Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security) 9402421882, 9789402421880

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NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - C: Environmental Security

Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence Edited by Gabriele Iacovino Mikael Wigell

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Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific activities supported through the framework of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. The NATO SPS Programme enhances security-related civil science and technology to address emerging security challenges and their impacts on international security. It connects scientists, experts and officials from Alliance and Partner nations to work together to address common challenges. The SPS Programme provides funding and expert advice for securityrelevant activities in the form of Multi-Year Projects (MYP), Advanced Research Workshops (ARW), Advanced Training Courses (ATC), and Advanced Study Institutes (ASI). The NATO SPS Series collects the results of practical activities and meetings, including: Multi-Year Projects (MYP): Grants to collaborate on multi-year R&D and capacity building projects that result in new civil science advancements with practical application in the security and defence fields. Advanced Research Workshops: Advanced-level workshops that provide a platform for experts and scientists to share their experience and knowledge of security-related topics in order to promote follow-on activities like Multi-Year Projects. Advanced Training Courses: Designed to enable specialists in NATO countries to share their security-related expertise in one of the SPS Key Priority areas. An ATC is not intended to be lecture-driven, but to be intensive and interactive in nature. Advanced Study Institutes: High-level tutorial courses that communicate the latest developments in subjects relevant to NATO to an advanced-level audience. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series reflect the views of participants and contributors only, and do not necessarily reflect NATO views or policy. The series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer, Dordrecht, in partnership with the NATO SPS Programme. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E. • • •

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springer.com http://www.iospress.nl

Series C: Environmental Security

Springer Springer Springer IOS Press IOS Press

Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence edited by

Gabriele Iacovino CeSI - Centro Studi Internazionali, Rome, Italy and

Mikael Wigell Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland

Published in Cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence Rome, Italy 27–28 October 2021 ISBN 978-94-024-2188-0 (PB) ISBN 978-94-024-2185-9 (HB) ISBN 978-94-024-2186-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2186-6

Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springer.com Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature B.V. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Contents

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Towards a Greener Defence: An Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mikael Wigell and Emma Hakala

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NATO Green Defence: From the 2014 Green Defence Framework to the 2021 Climate Change and Security Action Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pierluigi Barberini

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The Operational Advantages of a Greener Defence: What Should Defence Be Prepared for in the Next 20–30 Years as a Result of Climate Change? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Richard Nugee

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The Ecological Transition in the Italian Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Pierluigi Barberini

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Preparing for the Storm: Climate Change and the Finnish Model of Comprehensive Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Emma Hakala

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Energy Security in a Decarbonized World: EU-Africa Cooperation for a Clean Resilient Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Carlo Palleschi

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The Possible Contribution of the Defence Industry to the Green Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Tommaso Massa

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Enhancing Military Sustainability Through Education: Balancing Quick Wins with Systemic Behavioural Change . . . . . . . . . 95 Duraid Jalili

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Chapter 1

Towards a Greener Defence: An Introduction Mikael Wigell and Emma Hakala

Abstract As climate change advances, armed forces and other defence actors will increasingly need to understand how their strategy and operational conduct will be affected. At the same time, the defence sector will also need to device new policies and actions aimed at reducing their environmental footprint. This chapter will point out the relevance of climate and environmental issues to armed forces while also providing an introduction to the themes of the book, which examines the key aspects of shaping a more sustainable defence sector. It will first note some of the work that has already been done, for example in the frame of the Climate Change and Security Action Plan of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It will then outline the starting points and aims of the book, highlighting the interdisciplinary range of perspectives that has produced a comprehensive overview of the most pressing issues related to green defence. Finally, the chapter will briefly summarize the themes and main arguments of all the chapters included in the book.

Environmental issues have risen to the top of the global agenda. Concerns over the environment and how to address climate change, in particular, underpins most state activities and societal sectors these days. The armed forces and the wider defence sector make for no exception. On the one hand, the environmental footprint of the defence sector is exceptionally large, making it all the more urgent also for the armed forces to device new policies and actions aimed at reducing this footprint. This is not only a threat to military institutions, but simultaneously an opportunity to adopt new technologies that can enhance operational and military capabilities. On the other

M. Wigell (*) FIIA – The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland e-mail: mikael.wigell@fiia.fi E. Hakala Finnish Institute of International Affairs, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland e-mail: emma.hakala@fiia.fi © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature B.V. 2022 G. Iacovino, M. Wigell (eds.), Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2186-6_1

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hand, understanding the effects of climate change is paramount for achieving information advantage. The armed forces will need to understand how climate change and changing environmental conditions affect strategy and operational conduct. Extreme weather events, for instance, may impact not only the operability of military capabilities, but also their efficiency and military installations as such. In the future, we are also likely to experience more conflicts that are being driven by climate change for which security agencies will need to prepare themselves. Among international organizations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been at the forefront in defining a more eco-friendly framework for its activities. In 2014, NATO approved the “Green Defence Framework”, a key document suggesting a way forward for the Alliance and its member states in this regard. At the 2021 NATO Summit, Allied Heads of State and Government endorsed NATO’s Climate Change and Security Action Plan, based on awareness, adaptation, mitigation and outreach. In the Summit Communiqué, the leaders agreed to: ‘Aim for NATO to become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security’ and ‘significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions from military activities and installations without impairing personnel safety, operational effectiveness and our deterrence and defence posture’. NATO’s efforts are echoed by the European Union (EU). In the Strategic Compass, published in March 2022 to enhance the EU’s security and defence policy, climate change is emphasized as an emerging threat but also from the point of view of cutting the emissions from activities associated with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In particular, a focus will be on limiting the environmental footprint of CSDP missions around the world (Council of the European Union 2022). In addition, the EU Commission contribution to European defence points out the need to reduce the emissions from defence sector as an ‘integral part’ of the EU’s efforts to reach climate neutrality by 2050 (European Commission 2022). These aims are further detailed in the EU’s climate change and defence roadmap, which calls for improved energy efficiency and the development and application of new technologies and practices to reduce emissions from defence (Council of the European Union 2020). Various national governments have also acknowledged the need to take climate concerns into account in their defence policies. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, for instance, has outlined a Strategic Approach to Climate Change and Sustainability, which recognizes the role of the defence sector in cutting emissions. UK defence actors are noted as being at the ‘forefront’ of the greener military agenda, applying innovative technologies such as new vehicles, fuels standards and energy storage (Ministry of Defence 2021). Meanwhile, the United States Department of Defence has for some time worked to tackle the challenges that climate change poses to defence activities. This work has mainly focused on the capacity of the military and other security actors to adapt to climate risks and maintain their ability to perform in changing environments, but it also entails mitigation and emissions reductions. For instance, the US Army aims to cut emissions and attain net-zero GHG emissions by 2050, with actions such as significantly

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increasing the share of non-carbon energy sources and electric vehicles (Department of the Army 2022). Similar steps are being taken by the defence institutions and security actors in various countries, as examples in this book will also show. While the efforts to achieve greener defence at the country level generally are envisioned to aid in meeting the climate neutrality targets set by governments, they are also justified by their potential to strengthen defence capability. Energy efficiency and new technologies are perceived to increase to capacity of the defence forces to adapt changing climate conditions and meet future security challenges. For example, in the US, the mitigation of climate change is considered both a necessity and a competitive advantage that will increase the resilience and capability of the military (Department of the Army 2022). Whereas these efforts to start reducing the climate and environmental footprint of military are welcome, more needs to be done to achieve a genuine impact on emissions. As military spending continues to grow globally, emissions will likely keep rising. At present, countries are not obliged to include military emissions into their greenhouse gas emissions reporting under the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This creates a lack of transparency on military emissions, making it harder to track progress on mitigation and reinforce government accountability in the defence sector (Conflict and Environment Observatory 2021). The call for a uniform methodology for measuring military-related greenhouse gas emissions included in the NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan therefore is an important first step towards increased transparency and more effective action. In addition to mitigation, the defence sector needs to have a role in adaptation to climate change. Risk assessment and situation awareness are essential also in the face of climate risks. As experts on this field, security actors could crucially contribute to the development of climate-related preparedness. Overall, environmental and climate factors need to be comprehensively integrated into foresight and preparedness both within the defence sector and as a part of wider security. Both the NATO Action Plan and the EU’s Strategic Compass point towards this by calling for increased analytical capacity on the impacts of climate change on their strategic environment. These preliminary steps need to be followed up with concrete measures, also at the state level. This book addresses key aspects relating to the shaping of a more sustainable defence sector. It aims to analyze initiatives implemented by various institutional bodies, international organizations and private actors to achieve a greener, more climate-resilient defence. The contributions in the book look at the specific policies and technologies that can be implemented in order to reduce emissions and increase the overall sustainability in the defence sector. It also analyzes ways in which the defence industry may directly contribute to green transition as well as what sort of behavioural change is needed within the armed forces to achieve a greener defence and how to implement it. The book is the outcome of a joint project between the Centro Studi Internazionali (CeSI) and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) financed by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme. A key aspect of the project

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was the organization of a workshop in Rome in October 2021 facilitating discussion between experts and practitioners in the field of innovative technologies and sustainable solutions with a view to elaborate new policies needed for achieving a Greener Defence. Participants in the workshop came from a variety of organizational backgrounds, including various national defence sectors, international organizations such as the NATO, the European Commission and OSCE, as well as private companies engaged in the development of ecological solutions. The individual contributions gathered into this edited volume, were first presented in this workshop and have since been extensively reviewed and reworked in the internal discussions of the project. Together they provide a comprehensive and multidisciplinary overview of some of the most pressing issues related to green defence, pulling together perspectives of a variety of actors and stakeholders from the armed forces, national and international institutions, research and academia as well as industry. In Chap. 2 of this edited volume, Pierluigi Barberini provides an overview of the past, present and future initiatives undertaken by NATO in order to make defence activities more sustainable. In particular, he examines the historical evolution of the measures, policies and procedures implemented by the Atlantic Alliance over the years, focusing the attention on the way in which NATO has tried to understand and mitigate the security implications of climate change since the 1960s. Two steps are of great relevance: the 2014 NATO Green Defence Framework and the 2021 Climate Change and Security Action Plan, with which NATO aims at becoming the leading international organization in addressing climate change from a security and military perspective. The chapter thus tries to explain how and why the Atlantic Alliance is well positioned for achieving this ambitious yet fundamental goal. In his contribution for this volume (Chap. 3), Lt. Gen. Richard Nugee discusses the implications of climate change for the defence sector, showing how it represents both a threat and an opportunity. Climate change works as a threat multiplier by reinforcing existing threats particularly in regions suffering from resource scarcity with potential spillover effects in other regions through uncontrolled migration, for instance. However, military installations anywhere in the world will also be increasingly susceptible to climactic events putting pressure on the armed forced to adapt by strengthening resilience to environmental hazards. Furthermore, climate change represents a shaping threat by also framing the way it manifests itself. The move to renewables presents a significant challenge to the armed forces, but one to which they will need to adapt. At the same time, renewables and new technologies represent an opportunity in the way a greener defence approach may catalyze new capabilities. The chapter shows how understanding the effects of climate change and the technology being developed to adapt to it and mitigate its effects can result in a more capable force – either directly through the adoption of new technologies or indirectly through opportunities for the armed forces to become more self-sufficient and resilient. Chapter 4, by Barberini, moves the analysis to the national level, by shifting the attention towards the green defence initiatives implemented by the Italian Ministry of Defence. The chapter analyzes the 2019 Defence Energy Strategy, which focuses on three main pillars: raising awareness among Defence personnel on the need to

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develop a more eco-friendly and energy-oriented mindset; improving the energy efficiency of military infrastructures and of military mobility, with a special attention dedicated to the “Smart Military District” project; improving the protection and security of critical energy infrastructures. The chapter also provides an overview of the Governance structure, with a specific Task Force established within the Italian Ministry of Defence, and some recommendations on the possible way forward, in order to further improve and accelerate the energy and green transition of the Italian Defence. In Chap. 5, Emma Hakala looks at the ways in which climate change can be integrated into foresight and preparedness. In particular, the chapter considers the Finnish model of comprehensive security, and its potential for generating cooperative, preventive climate security practices. As the comprehensive security model is based on cooperation across societal sectors and aims to the safeguard the maintenance of vital functions of the society, it is increasingly relevant in the era of crises triggered by climate change. According to the chapter, however, the integration of climate security has so far been hindered by shortcomings in the implementation of the comprehensive security model. In addition, climate security impacts are inadequately taken into account in national foresight, further complicating their inclusion in preparedness. The chapter concludes by proposing ways to overcome some of the obstacles in order to better integrate climate change into comprehensive security, thereby enhancing both climate-related preparedness and the capacity of the Finnish model overall. In his contribution to the volume (Chap. 6), Carlo Palleschi discusses the main opportunities and challenges of energy security in the path towards a climate-neutral world, with a special focus on the role that the European Union and African countries can have in building a green and resilient future in the energy domain. In particular, the chapter explores the EU strategic posture in terms of both energy security and green agenda, focusing on the interlink between these two key issues, with a deep dive on critical raw materials. Furthermore, it discusses the short-term consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian war as well as the long-term implications of global decarbonization on African energy policies. The chapter then highlights how EU-Africa cooperation can open new venues for strong and mutually beneficial opportunities to leapfrog to an economy characterized by renewable, affordable, and accessible energy. Chapter 7, by Tommaso Massa, analyzes the question how the defence industry itself can contribute to a greener and more sustainable world. His analysis highlights five direct contributions: the development and deployment of new sustainable technologies and capabilities; investment in R&D and technological innovation to support and enhance such transition; the reduction of carbon emissions of the industry itself, its supply chain and final customers; the efficient management of energy consumption and a transition towards more sustainable energy resources; and, finally, the possibility for the defence industry to assume the role of enabler of the green transition in supporting the armed forces. In addition to these direct contributions, Massa also highlights an indirect contribution: the fact that without the technologies provided by the defence industry the armed forces would not be

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able to guarantee a peaceful and secure environment for our societies, which is crucial for the development of the green transition in both the military and civilian sectors. The final chapter (Chap. 8) by Duraid Jalili argues that it will be difficult to deliver a wholesale greening of the armed forces without creating an organizational culture in which all military staff actively prioritize it across most defence functions and units. The chapter highlights how military education provides a significant and resource-light method for supporting the systemic behavioural change needed. Jalili outlines a number of educational locus points and methods for the teaching of sustainability and environmentalism within the military. He argues that these locus points and methods can deliver ‘quick wins’ with regard to behavioural change.

References Conflict and Environment Observatory (2021). Under the radar: The Carbon Footprint of Europe’s military sectors. Report https://ceobs.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Under-the-radar_thecarbon-footprint-of-the-EUs-military-sectors.pdf Council of the European Union. (2020). Climate Change and Defence Roadmap. Council of the European Union, Brussels. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12741-2020INIT/en/pdf Council of the European Union (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security. General Secretariat of the Council 21.3.2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/ sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf Department of the Army (2022). United States Army Climate Strategy. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment. Washington, DC. February 2022. https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/about/2022_army_climate_strategy.pdf European Commission (2022). Commission contribution to European defence. Strasbourg 15.2.2022. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/com_2022_60_1_en_act_contribution_ european_defence.pdf Ministry of Defence (2021). Strategic Approach to Climate Change and Sustainability. https:// www.gov.uk/government/publications/ministry-of-defence-climate-change-and-sustainabilitystrategicapproach

Chapter 2

NATO Green Defence: From the 2014 Green Defence Framework to the 2021 Climate Change and Security Action Plan Pierluigi Barberini

Abstract During the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, the Atlantic Alliance stated that it wants to become the leading organization in understanding and mitigating the security implications of climate change, while presenting the Climate Change and Security Action Plan. This is an ambitious goal, but one that NATO can achieve since the Alliance’s focus on climate change is not new, but has its roots in the organization’s past. Indeed, this paper traces past efforts by NATO, which has worked over the years to increase both awareness of these issues and the tools and methodologies available to mitigate the security effects of climate change. From this point of view, the NATO Green Defence Framework of 2014 was an important step in fostering cooperation between Allies and between the different organs of the Alliance. However, it lacked a clear definition of the nexus between climate change and security, a nexus clarified by the 2021 Climate Change and Security Action Plan. The latter represents a further step towards developing a comprehensive four-pillar approach, based on awareness, adaptation, mitigation and outreach. This plan further lays the foundation for the future, actually accrediting NATO as the potential leading organization in this field.

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Introduction

Climate change represents one of the most important and complex challenges of the twenty-first century. For years at the center of public and political discourse, climate change issues have become an integral part of the daily debate, with a growing sensitivity on the part of public opinion in many countries towards the phenomenon, and with a multitude of initiatives launched by both institutional and private actors in order to reduce global warming and mitigate its effects over the coming years. The issue is approached from many angles, not least the impact that climate change has,

P. Barberini (*) CeSI – Centro Studi Internazionali (Center for International Studies), Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature B.V. 2022 G. Iacovino, M. Wigell (eds.), Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2186-6_2

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and above all will have in the future, in terms of security. In fact, from this point of view, there is a growing attention to the repercussions, at a security and military level, caused by phenomena related to climate change, which can be considered as a force multiplier capable of accelerating phenomena already in progress, by anticipating or intensifying their effects. With this in mind, it should come as no surprise that the Armed Forces and security agencies of various states are devoting increasing attention to the phenomenon, in order to try to understand the consequences, both direct and indirect, of climate change in the security sphere. On the one hand, for example, military institutions have a strong interest in understanding how phenomena related to climate change will impact the conduct of operations in the future, and how the occurrence of extreme weather events, which are increasingly intense and frequent (floods, storms, hurricanes, extreme heat waves, fires), even in regions of the planet that were not affected by such events until recently, will impact military installations, the operability of military assets and the overall efficiency of the military instrument. Emblematic in this case is the example of Hurricane Michael, one of the most powerful hurricanes to hit the United States in recent times, which, in 2018, damaged or completely destroyed as many as 17 F-22 Raptors at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida (Panda 2018). Due to an extreme weather event, the US lost almost 10% of its total F-22 fleet in one fell swoop. On the other hand, security agencies and Armed Forces are interested in understanding how climate change, through a chain of related events, may lead to new outbreaks of instability and conflicts. Consider, in this sense, the correlation of events whereby climate change could cause intense flooding or prolonged droughts in certain regions, which in turn could lead to famine, loss of arable land or disappearance of water resources. These phenomena, in turn, could impact contexts that are already fragile and precarious socially, economically and politically, thus causing possible outbreaks of tension and instability, which could turn into actual armed conflicts. Against this backdrop, NATO, which has always been attentive to climate change and its implications, is trying to intensify its actions to understand the security implications of climate change, to mitigate its effects and to adapt the Alliance’s future posture to the new scenarios. This paper seeks to retrace NATO’s efforts over the past few years, in order to understand how the Atlantic Alliance can play a leading role in promoting a greener defence and to better prepare for future security challenges related to climate change.

2.2

Past Efforts and the NATO Green Defence Framework

NATO has been engaged in the area of climate change for many years now, particularly in trying to understand the security implications arising from it. Indeed, as early as the 1960s, the Alliance recognized the importance of environmental challenges through the establishment of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) in 1969. The CCMS was responsible for carrying out a series of studies and research on issues concerning air and noise pollution, advanced

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health care and the disposal of hazardous wastes (NATO 2021). In the wake of the studies conducted by the CCMS, NATO began to develop an initial framework of policies, guidelines and standards concerning environmental protection in the late 1970s. With this in mind, the Alliance also began working to develop a series of tools to support member states in responding to emergencies caused by natural and environmental disasters, particularly from the 1990s onwards. It was in this context that the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) was launched in the same period, in order to improve coordination between the two sides of the Atlantic in responding to crises caused by the occurrence of extreme natural and meteorological events. In fact, this very area has been a sector in which the Armed Forces of NATO countries have been quite active for years. They are, indeed, increasingly called upon to flank and support civil agencies in responding to natural and environmental disasters, e.g. in cases of earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and volcanic eruptions. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations will increasingly be part of the spectrum of functions and missions performed by the Armed Forces of NATO’s member states, both in the case of intervention on the territory of the member states themselves and in the case of relief and aid missions to third countries (an example in this sense is represented by the HADR missions carried out by the Armed Forces of several countries in support of Haiti following the devastating earthquake of 2010). With the new millennium, as climate change issues entered the public and political debate, and with the increasing attention paid to them by both civil society and the governments of various states, climate change issues gradually became part of the discussions held at the broadest NATO levels. For instance, at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Allies noted a report on NATO’s Role in Energy Security, which identified guiding principles and outlined options and recommendations for further initiatives in this regard. Two years later, at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, Allies agreed on the need to integrate energy security considerations into NATO’s policies and activities. In this regard, two important innovations were introduced in the elaboration of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, which was presented at the Lisbon Summit. On the one hand, an “Energy Security Section” was established in the “Emerging Security Challenges Division” within NATO HQ; on the other hand, for the first time, NATO officially recognized climate change as a “security challenge”. Through these steps, the Atlantic Alliance wanted to give practical expression to the growing perception among Allies of the importance of the security challenges posed by climate change and the need to implement a range of instruments to best meet such challenges. At the same time, public opinion in the member states was becoming increasingly sensitive to environmental protection and climate change issues, which indeed many governments were beginning to take into account at the domestic political level. At that time, NATO’s attention seemed to be focused more on energy security aspects, and on the military and operational implications of possible actions that would affect the regular and stable availability of energy sources for the conduct of military operations. This should come as no surprise, since those were the years of the “War on Terror” and of NATO’s military operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which attacks on military convoys carrying

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fuel and water were frequent (NATO 2015). It was in this context, for example, that Lithuania established a research centre on energy and energy security, a centre that was accredited in 2012 by NATO as a NATO Centre of Excellence (NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence – ENSEC CoE), providing, from that moment on, subject matter expertise on energy security to NATO bodies and agencies, Alliance Member States and Partner countries (Larsen 2015). Continuing along this line of development, in 2014, during the Wales Summit, Allies declared that NATO would continue to work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of military forces (NATO 2021) and officially adopted the Green Defence Framework. The Green Defence Framework is a crucial document for two reasons. It aims to lay the foundations for wide-ranging cooperation among the Atlantic Alliance member states on the development of green defence policies and technologies; at the same time, it seeks to offer an organic and structured arrangement of the initiatives taken until that moment, and of new solutions to be implemented, in order to improve NATO’s “green profile”. It can therefore be said that the 2014 Green Defence Framework constituted a major step forward compared to the time when it was approved. Briefly analyzing the specific contents of the Green Defence Framework, it is structured along three pillars, which represented the lines of action to be pursued at the time according to NATO. These pillars are: reinforcing NATO bodies’ efforts; facilitating Allies’ efforts; improving NATO’s green profile. The first pillar therefore focuses on the activities of NATO as an organization, and on the need, for example, to improve internal coordination between the Alliance’s various structures in order to systemize knowledge already acquired and procedures already developed. The second pillar, on the other hand, envisages transforming NATO into a kind of platform that can facilitate and promote dialogue and the sharing of best practices among the various member states. The focus is therefore on individual member states and the need for NATO to serve as a platform for dialogue to foster cooperation among them. Finally, the third pillar concerns engagement with external actors, and aims to improve the Alliance’s overall green profile through a renewed focus on public diplomacy activities, cooperation with partner countries and international organizations, and the involvement of private sector actors. Overall, the 2014 Green Defence Framework sought to lay the foundations for fostering cooperation between both internal Alliance bodies and Member States on the development of green policies, technologies, and solutions to be implemented in the defence sphere. However, it also had important limitations. On the one hand, the document took the form of a general guideline, without giving specific indications and without setting precise targets to be pursued. This was probably due to the fact that, in 2014, it was still politically untenable for the governments of several Member States to commit themselves to set and achieve certain targets concerning the reduction of pollutant emissions at military level and the economic investments to be made to develop green technologies and applications. On the other hand, several states, especially on the European side of the Atlantic, were struggling with the consequences of the economic and debt crisis, therefore the political priorities of governments were

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directed elsewhere. Secondly, the document, as expressed above, lacked a clear and precise description of the connection between the emergence of new security challenges (such as climate change and its effects) and the need, but also the possibilities and opportunities, for NATO to invest in the development of a green defence to better respond to and address these challenges. In essence, as also stated by Larsen (2015), without clarifying the connections between security challenges and green defence solutions, it becomes much more complicated and complex to justify structural investments in the development of military green technologies at the political level and to understand whether a given solution can be relevant in addressing a given issue at the security and operational level. Over the following years, the Atlantic Alliance continued to develop the internal debate among its Member States about the security impacts of climate change and the need to develop greener and more environmentally sustainable military methodologies and technologies. However, for a number of years, the discourse focused mainly on issues concerning the energy security of NATO and its Member States, without any real qualitative leap in the approach towards climate change. Indeed, it will have to wait for the internal reflection process initiated with the 2030 Agenda for this issue to assume a certain level of centrality in the Alliance’s political and public debate, a process that will in turn lead to the adoption, during the 2021 Brussels Summit, of the NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan. Arguably, the “pause” between the Green Defence Framework (2014) and the Climate Change and Security Action Plan (2021) is due, on the one hand, to the need for the debate on climate change and environmental protection to take hold in all sectors of public opinion in the member countries, and, on the other hand, to the advent of the Trump Administration in the United States (January 2017 – January 2021), which, as is well known, has paid little political attention, either domestically or internationally, to issues related precisely to climate change and the development of green and more environmentally sustainable policies. From this point of view, the advent of the Biden Presidency (January 2021 – present day) and the growing awareness of environmental and climate issues among public opinion and the political classes in many European countries have contributed to a renewed focus on these issues at the civilian level, an attention that in turn is also translating into a greater awareness of climate and environmental issues related to defence and security.

2.3

Present and Future Efforts: The 2030 Agenda and the NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan

The historical overview just described about NATO’s past initiatives regarding the development of green defence is important for two reasons. On the one hand, as is well known, during the 2021 Brussels Summit, the Atlantic Alliance declared its intention to become the world’s leading organization in addressing the security

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implications of climate change (NATO 2021). Ambitious as it may be, it is neither improbable nor unreasonable that NATO could achieve such a goal, precisely by virtue of the fact that it can boast an attention and sensitivity to these issues that are not recent, but rather rooted in the Alliance’s past: thus, it can be argued that NATO possesses a solid and important background in this field. On the other hand, precisely because of the attention it has paid for years to issues such as climate change, energy security and green defence, NATO can leverage a number of existing and structured mechanisms to effectively and immediately set up future actions. These are not just words, but the real possibilities of turning these words into concrete actions. The initiatives undertaken in the context of the 2030 Agenda are part of this framework. In the report “NATO 2030: United for a New Era”, published in November 2020 and drafted by the reflection group appointed by the NATO Secretary General, the issues of energy security, climate change and the development of green defence are addressed. In particular, as far as energy security is concerned, it is emphasized how energy can be used as a foreign policy tool by potential competitors, also in the context of hybrid warfare activities; moreover, the increasing interaction and correlation between energy security and cyber security is highlighted. For these reasons, the panel recommends the development of new analyses and methodologies to respond to the use of energy as part of the hybrid toolbox, and also suggests that NATO incorporate energy security considerations into regular exercises and defence plans (NATO 2020). Regarding climate change and green defence, the same report recognizes how NATO can and should increase efforts in these areas in order to increase situational awareness of threats that could emanate from climate change-related phenomena and “for the ultimate purpose of improving military effectiveness and maintaining competitive advantages vis-a-vis systemic rivals” (NATO 2020). In essence, it is reaffirmed that the Atlantic Alliance should not mitigate polluting emissions from military activities and invest in green and sustainable technologies for the simple reason of protecting the environment (noble though that may be), but because of the security and operational implications arising from such activities, in order to keep NATO at the forefront of both understanding security phenomena and issues, and developing the best methodologies and tools to address these challenges. Canada’s proposal to create and host a NATO Centre of Excellence on Climate and Security on its territory (Robertson 2021) also fits into this perspective. In essence, the focus is on the link between security, climate, environment and green defence, and it is indeed this connection that is the core principle behind the NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan released in 2021. In fact, the Action Plan defines climate change as a “threat multiplier” and as “one of the defining challenges of our time” (NATO 2021). On the one hand, there are the direct impacts on military installations, on the conditions in which military operations are conducted and on the effectiveness of military capabilities. On the other hand, it is emphasized how climate change can influence the strategic choices and behavior of states in the international arena, how it can exacerbate existing fragile conditions, fuel crises, mass migrations and conflicts, and thus ultimately increase the insecurity of many human communities. In essence, it is reiterated that it is

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necessary on the one hand to prevent and on the other hand to address the challenges posed by climate change, not because of the ethical value in itself, but because of the enormous consequences for the security of Euro-Atlantic states, so as to contribute to NATO’s three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. In this context, the NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan is structured along four basic pillars: awareness, adaptation, mitigation and outreach. First of all, it is necessary to raise awareness both at the NATO level as an organization and at the level of individual Member States. To this end, the Alliance will conduct an annual “Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment” in order to determine what the practical consequences of climate change and of the occurrence of increasingly frequent extreme weather events are. Moreover, the assessment aims to understand how and where to intervene with mitigation measures, how to try to prevent, as far as possible, emerging security challenges and how to deal with them in a rapid and timely manner. For instance, from this specific point of view, at the level of capacity building, all satellite systems dedicated to Earth observation could play an increasingly important role, as they can monitor over time the evolution of phenomena such as the warming of the oceans, rising sea levels or the desertification of forested areas. This process, in turn, would lead to the identification of fragile and potentially at-risk areas, harbingers of possible crises of various kinds over the next few years, and therefore worthy of special attention by the Alliance. The second pillar concerns adaptation. On the basis of the assessment and evaluations carried out annually, the Atlantic Alliance is committed to incorporating “climate change considerations into its work on resilience, civil preparedness, defence planning, capability delivery, assets and installations, standards, innovation, training, exercises, and disaster response” (NATO 2021). The aim is to integrate the security implications of climate change into any type of activity conducted by the Alliance, ranging from the design and construction of new military bases and infrastructures to the conduct of military operations, especially in particularly hostile environments such as the Arctic or the deserts of Africa and the Middle East, but also ranging from the development of new green and environmentally sustainable technologies and applications to the response in the event of natural disasters and environmental emergencies, activities in which the Armed Forces of the various NATO Member States are increasingly involved. The third pillar is the contribution NATO can make to mitigating the effects of its activities on the environment and climate change. This is a very important and, at the same time, very complex aspect: the Armed Forces of any country are some of the most polluting players in the world, by virtue of the huge quantities of fossil fuels required to power the systems with which they are equipped (land vehicles of various kinds, air assets, naval vessels, not to mention military bases and infrastructure). Nowadays, despite numerous green initiatives already underway, such as the energy efficiency of military bases, the creation of “smart energy camps” and the study of biofuels, the Armed Forces of NATO countries rely on fossil fuels as primary energy sources to conduct military operations. NATO can and must

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contribute to accelerating the green transition process that is already underway, both by working at the organization level and by supporting individual Member States; this will help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, also favoring the achievement of the climate objectives that many Member States have set themselves at national level. Moreover, this will bring indirect benefits for the image and perception of the Atlantic Alliance itself in the public opinion of Member, Partner and even third-party countries. Looking to the future, as part of the Action Plan, NATO has announced its intention to develop a mapping and analytical methodology of greenhouse gas emissions from military activities and installations, so as to understand which sectors, areas and systems can be used to reduce polluting emissions without undermining the operational capabilities to be expressed. At the same time, it is necessary to mention how NATO has already implemented environmentally sustainable policies and procedures: it is important to refer, for example, to the 6 “Environmental Protection Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)”, which have introduced standards for environmental protection, energy efficiency and energy reduction, and waste management, to be applied to military infrastructure, training and operational activities, thus establishing “green” standards valid for all Member Countries and reinforcing the Alliance’s posture in becoming a leading organization in the sector (Goodman and Kertysova 2022). Finally, the fourth and last pillar consists of enhancing outreach. In this regard, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s participation in the COP 26 in Glasgow in November 2021 aimed at promoting the Alliance’s green profile and at strengthening NATO’s role as an ambitious and credible partner on climate change and security issues in other institutions. From this point of view, collaboration with other organizations, such as the European Union, the United Nations and the International Energy Agency, as well as with private actors such as universities, think tanks, research centers and companies, is fundamental in order to systematize mutual knowledge, share best practices, optimize funding and research and development activities for green technologies, and thus develop a global response to a phenomenon of global scope such as climate change. Overall, it can be argued that, through the Climate Change and Security Action Plan, NATO has laid the foundations to best approach the future security challenges posed by climate change Barberini and Leoni (2021). In order not to dissipate the efforts made so far, and to continue further along this path, it is important for NATO to continue to maintain the focus on these issues alive (Shea 2022), both at the organizational level, with the Alliance’s various structures and articulations, and at the national level of the individual Member States. A crucial role is played in this regard by the Emerging Security Challenges Division, one of the main offices within NATO HQ Staff that works daily on issues concerning climate change, the security challenges arising from it, and the development of policies and technologies for a green and more environmentally sustainable defence. With this in mind, it is desirable to strengthen the staff and resources available to this division, and to all the offices involved in such projects.

