the next chapter, this is the same position in which al-Mu tas.im (r. 217/833– 227/842) finds himself in relation to al-Ma mu¯n’s prosecution of Ibn H.anbal. [B] Hisha¯m as Sole Prosecutor The twelfth report focuses on Hisha¯m as Caliph and resumes the trial narratives after an intervening five pages of information that establish Ghayla¯n as an active, prominent member of the Caliphal court. Those pages also divide the accounts pertaining to Umar from those of Hisha¯m. The twelfth report is similar to the other versions except that the great legal scholar al-Awza¯ ¯ı (d. 157/774) narrates and serves as the prosecutor instead of the Caliph.82 The thirteenth trial report is also similar, but Ibn Asa¯kir includes divergent phrasings that establish the report underwent editing.83 The thirteenth narrative begins much like the others, with Hisha¯m hearing Ghayla¯n is a Qadarite. However, the narrative omits the Caliph’s question, “What is that which I hear about you teaching qadar?”84 We are told “the people complained about him” directly to the Caliph.85 Hisha¯m sends for Ghayla¯n, and once he arrives they have a brief exchange in which Ghayla¯n tells the Caliph

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to call whomever he wishes to debate him and offers to be decapitated if he loses the debate. As in the twelfth account, the Caliph takes the initiative, but upon his arrival Ghayla¯n boldly and arrogantly seizes it. In this version Ghayla¯n does not protest he has been slandered.86 The stakes have also been increased from those in the twelfth report, when he states that if he loses, then he should be beaten.87 Hisha¯m sends for al-Awza¯ ¯ı to be his prosecutor, because he does not understand the issues at stake.88 Al-Awza¯ ¯ı offers Ghayla¯n the choice of three or four questions or one question (in that order).89 Ghayla¯n opts for three, and the questions are more accessible and less elliptical than those in the previous (i.e., the twelfth) version. Al-Awza¯ ¯ı successfully rhetorically maneuvers Ghayla¯n so that he has no response, a concession of defeat. True to Ghayla¯n’s offer in the beginning, Hisha¯m orders him decapitated.90 This is ambiguous: Why was he decapitated? Was he decapitated because he was a heretic or because he arrogantly stated that if he lost, then he would surrender his head? Does his heresy or his insolence trigger the punishment? If one stopped reading here, this report would give the impression Hisha¯m decapitated Ghayla¯n solely for his arrogance. However, when one includes the context of the preceding 12 trial reports, the reader assumes heresy to be the cause. The thirteenth narrative continues oddly by adding that after the execution a perplexed Hisha¯m asks al-Awza¯ ¯ı to explain the meaning of his questions. Al-Awza¯ ¯ı obliges, and their exchange, using more direct language, is much clearer than the previous version, showing this to be a later rendition. Hisha¯m also asks which other questions al-Awza¯ ¯ı would have asked if Ghayla¯n had chosen four questions or one. Al-Awza¯ ¯ı once again obliges, presenting questions with only one acceptable response: any other response will bring a death sentence. The subtext is that if Ghayla¯n had obeyed and given the Caliph the correct answer, then he would have been freed. Instead, he obstinately refused. Al-Awza¯ ¯ı, deploying the polemics of naming, asserts that, for Qadarites, Iblı¯s/Satan is “their brother.”91 Their beliefs contradict those of the community of believers. Therefore, he argues, they left the community and should be punished for heresy. These statements serve to establish Ghayla¯n was executed for his beliefs, not just his arrogance. Ghayla¯n’s obstinacy positions him as representative of a

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long-standing recalcitrant satanic conspiracy, and his execution represents the just squelching of such a conspiracy. Al-Awza¯ ¯ı reinforces his argument with a string of Qur a¯nic verses (11:88, 6:77, 11:34, 7:43, 15:39, 14:21) that proclaim God’s guidance, through Muh.ammad, against the misbelief and misguidance of Iblı¯s and his brothers. Ghayla¯n, clearly labeled and categorized, serves as a warning of what, according to al-Awza¯ ¯ı (and presumably Ibn Asa¯kir), should happen to other Qadarites.92 [C] Umar and Hisha¯m In Ibn Asa¯kir, two reports combine details from the different Umar and Hisha¯m versions. The sixth (of the 14) is strategically placed in the middle of the reports focusing on Umar as prosecutor (first type).93 We will not dwell on number six, but the second, Ibn Asa¯kir’s fourteenth, is the longest version and addresses the problems of the previous ones.94 It begins when Umar hears Ghayla¯n is teaching qadar.95 Umar summons him and asks, “What is this which has reached me about you? Are you discussing qadar?”96 Ghayla¯n responds these are lies. Umar, acting as the prosecutor, immediately begins questioning Ghayla¯n. The contrast is clear between Umar, who acts as his own prosecutor, and Hisha¯m, who relies on al-Awza¯ ¯ı: their religious merit is implicitly being compared. Umar declares that if the allegations are true, then he will behead Ghayla¯n. The narrative maintains the threat of decapitation, but Ghayla¯n’s arrogance as motive is removed.97 Umar orders him to recite the Sura Ya-Sin (36), so Ghayla¯n begins with the first verse. When he finishes the seventh verse, Umar commands, “Stop!” and asks for his opinion.98 Ghayla¯n responds it is as if he had never recited it before.99 Unlike the previous texts, Ghayla¯n’s epiphany is not triggered from within while reading; instead, it comes from the Caliph stopping him and asking him about it. Umar tells him to continue reciting, and when Ghayla¯n recites the next verse (8), Umar instructs him to stop. Once again, he asks him a question about the verse, which clearly supports a predestinarian point of view; Ghayla¯n has no response. Umar orders him to continue, but this time he only gets partly through the next verse (9) before Umar interrupts with

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another question; Ghayla¯n has no answer. Umar demands he continue, and this time he gets through two more verses (10–11) before he, for the fourth time, orders Ghayla¯n to stop and asks him his opinion. He answers that it was as if he had never recited it before. In response to the four questions, Ghayla¯n twice responds he does not have an answer, and twice he responds it “was as if I had never recited it before.” As a result, Ghayla¯n repents and swears he will not speak about qadar again. With this assurance, Umar sets him free. Immediately after stating he was set free, the narrator adds that as Ghayla¯n turns to leave, Umar says, “O God verily he gave testimony to me by his tongue and You tested him in his heart and I (gave) him a taste of the heat of the blade.”100 We are told Ghayla¯n kept quiet until after Umar died. He thus acceded and came into obedience to the Caliphal command and was not executed. During Yazı¯d b. Abd al-Malik’s reign, Ghayla¯n reverts to his previous ways. Upon Yazı¯d’s death, Hisha¯m summons him and asks him about the promise he made to God to stop preaching qadar. A promise to the Commander of the Faithful is equivalent to one made to God. Ghayla¯n responds in an unexpected way, saying, “Forgive me, O Commander of the Faithful,” to which Hisha¯m replies, “God will not forgive me if I forgive you, O enemy of God.”101 He asks Ghayla¯n if he knows the Fa¯tih.a (Sura 1), directly challenging his basic knowledge of Islam. Ghayla¯n responds “yes” and begins reciting it. Upon reaching the end of the fifth of the seven verses, Hisha¯m stops him to question him about the verses.102 The text that immediately follows seems to be corrupted because it reads, “They took him away and then they decapitated him and they gibbeted him.”103 Reading this sentence in the context of the surrounding sentences, it either is a scribal error or a threat of decapitation. In the following sentence, Ghayla¯n asks the Caliph to choose someone to debate him; once again he is on the offensive. As in the previous report, he proposes the Caliph can decapitate him should he lose but adds the Caliph and his court must follow him should he win. Hisha¯m chooses al-Awza¯ ¯ı to be his champion. In this narrative the Caliph is appropriately aware of his subordinate position to a religious scholar. As in the preceding version, al-Awza¯ ¯ı asks if Ghayla¯n wants three or four questions or one question. Again, Ghayla¯n

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chooses three. The questions in this version are clear, succinct, and refined, although at the end Hisha¯m remains befuddled. As in the other versions, Ghayla¯n cannot answer any of the questions. It is interesting to note that in the first and third questions, Ghayla¯n is not named and in the second he is labeled as “the Qadarite.”104 When he does not have an answer to the third question, al-Awza¯ ¯ı calls him a ka¯fir,105 the first time this term is used. None of the usual vocabulary associated with heretics or heresy appears—no bid a or ilh.a¯d, and kufr is used sparingly.106 However, there is no mistaking he is questioned for deviance and is explicitly corrected. When he refuses to stay in compliance, he is killed, leading one to conclude he is executed for his refusal to remain publicly obedient to the Caliph rather than for his beliefs. The other narratives do not endeavor to label and categorize his behavior. The execution is sufficient, but this final amalgamated version explicitly defines his status. Hisha¯m responds to al-Awza¯ ¯ı’s labeling by ordering Ghayla¯n’s hands and feet be severed and he be decapitated and then gibbeted.107 Hisha¯m adds that he knows this to be Umar’s wish, thus establishing he is only fulfilling his (more pious) predecessor’s decree. Immediately after, Hisha¯m states he did not understand al-Awza¯ ¯ı’s questions.108 Al-Awza¯ ¯ı explains them, using the same examples as in the prior two. Hisha¯m asks about the fourth question he would have asked, which, as in the previous version, has four parts. Hisha¯m follows up with a question about what he would have asked if Ghayla¯n had chosen just one question. Al-Awza¯ ¯ı presents examples to show that all possible answers would have condemned him to death. Here, the subtext of obedience has been removed. There is no room for a correct answer, only one that confirms and legitimates condemnation based on unbelief. Ibn Asa¯kir ends this account by repeating for the fourth time a report on the authority of Ibn Awn that states he saw Ghayla¯n gibbeted at the Ba¯b Dimashq.109 Al-Awza¯ ¯ı’s elucidation of an already clear line of questioning indicates this is a late version of the trial. The additional details both assert a polemical position against Qadarism comprehensible to a wide audience and limit credit for exerting opposition to this heresy to the pious Umayyad Caliph, Umar. As al-Awza¯ ¯ı proves Ghayla¯n has backslid, negating the obligation of istita¯ba and forcing the implementation of

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full sanction, the full merit for the decision resides with Umar. Note that the accounts of the Mih.na have a similar effect but in a negative sense, because they affix blame squarely on al-Ma mu¯n as a way of limiting institutional Caliphal involvement in the Mih.na. One other problem Ibn Asa¯kir’s narrative progressions attempt to resolve is the role of the Caliphs. Van Ess rejects the historicity of al-Awza¯ ¯ı’s presence, arguing that the questions and answers are stylized to such an extent they are probably later accretions included to build up his stature.110 Judd counters that if they were designed to increase al-Awza¯ ¯ı’s stature, then Ibn Asa¯kir would have included them in his biographical account; however, he does not.111 Judd also observes that the content of al-Awza¯ ¯ı’s argument during Ghayla¯n’s trial is fairly sophisticated, which supports its authenticity. “Moralistic legends” tend to be simplistic because they target a mass audience as simple platitudes are more easily understood, remembered, and repeated, whereas complex theological arguments are not.112 However, what remains clear is that the Caliph leads the inquisition, which shows this was not an abnormal or unusual application of his social role as Commander of the Faithful. As much as the later versions Ibn Asa¯kir includes may attempt to manipulate that detail, it is an assumption in all of them. For example, in all of the accounts discussed in this book the initiative for reporting heresy resides with an individual who hears it but rather than addressing it individually he defers to the power and authority of the Caliph, in acknowledgment of the Caliph’s social role as Commander of the Faithful. Ibn Asa¯kir’s sources view Caliphal involvement in heresy trials as perfectly normal. In guiding the reader to the fourteenth narrative as the correct one, Ibn Asa¯kir solves what he views as a problem by having the Caliph defer to a religious/legal scholar, but he cannot be just any scholar. He must be plausible in terms of spatial and temporal reality, that is, someone in Damascus at the right time to whom a Caliph might believably have deferred. Hence, al-Awza¯ ¯ı enters the narrative, thus explaining why Ghayla¯n’s trial does not appear in al-Awza¯ ¯ı’s biography in Ibn Asa¯kir. It is not about al-Awza¯ ¯ı’s stature, authority, or even his personage. His addition diminishes the Caliph’s role, but the narrative manipulation can only go so far before becoming implausible. He is not making

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it up out of whole cloth, but he is changing the meaning of the elements. The Ghayla¯n narratives and the elevation of al-Awza¯ ¯ı denigrate the Caliph’s position while asserting that in deferring to al-Awza¯ ¯ı the Caliph is acknowledging he is a model worth following and the Caliph is fulfilling his proper social role of deference to religious/legal scholars. Ibn Asa¯kir paints a picture of al-Awza¯ ¯ı as a keen legal mind committed to Islamic orthodoxy and a figure worthy of emulation functionally similar to that which emerges of Ibn H.anbal from his trial. This description reflects much more accurately the social role of the Caliph vis-à-vis the ulama¯ of Ibn Asa¯kir’s time. Perhaps Ibn Asa¯kir was, as well, preserving the residual attempt to make al-Awza¯ ¯ı into a suitable eponym for a legal school of thought.113 [D] Alternate Accounts The narratives were clearly redacted and developed to meet specific polemical needs. One must recognize the discernible purposes behind textual inclusions and exclusions. As with the doxographies, the final product is an interpretation of events through the lens of a particular perspective. To elucidate this point further, we turn to two alternate accounts of Ghayla¯n’s trial: one from al-T.abarı¯ and a late one from Ibn al-Murtad.a¯ (d. 840/1437). Al-T.abarı¯ presents a Hisha¯m-focused report on the authority of al-Mada¯ inı¯.114 Although short, it shares many elements with the accounts in Ibn Asa¯kir. It states: Hisha¯m said to Ghayla¯n: “Woe unto you [wayh.ak] O Ghayla¯n: indeed a great many of the people have declaimed against you to me about your matter. And so let us pursue it from you. And if it is truth we will be attached to you and if it is that it is falsehood then I will abstain from it.”115 And he replied: “Yes.” And so Hisha¯m called Maymu¯n b. Mihra¯n to debate with him. And so Maymu¯n said to him: “Ask, as it will be stronger if you ask [first].” He said to him: “Has God willed that he be disobeyed?” And Maymu¯n replied to him: “Is it that He was disobeyed if He compelled it?” And he [Ghayla¯n] fell silent. And so Hisha¯m said to him: “Answer him!” And he did not answer him. And thus

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Hisha¯m said to him: “God will not forgive me if I were to forgive him.”116 He ordered that his hands and feet be severed. Judd notes Maymu¯n’s involvement could be a fabrication. He argues this report is an effort to distance Maymu¯n b. Mihra¯n from Ghayla¯n: what better way to accomplish this than to be shown as interrogating him for heresy?117 This is clearly the reason for including the narratives with Umar as the prosecutor. There is also the problem of the date. Al-T.abarı¯ includes this under the year 125/743. However, Maymu¯n died seven years prior. Thus, if the date is accurate, he could not possibly have been involved in the interrogation of Ghayla¯n.118 Judd mentions al-Mada¯ inı¯’s report is similar to the Medinan report, on the authority of Rabı¯ at al-Ra y.119 Van Ess states the Rabı¯ at version is “a local legend” yet concludes the al-Mada¯ inı¯, as it also appears in al-Bala¯dhurı¯ (and thus early), report is accurate but misplaced chronologically.120 Judd states van Ess dates of between 115/733 and 118/736 are far too early, because al-Awza¯ ¯ı was too young to have become a prominent enough scholar to be involved at that level. Van Ess argument is correct if the al-Awza¯ ¯ı material is discarded. Judd argues doing so creates further difficulties that are resolved if al-Mada¯ inı¯’s account is discarded. Even though Ghayla¯n’s death date remains uncertain, what emerges is Hisha¯m as the executioner late in his reign. However, that is not the end of the story. There is also a report in Ibn al-Murtad.a¯ (a Mu tazilı¯) of the type that focuses on both Umar and Hisha¯m, which attempts to rehabilitate Ghayla¯n and show he was subjected to an unjust prosecution.121 It also indirectly claims him as a Mu tazilı¯. In this version, Ghayla¯n sends a letter to Umar expounding his position on qadar, favorably using the term defined as “free will.” In it he also asks Umar what kind of imam he is: the rightly guiding or the misguiding. The letter is very critical of Umar but ultimately demands a job, to which Umar concedes. The scene shifts rather abruptly to Hisha¯m, who is upset about Ghayla¯n’s criticisms. Hisha¯m imprisons Ghayla¯n along with his companion S.a¯lih. and orders their hands and feet be severed. Hisha¯m asks one question (if God preordained his current position) and only after exacting punishment, establishing the

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unjustness of the act.122 Ghayla¯n responds, “May God curse him who does this to me!” The story then becomes even stranger. S.a¯lih. demands a drink but is refused. Ghayla¯n responds to this with an elliptical reference to the Mu tazilı¯ doctrine of the intermediate position (al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn). S.a¯lih. dies, and the handless, footless Ghayla¯n prays over him. He then makes a speech, after which, in a lapse of chronology, we are told Hisha¯m had severed his hands, feet, and then his tongue.123 How he makes his speech is unexplained. The report clearly presents Ghayla¯n as a believer who was unjustly killed rather than as a heretic. Hisha¯m executed Ghayla¯n because of his influence with the people and his “righteous disobedience,” and Ghayla¯n becomes a martyr. The narrative devices have been rearranged to alter the ultimate meaning of the narrative. Just as in the H.anbalı¯ versions of the trial of Ibn H.anbal, Ghayla¯n becomes the victim of unjust persecution. Rearrangement of details for so visible a polemical purpose prompts us to pay closer attention to Ibn Asa¯kir’s 14 versions. In spite of the shuffling of elements, there are some constants. All of the combined versions lead to the conclusion that Ghayla¯n was executed early in Hisha¯m’s reign. It is necessary for the execution to have taken place early in Hisha¯m’s reign for Umar’s prescription to be adduced plausibly as the reason for the punishment. The Yazı¯d anomaly exists to assert there was no time lag between Umar’s prescription and its enactment. To be sure, Ibn Asa¯kir did not just string together unrelated, unconnected reports. He uses Ghayla¯n to argue against Qadarism and concurrently exonerates Umar of his association with him. He is also asserting the “correct” Caliphal social role as deferential to the trained legal scholars. Exceptionally pious Caliphs proven to be of equivalent stature were possible but not normal. His sources’ presentation and data manipulation show otherwise. The reports are intended to be interpreted as a set, not individually, because the interpretive meaning of each report depends upon its particular placement within the set. If the order were reversed and the Umar narratives given last, then the reader would arrive at a completely different understanding of who was responsible for the execution of Ghayla¯n and of the Caliph’s power and authority.

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Each trial represents a different type of interaction between the Caliph and alleged heresy: al-H.a¯rith’s is fairly straightforward elimination of a claim to prophecy but with overtones of eliminating dualism; Ghayla¯n’s is more complicated, but at a basic level Hisha¯m limited the boundaries of orthodoxy by defining Qadarism as lying outside of it. In the next chapter, we turn to two more trials, those of Ibn H.anbal and Ah.mad b. Nas.r. Ibn H.anbal’s trial also represents a Caliphal attempt to limit the boundaries of orthodoxy by defining the correct position on the createdness of the Qur a¯n.124 In addition, the last trial, Ah.mad b. Nas.r s, combines elements seen in the other three, adding dissent and disobedience in the form of fomenting rebellion over the createdness issue.

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This chapter examines the two most famous trials of the Mih.na: those of Ibn H.anbal and Ah.mad b. Nas.r. Comparing the presentations of the trials shows the attempt to explain Ibn H.anbal’s release, to shift the blame for the trial itself and to enhance Ibn H.anbal’s pious credentials. The trends observed in Ibn H.anbal’s trial are mirrored in Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s: his role is diminished in an attempt to shift the meaning of the event to eliminate him as a potential rival to Ibn H.anbal’s status.

The Trial of Ah.mad b. H.anbal (218/833–220/835) Ibn H.anbal’s is by far the most famous of the Mih.na trials.1 Of the myriad narratives available, I compare four versions, two from unsympathetic sources (al-Ja¯h.iz. (d. 255/869) and al-Ya qu¯bı¯ (d. 284/898)) and three from sympathetic ones (S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H.anbal (d. 265/878), H.anbal b. Ish.a¯q (d. 273/886), and Abu¯ Nu aym (d. 430/1038)).2 Although a much later source, Abu¯ Nu aym was a contemporary of al-Baghda¯dı¯, functioned in the same doxographical milieu discussed in Chapter 3, and his version demonstrates the development of the narrative of Ibn H.anbal’s trial.

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To begin we should start with why al-T.abarı¯, the most famous source for early Islamic history, is not among those listed earlier. Answering that question reveals many assumptions about the Mih.na. Al-T.abarı¯ (d. 310/923) is often accused of neglecting to include Ibn H.anbal’s trial, causing scholars to speculate on the cause and motives for that gap. The assumption is that the beating of Ibn H.anbal, which al-T.abarı¯ does not include, is the sole equivalent to his Mih.na trial, which it is not. Importantly, the Mih.na began before his encounter with al-Mu tas.im in 220/835. The other sources, deeply influenced by the H.anbalı¯ narrative, equate Ibn H.anbal’s beating with his trial and the Mih.na as a whole—even as those same sources blame al-Ma mu¯n for the Mih.na. Al-T.abarı¯ includes his Mih.na trial, but not in the expected form. Al-T.abarı¯’s version simply appears incomplete without the spectacle of the beating. The Mih.na letters are read out to groups brought forward for questioning who are then asked, “is the Qur a¯n created?” Most respond affirmatively but after refusing to recant and turn to the Caliph’s position three times, Ibn H.anbal is sent, with fellow recalcitrant Muh.ammad b. Nu¯h, to al-Ma mu¯n in Tarsus. The penultimate Mih.na letter indicates that those sent to al-Ma mu¯n would be questioned further.3 The letter states, in addition, that those sent to Tarsus will be killed if they remain intractable. The last letter indicates that 19 individuals were remanded to the Caliph for questioning but does not name either Ah.mad or Muh.ammad as both had already been dispatched to the front.4 However, these 19 were sent back to Baghdad upon the death of al-Ma mu¯n. In the extant manuscripts al-T.abarı¯ never identifies Muh.ammad’s or Ah.mad’s fate. This omission clashes with the standard narrative, as one could conclude that they must have capitulated, as they were neither killed nor among the 19 returnees. We can discern from al-T.abarı¯ that according to the rules of istita¯ba, as they were given three chances to repent in the initial questioning, Muh.ammad and Ah.mad were being transported to receive punishment. Scholars often overlook this possibility because Ibn H.anbal is a relatively minor character in al-T.abarı¯’s account. Assuming that Ah.mad is the central figure in the Mih.na leads scholars to disregard reports where he is peripheral. The familial accounts of S.a¯lih., Ah.mad’s son, and H.anbal b. Ish.a¯q, his nephew,

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generally corroborate the information al-T.abarı¯ relays.5 But, their narratives continue beyond where he leaves off. Two questions remain: why does al-T.abarı¯ omit the beating narrative? Why did the H.anbalı¯ version, which makes the beating the focal point of the entire Mih.na, become the default one? Both questions offer intriguing possibilities, which we will address in the final chapter. First, we will collate and analyze the evidence needed to answer those queries. [A] Unsympathetic Narratives Al-Ja¯h.iz. provides the earliest existing account. It is included in a letter composed during the Mih.na.6 Focusing on an unconvinced audience, he argues for the createdness of the Qur a¯n.7 He introduces Ibn H.anbal approximately halfway through the letter, but only identifies him as “your master.” Al-Ja¯h.iz. includes the trial to “prove” that even Ibn H.anbal conceded to the createdness doctrine. In addition, it also shows that he was beaten not because of his stance on the doctrine of createdness but because of his continuous and unacceptable insolence to the Caliph. Moreover, al-Ja¯h.iz. emphasized that this beating was not severe.8 Ibn H.anbal acquiesced because he was intellectually outmaneuvered. Al-Ja¯h.iz. enters the trial midstream with Ibn H.anbal protesting the cause for his testing. Al-Mu tas.im responds that even if his brother had not imprisoned him, he would have tested him anyway and the test is intended to save him, not “scare” him.9 As shall be shown, he gives the polar opposite reason in the familial accounts and Abu¯ Nu aym. Al-Ja¯h.iz. broadly describes the beginning of the questioning with Ah.mad remaining recalcitrant. He notes that the Caliph has been nothing but kind to Ah.mad and has no intention of harming him.10 The chief judge, Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d, then posits a four-part syllogistic question to prove that the Qur a¯n was created.11 To each of the first three parts Ibn H.anbal answers “yes.” To the fourth, he replies, “I am not a mutakallim.” Al-Ja¯h.iz. derides this as covering for not having an answer. The early sympathetic accounts confirm that Ibn H.anbal responded in this manner, but give a radically different interpretation.12 According to al-Ja¯h.iz., al-Mu tas.im is offended by Ah.mad’s

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lies and insolent refusal to answer the questions and personally confronts “the liar [bı¯-l-kadhdha¯b].”13 At this point, the argument abruptly shifts to anthropomorphism. Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d interjects by asking if he “claim(s) that God, most high, was the Lord of the Qur a¯n.”14 Ibn H.anbal responds he has never heard the expression, so Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d rephrases and presses the point. The Caliph is incensed by “his lying about the questions” and “his rejection of the proof.”15 Although Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d proved his case, the issue of impudence remained.16 For that, al-Ja¯h.iz. briefly mentions, Ibn H.anbal received a beating. But immediately the questioning begins anew to emphasize Ah.mad did not recant as a result of abuse. Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d continues questioning, this time about the “speech” of God and its relation to the knowledge of God.17 Combining the arguments against uncreatedness and anthropomorphism, he draws Ibn H.anbal into a theological dispute. Ah.mad responds God’s speech is like God’s knowledge and therefore eternal. Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d quickly rebuts this with the concept of naskh, according to which later Qur a¯nic verses abrogate earlier ones. Ibn H.anbal accepts the principle of naskh, and Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d asks, “Is it not possible that God could have sent a different Qur a¯n?”18 Ah.mad replies negatively. Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d then requests a verse from the Qur a¯n as evidence, but Ah.mad cannot furnish one. For al-Ja¯h.iz., Ibn H.anbal engaged in the debate as a mutakallim, albeit as a poor one. Al-Ja¯h.iz. subtly argues, by engaging in the theological dispute, Ah.mad has accepted kala¯m as an appropriate method. The narratives from the opposing viewpoint assert the opposite.19 To make clear the Caliph’s position is correct, al-Ja¯h.iz. notes some have defended Ah.mad, saying, “The lie was permitted for him.” He refutes this by stating, on the authority of Ibn H.anbal (“your master”), that pious dissimulation (taqiyya) is only acceptable in the land of the polytheists (da¯r al-shirk).20 If what he said about the creation of the Qur a¯n during his trial was taqiyya, then because he was in the land of Islam, he must have been lying. He adds this is moot in any case because taqiyya could not be utilized as he was never really in danger.21 To seal his point, al-Ja¯h.iz. mentions Ibn H.anbal recanted his position not once but multiple times.

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Cooperson argues Ibn H.anbal never claimed he was subject to compulsion or taqiyya was permissible.22 However, as he points out, someone must have argued this; otherwise, why would al-Ja¯h.iz. respond? In his account, S.a¯lih. quotes his father, who says about others subjected to the Mih.na: If he was tested then it was not . . . compulsion, in my view, unless he is administered a beating or torture. And so as for the [merely] threatened [by words] then he was not, in my view, compelled by the threat because of the verse in which God says, “except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in faith.”23 In the final Mih.na letter in al-T.abarı¯, al-Ma mu¯n explains how this verse (16:106) does not apply. The same part is quoted: And Sulayman b. Ya qu¯b transmitted the report that Bishr b. al-Walı¯d interpreted metaphorically the verse which God most high sent down in relation to Amma¯r b. Ya¯sir, “Except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in faith,” indeed the metaphorical interpretation is wrong. On the contrary God, mighty and glorious is He, by this verse means he who held firmly to the faith while appearing to believe polytheism. However, he who held firmly to polytheism while appearing to believe the faith, well, this does not apply to him.24 These texts appear to relate to each other, as if in conversation. S.a¯lih. posits that if someone had recanted, then it could be justified as taqiyya. In contrast, al-Ja¯h.iz. and al-Ma mu¯n’s last Mih.na letter assert taqiyya cannot apply. We may never identify which text came first, but we can be certain an intertextual conversation occurred. As observed previously, al-Ja¯h.iz.’s account assures the reader Ibn H.anbal was treated with dignity and respect even though he was insolent and rude. In that presentation, al-Mu tas.im intends to make him an example. Al-Ma mu¯n’s ghost is not driving this; rather, al-Mu tas.im, acting as Commander of the Faithful, actively engages in the debate with rhetoric that makes clear that obedience to God’s rulings,

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specifically as interpreted by His representative, is what is at stake. Al-Ja¯h.iz. underlines that Ibn H.anbal never cited Qur a¯n or h.adı¯th to substantiate his position, even when asked to do so.25 This is the only supporting evidence Ah.mad would accept, and when pressed he cannot produce any. Of course, the converse is equally true:26 the Caliph had no evidence for his position from these sources either, but that is largely irrelevant to al-Ja¯h.iz.. His broader objective is to show Ah.mad participated in the dispute, engaged in kala¯m, and capitulated based on the strength of the Caliph’s argument. The beating is explained as a result of his continued insolence to the Caliph. The next account, from al-Ya qu¯bı¯ (d. 284/898), is, as always, succinct. He mentions a Mih.na letter, but the interrogation of Ibn H.anbal is not connected to it. The existence of only one letter, as opposed to the five included by al-T.abarı¯, corresponds to the familial account of S.a¯lih..27 Al-Ya qu¯bı¯ begins by stating that “he [al-Ma mu¯n] tested the notables about divine justice and divine unicity.”28 The test focused primarily on the legal scholars and not the muh.addithu¯n. He declares as unbelievers those who answered incorrectly; most did not.29 Because Ibn H.anbal’s trial was brief, the entire account follows: Al-Mu tas.im tested Ah.mad b. H.anbal about the creation of the Qur a¯n and Ah.mad replied, “I am a man who knows but I do not know it as this [created].” The legal scholars were brought to him, and Abd al-Rah.ma¯n b. Ish.a¯q and others argued with him, and he refrained from saying that the Qur a¯n was created. And so he was beaten several lashes. Then Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m said “Empower me O Commander of the Faithful to argue with him.” He [al-Mu tas.im] replied, “Do as you like by him.”30 Ish.a¯q asked, “This knowledge which you know, did an angel bring it down to you or do you know it from men?” He [Ah.mad] replied, “I know it from men.” And so he [Ish.a¯q] said, “Little by little or all together?” He [Ah.mad] replied, “I learned it little by little.” He [Ish.a¯q] said, “Does there remain anything which you do not know?” And he [Ah.mad] replied, “There remain for me [things I do not know].” He [Ish.a¯q] said, “Then this is a thing which you do not know, and indeed the Commander of the Faithful

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instructs you in it.”31 He [Ah.mad] replied, “And so I support the statement of the Commander of the Faithful.” He [Ish.a¯q] said, “Regarding the creation of the Qur a¯n?” He replied, “Regarding the creation of the Qur a¯n.” And so he was made to testify publicly regarding it. And a robe of honor was bestowed on him, and he [al-Mu tas.im] released him to his house.32 Once again the beating is ancillary to the recantation; he is beaten but, more important, outmaneuvered intellectually. The questions asked, like those in al-Ja¯h.iz., assert the legitimacy of kala¯m, and in the end, Ibn H.anbal accepts and submits not only to Caliphal authority but also to the applicability and acceptability of the rationalists’ methods of theological inquiry. Cooperson is skeptical of Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m’s involvement in these proceedings because he provides a theological argument but occupies a generally nontheologically oriented role as Baghdad’s chief of police.33 In most of the accounts Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m is a pivotal central figure, and thus it is difficult to completely dismiss Ish.a¯q’s role and al-Ya qu¯bı¯’s portrayal of him.34 Ish.a¯q is also involved, although not as centrally, in the later trials of al-Afshı¯n and Ah.mad b. Nas.r, both of which corroborate his role here.35 Cooperson assesses accurately that the argument is simplistic. Taking the next step, the lack of complexity indicates, as in Ghayla¯n’s trial, the dispute has been repackaged for the comprehension of a wider audience. No matter how one ranks the intellectual depth of contribution, Ish.a¯q’s role is too consistent to be dismissed. One curious note is that al-Ya qu¯bı¯ excludes Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d; in fact, most of the earliest sources sideline him. This is particularly strange in the portrayal in the familial accounts, where he meets with deep opprobrium but is not the lead prosecutor in the trial. When he appears, he tempers the vehemence of another party wishing to harm Ibn H.anbal. Al-Ja¯h.iz. and al-Ya qu¯bı¯ demonstrate that although anthropomorphism played a significant role in the questioning, the pro-Mih.na party’s focus was on the acceptability of kala¯m, the importance of divine unicity, and the need for obedience to the Caliph. Van Ess argues, and proves quite satisfactorily, that Ibn H.anbal had in fact recanted his position and acquiesced, as al-Ja¯h.iz. and al-Ya qu¯bı¯ report.36

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These sources can be viewed with some skepticism, because they are hostile witnesses, but this skepticism is not countered overwhelmingly by the “truth” of the pro-H.anbalı¯ accounts.37 [B] Sympathetic Accounts Turning to the familial accounts, S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H.anbal’s (d. 265/878) and H.anbal b. Ish.a¯q’s (d. 273/886) are by far the longest of the ones to be discussed.38 The many congruencies between their versions and the oppositional sources make a strong case for the authenticity of their accounts, but both are clearly biased in their presentations. With a noteworthy lack of respect, in H.anbal b. Ish.a¯q’s account al-Mu tas.im is referred to as Abu¯ Ish.a¯q and not Caliph or Commander of the Faithful. With even less respect, he refers to al-Ma mu¯n as the “enemy of God.” In doing so the author explicitly rejects their possession of that important social role. Al-Ja¯h.iz. and al-Ya qu¯bı¯ are no less biased. Regardless, the main characters and basic details show remarkable consistency across the spectrum of early narrators; they differ in the interpretation of that data.39 S.a¯lih. begins his account when Ibn H.anbal is brought in after being summoned. Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m commences the testing by reading aloud a letter from al-Ma mu¯n.40 As in al-Ya qu¯bı¯, only one letter exists. When he reads, “There is nothing like Him, and He is Creator of all things,” Ibn H.anbal responds by finishing the verse from the Qur a¯n: “and He is all-hearing and all-seeing” (42:11). Inherently acknowledging the ulama¯ were not all in agreement with Ah.mad, some of those being tested with him insist he be asked what that means; he replies that God is as He says He is.41 Ish.a¯q ignores this and continues with the testing while threatening them with prison. He does not threaten them with immediate bodily harm, although this appears in al-T.abarı¯’s version.42 S.a¯lih. notes that all but four capitulate, with this number quickly reduced to two, Ibn H.anbal and Muh.ammad b. Nu¯h..43 So far this account has mirrored al-T.abarı¯, but this changes. Ibn H.anbal and Muh.ammad are imprisoned while Ish.a¯q awaits further instructions from the Caliph. When instructions come, they are sent to the Caliph in Tarsus. Along the way, they stop in the middle

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of the night,44 and at this point S.a¯lih., establishing his father’s renown and fame, relates that a person recognizes him. The next day, they arrive at Adhana, again in the middle of the night. One has the sense that Ibn H.anbal, like the unnamed Bas.ran sent against al-H.a¯rith, is being portrayed as the torch of religious fidelity illuminating the darkness of the night. On the third day, they receive word of the Caliph’s death,45 and they are placed on a ship to return to Baghdad.46 En route Muh.ammad dies, leaving Ibn H.anbal to languish alone in prison for 28 months without trial.47 This narrative shows three sets of three days: the three days of travel, clearly impossible given the distances covered; three days of preliminary inquiry at Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m’s house; and, as we will see, three days in front of the Caliph. The repetition of sets of three reminds us these texts were consciously created. The second part of S.a¯lih.’s narrative begins as Ah.mad is relocated to the house of Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m, for reasons unstated.48 H.anbal b. Ish.a¯q’s version tells us Ibn H.anbal’s uncle wanted to resolve the episode and insisted on Ah.mad’s release, triggering the trial.49 For the next three days, two men (Ah.mad b. Raba¯h. and Shu ayb b. al-H.aja¯m) dispute with him. At the end of each day they add another set of chains, such that he is burdened with four by the third day.50 Al-Mu tas.im summons Ah.mad from Ish.a¯q’s house on the fourth night. Before sending him, Ish.a¯q informs Ah.mad the Caliph promised not to kill him with a sword, although he will beat him severely.51 Concurrently, he implores Ah.mad to consider his soul and cites Qur a¯n 43:3 (“Verily we made it an Arabic Qur a¯n”). He then asks if anything exists that is made but not created. Ah.mad replies with Qur a¯n 105:5 and 43:3 as examples of the verb “made” being used to indicate a transformation from one form into another, not a creation. Defeated, Ish.a¯q falls silent.52 Bugha¯ the Elder then takes Ah.mad by boat to the Caliph.53 Along the way, Bugha¯ asks—oddly enough, in Persian—a third man what “they” want from Ah.mad.54 He replies “they” wanted Ibn H.anbal to acknowledge the createdness of the Qur a¯n; Bugha¯ responds the shaha¯da should be sufficient.55 Back on land, they stop at a house in the middle of the night.56 Ibn H.anbal settles into his prayers in the dark but is interrupted by the summons of Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d. When Ibn

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H.anbal arrives, nothing is said until Ibn H.anbal takes the initiative.57 He cites a h.adı¯th concerning the prescriptions of faith, the five pillars, although strangely he omits the pilgrimage.58 Because he keeps to these, he implicitly questions the legitimacy of the interrogation. Here we can see the reverse of the rubric underlying the polemic of naming as deployed in the doxographies and an underlining of the limits to their ability to “expel” those they deem transgressors.59 This is stated most plainly when Ah.mad asserts one cannot be imprisoned on the basis of interpretations, which can only yield probable guidance to the straight path and thus cannot have the same force as divine pronouncements, which yield certainty. H.anbal b. Ish.a¯q quotes Ah.mad’s uncle as making a similar argument while advocating for Ah.mad’s release from imprisonment. Why a H.anbalı¯ source asserts a Murji ite position so visibly is an interesting question but will not detain us. Ultimately, the normative orthodox position concerning the status of a grave sinner relative to society will be similar to that just described. The proceedings continue with H.anbal b. Ish.a¯q noting, contrary to al-Ja¯h.iz., al-Mu tas.im proclaimed he must try Ah.mad, but had al-Ma mu¯n not arrested him it would not have been necessary.60 This distances al-Mu tas.im and the Caliphate as an institution from blame for the Mih.na, placing it solely with al-Ma mu¯n. Immediately after, Ibn H.anbal addresses Abd al-Rah.ma¯n, initiating the discussion.61 Abd al-Rah.ma¯n interjects, “What do you say about the Qur a¯n?” to which Ah.mad retorts, “What do you say about the knowledge of God?”62 The parley continues, unfortunately without being recounted in detail, until Ibn H.anbal declares, “O Commander of the Faithful, give me anything [as evidence] from the Book of God and the Sunna of the Messenger [for your position] then I will agree to it.”63 Placing the initiative with Ibn H.anbal contradicts al-Ja¯h.iz.’s account. However, the method is the same: only in al-Ja¯h.iz. the modification is negative, and here it is positive. Because the sources are silent, either side of this issue could be argued. As a result, one’s opponent could be proven wrong by demanding he produce evidence. The discourse thus devolves into an exegetical match—Ibn H.anbal’s territory—and avoids the “treacherous” venue of kala¯m. Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d asks Ibn H.anbal if he only relies on that type of evidence, which the intended audience considers to be

