Inequality and Governance in an Uncertain World: Perspectives on Democratic & Autocratic Governments 1666921440, 9781666921441

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Inequality and Governance in an Uncertain World

Inequality and Governance in an Uncertain World Perspectives on Democratic & Autocratic Governments Edited by Rekha Datta and Saliba Sarsar

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www​.rowman​.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE Copyright © 2023 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Datta, Rekha, editor. | Sarsar, Saliba G., 1955- editor. Title: Inequality and governance in an uncertain world : perspectives on democratic & autocratic governments / edited by Rekha Datta and Saliba Sarsar. Description: Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2023. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2023011281 (print) | LCCN 2023011282 (ebook) | ISBN 9781666921441 (cloth) | ISBN 9781666921458 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Equality--Government policy. | Social policy. | Social structure. | Democracy. | Authoritarianism--Social aspects. | COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020---Political aspects. | COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020---Social aspects. Classification: LCC JC575 .I55 2023 (print) | LCC JC575  (ebook) | DDC 320.01/1–dc23/eng/20230405 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023011281 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023011282 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

To honor all those on the front lines of the COVID-19 global pandemic and those resisting autocratic governments and policies; To remember all those whom we lost in these battles; and To reaffirm that we will work together toward a future of freedom, social justice, and dignity for all.

Contents

Acknowledgments ix Introduction‌‌‌‌ Rekha Datta and Saliba Sarsar

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Chapter 1: Culture, Governance, and the Politics of Inequality in Africa: A Focus on Nigeria Julius O. Adekunle‌‌

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Chapter 2: The Middle East and North Africa: A Region of Inequalities 39 Saliba Sarsar Chapter 3: Persistent Gender-Based Social and Economic Inequalities in India Abha S. Sood Chapter 4: Growing Inequality and Problems of Governance: Threats to Democracy and Human Security in Bangladesh Golam M. Mathbor

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Chapter 5: The Expansion of Governmental Control in China due to the COVID-19 Pandemic Peter W. Liu

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Chapter 6: Strongman on a Tightrope: Achievements and Failures of Putin’s Autocracy in Russia Thomas S. Pearson

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Chapter 7: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Policy Choices in Eastern Europe Kevin L. Dooley

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Chapter 8: The Pandemic, Politics, and Populism in Three Western European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, France, and Italy Kenneth L. Campbell Chapter 9: “Speech Now,” but Not with a Bullhorn: Political Misinformation in the Age of Super PACs in the United States Joseph N. Patten

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Chapter 10: Guided by the Light of Freedom: Black Women’s 100-Year Struggle for the Ballot in the United States, 1865–1965 223 Hettie V. Williams and Denis Long Chapter 11: Coloniality and COVID-19 in Mexico Manuel Chávez



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Chapter 12: Inequality and Governance across World Regions: A Concluding Perspective Stephen J. Chapman‌‌

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Suggested Bibliography

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Index



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About the Editors and Contributors



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Acknowledgments

Nelson Mandela is said to have once famously remarked that in order to safeguard equitable distribution of wealth, opportunity, and power in society, everyone will need to work together. In a world where individual freedoms and fundamental rights are facing impediments in democratic and autocratic societies and as the world community struggles to overcome the onslaught of a resilient global pandemic, that need to work together for more equitable public policies is urgent and ubiquitous. This volume is a manifestation of social scientists and humanist educators working together to offer a knowledge platform to explore the vicissitudes of inequality and their impact on the erosion of individual rights in democratic and autocratic societies. The editors would like to acknowledge the help of everyone involved in this project. More specifically, we thank the authors for their contribution. Our sincere gratitude to them for gifting their expertise and time to creating the core content chapters of this book. We thank Joseph Parry and the staff and reviewers for Lexington Books of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers who took part in the review process, enhancing the quality and presentation of the book. We thank our families, our students and colleagues, and Monmouth University for providing continued support, encouragement, and inspiration. We acknowledge the Freed Foundation’s Endowed Chair in Social Sciences for providing financial support. Without all that continued support, this book would not have come to fruition. For all that and more, we express our sincere appreciation to everyone. For all errors and shortcomings of the book, our humble apologies. Rekha Datta, PhD, and Saliba Sarsar, PhD, Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey, USA

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Introduction‌‌‌‌ Rekha Datta and Saliba Sarsar

“Democracy is in crisis around the world, appearing to be imperiled in various degrees in many countries and most regions”—that is the somber note on which the epilogue of Democracy in Crisis around the World1 ended. The findings vindicated the erosion of democratic principles evident in the rise of populism and the weakening of political institutions and processes in many of the countries the authors examined in the volume. The slide of democratic countries toward authoritarianism in this shifting continuum underscored an urge to study both democratic and autocratic governments more intentionally, focusing on complex nuances of both kinds of systems in this sequel volume. Moreover, the chapters and analyses in the first volume concluded at a critical cutoff time when the COVID-19 pandemic was beginning to spread, ushering in a health catastrophe with global outreach and persistent challenges that threatened the health and livelihoods of millions of people around the world. More than two years since the initial COVID outbreak in late 2019, with new variants such as Delta and Omicron continuing its presence, the impact of the pandemic on individual and collective freedoms, as well as the role of the state in ensuring public health security along with the pressures of existing disparities and divisions in society, present vital governance challenges in both democratic and autocratic governments. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has complicated matters, adding to the regional and global uncertainties. Alongside inherent structural inequalities and institutions and processes that challenge democracy, how such disruptions will affect governance around the world thus remains a question of urgent and utmost importance. To reiterate, for the greater part of the past two years, a tiny virus has disrupted life as we have come to know and experience as normal. While there have been other pandemics more recently, this time it is reminiscent of 1918, when the world grappled with the deadly flu, which sickened approximately 500 million people and killed 50 million globally.2 Between early 2020 and 1

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November 2022, an estimated 643 million people around the world have been stricken with COVID-19, and about 6.62 million people have already died from the disease. The countries that have been worst hit include the United States (100 million cases and 1,102,668 deaths), followed by India (44 million cases and 530,586 deaths), France (37 million cases and 158,163 deaths), Germany (36 million and 156,613 deaths), and Brazil (35 million cases and 689,003 deaths).3 While there are some countries, such as Chad, Yemen, and Nicaragua, where the spread of the virus has not been of the scale experienced in the countries listed above, practically every country has had to tackle COVID-19 since early 2020. Several countries have struggled with hospital capacity to care for the sick, and access to medical care and health care facilities has challenged many. While COVID does not yet seem to be done with its global infection spree, democratic and autocratic governments alike are having to make policy adjustments to mitigate its impact on citizens. INEQUALITY AND GOVERNANCE IN UNCERTAIN TIMES Even as the pandemic inched toward an endemic state, access to affordable public health resources continued to affect governance and human security in democratic and autocratic political systems alike. Coupled with the structural inequalities already deeply rooted in most societies, policy decisions surrounding access to resources may threaten the very edifice of inclusivity and unity and cause divisions within societies with unpredictable consequences. The pandemic notwithstanding, the US Capitol riot in Washington, DC, on January 6, 2021, by right-wing extremist groups underscores the uncertainties embedded in American society, which threaten the stability and unity of the country. We were reminded of Abraham Lincoln’s famous speech from the Illinois statehouse on June 16, 1858. In the “House Divided” speech, Lincoln reflected on the division created by slavery in the United States, saying, I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall— but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other.4

Lincoln’s famous speech was in the context of the abolition of slavery and stressed that “a house divided against itself cannot stand.” Arguably, the division of America during the Civil War was deeper than most contemporary ideological or other divergences in the country. Nonetheless, more than a century and a half after the Civil War, fissures continue in American society. The

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January 6 insurgency is symptomatic of deepening splits within American society and present a challenge to the strength of representative institutions in the United States. In addition, we witness how ideological differences often lead to policies that continue to marginalize people of color, women, immigrants, and other minority and protected groups. Recent scholarship has examined rising polarities and concerted efforts such as this raid and the potential and portends of such internal dissent and discords leading to internal schisms akin to a civil war in the American democracy.5 While much of the contemporary scholarship and public discourse examine the underpinnings of issues of inclusion and unity in a democracy, during the past decade or so, autocratic governments are also experiencing similar challenges and domestic dissent. Starting from Tunisia and spreading to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and other countries, democratic protests during the Arab Spring movement have led to the successful overthrow of several authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. Various degrees of authoritarianism are reemerging in some of these countries, while others remain autocratic in the region and elsewhere around the world. Evidently, during crisis points such as the current pandemic, political systems, democratic and autocratic ones alike, may experience the flaring up of old wounds that are traceable to structural inequities with cultural and historical roots and access to resources. During the early months of the pandemic, for example, the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis in the summer of 2020 unleashed widespread anger and nationwide protest, with demonstrators agitating against the use of excessive force by some law enforcement officials and systemic racism undergirding police brutality. “The Black Lives Matter movement has gone global too, inspiring activists from Europe to Africa, Asia to Oceania. Remarkably, international attention has shifted from the pandemic to US protests.”6 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS The basic premise of this book is that governments have had to adopt policies to mitigate the virus to keep their constituents safe as well as maintain economic viability and overall stability. In addition, the pandemic has exposed and underscored some of the long-standing inherent inequities in societies and opened old wounds of discrimination, dissent, and division. Governance in such uncertain times needs to focus on the short-term needs but cannot lose sight of the longer-term impact of structural inequalities and cultural and social fissures embedded in political systems.

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Inequality and Governance in Political and Social Theory and Economic History The search for good governance has been prevalent since ancient times; through the medieval period, the Renaissance, and the social contract theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and into modern times. Among others, it is evident in the establishment of an ideal society for justice as in Plato’s Republic and for the public good as in Aristotle’s Politics and in the creation of responsive and accountable institutions for good governance through various kinds of social contracts between the rulers and the ruled. With the onset of the liberal tradition, the focus on individual liberty and protection from governmental excesses became the focus of social and political thought. By the eighteenth century, a strive toward a more egalitarian society became part of the understanding in social transitions ushered in by transformative movements such as the French Revolution. Inspired by the French Revolution, especially for those Europeans seeking freedom from religious persecution, the pursuit of liberty and equality became the linchpins of the American Declaration of Independence. This was behind the early acceptance of the “All men are created equal” mantra. The American Pledge of Allegiance declares the promise of “one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” Thus, in this discourse, the goal of equality seems to go hand in hand with liberty. While there seems to be unequivocal acceptance of egalitarianism as an ideal societal goal, implementation of equality often creates ideological and practical divergences. Much debate surrounds the extent to which equality forms the essence of governance in capitalist systems based on free market forces. Governments are expected to allow their citizens to pursue their economic well-being in this free enterprise model. This conventional perspective has attributed laissez-faire and free market capitalism to Adam Smith’s 1776 classic The Wealth of Nations.7 Capitalist systems have typically embraced this model of egalitarianism to mean equality of opportunity, whereas Marxist philosophy and left-leaning ideologues have argued for governments to guarantee equality of outcomes, such as Karl Marx’s notion of “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.” Marx’s critique was that the polarized class (between the workers and the owners of capital) system created by capitalist societies undermined equality.8 A closer look at Smith’s work reveals that he was supportive of some healthy competition that would galvanize economic activity and productivity and that may result in economic inequality. But he expressed distress over extreme economic inequality. Ultimately, Smith worried that with excessive income inequality, culturally there will be more affinity with the wealthy and disdain for the poor. This would harm both morality and happiness in

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society.9 Even though we do not see a widespread acceptance in the public discourse of the moral argument that Smith was making, we do see a general dissatisfaction from both the right and the left on the impact of inequality. In recent years, much of the dissent and economic angst erupting in democracies around the world seems to have emanated from a sense of frustration with the growing income gap in capitalist societies, stagnant or reduced wages, and underemployment or unemployment, leading to an affordability gap to access vital resources such as education, health care, and so on. However divergent their rationale and sources of discontent may be, it is apparent that both advocates of leftist egalitarianism as well as those of rightist fundamentalism are disgruntled. From the Wall Street protests to Brexit, from the rise of populist leaders in European countries to the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency, recent political outcries in many capitalist economies have been symptomatic of antiestablishment hostility rooted in economic inequality and the offshoring of jobs, among others. INEQUALITY AND GOVERNANCE IN DEMOCRACIES AND AUTOCRACIES IN UNCERTAIN TIMES Whether we return to the classics or assess the state of widespread public angst, at the core of social contract lies the aspiration of all people to be treated equally by the state. Good governance assumes that public servants and policymakers will uphold the equality of all its citizens and not discriminate among class, race, gender, religion, and so on.10 As a corollary, social and economic inequality are often the root of much of the dissent and frustration with political leaders and authorities and policies. To be sure, particularly in times of uncertainty and public health crises, part of that social contract among citizens and the state brings with it an expectation that governments ought to make the health and well-being of their citizens a top priority. In fact, even when there is no public health crisis, governments ought to make accessible and affordable health care a main concern in its public discourse. Writing in a pre-pandemic context, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen noted that despite India’s celebrated status of being the largest democracy, the country struggles when it comes to health and other social indicators. While there was impressive economic growth over the past decade or so, that growth was not equitable, leaving large sections of the population without access to health care, meaningful education, and sanitation.11 During the early phases of the pandemic and mandatory lockdowns in India, migrant laborers and the poor were unevenly affected, many losing their sources of livelihood and being stranded due to the shutdown of public transportation.

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Ensuring economic viability, public health, and overall human security are concomitant areas of responsibilities for every government. Even as governance has been sliding toward authoritarianism in many parts of the world, democracies and autocracies alike have had to prioritize the health and safety of their citizens during the pandemic. During these past two years, governments around the world have introduced lockdowns, mask, and vaccine mandates, often inviting criticism from several sections of their citizenry. Forced to respond to the dent in economic viability and revenues following the restrictions, governments have had to distribute subsidies or relax the controls to allow businesses to thrive. Closing of public gatherings as in restaurants, testing and masking mandates for travel and indoor gatherings, and limiting sports and performance arts events and travel have been welcomed as well as dissented by many. It is likely that some of this discontent will be played out during future rounds of elections and power transition. During this latest and perhaps one of the most persistent and ubiquitous health crises in about a century, how governments have undertaken their role of safeguarding public health, economic security, and personal freedoms is of utmost importance in understanding public opinion and how it will affect democratic decision making and political transitions.12 Drèze and Sen had argued that the democratic process tends to tackle issues that arise in the political discourse. In the case of India, despite inequities, the democratic culture of dissent seems to be strong, even during the pandemic. In a related issue, farmers protested the government’s strict regulations that would adversely affect them. After about a yearlong sustained protest that started in 2020, the protesters were successful in having the government withdraw and rescind the proposed legislation and recalibrate their policy.13 In less democratic regimes, where people have a more constricting space to maneuver, infections and deaths from COVID-19 and its variants have been relatively limited. In the Middle East and North Africa, that came at a heavy cost to the governed, including increased violations of human rights and severe restrictions on individual and collective freedoms as well as on the media.14 As the 2020–2021 Amnesty International report explains, Governments across the region responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by declaring states of emergency or passing legislation with excessive restrictions on freedom of expression. People were prosecuted for their legitimate criticism of their governments’ handed response to the pandemic. Health workers protested a lack protection at work, including inadequate protective gear and access to testing, but faced arrest and prosecution for raising concerns about conditions of work and public health. Governments discriminated in their responses to the pandemic, including in vaccine distribution.15

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More autocratic regimes have implemented stringent measures to handle the coronavirus outbreak. In China, for example, a national emergency was declared and a “zero-COVID” approach followed, resorting to aggressive testing, quarantining “high-risk” individuals, deploying sophisticated digital surveillance technology, and sealing off more than 760 million people in their houses.16 Recently, to contain the spread of COVID variants, Chinese authorities imposed new lockdowns on millions of residents in Xi’an and Yuzhou, but these measures are proving to have enormous human cost.17 In the United States, along with the George Floyd protests, at a deeper level, the pandemic has exposed some long-standing structural inequalities that challenge equity, one of the core principles of democratic governance. Although the virus does not discriminate whom it infects, its effect varies depending on several factors, including biological and socioeconomic ones. The Economic Policy Institute assesses that although the current strain of the coronavirus is one that humans have never experienced before, the disparate racial impact of the virus is deeply rooted in historic and ongoing social and economic injustices. Persistent racial disparities in health status, access to health care, wealth, employment, wages, housing, income, and poverty all contribute to greater susceptibility to the virus—both economically and physically.18

Although this assessment is primarily based on US data, the global relevance and significance of this disparate impact of the pandemic seem relevant as well. Research on public health crises of the past also demonstrates such inequities. Princeton historian Keith Wailoo draws from interdisciplinary findings to establish the interplay of race and epidemics. He posits how cholera, influenza, AIDS, COVID-19, and other epidemics “give rise to distinctive, recurring racial scripts about bodies and identities.”19 The extent to which COVID-19 reveals some of the racial disparities and access challenges based on poverty, race, ethnicity, and so on will be of critical importance. In fact, as identified above, a major contribution of this book will be the premise that even though the intersections have typically been discussed in the literature in the context of democratic governments, the global pandemic and movements such as the Arab Spring will force autocratic governments to become more responsive to them. Thereby, this book will fill an important gap in the literature on comparative politics with its inclusion of inequality in autocratic governments. Authoritarian governments that have instituted some sort of electoral mechanism for regime change are more concerned about inequality than those whose regime continuity is not guided by electoral outcomes.20 As already mentioned, contextualizing the Capitol riot of January 6,

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2021, and the rise of extremist politics in America, recent scholarship sheds light on the possibility of democracies sliding into autocracies.21 ORGANIZATIONAL AND THEMATIC SEQUENCE OF THIS BOOK Taking into consideration the varying structural and policy challenges in particular societies, the chapters in this book include an exploration of governance in uncertain times by analyzing pandemic policy responses for public health and safety within democratic and autocratic governments. Such policies include various stages of lockdown practices, vaccine mandates, vaccine distribution, and policies that affected wages, employment, access to resources, and so on. The chapters examine how such policies dovetail into the challenges of socioeconomic inequality, frustration, and fragmentation stemming from divisions based on culture, religion, ethnicity, gender, class, race, and caste. One early account suggests that the pandemic is likely to exacerbate and accelerate the erosion of democracy further. Freedom House, the nongovernmental, nonpartisan, independent American watchdog organization that conducts surveys and assesses indicators of freedom and democracy around the world, dedicated a recent study to the crisis of democracy brought on by the global pandemic. The October 2020 press release of the report, titled Democracy under Lockdown, summarized the grim loss of democracy in the first year of the pandemic thus: Since the coronavirus outbreak began, the condition of democracy and human rights has worsened in 80 countries, with particularly sharp deterioration in struggling democracies and highly repressive states, according to the experts surveyed by the project. More than 60 percent of the respondents predicted that the pandemic’s impact on political rights and civil liberties in their countries of focus would be mostly negative for the next three to five years.22

Thus, even prior to and beyond the crisis posed by the pandemic, whether it is through taking to the streets or through the ballot box, it is evident that people around the world have been rising up and seeking accountability from their leadership. In addition, and perhaps to curb such outbursts, as seen in Democracy in Crisis around the World, many democratic leaders have sought to tighten their leashes on individual freedom of expression and have been sliding toward autocratic strategies and policies. Continuing an ongoing concern about such movements of democratic governance toward authoritarianism and the rising tide of protests in autocratic governments, this book contributes to the existing scholarship in the

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area in several ways. First, it will enhance and expand the current focus on democracy in the scholarship by including an examination of the challenges of governance in both democratic and autocratic societies. Second, starting with the contemporary pressure points in society, this book will delve deeper into societal and economic inequalities that have deeper and complex roots in society. Thereby, it will enrich the scholarship of governance in the context of societal and economic inequalities historically. Finally, this book will reexamine the prevalent assumption that autocratic societies are more homogeneous than democratic ones. The discussion and analysis covering a wide spectrum of autocratic and democratic societies will thus enhance the understanding of complexities and nuances under diverse political systems and governance structures. The following sections will present some details of these and other unique and exciting features and contributions of this book from both an academic and a general interest perspective. This book adopts a framework that is adapted from “intersectionality,” a notion introduced by critical race theorist Kimberlé W. Crenshaw.23 By incorporating this framework into a study of democracy, this book will provide a more complex and nuanced examination of democratic governance. Studies on political systems tend to consider aggregations of “citizens” or “people” when looking at institutional politics. Such analyses tend to adopt a broad brush with which they sweep up the differences that exist and the resultant outcome of policies that tend to favor majorities and ignore minority groups. The data clearly show the differential impact of policies on indicators of gender, race, ethnicity, and so on. The goal is to integrate the data within a conceptual framework when analyzing governance priorities and policy impact. Alongside issues of race, inequities based on economic class differences, gender, caste, and religion have been at the core of challenging countries that may have a long trajectory of democratic traditions and institutions. Some of these discrepancies have been exacerbated by and reflected on the public health access issues revealed by the pandemic, while others have persisted through other systemic cracks and structural flaws in democratic governance structures. This volume explores the nuances and interconnections of democracy with various ideologically directed policies and the realities of race, caste, class, gender, ethnicity, culture, and religion as expressed in different countries or world regions. Within this framework, the chapters present aspects of intersectionality in which democracies and autocracies in select countries are addressing inequalities. The special focus on how public health (i.e., the pandemic) is addressed given the diversity of environments and contexts will further address a contemporary concern that will have a lasting impact on access, dissent, rights, and sustainable lives of individuals in a democracy. There is evidence that discriminatory policies targeting African Americans in the United States cost

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everyone in society and that removing such practices would benefit everyone.24 By removing barriers and providing for equality and the upliftment of the vulnerable, governments can renew their pledge to create public good where each citizen flourishes, leading to the good of all. In terms of structural layout, this book will attempt to mirror the previous volume, Democracy in Crisis around the World, and, like it, will cover history and politics and cultural and economic nuances leading to structural and systemic inequalities in order to examine different paths to democracy in nine world regions (sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, East Asia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North America, and Latin America). It will thus enhance the previous volume by adding more focus on issues of race, caste, gender, class, religion, culture, and ethnicity as some leading countries around the world are experiencing, within and beyond the premises of public health access, as substantiated during the pandemic. The chapter by Julius O. Adekunle, “Culture, Governance, and the Politics of Inequality in Africa: A Focus on Nigeria,” examines how the culture of political domination by a single party, ethnic group, or religion affects governance, and how it has also perpetuated deep-seated inequality that is endemic in Nigerian society. There is a wide gap between the leaders and followers, and leadership resides in a few members of the political elite. The limited access to power, the exclusionary system in government, and the dominance of the political elite reflect the inequality in African politics, including Nigeria. The patriarchal system in the country prevents women from reaching and holding high political offices. Even prior to the pandemic, public health inequities barred resources from reaching the common people. With the onset of the pandemic, the elite scrambled for treatment, while others succumbed to the disease for lack of treatment. These trends present obstacles to equitable democratic governance in Nigeria and in Africa more broadly. Saliba Sarsar’s chapter on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) reflects the region’s inequality. It finds that the region as a whole has a small minority (10 percent) of the population earning close to 80 percent of the income, resulting in deep economic inequities and a “dual social structure.” The onset of COVID has exasperated and extenuated this inequity, leading to huge job losses and poverty. Over the past decade or so, the region has also witnessed popular protests and regime changes in several of the MENA countries. The chapter looks at inequities in income, wealth, gender, and internet access and finds that despite changes in the power structure and reforms, inequality in society has hardly seen a dent. Power concentration has sustained the political elites, and this does not portend justice and fairness in society, perpetuating inequities and the dual social structure and authoritarian tendencies. By addressing economic, gender, and digital inequalities, the region can achieve democratic stability and equitable prosperity.

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Abha S. Sood’s chapter on India, the world’s largest and one the most complex democracies, takes a nuanced view of inequalities embedded in how the system addresses gender discrimination and inequality. In the past seven decades since its independence, through its constitutional structure, electoral processes, and commitment to pluralism and secularism, India has created pathways toward a stable democratic destiny. However, persistent forms of inequality are evident in economic, social, and regional variations, raising questions about governance and policies and their impact of creating a more equitable society. The COVID-19 pandemic has further intensified such inequalities, underscoring how the pandemic affected low-wage women disproportionately and how unemployment and lack of access to health care have particularly disenfranchised Dalit, poor, and tribal women. One of the intriguing findings of the chapter is how recent trends in India show that gender inequity is not only a matter of male–female inequality. Even among women, the intersections of class, caste, religion, and related factors are the sources of discrimination among groups of women, resulting in denial of individual rights, a cornerstone of any democracy. In the chapter titled “Growing Inequality and Problems of Governance: Threats to Democracy and Human Security in Bangladesh,” Golam M. Mathbor incorporates elements of human security and offers a comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted structural and cultural constraints on democracy that confront Bangladesh. The remarkable economic recovery of this country, once considered among the world’s poorest and vulnerable to natural disasters, with a steady 6 to 7 percent growth in gross domestic product over the past decade or so, has helped to move Bangladesh into the middle-incomecountries category in 2020 in world development rankings. The chapter deftly demonstrates the multidimensional intersectionality that is challenging democratic governance in Bangladesh. It includes the absence of electoral fairness, violations of various forms of free speech and human rights, and conflicts emanating from the role of extremist Islamic groups and political parties, undermining the rights of minorities and other religious groups. Persistent and crosscutting pressures from such factors are contributing to inequality, threatening democratic values such as equitable education, political and religious freedom, and inclusion and diversity, among others. The chapter shows how social indicators are critical, as are areas such as disaster and COVID management, to ensure equitable access and resource distribution. In short, human security issues intersect with democratic governance along with political freedoms and constitutional guarantees. In “The Expansion of Governmental Control in China due to the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Peter Liu begins with an overview of income inequality and ethnic tensions in China, such as the conflict in Xinjiang, human rights abuses of the Uyghur, the recent and long-drawn-out protests in Inner Mongolia,

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Hong Kong, and the Tibetan region. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintained its stronghold and heavy hand in these tensions, just as it has and is responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. The chapter details the steps and policies that China undertook to eradicate COVID, which are reminiscent of its not-so-latent totalitarian foundation. This chapter is unique in that it essentially analyzes how the extreme measures that the government has undertaken to get to Xi Jinping’s Dynamic Zero COVID Policy have become omnipresent, affecting every individual. Many in the CCP find an opportunity to extend this authoritarian control over its population indefinitely. Elements of authoritarianism are a mainstay in Russia, as we see in Thomas S. Pearson’s chapter, “Strongman on a Tightrope: Achievements and Failures of Putin’s Autocracy in Russia.” In it, he takes a journey starting in February 2014 and with Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea. Meandering into historical and nuanced developments rooted in the cult of personality, the chapter argues that despite using a mix of fear and propaganda, Putin’s Machiavellian moves to annex territory, garner popular support, and even use separatists to weed out his opponents in Ukraine have effectuated mixed outcomes. He has successfully used the model of a “personalist autocracy” to seek his goals, including invasions such as the latest one in Ukraine. However, the latter’s dogged resistance and the support of the West, along with the failure of his administration to appease religious discrimination and economic crises and to adequately tackle the public health crisis of the pandemic, reveal possible fault lines in his authoritarian style. The chapter concludes that unless economic revival becomes a reality, autocrats such as Putin and his compatriots in neighboring Belarus, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union, face an uncertain future. As the discussion moves to the European region, Kevin L. Dooley’s “The COVID-19 Pandemic and Policy Choices in Eastern Europe” provides an insight into the rise of populist parties that have undermined the democratic path in many states in Central and Eastern Europe. The promises that came with the wave of democratic transition that replaced the dwindling Soviet empire have been eroding, perpetuating illiberal trends. Focusing on Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s Law and Justice Party and their respective leaders, the chapter analyzes how democratic values have declined and how extreme executive measures, emergency powers, and arbitrary and discriminatory policies toward the region’s most vulnerable populations have become a mainstay in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic provided more opportunity for autocrats, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, to introduce unilateral measures that ultimately would help them reinforce their authoritarian agendas. The chapter concludes on the somber note that the war in Ukraine may bear portends of strengthening the illiberal agendas of the region’s smaller and neighboring countries.

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In the chapter titled “The Pandemic, Politics, and Populism in Three Western European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, France, and Italy,” Kenneth Campbell looks at how the COVID-19 pandemic has challenged the already stressed governments since the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, which had ushered in “antisystem politics” and culture wars that have the potential to destabilize the political system. The chapter focuses on the rise of populism in Britain and the concomitant support of Brexit. France witnessed more of a move toward centrist leadership under Emmanuel Macron, which also nurtured rising rightist populist parties and declining of left-of-center ones. Italy too has been experiencing a rise in right-wing populism. This overall trend in all three countries has also intersected with inequalities and discrimination against various class and gender-based identities and issues, such as immigration and nationalism. Rising pressure for an effective and quick public health response to COVID-19, scientific knowledge and availability of vaccines, misinformation, and uncertainties associated with the early fatalities taxed the already existing political and cultural divisions. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the comparative effectiveness of COVID-19 policies in these governments and the relative strength of democracy in these states, hinting at their fault lines that might hasten their drift toward autocracy in the future. Systemic inequalities may be embedded in nuanced processes and campaign finance laws that allow big money, corruption, and political misinformation to enter into and dilute democratic outcomes. Joseph N. Patten’s chapter, “‘Speech Now,’ but Not with a Bullhorn: Political Misinformation in the Age of Super PACs in the United States,” analyzes how recent court decisions, such as Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) and SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission (2010), have deepened ideological schisms and fueled the rise of contentious politics, especially between right- and left-wing populist factions of the major US political parties. They have generated the spread of super political action committees (PACs), which are acting as “shadow parties,” infiltrating the system with large sums of dark money and affecting election outcomes to ensure that the congressional races go their partisan way. The discussion validates the long-standing Madisonian warning of the divisive and destabilizing role of factions stemming from economic inequalities. Furthermore, like other countries, as the United States also grapples with the global COVID-19 pandemic, many super PACs are funneling significant funds to engage in misinformation campaigns against COVID vaccines and the disease. The chapter recommends the creation of a universal campaign finance standard for federal candidates and external political organizations to help prevent superrich and partisan donors from influencing campaigns and elections disenfranchising low-income voters. Such

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Rekha Datta and Saliba Sarsar

measures would also help mitigate the power of super PACs from spreading misinformation and help mend partisan and racial schisms in the union. In the chapter titled “Guided by the Light of Freedom: Black Women’s 100-Year Struggle for the Ballot in the United States, 1865–1965,” Hettie V. Williams and Denis Long offer a sojourn of the role of African American women and the intersectional approach they have taken throughout history to combat racism and sexism. The narrative includes abolitionist African American women and their role in the liberation movement since 1865 and the suffrage movement to the contemporary movement for the systemic removal of racial inequalities led by the likes of Stacey Abrams. The chapter highlights how, during the hundred-year struggle from 1865 to 1965, Black women have used various platforms and confronted and sustained discrimination, intimidation, violence, and other barriers to accessing the ballot, continuing through organizations such as the Fair Fight group. The chapter outlines how discrimination and inequities surrounding the contours of race and sex are deeply embedded in the electoral process and have also been evident during the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of health care access and medical benefits. This discussion thus underscores that the inclusion of African Americans in the electoral process is a significant factor in ensuring the success of individual rights and freedoms in the American democratic system. As the book tackles inequalities in democratic and autocratic governments from a multidimensional perspective in different countries and regions of the world with a particular reference to their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, it behooves us to take a look at Mexico, where the last great pandemic had its origins and which became the edifice of a hierarchical society that perpetuates in the country in contemporary times. In “Coloniality and COVID-19 in Mexico,” Manuel Chávez explains how political structures in Mexico are reminiscent of European colonial structures propagated by French and Spanish and, later, US influences. With globalization and its concomitant neoliberal mantra of privatization, the poor and indigenous classes and groups slid into increasing immiserization, perpetuating inequalities. COVID-19 exasperated the system and the gaps already present in Mexico. Unemployment in informal sectors and among the female labor force and the poor increased, as did the gap between the rich and the poor. The pandemic exposed gaps in the different sectors of the economy and access to health care and showed an uptick in social, criminal, and domestic violence. The discussion also reveals the intersection between national and international systems frontiers. Despite the pandemic being characterized by the World Health Organization as a global health crisis, international partnerships, such as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), did not provide Mexico with access to US and Canadian vaccines, proving that the core–periphery inequalities continue to be barriers between wealthy and poor nations. As the

Introduction

15

world community becomes more and more interdependent, economic cooperation often spills over to political and social values, determining the success and propagation of democratic systems over authoritarian ones. Putting all these trends into perspective, in the concluding chapter to the volume, “Inequality and Governance across World Regions: A Concluding Perspective,” Stephen J. Chapman provides a general overview of how inequality and governance are measured. This exercise helps to show some patterns and trends of inequality and governance examined throughout the other chapters. The analysis that follows accounts for the variation across the different countries and regions covered in the volume. Among the variables presented are governmental structure, freedoms, access to health care, and the general wealth of the country. This understanding is important to assess the ebb and flow of inequality and governance and the shifts from democracy to autocracy and vice versa. As this volume and another calendar year of the global pandemic draw to a close, a defiant Ukraine continues to resist Russia’s unprovoked aggression, and the people of China unleash a new, historical awakening through widespread protests against Xi Jinping’s excessively stringent zero-COVID policies. The portends of these and related manifestations may be too early to predict, but the book ends with the hope that just as the world has been witnessing a shift toward autocracy, reverse transitions toward democracy are also possible through a renewal of the social contract, calling for more equitable social, economic, and health policies; obliterating the intersections of inequality; and trudging toward a more sustainable future for all. Still, the fragility of democracies is enhanced by the sobering reality of the climate crisis and the nefarious nature of disinformation through social media. The former calls for future efforts toward examining democracy and climate distress. It is already impacting our present and our future in multiple ways, from global health, migration, war, and more. The impact of disinformation on democracy has been introduced in this book and calls for further exploration and reflection. Maria Ressa’s book How to Stand Up to a Dictator: The Fight for Our Future25 cautions us and reminds us of how governments and people must work together to guard against the hate networks that are dissipating and infiltrating through our digital devices, numbing our senses, and delivering a slow death to democracy through multiple cuts. The triumph of reason and science will deliver us from disinformation and dystopic governments, be it for defense against diseases or dictators. The future of democracy remains uncertain, but the faith in reason should be reassuring to future scholars and students of individual rights and democratic freedoms for all.

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NOTES 1. Saliba Sarsar and Rekha Datta, eds., Democracy in Crisis around the World (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021). 2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), “1918 Pandemic (H1N1 Virus),” March 20, 2019, https:​//​www​.cdc​.gov​/flu​/pandemic​-resources​/1918​-pandemic​-h1n1​.html. 3. The data, rounded up as of January 2022, are from “COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic,” January 12, 2022, https:​//​www​.worldometers​.info​/coronavirus​/​#countries. 4. “House Divided Speech, Springfield,” Illinois, June 16, 1858, Abraham Lincoln Online, http:​//​www​.abrahamlincolnonline​.org​/lincoln​/speeches​/house​.htm. 5. Barbara F. Walter, How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them (New York: Crown, 2022). 6. Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The George Floyd Protests: A Global Rallying Cry for Democracy,” June 11, 2020, https:​//​www​.csis​.org​/analysis​/ george​-floyd​-protests​-global​-rallying​-cry​-democracy. 7. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Oxford: Bibliomania.com, 2002), https:​//​ lccn​.loc​.gov​/2002564559. 8. Allen W. Wood, The Free Development of Each: Studies on Freedom, Right, and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 9. Dennis C. Rasmussen, “Adam Smith on What Is Wrong with Economic Inequality,” American Political Science Review 110, no. 2 (May 2016): 342–52. 10. Andreas P. Kyriacou, Inequality and Governance (London: Routledge, 2021). 11. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). 12. “Trudeau Invokes Emergency Powers to Shut Down Canada’s Protests,” The Economist, February 19, 2022, https:​//​www​.shorturl​.at​/bjvR7; “Justin Trudeau’s Crackdown on Protests Could Make Things Worse,” The Economist, February 19, 2022, https:​//​www​.economist​.com​/leaders​/justin​-trudeaus​-crackdown​-on​-protests​ -could​-make​-things​-worse​/21807707. 13. Karan Deep Singh, “India’s Farmers Call Off Yearlong Protest against Hated Farm Laws,” December 9, 2021, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​/2021​/12​/09​/world​/asia​/ india​-farmer​-protests​-end​.html. 14. See Charles W. Dunne, Authoritarianism and the Middle East in the Time of COVID-19,” Arab Center, Washington, DC, https:​//​arabcenterdc​.org​/resource​/ authoritarianism​-and​-the​-middle​-east​-in​-the​-time​-of​-covid​-19, and Youssef Cherif, Hafsa Halawa, and Özge Zihnioğlu, “The Coronavirus and Civic Activism in the Middle East and North Africa,” Carnegie Europe, December 7, 2020, https:​ //​carnegieeurope​.eu​/2020​/12​/07​/coronavirus​-and​-civic​-activism​-in​-middle​-east​-and​ -north​-africa​-pub​-83142. 15. Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of the World’s Human Rights,” 49,https:​//​www​.amnesty​.org​/en​/documents​/pol10​/3202​ /2021​/en.

Introduction

17

16. Raymond Zhong and Paul Mozur, “To Tame Coronavirus, Mao-Style Social Control Blankets China,” New York Times, February 15, 2020, https:​//​www​.nytimes​ .com​/2020​/02​/15​/business​/china​-coronavirus​-lockdown​.html. 17. Jessie Yeung, Nectar Gan, and Yong Xiong, “Xi’an Lockdown Brings Heartbreak and Dysfunction as Political Pressure to Contain Outbreak Grows,” CNN.com, January 6, 2022, https:​//​www​.cnn​.com​/2022​/01​/06​/china​/xian​-lockdown​-zero​-covid​ -intl​-hnk​/index​.html. 18. Valerie Wilson, “Inequities Exposed: How COVID-19 Widened Racial Inequities in Education, Health, and the Workforce,” Economic Policy Institute, June 22, 2020, https:​//​www​.epi​.org​/publication​/covid​-19​-inequities​-wilson​-testimony. 19. K. Wailoo, “Spectacles of Difference: The Racial Scripting of Epidemic Disparities,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 94, no. 4 (2020): 602–25, https:​//​doi​.org​ /10​.1353​/bhm​.2020​.0085. 20. Terence K. Teo, “Inequality under Authoritarian Rule,” Government and Opposition 56, no. 2 (2021): 201–25, doi:10.1017/gov.2019.19. 21. Walter, How Civil Wars Start. 22. Freedom House, “Democracy under Lockdown—The Impact of COVID-19 on Global Freedom,” October 2, 2020, https:​//​freedomhouse​.org​/article​/new​-report​ -democracy​-under​-lockdown​-impact​-covid​-19​-global​-freedom. 23. Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 1241–99, https:​//​doi​.org​/10​.2307​/1229039. 24. Heather McGhee, The Sum of Us: What Racism Costs Everyone and How We Can Prosper Together (New York: One World, 2021). 25. Maria Ressa, How to Stand Up to a Dictator: The Fight for Our Future (New York: HarperCollins, 2021).

Chapter 1

Culture, Governance, and the Politics of Inequality in Africa A Focus on Nigeria Julius O. Adekunle‌‌

The culture of domination by a political party, ethnic group, or religion has resulted in poor governance and inequality in African countries. Along with ethnic marginalization, there is a noticeable cleavage between the leaders and followers. Leadership rotates among the few political elites. The imbalance in access to power, the exclusiveness in government, and the dominant force of the political elites clearly demonstrate inequality in African politics and governance. In a truly democratic society, there should be equal access to power and economic resources regardless of political views, ethnic background, religious affiliation, or social status. This chapter examines the inequality that exists in politics and governance and how African countries, especially Nigeria, handled health care challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic. The outbreak and quick spread of the COVID-19 virus exposed the weakness and inequality of affordable public health care and resources in Nigeria. The pandemic was global, and the toll for infected cases, deaths, and recovery was staggering; it is not far-fetched that African countries were ill prepared for the magnitude of the pandemic. There have been preexisting challenges surrounding equitable access to health care, but the outbreak of the pandemic only heightened it and the mismanagement in the health care system of African states. Many countries did not have clear health infrastructure or resources to immediately tackle the deadly disease. The response was slow, and the treatment was unequal. While wealthy political elites rushed for medical care overseas, common people died of lack of treatment. According to a report, Nigeria’s political elite were “in a panic mode following the confirmed 19

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Julius O. Adekunle

case” of a top government official in 2020.1 Another report noted that panic “gripped the ruling Zanu PF party after two senior party officials . . . tested positive for COVID-19.”2 Understandably, vaccines were not immediately available to control the spread, but even when available, the privileged class took advantage, and the general population scrambled to be vaccinated. NIGERIA: A HISTORY OF POLITICAL INEQUALITY Historically, Nigeria existed as independent political and cultural units, but in the wake of European imperialism and colonialism, it was forced into a union to form a single political entity. While some societies adopted the centralized form of government with all apparatuses of modern political systems, others thrived as segmentary societies with no formal political institutions. The centralized states engaged in military and expansionist policies to dominate neighboring communities. Even within that period, there was evidence of inequality in getting access to political offices. Powerful ethnic groups or privileged people often dominated over others. In the precolonial political structure, the male-dominated culture hindered women from occupying certain political offices. However, there were women who broke the gender barriers and emerged as powerful contributors to the political development of their respective societies. Among them were Queen Sheba of Saba Kingdom, Alaafin Orompoto of the Oyo Empire, Queen Nzinga of the Ndongo Kingdom, and Queen Amina of Zaria, to mention just a few. In the militaristic kingdom of Ethiopia, Queen Taytu proved that she had the political will and wit to lead her people.3 These women symbolized beauty, power, prosperity, and good governance. They distinguished themselves in politics, diplomacy, economics, and military affairs. While they dominated the history and politics of their respective kingdoms in precolonial times, they have all proven that leadership was not exclusive to men, and they have left remarkable legacies. The coming of the Europeans in the late nineteenth century and the imposition of colonial rule in the early twentieth changed the political map and political system in Nigeria. The erstwhile centralized and stateless systems gave way to the British parliamentary system. The British first created three protectorates: Lagos, Southern, and Northern. In 1861, the Lagos Protectorate was merged with the Southern Protectorate. An element of inequality was established when the British favored the Northern Protectorate, where Islam had dominated for many centuries. The favoritism was purposeful: to avoid military conflict and the disruption of colonial rule. In 1914, Frederick Lugard joined the Northern and Southern protectorates in what was known as the amalgamation of Nigeria. The imposed merger had some inherent problems. The southern educated elites who constituted the core of Nigerian

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nationalists did not embrace the amalgamation. Following constitutional approach, the British tried to appease the nationalists with colonial reforms. For example, there was the Richards Constitution of 1946, which created three regions: Northern Region, Eastern Region, and Western Region. With that regional system, the British introduced a system of unequal patronage to the Northern Protectorate to the detriment of the South, creating a legacy of regional inequality that has continued in postindependence Nigeria. Since independence, Nigeria has not favorably adjusted to the principles and practice of democracy. Against the monarchical political system of the precolonial period, the British had introduced and imposed the parliamentary system, which came with an in-built mechanism for inequality. The parliamentary system had elements of democracy, but the northern political elite had high expectations of having exclusive right to the leadership of the country. The ethnic groups that enjoyed power and dominance during the colonial period became entitled, resulting in the privileged groups arrogating power to themselves. For example, of the past and present heads of state, two came from the east, three from the west, and ten from the north, as shown in table 1.1. Thus, while Nigeria embraced unity at independence, there exist “strong ethnic politics, imbalance in educational level, and different political level between the North and South.”4

Figure 1.1.  Regions of Nigeria prior to Independence. Source: Choices Program, Brown University, https:​//​www​.choices​.edu​/video​/how​-did​-regional​-groups​-in​ -nigeria​-envision​-independence.