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Finally, an important step to understand the real level of integration of these issues within the Alliance’s strategic directions is represented by both the first Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment and the new Strategic Concept, both to be released and approved at the NATO Summit in Madrid in June 2022.1 The Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment will give an initial idea of NATO’s security perspective on climate change, the impacts it is having and could have in the future, and the specific actions the Atlantic Alliance could take in this regard. From the Strategic Concept, on the other hand, it will emerge a longer-term, broader, strategic direction that will constitute the overall framework within which NATO will set its actions on climate change in the coming years.

2.4

Conclusion

NATO has pledged to be the leading international organization in tackling the security implications of climate change. This is certainly not an easy goal to achieve, if only because of the vastness and complexity of the subject matter. However, NATO already possess the tools to best address the security challenges arising from climate change. In particular, the Atlantic Alliance has gone through an important internal reflection process, which, starting with the 2014 Green Defence Framework and arriving at the 2021 Climate Change and Security Action Plan, has contributed to increasing the Member States’ awareness and sensitivity on these issues, the first, fundamental step towards structuring an organic and comprehensive response. Moreover, thanks to the Climate Change and Security Action Plan, the link between security, climate and the environment has finally been highlighted, thus outlining the reasons why NATO, as a political and military organization, can and must deal with security issues related to climate change, as well as with its operational implications and with the development of a green defence. Looking to the future, the Atlantic Alliance will have to focus its efforts on two important and mutually complementary aspects, both based on the principle of cooperation and partnership building. On the one hand, NATO will have to act as a privileged framework to foster technological and scientific exchange among its Member States, acting as a facilitator in these processes; on the other hand, it will have to act as a reference actor and contact point towards third party institutions, bodies and organizations, such as the EU, OSCE and IEA, in order to establish dialogue and partnership relations and to build joint actions to better understand, address, mitigate and adapt to the security implications of climate change.

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This paper has been drafted at the beginning of May 2022.

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References C. Robertson, “Climate change is increasing global security threats. Canada can help”, The Globe and Mail, 16 November 2021, Opinion: Climate change is increasing global security threats. Canada can help – The Globe and Mail J. Shea, “NATO and Climate Change: better late then never”, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 11 March 2022, NATO and Climate Change: Better Late Than Never | Strengthening Transatlantic Cooperation (gmfus.org) K. K. Larsen, “Unfolding Green Defence”, Centre for Military Studies, 2015 NATO, “Environment, climate change and security”, 3 December 2021 NATO, “Environmental Protection: NATO Documents”, Last updated 7 March 2022, NATO Documents – Environmental Protection – NATO LibGuides at NATO Library NATO, “Green Defence Framework”, 2014 NATO, “NATO and its partners become smarter on energy”, 7 April 2015, NATO – News: NATO and its partners become smarter on energy, 07-Apr.-2015 NATO, “NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan”, 14 June 2021 NATO, “United for a New Era – Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General”, November 2020 P. Barberini, R. Leoni, “NATO Summit 2021: Un Action Plan green per la sicurezza e i cambiamenti climatici”, CeSI, 17 June 2021, NATO Summit 2021: Un Action Plan green per la sicurezza e i cambiamenti climatici | Ce.S.I. Centro Studi Internazionali (cesi-italia.org) Panda, “Nearly 10 Percent of the US F-22 Inventory Was Damaged or Destroyed in Hurricane Michael”, The Diplomat, 15 October 2018, Nearly 10 Percent of the US F-22 Inventory Was Damaged or Destroyed in Hurricane Michael – The Diplomat S. Goodman, K. Kertysova, “NATO: An unexpected driver of climate action?”, NATO Review, 1 February 2022, NATO Review – NATO: An unexpected driver of climate action?

Chapter 3

The Operational Advantages of a Greener Defence: What Should Defence Be Prepared for in the Next 20–30 Years as a Result of Climate Change? Richard Nugee

Abstract Defence needs to understand the implications of climate change – the needs of security, the adaptation of its equipment and the need to reduce emissions and become more sustainable. Strategies, plans and equipment must, as always, be adapted; and this also includes adapting to a new and harsher environment within which Defence will be operating. Climate change represents both a threat and an opportunity, which Defence should be prepared for. This does not need to be a zero sum game – either green or capable. There are many opportunities where adopting a green approach, understanding the effects of climate change and the technology being developed to adapt to and mitigate its effects, can result in a more capable force – either directly through adoption of new technologies or indirectly through opportunities to become more self-sufficient and resilient. With the increased likelihood of conflict around the world as a direct or indirect result of climate change, acting both as a threat multiplier and a shaping threat, Defence has an opportunity and potentially important role to act as a global leader in understanding, acting to build resilience and to prevent conflict in the first place.

3.1

Introduction

In 2022 it should not need to be said, but it is a fact that climate change threatens our way of life as we know it today, if we do nothing. The effects of extreme weather, loss of biodiversity, destruction of soils, combined with predicted population growth, will change the face of the planet in a way that will make our current living

R. Nugee (*) Lt. Gen. CB CVO CBE, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature B.V. 2022 G. Iacovino, M. Wigell (eds.), Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2186-6_3

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difficult if not impossible. And it will cost far more – China predicts that it will cost hundreds of billions of dollars if climate change continues unchecked.1 But why is this a Defence issue? This chapter suggests that Defence needs to understand and be aware of the implications of climate change – the needs of security, the adaptation of its equipment and the need to reduce emissions and become more sustainable. This is not just because of some overarching moral argument, although this is very strong, but because Defence has the ability to benefit from embracing the new technologies that are emerging to tackle climate change, and has the ability to lead in maintaining peace and building resilience across the world. It is worth explaining what a greener Defence does and does not mean. Defence’s purpose is very clear – in the UK’s case this is “To protect the people of the United Kingdom, prevent conflict, and be ready to fight our enemies”. This does not change when the threat evolves – Defence adapts its response to every new threat, to be able to meet and overcome that threat as necessary. In order to do that, Defence must remain as militarily capable as its resources allow and that means both understanding the context and reacting to it. Strategies, plans and equipment must, as always, be adapted; the difference with climate change is that this also includes adapting to a new and harsher environment within which Defence will be operating. Climate change is also demanding a look at the very basics which have been taken for granted for at least 100 years, and take new unknowns into account which potentially have existential consequences. And if nothing is done, we ought to be clear, at the very least the freedom of manoeuvre, strategically to tactically, will steadily be eroded and diminished. Thus, to remain at the forefront of operational capability, it is imperative that Defence understands the future, and adapts to it.

3.2

National Security

To be a national security risk, climate change has to manifest itself in ways that will damage citizens, either as a threat to life or to our livelihood – the way we live. This is not simple, as it is not a single threat and there is no single answer to preserve our security. Indeed, it will manifest in ways that affect the whole society, from economic to social, political and legal. Climate change has been described for a while as a threat multiplier, which implies that rather than being a cause of insecurity in its own right, it contributes to and exacerbates existing threats – to a point that simmering tension might tip over into boiling conflict. But it is more than that, as it is also a shaping threat, determining not only the strength of the threat (as a multiplier effect) but also driving the way the threat manifests itself. And like any threat, different environments and different conditions will shape the influence and the

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Briefing by Chris Stark, CEO Committee on Climate Change, to UK MOD, January 2022.

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ferocity of the impact of climate change, so different responses will be needed. Defence will have to be supremely adaptable to cope with threats that are driven by a scale of unpredictability such that even the most sophisticated modelling capability cannot assess it accurately. And while the full force of the harshness of the effects of climate change may not be felt across parts of Europe, they will be felt by UK’s trade partners, UK’s overseas territories and UK’s allies and so should concern the UK directly.

3.3

A Threat Multiplier

Climate change and the international response to it will manifest itself in many different ways. Perhaps the most obvious of these are the direct threats from a global weather system under extreme pressure from the warming of the seas particularly. The result, as we have graphically seen in the last couple of years, is extreme weather events, typified perhaps by the extraordinary fires in Australia and California, and the heat dome in northwest US and Canada, described as a once in a 1000-year event, made 150 times more likely by climate change. Similar examples are the destructive floods in Germany with downpours 20% heavier than normal which caused over 200 deaths, and in China where in Henan province an estimated year’s rainfall fell in 2 days in December 2021, with over 200 mm of rain falling in 1 h, causing over 300 deaths, the evacuation of 815,000 people and affecting 14.5 million people around the province.2 Climate change is already affecting every region on Earth and the unpredictable meteorological conditions that result will continue. This, in a series of cascading risks that compound each other will place ever increasing demands on finite public funds, with inevitable consequences for the ability of nations to fund other capabilities. In certain parts of the world, these storms and floods are powerful enough to lead to a breakdown in law and order, which requires extensive security forces to stabilise. The cost of such destruction in financial terms is significant: at least RMB 2.7 billion in China from that single event, and the US assess that from 2014 to 2018 the cost of extreme weather events is about $400 billion. But there is also a penalty in terms of the clearing up, much of which is done by the militaries around the world. The need for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), according to almost all relevant academic literature, is likely to grow, both at home and abroad. For example, where once the UK would send a Guard ship to the Caribbean to support victims of the hurricane season perhaps once every 5 years, now it is an annual event, and they are there for longer as there is evidence that the hurricane season itself may be lasting longer. Defence will have to take this into account although here there is genuine opportunity, for collaborative training and operating, and for shared equipment development. Climate change will force many changes,

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Briefing SGMI UK MOD, January 2022.

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and if the right approach is taken, these will allow for many more potential opportunities for working closely with allies and partners, and therefore increase the overall effectiveness of Defence. Military bases, airfields, ports and training areas are also susceptible to powerful climactic events, so Defence must think hard about the resilience of its own fixed assets, about the effect of rising sea levels on their naval bases, and on the impact of hotter, drier weather on their training areas across the world. The Pentagon have recently devoted significant effort to looking at the flood, hurricane and fire risks of all their bases, having had fast jets severely damaged by intense hail storms and bases flooding. For Defence to remain operationally capable, the adaptation required to build resilience on bases, training areas, ports and airfields across the world will become essential. The other direct threat is from the environmental degradation and permanent resource scarcity that results. Decline of forests, reduced biodiversity, expansion of the deserts, rising sea levels and increased acidification, expansion of disease zones and widespread drought, all of which we see evidence of, will have a profound effect. One of the key areas will be a reduction of food production from the traditional ‘grain baskets’ of the world such as Canada and South America. Global staple food trade is changing and is becoming more vulnerable, which is creating higher food prices for quality foodstuffs, and may result in changes to trade relations across the world. There is evidence from the Seventeenth Century of the effect of changes in food production causing conflict. Historians have linked the ‘General Crisis’ of the century to the simultaneous Little Ice Age, which on average reduced temperatures by 1  C after a long period of restricted agricultural growth, with far reaching consequences for the stability of the world. Indeed between 1618 and 1707 there was an outbreak of wars around the world, as the effect of the Little Ice Age reduced food supply and increased the vulnerability to disease. Wars proliferated, from Europe (the Thirty Years War, the English Civil War) to the Collapse of the Ming Dynasty in China to the Mughal-Maratha Wars in India. And although it would not be possible to prove at this distance a causal effect of climate change being the catalyst for war, there appears to be the possibility that the climate multiplied the threats and provided an environment where violence and conflict was more likely. Inevitably, as resources become scarcer, they are stored more by those who have them. Classic examples of this are dams, which not only store water but allow hydroelectric generation. Unfortunately, while excellent for green energy production, the effect of restricting water flows could have dramatic consequences further downstream. From the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam or the Kalabagh dam in Pakistan, to small holdings in Kenya, the potential for increasing conflict by those suffering restrictions of water downstream is significant. In Marsabit in Kenya, access to wells has already led to conflict, exacerbated by irrigated agriculture and water abstraction upstream, resulting in local violence tipping points being reached far more rapidly. This will only become more likely as water becomes scarcer as a result of climate change.

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Climate change reinforces insecurity. In Autumn 2021 CBS news and the New York Times ran articles suggesting that climate change had strengthened the Taliban, arguing that the repeated droughts, rapid melting of the winter snow which caused floods and then further droughts as the water from the melt did not last as long throughout the year, all contributed to conflict. With agriculture failing the farmers often had only two choices – grow poppies or turn to the Taliban for income, at $5–10 a day. We have seen this pattern in other areas as well. Andrew Harper, the Special Advisor to the High Commissioner for Climate Action at the UN Refugee Agency, suggests that Boko Haram gained footholds in the Lake Chad Basin in 2017, and ISIS took advantage of the extreme droughts in Iraq and Syria to build their support base. Peter Shwartzein,3 a journalist and environmental consultant, identified 4 critical areas that will lead to a rise in insecurity, after living in the Sahel for 6 months. First, he observed that climate change became a ‘stoker of resentment’, as some communities were worse affected than others, which exaggerated the difference between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. He also identified that the droughts and failing harvests and the economic poverty that resulted, created the conditions where radical movements, such as ISIS in Iraq or Boko Haram, could exploit the poor and desperate. These organisations are expert at exploiting the weaknesses in the local government, turning their recruits against the authorities who are seen as corrupt and exacerbating poverty. Christophe Hodder, the UN climate security and environmental advisor to Somalia, eloquently describes how drought led to farmers moving to cities, to be recruited by al-Shabab; by resolving the drought through irrigation, the recruits dried up – so much so that al-Shabab began to attack the irrigation systems; they understood the relationship. Third, he identified that the dislocation of many leaving the rural environments for cities robbed these villages of the critical mass for micro business to flourish, which resulted in a shattering of local cohesion. This, finally, was made worse by the fact that climate change – the weather – was beyond their control, which led to community, family and tribal structures becoming less effective and breaking down. In 2017 it is estimated that 18.8 million people were internally displaced because of the climate, while only 11.8 million were displaced through conflict itself. And history is full of the dangers of displaced peoples – dispossessed, desperate, they might turn to radicalisation, or they might move, but wherever they go they are quite likely to exacerbate tensions, as they will end up in a place where people already live. However, it is important to note that conflict is not inevitable – the city of Nouakchott, capital of Mauretania, has grown from 9000 to 1.3 million from the 1960s to today without significant tensions, as it was well managed. It is worth dwelling on migration for a moment, as many see this as one of the main threats to European security. After all, as the equatorial belt heats up to levels where it is physiologically impossible to live for long periods, as is predicted, the numbers of those who move to areas where the effects will be less extreme will

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Luxembourg Seminar, June 2021.

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grow. Indeed, with figures of displaced peoples varying from 25 to 250 million in Africa alone, it is conceivable that some would come to Europe. Indeed, one estimate puts global migration at 1 billion by 2100.4 Migration, caused by a multitude of factors rather than just climate change, is of course an adaptation strategy; through history many have fled war. But that presupposes that they can return when the war is over. If your home is not liveable in due to the climate, instead of conflict, then it is unlikely you will be able to go back. Migration itself can lead to a lack of security and instability. For those who have no choice, as their home is unliveable, and who are the poorest, very often they also become victims of criminal gangs, which encourages lawlessness, further instability and the potential for even first world countries to act in competition with each other. Climate change is likely to lead to resource scarcity, and also in regions with fragile States and poor governance, which in themselves are more likely to be in areas of climate stress, lead to inter-state tensions. Off the east African coast, the once-Somali pirates have turned to providing protection for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, which in turn is not only diminishing fish stocks, as they overfish the fishery spawning grounds, and the corals around them, but also is leading to further tensions with the Kenyans further south. Defence and the security sector cannot intervene everywhere to solve these potential areas of conflict. Instead, they have the potential to act as a support both for building local resilience and providing some local and specific expertise.

3.4

A Technology Threat

Much of the above is about local and regional stability and security that is stretched by climate change and its direct and indirect effects, possibly to a breaking point that results in conflict. And little of it is new or even perhaps surprising – there are many causes of conflict in history, and climate change is one more, even if more extreme. But there is one area of strategic geopolitical impact that needs to be noticed much more, and which could lead to a very significant re-alignment, and potential destabilisation – the transition away from fossil fuels and move to green energy solutions. There have been energy transitions in the past, but one particularly had massive geopolitical effects for the world – the move to oil over 100 years ago. The effect of converting the world’s navies from coal to oil on the eve of World War 1, and the need for fuel for their navy in World War 2, changed the course of both Wars for all sides – the Japanese need for oil adding impetus to their imperial designs, Hitler’s push for the Caucasus and the British determination to maintain security of the Suez Canal were all driven by oil considerations. Interest in the Middle East over the last 50 years also shows the clear importance of oil to Western geostrategic thinking. Certainly, defence and security strategies, both in peace and

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Quoted by Al Gore at COP 26 Glasgow, November 2021.

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war, have previously been shaped by the determination to maintain access to oil, as a strategic factor. This current transition away from oil will be no less impactful, but has 2 unique properties that make it much more difficult than anything we have seen before. The first is that this is an energy replacement, not an addition. The intent is to replace our reliance on fossil fuels very significantly, perhaps ultimately to zero; in contrast, coal was still used as well in the move to oil. The second is that the world has set itself a target of net zero emissions by 2050 – less than 30 years away. Yet, oil took 50 years for market penetration, and longer still for market dominance. The speed required is exceptional. Both these unique factors are very likely to increase the instability that will be caused by the transition away from fossil fuels. As the world pivots to renewable energy, there is the potential for significant winners and losers. Countries whose GDP or exports are dominated by fossil fuels will have to adapt to the potential $7 trillion loss of income by 2040 for oil producing countries predicted by the International Energy Agency.5 Some are already adapting and are reasonably well prepared, diversifying and creating new jobs in the renewable industry. Some have yet to adapt, but see the risks and opportunities and are working towards a solution. But it is those states which are already fragile and are most reliant on fossil fuels, or who do not see the need to adapt, who are likely to suffer the most. And it is possible to anticipate consequences from a subsequent reduction in GDP – internal unrest, domestic instability as economies start to fail, and even the potential for conflict with neighbouring States. The move to renewables is also uneven. The materials to power the renewable energy industry appear, at the moment, to be concentrated in certain parts of the world – rare earths in China, Cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo, lithium in Chile. This creates new power bases and opportunities. In the 1970s, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was able to alter the economies of countries far outside their own, as the power invested in the source of energy had strategic geopolitical impact. So if we are not careful, the reliance on fossil fuel producing countries, and the alliances and relationships that have been forged to ensure a continuity of supply, could be replaced by a similar reliance on new power houses, particularly China, for the supply of the raw materials for renewable energy generators. As the world is finding, even extracting the minerals for renewables is far from easy – lithium has risen in cost from $9600 a tonne in January 2021 to over $50,000 a tonne in January 2022. This is as much to do with the environmental damage of extraction as it is to do with demand and the concentration of deposits; local communities (in Chile for example) are shutting down or curtailing the output from the mines. Shifts in power in the world, especially at the speed demanded by the climate change timetable, are often associated with insecurity and instability and this could be exacerbated by such a large transition – it is estimated that 3% of the world’s GDP is in energy. It is the role of the security services and Defence to identify the risks, and so it is equally important to look at the implications of moving

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Briefing to UK FCDO, March 2020.

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away from fossil fuels and at what can and should be done to avoid such instability. And it is almost inevitable that new alliances and relationships will be needed, to ensure security of trade in vital minerals. The effect of the pivot to renewables and the quest for reducing dependence on fossil fuels is driving research and development away from existing solutions to new, different outcomes. Importantly, many in industry are already changing their research and development to embrace the opportunities from an imperative to reduce emissions. This has significant consequences for Defence. The ADS Group, the trade body for the UK Defence industry, wrote in December 2021 to the UK Chancellor and Defence Secretary calling on national governments to follow a number of principles to support sustainability within Defence. One stated explicitly “Any possible exclusion of defence activities from regulations on sustainability should mirror only the exclusions set out in international treaties signed, ratified, and adopted by the UK and European national governments”, in an attempt to ensure that they would not be penalised by the markets for appearing to ignore sustainability and wider ESG considerations when dealing with Defence. Another principle states powerfully “There is no sustainability without security, no security without defence capabilities, and no defence capabilities without defence industries”. There is a strong warning from industry, therefore, that they are going to have to become more sustainable to survive, with the implication that the speed at which society and the banks are demanding a change to technology, particularly renewable energy technology, has the potential to leave Defence behind. This is not easy for Defence, as there is no single solution to the issue of removing fossil fuel propulsion systems for air, land or maritime equipment. So while alternatives are researched and developed, Defence will ultimately have to chose what type of energy is optimal for each type of equipment. There are a few elements where Defence is unique – those that are should be researched using the Defence R&D budget. Outside these, Defence should act as a fast follower, or early adopter, of the settled view of industries and sectors for whom this challenge is existential. For the maritime and air industries, they must find an optimal energy source that is financially viable and which delivers the same capability – even if with different supply chains. Over the coming years there will be significant debate, experimentation, trials and failures in the pursuit of the optimal energy for the requirement, from hybrids to ammonia, hydrogen, synthetic fuels, or electric drives and storage. Defence, if it can avoid doing so, should not decide prematurely or unilaterally before the clear determination of other industries is apparent. Only that way will it be possible to avoid the potential for stranded assets in the future and ensure that it retains interoperability with allies and overseas nations. And of course it ought to be said that there will still be a role for fossil fuels even in 2050: Defence should not be looking to retrofit existing propulsion systems that will still be present in 2050 – such as aircraft carrier engines – as that would be prohibitively expensive. Instead, it should concentrate on the designs of new equipment and alternative fuels as they become viable, and take advantage of proven new technologies at the first opportunity. There are significant advantages tactically and operationally with a move to renewable energy, over and above the obvious advantages of reduced emissions.

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To give just a few examples. Electric small aircraft, ideal for short passenger journeys, are already a reality, and this sort of technology is recognised by the Royal Air Force as also ideal for training pilots and air cadets – with the electricity coming from renewable sources, or perhaps through generators powered by sustainable aviation fuel. As the technology develops further, there will inevitably be improvements in speed (with a recent successful breaking of the electric air speed record in the UK), and in the endurance of batteries, allowing greater range and/or more passengers. That technology, translated into uncrewed air systems would offer greater endurance on task. And with the RAF looking to achieve 80% of their training synthetically in the future, the opportunities for greater tactical experimentation out of sight of adversaries, while at the same time saving money (and emissions) on fuel, maintenance and wear and tear, is genuinely capability enhancing. Further, sustainable aviation fuel, although not yet viable economically, is on the horizon and will deliver the same capability and also reduce emissions. In some of the buildings that are being developed for the UK Defence training estate, such as at Nesscliffe, the developers have looked at every material they have used and, in order to reduce embedded carbon, have thought carefully and changed their approach. The net effect was to reduce cost and carbon, both of operation and for construction, with the financial savings being recycled into the buildings to make them carbon net negative and into the training estate, in this case being used to electrify the infantry ranges, creating a better environment to improve operational capability. The British Army and industry have already developed a Hybrid Jackal and are developing hybrid systems for both the Foxhound and logistic vehicles such as MAN SV. The Hybrid Jackal has the ability to run on battery power for over 2 h off-road before recharging by using its onboard engine. While the tactical advantages of a silent, emission free vehicle with reduced thermal profile are obvious in terms of stealth, the demonstration programme is showing other significant benefits. The weight of the battery and careful placing in the design creates a lower centre of gravity and a more balanced vehicle, reducing the chances of tipping over. With electric drives on each wheel, it offers far more control and manoeuvrability (and, useful in urban areas, the ability to pirouette 360 on a single point) and far better off-road capability, including going up and down steep slopes more effectively. Fuel consumption is reduced, by as much as 20% in a battlefield scenario, and more in an urban setting. And it is perhaps the effect on the crew that is more surprising: with no noise in battery mode, there is increased situational awareness; and with no vibration and noise from an electric motor, there is less crew fatigue. Importantly, with electric drives, there is far less training for the driver required – it is described as like driving a golf buggy – giving both confidence to the driver and making it less likely that the vehicle will get into difficulty. The long-term effect is greater operability in terms of distance, duration without resupply and fightability. Defence and industry must work in partnership on these issues to improve operational effectiveness, and attractiveness to recruits, as well as reduce emissions and at the same time build resilience. By leading on some of these technologies and using them as experimentation test beds, not only will Defence become significantly

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better at setting requirements in the future, but will also de-risk future technologies and possibly novel weapons while at the same time become an authority on setting the standards required across all the alliances. Further, in line with the new Defence Industrial Strategy, the UK should look to exploit the momentum for innovation of some of the new technologies available.