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the only acceptable kind. After Ibn H.anbal responds affirmatively, Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d labels him a “deviator, one who causes deviation and an innovator.”64 The Caliph asks those around him, “What do you say?,”65 and they respond in agreement. Al-Mu tas.im’s continual reference to those around him and his reliance on prosecutors reinforce his image, much like Hisha¯m in the later Ghayla¯n narratives, as ignorant of the situation and not responsible for the Mih.na.66 Regardless, the debate continues with an unnamed prosecutor quoting Qur a¯n 21:2, which Ibn H.anbal refutes by quoting 38:1. In a vein reminiscent of Hisha¯m in the trial of Ghayla¯n, Ibn Sama¯ a, a mutakallim, complains he does not understand Ibn H.anbal’s argument, which is explained to him.67 Unfortunately, the explanation is not recorded. Unlike S.a¯lih.’s account, in H.anbal b. Ish.a¯q it is al-Mu tas.im who requests clarification but still fails to comprehend even after further explanation.68 The argument continues with an exchange of Qur a¯n verses and h.adı¯th.69 The reliability and authority of h.adı¯th is underlined, which strengthens Ibn H.anbal’s position relative to his interlocutors. He is, after all, one of the great collectors of h.adı¯th. The scene changes when al-Mu tas.im sends away everyone but two: Abd al-Rah.ma¯n and Ibn H.anbal. Continuing the disputation in private, the Caliph asks Ibn H.anbal a question and rejects his answer. Ah.mad responds again, after which the Caliph draws back a bit. Abd al-Rah.ma¯n tries to soften the exchange by commenting that “I have known him [Ah.mad] more than twenty years he has shown obedience to you and the pilgrimage and the jihad with you and he was abiding in his house [i.e., he did not revolt].”70 Al-Mu tas.im seems moved and states in an aside to Abd al-Rah.ma¯n as if Ah.mad were not there that it would be a great boon to have such a learned scholar on their side but if only he would make some concession. The Caliph then says to Ibn H.anbal, “Woe unto you [wayh.ak] O Ah.mad, what are you saying?”71 This is precisely how the fourteenth trial narrative of Ghayla¯n in front of Umar begins. Ah.mad replies for a second time with the phrase “give me anything from the Book of God and the Sunna of His Messenger.” As the impasse sets in, the Caliph gets up and leaves, sending him into the care of two men—Ghassa¯n, a follower of Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d, and

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an unnamed follower of al-Sha¯fi ¯ı. This pairing is confusing. If one considers the rhetoric of heresy, then by using the pairing S.a¯lih. ties the Sha¯fi ites to the “reprehensible” figure of Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d. The Sha¯fi ¯ı and H.anbalı¯ schools of legal thought were competitors in their formative phases, a topic for Chapter 6. Because the trial occurs during Ramadan, food is brought for them to break the fast at the appropriate time. Ah.mad refuses to do so, but his companions do not, with further implications they argued with him all night.72 In the morning, Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d arrives with a message from the Caliph asking, “What do you say?” Ibn H.anbal replies the same as before, using, for the third time, the phrase “give me anything . . .” It is odd that Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d then labels him a Shı¯ ite and warns him that even though the Caliph has promised not to kill him with a sword, he will beat him harshly. This is the second time Ibn H.anbal is warned of violent consequences. Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d again asks him what he says. This account explicitly ties the beating to forcing Ibn H.anbal’s acquiescence, whereas al-Ja¯h.iz. and al-Ya qu¯bı¯ separate the two events. Here, the threat is incorporated into the trials and tribulations of a saint: extreme endurance, no sleep, no food, and no water. Ibn H.anbal remains obstinate, again asking for proof from the Qur a¯n and Sunna. An unnamed individual poses a new question about apostasy. Ibn H.anbal responds as before: the phrase is not quoted.73 The questioning continues into the second day, and Ah.mad is again brought back in front of the Caliph.74 Ah.mad notes that whenever “they,” the prosecutors, argued using kala¯m without recourse to the Qur a¯n or Sunna, he would reply, “I do not know what this is.” Of course, this exasperates the prosecution and matches al-Ja¯h.iz.’s presentation.75 Here, the account portrays Ah.mad’s action as a pious, steadfast response, whereas in al-Ja¯h.iz. it is obstructionist. His recalcitrance is a rejection not just of the questions, but also of the acceptability of the theological process (kala¯m).76 In spite of this behavior, faintly echoing al-Ja¯h.iz., the Caliph avers he has nothing but compassion for Ah.mad. Each time the Caliph shows signs of weakness toward Ibn H.anbal, some sort of intervention occurs, showing that the Caliph is not responsible for what transpired. Here, a prosecutor interjects, and

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states that forged h.adı¯ths exist. Ah.mad concedes he will rely only on the Qur a¯n for his argument and quotes 4:11, an inheritance verse. The prosecution falls silent. Ibn H.anbal is winning when Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d finally breaks in and the Caliph sends all but three of them away for the second time in two days. Al-Mu tas.im, Abd al-Rah.ma¯n, and Ibn H.anbal continue their disputation in private.77 It is interesting that Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d is sent away, even though he is usually portrayed as the arch-nemesis, a role he fulfills in the rest of the narrative. The Caliph and Abd al-Rah.ma¯n eventually leave and the two men who had kept him up all night return. Again they argue through the night, and again Ibn H.anbal refuses to break the fast as though he were maintaining a vigil in defense of the faith.78 In addition, Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d reprises his threat. Because three days without water approaches the maximum of human endurance, he was likely on the verge of death by dehydration. A crisis point had arrived, and his steadfastness was being sorely tested. The third day of the trial begins. Sensing the pivotal moment is nigh, Ah.mad tightly binds his pants79 and relates he has one or two hairs of the Prophet bundled in one of his sleeves. As he enters the Caliph’s presence, he notices swords and whips, which had not been present days one and two. The magnitude of his defiance in remaining steadfast is reinforced. As in the previous two encounters, al-Mutas.im sends away everyone but Ah.mad and Abd al-Rah.ma¯n. As earlier, the Caliph asks for counsel. He says, “Woe unto you,” and although he feels compassion for Ah.mad, he has no choice. Ah.mad asks for the fourth time for proof from the Qur a¯n and the Sunna, underscoring his unchanging steadfastness. Al-Mu tas.im becomes exasperated, calls everyone back in, and declares, “The curse of God be upon you!”80 They then seize Ah.mad and remove his shirt. Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m notices the bundle up his sleeve and asks what it is. Upon hearing the explanation, he preserves the relic.81 The Caliph calls for the whips, and they tie Ah.mad to the whipping posts. An official advises him to hold on to the handles, but Ah.mad does not comprehend the admonishment and neglects to hold on. S.a¯lih. notes his father’s wrists hurt for the rest of his life because of this lack of understanding. This information counters the statements that the beating was not severe or did

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no permanent damage and is further evidence al-Ja¯h.iz.’s and S.a¯lih.’s accounts were created in conversation. Meanwhile, al-Mu tas.im takes his seat, and Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d stands next to him to watch the ordeal. When the whips arrive, al-Mu tas.im examines them and exchanges them for others; S.a¯lih. does not provide the reason, although al-Ja¯h.iz. states it was to ensure the blows were not too severe. The Caliph orders that the two enforcers take turns giving two blows each until ordered to stop. In a surprising parallel, the phrase “May God cut your hands off!” (if the beating were not to continue/intensify) occurs here as well as in the account of Abu¯ Muslim’s murder.82 This continues for some time until the Caliph rises and says, “Woe unto you, O Ah.mad, you are killing yourself.”83 The Caliph repeats the phrase “woe unto you” and again adds that so long as he refuses to answer he has no choice but to proceed. Revealing some of the character of the audience observing the proceedings, a very important bystander, Ujayf b. Anbasa,84 pokes Ah.mad with the handle of his sword while asking him to recant.85 Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m interjects, “Woe unto you, the Caliph has risen [from his seat] regarding your head [i.e., to take it].”86 Then an unnamed individual says, “O Commander of the Faithful, let his blood be on my neck.”87 Al-Mu tas.im retakes his seat and orders the beating to continue two by two, urging them to hit harder. After another interval, the Caliph rises and states he must continue as long as Ah.mad remains obdurate. Abd al-Rah.ma¯n lists some of Ah.mad’s companions who had already capitulated.88 The Caliph repeats, “Woe unto you, it is incumbent upon me,” and Ah.mad replies as before, calling for evidence from the Qur a¯n and the Sunna. Again, the Caliph frames the punishment as out of his hands. It is also interesting that S.a¯lih. has preserved what must have been, on one level, a primary motivation for the beating: Ah.mad’s refusal to be publicly obedient tied the Caliph’s hands. He returns to his seat, and the whipping intensifies.89 Ah.mad notes he passed out and woke in a room, his chains removed.90 S.a¯lih. then describes a postbeating encounter, which implies Ah.mad did not capitulate but does not furnish a reason as to why Ah.mad was released.91 A witness comes to Ah.mad and states, “O Abu¯ Abdalla¯h [Ibn H.anbal], you were fasting and you were in the condition of

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taqiyya.”92 This is an odd comment, and Abu¯ Nu aym “corrects” it. Given that he describes his memory of the event as ending with “my mind left/passed out,” one can speculate that at one time someone asserted taqiyya was used to counter those who stated he capitulated. The speaker continues, marveling at Ah.mad’s hunger and thirst, reiterating that Ah.mad’s fast is an additional sign of his fortitude and piety.93 He rejected the fruits of ill-gotten gains, thus not for fear of poison but because of the impurity conveyed. Abu¯ Nu aym underlines this feature even more. In his account of events, Abu¯ Nu aym (d. 430/1038) includes S.a¯lih.’s, although he does change a few words94 and supplements it with Ah.mad b. al-Faraj’s account, which he admits is not as accurate as S.a¯lih.’s.95 This version will become integral to many later iterations. It bears the marks of heavy-handed authorial intervention, improving the story to make for a better, more dramatic and satisfying conclusion. Cooperson shows that Abu¯ Nu aym includes Ah.mad b. al-Faraj’s account to explain the cause for Ibn H.anbal’s release if he did not capitulate.96 Abu¯ Nu aym consistently removes legitimacy for Caliphal action by quoting only the Caliph’s supporters as referring to him as the Commander of the Faithful, a more subtle strategy than H.anbal b. Ish.a¯q’s refusal to use proper titles.97 The narrative first establishes our interlocutor is not a H.anbalı¯. Rather, he appears to be a neutral or potentially hostile observer, which enhances the veracity of his testimony to a non-H.anbalı¯ audience. Notice the similarity to the first version of the Ghayla¯n trial narrative, which depicts its narrator as a pious man.98 Our guide to the events, Ah.mad b. al-Faraj, was a loyal bureaucrat in the Abba¯sid administration with sufficient connections to secure a seat near the Caliph for the interrogation.99 The narrator visits the palace because “the people” had closed their shops and taken up arms. When asked why, they replied, “Ah.mad b. H.anbal has been arrested in order to be tested about the Qur a¯n.”100 In this case “the people” fill the narrative role Bugha¯ had in the familial account. In the palace, he is seated next to Ibn al-Zayya¯t, vizier for both al-Mu tas.im and al-Wa¯thiq; his proximity to the Caliph establishes he could clearly see the events. Concurrently, in relating the popular discontent over Ah.mad’s imprisonment and the

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Caliph’s position about the Qur a¯n, the narrative asserts the popular support for Ibn H.anbal and his positions. Abu¯ Nu aym streamlines the trial, compressing the three days of S.a¯lih.’s narrative into one. It begins with the Caliph stating, “Where is this [person] who claims that God, mighty and glorious is He, speaks through two productive members [i.e., teeth and tongue]? Fetch him to me.” It is odd, from a H.anbalı¯ perspective, because this statement establishes at the outset the trial was about anthropomorphization, a charge that will later be made against the H.ana¯bila. Ah.mad does not mount his defense on those grounds (a more developed response in Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s trial will be discussed). When brought to the Caliph, Ibn H.anbal is wearing a rough-hewn shirt and the blue .taylasa¯n of a scholar, both symbolic representations of his position: pious-minded ascetic and respected scholar.101 In addition to Ah.mad’s established role as a h.adı¯th transmitter, this clothing marks him as a legal expert, a later assertion, as seen in Chapter 6.102 To further underline his piety, we are explicitly told Ibn H.anbal put his trust in God. The Caliph begins by asking if he is Ah.mad b. H.anbal, to which he replies he is Ah.mad b. Muh.ammad b. H.anbal.103 The Caliph queries his position that the Qur a¯n “was the word of God, uncreated” and what he bases this upon.104 Ah.mad responds that he relies on the Qur a¯n and the Sunna of the Prophet. When the Caliph asks, “What did the Prophet say?,” Ah.mad recites a h.adı¯th that revolves around God speaking to Moses.105 Although the h.adı¯th appears not to address the question asked, this is not noted; instead, the Caliph accuses Ah.mad of lying. Ah.mad refutes this charge by quoting Qur a¯n 32:13, a verse that supports the existence of the word of God, to argue the word of God is not created. In this version, Ah.mad does not avoid the question by saying he is not a mutakallim; rather, he has a ready answer from both h.adı¯th and the Qur a¯n. He states his position and argues it is the orthodox one (and always has been). Nonetheless, he does not go so far as to declare the Caliph’s position heretical. Al-Mu tas.im then turns to Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d and Ibn al-Zayya¯t and asks for their opinions.106 “They replied: O Commander of the Faithful, kill him, his blood will be on our necks.”107 As this statement suggests, the prosecutors end up being blamed for the

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ordeal, and the Caliph is mostly, but not completely, absolved of his involvement as a result. Confirming his reputation as a man of action and not a scholar, the Caliph slaps Ah.mad’s face so hard he knocks him down. This causes a commotion among the “commanders of Khurasan” because “his father was from among the sons of the commanders of Khurasan.”108 Their reaction stirs fear in the Caliph and thus is the first of three explanations for Ah.mad’s release. The Caliph splashes water on his face to revive him. When Ah.mad comes to, he immediately asks about the water’s status, that is, whether they lawfully acquired it from its owner and whether it was ritually pure. Ah.mad’s question obviates any doubts that his refusals of food and drink were for concerns other than piety. Predictably, the insulted Caliph becomes angry, calls the enforcers, and asks how many blows would kill Ah.mad. They reply five, ten, fifteen, or twenty would be lethal. They then tie Ah.mad between two poles, and one enforcer begins his work. After ten blows, the blood begins to flow down his back, and he becomes physically weak. Because we are told he received ten blows, the narrative underscores his supreme endurance.109 The Caliph’s question coupled with the number of blows also signals the Caliph intended to kill him and would have done so but for the three reasons being given by the narrative for his release. The threat, in order for him to be a martyr (who lives), must be manifest. Appearing for the first time, Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m points out Ah.mad’s bodily weakness, which implicitly emphasizes his spiritual strength. As noted previously, Ish.a¯q is the pivotal character in all of these accounts, performing some act that leads to the encounter’s resolution. Although descriptions of Ibn H.anbal’s actions vary, Ish.a¯q’s spatial and temporal placement remains constant. The Caliph reiterates that the blows will continue until Ah.mad capitulates. Ish.a¯q, wishing to spare Ah.mad, responds with a subterfuge. He lies to Ah.mad, telling him the Commander of the Faithful’s position is that “there is no God but God.” Ah.mad repeats the phrase in agreement, a repetition paralleling al-Ya qu¯bı¯’s account.110 In al-Ya qu¯bı¯, by repeating the phrase Ish.a¯q has used, he ends up “supporting the position of the Caliph.”111 This is the second explanation for Ah.mad’s release. Ish.a¯q reports Ah.mad’s agreement to the Caliph, ambiguously

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stating Ah.mad and the Caliph are in agreement while neglecting to say in what regard. We are also told an unnamed figure hears a commotion at the door and goes to investigate. He returns to inform the Caliph an angry mob is waiting to kill him and advises the Caliph to release Ibn H.anbal to appease the crowd—the third explanation of Ah.mad’s release. Ah.mad’s clothes are returned to him, and he is released. To reinforce the point, the narrator rushes over to Ah.mad as he is leaving and overhears the people asking him what to believe. Ah.mad replies: “Write O as.h.a¯b al-akhba¯r and witness O assemblage of the masses, the Qur a¯n is the word of God, uncreated.”112 Ibn H.anbal’s stance remains unchanged. As a further endorsement of Ah.mad’s position, the narrator includes a miracle tale that “proves” divine approval.113 During the beating, in answer to Ibn H.anbal’s prayers, God extends His golden hand and pulls up Ah.mad’s pants after the string holding them has broken. The narrative no longer includes the talisman of the hairs of the Prophet because nothing should be perceived as bringing God’s help except the righteousness of Ah.mad’s position.114 This account is rife with narrative manipulation intended to show the position Ah.mad asserts: is popular and accepted by the populace, was ijma¯ (consensus bearing force of law), sanctioned by God as the ever-present truth, the Caliph was forced to release Ah.mad because of his righteousness, and al-Mu tas.im had been misled, and therefore the Caliphate was not at fault for the proceedings. [C] Ibn H.anbal Trial Conclusions The similarity in the basic structure of S.a¯lih.’s account to the fourteenth trial narrative for Ghayla¯n in Ibn Asa¯kir is striking. Both have two Caliphs interrogating a single figure, with the prosecutor taking the lead in the second half.115 Although Ghayla¯n had been given the chance to repent and did so, he relapsed, which absolves Umar of guilt for associating with a heretic. In later understandings Hisha¯m lacked the religious credentials to prosecute heretics, so the Umar narratives give Hisha¯m’s act legitimacy.116 As with Hisha¯m, al-Mu tas.im is presented as only fulfilling the prescriptions of the preceding Caliph. Al-Mu tas.im founded Samarra in 221/836. Because Samarra

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is not mentioned, the trial must have occurred in Baghdad and therefore early in al-Mu tas.im’s reign. It is interesting, in the Ghayla¯n trial narratives, the Caliph’s insistence on evidence from the Qur a¯n mirrors Ibn H.anbal’s insistence that his persecutors produce evidence from the Qur a¯n and the Sunna (or the Qur a¯n alone). Both trials are divided into two parts, and the major figures each have a counterpart in the other: Umar II = al-Ma mu¯n; Hisha¯m = al-Mu tas.im; Amr b. Muha¯jir = Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m; and al-Awza¯ ¯ı = Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d. S.a¯lih. would not have wanted to compare the two trials and leave al-Ma mu¯n in the parallel to Umar II, so the trial structure is either a topos from someone else applied in two cases with opposing results, or some underlying procedural continuity exists.117 The similarity between the trials of Ghayla¯n and Ibn H.anbal shows that the argument to free al-Mu tas.im and al-Wa¯thiq of responsibility or involvement are later accretions to absolve them of guilt.

The Trial of Ah.mad b. Nas.r al-Khuza¯ ¯ı (231/846) The second of the two Mih.na trials being discussed occurred a decade later, under the Caliph al-Wa¯thiq (r. 227/842–232/847).118 As with the trial of Ibn H.anbal, I discuss the context for it in the next chapter. Al-Wa¯thiq was al-Mu tas.im’s son and thus al-Ma mu¯n’s nephew. The most complete version of the trial, found in al-T.abarı¯, is based on eyewitness testimony, possibly from Ya qu¯b b. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Dawraqı¯, one of al-T.abarı¯’s teachers and a companion of Ah.mad b. Nas.r.119 Al-T.abarı¯ highlights that Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s father and grandfather were loyal followers of the Abba¯sid dynasty from its earliest days.120 His account begins with people rallying around Ah.mad in Baghdad in the year 231/846. He vehemently opposed the doctrine of the created Qur a¯n and publicly denounced it. His denunciation was eventually reported to the authorities, but this did not prevent Abu¯ Ha¯ru¯n al-Sarra¯j, T.a¯lib, and a Khurasa¯nı¯ associate of Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m from pledging adherence to him.121 It is odd this is not presented as the position of Ibn H.anbal or even of the muh.addithu¯n. He was surrounded by the h.adı¯th scholars Yah.ya¯ b. Ma ¯ın, Ya qu¯b b. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Dawraqı¯, and Abu¯ Khaythama, all of whom were somehow associated with Ibn

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H.anbal, yet Ibn H.anbal remains conspicuously absent.122 Although those h.adı¯th scholars all capitulated in the initial round of the Mih.na under al-Ma mu¯n (an implicit connection to the early days of the Mih.na) they urge him to agitate against the created Qur a¯n.123 At this point, al-T.abarı¯ states Ah.mad b. Nas.r was one of the leaders of the vigilante movement opposing the chaos in Baghdad following the death of al-Amı¯n (201/817–204/819) while al-Ma mu¯n was ruling from Marw.124 However, al-T.abarı¯ does not mention Ah.mad b. Nas.r in any discussion of those years. One must be suspicious this notation as vigilante was a later addition intended to develop his character and rationalize his revolt.125 Abu¯ al- Arab, a younger contemporary of al-T.abarı¯, draws no such connection.126 Immediately after noting his involvement as a vigilante leader, al-T.abarı¯ adds that Ah.mad b. Nas.r responded favorably to those encouraging him to revolt. The narrative compresses three decades into a short description, making it appear as if this revolt were a continuation of the vigilante campaign of commanding good and forbidding wrong. Without this connection, he appears to arrive on the scene fully formed, like Minerva. Its inclusion assures the reader he is not a common rebel; he possesses the credentials to call for a legitimate revolt. As alluded to previously, given his description and the accounts of his trial, it is unclear if he followed Ibn H.anbal. The earliest H.anbalı¯ sources do not claim his action. Although Ah.mad b. Nas.r was assuredly allied to the muh.addithu¯n movement, he was not necessarily a H.anbalı¯ even if the later biographical dictionaries make that claim.127 Of most importance, the famous Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯, while including him in a dictionary of the H.ana¯bila, does not connect him to Ibn H.anbal.128 According to H.anbal b. Ish.a¯q, Ibn H.anbal rejected his overt action and counseled obedience to the Caliph even while admonishing him in their hearts.129 The discrepancy occurs because Ah.mad b. Nas.r had to be shown as a follower in Ibn H.anbal’s footsteps (and interpretation of Sunna) in order to explain his martyrdom as not eclipsing Ibn H.anbal’s beating as a marker of steadfastness and defense of the religion. If Ah.mad b. Nas.r was merely following Ibn H.anbal’s precedent, then his merit as a martyr was derived from being a follower of Ibn H.anbal. The need to co-opt the merit of his death explains why so

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much energy is expended on claiming him as a H.anbalı¯ even though the connection was tenuous at best. In response to Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s campaign, Abu¯ Ha¯ru¯n al-Sarra¯j and T.a¯lib distribute dinars to each person who comes to them, to gather people around the cause. (Notice the third party has been dropped, just as he has been dropped from the other versions.) Having reached critical mass, Ah.mad b. Nas.r plans an uprising in Baghdad, but all does not proceed according to plan. Just prior to the appointed night, two of his followers, sons of Ashras the military commander, get drunk and prematurely put out the signal of drumming, thus alerting the guard something is afoot. Because Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m is not in Baghdad, his brother Muh.ammad acts quickly in his stead.130 In the ensuing days, Muh.ammad arrests the plotters, who were denounced. During the round-up, he discovers evidence against most of them. Nothing incriminating is found to implicate Ah.mad b. Nas.r, but Muh.ammad arrests him on the hearsay evidence of one of his servants. Muh.ammad sends him to Samarra to face al-Wa¯thiq along with five other conspirators. At this point, the narrator focuses on Ah.mad b. Nas.r, and the others disappear.131 Patton asserts Ah.mad b. Nas.r was prosecuted for failure to assent to the createdness doctrine and for denial of the beatific vision (the corporeal visibility of God on Judgment Day) and not for “sedition” because of the lack of evidence against him.132 He overlooks that Ah.mad b. Nas.r was prosecuted for sedition.133 His failure to obey the command of the Caliph and his act of rebellion are equated; both are equally seditious. Muh.ammad brings Ah.mad b. Nas.r directly to al-Wa¯thiq without intermediaries, an oddly high-level involvement for a minor threat of civil disturbance. Why involve the Caliph directly in dealing with such inept miscreants? Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m or his delegate easily could have dealt with them in Baghdad. Why go through the process of a trial? Perhaps al-Wa¯thiq wanted to send a message about the createdness doctrine and the beatific vision to the coterie of recalcitrant h.adı¯th scholars encouraging Ah.mad, or perhaps he wanted to shore up an alliance with the powerful men responsible for running the Mih.na. Both assessments have much to recommend them.

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Al-Mu tas.im and al-Wa¯thiq share a high proportion of personnel between their respective regimes. As one might expect for a highprofile case, the main protagonists from the trials of Ibn H.anbal and al-Afshı¯n (d. 226/841) are involved here.134 Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d and Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m have consistent roles in the three trials. Abd al-Rah.ma¯n, prominent in Ibn H.anbal’s trial, also makes an appearance. It is odd that Ibn al-Zayya¯t is absent, even though he was a prominent figure in al-Wa¯thiq’s court.135 Almost every figure involved in this trial partook in prosecuting Ibn H.anbal, with the exception of Sı¯ma¯ al-Dimashqı¯. Al-Wa¯thiq begins the trial by asking Ah.mad b. Nas.r, “What do you say about the Qur a¯n?”136 He responds curtly, “The word of God.” Then al-T.abarı¯ adds that before the trial, “defying death, he smeared himself with a depilatory and perfumed himself.”137 Al-T.abarı¯’s addendum is striking because it appears completely out of context. Nonetheless, the passage alludes to accusations against al-Afshı¯n, the convicted apostate noted for having never “smeared himself” with depilatories.138 This tidbit presents a physical and symbolic contrast between the ritual purity of these two individuals and their respective adherences to culturally normative behavior. That, however, stands at variance with the rest of the narrative and, as such, is likely a later editorial interpolation. Continuing, al-Wa¯thiq phrases the question more directly: “Is it created?” Ah.mad repeats his earlier answer. Satisfied he is disobedient about the issue of createdness, al-Wa¯thiq asks about the beatific vision, drawing a more verbose response. Ah.mad b. Nas.r cites two anthropomorphizing h.adı¯ths, which do not directly address the beatific vision, but do portray God as having fingers139 (another version cites a verse from the Qur a¯n).140 According to the friendly accounts, Ibn H.anbal, in his trial, responds, “He is as He has described Himself” or “I am not a mutakallim”—that is, he evades the questions. Here, Ah.mad b. Nas.r offers an argument against them, as if he accepts the legitimacy of asking about the beatific vision but not about createdness. As noted previously, no evidence exists for or against the createdness doctrine in the Qur a¯n. However, in regard to God’s physical characteristics, the Qur a¯n holds an abundance of problematic references. Thus, from

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a muh.addithu¯n perspective, those references provided much safer ground for discussion. Ibn H.anbal would have agreed. As in the other trial narratives, a third party places himself on the stage. Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m asks a question, and the response so irks him he warns the defendant to watch his tongue.141 Similar to the Ibn H.anbal accounts, the defendant’s insolence draws the ire of the prosecutors. Ah.mad b. Nas.r retorts he only said what Ish.a¯q ordered him to say, leaving Ish.a¯q disconcerted by the response’s implication. This creates literary tension until Ah.mad b. Nas.r clarifies that Ish.a¯q ordered him to give the Caliph good counsel. Seemingly tired of the discussion, al-Wa¯thiq asks advice from those around him, as does al-Mu tas.im in S.a¯lih.’s account of Ibn H.anbal’s trial. Abd al-Rah.ma¯n, a friend of Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s and somewhat sympathetically involved in S.a¯lih.’s narrative of Ibn H.anbal’s trial, avers that his blood is licit.142 The crime for which it was licit is ambiguous, but one can assume his continued open defiance of the Caliph makes it permissible to execute him. At this point, an associate of Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d exclaims, “Make me drink his blood, O Commander of the Faithful.”143 It is strange that al-Wa¯thiq defers primary decision making to the other prosecutors by stating “the killing will be as you wish.”144 Al-Wa¯thiq’s request for help and his deference to his court completely contrasts with his behavior prior to and following this scene. The clear disjuncture portrays the Caliph as following the directives of those around him. Al-Mas u¯dı¯ and Ibn Kathı¯r make this point more firmly. They state he was relying on his father’s and uncle’s comments about the Mih.na, thereby questioning al-Wa¯thiq’s personal independence—but to what end?145 (This question is discussed in Chapter 6.) Al-Wa¯thiq’s expression of doubt and resignation absolves him of some guilt associated with the Mih.na. As with al-Mu tas.im beating Ibn H.anbal or Hisha¯m executing Ghayla¯n, al-Wa¯thiq is merely following the advice of the scholars around him. Had “good” scholars been present, the outcome would have been different. Echoing al-H.a¯rith’s trial, Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d interjects Ah.mad b. Nas.r was not given the requisite chance to repent and redeem himself (istita¯ba) and perhaps was mentally ill.146 Despite Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d’s protestations, he was given the required chances to repent, because his

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sin was disobedience to the Caliph and not his position on either question. He was asked three times— twice about the nature of the Qur a¯n and once about the beatific vision—and all three times he remained disobedient to the Caliph. At each stage in this scene, the Caliph is in complete control. Al-Wa¯thiq then rises from his seat and calls for the sword al-S.ams.a¯ma,147 which is described in detail. He then calls for the leather execution mat, on which Ah.mad is placed and bound like a sacrificial sheep.148 What follows is even more intriguing. Al-Wa¯thiq swings twice, hitting Ah.mad twice but missing his neck. As in the other trials, an important bystander appears with a weapon, but instead of a spear or the hilt of a sword, Sı¯ma¯ al-Dimashqı¯149 strikes the blow that kills Ah.mad, decapitating him on the third try.150 Bugha¯ al-S.aghı¯r strikes another blow, and the Caliph stabs Ah.mad in the stomach.151 Thus, Ah.mad receives five blows, three from the Caliph. Note that in four of his trial narratives Ghayla¯n is subjected to five blows during his execution.152 In Ibn Kathı¯r’s version, al-Wa¯thiq hits him on the shoulder and the head and then stabs him in the stomach, and Sı¯ma¯ al-Dimashqı¯ decapitates him.153 As before, the third blow kills Ah.mad. In addition, five blows are given but by two people instead of three; for the fifth blow, Sı¯ma¯ al-Dimashqı¯ jabs the head on his sword and holds it aloft.154 The number of blows struck and his need for help finishing the job are manifest indications al-Wa¯thiq was no warrior. According to al-T.abarı¯, after the execution, Ah.mad’s body was gibbeted next to Ba¯bak’s and publicized prominently.155 It is interesting that Ah.mad’s hands and feet were kept with his body but that his head was sent to Baghdad to be displayed. A note attached to his ear provides a glimpse into the use of bodies as physical symbols of the power and authority of the Caliph. The text of the al-T.abarı¯ version follows: This is the head of the unbeliever, the polytheist, the deviator namely Ah.mad b. Nas.r b. Ma¯lik from among those God killed by the hand of the servant of God Ha¯ru¯n, the Imam al-Wa¯thiq bi-llah, Commander of the Faithful after the proof was presented to him of the createdness of the Qur a¯n and the rejection of

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anthropomorphism. He offered him repentance and made possible for him the return to the truth. He refused out of obstinacy and public opposition. Thanks be to God who hastened him to his fire and his grievous punishment. And the Commander of the Faithful asked him about this and he acknowledged anthropomorphism and expressed unbelief. As a result of this, the Commander of the Faithful declared his blood permissible and cursed him.156 Al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯ also reports a version of this note: In the name of God the most Beneficent and Merciful. This is the head of Ah.mad b. Nas.r b. Ma¯lik. The servant of God, the Imam Ha¯ru¯n, that is al-Wa¯thiq bi-llah, Commander of the Faithful, called him to the statement of the createdness of the Qur a¯n and the rejection of anthropomorphism. He refused out of obstinacy and then God hastened him to his fire. Muh.ammad b. Abd al-Malik [Ibn al-Zayya¯t] wrote [this].157 Notice that al-Khat.¯ıb’s version starts with the Basmalah, but al-T.abarı¯’s does not. Also, in the first version, the title “Commander of the Faithful” appears three times whereas in the second the title appears only once. Also notice that in the second Ah.mad b. Nas.r is no longer labeled as an unbelieving polytheistic deviator. In addition, the last line of al-Khat.¯ıb’s version removes the Caliph from responsibility for the note, which also distances him from the act. This directly counters the vision of the first, where the Caliph, acting as Commander of the Faithful, is actively fulfilling his legitimate social role. Both versions agree Ah.mad was killed for his contrariness. The first asserts his refusal to repent and obey was open opposition and thus rebellion, whereas the second focuses on his obstinacy. In both, he disobeys the Caliph, but only the first describes him as a deviator and apostate. In the first, not only was his blood licit, but also killing him was necessary for the good of Islam. The Caliph, legitimately within his social role, fulfilled all legal requirements, and the execution was just. The second, when considered in conjunction with the

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tenor of al-Khat.¯ıb’s account, argues his execution was unjust and his intransigence was actually steadfastness. Nevertheless, al-Khat.¯ıb’s version places responsibility for the note on Ibn al-Zayya¯t, distancing the Caliph from the act. In either case, what is at stake is determining who is in charge of defining orthodoxy; furthermore, this expression of power through inquisition is a legitimate Caliphal effort, whether one approved or not. The account in the Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d of al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯ (d. 463/1071) is thought provoking in its other similarities to and differences from al-T.abarı¯’s account, particularly given that he cites Ya qu¯b b. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Dawraqı¯ as the source for nontrial information about Ah.mad b. Nas.r (remember that Ya qu¯b was al-T.abarı¯’s teacher and main source for these events).158 Al-Khat.¯ıb begins by categorizing Ah.mad b. Nas.r as a muh.addith, noting his father and grandfather were early supporters of the Abba¯sids.159 He also presents Ah.mad as one of the two leaders of the vigilante movement in Baghdad, the other being Sahl b. Sala¯ma.160 Kha¯lid al-Daryu¯sh is not mentioned. Ah.mad b. Nas.r zealously calls for commanding good and forbidding wrong when al-Ma mu¯n first arrived in Baghdad, to end the period of anarchy. We are told that unlike Sahl, he did not automatically kowtow. Neither he nor al-T.abarı¯ notes Ah.mad was rather young to command the necessary respect to be such a major player 27 years prior. As with al-T.abarı¯, al-Khat.¯ıb compresses time by proceeding directly to the conspiracy for which Ah.mad was arrested. Without explanation for the reasons motivating the conspiracy, the reader infers it was a continuation of his vigilante activities, however chronologically unlikely that may be. Ah.mad b. Nas.r and his companions decide on revolt. In this version, the plot does not go awry because of a drunken mistake but is foiled when they are denounced. Unlike al-T.abarı¯’s version, Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m, not his brother, arrests the conspirators.161 He then conveys four prisoners to Samarra, half the number in al-T.abarı¯. As in al-T.abarı¯, the others are dropped from the narrative. The narrator begins the trial with al-Wa¯thiq asking Ah.mad, “What do you say about the Qur a¯n?” He replies curtly, as in the other narrative, “The word of God.”162 Al-Wa¯thiq then asks, “Is it created?” to which

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he clearly restates the position attributed to Ibn H.anbal that “it is the word of God.” The questions and answers regarding the createdness issue match al-T.abarı¯ verbatim, but the accounts diverge on the beatific-vision question with similar meaning conveyed but in different words.163 Al-Khat.¯ıb does not quote the h.adı¯th to counter the prosecution, and thus the responses to the createdness and to the beatific vision questions are of similar length, giving them the same emphasis. Al-Wa¯thiq responds to Ah.mad’s answers with “woe unto you” and declares it to be unbelief.164 Then, as in al-T.abarı¯, al-Wa¯thiq asks those around him for their counsel, even though he just declared Ah.mad b. Nas.r guilty of unbelief. At least in al-T.abarı¯, al-Wa¯thiq reserves judgment until after consultation. The colloquy in al-T.abarı¯’s account distances him from the decision to execute. Here, the “woe unto you” negates the separation: no longer is he a puppet obeying the decisions of his advisors: he determines guilt, but his advisors are responsible for sentencing. He remains one step removed from full culpability but holds more responsibility than in other accounts. The consensus of the advisors is that Ah.mad’s blood was licit, although the person who wants to drink his blood is missing.165 Abd al-Rah.ma¯n b. Ish.a¯q remains, and the description of him is similar, with the exception of the notation about him being a companion of Ah.mad b. Nas.r, severing the tie of this “pious” figure to one of the prosecutors of Ibn H.anbal. Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d interjects at this point, once again as in al-T.abarı¯, asserting that perhaps Ah.mad was diseased.166 However, erasing the procedural fault in earlier versions, he does not complain about the lack of an offer to repent. The reason is unclear, but both accounts portray Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d as attempting an insanity defense for Ah.mad. The interjections occur in similar circumstances both chronologically and contextually. The narrative continues with the statement that Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d was “loathe to kill him.”167 Al-Wa¯thiq retorts he was a sane unbeliever, implying he consciously rebelled against the Caliph and the community and was thus an apostate.168 As in al-T.abarı¯’s version, al-Wa¯thiq calls for the sword. Al-Wa¯thiq announces, “I will count my steps to this ka¯fir who worships a lord whom we do not worship nor do we know Him by the attributes by which he describes Him,”169 a statement

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comparable to those in the doxographies, that is, “his lord is not our lord.”170 He orders the defendant tied and placed on the leather execution mat. Al-Wa¯thiq then cuts off his head in one blow. In all respects al-Wa¯thiq is a much stronger character. Although the trial ends, al-Khat.¯ıb’s account of Ah.mad b. Nas.r continues. With the whereabouts of his body unknown, we are told al-Wa¯thiq displayed the head in Baghdad. Al-Khat.¯ıb relates the severed head said the shaha¯da171 and quotes Ibn H.anbal praising him and asking God to bless him.172 Of importance, al-Khat.¯ıb states only four individuals endured the Mih.na with their values intact, and all were from Marw: Ibn H.anbal, Ah.mad b. Nas.r, Muh.ammad b. Nu¯h. al-Mad.ru¯b, and Nu aym b. H.amma¯d,173 a ranking presumably in order of piety, as it is certainly not by order of death. Al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯ states al-Wa¯thiq killed Ah.mad b. Nas.r, Nu aym b. H.amma¯d died in prison under his rule, Muh.ammad b. Nu¯h. died in the “fitna of al-Ma mu¯n,” and Ibn H.anbal was beaten by al-Mu tas.im. Only Ibn H.anbal escaped with his life. Of the three deaths, two are attributed to al-Wa¯thiq, and the third is only indirectly credited to al-Ma mu¯n. At this point the author includes the text of the note hung from Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s ear, and immediately after, al-Khat.¯ıb reiterates “Muh.ammad b. Nu¯h. died in the fitna of al-Ma mu¯n, al-Mu tas.im beat Ah.mad b. H.anbal, [and] al-Wa¯thiq killed Ah.mad b. Nas.r and Nu aym b. H.amma¯d.”174 This redundancy reinforces the injustice of the Caliph’s actions, lest someone read the note on Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s ear and mistake his steadfast orthodoxy for mere mulishness. To reinforce this point, he recounts al-Mutawakkil’s epiphany that his predecessors’ actions were unjustifiable.175 Finally the severed head of Ah.mad b. Nas.r recites the Sura Ya-Sin (36).176 Let us now turn to one last rendition of the trial to provide added depth and contrast. Al-Ya qu¯bı¯’s account of these events is predictably concise.177 He relays information about al-Wa¯thiq being engaged in the Mih.na and that many ulama¯ were imprisoned as a result.178 The order of the account in relation to its textual context is intriguing. In al-T.abarı¯, the trial comes first and then a prisoner exchange with the Byzantines, which requires the ransomed prisoners to profess

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the createdness of the Qur a¯n and the negation of the beatific vision. Al-Ya qu¯bı¯ describes the prisoner exchange first, and the beatific vision is not mentioned. Ah.mad b. Nas.r revolts solely over the doctrine of createdness, not as part of the vigilantes or a movement to command the good. At one point, he discusses with Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d some of his commands he found unsatisfactory. Ah.mad leaves in disgust and begins to preach that Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d, not the Caliph, is guilty of unbelief179 and as a result begins to gather followers in Baghdad. No drunkards spoil the revolt. The drums are beaten and the people come, but they are all arrested due to insufficient popular support. The drunkenness trope is there not to criticize the followers, although this is possible, but rather to give a reason a righteous cause failed so miserably. Here in al-Ya qu¯bı¯, the plan simply fails and is unrighteous. Al-Wa¯thiq sends a messenger to Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m requesting the conspirators be sent to him instead of the other way around, thus prompting one to question how he knew to send for them. Upon his arrival, the Caliph crudely addresses Ah.mad b. Nas.r and tests him on the Qur a¯n.180 He refuses to profess the Qur a¯n’s createdness, but unfortunately al-Ya qu¯bı¯ does not quote him. Al-Wa¯thiq heaps scorn on him before decapitating him and gibbeting him in Samarra. He sends the head to Baghdad for display on the East Bank. Notice that the beatific-vision question is missing and the Caliph exercises his authority as Caliph without any advice or aid. Both Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s failure to obey the Caliph and pronounce the Qur a¯n as created resulted directly in his execution.