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Julius O. Adekunle

Table 1.1. Nigerian Past and Present Leaders Name

Years

Tafawa Balewa (prime minister) Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (president) Gen. Yakubu Gowon (military) Gen. Murtala Muhammed (military) Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (military) Shehu Shagari Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari (military) Gen. Ibrahim Babangida (military) Ernest Shonekan (interim government) Gen. Sani Abacha (military) Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar (military) Olusegun Obasanjo Umaru Yar-Adua Dr. Goodluck Jonathan Muhammadu Buhari Bola Tinubu

1960–1966 1963–1966 1969–1975 1975–1976 1976–1979 1979–1983 1983–1985 1985–1993 1993 1993–1998 1998–1999 1999–2007 2007–2010 2010–2015 2015–2023 2023–

State of Origin

Region

Bauchi Anambra Plateau Kano Ogun Sokoto Katsina Niger Ogun Kano Niger Ogun Katsina Bayelsa Katsina Lagos

North East North North West North North North West North North West North East North West

Source: Table prepared by the author.

INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL MANEUVERS Ducking a trend of one-party systems in many African states, since independence in 1960, Nigeria has been run through a multiparty system. On the eve of independence, the northern-dominated party, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), formed a coalition with the National Congress of Nigerian and Citizens (NCNC) against the Action Group (AG).5 The NPC and AG were heavily ethically based parties, but the NCNC had a more national outlook. The coalition between the NPC and NCNC did not last because of ethnic competition for political offices, educational inequality, and economic imbalance. In the absence of unity, “conflicts were endemic, as regional leaders protected their privileges; the south complained of northern domination, and the north feared that the southern elite was bent on capturing power.”6 The expectations of unity, faith, peace, and progress were not realized as one conflict after another ravaged the country. Politicians and political parties began to maneuver for dominance. However, while several parties have been formed, two parties have always dominated. Ethnic and religious conflicts have wreaked havoc on the peace, security, and unity of the nation. The Hausa/Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the west, and the Igbo in the east competed for leadership, each of them making political moves to deny the others from gaining access to central power. The coalition of the NPC and NCNC was the product of the ethnic and regional

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rivalry and competition to control the central government. The beginning of an unending political problems began in the Western House of Assembly in 1964. The intervention of the federal government resulted in further chaos. The military juntas were monitoring the political development, and, as Adewale Ademoyega puts it, “the Army had become permanently involved in the Nigerian politics of violence.”7 In January 1966, the military took over political power from the civilians, citing misuse of power, economic crisis, rampant corruption, and ethnic inequalities. The ethnic and political divide in Nigerian society eventually led to the Nigerian Civil War of 1967 to 1971. The military in governance is an aberration, and it underscores inequality since civilians are excluded from the governance of their own country. The return to civilian rule in 1979 was short lived because the military overthrew the civilian government again in 1983. The president then was a northerner, and the military head of state was also a northerner. At the return of a democratic process in Nigeria in 1999, the People’s Democratic Party, led by retired General Olusegun Obasanjo, gained control of the federal government over the All-People’s Congress. Obasanjo unsuccessfully attempted to run for the third time. According to Condoleezza Rice, the former US secretary of state, “In 2006, when President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria sidled up to the President [George W. Bush] and suggested that he might change the constitution so that he could serve a third term, the President told him not to do it.” President Bush said, “You have served your country well. Now turn over power and become a statesman.”8 The failure of the third term saved Nigeria of evolving into a one-party state. Obasanjo’s third-term agenda and political maneuvers collapsed as a result of opposition from internal and international political interests. African politics has been bedeviled by conflict and violence. Politics with bitterness features prominently, often leading to assassination or victimization of opponents. Nelson Mandela of South Africa set a good example for African political leaders when he laid a strong foundation for a peaceful political environment by advocating and practicing “politics without bitterness.” He embraced reconciliation, stating, “If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner.”9 Rather than maneuvering to eliminate or outdo political opponents, working with them supports democracy because it is a strategy to evolving an inclusive form of government. GENDER INEQUALITY IN NIGERIA The culture of gender inequality has been in African history for a long time. Like other parts of the world, Africa, in precolonial times, was a

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male-dominated society, especially in politics and governance. Colonialism did not change the trajectory. Adu Boahen, in African Perspectives on Colonialism, is of the opinion that colonialism downgraded the status of women in Africa. Women were unable to gain access into the professions. Thus, “the colonial world was definitely a man’s world, and women were not allowed to play any meaningful role except as petty traders and farmers.”10 Jean O’Barr and Kathryn Firmin-Sellers pointed out in their “African Women in Politics” that “during the colonial period, however, European administrators imposed a legal and cultural apparatus that undermined women’s traditional bases of power; women became politically and economically subordinated and marginalized.”11 It should be noted that while women were not politically involved in the colonial administration, they were not passive. They supported their male counterparts to resist exploitative and unacceptable colonial political and economic policies, especially in women’s affairs and taxation. The British had enforced “warrant chiefs” on a society that did not have a centralized political system. The warrant chiefs were excessive in performing their roles. The Aba Women’s War of 1929 is an appropriate reference to how women exercised their rights to oppose the political excess of the British and their appointed warrant chiefs.12 According to Toyin Falola, the Aba Women’s War was “the first gendered violence of note since the beginning of the British rule.”13 Under the assumption that they were going to be taxed by the colonial authorities, the women organized a multiethnic resistance. They were overpowered, and resistance was quickly suppressed, but the aftermath was a series of colonial reforms and reorganization. In southwestern Nigeria was Alimotu Pelewura (1865–1951), a fearless, radical woman who provided leadership for the political activities of the Lagos Market Women’s Association. Pelewura’s political role was supported and strengthened by her association with one of the foremost Nigerian nationalists, Herbert Macaulay. She mobilized the market women to support Macaulay’s political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party.14 Pelewura and the market women “protested colonial authority through petitions, meetings, boycotts, and demonstrations from 1908 to the 1940s.”15 Since she was becoming popular in political circles and her activities were striking fear in the government, the colonial authorities “offered to put her on its payroll in exchange for her enlisting the support of the market women for price control.”16 Pelewura rejected the offer and focused her attention on fighting for the women. The arrest, trial, and imprisonment of Pelewura did not stop the protests by the market women. Following Pelewura was Olufunmilayo Ransome-Kuti (1900–1978), a nationalist who was widely known for her political activism. She followed the example of the Aba women and organized anti-colonial protests. She took

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advantage of her education and background to help women. Married to a politician, Kuti became a leader of the women’s wing of the NCNC. She was a leader for women’s rights and stood against the British imposition of unfair taxes levied on market women. She mobilized the women to protest the political injustices and inequalities, especially the exclusion of women in colonial administration. Along with Grace Eniola Soyinka, Kuti formed the Abeokuta Women’s Union (AWU) in 1946 with the objective to “unite women; defend, protect, preserve, and promote the social, economic, cultural, and political rights and interests of the women and to cooperate with all organizations seeking and fighting genuinely and selflessly for the economic and political freedom and independence of the people.”17 The union demanded that the government allocate a definite proportion of political representation to women and be allowed to nominate their own representatives on the local councils.18 As a well-organized group, AWU used the American revolutionary slogan of “No Taxation without Representation” against the British tax policy.19 Mention can be made of Margaret Ekpo (1914–2006), who was also a female political activist. According to Gloria Chuku, “Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti and Margaret Ekpo attended constitutional conferences held in London where they presented not only the interests and aspirations of Nigerian women, but also those of the masses.”20 Moreover, they demanded representation in the government. Kuti was involved in the pre-independence constitutional negotiations of 1946. Without a doubt, Kuti’s political activism and anti-colonial protests facilitated women’s political recognition and women’s empowerment. Women have become more active in Nigerian politics since independence in 1960, but there is still a huge gap in terms of political positions. As mentioned above, Nigeria ran into chaos and political disorder shortly after independence. In the military era, women were “practically invisible.”21 The only gain for women during Babangida’s military regime was when his wife, Maryam, “allocated significant sums of federal money for her Better Life Program, which built women’s centers across the country to offer job training, literacy programs, health-care information, and the like.”22 Oladimeji Aborisade and Robert Mundt also mentioned that “there were no women on the 50-person committee that drafted the constitution of the Second Republic.”23 Toyin Falola agreed that gender inequality exists in the African society. He indicated that “while it is true that Africans were exploited by colonial rule, men had greater access than women to power, education, land, wage incomes, and new skills.” He added, “By the 1970s, gender relations in Africa had become unequal—men had more access to many privileges and opportunities.”24 Achieving political equality has been a continuing struggle for Nigerian women. Falola concluded with a suggestion that “for women’s position to change, the struggles for economic and political equality will have to intensify. More women have to acquire power so that they can change

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Julius O. Adekunle

Table 1.2. Women’s Political Participation in Nigeria, 1999–2015 S/N

Position

1 2 3 4 5 6

Presidency Senate House of Representatives Governorship Deputy governorship 36 statehouses of the Assembly Total

No. of Seats

No. of Women

2 109 360 36 36 990

1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 8 7 8 12 23 26 26 14 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 3 4 12 38 54 62 —

1533

28

67

94

98

26

Source: Table prepared by the author.

existing policies in their favor.”25 It is essential to point out that “about half of Nigeria’s population is made up of women. However, it is quite surprising and unfortunate that women occupy a very marginal political leadership position in the country. Rather than get better, the outcome of the 2019 general election has shown a worsening of the abysmal representation of women in government.”26 Reasons for the low number of women include the gender stereotype that politics is exclusive to the men, that not many women are educated enough to earn a place in politics, and that not many women have the financial capability to finance elections. Table 1.2 shows the positions of women in political participation in Nigeria from 1999 to 2015.27 Without any gainsaying, women’s participation is important because it will create a balance of power between genders. Beth Daley right pointed out that “the full and equitable participation of women in public life is essential to building and sustaining strong, vibrant democracies. When women are not participating in politics, it’s less likely that policies will benefit them. Women need to participate to bring attention to issues that uniquely affect them, and to change attitudes towards gender.”28 In contemporary Nigeria, there are women who play prominent roles both within and outside political realms. For example, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala served as Nigeria’s finance minister two times and as foreign minister (the first woman to hold both positions). She successfully carried out major economic reforms in Nigeria. She is currently the director general of the World Trade Organization. RELIGION: A FACTOR OF INEQUALITY AND POLARIZATION History shows a complex intersection of religion and politics in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Unlike Western societies, Nigeria has been unable to

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completely separate religion from politics. That intertwining relationship has been pronounced in the modern history of Nigeria. The religious affiliations and narratives of the precolonial and colonial eras are constantly replayed in the contemporary period. A major development that demonstrated government support for a religion at the expense of others took place in 1986. The then head of state, General Ibrahim Babangida, “arbitrarily enlisted Nigeria in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).”29 The OIC, which was founded in 1969, is an intergovernmental organization of fifty-six countries primarily in North Africa, the Near East, and South Asia. The objective of the organization “is to promote cooperation between Muslim states in the fields of culture, science, social cooperation and the economy. An essential part of its work is also the protection of the Islamic faith and the holy sites.”30 A strong opposition to Nigeria being a member of OIC almost tore the country apart. Rotimi Suberu adds that “since the OIC imbroglio, however, Nigeria appears to have degenerated from a religiously peaceable to a religiously polarized federation.”31 Another area of religion in politics in Nigeria is that of Shari’a (Islamic law). Islam, with its Shari’a, existed before the colonial period. The British colonial powers, however, took some steps that strengthened Islam and Shari’a to protect their own administrative interest. To maintain the colonial judicial system, the British limited the Shari’a only to civil cases in northern Nigeria. That clause was inserted into the Nigerian constitution at independence in 1960. The insertion demonstrates religious inequality since no other religion received such conspicuous attention in the constitution. Since Christianity and other religions dominated in the south, Mukhtar Umar Bunza affirms that “no single Shari’a court was established in the southwestern Nigeria in spite of the sizeable Muslim population.”32 Following Nigerian independence, Muslims demanded a return to the full implementation of Shari’a, and this call reached its height in 1999. The 1999 Constitution makes provision for the creation of state Shari’a Court of Appeals, but it was not intended to be imposed on all the states. The attempt to extend Shari’a to other parts of the country shows the level of politico-religious inequality that exists in Nigeria. Non-Muslims saw the move as a means of Islamizing Nigeria, which violates the rights and freedoms of Nigerians. The constitution supersedes any other law since Nigeria is a secular state. The proponents of Shari’a claimed that only Muslims would be affected, but non-Muslims argued that Shari’a, being a customary law, should not be extended to the southern states. Zamfara State was the first to implement Shari’a in 1999, and by 2002, eleven other states had followed suit.33 In the wake of the opposition, interreligious violence ensued, thousands of people were killed, and numerous properties were destroyed. Under Shari’a, some offenders were sentenced to death, flogged, stoned, or

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maimed. While religion in politics cannot be completely avoided in Nigeria, the emphasis on Islam and Shari’a in the constitution is evidence of the support given to a particular religion. It is not good governance when one religion is used against the other, particularly because secularism is an essential ingredient of democracy and national integration. Conflicts, civil war, and violence have ravaged Nigeria for many years. These acts have escalated and have taken different shapes, especially in recent times. Ethnic and religious conflicts are not new in Nigeria, but acts of religious fundamentalism and terrorism began only in 2002 with the formation of the Boko Haram group. While religion can be used as a force of unity, it can also serve as an instrument of division to propagate inequality. In Nigeria, religion is being used to tear down the unity that was originally intended by the British colonial power. With many ethnic groups and different religious orientations, Yusuf Abdulazeez argues that “the ideology of ‘unity in diversity’ expression is not a reality.” He states further, “There is no harmonious co-existence among people of different faiths, ethnic backgrounds, socio-economic statuses, and political affinities in diverse Nigerian quarters.”34 Religious diversity and its intertwining relationship with politics are amply exemplified in the activities of Boko Haram, an Islamic fundamentalist group that was founded in 2002. It turned into a terrorist organization, disrupting the

Figure 1.2.  The Twelve Shari’a States and Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. Source: World Watch Monitor, https:​//​www​.worldwatchmonitor​.org​/coe​/nigerian​-government​-complicit​-in​ -stealth​-jihad​-warn​-christian​-leaders.

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peace and political stability of Nigeria. Originally named the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, translated from Arabic as “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad,” the group became popularly known as Boko Haram. Boko Haram, meaning “Western education is forbidden” in the Hausa language, was formed by Mohammed Yusuf. Its social goal is opposing Western education, while its political objective is to enforce Shari’a throughout Nigeria. The group wanted Nigeria to become an Islamic state. However, according to the constitution, Nigeria is a secular state, and the religious orientation of the people has to be protected and respected. The spate and magnitude of human and material destruction became a matter of concern not only for the Nigerian government but also for the international community. The Nigerian government has been exasperated by the frequency of attacks and the extent of casualties. Boko Haram has been able to carry out its deadly acts partly because of the lack of security in Nigeria and the lackadaisical attitude of the government. A series of attacks have turned Nigeria completely into a war zone. Confirming the view that there are internal backers, President Goodluck Jonathan declared that Boko Haram has sympathizers within his administration and that “the current violence is worse than the 1967–1970 Civil War.” According to the president, “There is no doubt that the Boko Haram attack and kill with impunity in northern cities and states, targeting government institutions, Christians, and innocent Muslims. . . . That is how complex the situation is.”35 Nigeria faces more formidable security challenges than being under-policed. The police are underpaid, under-equipped, and under-trained for counterterrorism. This gives Boko Haram the opportunity to attack and kill with impunity in northern cities and states, targeting government institutions, Christians, and other Muslims who disagree with its teaching. Since 2010, the group had been operating on bombing and drive-by shootings on government targets in revenge for Yusuf’s death. Most of the attacks were well planned and coordinated. The group sometimes used guerrilla tactics, killing policemen, government officials, and innocent people who were believed to be assisting security agents against them. Maiduguri has become a city of fear because of the many Boko Haram operations there. Churches, government institutions, police stations, and prisons were conspicuous targets. On August 26, 2011, there was a car bomb explosion in the UN building in Abuja, and Boko Haram claimed responsibility. The building housed about twenty-six UN humanitarian and development agencies. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon condemned the attack. The December 25, 2011, bombing of St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madella, near Abuja, was another callous act of the Boko Haram fundamentalists. Commenting on the attack in a video recording, Abubakar Shekau, the leader, claimed the attack was a revenge

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on Christians. He asserted, “We are also at war with Christians because the whole world knows what they did to us. They killed our fellows and even ate their flesh in Jos.”36 He was referring to the Christian–Muslim clash in Jos, Plateau State, where approximately 1,000 people have been killed. Unsubstantiated reports followed that Christian youths burned and ate Muslims during the encounter. Hence, Boko Haram decided to take the law into their own hands and kill innocent Christians. Shekau assumed leadership and vowed that the government will not defeat the group. Boko Haram struck again in 2014 when 276 female students of the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State, were kidnapped. While some of the girls escaped, others remain in captivity, and the government has not succeeded in securing their release. As a result of the Boko Haram attacks, it is estimated that more than 20,000 people have been killed and more than 2 million people displaced. Considering the frequency of attacks and number of victims, the Global Terrorism Index declared Nigeria as the sixth of ten countries most impacted by terrorism in 2022.37 While patriotic ethnic and various religious groups are beating the drums of peace, equality, and religious freedom, the Boko Haram group is breathing and breeding violence. A greater number of Nigerians believe this is the time to put ethnic, religious, and political differences aside and combat the common enemies that destroy the peace, progress, and unity of the country. The government has been reluctant or slow in using military action against the militant group. SECURITY PROBLEMS: KIDNAPPING AND GOVERNMENT INACTION The effective working of the internal affairs and politics of Nigeria should be the topmost agenda for the government. This includes adequate security, democratic political stability, and economic stability. Diversionary policies or deliberate neglect of the needs of the people is a disservice. The loud call for political revolution or restructuring of the country has a solid foundation in the series of unending kidnapping and banditry, the increasing level of insecurity, and government inaction. The number of abductions or kidnappings is too numerous to mention; it has become normalized in the system. Given the sociopolitical inequality, tension, and high insecurity level and little effort from the government to curb the excesses of the kidnappers, ethno-nationalism is growing in strength. For example, the Yoruba people are asking for self-determination, an opt out of the “unholy alliance” that has been in place since 1914. They are calling for the creation of a Yoruba nation. The argument is based partly on ethnic discrimination because the

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topmost political offices are headed by northerners, which is clearly evidence of inequality. They also assert that most of the atrocities of indiscriminate killing and kidnapping are performed by the Fulani herdsmen, who are of the president’s ethnic group. To the Yoruba, living together as a unit has proven to be unfair and unequal to other ethnic groups of Nigeria. Headed by a famous historian, Banji Akintoye, under the auspices of the Ilana Omo Oodua Worldwide, the group has drafted a constitution and petitioned the United Nations and the International Criminal Court. Like Biafra in the late 1960s, the government sees the agitators as separatists whose intention is to destabilize the country. There have been calls for separatism from politicians in the north, and nothing has been done to them. However, those who agitate self-government in the south have been either arrested or silenced. The fight against insecurity has fallen heavily on state governments. Most states have formed security agencies to protect the people. In the southwest, the Amotekun corps provides security without bearing arms.38 Governor Fayemi of Ekiti, the chairman of the Nigeria Governors’ Forum (NGF), underscored the necessity of forming the Amotekun in the face of security challenges. According to him, “The genesis of this initiative was when we were being assaulted by a spate of kidnappings, banditry, and armed robbery across the length and breadth of Western Nigeria. We sought succor in all the places and the mainstream security agencies did their best to arrest the situation.”39 In recent times, the federal government permitted the Katsina state-owned security corps to bear arms while denying the southern states of the same right to bear arms. Reacting to this, Governor Rotimi Akeredolu of Ondo State accused the federal government of a double standard. According to the governor, “We are pursuing one country, two systems.”40 Governor Akeredolu is right that Nigeria exists as a country, but it operates on different systems regarding gender, governance, and religion. Ethnic cleavages and regional dichotomy point to political inequality. COVID-19: A GLOBAL PANDEMIC AND NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT ACTIONS The COVID-19 global pandemic was believed to have started in Wuhan, China, in December 2019. The deadly disease spread quickly to all world regions. Between then and now, globally, millions of people died of different variants of the virus. At its outbreak, Nigeria took similar measures like the advanced countries of the world. The wearing of masks was mandated, the movement of the people (especially interstate movement) was restricted, and infected people were subjected to quarantine. Isolation centers were established. Particularly in large cities, the federal government imposed overnight

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curfew. Public offices and marketplaces were closed, and large gatherings were prohibited. These measures were successful for a short time because the life of the people depended heavily on the local economy. The government closed all international airports and banned traveling overseas. The Coronavirus Preparedness Group was set up to counter the spread and impact of the virus. Since people did not have accurate knowledge of the virus, they were reluctant to comply with the precautionary measures. There was also the slow process of dissemination of information and enforcement of preventive measures, especially in the rural areas of the country. Nigeria did not have access to vaccines until March 2021. President Muhammadu Buhari and his vice president, Yemi Osinbajo, were vaccinated on March 6, 2021. However, the public did not have access to the vaccine for a long time since the government could not provide enough vaccines. While many people received the first dose, they were unable to take the second because of its unavailability. As indicated in a research report, “The inequality in access to oral health care in Nigeria is driven by the low numbers of trained health care workers, disproportionate distribution of oral health facilities, low level of oral health awareness, and the challenge associated with out-of-pocket expenditures.”41 On July 8, 2021, the government announced that a case of the Delta variant was reported and declared that “as the Delta variant began to spread in the country, the first step was getting the word out there fast to warn the general public.”42 In this regard, the government used the social media to bring awareness and severity of the pandemic to the people. The government also set in motion the mechanisms to identify new cases and new variants in order to quickly prevent transmission. In almost every African country, there was an apparent inequality in the treatment of COVID-19. However, according to the World Health Organization, “The path forward is to encourage and enable more countries on the continent to develop this capacity.”43 Given the pandemic and the accompanying economic challenges, Nigeria, like other African countries, adopted the policy of a public–private partnership with the purpose of facilitating development and financing economic infrastructure. It was also to support the private sector, which was heavily affected by the pandemic. According to Boss Mustapha, the secretary to the Government of the Federation, the federal government “continued to encourage and support the strengthening of the framework for Public-Private Partnership policy in Nigeria.”44 At the outbreak of the Omicron mutation, the Nigerian government attempted a widespread preventive measure by banning travel from some African countries. By December 2021, Nigeria had vaccinated only 3 percent of its very large population. Overall, according to a World Health Organization report, between 2020 and 2022, Nigeria recorded 261,885 cases, 3,147 deaths, and “a total of 56,126,494 vaccine doses have been administered.”45

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WHAT NIGERIA NEEDS Chinua Achebe, a renowned novelist, succinctly put the problem of Nigeria in one word: leadership. According to him, the problem “is simply and squarely a failure of leadership.”46 Nigeria has passed through many political vicissitudes, and its leaders need to put good governance—characterized by adequate security measures, economic growth, political freedom, application of fundamental human rights, and equality—as a priority goal. Nigerians need to enjoy equitable distribution of national wealth. The health of the people should be a major concern for the government. When these are missing (as they are now), lawlessness takes over. The people experience economic hardship and insecurity of life. That is why Nigeria has been classified as a failed state because the federal government has been unable to perform its political responsibilities. Among the indicators for a failed state are political instability, security threats, poverty level, and economic crisis (including high food prices and stagnant investment).47 The soaring inflation and plummeting of the currency testify to the inefficiency of the central government to check the collapsing economy. Achebe asserted that “Nigeria has been doomed to witness endless cycles of inter-ethnic, inter-religious violence because the Nigerian government has failed woefully to enforce laws protecting its citizens from wanton violence.”48 Given the political trend in Nigeria, democracy has turned into an autocracy, and with autocracy and inefficient governance, there emerges the supremacy of lawlessness, insecurity, poverty, and desperation to survive. This exposes the inequality and political weaknesses that exist in Nigerian society. What Nigeria needs are visionary leaders who are willing to uphold the principles of democracy, who can discharge the duties of leadership, and who are committed to improving their society through thoughtful, well-executed socioeconomic and political policies. The list of such leaders is currently very short. CONCLUSION This chapter has explored the inequality that exists in African societies, especially in Nigeria. In global perspective, politics and governance are often fraught with elements of inequality. Ethnic marginalization, gender discrimination, youth neglect, and the oppression of the common people make inequality apparent in the modern world. The challenge to rectify these conditions rests on both leaders and followers. Visionary ideas are engines that propel positive actions and accomplishments. Visionary leaders move their societies in directions that create comfort and engender achievable and

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sustainable agenda for future generations. While vision is not static, visionless leaders embroil their societies in stagnation. Democracy is a political system that fosters the greater good of the people and enables equal participation. Politics allows inclusiveness and equal access to power and resources. Ethnic, gender, and religious discrimination or marginalization do not align with the principles of democracy. Against the background that the patriarchal system of Nigerian society prevents women from holding high political posts, an effective democratic system will promote equitable participation. Like men, women also possess leadership qualities that cannot be ignored or overlooked. It has been argued that “women can indeed sanitize Nigeria if given the chance.”49 Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia became a trailblazer by being the first female president of an African country. The struggle for women may be fierce, but Nigeria can produce a female leader if there is equitable and fair political access to power. As this chapter has demonstrated, there are various aspects of governance in Nigeria that need to change in order to move toward an equitable political system. A long history of strong affiliation to ethnic groups in Nigeria does not support the culture of and practice of political equality in modern times. While inequality has been ingrained in the political culture of Nigeria, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic seemed to have heightened the preexisting practice. Access to health care in general has been a major challenge for many African countries. Not many governments pay adequate attention to the provision of health care to the common people. Although the pandemic has subsided, there is no doubt that the history of inequality in treatment has been written. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  Explain why women in Nigeria were more involved in protests and resistance movements than in the colonial administration. 2.  Explain how ethnicity and religion promote inequality in Nigerian politics and governance. 3.  What can the Nigerian government do to provide equal security for all the people of the country? 4.  “One country, two systems.” How does this describe the political inequality in Nigeria? 5.  Explain the measures the Nigerian government should take to provide equal health services for the Nigerian people.

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NOTE 1. Patrick Fort, “Coronavirus Shakes Up Politicians across Africa,” Agence France-Presse, March 27, 2020, https:​//​news​.yahoo​.com​/coronavirus​-shakes​ -politicians​-across​-africa​-152848925​.html​?fr​=sycsrp​_catchall. 2. Muza Mpoful, “JUST IN: Zanu PF in Panic Mode as 2 Senior Party Officials Test Positive for Covid-19,” My Zimbabwe News, December 8, 2020, https:​//​www​ .myzimbabwe​.co​.zw​/news​/74337​-just​-in​-zanu​-pf​-in​-panic​-mode​-as​-2​-senior​-party​ -officials​-test​-positive​-for​-covid​-19​.html. 3. Julius Adekunle, “Unforgettable African Women of Power” (paper presented at the Sixth Biennial Interdisciplinary Conference on Race, Monmouth University, West Long Branch, NJ, November 11–12, 2021). 4. Julius O. Adekunle, “Nigerian Politics,” in Assessing Barack Obama’s Africa Policy: Suggestions for Him and African Leaders, ed. Abdul Karim Bangura (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2015), 225. 5. The NPC was led by Sir Ahmadu Bello, the sultan of Sokoto. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was the leader of the NCNC, while Chief Obefemi Awolowo headed the AG. 6. Anthony Hamilton, Millard Kirk-Greene, and Toyin O. Falola, “Independent Nigeria,” updated 2022, https//www​.britannica​.com​/place. 7. Adewale Ademoyega, Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup (Ibadan: Evans Brothers [Nigeria Publishers] Limited, 1981), 37. 8. Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown, 2012), 638. 9. Quoted from Nelson Mandela Quotes, goodreads, https:​//​www​.goodreads​.com​/ quotes​/519720​-if​-you​-want​-to​-make​-peace​-with​-your​-enemy​-you. 10. A. Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 107. 11. Jean O’Barr and Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, “African Women in Politics,” in African Women South of the Sahara, 2nd ed., ed, Margaret Jean Hay and Sharon Stichter (New York: Longman Scientific and Technical, 1995), 189. 12. The protest encompassed women from six ethnic groups (Ibibio, Andoni, Ogoni, Bonny, Opobo, and Igbo) of southeastern Nigeria. Reports indicate that thirty-two people were killed and thirty-one wounded. See Michael Crowder, The Story of Nigeria (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), 260. 13. Toyin Falola, Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 108. 14. Herbert Macaulay was the first Nigerian engineer and a politician. His Nigerian National Democratic Party, formed in 1923, was the first political party in Nigeria. Macaulay is referred to as the “Father of Nigerian Nationalism.” 15. Gloria I. Chuku, “Women and Nationalist Movements,” in Africa: The End of Colonial Rule, Nationalism and Decolonization, ed. Toyin Falola (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 119. 16. Ibid., 127. 17. Cheryl Johnson-Odim and Nina Emma Mba, For Women and the Nation: Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti of Nigeria (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 73.

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18. Ibid., 101. 19. Ibid., 74. 20. Chuku, “Women and Nationalist Movements,” 122. 21. Oladimeji Aborisade and Robert J. Mundt, Politics in Nigeria (New York: Longman, 2002), 103. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Toyin Falola, Key Events in African History: A Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 292. 25. Ibid., 295. 26. “The Widening Gap of Gender Inequality in Nigerian Politics,” Databod, April 29, 2019, https:​//​search​.yahoo​.com​/search​?fr​=mcafee​&type​=E210US714G0​&p​=The +Widening+Gap+of+Gender+Inequality+in+Nigerian+Politics+​-+Databod. 27. Adapted from Eugena N. Abiodun-Eniayekan, Emmanuel Uba, Edith Awogu-Maduagwu, Edwin Onwuka, and Lily Chimuanya, “Women in Politics: The Nigerian Factor,” International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Reviews 6, no. 4 (December 2016): 141–47. 28. See “Nigeria Has Few Women in Politics: Here’s Why, and What to Do about It,” The Conversation, May 3, 2021, https:​//​theconversation​.com​/nigeria​-has​-few​ -women​-in​-politics​-heres​-why​-and​-what​-to​-do​-about​-it​-159578. 29. Rotimi T. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 16–17. 30. “Members of the OIC: Organization of Islamic Cooperation,” World.Data.info, https:​//​www​.oic​-oci​.org​/home​/​?lan​=en. 31. Ibid., 17. 32. Mukhtar Umar Bunza, “Shari’a in the History and Political Development of Nigeria,” in Religion in Politics: Secularism and National Integration in Nigeria, ed. Julius O. Adekunle (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2009), 143. 33. The other states were Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, and Yobe. 34. Yusuf Abdulazeez, “Political Leadership and Nigerian Economy: Poverty in the Midst of Plenty,” in Governance and Leadership in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges, eds. Julius O. Adekunle and Apollos O. Nwauwa (Glassboro, NJ: Goldline and Jacobs Publishing, 2016), 181–82. 35. Ahamefula Ogbu, “Jonathan—Boko Haram Has Sympathisers in Govt,” This Day, January 9, 2012, http:​//​allafrica​.com​/stories​/201201090012​.html. 36. BBC News—Africa, “Boko Haram: Nigerian Islamist Leader Defends Attacks,” http:​//​www​.bbc​.co​.uk​/news​/world​-africa​-16510929. 37. Ima Elijah, “Nigeria Ranks 6th in 2022 Global Terrorism Index,” Pulse, March 4, 2022, https:​//​www​.pulse​.ng​/news​/local​/nigeria​-ranks​-6th​-in​-2022​-global​-terrorism​ -index​/rpzz6c5. 38. Operation Amotekun was founded in 2020 as a regional security group to support the efforts of the police to curb acts of insecurity. The geopolitical outfit operates in six southwestern Nigerian states: Oyo, Ondo, Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, and Osun.

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39. Dayo Johnson, Regional Editor, S-West, Ola Ajayi, Adeola Badru, Prince Okafor, and Olayinka Ajayi, “Amotekun Not Agenda to Divide Nigeria—S’West Govs,” Vanguard, January 10, 2020, https:​//​www​.vanguardngr​.com​/2020​/01​/amotekun​-not​ -agenda​-to​-divide​-nigeria​-swest​-govs. 40. Donatus Anichukwueze, “Amotekun: FG Favours Other State-Owned Security Agencies—Akeredolu,” Punch Newspapers, September 22, 2022, https:​//​punchng​ .com​/amotekun​-fg​-favours​-other​-state​-owned​-security​-agencies​-akeredolu. 41. Toluwani Ifeoluwa Oluwatola, Oluwapelumi Micheal Olowookere, Morenike Oluwatoyin, Folayan, “COVID-19 Pandemic and the Widening Oral Health Inequality in Nigeria,” Pan African Medical Journal, January 17, 2022, https:​//​pubmed​.ncbi​ .nlm​.nih​.gov​/35382055. 42. “How Nigeria Is Tackling COVID-19 Variants,” World Health Organization, October 6, 2021, https:​//​www​.afro​.who​.int​/news​/how​-nigeria​-tackling​-covid​-19​ -variant. 43. Ibid. 44. “FG Reveals Why It Is Pushing for More Public Private Partnerships in Nigeria,” ENEWS, https:​//​enews​.com​.ng​/2022​/07​/fg​-reveals​-why​-it​-is​-pushing​-for​-more​ -public​-private​-partnerships​-in​-nigeria. 45. World Health Organization, https:​//​covid19​.who​.int​/region​/afro​/country​/ng. See also Reuters, “COVID-19 Tracker,” https:​//​graphics​.reuters​.com​/world​-coronavirus​ -tracker​-and​-maps​/countries​-and​-territories​/nigeria. 46. Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing, 2000). 47. “The Failed States Index 2011,” Foreign Policy, June 14, 2011, foreignpolicy. com/2011/06/14/the-failed-states-index-2011. 48. Chinua Achebe, There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 251. 49. Abiodun-Eniayekan et al., “Women in Politics,” 143.

Chapter 2

The Middle East and North Africa A Region of Inequalities Saliba Sarsar

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,1 by and large, suffers from a lack of equality and freedom, democracy, good governance, and justice. Resultant popular discontent during the past few years expressed itself in waves of unrest, including the 2010–2011 Arab Spring and the 2018–2022 New Arab Spring;2 the 2009, 2017–2018, 2019, and 2022 Iranian demonstrations; the 2011 and 2021 social justice protests in Israel; and the 2013 Gezi Park movement, the 2016 coup d’état attempt, and the 2021 youth rallies in Türkiye. A serious issue that has complicated people’s daily lives and livelihood as well as governance in MENA, as elsewhere around the world, has been COVID-19. It challenged the health care systems and educational practices and negatively affected the economy (e.g., tourism and retail) and fiscal stability of countries, including those that export oil.3 Between early 2020 and the autumn of 2022, more than 42 million people contracted the virus out of a total population of 550 million (7.6 percent), resulting in 416,612 deaths (0.99 percent). The countries that were hit the most in terms of total confirmed cases and deaths are Iran (with 7.5 million cases and 144,048 deaths) and Türkiye (with 16.7 million cases and 100,840 deaths).4 MENA governments reacted with strict measures that adversely impacted people’s movement and space in addition to the sense of equality covered in this chapter. This chapter will first discuss the meaning and importance of equality and freedom as basic values of democracies that distinguish them from autocracies and that advance human rights and the Social Development Goals 2030. Second, while there are various kinds of inequality, this chapter will examine the economic, gender, and digital aspects, including some overlap among 39

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them, and consider the effect of COVID-19 on them. Finally, this chapter it will argue for reforms that can engender a more equitable future for the people in MENA. ON EQUALITY AND FREEDOM Democracy is unique. Contrary to autocracy, it enables critical thinking and action about the present and the future. “It is the most successful and most versatile political model humans have so far developed for dealing with the challenges of the modern world.”5 Equality and freedom are among its basic values. As Benjamin R. Barber argued, “Democracy is the politics of equality. Without democracy, rights are empty words, dependent for their realization on the goodwill of despots.”6 As for freedom, Barber held that people sense it “when their choices feel meaningful; . . . when what is possible is a set of life choices ordered by ethical or religious values they have chosen for themselves; . . . when they participate in the free communities that permit them to define common lives autonomously and establish common identities freely.”7 While equality and freedom may be applied or interpreted in different ways, a case can be made that, together, they are mutually inclusive and positively connected. Without equality, freedom is diminished, and without freedom, equality is jeopardized. In addition, both equality and freedom strengthen equality of opportunity, which is a socioeconomic and political ideal that offers “a vision of how we ought to live together.”8 Democracy in a country is healthier when all its residents are guaranteed equal rights under the law and freedom from bias and intolerance. As Freedom House states, “If the rights and freedoms of one segment of the population are violated with impunity, the same sorts of abuses are likely to be visited on others. Those forced to endure a subordinate status have less incentive to play by the rules, creating a vicious circle of defiance and repression.”9 The quest for equality and freedom is as old as humanity. In our modern era, the United Nations has played a central role in promoting them, along with dignity, inclusion, human development, human security, and peace. The UN Charter, which was signed on June 26, 1945, and came into force four months later, contains the words “equal” and “equality” ten times and the words “freedom” and “freedoms” five times. The charter is not to be selectively observed or ignored; all member states are bound by it. It also comes as no surprise that the words “equal” and “equality” appear thirteen times in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was proclaimed as “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” by the UN General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948. The same goes for the words “free,” “freedom,” “freedoms,” and “freely,” which appear thirty times

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in the document. Of significance is Article 1, affirming that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Equality is also aligned with the 2030 Agenda, which was adopted by the United Nations in 2015 and which highlights seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, turning them into “a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure that by 2030 all people enjoy peace and prosperity.”10 In the words of the United Nations, “Inequality threatens long-term social and economic development, harms poverty reduction, and destroys people’s sense of fulfilment and self-worth. This, in turn, can breed crime, disease, and environmental degradation. Most importantly, we cannot achieve sustainable development and make the planet better for all if people are excluded from opportunities, services, and the chance for a better life.”11 Sustainable development and democracy are interrelated, and even though there might be strains between them, the latter cannot fully thrive without the former. What is similar in both is “participation—the ability of all people to come together and be involved in decisions about how we live and the goals we want to achieve as societies.”12 Hence, Sustainable Development Goal #10 focuses on reducing inequalities within and among countries so that “no one is left behind.”13 This concern relates to both economic inequality and gender inequality and how COVID-19 has negatively impacted both. Digital inequality and inequity are fast becoming a concern despite the meteoric innovations and impressive growth. The digital divide is clear, as “one-half of the global population remains off-line, with the starkest contrast between the most developed countries (87%) and the least developed countries (19%).”14 Most affected are females and the elderly. Economic equality denotes how economic variables are distributed among individuals, groups, or countries. While the traditional outcome-oriented perspective has utilized income as a proxy for well-being, the current opportunity-oriented view recognizes that “circumstances of birth are essential to life outcomes and that equality of opportunity requires a fair starting point for all.”15 The fairer the distribution, the more equality there is. Democratic institutions and policies, rooted in accountability, are geared toward such distributive fairness and inequality reduction, complying with the Sustainable Development Goal #10. Gender equality is a basic human right, and it is the core of Sustainable Development Goal #5. It means “the equal valuing by society of the similarities and the differences of men and women, and the roles they play.”16 This implies that the wants and needs of all females and males, young and old, are fully considered, recognizing “the diversity of different groups and that all human beings are free to develop their personal abilities and make choices without the limitations set by stereotypes and prejudices about gender roles.”17 Females make up half of the world’s population and, thus, half

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of its capability and promise. “Gender equality . . . is essential to achieve peaceful societies, with full human potential and sustainable development. Moreover, . . . empowering women spurs productivity and economic growth.”18 It may be argued that governance, prosperity, security, and stability are enhanced when females are given opportunities as equal and full as those of males.19 Digital equality implies that all people have access to technologies such as smartphones and tablets as well as applications such as the internet and have both cognitive and technical skills to use them. Such equality enhances connectivity and enables more people to tap into information and learn online as well as to work, trade, and seek medical care remotely, among other benefits. While more inclusion, productivity, and progress become possible, careful attention must be paid to the digital inequality along gender lines. But the internet is also becoming “less free, more fragmented, and less secure,”20 necessitating a constant vigilance to address and remedy the negative effects of digitalization, including “disinformation, misinformation, cybercrime, the spread of violent extremism and terrorism, and online abuse and harassment.”21 While each kind of equality is of utmost importance, securing all three can engender a centripetal force for advancing democracy. Their combined influence will be both an equalizer and a significant contributor to economic development, social justice, the empowerment of people to actualize their potential, and digital cooperation and connectivity. KINDS OF INEQUALITY IN THE MENA REGION Economic Inequality The strength of a country or region’s economy is crucial for its stability and prosperity. The more equitable the economy, the better the well-being of its people. However, that is not the case in the MENA region, where inequality is ubiquitous. One analyst finds an explanation in the “enormous income differences between oil-rich and population-rich countries” as well as in structural factors that allow economic resources to be put in “the hands of hereditary rulers or institutions controlled by the political leadership and their partners in the private sector.”22 It is no wonder that “56% of national income [is] accruing to the top 10% income earners in 2019, and the top 1% [is] earning almost twice the share of the bottom 50%, 23% compared to 12%.”23 In comparison to other regions around the world, “this value is close to that of Africa (55%), and larger than that of Asia (49%), the United States (47%), and Western Europe (34%).”24 This condition is most pronounced in the oil- and natural

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gas–rich Gulf countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where “the top 10% income earners hold around 54% of the national income.”25 These countries have relatively large numbers of South and Southeast Asian workers who lack labor rights26 and whose livelihood and stay are regulated by a “kafala,” or sponsorship system, with no citizenship option as well as highly subsidized economies that not only cause a national financial burden but also favor the citizens over the guest workers and the rich over the poor. The non-Gulf countries (e.g., Türkiye and Egypt) show a better equality picture. “In 1990, the top 10% income share stood high at 51%, 3% less than Gulf countries. It has decreased since 2000, to 48% in 2013, but it rose again to over 49% in 2019.”27 Moreover, as shown in table 2.1, there is a low level of economic participation, as reflected in the female labor force and unemployment rates. The Table 2.1. Labor Force Participation and Unemployment Rates

Country

Ratio of Female to Male Labor Force Labor Force Participation Rate Ages Participation Rate (%) 15+ (%) Total

Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Tunisia Türkiye UAE Yemen Regional average

Female Male

Unemployment Rate (%) Total

Female Male

36.9 71.6 45.0 43.7 41.9 64.0 40.2 73.8 46.1 47.8 45.5 70.8 88.1 54.9

16 42 15 14 11 59 13 47 21 34 22 29 57 31

60.0 86.9 66.8 70.0 72.4 68.9 62.7 87.8 71.6 61.0 71.0 87.8 95.6 78.4

24 51 23 21 15 89 22 57 32 56 33 34 60 39

12.7 1.9 9.3 11.5 14.2 5.0 19.3 3.7 14.5 19.6 11.5 3.1 0.3 7.4

22.1 5.6 24.3 19.0 32.8 4.9 27.2 8.9 8.6 26.8 13.5 12.9 0.6 21.6

10.4 1.0 5.9 9.9 11.3 5.1 17.6 2.0 13.1 15.5 10.8 1.7 0.2 3.7

43.4 47.0 58.1 80.8 36.3 54.5

16 25 39 47 6 28.6

71.2 68.3 78.0 92.7 65.4 74.5

22 32 45 53 9

10.6 16.8 13.4 3.4 13.6 10.09

23.2 24.7 14.9 8.1 26.3 17.6

7.7 13.7 13.1 2.4 12.4 12.9

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.