3.5

A Threat to Freedom of Manoeuvre

Freedom of manoeuvre is based on the ability to understand the environment, at home and abroad, and act accordingly. It is Defence’s duty to provide the best and most militarily capable Armed Forces possible and to be prepared to deploy wherever they are sent in the world. But that world is changing around us, so that what might have been once in a hundred-year events are becoming almost the norm. The increase in temperatures is affecting the ice caps, the temperature of the sea and the heat of the air. All of these have an impact on capability, and the freedom of manoeuvre to operate around the globe. For any nation to maintain that freedom of manoeuvre, they must be able to operate in a world where the current environmental envelopes built into the requirements are being pushed to their limits. For example, rising surface sea temperatures will force either operational compromises or new design criteria to be adopted. It is assessed that in the Gulf, in the next 10–15 years the summer surface sea temperatures could reach 36 frequently and 38–40  C occasionally,6 forcibly slowing ships as the sea used to cool the engines would instead act as a thermal blanket. The Arctic is a particular area of concern, especially as it is not covered by the type of International Treaty that protects Antarctica, and as it appears that climate change is affecting it 2½–3 times faster than the rest of the globe. This is a result of the reducing sea ice thereby diminishing the amount of reflection of the sun, and as a consequence of hotter water coming from the equator as part of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). There is therefore the potential for the arctic ice cap to melt in the summer in 15+ years, to allow open water across the Arctic Sea. In March 2019 Russia proposed, but has not yet signed into law, a statement that all foreign warships on the Northern Sea Route (in international waters) are restricted by Russian limitations, in a blatant challenge to the freedom of the seas. Similarly, it ought to be concerning that in January 2018 China declared itself a ‘near-Arctic’ state, so that it can influence the ‘polar silk route’. If freedom of manoeuvre is to be maintained alongside the other competing nations, particularly Russia who claims the Arctic Sea as their own, navies need to be able to operate within the same environment. Given the Russians, Chinese and Canadians are all hardening some of their ships’ hulls, to be able to deal with the

6 UK Met Office Hadley Centre, “Climate change impacts on marine environments for defence applications”, December 2020.

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disruptive ice state between open water and ice pack for which an ice breaker is required, other relevant nations, such as the UK ought to do the same. This does not need to be all of the Navy’s ships, but designing enough to be able to operate there would seem essential. Further, Russia is refurbishing many of their arctic bases and has increased their military activity, with surface ships, icebreakers (they now have at least 40), submarines and ground exercises. Consequently, NATO is already reacting with increased preparedness with the US 2nd Fleet being given responsibility for the Arctic and more exercises, such as the planned 2022 Exercise Cold Response with 35,000 soldiers from 28 nations and at least 2 aircraft carriers from the US and UK. The NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, has already identified and stated that the opportunities of the melting arctic ice also pose potential threats, with a heating up of geopolitics in the region. And if operating more in the Arctic, navies and troops need to be adapted to the increased exposure in that region of the phenomenon of space weather, which affects navigation, timing, radar and communications systems. It is not just maritime systems that will be affected. On land, a warm year in the 2000s will broadly become an average year in the 2040s, affecting the ability to train, as more days are lost to being ‘too hot to train’. A recent study by the UK Met Office7 identified that in temperate climates the number of days lost to training due to increases in temperatures is likely to rise by between 75% and 150% by 2040. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the projection is that all training will be lost in August to heat. In the air, higher temperatures resulting in reduced air density, results in less effective aerodynamic lift. The effect on take-off runs, in terms of reduced payloads and fuel capacity and reduced climb rates means that increased runway length and increased engine thrust may be necessary.8 Climate change can affect infectious disease transmission which will potentially hamper HADR operations. For example, the growing spread and geographic reach of diseases transmitted by arthropod vectors (such as malaria, Zika and dengue fever) could create challenges for force survivability, increasing the need for individual medical assistance, vaccinations and personal protective equipment.9 Medical preparation for deployments to areas with a risk of exposure to mosquito-borne diseases could also become more costly. Higher rainfall could increase the dissemination of infectious agents in water sources, raising the risk of personnel exposure to waterborne diseases, and high temperatures could increase the growth and survival of infectious agents. As climate change increases rainfall and temperatures, these health risks to service personnel could be exacerbated in certain parts of the world. Climate change can impact air quality and is likely to lead to an increase in

7

Changes in UK wet bulb globe temperatures due to climate change, June 2020. The effect of climate change on UK military air platforms and enabling functions, Dstl September 2020. 9 A changing climate: exploring the implications for climate change for UK defence and security, Cox et al, March 2020. 8

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concentrations of surface ozone, an urban air pollutant responsible for respiratory problems, which can also damage crops leading to a reduction in crop yields and food productivity.10 A greater reliance on electricity and connectivity to optimise the value of renewable energy, a critical part of moderating demand and reducing surges in power, will inevitably lead to greater vulnerability to cyber-attack which must be taken into account. Critical National Infrastructure could be particularly vulnerable as nations become increasingly interconnected. The rate of Global Mean Sea Level rise for 2006–2015 is unprecedented over the last century, mostly caused by melting ice sheets and glaciers.11 If the Western Antarctic Ice Sheet melts, which it might if the temperature increases by 2 , then mean sea levels might rise by as much as 3.3 m. Similarly, the Greenland ice sheets may start to melt far more rapidly if temperatures reach 1.5–2  C globally, potentially triggering a (long-term) rise of over 7 m in sea levels. Changes such as this which will take time, but will have very significant effects on the understanding of littoral strike and the abilities of navies to operate. Many aspects of climate change could have a potential impact on Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and sensors.12 The most significant effects likely to affect radio will be extreme weather events and increased rainfall; the presence of clutter in a radar sweep can reduce the resolution of data acquired and lead to misidentification. Optical sensors are susceptible to a number of climate effects. For example, passive Infra-Red (IR) sensors are unreliable in harsh weather conditions. IR, ultrasonic and laser are susceptible to moisture, dirt and temperature; millimetre electromagnetic waves (Extremely high frequency – EHF) are degraded by atmospheric conditions such as snow, cloud, dust, smoke and fog. Climate change also results in increased atmospheric turbulence, and this imposes a fundamental limit to Electro-Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) capability, particularly at the long range required for standoff ISR. Underwater acoustic sensors are of critical importance. Melting ice is changing acoustic propagation in the world’s oceans and changes in ocean chemistry and glacial melt will alter the thermohaline circulation of the ocean. This will alter the surface layer of the oceans, creating changes which will impact underwater capability. So, if freedom of manoeuvre is to be maintained, Defence must adapt to a changing, more challenging world – the environmental norms we have always operated under are changing, and we must adapt to meet them.

10

The effect of climate change on human factors, Dstl September 2020. Sea level rise risks for MOD bases, Interim report, UK Met Office, October 2020. 12 The effects of climate change on ISR and sensors, Dstl September 2020. 11

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3.6

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A Threat to the Licence to Operate

Defence, of course, is not operating in isolation, with a growing political, social and legal context equally as important. Increasing numbers of governments are pledging to reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions and in the UK this has been enshrined in law: the government will break the law if the UK does not reach net zero by 2050. This has a number of implications. As UK Defence is responsible for 50% of central government emissions, it will have to act to reduce its emissions if government is to reach its target. Government is already and will increasingly legislate for an emission-reduced approach to many areas, from cars and vehicles, to heating in domestic homes and buildings, to use of land and the preservation of biodiversity. Defence will not be exempt from much of this legislation and so will have to act. Defence already has external requirements that must be met. Reducing emissions will also allow Defence to operate in host nations, who conceivably may become more demanding on the emission profiles of any support and intervention. Nations may limit the ability to deploy if it is recognised that by so doing, Defence would be adding further stress to the environment – the licence to operate may be restricted. As an example of this sort of thinking, after the major volcanic eruption in Tonga, the local government laid very strict restrictions (due to COVID) on the aid that was brought from overseas – despite the need. Similarly, it is possible that certain nations would refuse the opportunity for Defence to train on or around their land if they are not environmentally friendly and sustainable. At the same time Defence needs to ensure that it remains a career of choice to attract quality recruits. With climate change recognised as an increasing public concern by more than 85% of the UK population13 and the majority of 18–24 year olds disagreeing with the statement that ‘there is too much concern for the environment’,14 if Defence does not act it will be seen as increasingly out of touch with the population base it protects and from which it recruits. There has been a steady increase in the number of people concerned about this issue, and Defence must be seen to be responding in sympathy with this pattern of concern in the population. A number of studies have suggested that the ability of commercial employers to recruit and retain their talent is becoming increasingly influenced by their policies on sustainability. While this may not be as great a concern for parts of the defence force (primarily the combat arms), with the increase in the number of people in society who are concerned about the effects of climate change and want government to act, this will become more relevant. There is potentially a significant legal impact from Court decisions, such as the decision against Shell in the Netherlands that demanded changes in their emission profiles. The key take-away is that Defence should be considering the net zero commitment as part of its decision-making processes when those decisions affect the environment. It is likely that, in a future case about a decision that has or may have 13 14

Ipsos MORI political monitor public, August 2019. Mediacom MTA Study, 2018.

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a measurable impact on the environment, a court would find that it is reasonable to expect decision-makers to take account of the net zero commitment in making such a decision. For example, if Defence was considering procuring a large number of military aircraft, it is likely that a court would expect them to take account of the net zero commitment in making the decision about which aircraft to procure. The net zero commitment would be one of many factors that are relevant to that particular decision and the court would expect a balancing exercise to be undertaken, for example carbon emissions against costs or technology required against procurement rules.

3.7

Opportunity

It would be a mistake to think of climate change just being a threat to Defence as there is significant opportunity as well. Understanding the effects of climate change and the technology being developed to adapt to and mitigate its effects can result in a more capable force – either directly through adoption of new technologies or indirectly through opportunities to become more self-sufficient and resilient, thereby saving money that can be spent on further enhancing operational capability. As already highlighted, there are opportunities for equipment and training to be optimised through the use of electric drives and hybrid systems, increased synthetic training and use of different materials, that all lead ultimately to enhanced operational, or military, capability. There is, however, a much greater prize to be won through thinking differently about sustainability and resilience. Becoming increasingly self-sufficient on operations, through the generation of power via sustainable and portable equipment and technologies such as solar power, allows greater resilience. Energy efficiency can serve as a force multiplier, because it increases the range and endurance of forces in the field and can reduce the number of combat forces diverted to protect energy supply lines, which are vulnerable to both asymmetric and conventional attacks and disruptions. The cost of delivering fuel, both in terms of lives and funding (with fuel to Helmand potentially costing over 40 times more than at home and the US reportedly spending $500 a gallon on fuel to Afghanistan) would be substantially reduced through self-sufficiency. Hybrid generators, connected to a microgrid, and solar panels have shown a 70% reduction in fuel consumption with the energy optimised for demand rather than supply. The potential for recycling water and the opportunity to reduce waste, the adoption of 3D printing techniques for spares, thereby further reducing the logistic resupply requirements, all adds to combat effectiveness. Combat troops (infantry, armour and aviation) that would protect logistic patrols in contested environments can be redeployed to the front line. Similarly, the creation of deployed operational bases that are more self-reliant will reduce the impact on the local community and further reduce supply chain vulnerabilities, thereby increasing resilience. This would also reduce the environmental impact of a deployment: it is possible, even likely, that defence will be required to deploy to areas most vulnerable to climate change related stress.

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The economic and resilience benefits of becoming more efficient on the base estate, through adoption of renewable and self generating power (for example solar, wind, nuclear micro-reactors and deep geothermal) or through efficiencies associated with building monitoring systems or adoption of LED lights, will give a return on investment that rapidly will ensure that more money can be spent on equipment and people, enhancing Defence. It will also insure against potential overloading of the national grid in the future as it moves exclusively to renewables. Adoption of a concept of a circular economy for all equipment and disposables, if possible, may offer opportunities for revenue generation. In many cases, recycling and selling on equipment will both lengthen their use and reduce waste; recycling materials will also generate finance and possibilities for novel use. To take an ecological example, the methane stored in grass cut on the sides of airport runways can be converted into a fuel to drive the mowers that cut the grass in the first place. Designing new equipment with sustainability and mitigation of emissions in mind, at every stage of the design process, will allow novel thinking to emerge. By reducing weight and size through making equipment remote controlled or even semi-autonomous, there are immediately greater opportunities for renewable energy solutions to be found, that will both reduce cost and logistic drag, and so enhance capability. In a vicious double-effect, communities in conflict contribute to the effects of climate change both by significantly increasing their emissions and at the same time being distracted away from trying to solve the climate crisis. Further, as we are seeing in Ukraine, conflict produces significant contamination on the ground and in the water sources, thereby reducing both the capability of future agriculture and increasing the vulnerability of the local population. Through reducing the incidence of conflict, deploying to build resilience and support the efforts of other militaries to reduce their own emissions, the concept of capacity and resilience building for nations most vulnerable and most affected by climate change offers the opportunity to reduce threats, increase alliances and build skills for Armed Forces personnel. This should address conflict drivers in advance of causes of instability such as radicalisation, promote good governance, create wealth through employment and should lead to better futures for the people of partnered nations. It can support a Government’s climate change programmes while at the same time deliver security, support trading, potentially extend commercial opportunities and influence. By deploying and building resilience capacity ‘upstream’ where appropriate, combined with advice on how to tackle military emissions, Defence could potentially take on a powerful leadership role.

3.8

Conclusion

Climate change represents both a threat and an opportunity, which Defence should be prepared for. This does not need to be a zero-sum game – either green or capable. There are many opportunities where adopting a green approach, understanding the

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effects of climate change and the technology being developed to adapt to and mitigate its effects, can result in a more capable force – either directly through adoption of new technologies or indirectly through opportunities to become more self-sufficient and resilient, thereby saving money that can be spent on enhancing further our operational capability. With the increased likelihood of conflict around the world as a direct or indirect result of climate change, acting both as a threat multiplier and a shaping threat, Defence has an opportunity and potentially important role to act as a global leader in understanding, acting to build resilience and to prevent conflict in the first place. It will need all its soft and hard skills to be most effective – adjusting the operational stance to whatever is needed. Even if this is a different requirement, that will in time lead to changes in organisation, in reality this is no different to tackling any other new threat that Defence has faced throughout its existence. Defence has significant potential to gain competitive advantage in a number of key areas from embracing climate change and sustainability if decisions are taken now to harness the opportunities that are available. The nations that recognise and prepare for this will have a significant advantage over those that do not. The challenge will be modernising the force to account for operating in a climate changed environment and simultaneously complying with the Government’s developing environmental regulations, with a prospect of changes being imposed on defence. If Defence were not to adopt an approach to sustainability and ignored the effects of climate change, there is the potential for significant disadvantage, operationally, politically, socially, economically and legally, poor investment choices, increased cost of later retrofit and the subsequent loss of a competitive advantage. Perhaps even more clearly, if Defence does not adapt and reduce its emissions while it can, it is conceivable that, to meet the legal requirement to reach net zero by 2050, the only option in the future will be to reduce operational capability to meet the targets. This is unacceptable and would leave future generations in an impossible position.

References Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Studies: Climate change and achieving information advantage, September 2020 The effect of climate change on human factors, September 2020 The effect of climate change on littoral strike, October 2020 The effect of climate change on UK military air platforms and enabling functions, December 2020 RAND Europe: Exploring the implications of climate change for UK Defence and security, May 2020 Implications of climate change for UK defence logistics in HADR and MACA operations, April 2021 UK Met Office Studies: Climate science overview report, September 2020 Climate change implications for global temperature, November 2020 Environmental operating limits regional: Persian Gulf and Red Sea, May 2019 Changes in UK wet bulb globe temperatures due to climate change, June 2020

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Impacts of climate change on aviation, November 2020 Sea level rise risks for MOD bases, November 2020 Natural hazard convergence – climate change and space weather, November 2020 Past and future trends in fire weather for the UK, 2020 Climate projections of drought and drought hotspots, November 2020 Climate change impacts on maritime environments for defence applications, November 2020 The influence of climate change on human heat-stress risk management, December 2020 IPCC 6th Report Global Strategic Trends 6th Report

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Chapter 4

The Ecological Transition in the Italian Defence Pierluigi Barberini

Abstract Over the last few years, the Italian Ministry of Defence has embarked on a path to make the activities carried out by the Italian Armed Forces more sustainable and mindful of environmental impacts. This initiative, which is mainly based on considerations related to strengthening energy security and critical national energy infrastructures, has become increasingly structured over time, culminating in the publication in 2019 of the Defence Energy Strategy, a document that serves as a guideline and that summarizes the main initiatives implemented by the Ministry. In this context, attention is being focused on different sectors, but the energy efficiency of buildings and infrastructures owned and operated by the Italian Armed Forces is the most important line of action. Other areas of intervention include the development of sustainable mobility, especially in urban and non-operational contexts, and the creation of an energy-oriented mindset and of a more conscious and attentive mentality towards these issues, both at personnel and senior officer level.

4.1

Introduction

In recent years, the Italian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has started to pay greater attention to issues related to energy security, energy efficiency and the protection of the environment. In line with actions already initiated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), such as the 2014 NATO Green Defence Framework and the 2021 NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan,1 as well as by the EU with

NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan (2021), NATO, NATO – NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan, 14-Jun.-2021 Accessed 01 March 2022.

1

P. Barberini (*) CeSI – Centro Studi Internazionali (Center for International Studies), Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature B.V. 2022 G. Iacovino, M. Wigell (eds.), Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2186-6_4

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the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap2 and the Italian Government with the 2017 Strategia Energetica Nazionale (National Energy Strategy – SEN),3 the Italian MoD officially adopted in 2019 the Strategia Energetica della Difesa (Defence Energy Strategy – SED),4 a road map to optimize and improve the production, management and consumption of energy within the Italian Defence, taking into account the peculiarities of the military instrument in terms of operational capabilities that must be assured by the Armed Forces. The main goal of the SED is to achieve energy security, as explicitly stated at the beginning of the official document. The Italian MoD views energy security as the set of activities aimed at reducing the vulnerability arising from the use of energy resources, ensuring safe and sustainable access to them.5 In such a perspective, by implementing the SED in order to achieve energy security, the Italian MoD aims at increasing the resilience of energy supply while pursuing compliance with national goals for sustainability, improved efficiency, and abatement of pollutant emissions related to energy use, with concomitant cost savings and reduction of environmental and climate pollution. In this regard, two preliminary observations can be made. First, like other militaries, the pursuit of greener actions in the Italian MoD arises from security considerations and has in the achievement of security purposes its first and most important objective: in this sense, the attainment of sustainable and environmentalfriendly targets is an important, yet secondary and supplementary, goal. Indeed, as written in the SED, the approach by the Italian MoD to the energy issue must be understood precisely in terms of energy security, meaning that the reduction of energy consumption and the efficiency of military installations must be aimed at decreasing energy dependency and increasing energy resiliency, while the positive impact on the environment is considered to be “desirable”.6 Second, unlike other militaries,7 the Italian MoD is focusing on those green defence initiatives specifically concerning the optimization and reduction of energy consumption, which are implemented, as we will see, mainly in terms of making military infrastructures more efficient and, in some cases, fully autonomous and

2

Towards a climate-proof security and defence policy: a Roadmap for EU action (2020), EEAS, Towards a climate-proof security and defence policy: a Roadmap for EU action | EEAS Website (europa.eu) Accessed 01 March 2022. 3 Strategia Energetica Nazionale (2017), Italian Ministry of Economic Development, Testointegrale-SEN-2017.pdf (mise.gov.it), Accessed 01 March 2022. 4 Strategia Energetica della Difesa (2019), Italian Ministry of Defence, Piano_SED_2019.pdf (difesa.it), Accessed 31 March 2022. 5 Strategia Energetica della Difesa (2019), Italian Ministry of Defence, Piano_SED_2019.pdf (difesa.it), Accessed 31 March 2022. 6 Strategia Energetica della Difesa (2019), Italian Ministry of Defence, Piano_SED_2019.pdf (difesa.it), Accessed 31 March 2022. 7 Barry B et al. (2022) Green Defence: the defence and military implications of climate change for Europe, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Green Defence: the defence and military implications of climate change for Europe (iiss.org)

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self-reliant from the energy perspective. Thus, at least until now, there has been less attention, compared to other countries, on the operational advantages coming from a green transition, while focusing instead on the purely organizational, infrastructural, and logistic aspects of the process. This paper will deal with the Italian Defence Energy Strategy, trying to outline the main initiatives that are currently being implemented in order to achieve a green transition in the Italian Defence sector. It will highlight the main factors on which Italian Armed Forces are focusing their efforts, while also analyzing the main weaknesses of the strategy and the possible areas in which to implement further actions in the coming future.

4.2

The Italian Defence Energy Strategy

The Italian Defence acknowledges its role as being an integrated part of the Italian Public Administration machine. This implies that the Defence sector must contribute to the efforts undertaken by all Italian institutions for reducing greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions and for carrying out their activities in a more eco-friendly and sustainable manner. This is especially true since the Italian MoD is one of the most polluting public actors in the country, as are all militaries in the world. Indeed, due to the specificities and peculiarities of the military domain, generally speaking, the Defence sector is often the single largest emitter of GHG among governmental bodies.8 However, at the same time, just because of the fundamental role assigned to Armed Forces, namely the security and protection of a country, Defence has usually been exonerated from sustainable and environmental-friendly initiatives, its primary goal being instead the development and delivery of high-end military capabilities which usually require a great consumption of energy from fossil fuels, the only ones capable of ensuring the required, high-level performances. In recent years, however, the Italian MoD, as other Defence establishments in Europe and the world, has started to pay greater attention to the impact of its activities in terms of GHG emissions, trying to reduce, wherever and whenever possible, the environmental footprint of the military operations it regularly carries out. More specifically, the Italian Defence has acknowledged that it can make a huge contribution in optimizing its overall efficiency from the energy perspective, thus improving energy security and reducing pollutant emissions. Against this backdrop, in 2019 the Italian MoD officially approved and released the Defence Energy Strategy (SED), in line with the overall National Energy Strategy elaborated by the Italian Government in 2017. The SED sets the achievement of energy security as its primary goal, within a time frame that stretches from

8

Barry B et al. (2022) Green Defence: the defence and military implications of climate change for Europe, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Green Defence: the defence and military implications of climate change for Europe (iiss.org)

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2019 until 2030. In this regard, the action of achieving energy security can be divided in both a short- and a long-term planning. In the short-term, the goal is to implement all the necessary measures so that the occurrence of risk situations does not result in damage or, at least, that the damage is limited in its scope and consequences. In the long-term, the objective is to avoid or at least limit the occurrence of risk situations at all, by reducing external dependency for energy and by building a stronger, more resilient, and sustainable domestic energy production and management system. According to the SED, energy security should be achieved by pursuing three main lines of action: • raising awareness on the energy issue; • focusing on the efficiency of the energy management process; • protecting critical energy infrastructures. These three lines of action actually represent the pillars on which the entire strategy is based. The following sections will thus describe and examine such pillars, providing an overall analysis of their practical implementations by Italian Armed Forces, as well as of the main criticalities encountered.

4.3

Pillar One – Raising Awareness

The first line of action is based on raising awareness among the whole Defence personnel on the importance of energy security and on the measures aimed at achieving an efficient and rational use of energy resources. Such process stems from two considerations: the first one is that only if military personnel are aware of energy issues will they be able to effectively implement and enforce all measures aimed at optimizing and rationalizing the energy consumption and management processes; the second one is that it is necessary to build and spread a sort of “energy security culture” at all levels, in order to actually shape an energy-oriented mindset in the Defence sector that can be built upon in the years to come, making the energy issue a structural and central element of the whole military thinking. In this regard, raising energy awareness is a goal to be pursued in the short term, in order to make personnel immediately understand the importance of energy issues, precisely in order to maximize the effectiveness of the process set in motion by the SED. Moreover, once an energy-oriented mindset is established, it is likely that the men and women of the Armed Forces will adopt eco-friendly behaviors and implement sustainable actions in their private lives as well, maximizing the impact of the initiative from an ethical and social perspective. For this raising awareness campaign to be successful, it is necessary that all organizational and hierarchical levels are involved, from the single private soldier to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Force. In such a way, the process will maximize its impact in both the quantitative and qualitative terms. Indeed, the SED provides for the single Armed Forces to issue guidance documents on energy matters, addressed

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to their personnel, adapted to the peculiarities of consumption of each service. Moreover, by involving high-ranking officials as much as possible, it is more likely that energy issues will continue to be perceived as fundamental, acquiring further importance and centrality in the future. Finally, within the line of action of raising awareness, in addition to the information dimension, it is also necessary to work on the educational one. This means strengthening and improving training and education courses for the specialized personnel who is in charge of managing the whole process, in order to educate new, highly-trained and skilled experts to form the governance structure, to supervise the future implementation of SED over the years and to deal with the new developments in the energy sector.

4.3.1

Pillar Two – Energy Efficiency

The line of action of improving the overall energy efficiency of the Armed Forces undoubtedly represents the most important driver on which the MoD is focusing for “greening” the Italian Defence. Such process starts with an energy audit aimed at identifying, in quantitative terms, the energy demand of the Italian Defence. More specifically, according to the SED, the energy audit represents the procedure that is necessary to achieve an accurate knowledge of energy consumption and energy flows in the infrastructures and activities carried out by the Defence sector. It is the starting point to implement all the solutions and measures aimed at9: • • • •

identifying energy saving potentials; proposing corrective measures to improve energy efficiency; quantifying the necessary financial investments; realizing a programme for the implementation of energy security measures.

In practice, such a procedure consists of analyzing the energy demand and consumption of all the existing infrastructures under the MoD, issuing a specific certificate (called Attestato di Prestazione Energetica – APE – Energy Performance Certificate) for each infrastructure, to be then put into a national database. Once the audit activities have been completed, it will be possible to identify the most energyconsuming sites and those on which it is a priority to intervene in terms of energy efficiency processes. Indeed, within the line of action of energy efficiency, there are two main sectors of intervention: • the energy efficiency of the physical infrastructures of the Italian Defence; • the energy efficiency of military mobility activities, especially of the non-operational ones.

9 Strategia Energetica della Difesa (2019), Italian Ministry of Defence, Piano_SED_2019.pdf (difesa.it), Accessed 31 March 2022.

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Overall, infrastructures and mobility thus represent the two main sectors on which the Italian Defence is working in order to “green” its activities. More specifically, the largest area of intervention provided by the SED is in fact the energy efficiency of military infrastructures.10 The Italian MoD possesses a huge number of real estate assets. Among them, there are barracks, naval bases, airports, training centers, arsenals, work plants, experimental centers, vehicle, material and fuel depots, lighthouses, radio bridges, service quarters, monumental complexes, forts, historic buildings and more. Such a vast number of military infrastructures, different from each other for typology and destination of use, is scattered all over the national territory. On the one hand, these military sites, in addition to the pure operational dimension, possess also an important economic value; on the other, they require constant and regular maintenance activities. Moreover, many of the Italian military buildings and sites have been realized decades if not centuries ago, thus having a priceless historical and, in some cases, artistic value, but being at the same time more expensive and complex to manage. In this regard, according to the Italian MoD,11 more than 50% of the military infrastructures and training areas used by the Italian Armed Forces were built before 1915 and only about 10% were built after 1945. Generally speaking, it can thus be argued that the whole Italian Defence infrastructural apparatus is a vast, complex and heterogeneous reality due to the variety and diversity of construction and building types, construction periods, functions and uses: for this reason, each single energy efficiency intervention must be adapted and tailored to each infrastructural reality, making it difficult to identify and implement one single model for all military sites. However, at the same time, it is possible to identify some standardization procedures that, repeated over time and in different infrastructural realities, lead to a reduction in the cost of study and design.12 According to preliminary research conducted in 2018, the total extension of all the buildings of the Defence sector in Italy is equal to about 760.000.000 square meters, with an annual expenditure for electricity consumption, necessary to power the military infrastructures, equal to about € 127.000.000 (2018 estimates). In the following table it is possible to see the top 20 military installations in Italy for electricity consumption, and the distribution of the annual electricity demand by military infrastructures in Italy at a regional level (Fig. 4.1).13

Caccamo M (2021) The Italian initiatives for a Greener Defence, Speech held at “Innovative technologies and renewed policies for achieving a Greener Defence” Conference, CeSI – Center for International Studies and FIIA – Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Rome, 27–28 October 2021. 11 Documento Programmatico Pluriennale della Difesa per il triennio 2021–2023 (2021), Italian Ministry of Defence, Copertina_Cap.2 (difesa.it), Accessed 15 March 2022. 12 Strategia Energetica della Difesa (2019), Italian Ministry of Defence, Piano_SED_2019.pdf (difesa.it), Accessed 31 March 2022. 13 Noto F. M. (2018), Audition before the Defence Committees of the Italian Parliament, Rome, 23 October 2018. 10

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Fig. 4.1 Distribution of annual electricity demand by military infrastructures in Italy at regional level and Top 20 military installations in Italy for electricity consumption (2018)

Some interesting considerations can be drawn by looking at the table. First of all, it is possible to see that the three sites that spend the most on electricity consumption are all naval bases: namely, the Naval Station Command in Taranto, the Maritime Military Arsenal in La Spezia and the Maritime Military Arsenal in Taranto as well. This should not come as a surprise, since Taranto and La Spezia are the two biggest and most important Italian Navy bases, hosting the majority of the ships of the fleet. Overall, in the top 20 list, there are seven Italian Navy bases, including the Italian Navy Command in Augusta in the fifth position and the Italian Navy HQ in Rome in the eight position. The Italian Air Force has the largest share of installations in the ranking, with 11 out of 20, while the Army has only one infrastructure and one site can be classified as “joint” (the Joint Intelligence Centre in Rome). Generally speaking, the military installations that consume the most electricity are those of the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force, which indeed operate few, large and complex military hubs such as the naval bases and the airports, while the Army has a more distributed presence on the Italian territory, with numerous, smaller and less electricity-demanding infrastructures. Regarding the geographical distribution of the sites, six of them are located in Lazio, mostly in and around the capital, Rome, while 5 are located in the southern region of Puglia, which host, among those present in the list, the naval bases in Taranto and Brindisi and the airports in Gioia del Colle and Amendola. Thus, not by surprise, Lazio and Puglia are the two most electricity-consuming regions in Italy

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from the militarily perspective, accounting together to around 43% of the annual national electricity consumption. Such peculiarities and differences in the military infrastructures operated by the Italian Armed Forces have an impact also in terms of the initiatives undertaken and implemented in order to make military bases more efficient and secure from the energy perspective. As we will see in the following paragraphs, the Italian Army, with its high number of small, distributed barracks and military facilities over the Italian territory, is indeed the most active Armed Force in green transition projects with specific regard to the energy efficiency of military buildings.

4.3.2

Pillar Two – The “Smart Military District” Initiative

One of the main lines of effort of the Italian Defence within the domain of improving the energy efficiency of military infrastructures is the project called “Smart Military District”. Such initiative aims at realizing smart military hubs, in which the selfconsumption of energy is maximized by producing electricity from renewable sources, thus becoming fully independent from external power grids and energy flows. The goal is to realize a military hub that is completely energy-resilient and thus capable of remaining fully operational even in the event of degraded scenarios due to external energy shocks, such as natural disasters and hybrid or conventional attacks. Furthermore, the smart military district is being designed in order to be able not only to self-produce electricity but also to accumulate it, through an electric energy storage system, so that sufficient energy supplies are available in case of necessity. In order to minimize consumption and maximize efficiency, the smart military district will be equipped with an intelligent system for real-time management of energy flows, placed in a context properly protected from the point of view of cyber security. Moreover, such system will be integrated with a water management system and a waste management system, in order to realize a unique and integrated management system for the cycle energy-water-waste, as this is deemed necessary to achieve the full autonomy, independence and resilience of the smart military district. The idea behind the project is to ensure the energy security of military infrastructures, often connected to the national civilian electricity grid and therefore vulnerable to any energy shocks that may affect the civilian infrastructure. Through this initiative, a twofold result could be achieved: to improve and ensure, as much as possible, the energy resilience of military infrastructures, disconnecting them from the national civilian networks and providing protection standards, also from the cyber point of view, of the highest level; to reduce the environmental impact and pollution caused by the activities carried out within military hubs, reducing CO2 emissions through the use of fully renewable energy sources, which are both safer in terms of supply and cleaner and more eco-friendly. At the same time, one of the most interesting aspects of the project, with important spin-offs also in the civilian field, concerns the fact that the Smart Military Districts, depending on the geographical location of the military base or

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infrastructure, could promote the technological and urban development of the surrounding areas, improving security and supporting the growth of the socioeconomic fabric of the local community. In fact, the overall idea is that, where Smart Military Districts are not isolated but are part of an urban context or in any case connected to local networks, they can on the one hand contribute to the development of the surrounding areas in terms of infrastructure, attracting investment and industrial interests and promoting technological research and public-private synergies, and on the other they can support the local community in case of energy shocks and in crisis or emergency situations, making available, in favor of the national management and transmission system, a share of the energy reserves independently produced, contributing to the stability of the power grids and promoting the energy resilience not only of the military infrastructure but also of the civil one. From this point of view, the idea is to “isolate” Smart Military Districts from the outside in terms of energy production and dependence on external sources or networks, but at the same time to make them open to support the local community in case of necessity. Certainly, this is not about creating “mini” power plants that can constantly provide energy at a local level, but about leveraging the capabilities of self-production, storage, and smart and cyber-secure management of energy flows to intervene in support of the local community in case of necessity, such as in emergency situations. To this overall design and conceptual idea of Smart Military District corresponds the pilot project currently in progress, the one for the creation of a Smart Military District in the Air Force district of Castro Pretorio, in the heart of Rome, the first Smart Military District in Italy.14 The project for the realization of a Smart Military District in Castro Pretorio was born in 2017, with the request by the Italian MoD to gain access to the funds provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB) through the ELENA (European Local Energy Assistance) programme. Such programme is promoted by the European Commission and EIB and aims at supporting the development of projects in the field of energy efficiency, renewable energy, and sustainable urban mobility for all the EU Member States. As the tender was won by the Italian MoD, the contract was signed in 2019, officially launching the ELENA FOR CASTRO PRETORIO SMART AND EFFICIENT (4CPS&E) Project.15 The total cost of the project for the realization of the Smart Military District is € 1.857.000, of which € 1.671.300 are funded through the ELENA mechanism. Once the project is completed, the expected results of such initiative are an annual total renewable energy generation capacity of 1.1 GWh, an annual total savings in the final energy consumption of 45 GWh and an annual total emission reduction of 17.900 t of CO2

14

Atto di indirizzo (2022), Italian Ministry of Defence, AI 2022 Finale Firmato.pdf (difesa.it) Accessed 18 March 2022. 15 ELENA Project Factsheet for Castro Pretorio Smart and Efficient (2019), European Investment Bank, project-factsheet-4cpsande-en.pdf (eib.org) Accessed 18 March 2022.