Conclusion The four examined trials all share features. Given the variety of sources, the similarities may indicate a common topos, but the trials more likely utilize a common methodology and rhetorical toolkit for dealing with “heretics.” Although modifications occur over time, the outline remains similar. It is difficult to assess whether these commonalities are a function of inclusion in a literary medium or an indication of physical reality. They are nonetheless striking. As evidence, consider the important similarities of al-H.a¯rith’s trial, the fourteenth trial

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narrative of Ghayla¯n, S.a¯lih.’s presentation of the trial of Ibn H.anbal, and Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s trial:181 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Directly report to the Caliph (all four) In the middle of the night (al-H. a¯rith, S.a¯lih., Ah.mad b. Nas.r) Summoned by the Caliph (all four) Trial in front of the Caliph (all four) Direct questioning by the Caliph (all four) Questioning by another figure (all four) Two Caliphs (Ghayla¯n 14, S.a¯lih.) Suspect demands a debate (Ghayla¯n 14, S.a¯lih.) Recant/repentance (Ghayla¯n 14 and Ibn H.anbal (in al-Ja¯h.iz., al-Ya qu¯bı¯)) 10. Interjection by a third party (all four) 11. “What do you say about . . .?”/”What is this which . . .?” (Ghayla¯n 14, S.a¯lih.) 12. Someone does not understand a question (Ghayla¯n 14, S.a¯lih.) 13. “Woe unto you” (Ghayla¯n 14, S.a¯lih., Ah.mad b. Nas.r) 14. Suspect released (Ghayla¯n 14, S.a¯lih.) 15. Suspect maintains silence (Ghayla¯n 14, S.a¯lih.) 16. Crucifixion/gibbeting (al-H. a¯rith, Ghayla¯n 14, Ah.mad b. Nas.r)

How does recognizing these parallels further our understanding of the Mih.na? Primarily, we learn that the trial of Ibn H.anbal fits within a pattern. At the climax of each trial, the Caliph determines guilt and/ or sentencing. None of the sources question this part of his social role. He defines the realm of orthodoxy and establishes the boundaries by prosecuting heretics/dissenters. The case of Ibn H.anbal is no different: it fits the narrative patterns and rhetoric of the other trials, showing his trial was part of a larger practice of pursuing and prosecuting heresy. The Mih.na was not anomalous; rather it resides comfortably within the parameters of how Commanders of the Faithful operated within society and how this activity is portrayed. In general, the sources are ambivalent in their portrayal of al-Ma mu¯n. On the one hand, they attempt to “rehabilitate” him in regard to the war between the brothers. On the other hand, they seek

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to blame him for the Mih.na and to praise Ibn H.anbal’s resistance to it. Recognizing the normality of heresy trials brings out the following question; how does the character of Ibn H.anbal’s trial change from a heresy trial to a clash of an orthodox muh.addith against a heretical imposition? The sides were reencoded: as Ibn H.anbal became representative of orthodoxy, the Caliph became heretical. However, because the Caliphate cannot be heretical, the charge was removed from the Caliph by affixing blame to Caliphal advisors or to al-Ma mu¯n alone. As a result of the transformation, Ibn H.anbal’s obdurate heresy became steadfast orthodoxy worthy of being followed. His stature as a model for righteous, legally correct behavior was enhanced. The note hung on Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s ear shows one way this transformation was achieved. As Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate, orthodoxy and its boundaries are in the eye of the beholder. Under the Caliph’s definition, the Caliph tries and convicts Ibn H.anbal for heresy, labeling him a heretic. In the H.anbalı¯ interpretation, the Caliph’s position is heretical, and Ibn H.anbal’s position is orthodoxy. The Mih.na’s emergence under the Abba¯sids and the continued arguments of the doxographies prove orthodoxy still had not solidified. The labeling and removal of heresy and heretics remained a communal and continuing endeavor, constantly being redefined, with no one entity or group completely in charge. However, because the Caliph controlled the levers of coercive force, he was positioned to occupy the apex of the communal discourse. Others might draw boundaries, but he possessed the power to enforce them. As the boundaries were redefined and it became accepted that the createdness doctrine was incorrect, the boundaries shifted, but the Caliph could not be excluded or be named as beyond the boundaries of orthodoxy because the Caliphate embodied the unity of the community. The narrative and the argument embedded in it were shaped so as to elevate the stature of Ibn H.anbal, denigrate al-Ma mu¯n, and absolve the Caliphate more generally. The Mih.na was no different from other Caliphal efforts to define the boundaries of orthodoxy. The needs of the H.ana¯bila to strengthen the credentials of their imam and to justify their place and legitimacy have shaped the presentation of both the Mih.na and Ibn H.anbal’s prominence during it. The lessening of the importance of the Caliph relative to his advisors was to preserve

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the legitimacy of the Abba¯sid Caliph but only as a figurehead. The trial of Ah.mad b. Nas.r presented a problem because he was martyred whereas Ibn H.anbal survived, with some question as to why he was released. The contrast between the two was intolerable in terms of the preservation of Ibn H.anbal’s role as a worthy eponym for a school of legal thought. The narrative subordinates him and renders him a follower of Ibn H.anbal. Having considered the trial narratives and their construction, now we put them into context.

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The Mih.na is most often described as a watershed event in Islamic history, as the first and only time a Caliph behaved as though he possessed the power to define religion but whose assault on traditional social roles was repulsed by the stalwart figure of Ibn H.anbal. Scholars keep asking what motivated al-Mamu¯n to initiate the Mih.na. In preparing to answer that question, the preceding chapters explored heresy, orthodoxy, heresy trials, and precedent for the Caliph’s actions in defining religion. Chapter 2 examines the nature of the Caliph’s social role and his exercise and acquisition of political and charismatic religious authority. Through this lens we are able to discern the motivations for Caliphal interventions in normative shaping and definitions of orthodoxy. By describing the social roles of doxographers in their attempt at controlling normativity and the rhetorical strategies they employed, I placed Caliphal behavior in deeper context. The Caliphs, as Commander of the Faithful, were part of a normative environment, and their pursuit of heretics using common idioms was an assertion of their social role as the leader of the believers. To further clarify the model, we applied it to an examination of Ash arite use of the polemics of naming in comparison with al-Ma mu¯n’s Mih.na letters. Doing so reveals common points of rhetorical strategy and motives for their deployment. This tells us more about al-Ma mu¯n’s

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motivations for initiating the Mih.na and his successors in continuing it while illuminating the Ash arite school of theology’s later struggle to assert itself as orthodox. Ash arite doxographers competed with other participants in the struggle over normative orthodoxy. The debate was acephalous, with no sole arbiter emerging. The process of establishing a school of thought as orthodox explains many features of the H.anbalı¯ madhhab’s development and their struggle with the burgeoning school of al-T.abarı¯, which we discuss in this chapter. Caliphs were not the only ones involved in defining orthodoxy but they occasionally saw fit to enforce their definitions coercively. Abd al-Malik (d. 86/705), the Caliph responsible for the trial of al-H.a¯rith, had just defeated Ibn al-Zubayr (ca. 73/692), reclaiming the empire for the Umayyads while building the Dome of the Rock. The inscriptions on the Dome of the Rock explicitly exclude Christians, thus firming the boundaries of the community of believers.1 His other bureaucratic reforms (standardization of coinage and use of Arabic) narrowed the definition of elite status. Abd al-Malik tried al-H.a¯rith for claiming prophecy in the context of redefining what it meant to be a Muslim. Abd al-Malik forcefully showed Muh.ammad was the seal of prophecy. Hisha¯m b. Abd al-Malik (r. 105/724–125/743) needed to establish his legitimacy and credentials as Commander of the Faithful in order to keep the empire unified and his father’s accomplishments in place. His immediate predecessors, all of whom had extremely short reigns, faced the same problem. Sulayman had sent armies against Constantinople. Umar II and Yazı¯d II had emphasized their piety. Each of these Caliphs faced resentment and opposition from those who asserted they had no claim to their social role. To retain power, they had to prove they were the legitimate Commanders of the Faithful. In that vein, Hisha¯m prosecuted Ghayla¯n for being a proponent of free will and executed him as a heretic. In both of these trials the Caliph actively engaged in setting the boundaries of orthodoxy. By examining and comparing the different versions of each trial we can see how different groups shaped the narrative to establish a view of events that raised their own stature, such as that by later proponents of Ibn H.anbal’s madhhab.

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In Chapter 5, we moved into the Abba¯sid period and studied the two most famous trials of the Mih.na. Through the more granular perspective we can see attempts to explain away the obvious problem of why Ibn H.anbal was released if he did not capitulate to the Caliph’s command of doctrinal obedience. We also can see more clearly the attempt to remove blame from al-Mu tas.im and thus the entire Abba¯sid line of Caliphs for having tried for heresy the eponym of an orthodox madhhab. The second trial examined, that of Ah.mad b. Nas.r al-Khuza¯ ¯ı by al-Wa¯thiq, confirmed trends observed in Ibn H.anbal’s. It was problematic for the H.anbalı¯s that Ah.mad b. Nas.r was prominently executed, or “martyred,” as a result of a Mih.na trial. This conferred a status that, unless neutralized or harnessed, had the potential for establishing a rival to Ibn H.anbal. Comparing the various narratives of each trial allowed us to see the meaning of the event shifted to enhance the status of the defendant and to show Ibn H.anbal as a pious defender of orthodoxy and Ah.mad b. Nas.r as his loyal follower. Using each of the elements covered so far, I have demonstrated an inquisition to enforce doctrinal conformity was among the actions a Caliph could and should undertake as part of his social role, whether by firmly asserting Muh.ammad is the last Prophet (al-H.a¯rith), establishing a position on God’s power vs. free will (Ghayla¯n), or reiterating tawh.ı¯ d/divine unicity (Ibn H . anbal, Ah.mad b. Nas.r). Engaging in the Mih.na was his prerogative and although an important initiative, it was not extraordinary. The importance of the Mih.na, and specifically Ah.mad b. H.anbal’s beating, has been assumed. Upon closer examination, this is not nearly as self-evident as it appears; exploring it illuminates the place of the ulama¯ and their authority over the law. To understand the Mih.na more clearly, I discuss the question of createdness vs. uncreatedness of the Qur a¯n, the context of the Mih.na, and the conflict between the madhhabs of Ibn H.anbal and of al-T.abarı¯ at their genesis. Each of these components adds another piece to the puzzle of explaining the significance of the Mih.na and of Ibn H.anbal’s role in it. Understanding these factors contextualizes the Mih.na and highlights the importance of the fractures in leadership that come with al-Mutawakkil’s death. As noted in Chapter 1, the Mih.na is traditionally

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viewed as the turning point in Caliphal power/authority at which the Caliph failed to force an ideology on the ulama¯ , who resisted en masse. However, the Mih.na did not change the relationship between the ulama¯ , the religion, and the law. This was not the final battle for religious and legal authority between the Caliph and the ulama¯ . The breaking point, when it came, had little to do with that struggle and a great deal more to do with the factional stratagems of the Samarran elite gone awry. The break that shifted authority from the Caliphate to the ulama¯ occurred with the assassination of al-Mutawakkil and the resulting degeneration of the center’s power. The ulama¯ steadily accrued social capital as legal interpreters, but the Caliphs always interjected themselves into defining the range of normativity, that is, until the death of al-Mutawakkil, when the elite center lost its ability to project authority, thus leaving the ulama¯ as the deeply subdivided arbiter of religious matters. In the Samarran milieu, when pressing factional strife consumed everyone and the center cannibalized itself, the Caliph permanently lost his seat at the table of debate. Neither he nor those around him were in a position to exert their previous moral authority. As a consequence, the provinces and the ulama¯ were left to improvise. Makdisi posits the Mih.na triggered the formation of the “personal” schools of law.2 I place the trigger in the chaos of Samarra. The transition from trends of legal thought, or Schacht’s “ancient schools,”3 to the “personal” schools of legal thought tied to an eminent founding figure possessing authority via a tie to early and correct practice resulted from the center’s inability to enforce its authority (power was a different matter). However, because they could not claim Caliphal authority, the logic of one overarching umma prevented local potentates from asserting authority over the definitions of orthodoxy independently. Because generations had passed by the time the Caliph and the capital reestablished stability, the madha¯hib were firmly entrenched. Al-Ma¯wardı¯ (d. 450/1058) famously argues the Caliphate still possessed the necessary legitimacy and authority to engage in those activities, but his manifesto is noticeably detached from the reality of his time.4 The moment for a strong centralizing arbiter of orthodoxy had passed. Caliphs continued to attempt to enter that fray, but their

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social roles had shifted dramatically, as had those of almost everyone around them.

The Question of the Mih.na The Mih.na is usually discussed as an entirely religious phenomenon, reinforcing the false dichotomy that religion was divorced from politics. In the Islamic empires, all religious acts and positions were inherently political, and any political act was couched in and perceived through religious terms. As such, the Mih.na addressed questions of religious authority, of legal interpretation, and of political control. We must identify al-Ma mu¯n’s motives, and the inherent implications, for choosing this particular theological problem. As stated during the discussion of Ibn H.anbal’s trial, the orthodox position on the createdness/ uncreatedness of the Qur a¯n had yet to be determined, and the evidence was inconclusive for both positions.5 As such, the Caliph and concerned members of the ulama¯ could define the boundary of orthodoxy and eliminate a perceived threat to the community’s continuance on the straight path. In doing so he publicly reinforced his social role as the decider of such matters. It also had the advantage of, as Vanessa De Gifis puts it, “severing this legitimizing bond between the Qur a¯n and the muh.addithu¯n.”6 Although Caliphal power concerns may have underlain some impetus for action, one should not cynically dismiss genuine concern for the eternal status of the community. At its root, the question of createdness hinges on one’s perception of divine unicity and divine justice (al- adl).7 An uncreated Qur a¯n would be an eternal partner with God and therefore violate divine unicity. One will remember that this was the same fundamental issue about which al-Mahdı¯ tested the zana¯diqa. Also, an uncreated Qur a¯n would mean God had unjustly condemned or rewarded those people mentioned in the Qur a¯n, because they had been foreordained to transgress or obey. This was, of course, also at the core of the predestination debate under which Ghayla¯n was tried. Because the createdness issue was phrased as a “yes” or “no” question, it was, as the sources imply, a simple test of a person’s understanding of divine unicity and predestination: a litmus test, if you will, to counter dualism and predestinarianism.8

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The issue of createdness had practical implications beyond the overarching tawh.¯ıd or adl arguments. If the Qur a¯n were created, then one could construe its verses as situational to limit or expand the legal effect9—exactly the argument Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d deploys against Ibn H.anbal in his trial when he asks if God could have sent a different Qur a¯n.10 Situationality was not a radical concept. Tafsı¯r, as a genre, explains Qur a¯nic verses by considering and contextualizing the events surrounding the revelation of a verse. Tafsı¯r was generally accepted.11 When al-Ma mu¯n chose this question, he did not want to alter the actual text of the Qur a¯n. He wanted to create more interpretive space by considering the environmental issues that prompted a revelation and assert the Caliph had authority to interpret and compel adherence to those interpretations. However, he was not trying to make earthshattering changes. The main concern was determining what constitutes legitimate topics for discussion.12 It was equally important to determine who defined those topics. Ibn H.anbal’s obstinacy telegraphs his position on the parameters for topics of debate. For the Caliphs, erecting the boundary and compelling a response helped shore up their legitimacy as Commander of the Faithful.13 Asking the question fulfilled his social role and forced the deposed to comply or violate their own roles. We also must take seriously al-Ma mu¯n’s religious convictions, that he firmly believed in his role as Commander of the Faithful and the correctness of his position. That, however, cannot explain why the Mih.na was continued. For that, we must turn to the context in which the Mih.na was implemented.

The Context of the Mih.na Throughout their reigns, each Caliph established his status and authority by fulfilling his political/religious role in society (social role) as Commander of the Faithful. As an erstwhile opponent to the Commander of the Faithful (his brother, al-Amı¯n), al-Ma mu¯n needed to firmly place his rebellion within the community of believers.14 As such, he repeatedly asserted he was the true Caliph/Commander of the Faithful and reportedly collected the ifta¯ (jurisprudential opinions) of

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his ancestor (and companion to the Prophet) Ibn Abba¯s, to strengthen his own credentials as the guardian of Muh.ammad’s tradition.15 The tenuousness of al-Ma mu¯n’s position forced him to exercise his prerogative as Caliph and receive public acknowledgment of this capacity—in order to consolidate his control of the center and thus over the empire. Similar to the situation in which Abd al-Malik found himself after defeating Ibn al-Zubayr, the war between the brothers (al-Amı¯n vs. al-Ma mu¯n) established conditions demanding vigorous assertion of the Caliphal social role, of which the Mih.na was one.16 This assessment does not resolve why al-Ma mu¯n’s successors continued it. Each of these Caliphs, including al-Mutawakkil, claimed an available identity in order to strengthen his position. Each Caliph defined heresy and prosecuted dissent in an effort to exercise, express, maintain, and extend theological and political control by defining the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of the community. The Mih.na represented one mode of this expression. However, as such, it was no more innovative or unprecedented than similar attempts by previous Caliphs. Al-Ma mu¯n began the Mih.na when he had established control and had successfully reconsolidated enough of the empire. Had he possessed the wherewithal earlier in his reign to push this issue, he probably would have done so. To understand the Mih.na one must recognize it was not a direct response to a power vacuum created by disloyalty of the abna¯ al-dawla or other unruly elite groups.17 Some view the Mih.na as an attempt by al-Ma mu¯n to replace the abna¯ , with al-Mu tas.im using slave soldiers as his preferred alternative. However, rulers commonly face institutional infrastructural power problems that are further exacerbated by successional conflicts. Premodern governments could only penetrate so far into society’s day-to-day activities.18 Rulers normally possessed tenuous control while centralizing power over bureaucratic and military elements. Although most recognize individual succession crises, many assume dynastic successions are smooth, institutionally routinized, and legitimized.19 Dynastic rulers draw this picture to legitimize their power by emphasizing connections to the past and to their immediate antecedents. Doing so maintains institutionalized charismatic authority.20 When a clear break occurs,

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as with the Abba¯sid revolution, the new dynasty emphasizes distinctions to differentiate its ideology of identity. Because the Caliphate had no routinized theory of succession, each Caliph needed to legitimize his possession of the throne—thus, each Caliph faced a legitimation crisis.21 Given that al-Ma mu¯n reestablished control over the Empire, it is unlikely the succession crisis alone motivated his decision to pursue heretics decades later. However, these motivations cannot be wholly eliminated because al-Mu tas.im, despite contrary assumptions, was keenly interested in the Mih.na for these very reasons. Al-Ma mu¯n and al-Mu tas.im experienced extraordinarily turbulent transitions to power, but the manner in which they responded was within the parameters of acceptable responses. Their task was no more difficult than Abd al-Malik’s or Abu¯ al- Abba¯s al-Saffa¯h.’s (r. 132/749–136/754). In order to strengthen their positions as legitimate Caliphs, al-Ma mu¯n, al-Mu tas.im, al-Wa¯thiq, and al-Mutawakkil pursued heretics in order to assert their identities as Caliphs. This understanding localizes our interpretation of the Mih.na. As discussed previously, al-Ma mu¯n’s implementation of it was not aberrant nor was al-Mu tas.im’s and al-Wa¯thiq’s continuance of it. The beating of Ibn H.anbal is generally construed as representing a turning point in relations between the Caliph and the ulama¯ . However, as Zaman shows, the state of Caliphal– ulama¯ relations remained largely unchanged before and after the Mih.na.22 Although the Mih.na continued for some time, scholars skip from Ibn H.anbal’s beating to al-Mutawakkil’s “declaring the Mih.na at an end” without acknowledging the intervening 15 years. As a consequence, al-Mutawakkil’s motives for ending it are left unexamined. The narrative that follows is necessarily episodic and focuses on some details to the exclusion of others but filling in the gaps is essential to recontextualizing the Mih.na and understanding its inception and continuance.23 In 186/802, while on pilgrimage, Ha¯ru¯n al-Rashı¯d prepared plans for the succession. He dictated his son al-Amı¯n would succeed him as Caliph and his son al-Ma mu¯n would be governor of Khurasan.24 Each son assented to noninterference in the other’s domain of administration and to an unalterable chain of succession: first al-Amı¯n, then al-Ma mu¯n. The agreement also stipulated that a third son, al-Qa¯sim,

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succeed al-Ma mu¯n, but a codicil permitted al-Ma mu¯n to change his successor if he so desired.25 When al-Rashı¯d died in 193/809, al-Amı¯n became Caliph, and al-Ma mu¯n remained governor of Khurasan. What many viewed at the outset as an untenable proposition quickly deteriorated. In 195/810, al-Amı¯n replaced his two brothers in the line of succession with his young son. Al-Ma mu¯n’s courtly faction objected vociferously and provocatively proclaimed him the “imam who guides along the right path [ima¯m al-huda¯].” Although not the same as anointing himself Caliph, this proclamation visibly denounced his brother.26 For al-Amı¯n, the implications were intolerable, so he dispatched a force to subdue his brother. In an unpredictable turn of fate, al-Ma mu¯n’s smaller army, led by T.a¯hir b. al-H.usayn, defeated them. T.a¯hir and his army, in the name of al-Ma mu¯n, gathered strength as they marched westward. After a prolonged siege, they captured Baghdad and executed al-Amı¯n in 198/813.27 When al-Amı¯n’s head arrived with the news of victory, al-Ma mu¯n was proclaimed Caliph but found himself to be in the same position as Abd al-Malik in 73/692.28 Having subjected the capital to a long and ugly siege that was unlikely to have endeared him to the populace, he decided it would be prudent to rule from his powerbase in Marw. T.a¯hir’s family was richly rewarded for their support, and the T.a¯hirids became vital components of the Caliphal power matrix for the next half century. In 200/815, in Mecca, Muh.ammad b. Ja far al-S.a¯diq, a descendent of Muh.ammad in the line of Fa¯t.ima and Alı¯ , was proclaimed Caliph while a claimant to the Shı¯ ¯ı title of Imam.29 This act of sedition divided loyalties, leading to one of al-Ma mu¯n’s more controversial acts. In 201/817, after suppressing that claim and some three years after his brother’s death, al-Ma mu¯n removed his other brother al-Qa¯sim from the succession. However, he did not designate his son as heir. Instead, he chose the Alid, Alı¯ al-Rid.a¯, to whose son he married his daughter.30 While al-Ma mu¯n ruled from Marw, Baghdad remained in a state of civil disorder. Al-H.asan b. Sahl, the governor, failed to restore control, and the designation of the new heir only exacerbated an already volatile situation. Further complicating matters, al-H.asan governed poorly and failed to pay the army on time, causing riots.31 The Abba¯sid elite of Baghdad feared al-Ma mu¯n was supplanting the Abba¯sid family and

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them with a different branch of the Prophet’s family, which in a sense he was. However, Alı¯ al-Rid.a¯ was at least 20 years older than the person he was to succeed. It seems unlikely al-Ma mu¯n expected him to rule,32 although that was no comfort to the elite of Baghdad or the Abba¯sid family as they looked to what might follow. A marriage alliance between the Ma mu¯nid line and the Alid line that produced an heir who was both Abba¯sid Caliph and an Imam would have been formidable indeed. The riots turned into a full-fledged rebellion by a pastiche of volatile groups, including some of the abna¯ al-dawla, who fought alongside of al-Amı¯n. A dizzying array of actors entered the scene and destroyed any remaining sense of order in Baghdad.33 Some scholars have posited that the vigilante groups who responded to the chaos would later form the roots of the H.ana¯bila and were the source of the resistance to al-Ma mu¯n’s Mih.na and the revolt of Ah.mad b. Nas.r. Vigilantes, led by Sahl b. Sala¯ma and Kha¯lid al-Daryu¯sh, responded to the depredations of the various armies and the rabble. Small landholders and shopkeepers formed the core of these vigilante groups with the purpose of self-protection, self-preservation, and a restoration of local law and order.34 They had no overarching agenda, and they were not a direct precursor to the H.anbalı¯s.35 When they achieved their goals of security, they dissipated as rapidly as they had formed, leaving few residual effects. Imputing too high a political motivation overstates the importance of this grassroots movement, its supporters, their goals, and future impact. They were neither loyalist (pro-al-Ma mu¯n) nor antiloyalist, and they were neither the prelude to mob action a decade later during Ibn H.anbal’s trial nor the roots of Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s revolt nearly 30 years later. In an effort to protect his brother al-H.asan, the aforementioned governor, al-Fad.l b. Sahl misled al-Ma mu¯n about the seriousness of the situation in Baghdad. He was executed for the deception.36 Having become apprised of the reality, in 202/818, al-Ma mu¯n and his entourage undertook an 18-month journey from Marw to Baghdad; during the journey al-Rid.a¯ died under mysterious circumstances.37 Upon his arrival, al-Ma mu¯n reestablished Baghdad as the seat of governance, and there was almost immediate tax-revenue increase,

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signaling the beginning of a successful recentralization.38 He initiated reforms in weights, measures, and coinage.39 Al-Ma mu¯n also insisted the court wear green until shortly after his return to Baghdad in 204/819.40 Once they obeyed, he relented, and they returned to traditional Abba¯sid black. Kimber reasons that the color change forced public obedience. As such, the shift fulfilled a need for public acknowledgment of deference to Caliphal authority. Much like Abd al-Malik, al-Ma mu¯n spent most of the next ten years reconsolidating, in essence reconquering, the Empire. The reconquest was not just military. In 210/825, al-Ma mu¯n overruled a decision made by the first Caliph, Abu¯ Bakr, concerning Fa¯t.ima’s inheritance from Muh.ammad. In al-Ma mu¯n’s letter ordering the change, he refers to his status as Commander of the Faithful no fewer than seven times in quick succession.41 Two years later, in 212/827, al-Ma mu¯n declared he considered the Qur a¯n to be created.42 Even though this was declared six years prior to the beginning of the Mih.na, it planted the seeds.43 In 213/828, he made his son, al- Abba¯s governor of the frontier provinces bordering the Byzantine Empire to prepare him for rule.44 Shortly thereafter (215/830), al-Ma mu¯n left Baghdad, never to return, to attack the Byzantines and fulfill his duty of jihad.45 As he went, so too did the center of government (almost half his reign was spent outside Baghdad). He wintered in Damascus46 and in the following year attacked Byzantine lands with the intent of occupying and holding new territory.47 These were no mere symbolic raids. Tarsus was his launching point, but T.uwa¯na/Tyana, beyond the Cilician Gates, which he conquered and used as a beachhead, had become his base of operations. He maintained another of the threads in the matrix of his social role by performing the role of the gha¯zı¯ (warrior for the faith).48 In 216/831, in a still visible act of vandalism, al-Ma mu¯n changed the inscription on the Dome of the Rock. He removed Abd al-Malik’s name as the builder and replaced it with his own.49 Given that everyone in Jerusalem knew that al-Ma mu¯n had not built it, the message must have been one of authority, control, and power. In the same year (216/832), he ordered Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m to instruct the troops in Baghdad to pronounce the takbı¯r (alla¯hu akbar, God is greatest) during prayer.50 His instructions only dictate one takbı¯r, but it was

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repeated three times, which concurs with the practice of Ja far al-S.a¯diq. Despite assertions otherwise, this is not evidence al-Ma mu¯n was Shı¯ ite because the order was for one and only for troops in Baghdad. The point was to physically manifest power and authority. In 217/832–33, al-Ma mu¯n crushed a rebellion in Egypt and returned to Syria.51 Sporadic uprisings occurred throughout his reign, but he dealt with them effectively. In each of these events al-Ma mu¯n consolidated his hold over the Caliphate and prepared for its transference to his heir by exerting his role as Commander of the Faithful. Al-Ma mu¯n’s jihad against the Byzantines is the immediate context for the onset of the Mih.na. He fortified, expanded, and garrisoned T.uwa¯na in preparation for a major assault on the Byzantines.52 The massive size of the fortifications suggests that he intended them to be permanent. Al-Ma mu¯n stationed there a large levy of troops under the command of his son, al- Abba¯s. Although the number of troops quoted by the sources is likely exaggerated, the scale of the operation appears to be equal or greater in magnitude than al-Mu tas.im’s later foray against Amorion.53 According to al-Ya qu¯bı¯, al-Ma mu¯n’s goal was Constantinople.54 Soon after beginning these preparations, in 218/833, some six years after his initial proclamation of his position on the createdness of the Qur a¯n, al-Ma mu¯n initiated the Mih.na.55 As noted in Chapter 5, al-Ya qu¯bı¯ briefly mentions one Mih.na letter from al-Ma mu¯n. The testing begins in Damascus, and only after this does he send a letter to Baghdad to order testing there: “al-Ma mu¯n traveled to Damascus in the year 218. And he tested the people about divine justice [al- adl] and divine unicity [al-tawh.¯ıd].”56 Al-T.abarı¯ differs, stating al-Ma mu¯n ordered the Mih.na from Raqqa, his father’s old staging point. In both cases, al-Ma mu¯n was en route to the front in preparation for a major campaign. However, he never made it. After consuming some “bad” dates, he died in Budandu¯n, halfway between Tarsus and T.uwa¯na.57 He was buried in Tarsus. Thus al-Ma mu¯n died at the inception of the Mih.na, which implicitly was tied to the jihad via his role as Commander of the Faithful. Al-Mu tas.im would be designated heir from al-Ma mu¯n’s deathbed. Al-Mu tas.im had risen to prominence at al-Ma mu¯n’s court because

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of his famous Turkish-slave soldiers. His succession was not without controversy.58 Some of the generals who favored al-Ma mu¯n’s son and proven military commander, al- Abba¯s, resisted. Disorder was staved off when he was induced to publicly proclaim allegiance to his uncle. Under this cloud, al-Mu tas.im began his reign, whereupon he razed the fortifications at T.uwa¯na, abandoned the campaign, and left for Baghdad.59 Once in the capital, he sent Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m and then al-Afshı¯n to squelch the insurrection of Ba¯bak and the Khurramiyya in Azerbaijan.60 In 219/834, al-Mu tas.im dispatched Abdalla¯h b. T.a¯hir, another T.a¯hirid, to pursue Muh.ammad b. al-Qa¯sim, an Alid rebel, and Ujayf b. Anbasa to quell the rebellion of the Zut.t. near Basra.61 From those campaigns, it becomes clear al-Mu tas.im’s vaunted Turkish military elite were unexceptional.62 In each of these episodes, al-Mu tas.im relied upon generals who, although competent, had been loyal commanders for his brother and had a lingering whiff of support for al- Abba¯s. Two years after coming to the throne, and having faced multiple rebellions, in 220/835, al-Mu tas.im tried Ibn H.anbal. Shortly thereafter, he moved the capital to Samarra, north of Baghdad, ostensibly to reduce frictions between his Turkish soldiery and the civilians in Baghdad. The move had the effect of isolating the Caliph from other elements of society and other potential powerbases. Meanwhile, the purge of the ulama¯ through the Mih.na continued apace as al-Mu tas.im and his ministers asserted dominance over normative orthodoxy and the agents of law. He also continued to impose control over the empire. After a methodical campaign, in late 222/837, al-Afshı¯n defeated Ba¯bak. Bugha¯ and i¯ta¯kh, prominent members of al-Mu tas.im’s Turkish guard, served as officers under al-Afshı¯n and performed so miserably their command endangered themselves and their men. In spite of their bungling, al-Afshı¯n delivered his captives to Samarra on the back of an elephant.63 Al-Mu tas.im executed Ba¯bak and his brother as brigands in 223/838 and displayed their dismembered bodies as a warning. Shortly following Ba¯bak’s execution, al-Mu tas.im, like al-Ma mu¯n, asserted his jihad credentials as Commander of the Faithful. In 223/838, he famously raided Amorion ( Ammu¯riya) to reinforce his

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legitimacy.64 In spite of its reputation as an overwhelming victory, the raid was only moderately successful, yielding little booty and no territorial gains.65 Nonetheless, it solidified al-Mu tas.im’s standing as a capable military leader and promoted the prowess and gha¯zı¯ credentials of his slave army. After the successful campaign to capture Amorion, on the return trip to friendly territory, and nearly five years after his uncle’s ascension to the throne, al- Abba¯s b. al-Ma mu¯n was accused of an attempted coup d’état. In response, al-Mu tas.im mercilessly purged almost all the ranking officers (stated by one source as numbering seventy) as accomplices.66 However, al-Mu tas.im spared al-Afshı¯n for his early and adamant loyalty to and defense of the Caliph. Without him, al-Mu tas.im might not have retained power. With the coup quelled, al-Afshı¯n was given charge of al- Abba¯s, to whom he gave a surfeit of food but no water. To ensure matters progressed quickly, he wrapped al- Abba¯s in a felt blanket and left him in the sun.67 The T. a¯hirid Muh.ammad b. Ibra¯hı¯m, Ish.a¯q’s brother, did much the same to Ujayf b. Anbasa, minus the blanket. Execution by dehydration allowed for witnesses to see the body had been untouched (i.e., not tortured or murdered) and mitigated the possibility the victim’s family could charge the executioner with murder; at most, execution by dehydration was death caused by neglect.68 In this way, al-Mu tas.im avoided censure for the death of a member of the Abba¯sid family. With his gha¯zı¯ bona fides, al-Mu tas.im strengthened his claim to be Commander of the Faithful, but the removal of many of the military elite left al-Afshı¯n with a disproportionate degree of power, rivaling that of the T. a¯hirids and even the Caliph.69 In 224/838–39, Muh.ammad b. Ibra¯hı¯m squelched a revolt staged by Ma¯zya¯r b. Qa¯rin; al-Afshı¯n was accused of aiding and abetting Ma¯zya¯r. The subtext reveals al-Afshı¯n was encroaching on T. a¯hirid prerogatives and thus challenging their position. The T. a¯hirids were essential to Abba¯sid rule; Ish.a¯q and Muh.ammad acted as the Caliph’s “fixers” for three decades, and the family governed Khurasan for them. The extent of T.a¯hirid– Abba¯sid interdependence meant any attempt to undermine T.a¯hirid influence represented an assault on the Caliph.70 Therefore, in 225/839, al-Afshı¯n was tried for apostasy (betraying the Caliph and thus the religion).71 The trial additionally benefited al-Mu tas.im because he had suppressed

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the last of al-Ma mu¯n’s most important military men, and it had been accomplished through the assertion of his role as Commander of the Faithful. Once convicted, al-Afshı¯n was starved to death in 226/841. The purge and trial of al-Afshı¯n is often read as a kangaroo court to remove an overmighty general using the guise of religion. However, the trial was also a religious act by the Commander of the Faithful. Disobedience in temporal matters showed disregard for the Caliph’s religious legitimacy; the two facets were deeply intertwined. Al-Ma mu¯n had reconsolidated and recentralized control over areas with a long experience of central rule. The expansion of centralized control to regions previously only under nominal control drove many of the rebellions.72 Ba¯bak and the Zut.t., which began under al-Ma mu¯n, were crushed by al-Mu tas.im. As the center (the Caliph and his tax collectors) projected its involvement more intrusively, local contact with the government increased, as did manifest disobedience and its prosecution.73 What appeared to be an increase in “rebellion” was actually internal consolidation. Al-Mu tas.im died in 227/841, after an eight-year reign, and his son al-Wa¯thiq succeeded him. The picture that emerges of al-Mu tas.im’s reign is of a strong Caliph enforcing his legitimacy and authority through any venue available. The Mih.na continued unchecked throughout his reign, with al-Afshı¯n’s trial another Caliphal intervention into the definition of correct belief and who was or was not a Muslim. Al-Mu tas.im’s attack on the military elite, and the continuance of the Mih.na, was directly tied to his other assertions he was the Commander of the Faithful. Al-Wa¯thiq would have a short and eventful but largely unexamined reign; even the primary sources have little to say about him.74 One thing is certain: there was tremendous continuity among the ruling elite who were holdovers from his father’s administration and who continued to oversee most of the functions of governance. As a result, though he possessed the title of Commander of the Faithful, he had little room for independent action. In 229/843–44, al-Wa¯thiq borrowed a page from Ha¯ru¯n al-Rashı¯d and the Barmakids. In an attempt to increase his independence, he arrested and stripped many bureaucrats of their power and assets.75 Any gains he made were ephemeral in the bubble of Samarra. In 230/845, he successfully quelled a

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rebellion around Medina. In 231/845–46, he exchanged prisoners with Byzantium.76 Asserting his ability to define who was worthy of being a member of the community of believers, al-Wa¯thiq required Muslim prisoners to profess the createdness of the Qur a¯n before being ransomed. According to Byzantine sources, al-Wa¯thiq broke with well-established convention when, in preparing for the exchange, he held 42 of the Byzantine officers who had been captured during the raid on Amorion and demanded they convert to Islam.77 Upon their refusal, they were executed. One may be skeptical of this account because it is derived from hostile Byzantine sources; however, the execution fits al-Wa¯thiq’s behavior pattern as described in the Arabic sources. Concurrent to this exchange, al-Wa¯thiq ordered that the people on the Byzantine frontier (thughu¯r) be tested on the createdness doctrine and beatific vision. In what appears to be a reference to the same incident, al-Ya qu¯bı¯ notes that al-Wa¯thiq commanded judges to test the people of the thughu¯r about the createdness of the Qur a¯n and to accept testimony only from “he who asserted the divine unicity.”78 According to al-T.abarı¯, all but four acknowledged its createdness.79 Although he did not record their fate, he tells us al-Wa¯thiq ordered they be threatened with decapitation. Within this narrow, yet eventful, window (the year 231/845–46) Ah.mad b. Nas.r revolted and was tried. Despite a short reign, al-Wa¯thiq exerted much effort to enforce orthodoxy and to proclaim his credentials as Commander of the Faithful. He did not lead the jihad, but he did develop Samarra from an armed camp into a functional city, likely to curry favor with the Turkish soldiery.80 Al-Wa¯thiq died under suspicious circumstances in the next year, 232/847.81 Apparently suffering from edema, he sought relief in heat and had a special sauna constructed. Left in the sauna too long, he was dying while Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d, Ibn al-Zayya¯t, Umar b. Faraj, and al-Fad.l b. Ish.a¯q al-Ha¯shimı¯ stood by—three of them were instrumental in what followed.82 Al-Ya qu¯bı¯ offhandedly tells us that the oath of allegiance as heir was taken to al-Wa¯thiq’s son before the sauna incident but makes no attempt to explain what happened.83 Al-Wa¯thiq died on 23 Dhu¯-l-H.ijja 232/10 August 847.84 Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d, i¯ta¯kh, Was.¯ıf,85 Umar b. Faraj, Ibn al-Zayya¯t, and Ah.mad b. Kha¯lid Abu¯ al-Wazı¯r initially decided

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to confer the Caliphate on al-Wa¯thiq’s son but reconsidered after Was.¯ıf’s objection he was too young.86 In fact, according to al-T.abarı¯, the decision was finalized because al-Wa¯thiq’s son was so small the robes of office looked ridiculous on him.87 After some back and forth, they eventually selected al-Mutawakkil to ascend the throne. They seem to have assumed al-Mutawakkil was the most palatable, yet manipulable, candidate. During his brother’s reign, his behavior gave every indication of a weak ruler, but his behavior as Caliph proved otherwise. From his compromised position, al-Mutawakkil would have to prove himself worthy of the title Commander of the Faithful or become a puppet. In short order, al-Mutawakkil changed the complexion of his government. Forty days after his enthronement, coinciding with the end of the mourning period, al-Mutawakkil ordered i¯ta¯kh to arrest and torture to death Ibn al-Zayya¯t, whose sins were so numerous he was an easy first target: he had treated al-Mutawakkil with contempt during his brother’s reign, supported al-Wa¯thiq’s son for the Caliphate, and made many enemies among the elite as an agent of torture.88 The year 233/847–48 was pivotal in al-Mutawakkil’s push for independence. He ordered that the createdness or uncreatedness of the Qur a¯n no longer be discussed. Of the six members of the council who selected him, four were eliminated: Ibn al-Zayya¯t was tortured to death, Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d suffered a debilitating stroke, and Umar b. Faraj and Ah.mad b. Kha¯lid Abu¯ al-Wazı¯r were arrested and humiliated. The latter’s removal occurred on the first anniversary of al-Mutawakkil’s ascension to the throne. The two remaining figures survived a little longer. Was.¯ıf not only outlived him, but also was an integral part of his assassination. i¯ta¯kh was eliminated under an elaborate ruse and executed by dehydration in 235/849 at the hands of Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m. Ish.a¯q died of unstated causes six months later (235/850), on the third anniversary of al-Mutawakkil’s enthronement and only a few days before al-Mutawakkil promulgated an elaborate succession arrangement. Even though the sources do not specify the cause of death, one can assume the worst, because al-Mutawakkil’s pattern was to bring down a major opponent on the enthronement anniversary. Exactly one solar year later (236/851), Ish.a¯q’s brother

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Muh.ammad was executed by dehydration,89 and Ish.a¯q’s son, who had been appointed to succeed his father, died days later. Within a single year, the three most important T.a¯hirids in Baghdad had been eliminated. By 235/850, of those present at the council choosing him as Caliph, all but Was.¯ıf had been removed from power, stripped of office, humiliated, or killed. This evidence indicates al-Mutawakkil effectively consolidated power. Ending the Mih.na was but one part of that enterprise. Al-Subkı¯ (a Sha¯fi ite and an Ash arite) relates that al-Mutawakkil ended the Mih.na in 234/848–49.90 While recounting the events surrounding the unfastening of Ah.mad b. Nas.r from the gibbet in 237/851, al-T.abarı¯ vaguely places the end of the Mih.na at the beginning of al-Mutawakkil’s reign.91 He adds that al-Mutawakkil prohibited debate about the Qur a¯n, neither reversing the course of the Mih.na nor proclaiming the opposite view.92 Contrary to the usual understanding, his actions do not define him as a H.anbalı¯ and do not represent a shift in his social role. The political infighting was largely invisible to those outside the court. He continued to maintain his role by defining correct belief, enforcing religious prescriptions, and demanding correct practice. In a letter written in 235/850, he states he imposes restrictions on the dhimmı¯s in order to fulfill his duty to enforce religious law and control them,93 a command he reinforced in 239/853 and 241/855.94 At the same time, he ordered the flogging of a Muslim man (Mah.mu¯d) claiming to be a prophet.95 Mah.mu¯d died in spite of having recanted. The shaykh who vouched for him was flogged until he disavowed Mah.mu¯d’s prophecy. In 236/851, al-Mutawakkil ordered al-H.usayn’s grave in Karbala destroyed to eliminate it as a place of Shı¯ ite pilgrimage. In 241/855–56, al-Mutawakkil ordered a man flogged to death for being a Shı¯ ite.96 In the letter pronouncing sentencing, the Caliph reasons he is: . . . protecting the religion of God, reviving its Sunna, and taking revenge upon those who deviate from it. And he ordered that the man be beaten according to the divine statute [h.add] for public defamation [of the Companions of the Prophet] and be given five hundred blows beyond the fixed punishment for the

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grave things he dared to undertake. And if he dies, he should be dumped into the water without a funeral prayer, thus deterring every deviant in religion [mulh.id] who abandons the community of Muslims.97 The ending of the Mih.na did not prevent al-Mutawakkil from delimiting the boundaries of orthodoxy and prescribing correct practice based on extrapolation from the Qur a¯n to derive a new legal precedent. Al-Mutawakkil’s behavior was the same as that motivating the Mih.na. Also, he did these things for many of the same reasons. Al-Mutawakkil’s boundaries may differ from those of al-Ma mu¯n, al-Mu tas.im, and al-Wa¯thiq—and this was partially the point—but he still acted within and performed the same social role.98 He was publicly asserting his position as Commander of the Faithful. Al-Mutawakkil enforced anti-Shı¯ ite doctrines and restrictions on dhimmı¯, but this does not mean he was pro-H.anbalı¯. He proclaimed positions contrary to those of past officials, not to enact a new position, but to differentiate himself. His initial activities clearly signal a changing of the guard, and his religious pronouncements were part of that. He replaced all of the individuals loyal to his brother and father with people he thought would be loyal to him. In the process he shattered the balance of power. Al-Mu tas.im’s purge undermined the influence of the non-Turkish military at court. Al-Mutawakkil exacerbated the situation when he purged the civilian elite. He eliminated all factional players with significant power bases outside Samarra, leaving only the military men of the Turkish guard. Their loyalties and factional games would play out rather differently in the microcosm of Samarra, where they were utterly dependent on cash payments disbursed from the treasury, a dependency that, in the face of relentlessly decreasing resources, maximized focus on control of the treasury in a zero-sum game.99 He, in essence, imprisoned himself by removing all external counterweights without finding replacements.100 When considered in this context, al-Mutawakkil’s cessation of the Mih.na carries a very different meaning. Ending it did not represent a restoration of Sunnism; rather, it was part of an attempt to free himself from domination by his father’s and brother’s advisors.