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region’s average participation rate is 28.6 percent, and ten of the nineteen countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) have 25 percent or less of female participation. “Factors as varied as constrained freedom of movement, workplace laws that implicitly or explicitly exclude women, pay disparities, and restrictions on women-led entrepreneurship have limited their participation in many fields.”28 There is also a huge positional leadership deficit in MENA. On average, less than 18 percent of managers in the region are women, and in some countries, women represent less than 10 percent, including in Syria (8.9 percent), Algeria (8.4 percent), Egypt (7.4 percent), Saudi Arabia (6.8 percent), and Yemen (4.1 percent). Only in Jordan are there at least as many women managers as men.29 As table 2.1 also shows, the unemployment rate remains high, with a regional average of 10 percent. Among the reasons for this high rate of unemployment are “the decline in intraregional labor migration, continued rural-to-urban migration, contraction of public sector jobs, and lack of formal sector job growth in the private sector.”30 The female unemployment rate is higher than the male unemployment rate in all MENA countries except for Israel, with nine countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) having a differential of more than 10 percent. This is, to begin with, despite the lower labor force participation rates for women. Contributing factors include restrictive cultural and social norms, discrimination and harassment, limited job opportunities, and lower salaries. This reality is worse for Arab youth, both females and males, where the national average of unemployment stands at 26.77 percent. Low youth unemployment percentages exist in Qatar (0.5 percent), Israel (7.3 percent), and the UAE (7.7 percent). Among the hardest-hit countries are Algeria (39.3 percent), Jordan (35.3 percent), Tunisia (34.9 percent), Iran (28.5 percent), and Iraq (25.6 percent). These percentages become starker when controlling for gender. The highest percentile differentials are in Algeria (female 82.0 percent versus male 33.1 percent), Iraq (female 63.3 percent versus male 22.0 percent), and Saudi Arabia (female 61.9 percent versus male 24.3 percent). The lowest percentile differentials are in Qatar (female 2.0 percent versus male 0.2 percent) and Israel (female 7.8 percent versus male 6.7 percent).31 Most youth in MENA are concerned about the rising cost of living, unemployment, and income inequality. This economic situation is leading to a sizable number of them emigrating or planning to emigrate to another country. The low levels of female economic participation and the high levels of female unemployment in MENA countries not only widen the gender-based income gap but also cause limited financial access to women. For example, in Saudi Arabia, “a woman’s income is on average only 24% that of a man, and in Egypt, 22%; in Algeria, 19%; in Iran, 18%; in Iraq, 12%; and in Yemen, 7%. Even in Israel, women’s income is only 61% of that of a man.”32 Amid

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the MENA region’s natural resources and oil wealth, there is extreme poverty (defined as income of less than US $1.25 per person per day) among 20 percent of the population, with another two-thirds being poor (defined as income of less than US $2 per person per day) or on the verge of extreme poverty.33 In addition to low income and unemployment, contributing factors include poor quality of work, disempowerment, inadequate standards of living, lack of education, poor health, living in environmentally hazardous conditions, and the threat of or actual gender-based violence. In ten countries, 41 percent of the total population, equaling around 116 million people, are poor, and 25 percent are at the risk of poverty.34 A similar condition is present in Iran, Israel, and Türkiye. Even though Iran is rich in natural resources, one-third of Iranians live in absolute poverty. Among the causes are high inflation, economic mismanagement, political corruption, and the unequal distribution of privileges,35 which signify an absence of democratic accountability. In Israel, “over 2.5 million Israelis currently live in poverty, among them more than 1.1 million children, and 932,000 households live in a state of economic distress.”36 Economic disparities and poverty are also on the rise in Türkiye, as evident in the annual survey of the Turkish Statistical Institute. “According to a poverty threshold set at 60% of median household income, the poverty rate increased 0.6 points to 21.9% of the population, meaning that 17.9 million people in Türkiye are now classified as poor, up from 17.2 million in 2019.”37 Economic inequalities and poverty tend to have a generational impact. The lack of job growth and the dependence on informal jobs, which are mostly unreliable and low paying, seal the fate of many and restrict their socioeconomic mobility. Both children and adults become trapped in a cycle of “poverty, despair, and hopelessness that will haunt the region for generations to come.”38 Children are among the most affected in households impacted by such economic disparities. A report on eleven countries, representing 78 percent of the total population under eighteen years old in the Arab states, found that “one in four children (24.7 percent) is acutely poor, while nearly one in two (44 percent) suffer from moderate poverty. This amounts to 29.3 and 52.5 million children, respectively. . . . Children under 5 are generally more deprived than older children.”39 With governments incapable of addressing this serious issue, the youth turn to “religious, sectarian, and ethnic organizations like Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood to fill the void.”40 Serious internal challenges and protracted conflict negatively impact the job market and intensify poverty. This is reflected in the drop in the Human Development Index values, as happened between 2020 and 2021–2022 in Lebanon (from 0.706 to 0.686) and in Yemen (from 0.455 to 0.450). Out of 191 countries and territories worldwide, Lebanon is ranked 112th, and Yemen is ranked 183rd.41

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COVID-19, which necessitated lockdown measures and restrictions on movement by governments, produced economic difficulties in most MENA countries. It “paralyzed economies and threaten to tip millions of people into poverty, with women, refugees, migrant workers, and those working in the informal economy among the worst affected.”42 In addition to the increase in poverty and inequality due to COVID-19, a 2021 World Bank development report points to the appearance of “new poor” who have become poor since the pandemic and to alterations in the number of people who work and in how hard they work.43 Clearly, the pandemic has impacted segments in society more than others, with a decrease in income and living standards felt mostly by the poorest in MENA. The resultant food insecurity and malnutrition generated not only uncertainty but anxiety and stress as well. Gender Inequality Women in the MENA region account for 48.2 percent of the total population in 2020.44 Women’s rights are human rights, and when women are denied equal rights, legal protection, and political representation, the whole society is impacted negatively. When women are denied economic opportunities, the economy suffers. As argued by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Just 24% of women in MENA countries are in employment—a level that compares to 60% in OECD countries—and gender-based discrimination in laws and social norms costs the region USD 575 billion a year according to the OECD Development Centre’s SIGI gender index. Failing to harness the talent of working-age women means lost economic potential and less inclusive growth. It is estimated that raising women’s participation in the labour force to the same level as men could boost global GDP by USD 12 trillion, or 26%, by 2025.45

The Arab Barometer survey in 2018 found that most publics across MENA believe women should have rights equal to men in various areas, such as employment (84 percent), access to higher education (75 percent), and political office (62 percent). Yet most, especially men, favor restricting women’s rights and the roles they play in society. While one-third hold that women are as effective in public leadership as men, six in ten give the husband the ultimate say within the family. Educational levels tend to impact people’s views, with those having lower levels more likely to support inequality. As educational achievement rises across MENA, it is implied that attitudes toward women may also improve.46 In 2005, the fourth issue in the UN Development Programme–sponsored series of Arab Human Development Reports, “Towards the Rise of Women

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in the Arab World,” was released. It focused on women’s empowerment and its shortfalls. “As human beings,” the report stated, “women and men have an innate and equal right to achieve a life of material and moral dignity, the ultimate goal of human development.”47 Viewing the rise of women within the context of human rights, it argued for “not only civil and political rights . . . but [also] freedom from ignorance, disease, want, fear and all else that diminishes human dignity.” Viewing the rise of women within the context of human development, it advocated for “complete equality of opportunity between women and men in the acquisition and employment of human capabilities; Guaranteed rights of citizenship for all women on an equal footing with men; and Acknowledgement of, and respect for differences between the sexes.”48 Although there have been some modest improvements since 2005, the status of women in Arab countries remains challenged. Women in the non-Arab MENA countries of Iran, Türkiye, and Israel have also faced multiple hurdles for years. In Iran, women suffer from systemic discrimination and inequality before the law and from society. They lack physical safety and security as their lives are devalued.49 In September 2022, Mahsa Amini, a twenty-two-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman, was arrested by the Iranian morality police for not abiding by the strict hijab law and ended up dying in police detention three days later.50 “Activist news agency HRANA said 450 protesters had been killed as of Nov. 26 [2022], including 63 minors, and over 18,000 have been arrested.51 Turkish women are subjected to the conservative Islamic agenda of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the ideology of its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. For years, Erdoğan has made his views known by starting to urge women to have three or more children, refer to men and women as explicitly ‘not equals,’ disparage career-oriented women for being ‘unnatural’ and unable to appreciate the importance of motherhood in Islam, object to birth control, family planning, and baby formula for being un-Islamic, and call abortion ‘murder.’”52 Similarly, though Israeli women enjoy more gender rights than their counterparts around MENA, gender bias and discrimination are widespread. This is so regardless of the principles of equality for women under the Israeli Declaration of Independence of 1948, the 1951 Women’s Equal Rights Law, and the 1992 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (or the way they are interpreted by the Israeli courts as a basic principle of the legal system). Women are bound by various cultural and institutional influences, including the religious establishment, which plays a dominant role in government and influences legal status and services, and the military, which impacts civil society and gender roles.53 The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2021 highlights the inequality between men and women in the MENA region.54 It ranks 156 countries by focusing on four criteria or subindices: political empowerment,

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educational attainment, health and survival, and economic participation and opportunity. It finds MENA to have a huge gender gap that would take more than fourteen decades to close given the gradual progress thus far, and of the bottom fifteen countries, nine are in MENA: Qatar, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. While some of the high-performing countries in MENA are the UAE, seventy-second in the global ranking (71.6 percent), and Israel, sixtieth (72.4 percent), Yemen, 155th (49.2 percent), and Iraq, 154th (53.5 percent), are among the lowestperforming countries in the world. In assessing the score change between 2020 and 2021, the two countries with the most improvement are the UAE and Lebanon. Both have succeeded in narrowing their gender gap, the UAE by 6 percent and Lebanon by 3.8 percent. The UAE did it by increasing the number of women in its unicameral parliament (the Federal National Council [FNC] or Majlis al-Ittihad al-Watani) from 22 to 50 percent.55 This change resulted from a December 2018 directive by President Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the emir of Abu Dhabi, that half the members of the FNC would be women. Lebanon, which has no legislated or voluntary party quotas, did it by increasing the number of women in the cabinet from 3.4 to 30 percent, at least for the cabinet that was formed on January 21, 2020. Six of the twenty ministers were females, and they held impressive portfolios of deputy prime minister and defense, justice, information, labor, the displaced, and youth and sports. But Lebanon’s score was short lived. On September 10, 2021, a new government was announced. Out of the twenty-four-minister cabinet, there was only one female selected, and she held the administrative development portfolio. This represented not only a precipitous drop from 30 to 4 percent but also a definite reversal of gender equity and representation. When the results of the Global Gender Gap are viewed by the subindex of political empowerment, the UAE ranks the highest in the MENA region and #24 among the top twenty-five out of 155 countries for the reason mentioned above. Israel (#65), Tunisia (#69), and Egypt (#78) follow. In contrast, nine MENA countries rank among the lowest twenty-five countries globally: Saudi Arabia (#138), Syria (#142), Bahrain (#143), Jordan (#144), Qatar (#148), Oman (#150), Iran (#151), Kuwait (#153), and Yemen (#154). As table 2.2 shows, during 2018–2022, women made up 16.17 percent of parliamentarians across the region, and in six countries, women represented less than 6.5 percent of lower-house members: Yemen (0.33 percent), Kuwait (1.6 percent), Oman (2.3 percent), Qatar (4.4 percent), Iran (5.6 percent), and Lebanon (6.25 percent). While gender quotas have boosted (e.g., Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and the UAE) or maintained female representation (e.g., Libya and Saudi Arabia), they have not engendered steady increases in women’s political representation in Algeria, Jordan, and Tunisia.

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The Middle East and North Africa Table 2.2. Women in Parliament in 2008–2021 in the Middle East and North Africa

Country Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Tunisia Türkiye UAE Yemen Regional percentage

% (Year 2010)

% (Year)

% (Year)

Gender Quotas (Unicameral/ Lower House)

7.7 2.5 1.8 2.8 25.5 14.2 6.4 3.1 4.7 7.7 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 22.8 9.1 22.5 0.3

25.8 (2017) 15.0 (2018) 14.9 (2015) 5.9 (2016) 25.5 (2018) 24.2 (2019) 15.4 (2016) 4.6 (2016) 4.7 (2018) 16.0 (2014) 20.5 (2016) 1.2 (2015) 9.8 (2016) 19.9 (2016) 13.2 (2016) 35.9 (2014) 17.5 (2018) 22.5 (2015) 0.33 (2014)1

8.1 (2021) 15.0 (2018) 27.7 (2020) 5.6 (2020) 28.9 (2021) 30.0 (2021) 12.3 (2020) 1.6 (2020) 6.25 (2022) 16.0 (2021)2 24.1 (2021) 2.3 (2021) 4.4 (2021) 19.9 (2020) 11.2 (2020) 26.3 (2019) 17.4 (2018) 50.0 (2019) 0.33 (2019)1

Yes None Yes None Yes None Yes None None Yes Yes None None Yes None Yes None Yes None

292.83/19 = 15.41 307.38/19 = 16.17

Sources: Data collected from Inter-Parliamentary Union, https:​//​data​.ipu​.org​/women​-ranking​?month​=5​ &year​=2022, and The Gender Quotas Database, https:​//​www​.idea​.int​/data​-tools​/data​/gender​-quotas; 1 “Yemen: Women in Parliament,” The Global Economy.com, https:​//​www​.theglobaleconomy​.com​/ //​ www​ Yemen​/Women​_in​_parliament; 2International Idea Supporting Democracy Worldwide, https:​ .idea​.int​/data​-tools​/data​/gender​-quotas​/country​-view​/199​/35.

In terms of cabinet ministerial positions, no MENA country enjoys more than 32 percent of women in these roles, which was Lebanon’s in 2021. When Lebanon is excluded, for the reason mentioned above, the others above 10 percent include Tunisia (29 percent), the UAE (27 percent), Israel (25 percent), Egypt (24 percent), Morocco (16 percent), Algeria (15 percent), Türkiye (12 percent), Oman (12 percent), and Syria (10 percent). Those countries below 10 percent are Jordan, Iraq, Qatar, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The latter two have no women ministers.56 Moreover, only three countries have had a woman head of government in the modern era: Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel (1969–1974), Prime Minister Tansu Çiller of Türkiye (1993–1996), and Prime Minister Najla Bouden Ramadhane of Tunisia (2021–present). As for a women head of state,

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Israeli politician Dalia Itzik served as acting president of Israel from January 25 to July 15, 2007. In terms of the educational attainment gender gap, while Israel has closed it, fifteen of the remaining seventeen countries (i.e., Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Türkiye, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Lebanon, Syria, and Iran) have narrowed the gap at least to 94 percent. Lagging far behind are Iraq and Yemen. The data look better for the gender gap in health and survival. Lebanon is in the lead, closing at least 97 percent of its gap, and Qatar trails behind at 94.8 percent. The other sixteen countries (Tunisia, Kuwait, Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Türkiye, Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, Oman, Morocco, Bahrain, Algeria, and Jordan) are within the 95–96 percentile range. As for economic participation and opportunity, the average regional score is 40.9 percent. Israel leads with closing 70.5 percent of the gap, while four other MENA countries (Jordan, Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar) closed less than 54 percent of their gaps, and ten other countries (Kuwait, Lebanon, Türkiye, Algeria, Oman, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Iran) closed less than 50 percent of their gaps. The three lowest global performers on this dimension are Syria (#153, 28.5 percent), Yemen (#154, 28.2 percent), and Iraq (#155, 22.8 percent). Similar results are found in the Women, Peace and Security Index 2020/22, which measures women’s inclusion (i.e., education, financial inclusion, employment, cell phone use, and parliamentary representation), justice (i.e., absence of legal discrimination, son bias, and discriminatory norms), and security (i.e., intimate partner violence, community safety, and organized violence) for 170 countries. While South Asia’s scores are the lowest, the MENA region is not far behind. Its performance is the worst, especially on the legal front, averaging only fifty of 100 points. “The share of men who believe it is unacceptable for women to have a paid job outside the home if they want one—our measure of discriminatory norms—is also highest in the Middle East and North Africa. This suggests a convergence of formal and informal barriers to women’s justice in the region.”57 As for the individual country performance, the UAE (#24, 85.6 percent) and Israel (#27, 84.4 percent) appear in the first quintile and score the highest in MENA. No MENA country is in the second quintile. Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia follow in the third quintile. All other MENA countries are in the fourth quintile, with Yemen (#168, 38.8 percent) and Syria (#169, 37.5 percent) trailing all of them and the world, along with Afghanistan. Countries with “high rates of organized violence rank low on the index” (p. 5). This is evident in Syria, where the security dimension is most challenged, as expressed by organized violence (i.e., battle deaths per 100,000 people) being

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the worst globally at 75.1 percent and perception of community safety being the worst regionally at 16.9 percent. As stated above, COVID-19 has had gendered effects, causing several hardships for women. This related to increases in unemployment and decreases in income and mobility, added responsibilities at home in terms of educating children and caring for elderly and sick family members, a rise in instances of domestic violence, and greater exposure to the virus “in feminized sectors such as healthcare, schooling, the food industry, and other frontline or essential sectors.”58 While the pandemic has impacted MENA countries in different ways, overall, women in the private sector have fared worse than those in the professions. “Women in the professions appear not to have lost jobs, although their care burdens have increased, and some women employees may have left their jobs voluntarily. Those in the private sector . . . have been most vulnerable to job and income loss. Medical workers . . . have performed heroically despite deteriorating conditions and wages and risks to their health.”59 Digital Inequality Digital technology is no longer just a luxury or an option; it is a prerequisite in almost all aspects of life, from education and finance to telecommunications and cybersecurity.60 Although the MENA countries have experienced impressive progress in incorporating and accessing such technology, wide gaps remain between and within them. These gaps prevent easy connectivity and the multiple benefits that accrue from participating in the digitally mediated world. Between 2000 and 2021, for example, internet usage grew exponentially. While only 12,500 Iraqis had access to the internet in 2000, 24.5 million did in 2021, which is an increase by a factor of 1,962. High internet growth occurred in several other countries during the same period, including Algeria (from 50,000 to more than 37.8 million; more than 756 times), Libya (from 10,000 to more than 6.6 million; more than 665), and Yemen (from 15,000 to more than 7.9 million; more than 526 times).61 However, as table 2.3 indicates, internet penetration has been anything but equal. Whereas the percentages of Qatar (104.3 percent) and the UAE (103.3 percent) saw unprecedented increases during 2020–2022, those of Yemen and Syria lagged with 25.9 and 46.5 percent, respectively. A similar picture emerges when looking at the number of Facebook subscribers and Facebook’s penetration rate. Whereas the UAE (105.5 percent), Qatar (101.4 percent), and Kuwait (97.5 percent) scored the highest, Yemen (11.5 percent), Syria (46.5 percent), and Iran (47.0 percent) scored the lowest. Internet penetration within countries does not advance when information and communication technologies (ICT) and other resources are not available

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Table 2.3. Internet and Facebook Users, E-Government Development, and E-Participation, 2020–2022 % of % of Internet Facebook E-Government E-Participation Penetration Subscribers Development Index 2020–20221 2020–20221 Index 20202 20203

Country

Population

Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Tunisia Türkiye UAE Yemen

45,150,879 1,748,296 105,530,371 85,028,759 41,179,350 8,789,774 10,269,021 4,328,550 6,769,146 7,024,811 37,344,795 5,223,375 2,930,528 35,340,683

83.8 97.7 51.9 91.8 59.6 79.7 84.7 98.3 81.9 94.8 68.5 76.8 104.3 90.1

63.3 86.7 51.7 47.0 64.3 74.2 63.7 97.5 62.2 94.8 66.3 58.7 101.4 72.9

0.5173 0.8213 0.5527 0.6593 0.4360 0.8361 0.5309 0.7913 0.4955 0.3743 0.5729 0.7749 0.7173 0.7991

0.1548 0.7738 0.5119 0.4643 0.3095 0.7143 0.3333 0.9048 0.3333 0.0357 0.5119 0.8333 0.6548 0.7143

18,275,702 11,935,766 82,961,805 9,991,089 30,490,640

46.5 68.4 83.3 103.3 25.9

46.5 71.6 67.3 105.5 11.5

0.4763 0.6526 0.7718 0.8555 0.3045

0.5119 0.6905 0.8929 0.9405 0.3095

Sources: 1Internet World Stats, https:​//​www​.internetworldstats​.com; 2United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division of Public Institutions and Digital Government, UN E-Government Knowledgebase, https:​//​publicadministration​.un​.org​/egovkb​/en​-us​/About​/Overview​/​-E​-Government​ -Development​-Index; 3Ibid., https:​//​publicadministration​.un​.org​/egovkb​/en​-us​/About​/Overview​/E​ -Participation​-Index.

and when the country is poor, has income inequality, and suffers from gender or marginalized group inequality. In Lebanon, for example, around “60 percent of students either do not have a computer or have to share it with at least 3 other family members.”62 Many students are not even linked to online or remote learning, which is indispensable during school closures, as happened with the COVID-19 pandemic. In Saudi Arabia, digital inequality results from the high cost of both ICT and broadband services, particularly among inhabitants with low incomes.63 The divide between male and female internet usage rates is stark in other MENA countries, which underscores the gender discrimination aspect discussed above. In a survey of several Arab countries, Morocco (male 79 percent versus female 56 percent) and Tunisia (male 73 percent versus female 46 percent) scored the largest gender gaps.64 This divide in internet access has widened with the pandemic as more women lost their jobs at a time when women make up only one-fifth of the labor force.65

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Even Israel, a high-tech powerhouse, has a degree of digital gap or illiteracy. Most impacted or vulnerable are the ultraorthodox (Haredi) Jews, the Arabs, and those in the sixty-five-plus age-group.66 The reasons for digital inequality vary from country to country, but, in general, navigating the governance structures and processes is a challenge. The infrastructure is not fully modernized, and those using it are not adequately trained. The education systems are either stuck in the past or not keeping up with the technology. Much can be done to actualize the digital potential. Among the necessary reforms are the following: 1.  Reducing burdensome regulations and enhancing modern governance frameworks 2.  Improving digital infrastructure, including broadband and other technologies, and ensuring equal access for individuals and communities 3.  Reforming education systems to prepare young people for the jobs of the future by reducing overreliance on knowledge transfer and enhancing twenty-first-century skills67 Digital technology adoption and inclusion would be transformative if properly implemented. The expected gains are significant economically, societally, and otherwise. There is evidence that “GDP per capita could rise by more than 40 percent; manufacturing revenue per unit of factors of production could increase by 37 percent; employment in manufacturing could rise by 7 percent; tourist arrivals could rise by 70 percent, creating jobs in the hospitality sector; long-term unemployment rates could fall to negligible levels; and female labor force participation could double to more than 40 percent.”68 Moreover, including marginalized and neglected populations and locales can not only promote universal digital access but also advance prosperity and well-being and foster trust in governance and in financial institutions and services.69 Most MENA countries have been active in bridging the digital divide and enhancing the digital inclusion of citizens and residents. Their efforts are partly reflected in the E-Government Development Index70 and the E-Participation Index.71 As indicated in table 2.3, the UAE is a leader in both e-government development and e-participation. Other countries include Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Türkiye, and Oman. Needing much improvement are Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Yemen. Many examples can be found on both sides of the spectrum. The UAE is set “to achieve 100 per cent mTransformation and promote an electronic lifestyle.” Its activities consist of computerizing public administration; adoption of e-services, including for rural areas; and enhancing learning by creating “smart” classes.72 Saudi Arabia is actively engaged in various initiatives

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and projects that are designed to leave no one behind in terms of broadband access and affordability, technology equipment access and affordability, digital literacy, and receptivity to follow a digital existence. The main goal is to achieve the UN Agenda 2030, Sustainable Development Goals, and Saudi Vision 2030.73 The Moroccan government built an Interactive Digital Center, the first in North Africa and the second the MENA region after Saudi Arabia. It has linked 10,740 villages to quality broadband telephone and internet connection. Its focus is on the digital transformation of the economy as investments, job opportunities, and competitiveness are partially dependent on digitalization and the telecommunications sector.74 While Algeria has great digital potential, it suffers from a costly and uneven technical infrastructure, a limited payment framework, an absence of a political vision, unsuitable laws and regulations, limited funding, unenthusiastic and underprepared leaders, and popular distrust.75 Yemen, which has suffered from a multilateral civil war, has an immense digital lag. “Barely half of the population is connected to mobile networks, with only 2 percent with broadband access. . . . This digital divide affects women and the poor even more severely; among Yemenis who use Facebook, women constitute only 13 percent of the total.”76 COVID-19 presented a major challenge to the governments in MENA. This challenge could become an opportunity if all concerned utilize the occasion to close the digital gap and enhance innovation. Inaction will prevent a quick recovery, reducing the ability of the region to fulfill its people’s needs and to compete internally and externally. STEPS TOWARD AN EQUITABLE FUTURE Inequality of any kind disempowers and dispossesses, as it creates a lack of fairness, freedom, and justice. It perpetuates poor governance by reinforcing favoritism and enabling the supremacy of socioeconomic and political elites. Addressing economic, gender, and digital inequalities should be a major priority in all MENA countries. A successful outcome will set the region on a more democratic, prosperous, and stable path. Major reforms or transformations are easier said than done. Systemic barriers abound, ranging from the religious to the financial and political. For example, in Israel, even though the courts have generally upheld the principles of gender equality, those principles under the Declaration of Independence and the Women’s Equal Rights Law do not have constitutional force, and the 1992 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not explicitly contain the principle of equality. While in the public sphere the legal system is mostly supreme, the religious establishment continues to enforce patriarchal norms and values on family life that typically give preference

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to males over females.77 In Yemen, women suffer from legal discrimination counter to international conventions. This is in addition to structural inequalities that impede female access to basic education and health services, resulting in high illiteracy and maternal mortality rates.78 In Lebanon, what stands in the way of gender equality as related to politics besides the socioeconomic challenges are the “laws and traditions that are encompassed in a system of government based on patriarchal religious views and controlled by male political elites.”79 In Egypt, inequality is so ingrained that it reproduces across generations, resulting in reduced social mobility and a weakened economy.80 In addition, the military occupies a central role in the economy, enabling it to compete with private businesses, which could result in “static or worsening employment and poverty.”81 A study of the digital gender divide in the UAE found that while ICTs energize females through education, information technology resources, and jobs, these do not ensure equality and freedom. “Men still wield more leverage over women because of various reasons, chief among them cultural norms and traditions.”82 Regardless of each country’s hurdles, the underlying causes of each kind of inequality must be tackled. While each country has its own approaches to change, solutions to economic inequality include introducing or strengthening democratic governance; closing or reducing the income gap between rich and poor; increasing the labor force, especially for women and the youth; reducing unemployment; and alleviating poverty. Solutions to gender inequality include removing the gender pay gap by having equal pay for equal work, enabling women to achieve leadership positions in all walks of life, assisting women to reach their full economic and financial potential, and ending discrimination in law and practice. Solutions to digital inequality include implementing inclusive digital strategies, tools, and training; providing affordable and reliable high-speed internet; and sustaining the use of dynamic technologies in daily life and the workplace. The MENA region and countries have much guidance in the UN Sustainable Development Goals.83 Most relevant for this chapter’s focus are the following: For inequality—Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries. Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunity for all. For economic inequality—Goal 8: Promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth; full and productive employment; and decent work for all. Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere.

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For gender inequality—Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. For digital inequality—Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and foster innovation.

Moreover, the MENA region and countries would be better served if they became more resilient in the face of future pandemics and other health crises and natural and human-induced disasters. In addition to setting up vaccination programs and improving data quality and transparency, a report by the World Bank suggests an Identification for Development (ID4D) tool that can enable people to access services. “It can help build an inclusive database and better identify and target beneficiaries by addressing issues such as poverty, gender equality and female empowerment, inequality, financial inclusion, health insurance coverage, and safe migration.”84 A report by the Economist Intelligence Unit argues for “building the digital infrastructure, data security regulations, and human development frameworks that will enable the greater integration of advanced technologies throughout [the MENA] economies.”85 However, all the guidance from different UN agencies and other sources will amount to little if good governance is nonexistent or weak. Good governance—defined as the process of decision making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)86—is a type of governance wherein public matters are addressed well and public means are used effectually and competently to attend to vital societal needs. Its major characteristics are participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and law abiding.87 Economic, gender, and digital equalities are all interconnected with good governance and with each other. Through strong institutions, the application of effective regulatory policies, and the control of political corruption, good governance can advance pro-poor and inclusive growth. Also essential are human capital enhancements, infrastructure development, and financial sector advancements.88 Apropos of gender equality, the participatory nature of good governance includes both men and women, and its equitability and inclusiveness denote that all members of society believe they are accepted and respected. One analyst views gender equality and good governance as part of “a virtuous cycle,” and what links them is female political leadership. “Without women in political office, government measures reflect the status quo, male-dominated policy environment.”89 Good governance can also facilitate digital equality, which, in turn, can strengthen gender equality through the creation of new business opportunities and jobs, thus engendering prosperity, stability, and social justice.

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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  What is equality? What is freedom? Are they compatible values, or are they in conflict? Why? 2.  What is economic equality? Why is there economic inequality in the MENA countries at a time when the region is relatively well endowed in natural sources? 3.  What is gender equality? How can the MENA countries overcome the challenges in the way of promoting gender equality? 4.  Digital equality is no longer an option or a luxury; it is a prerequisite for all aspects of life. Explain what digital equality is and account for the fact that there remain wide digital gaps between and within MENA countries. 5.  How do economic equality, gender equality, and digital equality interrelate? Provide examples to illustrate how this is expressed in the MENA region or in one MENA country. NOTES 1. MENA comprises the nineteen sovereign countries of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Although Palestine is an integral part of the MENA region, it is not included in this chapter, as it lacks sovereignty and the quality of its life (in terms of equality, governance, and socioeconomic development) is impacted adversely by the Israeli occupation in addition to its internal divisions and practices. 2. Saliba Sarsar, “Arab Authoritarianism, Arab Uprisings, and the Future,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 4 (Summer 2022): 121–36. 3. Economist Intelligence Unit, “From Crisis to Opportunity: Strengthening MENA’s Digital Ecosystem in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” The Economist, April 2021, 8–12, https:​//​impact​.economist​.com​/perspectives​/perspectives​/sites​/ default​/files​/12042021​_final​_report​_covid​-19​_impacts​_mena​.pdf. 4. See WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, September 11, 2022, https:​//​ covid19​.who​.int​/table. 5. Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2018), xviii. 6. Benjamin R. Barber, An Aristocracy of Everyone: The Politics of Education and the Future of America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 66. 7. Ibid., 25. 8. “An Introduction to Equality of Opportunity,” Equality of Opportunity and Education, McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society, Stanford University, https:​//​edeq​ .stanford​.edu​/sections​/equality​-opportunity​-introduction.

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9. Freedom House, “Equality & Human Rights,” https:​//​freedomhouse​.org​/issues​/ equality​-human​-rights. 10. “What Are the Sustainable Development Goals,” United Nations Development Programme, https:​//​www​.undp​.org​/sustainable​-development​-goals. 11. United Nations, “Equality: Why It Matters,” https:​ //​ www​ .un​ .org​ / sustainabledevelopment​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2017​/02​/ENGLISH​_Why​_it​_Matters​ _Goal​_10​_Equality​.pdf. 12. Andrea Westall, “The Relationship between Democracy and Sustainable Development,” Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development, May 2015, http:​ //​www​.fdsd​.org​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2015​/06​/The​-relationship​-between​-democracy​ -and​-sustainable​-development​.pdf. 13. For an elaboration on this point, see the United Nations Committee for Development Policy, Report on the Twentieth, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2018, Supplement No. 13 (E/2018/33), https:​//​sustainabledevelopment​.un​ .org​/content​/documents​/2754713​_July​_PM​_2​.​_Leaving​_no​_one​_behind​_Summary​ _from​_UN​_Committee​_for​_Development​_Policy​.pdf. 14. “Young or Old, UN Calls for ‘Digital Equality’ for All,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, https:​//​www​.un​.org​/development​/desa​/dspd​ /2021​/10​/digital​-equality​-for​-all. 15. “Concept of Inequality,” Development Issues No. 1, Development Strategy and Policy Analysis Unit, Development Policy and Analysis Division Department of Economic and Social Affairs, October 21, 2015, https:​//​www​.un​.org​/en​/development​ /desa​/policy​/wess​/wess​_dev​_issues​/dsp​_policy​_01​.pdf. 16. “Gender Equality: Glossary of Terms and Concepts,” UNICEF Regional Office for South Asia, November 2017, https:​//​www​.unicef​.org​/rosa​/media​/1761​/file​/Gender​ %20glossary​%20of​%20terms​%20and​%20concepts​%20​.pdf. 17. Ibid. 18. “Gender Equality: The Unfinished Business of Our Time,” https:​//​www​.un​.org​ /en​/global​-issues​/gender​-equality. 19. See Zoe Danon, “Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 16, 2021, 1, https:​//​sgp​.fas​.org​/crs​ /mideast​/R46423​.pdf, and Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo, Women, Peace, and Security Index 2021/22 Summary: Tracking Sustainable Peace through Inclusion, Justice, and Security for Women (Washington, DC: GIWPS and PRIO, 2021), iv, https:​//​giwps​.georgetown​.edu​/wp​ -content​/uploads​/2021​/10​/WPS​-Index​-2021​-Summary​.pdf. 20. Adam Segal and Gordon M. Goldstein, “Confronting Reality in Cyberspace: Foreign Policy for a Fragmented Internet,” Independent Task Force Report No. 80, Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022, https:​//​www​.cfr​.org​/report​/confronting​ -reality​-in​-cyberspace​?utm​_campaign​=tf​-cyber​&utm​_medium​=email​&utm​_source​ =announcement​&utm​_term​=Announcement​_CyberTFRPromo. 21. “High-Level Thematic Debate on Digital Cooperation and Connectivity: Whole-of-Society Responses to End the Digital Divide April 27 and May 24, 2021,” Summary of the President of the General Assembly, United Nations, New York, https:​

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//​www​.un​.org​/pga​/75​/wp​-content​/uploads​/sites​/100​/2021​/07​/PGA​-Letter​-Summary​ -of​-HLD​-on​-Digital​-Cooperation​-Connectivity​.pdf. 22. Lydia Assouad, “Inequality and Its Discontents in the Middle East,” Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, March 12, 2020, https:​//​carnegie​-mec​.org​/2020​ /03​/12​/inequality​-and​-its​-discontents​-in​-middle​-east​-pub​-81266. 23. Rowaida Moshrif, “Income Inequality in the Middle East,” World Inequality Lab—Issue Brief 2020-06, November 10, 2020, https:​//​wid​.world​/document​/income​ -inequality​-in​-the​-middle​-east. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. In recent years, some Gulf states, such as Qatar and the UAE, have introduced new labor laws to improve the living conditions and basic human rights of migrant workers, but these need to be reviewed regularly to ensure compliance. See Sabena Siddiqui, “Qatar Introduces New Labor Reforms,” Al-Monitor, September 14, 2020, https:​//​www​.al​-monitor​.com​/originals​/2020​/09​/qatar​-labor​-reform​-migrant​ -worker​ -minimum​ -wage​ .html, and Adam Lucente, “UAE Touts New Domestic Workers Law,” Al-Monitor, October 11, 2022, https:​//​protect​-us​.mimecast​.com​/s​/ QcvhC0RjlyUWYx8tzZphi​?domain​=emailcampaign​.al​-monitor​.com. 27. Moshrif, “Income Inequality in the Middle East.” 28. Yara M. Asi, “Women at Work in the Arab World,” Arab Center, Washington, DC, April 27, 2022, https:​//​arabcenterdc​.org​/resource​/women​-at​-work​-in​-the​-arab​ -world​-trends​-gaps​-and​-effects​-on​-the​-region. 29. “Global Gender Gap Report 2021,” World Economic Forum, 26–27, https:​//​ www3​.weforum​.org​/docs​/WEF​_GGGR​_2021​.pdf. 30. Valentine M. Moghadam, “Social Change in the Middle East,” in The Middle East, 15th ed., ed. Ellen Lust (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2020), 246. 31. World Bank, World Development Indicators. 32. Global Gender Gap Report 2021, World Economic Forum, 26–27, https:​//​ www3​.weforum​.org​/docs​/WEF​_GGGR​_2021​.pdf. 33. United Nations Academic Impact, “Addressing Poverty,” https:​//​www​.un​.org​/ en​/academic​-impact​/addressing​-poverty. 34. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Arab Multidimensional Poverty Report, Beirut, 2017, https:​//​archive​.unescwa​.org​/sites​/www​ .unescwa​.org​/files​/publications​/files​/multidimensional​-arab​-poverty​-report​-english​_0​ .pdf. 35. Khalil Khani, “Poverty and Its Causes in Iran—Analysis,” Eurasia Review, October 11, 2021, https:​//​www​.eurasiareview​.com​/11102021​-poverty​-and​-its​-causes​ -in​-iran​-analysis​/. 36. Ricky Ben-David, “Over 2.5 Million Israelis Live in Poverty, among Them 1.1 Million Kids, Report Finds,” The Times of Israel, December 23, 2021, https:​//​www​ .timesofisrael​.com​/over​-2​-5​-million​-israelis​-live​-in​-poverty​-among​-them​-1​-1​-million​ -kids​-report​-finds. 37. Mustafa Sonmez, “Official Data Lays Bare Deepening Poverty in Turkey,” Al-Monitor, June 18, 2021, https:​//​www​.al​-monitor​.com​/originals​/2021​/06​/official​ -data​-lays​-bare​-deepening​-poverty​-turkey​#ixzz7V9q1w7p7.

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38. Rami G. Khouri, “How Poverty and Inequality Are Devastating the Middle East,” Carnegie Corporation for New York, September 12, 2019, https:​ / /​ w ww​ . carnegie​ . org​ / topics​ / topic-articles/arab-region-transitions/ why-mass-poverty-so-dangerous-middle-east. 39. Lucia Ferrone, “Getting a Clearer Picture of Child Poverty in the Arab States,” UNICEF, March 8, 2018, https:​//​blogs​.unicef​.org​/evidence​-for​-action​/getting​-clearer​ -picture​-child​-poverty​-arab​-states. 40. Khouri, “How Poverty and Inequality Are Devastating the Middle East.” 41. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, 2021/2022, https:​//​hdr​.undp​.org​/data​-center​/country​-insights​#​/ranks. 42. Nabil Abdo and Shaddin Almasri, “For a Decade of Hope Not Austerity in the Middle East and North Africa: Towards a Fair and Inclusive Recovery to Fight Inequality,” Oxfam International, August 2020, https:​//​oxfamilibrary​.openrepository​ .com​/bitstream​/handle​/10546​/621041​/bp​-mena​-inclusive​-recovery​-260820​-en​.pdf​ ?sequence​=9​&isAllowed​=y. 43. Johannes G. Hoogeveen and Gladys Lopez-Acevedo, eds., Distributional Impacts of COVID-19 in the Middle East and North Africa Region, MENA Development Report (Washington, DC: World Bank), doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1776-2. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO. 44. “Population, Female (% of Total Population—Middle East & North Africa,” World Bank, https:​//​data​.worldbank​.org​/indicator​/SP​.POP​.TOTL​.FE​.ZS​?locations​ =ZQ. 45. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Legal and Social Barriers Holding Back Women’s Empowerment in Middle East and North Africa,” July 9, 2017, https:​//​www​.oecd​.org​/mena​/legal​-and​-social​-barriers​-holding​-back​ -women​-s​-empowerment​-in​-middle​-east​-and​-north​-africa​.htm. 46. Michael Robbins and Kathrin Thomas, “Women in the Middle East and North Africa: A Divide between Rights and Roles,” Arab Barometer, Wave IV, October 2018, https:​//​www​.arabbarometer​.org​/wp​-content​/uploads​/AB​_WomenFinal​ -version05122018​.pdf. 47. Arab Human Development Report 2005, “Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World,” United Nations Development Programme, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, and Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organizations, https:​//​arab​-hdr​.org​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2007​/11​/ahdr​-report​_2005​-en​ -full​.pdf. 48. Ibid. 49. Marjan Keypour Greenblatt, “Women in Iran: Political Representation without Rights,” Middle East Institute, October 29, 2020, https:​//​www​.mei​.edu​/publications​/ women​-iran​-political​-representation​-without​-rights. 50. Weronika Strzyżyńska, “Protests in Iran at Death of Kurdish Woman after Arrest by Morality Police,” The Guardian, September 17, 2022, https:​ //​ www​ .theguardian​.com​/world​/2022​/sep​/17​/iran​-protests​-death​-kurdish​-woman​-mahsaa​ -amini​-morality​-police. 51. Hritika Sharma, “US Soccer Briefly Removed Emblem from Iran Flag to Show Support for Protesters,” Reuters, November 27, 2022, https:​ //​ www​ .reuters​ .com​ /

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lifestyle​/sports​/us​-soccer​-briefly​-removed​-emblem​-iran​-flag​-show​-support​-protesters​ -2022​-11​-27. 52. Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, “Women’s Struggle in Turkey and a New Transnational Declaration,” Enheduanna, a blog of the Middle East Women’s Initiative, Wilson Center, December 31, 2020, https:​//​www​.wilsoncenter​.org​/blog​-post​/womens​ -struggle​-turkey​-and​-new​-transnational​-declaration. 53. Noa Balf, “A Multi-Pronged Approach to Gender Equality in Israel,” Enheduanna, a blog of the Middle East Women’s Initiative, Wilson Center, March 8, 2020, https:​//​www​.wilsoncenter​.org​/blog​-post​/multi​-pronged​-approach​-gender​-equality​ -israel. 54. Unless otherwise indicated, the following data are based on the Global Gender Gap Report 2021, World Economic Forum, 26–27, https:​//​www3​.weforum​.org​/docs​/ WEF​_GGGR​_2021​.pdf. 55. United Arab Emirates, Gender Quota Database, a joint project of International IDEA, Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Stockholm University, https:​//​www​.idea​.int​/ data​-tools​/data​/gender​-quotas​/country​-view​/43​/35. 56. “Women Power Index,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 29, 2021, https:​ //​www​.cfr​.org​/article​/womens​-power​-index. 57. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo, Women, Peace, and Security Index 2021/22 Summary, 3–4. 58. Valentine M. Moghadam, “COVID-19 and Female Labor in the MENA Region,” Middle East Institute, June 8, 2021, https:​//​www​.mei​.edu​/publications​/covid​ -19​-and​-female​-labor​-mena​-region. 59. Ibid. 60. Cybersecurity is a main element of the modern state—bolstering authoritarian rule, facilitating financial and other transactions, and impacting identities, “with privacy, personal security, freedom of expression and other human rights dependent on digital technological infrastructure and online social interactions.” See James Shires, The Politics of Cybersecurity in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 236. 61. See Internet World Stats, https:​//​www​.internetworldstats​.com​/stats5​.htm. 62. Wissam Harake, Ibrahim Jamali, Naji Abou Hamde, et al., “Lebanon Sinking (to the Top 3),” Lebanon Economic Monitor, Global Practice for Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank, Spring 2021, 45, https:​//​documents1​.worldbank​.org​/curated​/en​/394741622469174252​/pdf​/ Lebanon​-Economic​-Monitor​-Lebanon​-Sinking​-to​-the​-Top​-3​.pdf. 63. Altahir Saad and Ahmed Fahim, “Access Digital Divide in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA): Current State and Measures for Improvement,” I.J. Information Engineering and Electronic Business 13, no. 3 (June 2021): 13–21, https:​//​www​.mecs​ -press​.org​/ijieeb​/ijieeb​-v13​-n3​/IJIEEB​-V13​-N3​-2​.pdf. 64. Daniella Raz, “The Arab World’s Digital Divide,” Arab Barometer, September 25, 2020, https:​//​www​.arabbarometer​.org​/2020​/09​/the​-mena​-digital​-divide. 65. Abdo and Almasri, “For a Decade of Hope Not Austerity in the Middle East and North Africa.”