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equivalent.16 The military complex of Castro Pretorio in Rome, which will constitute the new Smart Military District, will include a total of 74 buildings belonging to the Italian MoD, divided between the Italian Air Force, the Italian Army and the General Secretariat of Defence, with a total area of 184,775 m2 and a total volume of 888,488 m3.17 As for the general model of a Smart Military District, the one in Castro Pretorio will be characterized by self-production and supply from sustainable energy sources, an integrated and smart energy management system for the real-time monitoring and management of the energy flows of the whole infrastructure, and an integrated water and waste management system. All these systems will be integrated into a single, cyber-secure network, using also innovative technologies based on Artificial Intelligence, big data analytics and Internet of Things.18 The project is also being carried out with the active collaboration of the Roma La Sapienza University, which is focusing on the “smart” dimension of the initiative, namely the interconnections between all different subsystems and their integration into one, single system, and with which a collaboration agreement was signed by the Italian MoD. At the time of writing (March 2022), the design phase is in progress: it should end in 2023, and then move on to the execution phase with the publication of the call for tender.19

4.3.3

Pillar Two – Caserme Verdi, Basi Blu and Aeroporti Azzurri

Within the broad umbrella of the Smart Military District project, each Armed Force (Italian Army, Italian Navy, Italian Air Force) is developing its own project for improving the energy efficiency and resiliency of its military infrastructures. In such a context, three different programmes were born: Caserme Verdi (Green Barracks) for the Italian Army, Basi Blu (Blu Bases) for the Italian Navy and Aeroporti Azzurri (Sky Blu Airports) for the Italian Air Force. Such tripartition follows a twofold logic we already mentioned. On the one hand, according to the SED, each Armed Force is required to conduct an overall analysis of the energy status of its military infrastructure, providing, publishing, and then implementing an energy strategy at the single Armed Force level, in accordance with the principles and guidelines established by the SED. On the other hand, as stated before, due to different operational needs and

16

ELENA Project Factsheet for Castro Pretorio Smart and Efficient (2019), European Investment Bank, project-factsheet-4cpsande-en.pdf (eib.org) Accessed 18 March 2022. 17 Nasce a Roma il primo Smart Military District d’Italia (2021), Italian Ministry of Defence, Nasce a Roma il primo Smart Military District d’Italia – Difesa.it Accessed 18 March 2022. 18 Nasce a Roma il primo Smart Military District (2021), Italian Ministry of Defence, Nasce a Roma il primo Smart Military District (difesa.it) Accessed 18 March 2022. 19 Interview held by the author with Maj. Eng. Riccardo Rubrichi from the Italian Army, 4 March 2022.

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requirements, the military infrastructures of the Army, Navy and Air Force are quite different from each other, with very few commonalities (such as administrative offices and accommodation for the personnel): for this reason, each Armed Force, on the basis of its operational peculiarities, is implementing its own programme for improving the energy efficiency and resiliency of its military sites. In this regard, the project “Caserme Verdi” of the Italian Army is the most important and ambitious one. As stated by the then Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, General Salvatore Farina, in September 2018,20 the Italian Army has an infrastructural apparatus consisting of approximately 2700 buildings of various types, including barracks, permanent fortifications, housing buildings, defensive constructions and various installations. In particular, there are 470 barracks, and of these about 320 were built before the second post-war period, while only six barracks have been built in the last 30 years. The Italian Army thus has to deal with a highly fragmented and old catalog of properties, with poor energy performance and sometimes not very functional to operational needs. Moreover, it must also be considered that in recent years the Italian Army has suffered from scarce budget allocations, especially compared to the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force. The lack of resources has resulted in poor and unregular maintenance interventions, which in turn has not only affected the efficiency of the military buildings, but in some cases also the very safety of them, leading to a dangerous decay of the military facilities. According to General Farina, the financial resources dedicated to the sector in the 2008–2018 period were well below the minimum required level, with an overdraft of about 40% of the needs determined by the Armed Force. Against this backdrop, the Italian Army, within the spirit of the new emphasis put on Green Defence by the Italian MoD, has launched the “Caserme Verdi” initiative, aimed at increasing the energy efficiency of several Army installations, while also improving safety standards and living conditions for the military personnel, reducing energy consumption and environmental footprint of the barracks and increasing the energy security and resilience of the infrastructures. Indeed, not by chance, that of military infrastructures is one of the five programmatic lines for the future development of the Italian Army illustrated by General Farina in September 2018, together with organization, personnel, training, and capabilities. In October 2020, General Farina outlined the main lines of actions of the project. At that time, a first group made of 28 Italian Army infrastructures was identified in order to be part of the initiative, on the basis of the following criteria: • • • • •

vast extension of the military complex (40/50 hectares); proximity to training areas and shooting ranges; low level of environmental impact of the modernization works; a convenient cost/effectiveness ratio; the role and functions performed by the selected installations.

20 Farina S. (2018), Audition before the Joint Defence Committees of the Italian Parliament, 20180 920_resoconto_stenografico_rid_ufficiale.pdf (difesa.it) Rome, 20 September 2018.

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According to such criteria, of the 28 infrastructures, 11 are located in Northern Italy, 6 in Central Italy and 11 in Southern Italy. Among them, 3 pilot projects were chosen: the barrack “Mittica”/Comprensorio “La Comina” in Pordenone; the Comprensorio La Cecchignola in Rome; the barracks in Persano and “Sernia – Pedone” in Foggia. As of 2020, the total estimated cost for the whole “Caserme Verdi” project was of approximately € 1,5 billion, to be spread over a 20-year time frame and to be financed by both ordinary budget allocation resources as well as specific financing channels. The expected saving in terms of reduction of maintenance costs, over the same period of time (20 years), is approximately € 450 million.21 A “Green Barrack” facility will be structured upon five areas: command area, training area, logistic area, sport-recreational area and housing area, the last two being focused on the well-being of the personnel. Indeed, it can be argued that the overall aims of the “Caserme Verdi” projects are: maximizing and optimizing energy efficiency; reducing GHG emissions and energy-related costs; improving the operational and safety standards of Army barracks; and improving the living conditions of Army personnel. Compared to the project “Caserme Verdi” by the Italian Army, there are less publicly available details about the parallel initiatives “Basi Blu” by the Italian Navy and “Aeroporti Azzurri” by the Italian Air Force. This may be due to several factors: the higher number of Italian Army infrastructures compared to the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force; the nature of such infrastructures, being the Army barracks and military facilities, as already said, generally smaller than the ones of the Navy and Air Force, and thus easier and faster to modernize from the energy perspective; the fact that the overall green projects of the Italian Armed Forces are still at a preliminary level, a factor that presupposes the launch of green pilot projects by starting with the simplest and least complex infrastructures to make efficient, such as those of the Army; the overall better status of the Navy and Air Force infrastructures compared to those of the Army, although naval bases and military airports also present several criticalities from an infrastructural point of view. Against this backdrop, according to the few information available on the “Basi Blu” initiative, it is known that the project envisages a total investment of around € 560 million from 2020 to 2032 for the extension and technological upgrading of port infrastructures concerning in particular the naval bases of Taranto, La Spezia and Augusta, with the aim of supporting new generation naval units for the Italian Navy.22 More specifically, the main project within the umbrella of “Basi Blu” concerns the energy efficiency transformation and the extension of the Taranto Naval Base. This is not a coincidence as Taranto hosts the most important naval base (home to the Italian Aircraft Carrier Cavour) and the most energy-consuming

21 Caserme Verdi Esercito, Italian Army, Brochure_caserme-verdi-190110.pdf (difesa.it) Accessed 23 March 2022. 22 Cavo Dragone G. (2020), Audition before the Defence Committe of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislatura – Comunicazione – Archivio di Prima Pagina Covid 19 e Marina militare, audizione ammiraglio Cavo Dragone (camera.it) Rome, 28 October 2020.

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military facility in Italy. The project, launched in 2020, envisages a total investment of around € 203 million23 divided into two tranches: the first one, worth € 191 million, will fund base expansion and energy upgrades, while the second tranche, worth € 12 million, will be used for development projects of the urban area where the base is located. Overall, it can be argued that the Italian Armed Forces have embarked on a path towards energy efficiency in their military infrastructures, which, although still in its early stages and with significant differences between the Army, Navy, and Air Force, aims at improving the energy security of Italian military bases, at increasing energy efficiency and reducing polluting emissions. However, it must also be said that such process has the additional aim of leveraging the “green” issues and the attention currently paid to such topics in order to receive more funds for the maintenance of military infrastructures, as in recent years the allocation of resources for this specific purpose has been modest, to say the least, for all the Armed Forces. Thus, if on the one hand it represents an opportunity, on the other it should not be misinterpreted, as the green activities related to the energy management and efficiency processes of military sites could not and should not become the regular channel for financing the regular maintenance of military buildings and infrastructures.

4.3.4

Pillar Two – Sustainable Mobility

The transportation sector represents another crucial segment in which several actions and measures can be undertaken in order to reduce GHG emissions and improve the overall energy efficiency, thus moving towards a more sustainable mobility. In this regard, the SED envisages that each Armed Force, according to its own peculiarities, develops a plan for the energy requalification of the vehicle fleet. Indeed, given the high number of transportation vehicles utilized by the Armed Forces, it would be possible to implement immediate actions in order to achieve short-term goals linked to the reduction of GHG emissions. More specifically, with regard to the non-operational mobility domain, and thus the transfer of military personnel and equipment from one location to the other within large military bases or between different military hubs across the Italian territory, the SED provides for the Armed Forces to start adopting hybrid or electric vehicles. Such initiative would be particularly useful in urban environments, such as in the area of the capital Rome, where dozens of different military infrastructures are located and in which thousands of soldiers are based, especially for command, staff and administrative functions.

23

Palminotti D. (2020), Marina militare di Taranto, via libera al progetto di ampliamento, Il Sole 24 ORE, Marina militare di Taranto, via libera al progetto di ampliamento – Il Sole 24 ORE Accessed 28 March 2022.

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Among the initiatives of the Italian Armed Forces for a sustainable mobility there is also the “Flotta Verde” project (Green Fleet), carried out by the Italian Navy with the support of the Italian energy company ENI. The project, launched in 2013, is aimed, as the SED, at increasing the energy security of the Italian Navy, while also reducing GHG emissions and thus the environmental footprint of the naval activities. In particular, the Green Fleet initiative is articulated along three different lines of action: the testing activities and eventually the adoption of a synthetic fuel made by renewable sources (the so-called green diesel) on board the Italian Navy ships; the design, testing and implementation of new and innovative technologies in order to reduce the ecological footprint of naval units; the overall reduction of energy consumption on board Italian Navy ships, through the adoption of energy saving measures and procedures. In December 2012, the Italian Navy signed a collaboration agreement with the Italian energy company ENI, for the development and testing of an alternative fuel, of renewable origin, fully compatible with the strict NATO regulations and standards on naval fuels. The final result of the research and development activities carried out by ENI, in collaboration with other entities and companies, is the “GreenDiesel” fuel, which can be mixed up to 50% with traditional diesel fuel of fossil origin. This blend is compliant with NATO specifications, and therefore there is no need to make changes or adjustments to the systems and circuits on board military ships.24 Direct on-board testing of the biofuel by the Italian Navy began on the Offshore Patrol Vessel Foscari, the first naval unit in Europe to employ it. In fact, in January 2014, ship Foscari, departing from the Sicilian port of Augusta, sailed for several hours using for propulsion and power generation on board a fuel mixture composed of 50% of “GreenDiesel” fuel obtained from renewable raw materials and 50% of traditional diesel produced from fossil fuels. The experimentation continued during 2015 with other Italian Navy ships. In particular, on the aircraft carrier Cavour, the reduction of nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions (up to 6%) with the use of “GreenDiesel” was tested, while the destroyer Duilio used “GreenDiesel” with gas turbines up to maximum speed. “GreenDiesel” was then tested on the submarine Gazzana (June 2015) and the frigate Maestrale (November 2015). Finally, in June 2016, as part of a joint exercise between Italian Navy and US Navy units, a replenishment at sea was conducted during which Italian ship Etna simultaneously supplied Italian and US Navy units with “GreenDiesel” produced in Italy. No further data, experimentations or test activities are available about the “GreenDiesel”. However, according to the Italian Navy, after the experimentation campaigns of previous years, Italian naval units regularly use on board significant quotas of “GreenDiesel” fuel with a component of renewable origin, without however specifying further details.25

I Combustibili alternativi, Italian Navy, I Combustibili alternativi – Marina Militare (difesa.it) Accessed 21 March 2022. 25 I Combustibili alternativi, Italian Navy, I Combustibili alternativi – Marina Militare (difesa.it) Accessed 21 March 2022. 24

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The second pillar of the Green Fleet initiative by the Italian Navy is represented by the adoption of energy saving measures on board Italian Navy ships. Among such measures, there are the dissemination of the culture of energy saving by raising awareness to the personnel on the importance of the reduction of energy consumption in daily activities, on the model of what is outlined by the SED; the adoption of automated systems, the so-called Energy Management System, for energy management aimed at the use of generator sets in their optimal operating range; the use of hybrid propulsion that integrates, in the traditional mechanical layout, the use of electric motors for medium and low speeds, reducing both consumption and the noise generated, thus being able to count on a quieter navigation with corresponding operational benefits (a quieter ship is more difficult to detect by acoustic sensors); the use of hull coatings with reduced vegetation adhesion and no biocide release to reduce vessel fuel consumption, maintenance costs, and marine pollution.26 Such measures are actually aimed at achieving three goals; the first one is to reduce fuel and energy consumption as well as the environmental pollution of naval activities; the second one is to optimize and reduce both time and cost for maintenance; the third is to save power on board the ship and to optimize the overall efficiency of the energy consumption processes in order to have more electricity for the growing operational demands and needs of modern vessel. Indeed, as the number and complexity of sensors and systems integrated on board naval units is growing, so is the overall energy demand required to properly operate them. Moreover, thinking about the possible implementation, in the future, of directed-energy weapons, which will further increase the demand for energy on board a military vessel, it is clear that any single energy saving and energy efficiency measure is fundamental in order to improve the overall performances and capabilities of a modern naval unit. Finally, the third and last pillar of the Green Fleet initiative is based on the adoption of new eco-design technologies.27 Such technologies include the power supply from shore for naval vessels during stops at naval bases (the so-called shore connection or cold ironing). Such arrangement has two main advantages: it makes possible to minimize the use of diesel generators on board, thus decreasing also related maintenance levels, and it reduces polluting gas emissions and noise pollution in the port area, which is generally very urbanized in Italy, as in the cases of Taranto, La Spezia, Augusta and Civitavecchia. Other technologies are the use of SCR (Selective Catalytic Reduction) systems for exhaust gas after-treatment and reduction of nitrogen oxides (NOx),28 the adoption of modern systems for selfproduction of water for human consumption from the sea, a new system of Misure di Energy Saving, Italian Navy, Misure di “Energy Saving” – Marina Militare (difesa.it) Accessed 21 March 2022. 27 Tecnologie di Eco-design, Italian Navy, Tecnologie di Eco-design – Marina Militare (difesa.it) Accessed 21 March 2022. 28 Such technology is adopted by other Navies on board their vessels, for instance by the Royal Navy with the new Type 26 frigates. See: Bahtic F. (2022), UK to greenify Type 26 frigate fleet to boost global presence, NavalToday, UK to greenify Type 26 frigate fleet to boost global presence – Naval Today Accessed 23 March 2022. 26

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differentiated treatment of shipboard waste and sewage water and finally measures to reduce the acoustic signature of ships, which is important for decreasing acoustic pollution and for making the unit less visible to enemy sonar and acoustic sensors. Given the aforementioned scenario, it can be argued that, on the one hand, the sustainable mobility initiatives of the Italian MoD are still almost entirely focused on non-operational activities, as such area is at the moment considered the one with the best prospects for intervention in terms of ecological transition, thus safeguarding operational requirements and capabilities for which traditional fossil fuels are still expected to be relied upon; however, on the other hand, the first signs of intervention also in the area of operational mobility are already present through the Italian Navy’s initiative for the adoption of biofuels on board ships. Such model, which is also based on a public-private cooperation, should be taken as a reference point for other Armed Forces, and the Italian Navy could act as a driving force for the launch of similar initiatives also by the Italian Army and the Italian Air Force, always taking into consideration the peculiarities and operational needs of land and air forces.

4.4

Pillar Three – Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructures

The third line of action provided by the SED is the protection of critical energy infrastructures. This is a fundamental point, as the main goal of the SED is to promote and guarantee energy security. In this sense, energy security must be achieved through the adequate protection of critical energy infrastructures and lines of communication and transportation, to be accomplished also by developing military capabilities aimed at such specific purpose. As Italy is highly dependent on imports of oil and gas supplies from other countries, the protection of the so-called lines of communications, through which energy is imported, is of the utmost importance. In this regard, apart from the “physical” protection of critical energy infrastructures, such as for instance the gas pipelines that arrive to Italy, the SED draws attention to two factors: realizing a supply architecture or network in order to make key military bases independent from external energy flows and improving the cyber security aspects of smart grids. In the first case, the Italian MoD attributes great importance to the network of military pipelines that connect military hubs, in particular to the NATO Petroleum Oil and Lubrification (POL) network. Such network allows for the reception, storage and distribution of fuel through a pipeline which is about 1000 km long, starting from the port of La Spezia and crossing the Po Valley, in Northern Italy. The NATO POL structure permits the withdrawal, from multimodal loading and transport bases, of fuel by Armed Forces users.29 Moreover,

29 Strategia Energetica della Difesa (2019), Italian Ministry of Defence, Piano_SED_2019.pdf (difesa.it), Accessed 31 March 2022.

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the Italian Defence is putting great emphasis on the on/off fuel depots, that is a series of depots dedicated to single military bases, generally placed either outside the base, but connected to smaller depots within the military hub, or situated directly within the perimeter of the military site. In the second case, the Italian MoD is increasing the attention towards the growing interactions and interconnections between energy security and cyber security, especially since the launch of the Smart Military District initiative, with the creation of an integrated energy management system within a military infrastructure. As already said in the previous paragraph, since the integration of different sensors and technologies for monitoring and managing in real time the energy flows is a crucial component of the concept of Smart Military District, so is the protection of such infrastructures from both the physical and cyber dimensions. Introducing Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) comes with both benefits and risks, hence the clear target set by the Italian MoD, since the very beginning of such transition initiatives, to take into account the cyber security component of all energy infrastructures, both new and modernized ones. However, probably due to operational security reasons, no specific details about the cyber security measures to be adopted are present in the SED or in any other official document or statement provided by the Italian Defence. Overall, also in light of the recent events between Russia and Ukraine and of the decision by the Italian Government to pursue a more active and dynamic strategy of energy supply diversification, it can be argued that the protection of critical energy infrastructures, both civil and military and from both the physical and cyber dimensions, will acquire a growing importance, with increasing attention paid to this issue in the forthcoming future.

4.5

The Governance: The Defence Task Force for Infrastructure, Energy and Environment Development

The governance of all the initiatives that fall under the SED and that are aimed at improving the energy efficiency and energy security levels of the Italian Armed Forces is entrusted to a specific body, the “Task Force Difesa per la Valorizzazione Immobili, l’Energia e l’Ambiente” (Defence Task Force for Infrastructure, Energy and Environment Development). Such a Task Force was officially established by a specific decree of the Italian Minister of Defence on 22 January 2021 and it incorporates the powers and responsibilities of two previous bodies: the “Task Force per la valorizzazione e dismissione degli immobili non residenziali della Difesa” (Task Force for the valorization and disposal of non-residential defence properties), first established in 2014, and the “Struttura Progetto Energia” (Energy Project Structure), first established in 2015. Indeed, the goal was to unify these two existing structures, providing a single governance body that could rationalize the available resources and achieve a better synergy between the two areas, making the

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overall action more homogeneous and organic, while also keeping an internal articulation divided into the two thematic areas. In fact, the Task Force is composed by two main offices: “Infrastructures” and “Energy and Environment”. The Task Force is led by a General/Admiral and is put under the direct supervision of the Minister of Defence.30 The fact that the Task force depends directly on the cabinet office of the Minister of Defence is an important sign of the political value that is attributed to the Task Force and to the mission and activities that it carries out. By virtue of its direct link with the supreme political authority, the Task Force is essentially set up to be the single point of contact for all the agencies and other State Administrations interested in Defence properties, but also the single point of reference regarding all the tools and initiatives implemented by the MoD aimed at guaranteeing the reduction of energy costs, the reduction of polluting emissions, the improvement of energy security conditions and the use of new green technologies. More specifically, the functions performed by the “Infrastructure” Area are: to be the Italian Defence’s single point of contact with the outside world with regard to the redevelopment and disposal of non-residential property; to promote initiatives aimed at simplifying implementation procedures; to identify ways of rationalizing the use of assets subject to redevelopment; to constantly monitor and supervise the state of works and activities.31 The activities carried out by the “Energy and Environment” Area are: to be the Italian Defence’s single point of contact with the outside world with regard to all the activities that concern energy; to provide technical support for the definition of the strategic and programmatic framework on energy and environment; to identify and promote activities aimed at the containment of energy expenditure, the reduction and decarbonization of consumption, the implementation of energy security and resilience, the reduction and mitigation of the environmental impact of Defence activities; to promote, also in coordination with the NATO Centre of Excellence on Energy Security (ENSEC COE), as well as with the European Defence Agency (EDA), programs on energy and environment, activities, studies and exchanges of experiences aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of the securityenergy combination; to promote the concept of the Smart Military District; to promote the development of projects in favor of sustainable mobility; to promote training and dissemination of energy culture to Armed Forces personnel.32 In pursuing the aforementioned goals, the Task Force has established over the years several collaborations with institutions, private companies and universities. In particular, it is worth mentioning some collaborations and partnership agreements signed over the years:

30

Currently, the Director is Army General Michele Giovanni Caccamo. Finalità – Task Force Difesa Area Valorizzazione Immobili, Italian Ministry of Defence Finalità – Difesa.it Accessed 28 March 2022. 32 Mission – Task Force Difesa Area energia e Ambiente, Italian Ministry of Defence, Mission – Difesa.it Accessed 28 March 2022. 31

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• the agreement between the MoD and ENEA33 (Agenzia nazionale per le nuove tecnologie, l’energia e lo sviluppo economico sostenibile – Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development), aimed at providing educational and training courses in the field of energy management, held by ENEA experts to the MoD personnel; • the agreement between the MoD and the municipality of Rome,34 for increasing collaboration and cooperation between the two institutions as the city of Rome hosts dozens of Italian Defence buildings and infrastructures, including the first Smart Military District in the neighborhood of Castro Pretorio; • the agreements with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (NATO ENSEC COE), for mutual collaborations projects and the participation by Italian experts to EDA’s and NATO’s activities; • the agreement between the MoD and Terna,35 for improving the energy security of the Italian high-voltage power grid, of which Terna is the national single operator; • the agreement between the MoD and SNAM,36 aimed at improving the sustainable mobility initiatives of the Armed Forces, especially through the use of natural gas and renewable gas for non-operational military vehicles; • several agreements for joint research studies and projects with many Italian Universities, including La Sapienza University in Rome, Pisa University, Calabria University, Modena e Reggio Emilia University, Federico II University in Napoli. Such agreements are important for several reasons: to establish joint research projects in the field of energy efficiency and renewable sources, with the aim also of sharing knowledge and best practices; to increase the outreach of the Italian Defence green initiatives to other stakeholders; to signal the role of the MoD and in particular of the Task Force as a key institutional stakeholder, both domestically and internationally; to systematize the resources and knowledge distributed among the various actors for the benefit of the so-called “Sistema-Paese” (Country-System). Finally, as stated in previous paragraphs, such collaboration projects offer the opportunity to organize training and educational courses for the personnel of the Italian MoD, and specifically of the Task Force, in order to further educate the experts and

Accordo Ministero Difesa – ENEA (2021), Italian Ministry of Defence, Accordo Ministero Difesa – ENEA per la formazione delle FF.AA. nella gestione energetica efficiente e sostenibile – Difesa.it Accessed 28 March 2022. 34 Difesa e ambiente urbano: siglato il Protocollo d’Intesa tra il Ministero della Difesa e Roma Capitale (2018), Italian Ministry of Defence, Difesa e ambiente urbano: siglato il Protocollo d'Intesa tra il Ministero della Difesa e Roma Capitale Accessed 28 March 2022. 35 Sicurezza energetica: Difesa e Terna siglano accordo (2019), Italian Ministry of Defence, Sicurezza energetica: Difesa e Terna siglano accordo – Difesa.it Accessed 28 March 2022. 36 Energia pulita: la Difesa sigla un accordo sulla mobilità sostenibile (2018), Italian Ministry of Defence, Energia pulita: la Difesa sigla un accordo sulla mobilità sostenibile – Difesa.it Accessed 28 March 2022. 33

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professionals who will be in charge of implementing such green initiatives from both the managerial and technical perspectives.

4.6

Conclusion

In light of what has been said before, it is possible to make an overall assessment of the green transition process in the Italian Defence. Over the last years, the Italian MOD has undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at making the Italian Defence “greener”. However, as highlighted at the beginning of this work, such initiatives are mainly referred to the energy sector and are mostly aimed at improving the energy security of the Italian Armed Forces; thus, the reduction of the ecological footprint of the Italian military is considered to be an important target, but not the main one. Some of these initiatives were born almost a decade ago, such as the Italian Navy “Green Fleet” project, a factor that makes the Italian MoD a sort of pioneer in this domain. In 2019, with the Defence Energy Strategy, and in 2021, with the establishment of the Task Force under the cabinet of the Minister of Defence, the Italian MoD tried to implement an organic, centralized and coherent approach towards the issue, elaborating a specific strategy with clear targets and ambitions and creating the proper governance mechanism to manage the entire process. Over the last years, some remarkable results have been achieved, such as the introduction of the “GreenDiesel” fuel in the Italian Navy fleet; the beginning of the audit processes within each Armed Force, to make a general census of the energy map of the Italian Defence; the kick-off of the Smart Military District project, in the Castro Pretorio area in Rome; the gradual implementation of the Caserme Verdi initiative, with the first pilot projects; the introduction of green, non-operational mobility services, especially in urban areas; the gradual emergence and spread of an energy-oriented mindset within the whole Italian Defence establishment. Looking toward the future, several further measures can be implemented, focusing on the main criticalities that the ecological transition process has, so far, highlighted. First of all, compared to other countries and militaries, Italy lacks a comprehensive climate change and security policy, as the Italian Green Defence strategy is mostly focused on energy security-related aspects only; thus, a first recommendation is to develop and publish an overall policy document taking also into account the impacts and consequences of climate change. Second, in order to set precise goals and to further reduce the GHG emissions by the Italian Armed Forces, some formal mitigations targets could be set, starting with modest, easily achievable goals and then setting more ambitious standards. Third, greater emphasis should be put on Green Defence initiatives at the operational level, possibly leveraging the experience of the “Green Fleet” initiative by the Italian Navy. Fourth, additional funds beyond those of the ordinary Defence budget could be allocated, perhaps using those of the Italian Recovery Plan, which sets the ecological transition of the country as a top priority. In this sense, a first step was recently made with the Decree Law 1st

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March 2022, n. 17, which allows the MoD to access the Recovery Plan resources to realize energy production plants from renewable sources. A new and updated version of the SED is set to be released in the forthcoming months. The expectation is that the new strategy will take into account the main criticalities that have emerged so far and that it will constitute a step forward on the path of the ecological transition of the Italian Defence.