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Having established why and when the Mih.na was started and why it was ended, we can now turn to the question of when the Caliph lost the ability to intervene in matters of belief. Al-Mutawakkil’s success in gaining independence was deeply ironic. In the winter of 247/861, alMutawakkil was assassinated, triggering nine years of chaos in Samarra that fundamentally altered the Caliph’s social role and the structure of the empire. Al-Mutawakkil was murdered by a coterie of conspirators that included his son, al-Muntas.ir, who would rule for only six months. The elite of the Samarran Turkish guard then anointed alMusta ¯ın Caliph, but he was less compliant than they had hoped.101 He ruled for four years, and at the end of his reign, in 251/865, he and his vizier, Was.¯ıf, fled to Baghdad, instigating the second major siege of that city. The Turks of Samarra would not tolerate such independence and replaced him with al-Mu tazz, who “led” the siege. By 252/866, resistance had collapsed, al-Musta ¯ın had been murdered, and Was.¯ıf would be murdered the following year. Al-Mu tazz would, in turn, be killed in 255/869 and was replaced by al-Muhtadı¯, who ruled for only 11 months before also being murdered by “his” Turkish guard in 255/870. On the eve of his removal, al-Muhtadı¯ challenged his attackers, saying, “Have you no religion, have you no shame, have you no piety? How long will this dissension against the Caliphs, this boldness and effrontery against God, go on?”102 However, because insolence to the Caliph no longer equated insolence to God and rebellion against the Caliph was no longer apostasy, these questions—at least when framed in this manner—were no longer relevant. The Caliph was no longer the Commander of the Faithful. The next Caliph, al-Mu tamid (d. 279/892), proved to be less problematic and even less important and reigned for more than 20 years. The Caliph was now a puppet, and in this case, his brother al-Muwaffaq and the leadership of the Turkish guard assumed the role of puppeteers. The fact that al-Muwaffaq refused to unseat his brother and take the title for himself speaks volumes about the Caliph’s reduced status and role. Being Commander of the Faithful no longer held the weight it once had, and the chaos from 247/861 to 256/870 was responsible. As a result, provincial elites, abandoned by the center, began governing as independent sovereigns. Ah.mad b. T.u¯lu¯n (d. 270/884)

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essentially ruled Egypt, most of Syria, and parts of the Jazı¯ra in spite of the nominal suzerainty of the Caliph.103 The T.a¯hirids and then the Saffarids controlled the East. The Zanj revolted in Basra. The area over which Samarra exercised power rapidly eroded and with it went the revenue to sustain the Caliphal edifice. Local officials sought support from non-Caliphal sources and eliminated any residual Caliphal influence. Because the Caliph could not provide leadership or guidance, the ulama¯ began to fully dominate Islamic law. The Caliph had been a primary actor in defining the boundaries of normativity, but as a puppet he was incapable of legitimately asserting this dimension of his social role. It would not be until al-Qa¯hir (r. 320/932–322/934) that some capacity was restored, but 70 years had passed. In the intervening years, several generations of legal scholars had grown accustomed to seeing the Caliph’s role as a mere figurehead symbolizing the now fictional unity of the community of believers: a “rubber stamp” for their interpretations but little more. His successor, al-Ra¯d.¯ı (d. 329/940), stated: Is it that the people say about me that this Caliph is satisfied that a Turkish slave arranges his matters even so far as to make judgments regarding the treasury and single-handedly manages state affairs? They [the people] do not comprehend that this matter had been corrupted before me and it was put on me by people against my desires.104 For decades no functional center could claim or exercise the authority vested in the mantle of the Prophet carried by the Commander of the Faithful, and the ulama¯ had little choice, given their social roles, but to shoulder it. By the time al-T.abarı¯ wrote a mukhtas.ar (epitome) of law in which he sketched out his legal approach for the Caliphs al-Muktafı¯ and al-Muqtadir,105 law firmly and permanently resided out of the Caliph’s hands. During this time, the madha¯hib began formalizing their existence and arguing for control over the mantle. As they developed, they gained sufficient institutional strength to resist the Caliph’s encroachment but never enough to dominate the field. Without a single figure in possession of coercive power, no

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one person or school exerted practical dominance, and competition grew fierce, whether through soft power and social exclusion or mob mobilization. This competition continued unabated for centuries without resolution. The discussion in Chapter 2 assists in explaining the timing of the Mih.na’s beginning. Like Abd al-Malik, al-Ma mu¯n waited until he solidified control over the institutions of power before attempting to enforce his limits to the boundaries of normative orthodoxy for the purpose of maintaining and expanding his power and authority. Al-Ma mu¯n’s decision to launch the Mih.na on the eve of a major jihad operation against the Byzantines was surely not coincidental. Both actions fulfilled his social role as Commander of the Faithful and as the embodiment of the community. Al-Mu tas.im, al-Wa¯thiq, and al-Mutawakkil struggled to establish themselves as legitimate and independent holders of the Caliphal social role. Continuity could aid or thwart that endeavor. However, it is false to assume the Caliphs had no choice but to continue the Mih.na. Al-Mu tas.im consolidated his control over both military and civilian sectors through purges. More often than not, modern scholars discuss the ulama¯ as a nameless, faceless monolith. The reality is much more complex. One feature not often noted within the Mih.na is division among the ulama¯ . The primary agents of the Caliph were ulama¯ , including Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d and the other veterans from al-Ma mu¯n’s regime, who were enforcing normativity on other ulama¯ . The alliance was utilitarian and mutually beneficial. On the surface al-Wa¯thiq ascended the throne in a fairly strong position. He faced no accusations of usurpation, as had his father and uncle. However, he lacked a loyal military force and the allegiance of the main court ministers, who were positioned to control him. The Mih.na represented a means to visibly assert his authority and build an alliance with the court ministers. Developing Samarra into a functioning city would have fostered loyalty among the soldiery, firming up his military support. After al-Wa¯thiq’s failure and probable murder, al-Mutawakkil recognized neither strategy worked. As shown by reading the Mih.na in context, al-Mutawakkil’s cessation of the Mih.na was not to overturn a heresy or restore Sunnism. Instead it should be seen as an

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attempt to free himself to rule independently, albeit with catastrophic consequences.

Defining the Importance of the Mih.na With an absent Caliph, the eventual acceptance of al-Sha¯fi ¯ı’s legal theories about the hierarchy of the Qur a¯n over Sunna as a legal source, and al-Ash arı¯’s (and his students’) reconciliation of h.adı¯th to kala¯m, tradition and thus practice prevailed over theology and became the focus of belief.106 Ash arite doxographies studied in Chapter 3 were an integral part of a claim that they and the reconciliation they engaged were orthodox. They consistently eponymized heretical gangs. Because corporate entities are not recognized in Islamic law, doxographers assigned responsibility to a single individual for the crime of initiating deviation, or, as al-Baghda¯dı¯ states, “the founder of the innovation, upon him are its sins and the sins of he who acts by it, until the Day of Rising [Judgment Day].”107 Marking out the Other delineated who and what was accepted by the one doing the delineation. Eponymization and the need to chart an intellectual heritage was not limited to doxographies solely for the purposes of denigration—it also occurred in other mediums for opposite reasons. As the madha¯hib coalesced into established institutions, their founding members named them for an individual. Madhhab eponymization asserted normative status for the school as following reliable guides on the path of knowable good practice based firmly on precedents from the earliest pious figures. This process explains why, in spite of consistent invocations of their shaykh, the writings of his followers contrast strongly with those of al-Ash arı¯.108 The same principle applies to the madha¯hib and their eponyms. The Mih.na presented a distinct set of problems for the H.anbalı¯s, because much of their legitimacy derived from the story that their shaykh was steadfast in his piety against a Caliph of whose descendants they had become partisans. However, for this image to emerge, the H.ana¯bila had to redefine his encounter with al-Mu tas.im. The earliest sources for Ibn H.anbal’s trial agree: the questioning occurred; the Caliph was deeply and personally involved; indicators suggest Ibn

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H.anbal acquiesced, or at the very least the adamant defense indicates uncertainty about how steadfast he was; and the trial did not cause any immediate disturbances among the population of Baghdad. The later sources emphatically state Ibn H.anbal did not capitulate and, because he represented popular opinion, his trial generated civil unrest. These sources also imply and sometimes state al-Mu tas.im did not understand the circumstances of the trial;109 rather, he followed bad advice or simply followed the directives of his brother’s last will and testament. These emphases present a paradox for the H.anbalı¯s. The most pressing question is how he could be a hero and survive. Ah.mad b. Nas.r died a “martyr’s death” in his questioning, yet Ibn H.anbal lived. H.anbalı¯ narratives of the Mih.na concentrate on rationalizing Ibn H.anbal’s release sans capitulation without implicating the institution of the Caliphate with enforcement of a heresy.110 But Ibn H.anbal routinely stated one should not revolt against legitimate authority. Therefore, if Ibn H.anbal resisted (and caused revolts), then the authority must have been illegitimate. To solve this, al-Ma mu¯n was cast as a heretic, and al-Mu tas.im as misled by heretical advisors. Illustrating the trial in this manner resolves the paradox and was necessary for the H.anbalı¯ madhhab to be counted among the orthodox. The remaining Abba¯sid Caliphs descended from al-Mu tas.im, and after al-Mutawakkil, the H.ana¯bila grew increasingly close to them. The sources clearly distance al-Mu tas.im and even al-Wa¯thiq from active involvement with the Mih.na while affixing blame on al-Ma mu¯n and Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d.111 To make this narrative reordering sensible, they had to assert the Mih.na was aberrant. Cook comments that “posterity was to impose on him [Ibn H.anbal] a role he had never sought: that of founder and leader of a well-defined and often aggressive religious community,” and this reconstruction “erode(d) the foundations of Ibn H.anbal’s apolitical policies.”112 The madhhab took on a life beyond what Ah.mad or his sons would recognize. The earliest sources (S.a¯lih., H.anbal b. Ish.a¯q, and al-Ja¯h.iz.) show signs of an intertextual conversation between groups seeking either exoneration or incrimination of Ibn H.anbal. In the fourth/tenth century, the struggle to define a new H.anbalı¯ madhhab as orthodox magnified these conversations. The Mih.na became equated with Ibn

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H.anbal’s trial and with the muh.addith–mutakallim theological showdown, when his identity as a resistance figure became relevant in the establishment of the new madhhab. An individual who would suffer the threat of punishment for defying the Caliph in defense of his/ the community’s orthodox principles would certainly be worth following, and all who followed would be equally orthodox and acceptable. His behavior in the Mih.na enhanced the positive perception of him, exemplified his piety, and solidified the foundation of the movement that claimed him.113 If he acquiesced, though, he lost the claim to be the staunch defender of orthodoxy in a major clash with the Caliph, weakening his followers’ position. During the H.anbalı¯ madhhab’s formation, its early followers were divided over the legacy of Ibn H.anbal. Abu¯ Muh.ammad al-Barbaha¯rı¯ (d. 329/941) led the wing that militantly engaged in commanding good and forbidding wrong.114 Like Abu¯ Bakr al-Khalla¯l (d. 311/923), the second major leader, Abu¯ Muh.ammad al-Barbaha¯rı¯ studied with Abu¯ Bakr al-Marru¯dhı¯ (d. 275/888), a follower of Ah.mad’s son Abdalla¯h. A third claimant to the legacy of Ibn H.anbal, al-Ash arı¯ (d. 324/935), was specifically excluded from the H.ana¯bila as part of this struggle. As he tried to reconcile the traditionalists’ h.adı¯th focus with rationalists’ methods, he claimed the legacy of Ibn H.anbal. Of the paragons of the traditionists from which to choose, Ibn H.anbal, having been tried by rationalists and survived, was uniquely positioned for al-Ash arı¯’s purposes. Claiming him as his shaykh allowed al-Ash arı¯ to contend he was defending the legacy of Ibn H.anbal while utilizing rationalist methods. If he were a faithful, loyal, and pious follower of Ibn H.anbal, then he would not be corrupted by the negative aspects of rationalist kala¯m.115 Ibn H.anbal provided him with credibility. Al-Ash arı¯’s struggle against the H.ana¯bila for inclusion among the orthodox explains much of the doxographic venom expended by the Ash arites. It also explains why, in the doxographies, the Ash arites are the mean between the two poles of the Mu tazila and the H.ana¯bila. Melchert shows the eponyms of the four remaining Sunni madha¯hib were not responsible for their formation, and Ibn H.anbal was no different for the school bearing his name:116 al-Khalla¯l distilled and organized Ibn H.anbal’s teachings,117 making coherent an amorphous

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mass of material. With this, al-Khalla¯l and the other students of al-Marru¯dhı¯ asserted they were a madhhab on par with any other. Further, al-Khalla¯l wrote a .tabaqa¯t of the H.ana¯bila. A t.abaqa¯t is a biographical dictionary that lists past members of a school (or some other identifying category), whether the connection is real or imagined.118 As such it represents an intellectual history and validation of the school’s authenticity and orthodoxy. Although he was at most the third generation, al-Khalla¯l established a legitimating pedigree for the school by writing one. The act marks a conscious endeavor at formulating and formalizing a distinct social entity. Al-Khalla¯l also composed the t.abaqa¯t to claim ownership of that pedigree, refuting al-Barbaha¯rı¯’s and al-Ash arı¯’s claims as the inheritors of Ibn H.anbal’s legacy. At the same time, all three “groups” competed with the Sha¯fi ites and al-T.abarı¯ for legitimacy and the definition of orthodoxy.119 Following Makdisi, Devin Stewart argues the t.abaqa¯t works were “crucial” in establishing the madha¯hib and al-T.abarı¯ wrote a t.abaqa¯t as part of creating a curriculum for training jurisprudents, which unfortunately has been lost.120 Thus al-T.abarı¯ was also on the cutting edge of school formation. These competitions also existed among the H.ana¯bila. Each wing differed with regard to their attitudes toward activism. Al-Khalla¯l was quietist, as is demonstrated by his collection of materials in the book al-amr bi l-ma ru¯f.121 Al-Barbaha¯rı¯, in contrast, incited and led riots.122 Residuals of the internal conflict can be seen in an episode found in a later H.anbalı¯ t.abaqa¯t: a person labeled an innovator passes by one of the followers of al-Barbaha¯rı¯, who is reeling from drink. The “innovator” snorts, “These H.anbalı¯s!” The H.anbalı¯ turns to him and announces there are three types of H.anbalı¯s: “ Ascetics who fast and pray. The type who write and make juridical judgments and the type who slap all transgressors like you.’ And then he slapped him and hurt him.”123 Al-Barbaha¯rı¯ is of the third type: drunk and incoherently violent, a character later H.ana¯bila would condemn. Al-Khalla¯l is of the second type, consistently counseling against riotous activities. He says one can command the good but should not seek wine jars to break. An important addendum is that in spite of al-Barbaha¯rı¯’s actions he also enjoined against admonishing the ruler. The quietist faction won,

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but victory was not achieved by al-Khalla¯l. Although he provided the tools, the dispute within the school raged for centuries, with the H.ana¯bila earning a well-deserved reputation as rabble rousers.124 Although the militant and quietist factions may have emphasized different aspects of Ibn H.anbal’s legacy, both found it necessary to justify his place as a legitimate source to be imitated. This was especially true for al-Khalla¯l as the formulator/codifier of a new school, because he had to prove the deep-rootedness of the madhhab to counter opponents’ claims he was innovating. Al-Dhahabı¯ (a Sha¯fi ite) relates that al-Barbaha¯rı¯ says to al-Ash arı¯, “I do not know what you say: we know nothing but what the imam Ah.mad said.”125 From the H.anbalı¯ perspective, this statement is perfectly accurate. Ibn H.anbal transmitted the Musnad, a massive compendium of h.adı¯th containing all necessary materials for determining correct practice and the source that guided his exemplary life.126 From a Sha¯fi ¯ı perspective however, detaching criticism from the founder and placing it with the followers was a condemnation of the school while preserving the useful material contained in the Musnad. Given the competition in the tournament of normativity, Ibn H.anbal’s role as the most important defender of orthodoxy in the Mih.na became the H.anbalı¯s’ primary weapon in asserting their methodology, which, based on the Musnad, was the most accurate and precise approximation of sharı¯ a. The significance of Ibn H.anbal’s trial was magnified for very specific reasons, one of which was to assert he was the most qualified to lead the community because he had the clearest understanding of the religion’s correct practice.127 The sources often tell us individuals gravitated to Ibn H.anbal because of his heroic steadfastness in front of al-Mu tas.im and many followed his example of resistance. As a corollary, had he submitted, the masses would have followed him down that path to perdition.128 In an interesting parallel, when the Sha¯fi ite Bakka¯r b. al-H.asan (d. 238/852–53) is tested in the Mih.na, he says, “The eyes of the people are on me. If I answer [affirming the Qur a¯n created], I fear that they will respond [as asked] and become unbelievers.”129 In addition, al-Buwayt.¯ı (d. 231/846), a Sha¯fi ite who was imprisoned and died as a result of his refusal to capitulate when questioned, is quoted by al-Dhahabı¯ as saying, “A hundred thousand will follow my example without knowing

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the meaning.”130 Each story promotes the individual mentioned as the most important leader in the community. The depiction of al-Buwayt.¯ı’s death places him on a level of steadfastness comparable to that of Ibn H.anbal and thus attempts to “steal” the issue from the H.ana¯bila. Because he sacrificed his life and Ibn H.anbal survived, this represented a serious threat, particularly because the Sha¯fi ites were making inroads in Baghdad when al-Khalla¯l and al-Barbaha¯rı¯ were active. It is telling that al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯ omits him from the list of those killed in the Mih.na.131 The H.anbalı¯ reaction to al-T.abarı¯ underscores the H.anbalı¯ concern over being branded as innovators or, worse, unqualified. In addition to being a famous historian and commentator on the Qur a¯n, al-T.abarı¯ was better known during his own lifetime for his legal scholarship.132 He established the Jarı¯rı¯ madhhab, one of the only legal schools of thought to be consciously formulated by the eponym. Stewart shows that al-T.abarı¯’s books constitute a corpus for training in the methods of his own madhhab.133 Because he was engaged in founding and legitimizing his own school, when asked, al-T.abarı¯ said he did not consider Ibn H.anbal to be a noteworthy jurist.134 In his Ikhtila¯f, a book designed to trace the differences between legal scholars, he completely ignored him.135 It is interesting that al-T.abarı¯’s statement that Ibn H.anbal was not a jurisprudent mirrors Ibn H.anbal’s own assertions according to H.anbalı¯ sources. Ibn H.anbal had no intention of forming a madhhab and would have abhorred the concept.136 But as Franz Rosenthal asserts, this position “could have led to riots if it was ever expressed ex cathedra.”137 When it was, the H.ana¯bila violently attacked al-T.abarı¯ for it. Islamic law tolerates a wide range of opinions on juristic decisions. In matters not specifically detailed in the Qur a¯n, each jurist can only provide a probable opinion: the most authoritative opinion is the one that should be followed. If a jurisprudent is considered competent, even if another jurisprudent offers a more probable answer, one must accept the possibility of error and recognize that the first jurisprudent could be correct.138 Epistemologically, one had to accept the authority of the Other to engage in legal discourse as an equal. Conversely, it was vital to be recognized by the Other as competent jurists and jurisprudents.

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Al-T.abarı¯’s assertion was intolerable because denying their eponym’s competence negated the H.ana¯bila’s very existence as a school of legal thought. In addition, as with the doxographies, if the H.ana¯bila were to be accepted as competent jurists, then they had to accept the other schools’ competency in order to avoid complete exclusion. Al-Khalla¯l’s emphasis on quietism gave them the tools of adaptation, but that had to wait until his line of thought had triumphed within the H.ana¯bila. The violent H.anbalı¯ response to al-T.abarı¯ is most clearly understood if their madhhab is seen as a new player competing with al-T.abarı¯’s madhhab, which was equally new.139 Both were vying for adherents, permanency, and orthodox status.140 Al-Ash arı¯’s efforts, as a contemporary endeavor, further complicated matters. Conflict arose between al-T.abarı¯ and H.anbalı¯s, specifically in regard to the interpretation of Qur a¯n 17:79. The H.ana¯bila interpreted it anthropomorphically, with God seating Muh.ammad on the throne next to Him, in the “praiseworthy position,” implying God could corporally sit upon a chair. Others (not exclusively the followers of al-T.abarı¯) interpreted the verse metaphorically, because God should not be anthropomorphized. The two sides skirmished in the streets over these issues.141 When asked about the H.anbalı¯ interpretation in 290/903, al-T.abarı¯ decried it as poppycock, causing the H.anbalı¯s to launch an assault on his house.142 What is most interesting about this bloody fracas is it took place between the hoi polloi, who asserted they followed al-Bukha¯rı¯’s interpretation of the verse, and the followers of Abu¯ Bakr al-Marru¯dhı¯.143 In this instance the rabble were followers of al-T.abarı¯,144 who were portrayed as the majority and in possession of a more sound interpretation derived from one of the greatest h.adı¯th compilers and thus possessing ijma¯ . Al-Bukha¯rı¯ studied with Ibn H.anbal and to reference him also incorporated Ibn H.anbal’s intellectual history (and isna¯d, an isna¯d that served to trump the H.ana¯bila). In addition, rather than being solely the act of al-Barbaha¯rı¯ and his militants, the attack on al-T.abarı¯’s house was a general H.anbalı¯ attempt to militantly insist upon its interpretation as orthodox. They battled for external acceptance even as they internally struggled over how to express it. This encounter was not just about the interpretation of a verse but also about inclusion within normative orthodoxy.145 Returning

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the favor of insultingly ignoring an eponym, almost 20 years later, in 309/921, al-T.abarı¯ was summoned to debate with the H.anbalı¯s about an unnamed issue.146 The H.anbalı¯s refused to participate. Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) informs us of civil unrest at the time of al-T.abarı¯’s death, in 310/923.147 He does not state who the troublemakers are, but Ibn Kathı¯r confirms they were the H.ana¯bila.148 The H.ana¯bila accused al-T.abarı¯ of Ra¯fid.ism (extreme Shı¯ ism) and heresy (ilh.a¯d, deviation), causing such a din outside al-T.abarı¯’s house he had to be buried at night.149 The H.anbalı¯ accusations were meant to denigrate his other ideas and opinions, most specifically, those on his position about Ibn H.anbal’s legal competency.150 Ibn Kathı¯r refuted the defamation and revised the role of the crowd to advance a majoritarian position for al-T. abarı¯ by claiming that crowds from “the rest of the quarters of Baghdad came to honor him.”151 He states they came to pray over him and continued to do so for a month. The H.ana¯bila also pressed their claim of superiority over al-T.abarı¯ in areas other than popular violence. As Melchert observes, Ibn al-Muna¯dı¯ states that Ibn H.anbal composed a tafsı¯r larger than al-T.abarı¯’s “lest al-T.abarı¯ seem to have outshone him in this important respect.”152 The impetus for these H.anbalı¯ acts was twofold: a desire for widespread recognition that the H.ana¯bila fell within the domain of normative orthodoxy and defense of the legacy and reputation of their eponym. The H.ana¯bila were asserting by their activities, both quietist and militant, that they belonged.153 The claim and counterclaim of status and authority was necessarily a discursive activity, engaging an Other either directly or obliquely. As noted in Chapter 5, al-T.abarı¯ omits Ibn H.anbal’s encounter with al-Mu tas.im. Several possible reasons can explain this omission: Ibn H.anbal did not acquiesce, and al-T.abarı¯ did not want to show it because it would enhance the H.anbalı¯ position; he acquiesced, but al-T.abarı¯ did not want to risk further violence from the H.ana¯bila; or the situation was so ambiguous he could not determine what happened. The first explanation is improbable because contradictory narratives existed, were easily available and credible, and when paired would have effectively cast the necessary doubt to do the job. The second explanation is also doubtful given that the violent tendencies of the H.ana¯bila did not prevent him from stating Ibn H.anbal was

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not a jurist, a much more directly inflammatory statement. The third explanation is even more unlikely given al-T.abarı¯’s propensity for including contradictory versions. However, there is a fourth possibility. If al-T.abarı¯ were antiH.anbalı¯, then why did he mention Ibn H.anbal’s imprisonment under al-Ma mu¯n? Why not disregard him completely? When al-Ma mu¯n’s letters are contextualized, Bishr b. al-Walı¯d and Ibra¯hı¯m b. al-Mahdı¯ receive more focus from the Caliph and are more prominent figures. Ibn H.anbal appears relatively unimportant to his social context, merely one h.adı¯th transmitter among many. Al-T.abarı¯ could not deny Ibn H.anbal was tried, so he made his trial brief, unimportant, uneventful, and inconclusive. Al-T.abarı¯’s last mention of Ibn H.anbal is when he is sent to al-Ma mu¯n for questioning. Downplaying Ibn H.anbal’s role undermines H.anbalı¯ claims more so than an overt claim of Ibn H.anbal’s acquiescence could. An overt claim recognizes Ibn H.anbal was a consequential figure, whether heretical or orthodox. Omission argues he was insignificant, heretic or not. H.anbalı¯ attacks on al-T.abarı¯ and on those who interpreted Qur a¯n 17:79 differently show the H.ana¯bila were militantly asserting their place within the range of normative orthodoxy and the place of their eponym among the paragons of juridical thought. Chapters 2 and 3 show that a method for establishing one’s place among the acceptable was to paint opponents in the worst possible light while tracing one’s own ideological/theological pedigree through the earliest pious figures. Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯ writes about Ibn H.anbal, “How he stands out among the truthful, how close he is to the ancients.”154 To press the point further, the H.ana¯bila emphasized Ibn H.anbal’s role as a monumental collector of h.adı¯th, of the Musnad, to prove his connection to and understanding of the beliefs and modes of behavior of the earliest pious figures. Ultimately, he becomes the inheritor and protector of the Prophet’s legacy.155 To strengthen the claim of authority, the H.ana¯bila vigorously proclaimed the importance of their imam. They presented his trial as evidence of his importance while squelching doubts as to the outcome of that encounter. We have yet to address the means by which the H.anbalı¯ interpretation of Ibn H.anbal’s trial became dominant. Al-Khalla¯l’s successful

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efforts to formalize a H.anbalı¯ madhhab were the key to the mainstream adoption of the H.anbalı¯ narrative. The early sources note Ibn H.anbal avoided activist movements like Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s for commanding the good with militancy. Al-Khalla¯l’s presentation of Ibn H.anbal’s position on al-amr bi l-ma ru¯f suggests commanding the good was not an individual duty but rather a collective one.156 Instead, quietism was to be a dominant choice for membership in the madhhab if al-Khalla¯l were to have his way, which he ultimately did.157 His focus on coexistence may have been an effort to gain greater acceptance of their madhhab by the other madha¯hib. In contrast, al-Barbaha¯rı¯ claimed exclusive ownership of normative orthodoxy.158 As shown through the doxographies, however, the maximalist position risked complete exclusion. Al-Khalla¯l’s enjoining of quietism had its intended effect as it became the predominant mode of interaction for all the participants.

Conclusions Islam tends toward inclusion within a normative range, provided the basics (the five pillars) are accepted. When al-Mutawakkil was assassinated, the center no longer focused on such matters, and the possibility of a central organ dictating orthodox/nonorthodox dissipated. With an incapacitated/captive Caliph, no group could gain a decisive advantage over the others in determining normativity because all groups were roughly even. As groups recognized a decisive victory was impossible, they realized the zero-sum game hurt all, whereas coexistence and toleration benefitted all players. Any groups contriving to display maximalist behavior were quickly alienated. This development also meant once a school of legal or theological thought was generally accepted as orthodox, its constituents and especially its eponym were assumed to be orthodox. Because the H.ana¯bila integrated themselves within the normative range, they began, in spite of the admonitions of Ibn H.anbal to his family, to draw themselves toward the center of power. They became deeply associated with and the staunchest supporters of the Abba¯sid Caliphate.159 Paradoxically, through this link, the extant descriptions of the Mih.na are based in the H.anbalı¯ vision because, in a later period, they aligned themselves most closely to the Caliphate.

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The portrayal given in H.anbalı¯ sources has driven our understanding of the Mih.na as an aberration whose sin is debited to al-Ma mu¯n or Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d. Their magnification of the piety of Ibn H.anbal and diminishment of the culpability of the Caliphs has shaped our interpretation of the Mih.na and of the role and importance of the figures involved. Using the H.anbalı¯ rendering, modern scholars have made assumptions about the legitimacy of Caliphs exerting political and theological authority. However, the Mih.na was neither aberrant nor did it change the Caliph’s social role, particularly with respect to the ulama¯ . Although the Mih.na and Ibn H.anbal’s trial assumed tremendous importance and looms large on the landscape of early Islamic historiography, in spite of its precedented and nonaberrational nature, we now see that the Mih.na’s context, and the context of later renditions, differ greatly. In the Mih.na, the ulama¯ were not a social force in opposition to the Caliph, forcing him to recant his claim as Commander of the Faithful. The Mih.na did not signal a dramatic shift in the Caliph’s social relations either. The reason the ulama¯ inherited control of the law is due to the court intrigues surrounding the death of al-Mutawakkil and the chaos of the Samarran period, not because the Caliphs “lost” during the Mih.na. The inevitable questions arise: What made the Mih.na unique? Why had the infrastructural problems and legitimation crises not caused this type of response before? The answer is it had. Abd al-Malik and Hisha¯m, among others, pursued heretics as a way of dealing with infrastructural problems and legitimation crises. The particular form of the Mih.na as a pursuit of heresy was different largely as a result of the intellectual acumen of al-Ma mu¯n. Identification and definition of heretics was a regular activity that served a variety of purposes, among which was publicizing membership in and authority to delineate orthodoxy. Orthodoxy was dynamic and constantly redefined. Considered within this context, the Mih.na, although significant, has had its meaning and importance distorted by the needs of the H.ana¯bila. The Mih.na was merely one incident in a series of events on the path to define orthodoxy.

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NOTES

Chapter 1 1. Walter Patton in 1897 was the first to translate “Mih.na” as “inquisition.” Although I use that translation, it was not analogous in scope to the medieval European inquisitions. W. M. Patton, Ah.med Ibn H . anbal and the Mih.na (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1897). 2. See J. A. Nawas, “al-Ma mu¯n: Mih.na and Caliphate” (PhD diss., Catholic University of Nijmegan, 1992), 61. 3. Although the opening statement usually is, “What is your view about the Qur a¯n?” The defendant either states its created nature or tries to evade and then is asked, “Is the Qur a¯n created?” See Abu¯ Ja far Muh.ammad b. Jarı¯r al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh al-rusul wa l-mulu¯k, ed. M. J. de Goeje. 15 vols (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1879), 3:1121–124. 4. For an interesting parallel, see the description of Justinian’s antiheretic activities in R. I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society (New York: B. Blackwell, 1987), 12. Nawas and Cooperson note the possibility of a parallel between al-Ma mu¯n and Byzantine iconoclastic repression occurring at the same time. J. A. Nawas, “The Moral Imperative in Contemporary Islamic Movements,” in Strategies in Medieval Communal Identity, ed. W. J. van Bekkum and P. M. Cobb (Leuven: Peeters, 2004); M. Cooperson, Al-Ma mu¯n (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005), 126–27. 5. The death toll for the Mih.na was extremely low, which is the reason for caution in comparisons to the Spanish Inquisition. Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d was no Torquemada, and there was no auto da fe.

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6. For example, Ibn Asa¯kir relates “none of the caliphs memorized the Qur a¯n except Uthma¯n b. Affa¯n and al-Ma mu¯n.” Ta rı¯kh madı¯nat Dimashq (hereafter TMD) (Beirut: Da¯r al-Fikr, 1995), 33:288.6. 7. El-Hibri briefly mentions the attempt to remove blame. Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 124–25. 8. For more, see J. P. Turner, “Ah.mad b. Abı¯ Du a¯d,” in EI3. 9. For more, see H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kala¯m (Cambridge: HUP, 1976). 10. W. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 135. 11. For a good summation, see I. Mattson, The Story of the Qur a¯n (Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 2008), 137–44; R. C. Martin, “Createdness of the Qur a¯n,” in EQ; and B. Weiss, “Law in Islam and in the West,” in Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams, ed. W. Hallaq and D. Little (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 244. 12. My decision to use the gender-specific pronoun for God is merely to simplify grammatical structure. 13. J. A. Nawas, “A Reexamination of Three Current Explanations for Al-Ma mu¯n’s Introduction of the Mih.na,” IJMES 26 (1994): 20n. 14. Mathieu Tillier notes, “Les cadis furent régulièrement utilisés comme prolongement de la personne du calife, tant pour l’informer de la situation de ‘lempire que pour légitimer des actes politiques.” Les cadis d’Iraq et l’état abbasside (132/750–334/945), Pifd (Damas: IFPO, 2009), 553. 15. For more on judges, see M. Masud, R. Peters, and D. Powers, “Qa¯d. ¯ıs and their Courts: An Historical Survey” in Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and Their Judgments, ed. M. Masud, R. Peters, and D. Powers (Boston: Brill, 2006). 16. For more on muftis see M. Masud, B. Messick, and D. Powers, “Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation,” in Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas, ed. M. Masud, B. Messick, and D. Powers (Cambridge: HUP, 1996). 17. See M. Fierro, “Religious Dissension in al-Andalus,” al-Qant.ara 22 (2001). Also see W. Hallaq, Sharı¯ a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 544. 18. A. Knysh, “Orthodoxy and Heresy in Medieval Islam,” MW 83 (1993): 54–55. Hallaq agrees: The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (New York: CUP, 2005), Chap. 3. For more on the h.adı¯th see J. Burton, An Introduction to the H . adı¯th (Edinburgh: EUP, 1994); G. H. A. Juynboll, Muslim Tradition (Cambridge: CUP, 1983); and M. A. Cook, Early Muslim Dogma: A SourceCritical Study (Cambridge: CUP, 1981).

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19. Of the four, the H . anbalı¯ has traditionally been the smallest. That shifted somewhat with the advent of Saudi Arabia in the twentieth century and their adoption of it as the basis for their legal system. 20. There were others, but because the Mih.na is most often discussed in relation to Ibn H . anbal, only he is mentioned here. 21. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:481.10–481.15. 22. Here al-Mahdı¯ is operating with a definition of Sunna that includes the practices of Muh.ammad’s companions. This was a common interpretation; C. Melchert notes, “Ah.mad [b. H . anbal] expressly identifies the binding sunnah as that of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided caliphs, not of the Prophet alone, adding that he dislikes to disagree with any of the other Companions.” “The Early History of Islamic Law,” in Method and Theory in the Study of Islamic Origins, ed. H. Berg (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 310. 23. For more on the definition of state and its attendant structures, see C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990, rev. ed. (Cambridge: B. Blackwell, 1992), 1–5. The state as usually understood did not exist in the premodern period. As such, my use of the term “state” is merely a convenience. For another compelling definition see W. al-Qa¯d. ¯ı, “The Religious Foundation of Late Umayyad Ideology and Practice,” in Saber Religioso y Poder Político en el Islam, ed. M. Marín (Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, 1994), 231:2n. 24. P. Crone, God’s Rule: Government and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), Chap. 2. The desert caravan analogy is hers. I disagree with her on the point in time at which the Caliph ceased to be (or perceived himself as) the guide for the community. 25. On social roles as a sociological tool see J. A. Jackson, “Editorial Introduction,” in Role (Cambridge: CUP, 1972). 26. Theology proves God’s existence whereas law provides guidance for how to manifest belief in that. See G. Makdisi, “The Juridical Theology of Sha¯fi ¯ı,” SI 59 (1984). Also noted by Weiss, “Law in Islam and in the West,” 243–46. 27. Weiss, following Makdisi, makes this point and notes that for both medieval Christian and Muslim audiences this statement would be laughably obvious. He does not note that in the medieval Christian world, positive law became the purview of the ruling elite as lay political leaders became more powerful and the church lost ground in this realm. This, however, would not completely sever the link between law and theology. “Law in Islam and in the West,” 243–46. 28. D. Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1998), 46–47.

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29. Melchert notes, “Like medieval Christians, the Sunni community eventually achieved a majoritarian piety by defining membership strictly in terms of profession of orthodox beliefs, not necessarily living up to them.” As with the Christians, mechanisms developed for channeling those of a more zealous bent. Ahmad ibn Hanbal (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 112. 30. Note that even though it became dominant it was never the only one. 31. See H. A. R. Gibb, “Government and Islam under the Early Abbasids,” in L’élaboration de l’Islam, colloque de Strasbourg, ed. C. Cahen (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961). 32. I. M. Lapidus, “The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society,” IJMES 6 (1975): 371. For more on the abna¯ al-dawla, see J. P. Turner, “The abna¯ al-dawla: The Definition and Legitimation of Identity in Response to the Fourth Fitna,” JAOS 124 (2004). 33. For a solid refutation of the traditional understanding of how, why, and to what purpose the “slave soldiers” served, see M. Gordon, The Breaking of a Thousand Swords (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001). 34. His earliest purchases were of Turks in Baghdad who had been somewhat acculturated to the norms of the capital. 35. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1099. For more see M. Hinds, “Mih.na,” in EI2. 36. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1112. 37. Ibid., 3:1112–133. Al-T.abarı¯ relied on an earlier source, which preserves the letters. Ah.mad Ibn Abı¯ T.a¯hir T.ayfu¯r, Sechster Band des Kitâb Bagdâd, ed. H. Keller (Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1908), 338–47. The following quote from the letters is located in al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1115.14– 116.4. I have followed but modified significantly the translation of Patton, Ah.med Ibn H . anbal, 60. The letter goes on to say that those questioned, once they proved themselves not to be heretics, were to question those under their authority and those who came before them in court. For an in-depth discussion of the letters, see V. De Gifis, “Qur a¯nic Rhetoric in the Politics of al-Ma mu¯n’s Caliphate” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2008), Chap. 3. 38. Nawas, “al-Ma mu¯n,” 57; Nawas, “A Reexamination,” 621; and M. Cooperson, Classical Arabic Biography (hereafter CAB) (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 110. 39. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1116–117. 40. Nawas, “al-Ma mu¯n,” 70. See Patton, Ah.med Ibn H . anbal, 64. It is alleged al-Ma mu¯n was dissuaded from including Ibn H . anbal in the first group. Given that the earliest H . anbalı¯ sources are silent on this point, it is a clear interpolation designed to illustrate and enhance Ibn H . anbal’s prestige. 41. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1116–117.