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66. Roni Dorot, “Media Influence Matrix: Israel—Technology, Public Sphere, and Journalism,” CEU Democracy Institute, Center for Media, Data, and Society, March 2021, https:​//​cmds​.ceu​.edu​/sites​/cmcs​.ceu​.hu​/files​/attachment​/article​/2025​/ mimisraeltechnology​.pdf. 67. Nader Kabbani, “How Will Digitalization Affect Youth Employment in MENA?,” Brookings Institution, May 6, 2021, https:​//​www​.brookings​.edu​/opinions​/ how​-will​-digitalization​-affect​-youth​-employment​-in​-mena. 68. Ana Paula Cusolito, Clément Gévaudan, Daniel Lederman, and Christina A. Wood, The Upside of Digital for the Middle East and North Africa: How Digital Technology Adoption Can Accelerate Growth and Create Jobs (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2022), xi, https:​//​openknowledge​.worldbank​.org​/handle​/10986​/37058. 69. Ibid. 70. The E-Government Development Index assesses a country’s website development patterns and includes its access characteristics (e.g., the infrastructure and educational levels) to show how it is using technology to advance access and inclusion of its people. It measures three key aspects of e-government: provision of online services, telecommunication connectivity, and human capacity; https:​//​publicadministration​.un​ .org​/egovkb​/en​-us​/About​/Overview​/​-E​-Government​-Development​-Index. 71. The E-Participation Index relates to a government’s efforts to utilize online services to empower its people. It is done by imparting information to citizens (“e-information sharing”), interacting with stakeholders (“e-consultation”), and engaging in decision-making processes (“e-decision making”); https:​//​publicadministration​ .un​.org​/egovkb​/en​-us​/About​/Overview​/E​-Participation​-Index. 72. United Arab Emirates, “Bridging Digital Divide,” United Arab Emirates’ Government Portal, November 16, 2021, https:​//​u​.ae​/en​/about​-the​-uae​/digital​-uae​/ bridging​-digital​-divide. 73. Saudi Arabia, “Digital Inclusion,” gov.sa, https:​//​www​.shorturl​.at​/gkzFS. 74. Mohamed Alaoui, “Digital Economy Making Inroads in Morocco,” The Arab Weekly, January 12, 2020, https:​//​thearabweekly​.com​/digital​-economy​-making​ -inroads​-morocco. 75. Ismail Chaib and Amine Lefkir, “Digital Transformation in Algeria—Assessing Digital Transformation in the Country: Overview, Challenges, and Opportunities,” Digital Arabia Network (DAN) and DAAS—Deutsch-Algerischer Akade- miker und Studierender Verein e.V., December 2020, 18, https:​//​digitalarabia​.network​/media​/ pages​/articles​/grab​-a​-coffee​-read​/da075f7bd5​-1617783451​/strategy​_paper​_algerien​ _20210406​.pdf. 76. Nadia Al-Sakkaf and Justin Alexander, “Internet Access in Yemen Should Be an Opportunity for Cooperation, Not a Target,” Fikra Forum, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 4, 2022, https:​ //​ www​ .washingtoninstitute​ .org​ /policy​ -analysis​/internet​-access​-yemen​-should​-be​-opportunity​-cooperation​-not​-target. 77. Frances Raday, “Equality, Religion, and Gender in Israel,” in The Shalvi/ Hyman Encyclopedia of Jewish Women, July 7, 2021, https:​//​jwa​.org​/encyclopedia​/ article​/equality​-religion​-and​-gender​-in​-israel. 78. “Yemen,” Arab States, UN Women, https:​//​arabstates​.unwomen​.org​/en​/ countries​/yemen.

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79. “Women’s Political Participation in Lebanon: Perspectives from Mount-Lebanon,” Euro-Mediterranean Women’s Foundation, April 2017, https:​ //​www​.iemed​.org​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2020​/12​/Womens​-Political​-Participation​-in​ -Lebanon​-Perspectives​-from​-Mount​-Lebanon​.pdf. 80. Adel Abdel Ghafar, “Causes and Consequences of Inequality in Egypt,” Muslim World 111, no. 1 (Winter 2021): 7, https:​//​onlinelibrary​.wiley​.com​/doi​/abs​/10​.1111​/ muwo​.12370. 81. Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, “Egypt 2020: The Impact of Military Consolidation on Long-Term Resilience,” Humanitarian Foresight Think Tank, May 2017, 2, http:​//​www​.iris​-france​.org​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2017​/05​/Obs​ -ProspHuma​-EGYPT​-2020​-May​-2017​.pdf. 82. Mohamed Ben Moussa and Joanna Seraphim, “Digital Gender Divides and E-Empowerment in the UAE: A Critical Perspective,” International Journal of Education and Development Using Information and Communication Technology 13, no. 3, (2017): 157, https:​//​files​.eric​.ed​.gov​/fulltext​/EJ1166619​.pdf. 83. “What Are the Sustainable Development Goals.” 84. Johannes G. Hoogeveen and Gladys Lopez-Acevedo, eds., Distributional Impacts of COVID-19 in the Middle East and North Africa Region, MENA Development Report, 18. 85. Economist Intelligence Unit, “From Crisis to Opportunity: Strengthening MENA’s Digital Ecosystem in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 5. 86. “What Is Good Governance?,” United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, https:​//​www​.unescap​.org​/sites​/default​/files​/good​ -governance​.pdf. 87. Ibid. Note that the Council of Europe adds four other characteristics of ethical conduct: innovation and openness to change, sound financial management, and human rights, cultural diversity, and social cohesion. See “12 Principles of Good Governance,” https:​//​www​.coe​.int​/en​/web​/good​-governance​/12​-principles​ #{"25565951":​[5]}. 88. Djeneba Doumbia, “The Role of Good Governance in Fostering Pro-Poor and Inclusive Growth,” Brookings Institution, July 1, 2020, https:​//​www​.brookings​.edu​/ blog​/africa​-in​-focus​/2020​/07​/01​/the​-role​-of​-good​-governance​-in​-fostering​-pro​-poor​ -and​-inclusive​-growth. 89. Polly Diven, “Linking Gender Equality and Good Governance: The Importance of Political Representation,” paper presented at the European Conference on Politics and Gender, Uppsala, Sweden, June 2015.

Chapter 3

Persistent Gender-Based Social and Economic Inequalities in India Abha S. Sood

The status of a democracy is determined by the fairness of the electoral process, the participation of the electorate, and the representation of every segment of society in that process and among those elected to positions of service and power. Considering the numerous attacks on democracies across the world, it is becoming increasingly apparent that democracy, still a novel concept, is in crisis as the world goes through yet another transitional period where the liberties of citizens are threatened by forces of autocracy, disruption, disease, rampant apathy, greed, and war. Since 2020, the onset and persistence of the global COVID-19 pandemic have put democratic governments further to the test of representation, equality, and the authoritative allocation of assets among various segments of the citizenry, especially regarding access to health care and economic resources. Even prior to the pandemic, various factors had contributed to the threats faced by Indian democracy—the divisive elements of religion, caste, regionalism, and political opportunism have consistently eroded the basic ideas of liberty and equality established in the Indian Constitution in 1950. As in any democracy in peril, the condition of its weakest, least-regarded members is always threatened the most. Since the success and prosperity of individuals in any country is determined by their access to adequate nutrition, education, employment, health care, personal status, safety, property, civic rights, and self-determination, this chapter will examine the status of women in India regarding the above basic rights, which are considered fundamental human rights. 65

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WOMEN’S STATUS IN INDIA Women’s status in India has changed greatly since independence, especially after the first elected government in independent India. Yet a conundrum remains: women in India are some of the least-acknowledged contributors to the domestic, social, political, and commercial economy of the nation, even as middle- and upper-class Indian women are some of the most highly educated, talented, securely situated, and well-employed women in the world, while Indian women from lower socioeconomic strata, in contrast, are some of the most highly abused and subjugated women in the world. Women in India contribute in large numbers to the informal economy. They work in agricultural fields, mines, small factories, and vegetable markets and provide laundry and household help, among various other services. Unfortunately, this is not recorded in official labor force participation rates; neither do women in the informal sector receive any insurance and other workplace benefits that are common in the formal sector. As Awasthi states in her evaluation of the accredited social health activist (ASHA) workers, nine lakh accredited health and social workers, mainly women, service large rural and urban populations (approximately 2,000 people) in pairs and are forced to work for low stipends without employment benefits, such as leave or health insurance.1 More recently, women’s participation in the workforce increased steadily from 2014 (29 percent), peaked in 2016 (32 percent), fell again in 2020 (23 percent), rose in 2021 (36 percent), and fell in 2022 (33 percent).2 These changes in women’s participation have been due to a steady downturn in the economy, and the recent upsurge was due only to the demand for and work-from-home availability during COVID. Gendered perspectives, aligned with socioeconomic status and class, have much to do with the contradictions in women’s perceived labor force participation. Women’s lives in general depend on the attitude, competence, and structure of their families; their location in urban or rural areas; and the dynamics of their general social environment. Even in the third decade of the twenty-first century, a woman’ level of education often depends on the level of education of the families’ male members and their view of women’s education and self-determination—traditional households still discourage women from pursuing higher education, directing young women toward marriage and family life instead. As Palkhivala states, India’s heritage has “remained undimmed,” and women’s lower position is an integral part of that heritage, which most male holders of power, especially in families, and orthodox and traditional societies call on to justify the limitations imposed on women’s movement outside the family, particularly to pursue formal education or gainful employment.3

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To further complicate these matters, there is a great preponderance of evidence of sexual violence in the home against women, which is still a major issue across rural, urban, and cosmopolitan landscapes. Women also undergo varying degrees of either sexual harassment or sexual violence outside the home on a regular basis, with some research citing about 92 percent of women reporting such violence. In 2020 and 2021 alone, crimes against women increased by over 20 percent (43,414 cases registered in 2021), while crimes against young girls and women from Scheduled Castes (SCs) Scheduled Tribes (STs) also increased significantly.4 Patriarchy, with all its toxic elements in the general Indian scenario, has not been effectively dismantled or toned down by India’s independence, political changes and socioeconomic progress, scientific developments, industrialization, increased access to education, and overwhelming evidence of women’s engagement in education, organized or unorganized labor, and industry in rural and urban regions and contributes to the continuing threatened status of women in India. This patriarchy is deeply entrenched in the social fabric of the nation even as it exerts undue influence and force on the legislative and judicial systems. Thus, while on the one hand there is gender-based violence, which is defined by verbal, sexual, and physical abuse in domestic, public, or occupational spaces, on the other hand there is also sex-based violence in family life, in personal relations, and in medicine (as in uneven access to health care, procreative rights, right to life, and so on). In every instance, it is an example of apathy, control, or power over a large portion of the population based on gender. There is a vast disjunction between the religious veneration of female goddesses like Durga, Kali, Lakshmi, Parvati, or Sarasvati, who are called on for their strength, valor, and fierceness and their ability to grant boons of prosperity. But women in India, especially daughters, are not treated as valuable or with respect or dignity very often. Even when they are cherished and loved, they still have a lower status than the men in a family and professionally. Violence against women continues in various forms. Sometimes it takes the extreme form of brutal abuse and murder, as in the case of Jyoti Singh, who was brutally raped by several men on a moving bus on December 16, 2012.5 She was brutally assaulted for more than an hour by six men on the bus and beaten with an iron, while her friend was also badly beaten, and then both were thrown out of the bus, half clothed, on a freezing winter night. Besides assaulting them brutally, the rapists also robbed them of their personal belongings. When Singh later succumbed to her injuries, the men were brought to trial. The brutality of their actions and their cavalier attitude toward the victim appalled the entire country and the world. The outrage of Indian people forced the Indian government to act more promptly in this case, as they wanted to avoid adverse publicity. The men were sentenced to death,

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but the sentence was not carried out until 2020. The eight-year delay in the execution of justice is a significant mark of the general disregard for women’s issues in the Indian polity. Beyond overt physical and sexual violence, women’s worth and intelligence is undermined in several other ways. The main justification for this brutality is a mythical form of received “tradition,” which has continually enabled male dominance over and violence against women. Tradition aligns itself with religion, which results in an abrogation of the rights of numerous people who are considered other, lesser, or weaker and are often subdued by force to keep them in that position. Whether this violence or control is supported by religion, which some governments use to justify their brutality against women, as in a few military regimes and autocratic governments (the current crackdown on protesters in Iran is an apt example),6 or by male hegemony, which sees women as the lesser other, is detrimental to women’s overall growth, and mental and physical health. Women have thus been systematically subjugated through emotional and psychological bullying, physical violence, nutritional deficiencies, social and political exclusion, and employment discrimination. Education and Literacy Inequality in access to education for women exists in certain regions of India due to the regional, cultural, and traditional beliefs and practices, as in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and so on, and due to their lower socioeconomic status and/or belonging to the labor or poorer class. While literacy rates have improved overall (male-to-female ratio: 60.5: 31.7 percent in 1987–1988 to 80.3: 61.8 percent in 2017), some states still lag behind: Rajasthan had the highest literacy gender gap at 29 percent with Uttar Pradesh (23 percent), Jharkhand (21 percent), Bihar (21 percent), Jammu and Kashmir (20 percent), and Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh (20 percent) close behind. The lowest gender gap is in the eastern states of Meghalaya and Mizoram (2 percent), Kerala (5 percent), Tripura (6 percent), Sikkim (7 percent), and Assam and Nagaland (8 percent). Even as this gap is narrowing among younger populations, a large proportion of the older population remains illiterate, thus skewing the overall numbers.7 These numbers are an indication of a continued hesitation to educate women. The response to women who acquire knowledge, an education, or a stable career is often mixed, based on the social systems in the regions they live in and belong to. Women with advanced or even basic education are viewed with skepticism, resentment, or misgiving, and stepping out of familial, cultural boundaries is often a precarious act. Various forms of microaggressions are evident against women in public spaces, whether these are

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overt, as in sexual harassment, or covert, as in denying women access to the same respect and consideration for their achievements. Often these aggressions take extreme form—as with the case of Jyoti8 in the horrific case of rape and murder in December 2012. Women are largely blamed for not recognizing male authority in the name of sanskriti, parampara, or maryada—all words that are liberally thrown around to justify their mistreatment in and out of the home. The propensity to greed (demarcating public spaces for male use as a mainly male domain) and senseless violence, which can translate into abuse at home or harassment outside the home, permeates much of the social fabric, especially in urban spaces. It is suggested that avoiding confrontation and its consequences by staying ensconced in their homes in the protection of their male relatives is the best option for women. Indian women’s socioeconomic status as a gender is also affected by disparities in access to work or labor, varied promotion opportunities, and inequality in pay. It seems that the desire to maintain control over and continue to define Indian society and women’s place in it by male parameters or patriarchal structures that valorize and benefit only the male has expressed itself in the escalated acts of violence on women in public and private spheres. The law may have the provisions to punish such acts, but the will to punish the perpetrators is mostly lacking, as in the case of Jyoti Singh. Only when common people are outraged and mobilize in mass numbers to protest will the law respond to the level matching the severity of the brutality enacted against a female victim. Complaints about common, routine infringements of personal space or professional mistreatment are ignored or justified, and women are advised to withdraw from those confrontations or suffer the abuse. Issues with Attaining Universal Literacy The total literacy rate in India, as determined by the ability of an individual to read and write, a minimalistic criterion, is rather low: 73.02 percent total, with 81.5 percent for men and 64.6 percent for women—which reveals a huge disparity.9 This exemplifies both the continuing abject position of women in the Indian polity and the need for women’s education and continued uplift (even in the third decade in the new millennium). There have been programs like the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), or Education for All, that promise equal access to education for all children regardless of socioeconomic status or gender and support providing adequate nutrition through midday meal programs.10 Whether this is the government’s recognition of the need to assist and uplift the general populace at large, a popularity measure, or a response to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations that determine a country’s status, reputation, and the funding received from various UN agencies, these are all steps in

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the right direction. According to the SDG data, students at the primary level have higher completion rates, and these rates go down as the students go through higher grades and secondary education, with women falling behind in completion, even though they were ahead of their male peers in both reading and math literacy at the elementary level.11 The Right to Education Act 2010, a long-needed legislation for universal education, also promised every child at least an elementary education, free of cost and mandated by the law.12 It may prove effective in conjunction with other outreach programs (like SSA and the midday meal plans) to support access, enrollment, and retention of students in primary schools. It seems like a low target, but considering the sheer magnitude of educating the entire populace of India, at least 50 percent of whom have lower socioeconomic status and limited access to basic life resources, it is an ambitious project. It is noteworthy that similar programs have always been in existence, especially since the 1970s, and have taken different shapes or nomenclatures due to the changing terminology used to define the work of “uplifting” or supporting women (and children) in becoming equal citizens of the nation. The word “empowerment,” which replaced the term “welfare,” has been used liberally by supporters of women’s issues and “has been co-opted by governments, feminist movements and organizations, and donor and development agencies alike.”13 At this point, it is important to consider a stable definition of empowerment. While Naila Kabeer defines power as “an individual’s ability to make choices” and empowerment as “the processes by which a person denied the ability (and power) to make choices acquires that ability (and power),”14 Mohanty describes empowerment as women taking control of their own representation. The empowerment model followed by many governments is top down and considered a part of the capitalistic structure; in contrast, feminist thought provides more agency to the disempowered, who can then wrest autonomy or control through their own actions. The idea of empowerment is proffered to women from various sides: the government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other entities and programs that support women, whether nominally or actually, or the women’s organizations in India that seek to wrest more autonomy, control, and equality for women belonging to various socioeconomic levels. Essentially, it is the work of the latter (women’s organizations) that in effect forces the government and other related organizations to act, create legislation, and enforce the laws that have been put in place. This is evident in the fight to improve literacy levels for girls and women. The UN-ESCAP 2015 had concluded that India, despite the challenges to enrollment and completion, was on its way to attaining gender parity in education at all levels with increases in literacy rates annually: 1.63 percent for females and 0.83 percent for males.15 According to the latest SDG report,

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however, the progress has been much slower.16 For the seven decades after independence, NGOs and alternative school systems have attempted to fill this gap by providing accessible education to all children, especially girls, in the country17 through systematically organized admission programs, free books, supplies, uniforms, and meals. Even as the country’s government now tries to provide trained educators and basic amenities like drinking water and toilets in schools as part of the overall infrastructure development (again, facilities that should be considered basic amenities), the sheer magnitude of the task is astounding, and its success would improve the lives of people, especially females, in numerous related ways. While data suggest that male and female children complete primary education at the same rate, the completion gap widens as children of each gender grow older. The completion rate at the primary level is approximately 91 percent for male and female children. This rate changes for lower secondary levels at 82 percent for male and 79 percent for female children and is alarmingly wide for upper secondary students at 48 percent for males and 39 percent for females. This may be the impact of gender preference and the emphasis on fulfilling males’ needs in several Indian families and the overall impact of poverty, faced by more than 25 percent of Indian households,18 which skews data favorably for urban, richer localities and encourages families to stop education for their daughters and marry them off at a younger age. The other issue is the availability of adequately trained teachers and staff, facilities, equipment, and technical abilities in secondary and tertiary education.19 The Indian government’s education budget has been approximately £5 billion for school education and approximately £3.5 billion for higher education for the past four years. While private institutions and NGOs pick up the slack in primary and tertiary education, the imbalance in preparing a large proportion of the lower and poorer classes nationwide and the rural population is evident in the lifetime poverty levels of the entire population. Thus, it is inevitable that women make up 55 percent of the poorest populations of India (approximately 25 percent) and that the rate for childhood poverty is the highest in the world, even as overall poverty rates have declined in the past decade. Inheritance or Access to Property Indian women’s economic status is also compromised by the traditional approach to inheritance of property and access to familial wealth. Unmarried women, married women, widows, and daughters—whatever their social or personal status—have been routinely denied equal access to personal property and inheritance rights over the past few centuries. Women have had limited access to patrimony and marital property, which has historically been addressed by various acts and bills in the past two

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centuries, including the Hindu Widow’s Remarriage Act of 1856, the Hindu Inheritance Act of 1929, the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act of 1937, and the Hindu Succession Acts of 1956. Despite these acts, women did not effectively gain more recognizable rights to property until 2005. The 2005 Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, section 6, gives equal rights to daughters, just like sons, to the property of their father.20 Prior to this time, women were generally denied these rights. Marital institutions and enmeshed joint family structures kept women’s positions subsidiary to the males in the family. The emphasis on having male children as the continuers of the family and men routinely being given majority or entire shares of the property simply sidelined and ignored women’s numerous and powerful contributions to the family’s, household’s, and nation’s economy in material and labor terms through household work, child rearing, social engagement, and network building. As Datta holds, “Large numbers of women, especially in states with large farm populations such as Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh, continue to be deprived of their legitimate share of ownership and inheritance.”21 However, the previously mentioned acts pertain mainly to Hindus in the nation as a majority segment of the population. Hence, other religious minorities in the country needed separate and distinct laws to meet their religious requirements, such as the Muslim Personal Law Application Bill of 1937 and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Bill of 1938—Muslim inheritance is determined by religious texts and is not codified under Indian law.22 This has inevitably created a further subjugation of women in specific religious groups where religious authority and tradition justify women’s lesser status in the family and public spheres. The 1985 case of Shah Bano is pivotal here. Her demand for alimony was upheld by the Supreme Court. Yet that decision was overturned by the then prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, when he enacted a law in 1986 denying Muslim women the right to alimony to retain the support of his Muslim voters, much to the dismay of other female politicians of the time, like Margaret Alva. Political expediency and maintaining the status quo seem to direct actions more often than does a real desire for equity or fairness. Despite the seemingly progressive agenda of most political parties and nationalist leaders, women’s place has preferably been valued inside the bounds of the “home.” Women are still seen as a “minority” or the deprived section in the populace who must be “uplifted,” “brought forward,” or “validated” for their contributions by patriarchal institutions, especially the government. Only when they are recognized by an authoritative entity do they have any value. As Chatterji says, “The projection of the ideal Indian woman as self-effacing was a favorite theme in nationalist discourses,”23 and it continues to be so—women accept recognitions and awards with much diffidence and humility. It is suggested that women should not only not desire

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any monetary gain or recognition in personal and public life but also dutifully abjure such gain, serve selflessly, and humbly step aside when the interests of males are in jeopardy. Moreover, women have always borne the burden of cultural continuity, whether it is in being polite in public or at home; maintaining the hierarchy and culture of respect in familial systems; continuing cultural traditions through formal religious rituals, festivals, observances, and interactions within families (through festivals like Diwali, Rakhi, Teej, and so on); using traditional ingredients and methods in food preparation; or child rearing, all of which remain the exclusive domains of mothers or other women in the family or hired female help. All these actions serve the males in the family and, by extension, the nation at large. It is thus considered unseemly or unfeminine to demand more attention, private property, or social recognition. Economic Empowerment of Women Of the seventeen SDGs, Goal #5 is devoted to gender equality and equal access to opportunities for education, employment, and success with a special focus on universal reproductive rights and access to health care related to sexual and reproductive services. The SDGs depart from the language of the Millennial Development Goals in that they recognize and plan to aid women in attaining more autonomy of their bodies, economic well-being, and retention of property rights. This has an implication for Indian women as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other institutions are observing the creation and implementation of policies in India that will advance women’s welfare, protection from violence, the right to health and access to nutrition and care, and reproductive agency. This will conflict with the changed attitude of families and the general social environment post-COVID, as the nation has seen some return to traditional and patriarchal values during this crisis. Expectations for women’s empowerment are even more challenged in the contemporary world. Thus, the role of female “uplift” or empowerment has become mainly a facet of nation building, as the political structure continues to ignore women as individuals with unique abilities, desires, needs, and potential. The IMF report for 2022 suggests that post-pandemic, India will see a resurgence in economic growth, yet this report and other researchers also predict greater socioeconomic inequalities and disparities.24 The former statistics of Indian women’s participation in the labor force and of their productivity, income level and parity, education, and marital status prove that they will be at a significant disadvantage. This had previously been due to unequal access to education, marital life’s impact on education and employment, marginalization in mechanized industry and farming, relegation to low-skilled and

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insecure occupations in both urban and rural areas, and inequity in pay scales offered to women in other professions or industries as compared to men.25 While the IMF and the World Bank in 2015 may have predicted that spending on education and infrastructure will erase inequities of income and gender, the social realities of life in various regions and communities in India (especially post-COVID) challenge such broad assumptions since low-wage earners have not rebounded from the pandemic in the same fashion as large corporations.26 Their predictions are hopeful at best even as the report acknowledges the losses in education to girls.27 Notably, depending on the “legal framework and state-guided reform agenda”28 alone (which is also biased in its conception, as noted by various economists and policy experts) may not be the most effective way to attain such empowerment. Also, the increased trend toward centralizing all resources and reserves in the central government have suggested a negative trend in benefits for marginalized populations. Challenging the status quo often incites violent resistance from entrenched and powerful groups in various regions and from individuals within various systems. Laws and rules are not followed consistently, whether in education, employment, or access, and are often flouted with impunity since the legal process in India is notoriously burdensome and slow. Since 2001, the central government has attempted to address employment and income issues through various measures. One such measure is the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, enacted in 2005, with several attractive provisions to provide suitable occupations and guaranteed work of 100 days per year for rural women. This did not really enhance women’s labor force participation rates since the mid-2010s, as families still prefer women to stay at home, especially with rising overall family incomes.29 This highlights the concerns mentioned above—traditionally women’s labor in the home, universally unpaid domestic labor is preferable to work outside the home, which is considered a male prerogative and obligation. Yet, evidently, a woman’s position in the home, instead of improving as a corollary of rising family income, declines as she is devalued due to her lack of “material” income, and she has limited potential to inherit or retain familial wealth or landed property that will pass to her sons or male relatives. As Datta argues, “Economic development does not automatically help raise the status of women.”30 Something more is required here—a changing mindset, significant psychoeducation of the men in the family, and a radically different approach to gender parity and economic well-being in social systems—not just in India but all over the world. Improving women’s health and access to nutrition, changing the attitude toward gender-based violence, and women’s safety in private and public spaces are essentially the first steps toward “raising” the status of women.

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Gender-Based Violence As per National Crime Records Bureau data, there has been a significant increase in cases of human trafficking (27.7 percent), missing persons (20.6 percent), and kidnapping (19.9 percent) from 2020 to 2021, with the ratio of female victims being two to five times that of males.31 Since 2020, registered crimes against women increased (15.3 percent in states and union territories [UTs]; 22.9 percent in metropolitan cities); a majority of these acts of violence (31.8 percent in states and UTs; 33 percent in metropolitan cities) were caused by husbands or in-laws, and about half of all crimes against women (46 percent in states and UTs; 45 percent in metropolitan cities) were related to sexual crimes.32 Although the Indian legal system statistically acknowledges crimes against women through investigations, charge sheets, and trials, it is unclear whether such actions impact the mindset toward crimes against women in general. While gender is the source of numerous disparities and violence against women, so is socioeconomic status. Living below the poverty level also affects women’s safety level, especially for those considered the lowest castes or tribes in India’s caste system. From 2020 to 2021, crimes increased against SC (1.2 percent) and ST (6.4 percent) as well.33 The Seventy-Third and Seventy-Fourth amendments to the Indian Constitution, adopted in 1993, aimed at the decentralization of power in India and the establishment of local governments in the form of Gram Sabha, Panchayati Raj Institutions, or local village leadership. These amendments supported the status of SC and ST women by giving them more self-determination through local judicial powers, especially in issues concerning women. A 2020 record of elected women representatives in Panchayats across each state shows consistently that about 50 percent of the elected leaders are women even as the government provides no information on the number of actual SC/ST women who are in this group.34 A study on inclusion in Panchayati Raj Institutions concluded that there is some continuing discrimination against people of SC, while “other backward classes” experience slightly less discrimination in performing their functions on the Panchayats.35 WOMEN’S GROUPS AND THEIR ACTIVISM Beyond governmental policies and actions, several formal NGOs have taken on the task of improving women’s conditions as well. According to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, there are 3.3 million NGOs in India, of which perhaps only 150,000 are registered or certified.36 Women’s

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NGOs have been working diligently to improve the status of women. For example, the Dalit Mahila Samiti in Uttar Pradesh, which has been operating since the 1980s and has about 1,500 women members, educates and empowers women through skills and training.37 Another notable organization is the Ahmedabad, Gujarat–based Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA),38 established in 1972 by Ela Bhatt, a female lawyer, to empower women. SEWA provides training, employment, and economic empowerment to women in the informal sector so that women can work from home and gain economic, food, and social security. It employs and trains thousands of women who create and directly sell high-quality handicrafts locally and internationally and is an exemplary self-help model that provides economic support through dignified labor. Although women’s groups began forming in India in the 1920s39 and continued to the 1970s, these focused mainly on attaining equality, especially voting rights. As with their other South Asian counterparts, after the 1980s, the issues brought up by Indian women’s organizations, like the Women’s Indian Association and the National Council of Indian Women, addressed the needs of their members, not those of the larger body of poorer, disenfranchised women. Hence, the representation of the larger female population was a major issue. Women’s organizations were not always equitable: their membership and work represented different strata of society. For example, the All-India Women’s Conference, formed in 1927 by Margaret Cousins, aligned itself with the Congress Party40 and was more proactive for a broader base of women. It handled issues like child marriage, resulting in the 1927 Child Marriage Bill and the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929.41 The main office is in New Delhi, and its focus now is on women’s education.42 While attaining independence in 1947 suggested constitutional guarantees of equality, that was not truly achieved until much later after numerous struggles and determined activism by various women’s groups. Several notable women, like Vijayalakshmi Pandit or Sarojini Naidu, may have represented Indian women in a newly independent nation, but over the next several decades, women who led the nation were few and far between. In general, the status of women in India has also been precarious with a high mortality rate, high fertility, and low female birth rate.43 Since the availability of prenatal testing in the 1970s and ultrasound in the 1980s, this male-to-female ratio at birth declined but is improving across all regions and religions (108.1 males to 100 females in 2020), with the northern, western, and central regions of India experiencing the most positive change.44 Some sources suggest that India has 1,068 males to every 1,000 females, while other sources indicate a rise in the number of women.45 This ratio varies by rural and urban locations and by state, with some UTs, like Chandigarh, Goa, Dadra Nagar Haveli, and Daman Diu, and some states, like Himachal,

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showing the lowest numbers in 2019–2021,46 and by age-group, with women outnumbering men in the population age sixty-five and above. Despite the presence of various notable, formidable women in Indian politics, adequate political representation has eluded Indian women. Women like Indira Gandhi, Kamala Nehru, Aruna Asaf Ali, Sarojini Naidu, Margaret Alva, and Mamata Banerjee have represented India on the national and international stages, but the success stories, their individual political prowess notwithstanding, are limited. Mamata Banerjee is one of the few senior politicians who has managed to retain her authority and might as a politician. She is the longest-serving (and the first woman) chief minister of West Bengal and has been a force of nature since her early days in the Congress Party in the 1970s. Her political acumen is evident in her effort to effect change in any position she has been appointed to, whether as union minister for human resources in 1991, railway minister in 1999, or minister of coal mines in 2004. Despite enduring some financial and other scandals during her administration, she has survived and is known not just in the political field but also as an artist and poet. As Datta explains, “Constitutional safeguards for the rights of women and minorities co-existed, [but] were sometimes superseded by ‘personal laws,’”47 which suggests that communal, regional, religious, and caste- or class-based gender discrimination has continued to impact the personal, social level, constantly undermining the policies instituted at the federal or state level. As Mrinal Pande stated in her evaluation of customs related to marriage and women’s position in society, these “can be understood only in the light of a past that it seeks to perpetuate; a past that was codified entirely by male lawgivers like Manu.”48 The established custom of arranged marriages and the economic cost of a wedding have affected women’s lives for the past two centuries, and the lack of options for the liberated lifestyle of a student or young career woman in the West is not an option for many young Indian women. Also, while certain institutions like dowry have been illegal for a while, there are several thousand (more than 7,000 in 2020) dowry-related deaths reported in India each year,49 another instance of patriarchal institutions manifesting themselves in the form of societal greed that causes such acts and the general social and legal apathy toward women’s rights and lives. Even as such statistics prevail and abuses continue in the country, women have organized and taken up the task of their own survival. They have resorted to grassroots activism on their own behalf to obtain some economic independence and to influence local policies that affect them. Crossette lists (as early as 1998) a “group of 4,000 women representing local organizations . . . who quickly agreed on three priority areas of concern: violence against women in domestic and public life; the failure of governments at all levels to protect them, and the dislocations women suffer when ambitious

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development projects are imposed on their communities without their advice or consent.”50 Such organizations have done more for the benefit and uplift of women than have numerous legislative policies combined. Organizations like SEWA are the exemplars for women to become self-sufficient and empowered, and many new NGOs led by women to support women, their incomes, and their environments have started in the past two decades alone. Feminist movements and women’s studies in the nation at large, especially in academia, suggest that the intellectual representations of equality are not replicated in the general population. Hence, several grassroots and self-help organizations and NGOs have arisen in the past five decades to cover various aspects of women’s lives to provide support and activism on behalf of women, as shown in table 3.1. Legislative Initiatives It seems that the insistence by the women’s movement on a Uniform Civil Code has had some impact, especially starting in 1985 with the case of Shah Bano, whose demand for alimony was upheld by the Supreme Court. Yet that decision was overturned by the then prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, when he enacted a law in 1986 denying Muslim women the right to alimony to retain the support of his Muslim voters, much to the dismay of other female politicians of the time, like Margaret Alva. All this suggests that women needed to have stronger and larger (more equal) political representation in the country’s Parliament—a lot more than the 5 percent who were elected in the first-ever election in India and the 14 percent of women members of Parliament elected in the 17th Lok Sabha51 in 2019. International bodies like the United Nations have cited women’s representation in the Indian Parliament as not matching up to women’s population in the country.52 Even women’s success and personal clout in national politics, such as that of iconic women like Indira Gandhi, Sonia Gandhi, Mamata Banerjee, and Jayalalitha, and the election of various state chief ministers or cabinet ministers in numerous governments in the past seventy-five years are often a reflection of their connections to men and families in power and not in recognition of their personal acumen in leadership and politics. Greater representation by women in the highest legislative body would positively affect the attention received by women’s issues and rights in the nation. Women’s progress and achievements in the entertainment industry, sports, and academics and even in the scientific, medical, or technological realms have not meant much in elevating the status of women universally in the nation. Women’s main role is still considered that of “running the home.”53 The marginalization, elimination, and disempowerment of women starts early with selective birth of only, preferably, male children (in some highly

Center for Social Research

Center for Catalyzing Change (C3) Snehalaya

Guria India

Breakthrough India

2

3

5

6

4

Pradan

1

Name of Organization

2000

1993 New Delhi

Varanasi

Ahmednagar

New Delhi

1987

1989

New Delhi

New Delhi

Location/Main Office

1983

1983

Founding Year

Table 3.1. Notable Groups and Organizations Supporting Indian Women

Started by Deep Joshi and Vijay Mahajan, this organization supports women in the poorest rural communities in seven states in central and eastern India: Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Odisha, and West Bengal.1 Founded by social scientists from Jawaharlal Nehru University, this organization operates locally, regionally, and nationally to improve women’s lives. A key change-making organization for women and girls in five states of India: Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Gujarat.2 This organization helps destitute women, children, infants, and the LGBT community. It operates orphanages, safe houses, emergency care, and free help lines for children and serves about 19,000 people each year.3 Started by Ajeet Singh, this human rights organization “works toward eradicating human trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and children.”4 This human rights organization operates in five states and thirteen districts and uses a deep transformational model to effect unacceptability of violence and discrimination against women.5,6

Scope of Work

ASHA

Gulabi Gang, or Pink Brigade

Women on Wings

Sayodhya

Sayfty

7

8

9

10

11

2013

2010

2007

2006

2005

Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh

Hyderabad

Udaipur

Banda District, Uttar Pradesh

Ministry of Health and Family Welfare

This group, appointed by the National Rural Health Mission of the Indian government, consists of women ages twenty-five to forty-five years who serve a rural, urban population of lower- and lower-middle-income communities.7 These women work selflessly and tirelessly with a low stipend and without access to health care or insurance even though they are exposed to dangerous situations, such as during COVID, when they worked with inadequate personal protective equipment. This women’s movement was founded by Sampat Pal Devi in the Banda District of Uttar Pradesh, a very poor area in North India. It is known as Gulabi (Pink) Gang because its members wear bright pink saris, wield bamboo sticks, and act in a united way to oppose women’s oppression.8 This feminist organization, started by Maria van der Heijden and Ellen Tacoma, empowers low-income and rural women via jobs and job training.9,10 This women’s rights organization provides shelter, a twenty-four-hour help line, and legal aid to female trauma victims.11,12 Founded by Dr. Shruti Kapoor in response to the gang rape of Jyoti Singh, this organization focuses on “empowering women to speak out against gender violence” through self-defense classes, advocacy for victims, and online campaigns for women’s safety.13

Gender at Work India

2015

India

This international feminist organization builds “cultures of equality and inclusion” and addresses structural inequities and sexist norms in institutions and organizations. It has been working in India since 2004 under various auspices.14,15,16

Sources: This table was prepared by the author using the following works: 1“Our Impact,” Pradan, 2022, https:​//​www​.pradan​.net​/our​-impact​/​#storiesofimpact. 2“We Are C3,” Center for Catalyzing Change, 2022, https:​//​www​.c3india​.org​/who​_we​_are. 3“5 Organizations Fighting for Women’s Empowerment in India,” The Borgen Project, April 1, 2019, https:​//​borgenproject​.org​/5​-organizations​-fighting​-for​-womens​-empowerment​-in​-india/. 4Guria India, 2017, http:​//​www​.guriaindia​.org/; 5Breakthrough, 2022, https:​//​inbreakthrough​.org/. 6“Women’s Day 2022: These Indian Organizations Are Helping Empower Women in Various Ways,” India Today, March 8, 2022, https:​//​www​.indiatoday​.in​/education​-today​/featurephilia​/story​/women​-s​-day​-these​-indian​-organisations​-are​-helping​-empower​-women​-in​-various​-ways​-1921763​-2022​ -03​-07. 7About Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA), National Health Mission. Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2022, https:​//​nhm​.gov​.in​/index1​.php​?lang​=1​ &level​=1​&sublinkid​=150​&lid​=226. 8 Gulabi Gang, 2022, https:​//​gulabigang​.in/. 9“How we came about,” Women on Wings, 2021, https:​//​www​.womenonwings​.com​ /how​-we​-came​-about/. 10“5 Notable Feminist Organizations in India,” Women’s Republic, 2021, https:​//​www​.womensrepublic​.net​/5​-notable​-feminist​-organizations​-in​ -india/. 11“Sayodhya: Home for Women in Need,” 2022, https:​//​sayodhya​.org/; 12Sonali Sinha, “Women and Women’s Rights Organizations in India,” Eye Mantra, March 18, 2021, https:​//​eyemantra​.org​/blog​/women​-rights​-organizations​-in​-india/. 13“About Us,” Sayfty, 2022, https:​//​sayfty​.com​/about​-sayfty/. 14“Gender at Work Is Part of the Government of India Recommended Panel of Institutions/Organization for Imparting Training Programs/Workshop under Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013,” Gender at Work, 2022, https:​//​genderatwork​.org​/genderatwork​-india/. 15Gender at Work, 2021, https:​//​genderatwork​ .org/. 16“5 Notable Feminist Organizations in India,” 2021.

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conservative communities in western and central India, among other regions) due to access to gender identification medical technology, numerous abortions of female fetuses, and, thereafter, a systematic undermining of the potential of female children in the family and larger Indian society. This is evident in various districts in the country. Beyond this, the difficulty of raising, educating, and then marrying off (a considerable rite of passage for Indian women) their daughters is still a subject of much concern for Indian parents. Numerous documentaries, movies, research, and publications address the issue, but this has been almost impossible to remedy. A Suitable Girl (2017) by Smitri Mundhra and Jennifer Tiexera tracks the lives of three young women before and after marriage. The documentary shows that traditional expectations of women persist and that education, socioeconomic status, and location do not support women’s personal choices. Documentaries like Gulabi Gang (2012),54 Writing with Fire (2021),55 Purple Skies (2014), and The Holy Wives (2010) have addressed issues of women in lower-socioeconomic, rural, or alternate communities. Besides the general status of women, the status of women in some impoverished or marginalized segments of Indian society, like the scheduled castes and tribes, has been an area of concern that various governments have tried to address. The National Commission for Women (NCW) Act (Act No. 20 of 1990 of the Government of India) of January 1992 was set up56 as a statutory body. It established a commission of five members with a chairperson and provided for one member each from the SCs and STs.. The NCW is charged with bringing forward issues related to safeguarding the interests of women, examining any complaints, and considering timely amendments or additions to the Constitution to ensure the rights of women. While it has been provided with funding, this in inadequate to meet its needs, and while the members are charged to act on behalf of women in the nation, they do not have any concrete legislative power. The NCW regularly notes, refers, and provides information to the government regarding issues or incidents related to women. This has given some visibility to and recognition of the need for addressing women’s issues, but in general, the NCW does not handle cases effectively or with sensitivity. The fact that leadership is appointed instead of democratically elected and that the political affiliations of its members and chairperson direct its actions have led various women’s bodies and organizations to appeal for reforming the NCW.57 While several consecutive Indian governments may have established commissions and other statutory bodies through passing timely laws to take care of women in need of economic support or assistance with health care and education, the position of women has not automatically improved. The gaps in the functioning of various government organizations and the bureaucratic process as well as the entrenched interests of bureaucrats leave many women

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and families in desperate situations. The issues facing women seem to be attitudinal and cultural, based on biased and outdated social structures and vested interests. The lack of access to basic resources like food and health care—evident in the need to institute a program like the “Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana,” launched in 2010 and renamed in 2017, and “Poshan Abhiyaan,”58 launched in March 2018, both of which try to provide the right nutrition to mothers and children—suggests either the unwillingness of families to feed mothers and children or their inability to do so due to poverty. The “Beti Bachao Beti Padhao” scheme to provide education to female children and women has the objective of “challenging mindsets and deep-rooted patriarchy in the societal system . . . advancing education of the girl child: focus is on issues of women empowerment on a life cycle continuum,”59 yet its long-term impact remains to be seen, even as some news organizations have reported a positive uptick in girls’ birth rates and enrollment in elementary schools in the districts involved in the project.60 THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 As the UN studies on population have noted in the past two years, the impacts of COVID are felt more strongly by women, as they are designated caretakers at home as well as in the medical and caregiving industries. The World Bank and the United Nations have noted that “women comprise 70% of the global healthcare workforce” and are retained only for lower-level work.61 In India, the focus on providing preventive and palliative care during COVID gained precedence over health services for women, especially pregnant and nursing women, and ASHA workers, all of whom are women, have struggled to provide “noncritical” care, like immunizations, prenatal vitamins, birth control, and postnatal support.62 Women have had to also face the burden of caretaking responsibilities in both single- and dual-parent households since paid child care became unavailable, and health care workers particularly faced the risk of contracting COVID and infecting families even as they faced the additional stress of long hours of work, unemployment due to mandatory layoffs and furloughs, lack of personal protective equipment and rapid testing, and the increased physical demands of their families. The gendered nature of the pandemic showed in high relief in communities of the Dalits, tribal groups, and minorities. According to the International Labour Organization, women workers from these groups in the low-wage, informal sectors lost three times more jobs than did their “upper-caste” counterparts and risked falling deeper into poverty.63

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Jayati Lal also notes that “women are overrepresented in ‘frontline’ service work in nursing, airlines, teaching, food services, and retail” and calls for an active investment in “the social infrastructure of capitalism that will entail the recognition, valuation and support for the paid and unpaid gendered labor of social reproduction.”64 Other impacts of this pandemic have been on girls and young women in lower- and lower-middle-class families; their futures in education, employment, and personal freedom are threatened by parental concerns for their familial financial survival, and many young women were forced to leave school and start working and to choose marriage as an option.65 Likewise, slum dwellers’ and domestic workers’ livelihoods were devastated by the pandemic lockdown and experienced “physical compression on an unthinkable scale.”66 Data from the National Sample Survey Organization suggest that there are 4 million domestic workers, while unofficial sources claim this number to be 50 million.67 This highlights the impact on several million households in rural and urban locations. Even after the pandemic restrictions were eased several months later, the plight of domestic workers continued, as they were not permitted to resume work until much later. The middle-class households also experienced a regeneration of the old-fashioned gender divide in domestic work, while in some younger, dual-income families, task sharing among both genders was evident as well.68 The helplessness of a large portion of India’s poor, especially itinerant workers, whose livelihoods and shelter were suddenly snatched away during the pandemic lockdowns due to job loss, unpaid back wages, and low prospects of survival in cities, caused a large-scale migration back to their hometowns.69 This period was a case study in bureaucratic cluelessness and mismanagement where the government not only failed to provide protections or support for the poor, resourceless workers but also harassed and punished them. According to the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, the “unemployment rate in the country increased from 8.7 percent in March 2020 to a whopping 23 percent in April 2020.”70 In addition, schemes like the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, which could have supported agricultural, rural workers returning home from urban areas, were suddenly suspended, leaving the workers with no recourse for employment or livelihood.71 While several governments provided funding to support the indigent, Prime Minister Narendra Modi started a “PM Cares” fund, “which is set up as a private trust with no accountability or oversight.”72 It has been controversial due to its management, the secrecy about the amount in the fund, and the refusal to merge its contents with the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund (PMNRF).73 The prime minister has recently appointed new trustees to the fund, and “as per Centre’s data, a total of ₹7,031.99 crore was collected under

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PM CARES Fund [during] 2020–21.”74 The distribution of money from this fund and its impact on providing support to the indigent remain to be seen. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  What are the factors that impact women’s status in India? Explain and use examples to illustrate your answer. 2.  How does unequal educational access act as a detriment to the personal, social, and economic progress of Indian women? 3.  How does patriarchy support the prevalence of violence against women in India? 4.  How has the growth of women’s movements impacted the economic status of women in India? 5.  How has COVID-19 affected women’s role in the family and the workspace in India? NOTES 1. Puja Awasthi, “The Life of ASHA Workers in the Time of COVID-19,” The Week, April 10, 2020. 2. “Share of Participation at Work across India from 2014 to 2022, by Gender,” Statista, 2022, https:​//​www​.statista​.com​/statistics​/1043300​/india​-work​-participation​ -by​-gender. 3. N. A. Palkhivala, India’s Priceless Heritage (Mumbai: Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 2003), 47, as quoted in Rekha Datta, Contemporary India: The Basics (London: Routledge, 2017), 138. 4. “Crime in India—2021,” National Crime Records Bureau, 2021, https:​//​ncrb​ .gov​.in​/sites​/default​/files​/CII​-2021​/CII​%202021​%20CITIES​%20SNAPSHOTS​.pdf. 5. “What Is the Nirbhaya Case?” The Times of India, December 18, 2019, https:​//​ timesofindia​.indiatimes​.com​/india​/what​-is​-nirbhaya​-case​/articleshow​/72868430​.cms; Gethin Chamberlain and Soudhriti Bhabani, “Five Years after the Gang-Rape and Murder of Jyoti Singh, What Has Changed for Women in India,” The Guardian, December 3, 2017, https:​//​www​.theguardian​.com​/society​/2017​/dec​/03​/five​-years​ -after​-gang​-murder​-jyoti​-singh​-how​-has​-delhi​-changed. 6. “Iran: Crackdown on Peaceful Protests since Death of Jina Mahsa Amini Needs Independent International Investigation, Say UN Experts,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, October 26, 2022, https:​//​www​.ohchr​.org​/ en​/press​-releases​/2022​/10​/iran​-crackdown​-peaceful​-protests​-death​-jina​-mahsa​-amini​ -needs​-independent.