References Accordo Ministero Difesa – ENEA (2021), Italian Ministry of Defence, Accordo Ministero Difesa – ENEA per la formazione delle FF.AA. nella gestione energetica efficiente e sostenibile – Difesa.it Atto di indirizzo (2022), Italian Ministry of Defence, AI 2022 Finale Firmato.pdf (difesa.it) Barry B. et al (2022) Green Defence: the defence and military implications of climate change for Europe, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Green Defence: the defence and military implications of climate change for Europe (iiss.org) Caccamo M. (2021) The Italian initiatives for a Greener Defence, Speech held at “Innovative technologies and renewed policies for achieving a Greener Defence” Conference, CeSI – Center for International Studies and FIIA – Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Rome, 27–28 October 2021 Caserme Verdi Esercito, Italian Army, Brochure_caserme-verdi-190110.pdf (difesa.it) Cavo Dragone G. (2020), Audition before the Defence Committe of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislatura – Comunicazione – Archivio di Prima Pagina Covid 19 e Marina militare, audizione ammiraglio Cavo Dragone (camera.it) Rome, 28 October 2020 Difesa e ambiente urbano: siglato il Protocollo d'Intesa tra il Ministero della Difesa e Roma Capitale (2018), Italian Ministry of Defence, Difesa e ambiente urbano: siglato il Protocollo d'Intesa tra il Ministero della Difesa e Roma Capitale Documento Programmatico Pluriennale della Difesa per il triennio 2021-2023 (2021), Italian Ministry of Defence, Copertina_Cap.2 (difesa.it) ELENA Project Factsheet for Castro Pretorio Smart and Efficient (2019), European Investment Bank, project-factsheet-4cpsande-en.pdf (eib.org) Energia pulita: la Difesa sigla un accordo sulla mobilità sostenibile (2018), Italian Ministry of Defence, Energia pulita: la Difesa sigla un accordo sulla mobilità sostenibile – Difesa.it Farina S. (2018), Audition before the Joint Defence Committees of the Italian Parliament, 20180 920_resoconto_stenografico_rid_ufficiale.pdf (difesa.it) Rome, 20 September 2018 I Combustibili alternativi, Italian Navy, I Combustibili alternativi – Marina Militare (difesa.it) Misure di Energy Saving, Italian Navy, Misure di “Energy Saving” – Marina Militare (difesa.it) Accessed 21 March 2022 Nasce a Roma il primo Smart Military District (2021), Italian Ministry of Defence, Nasce a Roma il primo Smart Military District (difesa.it) Nasce a Roma il primo Smart Military District d’Italia (2021), Italian Ministry of Defence, Nasce a Roma il primo Smart Military District d’Italia – Difesa.it NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan (2021), NATO, NATO – NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan, 14-Jun.-2021 Noto F. M. (2018), Audition before the Defence Committees of the Italian Parliament, Rome, 23 October 2018 Palminotti D. (2020), Marina militare di Taranto, via libera al progetto di ampliamento, Il Sole 24 ORE, Marina militare di Taranto, via libera al progetto di ampliamento – Il Sole 24 ORE

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Sicurezza energetica: Difesa e Terna siglano accordo (2019), Italian Ministry of Defence, Sicurezza energetica: Difesa e Terna siglano accordo – Difesa.it Strategia Energetica della Difesa (2019), Italian Ministry of Defence, Piano_SED_2019.pdf (difesa. it) Strategia Energetica Nazionale (2017), Italian Ministry of Economic Development, Testo-integraleSEN-2017.pdf (mise.gov.it) Tecnologie di Eco-design, Italian Navy, Tecnologie di Eco-design – Marina Militare (difesa.it) Accessed 21 March 2022 Towards a climate-proof security and defence policy: a Roadmap for EU action (2020), EEAS, Towards a climate-proof security and defence policy: a Roadmap for EU action | EEAS Website (europa.eu)

Chapter 5

Preparing for the Storm: Climate Change and the Finnish Model of Comprehensive Security Emma Hakala

Abstract Climate change threatens people and societies around the world, and its impacts will only worsen in the future. In order to address these threats, it is necessary to develop concrete climate security policies as well as preparedness mechanisms. This paper will look at the ways in which climate change is integrated into the Finnish model of comprehensive security. Comprehensive security is based on a cooperative approach to preparedness, and it aims to ensure that vital functions of the society are secured also in crisis situations. As such, the model provides potential for developing climate security practices that are based on cooperative efforts and comply with democratic decision-making. The paper argues that specific shortcomings in the implementation of the comprehensive model have so far hindered the integration of climate security, but overcoming these could benefit both climate-related preparedness and the capacity of the model overall. The paper goes on to point out that climate security impacts are difficult to predict due to their complex character, and they should therefore be systematically included in foresight activities. Finally, the paper proposes a number of recommendations for better integrating climate change into comprehensive security and preparedness work in general.

5.1

Introduction

As our understanding of the consequences of global climate change advances, the threat it poses to people and societies around the world appears increasingly imminent. The frequency and intensity of heatwaves, droughts, and storms is already rising, and without urgent and effective decarbonization there will be severe ecosystem level disruptions by the end of this century (IPCC 2021). Such consequences

E. Hakala (*) Finnish Institute of International Affairs, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland e-mail: emma.hakala@fiia.fi © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature B.V. 2022 G. Iacovino, M. Wigell (eds.), Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2186-6_5

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will not only directly threaten human lives and wellbeing but also affect societal stability, peace and security. In order to stand a chance of coping with the risks ahead, it is necessary to improve foresight and preparedness. Although mitigation is the best way to prevent the worst impacts of climate change, research suggests that some adverse impacts are inevitable and call for adaptation (IPCC 2021; Knutti et al. 2016). Beyond that, the scale and urgency of the measures needed to achieve adequate decarbonization will require significant structural changes in energy production, industry and many other vital functions of the society (Geels et al. 2017). While necessary, such changes will also influence security and stability and therefore need to be taken into account in preparedness planning. The security challenges of climate change are starting to be recognized at the centre of international politics. The issue has been repeatedly debated at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), for instance, and many countries have included it in their security strategies in one way or another (Brzoska 2012). Some actors have also aimed to take climate-related risks into account in their concrete practices and policies. For instance, the United States Department of Defense has a climate adaptation plan that outlines a set of measures, such as monitoring and assessment, enhanced infrastructure and training, to improve resilience to climate change (Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment) 2021). However, detailed plans to account for the security impacts of climate change at the level of policy-making are still largely missing (see e.g. Hakala et al. 2019a). Meanwhile, the perils of excessive, undue climate security discourse have also been pointed out, as it may lead policy-making to neglect other factors that induce vulnerability and instability (Daoust and Selby 2021). The integration of climate change into security is not without challenges. This paper will provide a closer look at the dynamic by focusing on the role of climate change in the Finnish model of comprehensive security, which is an important guiding element of Finland’s security policy. As the model is based on an anticipatory approach as well as cooperation across societal sectors, it appears to have the potential to enhance preparedness in the face of unconventional security threats such as climate change. In practice, however, climate-related issues have not been strongly incorporated into the model (Räisänen et al. 2021). This paper will discuss the potential and the limitations of the comprehensive security model to integrate climate change and propose some insights as to how climate change could be better taken into account in security and preparedness planning.

5.2

Climate Change and Security: Theoretical Approaches

In research, the security implications of environmental and climate change have been an expanding topic at least for the past two decades. Numerous studies on the role of climate change in the onset of conflict have led scholars to caution against strict causal links while recognizing a potential climate impact on instability in the

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presence of other vulnerability inducing factors (see e.g. Mach et al. 2019). Research also suggests that climate change has implications for wider human security through factors such as livelihoods, health and forced migration (Matthew et al. 2010; McDonald 2021; Sygna et al. 2013). The consequences of both climate change itself and the efforts to mitigate it will also influence and potentially increase instability in geopolitical relations as, for example, some great powers are weakened by decreasing fossil fuel revenues (Dalby 2020; Hakala et al. 2019b). The increasing use of climate security especially in policy discussion has also been criticized for a tendency to exaggerate climate-related risks while downplaying other causes of vulnerability. In the case of Lake Sahel, for instance, this has steered international policy debate to focus on climate-related triggers, thereby potentially neglecting other, more effective responses (Daoust and Selby 2021). Excessive securitization also involves the risk of moving an issue beyond the normal democratic process and resorting to exceptional measures (Buzan et al. 1998). Yet at the same time, a failure to recognize climate risks may lead to shortcomings in security policy and preparedness (Räisänen et al. 2021). The linkage of climate change to security should therefore not be designated as good or bad at face value. Rather, justification for the linkage depends on the validity of the actions that it brings about in a specific context (Floyd 2016). Research has suggested that the solutions to strengthen climate security can also be cooperative rather than antagonistic (Trombetta 2011). This, however, leaves a responsibility to climate security research and policy-making to contextualize the outcomes of their work and propose constructive actions to take rather than merely attempting to prove or disprove that a link between climate and security exists. One way of gaining a more comprehensive picture of the climate and security linkage is to categorize different kinds of climate security impacts. To that end, Hakala et al. (2021a) have developed a conceptualization that divides climate security into direct, cascading, and transition impacts.1 Direct impacts entail changes in the physical environment and their consequences for human health and critical infrastructure, such as increasingly intense storms that have the potential to cause extensive power outages. Cascading impacts occur when environmental changes are combined with socio-economic and geopolitical factors. For example, extreme weather in the vicinity of a critical transportation choke point may cause disruptions in supply chains at the global level. Transition impacts result from the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. These can occur either due to harmful side effects of individual climate policy measures or through wider, systemic disruptions stemming from decarbonization. The categorization of the security impacts of climate change makes it possible to better grasp their comprehensive character. In addition, it helps to identify potential impacts and to consider ways to prepare for them in more concrete terms (Hakala et al. 2021a). The role of climate change in foresight and preparedness activities is

1 The conceptualization builds upon previous work by Hakala et al. (2019a, b) that categorizes environmental security into local, geopolitical and structural impacts.

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still relatively underexplored in both research and practice, but Räisänen et al. (2021) suggest that it could provide grounds for the development of climate security policy without taking it out of reach of civil society and democratic processes. The Finnish model of comprehensive security provides an example for exploring this potential.

5.3

The Finnish Model of Comprehensive Security

Comprehensive security is a cooperation model that forms the basis of Finnish preparedness activities. It brings together authorities, private sector and civil society to work jointly to ensure the continuity of the vital functions of society also during disruptions or emergencies (Prime Minister’s Office 2017). The vital functions are the basic elements that are needed to maintain daily activities in the society. These are listed as follows in the Security Strategy for Society (Prime Minister’s Office 2017), which outlines the principles of comprehensive security: – – – – – – –

leadership; international and EU activities; defence capability; internal security; economy, infrastructure and security of supply; functional capacity of the population and services; psychological resilience.

Cooperation within the comprehensive security model means that the actors involved are expected to share and analyze security information, prepare joint plans and train together. It is specifically pointed out in the Security Strategy for Society that all actors taking part in coordinated security activities are considered security actors. The work as a whole is directed, supervised and coordinated by the Government, but each competent ministry is responsible for doing the same in its own administrative branch. During disruptions or emergencies, only minimal changes can be made to the lines of authority or responsibilities (Prime Minister’s Office 2017). The threat scenarios that inform comprehensive security are updated at regular intervals. They take into account traditional security concerns, including the use of military force against Finland, but also less conventional ones, such as serious disruptions in power supply, public health risks and major weather events. The actors participating in comprehensive security are also expected to monitor the operating environment in order to be able to anticipate emerging risks (Prime Minister’s Office 2017). At present, the comprehensive security model does not explicitly outline measures for climate-related preparedness. Climate change is mentioned in general terms and with regard to potential weather risk in the National Risk Assessment and several security strategies, but the ways in which these should be factored into preparedness processes are not discussed in detail. A more comprehensive

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perspective acknowledging the cascading and transition impacts of climate change also appears to be missing (Hakala et al. 2019a). Nevertheless, Räisänen et al. (2021) argue that the comprehensive security model has distinct features that present opportunities for integrating climate change into preparedness. First, it is based on cross-sectoral cooperation, allowing the kind of comprehensive responses needed to prepare for climate-related risks. Second, the model has a proactive outlook, emphasizing constant monitoring and coordinated foresight in order to anticipate the kinds of emerging risks that are associated with climate change. Third, it assumes a wide understanding of security actors as it goes beyond the traditional security sector, making it possible to engage expertise that is best equipped to address environmental threats. Fourth, the model aims for applicability at multiple levels, suggesting that different measures can be developed to react to impacts that may vary between the national, regional and local context. The opportunities cannot be fully seized, however, without a concerted effort to develop climate preparedness as a part of comprehensive security. This may also require the adoption of new policies and practices to address potential consequences in the Finnish context. Therefore, it is necessary to better understand what kinds of impacts climate change will have on Finland’s security.

5.4

Finland and the Impacts of Climate Change on Security

A recent research project commissioned by the Finnish government explored the consequences of climate change for Finland’s security and identified some of the potential impacts (Hakala et al. 2021b).2 The resulting summary of impacts does not aim to be conclusive but to give an overview of some outcomes and critical developments that can be expected. The analysis was specifically built upon the framework of the vital functions that is also at the core of the Finnish model of comprehensive security. Each one of the seven vital functions was considered with regard to direct, cascading and transition impacts of climate change. An overview of some of the most prominent impacts that were identified can be seen in Table 5.1. Direct impacts particularly involve weather risks on infrastructure and on the welfare of the population. Economy, infrastructure and security of supply may be affected by potential disruptions in water or energy provision. Defence capability may be under increasing pressure to adapt to new weather conditions and provide assistance to other authorities in case of severe weather damage. Especially in the longer run, increasing or recurring environmental crises may also erode

2

The analysis was carried out through a literature review and a series of expert workshop discussions. The period under study was only until year 2035, when changes in the average climate conditions remain small compared to natural decadal climate variability, so main shifts were expected to occur in political and technological development.

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Table 5.1 Examples of climate security impacts identified for Finland (on the basis of Hakala et al. 2021b) Direct impacts Damage to infrastructure caused by extreme weather events New and increasing health problems

Cascading impacts Supply chain disruptions Sudden migration Vulnerability to hybrid threats International instability

Transition impacts Rising inequality (perceived and actual) Political polarization Public resentment and unrest Supply chain insecurity for emerging material needs Hybrid influencing Geopolitical tension

psychological resilience and leadership, especially if the authorities or political leaders are not perceived to address them efficiently (Hakala et al. 2021b). Cascading impacts will affect Finland’s security through insecurities in the international system. For example, if states increasingly turn inward to secure their own access to natural resources and commitment to international defense cooperation wanes, Finland’s defense capacity will be adversely affected. Likewise, disruptions in global supply chains would create risks for the Finnish economy, infrastructure and security of supply. The global impacts of climate change also may also increase sudden flows of mass migration, which would challenge internal security. At the same time, climate-related crises may create vulnerabilities that can be employed for the purposes of hybrid influencing (Hakala et al. 2021b). Transition impacts stem from both domestic and international developments. Leadership, for instance, may increasingly be discredited and face discontent if it fails in the double challenge of driving decarbonization that is both effective and socially just. Poorly planned decarbonization efforts may also affect the functional capacity of the population and services if it increases real or perceived inequality, thereby could aggravating social problems and giving rise to protests. These also increase vulnerability to hybrid influencing. At the same time, international and EU activities may come under strain if geopolitical tensions increase as a result of the disparate capacity of different countries to adapt to energy transition. Changing production patterns especially in the energy sector may generate new resource scarcities that will affect economy, infrastructure and security of supply (Hakala et al. 2021b). Overall, the analysis of different levels of climate security impacts with regard to vital functions helps to discern consequences beyond the traditional understanding of national security, which tends to be restricted to issues like defense capability or border security. As the comprehensive security model points out, the continuity of vital functions is also essential for the resilience of society. The role of civil preparedness is therefore not only important for strengthening defense capacity against military aggression – it can have a key role in addressing unconventional or so-called actorless threats. At the same time, however, the effort to identify climate security impacts is not a straightforward task, even for a limited timeframe and geographic context. In

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particular, cascading and transition impacts involve a high degree of uncertainty as they depend on political and economic factors that could bring about different, sometimes opposite outcomes. On the other hand, many of these factors are taken into account in foresight and national risk assessment in one way or another. In fact, a better ability to observe climate-related risks into foresight may not only help to advance climate security responses but could also contribute to better situational awareness for preparedness as a whole. Therefore, the challenge of integrating climate change into preparedness activities becomes all the more warranted.

5.5

Shifting Gears: Enhancing the Integration of Climate Change into Comprehensive Security

While knowledge about the potential security impacts of climate change is necessary for preparedness, it is not in itself enough to generate climate security policy. A concerted effort to transform the knowledge into the development and implementation of appropriate measures is needed. The uncertainty associated with foresight on climate security pose an additional challenge to policy-making. In addition, a cooperative approach to preparedness, such as the one outlined in the Finnish model of comprehensive security, will not alone mean that all new threats will be adequately recognized and acted on. Some issues may also be easier to integrate into the work than others. For instance, cyber security and hybrid influencing already feature relatively prominently on the comprehensive security agenda, perhaps because they are closer to conventional security threats and the work of traditional security actors than issues like climate change. On the basis of their analysis of interviews with a wide range of actors who engage comprehensive security work in practice, Räisänen et al. (2021) point to a number of challenges to the integration of climate change into the model. Overall, they argue that the model continues to be led and coordinated by the traditional security sector, thereby limiting the access and ability of other sectoral actors to contribute. This may weaken the role of environmental and other relevant expertise in preparedness planning and limit the extent to which it is reflected in the resulting policies. Moreover, Räisänen et al. (2021) suggest that the comprehensive security model has not fully succeeded at taking into account threats with the kind of characteristics that make climate security impacts particularly challenging to predict. First, a longterm perspective is often needed to identify climate security impacts. For instance, some weather extremes will only become clearly visible in a few decades, as will the kinds of changes of the energy system that might bring about transition impacts. However, many of the decisions needed to prepare for them need to be taken at present. The actors involved in comprehensive security planning generally do not recognize the ways in which long-term developments may play out and cause risks in the future. This is not necessarily a problem for day-to-day preparedness work in the short term, but strategic planning also requires understanding of slow-onset impacts that take place on the long term.

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Second, climate security impacts require cross-sectoral responses. Even direct impacts usually have consequences that affect several sectors of the society – for instance, a storm may cause simultaneous problems for energy distribution, water supply and forestry. Cascading and transition impacts are likely to lead to even more wide-ranging consequences. Such comprehensive impacts can not be addressed merely through efforts on one sector. However, despite its focus on cross-sectoral cooperation, comprehensive security has not quite lived up to this principle in practice. This is the case at least from the point of view of the environmental sector, which appears to have been sidelined, to some extent, on decision-making on comprehensive security (Räisänen et al. 2021). Third, climate security impacts often involve cascading chains of events. This is particularly reflected in cascading impacts, but transition impacts can follow from similar patterns. However, comprehensive security actors in Finland tend to consider climate security impacts only as individual, local and resulting from direct causes, leading them to neglect the chains of events behind them. This hinders effective foresight, as it may prevent tracking weak signals and concurrent events that might evolve into crisis when combined with climate impacts. The preparedness for chains of events may also be deficient if they lack full understanding of the origins of the threats (Räisänen et al. 2021). While the comprehensive security model evidently has not thoroughly integrated climate change, it is by no means obsolete with regard to building relevant preparedness. The findings of Räisänen et al. (2021) suggest that there has so far not been a particular effort to strengthen the role of climate change in comprehensive security planning. Deliberate action to increase climate security foresight and preparedness measures by addressing the shortcomings outlined above therefore has every chance of success. This could also contribute foresight and preparedness capacity overall by improving situational awareness. On the basis of their work identifying potential climate security impacts for Finland, Hakala et al. (2021b) have also proposed concrete actions to improve climate security preparedness in Finland. These include both general practices of work as well as individual actions targeting a specific part of comprehensive security. According to Hakala et al. (2021b), it is necessary to increase cross-sectoral cooperation in comprehensive security. Different sectors should not only exchange information but genuinely work together in order to develop new practices. The cooperation should also involve the wider society, engaging civil society actors and the private sector, among others. In addition, environmental expertise should be strengthened in different sectors of administration. This can take place through training and awareness-raising, employing experts on climate change and improving communications capacity related to climate security issues. It is also necessary to take climate change more comprehensively into account in foresight and preparedness. There is a need for consistent, systematic monitoring of climate impacts and their potential coincidence with other global and regional developments that are critical for security. In particular, attention should be paid to developments such as political polarization, growing inequality, hybrid influencing, heightened geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions and emerging material needs.

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In addition, climate change should be integrated into the planning of comprehensive security. This includes its inclusion into future updates of Finland’s Strategy for Security of the Society and its cross-cutting consideration in risk assessments and threat scenarios. The Finnish system of security of supply should also be examined from the point of view of climate change, with the aim of strengthening its resilience against crises. Beyond domestic efforts, Finland should actively participate in international initiatives on climate security. Although the model of comprehensive security primarily addresses and coordinates actions at the national level, it is clear that climate security requires international solutions. Support to global or regional climate security cooperation will therefore also improve Finland’s capacity to respond to climate-related crises. Finally, Hakala et al. (2021b) point out the need for further research on the interconnections between climate change and security. There clearly is a need for a better understanding of the dynamics behind cascading and transition impacts in particular. Research on these complexities is essential for foresight and will also help to find better responses for preparedness.

5.6

Conclusion

While climate security discourse has evolved rapidly over the past decade, it still requires more concrete actions both at the global and national level. The Finnish case of comprehensive security focuses on the national level, but it can still provide some insights to climate security at a more general level, particularly with regard to foresight and preparedness in practice. Lessons learned from a specific context can inform work in others, and some responses may be possible to scale up to the international level. At the same time, the Finnish model is also a work in progress from the point of view of climate security, and pinpointing some of its shortcomings so far can help to not only address them in the Finnish system, but avoid them in security policies elsewhere. The Finnish case also gives rise to some broader reflections on climate security. For one, it is clear that new practices and wider conceptualizations of security are needed in order to prepare for the consequences of climate change. Traditional security policy at present does not have the means to fully address the threats posed by climate change, but security actors cannot simply ignore the risks either. A better understanding of the comprehensive consequences of climate change will become a prerequisite for maintaining a realistic outlook of the operating environment. At the same time, security actors – as experts on preparedness – can beneficially contribute to the development of the climate security agenda. However, the caution over excessive securitization of climate change still needs to be taken into account. The topic can not and should not be left to the responsibility of security actors alone – indeed, a majority of the actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change need to be taken on other sectors of the society. Yet as previous

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research (e.g. Trombetta 2011; Floyd 2016; Räisänen et al. 2021) suggests, it is possible to integrate climate-related issues into the security sector without necessarily moving them beyond democratic decision-making processes. Instead, on this specific issue, the security sector may need to adapt practices that reflect increased openness and interaction, integrating climate expertise and civil society perspectives. This is likely to also benefit security policy-making in the form of better foresight and situational awareness. Another crucial point to take into account is the difficulty of foreseeing and preparing for climate security impacts. They often occur in the long term, have cross-sectoral implications and tend to cascade, making it impossible to account for all the factors that determine when, how and with what kinds of consequences they will be brought about. The more complex cascading and transition impacts are only starting to be addressed even in research. The integration of climate change into foresight and preparedness seems to contribute to both the risk of excessive securitization and the difficulty of prediction. On the one hand, as the Finnish model of comprehensive security shows, effective preparedness needs to be cooperative and participatory, involving actors far beyond the security sector. This reduces the possibility that the efforts to address climaterelated risks would venture out of reach for ordinary democratic processes. On the other hand, the involvement of preparedness professionals familiar with risk assessment and scenario work can – in cooperation with experts other from sectors – yield more useful insight and analysis than for example academic research alone. This kind of systematic foresight will also make it possible to continuously monitor broader political and economic developments relevant to climate security rather than merely attempting to identify individual impacts. In addition, international cooperation is crucial for advancing climate security and preparedness. As the security impacts of climate change are overwhelmingly transboundary, they cannot be adequately addressed without coordination across national borders. Through cooperation and exchange of information, individual states may also stand to gain from more effective foresight and preparedness measures regarding climate change. International organizations working on climate security, on the other hand, could benefit from increased coordination, allowing them to streamline their activities and develop new practices. Overall, cooperation is the key to avoiding antagonistic responses or harmful competition between countries and rather yielding solutions based on shared understanding and climate justice.

References Brzoska, M. (2012). Climate change as a driver of security policy. In Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Brauch, H. G., Link, P. M., & Schilling, J. (Eds.). Climate change, human security and violent conflict (pp. 165–184). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. Buzan, B., Waever, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

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Dalby, S. (2020). Anthropocene geopolitics: Globalization, security, sustainability. University of Ottawa Press. Daoust, G., & Selby, J. (2021). Understanding the Politics of Climate Security Policy Discourse: The Case of the Lake Chad Basin. Geopolitics, 1–38. Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment). (2021). Department of Defense Draft Climate Adaptation Plan. Report Submitted to National Climate Task Force and Federal Chief Sustainability Officer. Floyd, R. (2016). Extraordinary or ordinary emergency measures: What, and who, defines the ‘success’ of securitization? Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29(2), 677–694. Geels, F. W., Sovacool, B. K., Schwanen, T., & Sorrell, S. (2017). Sociotechnical transitions for deep decarbonization. Science, 357(6357), 1242–1244. Hakala, E., Berninger, K. Erkamo, S., Pyykönen, J., Tuomenvirta, H., Tynkkynen, O., & Vihma, A. (2021a). Climate change and Finnish comprehensive security: Insights into enhanced preparedness. FIIA Briefing Paper 325. https://www.fiia.fi/julkaisu/climate-change-andfinnish-comprehensive-security Hakala, E., Erkamo, S., Pyykönen, J., Tuomenvirta, H., Tynkkynen, O., Berninger, K. & Vihma, A. (2021b). Ilmastonmuutos ja Suomen turvallisuus: Uhat ja varautuminen kokonaisturvallisuuden toimintamallissa [Climate change and Finland’s security: Threats and preparedness in the model of comprehensive security]. Publications of the Government’s analysis, assessment and research activities 2021:52. https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/ handle/10024/163384 Hakala, E., Lähde, V., Majava, A., Toivanen, T., Vadén, T., Järvensivu, P., & Eronen, J. T. (2019a). A lot of talk, but little action—The blind spots of Nordic environmental security policy. Sustainability, 11(8), 2379. Hakala, E., Lähde, V., Majava, A., Toivanen, T., Vadén, T., Järvensivu, P., & Eronen, J. T. (2019b). Northern warning lights: Ambiguities of environmental security in Finland and Sweden. Sustainability, 11(8), 2228. IPCC (2021). Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [MassonDelmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S. L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M. I. Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J. B.R. Matthews, T. K. Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu and B. Zhou (Eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. https:// www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-as-sessment-report-working-group-i/ Knutti, R., Rogelj, J., Sedláček, J., & Fischer, E. M. (2016). A scientific critique of the two-degree climate change target. Nature Geoscience, 9(1), 13–18. Mach, K. J., Kraan, C. M., Adger, W. N., Buhaug, H., Burke, M., Fearon, J. D., Field, C. B., Hendrix, C. S., Maystadt, J.-M., O’Loughlin, J., Roessler, P., Scheffran, J., Schultz, K. A., & von Uexkull, N. (2019). Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict. Nature, 571(7764), 193–197. Matthew, R. A., Barnett, J., McDonald, B., & O’Brien, K. L. (Eds.). (2010). Global environmental change and human security. MIT Press. McDonald, M. (2021). Ecological Security. Cambridge University Press. Prime Minister’s Office. (2017). The security strategy for society (Government Resolution 2.11.2017) https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/en/security-strategy-for-society/ Räisänen, H., Hakala, E., Eronen, J. T., Hukkinen, J. I., & Virtanen, M. J. (2021). Comprehensive security: The opportunities and challenges of incorporating environmental threats in security policy. Politics and Governance, 9(4), 91–101. Sygna, L., O’Brien, K., & Wolf, J. (Eds.). (2013). A changing environment for human security: Transformative approaches to research, policy and action. Routledge. Trombetta, M. J. (2011). Rethinking the Securitization of the Environment: Old Beliefs, New Insights. In Balzacq, T. (Ed.): Securitization theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve. London: Routledge, 135–149.

Chapter 6

Energy Security in a Decarbonized World: EU-Africa Cooperation for a Clean Resilient Future Carlo Palleschi

Abstract In a context where energy security is at risk and energy demand is surging, it is worthy asking what energy model needs to be followed to build a clean and resilient future, to ensure energy security without jeopardizing the commitments made under the Paris Agreement. In fact, oil, coal and natural gas still meet most global energy needs, creating serious implications for the environment, while increasing vulnerability to geopolitical shocks and disruptions in fossil fuel markets. Framing energy and climate policies into this complementary paradigm requires a forward-looking and strategic approach, capable of anticipating future developments, especially when it comes to the geopolitical consequences of energy transition. Against this backdrop, this Chapter explores the interlink between energy and climate security, with a special focus on the European Union and African countries. It seeks to answer the following questions: (i) How can the EU ensure energy security by capitalising on its green agenda? (ii) What are the implications of global decarbonization for African countries? (iii) What does the clean energy mean for mineral production in Africa? (iv) What are the opportunities raising from energy transition for the EU-African cooperation?

6.1

Introduction

As the Ukrainian crisis clearly pointed out, the reliance of the current economic system on fossil fuels makes the global economy and our societies extremely vulnerable to geopolitical crises. If we look back the past, this concept has repeated itself over the last decades, dominating the energy security narrative of both this and past century. The most emblematic example is undoubtedly the 1973 oil shock, which occurred as a result of the embargo decided by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to target those countries that supported

C. Palleschi (*) CeSI – Centro Studi Internazionali (Center for International Studies), Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature B.V. 2022 G. Iacovino, M. Wigell (eds.), Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2186-6_6

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Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The embargo quadrupled the price of oil from $2.90 a barrel to $11.65 a barrel in January 1974, severely hitting the global economy. Nowadays, the energy landscape is considerably different from the past, as the acceleration of clean energy transition has resulted in a growing importance of energy sources alternative to fossil fuels, whose role is expected to gradually diminish. This trend opens a window of opportunity to concretely build a paradigm of energy security capable of capitalizing on the opportunities raised from the green agenda, boosting the role of renewable energies in the energy mix so as to reduce the exposure of economic systems to future geopolitical shocks and disruptions in fossil fuel markets. This chapter will discuss the opportunities and challenges of energy security in the path towards a decarbonized world, focusing on the link between the European Union (EU) green targets and its energy security strategy, with a special focus on the role that the EU-Africa cooperation can play to build together a green and resilient future in the energy domain. The first paragraph will address the concept of energy security, stressing the importance of both route and source diversification, especially with the aim of avoiding the use of energy supply as a geopolitical leverage. The second paragraph will analyse the EU strategic posture in terms of both energy security and green agenda, focusing on the interlink between these two key issues and highlighting potential challenges, with a special focus on critical raw materials. The third paragraph will discuss the implications of the EU energy security strategy for the African continent in both a short-term and long-term perspective. In particular, it will examine opportunities of cooperation between the EU and African countries in the context of a greener path.