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42. Ibid., 3:1131. Patton, Ah.med Ibn H . anbal, 70. Hinds, “Mih.na.” Who was Muh.ammad b. Nu¯h.? We know almost nothing about him, but his name certainly raises questions, because mad. ru¯b means free from blame. 43. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1131–132. We hear nothing more about these two in al-T.abarı¯. 44. For more on taqiyya see D. Stewart, “Taqiyya as Performance,” in Law and Society in Islam, ed. B. Johansen (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996). 45. Patton, Ah.med Ibn H . anbal, 107–11. 46. For the Samarran milieu see Gordon, The Breaking of a Thousand Swords; and H. Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs (New York: Routledge, 2001). For the physical landscape see A. Northedge, The Historical Topography of Samarra (London: British School of Archaeology in Iraq, 2005). 47. The earliest work in English on the Mih.na is Patton, Ah.med Ibn H . anbal. Goldziher briefly addresses the Mih.na in his review of Patton’s book. “Review: W. Patton’s Ah.med ibn H . anbal and the Mih.na,” ZDMG 52 (1898). D. B. Macdonald, “Review: Patton’s Ah.med ibn H . anbal and the Mih.na,” American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures 14 (1898). G. le Strange, “Review of Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and the Mihna,” The English Historical Review 13, no. 50 (1898). 48. Patton, Ah.med Ibn H . anbal. H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 2004), 161–62. I. Bligh-Abramski, “The Judiciary (Qa¯d. ¯ıs) as a Governmental-Administrative Tool in Early Islam,” JESHO 35 (1992): 60. W. M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh: EUP, 1973). 49. Wilferd Madelung asserts al-Ma mu¯n used the Mih.na as a convenient political tool to control opposition groups without really intending “to impose Mu tazilı¯ theology.” “The Vigilante Movement of Sahl b. Sala¯ma al-Khurasa¯nı¯ and the Origins of H . anbalism Reconsidered,” Journal of Turkish Studies 14 (1990): 337. 50. Hinds, “Mih.na.” I thank Prof. Melchert for directing me to his article that nicely illustrates this point. “The Adversaries of Ah.mad Ibn H . anbal,” Arabica 44 (1997). Also see Melchert, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 90. Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d was more likely to have been of the H . anafı¯ madhhab, from whence he derived his position. The two were not mutually exclusive; one could be H . anafı¯ and Mu tazilı¯ at the same time. 51. Following Knysh, “Orthodoxy and Heresy,” 50. Because the term “heresiography” presumes the accuracy and ahistoricity of the hierarchy of orthodoxy and heresy, I use the term “doxography” to mean “description of beliefs” as a way of reducing the inherent privileging of what became “orthodoxy.”

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52. D. Sourdel, “La politique religieuse du calife Abba¯side al-Ma mu¯n,” REI 30 (1962). Watt, Formative Period, 176–79. Lapidus, “Separation,” 382–83. Lapidus sees al-Ma mu¯n as using Shı¯ ism as a tool. He revised his thesis somewhat but not dramatically. See I. M. Lapidus, “State and Religion in Islamic Societies,” Past and Present 151 (1996). For him, the Mih.na remains the defining point of separation between church and state in Islam. 53. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1098. See Ibn Abı¯ T.a¯hir T.ayfu¯r, Kitâb Bagdâd, 91. Alı¯ b. al-H . usayn al-Mas u¯dı¯, Muru¯j al-dhahab wa ma a¯din al-jawhar, ed. M. H. Al-Na sa¯n (Beirut: Dar el-Marefah, 2005), 4:37.6-.28. Sourdel, “La politique religieuse,” 39. 54. Sourdel, “La politique religieuse,” 39. 55. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1099. 56. Ibid., 3:1105; and Ibn Abı¯ T.a¯hir T.ayfu¯r, Kitâb Bagdâd, 265. Note he only orders them to pronounce it once. 57. Nawas, “A Reexamination,” 619. Sourdel, “La politique religieuse,” 41–42, 46. 58. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1136. 59. W. M. Watt argues this forced the Shı¯ a to define the Imamate and to rank him as the eighth Imam. “The Reappraisal of Abbasid Shi ism,” in Arabic and Islamic Studies, ed. G. Makdisi (Cambridge: Dept. of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures of Harvard University, 1965), 647. 60. See Watt, Formative Period, 177–79. 61. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:796. 62. Nawas, “al-Ma mu¯n,” 25–26, 51–52. Nawas, “A Reexamination,” 624. 63. P. Crone and M. Hinds, God’s Caliph (Cambridge: CUP, 1986). Hinds, “Mih.na.” Crone has since revised her argument. “The Kha¯rijites and the Caliphal Title,” in Studies in Islamic and Middle Eastern Texts and Traditions in Memory of Norman Calder, ed. G. R. Hawting, J. A. Mojaddedi, and A. Samely (Oxford: OUP, 2000). She further strengthens the argument in God’s Rule. 64. Concerning the tradition that Abu¯ Bakr rejected the title khalı¯fat alla¯h, Watt writes it “is almost certainly an invention made to oppose Umayyad claims.” “God’s Caliph: Qur a¯nic Interpretations and Umayyad Claims,” in Iran and Islam, ed. C. E. Bosworth (Edinburgh: EUP, 1971), 572. 65. Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph, 93. 66. Hinds, “Mih.na.” 67. See W. al-Qa¯d. ¯ı, “The Term “Khalı¯fa” in Early Exegetical Literature,” Die Welt des Islams 28 (1988). A. Shahin, “Struggling for Communitas” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2009), 403–628. His conclusions, although worthwhile, do not discount Abba¯sid use of the term (p. 409).

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68. F. M. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers (Cambridge: HUP, 2010), 57, 98–99, 209–11. 69. Nawas, “al-Ma mu¯n,” 62. 70. Nawas, “A Reexamination,” 619. 71. Nawas, “al-Ma mu¯n,” 52. 72. Ibid., 1. 73. Ibid., 60. 74. Ibid., 65. 75. N. Hurvitz, The Formation of H . anbalism (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), Pt. III. Also see N. Hurvitz, “Who Is the Accused? The Interrogation of Ah.mad Ibn H . anbal,” al-Qant.ara 22 (2001). 76. Hurvitz, Formation, 117–18, 122; and Hurvitz, “Who Is the Accused?” 77. Hurvitz, Formation, 123–24. 78. Also see Fierro, “Religious Dissension,” 464. She writes, “… the rulers had a vested interest in playing the role of umpires between factions of scholars, which again helped the fluidity of belief and practice.” 79. N. Hurvitz, “Ah.mad Ibn H . anbal and the Formation of Islamic Orthodoxy” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1994), 213–14, 227. M. Cooperson and M. Zaman also note the need to ensure the Caliph was not held blameworthy, a point to which I return. Cooperson, CAB, 149, 152–53. M. Q. Zaman, Religion and Politics Under the Early Abba¯sids (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 112, 113. El-Hibri alludes to this as well. El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, 124. 80. Zaman, Religion and Politics. For some important considerations regarding his argument see C. Melchert, “Review of Religion and Politics under the Early Abba¯sids. The Emergence of the Proto-Sunnı¯ Elite, by Muhammad Qasim Zaman,” ILS 6 (1999); and E. L. Daniel, “Review of M. Q. Zaman, Religion and Politics Under the Early Abba¯sids,” JRAS 8 (1998). 81. See Zaman, Religion and Politics, 130, 205, 209. He elaborates further in M. Q. Zaman, “The Caliphs, the Ulama, and the Law,” ILS 4 (1997). 82. Zaman, Religion and Politics, 202–204. 83. Ibid., 136. 84. Ibid., 64, 107–108. 85. Ibid., 113–14. 86. Ibid., 11. Hallaq mostly agrees with Zaman’s assessment. The Origins and Evolution, chap. 8. 87. Cooperson, CAB. 88. Ibid., 107–12. 89. Ibid., 11.

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90. El-Hibri also notes the effort to detach blame from al-Ma mu¯n’s immediate successors. El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, 124. 91. For more on the third/ninth century, see Watt, Formative Period. For the development of Islamic law in the fourth/tenth century, see, among others, N. Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories; C. Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th–10th Centuries C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 1997); K. Vikor, Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law (Oxford: OUP, 2005).

Chapter 2 1. B. Lewis, “Some Observations on the Significance of Heresy in the History of Islam,” SI 1 (1953). The term heretic is a relatively recent loan word to Arabic. The concepts translated most often as “heresy” have more shades of meaning than the English word conveys. Bid a means innovation. Ilh.a¯d means deviation. Kufr means unbelief. I use the term heretic in the sense of those who were defined as deviant by some individual or group, whether through innovation, deviation, or unbelief. This does not indicate I take them to be, in fact, heretical, only that someone deemed them so. The focus here is on the namers and not the named. Also see J. van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology (Cambridge: HUP, 2006), 11–14. D. Stewart, “Blasphemy,” in EQ. M. A. Amir-Moezzi, “Heresy,” in EQ. 2. On diversity see F. Griffel, “Toleration and Exclusion,” BSOAS 64 (2001). Also see J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 67–68. 3. Following Knysh’s definition of doxography. “Orthodoxy and Heresy,” 50. 4. For a quick background, see C. W. Hollister and J. M. Bennett, Medieval Europe, 10th ed. (Boston: McGraw–Hill, 2006), Chaps 8–10. 5. Upon interrogation early in the Mih.na, Abu¯ H . asan al-Ziya¯dı¯ explicitly enumerates the role of the Caliph. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1123. It is intriguing that the doxographer al-Baghda¯dı¯ (d. 429/1037) also includes the ability to practice ijtiha¯d among the abilities of the Imam/Caliph. Cited by W. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtiha¯d Closed?” IJMES 16 (1984): 13. Before that (with translation) by H. A. R. Gibb, “Constitutional Organization,” in Law in the Middle East, ed. M. Khadduri and H. Liebesny (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1955), 7–11. 6. Shahin has shown in great detail that Crone and Hinds’ argument about the phrase khalifa¯t alla¯h is shaky for the earliest period. However, he has not disproven that each Caliph behaved as if he, as Commander of the

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8.

9. 10.

11.

12.

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Faithful, possessed the mantle of leadership for a community of believers and that entitled each one to rule in matters of belief. In practical terms, whether the Caliph was claiming to be “God’s Deputy” or was in possession of the mandate of heaven, within a legitimating discourse the behavior was the same. Shahin, “Struggling for Communitas,” 404–628. De Gifis and al-Qa¯d. ¯ı present compelling arguments in which obedience to the Caliph is equivalent to membership in the community. De Gifis shows al-Amı¯n and al-Ma mu¯n, in their exchange of letters, claiming obedience is due because they have been divinely ordained to their position. De Gifis, “Qur a¯nic Rhetoric,” 142–43. Al-Qa¯d. ¯ı discusses similar claims from the Umayyads in “Religious Foundation.” The Umayyads asserted disobedience to the Caliph was equivalent to disobedience to God. Watt, “God’s Caliph,” 571. Al-Qa¯d. ¯ı discusses this extensively in “Religious Foundation.” See L. R. Kurtz, “The Politics of Heresy,” American Journal of Sociology 88 (1983): 1087. “Every heresy implies a political stance and every heretic is the leader of an insurrection, implicitly or explicitly.” Also see P. Crone, “Ninth Century Muslim Anarchists,” Past and Present, no. 167 (2000): 9–11. A. Marsham, Rituals of Islamic Monarchy (Edinburgh: EUP, 2009), 102, 108. al-Qa¯d. ¯ı, “Religious Foundation,” 241. De Gifis observes this in the letters exchanged between al-Amı¯n and al-Ma mu¯n. “Qur a¯nic Rhetoric,” 110, 129–31, 145. For the modern context, see R. Peters and G. De Vries, “Apostasy in Islam,” Die Welt des Islams 17 (1976–77): 16–17. They note that “by abandoning Islam, one rebels against the Islamic state and society,” and this is why it is punishable. S. Judd, “The Third Fitna: Orthodoxy, Heresy and Coercion in Late Umayyad History” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1997), 31. Al-Ja¯h.iz. in one of his famous letters, acting as an apologist for the Abba¯sids, lists a litany of heretical acts committed by the Umayyads with the clear inference about the status of the Abba¯sids relative to them. Amr b. Bahr al-Ja¯h.iz. , Rasa¯ il al-Ja¯h.iz. , ed. H . . Sandu¯bı¯ (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tija¯riyah al-Kubra, 1933), 295–97. The late Umayyads framed disobedience as rebellion too. al-Qa¯d. ¯ı, “Religious Foundation.” W. al-Qa¯d. ¯ı, “The Impact of the Qur a¯n on the Epistemology of Abd al-H . amı¯d,” in Approaches to the Qur a¯n, ed. G. R. Hawting and A-K Shareef (London: Routledge, 1993). See J. Taylor, “An Approach to the Emergence of Heterodoxy in Mediaeval Islam,” Religious Studies 2 (1967): 197. He notes that the word “heterodox” automatically denigrates that position as not “orthodox” and as the “antithesis to orthodox.”

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13. For the genesis of this notion, as applied to the construction of national identity, see M. Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995). 14. See M. Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the Text, ed. R. Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981). 15. For more on them see S. Stroumsa, Freethinkers of Medieval Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1999). M. Chokr, Zandaqa et zindı¯qs en Islam au second siècle de l’Hégire (Damas: Institut français de Damas, 1993). J. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra (hereafter TG) (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 1:416–26. 16. For example, J. L. Kraemer, “Heresy Versus the State in Medieval Islam,” in Studies in Judaica, Karaitica, and Islamica, ed. S. R. Brunswick (Ramat-Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1982). 17. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:534.11-.19. This is a notoriously difficult term to define. It will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 18. Moore, Formation, 146. Also see M. Rubin, “Review of R. I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society,” Speculum 65 (1990): 1025. He notes that “the boundaries of Christian society were being drawn by the newly invigorated clergy of the post-Gregorian age and, according to Moore, for it,” and in so doing it asserted for itself the authority to define as outside Christian society anyone who opposed it. The clergy asserted its place as “universal cultural agents…through the creation of robust notions of that which it contained, as well as images of that which was outside it, its Other—the polluted, marginal, deviant, disobedient— the dangerous.” 19. Asad notes, “For heresy expresses an asymmetrical power relationship between the Church and the souls in her care.” “Medieval Heresy: An Anthropological View,” Social History 11 (1986): 355. 20. See the interesting commentary in Swanson where, based on Moore, he discusses the rise of the clerici, a literate rival to the privileges of the nobility, and states “their voluble concern about heresy may have originated in anxiety to establish their own status in the contemporary society which they hoped to remold (perhaps especially important given the criticism of the schools and their products at the time) and the uncertainties produced by their speculations about the nature of christianity.” “Literacy, Heresy, History, and Orthodoxy,” in Heresy and Literacy, 1000–1530, ed. P. Biller and A. Hudson (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 280. 21. In writing refutations of heretics “all of this activity had to do with struggles among scholars for the definition of correct belief and practice, and for the establishment of their own reputation as upholders of orthodoxy.” Fierro, “Religious Dissension,” 473.

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22. Lewinstein comments that, although al-Baghda¯dı¯ is more polemical than his predecessors, “this may be partly due to temperament, but may also reflect a conscious attempt on his part to win an orthodox berth for the newly developing Ash arite theology.” “Studies in Islamic Heresiography” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1989), 17. This also applies to the invective of the H . anbalı¯s. 23. The Ash arites became so successful that eventually even the H . ana¯bila mostly subscribed to their theology. See Melchert, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 102. 24. Lewis, “Some Observations,” 62. 25. Noted by Moore and Russell. Also see Judd, “The Third Fitna,” 37. However, Swanson sounds a cautionary note, observing that “the evidence of the recording of heresy and the polemical reaction to it does not always offer precise indications of the actual extent or content of heresy.” “Literacy, Heresy, History and Orthodoxy,” 281. 26. Bowering cites al-H . alla¯j as a prime example for this. G. Bowering, “Early Sufism Between Persecution and Heresy,” in Islamic Mysticism Contested, ed. F. de Jong and B. Radtke (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 59. 27. J. B. Russell, Dissent and Order in the Middle Ages (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), 27. Moore, Formation, 68–69. “Heresy . . . can only arise in the context of the assertion of authority, which the heretic resists, and is therefore by definition a political matter. Heterodox belief, however, is not. Variety of religious opinion exists at many times and places, and becomes heresy when authority declares it intolerable.” On p. 71: “Obedience was always the test, but it was not always demanded with equal firmness or measured with equal nicety.” 28. R. I. Moore, “Literacy and the Making of Heresy c. 1000–c. 1150,” in Heresy and Literacy, 1000–1530, ed. P. Biller and A. Hudson (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 28. Moore, Formation, 114–15. 29. Moore, Formation, 107–108, 113, 123. The following is based on Moore 108–10. 30. Ibid., 109–10. This control would not be enacted in Islamic law until the Ottomans began systematizing its application in the modern period. See Hallaq, Sharı¯ a, 396–420. 31. See Moore, Formation, 109–10. For Weber’s discussion of legitimate violence and criminals and criminality, see M. Weber, Economy and Society, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich, 2 vols (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 311–25. 32. Asad observes “what is immediately at stake in any specific incident of heresy is the authority to judge the Truth, and something else too: the disciplines (behavioral and intellectual) by which that authority is secured.” “Medieval Heresy,” 355. Moore, Formation, 111.

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33. Judd, “The Third Fitna,” 43. His conclusions support al-Qa¯d. ¯ı’s arguments. “Impact of the Qur a¯n.” 34. Zaman, Religion and Politics, 63. 35. Ibid., 69. Similar to Moore, Formation. 36. See J. Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu (Oxford: OUP, 1978), 124. Also H. Laoust, “L’hérésiographie musulmane sous les Abbassides,” Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale 10 (1967): 158. He notes a usual tendency to think of Islam as a monolith, but Islam admits much diversity, which has been instrumental in its development. He continues noting the sects continually were in competition and “excommunicated” each other on a regular basis. 37. Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu, 124. 38. Knysh, “Orthodoxy and Heresy,” 49, 52, 62. Also see Abd al-Qa¯hir al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq bayn al-firaq, ed. M. Badr (Egypt: Matba at al-Ma a¯rif, 1910), 11.8–11.15. He allows room for error and disagreement within the confines of the community but puts restrictions on full membership, reserving it implicitly only for those who are in agreement with his positions and therefore who are not in error. 39. The tournament example is mine but is largely in agreement with W. Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity, ed. R. A. Kraft and G. Krodel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 130–94. 40. Knysh notes that “according to al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, different scholars held different opinions, and therefore some of them inevitably diverged from what he himself held to be an ‘authentic’ creed. But even if they erred, it was in good faith, and they remained within the confines of Islamic religion.” “Orthodoxy and Heresy,” 63. 41. On the Kha¯rijites, their tendency toward takfı¯r (declaring professed Muslims to be unbelievers) and the moderating and inclusive response of the majority to them, see Ess, Flowering, 30–31. 42. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtiha¯d Closed?” 9–10. Laoust places them within the H . ana¯bila, but Hallaq effectively shows they were not. Also see A. S. Halkin, “The H . ashwiyya,” JAOS 54 (1934). 43. Van Ess comments, “Sects, after all, do not name themselves; their names are given by their opponents and at times are coined by the heresiographers.” “The Ka¯milı¯ya,” in Shı¯ ism, ed. E. Kohlberg (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2003), 5. Watt agrees. “The Great Community and the Sects,” in Theology and Law in Islam, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum (Los Angeles: Near Eastern Center, UCLA, 1971), 28. 44. Consider Moore, Formation, 72. 45. J. R. Gillis, “Memory and Identity,” in Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, ed. J. R. Gillis (Princeton: PUP, 1994), 5.

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46. R. Dahrendorf, “Homo Sociologicus: On the History, Significance, and Limits of the Category of Social Role,” in German Sociology, ed. U. Gerhardt (New York: Continuum, 1998), 132. 47. K. Korsgaard, “The Sources of Normativity,” in Moral Discourse and Practice, ed. S. L. Darwall, A. Gibbard, and P. A. Railton (New York: OUP, 1997), 392. Also see Weber, Economy and Society, 31. 48. J. Habermas, “Discourse Ethics,” in Moral Discourse and Practice, ed. S. L. Darwall, A. Gibbard, and P. A. Railton (New York: OUP, 1997), 289. 49. In this context the discussion of Ibn H . anbal’s behavior as a guide for living a pious life makes perfect sense. See Melchert, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 75. Also see Cooperson, CAB, 141–42. 50. Muh.ammad b. Abd al-Karı¯m al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, Kita¯b al-milal wa l-nih.al, ed. W. Cureton, 2 vols (London: Society for the Publication of Oriental Texts, 1842–46), 1:9.3-.4. 51. See Weber, Economy and Society, 754–55. 52. Korsgaard, “The Sources of Normativity,” 393. I add this of course only applies to those facets of one’s practical identity one deems as fundamental to the whole. Negating one facet, or putting one facet aside, does not represent a threat to the whole because the individual engineers a hierarchy of identities, and if the whole matrix of identities the individual has designated as highest are not violated, then the person has not called into question the fundamental understanding of the self, thus allowing the individual to adapt to different situations and changes in social position without undermining the self or instigating a crisis of identity. This also allows for changes in individual strands of the identity without compromising the whole. 53. As Dahrendorf states, “It is by positions and roles that two conceptually distinguishable facts, the individual and society, are mediated . . .” Dahrendorf, “Homo Sociologicus,” 132. 54. Ibid., 131. 55. Russell observes that there was no concept of the separation of church and state in an “ancient polity.” It was thought perfectly natural that the Emperor would “regulate the church.” Russell, Dissent and Order, 10. This conception of the place of the ruler in society is strikingly similar to that of the Umayyads and the early Abba¯sids. 56. See Laoust, “L’hérésiographie musulmane,” 158. Laoust notes that the sects were both political and religious: “the theological-political question is at the heart of Muslim thought . . . ,” 167. He also states al-Baghda¯dı¯’s “political sociology supposes a theology, and his theology outlet upon a political sociology,” 178. He notes the religious and political history are best when considered as a pair because in practice one defines the other.

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57. For example, Zaman states, “The only attempt made in the early Abba¯sid period to enforce a particular doctrine was that of al-Ma mu¯n.” Religion and Politics, 202. Nyberg assumes the Mu tazila were the theological arm of the Abba¯sid political machine. H. S. Nyberg, “Mu tazila,” in E. J. Brill’s First Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1913–1936, ed. M. Th. Houtsma (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993). 58. For a literary example see De Gifis’ discussion of al-Amı¯n and al-Ma mu¯n’s letter exchange. De Gifis, “Qur a¯nic Rhetoric,” 115–16. 59. As a further explanation, Russell notes the church hierarchy identified Catharism with fourth-century Manichaeans. Despite the diversity of beliefs they encountered, they assumed it was all of a piece and rooted with Satan. This is extremely important, as he observes, “because people act on what they believe to be true rather than what may actually be true.” Dissent and Order, 49, 62. Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ questions the origin of the sects and schisms and concludes Satan is behind it all. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:6–11. Cited by Laoust, “L’hérésiographie musulmane,” 171. Swanson notes, “The repetitive listing of sects and reproduction of the stereotype of heretical depravity was at root a literary and literate concoction, with little real meaning for those actually accused of heresy.” “Literacy, Heresy, History and Orthodoxy,” 280. 60. Moore, Formation, 90–91. 61. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:10.5-.7. “And then the accursed man resumed and he said: this portion did not have in mind the countenance of God, most high. This (was) an unadulterated attack against the Prophet, upon him peace. If (one) who opposed the true Imam became a Kha¯rijı¯ then (he) who opposed the true Messenger, verily he becomes a Kha¯rijı¯.” 62. See Ess, “The Ka¯milı¯ya,” 8. For some examples see Lewinstein, “Studies in Islamic Heresiography,” 131, 134, 138–39, 147–48. Russell astutely observes that “the pedantic obscurity of the names [given to heretical groups], which derived from minor references in the New Testament, shows that the reformers had to grope for categories for new heresies that they themselves created by defining them.” Dissent and Order, 24. Brackets added. 63. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 4–5. Considering Wansbrough’s comment about “heresiography,” the organization “tends to be schematic and based upon a variety of propositions: (1) numerical (to make up the celebrated total of ‘73 sects’), (2) ad hominem (‘schools’ generated from the names of individuals by means of a nisba suffix), (3) doctrinal (divergent attitudes to specific problems).” The Sectarian Milieu, 116. Also see D. Sourdel, “La classification des sectes Islamiques dans le kita¯b al-milal d’al-Sahrasta¯nı¯,” SI 31 (1970): 245.

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64. See Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kala¯m, 508–509. Consider Wolfson’s comment about al-Shahrasta¯nı¯: “Now it will be noticed, in the passage quoted from Porphyry, upon which Shahrasta¯nı¯ makes his observation about Anaxagoras being the first who advanced the theory of ‘hiding—and— appearing.’ All that Porphyry is quoted as saying is that ‘the root of things is one single body’ and that ‘from it proceed all bodies and bodily forces and species and genera.’ The characterization of it as a theory of ‘hiding— and—appearing’ was thus given to it by Shahrasta¯nı¯ himself because of its similarity to the theory of Naz. z. a¯m, which was widely known among Muslims.” On p. 509: “What we really have in this passage is Shahrasta¯nı¯’s own opinion that the theory of latency, which in the passage he has quoted from Khayya¯t.’s Intis.a¯r is ascribed to Naz. z. a¯m, is in reality a theory which was held by certain Greek philosophers. …” 65. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:645. 66. Ibid., 3:1235. 67. Also see al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:79.17–85.9. In the discussion of the Karramiyya, whereas al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ is pointing out flaws and discrepancies in Karramı¯ theology, one has the distinct impression al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ has cobbled together a collection of individuals and beliefs and placed them under the rubric of the Karramiyya for the sake of systematization. There appears to be little connection between these individuals other than the assertion they were Karramiyya; the beliefs are contradictory. Also see Izz al-Dı¯n Ibn al-Athı¯r, al-Ka¯mil fı¯ l-ta rı¯ kh, ed. C. J. Tornberg (Beirut: Da¯r S.a¯dir, 1965), 6:152. Also see J. van Ess, Frühe mu tazilitische Häresiographie (Wiesbaden: In Kommission bei F. Steiner, 1971), 35.9–35.13. 68. Laoust, “L’hérésiographie musulmane,” 168. Citing al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 299–354. 69. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:5.1–5.2. Cited by Sourdel, “Classification des sectes,” 244. 70. See Moore, Formation, 98–99. Moore, quoting Leach, asserts humans cannot often affect the physical structure of their surroundings, but they can affect the meanings of those structures and how these are categorized and arranged, thus allowing us to draw lines of difference and otherness. 71. Knysh notes al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ “provided, perhaps unconsciously, a picture accentuating not the irrevocable confrontation between the religiously true and the religiously wrong, but rather the creative dialogue between equally legitimate and independent interpretations of Islam, built on the same invariant premises.” “Orthodoxy and Heresy,” 51. Rubin comments Moore shows “a language of exclusion created a cluster of attributes, a discourse of otherness, which was variously used to fit the many groups

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72. 73. 74. 75.

76.

77.

78.

79. 80.

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to which it was applied.” “Review of R. I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society,” 1026. Swanson, “Literacy, Heresy, History and Orthodoxy,” 284. See ibid., 281–82. For a nondoxographic example, see al-Ma mu¯n’s first Mih.na letter. Especially al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1115. See al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:10.19–10.20, where he asserts the criticism leveled against Muh.ammad “became like the seeds and the uncertainty (errors) appeared from it like the crop.” Watt states the Jahmites “seem to have been created out of almost nothing.” “The Significance of the Sects in Islamic Theology,” in Actas, IV Congresso des Estudos Arabes e Islamicos (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), 169. Watt, “The Great Community,” 30. Also consider the account in Ess, Frühe, 35.9–35.13. It makes clear the Khurramiyya were not a unified monolith, but this point is quickly glossed over by the author. While noting differences, his presentation maintains the sense of a collective threat by coding them with the same name, although clearly they were different groups, if they in fact ever existed. Consider the following comment by S. Stroumsa and G. G. Stroumsa: “In the Byzantine world ‘Manichaeism’” was a derogatory term that was applied to a variety of “heretics whose beliefs were not even loosely connected to Manichaeism.” “Aspects of Anti-Manichaean Polemics in Late Antiquity and Under Early Islam,” Harvard Theological Review 81 (1988): 38, 5n. Van Ess states “the name Walı¯dı¯ya cannot have been used by anyone except himself [the author of the doxography quoted].” “A New Source of Muslim Heresiography,” in Proceedings of the 27th International Congress of Orientalists (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1971), 270. Information in brackets added. See G. Vajda, “Les Zindı¯qs en pays d’Islam au début de la période Abbaside,” Rivista degli Studi Orientali 17 (1938): 181. He argues that by the end of the second century “the orthodox applied the epithet zindı¯q to those who professed the Qur a¯n to be created.” Also see Stroumsa and Stroumsa, “Aspects of Anti-Manichaean Polemics,” 56–58. They note that in a text by Theodore Abu¯ Qurra, a Christian, “the reference to Manichaeism is made only as ilza¯m, that is, in order to force the opponent to see the outrageous logical outcome of his claims” and that he was not actually arguing against or about Manichaeism but about the doctrine of free will. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:37.6–37.7. Ibid., 1:37.20. Also 37.5–37.6: “And indeed he read from the books of the philosophers and he blended their kala¯m with the kala¯m of the Mu tazila.” Note that throughout al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ associates the ideas of the philosophers

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81.

82.

83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

89.

90.

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with unbelievers, innovators, apostates, and the like, which all serves as subtle proofs that the “ancient philosophers” were unacceptable. Consider pp. 44.12–44.13: “For them [Ibn Kha¯bit. and Fad. l al-H . adathı¯] was another path about the transmigration of souls, it was for them a combination of the kala¯m of the metempsychosists, the philosophers and the Mu tazila.” This, of course, papers over the fact the Ash arites also partook of “the kala¯m of the Mu tazila.” Al-Baghda¯dı¯ argues the Mu tazila “try to mislead the gullible” when they claim al-Naz. z. a¯m’s name referred to him as a composer of poetry (Farq, 113.11–113.12) and compares al-Naz. z. a¯m’s beliefs to those of the Manichaeans (117.6–117.7). He also states al-Naz. z. a¯m associated with dualists and sophists and got his ideas from the “deviators (mulh.id) of the philosophers” (113.15). He “concurred with the school of thought of the dualists, and with the innovations of the philosophers, and with the dubious deviators in the religion of Islam” (114.3–114.4). Ibn al-Nadı¯m traces what amounts to an apostolic succession for the Manichaeans that shows the Manichaeans of his time were the same as the Manichaeans of yesteryear. Muh.ammad b. Ish.a¯q Ibn al-Nadı¯m, Kita¯b al-fihrist, ed. G. Flügel, 2 vols (Leipzig: F. C. W. Vogel, 1871), 1:334.19–335.1. In the process he explains away the differences among them and shows they really all descend from the same root and therefore can be considered together. Even though they had differences, they all were derived from Mani. Ibn al-Nadı¯m made the point they, the Manichaeans, were active all along in a line of continuous succession, an isna¯d of evil. Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu, 124–25. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 19.18–20.2. Emphasis added. M. S. Seale, Muslim Theology (London: Luzac, 1964), 43. Citing Ibn al-Murtad. a¯ al-Munya, 5. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:17.19–17.20. He also admits Wa¯.sil was responsible for only one of the five doctrines (manzila bayn al-manzilatayn). Knysh, “Orthodoxy and Heresy,” 54–55. Ibid., 53. He notes about Ash arism that “during many centuries, it was bitterly opposed by the h.adı¯th folk (ahl al-h.adı¯th), an influential group of Sunni ulama¯ , often portrayed by western researchers as staunch supporters of ‘Sunni orthodoxy.’” See G. Makdisi, “The Sunni Revival,” in Islamic Civilisation, 950–1150, ed. D. S. Richards (Oxford: Cassirer, 1973). Al-Baghda¯dı¯ was writing during a period of deep suspicion of the Ash arite enterprise. See G. Makdisi, “Ash arı¯ and the Ash arites in Islamic Religious History: Part II,” SI 18 (1963): 37–38. The Ash arite sources paint Ash arism as the

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91. 92.

93. 94. 95.

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moderate mean between “ultrarationalist” Mu tazilı¯s and the “ultraconservative” H . anbalı¯s. “This picture was calculated to convince viewers that Ash arism was the middle of the road orthodoxy. And so we dutifully became convinced not only of this, but of more, by force of implication.” I suspect this, combined with the common assumption that Ash arism was the definition of orthodoxy, has led most scholars to interpret and discuss the Mu tazila as heretics and to try and determine how these “heretics” were able to dupe such a shrewd Caliph as al-Ma mu¯n, when the reality of the situation was that at the time of al-Ma mu¯n and his immediate successors, the Mu tazila were not considered to be nor were successfully labeled as heretics until much later. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 15.10. What al-Ash arı¯ actually may have done or said, as Makdisi has pointed out, had only tangential impact on the development of the school named for him. We will return to this pattern of assertion. “Ash arı¯ and the Ash arites in Islamic Religious History: Part I,” SI 17 (1962). Makdisi, “Ash arı¯ and the Ash arites, Part II,” 37–38. For a telling example of excluding information for polemical purposes see Laoust, “L’hérésiographie musulmane,” 169. Russell, Dissent and Order, 61. For a discussion of “fame” see M. Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350 (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), Chaps 4 and 5. Hurvitz describes the process through which the muh.addithu¯n had been “successfully” marginalizing the mutakallimu¯n. Formation, 122. Lewinstein observes “Baghda¯dı¯ is an Ash arite propagandist before he is a Sunni heresiographer; he is less interested in providing a history of the sects than in elaborating a normative classification of them in terms of their relationship to his own Ash arite-Sunnism.” “Studies in Islamic Heresiography,” 19.

Chapter 3 1. Gaiser questions al-Shahrasta¯nı¯’s Ash arism and argues he was a cryptoIsma ilı¯. Although an intriguing argument, the Ash arites nevertheless come across as the definition of Sunni orthodoxy. A. Gaiser, “Satan’s Seven Specious Arguments,” Journal of Islamic Studies 19 (2008). 2. Hallaq refers to a similar process in law as the “Great Synthesis,” although he does not explicitly include in his discussion the efforts of al-Ash arı¯. Hallaq, Sharı¯ a, 55–60. Also see Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution, Chap. 6. 3. Sourdel, “Classification des sectes,” 246. 4. Ibid., 241. See Laoust, “L’hérésiographie musulmane,” 172–73. 5. Sourdel, “Classification des sectes,” 242.

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6. Consider El-Hibri’s comment about the chronicles: “. . . it seems clear that there was no need for the chronicler to interject his opinion; indeed, doing so would have undermined the aesthetic basis of the literary construct. The message of the text lay in the very encoded structure of symbolism, allusion, innuendo, symmetry, and intertextuality that governed the make-up of the historical text.” Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, 216–17. 7. Abu¯ al-H . asan al-Ash arı¯, Maqa¯la¯t al-isla¯miyyı¯n, ed. H. Ritter (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1963). 8. Laoust, “L’hérésiographie musulmane,” 163. 9. Ibid., 166. Laoust notes al-Ash arı¯ allocated most of his work to studying the Mu tazila. Also see p. 164. 10. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 309–25. 11. Laoust, “L’hérésiographie musulmane,” 171–72. 12. Sourdel, “Classification des sectes,” 241. 13. Ibid., 240. Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ “presents us with an exposé synthétique of great value upon the Ash arite position.” 14. Deploying Qur a¯nic verses was a vital component of this tactic. De Gifis provides a compelling discussion of the use of the Qur a¯n as a legitimizing tool. “Qur a¯nic Rhetoric.” 15. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:65.14–65.16. 16. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 3.1–3.3. 17. Ibid., 10.12–10.17. He also asserts the authority of “our shaykh Abu¯ al-H . asan al-Ash arı¯” (51.17). 18. Ibid., 27.6–27.8. Another good example is on p. 44.18, where his response to the Muh.ammadiyya begins with “and our companions say to this group…” The group has been described such that the reader, unless he wants to be considered a ka¯fir, has to describe himself as belonging to “our.” The reader is subconsciously left with no choice. 19. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ pursues this strategy throughout in al-milal wa l-nih.al. Compare this with al-Ma mu¯n’s rhetoric in his first Mih.na letter. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1114–115. For more on the between-two-extremes strategy, see Sourdel, “Classification des sectes,” 244; Watt, Formative Period, 4; Watt, “The Great Community,” 27; and J. B. Henderson, “The Multiplicity, Duality and Unity of Heresies,” in Strategies of Medieval Communal Identity, ed. W. J. van Bekkum and P. M. Cobb (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 16. 20. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 114.18, 162.11–162.12. It is important to remember doxographers were not just inventing information: al-Ja¯h.iz. had studied with al-Naz. z. a¯m. 21. For a lively discussion of Sha¯fi ¯ı’s position on the ability of an apostate to repent without penalty any number of times and the dispute over an attempt

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22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

29.

30. 31.

32. 33. 34.

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to limit this, see Griffel, “Toleration and Exclusion.” The discussion concerning whether to allow someone hiding their unbelief to have the option of repentance is particularly illuminating. Al-Baghda¯dı¯ writes, “If they are repentant, then this is good. Otherwise killing them and seizing their possessions is incumbent.” Farq, 350.9–350.10. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 114.5–114.17. “And all of the divisions of the community from the divisions of al-Ra y and the h.adı¯th (along) with the Khawa¯rij and the Shı¯ a and the Naja¯riyya and most of the Mu tazila agreed about declaring al-Naz. z. a¯m to be an unbeliever…” (114.16–114.17). Note that according to al-Baghda¯dı¯, not all of the Mu tazila condemn him. Al-Baghda¯dı¯ has to maintain the connection of his (al-Naz. z. a¯m) reprehensibility to the Mu tazila. Ibid., 133.9–134.11. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:61.15–61.16. Ibid., 1:60.7–60.8. Emphasis added. Ibid., 1:60.6. Ibid., 1:32.5–32.7. Likewise, al-Baghda¯dı¯ sketches the Ba¯t.iniya as a Zoroastrian Trojan Horse seeking to destroy Islam from within. Farq, 265–99. Moore, Formation, 152. See al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 264.1–265.10. He qualifies the Maymuniyya as ghula¯t because they permit marriage within the prohibited degrees. This charge also appears in al-Ash arı¯, Maqa¯la¯t al-isla¯miyyı¯n, 95.12. Others citing al-Kara¯bı¯sı¯ are: Ali b. Ah.mad Ibn H . azm, Kita¯b al-fis.al fı¯ al-milal wa l-ahwa¯ wa l-nih.al, 5 vols (Cairo: al-Matba a al-adabiyya, 1903), 5:31.8–31.10; and al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:96.7–96.13. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 26.6–26.7. “The Rawa¯fid. of Kufa were characterized by their perfidy and greed …” For further examples see, 63.3–63.6. The Aza¯riqa claim that to show solidarity and to prove one is really one of them, a person must kill a Muslim captive. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:49.11–49.13. He also implies there are some Muslims who are worse than the zindı¯qs and Magians. Ibid., 1:41.13–41.17. Also see 60.6–61.17 for his description of the Jahmiyya. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 135.17–135.18. Ibid., 126.14–126.18. Ibid., 135.4–135.5. Also see p. 103.5: “And Abu¯ al-Hudhayl claimed that his lord …” [was not our lord]; p. 114.6: “And he rejected what was related about the miracles of our Prophet …”; and p. 126.2: “And then indeed the Jews and the Christians and the Magians and the zana¯diqa knew that our Prophet …” In each case, emphasis added.