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7. Tanushree Chandra, “Literacy in India: The Gender and Age Dimension,” ORF Issue Brief, issue 322, October 31, 2019, https:​//​www​.orfonline​.org​/research​/literacy​ -in​-india​-the​-gender​-and​-age​-dimension​-57150. 8. Rekha Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” in Contemporary India, 134. 9. Chandra, “Literacy in India.” 10. Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 123. 11. “Goal 4: Quality Education,” Country SDG Profiles, 2022, https:​//​data​.unescap​ .org​/data​-analysis​/country​-sdg​-profiles. 12. Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 125. 13. S. Batliwala, “Taking the Power Out of Empowerment: An Experiential Account,” Development in Practice 17, no. 4/5 (2007): 558, as quoted in Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 122. 14. Meagan Call-Cummings, “Feminist Theory and Empowerment,” 2013, https:​//​ researchforempowerment​.com​/feminist​-theory​-and​-empowerment. 15. India Millennial Development Goals Report 2015, 36–37, as quoted in Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 123–24. 16. SDG Progress, SDG Gateway: Asia Pacific, 2022, https:​//​data​.unescap​.org​/data​ -analysis​/sdg​-progress#. 17. Datta, Contemporary India, 125. 18. “Poverty Rate in India 2022,” The Global Statistics, 2022, https:​ //​ www​ .theglobalstatistics​.com​/poverty​-in​-india​-statistics​-2021. 19. India: Goal 4: Quality Education,” SDG Gateway: Asia Pacific, UNESCAP, 2022, https:​//​data​.unescap​.org​/data​-analysis​/country​-sdg​-profiles. 20. “The Hindu Succession Amendment Act 2005,” UN Women: Global Database on Violence Against Women, 2016, https:​//​shorturl​.at​/AS356. 21. Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 130. 22. “Rights of Legal Heirs under Muslim Law,” Inheritance Law, NRI Legal Services, 2022, https:​//​www​.nrilegalservices​.com​/rights​-of​-legal​-heirs​-property​ -inheritance​-law​-in​-india​/​#Property​_inheritance​_under​_Muslim​_personal​_laws. 23. B. Chatterji, “Political Development in India,” in Politics India: State-Society Interface, ed. R. Chatterji (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2009), 411–12, as quoted in Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 119. 24. “India’s Economy to Rebound as Pandemic Prompts Policy Change,” IMF Country Focus, International Monetary Fund, November 12, 2021, https:​ //​ www​.imf​.org​/en​/News​/Articles​/2021​/11​/02​/na111121​-indias​-economy​-to​-rebound​-as​ -pandemic​-prompts​-reforms https:​//​www​.imf​.org​/en​/Countries​/IND. 25. Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 127–29. 26. The language used in the report is hopeful at best and relies on projections and planned endeavors instead of real, critical numbers or certainty of policy changes and implementations. See “India: 2021 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by Executive Director for India,” IMF Country Report No. 21/230, October 2021, 8, file:///C:/Users/Abha/Downloads/1INDEA2021001. pdf. The IMF Working Paper (2015) and the World Bank Report (#ACS7935: xi) comment on the decrease in Indian women’s labor force participation rate (LFPR)

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from the 1990s on while observing that the spending on infrastructure and education focused on equity may improve women’s LFPR (as noted in Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 127–29). 27. “India,” 18. 28. Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 129. 29. Ibid., 130. 30. Ibid., 131. 31. “Crime in India—2021: Snapshots (States/UTs),” National Crime Records Bureau, Government of India: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2021, xi, xii, xiii, xv, https:​//​ncrb​.gov​.in​/sites​/default​/files​/CII​-2021​/CII​%202021​%20SNAPSHOTS​ %20STATES​.pdf; “Crime in India—2021: Snapshots (Metropolitan Cities ->2 Million Population),” National Crime Records Bureau, Government of India: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2021, xix, https:​//​ncrb​.gov​.in​/sites​/default​/files​/CII​-2021​/CII​%202021​ %20CITIES​%20SNAPSHOTS​.pdf. 32. “Crime in India—2021: Snapshots (States/UTs),” xiii. 33. Ibid. 34. Ministry of Panchayati Raj, “Representation in Panchayats,” September 23, 2020, https:​//​pib​.gov​.in​/PressReleaseIframePage​.aspx​?PRID​=1658145. 35. N. Sukumar, Lal L. David, and Vinod Kumar Mishra, “Inclusiveness in the Panchayati Raj Institutions,” Journal of Social Inclusion Studies 5, no. 1 (2019): 72–88, https:​//​doi​.org​/10​.1177​/2394481119859675. 36. “India,” International Center for Not-for Profit Law, September 12, 2022, https:​ //​www​.icnl​.org​/resources​/civic​-freedom​-monitor​/india. 37. Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 132. 38. SEWA International, 2020, https:​//​www​.sewainternational​.org. 39. Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 119. 40. B. Crossette, “The Role of Women,” in Understanding Contemporary India, S. Ganguly and N. DeVotta, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 138. 41. Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India, 2017. 42. All India Women’s Conference, 2022, http:​//​www​.aiwc​.org​.in​/history​.html 43. Crossette, “The Role of Women,” 139. 44. “India’s Sex Ratio at Birth Has Been Moving toward Balance in Recent Years,” Pew Research Center, August 18, 2022, https:​//​www​.pewresearch​.org​/religion​/2022​ /08​/23​/indias​-sex​-ratio​-at​-birth​-begins​-to​-normalize​/pr​_2022​-08​-23​_india​-sex​-ration​ _00​-01. 45. “India Population Clock (live),” 2022, https:​ //​ countrymeters​ .info​ /en​ /India; “India Now Has More Women Than Men but Sex Ratio at Birth Still Low,” Business Standard, November 25, 2021, https:​//​www​.business​-standard​.com​/article​/ current​-affairs​/india​-now​-has​-more​-women​-than​-men​-but​-sex​-ratio​-at​-birth​-still​-low​ -121112501539​_1​.html. 46. “Annexure–II: Sex Ratio at Birth for Children Born in the Last Five Years, India and by States/UTs, NFHS-4 & NFHS-5,” Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, December 17, 2021, https:​//​pib​.gov​.in​/PressReleasePage​.aspx​?PRID​=1782601. 47. Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 120. 48. As quoted in Crossette, “The Role of Women,” 140.

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49. Crossette, “The Role of Women,” 143; S. Kanwal, “Total Number of Reported Dowry Death Cases in India from 2005 to 2020,” Statista, 2021, https:​//​www​.statista​ .com​/statistics​/632553​/reported​-dowry​-death​-cases​-india​/Statista​.com 2020. 50. Crossette, “The Role of Women,” 143–44. 51. Shruthi Radhakrishnan, “New Lok Sabha Has Highest Number of Women MPs,” The Hindu, May 27, 2019, https:​//​www​.thehindu​.com​/news​/national​/new​-lok​ -sabha​-has​-highest​-number​-of​-women​-mps​/article27260506​.ece. 52. Datta, “‘Mother of a Hundred Sons’ No More,” 121. 53. As quoted in ibid. 54. Gulabi Gang, dir. Nishtha Jain, 2012, https:​//​www​.imdb​.com​/title​/tt2196638. 55. Sushmita Pathak, “India’s All-Female News Outlet Faces Sexism, Death Threats, a New Film Tells the Story,” NPR, November 26, 2021, https:​//​www​.npr​.org​/ sections​/goatsandsoda​/2021​/04​/04​/980097004​/indias​-lowest​-caste​-has​-its​-own​-news​ -outlet​-and​-shes​-in​-charge. 56. National Commission for Women, 2022, http:​//​www​.ncw​.nic​.in​/Acts​-and​-rules​ /national​-commission​-women​-act​-1990​-act​-no​-20​-1990​-govtof​-india. 57. Sadhna Arya, “National Commission for Women: An Overview of Its Performance,” Economic and Political Weekly 48, no. 18 (2013): 112–19, http:​//​www​.jstor​ .org​/stable​/23527315. 58. “Poshan Abhiyan,” Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India, 2022. 59. “Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao,” Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India, 2017. 60. The Web page for the scheme was last updated in 2017. Hence, we do not have adequate official data to consider its success. 61. Inez Miyamoto, “COVID-19 Healthcare Workers: 70% Are Women,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2020. 62. Miyamoto, “COVID-19 Healthcare Workers”; Awasthi, “The Life of ASHA Workers in the Time of COVID-19.” 63. Jayati Lal, “Coronavirus Capitalism and the Patriarchal Pandemic in India: Why We Need a ‘Feminism for the 99%’ That Centers Social Reproduction,” in Being Human During COVID, ed. Kristin Ann Hass (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021), 290. 64. Ibid., 287, 288. 65. Ibid., 291. 66. Arundhati Roy, “The Pandemic Is Portal,” Financial Times, April 3, 2020, as quoted in ibid., 292. 67. Haripriya Narasimhan, Chittem Mahati, and Pooja Purang, “Pandemic Times in a WhatsApp-ed Nation: Gender Ideologies in India during COVID-19,” in Viral Loads: Anthropologies of Urgency in the Time of COVID-19, ed. Lenore Manderson, Nancy J. Burke, and Ayo Wahlberg (London: UCL Press, 2021), 367. 68. Narasimhan et al., “Pandemic Times in a WhatsApp-ed Nation,” 368–70. 69. Lal, “Coronavirus Capitalism and the Patriarchal Pandemic in India,” 289.

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70. Vikas Rawal, Manish Kumar, Ankur Verma, and Jesim Pais, “COVID-19 Lockdown: Impact on Agriculture and Rural Economy,” Social Scientist 48, no. 3/6 (March–June 2020): 78. 71. Rawal et al., “COVID-19 Lockdown,” 79. 72. Lal, “Coronavirus Capitalism and the Patriarchal Pandemic in India,” 298. 73. Geeta Pandey, “Coronavirus: Secrecy Surrounds India PM Narendra Modi’s ‘$1bn’ Covid-19 Fund,” BBC News, June 30, 2020, https:​//​www​.bbc​.com​/news​/ world​-asia​-india​-53151308. 74. “Govt Appoints Ratan Tata, 2 Others as Trustees of PM CARES Fund,” Livemint, September 21, 2022, https:​//​www​.livemint​.com​/news​/india​/govt​-appoints​-ratan​ -tata​-2​-others​-as​-trustees​-of​-pm​-cares​-fund​-11663746503305​.html.

Chapter 4

Growing Inequality and Problems of Governance Threats to Democracy and Human Security in Bangladesh Golam M. Mathbor

Bangladesh achieved its independence in 1971. The year 2021 marks its fiftieth anniversary. The country has come a long way since its birth and, in 2020, graduated as a member of the middle-income countries category by maintaining a steady economic growth of 6 to 7 percent over the years. It has been able to hold on to its democratic processes over the years despite the numerous obstacles thrown at it periodically. However, currently, there is a serious concern about fairness of national elections, freedom of speech, growing inequality, and gross violation of human rights. This chapter will explore the multidimensional aspects of poverty, including social, political, environmental, economic, and psychological. It will examine factors that are contributing to inequality, such as population, economy, politics, education, religiosity, inclusion and diversity, corruption, leadership, and disaster impacts. All these elements have severe consequences for the limited social safety net prevalent in the country. The residual approach of the social safety nets is a major impediment to human security in Bangladesh. Inequality caused by poverty will be analyzed based on population as well as several other indices: poverty line, gross domestic product (GDP), Human Development Indicator, and Human Poverty Index. Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are further deteriorating the socioeconomic and political condition of Bangladesh and widening the inequality that threatens its democracy and human security. 91

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INTRODUCTION In Bangladesh, the garment industry and foreign remittances are the primary drivers of the economy. The population in 2022, as reported by the UN Population Fund, is 167,900,000, with the country having the distinction of being one of the most densely populated countries in the world.1 Bangladesh is susceptible to natural disasters due to location, terrain, and poverty, which in any country can hold back gains made. Governance becomes essential, as it is the umbrella offering a safety net over four areas that can ensure a stable foundation of democracy and equality for the citizens of any country. The areas are (1) social indicators, consisting of education, food security, health, and religiosity; (2) environment; (3) economy; and (4) politics and government. These will be examined to see how they have affected the current state of democracy and equality in Bangladesh. These are similar to those in Pakistan, where the late Mahbub ul Haq put forth the idea that the government there needed to provide all people with basic needs before spending on additional activities. Haq felt that more must be spent on human development to close the inequality gap. Providing only income for subsistence is not enough; people should also be given the means to advance. Policies are needed to rethink development so that it is tied not only to GDP.2 Amartya Sen also sees development policy as needing change because it is too narrowly focused on income. In an interview with the Asia Society in New York on December 6, 2004, he stated, “That proved to be a not very good way of thinking about development, which has to be concerned with advancing human well-being and human freedom. Income is one of the factors that contributes to welfare and freedom, but not the only factor.” This also applies to Bangladesh, where development policy should include those whom the policy will affect and focus on both income and well-being. The government of Bangladesh has managed to improve many areas since independence, but challenges remain, along with other areas needing improvement. SOCIAL FOUNDATION: EDUCATION A solid educational system is part of the social structure of a country and the future of any nation as youth grow up to take their place in the adult world. Education is affected by each of the other three foundation areas. In Bangladesh, the educational system lags behind other achievements. As with other countries in South Asia, the COVID-19 virus created setbacks in

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education, and in Bangladesh, impediments have exacerbated the inequality in the educational system. Children in Bangladesh are educated in public, private, or religious schools. The Madrasah (Islamic religious school) education system, from primary to tertiary, runs parallel to the formal school system, with Madrasah education provided by both public and private institutions. The number of Madrasahs and of students enrolled has grown rapidly in recent years; they now enroll up to one-third of all school attendees in Bangladesh.3 With such a large population, Bangladesh has done well with enrollment at the primary education level: 18 million children, or 98 percent of primary-age children, are enrolled in primary school. As of 2016, gender parity had been achieved with girls making up 50.9 percent of total school enrollment. The large refugee population, living in temporary settlements for extended periods, are particularly challenging for the educational system. These populations have not assimilated into Bangladeshi society because the government refuses to accept them and is adamant that their home country is responsible for their own people. The Biharis and Rohingya are the main refugee populations in Bangladesh. Members of the Bihari community are non-Bengali Muslims who fled the eastern Indian state of Bihar, and they have lived in Bangladesh for decades. Their language is Urdu. The Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority who fled from Myanmar in two waves in 1978 and again in 2017, have their own distinct Rohingya language. The government of Bangladesh still sees their presence in the country as temporary, although they number 1.1 million people and are known as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs). Bangladesh refuses to accept responsibility, looking to the United Nations for resolution. Home countries of the refugees of India and Myanmar, respectively, also refuse to have them. They are stateless peoples. The government report Bangladesh Preparing for Sustainable Graduation Annual Monitoring Report 2021, submitted to the UN Committee for Development Policy (CDP), states, None of the temporary arrangements, be in Cox’s Bazar or in Bhasan Char, is tenable in the long run. The crisis is created in Myanmar and the solution lies only in Myanmar. All FDMNs must return to their ancestral homeland in the Rakhine State of Myanmar in safety, security, and dignity for sustainable reintegration there. The Rohingya are also eager to return as it is their right.4

Indigenous people are another challenge to the government because ethnic group enrollment in schools is low. “This is particularly evident in the Khasi, Patro and Tea Labour communities where education of children rarely progresses past primary level.”5

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Children living in remote villages may not have access to secondary schools. Literacy rates are low among the adult population, and many parents/ guardians do not enforce attendance, seeing little value in education. Since classes are conducted in Bangla, issues are created for children of ethnic communities with different languages. As impressive as primary enrollment is, the quality of education and retention in later grades in Bangladesh needs improvement. Students are behind in reading and comprehension, and one-fifth drop out by fifth grade. These children go on to become disadvantaged youth and adults who have trouble competing successfully to advance their position in society. Reasons for literacy issues include lack of access to educational facilities, educational material only in Bangla and not in other languages, and teachers who need better training.6 While participation in secondary education has grown strongly over the past decade, the numbers can be misleading. Attrition rates in Bangladeshi secondary schools are high, particularly among girls, many of whom drop out of school because they marry early or lack the same parental support for education as boys. At the tertiary level, limited slots are available at public universities, and competition is keen at private universities, resulting in many students going overseas for higher education. If slots are increased, would the “brain-drain” lessen? This remains to be seen, as the intrigue of going abroad is considered enticing to secondary school students in many countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, including Bangladesh.7 Core Curriculum In March 2008, a comprehensive report was issued about the need for early childhood education at the preprimary level. The report, titled Operational Framework for Pre-Primary Education, states, The lack of school readiness makes it difficult for children to adapt themselves to school so this can lead to children dropping out. Therefore, early childhood education including pre-primary education is regarded as a necessary area of intervention for the success of primary education.8

In 2010, as a follow-up to this report, Bangladesh adopted a new national education policy with one year of compulsory preschool education and extended the length of compulsory education from grade 5 to grade 8. Other changes included a common elementary core curriculum and national examinations at the end of grades 5 and 8. However, the curriculum and exam changes created a new issue for low-income families. In their quest for

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attainment of the goal of achieving passage, tuition classes became a necessity, especially for parents lacking the education to help their children, but this is an expense many families are unable or struggle to afford. Rural Education Inequality is growing because Bangladesh is lagging in the secondary and tertiary educational levels, especially in rural areas. As urbanization of the nation increases, it brings forward the issue of inequality in education and the effect of this disparity on education. Bangladesh’s population is mainly rural, with 38.2 percent of the population living in urban areas.9 Other issues faced by rural populations include lack of access to educational facilities; boys not attending school due to family work commitments in employment areas such as farming, fishing, or trades; and adolescent girls being removed from school to help in poverty-stricken households or to become young brides. Parental support can be lacking, especially if the parents themselves have little education. Poverty forces many families to concentrate on their present survival rather than an intangible future. UNESCO data show that in 2019, 18 per cent of lower-secondary age boys were out of school nationwide, compared to 8 per cent of girls (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics & UNICEF Bangladesh, 2019). Social norms including early marriage also put adolescent girls’ progression in education at risk. In rural areas, only 25 per cent of girls complete upper-secondary school, compared to 30 per cent of boys. (UNESCO UIS data, 2019)10

An educational project that highlights the educational issues rural areas face was introduced for children in Sylhet, one of eight administrative divisions in Bangladesh. Sylhet is in the northeast of Bangladesh in an area of low-lying floodplains that inundate the area with water for about six months every year. Because of this flooding, children and their families face difficulty in school access, which is already difficult in this remote poverty area. When compared to other regions in Bangladesh, Sylhet has some of the poorest performance of educational learning at all levels: Fifteen per cent of children attend pre-primary education and only 21 per cent of children aged 3–4 are developmentally on track in literacy and numeracy, against a national average of 29 per cent (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics & UNICEF Bangladesh, 2019). Primary and lower-secondary school completion rates in Sylhet are the lowest and second-lowest nationwide, respectively. (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics & UNICEF Bangladesh, 2019)11

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In 2019, UNICEF and partners introduced in Sylhet three pathways for children to follow to a career through education: entry into primary school, acquiring foundational skills to access learning, and entry into the job market. Ninety percent of children came from families who lived on 2,000 Taka (US $24) or less per capita monthly, which is below the international poverty line of US $1.90 daily. The international poverty line was established by the World Bank as an indicator of poverty in a country and uses 2011 data of purchasing power parity. The Sylhet program did not include marginalized groups, such as the differently abled, homeless children, and orphans, but these groups were recommended for future consideration. Thirty-five percent of learners who had achieved adequate grade-level competencies went on to mainstream education in formal primary schools or Madrasahs. Some children did drop out of the program for reasons such as the family’s lack of awareness, the distance to school, not liking the program, child labor, and/or poverty. But those who completed the program and went into employment successfully chose certain trades to become productive members of society. The highest three trade entries were dressmaking (50 percent), woodwork furniture design (14 percent), and information technology support technician (14 percent). Other trades were mobile phone servicing, beauty salon work, graphic design, motorcycle repair, and refrigeration and air-conditioning repair.12 Although this program highlights success in training and school retention in a high-poverty area, another report unfortunately gives a scathing evaluation of rural education in Bangladesh. The report concludes, However, while the government has recently built thousands of schools, notably in remote rural areas, and poured considerable resources into improving education, implementation of many of the reforms remains a work in progress hampered by funding problems with many classrooms overcrowded and teachers often poorly trained. Dropout rates are high with nearly 20 percent of pupils not completing elementary school in 2016. At the lower-secondary level, the dropout rate stood at 38 percent in 2017 with fully 42 percent of girls leaving school before completing grade 10, due to factors like poverty and child marriage. Teacher-to-student ratios, meanwhile, remain well above the official target ratio of 30:1. (42:1 in secondary schools in 2016)13

SOCIAL FOUNDATION: FOOD SECURITY Another social problem crossing each sector is food security, which is problematic with such large population numbers in Bangladesh. The World Bank states,

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More than 70 percent of Bangladesh’s population and 77 percent of its workforce lives in rural areas. Nearly half of all of Bangladesh’s workers and two-thirds in rural areas are directly employed by agriculture, and about 87 percent of rural households rely on agriculture for at least part of their income.14

In Bangladesh, the primary source of income is in the agricultural and aquaculture sectors. In rural areas, farming, especially of rice, is an important source of subsistence, although many farmers are tenant based. Development, natural disasters, and especially flooding and climate change effects erode arable land areas and affect fishing sources both inland and in marine life areas. With less land available for crop production and water resources shrinking, population growth stresses food supplies and results in more food imports, such as wheat. Fisheries make significant contributions to the socioeconomic development of the country. The fisheries sector accounts for 4.4 percent of national GDP and contributes about 22 percent to the agricultural GDP and slightly less than 3 percent to foreign exchange earnings through the export of fish products.15 The changing climate affects life in the oceans and on land, as droughts, floods, rising seas, ocean acidification, warming oceans, and wildfires change the productivity of water sources where human food sources of aquatic creatures and wildlife live, spawn, and feed. Although climate change is seen as a countrywide issue, local communities must also do their part to adapt to the issues they face.16 A historical example of government policy affecting food security is the 1974–1975 famine, when the Brahmaputra River flooded, particularly the northern parts of Bangladesh. In 1974, just three years after independence, the country had higher-than-normal rice production, but availability was exacerbated by poor government policy. The United States had applied food aid sanctions due to Bangladesh’s trade with Cuba, resulting in low food stocks and fewer imports. The food shortage from this should have been shared by all, but government made a serious policy mistake by rationing food, resulting in urban areas receiving more than rural areas. The dire consequence of low food stocks and low production due to flooding was famine, resulting in 1 million deaths.17 The government set up feeding centers called “gruel kitchens” but underestimated the number of people needing food. “Demand from the kitchens has substantially affected supplies to the regular rationing outlets, on which the bulk of the working population in this country of 75 million depends.”18 But almost fifty years later now, in 2022, Bangladesh continues to have issues with food security. Almost half of children are stunted in their growth,

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with others malnourished and underweight or anemic. Women’s nutrition has improved, but still, one-quarter are undernourished and others anemic.19 Nutritional intake is also a food security concern because many families struggle to have adequate food intake. This affects poorer families where, with insufficient food, many women suffer their own intake in order to provide for their families. The divide between the rich and poor creates inequality in both purchasing power and adequate nutrition. Climate change and the increasing movement of people to urban areas also affect food security. Nutritional deficiencies in turn lead to health issues, which can burden the government.20 The World Food Program has found that although the government of Bangladesh has put funding into increasing agricultural output through better practices and use of technology, the small farmers have been often excluded with funding going to large holders.21 The COVID-19 pandemic affected food production in Bangladesh by disrupting the business cycle in such areas as production, transport, marketing, demand, supply chains, and the incomes of farmers and fishers. The poor suffered disproportionately as their livelihoods were affected. Their access to nutritious food was affected by loss of income. A positive outcome was that the government reacted to COVID’s effect on agriculture by developing plans to improve technology processes in agriculture and to improve research and development in areas such as crop yield. The government does have food safety schemes in effect: A number of food safety net programmes are in operation in Bangladesh, each with its own specific objectives and target population. These include test relief, Vulnerable Group Feeding, Vulnerable Group Development, Food for Work, Employment Guarantee Scheme, etc. A number of social protection programmes such as vulnerable group feeding, allowance for destitute women, and old age pensions have also been introduced to support food security of the extremely needy people.22

Aquaculture has been one of the fastest-growing economic subsectors of the Bangladesh economy, providing high-protein food, income, and employment and earning foreign exchange. More than 4 million fish farmers, mostly small scale, and more than 8.5 million people derive a livelihood, either directly or indirectly, from the fisheries sector. Export revenue in 2012 was estimated at US $450 million: National Aquaculture Development Strategy and Action Plan of Bangladesh 2013–2020, which is aligned with and draws guidance from the Country Investment Plan of 2010–2015 and the Sixth Five Year Plan 2011–2015. The mission for aquaculture under this Strategy and Action Plan is that it shall improve the welfare of the resource-poor people dependent on aquatic resources

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for livelihood, create employment opportunities for the landless and the fishers who are poor, conserve and, as much as possible, enhance the natural resources on which livelihoods are based, promote the sustainable development of rural communities, increase export earnings and contribute to the creation of national wealth and improvement in peoples’ welfare. It shall be inclusive of all stakeholders but place emphasis on the small and poorer constituents of the aquaculture subsector.23

The Sixth Five Year Plan (2011–2015) provided a strategic framework and guidelines for reducing regional disparities; developing human capacity; managing land constraints; using natural resources; increasing agricultural productivity, household income, and employment; and ensuring food security.24 SOCIAL FOUNDATION: RELIGIOSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS The political situation in Bangladesh can be tenuous, especially at times of local and national elections, and political unrest can shut down business operations and impact supply chains. Terrorism—and how the government reacts to it—is a major barrier to business investment in a country, resulting in foreign direct investment (FDI) being taken to more stable countries. Humanitarian crises in a country can also affect FDI, such as the refugee situation in Bangladesh, where it is seen as an economic burden to the government because of the diversion of financial resources from the economy.25 Although Islam is the official religion of Bangladesh with 90 percent of the population being Sunni Muslim, the Constitution guarantees religious diversity with the Fifteenth Amendment promoting equal rights for other religions. For the most part, believers in Islam, the majority religion, live in harmony with the other minority religious communities of mainly Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists as well as with a mix of other minor religions. However, religiosity (strong religious feeling or belief) often becomes extreme and creates major problems for the government. The government then needs to move expeditiously to defend the people’s right to religious freedom. In 2015, Heiner Bielefeldt, the UN Special Rapporteur on religious freedom or belief, visited Bangladesh, where he confirmed that “people generally live peacefully together across religious divides in Bangladesh.” He also stated, The Constitution of Bangladesh, which enshrines the principle of secularism while at the same time proclaiming Islam as the official State religion gives rise

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to ambiguities that have a direct impact on human rights in the country, including the protection of religious minorities.26

Land Grabbing Bielefeldt’s observations included what he saw as the government sometimes compromising secularism to appease religious militants. He cites two examples, both involving land issues, also known as land grabbing. Minority religious groups often face property and landownership disputes and forced evictions, including by the government. Government construction projects on land traditionally owned by indigenous communities in the Moulvibazar and Modhupur forest areas and land acquisition through false documents by private citizens are some of the issues faced by these populations. These incidents bring forth issues with the land registry system. Disputes are often in areas where new roads or industrial development zones are located because of increased land values. Local police and leaders have been accused of receiving bribes and favors in return. Local residents lack political clout and funds to legally remedy these situations. The first example involves the Hindu community whose population has declined from 23 percent in 1971 to 9 percent in 2015, and they have lost land seized by the state. The Enemy Property Act of 1965, enacted in Pakistan before the formation of Bangladesh, resulted in many Hindu properties, mainly real estate, being confiscated. After independence, this continued with the Vested Property Act, and as a result, many Hindu families emigrated to India and other countries. Many of the confiscations carried out amounted to land grabbing by the government. The government tried to compensate for this land grabbing by passing the 2001 Vested Property Return Act, which would return properties to Hindus who lost them. The other example cited is in the Chittagong Hills Tract (CHT). In this case, land used for religious purposes was taken away, sometimes by force, from the indigenous population in the CHT area, impacting their freedom of religion. Three CHT villages filed a report with the deputy commissioner accusing Jashim Uddin Montu, a businessman, of land grabbing. In an investigative report, The Daily Star discovered that Montu falsified residency documents in Bandarban for the right to purchase CHT land to build a tourist property. Villagers said Montu donated money and some of the purchased land in CHT to build a two-story police camp in Bandarban.27 Violence Two incidents in the new millennium involved violence against Buddhist and Hindu communities by the majority Islamic community. In 2012, more than

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twenty historic Buddhist temples and houses belonging to Buddhists were destroyed in Ramu, Cox’s Bazar, due to a fake social media post that started the violence. In a show to the world that this type of religious violence would not be tolerated, the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina restored the temples within a year of the attack using the Engineering Corps of the Bangladesh Army to do the reconstruction.28 Another example of religiosity gone awry is the violence against the Hindu community in October 2021. A social media post showed a picture of the Qur’an on the ground at the base of a Hindu statue at a Hindu festival. Although it turned out to be fake, hundreds protested what they saw as disrespectful and blasphemous. Despite the government urging constraint against violence, mob mentality prevailed. Hindu religious sites were attacked, and houses were pilfered and burned, resulting in six deaths and several injuries. Police were transferred for not doing enough to stop the violence, and arrests were made of those responsible for the violence. Subsequently, the Hindu community had a peaceful protest demanding justice from the government: The unrest is some of the worst in Bangladesh since Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League party came to power there in 2009. It poses a challenge to her party, which is seen as the more secular one of the two political groups that have alternated power in Bangladesh for most of its independent history.29

SOCIAL FOUNDATION: HEALTH The government of Bangladesh did not establish a health policy for the country until 2011. Although improvements have been made, problems still exist. A system that should be equitable to all has created division in the quality of care delivered to urban and rural areas. Another problem area is management in public health care being retained by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, the result being a lack of local planning and decision making for community issues.30 Maternal and child health services have been given high priority in the health system of Bangladesh, but the disparity between those living in rural and urban areas is evident in lower spending on childhood and maternal health. This can place women and children at high risk in rural areas. For example, postpartum (antenatal) care is an issue with less spent in rural areas. However, there can also be a lack of use of services available due to the mother’s own choice. The issue of child marriage is intertwined with the health system through cultural norms and religious practice. According to Human Rights Watch,

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Bangladesh has the fourth-highest rate of child marriage in the world (after Chad, Niger, and the Central African Republic).31 Parents in families with limited means often see daughters as a family burden and force marriage at an early age to give boys priority in education. Social pressure, along with a system of bribes, dowries, honor, or forged birth certificates, results in the marriage of girls at young ages. The Child Marriage Restraint Act of 2017 was passed, but it has changed little and is controversial. Child marriage has technically been illegal in Bangladesh since the adoption of the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929, but the law is poorly enforced and does little to stop the practice. Because of the lack or poor enforcement of the law, as well as being an abuse of human rights for these minor children, this practice creates medical and mental health issues for them and for the health care system. What is even worse is that, for some, cultural norms may prevent many from securing the help they need. Mental health issues are not given a priority by the government health care system, and in rural areas, the stigma of seeking help exists. Two problems that need priority are suicide prevention and inclusion of mental health issues as part of disaster planning, response, and recovery. The physical and psychosocial impacts of COVID-19 due to income loss were most severe in the poor and marginalized communities, pushing many into deeper poverty with mental health repercussions.32 The response of the government of Bangladesh to the COVID-19 pandemic is a program with four main strategic goals: increase government spending to create jobs and eliminate unnecessary spending; provide low-interest credit facilities through the banking system to industries and business enterprises; increase social security programs to protect the unemployed in the informal sector, among the poor, and in low-income groups; and increase the money supply with fiscal and stimulus packages. In a joint statement by the United States and Bangladesh at a meeting held in June 2022, the United States commended Bangladesh on its admirable response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Bangladesh has fully vaccinated over 76 percent of its population and partially vaccinated over 99 percent of the eligible population. Bangladesh expressed gratitude for the over 64 million vaccine doses the United States donated, in partnership with COVAX, to support Bangladesh’s COVID-19 response efforts.33

However, despite these successes with COVID, the refugee situation, especially the influx of FDMN, has overstressed the medical system for infectious diseases and COVID vaccinations. Bangladesh does not have an adequate number of hospital beds for its large population. Cultural and social norms have been shown to affect preference

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of location and attendant for services. Vacant positions in health sector staffing, such as nurses, doctors, and midwives, add to the problem. Ambulance availability is also inadequate. A major problem with the current system is out-of-pocket health care spending, which is estimated to be two-thirds of health costs, with prescription costs being the primary cause. Health care services in public hospitals are supposed to be free, but additional costs for medicines, lab tests, and some other services can become a burden to the patient and family. This high cost can easily move many families into a lower income level or poverty.34 Health care in Bangladesh is based on income status, with basic government services mainly for people of low income but enhanced private services for people with higher incomes. Geographical area and wealth determine who will receive the best care or any care at all. This division is a threat to human lives and democracy in Bangladesh. ENVIRONMENT Bangladesh is prone to natural disasters, especially cyclones. Natural disasters affect all aspects of a country’s economy. They cause crops, houses, roads, and other infrastructure to be damaged or erased, resulting in large economic losses. People become homeless, and food and potable water can become scarce. Livelihoods are affected. Health issues and disease outbreaks, such as typhoid and cholera, and a scarcity of medicine become problematic. Bangladesh is a country of many rivers, and riverbank erosion is a major result of natural disasters. The many thousands of people who live along the riverbanks are displaced, and Bangladesh loses valuable hectares of land due to riverbank erosion. Saltwater intrusion of fresh water is a problem for coastal areas during natural disasters and the monsoon season. This affects agriculture and freshwater fisheries and contaminates surface and groundwater. Natural disasters are becoming more frequent due to climate change and unpredictable weather patterns. Infrastructure can be destroyed, and social systems can break down. The devastation that is caused affects people of all backgrounds, mostly those with lower incomes. If agriculture is the main source of livelihood and agricultural lands are destroyed in floods, people, if they can, temporarily shift from agriculture to other labor. This results in less production and affects the food supply chain. Government is the key management player in disasters, although the role of the private sector is important to their work. Bangladesh currently takes a comprehensive approach to disasters—and it must, as it is one of the most vulnerable countries to disaster. Cyclones in the

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past have caused much destruction and loss of life. The country has passed laws and created plans to carry out disaster management mitigation and planning, rescue and recovery, and post-recovery. Safe houses and early warning systems have been established. But farming communities need to be assisted by the government to withstand climate change through both the choice of crops and appropriate farming practices. Efforts need to go beyond agriculture because all communities need to adapt to changing environmental conditions caused by climate change. The World Bank states, More than 70 percent of Bangladesh’s population and 77 percent of its workforce lives in rural areas. Nearly half of all of Bangladesh’s workers and two-thirds in rural areas are directly employed by agriculture, and about 87 percent of rural households rely on agriculture for at least part of their income.35

Many of the most disaster-prone areas in Bangladesh are in rural areas with high poverty. Besides funding, another major challenge to recovery can be accessing remote rural areas, leaving communities to resolve their own issues. A major disaster would require the national government to step in to assist, but delays in access could happen in remote areas. Environmental issues may affect the entire country, but differences exist based on geographical area. This division is sometimes unavoidable due to geography, but a comprehensive approach of coordination and cooperation by the government can help rural communities to not feel marginalized. It can also save lives. ECONOMY The impact of COVID sent a shock to the Bangladeshi economy as it did to other world economies. To address the impact of COVID, a stimulus package was introduced by the government to provide funding to many sectors, such as poverty, exports, and health: The government undertook a comprehensive economic recovery program containing 28 fiscal and stimulus packages to the tune of Tk. 1,877 billion (US $22.08 billion) which amounts to 6.23 per cent of GDP to facilitate the implementation of these strategies. . . . Even though the GDP growth rate showed a decline to 3.5 percent in FY2020 [fiscal year 2020], it rebounded to 5.47 percent (provisional) in FY2021. The foreign exchange reserve has grown to a record US$ 48.02 billion in August 2021 which now stands at $45 billion as of 10 November 2021. Considering the current trend of Bangladesh’s economy, it is

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evident that the stimulus measures have played a highly effective role in countering the adverse economic shocks of COVID-19.36

Much of Bangladesh’s economic growth relies on exports from the $31.5 billion garment industry. Bangladesh has set up several export processing zones (EPZs) to facilitate investment in the country with streamlined regulations to make the export process easier. The country has also set up economic zones (EZs), offering investment incentives with few differences between foreign investment and domestic investment. EPZs accommodate exporting companies only; EZs are open for both export- and domestic-oriented companies. Export numbers in 2017 are indicated in table 4.1. Foreign remittances are also a source of money that stimulates the economy. Bangladesh has a low wage rate, resulting in workers going abroad for employment and sending back foreign remittances. For fiscal year 2020– 2021, remittance inflows were a record $24.8 billion. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bangladesh’s GDP reached $329.12 billion in fiscal year 2019–2020, with an annual growth rate of 3.8 percent. However, also according to the IMF, tax revenues were only 9.1 percent of GDP in 2018. There is also the issue of state-controlled banks having a high number of nonperforming loans. These loans are in default, which impedes economic progress. Dhaka is the primary financial hub of Bangladesh, with Chattogram (formerly Chittagong) being the next. Chattogram is the location of the country’s major seaport for international trade. Another port, the country’s first deep-water port, is under construction south of Chattogram in Matarbari.37 A serious investment in time and money is required to cultivate a relationship with foreign investors, but in Bangladesh, issues affecting the business process can be barriers to FDI. These include “inadequate infrastructure, limited financing instruments, bureaucratic delays, lax enforcement of labor laws, and corruption.” Also, the government has been slow to implement more effective judicial procedures and alternative dispute resolution, which can affect business contracts and disputes. FDI is needed to stimulate the economy and create jobs.

Table 4.1. Exports from Bangladesh in 2017 Sector Agriculture Industrial Services Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.