6.2

Diversifying: The Core of Energy Security

Energy security is a cross-cutting concept, which entails economic, geopolitical, environmental, and social elements. It can be defined as the availability of energy in sufficient quantities and at affordable prices at all times, without any adverse economic and environmental impacts (UNDP 2004) while ensuring through adequate technologies the sustainability of resources and social acceptability (Valdés 2018). The key pillar of energy security is still the same old one: diversifying. The overreliance on a sole energy source and/or on a few suppliers increases energyimporting countries’ vulnerability to disruptions in the energy market as well as to geopolitical shocks. Indeed, energy can be weaponized by producing countries, as done by OPEC in 1973 or by Russia in nowadays conflict in Ukraine, to increase the pressure on energy importing countries, with the aim of obtaining strategic advantages and advancing their own national security interests. At the same time, outbreaks of wars, unstable regimes or regional tensions can affect energy reliability, as demonstrated by the conflict in Libya, the political instability in Algeria or the ongoing Yemeni war, with the recent attack against Aramco facilities launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

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Another relevant aspect of energy security is related to the importance of protecting energy installations from terrorist attacks, as well as to building adequate and robust infrastructures and, mostly, protecting them. Indeed, critical energy infrastructures can be the target of cyber-attacks, such as the disruption of the servers of Saudi Aramco (Alshathry 2017) or the 2015 attack to the Ukraine power grid. Indeed, more and more energy companies and power grid operators have embraced digitization, increasing their reliance on industrial technological solutions, the so-called Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT), and on Industrial Control System and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (ICS/SCADA) (Plėta et al. 2020). The higher degree of digital and smart solutions increases the exposure of critical energy infrastructures to potential cyber-attacks, with tremendous consequences on the availability of energy products on the market. Although recognizing that protection against cyber-attacks represents a crucial issue at this moment in time, this chapter focuses on the first dimension of energy security, namely that related to diversification. Diversifying is thus the life jacket for energy-importing countries to mitigate the risk and the impact of such shocks. Diversification can be interpreted – and thus achieved – in two complementary ways. On the one hand, it is conceived in terms of spatial diversification, in the sense that the more a country imports energy from several supplier, the more that country is protected: if one supplier collapses or decides to weaponize energy supply as a geopolitical lever, importing country can still meet its needs by importing energy from other producers. The Ukrainian war is a case in point: the EU response to 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has been constrained (also) by its overdependence on Russian gas, a liability used by the Kremlin to paralyse the EU and its Member States. Moreover, the spatial dimension stresses the importance of constantly assessing the risk linked to energy corridors, in terms of routes, lengths and geopolitical shocks, so as to allow importing countries to adequately distribute such risk across different sites and reduce the impact of critical incidents in a specific location. On the other hand, diversification revolves around the opportunity to build a balanced energy mix, based on a diverse range of sources – such as coal, oil, gas, nuclear, hydropower, solar, wind, biofuels –, which would enable countries to face a shock in one energy input by increasing the use of another. The multifaceted composition of the energy mix offers countries a broad range of possibilities to build their own diversification strategy, but also offers something more, namely the chance to shift from an economic system based on fossil fuels to one that produces very limited, if not zero, carbon emissions. Therefore, greening the energy mix has a tremendous potential to strengthen energy security while mitigating climate change, especially considering that energy is the largest driver of climate change, accounting for around three-quarters of global greenhouse gas emissions. Climate security and energy security are two sides of the same coin, and therefore must be both ensured through a forward-looking and complementary approach.

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Energy Security and Energy Transition in the EU: Killing Two Birds with a Stone

Capitalising on the interlink described above, the EU ambition to play a key role in advancing and leading the green agenda presents a unique and timely opportunity to strengthen European energy security (Morningstar et al. 2019). The EU response to climate change and growth strategy is represented mainly by the Green Deal, which has the ambition to transform the EU into a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy, achieving the following targets: (i) no net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050; (ii) decoupling of economic growth from resource use; (iii) protection of natural capital, which sustainably managed and restored; (iv) protection of health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts, leaving no person and no place behind. Looking ahead, the EU energy mix is expected to slightly change by 2030, with fossil fuels contributing to half of it and a substantial reduction of coal, while a real change is expected to materialize between 2030 and 2050, when oil is expected to be almost entirely phased out, while natural gas will continue contributing a tenth of the EU energy mix (EC 2020a). This sustainable path could be seriously jeopardized by the Ukrainian crisis, which represents a real game-changer. The EU is working to diversify gas supplies, speed up the roll-out of renewable gases and replace gas in heating and power generation. The way forward has been detailed in the strategy REPowerEU, which sets the goal of reducing the EU demand for Russian gas by two thirds before the end of 2022 and phasing out the EU dependence on fossil fuels from Russia well before 2030. To achieve this ambitious and pressing objective, the EU aims two follow two main tenets: diversifying gas supplies, via higher Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and pipeline imports from non-Russian suppliers, such as Norway, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Algeria; and, reducing faster the use of fossil fuels in homes, buildings, industry, and power system, by boosting energy efficiency, increasing renewables and electrification, and addressing infrastructure bottlenecks. Nevertheless, there are growing concerns that the EU effort to reduce its dependence on Russian gas could represent a setback for the EU green strategy, negatively affecting the timeline and the commitments of the climate-neutral transition and boosting, at least in the short run, coal demand even further. Indeed, if the EU wanted to accelerate the decoupling and switch away from Russian gas in the power sector more quickly, Brussels could do so by increasing the use of coal or alternative fuels, such as liquid fuels, within existing gas-fired power plants, an option which would significantly raise the EU’s emissions (IEA 2022b). Changing our perspective, the fact that the EU is at the mercy of Russian energy weaponization is though the result of inadequate source and spatial energy diversification, which has not been pursued with enough determination and at sufficient pace. Indeed, in 2019, the EU dependence rate was equal to 61%, meaning that more than half of the EU’s energy needs were met by net imports, ranging from over 90% in Malta, Luxembourg, and Cyprus to 5% in Estonia, and it has increased since 2000,

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when it was just 56%. The EU mainly depends on Russia for imports of crude oil, natural gas and solid fuels, followed by Norway for crude oil and natural gas. On the side of source diversification, the EU energy mix is still dominated by three-quarters by fossil fuels: oil covers 35% of the EU energy mix, followed by natural gas (24%) and coal (14%), while renewables are growing in share but still play a more limited role (14%), as does nuclear (13%). The lack of energy diversification is the Achilles heel of the EU, explaining why the EU energy sector continues to being highly vulnerable to exogenous geopolitical shocks. If the Ukrainian crisis accelerated the urgency for the EU to enhance its energy security and implement sound policies aimed at fostering diversification, this cannot – and should not – happen at detrimental of the green agenda. On the contrary, the current situation is an impetus to accelerate energy transition: moving away from fossil fuels and investing in renewable energy technologies are an alternative for power generation and subsequently a powerful tool to foster dependence reduction on energy imports and thus enhance the EU energy security (Creutzig et al. 2014). Phasing out fossil fuels switching to renewable and hydrogen, combined with more energy efficiency, would allow the EU to kill two birds with a stone: ensuring the achievement of climate-neutral commitments while being capable of mastering its own energy system. Energy transition would generate benefits in terms of energy security through several other channels. Unlike fossil fuels which are concentrated in specific geographic locations, renewable energy resources are available in most countries. While the protection of crucial choke points, such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Suez Canal, is now critical to ensure constant availability of energy, with the green transition these seaborne passages are likely to lose relevance and thus become less subject to regional and global competition. As a result, in a decarbonized world, the energy chessboard is expected to be less monopolized by traditional energy powers and more geographically fragmented. If on the one hand it can be argued that energy transition would replicate the geopolitical logic of oil and gas into renewables (Overland 2019), on the other hand it is worthy underling that for a series of reasons weaponizing renewable energy is not as straightforward as for fossil fuels: (i) renewable energies, unlike oil and gas which flow in one direction, can be traded bidirectionally, so as to replace the EU energy dependence with new patterns of reciprocity and interdependence; (ii) due to the fact the energy can be produced in various locations, the EU countries, some more some less, have the potential to produce renewable energy domestically, so as to reduce their energy imports; (iii) the non-exclusivity of the relationship between sellers and buyers of electricity makes easier for the EU countries to change their trade partners, so as to minimize the impact of boycotts and embargoes (IRENA 2019). Nevertheless, it would be misleading to argue that energy transition is the perfect panacea for the EU energy security. A key factor of complexity is related to the important role played by critical raw materials for renewable energies, which face though significant supply uncertainty. In fact, clean energy technologies require a considerably higher degree of critical elements compared to other power generation sources. For instance, lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, and graphite are crucial to

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battery performance, longevity and energy density, and electricity networks need a huge amount of copper and aluminium, with copper being a cornerstone for all electricity-related technologies. The main concern regarding the use of critical raw materials in clean energy systems is represented by the fact that these materials are highly concentrated in a few countries, with China and Russia holding together 57% of global reserves and Australia, the third largest country, holding just 2.4% of global reserves. Not to mention that processing raw materials is often very difficult, costly, and capital intensive. Lithium is a good example of this structural weakness, as five major companies are responsible for three-quarters of global production capacity (IEA 2022a). There is therefore the risk that new cartels could arise revolving around the control of critical raw elements generating bottlenecks in the energy market, increasing the risk of using critical materials as a geopolitical leverage and creating a dependence mechanism, similarly to what has happened so far in the oil and gas markets. Although in the transition to clean energy critical minerals bring new challenges to energy security, some mitigation strategies could be adopted, such as recycling, re-using and stockpiling critical raw elements or investing in research and technological innovation to find alternatives in renewable technologies (O’Sullivan et al. 2017). This topic will be addressed more in details in the next paragraph, with a special focus on African critical raw materials.

6.4

What Does This Mean for African Countries? Opportunities for EU-Africa Cooperation

The EU quest to enhance energy security while accelerating green transition is likely to significantly affect the global energy landscape and change the traditional geopolitical balance, with significant consequences for other regions, and especially for African countries. This paragraph seeks to unpack the geo-economic and geopolitical implications of the EU energy security policies on African countries, distinguishing between short-term and long-term effects.

6.4.1

Here and Now: A New Window of Opportunity?

Providing a short-term perspective is needed to address the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, which has contributed to add another layer of complexity questioning the EU traditional energy trade policy. In fact, as a result of the EU effort to switch away from Russian energy, the demand for African oil and gas has increased, opening up a window of opportunity for African energy exporters, such as Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Mozambique, Nigeria and Tanzania, to step up their production to meet growing demand. At the same time, though, the price shock in energy markets has negatively affected those African countries which are importers,

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reversing the economic benefits gained as a result of the fall in price determined by the pandemic. Nevertheless, strengthening gas-driven cooperation with Africa faces several challenges. The first constraint is represented by the lack of adequate infrastructures capable of ramping up the production, such as the need for new pipelines across the Sahara to transport Nigerian gas or for liquefaction facilities required to fully harness the potential of the Tanzanian $30bn LNG project. Secondly, the majority of African oil and gas reserves is concentrated in weak states affected by chronical instability and internal conflicts, raising growing concerns about the reliability of these energy vectors. The ongoing conflict in Cabo Delgado hampering gas extraction in Northern Mozambique, Libyan deep-rooted institutional and political instability hindering country’s huge gas extraction potential, and security challenges mounting in the Niger delta pushing many oil and gas companies to exit the Nigerian market are just a few examples to illustrate this degree of complexity. Not to mention the decision made by Algeria in November 2021 to interrupt gas supply to Spain through the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline in the aftermath of the breakdown of diplomatic relations with Morocco. Another challenge is represented by the unsustainability of the system itself. Indeed, in a context of growing domestic demand for energy, an export-led increased production could further accelerate the depletion of oil and gas proven reserves, which are already dwindling, with the subsequent consequence of seriously jeopardizing internal socio-economic stability. In fact, despite significant gas discoveries in Mozambique, Tanzania Senegal and Mauritania, other African states have much more limited gas reserves: Angolan gas is expected to last only for 58 years, Algerian gas reserves are estimated to support production for 50 years onwards, those of Cameroon for 47 years and Equatorial Guinea for 28 years.1 These constraints place a question mark on the short-term EU effort to boost cooperation in exploring African reserves, reinvigorating the need to recalibrate its energy strategy by enhancing the other side of diversification, namely that related to ‘greening’ the energy mix. For African countries, this cooperation is not free from risks, as the possibility that this bless might turn into a curse is a concrete reality. The increase in oil and gas production triggered by the EU diversification from Russia could aggravate structural weaknesses of African renter countries rather than providing an opportunity for growth, as governments could take advantage of the opportunity to carry out shortsighted and not profitable colossal projects, without addressing underlying and structural problems and neglecting crucial economic diversification policies. Furthermore, new African investments in fossil fuel exploration and extraction would require a period of amortisation which though does not match with international emissions reduction deadlines, increasing the risk for African countries of being trapped in an economic model which would turn to be obsolete in a few decades.

These figures were estimated using data for natural gas reserves and gas production (2019) provided by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) available at: https://www.eia.gov/ international/data/world

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This caveat should be a stimulus not to be prisoners of the present and instead to look ahead, shaping the EU-Africa energy cooperation with a forward-looking decisionmaking approach.

6.5

Looking Ahead: Being Ready for Future Challenges and Opportunities

Assuming that the EU determination in implementing the energy transition will continue to be in line with its commitments, the Africa-EU energy relation in the long run will be significantly different from that resulting from short-term outlook and, as argued above, both African and European policymakers should integrate clean energy into their energy security strategies, bringing future developments into today’s policy and investment decisions. The long-term energy and green EU-Africa partnership will be deeply shaped by two main geo-economic strategic shifts: the expected reduction in demand for oil and gas and the growing importance of critical raw materials for clean technology.

6.5.1

The Future of Fossil Fuels: Africa’s Energy Conundrum

As argued above, energy transition is likely to trigger significant changes in the geopolitical balances, shifting power from those controlling fossil fuels to those developing clean energy technologies (Stang 2016). African countries will be affected by this shift inasmuch as the expected reduction in the demand for fossil fuels will result in the drop of rents associated with oil and gas production. Indeed, according to the REPowerEU, it is estimated that the EU demand for gas will drop by 40% in 2030 in comparison to 2021. Overall, according to the estimates elaborated by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2019), in a scenario where global oil demand and prices decrease in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, oil production in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to decline by almost 40% over the period 2026–2040, and the average net income of oil producers in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to be 45% lower than under the current scenario. As far as gas is concerned, the downside is estimated to be less pronounced, while being gas less lucrative than oil. This would mean that oil producers, such as Nigeria or Angola, would be much more affected by this shift than gas producers, as Mozambique and Tanzania whose cumulative net income decline is expected to be respectively 20% and 15%. This downward trend risks resulting in an exacerbation of African political instability and insecurity, since without such rents, many African countries would be much more vulnerable to domestic unrest or conflicts, especially in the light of the fact that fast population growth reduces net income from oil and gas when calculated

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on a per-capita basis. Against this backdrop, it is thus crucial for African countries to uphold their commitment to ambitious green agenda and embark on structural reforms, although it would be difficult to fully compensate for the drop in oil and gas incomes. Increasing the share of renewable energies in the energy mix is crucial not only as a key measure to enhance the readiness towards global decarbonization pathways, but also as a tool for African countries to reduce their emissions and contribute to the global green agenda. In this regard, it is worthy stressing that in reality African countries’ contribution to global emissions is negligible, while being highly exposed and vulnerable to extreme climate-induced natural hazards, whose frequency and impact are expected to be intensified by climate change. Indeed, combined emissions from fossil fuel use in Africa made up only 3.6% of global total emissions in 2017, even though the continent hosts nearly 17% of the world’s population (IEA 2019). Climate change adaptation is therefore an absolute priority, but mitigation strategies are still an important aspect to be considered, especially in order to address the expected increase in domestic energy demand. In fact, as a result of the combined impact of economic growth, industrialization, demographic boom and growing urbanisation, even with efficiency measures, energy demand in African economies is expected to nearly double by 2040 (IRENA 2019). This trend has a high impact in terms of GHG emissions, as the electricity sector is responsible for the largest share of energy-related CO2 emissions in Africa, at around 42% of the total in 2018. Moving towards zero-emission African power sectors is thus crucial to prevent a scenario in which growing demand is met with fossil fuel sources. In fact, while fossil fuels -especially gas- and renewable energy will coexist in the near future, no new oil and natural gas fields would be needed in the global pathway to net-zero emissions by 2050 (IEA 2021). Against this backdrop, supporting the energy transition, in line with the roadmap laid out in the African Union’s “Agenda 2063: the Africa we want”, is thus a matter of both energy and climate security, in addition to being an enabler of other development goals. To achieve this aim, African countries can rely on a huge energy potential, yet still untapped. Estimates of power generation potential in the continent are 350 GW for hydroelectric, 110 GW for wind, 15 GW for geothermal and a staggering 1000 GW for solar (AfDB 2017). Solar is particularly promising in terms of geographical distribution, as it could be harnessed virtually everywhere in Africa, albeit with varying potentials. Morocco, Senegal, Egypt, South Africa and Kenya, for instance, have showcased encouraging trends in terms of adding new renewable energy capacity. In particular, Southern Africa is leading the continent in terms of installed renewable capacity, with 19,000 MW, while Central Africa has the highest share of renewables installed (72%), mainly from hydropower (IRENA 2020). Despite this huge potential, the development of clean energy is challenged by two complementary elements. Firstly, energy access is still very limited, one of the lowest in the world, mainly because of structural constraints, lack of investments in energy infrastructures and low level of technologic development. Secondly, from a development perspective, the extraction of oil and gas continues to be a key source for African governments to help get people out of poverty. Indeed, natural

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resources – such as oil, minerals and gas – have historically been key in allowing many countries to jumpstart their growth trajectories, even if other problems later appeared and jeopardized such growth. In a context of widespread and deep-rooted poverty, food insecurity and worsening human conditions, the consequences of phasing out fossil fuel should be assessed wisely. Indeed, despite the progress achieved in providing millions with access to electricity in the continent, more than 600 million people in Africa still live without electricity, including more than 80% of those residing in rural areas. Only two countries in the region, Mauritius and Seychelles, have near universal electricity coverage. Household electricity access is 75% or higher in only six nations in Africa and almost two-thirds of the countries in the region have household access rates of less than 50% (Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 2019). It is thus clear that Africa’s most urgent challenge is speeding up electrification efforts and leveraging the energy-development links. Energy, in fact, is the main enabler of economic development, as clearly outlined by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and by the United Nations-World Bank “Sustainable Energy for All” initiative, which set the goal of universal access to modern energy by 2030. Against this backdrop, the transition to clean energy is not as straightforward as it might seem, because the very first priority continues to be that of providing access to energy. As Pistelli (2020) pointed out, “if the majority of the population does not have access to energy, it does not have anything to transit away from”. In a context where talking about transition is pointless for many African countries, there has been a growing interest in exploring the possibility to leapfrog the conventional energy development path and shift directly from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. Indeed, there is broad scope to move directly towards a renewables-based energy system, as African countries have a huge natural potential to be harnessed. In fact, Africa’s estimated potential to generate renewable energy from existing technologies is 1000 times larger than its projected demand for electricity in 2040, which means that the continent has more than enough renewable energy potential to serve its future demand, not to mention that renewable energy could be strategic in replacing African exports of coal, oil and gas (IRENA 2020). Nonetheless, African leapfrog strictly depends on technological development and innovation in power generation, development of skill training programs and the removal of barriers to market access, which would increase entrepreneurial activities so that electricity services can be better exploited for productive use. With cheaper, more powerful off-grid systems, electricity consumption could increase in the region, generating more productive use and financial viability for investors. Given the current context, it is difficult to foresee that Africa’s energy leapfrog can happen without detrimental to industrialization and development goals. To mitigate these risks, while developing renewable energy as rapidly as possible, natural gas could be seen as a “bridge fuel”, providing a flexible and dispatchable source of electricity, while being compatible with long-term decarbonization goals inasmuch gas pipelines and other infrastructures can be reused for transportation and storage of cleaner hydrogen.

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The EU could play a key role in supporting African countries to efficiently leapfrog towards low-carbon economic development. The EU document “Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa” identified the partnership for green transition and energy access as a key pillar of its engagement with the continent. In this regard, the Strategy outlines the importance of innovation for African leapfrog: “investments should be geared towards strengthening scientific capacities in Africa by providing access and local adaptation to technologies. This will enable African countries to pursue a low-carbon, climate resilient and green growth trajectory, that avoids inefficient technologies and resists new investment in coal power generation, deploying instead new renewable energy sources and hydrogen production”. Furthermore, the Strategic document stresses the fact the “the EU should partner with Africa on green finance, on sustainable energy and energy efficiency through the launch of a ‘Green Energy’ initiative [. . .] and share experiences in managing a socially just transition away from fossil fuels” (EC 2020c). In line with this approach, the EU Global Gateway Investment Package proposed the Africa-EU Green Energy Initiative, whose objective is to decarbonise the energy mix, including phasing out coal, optimising the share of transitional sources of energy, while avoiding carbon lock-in, and investing in renewable energies as well as in energy efficiency. The ambition laid out by the Global Gateway is to increase by 2030 African renewable energy generation capacity by at least an additional 300 GW.

6.5.2

Critical Raw Materials

The energy transition will increase the demand for critical materials, and this will put Africa in the spotlight, as these material are abundant in many African countries: South Africa accounts for 50% and 90% of the world’s platinum group metals respectively production and reserves, and 30% of the world’s manganese production; the Democratic Republic of Congo accounts for 70% of global cobalt production and 50% of global cobalt reserves; Gabon holds 13% of the world’s manganese production; Guinea accounts for 20% of the world’s bauxite production and 30% of the world’s bauxite reserves; 23.5% of reserves of nickel are located in Madagascar and 4% in South Africa (Nel and Davis 2022). Despite this richness, African countries’ role is limited to the first stage of the critical material supply chain, namely that of extraction, as the activities of processing, refining, and manufacturing take place abroad, especially in China, due to high costs and capital-intensity. The EU is looking with growing interest at strengthening cooperation with African countries to secure the supply of critical raw materials that Europe imports. The EU obtains 64% of bauxite from Guinea and 30% of tantalum from Rwanda, while the Democratic Republic Congo is important in terms of cobalt and tantalum provision, accounting for 68% and 36% of the EU respective imports. South Africa is a strategic partner in addressing EU needs for raw materials, as it provides 71% of platinum, 80% of rhodium, and 93% of ruthenium imports (EC 2020b). As acknowledged by the European Green Deal and the EU Action Plan on Critical Raw

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Materials, the access to such resources is a strategic security question, crucial to ensure a successful energy transition and enhance the energy security framework. The rising importance of critical raw materials has already triggered new patterns of multipolar competition revolving around the control of African materials. In fact, the EU is not the sole actor engaging in this sector, but other actors, such as Japan, the US, Australia or South Korea are shifting their African economic policy towards this sector. Nevertheless, due to the rapidity of technological innovation, the geopolitical context is much more blurred, as it is not improbable that the raw materials currently used may soon be replaced by others (Pistelli 2020). The EU posture towards African raw materials is strategic also in order to reduce its dependence on China, which almost monopolizes the EU imports in this field. It would be extremely detrimental to replace dependence on Russian gas with another pattern of dependence, namely that on Chinese critical raw materials. Indeed, their supply could be easily weaponized, just like fossil fuels, and Beijing has already given proof of being capable – and willing – to do so. In 2010, China banned the export of rare earths to Japan in the aftermath of a dispute around contested Senkaku islands and in 2019, amid rising tensions with Washington, declared to be seriously considering restricting rare earth exports to the United States. Creating partnership with African countries on critical raw materials is thus a key long-term mitigation approach to reduce potential dependence on China and strengthen strategic autonomy in the energy transition process. The rule of thumb of energy security is to diversify, regardless it is about fossil fuels or renewable energy. African states could take advantage of the EU’s shift towards Africa to overcome the barriers that African entrepreneurs could face in entering raw materials’ market, due to their limited knowledge of the business, insufficient experience of delivering an efficient and sustainable mining operation, and lack of adequate financial resources (ANRC 2021). In this regard, therefore, it would be possible to build joint ventures, to overcome the difficulties of African owned businesses in raising capital, with potential huge benefits in terms of economic growth, employment, capital accumulation and technological development for host countries and regions. Furthermore, capitalizing on the EU interest in their critical raw material endowments, African countries could balance growing Chinese influence, whose approach on the continent driven by the so-called ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ and the ‘resources for infrastructures’ (R4I) strategy has raised various concerns among many African capitals. There is indeed a growing awareness that allowing Chinese businesses to effectively run owned operations in Africa with little benefit to local communities has been very harmful for African economic integrity and endogenous growth. Against this backdrop, there is room for the EU to develop strategic partnerships with African countries, with the twofold aim of enhancing its own energy security while unlocking African potential and generating opportunities for green, resilient and inclusive development and growth. In this regard, a fundamental aspect should be borne in mind: African countries are not just a reservoir of resources or spaces where geopolitical competition materializes, they are key actors who are aware of their potential and want to have a say. The corollary of this approach is that EU-Africa cooperation in this field, to be successful, would need to develop a real

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mutually beneficial ‘partnership of equals’. To give substance to this concept, it is crucial for the EU to follow three main tenets. Firstly, the EU-Africa cooperation on critical raw materials would need to cover not only extraction, but also processing and refining, so as to build domestic African value chains capable of contributing to both the global transition to a low carbon future and increased socioeconomic development across African countries. Secondly, this partnership should revolve around the empowerment of local workers, spurring human capital accumulation and skill transfers, which are key drivers of African economic growth, while enhancing low worker protection and the legal framework. Thirdly, due to the high environmental impact linked to the extraction of these materials, particularly water-intensive and pollution, it is crucial to wisely assess this dimension, in order to avoid the logic of ‘extract today, and clean up later’, which would clearly contradict the commitment behind the energy transition. The EU Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials has acknowledged the importance of this approach, stressing that the EU can help African partner countries “develop their mineral resources sustainably, supporting improved local governance and dissemination of responsible mining practices, creating in turn value added in the mining sector and drivers for economic and social development” (EC 2020b). In other words, to EU can actively partner with the African continent to build a knowledge-driven African mining sector that stimulates and contributes to the broad-based development of African societies and economies, while respecting ambitious environmental and climate standards.

6.6

Conclusions

Energy security and energy diversification has come to the forefront of the political debate as a result of the Ukrainian war, which brought to light the EU structural liabilities and intensified the need to switch from Russian oil and -especially- gas. As argued in this Chapter, though, energy security cannot be ensured just through spatial diversification -in the sense of diversification of energy suppliers-, but has to be achieved also, and especially, through source diversification, capitalising on the fact the replacing fossil fuels with renewable energies would allow countries to be truly independent and less exposed to energy weaponization. Linking energy security and climate security is the paradigm which should be followed in the next decades and in which energy and climate policies should be framed in a complementary way. This would require a forward-looking and strategic approach and a wise ponderation between short-term needs, driven by the current economic and geopolitical critical juncture, and long-term policies aimed at consistently upholding green commitments. Against this backdrop, the EU could play a leading role in the climate and energy field in the new world shaped by Russian invasion of Ukraine, turning it into a stimulus to enhance its role on the international arena and support other countries to steer their economic growth model towards a sustainable path. This Chapter has

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highlighted how EU-Africa cooperation might evolve both in the short-term and long-term, opening up for strong and mutually beneficial opportunities of cooperation to leapfrog to an economy where the energy produced is renewable, affordable and accessible. In this context, African oil and gas exporters should look at international decarbonization pathways and at low-carbon technologies as an opportunity to develop forward-looking strategies to transform their economies. It is not an easy task either for the EU or for African countries, but it is not impossible either, if upheld by political willingness and bold actions. Living in a decarbonized world is not a self-fulfilling destiny, but the result of the actions and the decisions of the today’s men and women.

References African Development Bank (AfDB), (2017), “The new deal on energy for Africa. A transformative partnership to light up and power Africa by 2025. Update of implementation”. African Natural Resources Centre (ANRC), (2021), “Rare Earth Elements (REE). Value Chain Analysis for Mineral Based Industrialization in Africa”, African Development Bank, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Alshathry, (2017), “Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco. International Journal of Management of Information Technology”, 11(5), p. 3037. https://doi.org/10.24297/ijmit.v11i5.5613. Blimpo M. P., and Cosgrove-Davies M., (2019), “Electricity Access in Sub-Saharan Africa: Uptake, Reliability, and Complementary Factors for Economic Impact”. Africa Development Forum series. Washington, DC. Creutzig F., Goldschmidt J. C., Lehmann P., Schmid E., von Blücher F., Breyer C., Fernandez B., Jakob M., Knopf B., Lohrey S., Susca T., Wiegandt K., (2014), “Catching two European birds with one renewable stone: Mitigating climate change and Eurozone crisis by an energy transition, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews”, Volume 38, Pages 1015–1028, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.07.028. European Commission (EC), (2020a), “Communication from the Commission: Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition”, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? uri¼CELEX%3A52020SC0176. European Commission (EC), (2020b), “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security and Sustainability”, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri¼CELEX:52020 DC0474&from¼EN European Commission (EC), (2020c), “Joint Communication To The European Parliament And The Council Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa”, https://ec.europa.eu/ international-partnerships/system/files/communication-eu-africa-strategy-join-2020-4-final_ en.pdf. International Energy Agency (IEA), (2022a), “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, World Energy Outlook Special Report, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b8c30-4e9d-980a-52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf. International Energy Agency (IEA), (2022b), “A 10-point plan to reduce the European Union’s Reliance on Russian Natural Gas”, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/1af70a5f-9059-47b4-a2dd-1b4 79918f3cb/A10-PointPlantoReducetheEuropeanUnionsRelianceonRussianNaturalGas.pdf. International Renewable Energy Agency (IEA), (2021), “Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector”, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/deebef5d-0c34-4539-9d0c-10 b13d840027/NetZeroby2050-ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector_CORR.pdf.