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35. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1318.14. Emphasis added. 36. For more on al-Afshı¯n see J. P. Turner, “Al-Afshı¯n, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?” in Abbasid Studies II: Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies, ed. J. A. Nawas (Leuven: Peeters, 2010); and J. P. Turner, “The Death of al- Abba¯s b. al-Ma mu¯n and a ‘Thwarted’ Coup d’Etat,” JNES 72 (2013). 37. For example, see al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 42.9–42.14. 38. Ibid., 15.7–15.9. At a later point (98.9–98.12) he repeats the charge that Wa¯.sil b. At.a¯ did not break off from al-H . asan al-Bas.rı¯’s group but was driven off by al-H . asan himself. For more on al-H . asan al-Bas.rı¯ see S. A. Mourad, Early Islam between Myth and History (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 39. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:65.14–65.16. 40. Ibid., 1:44.14–44.15. 41. Ibid., 1:64.3–85.9. 42. Of the seven main divisions in al-Shahrasta¯nı¯’s work, the S.ifa¯tiyya have the fewest subdivisions. 43. On the Ash arites, al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:65.18–75.14. In addition, notice pp. 64.3–85.9 are on the S.ifa¯tiyya, the orthodox. Also, consider Makdisi’s observation: “Thus we may learn that the Ash arites were in need of (1) gaining legitimacy for their doctrines, (2) in order to be admitted into the ranks of the orthodox, (3) through membership in the Sha¯fi ite school of law.” “Ash arı¯ and the Ash arites, Part I,” 44. 44. See Laoust, “L’hérésiographie musulmane,” 163. He notes al-Ash arı¯ is concerned with showing the community is not/was not divided. This is clearly true of al-Baghda¯dı¯ and al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, especially because they show the divisions among the deviators and continually contrast this with the unity of those they define as the community. 45. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:8. 46. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 115.16. He makes another comment in reference to al-Naz. z. a¯m that is striking: “And if the text of the Qur a¯n and the true Sunna do not guide about it then it came from the whisperings of his [al-Naz. z. a¯m] Satan which called him to his deviation” (130.8–130.10). 47. Melchert says about Ibn H . anbal’s creeds, “These are not objective surveys, and it is more important to brand rejected views with strange names … than to represent them as they would recognize themselves, somewhat as polemists of our time have spoken of ‘Communists,’ ‘Fascists,’ and ‘pseudo-intellectuals.’ ” Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 91. 48. Lewinstein, “Studies in Islamic Heresiography,” 20. He notes of al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ that Is this change correct? “if he does not have as explicitly Ash arite an agenda as Baghda¯dı¯, his presentation of the Ash arı¯ya firqa does work to position it as the approved middle way between the excesses of the Mu tazila

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49. 50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

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and those of the H . ashwı¯ya on the other.” Citing al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:65–75. For the context of the letters see Chap. 6. Here, the focus is on content and arguments. Five letters concern the Mih.na. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1112–134. He had at hand Ibn Abı¯ T.a¯hir T.ayfu¯r’s (d. 280/893) Kita¯b Baghdad and copied this part of it verbatim. Ah.mad Ibn Abı¯ T.a¯hir T.ayfu¯r, “Kita¯b Baghdad” (London: British Library), folio 127b–130b. Ibn Abı¯ T.a¯hir T.ayfu¯r, Kitâb Bagdâd, 338–346. Van Ess discusses the letters and concludes the third is a later draft of the first. Ess, TG, 3:452–56. De Gifis compellingly compares the Qur a¯nic citations in the letters and shows them to be part of a legitimating rhetorical strategy. Al-Ma mu¯n projects himself as the rightly guided imam who has the authority to correct those who have strayed from the path. “Qur a¯nic Rhetoric,” 241–99. For another example, see al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1040.5–1040.7. During a theological disputation al-Ma mu¯n says, “Then he who speaks the truth, we will praise him. He who is ignorant, that [one] we will stop him. He who is ignorant [of] both matters [i.e., unsure if he knows the truth] we judge for him by what is necessary.” This is what happens in the encounter with Ibn H . anbal in the accounts of al-Ja¯h.iz. and al-Ya qu¯bı¯. This particular disputation is about Shı¯ ism. One of the participants says, “You ignorant Nabat.¯ı, what do you know about theological disputation [kala¯m]?” Nabat.¯ı indicates an upstart newcomer, a “sprouter,” and applies to a group of heretics. See W. al-Qa¯d. ¯ı, “The Earliest “Na¯bita” and the Paradigmatic “Nawa¯bit,” ” SI, no. 78 (1993). In addition, the list of participants in this disputation is impressive: Bishr b. Ghiya¯th al-Ma¯risı¯, Thuma¯ma b. Ashras al-Numayrı¯, Muh.ammad b. Abı¯ al- Abba¯s al-T.u¯sı¯, and Alı¯ b. al-Haytham. Cooperson notes, “For al-Ma mu¯n, wrong belief and defiance of caliphal authority amounted to one and the same thing.” It was not just al-Ma mu¯n who behaved this way. “Two Abbasid Trials: Ah.mad Ibn H . anbal and H . unayn b. Ish.a¯q,” al-Qant.ara 22 (2001): 384. Also see al-Qa¯d. ¯ı, “Impact of the Qur a¯n.” De Gifis shows al-Ma mu¯n deploying the Qur a¯n in these letters to assert that his was the Qur a¯nic and therefore correct position. “Qur a¯nic Rhetoric,” 241–99. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1113.3–1113.4. Also see Ess, Frühe, 51.6–51.7, where the author defines the Imam as “al-ima¯m huwa alladhı¯ yu addibu al-umma wa yu arrifuha¯ ma a¯lim dı¯niha¯.” al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1116.3–1116.4: “And then when they affirm this [the Qur a¯n is created] and they are consistent with the Commander of the

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57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66.

67.

68.

Notes.indd 173

173

Faithful about it and are on the path of right guidance and redemption then …” Also see ibid., 3:1112.12–1112.16: “Verily, God has made incumbent upon the imams of the Muslims and their Caliphs the striving for knowledge [ijtiha¯d] in the establishment of the religion of God which he asked them to safeguard and the legacy of prophethood he passed down to them and the luster of knowledge which he gave to them for safekeeping and the acting by the truth in guarding them [the subjects] and the laboring for obedience to God in them …” This is similar to al-Mahdı¯’s letter concerning Ziya¯d b. Abı¯hi. Ibid., 3:479–81. We do not have the text of the second letter. Consider “and the renegade/apostate said I believe that there is no God but God, unified and without partners and that Christ was a servant of God and his messenger. And that Muh.ammad (PBUH) was truthful and that you [al-Ma mu¯n] are Commander of the Faithful truly.” Ibn Abı¯ T.a¯hir T.ayfu¯r, Kitâb Bagdâd, 62.6–62.9. “Kita¯b Baghdad,” 25a.16–25a.19. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1125.8–1125.11. Ibid., 3:1040.5–1040.7. Ibid., 3:481.5–481.6. The rest of the verse quoted is from Yusuf Ali’s translation. The word khalı¯fa only appears twice in the Qur a¯n. The other occurrence is in 2:30. For a discussion of those see al-Qa¯d. ¯ı, “The Term ‘Khalı¯fa.’ ” Shahin, “Struggling for Communitas,” 619–23. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:479–81. Ibid., 3:1117.4–1117.6. Ibid., 3:1115.11–1115.14. Compare this with the assertion made by al-Mahdı¯ , ibid., 3:481.10–481.15. “He [the Commander of the Faithful] followed in that [decision] the words of the Messenger of God, peace be upon him, and what the righteous people and the rightly guided imams had agreed upon. He did not allow [as legitimate] what Mu a¯wiya had the audacity to do of what contradicted the Book of God and the Sunna of His Messenger, may God’s blessing and peace be upon him. The Commander of the Faithful was most correct to rule by that and to do by it because of his kinship with the messenger of God and his following in his [Muh.ammad’s] tracks and keeping alive his Sunna and thwarting the customs of others who deviate and outrage [both] the truth and the rightly guided.” Ibid., 3:1119.14–1119.16. Bosworth’s translation served as a guide. Abu¯ Ja far Muh.ammad b. Jarı¯r al-T.abarı¯, The Reunification of the Abba¯sid Caliphate, trans. C. E. Bosworth, vol. 32 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987), 207. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1115.5–1115.6.

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69. Ibid., 3:796. 70. Compare this to the delineation of difference between “our God” and theirs discussed in the preceding section. 71. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1117.17–1118.4. Again compare this to the quote from al-Mahdı¯ cited previously. 72. F. Gabrieli, “La “Zandaqa” au Ier siecle abbasside,” in L’élaboration de l’Islam, colloque de Strasbourg, ed. C. Cahen (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), 30–31. This observation especially applies to al-Naz. z. a¯m. 73. Consider Watt, Formative Period, 212. Although tawh.¯ıd was used as an argument against Manichaeans it was not “in the sense of asserting God’s internal unity, because the discussion of attributes was probably not a serious question until the reign of al-Ma mu¯n.” But he offers no support for this assertion. Compare the early Mu tazila in Watt (220) to the vision given in al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, especially al-Naz. z. a¯m, who is severely criticized. We should not assume al-Ma mu¯n was a Mu tazilı¯. Crone notes some of the Mu tazila said the Imamate was unnecessary (“Ninth-Century Muslim Anarchists,” 14). It is clear from al-Ma mu¯n’s rhetoric that not only was the Imamate necessary but it also was vested in him. There was much diversity in the label Mu tazilite, and al-Ma mu¯n may have subscribed to some doctrines they held without being a Mu tazilı¯. 74. al-Mas u¯dı¯, Muru¯j al-dhahab, 4:10.9–10.10: “Zandaqa who follow the teachings of Ma¯nı¯.” Al-Mas u¯dı¯ distinguishes between Manichaean and other types of zindı¯qs. 75. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1128.15–1129.4. Also see 1127.15–1128.2, from the fourth letter: “As for al-Fad. l b. Gha¯nim, tell him that he did not hide from the Commander of the Faithful what was for him in Egypt and what he acquired for himself of the wealth in less than a year nor what broke out between him and al-Mut.t.alib b. Abdalla¯h about that. Verily he whose behavior was [as] his behavior and was [as] his craving of the dinar and [of] the dirham then was it not reprehensible that he would sell his faith because of greed and lust for temporal benefit.” 76. Ibid., 3:1120.7–1120.9. I have modified Bosworth’s translation. al-T.abarı¯, Reunification, 209. 77. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1127.5–1127.9. From the fourth letter. 78. al-T.abarı¯, Reunification, 217; al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1128.4–1128.8. I have modified Bosworth’s translation. In addition, al-Mahdı¯, in the letter mentioned previously, corrects the genealogy of Ziya¯d, negating his adoption by Mu a¯wiya, thus in practice making him Ibn Abı¯hi (“the son of his father”), a bastard son of a prostitute. Also consider the implicit moral posturing of highlighting this was the type of person Mu a¯wiya wanted for a son. Ibid., 3:479–81.

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175

79. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1126–127. 80. For the difficulties al-Ma mu¯n faced from his family see J. A. Nawas, “All in the Family? Al-Mu tas.im’s Succession to the Caliphate as Denoument to the Lifelong Feud Between al-Ma mu¯n and his Abbasid Family,” Oriens 38 (2010).

Chapter 4 1. For example al-Mans.u¯r says to Abu¯ Muslim, “Yet you killed him and disobeyed me, thus putting yourself in conflict with me. May God kill me if I don’t kill you!” Abu¯ Ja far Muh.ammad b. Jarı¯r al-T.abarı¯, Abba¯sid Authority Affirmed, trans. J. D. McAuliffe, vol. 28 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 38–39. 2. What follows has been deeply influenced by Donner, Muhammad and the Believers. G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986). Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 82–112. And C. Robinson, Abd al-Malik (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005). 3. See Robinson, Abd al-Malik, Chap. 2, “The Caliphate of Ibn al-Zubayr.” 4. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers, Chap. 5. For a full exploration of the meaning of the Dome of the Rock, ibid., 199–203; Robinson, Abd al-Malik, 3–9; and A. Elad, Medieval Jerusalem and Islamic Worship (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 24–26, 44–46, 158–163. 5. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers, 57. 6. Robinson, Abd al-Malik, 31. 7. Hawting, First Dynasty of Islam, 58. 8. Al-Dhahabı¯ gives the death date as 79. Muh.ammad b. Ah.mad al-Dhahabı¯, Ta rı¯kh al-Islam, ed. U. Tadmurı¯ (Beirut: Da¯r al-Kita¯b al- Arabı¯, 1990), v. for the years 61–80, 390.17. Khalı¯l b. Aybak al-S.afadı¯, al-Wafı¯ min al-wafaya¯t (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1981), 11:254.7–254.14. He gives the year as 80. 9. In an interesting parallel De Gifis notes “politicians” use rhetoric to “equate the enemy in the Qur a¯n with his own enemy” and his group with the “righteous in the Qur a¯n.” “Qur a¯nic Rhetoric,” 61–62. 10. D. M. Dunlop, “Al-H . a¯rith b. Sa ¯ıd al-Kadhdha¯b, a Claimant to Prophecy in the Caliphate of Abd al-Malik,” Studies in Islam 1 (1964). Van Ess was explicitly concerned with Ghayla¯n and hence only deals with al-H . a¯rith by connection. Ess, TG, 1:72–135. Judd also confronts him in relation to Ghayla¯n. “The Third Fitna” and “Ghayla¯n al-Dimashqı¯,” IJMES 31 (1999). S. W. Anthony, “The Prophecy and Passion of al-Ha¯rit b. Sa’ı¯d al-Kadda¯b,”

Notes.indd 175

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11. 12.

13.

14. 15.

16. 17.

18. 19. 20.

21.

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Arabica 57 (2010). Unfortunately I received a copy of Judd’s “Muslim Persecution of Heretics during the Marwa¯nid Period (64–132/684–750),” al-Masa¯q 23 (2011) too late in the writing process to make use of it. Judd, “The Third Fitna,” 232; Ess, “Umar II and His Epistle Against the Qadarı¯ya,” Abr-Nahrain 11 (1972): 25. Dunlop, “Al-H . a¯rith,” 17–18. Ess, Anfänge muslimischer Theologie (Wiesbaden: Orient-Institut, 1977), 228–30; Ess,”Les Qadarites et la Gaila¯nı¯ya de Yazı¯d III,” SI 32 (1970): 282; Ess, “The Qadariyya in Syria,” in Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bilad-al-Sham (Amman: University of Jordan, 1984), 58; and Ess, TG, 1:74. He asserts Ghayla¯n was also of Coptic origins but on p. 81 notes his Christian origin was disputed. Judd, “The Third Fitna,” 229–32. Likewise, al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ draws a connection between Ghayla¯n and Wa¯.sil b. At.a¯ , the founder of the Mu tazila. al-milal wa l-nih.al 1:32.5–32.7. James Montgomery made this observation in the School of Abba¯sid Studies meeting in Leuven (2010). There are also reports in Ah.mad b. Ali Ibn H . ajar al- Asqala¯nı¯, Lisa¯n al-mı¯za¯n, 7 vols (Beirut: Al-Alami Library, 1971), 2:151.15–152.4. Ya¯qu¯t mentions him prominently under the entry for al-H . u¯la. Ya¯qu¯t al-H . amawı¯, Mu jam al-Bulda¯n, ed. Muh.ammad Abd al-Rah.ma¯n al-Mar ashlı¯, 4 vols (Beirut: Da¯r Ihiya al-Turath al- Arabı¯, 1997). al-Dhahabı¯, Ta rı¯kh, v. for the years 61–80, 386.6–390.17. These reports do not supply any information significantly different from Ibn Asa¯kir’s. Ibn Kathı¯r labels him a zindı¯q and gives 79 as the year of his death. Isma ¯ıl b. Umar Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah wa-al-niha¯yah, ed. A. M. Mu awwad. (Beirut: Da¯r al-Kutub al- Ilmı¯yah, 2005), 9:29.26–31.31. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:427.7–427.16. S.alaba does not always mean crucifixion and can mean gibbeting. Here it clearly means crucifixion. See K. Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (New York: CUP, 2001), 47, 67n. On p. 59 he mentions al-H . a¯rith and notes Abd al-Malik crucified him, but that was unusual. This also occurs in the trial of al-Afshı¯n. Turner, “Al-Afshı¯n, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?” Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:427.21–427.24. Ibid., 11:428.2–430.18. Also see al-Dhahabı¯, Ta rı¯kh, v. for the years 61–80, 386.6–390.17. Ya¯qu¯t al-H . u¯la. . amawı¯, Mu jam al-Bulda¯n, the entry for al-H Anthony argues this account is an amalgam intended as a “type of parodic, farcical account” of him as a prophet. “The Prophecy and Passion,” 20. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:428.4. Also found in al-S.afadı¯, al-Wafı¯ min al-wafaya¯t, 11:254.9; and al-Dhahabı¯, Ta rı¯kh, v. for the years 61–80, 386.10.

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177

22. The father quotes Qur a¯n 26:221–222 as his evidence. 23. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:428.15–428.16. 24. Ibid., 11:429.12. This unwillingness to make a report to anyone but the Caliph appears repeatedly in a variety of contexts. For another example see al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1262. 25. Anthony notes the inclusion of Fara¯ghina is a bit anachronistic. For me, this underlines Ibn Asa¯kir’s editorial hand. “The Prophecy and Passion,” 28. 26. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:430.1–430.4. This symbolic device of going to the house in the dark of night, insisting the master of the house be awakened to discuss an important matter, occurs in the narrative of al-Afshı¯n’s trial. Turner, “Al-Afshı¯n, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?,” 125. In addition, “the middle of the night” plays a prominent role in the presentation of the episodes of Ibn H . anbal and Ah.mad b. Nas.r. See Chap. 5. Also see H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr mih.nat al-ima¯m Ah.mad b. H anbal (Cairo: Da r Nashr al-Thaqa¯fa, 1977), ¯ . 83–84. Ibn H anbal is told to leave town in the middle of the night. . 27. In regard to the murder of al-Mutawakkil, see El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, 194, 31n. Here the symbolic opposite occurs: “The correspondence between the evil act of murder about to happen and the context of cosmic darkness occurs systematically in the setting of the murders of al-Walı¯d, al-Amı¯n, and al-Mutawakkil. In the narrative of al-Walı¯d’s reign, T.abarı¯ quotes a narrator saying that the assassins set out on a moonless night.” 28. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:430.6. Van Ess notes this is a “cliché.” Anfänge, 230. 29. We see this underground passage, which serves to connect Ghayla¯n and al-H . a¯rith, in the entry for Ghayla¯n in Ibn Asa¯kir. TMD, 48:191.8–191.13. 30. Quoting Qur a¯n 40:28 31. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:430.10. 32. Fierro notes legal theory favored decapitation over crucifixion. “Religious Dissension,” 474–75. 33. Van Ess points this out (TG, 1:5). Judd also observes this (“The Third Fitna,” 232) as does Anthony (“The Prophecy and Passion,” 14). 34. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:430.14. 35. Ibid., 11:430.16–430.18. 36. See Chap. 5 and Abu¯ Bakr Ah.mad b. Alı¯ al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kha¯njı¯, 1931), 5:177. 37. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:431.2–431.14; and al-S.afadı¯, al-Wafı¯ min al-wafaya¯t, 11:254.7–254.14. 38. Qur a¯n 17:29 (Yusuf Ali translation). 39. Although Abd al-Malik’s location is not mentioned, I assume he was in Damascus or S.innabra and al-H . a¯rith was therefore crucified in either of

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40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47.

48. 49.

50. 51. 52.

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those locations. Given the performative and exemplary nature of the style of execution, Damascus, as a major city, seems more likely. It is important to note he was not executed in Jerusalem; all of these reports are of him being led from Jerusalem for interrogation and execution. Anthony argues in favor of S.innabra. “The Prophecy and Passion,” 26. Van Ess says it was in Jerusalem. TG, 1:5. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:431.3. Qur a¯n 34:50 (Yusuf Ali translation). There is no attempt to explain how the eyewitness came to be present. On istita¯ba and al-Sha¯fi ¯ı see Griffel, “Toleration and Exclusion,” 342–50. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:431.8–431.10. Ibid., 11:431.13–431.14. The two assailants (the stabbers) at this point have been amalgamated into one individual. Ibid., 48:191.8–191.13. Ibid., 11:430.19–430.21. Also included in al-Dhahabı¯, Ta rı¯kh, v. for the years 61–80, 389.6–389.9. See Ess, Anfänge, 228–29. He discusses the meaning of the “apple.” Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:191.17–191.21 and 11:431.19–431.21. This also appears in Abd al-Rah.ma¯n Abu¯ Zur a, Ta rı¯kh Abu¯ Zur a al-Dimashqı¯, ed. S. N. Qawja¯nı¯ (Beirut, 1970), 371.5–371.9. There are no appreciable differences between the three. Van Ess notes it may be an interpolation as well. Ess, Anfänge, 228–30. Anthony, citing van Ess, concurs. “The Prophecy and Passion,” 11–12. Ibn H . ajar al- Asqala¯nı¯, Lisa¯n al-mı¯za¯n, 4:424.4–424.5. To avoid confusion about his name, I refer to him as Ghayla¯n. For fur· ther discussion see S. Diwald, “Der Bericht des Ibn Asa¯kir uber Gaila¯n ad-Dimasqı¯,” in Festgabe für Hans Wehr, ed. W. Fischer (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1969). For an extended discussion of Ghayla¯n and his movement see Ess, TG, 1:72 –135 and Judd, “Ghayla¯n.” For his alleged theory of just rulership see van Ess, “Les Qadarites,” 279 and Ess, Frühe, 107–108. For the dispute over the authorship of that doxography see W. Madelung, “Frühe mu tazilitische häresiographie: Das kitab al-Usul des Ga far b. Harb?,” in Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985). Judd, “Ghayla¯n,” 164. Ibid., 179. This interesting struggle also appears in discussions of the Jahmites and the Mu tazila, which surely results from a polemical intent. For example see al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 14.18 and 96.18 and Ah.mad b. Alı¯ al-Qalqashandı¯, Subh. al-a sha¯, ed. M. H. Shams al-Din (Beirut: Da¯r al Kotob al-Ilmiyah, 1987), 1:529.13. He mentions Ghayla¯n in the same breath as the Manichaeans (madhhabı¯ ma¯nı¯). He receives only passing mention as a

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NOTES

53.

54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

Notes.indd 179

179

Qadarite in Ah.mad b. Muh.ammad Ibn Abd Rabbih, Kita¯b al- iqd al-farı¯d, ed. M. al-Tu¯njı¯, 2 ed. (Beirut: Da¯r S.a¯dir, 2006), 4:438.1. Van Ess states, “The meaning of the term usually depends on the intention with which it is used; for a Mu tazilite, ‘Qadarite’ is equivalent to a determinist; for a moderate determinist, ‘Qadarite’ designates a partisan of unconditional free will, a Mu tazilite for example; for an ultraorthodox determinist, the moderates themselves are the ‘Qadarites’ when they do not believe that the sin (al-Ma .s¯ıya) was created by God.” “Les Qadarites,” 271. Ess, “Qadariyya in Syria,” 53: “But derogatory terms never tell us what somebody is, but only what somebody else thinks he is or wants him to be.” He also notes the term “Qadarite” was not attested “safely” until 100/718 or 120/737. Ibid., 56. Watt, Formative Period, 87–88. Judd, “Ghayla¯n,” 163. Consider Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:190.19–191.3. Makh.u¯l and Ghayla¯n are seated together and asked about al-H . asan al-Bas.rı¯. The issue is not mentioned, but Makh.u¯l is angered by Ghayla¯n’s comment and cites a Prophetic h.adı¯th asserting a man named Ghayla¯n will come from Iblı¯s (Satan). To Makh.u¯l the referent is clear. See al-Dhahabı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 7:441.11–441.12. Also see Abdalla¯h b. Muslim Ibn Qutayba, al-Ma a¯rif, ed. Tharwat Uka¯sha (Cairo: Da¯r al-Ma a¯rif, 1969), 625. He lists both Makh.u¯l and Ghayla¯n as Qadarites. On the contrary Ibn H . ajar states Makh.u¯l would not let Ghayla¯n Asqala sit near him. Ibn H ajar al¯ nı¯, Lisa¯n al-mı¯za¯n, 4:424.8. In one report . Ghayla¯n is accused of bid a, and Makh.u¯l rejects him for it. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:201.14–201.17. Judd, “Ghayla¯n,” 163, 169. Ess, “Qadariyya in Syria,” 57. Ess, Anfänge, 186–94. Ess, “Qadariyya in Syria,” 57. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:1733. For problematic issues within this text, see Judd, “Ghayla¯n,” 167–69. Ibn Asa¯kir includes a report ambiguously implying Umar severed Ghayla¯n’s hands and feet before gibbeting him. TMD, 48:197.1–197.13. Judd, “Ghayla¯n,” 163, 169. For the entire entry for Ghayla¯n, Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:186–212. The 14 trial narratives are on pp. 193.18–210.15. Ibid., 48:195.11–196.5. Amr b. Muha¯jir appears in most of these reports. The third and fourth reports are on pp. 194.9–194.14 and 194.19–195.7. See Ess, Anfänge, 188, “Les Qadarites,” 272, “Qadariyya in Syria,” 58; TG, 1: 73. He identifies the second man as S.a¯lih. b. Suwayd. Ibn al-Murtad. a¯ tells us S.a¯lih. was executed along with his companion Ghayla¯n. Ah.mad b.

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180

66. 67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79.

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Yah.ya¯ Ibn al-Murtad. a¯, T.abaqa¯t al-mu tazila, ed. S. Diwald-Wilzer (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1961), 25.8. The third trial report states, “Woe unto you [wayh.ak] O Ghayla¯n, what is this which is related to me that you say?” Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:194.9–194.10. The third report states, “Qur a¯n.” This has been adapted and expanded upon in the sixth trial report (ibid., 48:196.8–196.18.), where Umar responds by quoting what “God says” in Sura 76:30–31. “And then he said: what do you say?” (196.13–196.14), clearly asserting what Ghayla¯n said was not what God said. Ibid., 48:195.12. As in the trial of Ibn H . anbal, the Caliph asks, “What did the Prophet say?” although with different results and intonation. Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kha¯njı¯, 1932–38), 9:205.2–205.3. In the third version, he does not quote them to Umar’s satisfaction, who obviously sees Ghayla¯n has taken it out of context. Umar curtly orders him to finish the Sura but does not give him the chance. He recites the thirtieth verse and recites two more from a different Sura (2:30–32). Ghayla¯n responds by recanting his position (Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:194.13–194.14.). Umar accepts his repentance and lets him go but with the admonition not to discuss it any longer. Ibid., 48:195.16. They only adduce Qur a¯nic evidence in these debates and avoid referring to h.adı¯th or Sunna. Although Ibn Asa¯kir adduces h.adı¯th in the first part of the entry, these do not enter into the trial narratives. Al-Shahrasta¯nı¯ places the beginning of all heresy with this story. Satan disobeys God’s order and is cast out. Heresy and disobedience are the same thing. al-Shahrasta¯nı¯, al-milal wa l-nih.al, 1:8. See Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:193.18–193.23. See the criticism by Ibn al-Murtad. a¯, T.abaqa¯t, 123.3. “They allege that the people of Islam overcame [their enemies] by the sword and not by the proof.” In the entry for al-Ma mu¯n. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:197.18–197.24. The severed head of Ah.mad b. Nas.r recites this Sura as well. See Chap. 5. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:197.22–197.23. This phrase recurs in the seventh, eighth, ninth, and fourteenth trial narratives. Ibid., 48:198.23–199.5. The eighth, ninth, and tenth narratives are on pp. 197.18–197.24, 198.5–198.14, and 198.18–198.21. The eleventh uses a different isna¯d. See ibid., 48:197.1–197.13. The seventh trial report, which is similar. Ibid., 48:199.1. Part of this phrase (h.arr al-sayf aw h.add al-sayf) reappears. See note 100. Compare this to the use of the phrase sayfa¯n mashu¯ra¯n.

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NOTES

80.

81.

82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

87. 88. 89. 90.

91.

92.

Notes.indd 181

181

See Chap. 5, 21n. Also compare this to the deployment of the sword, Chap. 5, 150n. A loose parallel occurs in the year 224/839: “He (al-Durrı¯) stretched out his forearm, and it was severed from the elbow; his leg was stretched out, and that was severed from the knee. The same thing was done with the other forearm and leg. He squatted down on his backside but did not utter a word or tremble at all. Muh.ammad b. Ibra¯hı¯m [the T.a¯hirid] then ordered his head to be chopped off.” Abu¯ Ja far Muh.ammad b. Jarı¯r al-T.abarı¯, Storm and Stress along the Northern Frontiers of the Abba¯sid Caliphate, trans. C. E. Bosworth, vol. 33 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 174. Note in bracket added. Also see Ibn al-Murtad. a¯, T.abaqa¯t, 27.7. The handless, footless Ghayla¯n prays over his slain companion. Compare this to Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:323.7–326.13. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1348.3–1348.13. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:177.8. Abu¯ al-H . ana¯bila (Cairo: . usayn Muh.ammad Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯, T.abaqa¯t al-H Mat.ba at al-sunna al-muh.ammadiya, 1952), 1:81. See Chap. 5, when al-Wa¯thiq uses a sword to execute Ah.mad b. Nas.r. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:204.20–205.9. Ibid., 48:205.19–207.18. Which occurs in the sixth (ibid., 48:196.9.), twelfth (204.20–204.21), and fourteenth (208.9–208.10). Ibid., 48:205.19. Ibid., 48:197.18–197.24, 198.5–198.14, 198.18–198.21, and 208.9–210.15. On p. 204.20, in the twelfth report, he implies but does not state he has been lied about. Ibid., 48:205.1. Ibid., 48:206.1. In the twelfth version, he offers seven, five, or three questions. In each of the three reports, Ghayla¯n chooses three. In the twelfth account he is beaten and then presumably released. Notice this is the punishment inflicted upon Ibn H . anbal. The thirteenth version also stands out because he is not gibbeted. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:207.11–207.12, 207.17, 207.18. It is interesting that, in this version, when al-Awza¯ ¯ı is speaking, Ghayla¯n’s name is not used. He is just called “Qadarite.” Immediately following the end of the trial narratives (ibid., 48:211.4–211.7.) is a criticism of Amr b. Ubayd designed to implicate him with Ghayla¯n. It shows that what happened to Ghayla¯n was a warning to all Qadarites. A man in Basra sees someone preaching Qadarism. He confronts him, saying, “If I were in al-Sha¯m [Syria] and I saw a man preaching this, then

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182

93. 94. 95. 96.

97. 98.

99. 100. 101.

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107.

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I would take him to the Commander of the Faithful Hisha¯m.” This asserts the Caliph was the one qualified to judge such matters and Qadarism was wrong. Ibid., 48:196.8–196.18. Ibid., 48:208.9–210.15. The immediately preceding two accounts (12, 13) have different isna¯ds but are similar in content. Umar states this to Amr b. Muha¯jir, the captain of his guard, in the sixth report (ibid., 48:196.9). Ibid., 48:208.9–208.10. The sixth version begins with “O Ghayla¯n” and ends with him asking, “Are you discussing qadar?” (196.9). Also in the sixth version Ghayla¯n avoids the summons and has to be arrested. Its temporal location has changed, but it appears again in the Hisha¯mquestioning section of this report. In the sixth version, Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:196.10–196.14. Ghayla¯n cites 76:1–3 on his own accord as a defense. Umar counters with 76:30–31 and asks, “What do you say, O Ghayla¯n?” Ghayla¯n acknowledges defeat and states he was blind, deaf, and deviating but the Caliph has changed that. See the seventh, eighth, and ninth trial reports (ibid., 48:197.7, 197. 22–197.23, 198.9) where this same response occurs. Ibid., 48:209.2–209.3. Compare this to note 79 (heat of the blade) and to Chap. 5, 21n (sayfa¯n mashu¯ra¯n) and 150n. Ibid., 48:209.6–209.7. Compare this to al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:1733.8–1733.9. Almost the exact same phrase occurs. The only difference is one pronoun: “God will not forgive me if I forgive him.” Following Hillenbrand’s translation, Abu¯ Ja far Muh.ammad b. Jarı¯r al-T.abarı¯, The Waning of the Umayyad Caliphate (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), 26:76. See below for more on al-T.abarı¯’s version. Here, the Caliph does not command him to recite. The command is implied. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:209.9–209.10. Ibid., 48:209.16. Ibid., 48:209.19. Note he does not just fall silent. He admits he does not have an answer. Although bid a is used (ibid., 48:201.14–201.17.) in a report that has H . anbal b. Ish.a¯q in the isna¯d. Also see al-Dhahabı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 7:441.13–441.16. As Umar called for and Hisha¯m implemented, “… he was cut into fourths and gibbeted in Damascus for qadar.” In the sixth report, there is no questioning before Hisha¯m cuts off his hands (Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:196.8–196.18.) A man walking by asks the handless Ghayla¯n if this was preordained. Ghayla¯n

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NOTES

108.

109.

110. 111. 112. 113.

114.

115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

Notes.indd 183

183

responds it was not decreed or preordained, to which Hisha¯m responds by gibbeting him. This establishes that cutting off his hands is the punishment for rebelling, that is, for having disobeyed the Caliph by returning to teaching qadar. The gibbeting is a response to his continued expression of heretical beliefs. Therefore the prescription of the istita¯ba offer is fulfilled. A similar version occurs in Ibn al-Murtad. a¯, T.abaqa¯t, 26.17–27.11. Hisha¯m asks him if this was preordained. He is not decapitated but dies as a result of his wounds. Also see Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:197.1–197.13. The narrator walks past the handless, footless Ghayla¯n and informs him “this was the prescription of Umar …,” and he is gibbeted. This has been transformed from the immediately preceding (sixth) report. The question about predestination has been eliminated. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:209.22–210.15. Compare p. 210.13–210.14, where al-Awza¯ ¯ı explains to Hisha¯m “he himself becomes a partner for God,” to van Ess’ note that Umar in the epistle argues “if man decides according to his will, this means for him that God would have to share His power with a partner.” “Umar II,” 22. Consider that the Mih.na sought to eliminate a belief that holds God has a coeternal partner, the uncreated Qur a¯n. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:210.19. Also 187.13–187.16, 198.14, and 199.13. It was also included by Abdalla¯h Ibn Adı¯, al-Ka¯mil fı¯ d. u afa¯ al-rija¯l (Beirut: Da¯r al-Fikr, 1984), 6:2037.22. Ibn Awn was a student of al-H . asan al-Bas.rı¯. See Ess, “Qadariyya in Syria,” 55. Ess, Anfänge, pp. 207–13. Judd, “Ghayla¯n,” 171. Ibid. Because this is not the focus of this book, I leave that for another venue. However, one might make note of when those reports went into circulation and compare this to when al-Awza¯ ¯ı’s followers were marginalized. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:1733.2–1733.9. I have been aided by Hillenbrand’s translation, particularly the penultimate sentence. al-T.abarı¯, Waning, 75–76. Compare this to Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:200.12–200.13. The debate between Ghayla¯n and Abu¯ H . amza, which begins with Abu¯ H . amza asking how to begin: “Do you begin, or do I begin?” Al-Ma mu¯n makes a similar comment. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1040.5–1040.7. As pointed out previously, the same phrasing appears in the fourteenth narrative. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:209.6–209.7. Judd, “Ghayla¯n,” 166–67. Ibid., 168. For the report, Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:200.23–200.24. He is Rabı¯ at b. Abd al-Rah.ma¯n.

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120. Ess, Anfänge, 204–207. Ah.mad b. Yah.ya¯ al-Bala¯dhurı¯, “Kitab ansa¯b al-ashra¯f,” in Süleymaniye Umum Kütüphanesi (Istanbul 1711), 2:245.34–246.4. Also cited by Judd, “Ghayla¯n,” 168. 121. Ibn al-Murtad. a¯, T.abaqa¯t, 25.1–27.11. Also see al-Dhahabı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 7:441.1–441.17. 122. This is parallel to the al-T.abarı¯ account and the version cited in 107n. 123. Also see Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:212.19–212.21. A report that includes Abdalla¯h b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal in the isna¯d concurs Ghayla¯n had his tongue cut out and was gibbeted but only one hand was severed. 124. Much like al-Mahdı¯’s action against zandaqa the underlying issue was divine unicity and concern over dualism.

Chapter 5 1. For his biography, see Melchert, Ahmad ibn Hanbal; and Hurvitz, Formation. The standard secondary work on Ibn H . anbal and his encounter remains Patton, Ah.med Ibn H . anbal. 2. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat al-Ima¯m Ah.mad b. H . anbal (Alexandria: Mu assasat Shabab al-Ja¯mi a, 1981); H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr; Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ ; al-Ja¯h.iz. , Rasa¯ il; Ah.mad b. Abı¯ Ya qu¯b b. Ja far al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh al-Ya qu¯bı¯, ed. A. A. Muhanna¯ (Beirut: Mu assasa al- Ulamı¯ li l-Mat.bu¯ a¯t, 1993). For other accounts see al-Mas u¯dı¯, Muru¯j aldhahab, 4:47.4, where it is barely mentioned. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:290. 1–290.25. Ibn al-Murtad. a¯, T.abaqa¯t, 123.4–123.7, 123.15–125.3. Abu¯ alFaraj Ibn al-Jawzı¯, Mana¯qib al-ima¯m Ah.mad b. H . anbal, ed. A. b. A. Muh.sin al-Turkı¯ (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kha¯njı¯, 1979), 385–420. Abu¯ al-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzı¯, al-Muntaz. am fı¯ ta rı¯kh al-mulu¯k wa l-umam (Beirut: Da¯r al-Kutub al- Ilmı¯yah, 1992), 11:42.12–44.8. For other sources see Hinds, “Mih.na.” 3. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1331. 4. Ibid., 3:1132. 5. H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr; and S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat. 6. For more on his position regarding the role of the Caliph see al-Ja¯h.iz. , Rasa¯ il, 295–97. 7. Ibid., 147.5–154.23. The account of the trial is on 150.20–152.22. Van Ess notes Umar II in his epistle argues against the createdness of the Qur a¯n, although his argument is not explicit. Using an argumentio e silentio, he posits the doctrine of the created Qur a¯n was not yet known, otherwise Umar would have addressed it directly. “Umar II,” 22–23. 8. al-Ja¯h.iz. , Rasa¯ il, 152.15–152.18. Al-Ja¯h.iz. states, “In the majlis there was no oppression nor was he in a state of despair, nor was he burdened by chains,

Notes.indd 184

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NOTES

9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

Notes.indd 185

185

nor was his heart wrenched by a strong threat and indeed he was contested by soft words and he answered with coarse words. They [the prosecutors] were wise and he was light. They were forbearing and he was heedless.” Ibid., 150.22–151.3. Ibid., 151.8–151.14. Although the questions are different, it echoes of al-Awza¯ ¯ı’s four-part question to Ghayla¯n. For S.a¯lih. and H . anbal, see below. Hurvitz argues convincingly that Ibn H . anbal’s refusal is a rejection of the legitimacy of the question. Thus, the refusal, to his supporters, is out of steadfastness, whereas his opponents see it as obstreperous. In essence, the sides talk past each other about the meaning of what has transpired. Hurvitz, Formation, 131–32. This is equally clear according to Cooperson’s description. Al-Ma mu¯n, 117–18. Also see Cooperson, “Two Abbasid Trials,” 386. I thank Michael for referring me to his article. al-Ja¯h.iz. , Rasa¯ il, 151.17. These are refusals and not just silences. Although these are taken as signs of his guilt, they are not conclusive proof, as if he had fallen silent. Ibid., 151.19. Ibid., 151.21. Ibid., 152.1. Ibid., 152.1–152.10. Ibid., 152.7. The argument is not this succinct. Hurvitz’s argument allowed me to see this pattern. Formation, 131–32. al-Ja¯h.iz. , Rasa¯ il, 152.11–152.12. Ibid., 152.15. He adds “he did not feel the burn of the unsheathed sword [sayfa¯n mashu¯ra¯n].” Compare this to Chap. 4, 79n, 100n; and below, 150n. Cooperson, CAB, 127. However, on p. 124, Cooperson notes H . anbal b. Ish.a¯q quotes Qur a¯n 16:106, which is used to justify taqiyya. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 79.5–79.7. The quote is from Qur a¯n 16:106 (Yusuf Ali translation). al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1131.19–1132.5. I have modified Bosworth’s translation. Al-T.abarı¯, Reunification, 221. This statement conjures discussions of zindı¯qs and the permissibility of killing them without trial because they were inveterate liars making a trial pointless. al-Ja¯h.iz. , Rasa¯ il, 152.21–152.22. Cooperson, CAB, 126. Cooperson, Al-Ma mu¯n, 115. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:426.21–427.2. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 49.5–49.8.