% GDP

% Population Employed

13.6 35.1 51.3

40.6 20.4 39.0

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Garment industry conditions with worker safety issues and economic hardships for workers are also problematic. Workers’ rights to freely associate and bargain collectively are still difficult. The gap between rich and poor is evident in the garment industry, where wages are low and conditions unsatisfactory in many locations. Wages being low with poor working conditions and buildings being structurally defective, accompanied by industrial accidents, does not bode well for FDI. Adequate payment and settlement systems are another area affecting FDI. To safeguard the smooth movement of money in the financial system, the country had passed the Bangladesh Bank Order in 1972, setting up the Central Bank to ensure adequate monetary policy and risk aversion against fluctuating markets as well as interest and exchange rates, both domestically and through foreign exchange markets. In 2012, the Payment Systems Department was set up to modernize the country’s financial infrastructure.38 Discourse about the economy must also consider the role of microfinance because it is seen as a program that can ease poverty, especially in rural areas, where most of the microfinance programs are located. Bangladesh in the past was the world leader in microfinance, when the idea was championed by Mohammed Yunus and his establishment of Grameen Bank, the village bank for the poor. Microfinance provided loans to start small businesses and linked these loans with savings programs. Most participants with Grameen were women. The microfinance program has grown significantly with bank participation. The microfinance model in Bangladesh is regulated by the government and currently contains elements of credit, savings, and insurance. The program has been used as a successful model in other countries. Another area to be considered important in poverty alleviation is the role of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) because they contribute to the economy by providing employment and also by contributing to the GDP: According to the SME Policy 2019 from the country’s Ministry of Industries, the SME sector in Bangladesh is made up of about 7.8 million enterprises that contribute close to 25 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. (GDP)39

However, unlike microfinance, many of these businesses face different standards for credit. Their access to loans at lower costs would help the sector grow even further. Considering the variety of roadblocks—natural disasters, political unrest, high population density, and the pandemic—Bangladesh has managed to stay on track to maintain its economy. The country does actively seek FDI, and it will need to continue to develop the economy in the export area since the country’s main export is garments. However, due to world events such as COVID and the war in Ukraine, Bangladesh is now experiencing a higher

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trade deficit and falling remittances and is seeking help in 2022 from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. It is attempting to avoid the mistake made by Sri Lanka in not seeking IMF help soon enough to avoid a collapsing economy. POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT Bangladesh today strives to be a country exhibiting democracy, pluralism, and peace, but its history since independence has been marred by violence, especially with political matters, resulting in mass protests, parliamentary boycotts by opposition parties, general strikes, vote rigging accusations, and low voter turnout. Mutiny even took place when in 2009 “a section of the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) mutinied, ostensibly over pay and conditions. Officials reported 74 deaths—mostly BDR officers—and more than 1,000 soldiers were arrested.”40 The government of Bangladesh has been accused at times of permitting human rights abuses and killings through law enforcement and intelligence agencies as political tools, especially at election times.41 The Awami League shows itself as a secular party but is often seen as favoring the Islamic majority component at the expense of protecting the rights of minorities. But no matter the political party, they all face the dilemma created by the Constitution, which provides for freedom of religion to all but establishes Islam as the state religion. Islamic extremists take advantage of being the state-designated religion by interfering with politics while denigrating other religions that exist in the country and even others of the Islamic faith. Rulers over the years have made concessions to dissenting hard-line Islamist extremists, who then feel empowered to force future policy changes with the ruling party, often through violence: For the West, Bangladesh has become everyone’s economic darling with its per capita GDP recently surpassing that of neighboring India. No doubt, political stability has facilitated Bangladesh’s consistent GDP growth of 6 percent for almost a decade. However, unequal wealth distribution, public grievances over alleged irregularities, and the overall law and order situation continues to fuel discontent.42

FUTURE OUTLOOK Bangladesh is on track to becoming a middle-income country despite some of the current problems stated previously. Barring another disaster or serious

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catastrophe, the track to graduation from a least developed country (LDC) should be achieved with few bumps along the way. Bangladesh met all three criteria required to graduate from the UN list of LDCs for the first time at the triennial review of the UN CDP in March 2018. In February 2021, the CDP confirmed Bangladesh’s eligibility to graduate from LDC status. The country is scheduled to officially graduate from LDC status in 2026 instead of 2024, as earlier planned, to allow it two additional years for a smooth transition in view of the adverse impact of COVID-19 on the economy. Bangladesh will lose duty-free quota-free (DFQF) access to several major export markets after graduation. However, the European Union’s Generalized System of Preferences Plus (GSP+) program may allow Bangladesh DFQF access for an additional three-year transition period following the country’s effective date of graduation. To be eligible for the GSP+ program, Bangladesh must ratify additional international conventions on human and labor rights, the environment, and governance and show that it has plans to amend and enforce its laws accordingly.43 The Eighth Five Year Plan (July 2020–June 2025) is also in line with this graduation goal. The plan focuses on six core themes: rapid recovery from COVID-19; GDP growth acceleration, employment generation, and rapid poverty reduction; a broad-based strategy of inclusiveness; a sustainable development pathway that is resilient to disaster and climate change; improvement of critical institutions necessary to lead the economy to upper-middleincome-country status by 2031; and attaining Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets and mitigating the impact of LDC graduation. CONCLUSION This chapter has shown how four foundation areas of governance—social indicators, consisting of education, food security, health, and religiosity; environment; economy; and politics and government—can be improved to support democracy in Bangladesh. Governance crosses all these four foundation areas, and the government is committed to a comprehensive approach to save human lives and democracy in Bangladesh, but the threat to human security and equality is real, especially with the divide between urban and rural areas. Politics cannot be separated from government, but politics is threatening the democracy of the nation based on conflicts with political parties and actions of extremist Islamic groups that undermine the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to other religious groups. Cultural norms stemming from religion, such as child marriage, can also affect human rights. In Bangladesh,

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this division has created inequality in the freedom to choose religion and is a threat to social equality, human rights, and democracy. Environmental issues affect the entire country, based mostly on geographical areas. Weather extremes affect Bangladesh because it is a disaster-prone country, but these effects are unavoidable due to geography and climate. Although the government has taken steps to improve its disaster management plan, more must be done with better coordination and cooperation to help rural communities to not feel marginalized. Disaster management around the world is using new technology, such as drones and satellites, that could also help Bangladesh do geographical surveys to assist with all stages of disaster management. Most of the population of Bangladesh lives and works in rural rather than urban areas. Disasters affect food production and water supplies, especially for individual farmers who do small-scale farming or in the fisheries sector, where small businesses strive to survive. Bangladesh has been a leader in microfinance, but more needs to be done for the smaller local businesses, especially in rural areas, including SMEs. These SMEs need better support from the government because they are at critical risk when disaster strikes. Considering roadblocks along the way from natural disasters, political unrest, high population density, and now the pandemic, Bangladesh has managed to stay on track until quite recently to maintain the economy since independence. However, due to world events, such as COVID and the war in Ukraine, Bangladesh is now experiencing a higher trade deficit and falling remittances and is seeking help in 2022 from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. The country is attempting to avoid the mistake made by Sri Lanka and other countries in not seeking IMF help soon enough to avoid a collapsing economy. The country does actively seek FDI, and Bangladesh will need to continue to develop the economy in the export area since the country’s main export is garments. Additionally, the gap between rich and poor is also evident in the garment industry, where wages are low and conditions unsatisfactory in many locations. The educational system does well in certain areas but has roadblocks with social norms in some areas. Rural areas have higher dropout rates, with young girls being removed from schools to become young brides or both boys and girls being made to help with family chores or businesses rather than going to school. It is a never-ending cycle because these are the future parents who will do the same with their children. Their parents are unable to help with school because of limited education. Also, there is a dearth of qualified teachers in rural areas, and this needs to be addressed. Incentives, along with more recruitment and training, might help with this issue. For example, the United States offers programs that provide loan forgiveness to qualifying teachers for their student loans. In return for forgiveness, teachers must work for a period

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of time in certain targeted locations or teach certain subjects. With the right incentive or training, Bangladesh could offer a similar type of program to encourage more teachers to work in rural areas. Delivery of health care services divides the nation based on income status, with basic government services mainly for people of low income and enhanced private services for people with higher incomes. Geographical area and wealth determine who will receive the best care or any care at all, creating a threat to human survival. Child marriage is also a health issue for young brides. Bangladesh is committed to achieving all the SDGs, although, like many countries, there have been target setbacks due to the pandemic. Goal #3 is to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.” Religiosity affects all the foundation areas, and although the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, it also establishes Islam as the state religion. With political parties not reaching a consensus to change this, conflict and division remain in this area. Child marriage is perpetuated through the majority religion, whether valid or not. Those of the minority religions feel marginalized. The refugee crisis is a complicated situation for the Bihari and Rohingya populations, with little assimilation and integration of refugees into Bangladeshi society. They each have their own religion. Without agreement for the betterment of these groups by government and religious leaders, these social problems will continue. Bangladesh needs to resolve the refugee crisis, especially the Rohingya issue, as this continues to drain the economy and affect the foundation of government. Will Bangladesh be able to do this without international help? This is doubtful, but when will the world step in to help resolve this humanitarian crisis? The foundation areas are interrelated under governance, but despite all the formal written plans in place across these areas, the common theme shows a deep division between the urban and rural areas that needs to be heeded. Inequality can cause unrest, which, in turn, can deter or eliminate the country’s progress. Division based on geographical areas of urban and rural is also a threat to human livelihoods and survival in Bangladesh, requiring new thinking with better solutions than in the past. These inequalities are a serious threat to democracy in Bangladesh and require a new way of thinking about better solutions for the future. Ensuring change will advance the progress that has already been made for Bangladesh and its people. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  To improve education in rural areas, what incentives or training could Bangladesh offer teachers to encourage teaching in these areas?

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2.  Keeping in mind religiosity and deeply rooted traditions, if you were hired to advise the government of Bangladesh on how to enforce child marriage laws, what advice would you give? 3.  You have been asked to make a speech before the United Nations urging resolution of the refugee situation in Bangladesh. What would be your arguments? 4.  Because the economy of Bangladesh relies mainly on income from garment industry exports and foreign remittances from workers, how can Bangladesh diversify its economy? 5.  Continual climate threats to Bangladesh require constant vigilance with disaster management plans. Given the country’s terrain and the cost, would the increased use of drones be a feasible idea for disaster management in Bangladesh? NOTES 1. UN Population Fund (formerly UN Fund for Population Activities, “World Population Dashboard,” https:​//​www​.unfpa​.org​/data​/world​-population​/BD. 2. Mahbubul Haq, “New Imperatives of Human Security,” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 4, no. 1 (1995): 68–73, http:​//​www​.jstor​.org​/stable​ /45064264. 3. Stefan Trines, “Education in Bangladesh,” August 1, 2019, https:​//​wenr​.wes​.org​ /2019​/08​/education​-in​-bangladesh. 4. Committee for Development Policy, 24th Plenary Session United Nations, Virtual Meeting, “Monitoring of Countries Graduating and Graduated from the List of LDC Category: Bangladesh,” CDP2022/PLEN/8.b, February 21–25, 2022, 11, https:​ //​www​.un​.org​/development​/desa​/dpad​/wp​-content​/uploads​/sites​/45​/CDP​-PL​-2022​-8​ -2​-Monitoring​.pdf. 5. “Ethnic Community Development Organization: Indigenous People—The Issues,” https:​//​www​.ecdobd​.org​/the​-issues. 6. “US Aid Bangladesh Education,” September 26, 2022, https:​//​www​.usaid​.gov​/ bangladesh​/education. 7. Trines, “Education in Bangladesh.” 8. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, “Operational Framework for Pre-Primary Education,” March 2008, http:​//​ecd​-bangladesh​.net​/document​/documents​/Operational​_Framework​_for​_PPE​ .pdf. 9. “Bangladesh Country Commercial Guide Market Overview,” July 20, 2022, https:​//​www​.trade​.gov​/country​-commercial​-guides​/bangladesh​-market​-overview. 10. Trines, “Education in Bangladesh.” 11. Ibid. 12. Marco Valenza, Cirenia Chávez, Annika Rigole, Taniya Laizu Sumy, Mohammad Mohsin, and Iqbal Hossain, “Ready to Start School, Learn and Work: Evidence

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from three Education Programmes for Out-of-School Children and Adolescents in Bangladesh,” UNICEF Office of Research–Innocenti, Florence, 2021, 17. 13 Trines, “Education in Bangladesh.” 14. World Bank, “Bangladesh: Growing the Economy through Advances in Agriculture,” October 9, 2016, https:​//​www​.worldbank​.org​/en​/results​/2016​/10​/07​/ bangladesh​-growing​-economy​-through​-advances​-in​-agriculture. 15. USAID, “The Importance of Wild Fisheries for Local Food Security: BANGLADESH,” https:​//​www​.shorturl​.at​/aqIKL. 16. S. R. Osmani, Akhter Ahmed, Tahmeed Ahmed, Naomi Hossain, Saleemul Huq, and Asif Shahan, “Strategic Review of Food Security and Nutrition in Bangladesh,” an independent review commissioned by the World Food Programme, September 2016, Dhaka, https:​//​cdn​.wfp​.org​/wfp​.org​/publications​/Bangladesh​_Strategic​ _Review​_full​_report​.pdf​?​_ga​=2​.220338458​.361351387​.1657909849​-1303343007​ .1657909849. 17. Kaushik Basu, “Entitlement Failure,” Encyclopedia Britannica, https:​//​www​ .britannica​.com​/science​/famine​/Entitlement​-failure​#ref1263955. 18. Kasturi Rangan, “Bangladesh Fears Thousands May Be Dead as Famine Spreads,” Top of Form Bottom of Form Special to the New York Times, November 13, 1974, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​/1974​/11​/13​/archives​/bangladesh​-fears​-thousands​ -may​-be​-dead​-as​-famine​-spreads​-september​.html. 19. USAID, “The Importance of Wild Fisheries for Local Food Security.” 20. Osmani et al., “Strategic Review of Food Security and Nutrition in Bangladesh.” 21. Ibid. 22. Mahabub Hossain, “Food Security in Bangladesh, Achievement and Challenges,” The Daily Star, March 20, 2013, https:​//​socialprotection​.gov​.bd​/wp​-content​/ uploads​/2017​/08​/Achievement​-and​-challenges​-Daily​-Star​.pdf. 23. Government of Bangladesh and FAO, “National Aquaculture Development Strategy and Action Plan of Bangladesh 2013–2020,” FAO Non-Serial Publication, Rome, 2014, xiii, https:​//​www​.fao​.org​/3​/i3903e​/i3903e​.pdf. 24. Ibid. 25. US Department of State, “2021 Investment Climate Statements: Bangladesh,” https:​//​www​.state​.gov​/reports​/2021​-investment​-climate​-statements​/bangladesh. 26. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Preliminary Findings of Country Visit to Bangladesh,” Heiner Bielefeldt, September 9, 2015, https:​//​www​ .ohchr​.org​/en​/statements​/2015​/09​/preliminary​-findings​-country​-visit​-bangladesh​ -heiner​-bielefeldt​-special​?LangID​=E​&NewsID​=16399; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in “Bangladesh: A Secular State with a State Religion,” September 9, 2015, https:​//​www​.ohchr​.org​/en​/press​-releases​/2015​/09​/bangladesh​ -secular​-state​-state​-religion. 27. US Department of State, “2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Bangladesh,” https:​//​www​.state​.gov​/reports​/2019​-report​-on​-international​-religious​ -freedom​/bangladesh. 28. “Ramu Mayhem’s Prime Accused Detained in Dhaka,” The Daily Star, January 11, 2016, https:​//​www​.thedailystar​.net​/city​/ramu​-mayhems​-prime​-accused​-detained​ -dhaka​-200293.

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29. Al Jazeera, “Hundreds Protest in Bangladesh over Deadly Religious Violence,” October 19, 2021, https:​//​www​.aljazeera​.com​/news​/2021​/10​/19​/bangladesh​-hindus​ -protest​-deadly​-religious​-violence. 30. E. Munzur and Mainul Haque Murshid, “Hits and Misses of Bangladesh National Health Policy, 2011,” Journal of Pharmacy and Bioallied Sciences 12, no. 2 (2020): 83–93, https:​//​www​.cjhr​.org​/article​.asp​?issn​=2348​-3334;year​=2018;volume​ =5;issue​=1;spage​=1;epage​=7;aulast​=Mahmudur. 31. Human Rights Watch Video, “Child Marriage in Bangladesh,” http:​//​features​ .hrw​.org​/features​/child​_marriage​_bangladesh. 32. “Mental Health Stigma a Barrier to Care in Bangladesh,” Dhaka Tribune, April 15, 2021, https:​//​archive​.dhakatribune​.com​/health​/2021​/04​/15​/mental​-health​ -stigma​-a​-barrier​-to​-care​-in​-bangladesh; Mohammad Budrudzaman, “Bangladesh Needs to Factor Mental Health into Disaster Response Policies,” September 2, 2021, https:​//​www​.thethirdpole​.net​/en​/culture​/mental​-health​-bangladesh​-disaster​-response​ -policies. 33. US Department of State, “US Bangladesh High-Level Economic Consultation,” joint statement by the governments of the United States and Bangladesh, Office of the Spokesperson, June 2, 2022, https:​//​www​.state​.gov​/u​-s​-bangladesh​-high​-level​ -economic​-consultation. 34. Munzur and Murshid, “Hits and Misses of Bangladesh National Health Policy, 2011.” 35. World Bank, “Bangladesh.” 36. Committee for Development Policy, “Monitoring of Countries Graduating and Graduated from the List of LDC Category.” 37. International Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce, “Bangladesh Country Commercial Guide Market Overview,” July 20, 2022, https:​//​www​ .trade​.gov​/country​-commercial​-guides​/bangladesh​-market​-overview. 38. Central Bank of Bangladesh, “Payment and Settlement Systems,” https:​//​bb​.org​ .bd​/en​/index​.php​/financialactivity​/paysystems​#oversight; International Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce, “Bangladesh Country Commercial Guide Market Challenges,” July 20, 2022, https:​//​www​.trade​.gov​/country​-commercial​ -guides​/bangladesh​-market​-challenges. 39. Alexander Ayertey Odonkor, “How Can SMEs Spur Inclusive Growth in Bangladesh?,” December 23, 2021, The Diplomat, https:​//​thediplomat​.com​/2021​/12​/how​ -can​-smes​-spur​-inclusive​-growth​-in​-bangladesh. 40. Commonwealth Governance Bangladesh, “Government Politics of Bangladesh,” https:​//​www​.commonwealthgovernance​.org​/countries​/asia​/bangladesh​/ government​-politics.

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41. Toby Cadman, “Democracy Is Dying in Bangladesh. Targeted Sanctions Could Save It,” The Diplomat, September 25, 2020, https:​//​thediplomat​.com​/2020​/09​/ democracy​-is​-dying​-in​-bangladesh​-targeted​-sanctions​-could​-save​-it. 42. Manas Nag, “Bangladesh’s Dangerous Islamist Appeasement—And What It Portends,” The Diplomat, December 22, 2020, https:​//​thediplomat​.com​/2020​/12​/ bangladeshs​-dangerous​-islamist​-appeasement​-and​-what​-it​-portends. 43. US Department of State, “2021 Investment Climate Statements: Bangladesh,” https:​//​www​.state​.gov​/reports​/2021​-investment​-climate​-statements​/bangladesh.

Chapter 5

The Expansion of Governmental Control in China due to the COVID-19‌‌‌ Pandemic Peter W. Liu

COVID-19 emerged in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and spread rapidly around the world. While countries struggled to control the pandemic, China developed its own COVID eradication strategies that reveal the nature of its totalitarian regime. These include absolute lockdown in any area where COVID is suspected, repeated polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests as a preventive measure for the entire population where a COVID-19 case is found, computerized contact tracing and the subsequent forced isolation not only of COVID suspects but also of everyone who has been in the area of the subject, the requirement for the entire population to display an ever-changing colored “Health Code” at all times, mandatory masking and vaccination for the entire population, and the absolute muzzling of any voice that challenges the draconian measures on traditional media or social media. Through these extreme control measures, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its government at all levels have significantly grown in authority compared to pre-pandemic times. The government’s control has reached every individual in China directly—the right of privacy exists no more. Although residents of different social status receive different treatments, all of them are restricted in motion and lose their freedom of speech entirely. This chapter reveals how the CCP has utilized the pandemic to gain total control of China’s population. The CCP has ruled China since 1949. It is a continuation of the 2,000-year history of the Chinese totalitarian system, which is characterized by a centralized imperial rule that controlled all aspects of individual life through coercion and suppression.1 For imperial rulers and the CCP leaders, it is important 115

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to form and maintain an extremely stable social structure by cultivating obedient subjects. A strong leader could manipulate and control the people’s minds as well as physical movements. However, a weak leader allows for free ideas and defiant actions that would unexceptionally lead to social reform or even revolution and that can cause damage to their rules. The COVID-19 pandemic gave the CCP leader Xi Jinping an opportunity to demonstrate his political authority over other party leaders who may challenge his authority.2 He wants to be remembered as the most powerful leader in the world and needs a great accomplishment to prove that he is undoubtedly the ultimate dictator of China. For this reason, Xi created a COVID-19 fighting strategy named the Dynamic Zero COVID Policy, which will be discussed in depth in this chapter. Because this subject matter is too new, the existing literature on it is scant. Although information obtained on social media is questionable regarding its validity and reliability, it does reflect public opinion, and when used carefully, cases can show the trend of social policies. This chapter mined thousands of cases reported on social media, mainly in the Chinese language, including WeChat, Weibo, and Twitter. This is not meant to be scientific research; instead, through compiling the daily cries of the people who unfortunately fell victim to human tragedies created by the government, it depicts how the CCP utilized the opportunity of the pandemic to gain total control of China’s population. BACKGROUND When Wuhan pneumonia, later known as COVID-19, was first known in China in December 2019, the Chinese government tried to play it down and cover it up. Dr. Li Wenliang, the first whistleblower, was reprimanded by the police and threatened with the charge of spreading rumors in the public arena.3 The pandemic then broke out such that the government could no longer hide it. On January 23, 2020, without any sign or warning, Wuhan’s 11 million people were completely locked down.4 No one could enter or exit the city. People stayed inside their homes; all businesses and transportation stopped. Medical treatments were paused because the facilities were doing one thing only—treating Wuhan pneumonia patients. There were 20,066 reported cases of infection on January 23, and it was estimated that more than 100,000 infected patients would have left Wuhan for destinations all over the world by January 30 if the city were not locked down.5 The authorities deemed it worthy to sacrifice one city to slow down the spread of virus. To implement the extreme measures of social control, Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the CCP, called out to the entire cadre of Chinese government



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officials on January 23. He claimed that it is he who was in total command of directing the war against the pandemic and that there would be only one result—a total victory—regardless of the price the nation had to pay. Winning the war could demonstrate to the world the salient advantage of the socialist system under the CCP’s leadership.6 Because Xi has a strong ambition to continue his personal dictatorship, he must show the party that he is the greatest leader in present times. A total victory would be his highest political achievement. Because he has been experiencing severe setbacks in other areas—the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Xiong’an New Area, Hong Kong’s repatriation, and military developments in the South China Sea—he desperately needed one great feat to secure his goal of lifetime dictatorship, which he achieved in November 2022 at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Using his prior experience of handling the SARS breakout in Zhejiang Province as a party chief in 2003, Xi has enhanced and created new social control mechanisms to eradicate COVID-19. He has utilized his unchallenged power to directly control every individual citizen of China through technology and a massive party/government network. This author obtained thousands of government documents, official reports, and traditional and social media items and categorized the data according to social control mechanisms. The analysis of such data provides a clear picture—under Xi, China has become the most strictly controlled country in human history. While the Chinese had been already deprived of basic human rights, including the right to decide how many children a couple could have, the pandemic has caused them to lose every ounce of privacy. They have become transparent beings in front of the government, which, in the name of pandemic control, has seized every piece of everyone’s personal information, private physical space, and freedom of movement. Xi announced on September 8, 2020, that China’s war against COVID-19 had achieved strategic results and that such efforts had not been seen in human history.7 However, the rapid breakout of the Omicron variant changed everything. It tested Xi’s zero-COVID mentality, so he increased the breadth and depth of his Dynamic Zero COVID Policy. Dynamic Zero COVID Policy There are six specific strategies under the Dynamic Zero COVID Policy. These range from absolute lockdown to muzzling any voices that challenge the extreme measures.

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Strategy 1: Absolute Lockdown Until February 2022, there were 353 cities in China that had found COVID-19 cases.8 The New York Times estimated that in April 2022, there were forty-five major cities under lockdown, affecting 373 million people, around one-third of the nation’s population. Together, the cities created $7.2 trillion in gross domestic product (GDP), about 40.3 percent of the national GDP.9 Why would governments at all levels be willing to pay such a high price to eradicate COVID cases that are few and far between in some areas? It has to do with the CCP and government officials who are appointed, not elected, by upper-level authorities as well as the top-down structure of the chain of command that uses a goal management method to send local officials one message: the goal is zero virus. The way to achieve this goal is a general guideline (the six strategies), but it is up to the individual official as to how to implement these strategies. Failure to achieve the goal means removal from office and loss of social status, while success can lead to promotion. Xi Jinping gave a stern order to the CCP: Party organizations at all levels shall examine and identify cadres on the frontline of the struggle, vigorously praise and boldly use those with outstanding performance. We will seriously hold accountable those who are inactive and give dereliction of duty. They will be removed from their posts on the spot.10 There are three different levels of lockdown when a PCR-positive case appears. The flowchart in figure 5.1 explains the decision-making process as to how levels of lockdown are determined and specific actions to be taken.11

Figure 5.1.  Determination and Control of Different Levels of Lockdown. Source: 柳叶刀财经 (Lancet Finance).



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The first and strictest level of lockdown is called the area of absolute lockdown. A building with a PCR-positive case is locked down for fourteen days and the rest of the housing complex for seven days, with no one entering or leaving their own apartment. There is a high chance that everyone will be removed from the building complex and sent to a remote isolation center. The second level is called the area of controlled lockdown, which neighbors the area of absolute lockdown. All streets are closed; no one can enter or exit this neighborhood for seven days. The third area, prevention lockdown, consists of the general district where a case is detected. All residents are urged to remain inside, businesses are closed, and no one is allowed to travel. Why did a metropolitan area of 25 million people get locked down? On February 28, 2022, the first case of Omicron BA.2 was found in Shanghai. There were 16,013 reported PCR-positive cases by March 27, when the city was partially locked down. By April 8, the total confirmed cases reached 131,524.12 Although science and professionals concluded that Omicron could not be eradicated, Xi Jinping insisted that all positive cases be turned into negative ones at all costs. When it obviously was not possible, he revised the policy to rename it Zero COVID in Society—all positive cases are contained, and the rest of the society is virus free. Lockdown in Shanghai continued until June 1, when the government suddenly announced that the goal of Zero COVID in Society was achieved. Shanghai gradually reopened, with some new cases reported and some districts locked down again. During the lockdown, 60,000 medical personnel were sent to Shanghai from other provinces and the military. Food and supplies were provided irregularly since all the highways and local businesses ceased to operate. Millions of people were starving; cases of death due to starvation and lack of medical supplies were reported. Many people were locked down in their offices and stores. About 2 million laborers from outside the city were stuck in the streets, unable to leave. Hotel guests were forced to stay for two months and pay ridiculous prices.13 How can the absolute lockdown in megacities like Shanghai be imposed? The government has designed a grid system to enforce the rules. Previously, the lowest city government management level was the Neighborhood Committee, which oversaw a neighborhood of about 5,000 to 10,000 people. During the pandemic, the cities adopted a new level of management—Xiao Qu (小区), or the gated building complex. Since the 1990s, new resident buildings were built as Xiao Qu, which is encircled with walls/fences around several buildings. Each Xiao Qu employs a Home Owner’s Association (HOA). During the pandemic, the task of securing the Xiao Qu and supplying food and medicines was granted to the HOA. The HOA became a level of government management that employs full-time workers. Those essential workers wear white hazmat suits and are therefore called Da Bai (大白), or

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Big White. Suddenly, Da Bai became the most powerful personnel because they determined who gets what food and who can enter or exit the gated community. When a positive case is detected, Da Bai forcibly remove the person and the family from their home, sending them to different isolation centers called Fang Cang (方舱). After the apartment is cleared out, Da Bai spray everything with disinfectant, including all personal items and clothes. Da Bai also take family pets away and kill them. The image of Da Bai symbolizes the absolute power of the government over the populace. Strategy 2: Repeated PCR Tests for All The PCR test for COVID-19 is a molecular test that analyzes one’s upper respiratory specimen, looking for genetic material (ribonucleic acid [RNA]) of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19.14 The sample collection process is painful because the technician needs to use nasopharyngeal swabs to go deep into one’s nasal cavity. It takes at least twenty-four hours to have the sample analyzed. The Chinese central government requires all cities with a population of fewer than 5 million to have the ability to test all residents within forty-eight hours (seventy-two hours in larger cities). In a city of 10 million people, the number of PCR testers is 500,000.15 Having a PCR test has become a routine in people’s lives because proof of a negative test that was done within forty-eight or seventy-two hours is required for anything. One can see lines of people miles long waiting to get PCR tests done.16 Every time COVID-19 cases are reported, the government orders PCR tests for everyone in the entire city/region. On January 9, 2022, after two Omicron variant cases were detected, Tianjin City ordered its population of 14 million to have the PCR test done immediately.17 On June 20, 2020, the Tianjin government also ordered PCR tests for the entire population. It instructed its residents to follow the two-points-one-straight-line rule, meaning that residents are allowed to go to their workplace and home and that the commute must be a straight line between the two places.18 The second type of test is called a COVID-19 antigen test, which is a self-administering, easier, faster, but less accurate test. During Shanghai’s lockdown, everyone was required to do two PCR tests and three antigen tests each week.19 One person complained that since March, within fifty days, he had done fourteen PCR tests and twenty-one antigen tests.20 A technician reported that he had done PCR sample collection to at least 10,000 people.21 Strategy 3: Forced Isolation The Chinese government has developed a comprehensive contact tracing system. Based on the possibility of infection, the affected population is categorized into several categories: (1) infected with symptoms, (2) infected



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without symptoms, (3) closely contacted with (1) or (2), (4) closely contacted with (3), (5) community members where five or more PCR-positive results are found, and (6) travelers from abroad.22 Each group is isolated in a way according to government guidelines. Those who test positive in a PCR test are taken to Fang Cang, an isolated medical center, where they stay for at least fourteen days. After they are released, they will either be continuously isolated at a nonmedical isolation center or locked up in their own homes. People of type (3), (4), (5), or (6) are taken to nonmedical isolation centers, which can be a designated hotel, resident building, sport arena, school, or convention center—all in remote areas. Depending on the possibility of infection, they are isolated for seven to fourteen days. Some of them are required to be isolated at home for another seven to fourteen days after being released. Those who refuse to follow orders are dealt with forcibly.23 In April 2022, there were about 120 Fang Cang in Shanghai, with 270,000 beds for patients. In addition, there are another fifty transition stations, with about 60,000 beds. The total capacity to house COVID patients is more than 300,000.24 Because these Fang Cang were built in a rush (usually a few days), the conditions inside can be terrible—no running water, no toilets, no medicine, no cleaning crews, no assistance for the elderly and handicapped, and no isolation because hundreds of people are crowded in one building.25 A person who tested positive detailed what happened to people like himself on April 9, 2022. About 1,000 people in several dozens of buses arrived to a Fang Cang, only to see that the construction was not completed. They were thrown into a large warehouse type of building, with the compartments still being built. There was only one bathroom, without running water. Food service people brought in bags of steamed buns and pickles; one had to pick them up from the dirt floor. There were no medical personnel. They were told that if they had severe symptoms, they would be transferred to a hospital. If the symptoms were mild or there were none, they just had to deal with it.26 To avoid going to the inhumane Fang Cang, many people tried to stay in their own homes. However, when their health code turns red or their PCR tests return positive, the police and Da Bai take them away by force. The compulsory isolation has caused some human tragedies too. There are many cases where parents and young children are sent to separate places because they are categorized differently and must be taken to different isolation centers. Sometimes, caretakers are taken away, and then disabled family members cannot help themselves and gradually starve to death.

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Strategy 4: The Requirement for the Entire Nation’s Population to Display an Ever-Changing Colored “Health Code” at All Times The key mechanism of the Chinese government’s Dynamic Zero COVID Policy is the big data–based health code system. It is a smartphone app, first designed for company employees by Alibaba in February 2020 but soon adapted by the provincial and national governments to become everyone’s real ID, obtaining both private and government data. It includes the ID number, date of birth, sex, phone number, home address, Alipay (Chinese version of Apple Pay), public transportation pass, health information, vaccination records, PCR test information, real-time travel information, travel records, contact tracing information, criminal records, and data on closely watched populations, such as political dissidents and Uyghurs.27 There are three colored codes.28 A red code means that the holder is forced to be absolutely locked down. The red coders must stay in a designated isolation center or isolate at home. When someone’s code turns to red, everyone in the neighborhood receives a warning, and their code turns to yellow. Yellow means that one’s freedom to travel and to walk outside their home is limited. They are not allowed to take public transportation and enter public places and must get a PCR test done immediately to turn their code back to green. A green code means that the government allows them to go to places. There is also a gray-colored warning window outside of the three colored codes. When the system is unsure what color should be assigned, a warning window pops up (弹窗). The recipient must follow the instructions to unlock it, or it is treated as red, causing one to lose freedom entirely. In Beijing, a system called an electronic fence is used. When an area is deemed to be restricted, any vehicle that enters the area triggers an alarm and is registered by the electronic fence system, causing a warning window to pop up. For example, a Didi car (Uber’s Chinese version) can see which area is restricted on its map. If someone goes in regardless, this car is registered, and the driver and passengers receive a warning on their health code. They must go to a designated place to have a PCR test done to unlock the warning.29,30 The government can also use the health code system to limit the residents’ freedom to travel. For example, in April 2022, four local banks in Henan Province were suddenly out of funds, and more than 400,000 customers’ deposits had gone missing. The customers gathered information and sent petitions to the relevant government agencies but to no avail. Finally, they began talking about protesting in front of government agencies. To stop the petitioners and other customers’ movement, some unidentified authorities changed all customers’ code to red so that they were not able to go outside regardless of where they were. Some were even in different provinces and had no intention



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of being at the protests.31,32 This incident shows how the government can easily turn a health code system to a social control/national security system and how governmental control has become completely individualized and personalized. The government can strip any individual’s mobility and personal freedom by simply pressing a button. Strategy 5: Mandatory Vaccination and Masking for the Entire Population Mandatory masking is not strongly resisted by the population because the Chinese people are accustomed to wearing masks every winter. They voluntarily wear masks to prevent themselves and others from contracting the common cold and flu. However, COVID-19 vaccination is a totally different story. Just like everything else, the vaccination policy is highly political in nature. Because of Xi Jinping’s ideology of confidence in the socialist system, China must demonstrate its ability to control the virus without the assistance from the Western world. Therefore, from the start, China put forth substantial human and financial resources to develop its own vaccines. Its efforts resulted in two vaccines, CoronaVac and Sinopharm, and they were approved for emergency use by the World Health Organization in June 2021. The vaccines were exported to forty developing countries and were welcome because of their low cost, easy transportation, and ability to be stored at room temperature. However, the vaccination program was not without problems in China. First, the vaccines had only a moderate success rate, with 51 percent effectiveness in preventing COVID-19 for CoronaVac.33 Technologically, these vaccines use an older method of inactivated virus, injecting killed SARS-CoV-2 to induce the human body to make antibodies against the virus. Many times, the antibody does not work, causing the prevention to fail. Second, it could introduce severe side effects. For example, many cases of leukemias and diabetes for children were reported, but the government does not release any information about the vaccination’s side effects. On June 1, 2022, an open letter signed by more than 600 parents surfaced on the internet. Each reported their own child’s vaccination history and subsequent diagnosis of type 1 diabetes. They challenged the government’s conclusion that the diagnoses have nothing to do with CoronaVac and Sinopharm.34 Third, historically, the Chinese health agencies were involved in vaccine scandals for many years prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, and millions of children fell victim to fake and/or contaminated vaccines.35 As a result, the Chinese people have low confidence in CoronaVac and Sinopharm. They would rather take mRNA vaccines, such as those of Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna. However, because of national pride, the Chinese government refuses to import those more

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effective vaccines. The Chinese people have no other choice but to continue using the inactivated virus. The Chinese government mandated all citizens to be vaccinated; however, due to health issues and strong side effects, many people are waived of forcible vaccination. By December 2021, 85 percent of the Chinese population has been fully vaccinated.36 Strategy 6: Any Voices Challenging the Extreme Measures on Traditional Media or Social Media Are Absolutely Muzzled The Chinese government controls all traditional media, from TV channels to print media. In recent years, the general population found loopholes in social media. WeChat is a social media app used by nearly everyone in China. It is a mega-platform that includes social media, ordering food delivery, Uber/Lyft-like functionality, sending money to friends, making medical appointments, paying off bills, communicating in business, and even using government services.37 While indispensable to citizens’ lives, it is strictly monitored and regulated by the CCP’s censorship. Since the lockdown in Shanghai, the monitors of social media have closed several forums, including Food in Shanghai, Information from Shanghai, and Recording Shanghai. When residents complained about their neighborhood committee due to food shortages and other issues, their posts were removed quickly. A Pudong resident sent out a “Help” message on WeChat on April 16, 2022, complaining that this was the twenty-second day of lockdown but he had received only three food deliveries. This post was removed because it had violated the Provisions on Public Information Management on the Internet.38 A Twitter picture posted on April 10, 2022, showed a street banner poster in Shanghai saying that all internet discussions on the pandemic are banned.39 In April 2022, a short edited video, called Voice of April and showing the lives of Shanghai people during the lockdown, went viral on Chinese social media. Receivers used their own ways to alter the format so that the government, which can remove the original post, could not remove all other variations. It lasted for a few days and eventually disappeared on all Chinese media.40 On July 17, 2022, the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission and the Cyberspace Administration of China jointly issued a document, “Regulations on the Services of Internet Follow-Up Posts/Comments,” in which the government specifies how to grade and categorize internet users who post words or other content as follow-up comments under the original posts.41 Everyone who leaves any mark on the internet is monitored and managed by the government. Xi Jinping’s Dynamic Zero COVID Policy, no matter how cruel and ridiculous it is, is not subject to criticism or questioning.



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Social Problems Caused by the Dynamic Zero COVID Policy Shanghai’s lockdown has caused many social problems and abuses. The first social problem is food distribution inequality and discrimination. When 25 million people are locked down, the food supply becomes the number one issue. Millions of families and young people do not cook. They usually rely on cafeteria, takeout, and delivery of food. They do not have any food storage in their living quarters. When the city is locked down, all food provider services are shut down, causing starvation. There are several ways for the city residents to get groceries. First, the city government allows gated building complexes (小区) to organize their own food service team to register each household’s need and order food collectively from the grocery depot. After their orders come to the gate, the service team goes outside to pick them up and deliver them to each household. Second, once or twice a week, the government delivers groceries to each building complex in bulk, and the team separates them and delivers to each household. Third, neighbors connect via WeChat to buy groceries online in bulk that are then shipped to their households. Most residents survive, but those who are not connected to neighbors, such as the elderly and the sick, have no one to deliver food to them. Cases of starving to death were seen everywhere, even happening to foreigners who resided in Shanghai.42 There were a few million day laborers from outside Shanghai who were stuck in the streets because they could not leave. They became homeless and picked up whatever they could find to survive the lockdown. There were other groups who were locked down in their workplaces, not being able to leave for their residences. While most of the residents suffered food shortages and malnutrition, there was always someone posting pictures of rare and expensive food delivered to their doors. The privileged neighborhoods include the wealthy foreigners, upper-class Chinese, and the building complexes that house government employees. They are never short of high-quality food deliveries from special channels run by government contractors. However, food service teams for ordinary people need to deal with all kinds of competition and exploitation. To get good-quality food, they must overprice others in the black market and bribe the management personnel and security guards of their housing complexes to facilitate access to their orders. They have no one to complain to when groceries delivered are expired or rotten. Outsiders, people of lower class, senior citizens, and the ill suffer the most during the lockdown. The second social problem is corruption, especially as related to the PCR tests. Why are local governments so eager to force all members under their control to have PCR tests so frequently? Answers may be found in fear and in fraud. Regarding fear, local governmental officials are held responsible

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for any undetected COVID cases that appear in their jurisdictions, leading to possible exposure. The penalty can be severe, ranging from fines to losing positions or even prosecution. Nervous officials always make sure that everyone has the test done, even those who have no contact with the outside world. The ironic situation is that when hundreds or thousands of people line up for the test, they cannot keep the required social distance, and the cross infection may occur. Concerning fraud, the frequent forced PCR tests constitute a moneymaking machine. The central government allows for 5 percent of the profits to go to the administrators. The more tests the administrators conduct, the more money they can make. Companies that administer the tests and the supervising government agencies made hundreds of millions of yuan when they do the test fraudulently. For example, a test administrator can receive 8 yuan ($1.25) from the government for each test. By mixing 200 tests into one tube, he gets 1,600 yuan ($246), and by paying the testing company 38 yuan ($5.85), he makes 1,562 yuan ($240). This type of fraud is prominent everywhere. When a city does 12 million tests a day, how much can those people make? Most of the money goes to the government agencies and government personnel that supervise the tests.43 The third social problem is human rights abuses. The draconian measures of the Dynamic Zero COVID Policy has produced all kinds of violations. The following cases (many in a video format) record only a small portion of the situations. They are organized into three categories: stripping freedom of movements, illegal breaking and entering and unlawful detention and arrest, and collective punishment. Stripping Freedom of Movement Case 1: On April 26, 2022, in Qian’an, Hebei Province, the government ordered all residents in every household to leave a key in the lock outside the door. Government officials can lock the household from outside anytime they deem it necessary. If anyone resists, the government will install a lock from the outside.44,45 Case 2: In Zhuanghe City, Dalian, Liaoning Province, 400,000 households were ordered to lock down for fourteen days in November 2021. The government used a paper seal to seal each door so that no one could violate the order. A paper seal is utilized when the government confiscates property. If the seal is broken, trespassing occurs, and the law is broken. The perpetrator is considered a criminal. When a residence is sealed by the government, the occupants are imprisoned inside until a government official comes to take it down.46 Case 3: A worker was installing barbed wire on the top of the fence of a building complex. A resident demanded work orders and told him to stop



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doing it in front of his house. The worker rebuked him by saying that the house does not belong to him; it belongs to the Communist Party.47 Case 4: Beijing’s municipal government issued health alert bracelets to those who were ordered for home isolation. The bracelet records the wearer’s body temperature and physical movements, which are monitored by a central control. If someone steps outside their home or has a fever, government personnel show up at the door to take them away. Beijing residents feel that their personal spaces have been violated.48 Illegal Breaking and Entering and Unlawful Detention and Arrest Case 5: It is a felony if someone knows about their COVID positive status but decides not to release it to the public and continues to have contact with others. Li Fuying, director of the Department of Justice of Beijing, said on February 8, 2020, that this kind of criminal would be severely punished, with the highest penalty being life in prison or even death.49 Case 6: A video showed a group of people in white hazmat suits breaking the lock to force open an apartment door. The woman resident protested, “It’s illegal to break my lock! I am not in defiance, but I have a right to know where I am going. I am not in close contact with any patient, why do you take me? Where do you take me?” The man who broke in did not show any ID, did not announce his name, and gave an order to the woman: “Hurry up! Pack, and come with us!” When asked repeatedly where they were going, he impatiently said, “North Pudong Road.” He then threatened to use force to take her away if she did not comply.50 Case 7: In Minhang District, Shanghai, a man who was under eighteen years old was arrested because he forwarded a message complaining about the food shortage.51 Case 8: A farmer was arrested on his farm because he violated the lockdown order even though he was the only person working in a vast field.52 Case 9: On May 31, 2022, Siping City, Jilin Province, issued the “Notice on Carrying Out Nucleic Acid Testing for Urban Residents on June 2,” requiring that those who missed the PCR test two or more times be placed under administrative detention for ten days in accordance with the law, fined 500 yuan, and included in the list of untrustworthy persons.53 Since March 7, 2022, Beijing police have handled 104 COVID-19 related cases, arrested twenty-four violators, and fined 123 people.54 Case 10: In Fujian Province, six people were arrested for skipping the PCR test. They were handcuffed and fettered, paraded through the streets, and then forced to take the PCR test.55

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Collective Punishment Case 11: A local government sent a note to all residents requesting proof of a third vaccination. If anyone had no proof, the building would be cut off from water and electricity.56 Case 12: Xue Lang Middle School of Wuxi City requires all students to show proof of vaccination from all family and extended family members, including grandparents. The student is not allowed to register if any family member fails to provide the proof.57 Case 13: Shenzhen City started using a “Group Health Code.” Groups are workplaces. If one person’s health code is red, the other employees in the company receive a yellow code, so everyone’s activities are restricted. This system links the group’s interest to every individual’s health condition. When one is at fault, the entire group is punished.58 Consequences The draconian anti-COVID measures have taken heavy tolls on Chinese society and its economy. Prior to the pandemic, 740,000 people on average visited hospitals for medical needs every day, and all hospitals combined performed 7,000 operations a day in Shanghai.59 During sixty-three days of lockdown, only emergency rooms remained open, but all patients were required to show a PCR-negative report taken within forty-eight hours. Most patients were unable to see a doctor; that number could be as high as 40 million. The nonemergency surgical operations were not performed, so hundreds of thousands of patients were not treated in a timely manner. Wong Xueli, a seventy-one-year-old patient, and her husband, Sun Ming, seventy-four, both needed to have hemodialysis three times a week, but they could not get their treatment on time during the lockdown. They did not have a hemodialysis for eight days. The husband died at home, and she survived after finally having an emergency treatment.60 One can only imagine how many patients died due to a lack of medical attention. The number would be tens of thousands.61 On March 23, 2022, Zhou Shengni, a nurse who worked at Dongfang Hospital, suffered from a severe asthma attack, so when a family member brought her to her own hospital, she was refused entry because it was closed due to the lockdown. When she was rushed to another hospital six miles away, it was too late to revive her.62 The economic cost is huge. For the first thirty days until April 27, 2022, in Shanghai, PCR tests were conducted for 5.67 million people per day, and the estimated cost was 5.534 billion RMB, which is equivalent to US $850 million. The cost of antigen tests was estimated to be 2.075 billion RMB. The cost of building quarantine centers (方舱) with a total of 160,000 beds was



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5.92 billion RMB. To house that many patients, the cost is 240 million RMB. The reduction of tax income compared to the same period in 2021 was 4.028 billion RMB, and loss of property rent was 10 billion RMB. Altogether, the direct cost of thirty days of lockdown in Shanghai in the first thirty days was 27.701 billion RMB, or US $4.26 billion, which does not even consider lost GDP. The lockdown continued in Shanghai for sixty-three days.63 Another study estimated that the direct cost of the Dynamic Zero COVID Policy in Shanghai for the first fifty-three days was 99.2 billion RMB, or US $15.26 billion.64 It was estimated that the total cost of the Shanghai lockdown could be a 4 percent reduction of China’s GDP in that period.65 Using truck traffic data in China, Professor Song Zheng of Hong Kong Chinese University estimated that due to the policy, Shanghai’s economic activities were reduced by 40 percent and those of Shenzhen, another industrial center next to Hong Kong, by 34 percent.66 The monthly economic loss due to the policy in China is US $46.3 billion.67 Both Shanghai and Shenzhen cities are major seaports that contribute 30 percent of the imports and exports of China. When they were shut down due to the policy, the supply chains of the world economy were severely interrupted, which directly aggravated inflation throughout the world. For example, 206,700 American companies rely on goods from those locked-down regions in China, and 103,900 companies import directly or indirectly from local businesses in those regions. All their supply chains were cut off.68 The global economic growth for 2022 was estimated to be 4.1 percent before Russia’s war on Ukraine and China’s lockdowns in forty-five major cities (resulting in 400 million people being affected). Afterward, the prediction was cut to 3.2 percent, and US inflation is now surging to forty-year highs.69 CONCLUSION Why would China take such a draconian approach to controlling the COVID-19 even though the World Health Organization has called the Dynamic Zero COVID policy unsustainable?70 There is only one answer: supreme leader Xi Jinping has made the war against COVID-19 the highest national security priority. When Xi became the general secretary of the CCP in 2012, he abolished the party’s tradition of collective leadership that had been in place since Mao’s death in 1976 and built a dictatorship resembling Mao’s. Xi viewed the previous leaders Jiang Zeming and Hu Jintao as weak and corrupted at a time when China was challenged by “color revolutions,” a democratic movement throughout the world. His image of the world is that evil foreign forces led by the United States have threatened the political security of the CCP.71 He single-handedly consolidated all powers into his office.