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International Renewable Energy Agency (IEA), (2019), “Africa Energy Outlook 2019”. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), (2020), “The Renewable Energy Transition in Africa”. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), (2019), “A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation”. Morningstar R. L., András Simonyi, Khakova O., and Markina I., (2019). “European Energy Security and Transatlantic Cooperation: A Current Assessment”, Atlantic Council, https:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/European_Energy_Security_and_Trans atlantic_Cooperation.pdf. Nel J. and Davis C., (2022) “Filling the void – Africa’s role in European energy security”, Oxford Ecnomics, Research Briefing. Overland I., (2019), “The geopolitics of renewable energy: debunking four emerging myths”, Energy Res Soc Sci 49:36–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.10.018. O’Sullivan M., Overland I., Sandalow D.,(2017), “The Geopolitics of Renewable Energy”. Columbia Centre on Global Energy Policy, Working Paper, https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/ default/files/CGEPTheGeopoliticsOfRenewables.pdf. Pistelli L. (2020). “Addressing Africa’s Energy Dilemma. The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition”, 73, 151–174. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39066-2_7 Plėta T., Tvaronavičienė M., Della Casa S., Agafonov K., (2020). “Cyber-attacks to Critical Energy Infrastructure and Management Issues: Overview of Selected Cases”, SSN 2669-0195 (online) http://jssidoi.org/IRD/ 2020 Volume 2 Number 3 (September), https://doi.org/10. 9770/IRD.2020.2.3(7). Stang G (2016) Shaping the future of energy. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Brief Issue, 24 UNDP, (2004), “World Energy Assessment”. Valdés, J., (2018), “Arbitrariness in multidimensional energy security indicators. Ecological Economics”, 145, 263–273. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.09.002.

Chapter 7

The Possible Contribution of the Defence Industry to the Green Transition Tommaso Massa

Abstract How can the Defence industry contribute to the green transition? This paper will try to answer this question by highlighting the possible contribution of the Defence industry to the transition towards a greener and more sustainable world. Five direct means of contributions are identified: the development and deployment of new sustainable technologies and capabilities that can contribute to the green transition; the investment in R&D and technological innovation to support and enhance such transition; the reduction of carbon emissions of the industry itself, its supply chain and its final customers; the efficient management of energy consumption and a transition towards more sustainable energy resources; and, in the end, the possibility for the Defence industry to assume the role of enabler of the green transition in supporting the Armed Forces. Along with the direct contributions, there is also an indirect one: the fact that without the technologies provided by the Defence industry the Armed Forces would not be able to guarantee a peaceful and secure environment for our societies, which is crucial for the development of the green transition in both the military and civilian sectors.

7.1

Introduction

The green transition is one of the major challenges of the current era. The need to address climate change and climate-related issues dates back to quite a time ago, but only in recent years the main political institutions (both at the state level and at the supra-national level)1 have decided that confronting climate change is a political priority. Almost every western country has developed a national framework to 1

Think about the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or the European Union Green Deal for the supra-national level. For the state level some examples are the “Strategia Nazionale di Adattamento ai Cambiamenti Climatici” by Italy or the “Long-term strategy of the United States. Pathways to Net-Zero Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 2050” by the US. T. Massa (*) Genova, Italy

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature B.V. 2022 G. Iacovino, M. Wigell (eds.), Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2186-6_7

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address the issue of climate change and governments all over the world are trying to implement their strategies for a green and sustainable transition. Moreover, international institutions are developing their own strategies to confront climate change and enhance the green transition as well. Indeed, in recent years, the issue of climate change has become more and more critical, as the temperature keeps rising, ice keeps melting and atypical meteorological phenomena keep manifesting all over the world. One of the main causes of climate change is for sure pollution, in particular the emissions of greenhouse gasses. Generally speaking, the Armed Forces, and more specifically the Defence Departments, are accountable for almost 50% of the greenhouse gas emissions of the public sector (Bowcott et al. 2021). For these reasons the Defence sector cannot be left behind in the green transition, especially if the attention is focused on state-level policies. The growing centrality of themes such as green transition and sustainability is one of the major trends of our time. The vastness of such themes tends to be an important issue for the management of several companies when it comes to taking account of green and sustainable business and production models. In this sense, the Defence industry, in its broader significance, is not extraneous to the green transition and to the concept of sustainability. The principal way to sustain the green transition is to reduce emissions, especially greenhouse gas emissions, at least in the short term. More can be done in the long term to sustain the measures already in practice, mainly through the development of new technologies and new systems that can sustain and enhance the transition towards a greener and more sustainable world. Moving on to the topic of the current analysis, the question is what the Defence industry can do in order to contribute to the green transition. Along with the general strategies of green transition and decarbonization, there are precise strategies developed specifically for the Defence sector. According to a report made by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), the countries that have a “Green Defence strategy” are: France, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, and Canada (Barry, 2022). Relevant examples in this direction are the “Military Green” strategy developed by the European Defence Agency2 and the NATO Green Defence Framework, for the supra-national level, or the US Army Strategy for the Environment (“Sustain the Mission – Secure the Future”)3 and the “Climate Change and Sustainability Strategy”4 developed by the UK Ministry of Defence at the state level. The official release of such strategies represents a clear commitment by the political classes to implement the green transition also in the Armed Forces and more in general in the Defence sector.

For more details see “MILITARY GREEN. Energy & Environment at the European Defence Agency” at https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/news/military-green-leaflet.pdf 3 For more details see https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA526520.pdf 4 For more details see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/973707/20210326_Climate_Change_Sust_Strategy_v1.pdf 2

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The political project to create a greener and more sustainable military instrument will not succeed if the systems and technologies that are necessary to enable such transition without undermining the mission-critical capabilities of the Armed Forces are not developed: that is the duty and the mission of the Defence industry. In this regard, it is quite clear that the contribution of the Defence industry will be crucial in order to achieve the ambitious goal of a decarbonized military. Concentrating on the industry, the main contribution to decarbonization, at least in the short term, is for sure the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. First of all, it is possible to distinguish between 3 types of emissions: the emissions directly coming from the Defence firms’ industrial production; the emissions coming from the supply chain (both the emissions coming from the production of components and the emissions coming from the transportation of such components); the emissions coming from the final customer or user of the Defence industry products (namely the Armed Forces). In order to address the reduction of the above-mentioned emissions 3 different strategies could be implemented. For the reduction of the emissions originating from the supply chain, it will be fundamental that the suppliers of components for the Defence industry meet precise standards of emissions in the production and shipment of such components. There is not much the industry can do in this sense, except for taking the decision to have as suppliers only firms or enterprises that incorporate and implement green and sustainable policies, standards, and procedures in their strategies (Bowcott et al. 2021). Way more can be done in the field of reducing the emissions for what the Defence industry is directly responsible for, mainly the ones linked with the production process. In this sense it will be crucial for the Defence industry to implement a plan of decarbonization in its production process along with a plan for an efficient management of energy consumption. Finally, the emissions of greenhouse gas coming from the final customer of the Defence industry, namely the Armed Forces, represent the biggest part of the total emissions. For this reason, the main effort of decarbonization should be concentrated on this category of emissions. The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions coming from the military is for sure the main priority. As mentioned above, the Defence Departments are usually the main contributors of the public sector to the emission of greenhouse gas, in some cases accounting for more than 50% of the whole emissions of the public sector (Bowcott et al. 2021). For this reason, the main section of the paper will be dedicated to this topic. The Defence industry can enable the green transition of the Armed Forces mainly through the development of new systems and technologies that will make such transition possible. Such systems and technologies should pay attention to at least 2 factors: the energy consumption and its management, and the emissions (especially of greenhouse gas). In order to be able to address this complicated task, the Defence industry should divert a great amount of resources to Research and Development (R&D), in particular to “green R&D”. Technological innovation is the principal way to make the green transition possible, not only in the military realm but in all industrial sectors. In this sense, it is important to mention that the Defence industry has historically been the main contributor to technological innovation, at least since World War I (Bellais 2013).

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Before entering more deeply into the discussion about systems and technologies some crucial points should be added. First of all, the development of modern systems and technologies that keep in mind the above-mentioned characteristics needs know-how and specific capabilities that are both present in the Defence industry (Pie 2021). One of such capabilities is the capacity to create critical technological innovation that opens up the possibilities of a green transition. To develop such systems and technologies many resources should be delivered to Research and Development (R&D), in particular in “green R&D”. In this sense the fact that the Defence industry already allocates an important amount of resources in R&D is a good starting point. The leading role of the Defence industry in funding R&D, compared to other industrial sectors (Batacchi 2022), is for sure something not to forget when talking about green technologies. The importance of R&D is linked to another crucial component of our analysis: the capacity to obtain funds. Funding is vital for every possible development of new systems and technologies, and the case of green technologies is not an exception. In this sense it is worth mentioning the growing impact of sustainable finance and of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) standards to be met by companies that want to be able to raise funding both at the private and the public levels. In recent years, financial institutions have started to introduce the so-called “sustainable financial products”, that directly exclude equity or debt from enterprises of the Defence industry (BDSV 2021). The idea that leads to the exclusion of the Defence industry from the access to such category of funds is embedded in the conviction that the companies that are part of the Defence industry are not in compliance with ESG standards. On the contrary, the Defence industry is actually directly engaged in environmental and social sustainability. However, way more should be done by this industry in order to support in a more clear and direct way environmental and social projects for sustainable development. For what concerns the European Union another important indicator of the so-called “sustainable finance” should be mentioned: the EU taxonomy. The European Union taxonomy is a mechanism that enables Governments from the countries of the Union to financially support sectors of the industry through European funds. There is an ongoing debate on the fairness of including the Defence industry in the European Union taxonomy. The fact that it is a highly regulated industry, that it is in compliance with very strict international rules and treaties (such as the UN Arms Trade Treaty), and that it respects both national and regional regulations, should play in favor of the inclusion of the Defence industry in both ESG criteria and EU taxonomy. If sustainable finance becomes the praxis, the inclusion of the Defence Industry in the above-mentioned standards will be crucial for the Defence compartment to meet those standards. The fact of not being included in those standards will undermine the capacity of the Defence industry to financially sustain itself, and in the end, it will lead to a reduction of its critical capabilities to both procuring the Armed Forces with the adequate equipment the need and to enhance the green transition in the military, but also in the society more in general. The capacity to raise funds and to have access to all possible financing channels is crucial for the Defence industry in order to maintain its technological edge (BDSV 2021), which is in turn fundamental for every kind of investment in a green and sustainable transition.

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After this brief introduction, the analysis will now move to the core of the issue: the contributions of the Defence industry to the green transition and to decarbonization. In the following section, the direct contributions that the Defence industry can bring to the green and sustainable transition will be addressed more in detail.

7.2

Direct contribution

For what concerns the development of new technologies and capabilities that are green and sustainable or that can contribute to a green and sustainable transition, there are several examples that perfectly fit such category. For exposition purposes, this paragraph will be divided into five different parts addressing technologies developed in the five different military domains: air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace. Among the green technologies that apply to the air domain, one of the most interesting and promising is the development of solar-powered unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Such systems, thanks to the solar energy, can have an infinite flight time, at least in theory. One example of such a system is the SKYDWELLER project, in development by a Spain-US start-up (with also the participation of Italian company Leonardo). The SKYDWELLER is an unmanned aerial system powered by photovoltaic cells installed on the wings of the plane (72 m of wingspan): thanks to this mechanism of energy generation, it can fly for an unlimited period of time (Roscini Vitali 2021). This technology can be used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by diverting to the solar-powered drone the missions that it is able to conduct (for instance, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance – ISR – operations), instead of using a more expensive and polluting fossil fuel-powered aircraft. These categories of UAVs can be used also for civilian purposes: in this sense, one can think about the possibility to have an aerial platform flying 24/7 and carrying out activities such as search and rescue, disaster relief, communication, and connectivity. Another relevant example in this domain are electric-powered UAVs with growing capabilities, for instance in terms of lifting capacity: in this case, the fact of being green or not is linked to the way in which the electricity they use is generated. If the electricity is produced by renewable energy sources, it will be a green platform. On the contrary, if the energy is produced by fossil fuel sources (such as gas, oil or coal), it means that the platform will not be purely green, as the electricity it uses is produced in a way that still causes the emissions of greenhouse gas. For what concerns the maritime domain a great example of green technology developed by the Defence industry are the unmanned ships powered by hydrogen: indeed, the development of power units that can run by hydrogen has received quite an important contribution from the Defence industry over the last years. These systems can be used for missions similar to those mentioned above for the solarpowered UAVs. Another example are the new propulsion systems under

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development that will enable the use of green and sustainable fuels onboard military ships, such as hydrogen and biofuels, which could also be adopted by civilian vessels. For the land domain, the ongoing development of man-portable solar or wind energy generation systems can be extended to civil duties and non-military activities (Judson 2022). Moreover, the development of electric-powered vehicles is undergoing in the Defence industry as well (Judson 2022). Electric vehicles are not a novelty nor a technology developed solely by the Defence industry: however, the commitment of the Defence industry to the development and production of such vehicles, and also of batteries and power units, can give an important contribution to the whole sector. For instance, in this specific regard, the US Army has also demanded to the Defence industry to develop a vehicle that can function as an autonomous mini-grid, reducing fossil fuels consumption and developing a system that in the future could also be used for non-military activities. In relation to the space domain, the technology that is mounted on satellites in order to power them is highly sophisticated, and the necessity to develop such systems in accordance with strict criterion (such as dimensions, endurance, resistance, etc.) have contributed to the development of similar technologies for civilian purposes. Satellites are a military invention but are now used for a huge variety of functions and duties also in the civilian dimension, including those related to monitoring the temperatures, the melting of polar ice, and the greenhouse gas in the atmosphere. This is a great example of how a system first developed and manufactured for military purposes is now largely used for non-military activities, including those in the “green” dimension. Such elements also show how the development of green technologies is a process that has implications in both the military and civilian sector, thus giving the possibility of leveraging such dualcapable role for enhancing investment in the sector. Another example, linked to satellites, is the Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) project of NASA for the propulsion of a rocket aimed at delivering satellites in space. This advanced propulsion technology will be more efficient in terms of energy consumption and will use green energy for its functioning. Finally, in the cyberspace dimension, technologies such as virtual reality and augmented reality can be used for training purposes in order to reduce the impact of such activities in terms of emissions, consumption, and overall impact on the environment. Another important contribution to the development of green technologies is given by artificial intelligence and quantum computing. The development of both technologies is partially linked with the Defence industry and Defence firms own some of the most powerful computer and AI systems. Those systems permit the analysis of huge amounts of data in a short period of time and this in turn can be very helpful also for managing the green transition. In this regard, the US Air Force has recently used a computer software (called Jigsaw) in order to better manage its air refueling operations. Thanks to this software, the US Air force managed to reduce of about 10% the fuel consumption during the air refueling process (Jared Serbu, 2021). Before moving on one crucial point should be added. The systems and equipment to be used by the Armed Forces in the near future are already being developed right

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now. As Defence programs have a long lifetime, and their development process requires years, it is important for the Defence industry to continue to invest in such technologies, in order to develop systems that will enable the green transition of the Armed Forces. For what regards technological innovation and the investments in green research and development (R&D), the Defence industry has always contributed to such progress and will continue to do so. Indeed, the Defence industry is one of the leading industries for what concerns investments in R&D and is also the main contributor to technological innovation, at least since World War I. This is due to the fact that Defence companies must develop the most advanced technologies in order to provide Armed Forces with the most modern, efficient, and effective systems. Another reason that makes the Defence industry stand high in contributing to technological innovation is the fact that it has access to huge funding from national governments, and the fact that those funding usually come within a longtime framework, thus assuring continuity and stability in the allocation of resources. This in turn allows Defence enterprises to test multiple prototypes and pilot projects, in order to maximize chances to come up with a concrete technological solution to be then properly developed in a more structured way. Another relevant aspect of the green transition, as seen in the introduction, are emissions, in particular carbon emissions. In this field, the Defence industry, besides developing new technologies that reduce emissions, can engage directly in reducing its own emissions, both direct and indirect. The direct emissions are the ones for which the industry is directly responsible; the indirect emissions are the ones produced by its supply chain and by its final customers. As mentioned in the introduction, the main effort should be dedicated to the reduction of the emissions of greenhouse gas coming from the Armed Forces, mainly through developing the already mentioned “green systems and technologies”. For instance, the US Department of Defence (DoD) is the single largest institutional producer of greenhouse gas in the world. From 1975 to 2018 the US DoD emitted more than 3685 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent (Crawford 2019). The DoD alone emits more greenhouse gas than all the US production of steel and iron. The annual emissions of the US DoD are estimated at 56 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent, 60% of which come from vehicles, aircrafts, ships, and passenger-fleet (Crawford 2019). This statistic suggests that the main priority should be indeed the development of the above-mentioned “green technologies and systems”, in order to reduce that huge percentage. For what concerns instead the reduction of the emissions of greenhouse gas coming directly from the industrial production processes of the Defence industry, the main effort should be dedicated to the development of energy-efficient systems and models of production, and to the creation of production facilities that take into account the emissions and the pollution caused by the production process. Another crucial aspect of the green transition is energy consumption, in particular the category of energy consumed and the efficiency of the energy systems. The US DoD is the world’s largest institutional user of fossil fuels, most of it being consumed by the US Air Force (57% in FY2014) and by the US Navy (26% in FY2014) (Crawford 2019). In this sense, there is a trend where green and sustainable

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fuels (such as biofuels and non-fossil fuels) are already used, at least in part, on both aerial and naval platforms. Some examples for the maritime domain are the Italian Navy “Flotta Verde”5 project or the US Navy “Green Fleet”6 initiative; for the air domain, there is the project “Operational Energy” of the US Air Force, which aims to develop a system that can convert the CO2 emissions of the jet engines into sustainable fuel directly usable by the jet (Poland 2021). For what concerns energy efficiency, there are several measures that can be implemented: for instance, the use of more efficient engines and power units or the development of more aerodynamics and hydrodynamics designs when manufacturing aircraft or ships. In this sense, it is worth mentioning the fact that aircraft efficiency is expected to increase by 36% before 2050, also thanks to new design software and capabilities, developed indeed by the Defence industry (Bowcott et al. 2021). Finally, the Defence industry will be a key enabler for the green transition of the Armed Forces, providing them with the necessary technologies and systems to reduce their carbon footprint without undermining their mission-critical capabilities. As the primary contractor of the Armed Forces, the Defence industry will play a crucial role in making the green transition of the military possible. Moreover, such a contribution is also linked to the political dimension, in particular to the willingness by the political establishment to properly address such transition, both in terms of allocating resources and in terms of developing an adequate normative framework. For this reason, in order to achieve the target of having a decarbonized military instrument, it will be fundamental to establish a direct channel of communication and cooperation between the Defence industry, the Armed Forces and the political institutions. The above-mentioned contributions are all direct contributions of the Defence industry to the green transition process. There is another modality of contribution, that is instead of indirect character, that the Defence industry can give to the green transition: it is the supply of equipment to the Armed Forces, whatever equipment, even the most polluting ones. Without the proper equipment, the military will not be able to guarantee peace and security, that is the task for what it is conceived. By giving the Armed Forces the technologies and capabilities they need in order to enhance peace and security both domestically and abroad, the Defence industry contributes indirectly to the creation of a peaceful and secure environment. But what does this have to do with the green transition? As the UN Sustainable Development Goal number 16 suggests: peace, security, and strong institutions are the key to prosperity, and so to any further development, green transition included. Indeed the mere fact that is possible to even think or imagine a green transition, or to discuss about sustainability, is possible due to the prosperity of our States and societies, which is granted by peace and security, thanks to the Armed Forces, and so, indirectly, thanks to the Defence industry.

5 6

For details on this project see Flotta Verde – Marina Militare (difesa.it). For more details see: https://allhands.navy.mil/Features/GGF/

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Conclusion

This analysis resumes the implication of the green transition for the Defence sector, in particular the contribution that the Defence industry can give in order to sustain such transition. In the short term, the main contribution should be the reduction of emissions and the use of renewable energy resources. In the long term, the contribution can be higher, especially in terms of developing new systems and new technologies that enable the transition towards a greener and more sustainable military instrument, without undermining the capabilities of the Armed Forces. As seen above the capabilities of the military is crucial in order to maintain a peaceful and secure environment, that represents the basis for any form of development, green transition included. Some of the technologies exposed in this analysis are already operational, some others are under construction or under development. But, in order to sustain the green transition a lot of resources should be delivered to R&D for the development of new systems and technologies that will shape the future of the transition toward a greener and more sustainable world.

References All Hands, “The Great Green Fleet”, in ALLHANDS magazine of the US NAVY (https://allhands. navy.mil/Features/GGF/) Barry Ben (with contributions from Shiloh Fetzek and Caroline Emmett), 8 February 2022, “Green Defence: the Defence and military implications of climate change for Europe” International Institute for Strategic Studies research paper. Battacchi Pietro, 31 march 2022, “2% del PIL per la Difesa, se non ora quando?” in Rivista Italiana Difesa online. (https://www.rid.it/shownews/4851) BDSV, March 2021, “No sustainability without a Defence and security industry”. Bellais Renaud, 2013, “Technology and the Defence industry: real threats, bad habits, or new (market) opportunities?” in Journal of Innovation Economics & Management 2013/2 (n.12) pag. 59–78 Bowcott Harry, Gatto Giacomo, Hamilton Alastair, and Sullivan Erik, 1 July 2021, “Decarbonizing Defence: Imperatives and opportunity” Article McKinsey & Company. (https://www.mckinsey. com/industries/aerospace-and-Defence/our-insights/decarbonizing-Defence-imperative-andopportunity) Crawford C. Neta, 13 November 2019, “Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change and the Costs of War”, Watson Institute International & Public Affairs, Brown University. (https://watson. brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/Pentagon%20Fuel%20Use%2C%20Climate%20 Change%20and%20the%20Costs%20of%20War%20Revised%20November%202019%20 Crawford.pdf) European Defence Agency, “MILITARY GREEN. Energy & Environment at the European Defence Agency”. (https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/news/military-green-leaflet.pdf) Judson Jen, 12 April 2022, “Power struggle: How the US Army is tackling the logistics of battlefield electricity” in DefenceNews. (https://www.Defencenews.com/land/2022/04/12/power-strugglehow-the-us-army-is-tackling-the-logistics-of-battlefield-electricity/) Marina Militare, “FLOTTA VERDE” in MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA – MARINA MILITARE (https://www.marina.difesa.it/cosa-facciamo/per-ambiente/flotta-verde/Pagine/flotta-verde. aspx)

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Pie Jan, 6 October 2021 “ASD Considerations on Sustainability and the European Defence Industry” in ASD. (https://www.asd-europe.org/sustainability-and-the-european-Defenceindustry) Poland Corrie, 22 October 2021, “The Air Force partners with Twelve, prove it is possible to make jet fuel from thin air” in Air Force (US Air Force website) (https://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/Article/2819999/the-air-force-partners-with-twelve-proves-its-possible-to-make-jetfuel-out-of/#:~:text¼Fischer%2DTropsch%20certified%20synthetic%20fuels,synthetic% 20fuel%20and%20petroleum%20fuel.) Roscini Vitali Eugenio, 17 August 2021, “L’US Navy investe sull’UAS a propulsione solare Skydweller Aero” in ANALISIDIFESA. (https://www.analisidifesa.it/2021/08/lus-navyinveste-sulluas-a-propulsione-solare-skydweller-aero/) Serbu Jared, 26 February 2021, “Smarter software could help Air Force cut fuel bills by a million gallons per week” in FEDERAL NEWS NETWORK (https://federalnewsnetwork.com/airforce/2021/02/smarter-software-could-help-air-force-cut-fuel-bills-by-a-million-gallons-perweek/) United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “Ministry of Defence. Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach”. (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/973707/20210326_Climate_Change_Sust_Strategy_v1) US Army, “The Army strategy for the environment. Sustain the Mission – Secure the Future”. (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA526520.pdf)

Sitography https://allhands.navy.mil/Features/GGF/ https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2022/02/green-Defence https://www.rid.it/shownews/4851 https://www.bdsv.eu/files/themen/Nachhaltigkeit/2021-03-26%20Key%20ESG-Messages%20to% 20Governments%20and%20the%20Commission.%20final%20(mit%20Datum).pdf https://www.cairn.info/revue-journal-of-innovation-economics-2013-2-page-59.htm https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/aerospace-and-Defence/our-insights/decarbonizingDefence-imperative-and-opportunity https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/Pentagon%20Fuel%20Use%2C%20 Climate%20Change%20and%20the%20Costs%20of%20War%20Revised%20November% 202019%20Crawford.pdf https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/news/military-green-leaflet.pdf https://www.Defencenews.com/land/2022/04/12/power-struggle-how-the-us-army-is-tackling-thelogistics-of-battlefield-electricity/ https://www.marina.difesa.it/cosa-facciamo/per-ambiente/flotta-verde/Pagine/flotta-verde.aspx https://www.asd-europe.org/sustainability-and-the-european-Defence-industry https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2819999/the-air-force-partners-with-twelveproves-its-possible-to-make-jet-fuel-out-of/#:~:text¼Fischer%2DTropsch%20certified%20syn thetic%20fuels,synthetic%20fuel%20and%20petroleum%20fuel. https://www.analisidifesa.it/2021/08/lus-navy-investe-sulluas-a-propulsione-solare-skydwelleraero/ https://federalnewsnetwork.com/air-force/2021/02/smarter-software-could-help-air-force-cut-fuelbills-by-a-million-gallons-per-week/ https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 973707/20210326_Climate_Change_Sust_Strategy_v1 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA526520.pdf

Chapter 8

Enhancing Military Sustainability Through Education: Balancing Quick Wins with Systemic Behavioural Change Duraid Jalili

Abstract The lack of historical military action on GHG emissions is underpinned not by a deficit of available technologies, but by an organisational and sociopsychological de-prioritisation of sustainability. Although current practices may be able to achieve some emissions reductions, it will remain difficult to deliver substantive and holistic ‘greening’ of the military without creating an organisational culture in which all personnel actively prioritise mitigation and adaptation across all defence functions and units. This chapter will highlight how military education provides a significant and resource-light method for supporting the behavioural change required to achieve this. It will outline the existence of relevant scholarship on military and environmental education, alongside well-developed epistemic networks, pedagogical knowledge and locus points for delivery of environmental learning across existing military education infrastructures. These contexts, it argues, generate valuable opportunities to deliver quick wins on sustainability knowledge and behavioural change across different points of the defence function. At the same time, it concludes, armed forces should still implement systemic training needs analysis programmes, with micro-level analyses of the environmental biases and educational needs of key functions, as well as macro-level analyses of the entire defence function.

8.1

Introduction

The tendency to focus on potential technological solutions for the greening of defence forces is understandable. In principle, the rapid procurement and installation of existing resources and technologies – such as insulation for buildings, decentralised renewables and synthetic biofuels – could manifestly benefit the sustainability of the defence estate and wider defence operations. This process

D. Jalili (*) Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature B.V. 2022 G. Iacovino, M. Wigell (eds.), Innovative Technologies and Renewed Policies for Achieving a Greener Defence, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2186-6_8

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would simultaneously enhance operational effectiveness and resilience, as well as reducing financial, reputational and legal risks. This prospect, however, is not new. Although the efficiency, diversity and cost-effectiveness of such technologies has increased significantly over time, the ability to implement certain sustainability initiatives at scale has existed for decades. In part, this lack of implementation can be related to wider inhibitors for achieving rapid organisational change, ranging from budgetary protectionism through to flawed, incremental, short-termist and over-optimistic policymaking approaches (Cornish and Dorman 2011; Meiser 2017; National Audit Office 2013). Underpinning these wider inhibitors, however, are two more fundamental socio-psychological barriers. First, significant variations exist in beliefs and threat perceptions surrounding climate change amongst military personnel. As seen in Motta et al. (2021, supplementary material), for example, a significant number of contemporary personnel may still maintain the belief that global heating is mostly due to natural patterns in the Earth’s environment (32.08%) or that average global temperatures aren’t actually rising (12.29%). Second, there exists a deep-rooted, historical policy and mindset of “environmental exceptionalism” across senior politico-military officials (Light 2014). In simple terms, this is the belief that the importance of security as a core duty of the state and the historically kinetic nature of conflict means that the military should be exempt from meeting governmental or inter-governmental environmental targets. As will be discussed later, although mindsets both within and beyond different armed forces may be gradually shifting away from this perspective, the legacy of environmental exceptionalism may persist in more nuanced forms. There exist, of course, wider factors that may force the hands of military officials or, alternatively, provide them with by proxy sustainability gains. The greening of national electricity grids, for example, have already significantly reduced carbon footprints of various military forces. Defence industry partners are also facing increased pressures to enhance the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) credentials underpinning their goods and services in order to maintain capital funding, particularly from private sector investors but also from government. Growing media coverage of the interlinked climate, biodiversity and biocapacity crises will place increased pressure on military leaders to make public declarations of support and even to set targets for sustainability initiatives (whether such statements speak to genuine personal beliefs and credible emissions reduction pathways, or not). These wider factors, however, do not inherently change or influence the historical deprioritization of greening initiatives within militaries and the underpinning sociopsychological contexts that have informed this. In line with these contexts, any prospects for guaranteeing rapid, far-reaching and sustained progress in the greening of defence forces, requires the creation and implementation of policies and activities to influence the knowledge, beliefs and calculus of key stakeholders within the military. Simply put, it is not enough to announce or dictate that a transformational change programme is required and provide a conceptual strategy. Instead, militaries need to implement large-scale behavioural change programmes across the defence function, to gain genuine support from all stakeholders involved in the delivery of

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transformational change. In doing so, they can enhance the likelihood that defence policies and processes will be informed by and oriented around sustainability in a way that is organic, continuous and holistic, rather than enforced, sporadic and disconnected. As this chapter will highlight, an obvious conduit for achieving this, is in enabling military education practitioners, in collaboration with subject matter experts, to both inform and inculcate personnel regarding the scale, nature and urgency of sustainability initiatives. In particular, the chapter will demonstrate how the traditional outcomes, resources and logistics of military education reveal it to be a valuable component for change management and behavioural change within military forces. In seeking to operationalise this, it will argue that the scale, pace and political contexts surrounding ‘environmental’ issues requires the armed forces to implement a dual process, undertaking two separate activities simultaneously. First, using existing courses, delivery methods and networks to achieve quick wins. Second, implementing a more significant programme of research, testing and distribution, to understand how to achieve a sustained and connected approach to environmental education in the mid- to long-term.