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28. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:426.21–426.22. 29. Ibid., 2:427.1–427.2. 30. See below, where al-Wa¯thiq makes a similar statement in the trial of Ah.mad b. Nas.r: “The killing will be by what you wish.” al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1347.18–1348.1. 31. See the “Letters of al-Ma mu¯n” in Chap. 3. For example, in the Mih.na letters, “he who is ignorant concerning his religion, that which God commanded him about His oneness, is even more sunk in ignorance in regard to other things.” Ibid., 3:1120.7–1120.9. A modification of Bosworth’s translation. al-T.abarı¯, Reunification, 209. 32. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:432.6–432.16. 33. Cooperson, CAB, 128. 34. He was also an important player in the politics of Baghdad and Samarra up until his death in 235/850. See J. P. Turner, “The End of the Mih.na,” Oriens 38 (2010). 35. For his role in the trial of al-Afshı¯n, see Turner, “Al-Afshı¯n, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?” 36. Ess, TG, 3:464–65. Also see Hinds, “Mih.na.” Cooperson argues the ambiguity in the sources does not allow us to be certain of this conclusion. “Two Abbasid Trials,” 388. 37. For a discussion of al-Ya qu¯bı¯’s alleged Shı¯ ite bias, see W. Millward, “al-Ya qu¯bı¯’s Sources and the Question of Shı¯ a Partiality,” Abr Nahrain 12 (1972). For another view see E. L. Daniel, “Al-Ya qu¯bı¯ and Shı¯ ism Reconsidered,” in Abbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies, Cambridge, 6–10 July 2002, ed. J. Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2004). Also see T. M. Johnstone, “An Early Manuscript of Ya kubi’s “Ta rı¯kh,” Journal of Semitic Studies 2 (1957). 38. H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 34.1–67.13. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 49.1–68.5. S.a¯lih.’s version was written down by an author quoting Abu¯ al-Fadl (S.a¯lih.), who is quoting his own father (Ah.mad). 39. Cooperson and Hurvitz make similar observations. Cooperson, CAB, 126; and Hurvitz, “Who Is the Accused?” 361. 40. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 49.6. For the text of the letter in al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1117–1121, especially 1118.8–1118.10. Although similar in meaning, they are nonetheless different. 41. Also see al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1124. “God is as He described himself.” 42. Threats of decapitation are made specifically against Bishr b. al-Walı¯d and Ibra¯hı¯m b. al-Mahdı¯. Ibid., 3:1126.15–1127.2. 43. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 50.1–50.3. In al-T.abarı¯ he is identified as Muh.ammad b. Nu¯h. al-Mad. ru¯b. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1121, 1131. In al-Khat.¯ıb’s

Notes.indd 186

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NOTES

44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52.

53. 54.

55.

Notes.indd 187

187

entry for Ah.mad b. Nas.r, he is Muh.ammad b. Maymu¯n al-Mad. ru¯b. The name al-Mad.ru¯b is inherently a status claim indicating a righteous person. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 50.11. fi jawf al-layl, “in the middle of the night,” also occurs on 51.2 and 55.4 as well as in the narrative for al-Afshı¯n. See Turner, “Al-Afshı¯n, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?” It also occurs in the narrative concerning Ghayla¯n and al-H . a¯rith; see Chap. 4. El-Hibri notes the same phrase occurs in regard to “the murders of al-Walı¯d, al-Amı¯n and al-Mutawakkil.” Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, 194, 31n. Kennedy describes a similar scene when the Caliph al-Mans.u¯r is awakened in the middle of the night to be informed of al-Nafs al-Zakı¯ya’s revolt. When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo, 2005), 25. This seems to be in answer to Ibn H . anbal’s prayers. H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 41.1–41.9. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 52.1–52.2. H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 42.1 says 30 months. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 53.3. H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 43.8–44.9. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 53.7–53.8. H . anbal’s account parallels this closely except Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d gives this warning. He also includes the reiteration of the warning on the third day by Abd al-Rah.ma¯n as does S.a¯lih.. See H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 58.15– 58.16; and S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 62.6–62.7. Cooperson reads Abd al-Rah.ma¯n’s warning as a subtle way of encouraging Ibn H . anbal through assuring him that he was not about to die. Cooperson, “Two Abbasid Trials,” 387, and CAB, 151. This is the argument Ibn al-Bakka¯ unsuccessfully uses against Ish.a¯q in al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1124.10–1124.13. He uses 43:2 in comparison with 21:2. This is not part of but follows immediately after Ibn H . anbal’s first interrogation. The opposite of this occurs in one of the Mih.na letters (1118.10– 1119.2), where the Caliph is arguing the verb means created. This is more evidence to support the conclusion the texts were in conversation. Note his role in the end of al-Mutawakkil’s life. See M. S. Miah, The Reign of al-Mutawakkil (Dacca, Bangladesh: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1969). S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 54.11. “bi al-fa¯rsı¯ya”. This is strange because Bugha¯ is well known as one of the elite Turkish slave soldiers. He should be addressing the other person in Turkish. Recall al-Baghda¯dı¯ quoting a Mu tazilı¯ who says this as well. See previous, Chap. 2. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 8.13–9.1. Gordon reads this episode differently. Bugha¯ in his statement professes to only know the shaha¯da.

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188

56.

57. 58. 59.

60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

Notes.indd 188

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Gordon interprets this partially as an admission of ignorance but more so as a deferment to caliphal authority. The Breaking of a Thousand Swords, 137. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 55.4. “wa dhalika fi jawf al-layl.” Why they stop at night is unclear because all of this is presumably happening in Baghdad before the founding of Samarra. See H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 47.2. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 55.13–55.17. H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 47.11–47.18, 48.1. S.a¯lih. reminds his reader that his father disapproved of discourse with those who held the Qur a¯n to be created. Sı¯rat, 77.12–77.13. Also see ibid., 56; and H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 43.8–44.9. H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 48.9–48.10. Ibn Kathı¯r explicitly blames Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d for causing “the sultan to test the people about the createdness of the Qur a¯n.” Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:339.21–339.22. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 56.8. This phrase recurs several times. This exchange is similar to al-T.abarı¯’s account of the trial of Ghayla¯n. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 56.12. Ibid., 57.1. Ibid., 57.3. Also see 62.18: “He asked their counsel, and then he followed them.” Also see H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 60.10–60.12, where Ish.a¯q counsels him that Ibn H . anbal had defied two Caliphs and must be punished. H . anbal b. Ish.a¯q explicitly states al-Mu tas.im does not really understand what is happening. Dhikr, 58. Because he was chief judge under al-Ma mu¯n and categorized as a H . anafı¯, perhaps this is part of an anti-H . anafı¯ polemic. H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 57.15–58.5. We are not told what that explanation is. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 58.5–58.7; H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 50.4–50.12. H . anbal b. Ish.a¯q does not include the verse but alludes to it. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 59.1–59.2; H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 52.8–52.10. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 59.6. This is explicitly stated in ibid., 62.8. Ibid., 60.4–60.5. “And then I replied to him according to what I replied to Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d.” Ibid., 60.9. Ibid., 60.13. See Hurvitz, Formation, 131–32. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 61.15–61.16. Ibid., 62.6–62.8.

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189

79. This interesting precursor sets the stage for the miracle in Abu¯ Nu aym’s account, which follows. 80. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 63.3. 81. I have always wondered why Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m emerges from these narratives unscathed. He was a primary force in the Mih.na, yet no blame is attached to him. Cooperson has reminded me Ish.a¯q was an old acquaintance of Ibn H . anbal’s family, which could serve as one explanation. 82. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 64.5, 64.7, 65.2, 65.3, 65.10. “shadd qat.a a alla¯h yadaka.” al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:115.17. “qat.a a alla¯h aydaykum.” 83. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 64.11. 84. He will be implicated shortly after this episode in a plot to kill al-Mu tas.im and replace him on the throne with al- Abba¯s b. al-Ma mu¯n. See Turner, “Death of al- Abba¯s.” 85. This recalls the stab to the side in the accounts regarding al-H . a¯rith. See Chap. 4. 86. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 64.15. 87. Ibid., 64.16; and Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ , 9:205.12. This is similar to Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s trial. See al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1347.18 and Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:325.18–325.20. 88. Yah.ya¯ b. Ma ¯ın, Abu¯ Khaythama, Ibn Abı¯ Isra ¯ıl, and others not named. According to al-T.abarı¯, Yah.ya¯ and Abu¯ Khaythama are two of the chief instigators of the affair of Ah.mad b. Nas.r. 89. H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q states he was struck with “thirty-three or thirty-four blows.” Dhikr, 64.12. 90. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 65.11. “fa dhahaba aqlı¯” “And then my mind left” is a phrase van Ess reads as a cover-up for his capitulation. I infer Ah.mad could have recanted, but as his senses had left him, he was not responsible, and any testimony he might have rendered would have been inadmissible. Ess, TG, 3:464–65. Cooperson also takes note of this ambiguity and points out al-Ja¯h.iz. explicitly states he makes a lucid statement. Cooperson, CAB, 125–27. 91. Cooperson argues that the lack of an attempt to proffer an excuse argues for this account’s veracity and when compared to the trial of H . unayn b. Ish.a¯q, it remains questionable whether Ibn H . anbal capitulated or not. “Two Abbasid Trials.” 92. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . ilyat . anbal, Sı¯rat, 67.3–67.4. Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H al-Awliya¯ , 9:203.18. He is quoting S.a¯lih. but replaces the word taqiyya with masghaba (hungry/fatigued). 93. This has the added effect, as Cooperson notes, of giving a reasonable reason for his passing out. CAB, Chap. 4; and Cooperson, “Two Abbasid Trials.”

Notes.indd 189

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190 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105.

106.

107.

108.

109.

110.

Notes.indd 190

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Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ , 9:196.5–204.6. Ibid., 9:204.7–206.11. Cooperson, CAB, 131–34. In fact, in this version, which Caliph is never specified. It is assumed the reader knows from reading the account quoted from S.a¯lih.. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 193.18–193.23. He is praying when Amr b. Muha¯jir, the captain of Umar b. Abd al- Azı¯z’s guard, tells him that if he comes, he will tell him what happened to his friend Ghayla¯n. This effectively accounts for how the narrator gained access to the private conversations recounted, which otherwise could not be justified as accurate or even possible. Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ , 9:204.20. Ibid., 9:204.12–204.13. Ibid., 9:204.23. Could the “blue” be intended to make clear he did not wear Abba¯sid black? R. P. Dozy, Dictionnaire détaillé des noms des vêtements chez les Arabes (Amsterdam: J. Müller, 1845), 278–80. This parallels al-Afshı¯n’s trial, where an effort is made to identify each participant. See Turner, “Al-Afshı¯n, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?” Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ , 9:204.25–205.1. The isna¯d of which includes al-Zuhrı¯, who is included as a narrator of Ghayla¯n’s trial. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:197.18–197.24, 198.5–198.14, 198.18–198.21, 198.23–199.5. Ibn al-Zayya¯t’s presence is an anomaly. This is the only account in which he appears. Ibn al-Zayya¯t died as a result of his participation as kingmaker for al-Mutawakkil. See Turner, “The End of the Mih.na.” Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ , 9:205.12. This appears in S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H anbal, Sı¯rat, 64.16, and can be compared to the . declaration in Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s trial. Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ , 9:205.13. For a discussion of the terms abna¯ and so forth, see Turner, “The abna¯ al-dawla.” In addition consider that these familial ties were claimed for Ah.mad b. Nas.r, and the connection to Marw is claimed for all the figures who died in the Mih.na according to al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯ (see below). Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ , 9:205.19. Other versions report him suffering three times as many or more, most notably, in Ibn al-Murtad. a¯, T.abaqa¯t, 122–25; and al-Mas u¯dı¯, Muru¯j al-dhahab, 4:47.4; H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 64.12. Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ , 9:206.1. This should be considered in light of the assertions in S.a¯lih.’s account that because he had recited this and was observing the basics of the faith, he should not have

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NOTES

111. 112.

113. 114. 115.

116. 117. 118.

Notes.indd 191

191

been bothered. In addition, Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s severed head recites the shaha¯da. See al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:177.9–177.13 as well as 135–36. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:432.14. Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ , 9:206.6–206.7. This slogan is stated by Ibn H . anbal in S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 77.9. Ah.mad uses Qur a¯n 9:6, in which he says God told Gabriel, Gabriel told the Prophet, and the Prophet told the companions of the Prophet, and therefore the “Qur a¯n is the word of God uncreated.” This follows a list of three points on which he differs from the Jahmiyya (77.4–77.6): “They say the Qur a¯n is created,” “They say ‘word of God’ and fall silent” [which is exactly what both Ibn H . anbal and Ah.mad b. Nas.r do], and “They say our pronunciation of the Qur a¯n is created.” It is obvious these are all later theological arguments put in the mouth of Ibn H . anbal, which of course questions this source’s reliability. Also see Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯, T.abaqa¯t, 2:30.1–30.2. Al-Barbaha¯rı¯ is quoted making a statement that mirrors this one. Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H . ilyat al-Awliya¯ , 9:206.8–206.11. Cooperson makes this point as well. CAB, 133. See above at note 81. In addition, Maymu¯n b. Mihra¯n appears in S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 50.6–50.7. An Abu¯ H . amza is on 56.1 and in the five reports between the Umar and the Hisha¯m reports. See Chap. 4, in particular al-T.abarı¯’s narrative of Ghayla¯n’s trial. Judd, “Ghayla¯n.” It is possible Ibn Asa¯kir would have wanted to draw the parallel, but this seems unlikely. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1343.5–1350.4. Ibn Qutayba, al-Ma a¯rif, 393.5–393.6. Al-S.u¯lı¯ merely notes al-Wa¯thiq killed Ah.mad b. Nas.r. Muh.ammad b. Yah.ya¯ al-S.u¯lı¯, Kitab al-avraq (Kniga listov), ed. V. I. Beliaev and A. B. Khalidov (St. Petersburg: Tsentr Peterburgskoe vostokovedenie, 1998), 557.9–557.10. Ibn al-Athı¯r is an abbreviated version of al-T.abarı¯. Ibn al-Athı¯r, al-Ka¯mil, 7:20.12–23.5. The Fragmenta is also an abbreviated version of al-T.abarı¯. M. J. De Goeje, Fragmenta historicorum arabicorum, 2 vols (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1869), 1:529.5–532.9. The account in Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯’s T.abaqa¯t al-H . ana¯bila was likely derived from the account of al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯. Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯, T.abaqa¯t, 1:80.18–82.6. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:173.9–180.15. As with al-Khat.ı¯b, the account in Ibn Kathı¯r is similar to that in al-T.abarı¯. It is fair to surmise he used al-T.abarı¯’s work as his source, but there are some differences. In al-Mas u¯dı¯,

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192

119. 120. 121. 122.

123. 124.

125.

126. 127.

128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133.

Notes.indd 192

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his death as a result of the Mih.na is barely noticed and is mentioned almost as an afterthought. Muru¯j al-dhahab, 4:9.10–9.12. See Abu¯ Ja far Muh.ammad b. Jarı¯r al-T.abarı¯, Incipient Decline, trans. J. L. Kraemer, vol. 34 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), xv. And he was from Marw. These same claims are made for Ibn H . anbal. Note neither Ah.mads are labeled as abna¯ . See Turner, “The abna¯ al-dawla.” al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1344.1, 1344.4–1344.5. Ibid., 3:1343.11–1343.12. Al-T.abarı¯ implies many more muh.addithu¯n are around him. I accept Kraemer’s emendations of the text: Ibn Khaythama = Abu¯ Khaythama, and Ibn al-Dawraqı¯ = Ya qu¯b b. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Dawraqı¯. Incipient Decline, 27, 92n. See al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1116.15–1116.16. Also see al-Khat.ı¯b al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:176.9–176.11. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:323.2–323.4. De Goeje, Fragmenta, 1:529.20–530.3. Ibn al-Athı¯r and Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯ do not include this. On the “vigilante” movements see Madelung, “Vigilante Movement”; and Lapidus, “Separation,” especially p. 381, where Lapidus accepts the assertion Ah.mad b. Nas.r was a “vigilante” leader. I disagree with their assessment of the importance of this movement. Al-T.abarı¯ notes Nas.r. b. H . amza b. Ma¯lik al-Khuza¯ ı¯ (Ah.mad’s cousin) was in charge of the east side of Baghdad and therefore was not a member of the vigilante movement. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1002.5–1002.6. Ibn Kathı¯r says his father, Nas.r. b. Malik, was the vigilante, although it is ambiguous whether he or his father is meant, so it could be read that he was the vigilante leader. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:323.1–323.2. Muh.ammad b. Ah.mad Abu¯ al- Arab, Kita¯b al-mih.an, ed. Y. Jabbouri, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Da¯r al-Gharb al-Isla¯mı¯, 2006). al-Khat.ı¯b al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:177.16–177.17. Although al-Khat.ı¯b mentions Ibn H . anbal praising Ah.mad b. Nas.r, he does not assert he was a student or follower of Ibn H . anbal. Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯, T.abaqa¯t, 1:80.18–82.6. H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 81–83. Also see Abu¯ al- Arab, Kita¯b al-mih.an, 214.7–216.8, 363.10–363.12. This detail varies from source to source. The five others are not the accomplices mentioned previously but are two of his sons, two servants, and Isma¯ ı¯l b. Muh.ammad b. Mu a¯wiya. Patton, Ah.med Ibn H . anbal, 117. Abu¯ al- Arab includes a very strange version. In this account there are no vigilantes, no H . anbalı¯s, no revolt or plans for such, and most important no trial. Ah.mad is killed for a very creative insult to the Caliph. Abu¯ al- Arab, Kita¯b al-mih.an, 215.11–215.13.

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NOTES

193

134. For al-Afshı¯n’s trial see Turner, “Al-Afshı¯n, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?” 123–32. 135. In al-Khat.ı¯b’s account the note hung on Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s ear is signed by him, indicating his involvement. 136. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1347.3. 137. al-T.abarı¯, Incipient Decline, 31 (Kraemer’s translation). See al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1347.3–1347.4. Also see Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:324.5; and Ibn al-Athı¯r, al-Ka¯mil, 7:22.3. Perhaps this statement means he was preparing his body for burial. 138. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1310.3. 139. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:324.11–324.13. Ibn Kathı¯r (326.11–326.13) ends his account by repeating the h.adı¯th completely removed from context and then bi la kayf (“without asking how”), a normal H . anbalı¯ response to this type of question. Abu¯ al- Arab cites the two-fingers h.adı¯th in his brief account of Ah.mad’s execution. Kita¯b al-mih.an, 215.14–215.15. 140. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:324.6–324.8. He follows this by quoting al-Khat.ı¯b al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:176.21–177.1. 141. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1347.10–1347.11. 142. He was also in the group with Ibn H . anbal when questioned by Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m early in the Mih.na. See ibid., 3:1120.10, 1125.8, 1128.11, 1128.13–1128.14. He figures prominently in the Mih.na letters. Also see al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 10:260–61. 143. Spoken by Abu¯ Abdalla¯h al-Armanı¯. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1347.18. Ibn Kathı¯r is verbatim of the text in al-T.abarı¯. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:324.17–324.18. Compare to the trial of Ibn H . anbal according to S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . ilyat . anbal, Sı¯rat, 64.16; and Abu¯ Nu aym al-Is.baha¯nı¯, H al-Awliya¯ , 9:205.12. 144. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1347.18–1348.1. It faintly echoes al-Mu tas.im’s response to Ish.a¯q b. Ibra¯hı¯m in al-Ya qu¯bı¯’s account of Ibn H . anbal’s trial: “Do as you like by him.” Ta rı¯kh, 2:432.10. 145. al-Mas u¯dı¯, Muru¯j al-dhahab, 4:60.2–60.3. He goes on to say al-Wa¯thiq was dominated by Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d and Ibn al-Zayya¯t. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:323.7–323.9. 146. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1348.1–1348.2. See al-T.abarı¯’s version of the note hung on Ah.mad b. Nas.r’s severed head, stating he was given the chance to repent, Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d’s comment not withstanding. See Chap. 4 in al-H . a¯rith’s trial, in which the same criticism is made. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:430.16–430.18. 147. This also appears in the hand of Abd al-Malik in Ibn al-Jawzı¯, al-Muntaz. am, 6:91.16. Al-T.abarı¯ asserts it first came into the possession of the Caliph of al-Hadı¯, with no mention of the Umayyads.

Notes.indd 193

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194

INQUISITION

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148. Compare this to al-Afshı¯n’s trial where he is accused of walking between the two halves of a sacrificed sheep in an un-Islamic ritual. See Turner, “Al-Afshı¯n, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?” 128. 149. Also known as al-Turkı¯. Al-Ya qu¯bı¯ notes he was the first to swear allegiance to al-Mutawakkil upon his elevation to the throne. Ta rı¯kh, 2:446.16–446.17. 150. Also see al-Ja¯h.iz. , Rasa¯ il, 152.15. sayfa¯n mashu¯ra¯n “unsheathed sword.” A similar phrase appears in al-Ja¯h.iz. ’s account of the trial of Ibn H . anbal. Compare to Chap. 4, 79n, 100n, and 21n (previous). 151. For the whole scene al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1348.3–1348.13. 152. See Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:197.1–197.13, 208.9–210.15. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1733. Ibn al-Murtad. a¯, T.abaqa¯t, 25.1–27.16. 153. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:324.26. For comparison, see Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 48:198.23–199.5. 154. For an interesting parallel (five blows to kill someone and one of the Turkish guard (Bugha¯ al-S.aghı¯r) as one of the perpetrators) see al-T.abarı¯’s death scene for al-Mutawakkil al-T.abarı¯. Ta rı¯kh, 3:1459–1460. 155. Compare this to the treatment of al-Afshı¯n’s body. Turner, “Al-Afshı¯n, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?” 133. 156. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1348.18–1349.6. Ibn al-Athı¯r is brief: “This is the head of the unbeliever, polytheist, deviator, Ah.mad b. Nas.r.” Ibn al-Athı¯r, al-Ka¯mil, 7:23.4–23.5. Also see Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:324.29–325.3. 157. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:177.22–178.3. 158. Ibid., 5:173.9–180.15. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:322.23–326.13. Ibn Kathı¯r clearly gives an amalgamated version that attempts to harmonize al-T.abarı¯ and al-Khat.¯ıb. He alters the dialogue of the participants so the audience can more easily comprehend them. All the events and details are the same as in al-T.abarı¯ except the words, which are spoken by the different characters who convey the same meaning but are nonetheless different. Their difference is particularly noticeable as a conscious change by the author because all other details are the same. 159. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:176.8–176.9. 160. Ibid., 5:176.9–176.11. 161. This raises the question of why the chief of the police of a major metropolis is so minutely involved. One expects the rebels to be brought to him, but one does not expect him to be active at the first sign of drumming. 162. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:176.19–176.20. 163. al-Khat.¯ıb also leaves out the information about the perfume and depilatories, which confirms this was a symbolic device in al-T.abarı¯

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NOTES

164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169.

170. 171.

172.

173.

174.

175. 176.

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195

alluding to and contrasting with the trial of al-Afshı¯n. See Ta rı¯kh, 3:1310.3, 1347.3–1347.4. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:176.21–177.1. Ibid., 5:177.1–177.2. Again, this is an objection made to the execution of al-H . a¯rith in Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 11:430.16–430.18. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:177.3. The charges against al-Afshı¯n and his trial lead to the same conclusion. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:177.6–177.7. Also Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯, T.abaqa¯t, 1: 81.7–81.8. In al-T.abarı¯ the quote from al-Wa¯thiq stops at “I will count my steps toward him.” Ta rı¯kh, 3:1348.3–1348.4. See Chap. 3. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:177.9–177.13. Ibn Kathı¯r also has the severed head reciting the Qur a¯n. Also see Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:325.20–325.22. The Prophet, in a dream, is quoted as saying, “I turned away from him in shame at the time when a man claiming that he was from the ahl al-bayt killed him.” This clearly calls into question one of the central Abba¯sid claims to legitimacy; lineal ties to the Prophet. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:177.16–177.17. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 10:325.30–325.31. He draws a connection between Ibn H . anbal and Ah.mad b. Nas.r as well, but his is more implicit. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:177.18–177.22. We have access to a work written by Nu aym that collected an abundance of apocalyptic material. Nu aym b. Hamma¯d al-Khuza¯ ¯ı, Kita¯b al-Fitan, ed. S. Zakkar (Bayrut: Da¯r al-Fikr, 1993). It is interesting that he appears to be of the same tribe as Ah.mad b. Nas.r and dies in prison three years before him (228/843). He neither faced trial by the Caliph nor was he executed. Also see Patton, Ah.med Ibn H . anbal, 119. Note the ascetic Bishr al-Hafı¯ was also from Marw. In an interesting parallel, al-T.abarı¯ tells us all but four on the thughu¯r (frontier) assent to the createdness doctrine. Al-Wa¯thiq orders them to be decapitated. No names are given. Ta rı¯kh, 3:1352. al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 5:178.3–178.5. Nu aym b. H . amma¯d is not mentioned in al-T.abarı¯, and neither is the death of Muh.ammad b. Nu¯h.. Thus, in al-T.abarı¯ there is only one named death from the Mih.na, whereas by the time of al-Khat.¯ıb there are four prominent ones. There is a seeming proliferation of deaths as a result of the Mih.na: the later the source, the more deaths that are attributed to it. See Turner, “The End of the Mih.na.” As mentioned previously, this Sura appears prominently in the accounts of Ghayla¯n’s trial. See Chap. 4.

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177. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:444.9–445.9. 178. Ibid., 2:444.11. The preceding line includes “judges should only permit the testimony of he who asserts the divine unicity.” 179. This is similar to Ibn al-Murtad. a¯’s account of the trial of Ghayla¯n. Ibn al-Murtad. a¯, T.abaqa¯t, 25–27. 180. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:445.6–445.9. 181. Elements 1, 2, 3, 4 (implied), 6, 10, 11, 12, and 16 also occur in the trial of al-Afshı¯n. Taqiyya is also mentioned in al-Afshı¯n and S.a¯lih.’s trials.

Chapter 6 1. For the basis of that argument see Donner, Muhammad and the Believers. 2. G. Makdisi, “T.abaqa¯t-Biography: Law and Orthodoxy in Classical Islam,” Islamic Studies 32 (1993): 390. Hallaq does as well, although he is more specific in pointing to the end of the Mih.na as the key point. The Origins and Evolution, 125. For a helpful comparison of their approaches see C. Melchert, “George Makdisi and Wael B. Hallaq,” Arabica 44 (1997). 3. J. Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950). Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law. 4. H. A. R. Gibb, “Al-Mawardi’s Theory of the Caliphate,” in Studies on the Civilization of Islam, ed. S. J. Shaw et al. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962); Alı¯ b. Muh.ammad al-Ma¯wardı¯, The Ordinances of Government, trans. W. H. Wahba (London: Garnet Publishing, 1996), 3–22. 5. See the discussion in W. Madelung, “The Origins of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of the Koran,” in Orientalia Hispanica sive studia F. M. Pareja octogenario dedicata, ed. J. M. Barral (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974). It is extremely difficult to approximate when an orthodox position was determined. As Madelung notes, the issue becomes clearer at the time of the Mih.na, a natural consequence of the attempt to define a doctrine as either orthodox or unorthodox. Ibid., 504. For further discussion see Mattson, The Story of the Qur an, 137–44; and Martin, “Createdness of the Qur a¯n.” 6. De Gifis, “Qur a¯nic Rhetoric,” 239. 7. al-Ya qu¯bı¯ explicitly tells us the test was about “divine justice [al- adl] and divine unicity [al-tawh.¯ıd].” Ta rı¯kh, 2:426.21–427.2. 8. See ibid., 2:444.9–444.12: “al-Wa¯thiq tested the people about the createdness of the Qur a¯n … judges should only permit the testimony of him who asserts the divine unicity.” 9. Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 33:306.10–306.16. Al-Ma mu¯n uses the context of the revelation of a verse to limit its effect. For a deeper discussion, see Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu, 7, 29, 30, 41.

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NOTES 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21.

22. 23. 24.

25. 26.

27.

28.

Notes.indd 197

197

al-Ja¯h.iz. , Rasa¯ il, 152.7. Martin, “Createdness of the Qur a¯n.” Hurvitz, Formation, 117–18, 122. Nawas, “Moral Imperative,” 80–82. El-Hibri examines the process by which the narratives surrounding the civil war were reshaped to accomplish this. Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, Chaps 3, 4, 5. Masud, Messick, and Powers, “Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation,” 7. For the connection to the war see M. Rekaya, “al-Ma mu¯n,” in EI2, 6:338. See Turner, “The abna¯ al-dawla.” For a discussion of the nature of the penetration, see M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power, 2 vols (New York: CUP, 1986), 1:169–70. In this vein Melchert asks why Uthma¯n is not considered an Umayyad, because he was “just as Umayyad as Mu awiyah …” Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 94–95. See Weber, Economy and Society, 212–301. J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), 1–8, 95–117. However, I do not subscribe to such rigid “class” determinations. Zaman, Religion and Politics. For a more comprehensive chronological narrative see Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 147–97. T. El-Hibri, “Ha¯ru¯n al-Rashı¯d and the Mecca Protocol of 802,” IJMES 24 (1992). For a different interpretation, see R. Kimber, “Ha¯ru¯n al-Rashı¯d’s Meccan Settlement of AH 186/AD 802,” Occasional Papers of the School of Abba¯sid Studies 1, no. 1 (1986). Al-Mu tas.im was eligible but not important enough to be considered. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:796. Contrary to Watt, this was not unprecedented for the Abba¯sids. Watt, Formative Period, 177; Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph, 80, 139n. A. Arazi and A. El’Ad, “‘L’épître a l’armée’ al-Ma mu¯n et la seconde Da wa (premiere partie),” SI 66 (1987). A. Arazi and A. El’Ad, “‘L’épître a l’armée’ al-Ma mu¯n et la seconde Da wa (seconde partie),” SI 67 (1988). For the fourth fitna, see Turner, “The abna¯ al-dawla”; El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography; H. Yucesoy, “Meta Narratives: Political Legitimacy, Fate, and Piety in the Narratives of the Abbasid Civil War,” Turkish Journal of Islamic Studies 10 (2005). De Gifis examines the rhetorical exchange between the brothers. “Qur a¯nic Rhetoric,” Chap. 2. Rekaya, “al-Ma mu¯n.”

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29. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:989–95. For more on the milieu of the revolt, see J. P. Turner, “Abu¯ l-Sara¯ya¯ al-Shayba¯nı¯,” in EI3; and R. Kimber, “Al-Ma mu¯n and Baghdad: The Nomination of Alı¯ al-Rid. a¯,” in Actas XVI Congreso UEAI, ed. M. C. Vazquez De Benito et al. (Salamanca, Spain: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, 1995). 30. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1012–1013. For more on the appointment of al-Rid. a¯ see Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph, app. 4.; Cooperson, CAB, Chap. 3; and D. G. Tor, “An Historiographical Re-examination of the Appointment and Death of Alı¯ al-Rid. a¯,” Der Islam 78 (2001). 31. Some later sources read this as a reaction to al-Rid. a¯’s appointment. Lapidus, “Separation,” 371. 32. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 152. Madelung has a different opinion on the appointment. “New Documents Concerning al-Ma mu¯n, al-Fad. l b. Sahl and Alı¯ al-Rid. a¯ ,” in Studia Arabica et Islamica, ed. W. al-Qa¯d. ¯ı (Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1981). 33. Lapidus, “Separation,” 371–72. Also see S. Sabari, Mouvements populaires à Bagdad à l’époque abbasside, IXe-XIe siècles (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1981), 77–79. Yucesoy and I have a similar conclusion about the “vigilantes.” Messianic Beliefs and Imperial Politics in Medieval Islam (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2009), 68–70. 34. M. A. Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (New York: CUP, 2000), 107. The leaders justified themselves and their actions as fulfilling the Qur a¯nic injunction to command right and forbid wrong. 35. Madelung, “Vigilante Movement,” 335. 36. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1025–1027. 37. Why al-Ma mu¯n took so long has not elicited much comment, but I assume he was attempting to mend fences with local notables to strengthen his position in general and to provide a clear road back to Marw should he need it under duress. 38. D. Waines, “The Third Century Internal Crisis of the Abbasids,” JESHO 20 (1977): 286. 39. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1039. For the coinage reforms, see T. El-Hibri, “Coinage Reform under the Abba¯sid Caliph al-Ma mu¯n,” JESHO 36 (1993). 40. Kimber, “Al-Ma mu¯n and Baghdad,” 280. 41. Ah.mad b. Yah.ya¯ al-Bala¯dhurı¯, Futu¯h. al-Bulda¯n, ed. A. Q. M. Alı¯ (Beirut: Da¯r al-Kutub al- Ilmı¯yah, 2000), 27–28. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:428. Also see Sourdel, “La politique religieuse,” 41. 42. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1099. At the same time, he declared Alı¯ the best of men.

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43. Nawas reads this as al-Ma mu¯n testing the waters to see which issue would provide more traction in preparation for launching the Mih.na. “Moral Imperative,” 79–80. 44. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1100. 45. Ibid., 3:1102. 46. Ibid., 3:1103. Hence the entry in Ibn Asa¯kir, TMD, 33:275–341. 47. See P. von Sivers, “Taxes and Trade in the Abba¯sid Thughu¯r, 750–962/ 133–351,” JESHO 25 (1982): 78–79. 48. See M. Bonner, Aristocratic Violence and Holy War (New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 1996), 148. 49. Elad, Medieval Jerusalem, 45–46. 50. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1105. 51. Ibid., 3:1107. 52. Ibid., 3:1111–1112. Beginning in 216/831, this site had been a launching point for expeditions. Ibid., 3:1104. Al-Mas u¯dı¯ briefly mentions T.uwa¯na as part of al-Ma mu¯n’s preparations. Muru¯j al-dhahab, 4:38.12–38.16. 53. Kennedy also reads this as preparations for large-scale conquest. When Baghdad Ruled, 210. 54. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:429.2. He mentions that Amorion was also a target (428.21). Also see Yazı¯d b. Muh.ammad al-Azdı¯, Ta rı¯kh al-Maws.il, ed. A. Habibah (Cairo: al-Majlis al-A la¯ li l-Shu u¯n al-Isla¯miyya, 1967), 414. Noted by Bonner, Aristocratic Violence, 148; and Sivers, “Taxes and Trade,” 78. 55. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1111–1134. 56. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:426.21–427.2. 57. In modern Turkey, Budandu¯n is the village of Pozanti. G. le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate (Cambridge: CUP, 1905), 134. Cooperson describes a visit to the “tomb” of al-Ma mu¯n. “The Grave of al-Ma mu¯n in Tarsus,” in Abbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies, Cambridge, 6–10 July 2002, ed. J. Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2004). Also see Cooperson, Al-Ma mu¯n, 123. 58. For the narrative development of the death scene, see El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, Chap. 4. Why did he pass over his seemingly qualified son al- Abba¯s? Or did he? On p. 121, El-Hibri hints that al-Mu tas.im may have murdered him (also p. 141, 119n). See Turner, “Death of al- Abba¯s.” Madelung discusses the succession but gives a different context. “New Documents,” 346. 59. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1164; al-Azdı¯, Ta rı¯kh al-Maws.il, 415. 60. Ba¯bak had been in rebellion since 201/816–17. 61. It is unclear who the Zut.t. were. They had been staging periodic raids since at least 205/820 although without causing serious disruptions until the events that occasioned the dispatch of Ujayf.

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62. Gordon speculates this may have been the reason they were not deployed beyond Iraq, at least initially. The Breaking of a Thousand Swords, 76. 63. See Turner, “Al-Afshı¯n, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?” 64. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1236–267. Also see Khalı¯fa Ibn Khayya¯t. al- Usfurı¯, Ta rı¯kh Khalı¯fa Ibn Khayya¯.t, ed. M. N. Fawwaz and H. K. Fawwaz (Beirut: Da¯r al-Kutub al- Ilmı¯ya, 1995), 316–17. For the Byzantine take, see W. T. Treadgold, “The Chronological Accuracy of the ‘Chronicle’ of Symeon the Logothete for the Years 813–845,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 33 (1979). Thanks go to Etienne de la Vaissiere for pointing me to this article. 65. For more on its reputation, see J. Bray, “Al-Mu tas.im’s ‘Bridge of Toil’ and Abu¯ Tamma¯m’s Amorium Qas.¯ıda,” in Studies in Islamic and Middle Eastern Texts and Traditions in Memory of Norman Calder, ed. G. R. Hawting, J. A. Mojaddedi, and A. Samely (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 66. De Goeje, Fragmenta, 1:398. 67. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1265. 68. J. Lassner, The Middle East Remembered (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 241. Kennedy notes a shift toward nonmarking executions as an indication of the victim’s status. When Baghdad Ruled, 238–39. 69. The sources make clear allusions to Abu¯ Muslim. 70. Given the direction in which this was heading, one wonders if, had al-Mu tas.im lived longer, he would have allowed the T.a¯hirids to remain in position. 71. Turner, “Al-Afshı¯n, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?” Also see E. de la Vaissiere, Samarcande et Samarra, Studia Iranica. Cahier, 35 (Paris: Association pour l’avancement des etudes iraniennes, 2007). I thank Etienne for pointing out his helpful book. 72. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 164; and Kennedy, “The Decline and Fall of the First Muslim Empire,” Der Islam 81 (2004). 73. This situation looks much as Moore and Russell describe the increase of heresy prosecutions in Europe. See Chap. 2. 74. For a more complete discussion of al-Wa¯thiq, see J. P. Turner, “The Enigmatic Reign of al-Wa¯thiq (r. 227/842–232/847),” in Abbasid Studies IV: Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies, ed. M. Bernards (forthcoming). 75. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1331–336. 76. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:444.12–444.20. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1351–356. 77. A. Kolia-Dermitzaki, “The Execution of the Forty-Two Martyrs of Amorion,” Al-Masa¯q 14 (2002). 78. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:444.9–444.11. 79. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1352. Of course this looks like a topos because in his account of the beginning of the Mih.na there are four holdouts as well.

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80. Gordon, The Breaking of a Thousand Swords, 78–79. Northedge notes that al-Wa¯thiq’s contribution boils down to assuring the elite of the permanence of Samarra, which ensured their investment in construction. Northedge, The Historical Topography of Samarra, 99–100. 81. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1363. 82. Ibid., 3:1364. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:446.4–446.7. Al-Ya qu¯bı¯ writes (.4–.6), “And his illness intensified until a pit was dug for him in the earth like an oven [tannu¯r], then heated by tamarisk wood. And he was committed to it for a time. And he was saying in his illness; ‘By my love, verily may God forgive me my lapse and verily may He lift the burden from my head.’” Also see al-S.u¯lı¯, who gives a slightly different account. Kitab al-avraq, 556–55. 83. al-Ya qu¯bı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 2:446.6–446.7. 84. Coincidentally, al-Mutawakkil’s succession date is in the same week as the anniversaries of Umar’s and Uthma¯n’s assassinations. 85. Was.¯ıf and i¯ta¯kh were some of the first Turkish slaves al-Mu tas.im purchased. 86. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1368.7–1370.6. For more evidence for what follows, see Turner, “The End of the Mih.na.” 87. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1368. 88. Ibn al-Zayya¯t created a torture device resembling an iron maiden that is referred to as the tannu¯r. This was used on him in his last days (ibid., 3:1374– 375.). Although it is interesting to draw a link between al-Wa¯thiq’s death and this torture device, it can be no more than speculative. However, the suspiciousness of his death, Ibn al-Zayya¯t’s presence during it, and the odd reference to him dying in an oven lends an air of truth. Thanks to James Montgomery for helping me see the connection. Also see Turner, “The End of the Mih.na.” 89. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1404–405. 90. Ta¯j al-Dı¯n al-Subkı¯, T.abaqa¯t al-Sha¯fi ¯ıyah al-kubra¯, ed. M. M. al-T.ana¯h.¯ı, 10 vols (Cairo: Isa¯ al-Ba¯bı¯ al-H . alabı¯, 1964–76), 2:54. Also see Muh.ammad b. Yu¯suf al-Kindı¯, The Governors and Judges of Egypt, ed. R. Guest and A. A. al-Askalami (London: Luzac & Co., 1912), 197. Patton, Ah.med Ibn H . anbal, 122; Hinds, “Mih.na.” For what follows, see Turner, “The End of the Mih.na.” 91. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1412–413. 92. C. Melchert, “Religious Policies of the Caliphs from al-Mutawakkil to al-Muqtadir, a.h. 232–295/a.d. 847–908,” ILS 3 (1996). He has changed his stance somewhat. See Ahmad ibn Hanbal, p. 17. 93. al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1390–394. For an additional example, see al-Qalqashandı¯, Subh. al-a sha¯, 13:368.7–369.3.

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202 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

99. 100.

101.

102. 103.

104. 105.

106. 107. 108. 109. 110.

111.