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For him, political security is the prerequisite for the survival and development of the country. In today’s world, confrontations between China and the West are inevitable. He Bin, a Communist Party official, announced at an official meeting that Xi has made the political judgment that the East is rising and that the West is falling; the biggest source of chaos in the world today lies in the United States, which is the greatest threat to China’s development and security.72 For Xi, these confrontations are not limited to military conflicts but also include politics, economics, and public health. He believes that China’s “success” in COVID-19 eradication contrasts with America’s miserable failure and therefore demonstrates the supremacy of China’s socialistic system.73 Xi is very confident about his ability to defeat the virus. It is a mystery why and how COVID-19 originated in Wuhan City in late December 2019. However, it is not a secret that the Chinese government for unknown reasons decided not to release the information to the public, instead punishing the whistleblowers, including Dr. Li Wenliang, who died of the deadly virus later in February 2020.74 Xi said that he would personally command the war against the virus at the Politburo meeting on January 7, 2020. He ordered government officials to pay close attention to the novel coronavirus in Wuhan.75 However, no major actions were taken in terms of controlling the spread in Wuhan. On January 23, 2020, after more than a month of inaction, Xi suddenly ordered the Wuhan government to lock down the entire city of 12 million people indefinitely. Although people in Wuhan fell into chaos and desperation, the virus was not controlled. It spread to the whole world. Facing the growing threat, Xi reiterated on February 23, 2020, that he personally oversaw the war against the deadly virus and declared that there would be only one result: absolute victory over it.76 In doing so, he shows the CCP and the nation that his demolition of term limits for the president of China is justified because the country needs a great leader in such hard times. In the past ten years, his economic, defense, and foreign policies, including the BRI, have failed miserably,77,78 so the pressure to remove him from the highest leadership is getting stronger.79 Therefore, totally eradicating the virus from China is a life-or-death matter for Xi, as it demonstrates great leadership. On June 29, 2022, Xi reiterated that China must control the virus at all costs, even though the economy has been sacrificed “a little bit.”80 No one in the system dared to challenge Xi’s idea that the Dynamic Zero COVID Policy is the only way to address the pandemic. The cost to China’s and the world’s economy is too high when there are almost zero deaths and very rare severe cases caused by the Omicron variant. Of course, many CCP officials support Xi’s extreme measures because they feel that this is the best opportunity for the party to extend its ability to control the population at the individual level. Chinese nationals, domestic or foreign, are directly monitored, and their movement is limited through the latest technologies of health



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codes, facial recognition, movement chasing, and financial footprints. This new expansion of China’s authoritarian rule over its own people has not been seen anywhere in human history. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  What are the main components of China’s Dynamic Zero COVID Policy? Do you think that the World Health Organization would endorse such a policy? 2.  Review China’s absolute lockdown and colored “health code” measures as outlined in the chapter. Discuss how they can be implemented practically in China. Can they be implemented in your country? Why or why not? 3.  When facing the conflict between pandemic control and individual rights, what is the Chinese government’s position? What are the positions held by the Chinese people? Can different opinions be discussed publicly in Chinese media and social media? Are there public opinion polls in China about this issue? 4.  How will the Dynamic Zero COVID Policy impact China’s social order control and compliance? How would you feel about your personal well-being in China if you were a Chinese citizen? Would you support and comply with such policy? 5.  How will the Dynamic Zero COVID Policy impact the Chinese and world economies? Focus on the issue of global supply chains, China’s BRI, and inflation around the world. NOTES 1. Peter W. Liu and Justin M. Liu, “Digital Authoritarianism in the People’s Republic of China,” in Crisis of Democracy around the World, ed. Saliba Sarsar and Rekha Datta (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021), 167–84. 2. Radio France International, “Rumors about Xi to Be Replaced by Li Are Difficult to Deny—Xi May Not Renew His Term at the 20th Party Congress” (in Chinese), May 18, 2022, https:​//​www​.shorturl​.at​/hNTWZ. 3. Talha Burki, “The Wuhan Lockdown,” The Lancet, July 1, 2022, https:​//​www​ .thelancet​.com​/journals​/lanres​/article​/PIIS2213​-2600(22)00177​-1​/fulltext. 4. Ibid. 5. Cicong Wang, Yuanqing Ye, Kejia Hu, Hao Lei, Chen, Xiaolin Xu, Wenyuan Li, Changzheng Yuan, Shuyin Cao, Sisi Wang, Shu Li, Junlin Jia, Qinchuan Wang, Zilong Bian, and Xifeng Wu, “The Impact of Wuhan Lockdown on COVID-19 Pandemic Situations—A Study Based on Population Flow Data” (in Chinese), Journal of

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Zhejiang University (Medical Science) 50, no. 1 (February 2021): 61–67, doi:10.3724/ zdxbyxb-2021-0021, https:​//​www​.ncbi​.nlm​.nih​.gov​/pmc​/articles​/PMC8675066. 6. “Xi Jinping: Speech at the Conference on Coordinating and Promoting the Prevention and Control of the COVID-19 Epidemic and Planning of Economic and Social Development” (in Chinese), Xinhuanet, February 23, 2020, http:​//​www​ .xinhuanet​.com​/politics​/leaders​/2020​-02​/23​/c​_1125616016​.htm. 7. “Xi Jinping: Speech at the National Commendation Conference for Fighting COVID-19)” (in Chinese), Xinhuanet, October 15, 2020, http:​//​www​.xinhuanet​.c​.om​ /politics​/leaders​/2020​-10​/15​/c​_1126614978​.htm. 8. Deutsche Welle, “Under the Dynamic Zero COVID Policy, How Many Cities in China Have Been Locked Down?” (in Chinese), DW, February 5, 2022. 9. Ibid. 10. “Xi Jinping.” 11. Lancet Finance, “It Is Getting Weird That Shanghai Continues to Be Locked Down” (in Chinese), March 31, 2022, https:​//​xueqiu​.com​/5900568191​/215868915. 12. Peipeng Luo, “Shanghai: A Total of 131524 Cases of Local Positive Infection Have Been Reported, and There Is Currently 1 Severe Case” (in Chinese), Xinhuanet, April 8, 2022, http:​//​sh​.news​.cn​/2022​-04​/08​/c​_1310548843​.htm. 13. Xiaoyou You, “Do You Want to Know How Workers from Outside Shanghai Are Doing?” (in Chinese), NetEase, April 19, 2022, https:​//​www​.163​.com​/dy​/article​/ H5AHJFH50552J0VR​.html. 14. Cleveland Clinic, “COVID-19 and PCR Testing,” 2022, https:​ //​ my​ .clevelandclinic​.org​/health​/diagnostics​/21462​-covid​-19​-and​-pcr​-testing. 15. State Council, People’s Republic of China, “Guidelines for the Implementation of COVID-19 PCR Test for Entire Population” (2nd ed.) (in Chinese), September 14, 2021, http:​//​www​.gov​.cn​/xinwen​/2021​-09​/14​/content​_5637134​.htm. 16. Deo Krish Reviera, “PCR Testing for Everyone in Shanghai, Queueing Up Overnight,” March 12, 2022, https:​//​twitter​.com​/krish​_deo​/status​/1502587573868240897. 17. Reuters, “China’s Tianjin Begins City-Wide Testing after at Least Two Local Omicron Cases Detected,” January 9, 2022, https:​ //​ www​ .reuters​ .com​ /business​ /healthcare​-pharmaceuticals​/china​-reports​-165​-new​-covid​-19​-cases​-jan​-8​-omicron​ -cases​-reported​-tianjin​-2022​-01​-09. 18. Xuan Yuan Wen Fei, “New Round of PCR Test for Entire Population in Tianjin” (Chinese), January 21, 2022, https:​//​t​.co​/BURZ6400hi. 19. Lancet Finance, “It Is Getting Weird That Shanghai Continues to Be Locked Down.” 20. Zhaoguang Ge, “In The 50 Days since March, Done PCR 14 Times and Antigens 21 Times” (in Chinese), May 2, 2022, https:​//​twitter​.com​/GeZhaoguang​/status​ /1521032469914341377. 21. Dan Du, “I’ve Taken PCR Samples for at Least 10,000 People” (in Chinese), China Digital Times, April 17, 2022, http:​//​chinadigitaltimes​.net. 22. State Council, People’s Republic of China, “Covid-19 Prevention and Control Plan” (7th ed.) (in Chinese), September 15, 2020, http:​//​www​.gov​.cn​/xinwen​/2020​-09​ /15​/5543680​/files​/931ddbb00e134025bbb86739c8ed68ee​.pdf.



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23. iPaul@iPaulCanada, “One Person Is Positive and 7 Households Are Taken Away,” May 7, 2022, https:​//​t​.co​/2tdhEK058E. 24. Qian Wang and Wenbo Bo, “The Number of Fang Cang in the Country Is Nearly 400, Doubled 5 Times in a Month. Can Permanent Fang Cang Solve the Problem?” (in Chinese), Tengxun News, May 10, 2022, https:​//​new​.qq​.com​/rain​/a​ /20220519A08KCE00. 25. Annie@Wanting3699, “The Fang Cang Hospital in Shanghai Was in Turmoil” (in Chinese), March 29, 2022, https:​ //​ twitter​ .com​ /wanting3699​ /status​ /1508776632399831047. 26. 猪鼓励逗@Julia22884, “Thousands of People Can’t Get in Fang Cang because the Construction Has Not Yet Been Finished” (in Chinese), April 9, 2022, https:​//​t​.co​ /GJVvtuLhq5. 27. Liling Huang, “China’s Epidemic Management Digitization—System Omissions and Privacy Violations Cause Concerns” (in Chinese), VOA, August 11, 2022, https:​//​www​.voachinese​.com. 28. Songpinganq@songpinganq, “Since February 2020 in China, You Need to Scan It Everywhere You Go” (in Chinese), January 10, 2022, https:​//​t.​co​/rH4InKB1ew. 29. Jia Tou Xiao San, “What Exactly Is the Electronic Fence?” (in Chinese), May 21, 2022, https:​//​www​.toutiao​.com. 30. Xiao Xiang Chen Bao, “Beijing ‘Health Treasure’ Pop-Up Window (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Detailed Explanation!” (in Chinese), May 7, 2022, https:​//​www​.baidu​.com. 31. Lian Duan, “Difficult to Withdraw Money from Rural Banks; Depositors Outside Henan Are Also Accurately Given a Red Code” (in Chinese), June 14, 2022, https:​//​www​.nbd​.com​.cn. 32. Yun Wang, “The Beginning of the ‘Matrix’—Henan Bank Customers’ Health Code Strangely Turned Red” (in Chinese), Radio Free Asia, June 14, 2022, https:​//​ www​.rfa​.org. 33. Smrity Mallapaty, “WHO Approval of Chinese CoronaVac COVID Vaccine Will Be Crucial to Curbing Pandemic,” Nature, June 4, 2021, https:​//​www​.nature​.com​ /articles​/d41586​-021​-01497​-8. 34. Baixing Wei, “Distress Letter! More Than 600 Children Were Diagnosed with Type 1 Diabetes after Vaccination” (in Chinese), May 2022, http:​//​wbx​.jiangyaojia​ .com​/archives​/9905. 35. Chris Buckley, “China’s Vaccine Scandal Threatens Public Faith in Immunizations,” New York Times, April 18, 2016, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​/2016​/04​/19​/world​ /asia​/china​-vaccine​-scandal​.html. 36. Caiyu Liu and Shumei Leng, “85% of Chinese Fully Vaccinated ahead of Festive Travel Rush” (in Chinese), Global Times, December 29, 2021, https:​//​www​ .globaltimes​.cn​/page​/202112​/1243753​.shtml. 37. Patrick Howell O’Neill, “How WeChat Censors Private Conversations, Automatically in Real Time,” MIT Technology Review, July 15, 2019, https:​ //​ www​.technologyreview​.com​/s​/613962​/how​-wechat​-censors​-private​-conversations​ -automatically​-in​-real​-time. 38. ABC News, “‘Censorship of Suffering’: Chinese Netizens Criticizing the Authorities for Blocking the Topic of Calling for Help Due to the Pandemic in

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Shanghai,” April 15, 2022, https:​//​www​.abc​.net​.au​/chinese​/2022​-04​-16​/china​-censors​ -shanghai​-covid​-post​-social​-media​-weibo​-wechat​/100986880. 39. 习惯拒绝中共反人类集权@NoNaziCCP, “China, CCP Banners on Streets: No One Should Talk about Pandemic in Social Media” (in Chinese), April 10, 2022, https:​//​twitter​.com​/NoNaziCCP​/status​/1513031341830721537. 40. Silin Lei, “A Story Written For You - Why Was the Video Deleted On All Network?” (Chinese), China Digital Times, April 22, 2022, http:​//​chinadigitaltimes​ .net​/chinese​/680131​.html. 41. Cyberspace Administration of China, “Regulations on the Administration of Follow-Up Comments on the Internet” (in Chinese), August 15, 2017, http:​//​www​.cac​ .gov​.cn​/2017​-08​/25​/c​_1121541842​.htm. 42. Opera News, “RIP: A South African Woman Died in Chinese Flats in Shanghai and This Is What Killed Her,” 2022, https:​//​opera​.news​/za​/en​/society​/652f915fb7354 da0ea012aec94555048. 43. Guoshu Zhan, “Corrupted PCR Testing, Shocking, and Unconscionable” (in Chinese), Jinri Toutiao, May 30, 2022, https:​//​www​.toutiao​.com​/article​ /7103514393521947168​/​?wid​=1655489942573. 44. Falin Gao, “Anti-Pandemic Measures” (in Chinese), April 27, 2022, https:​//​t​ .co​/xxdP7OfEZy. 45. LaiDao Shijie Wei Kan Yangguang, “Qian’an, Hebei: Hard Isolation: Residents Required to Hand Over the Key, Locked from the Outside” (in Chinese), China Digital Times, April 27, 2022, https:​//​chinadigitaltimes​.net​/chinese​/680436​.html. 46. Bing Lin, “The Pandemic Is Severe! 400,000 Residents’ Doors in Zhuanghe City, Dalian Were Sealed” (in Chinese), Bright Times, November 13, 2021, https:​//​ mingdemedia​.org​/yiqingyanjun​-dalianzhuangheshi​-40wanrenjiamenbeitiefengtiaozu buchuhu. 47. bridgeduan@bridgeduan, “This Is Not Your House, It’s the Communist Party’s” (in Chinese), May 12, 2022, https:​//​t​.co​/RA6TWIwM4I. 48. Dongni An, “Due to Too Many Complaints, the Beijing Tiantongyuan Community Withdrew the COVID-19 Surveillance Ring” (in Chinese), RFI, July 14, 2022, https:​//​www​.shorturl​.at​/ajLV8. 49. Sinchew.com.my, “During the Question Session, Li Fuying Mentioned Remarks about Sentences to Prison and Life Imprisonment and the Death Penalty” (in Chinese), Sinchew.com.my, May 12, 2022, https:​//​www​.shorturl​.at​/foqTU. 50. Bing Yu, “A Female Resident of Shanghai Recorded a Group of Da Bai Forcibly Prying the Door of Her Apartment” (in Chinese), May 14, 2022, https:​//​t​.co​ /7vhqoMdrif. 51. 赛先生的小迷弟@TruthOfFinance, “Teenagers under 18 Were Taken Away by Police” (in Chinese), May 1, 2022, https:​//​t​.co​/pckPtkJEZj. 52. Wenxing Wu, “Peasants Are Not Allowed to Farm and Arrested” (in Chinese), May 10, 2022, https:​//​t​.co​/WVOvDXSX0Y. 53. Wang Lv Da Yi, “Those Who Miss PCR Testing Twice or More Will Be Detained for 10 Days” (in Chinese), May 31, 2022, https:​//​mp​.weixin​.qq​.com​/s​/ GqNMEfdVwcS0oIEjyIOdsw.



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54. GlobalNet, “Just Now, Beijing Announced: Criminal Cases Filed for Investigation!” (in Chinese), March 20, 2022, https:​//​mp​.weixin​.qq​.com​/s​/U​ -2uWDUSQZs5X69clsW​-Ww. 55. SongPinganq@songpinganq, “Chinese Citizens Who Skipped Their Tests, Handcuffed and Fettered, under Police’s Watch, Taking Their Mandatory COVID Test at a Hospital” (in Chinese), July 14, 2022, https:​//​twitter​.com​/songpinganq​/status​ /1547586022602461184. 56. Feng Gu, “Anyone Misses Vaccination, Water, and Electricity Are Cut Off for Entire Building” (in Chinese), April 27, 2022, https:​//​t.​co​/XEgwn9X4KG. 57. Yunhe Zhu, “Xuelang Middle School Requires Freshmen to Show the COVID-19 Vaccination Certificate of Their Parents and Grandparents When They Register” (in Chinese), July 27, 2022, https:​ //​ twitter​ .com​ /zhu0588​ /status​ /1552015830052847617. 58. Jacobson@jakobsonradical, “Shenzhen Began to Implement the Collective PCR System” (in Chinese), July 27, 2022, https:​//​twitter​.com​/jakobsonradical​/status​ /1552126251782905856. 59. Wen@wenyuanchao, “Behind Every 1 Treated Confirmed COVID-19 Patient, Stood 1531 Other Out-Patients and 14 In-Patients Awaiting Surgery” (in Chinese), April 6, 2022, https:​//​t​.co​/FPqvh4OaXz. 60. Ou Er Zhi Yu, “After Hospitals Were Shut Down, Shanghai Hemodialysis Patients Were ‘Wandering’ for 23 Days” (in Chinese), China Digital Times, April 23, 2022, https:​//​chinadigitaltimes​.net. 61. Jiajie Tang, “Medical Clashes and ‘Extra Deaths’: A Secondary Disaster under Shanghai’s Lockdown” (in Chinese), RFA, April 8, 2022, https:​//​www​.rfa​.org​/ mandarin​/yataibaodao​/huanjing​/jt​-04082022103625​.html. 62. Tengxun Net, “After Being Rejected by the Hospital Where She Worked, the Nurse Died In ‘Someone Else’s Hospital’” (in Chinese), March 25, 2022, https:​//​new​ .qq​.com​/omn​/20220325​/20220325A0BQ9J00​.html. 63. Zhen Jiao Lu Suo, “In the First Month, How Much Money Did Shanghai Spend on Pandemic Control” (in Chinese), China Digital Times, April 26, 2022, https:​//​ chinadigitaltimes​.net. 64. Yunkui Xue, “Examination of Cost of Shanghai Lockdown” (in Chinese), SINA, May 22, 2022, https:​//​www​.sina​.com​.cn. 65. Qinglin Li, “Shanghai’s Pandemic Is Out of Control Research: Lockdown Will Hit China’s GDP Growth Hard” (in Chinese), Epoch Times, May 24, 2022, https:​//​test​ .qycz​.org​/a​/202204​/n11908258​/web. 66. Jingjing Chen, “The Economic Cost of Lockdown in China: Evidence from City-to-City Truck Flows” (in Chinese), ZaiHuangShi, April 3, 2022, https:​//​www​ .zaihuangshi​.com. 67. AASTOCKS, “CUHK Research: Mainland ‘Lockdown’ Causes Economic Losses of at Least US$46.3 Billion a Month Equivalent to 3.1% of GDP” (in Chinese), March 29, 2022, http:​//​aastocks​.com​.hk​/sc​/funds​/news​/comment​.aspx​ ?source​=AAFN​&id​=NOW​.1173294​&cur​=N​/A. 68. Wen Ni, Zhongyuan Zhang, and Jiayi Wang, “Shenzhen and Shanghai Have Successively Locked Down the City, Exacerbating Global Supply Chain and

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Inflationary Pressures” (in Chinese), Epoch Times, April 2, 2022, https:​ //​ www​ .epochtimes​.com. 69. William Pesek, “China’s ‘Zero-Covid’ Crackdown Threatens Global Economy,” Forbes, April 19, 2022, https:​//​www​.forbes​.com​/sites​/williampesek​/2022​/04​ /19​/chinas​-zero​-covid​-crackdown​-threatens​-global​-economy​/​?sh​=52ff1a353778. 70. Ralph Jennings, “China’s Xi Bets It All on Zero-COVID Policy,” VOA, May 16, 2022, https:​//​www​.voanews​.com​/a​/china​-s​-xi​-bets​-it​-all​-on​-zero​-covid​-policy​-​ /6576000​.html. 71. Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, “In Turbulent Times, Xi Builds a Security Fortress for China, and Himself,” New York Times, August 6, 2022, https:​//​www​ .nytimes​.com​/2022​/08​/06​/world​/asia​/xi​-jinping​-china​-security​.html. 72. Zhe Jin, “The Contradiction between Xi Jinping’s ‘East Rising and West Falling’ Worldview and Reality” (in Chinese), VOA, March 14, 2021, https:​//​www​ .voachinese​.com​/a​/xi​-nationalistic​-rhetoric​-and​-its​-implications​-20210314​/5813777​ .html. 73. Buckley and Myers, “In Turbulent Times, Xi Builds a Security Fortress for China, and Himself.” 74. “Chinese Doctor, Silenced after Warning of Outbreak, Dies from Coronavirus,” New York Times, February 6, 2020, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​/2020​/02​/06​/world​/asia​/ chinese​-doctor​-Li​-Wenliang​-coronavirus​.html. 75. Jinping Xi, “Speech at the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee to Study the Response to the Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Epidemic” (in Chinese), QSTheory.cn, February 15, 2020, http:​//​www​ .qstheory​.cn​/dukan​/qs​/2020​-02​/15​/c​_1125572832​.htm. 76. Jinping Xi, “Xi Jinping: Speech at the Conference on the Overall Promotion of the Prevention and Control of the New Corona Pneumonia Epidemic and the Economic and Social Development” (in Chinese), February 24, 2020, https:​//​www​ .gov​.cn. 77. Mu Gu Chen Zhong, “Fair Evaluation of Xi Jinping” (in Chinese), Yibao, March 1, 2022, https:​//​yibaochina​.com​/​?p​=245173. 78. Alicia García-Herrero and Eyck Freymann, “A New Kind of Belt and Road Initiative after the Pandemic,” WITA, June 23, 2022, https:​//​www​.wita​.org​/blogs​/a​ -new​-kind​-of​-belt​-and​-road​-initiative​-after​-the​-pandemic. 79. Xin Touke, “Li Keqiang Continues to Fight Xi Jinping” (in Chinese), China Affairs, May 18, 2022, http:​//​www​.chinaaffairs​.org​/gb​/detail​.asp​?id​=190600. 80. State Council, People’s Republic of China, “When Xi Jinping Inspected Wuhan, Hubei Province, He Stressed: Firmly Grasp the Lifeblood of Science and Technology in China’s Own Hands; Continuously Improve China’s Security, Independence, and Autonomy” (in Chinese), June 29, 2022, https:​//​www​.gov​.cn.

Chapter 6

Strongman on a Tightrope Achievements and Failures of Putin’s Autocracy in Russia Thomas S. Pearson

On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin shocked the world with his brutal invasion of Ukraine. Insisting that Russia’s “special military operation” was to prevent the “Nazification” of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk territories and the extension of NATO’s control over Ukraine—a geopolitical threat to Russia—Putin claimed he was protecting his people from the corrupt democracies of the West and restoring the Russian empire to its former glory. Putin has disseminated this narrative, especially since 2012, not only to people in the Russian Federation and Russian diaspora but also to all in the “Russian world” (Russians and foreigners who embrace Putin’s geopolitics).1 Mindful of the Maidan Revolution and the ousting of his protégé, Viktor Yanukovych, as Ukraine’s president in 2014, Putin sent Russian security forces into Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2020 and 2022 to prop up the regimes of his fellow autocrats Alexander Lukashenko and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.2 What accounts for Putin’s evolution from an elected president governing by “managed democracy” in the early 2000s to a full-fledged dictator who describes himself as a historic leader “saving” Russia and its exceptionalist Orthodox Christian culture from the corrupt, secular West? This chapter will argue that after his first two successful terms as president (2000–2008), a period that restored stability and brought prosperity to Russia following the turmoil in the 1990s under President Boris Yeltsin, Putin fell out with the West and from 2008 to 2014 established a “personalist autocracy” in Russia that played to Russian national pride.3 Buoyed by his quick success and 137

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Russian public approval in annexing Crimea to Russia in March 2014 and facing few international repercussions, he pursued an imperialist intervention in eastern Ukraine that increased his wealth and that of the siloviki, his allies in autocratic rule. Since 2012, his domestic agenda (enacting economic reforms, improving Russia’s competitiveness in the global economy, raising living standards, and addressing public health and education needs) has largely failed, thus leading him to portray Russia as a fortress “besieged” by Western enemies.4 With his declining public approval ratings in 2018–2020, Putin has repressed all democratic opposition and groups that, according to the Kremlin, identify with Western values and act as “foreign agents.”5 As this chapter will show, these changes in Putin’s philosophy of governance and his failures in solving Russia’s structural problems have led him to resort to all-out war against Ukraine and create a political environment in Russia that historian Timothy Snyder calls fascism with its cult centered on a single leader, Putin; its “cult of the dead, organized around World War II”; and its “myth of a past golden age of imperial greatness, to be restored by a war of healing violence—the murderous war on Ukraine.”6 Thus, following our analysis of Putin’s evolution from the early 2000s to his strongman dictatorship in Russia today and his plans to re-create the Russian empire of the late nineteenth century, we will discuss the main aspects of inequality and governance in Russia since 2012—reflecting failures of the president’s leadership (including his handling of the pandemic and economic stagnation)—and their ramifications for Russia’s future. PUTIN AND RUSSIA’S EVOLUTION FROM “MANAGED DEMOCRACY” TO HIS BREAK WITH THE WEST In the tumultuous decade that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, few developments were more surprising than the resignation of the infirm Yeltsin and his designation of Putin as the interim president on January 1, 2000. Yeltsin’s imprimatur gave Putin the advantage of the Kremlin’s media support over other candidates in the March 2000 election. An obscure KGB lieutenant colonel who left his position in the German Democratic Republic following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Putin returned home to St. Petersburg in 1990, resigned his KGB position, and went to work for his former law professor and the city’s mayor, Anatoli Sobchak. Putin’s experience and his contacts in Germany were invaluable to Sobchak’s plans to make St. Petersburg a “free enterprise zone.” However, Putin’s abuse of power in selling contracts to his friends (from his childhood and in the military and intelligence services) created a scandal that ultimately brought Sobchak down as mayor in 1996 and necessitated Putin’s transfer to Moscow. Along the

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way, Putin and his siloviki, his hard-line friends in the military and Federal Security Service (FSB)—the successor to the Soviet KGB—amassed huge fortunes. The siloviki would soon push aside the oligarchs of the Yeltsin era and become the backbone of Putin’s presidency.7 Putin’s service in Moscow under Yeltsin as director of the FSB (1998– 1999) and prime minister (1999) brought important benefits to a president who was facing state investigations into corruption by his family and close associates. Yeltsin needed Putin’s protection. He also valued Putin’s career of state service and his nonaffiliation with any political ideology (specifically communism). Unfortunately, for Yeltsin’s legacy as a champion of democracy, Putin’s authoritarian tendencies were already baked into his core.8 Putin likewise benefited from Yeltsin’s greatest administrative accomplishment as president—the dismantling of the Communist Party apparatus—as well as from his failures as Russia’s leader. These included his reluctance to form a liberal democratic party to unite Russia’s democratic factions under the 1991 constitution and his decision to jettison the planned Soviet economy overnight through “shock therapy” (January 1992) in order to establish a free market economy based on private property. Most fateful of all were his armed confrontation with the Russian Parliament over his presidential powers (October 1993) and his alliance with a small group of oligarchs who made huge fortunes through insider trading arrangements with the Yeltsin government (the infamous “loans for shares” privatization scheme). In return for their economic windfalls, the oligarchs financed Yeltsin’s reelection as president in 1996 (he defeated Gennadi Zyuganov, the Russian Communist Party leader). Although Russians enjoyed unprecedented political freedoms under Yeltsin, the 1990s were a nightmare for most people. In 1992, the annual rate of inflation hit 2,525 percent; by 1999, nearly three out of every ten Russians lived in poverty. The shock therapy of 1992 and global financial crisis of August 1998 wiped out the savings of most Russian citizens, and organized crime and corruption controlled many businesses in the Russian Federation. Adding insult to injury, in 1991, President George H. W. Bush proclaimed the United States to be the victor in the Cold War, and his successor, Bill Clinton, in Putin’s view, reneged on earlier oral pledges to Russia not to extend NATO membership to Eastern European states formerly in the Soviet bloc.9 As he began his presidency in 2000, Putin signaled his desire to develop closer ties with the West. This was not just a Machiavellian maneuver on his part. Putin stressed that “Russia is part of the European culture . . . and I cannot imagine my country in isolation from Europe and what we often call the civilized world. So it is hard for me to visualize NATO as the enemy.”10 He saw the West as his ally in the struggle against Muslim terrorists in Chechnya (see below) and elsewhere. Nonetheless, as he began his tenure espousing

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“managed democracy,” a concept conceived by Vladislav Surkov, his chief ideologue from 1999 to 2013, Putin’s focus was on restoring national unity by reasserting the state’s central control (gosudarstvennost)—otherwise, he claimed, Russia risked becoming a second- or third-world country. Three days before he took office as interim president, Putin endorsed a plan to reestablish stability through administrative reforms that concentrated power in his hands. The state would establish its active direction over all government and independent media, all branches and levels of government, and all propaganda and agitation strategies, be they overt or covert. In a significant break with the 1993 constitution, all security agencies would continue to report directly to Putin. The plan called for the creation of an “information and political” barrier between the Russian president and all opposition groups. It has enabled President Putin to govern Russia and implement draconian measures while shielding him from taking personal accountability.11 In her study of the Kremlin’s decision-making process in 2005–2012, based on the sistema that Putin put in place under the December 28, 1999, plan (noted above), sociologist Alena Ledeneva emphasizes that instead of ruling by edict, Putin depends on a host of informal rules and personal relationships to manage his elites and their supporters. Summarizing Ledeneva’s research, Timothy Frye points out, The members of these networks keep Putin in power as long as he provides them with benefits in exchange for political loyalty. This sistema . . . is based on Putin’s ability to make deals with different oligarchic groups within the state, but it is not rooted to anything specific to Putin per se. [Ledeneva] notes, “It is essential . . . not to overstate the personalization of sistema in the sense that Putin’s sistema, which he shaped by mobilizing his personal networks, is not really controlled by him. Like everyone else, leaders are ‘locked’ into their networks while relying on them in performing their public functions and satisfying their private needs.”12

By the same token, the multiethnic and multi-confessional status of the Russian Federation drives Putin’s approach to governance. With no communist ideology or party cadres to hold the diverse realm together, Putin has used a tsarist model of patron–client relations that meshes with his concept of sistema. Unlike in the Soviet Union with its emphasis on atheism, Putin as president and an Orthodox Christian has promoted religious toleration for most non-Orthodox believers in Russia. This has enabled him to maintain control throughout the Russian Federation by relying on loyal lieutenants employing customized carrot-and-stick strategies. The case of Chechnya illustrates the risks and rewards of such an approach. With its multiple ethnic (Chechens and Russians) and religious identities (Muslims and Christians),

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Chechnya from the early nineteenth century on has constituted perhaps the most nettlesome challenge to Russian state control. At various times, Chechens have fought against and on behalf of the Russian motherland.13 Putin’s reliance on Akhmad Kadryov until his assassination in 2004 and thereafter on Ramzan Kadryov, who has used terroristic tactics to pacify democratic activists, independent journalists, and gays and lesbians, has prompted many of the siloviki to denounce Kadryov and urge Putin to cut his ties to the rogue Chechen strongman. During his first term (2000–2004), President Putin won acclaim in Russia and even the West for his policies, such as his market reforms anchored by a 13 percent flat tax to stimulate business and foreign investment and his new criminal code (2001) that was more aligned to Western judicial models. The United States welcomed Putin’s personal and logistical help following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks for its war in Afghanistan. Putin’s rapprochement with the West, however, was based on the assumption that Russia would receive benefits in return. Hence, President George W. Bush’s announcement in June 2002 that the United States intended to withdraw unilaterally from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) shocked Putin and reinforced the suspicions of the Russian president and his siloviki about the trustworthiness of Western partners.14 More important, Putin’s first eight years in office, coinciding with a meteoric rise in global oil prices, brought a decade of unprecedented prosperity that was also the result of Kremlin decisions to shut down failing private energy firms and return their assets to state control (reiderstvo). Russians saw an increase in their average annual wages from less than $4,000 in 2000 to more than $15,000 in 2011—and the rising standard of living was noticeable everywhere. Home and automobile ownership increased, many Russians traveled to the West, the poverty rate fell from 25 percent in 1998 to about 14 percent in 2010, and, most important, Russia grew its middle class. “Vladimir the Lucky,” as political scientist Andrew Kuchins dubbed him, reaped the political benefits. The proportion of Russians who thought that “having a democratic political system was ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ good” rose from 46 percent in 1999 to 67 percent in 2011.15 These outcomes and Putin’s pacification of Chechnya in the war of 1999– 2004, which included relentless bombing of the Chechen capital Grozny, secured his reelection in 2004 with more than 71 percent of the vote. The Kremlin’s manipulation of the election campaign so that no serious contender ran against Putin also contributed to the outcome. Still, at this point, Putin was very popular in spite of the Kremlin’s seizure of the independent television stations of two powerful Russian oligarchs, Vladimir Gusinskii and Boris Berezovskii, in 2000–2001. Such actions provided early proof of Putin’s core belief that state control of television constituted the most critical instrument of his power and public support.16 More ominously, in October 2003,

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Russian police arrested oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovskii, allegedly for tax evasion but in reality for organizing a democratic opposition against Putin. As the richest private citizen in Russia at the time, he had embarrassed Putin on national television in February 2003 by asserting that corruption consumed 25 percent of the state’s budget. Khodorkovskii’s arrest and sentence to ten years in prison created another fissure in Russia’s relations with the West. Nevertheless, Putin was quick to confiscate the oligarch’s many assets, including the humongous firm of Yukos Oil, and to redistribute them to his siloviki, most prominently Igor Sechin.17 In Putin’s mind, Khodorkovskii had violated the pact he made with Russia’s wealthiest oligarchs in 2000: he would leave them and their fortunes alone provided that they stayed out of politics. This tacit “nonparticipation pact” involving Russians of all socioeconomic levels, as political scientist Masha Lipman calls it, explains much as to why Russians have lost nearly all of their freedoms in a trade for stability and material prosperity that came early in Putin’s tenure.18 However, not all went well for Putin as he consolidated his power over Russia’s governors following his reelection in 2004. The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 unnerved him, especially because, in the latter case, he had gone to extraordinary (and ultimately fruitless) lengths to secure the election of his candidate, Yanukovych. The mass popular demonstrations in Kyiv in support of Western-style liberal democracy and Yanukovych’s opponent, Viktor Yushchenko, who had the support of the United States and the European Union, alarmed him, as did the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 despite Russia’s strong protests. Even more, Putin soured on President Bush’s “freedom agenda” and his plans to promote Georgia and Ukraine for membership in NATO. In his February 10, 2007, speech to the Munich Security Conference, Putin, reprising his assertion (2005) that the Soviet Union’s demise was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century, blasted the United States for pushing a unipolar view of the world and an aggressive foreign policy that violated the agreements that the United States and Soviet Union had made at the end of the Cold War. The disrespect that the United States was showing Russia at this point reminded the leaders in the Kremlin of the deep humiliation they felt a decade earlier as Yeltsin was powerless to halt NATO expansion and international recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. In August 2008, Putin sent 40,000 Russian troops into the Russian populated, autonomous territories of Ossetia and Abkhazia to prevent their takeover by Georgia.19 As would become evident in the next few years, Putin’s domestic and foreign policy actions all but extinguished democracy in Russia.

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EXCEPTIONAL RUSSIA AND PUTIN’S PIVOT TO DICTATORSHIP: 2008–2014 AND BEYOND Putin’s success in restoring a strong state and returning Russia to the international prominence it had during the Cold War derived not only from winning elections and controlling political parties in the Russian Duma, notably United Russia. He also promoted the narrative of Russia as an exceptional Eurasian state that was defined by its autocracy, Orthodoxy, and a dominant Russian nationality, as articulated by Tsars Nicholas I (1825–1855) and Alexander III (1881–1894). Although television was Putin’s principal vehicle in consolidating his power, his manipulation and falsification of Russian history, in making sacred the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) and rehabilitating Stalin, mobilized popular support for his rule. As soon as he was inaugurated as president in 2000, Putin resurrected the Soviet national anthem with lyrics revised to suit post-Soviet Russia.20 He called for an emphasis on patriotism and military glory in the arts, cinema, and the schools. The centerpiece of this campaign, according to historian Anton Weiss-Wendt, was to make the Great Patriotic War a new civil religion and the celebration of Victory Day, May 9, 1945, a sacred holiday. In 1965, Soviet leaders had established Victory Day as a nonlabor holiday to rally public support for the Communist Party and remind the world of the Soviet Union’s pivotal role and immense sacrifice in defeating Hitler and fascism.21 Putin made sure the political message was clear by establishing—and chairing—the Victory Organization Committee in 2000. As Russia’s relations with the West have deteriorated, he has banned the participation of the Soviet Union’s Western allies in World War II in the Victory Day parades in Moscow.22 Since 2015, Victory Day has become a choreographed holiday in Russia, increasingly devoid of genuine emotion and intended to cultivate public acquiescence to Kremlin plans, such as Russia’s current war against Ukraine. According to Weiss-Wendt, In Putin’s Russia, obsession with the past comes in lieu of plans for the future. As a core memory, the Second World War is getting sanitized of all the blood and gore associated with a military conflict. . . . Hence, there emerges a generic historical picture framed by bravery and sacrifice. This quasi-religious interpretation fits well with so-called traditional values superimposed by the Orthodox Church.23

Not surprisingly, Putin’s cult of the Great Patriotic War has burnished Stalin’s reputation. In his first years in power, Putin acknowledged Stalin’s mistakes and crimes (e.g., his purges of party officials, the military, and the intelligentsia). During the glasnost era under Mikhail Gorbachev, Stalin’s

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public approval rating had fallen to 10 percent. By 2012, however, Putin had modified his position on Stalin, emphasizing his indispensable leadership in the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II. He inserted these views into the school curriculum.24 As a series of Levada Center opinion polls have shown, Stalin’s historical reputation with the Russian public has benefited. In 2012, 27 percent of participants thought the Stalin era had brought “more good than bad”; three years later, the figure had risen to 52 percent.25 Stalin’s approval rating hit a record high of 72 percent in April 2019.26 Even allowing for the need to view opinion polls with caution, the trend shows strong public acceptance of Putin’s narrative of an exceptional Russian state facing a hostile West and needing to rebuild its empire. For personalist autocrats or “spin dictators,” such as Putin and Viktor Orbán in Hungary, polls showing public approval for their policies connote legitimacy, and these dictators often evoke patriotic history to galvanize public support. Thus, in touting Stalin and associating his territorial expansion aims with Stalin’s imperialist policies in the 1930s–1940s, Putin can fabricate that his war against Ukraine is directed against Nazi sympathizers, similar to those who welcomed Hitler’s invaders in 1941. He can distort history and assert that Ukraine has no claim to be a state separate from Russia and impute that a straight line of autocratic rule runs from the tenth-century princes in Kyiv to the Kremlin today, an argument that ignores the democratic republics and powerful, independent aristocratic families that flourished in early Rus.27 In 2008, with his power secure and most Russians enjoying relative prosperity (a sharp turnaround from the 1990s), Putin adhered to the 1993 constitution, which barred a third consecutive term as president, and stepped aside to allow his prime minister, Dmitrii Medvedev, to run as United Russia’s presidential candidate. Many in Russia and the West, including the newly elected US president, Barack Obama, hoped that the younger, high-technology–oriented Medvedev would be more supportive of pro-democracy elements in Russia (such as nongovernmental organizations and environmental groups) and improve Russia’s relations with the West.28 However, it soon became evident that in his desire for a positive “reset” with Russia, Obama exaggerated Medvedev’s influence and failed to respect Putin’s dominant role as prime minister in the Kremlin—a position that became obvious in September 2011 when Putin announced that he would run for president in 2011 and Medvedev would return as his prime minister in a plan conceived in 2008. The announcement infuriated Russia’s younger voters and the urban intelligentsia, who had hoped that Medvedev would seek reelection as president. The extraordinary significance of Putin’s decision became clear when he returned as president in 2012 and embarked on a radical nationalistic course that revealed his intent to reconstruct the Russian empire at the risk of severing ties with the West—a course that many analysts at the time called Putin 2.0.