8.2

The Value of Education for Organisational Change

The idea that formal education can assist with behavioural change and change management programmes is neither ground-breaking nor controversial. Education provides a point of delivery and a force multiplier for actions and processes that are integral to change management, such as communicating the rationale and need for change (Edmonds 2011), gaining insights to anticipate as well as mitigate resistance to change (Kotter 1995), supporting employees who feel the need or desire to keep up with organisational change (Crouse et al. 2011) and, most obviously, enhancing the knowledge, core competencies, organisational alignment and networks required for employees and leaders to contribute and collaborate in support of change (Higgs and Rowland 2009; Ray and Goppelt 2011; Alagaraja 2013; Kanaane et al. 2015). The need to enhance and expand the delivery of such actions is particularly relevant during the transitionary phase of organisational change, when feelings of stress and resentment can emerge from uncertainty and insufficient communication, consultation and support regarding the goals and prospective impacts of organisational changes (Smollan 2015). These principles are also inherent to wider behavioural change programmes. Indeed, multiple studies highlight that the provision of information alone is liable to be insufficient in influencing environmental behaviour. Instead, information must be delivered in a way that accounts for factors including a recipient’s personality, their attitude and sensitivity towards a subject, their perceived sense of agency regarding the issues presented, the level of knowledge they possess on possible strategies and solutions, and their personal ability and aptitude to implement these strategies and solutions (Hungerford and Volk 1990). Such issues can be particularly

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complex to deal with in relation to sustainability and environmental security, given the sheer complexity and scale of the issues at hand, and the associated feelings of agency, obligation, guilt and intention that arise (Bray and Cridge 2013). Although education cannot automatically solve such challenges, it can be used to enhance knowledge, attitude change and the adoption of positive environmental behaviours (Wi and Chang 2019). In addition to these general contexts, there exist a range of variables that make formal education valuable for supporting and catalysing change within military forces specifically. In reductive terms, these variables can be framed within two categories: (A) Impact (i.e. military education has been shown to have a significant impact on the knowledge, perspectives and policies of military officials); and (B) Logistics (i.e. the traditional structures for delivering military education provide a suitable and accessible means of delivering new concepts and priorities at pace across different forces). As highlighted in Jalili (2020), in terms of the historical ‘impact’ of military education, practitioners across multiple countries and programmes have noted that providing military personnel with varied perspectives on key issues can enhance critical thinking skills, provide more nuanced awareness, and reduce parochial or pejorative mindsets. Education is also seen as an effective means of increasing or maintaining transnational stability, by enhancing the capacity for more effective and interoperable planning, policy formulation and leadership skills across military personnel. Achieving these outcomes is not simply due to the delivery of relevant knowledge, but the fact that attendance on educational programmes can lead to the creation of epistemic networks across personnel, which can be used to reduce bureaucratic obstacles and enhance collaboration and knowledge sharing. This combination of outcomes – from the generalised value of education for change management programmes through to the specific value of military education in enhancing critical thinking, open mindedness, planning and collaboration – highlights the inherent relevance of education as a method of achieving “impact” as part of a sustainability reform process. In addition to this, however, there is an underpinning “logistical” value in using education as a force multiplier for reform. In particular, education provides a relatively cost-effective method of delivering the outputs discussed above (Cope 1995; Hanauer et al. 2014; Reveron 2016). Indeed, its biggest cost – in the form of maintaining a roster of high-quality human resources, from faculty and guest speakers, to librarians and researchers – is also its biggest asset. Such resources not only underpin the educational outcomes discussed above, but also provide access to epistemic networks of educational practitioners who are integrated into different military colleges, courses, regiments, corps and training departments worldwide (Last 2016; Hanauer et al. 2014; Jalili 2020). Such networks can help to both enhance the diplomatic and socialization objectives noted above, and increase international diffusion of and adherence to norms and beliefs, that can impact on areas including resource allocation, policy and curricular reform (Last 2016).

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Underpinning the value of these linkages is the fact that, whilst military education does serve as a tool for soft power, indoctrination and political socialisation (Atkinson 2014), it remains – in comparative terms – a relatively neutral area for military forces to engage in diplomacy, collaboration and coordination of effect. Indeed, there are wide ranging examples of educational programmes being used by nations to engage with longstanding and prospective adversaries, as well as allies and partners (Reveron 2016). Furthermore, whilst it’s important to acknowledge that education may not be able to wholly redress conservative or sceptical perspectives on climate change and sustainability within the military, there exists a perceivable shift in the level of concern held by military officials regarding environmental trends (Motta et al. 2021) and the level of desire shown by officers within educational environments to understand more about these trends and the potential role of defence in helping to mitigate and adapt to them (Jalili 2021). This scenario means that military educators are well placed to support and magnify this existing shift. Given these contexts, it may seem unsurprising that training and education have been foregrounded in recent defence strategies for climate security and sustainability (albeit with a notable focus on training rather than education). Public-facing strategies relating to UK defence, for example, have highlighted the need to ensure that climate impacts on existing training programmes are mitigated, whilst acknowledging the value of providing guidance, new skills and training to drive both understanding and social values across different departments that will enable prioritisation of climate and sustainability (Cox et al. 2020; UK MoD 2021). The US Army’s recent Climate Strategy also foregrounded “training” as one of three core “Lines of Effort” for mitigation and adaptation efforts, with stated goals including the publication of regular climate change lessons, updating leader development and training programmes to include climate topics, ensuring that operational and strategic exercises integrate climate risks, and considering how to reduce the Greenhouse Gas (GHG) impact of both education and training activities (Dept of Army 2022). There are any number of interpretations that one could put forward regarding the variations in emphasis placed on training and the kinds of targets put forwards in these different strategies. What is notable, however, is the shared acknowledgement regarding the need to achieve both immediate effect and longer-term sustainable change. The work required to implement these targets is significant in scale and complexity. At the same time, it is still potentially easier to orchestrate than the complex systemic changes required for greening defence. Education as a route for behavioural change requires limited financial resources, beyond the labour cost of ringfencing time for practitioners to research, test, distribute and deliver educational interventions relating to sustainability. As will now be outlined, in approaching this issue, forces will likely need to engage in a dual process. In the first instance, defence forces must quickly take advantage of existing courses, delivery methods and networks to achieve quick wins. At the same time, they should also seek to implement more large-scale macro and micro training needs analysis programmes, to understand how to create systemic change through environmental education and training.

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Taking Advantage of Existing Systems for Quick Wins

There are any number of routes through which different forces may seek to take advantage of existing educational resources to enhance sustainability and environmental knowledge and support across the defence function. Significant external resources exist in the form of scholarship, governmental and non-governmental reports, reputable news and social media feeds, multi-media content, and opensource or modular online educational courses. Furthermore, there exists a wealth of external experts with an active personal interest in supporting sustainability and environmental reform initiatives across high-polluting sectors. The past decade has also seen sporadic growth in the number of environmental education activities and case studies found within existing military educational programmes, with potential for replication or adaptation across different courses and armed forces. At the same time, sustainability and environmental security remain significantly underdeveloped as subject areas in military education, in comparison to other areas with objectively lower levels of strategic and operational importance. One question facing both educators and policymakers, therefore, is how far it may be possible to quickly repurpose, refine and integrate pre-existing environmental and sustainability content and educational activities across different curricula, modules or learning interventions. In order to examine the process by which this could be achieved at pace (i.e. for ‘quick wins’), it is useful to consider the issue through the scope of two lenses: (A) Key locus points at which such activities could be integrated and delivered with a relatively quick turnaround; and (B) Suitable principles and resources for effective delivery and distribution of such activities.

8.3.1

Key Locus Points for Delivering Sustainability Learning

As this sub-section will highlight, there are significant opportunities to take advantage of existing educational locus points, as well as existing scholarship and expertise (both internal and external to the military), to deliver sustainability knowledge. Although this includes potential quick wins in ‘iterative’ or ‘semi-regular’ courses for specialised roles, as well as ‘context’ or ‘locale’-specific courses, the greatest gains are liable to come through enhancing generic cross-organisational courses and tiered officer education courses at military colleges. It is important to acknowledge, however, that these locus points represent only a small part of the overall spectrum of education and training, which necessarily includes an almost infinite array of opportunities and delivery points for both formal and informal learning. As implicitly highlighted in the US Army’s Climate Strategy, integral to achieving any form of genuine behavioural and organisational change is the need to enhance climate literacy across the defence function. In this regard, the potential

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value of more generic “Climate 101” or “Sustainability 101” courses should not be underestimated, particularly in providing personnel with a shared, base-level understanding of environmental science and the implications of current trends for biocapacity and ecological security. Such courses can help overcome differences in the level of knowledge held by different personnel, particularly when delivered in a ringfenced period of time with suitable incentives. Furthermore, they can technically be delivered at any location or time, particularly if they are designed for distributed or hybrid implementation (albeit with the need to ensure that students receive the support and guidance required to convert ‘information’ into actual ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’). In theory, policy or doctrinal briefs could achieve a similar or related effect. Furthermore, such documents can be translated downwards into manuals, tactics and even rules of engagement that can be used to specific actions at the operational and tactical levels. The lag time involved in this process and the inability to guarantee that all personnel will sufficiently review, understand and agree with such documents, however, means that broad and replicable educational interventions, delivered across the defence function, represent a more feasible system for creating a base level of environmental knowledge at a suitable scale and pace. Such educational courses may benefit from having doctrine or policy documents as a form of primary ‘source’ to help shape discussions, but can often be just as easily and effectively delivered in the absence of such documents. Development of generic courses such as these has the potential to create valuable gains and a force multiplier effect. This potential may even be further enhanced if the process is achieved through international working groups who are capable of producing and distributing curricula that account for variables and factors which can affect education and sustainability across different armed forces; such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfP) and Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). Generic climate or sustainability courses, of course, represent only one part of a wider system of education. As with any complex organisation that contains within it separate functions and expert spheres, there is an inherent need to enhance specialised courses that take place in a semi-regular or iterative fashion. This includes providing greater insights into the specific implications of environmental shifts upon individual functions, operational theatres and domains, as well as the capacity for personnel in specific roles to contribute to mitigation, adaptation and resilience. The most commonly referenced areas for such enhancement are in engineering, procurement, logistics and infrastructure, in which concepts regarding sustainability, master planning, lean and systems thinking, provide obvious routes through which to enhance the sustainability and resilience of defence capabilities and, in particular, to reduce unnecessary consumption of critical resources. In terms of quick wins, there does exist a burgeoning array of scholarly literature on such issues as well as a wide range of external courses and motivated experts (both within the armed forces’ full time and reservist components, and across academia and the private sector). This enables departments and chiefs of staff to take advantage of such resources in an ad hoc fashion prior to the implementation of more comprehensive training needs analysis processes. However, it is this area of specialised,

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iterative courses that is perhaps most critical for a more holistic approach (as will be discussed in the final section). Bearing some similarity to these specialised, iterative courses are what can be categorised as ‘context’ or ‘locale’-specific educational interventions. The ability to improve operational sustainability, for example, will likely require commanders and relevant personnel across different theatres and domains to be given enhanced knowledge on environmental variables and risks, both before and during deployments. This not only includes more traditional meteorological insights into how extreme weather and resource availability could create tactical, operational and strategic challenges, but insights into how specific actions by the military and its adversaries could benefit or exacerbate the environmental foundations required for peace and stable governance in the mid- to long-term (see, for example, ICRC 2020). Provision of insights into the human and politico-economic impacts of issues such as biocapacity loss, GHG emissions, hazardous waste, deforestation, migration, and land use changes within a conflict, for example, could provide commanders with the capacity to balance immediate tactical and operational goals with desired strategic outcomes. Although the educational component of such aspects is more relevant for pre-deployment briefs, the capacity to utilise external and internal experts from pre-deployment through to deployment exists. Similar to specialised training, however, this remains a more complex and sensitive area for educational intervention, requiring rigorous vetting and monitoring of experts and content (to avoid the prospect of misinformation negatively affecting operational decisions). The final, obvious area for integrating sustainability and environmental concepts within education is through the traditional ‘tiered’ officer education courses at the junior, intermediate, and advanced levels, that take place almost exclusively at military colleges. Environmental concerns have, of course, factored into such courses in various guises for some time. However, there exists a broadly acknowledged deficit of educational programmes, with a historical reliance on isolated and sporadic interventions, in the forms of lectures, case studies (especially on securitization), elective modules, or optional dissertation topics (Hill 2021; Jalili 2021). The relatively limited depth and breadth of perspective resulting from this current state of affairs lessens the potential impact of education in reducing sceptical, defensive or securitized perspectives, or enabling motivated officers to propose and implement solutions (Jalili 2021). Although a more thorough training needs analysis may be required for such courses, informal discussions and student feedback at junior, intermediate and advanced levels highlight a recurrent set of areas where officers could benefit from greater insight in support of sustainability and resilience goals: (A) Basic ecological concepts and lenses/characteristics through which to understand environmental trends (e.g. scale, pace, proximity, complexity/ non-linearity, interdependence, and reversibility/irreversibility); (B) Different strategic narratives, misinformation and disinformation surrounding sustainability and environmental issues, the different stakeholders driving these narratives, and their potential objectives;

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(C) Policy and governance contexts, from high-level inter-governmental and national frameworks, through to internal organizational policy/doctrine, departmental responsibilities, promotion pathways and epistemic networks; (D) The security implications of ‘unsustainable’ consumption and associated environmental trends, in relation to both traditional and non-traditional threats, and the defence function itself; (E) The potential (opportunities – borne of mitigation and adaptation – for) reducing regional and local insecurity, as well as enhancing efficiency and reducing risks for the military; and (F) The potential negative and positive, voluntary and mandatory contribution(s) of defence in relation to points (B), (C), (D) and (E) listed above. The combination of such concepts has the potential to provide officers not only with the ability to understand and accept the significance of current trends and the value of sustainability actions, but also insights into the methods and pathways through which they could most effectively contribute to and advocate for sustainability reform, both internally and as part of wider inter-governmental efforts. In general terms, there exists sufficient scholarship, expertise and pre-existing educational content surrounding these areas, to be able to develop isolated lectures or specific modules on such topics (with the potential exception of providing ‘internal policy and governance’ overviews for certain armed forces). This represents a particularly significant potential area for ‘quick wins’ – both in terms of impact and feasibility – in enhancing knowledge, behavioural change and active participation from officers across a wide range of different roles, ranks and responsibilities. Notable gains in this area, for example, could be achieved simply by ringfencing time for a faculty member within a college to create or acquire content on such issues, and to distribute it across different course directors. As will be seen in the next subsection, this prospect is further enhanced through access to existing epistemic networks across the military education community.

8.3.2

Methods for Delivery and Distribution

The second lens through which to consider the prospects for rapid enhancement of sustainability and environmental issues through education, is in the methods suited to delivering such concepts. Perhaps one of the most important recent developments in this regard is the rapid growth of distributed and hybrid learning activities that militaries have been forced to develop as a result of Covid-19 (from new digital learning portals and interactive online learning courses, through to organisationalwide subscriptions to video-conferencing and remote meeting software). These measures have been seen by many as a turning point in approaches to military education, particularly in enabling more resilient and democratised forms of learning (Szczepański and Pacer 2021; Woźniak 2021). The measures taken to achieve this were necessarily borne of emergency and, thus, the current capacity for distributed

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learning cannot be seen as a ‘final product’ in any meaningful way. Indeed, suggestions for creating more unique and tailored online education for the military function range from building upon and enhancing these existing systems, through to contracting external academic providers or even creating exclusive academies for online education (González de Escalada Álvarez 2019). Such concepts or prospects, however, do not mean that there is a specific need to wait for current systems to be refined before using these existing channels to implement and test sustainability and environmental courses across a wide range of personnel. Even ad hoc implementation of environmental courses through hybrid methods could enhance the potential for increased inter-agency, inter-sectoral and international learning experiences, as recommended in reviews on the implications of climate change for the defence function (Cox et al. 2020). Furthermore, any process of implementation would be able take advantage of a range of existing studies and data on military personnel engagement levels with different forms of online learning (Artino 2009; Starr-Glass 2011; Ford and Vignare 2015). This above-mentioned availability of studies and insights into best practices represents a second area in which practitioners can take advantage of existing opportunities for quick wins. Specifically, whilst there exist a range of unique organisational and socio-psychological variables that will impact upon the teaching of sustainability and environmentalism within the military, there are also a range of studies on both ‘environmental education’ and ‘military education’ principles that can be used by practitioners as temporary or ad hoc frameworks through which to create a baseline of effective learning for military personnel. As seen in Monroe et al. (2019), for example, a wide range of research on climate change education emphasises the value of focusing on content that is personally relevant and meaningful to students, and delivering this through active and collaborative pedagogies, with access to scientific experts. These principles correlate both with broad adult educational taxonomies (Knowles et al. 2005; Wlodkowski 2008) and targeted studies on military education. As highlighted by Jalili (2020), amongst the various educational preferences demonstrated by security and defence officials is a predominant focus on the value of gaining insight and access to knowledgeable experts, using collaborative and student-led pedagogies, and focusing on topical and relevant content. These attributes are further enhanced by a broader educational emphasis on academic rigour and the need to create a safe and equal learning environment with appropriate attitudes and behaviours, as well as foregrounding freedom of speech and diversity of perspective (Ibid). In addition to the enhanced opportunities for distributed learning and pre-existing scholarly works on suitable pedagogies, the prospects for generating quick wins in sustainability and environmental education are currently being enhanced by the relatively recent proliferation of educational interventions in the field. Climate and environmental wargaming and roleplaying scenarios, for example, are being increasingly developed and utilised across different nations including the United States and the United Kingdom, often in collaboration with academic partners (King’s College London 2021a; University of Alaska 2021; Vergun 2021). Although they are currently largely confined to examining the potential impacts of and responses to

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climate change (i.e. rather than playing out scenarios for sustainability implementation), such activities also have the potential to reinforce to personnel how “prevention activities today are essential to avoiding dire consequences in the future” (Vergun 2021). Collaboration with external partners is also a significant feature in the emerging use of incubators and student-led research groups, as seen most prominently in the ‘Hacking for Climate and Sustainability’ programme run by the Common Mission Project, which incentivises students to solve military sustainability challenges using the Lean Launchpad methodology. These kinds of individual educational inputs represent not only an obvious opportunity for quick wins for military forces, but also an area of pedagogical growth that is worth monitoring more broadly for the military education function. In addition to these kinds of targeted or individual interventions, there exists a notable growth in pre-developed modules on environmental security and sustainability issues, capable of being accessed remotely or integrated within existing military curricula (see, for example, King’s College London 2021b). This access is complemented by the significant increase in the number and relative influence of environmental security associations and experts, both capable and willing to deliver insights for the military education community (Jalili 2021). This latter phenomenon, in particular, represents a clear resource for militaries seeking to deliver expert insights or mentoring not simply within existing educational programmes, but as part of iterative or context-specific interventions, such as pre-deployment briefings (or even within environmental advisory teams integrated within the decision-making process during operations). This growing community of experts ties in with a final area for gaining quick wins in sustainability education, by increasing access and distribution of learning interventions through epistemic networks. As noted above, the Covid-19 pandemic has led to a significant increase in the provision of and access to online learning portals for military personnel across various forces. This developing scenario provides an obvious opportunity for increasing the distribution of sustainability learning, in an online or hybrid form. Simple distribution, however, is not a panacea for sustainability and environmental education across armed forces. In particular, access to intellectual content does not automatically mean that such content will be prioritised by students, that they will actively engage with and learn the content, that they will achieve any higher-level learning objectives, or that they will gain sufficient learning support. Furthermore, significant variations exist in the culture, challenges and resources of military personnel both within individual forces and between different armed forces (Jalili 2019). This scenario highlights the need for alternative routes of delivery and distribution, to ensure that core environmental principles and solutions are sufficiently translated and tailored to the needs of military personnel worldwide. There exists, however, a route through which military forces can mitigate the negative impact of these limitations and, in doing so, better distribute and deliver short-term educational interventions for quick wins. In line with historical processes of institutional isomorphism, as well as increasing collaboration frameworks, associations and memorandums of understanding, there exists a burgeoning epistemic network of educators across different military colleges worldwide (Last 2016; Libel

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2016; Jalili 2019). Notable examples of associations and programmes with strong networks of military educators include the International Society of Military Sciences (ISMS), International Military Testing Association (IMTA), Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), ‘Conference of Commandants’ events across different continents, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium and Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). Such epistemic networks provide a means of collaboratively developing, distributing, adapting and implementing sustainability and environmental educational interventions. Given the nature of such networks, distribution is liable to have a more significant impact on ‘tiered’ officer education courses at the junior, intermediate, and advanced levels. However, in connecting with the increasing number of ‘sustainability networks’ being developed within various militaries (in both formal and informal guises), as well as the external environmental security associations and organisations containing officials who are influential or trusted at higher policy-making levels (Jalili 2021), such epistemic networks have the potential to reach broader areas of the education and training function (including generic and semi-regular iterative courses). These potential areas for achieving quick wins through individual educational interventions, however, should not obscure the need for larger training needs analysis programmes.

8.4

Beyond Quick Wins: Achieving a Sustained and Connected Approach

Unfortunately, whilst there is a value in using existing educational locus points, pedagogies, scholarship and distribution methods to gain quick wins, there are significant risks in assuming that these existing capabilities can or should be generically used as a foundation for environmental education in the military context. In the first instance, existing scholarship on environmental education tends to focus on methods for inspiring individual action (particularly amongst young people) rather than achieving systemic change across complex governance systems and multi-actor networks (Jorgenson et al. 2019). Such findings cannot be uncritically applied to the education of security and defence officials, whose organisational goals, constraints, doctrine, identities, and values represent significant variables. Similarly, there exist large areas of military education research and practice that are influenced and shaped by anecdotal data, deficient methodologies, reductive taxonomies, and biased or essentialist belief systems (Jalili 2019; Jalili 2020). This necessarily limits the ability to take certain defence and security education principles and practices for granted. In the second instance, there exists limited empirical insight – within a military context – on key issues including: (a) the sustainability learning needs of different officials, (b) where resource should be focused or targeted to achieve greatest effect, (c) how educational outcomes in one function could impact upon educational

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requirements in another function, and (d) what factors could generate a disconnect between knowledge and action on sustainability. These contexts highlight the critical need for armed forces to implement organisational-wide training needs analysis programmes for sustainability and wider environmental issues. As this section will argue, central to this is the need to implement micro-level training needs analyses across different departments and functions, supported by macro-level analyses across the entire defence function. This is due to two core issues: the presence of counterproductive beliefs and biases amongst personnel, and the arguably disproportionate impact of certain defence functions on enhancing sustainability.

8.4.1

Understanding Counterproductive Beliefs and Biases

The first key benefit of combining macro- and micro-level analyses is that this can help generate greater insight on both generalised and role-specific socioorganisational and psychological inhibitors for prioritising sustainability. As noted previously, significant variations exist in the beliefs of personnel regarding both the nature of environmental trends and the need for the security function to operate unconstrained from sustainability targets (Light 2014; Motta et al. 2021). These variations may not necessarily manifest in outright climate denialism. Instead, they may present as more nuanced biases and heuristics, such as selecting and using more conservative environmental reports or climate projections, de-prioritising sustainability actions by categorising them as ‘important’ but ‘non-urgent’, or assuming that future technological solutions will solve current problems. Unfortunately, providing educational interventions that don’t sufficiently account for variations in personnel’s beliefs, biases or heuristics could generate counterproductive outcomes. Such interventions may, for example, enable or prompt personnel to actively challenge mitigation and adaptation initiatives (Kraft et al. 2015) or, alternatively, create a sense of internal conflict within personnel if they believe such initiatives run contrary to the organisational culture they have been asked to uphold (Kahan et al. 2012). Educational interventions must, therefore, simultaneously inform and persuade personnel with deep-rooted scepticism or doubts. Macrolevel training needs analyses can support this process, by generating insights into the diverse factors that may inhibit and enable effective performance across defence, including general or common beliefs that can shape personnel’s receptiveness to sustainability and environmental initiatives, and the most common manifestations of these beliefs. At the same time, there exists a value in supporting such reviews with parallel micro-level training needs analyses of specific functions or units, as such analyses can provide greater methodological rigour, more consideration of stakeholder perspectives, and higher potential that research findings will actively influence the training cycle and service delivery (Gould et al. 2004). This focus on active, stakeholder led analysis is also beneficial for empowering participants to find

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avenues for innovation and change faster than other methodologies (Reason and Bradbury 2008), thus potentially catalysing new initiatives.

8.4.2

Targeting Key Functions Whilst Avoiding Negative Effects

In addition to reducing the potential for counterproductive reactions from personnel, combined macro- and micro-level training needs analyses could help to create targeted education for defence functions that have a disproportionate impact on sustainability reform whilst reducing the potential for negative second- and thirdorder effects of such education. More specifically, as noted previously, existing locus points for ‘quick wins’ are generally focused around generic or tiered educational courses, that seek to drive ‘generalist’ behaviours and knowledge. Although these courses will contain personnel who are moving into influential roles, the level of impact that generic education will have on those roles and the time lag involved is uncertain. Although micro-level analyses can be deployed for specific functions to achieved targeted effect, this may have negative second- and third-order effects that require a macro-level analysis to understand and mitigate. Options exist, for example, to produce tailored educational inputs for personnel at the highest levels of power (such as Ministers of Defence, Chiefs of Defence Staff, and the Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of individual services). These could include targeted workshops or presentations on the benefits of sustainability initiatives (e.g. in enhancing operational effectiveness and resilience, or mitigating financial and asset risks). In combination with wider governmental and societal pressures, delivery of such inputs could help to catalyse top-down strategic emphasis on sustainability, particularly if delivered by respected experts with personal trust, organisational insights, and similar ideational outlooks (Meyer 2020). Unfortunately, whilst enhancing the level of emphasis placed on sustainability by personnel at the highest levels of power may embolden wider defence personnel across the chain of command, it may also lead to unintended scepticism and dissatisfaction amongst personnel if not delivered with suitable transparency, rigorous methodologies or clear policies (Jalili 2021). Micro-level analyses can help to better understand and, thus, generate strategies to mitigate these potential negative responses. These kinds of micro-level analyses – across specific functions or units – are potentially even more important for Top Level Budget holders (TLBs) with overarching responsibility for spending and procurement, and for personnel in financial and commercial roles that tend to deliver the standards and policies that drive decision making across the defence function. Simply put, integrating sustainability as both an important and urgent principle or output for those personnel who are responsible for financial allocation and auditing, arguably represents a disproportionately powerful lever for driving accountability and behavioural change across the defence function. Targeted micro-level training needs analyses of such functions,

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therefore, may be a potentially important route for generating significant, organisation-wide sustainability gains. At the same time, the delivery of effective, targeted education for such roles may have negative second- or third-order effects. Most obviously, capability and procurement personnel will need to rapidly enhance their understanding of how to achieve new sustainability standards across all parts of the value chain and decision-making process. Unless sufficient training needs analysis and educational support is provided to enable this, it could result in serious capability failures or delays. This risk is not restricted to capability and procurement roles, but permeates in complex ways across the full range of defence functions. Thus, whilst targeted micro-level training needs analyses and educational provision may generate significant gains, there remains a need for overarching macro-level analyses to understand how different educational interventions could generate second- and third-order effects for different components of defence, and to understand what additional micro-level analyses would be required to mitigate those effects. Generating this more holistic macro-level transparency on the needs of different roles could, in principle, also help to enhance the potential for a systems-wide approach to sustainability, by helping forces to understand which functions or units to prioritise when implementing specific sustainability initiatives (thus, reducing the potential that these different functions or units will unknowingly duplicate each other’s efforts, or implement initiatives that fail to connect or that counteract each other).

8.5

Conclusion

It is important not to overestimate the role of education in catalysing or enhancing sustainability across the defence function. Achieving holistic and continuous sustainability reform across the defence function requires full-scale behavioural change and change management programmes. Educational inputs cannot, in isolation, generate the level of change required in these areas. At the same time, they provide a valuable resource in supporting this process. The presence of existing scholarship, epistemic networks, pedagogical knowledge and locus points for educational delivery, generates significant opportunities to deliver sustainability and environmental learning interventions quickly across different points of the defence function (particularly in the form of generic courses accessible to all personnel and more focused interventions in tiered officer education courses). Such opportunities require minimal input, beyond the ringfencing of relatively small portions of time for faculty to coordinate and implement interventions. At the same time, such isolated activities cannot be seen to represent a holistic or long-term solution. Such a solution would require armed forces to implement more systemic training needs analysis programmes, which include micro-level analyses of the environmental biases and educational needs of key functions (particularly financial and commercial roles, which tend to deliver the standards and policies that drive change across defence), as well as macro-level analyses across the entire

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defence function (to understand broader biases and mitigate the impact of negative second- and third-order effects from targeted sustainability initiatives). Although this process requires a far more systemic approach, it still remains a relatively resource light and, thus, cost effective activity, mainly requiring the allocation of human resources and top-down support to undertake research across different departments and functions of defence. Simply put, much like the need to create detailed baselines on existing military GHG emissions, whilst quick wins are possible through isolated educational interventions, it will remain difficult for armed forces to deliver substantive and holistic change without gaining a detailed understanding of the variables involved in informing and influencing personnel to support and drive mitigation and adaptation initiatives across different functions and units.

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