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al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1419, 1422–423. Ibid., 3:1394. Ibid., 3:1424. Ibid., 3:1425.9–1425.15. I have relied on the translation of al-T.abarı¯, Incipient Decline, 136–37. For an additional example, see al-T.abarı¯, Ta rı¯kh, 3:1434. In 242/857, al-Mutawakkil charged a man with apostasy; when he refused to recant he was executed and his body burned. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 170. For a discussion of his attempt to rectify this, see P. M. Cobb, “Al-Mutawakkil’s Damascus: A New Abba¯sid Capital?” JNES 58 (1999). In 249/863, al-T.abarı¯ comments “they [the Turks] killed whomever they wished to kill of the Caliphs and made Caliph whomever they preferred to appoint with recourse by them neither to religion nor to consideration of the Muslims.” Ta rı¯kh, 3:1510.11–1510.13. Abu¯ Ja far Muh.ammad b. Jarı¯r al-T.abarı¯, The Revolt of the Zanj, trans. D. Waines, vol. 36 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 74. Kennedy adds the important caveat that Ibn T.u¯lu¯n always remained a creature of the Abba¯sid court. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 309. Down to the spiral minaret, the architecture of his mosque in Cairo evokes Samarra. Muh.ammad b. Yah.ya¯ al-S.u¯lı¯, Akhba¯r al-Ra¯d. ¯ı wa al-Muttaqı¯ min kita¯b al-awra¯q, ed. J. H. Dunne (Cairo: As-Sawy, 1935), 41.3–41.5. See D. Stewart, “al-T.abarı¯’s Kita¯b Maa¯tib al- ulama¯ and the Significance of Biographical Works Devoted to ‘the Classes of Jurists,” Der Islam (forthcoming). I thank Devin for sharing a prepublication copy. Hallaq terms this the “Great Rationalist-Traditionalist Synthesis.” The Origins and Evolution, Chap. 6. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 111.7–111.9. For a discussion of this contrast see Makdisi, “Ash arı¯ and the Ash arites, Part I.” Also see “Ash arı¯ and the Ash arites, Part II.” Ibn al-Jawzı¯, Mana¯qib, 319–20. This is also shown in early sources such as H . anbal Ibn Ish.a¯q, Dhikr, 58. The need to keep both Ibn H . anbal and the Caliph from culpability is pointed out in Cooperson, CAB, 149, 152–53. Zaman, Religion and Politics, 113. Hurvitz, “Ah.mad Ibn H . anbal and the Formation of Islamic Orthodoxy,” 213–14, 227. See Abu¯ Bakr Ah.mad b. Alı¯ al-Khat.¯ıb al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta rı¯kh madı¯nati as-sala¯m, ed. B. A. Ma rouf (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 2001), 16:25.

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NOTES

112. 113.

114. 115.

116.

117.

118. 119.

120. 121.

122. 123. 124. 125.

Notes.indd 203

203

Al-Khat.¯ıb says Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d controlled al-Wa¯thiq as he intensified the Mih.na. He also says al-Wa¯thiq repented of it before he died. Cook, Commanding Right, 113. Cooperson notes, “Moreover, it helped reinforce the specifically H . anbalı¯ claim to authority as against that of the other schools of legal interpretation.” CAB, 152–53. Melchert, Formation of the Sunni Schools, 150–53. Melchert does not couch it in these terms. Also see Melchert, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 79–80. Makdisi states al-Ash arı¯ became a follower of Ibn H . anbal because doing so “attest[ed], in the strongest possible terms,” to his rejection of the rationalists by following “a leader who, though long absent from the scene, had a name that retained its powerful resonance as a rallying point for traditionalists.” “T.abaqa¯t-Biography,” 380. Melchert, Formation of the Sunni Schools, Chap. 7. Hallaq makes this point as well. The Origins and Evolution, 154. For an interesting take on how and why the followers gathered around Ibn H . anbal and his ideals, see N. Hurvitz, “Schools of Law and Historical Context,” ILS 7 (2000). Melchert credits al-Khiraqı¯ (d. 334/945–46) with an epitome (mukhtas.ar), thus indicating the H . ana¯bila had crystallized as a school of legal thought, confirming the victory of this strain over al-Barbaha¯rı¯. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 69, 79. By “imagined” I mean in the sense of B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991). Hallaq mentions that the legal theory of the Sha¯fi ¯ı school, along with its followers, was entering Baghdad in the first quarter of the tenth century. He does not note this coincides with the dispute between al-T.abarı¯ and the H . ana¯bila. The Origins and Evolution, 177. Stewart, “al-T.abarı¯’s Kita¯b Maa¯tib al- ulama¯ .” Abu¯ Bakr al-Khalla¯l, al-Amr bi l-ma ru¯f wa l-nahy an al-munkar, ed. A. Q. Ahmad (Cairo: Da¯r al-I tis.a¯m, 1975), 102.4–102.7, 108.7–108.15, 124.8–124.9, 134.4–134.9, 138.3–138.5. Ibn al-Athı¯r, al-Ka¯mil, 8:229–31. Take particular notice of al-Ra¯d. ¯ı’s condemnation of him and his followers. Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯, T.abaqa¯t, 2:43.16–43.19. Also cited in Melchert, Formation of the Sunni Schools, 150; and Cook, Commanding Right, 122. See R. P. Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society (Princeton: PUP, 1980), 25. Melchert, Formation of the Sunni Schools, 152. Melchert cites Muh.ammad b. Ah.mad al-Dhahabı¯, Siyar a la¯m al-nubala , ed. S. Arna u¯t. (Beirut: Mu assasat al-Risa¯lah, 1981), 15:90. This statement is an uncomfortable parallel to Ah.mad’s response during his trial.

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126. Ibn H . anbal’s Musnad, in addition to being a collection of h.adı¯th, is a statement of who among the ulama¯ is trustworthy. As Makdisi states, “The musnads and the .tabaqa¯t were so arranged as to highlight the scholar of h.adı¯th and his pedigree.” “T.abaqa¯t-Biography,” 376. 127. This was hardly an exclusively H . anbalı¯ phenomenon. Vikor notes concerning the Ma¯likı¯s “all of this process of cementing the unity of the Ma¯likı¯ grouping around the figure of Ma¯lik and raising him to the ultimate interpreter must have come later; perhaps starting to develop from a half a century to a century later . . .” “The Truth about Cats and Dogs: The Historicity of Early Islamic Law,” Historisk Tidsskrift 82 (2003): 16. 128. For one example see Alı¯ b. al-H . asan Ibn Asa¯kir, Ta rı¯kh al-Kabir (Damascus: al-Rawdat al-Sham, 1911), 2:41. Cited by M. Cooperson, “The Heirs of the Prophets in Classical Arabic Biography” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1994), 422. 129. Cited in C. Melchert, “The Piety of the Hadith Folk,” IJMES 34 (2002): 429, 41n. 130. Melchert citing al-Dhahabı¯, Siyar, 12:61. “Piety of the Hadith Folk,” 429, 42n. 131. See previous, Chap. 5. 132. Stewart observes this as well. “Muh.ammad b. Jarı¯r al-T.abarı¯’s al-Baya¯n an us.u¯l al-ah.ka¯m and the Genre of us.u¯l al-fiqh in Ninth Century Baghdad,” in Abbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies, Cambridge, 6–10 July 2002, ed. J. Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 327. 133. Stewart, “al-T.abarı¯’s Kita¯b Maa¯tib al- ulama¯ .” 134. Ibn al-Athı¯r, al-Ka¯mil, 8:134.14–134.17. Ya¯qu¯t al-H . amawı¯, Irsha¯d al-arı¯b ila¯ ma rifat al-adı¯b, ed. D. S. Margoliouth (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1907–27), 6:6:436.2–436.12. In this, he was not alone. Hallaq notes the H . ana¯bila were not generally considered to be a school of legal thought “until the end of the third/beginning of the tenth century” and in addition to al-T.abarı¯ “many other scholars did not view Hanbalis as law experts.” “Was the Gate of Ijtiha¯d Closed?” 9. 135. Abu¯ Ja far Muh.ammad b. Jarı¯r al-T.abarı¯, General Introduction, and, From the Creation to the Flood, trans. F. Rosenthal, vol. 1 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 70. Also noted by Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtiha¯d Closed?” 9. 136. Melchert, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 79. 137. al-T.abarı¯, General Introduction, 70. Rosenthal concludes “al-T.abarı¯ appears to have been the victim of a slander campaign by certain H . anbalites. They propagated the idea that he was a Shı¯ ah extremist and ultimately a heretic.” Ibid., 62.

Notes.indd 204

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NOTES

205

138. On ijtiha¯d and errors, see B. Weiss, “Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtiha¯d,” American Journal of Comparative Law 26 (1978): 204–205. 139. Melchert notes, “If the last report is valid [assertion that Ibn H . anbal was not a jurisprudent], then the persecution [of al-T.abarı¯] had to do with the H . ana¯bilah’s desiring to be recognized alongside the sophisticates of the Sha¯fi ¯ı school.” Formation of the Sunni Schools, 153. 140. These were not the only ones the H . ana¯bila competed with. Consider their relations with the Sha¯fi ites. S.a¯lih. mentions one of Ibn H . anbal’s persecutors is a follower of al-Sha¯fi ¯ı in the same breath as one of the followers of Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯d. S.a¯lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, Sı¯rat, 59.9. 141. See Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 11:184.15–184.20. At least from the perspective of the sources, the H . ana¯bila always seem to be the ones who initiate violent conflict. 142. Ya¯qu¯t al-H . amawı¯, Irsha¯d al-arı¯b ila¯ ma rifat al-adı¯b, 6:436. Also see al-T.abarı¯’s commentary on this verse in his Tafsı¯r, in which he specifically rejects this interpretation. General Introduction, 149–51. Melchert notes that a number of different reasons are given for the assault. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 80. 143. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 11:184.17–184.19. Also see Ibn al-Athı¯r, al-Ka¯mil, 8:157–58. 144. H. Laoust, “al-Barbaha¯rı¯,” in EI2. al-T.abarı¯, General Introduction, 71–73. 145. Schacht dismisses excited responses to issues of Qur a¯nic interpretation as a mask for “other motives,” but this is not entirely accurate. Public passion about Qur a¯nic interpretation cannot be dismissed when we consider whether or not an individual was going to hell as a result of a faulty interpretation was a real motivational force for a Baghdadian in the ninth century. See Crone, God’s Rule, Chap. 2. J. Schacht, “New Sources for the History of Muhammadan Theology,” SI 1 (1953): 36. 146. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 11:142.5–142.8. 147. Ah.mad b. Muh.ammad Ibn Miskawayh, The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate, ed. H. F. Amedroz and D. S. Margoliouth (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1920), 1:84.19–84.21. Also see Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 11:157.28–158.2. Rosenthal questions the historicity of the conflict outside his house. al-T.abarı¯, General Introduction, 70–80. 148. Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 11:158.1. 149. Ibid., 11:157.28–158.2. 150. Al-T.abarı¯ was not the only one making such statements about Ibn H . anbal nor was he the only one to face the wrath of the H . anbalı¯ mob as a result. Once again, consider the altercations with the Sha¯fi ites.

Notes.indd 205

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206 151. 152. 153. 154. 155.

156. 157. 158.

159.

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Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯yah, 11:158.4–158.5. Melchert, Formation of the Sunni Schools, 153. As Melchert puts it, there is a strong sense of “me, too” about it all. Ibid. Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯, T.abaqa¯t, 1:13. Cited and translated by Cooperson, CAB, 138. Cooperson notes that “within the h.adı¯th-community itself, Ibn H . anbal’s legend served other important purposes. . . . Moreover, it helped reinforce the specifically H . anbalı¯ claim to authority as against that of the other schools of legal interpretation.” CAB, 149. Cook, Commanding Right, 106. See Ess, Flowering, 134–35. Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯, T.abaqa¯t, 2:28.14–29.7. Al-Barbaha¯rı¯ asserts “they” are the one true faith, the division following the death of Uthma¯n was bid a, and one must be careful of those who lead to a false path. See Cook, Commanding Right, 123–43.

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INDEX

al- Abba¯ s b. al-Ma mu¯n, 128–131 Abba¯sids administration, 100 Caliphs, 1, 19, 21, 25, 117, 127, 141, 149 dynasty, 1, 16, 21, 24–27, 58, 60, 61, 64–65, 104, 111, 116, 120, 126, 127, 131, 141, 149 elites, 126, 131 period, 18, 61, 73, 120 revolution, 63, 66, 125 Abd al-Malik accomplishments, 22 as Commander of the Faithful, 17, 63–64, 119 comparison to al-Ma mu¯n, 124, 125, 126, 128, 139, 150 piety of, 64 prosecution of al-H . a¯rith, 1, 29, 62, 65, 66–71, 119 reforms, 64, 119 religious views, 27, 63 sons, 64–65 Abd al-Rah.ma¯ n b. Ish.a¯ q, 91, 95–96, 98–99, 107–108, 112 Abdalla¯ h b. Abı¯ Zakariya, 67 Abdalla¯ h b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal, 7, 142 Abdalla¯ h b. T. a¯ hir, 130 abna¯ al-dawla, 11, 124, 127

Index.indd 219

Abu¯ Abdalla¯ h see Ibn H . anbal Abu¯ Ha¯ ru¯n al-Sarra¯ j, 104, 106 Abu¯ H . assa¯ n al-Ziya¯ dı¯, 57 Abu¯ Idrı¯s al-Khawla¯ nı¯, 67–68 Abu¯ Khaythama, 104 Abu¯ Ma mar, 56 Abu¯ Muslim, 99 Abu¯ Nu aym, 86, 88, 100–103 Adam, 74–75 Adhana, 94 adl (Justice) see God al-Afshı¯n, 48, 107, 130, 131 death of, 49, 92, 132 ahl al-fiqh see jurisprudent ahl al-h.adı¯th see h.adı¯th, transmitters of ahl al-sunna wa l-jama¯ a, 11, 36, 38–39, 45 Ah.mad b. al-Faraj, 100 Ah.mad b. H . anbal see Ibn H . anbal Ah.mad b. Kha¯ lid Abu¯ al-Wazı¯r, 133–134 Ah.mad b. Nas. r al-Khuza¯ ¯ı, 104–105 arrest of, 106 execution of, 2, 109–111, 113–114 portrayal of, 62 revolt of, 127, 133 trial of, 60, 70, 86, 101, 104–114, 115, 117 discrepancies, 22 trends, 120

3/4/2013 7:55:25 PM

220

INQUISITION

Ah.mad b. Raba¯ h, 94 Ah.mad b. T. u¯lu¯n, 137 Alı¯ b. Abı¯ T. a¯ lib, 15, 63, 126 Alı¯ b. Isa¯ b. Ma¯ ha¯ n, 36 Alı¯ al-Rida¯ , 15, 126–127 Alids loyalism, 15 rebels, 63, 130 alla¯ hu akbar, 15, 128 al-Amı¯n, 11, 58, 105, 123–125, 127 amı¯r al-mu minı¯n see Caliph Amma¯ r b. Y a¯ sir, 90 Ammu¯riya see Amorion Amorion, 129–131, 133 Amr b. Muha¯ jir, 74, 104 Amr b. Muh.mmad al- Amrakı¯, 36 Amr b. Ubayd b. Ba¯ b, 49 al-amr bi l-ma ru¯f, 143, 149 al-Anba¯ r, 57 Anthony, Sean, 66 anthropomorphism, 3, 50, 89, 92, 101, 110, 146 apostasy, 29, 49, 97, 107, 110, 112, 131, 137 Arabic, 63–64, 68–69, 119, 133 ascetics, 67, 101, 143 al-Ash arı¯ ideologies, 43–44, 140 link to Ibn H . anbal, 39, 142–144, 146 the Mu tazila and, 49 piety of, 45, 50 students of, 140 Ash arism, 28, 50 Ash arites doxographers, 58, 119 doxographies, 26, 41–43, 140, 142 portrayal of, 45–46 social identity, 39–40 al-Awza¯ ı¯ prosecution of Ghayla¯ n , 77, 79–80 historical discrepancies, 81–82 Ba¯ b Dimashq, 80 Ba¯ bak body of, 109

Index.indd 220

IN

E ARLY ISLAM execution of, 130 heresy of, 36 rebellion of, 132 Baghdad, 1, 7, 11–15, 58, 87, 92, 94, 109, 111, 113–114, 135, 145, 147 chaos in, 105 civil unrest in, 141 siege of, 126, 137 uprisings in, 106 al-Baghda¯ dı¯ (doxographer) heresy and, 49 religious views, 44–45 Bakka¯ r b. al-H . asan, 144 al-Bala¯ dhurı¯, 83 al-Barbaha¯ rı¯, Abu¯ Muh.ammad, 142–146, 149 Barmakids, 132 Basra, 68, 130, 138 beatific vision, 4, 106–107, 109, 112, 114, 133 Believers, 9, 17, 22, 24, 28, 31–32, 56, 60, 62–64, 77, 118–119, 121, 123, 133, 138 mu minu¯n, 17, 63–64, umma, 9, 28, 32, 121 bid a see innovation bishops, 29, 35 Bishr b. al-Mu tamir, 49 Bishr b. al-Walı¯d, 58, 90, 148 Budandu¯n, 129 Bugha¯ the Elder, 94, 100, 130 Bugha¯ al-S.aghı¯r, 109 al-Bukha¯ rı¯, 17, 22, 146 al-Buwayt.¯ı, 144–145 Byzantines, 113, 139 Emperor, 11, 24 frontier, 12–13, 128–129, 133 officers, 133 Caliph Abba¯ sid, 1, 19, 21, 25, 27, 60, 117, 127, 141, 149 amı¯r al-mu minı¯n (Commander of the Faithful), 7, 9, 12–13, 15,

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INDEX 17, 24, 28, 35, 40–41, 51–55, 57–59, 62, 64–67, 75, 79, 81, 90–93, 95, 99–102, 108–110, 118–119, 123, 128–134, 136–139, 150 defiance among, 61, 98, 108 in Spain, 9 independence of, 108, 132, 134, 137 khalı¯fa, 53 khulafa¯ , 54 and the Mih.na, 13, 18–19, 21, 81 persecution of heretics and, 17, 25–26, 41, 52, 81, 116 political power, 16, 21, 23, 118, 121, 137 as prosecutors, 76, 94, 97–98, 102, 109 religious authority, 2, 24, 34, 56, 60, 118–119 social roles of, 2, 7–10, 24, 29, 34–35, 41, 51, 52, 61–62, 64, 65, 67, 81–82, 84, 110, 115, 118, 119, 120–124, 128, 135–139, 150 Umayyad, 1, 21, 27, 60, 62–63, 80 Christianity Catholicism, 31 ecclesiastical structure, 10, 27–30, 35, 40 European, 24, 26 Christians, 10, 56, 63, 119 Cilician Gates, 128 civil war (fitna), 11, 15, 16, 21, 63, 113, 115, 124 coinage, standardization of, 64, 119 Commander of the Faithful see Caliphs, amı¯r al-mu minı¯n conspiracy, 35, 55, 78, 111 Constantinople, 65, 119, 129 Cook, Michael, 141 Cooperson, Michael, 19–20, 90, 92, 100, 151 coup d’état, 131 Crone, Patricia, 16–17

Index.indd 221

221

Damascus, 1, 62, 72, 81, 128–129 David (Prophet), 53, 57 De Gifis, Vanessa, 122 al-Dhahabı¯, 144 al-Dhayya¯ l b. al-Haytham, 57 dhimmı¯, 135–136 disobedience, 24–25, 29, 30, 58, 60, 62, 82, 84–85, 107, 109, 110, 132 dogma, 15, 19, 24, 31, 66 Dome of the Rock, 63–64, 119, 128 Donner, Fred, 17, 63 doxographers portrayal of heretics, 35–36, 43, 45, 50–51, 57 social role of, 118 doxography, 23, 25–26, 28, 33–35, 37, 41–43 drunkenness, 10, 48, 111, 114 dualism, 3–4, 27, 56, 62, 85, 122 Egypt, 13, 129, 138 elephants, 130 empire, 1, 22, 65, 119, 122, 124–125, 128, 130, 137 Europe, 8, 27, 29–30, 40 Eve, 75 excommunication, 40 execution of al- Abba¯ s b. al-Ma mu¯n, 131 of Afshı¯n, 49, 92, 132 of Ah.mad b. Nas. r, 2, 109–111, 113–114 of Ba¯ bak, 130 by crucifixion, 1, 67, 69, 70, 115 by decapitation, 56, 77–80, 109, 114, 133 by dehydration, 98, 131, 134–135 of Ghayla¯n, 47, 71, 73, 77–78, 80, 84 of al-H . a¯ rith, 67, 70 of Ujayf b. Anbasa, 131 al-Fad.l b. Ish.a¯ q al-Ha¯ shimı¯, 133 faith, 7, 11, 17, 26, 31, 38, 52, 57, 64, 90, 95, 98, 128

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222

INQUISITION

fame, 7, 40, 94 fard. ayn, 24 fard. kifa¯ya, 24 Fargha¯ na, 68 Fargha¯ nı¯, 69 Farq bayn al-firaq, 44 fa¯siq, 48 Fa¯ t. ima, 63, 126, 128 Fatimids, 9 feet, severing of, 80, 83–84, 109 fitna see civil war five pillars of Islam, 31, 95, 149 funerals, 15, 66, 75, 136 fuqaha¯ see jurisprudent Gabrieli, Francesco, 55 Ghassa¯ n, 96 Ghayla¯ n al-Dimashqı¯, 1, 22, 29, 60–62, 65–66, 71, 92, 96, 100, 103–104, 108–109, 115, 119, 122 execution of, 47, 71, 73, 77–78, 80, 84 imprisonment of, 83 trial of, 72–85 gha¯zı¯, 128 gibbet, use of, 1, 76, 79–80, 109, 114–115, 135 Gillis, John, 33 God attributes of, 4, 38, 47, 112, Creator, 38, 93 justice of ( adl), 3, 38, 62, 91, 122, 129 speech of, 4, 89 teeth and tongue of, 101 throne of, 146 h.adı¯th prayer and, 5 religious authority, 16, 96 traditions, 7, 55, 57 transmission, 3, 6–7, 53 transmitters of (muh.addithu¯n, ahl al-h.adı¯th), 4–6, 14, 16, 18–19,

Index.indd 222

IN

E ARLY ISLAM 38–39, 43, 50, 54, 91, 101, 104–106, 108, 122, 142, 148 social roles of, 19–20, 53, 54, 57, 93 Hallaq, Wael, 32 H . anbalı¯s, H . ana¯ bila conflicts, 146–147 narratives, 87, 141, 149 hands, severing of, 76, 80, 83, 84, 99, 109 al-H . a¯ rith b. Sa ¯ıd al-Kadhdha¯ b arrest of, 68–71 execution of, 62, 67, 69–70 Ghayla¯ n, similarities to, 66, 71 trial of, 22, 60–62, 65, 66–71, 85, 119 trends, 114–115 al-H . asan al-Basri, 49 al-H . asan b. Sahl, 126–127 H . ashwiyya, 32 “heat of the blade”, 76, 79, 89 note 21, 109 note 150 heaven, 4, 48, 69, 71 Hijra, 9 Hinds, Martin, 16–17 Hisha¯ m b. Abd al-Malik ascension of, 22, 64–65 legitimacy of, 27, 30, 103, 119, 150 trial of Ghaylan, 1, 29, 62, 66, 72–74, 76–80, 82–85, 96, 104, 108 Hurvitz, Nimrod, 18 H . usayn b. Alı¯, 63 Iblı¯s see Satan Ibn Abı¯ Du a¯ d, Ah.mad blame for the Mih.na, 141, 150 caliphal advisor, 3, 139 death of, 134 as kingmaker, 133 as Mu tazilite, 3, 14, as prosecutor of Ibn H . anbal, 18, 88–89, 92, 94–99, 101, 104, 123

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INDEX as prosecutor of Ah.mad b. Nas. r, 107–108, 112, 114 Ibn Abı¯ Ya la¯ , 105, 148 Ibn H . ajar, 71 Ibn H . anbal, Ah.mad as Abu¯ Abdalla¯ h, 99 acquiescence of, alleged, 88, 92, 97, 141, 147–148 authorities of, 19, 57, 61 beating of, 2, 14, 76, 87, 103, 105, 113, 125 biography, 20 imprisonment of, 93–95, 100, 148 legacy of, 142–143 piety of, 7, 86, 100–102, 120, 142, 150 release of, 103, 120 scholarly dress, 101 talisman belonging to, 103 trial of, 2, 13, 20, 60, 85, 86–104, 108, 115–116, 122, 130, 150 significance of, 144 trends, 115, 120 uncertainties, 20, 22, 108, 140–141 Ibn Kathı¯r, 108–109, 147 Ibn Miskawayh, Ah.mad b. Muh.ammad, 147 Ibn al-Muna¯ dı¯, 147 Ibn al-Murtad.a¯ , 39, 82–83 Ibn Sama¯ a, 96 Ibn al-Zayya¯ t, 100–101, 107, 110–111, 133–134 Ibn al-Zubayr, 22, 62–65, 119, 124 Ibra¯ hı¯m b. al-Mahdı¯, 58, 148 ifta¯ , 123 ijma¯ , 103, 146 ijtiha¯d, 32 Ikhtila¯f, 145 Imam, 7, 10, 15–16, 55, 83, 109, 116, 126–127, 144, 148 ima¯m al-huda¯ , 15, 55, 126 Imamate, 15 imtih.a¯n, 12

Index.indd 223

223

innovation (bid a), 37–39, 43, 46–47, 49–50, 52, 57, 140 interrogation, 2, 4, 67, 73, 83, 91, 95, 100, 103 Ish.a¯ q b. Ibra¯ hı¯m execution of ¯ıta¯ kh, 134 implementation of the Mih.na, 13 prosecution of Ah.mad b. Nas. r, 108 prosecution of Ibn H . anbal, 91, 93, 99 discrepancies, 92, 94 Islam beliefs, 4, 10, 27, 31 development of, 6, 8, 63 diversity in, 28, 149 the Mih.na and, 8 pillars of, 31, 95, 149 sects, 44 structure, 24–25 Islamic law, 5, 8–9, 13, 20, 138, 140, 145 isna¯ d, 5, 7, 146 istita¯ ba, 70, 80, 87, 108 Ita¯ kh, 130, 133–134 Ja far al-S.a¯ diq, 129 al-Ja¯ h.iz. , 46–47, 86, 88–93, 95, 97, 99, 115, 141 Jahm b. S.afwa¯ n, 37, 47 Jerusalem, 63, 67–71, 128 jihad, 24, 56, 96, 128–130, 133, 139 Judd, Steven, 66, 72–73, 81, 83 judge see qa¯d.¯ı Judgment Day, 4, 9, 11, 106, 140 jurisprudent, 38, 53, 70, 143, 145 al-Kadhdha¯ b see al-H . a¯ rith kadhdha¯ b (liar), 1, 54, 66, 76, 89 kala¯ m, 3, 5, 10–11, 18, 28, 43, 45, 49, 56, 68–69, 89, 91–92, 95, 97, 140, 142 Karbala, 135 Karra¯ miyya, 49 Kha¯ lid al-Daryu¯sh, 111, 127

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224

INQUISITION

Kha¯ lid b. Yazı¯d b. Mu a¯ wiya, 70 al-Khalla¯ l, Abu¯ Bakr, 142–146, 148–149 Kha¯ rijites, 32 al-Khat. ¯ıb al-Baghda¯ dı¯, 110–113, 145 Khurasan commanders of, 102 Khurramiyya, 130 Kimber, Richard, 128 Knysh, Alexander, 39 kufr, 80 Laoust, Henri, 36, 43 legal theory, 5–6, 8, 16, 24 legitimation, 7, 41–42, 52–53, 59, 61–65, 67, 73, 110–111, 117, 119–121, 123, 125, 132, 138–140, 143, 150 Lewis, Bernard, 29 Ma bad al-Juhaynı¯, 72 al-Mada¯ inı¯, 82–83 madhhab, madha¯ hib, 6, 23, 26, 30, 38, 41–42, 45, 119–121, 138, 140–146, 149, 151 formation of, 121, 142–143 H . anbalı¯ , 149 Jarı¯rı¯ (al-T. aba¯ rı¯), 42, 119–120, 143, 145–148 Ma¯ likı¯, 8 Sha¯ fi ites, 97, 143, 145 al-Mahdı¯ authority of, 7–8, 53 persecution of the zana¯ diqa, 19, 26, 30, 55–56, 122 Mahmu¯d, 135 majlis, 49 Makdisi, George, 121, 143 Makh.u¯l, 67 al-Ma mu¯n ascension of, 11–12, 125 civil war, 11, 15, 124 conquests of, 128, 139 death of, 2, 13, 18, 42, 87, 129

Index.indd 224

IN

E ARLY ISLAM the Mih.na and, 18–20, 27, 41, 87, 105 initiation of, 2–3, 11–12, 24, 35, 118, 124, 129, 139 letters, 42, 51–53, 58, 87, 90, 118 military, 126, 129, 132 prosecution of heretics, 17, 26, 113, 150 of Ibn H . anbal, 13, 20, 76, 87, 90–95, 104, 116. 141, 148, 150 reforms, 128 regime of, 139 religious views, 13–15, 56, 128 succession of, 125–127, 129–130 vandalism of the Dome of the Rock, 128 Ma mu¯nids, 127 Manichaean, 4, 26, 56 al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn, 84 Maqa¯la¯t al-isla¯miyyı¯n, 44 al-Marru¯dhı¯, Abu¯ Bakr, 142–143, 146 martyrdom, 84, 102, 105, 117, 120, 141 Marw, 105, 113, 126–127 Marwa¯ n, 64 al-Mas u¯dı¯, 108 al-Ma¯ wardı¯, 121 Maymu¯n b. Mihra¯ n, 82–83 Ma¯ zya¯ r b. Qa¯ rin, 131 Mecca, 126 medieval, 8, 27–29, 40, 151 Medina, 8, 133 Melchert, Christopher, 142, 147 Milal wa l-nih.al, 43–44 militants, 34, 144, 146–147 military control, 130, 136, 139 Minerva, 105 miracles, 48, 103 Montgomery, James, 66 Moore, Robert, 27 Moses, 101 Mu a¯ wiya, 7, 15, 53, 62

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INDEX mufti, 5 muh.addithu¯n see h.adı¯th, transmitters of Muh.ammad descendants, 8, 63, 128 hadı¯th and, 5 Messenger of God, 7, 15, 55, 57, 67 prophecy of, 119–120 Muh.ammad b. Ha¯ tim b. Maymu¯n, 56 Muh.ammad b. Ibra¯ hı¯m (T. a¯ hirid), 106, 131, 135 Muh.ammad b. Ja far al-S.a¯ diq, 126 Muh.ammad b. Nu¯h. al-Ijlı¯ al-Mad.ru¯b, 13, 56, 87, 93, 113 Muh.ammad b. al-Qa¯ sim, 67–68, 125–126, 130 Muh.ammira, 36 al-Muhtadı¯, 137 Mukhta¯ r, 63 mukhtas. ar, 138 al-Muktafı¯, 138 mulh.id, 136 mu minu¯n see Believers al-Muntas. ir, 137 al-Muqtadir, 138 Murji ism, 31 Murji ites, 31–32, 72, 95 Musaylima, 54, 66 Mushabbiha, 49 Musnad, 7, 144, 148 al-Musta ı¯n, 137 mutakallimu¯n, theologians, 3, 10, 18, 38–39, 43, 88–89, 96, 101, 107, 142 al-Mu tamid, 137 al-Mu tas. im as Abu¯ Ish.a¯ q, 93 ascension of, 125–126, 130 beating of Ibn H . anbal and, 99, 101, 108, 113 death of, 132 execution of Ba¯ bak, 130 reign of, 104, 131

Index.indd 225

225

trial of Ibn H . anbal and, 86–104, 131 al-Mutawakkil ascension of, 134 assassination of, 22, 31, 120–121, 134, 137 cessation of the Mih.na, 2, 14, 20, 42, 125, 135, 139 Mu tazila, 3, 14–15, 18, 37, 39–40, 46–50, 55, 83–84, 142 Mu tazilism, 15 al-Mu tazz, 137 al-Muwaffaq, 137 nabat.¯ı, 53 narratives, manipulation and shaping of, 22, 61, 65, 73, 81, 103 naskh, 89 Nawas, John, 17 normativity, 2, 5, 7, 10, 23, 25–29, 32–34, 36, 37, 39–41, 42, 65, 67, 118, 121, 138–139, 144, 149 Nu aym b. H . amma¯ d, 113 Papacy, 24 paradise, 9 Patton, Walter, 106 perdition, 36, 55, 144 philosophy, Greek, 3 pilgrimage, 95–96, 125, 135 politics and religion, separation of, 8, 19, 22, 34, 122 polytheism, 4, 56–57, 89–90, 109 Pope, 11, 24, 28, 31 prayer, 5, 9, 15, 24, 94, 103, 128, 136 predestinarianism, 4, 49, 75, 78, 122 prophecy, 53, 62, 66–68, 85, 119, 135 Prophet see Muh.ammad, prosecution, 21, 40–41, 51, 60, 76, 83, 97–98, 112, 132 prosecutors, 76–78, 83, 92, 96–97, 101, 103, 108, 112 proto-Sunni, 18–19

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226

INQUISITION

qadar, 27, 37, 47, 72, 74–76, 78–79, 83 Qadarism, 72, 74, 80, 84–85 Qadarites, 66, 71–72, 76–78, 80 qa¯d.¯ı, 3–5, 12, 67, 68, 88, 133 al-Qa¯ d. ¯ı, Wada¯ d, 17 al-Qa¯ hir, 138 al-Qa¯ sim b. Ha¯ ru¯n al-Rashı¯d, 125–126 al-Qa¯ sim b. Mukhaymı¯ra, 67–68 quietism, 20, 143–144, 146–147, 149 Qur a¯ n createdness of, 2–4, 6, 12–14, 17–18, 62, 85, 87–88, 94, 104–107, 109–110, 112, 114, 116 120, 122–123, 128, 129, 133–134 cessation of, 134–135 creation of, 6, 12, 89, 91–92, 94 image of God and, 107, 146 Islamic law and, 5, 16 misspelling of, 69 Sura Fa¯tih.a, 79 Sura Ya-Sin, 75, 78–79, 113 uncreatedness of, 54–56, 103 Rabı¯ at al-Ra y, 83 al-Ra¯ d.¯ı, 138 Ra¯ fid.ism, 147 raids, 128, 130, 131, 133 Ramadan, 97 Raqqa, 13, 129 al-Rashı¯d, Ha¯ ru¯n , 125–126, 132 rebellion, 25, 35, 85, 127, 132–133, 137 of Ahmad b. Nasr, 106, 110 of Ba¯ bak, 36, 132 in Egypt, 129 vs. heresy, 61–62 of al-Ma mu¯n, 51, 123 of the Zutt, 130, 132 recant, 13, 87, 89–90, 92, 99, 115, 135, 150 relics, religious, 98

Index.indd 226

IN

E ARLY ISLAM repent, 48, 70, 74–75, 79, 87, 103, 108, 110, 112, 115 Rosenthal, Franz, 145 Russell, Jeffrey, 40 al-Saffa¯ h, Abu¯ al- Abba¯ s, 57, 125 Saffarids, 138 .s ah.¯ıfa, 71 Sahl b. Sala¯ ma, 111, 127 salaf, 39, 45 S.a¯ lih. b. Ah.mad b. H . anbal narratives of, 91, 93–94, 96, 99, 101, 103, 108 Samarra chaos in, 121, 137 foundation of, 14, 103, 130, 133, 139 Samarran period chaos of, 132, 150 elites, 12, 121–122, 136–137 al-S.ams. a¯ ma, sword, 109 Satan, 37–38, 50, 55, 67, 70–71, 74, 77,78 Schacht, Joseph, 121 scholars elite, 11 exclusion of, 40 h.adı¯th, 104–106 issue of createdness and, 17 legal, 74, 76, 81–82, 84, 91, 138, 145 religious, 78, 81–82 shunning of, 17, 40 social roles of, 57 al-Sha¯ fi ¯ı, 6, 16, 97, 140 shaha¯ da, 31, 94, 113 Shahin, Aram, 17 al-Shahrasta¯ nı¯ doxographies of, 33, 36–39, 43–45, 47–50, 72 Sharı¯ a see Islamic law shaykh, 39, 45, 135, 140, 142 Shı¯ a, 10 Shı¯ ism, 15, 18, 147 Twelver, 15–16

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INDEX Shı¯ ites, 14–16, 97, 129, 135–136 shirk see polytheism Shu ayb b. al-H . aja¯ m, 94 S.ifa¯ tiyya, 45, 49 S ¯ıma¯ al-Dimashqı¯, 107, 109 sinners, 10, 32, 48, 67, 95 social roles, 32–34, 41, 42 of the Caliphs, 2, 7–10, 24, 29, 34–35, 41, 51, 52, 61–62, 64, 65, 67, 81–82, 84, 110, 115, 118, 119, 120–124, 128, 135–139, 150 of doxographers, 118 of muh.addithu¯n, 19–20, 53, 54, 57, 93 of the ulama¯ , 2, 23, 57, 138 soldiers, 12, 15, 68–70, 124, 128–129, 139 Turkish 12, 130, 133, 136–138 soul, concept of, 48, 70, 94 Sourdel, Dominique, 43 Stewart, Devin, 10, 143, 145 “straight path” to salvation, (Path of God), 5, 8–9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 24–25, 37, 45, 48, 50, 53, 55, 57, 60, 64, 74, 95, 122, 126 al-Subkı¯, 135 submission, 10, 27 succession, 35, 62, 124–126, 130, 134 successors, 2–3, 19, 21, 41, 51, 66, 119, 124 Sufis, 29–30 Sulayma¯ n b. Abd al-Malik, 65, 119 summoned, 93, 115, 147 Sunna, 5, 7, 16, 20, 53, 57, 95–99, 101, 104–105, 135, 140 Sunni, 6, 11, 14, 18–19, 30, 32, 36, 136, 139, 142 swords, 1, 62, 76, 94, 97–99, 109, 112 Syria, 129, 138 al-T. abarı¯, 15, 26 death of, 147 trial narratives, 51, 83, 93

Index.indd 227

227

of Ah.mad b. Nas. r, 107, 109–113 of Ghayla¯ n, 82–83 of Ibn H . anbal, 87–88, 90, 119–120, 143, 145–148 t. abaqa¯ t, 143 tabdı¯l, 55 tafsı¯r, 123, 147 T. a¯ hir b. al-H . usayn, 126, 135 T. a¯ hirids, 12, 126, 130–131, 135, 138 takbı¯r, 15, 128 T. a¯ lib, 104, 106 taqiyya, 13, 89–90, 100 taqlı¯d, 23, 38 Ta rı¯kh Baghda¯d, 111 Tarsus, 13, 87, 93, 128–129 tawh.¯ıd (divine unicity), 4, 13, 27, 35, 52, 56, 91, 92, 120, 122, 123, 129, 133 t. aylasa¯ n, 101 theology see kala¯m thughu¯r, 133 Thuma¯ ma b. Ashras al-Numayrı¯, 48 topos, topoi, 66, 104, 114 torture, 90, 131, 134 transgressors, 95, 143 treason, 61 T. uwa¯ na, Tyana, 128–130 Ujayf b. Anbasa, 99, 130–131 ulama¯ Caliphs and, 21 imprisonment of, 113 independence of, 11–12 the Mih.na and, 18–19, 27 political authority, 23–24, 120, 138, 150 social roles of, 2, 23, 57, 138 Umar II court of, 72 interrogation of Ghayla¯ n, 73–76, 78–79 piety of, 65, 73, 80, 119 prescription, 73, 76, 84 as prosecutor, 83

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228

INQUISITION

Umar b. Faraj, 133–134 Umayyads overthrow of, 1, 62, 66 persecution of heretics, 26 umma see Believers unbelievers, 10, 32, 38, 46, 91, 109, 112, 144 unicity, divine see tawh.¯ıd usury, 56

Index.indd 228

IN

E ARLY ISLAM prosecution of Ah.mad b. Nas. r, 104–114, 120 execution of, 109–110, 113 religious views, 27 treatment of heretics, 125, 133 Watt, Montgomery, 72 wayh.ak (woe unto you), 82, 96, 98, 99, 112, 115

van Ess, Josef, 73, 81, 83, 92 victory, 131, 144, 149 vigilantes, 105, 111, 114, 127

Yaq u¯b b. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Dawraqı¯, 104, 111 al-Ya qu¯bı¯, 86, 91–93, 97, 102, 113–115, 129, 133 Yazı¯d b. Abd al-Malik, 65, 76, 79, 119

war between the brothers see civil war Wa¯ s. il b. Ata¯ , 39, 47, 49 al-Wa¯ thiq continuation of the Mih.na, 15, 19, 21 death of, 133–134

Zaman, Muh.ammad, 18–19, 125 Zanj, 138 Zayd b. Alı¯, 39 zindı¯qs, zana¯ diqa, 18–19, 26–27, 30, 32, 35, 37, 55, 56, 122 Ziya¯ d b. Abı¯hi, 57

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