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What prompted Putin to embark on Putin 2.0? Some historians maintain that Putin’s expansionist ambitions were inspired by right-wing Eurasianist theories of the early twentieth century.29 However, the Arab Spring uprisings (2011), the Obama administration’s support for street demonstrators using social media to bring down dictators like Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, and the reverberations these events had for Russian politics in 2011–2012 were more critical in leading Putin to introduce a dictatorship on his return to the presidency in March 2012. First, the Arab protests triggered Putin’s reflex to crush spontaneous political protests, as he did in Dresden on December 9, 1989, when he threatened to shoot demonstrators who breached the local KGB compound.30 Second, once the United Nations endorsed a NATO bombing plan to overthrow Libyan despot Muammar Gaddafi (who was executed) in October 2011, a measure that the Russian delegation at the United Nations supported, Putin and his siloviki recognized that Medvedev had to go. He was too weak to stand up to the United States. Even worse, when massive protests erupted in Moscow and St. Petersburg over allegations of widespread voter fraud by United Russia in the Duma election of 2011 and the presidential election in 2012, Putin faulted Medvedev for engaging with the opposition rather than arresting them.31 He singled out US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for conspiring with protesters who demanded Putin’s resignation as president but offered no evidence to support his accusations. Instead, he pushed through a series of laws in 2012 that jailed prominent dissidents, intimidated human rights activists, restricted nongovernmental organizations, criminalized public actions of the LGBTQ community (more below), and expanded the definition of treason against the state.32 Putin’s March 4, 2012, rally in Moscow, celebrating his return to the presidency, provided a chilling preview of his pathway to dictatorship and imperial plans—his speech was filled with anti-Western, ultranationalistic rhetoric. Assessing Putin’s political evolution from 2011 to 2013, Dmitri Trenin in the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace told New York Times journalist Bill Keller that Putin was on a personal crusade to expose “Europe as decadent and alien to the Orthodox Christian, Eastern Slav world to which both Russia and Ukraine belong.”33 As detailed in the section below, since 2012, President Putin (reelected in 2018 to a second six-year term) has focused almost entirely on adding to his power base and fulfilling his imperial dreams, even to the point of comparing himself to Peter the Great in recovering Russia’s Ukrainian lands from foreign forces. According to Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar, “Putin’s seclusion and inaccessibility . . . and his decision to surround himself with ideologues and sycophants have all helped to bring Europe to its most dangerous moment since World War II.”34 The arrival of “little green men” to liberate Crimea in February 2014 and their role in launching a guerilla war in Donbas a month

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later has long been revealed to be a Kremlin operation orchestrated by Putin himself.35 Russia’s annexation of Crimea, following a rushed referendum in March 2014 involving most residents in the region, brought Putin to the peak of his popularity in Russia—89 percent of Russians polled in 2014 approved of Putin’s action. However, his subsequent military operations in Ukraine, the Syrian civil war (2015), and his talk of incorporating Belarus and other former Soviet states into a reconstituted Russian empire have generated much less enthusiasm in Russia.36 Indeed, it is telling that as Putin contemplates continuing in office beyond the end of his current term (2024)—an arrangement made possible by constitutional amendments he pushed through a public referendum in July 2020—his public approval rating in 2021 dropped to the lowest point of his tenure.37 INEQUALITY AND GOVERNANCE IN PUTIN’S DICTATORSHIP: VICTIMS UNDER SIEGE Putin’s rule in the past decade has centered on growing a Putin cult that in 2012 saw his image on display everywhere. At that point, his edicts became directives. His public relations chief in 2014 (Vyacheslav Volodin) simply quipped, “While Putin is there, so is Russia; once Putin is gone, so is Russia.”38 However, for most Russians, Putin’s dictatorship has also meant pervasive corruption and repression in governance and a widening wealth gap. Public protests over the end of free and fair elections in 2011–2012, the corruption of Putin’s elite and Russian law enforcement officials, and the elimination of elections to the judicial branch have defined Putin 2.0 and reminded the older generation of the pre-Gorbachev Soviet era.39 In 2012, Russia ranked near the bottom of the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index. It placed at number seventy-one out of ninety-seven countries on the “absence of corruption,” eighty-three on fundamental rights, and ninety-two on order and security.40 These grievances and the fraudulent nature of the elections in 2011–2012 produced the largest antigovernment protests in Russia since the end of the Soviet regime. As the opposition called for Putin’s resignation and the removal of his party of “swindlers and thieves,” the Kremlin retaliated with police raids on the homes of leftist activists and amendments to the Russian Penal Code that substantially broadened the definition of “high treason.”41 At the same time, the authorities increased the use of strategies of arresting dissidents for nonpolitical crimes and revolving-door detentions in hopes of isolating and demoralizing the opposition.42 The defining moments in the Kremlin’s repression of the democratic opposition were the assassination of Boris Nemtsov outside the Kremlin on February 27, 2015, and the arrest of Alexei Navalny on his return from

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Germany to Moscow on January 17, 2021. Nemtsov, a liberal deputy prime minister under Yeltsin and leader of the antiwar movement in Russia, was long a thorn in the Kremlin’s side. At the time of his assassination, he was writing a report that would expose Putin’s role in directing the separatists in eastern Ukraine—an allegation the Kremlin had repeatedly denied. On February 27, hours before his death, Nemtsov gave an interview to the Ekho Moskvy radio station that would force Russia Today talk-show host, Oksana Boyko, “to admit that Russian state television had fabricated much of its coverage of the early months of the Donbas conflict.”43 Six ethnic Chechens were ultimately convicted of Nemtsov’s murder, but who commissioned the act was never made public, and the Kremlin has worked to discredit Nemtsov’s reputation as a martyr for democracy.44 Navalny has represented an even greater threat since his leadership of the mass rallies against Putin in 2011–2012. His skill in using social media and appeal to the younger generation has rattled the Kremlin, especially after he received more than 30 percent of the vote in the Kremlin-controlled election for mayor of Moscow in 2013. In the spring of 2017, he embarrassed Putin and the siloviki by posting videos on his YouTube channel depicting their corruption and wealth. His video on the Putin Palace on the Black Sea (estimated cost of $956 million) was viewed more than 122 million times. A Levada Center poll showed that 55 percent of viewers were inclined to believe the claims made in the program.45 In August 2020, FSB agents poisoned Navalny on his trip to Siberia—he survived the attack and recovered in Germany, but before returning to Russia, he posed as a Russian security officer and duped one of the FSB agents involved in the botched plot into revealing details of the operation. He then broadcast the interview on his YouTube channel and mocked Putin as “Vladimir, the Poisoner of Underpants,” in a swipe at an autocrat who wishes to be equated to Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. At present, Navalny is serving a fifteen-year sentence in a Russian penal colony for crimes trumped up by the Kremlin.46 Putin’s regime has repressed other individuals and groups, in part because of their identification with secular Western values. The LGBTQ community since 2011–2012 has come under increasing attack from the government, the Russian Orthodox Church leadership, and homophobic Russians. In 2012, LGBTQ activists were victims of thirty-three hate crimes; by 2015, the number had risen to sixty-five. Of the 200 hate crimes against gays and lesbians officially registered from 2012 to 2015, 90 were murders.47 However, various Russian opinion polls show that the majority of respondents support the Kremlin’s policies in dismantling LGBTQ rights.48 The government has also in recent years introduced discriminatory legislation requiring migrant workers seeking employment in the Russian Federation to pass Russian-language entrance tests and decriminalizing

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domestic violence (2017) for first-time offenders in cases that do not cause serious injury to victims (the overwhelming number of whom are women).49 Since 2012, Putin, with the support of the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy, has pushed an agenda of masculinity and traditional family values. In the past decade, Russian women have experienced a 25 to 30 percent wage gap compared to their male counterparts and the indifference of law enforcement authorities in responding to their complaints of domestic abuse. In 2018 alone, 5,000 Russian women died at the hands of their abusers; indeed, one study found that 10 percent of global fatalities from domestic abuse occurred in Russia—a country that constitutes less than 2 percent of the world’s population.50 Following the passage of the 2017 legislation noted above, the number of domestic violence reports filed with Russian police declined by almost 50 percent. Nonetheless, since 2012, poll data show that there is no substantial gender gap in public approval ratings for Putin (Russian feminists, however, are outspoken in protesting Putin’s war against Ukraine).51 The outbreak of Putin’s war against Ukraine in February 2022 has led to even higher levels of indiscriminate repression. All independent Russian and all foreign media outlets are now shut down either by the Kremlin or by foreign news outlets leaving Russia. Russians who show any behavior that can be construed as against the war may now be prosecuted under a March 2022 law that carries a prison sentence of up to fifteen years; and on March 16, Putin called for a “self-purification” campaign encouraging Russians to “distinguish true patriots from scum and traitors and [to] simply spit them out like a fly that accidentally flew in their mouths.” Echoing the paranoia that gripped Soviet society under Stalin, Russians have begun to denounce their fellow citizens to the authorities.52 Besides living in a coercive state, nearly all Russians have suffered a decline in their standard of living that has wiped away the economic gains they made in the early 2000s. At the time Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, Russia was already on its way to becoming the world’s most unequal economy. In 2016, a Credit Suisse study revealed that the richest 1 percent of Russia’s population controlled 74.5 percent of the nation’s wealth, placing Russia far ahead of other highly ranked countries, such as India (58.4 percent), China (43.8 percent), and the United States (42.1 percent).53 The reasons for the concentration of immense wealth in so few hands include Putin’s redirection of the economy from private to state ownership (with the state’s share growing from around 25 percent in 2000 to 60 to 70 percent in 2019); the government’s emphasis on accumulating cash reserves as opposed to making long-term infrastructure investments, even in years with budget surpluses; and, most important, the cronyism and corruption embedded in the Putin system.54 According to Timothy Frye, CEOs who won a seat in their regional legislatures on average increased their company’s revenue by

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60 percent and their profitability by 15 percent during their term in office as opposed to CEOs who failed to win a seat and gain access to state contracts.55 Faced with a decline in global oil prices and the political protests of 2011–2012, Putin promised structural reforms when he returned as president in 2012 to jump-start the economy and remove barriers to growing businesses. He announced his twelve “May Decrees” (2012) that pledged to scale back state control of the economy, stimulate labor productivity, and raise investment to 27 percent of gross domestic product by 2020—all of which portended an increase in living standards, especially for the middle class. However, the promised reforms were never implemented, and instead of an annual growth rate of 6 percent from 2012 to 2018, the annual rate never exceeded 1 percent.56 In his presidential campaign in 2018, Putin again approved an amended plan for structural reforms that envisioned the creation of “national projects” to be funded by a combination of foreign and private Russian investments and additional tax revenue. Above all, funds were not to be taken from the State Treasury or from expenditures on new weapons systems to pay for the projects. As the World Cup soccer competition unfolded in Russia in June 2018, the Kremlin unveiled a proposal to reduce state pension payments by extending the age when men and women could retire and begin to draw pensions in order to eliminate the federal budget deficit. Overnight, thousands of people across the Russian Federation took to the streets to protest what they considered to be a backdoor effort by the Kremlin to breach the social contract and take payments guaranteed to them from Soviet times. Polls showed that only 9 percent of Russians supported the reforms, prompting Putin in the fall to scale back the plan to increase the mandatory retirement age. Nevertheless, Putin’s approval rating took a big hit: in a November 2018 Levada Center poll, 61 percent indicated that, in their view, Putin was fully accountable for the nation’s woes (another 22 percent held him partly accountable). Fed up with declining living standards and broken promises, Russians saw deferred retirement and reduced pensions as too much to stomach even under Putin.57 Putin’s current war against Ukraine has only widened the wealth gap in Russia. It is the area of his greatest political vulnerability. As the richest 1 percent of people have gotten wealthier in 2020–2022, the poverty rate stands at 14.2 percent (2021), with an additional 49 percent of people on the brink of falling into poverty.58 This imbalance may well account for Putin’s hesitancy to reimplement a national draft to fight the current war in Ukraine. From 2011 to 2016, more than 300,000 professionals and businesspeople left Russia—a veritable “brain drain”—and the outbreak of the war, according to data from the FSB, saw more than 3.8 million Russians leave their homeland between January 1 and March 31, 2022, among them the brightest young people (a small number has returned).59 Russia’s demographic prospects are

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bleak: the most optimistic Russian projections (made before the pandemic began) indicate that Russia’s population will decline from approximately 145 million this year to 130 million by 2050.60 Western sanctions imposed on Russia because of its invasion of Ukraine have Russia facing a 6 percent decline in gross domestic product for 2022 and have produced shortages of vital parts and technology previously imported from the West. The long-term impact is likely to bring Russians an economic misery comparable to the late Gorbachev era.61 As in much of the world, COVID-19 hit Russia hard. The pandemic was particularly lethal because Putin initially underestimated the dangers and showed little interest in taking urgent steps to contain the spread of the disease. His priority in the spring of 2020 was to achieve a revision of the constitution that would allow him, if he desires, to run for president in 2024. In public health, as in other areas, the coronavirus showed the weaknesses of Putin’s “vertical of power.” Confusion between central and regional authorities over the methodology to track the spread of COVID-19 and to allocate resources to physicians and hospitals resulted in infections and deaths that greatly exceeded the numbers reported by the government.62 Yet nowhere did the shortcomings of Putin’s management of the pandemic have more adverse consequences than in the Kremlin’s COVID vaccination efforts, which aroused much mistrust from Russian citizens. With great fanfare, Putin announced on August 11, 2020, that Russia had developed the world’s first vaccine for COVID-19 (Sputnik-V) and that one of his daughters was already vaccinated. Russians soon discovered that the vaccine was being administered without approval from any international agencies, such as the World Health Organization. A survey in August 2020 showed that only 38 percent of Russians were willing to get the Russian vaccine and that more than 50 percent thought it was not ready for use.63 The reservations in part stemmed from Russian conspiracy theorists and state media spreading disinformation about the adverse effects of Western-manufactured vaccines in trial runs. It did not help that Putin himself waited until March 2021 to get vaccinated behind closed doors. In spite of the Kremlin’s promotion of vaccination, which included threats to lay off unvaccinated people, as of May 5, 2022, only 55 percent of the Russian population had received even one dose of the vaccine.64 To many Russians, the government’s reliance on lockdowns, business closures, treatment of medical professionals as “cannon fodder,” and surveillance technologies to monitor compliance with COVID regulations (some people believed the real purpose of such technologies was to spy on political opponents) was an arbitrary and haphazard public health strategy. On July 1, 2022, the government scrapped all COVID restrictions, not wishing to hamper the Russian economy during war. Putin’s reluctance at the end of 2021 to back any more unpopular

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COVID measures being considered in the State Duma, including mandatory vaccination and pervasive use of QR codes—combined with his sagging poll ratings—likely shows that political considerations played no small role in the government’s announcement.65 As Russia’s war with Ukraine grinds on indefinitely, Putin looks increasingly like a ruler making a last stand rather than a leader opening a positive chapter in Russia’s history. In Ukraine, he faces a country determined to defend its democracy and ethnic history, led by a media-savvy young president, Volodymyr Zelensky, who has inspired his troops and the United States and NATO to push back against Putin’s dream of expanding Russia’s empire. Putin’s plan to score a quick victory and effect regime change in Ukraine failed, undermined by faulty Russian intelligence and a poorly trained and demoralized Russian army. Even worse, the war has badly damaged Russia’s reputation in the world. Not only have Finland and Sweden moved from neutrality to join NATO, but Russian atrocities in Mariupol and Bucha stamp Russia’s president and his generals as war criminals.66 Russia’s autocrats have historically relied on an endless supply of human capital and Russians’ willingness to defend the motherland against enemies to support their wars of expansion. But unlike Peter the Great, who went to war to open Russia up to economic and cultural opportunities provided by the West, Putin’s war is destroying the Russian economy and severely hurting his citizens in the long run. As Russian historian Boris Kipnis emphasizes, “Whatever the historical circumstances, if we abandon the path set by Peter I, we will ruin the country and the people. We are a European country.”67 Even with the expanding trade with China and India, Russia’s largest state bank predicts that, absent major reforms, Russia’s economy will need ten years to return to its 2021 level.68 Such grim prospects for the Russian people and his obsession with winning the war, whatever its cost, has put Putin on a precarious path, notwithstanding current state polls that show his approval ratings around 80 percent (younger Russians give him much lower ratings).69 Putin’s political base of elderly rural Russians nostalgic about the Soviet past is dying out. Russia’s military humiliations in Ukraine in early September 2022 have precipitated a cascading criticism of his leadership from far-right Russian bloggers with contacts at the front and stirred discord among his siloviki. Even allowing for Russia’s relative affluence among nations ruled by dictators, Putin’s twenty-two years of autocratic rule—with its corruption and repression, its weak political and judicial institutions, and its current isolation from the West—make Russia’s return to democracy highly improbable in the coming decade.70 Nor do Russia’s oligarchs, with their history of putting their material self-interest above the establishment of a sound constitution rooted in respect for human rights and the rule of law, offer much hope for a future

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democratic government once Putin leaves the scene. Is it any wonder that George Orwell’s 1984 has at present become a best-selling book in Russia?71 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  What led to Putin’s break with the West and his policies during Putin 2.0 (2012–2022)? 2.  What are Putin’s greatest assets and liabilities as Russia’s leader? Overall, have his years in power been good for Russia and Russians? 3.  Does Putin govern by a “social contract” with citizens of the Russian Federation? 4.  What do public opinion polls tell us about Putin’s effectiveness as a ruler? 5.  What constitutes the greatest obstacle to a future rebirth of democracy in Russia? NOTES 1. Stanislav Kucher, “‘Russkiy Mir’: What Putin’s Worldview Tells Us about the War in Ukraine, the Russian People and Himself,” Grid, July 7, 2022, https:​//​ flipboard​.com​/@gridnews. 2. “Putin Says He Could Send Police to Belarus if Necessary,” BBC News, August 27, 2020, https:​//​www​.bbc​.com; “Russian Intervention in Kazakhstan Risks ‘Destabilizing’ Ethnic Divides,” France 24, July 1, 2022, https:​//​www​.amp​.france 24.com. 3. On Putin’s view of himself as Russia’s “savior,” see Tatiana Stanovaya’s analysis, as noted in Joshua Yaffa, “How the Coronavirus Revealed the Hollowness of Putin’s ‘Vertical of Power,’” The New Yorker, May 26, 2020, https:​//​www​.thenewyorker​.com​ /news​/dispatch​/how​-the​-coronavirus​-revealed​-the​-hollowness​-of putins-vertical-ofpower; the concept of “personalist autocracy” is explained in Timothy Frye, Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021), 37–49. See also Pierre Hassner, “Russia’s Transition to Autocracy,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 2 (April 2008): 8–9. 4. On Putin’s geopolitical aim to restore Russia’s nineteenth-century empire and colonize non-Russian, non-Orthodox populations, see Steven Erlanger, “A Latter-Day Emperor Wages a War of ‘Recolonization,’” New York Times [hereafter NYT], March 17, 2022, A9. 5. Anton Troianovski, “Russian Official Calls Out War in a Fiery Exit,” NYT, May 24, 2022, A1, A8. The official in question was Boris Bondarev, former attaché at Russia’s UN mission in Geneva. Political scientist Daniel Treisman argues that Putin’s success in the past decade in silencing the domestic opposition has led him to indulge in more “grandiose international projects” in Ukraine. Daniel Treisman,

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“Putin Unbound: How Repression at Home Presaged Belligerence Abroad.” Foreign Affairs 101, no. 3 (May/June 2022): 52. 6. Timothy Snyder, “Why It Matters That Russia Is Fascist,” op-ed, NYT, May 22, 2002, 4. 7. On Putin’s KGB career and work as Sobchak’s chief deputy (1992–1996), see Steven Lee Myers, The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015), 33–103. On the importance of the siloviki to Putin, see Catherine Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020), 179–91. The “senior siloviki,” Putin’s strongest allies from the 1990s, consist of thirty or so men, each of whom has networks that extend their own power throughout Russian government and business. 8. Thomas S. Pearson, “The Erosion of Democracy in Post-Soviet Russia: A Model for Eurasia,” in Democracy in Crisis around the World, ed. Saliba Sarsar and Rekha Datta (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021), 194–95. On the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras (1985–1999), see Daniel Treisman, The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev (New York: Free Press, 2011). 9. Pearson, “The Erosion of Democracy in Post-Soviet Russia,” 194–95; Michael McFaul, “Russia’s Road to Autocracy,” Journal of Democracy 32, no. 4 (October 2021): 11–26, https:​//​www​.journalofdemocracy​.org​/articles​/russias​-road​-to​ -autocracy. Bush’s secretary of state, James Baker, who floated the pledge idea, later retracted it. 10. Quoted in Michael McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), 59–60. See also Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President, with Nataliya Gevorkyan, Nataliya Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 169. 11. Shaun Walker, The Long Hangover: Putin’s New Russia and the Ghosts of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 14; Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), 252–54. 12. Quoted from Frye, Weak Strongman, 23, 25–26. Putin’s “vertical of power”— deriving from central state control—looks much more systemic on paper than it functions in practice. 13. See Paul W. Werth, The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 260, and Julius Strauss, “Putin and the Muslim World,” The Spectator, March 20, 2022, https:​ //​www​.spectator​.co​.uk​/putin​-and​-the​-muslim​-world. 14. Belton, Putin’s People, 189. 15. Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2022), 195; Frye, Weak Strongman, 33–34, 88–89. 16. See the comments of Putin’s former confidant, Sergei Pugachev, in Myers, The New Tsar, 202. A study by Samuel Greene and Graeme Robertson, based on a Levada Center poll (2014), indicates that the majority of Russians, especially older Russians, get their news from Kremlin-controlled television channels; this also allows the state to instill “a lying world of consistency” in their viewers. The phrase comes

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from Hannah Arendt; see Samuel A. Greene and Graeme B. Robertson, Putin v. the People: The Perilous Politics of a Divided Russia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019), 106. 17. Pearson, “The Erosion of Democracy,” 196–97. On Putin’s war against the Chechens and subsequent rule through his ruthless vassal, Ramzan Kadryov, see Walker, The Long Hangover, 43–64. 18. For Lipman’s views, see Isaac Chotiner, “Putin Has a Patriotism Problem,” The New Yorker, June 8, 2022, https:​//​putin​-has​-a​-patriotism problem. 19. Angela Stent, Putin’s World: Russia against the West and with the Rest (New York: Twelve, 2019), 159–63, 293–95. In 2006–2008, numerous Russian experts in the Bush administration, most notably Fiona Hill, warned Bush that any talk of NATO expansion to include Ukraine and Georgia would trigger a hostile response from Moscow and likely upend Russian–American relations. NATO and the United States decided in 2007–2008 to put the membership question for Ukraine and Georgia on an indefinite hold—an outcome that ultimately satisfied none of the parties. See Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 260–61. 20. Biographer Philip Short attributes Putin’s turn from the West to an emphasis on the “national idea” in 2008 to the influence of the siloviki and cultural leaders like Nikita Mikhalkov, who won an Academy Award for his 1994 film Burnt by the Sun. Mikhalkov is a Russian Orthodox ultranationalist who (like Ivan Ilyin, a White Russian exile who was anti-Semitic and initially believed Hitler would save Europe from Bolshevism) favors the restoration of the Russian empire ruled by a strong autocrat. Philip Short, Putin (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2022), 439–47. 21. Anton Weiss-Wendt, Putin’s Russia and the Falsification of History: Reasserting Control over the Past (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021), 89, 93–94. 22. Compare Ellen Barry, “Russian President Reaches Out to Nation’s World War II Allies,” NYT, May 10, 2011, A4, with Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Looks to Its Victory, Not Old Allies—A Parade of Might to Mark War’s End,” NYT, May 8, 2015, A4, A6, and Shaun Walker, “How Victory Day Became Central to Putin’s Idea of Russian Identity,” The Guardian, May 6, 2022, https:​//​www​.theguardian​.com​/2022​/05​/06​/how​ -victory​-became​-central​-to​-putins​-idea​-of​-russian​-identity. 23. Quoted from Weiss-Wendt, Putin’s Russia and the Falsification of History, 2. 24. Leonid Bershidsky, “Russian Schools to Teach Putin’s Version of History,” BloombergView, June 18, 2013, https:​//​www​.bloombergview​.com​/articles​/2013​-06​ -18​/russian​-schools​-to​-teach​-putins​-version​-of​-history. 25. The figures are cited in Alec Luhn, “Stalin, Russia’s New Hero,” op-ed, NYT, March 13, 2016, SR 7. A contributing factor in Stalin’s rise in popularity is the ignorance of Russian respondents eighteen to twenty-four years of age of Soviet history and the Stalin era in particular. A Kremlin poll conducted in October 2018 revealed that 47 percent of respondents were unaware of Stalinist repressions. See “Half of Russian Youth Say They’re Unaware of Stalinist repressions—Poll,” The Moscow Times [hereafter MT], October 5, 2018, https:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​.com​/2018​/10​ /05​/half​-russian​-youth​-say​-theyre​-unaware​-of​-stalinist​-repressions​-poll.

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26. “Stalin’s Approval Rating among Russians Hits Record High—Poll,” MT, April 16, 2019, http:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​.com​/2019​/04​/16​/stalins​-approval​-rating​ -among​-russians​-hits​-record​-high​-poll. 27. On the importance of public opinion polls to Putin and other “personalist autocrats”/“spin dictators,” see Frye, Weak Strongman, 37–41; and Guriev and Treisman, Spin Dictators, 5, 19–29, 37–40, 75–77, 121–32. On Putin’s interpretation of Ukrainian history, see Weiss-Wendt, Putin’s Russia and the Falsification of History, 83–87. Putin’s attack on Ukraine is a direct violation of Russia’s 1994 treaty with Ukraine and its agreement to respect Ukraine’s independent status. 28. See McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace, 102–8, and Short, Putin, 472. 29. On Putin’s strained relations with the West from 2012 on, see Stent, Putin’s World, 3, 61–65, 138, 311–43. Stent emphasizes that Putin supported Donald Trump in 2016 to discredit Hillary Clinton’s campaign for US president. On Putin’s attraction to “Eurasian” theories, see the analysis of Jane Burbank, who contends that his views draw heavily on the writings of Lev Gumilyov (1912–1992) that circulated in the late 1980s and of Alexander Dugin, who argued in 1997 that the Atlantic world, led by the United States, was the impediment to Russia’s manifest destiny—an Orthodox empire. Jane Burbank, “The Grand Theory Driving Putin to War,” op-ed, NYT, March 22, 2022, A25. 30. Myers, The New Tsar, 51. 31. McFaul, “Russia’s Road to Autocracy”; Mikhail Zygar, “The Once and Future King,” Time, April 2, 2018, 38. 32. “Six of President Putin’s Most Oppressive Laws,” Amnesty USA, September 5, 2013, https:​ / /​ w ww​ . amnestyusa ​ . org ​ / 6 ​ - of ​ - president ​ - vladimir putins-most-oppressive-laws. 33. Trenin is quoted in Bill Keller, “Russia vs. Europe,” op-ed, NYT, December 16, 2013, A25 (emphasis added). 34. Quoted from Mikhail Zygar, “No Man Is an Island, Except Putin,” opinion, NYT, March 13, 2022, SR 2. 35. Neil MacFarquhar, “Early Memo Urged Moscow to Annex Crimea, Report Says,” NYT, February 26, 2015, A4. 36. Frye, Weak Strongman, 52; Greene and Robertson, Putin v. the People, 120. 37. See Guriev and Treisman, Spin Dictators, 127–28, and McFaul, “Russia’s Road to Autocracy,” who notes that in a July 2021 poll, only 31 percent of respondents listed Putin when asked which public figures they trusted the most. 38. The quote is found in Gleb Pavlovsky, “Russian Politics under Putin,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 3 (May–June 2016): 10. Pavlovsky is a former Putin confidant. 39. McFaul, “Russia’s Road to Autocracy.” 40. “Russia Near the Bottom in Rule of Law Index 2012,” RIA Novosti, November 28, 2012, http:​//​en​.rian​.ru​/russia​/20121128​/177802781​.html; “The Fight against Corruption as a New Year’s Present,” Institute of Modern Russia, December 26, 2012, http:​//​imrussia​.org​/en​/rule​-of​-law​/357​-the​-fight​-against​-corruption​-as​-a​-new​-years​ -present​?html. 41. “Russian Police Raid Homes of Leftist Activists,” The Moscow News, May 23, 2013, http:​//​www​.themoscownews​.com​/news​/20130523​/191538478​/russian​-police​

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-raid​-the​-homes​-of​-leftist activists.html; Institute of Modern Russia, “The Return of Stalinist “Justice,’” October 6, 2012, http:​//​imrussia​.org​/en​/rule​-of​-law​/312​-the return-of-stalinist-justice. 42. Guriev and Treisman, Spin Dictators, 51–53. 43. Greene and Robertson, Putin v. the People, 159–66. 44. “Russian Opposition Parties Combine Forces after Nemtsov Killing,” MT, April 18, 2015, http:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​.com​/article​.php​?id+519320; Andrew W. Kramer, “Putin Foe’s Work on Russian Role in Ukraine Sees the Light of Day,” NYT, May 13, 2015, A4. 45. “The Dissident,” Time, January 31–February 7, 2022, 36–41; Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin (New York: Public Affairs, 2016), 207–21. 46. Aleksei Navalny, “It’s the Duty of Every Person to Defy You,” Navalny’s speech in Moscow courtroom on Tuesday, February 2, 2021, transcribed and translated in NYT, February 4, 2021, A23. 47. Greene and Robertson, Putin v. the People, 37, 144–45. 48. Ibid., 36–38; Elene Kurtanidze, “Dismantling LGBT+ Rights as a Means of Control in Russia,” Freedom House Perspectives, April 30, 2021, https:​//​freedomhouse​ .org​/article​/dismantling​-lgbt​-rights​-means​-control​-russia; “LGBT Rights in Russia,” https:​//​www​.equaldex​.com​/region​/russia. 49. See Nina Rozhanovskaya and Victoria Pardini, “The Status of Women in Russian Society—Conference Report,” Wilson Center, Kennan Institute, Washington, DC, 9–10. 50. Kay Rollins, “Putin’s Other War: Domestic Violence, Traditional Values, and Masculinity in Modern Russia,” Harvard International Review, August 5, 2022, https:​ //​hir​.edu​/pitins​-other​-war. On the gender pay gap in Russia, see Brooklyn Quallen, “5 Facts about Women’s Rights in Russia,” The Borgen Project, October 30, 2020, https:​ //​borgenproject​.org​/womens​-rights​-in​-russia. 51. Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, “Russian Public Opinion: Putin Praised, West Panned,” Pew Research Center, June 10, 2015, https:​//​www​ .pewresearch​.org​/global​/2015​/06​/10​/2​-russian​-public- opinion-putin-praised-westpanned. On the Russian feminists’ opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, see “Russian Feminists’ Manifesto against Putin’s War,” Workers’ Liberty, March 7, 2022, https:​//​www​.workersliberty​.org​/story​/2022​-03​-07​/russian​-feminists​-manifesto​ -against​-putins​-war. 52. Anton Troianovski, “Putin, Rooting Out War Critics, Turns Russians against Russians,” NYT, April 10, 2022, A1, A6. 53. “All the World’s Most Unequal Countries Revealed in One Chart,” The Independent, November 23, 2016, https:​//​www​.independent​.co​/uk​/news​/world​/politics​/ credit​-suisse​-global​-wealth​-world​-most​-unequal​-countries​-revealed​-a7434431​,html; see also “Russia Named World’s Most Unequal Economy,” MT, October 22, 2019, https:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​.com​/2019​/10​/22​/russia​-named​-worlds​-most​-unequal​ -economy. 54. Joshua Yaffa, Between Two Fires: Truth, Ambition, and Compromise in Putin’s Russia (London: Granata Publications, 2021), 317; Nick Trickett, “The Russian

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Economy: Failing to Plan, Planning to Fail,” MT, August 17, 2022, https:​//​www​ .themoscowtimes​.com​/2022​/08​/17​/the​-russian​-economy​-failing​-to​-plan​-planning​-to​ -fail​-a78592. 55. Frye, Weak Strongman, 97. 56. Sergei Guriev, “20 Years of Vladimir Putin: The Transformation of the Economy,” MT, August 16, 2019, https:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​.com​/2019​/08​/16​/20​-years​ -of​-vladimir​-putin​-the​-transformation​-of​-the​-economy​-a66854. 57. See “Majority of Russians Hold Putin Responsible for National Woes, Poll Says,” MT, November 22, 2018, and “Disapproval with Country’s Course Hits 12-Year High in Russia-Poll,” MT, February 1, 2019, https:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​ .com​/2019​/02​/01​-disapproval​-with​-country’s​-course​-hits​-12​-year​-high​-in​-russia. On Putin’s broken social contract with Russians, see Anders Aslund, Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019), 92. 58. “Pandemic Boosted Fortunes of Country’s Wealthiest, While Knocking Living Standards of the Poorest,” MT, June 10, 2021, https:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​.com​ /2021​/06​/10​-russias​-500​-super​-rich​-wealthier​-than​-poorest​-99​.8%; see also Farida Rustamova, “Putin Rules His Nation Like a Psychiatric Ward,” NYT, May 25, 2022, A23. 59. Sergei Guriev, “Russia’s Constrained Economy: How the Kremlin Can Spur Growth,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 3 (May–June 2016): 19; “Nearly 4M Russians Left Russia in Early 2022—FSB,” MT, May 6, 2022, https:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​.com​ /2022​/05​/06​-nearly​-4m​-russians​-left​-russia​-in​-early​-2022​-fsb. 60. Roxanne Easley, Mark Davis Kuss, and Thomas Pearson, Modern Russian History: The Search for National Identity and Global Power (San Diego, CA: Cognella, 2021), 315. 61. “Kremlin Makes Push to Bolster Economy as Sanctions Take Toll,” NYT, May 27, 2022, A1, A7. 62. In May 2022, the Russian government reported that approximately 320,000 Russians had died of COVID; however, excess mortality rates (using World Health Organization data from 2019 as a benchmark) indicated that Russia’s pandemic deaths were closer to 1,072,000. See “Where Death Rates Rose Most in Pandemic,” NYT, May 30, 2022, A6–A7, and Frye, Weak Strongman, 93. 63. “Novost’ o sozdanii vaktsiny ot koronavirusa u 46 rossiyan vyzvala negativnye emotsii,” Levada Center, August 28, 2020, https:​//​www​.levada​.ru​/2020​/08​/28​/novost​ -o​-sozdanii​-vaktsiny​-ot​-koronavirusa​-u​-46​-rossiyan​-vyzvala​-negativnye​-emotsii. 64. Vaktsina Stopkoronavirus, https:​//​vaktsina​.stopkoronavirus​.rf; Aleksey Kovalev, “The Pandemic Is Beating Putin,” opinion, NYT, December 9, 2021, A28. 65. “Russia Scraps Remaining COVID Restrictions,” Reuters, July 1, 2022; “Russia Faces Up to Huge Covid Death Toll and Vaccine Skepticism,” MT, December 25, 2021, https:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​.com​/2021​/12​/25​/russia​-faces​-up​-to​-huge​-covid​ -death​-toll​-and​-vaccine​-skepticism​-a75867; see also “Why Russia Hasn’t Cracked Down on COVID-19,” The New Yorker, dispatch, November 23, 2021, https:​//​www​ .thenewyorker​.com​/news​/dispatch​/why​-russia​-hasnt​-cracked​-down​-on​-covid​-19.

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66. Neil MacFarquhar, “In State News, Clash of Civilizations.” NYT, August 22, 2022, A1, A6. Officials in the United States estimate that as of August 22, 2022, 20,000 Russian troops have perished in the war. So far, the Kremlin has acknowledged only 1,351 deaths. 67. “Isolated Russia Celebrates Tsar Who Opened ‘Window to Europe,’” MT, June 9, 2022, https:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​.com​/isolated​-russia​-celebrates​-tsar​-who​ -opened​-window​-to​-europe​.html. 68. “Russian Economy Faces 10 Years of Recession without Reforms—Sberbank CEO,” MT, June 17, 2022, https:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​.com​/russian​-economy​-faces​ -10​-years​-of​-recession​-without​-reforms​.html. 69. Oleg Kashin, “Why No One Is Willing to Get Rid of Putin,” opinion, NYT, August 21, 2022, 10. 70. See Frye, Weak Strongman, 90–96; Anton Troianovski, “Stunned Moscow Admits to Losing Most of Kharkiv: Retreat Dents Image of a Mighty Putin,” NYT, September 12, 2022, A1, A11; and Yevgeniia Albats, “Six Months of War: What Putin Wanted: What Putin Got,” MT, September 1, 2022, https:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​ .com​/six​-months​-of​-war​-what​-putin​-wanted​-what​-putin​-got. 71. “Explainer: How Orwell’s ‘1984’ Looms Large in Wartime Russia,” MT, May 25, 2022, https:​//​www​.themoscowtimes​.com​/2022​/05​/25​/explainer​-why​-orwells​ -1984​-looms​-large​-in​-putins​-russia​-a77780.

Chapter 7

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Policy Choices in Eastern Europe Kevin L. Dooley

Most of the literature in public policy related to the COVID-19 pandemic examines health protocols—that is, the way that states protected health care workers; tested, contact traced, and established masking and social distancing protocols; and treated and vaccinated their populations. However, evidence is emerging that COVID-19 has also impacted non–health-related policies. As governments embraced emergency powers to combat a global pandemic, some of them took the opportunity to pass laws that increased their political power, undermined the rule of law, and upended basic human rights. Although this type of behavior is not unique to any region, it is more prevalent in states where democratic institutions are frail. This is the situation in much of Eastern Europe, a region plagued by political corruption, democratic backsliding, challenges to the rule of law, and, most recently, war. The promise of democracy, ushered in after decades of authoritarian rule, has evaporated. The region has experienced uneven economic development, violations of basic freedoms, increased levels of political corruption, a global pandemic, and (as of this writing) a war with Russia. According to Freedom House, the majority of the states in Eastern Europe are less democratic today than they were in 1995, the first year its “Nations in Transit” report was introduced. This decline has resulted in not only a wave of nationalist-populist parties but also a weakening of democratic institutions, civil liberties, and overall trust in government. Eastern Europe is currently standing at the crossroads of democracy. COVID-19 has impacted the lives of its citizens and empowered many of its governments to further restrict civil liberties. Its states continue to struggle with issues of transparency and corruption as its borders swell with refugees from war-torn Ukraine. 159

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Since the continued presence of populism and democratic decline are of interest to this volume, the chapter will focus on where populism has advanced (Hungary and Poland) and how this continues to threaten liberal democracy and the rule of law. Although the geographic and economic diversity of Eastern Europe has made comparative analyses a challenge, COVID-19 has allowed scholars to determine policies in the presence of a similar challenge, that is, a debilitating, infectious disease. At the center of much of the controversy is the idea of democracy itself. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán famously quipped that Hungary is no longer a liberal democracy but an illiberal one. Through this pronouncement, he made the claim that his government had created a system that allows for elections but that has limitations on the freedoms and rights found in traditional liberal democracies. For example, an illiberal government is considered one that sees political power vested in the hands of an overwhelmingly popular and elected party (Fidesz [Alliance of Young Democrats]) while simultaneously restricting the fundamental rights of its citizens and noncitizens. It is a system that holds elections and seats governments but that also rejects forms of protest on the grounds that majority rule trumps minority protections or civil disobedience. The chapter will begin with an overview of the region to provide a portrait of its diversity and its continued struggle with democracy. It will then look at two of the states—Poland and Hungary—that have used the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to further their agenda. The story of contemporary Eastern Europe began with the implosion of the Soviet Union and the establishment of free market economics. Hungary’s democratic trajectory began with a much younger Viktor Orbán proclaiming the virtues of liberal democracy as the path that Hungarians must take. His center-left party Fidesz, which he started in 1988, was able to gain seats in the 1990 parliamentary elections. Fidesz, the symbol of youthful opposition (its members had to be younger than age thirty-five), charted its path as the antagonist of the status quo. In its early years, Fidesz was neither nationalist nor socialist. However, by the mid-1990s, an ideological divide emerged among Fidesz party leaders that was exacerbated by its poor performance in the 1994 election. The Fidesz of today grew out of this split. At the end of the decade, Fidesz, with Orbán at its helm, blazed a distinct path that had little in common with its ideology of the late 1980s. Orbán recognized that nationalism was the fuel that could vault Fidesz to dominate Hungarian politics. Nationalist views, which were outlawed during the Soviet days, had grown in favor among Hungarians by the start of the twenty-first century. In addition, Hungarian socialists, particularly the Socialist Party, had begun to lose its grip on power and had been crippled by corruption. Orbán seized on these failures and branded Fidesz as the harbinger of Hungarian values: values

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defined as Catholic, anti-European, and family centered. In 2010, Fidesz took control of the Hungarian National Assembly and has been able to remain in control ever since. What has become apparent over the past decade is the merging of Orbán and Fidesz. He is no longer simply the leader of a political party but the embodiment of everything it stands for. Orbán’s popularity has given him the ability to change Fidesz’s messaging and ideological belief system to advance his goals. His rule has impacted the future of Hungary because few can understand Hungarian politics without him. He has left an indelible mark on the legislature, how media are consumed, and how civil rights are enunciated. In Poland, the situation emerged differently. The ruling Law and Justice Party was established in 2001 by Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczyński as a conservative, pro-market party. However, soon after joining the European Union (EU), it became more protectionist. The leadership of Law and Justice saw that its power and popularity would benefit from its opposition to the EU. Defining the EU as a supranational state, powerful enough to shape the economic development and political character of its member states, Law and Justice became the defender of the Poland’s aging, deeply Catholic, rural poor. In 2015, Law and Justice solidified its place as the dominant party in the Sejm (lower house), having received the largest percentage of seats since the end of the Soviet Union. This political power has expanded its political reach, as it has now created some of the strictest socially conservative policies in all the EU. However, unlike Fidesz, Law and Justice’s power comes not from a charismatic leader but from a semi-presidential system that affords the leading political party with the ability to impact not only laws but also the constitutionality of said laws. Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal (high court) consists of fifteen members chosen by the Sejm for single nine-year terms. In 2015, Law and Justice was able to add five new members to the Tribunal, thus underscoring its power in Polish politics. Since then, the Labor and Justice Party has been engaged in an ideological struggle with the EU, taking many of its populist cues from Hungary’s Fidesz. And like Fidesz, it has been able to remain in power since taking power in the middle of the 2010s. But will Fidesz and Law and Justice be able to remain in power? For now, the answer seems to be yes. On April 3, 2022, Hungarians took to the polls and gave Fidesz another governing mandate. Orbán spent the campaign vilifying the EU, elites at financial institutions, and the peoples of Western Europe for tainting Hungarian values. For him, it was a simple choice: a vote for Fidesz was a vote for Budapest; a vote for his opponents was a vote for Brussels. As simplistic as this narrative was, it worked. Fidesz gained a supermajority in the legislature (135 of 199 seats) and its third in the country’s last four elections. In Poland, the ruling Law and Justice coalition (PiS) has also ensured its legislative dominance

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by undermining the principle of checks and balances through its control of the courts. The PiS not only chooses and trains judges but also has begun to solicit “inspectors . . . to investigate any judge that may oppose its political agenda.” There has been a wave of populist parties in Eastern Europe, and their power has only increased during the COVID-19 era. Populist leaders have enhanced their electoral chances, strengthened their legislative control, and exported an anti-globalization, anti-EU, and anti-immigrant worldview to the rest of the states in the region. Populism in Eastern Europe in the guise of what Orbán famously referred to as “illiberal democracy” is portrayed by its supporters as a viable alternative to liberal democracy. The continued dominance of Fidesz and the Law and Justice coalitions are troubling, but the situation is worsened by the fact that Hungary and Poland were once considered the liberal exemplars of the region, having led the way toward EU accession in 2004. Hungary and Poland were the hopes of the former communist bloc and heralded as models for political and economic inclusion. Now they seem to be backsliding. BACKGROUND ON EASTERN EUROPE “In Eastern Europe, the past is not only always hovering over the present, it is not even passed. It waits, like some malevolent caged beast, ready at any moment to escape and bring back all the horrors.”1 Michael Korda’s graphic description demonstrates the anxiety that still permeates the political culture of Eastern Europe. Since the region became free from the grip of communism in the early 1990s, it has perpetually dealt with corruption, scandal, the violation of civil rights, and the reality of a return to authoritarianism. Its democratic decline plays into this narrative and forces its people into a sense of hopelessness. “Of the ten states that make up Eastern Europe, only the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania rank in the top fifty of the world’s happiest countries. The six other Eastern European states range between Hungary (52) and Ukraine (108).”2 The United Nations considers Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine as the states of Eastern Europe. Therefore, this section will focus primarily on these states. Some scholars have placed the Baltic states, as well as those in the former Yugoslavia, within what is considered Eastern Europe, but for purposes of the present study, I prefer to use the UN designation. If all the states that were once considered part of Eastern Europe were analyzed, the chapter would not be able to provide an accurate depiction of the region. It would run the risk of being overgeneralized. The UN designation allows for a more comprehensive, comparative analysis.

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In 1991, following the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, the aforementioned states were placed on a path of free markets and fair and free elections. These twin aspirations resulted in an uneven distribution of resources and levels of democracy. The economic growth and institution building that took place in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in the 1990s were far greater than in the other Eastern European republics. These three states were able to adjust to market pressures and establish high levels of democratic indicators within a few years of gaining their independence. Unfortunately, much of Eastern Europe experienced massive traumas while moving toward capitalism. Ukraine, for example, has been consistently ranked by Freedom House as “partly free” with one of the lowest rankings for transparency in government. Political corruption at the highest levels has led to numerous nationwide protests with citizens proclaiming that elections are neither fair nor free. In addition, members of the Ukrainian and international press are routinely threatened with physical violence. “The independent Institute of Mass Information recorded 205 media-freedom violations in 2020, including 19 cases of physical violence, 11 cyberattacks, 111 incidents of interference, 18 incidents of threats, 17 cases of restricting access to public information, and 2 cases of direct censorship.” The situation in Bulgaria and Romania, other emerging democracies in the region, is similar. Although Bulgaria and Romania have relatively fair and free elections and have been successful in developing a wide array of competitive political parties, corruption is endemic, and bribery of public officials is common. Government corruption and a vibrant black market—both commonly found in the days of the Soviet Union—had been weakened following its collapse. However, after the financial crisis of 2012 as well as the impact of COVID-19, certain states have seen increases in organized crime and black market operations. As states were unable to obtain goods and services as readily as they once had, a new system of corruption fueled in part by the establishment of wealthy elites, commonly referred to as “oligarchs,” emerged. States that were able to adopt constitutional safeguards against corruption or the monopolization of industries were generally more successful in creating democratic institutions, a protection of rights, and a general sense of approval among their citizens. When one examines the trajectory of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, all three successfully tempered market reforms by establishing a limited number of representative political parties, holding successive fair and free elections, and, most important, constitutionally protecting democratic institutions, that is, well-organized legislatures, executives, and federal courts. Black market operations are thus found in places that lack strong institutions, government transparency, and economic development. During the

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initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, when medical supplies were in demand, Romania’s black market began diverting masks away from hospitals intended for patients and health care professionals and manufacturing and distributing “counterfeit European quality and safety certificates.”3 Since many of the goods were stolen, they thus lacked the appropriate certifications required for sale and distribution. Organized crime networks stepped in and are still prevalent in many Eastern European states because the governments are unable to provide the types of services that the citizens have come to expect. Corruption and the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic were the main issues leading up to the April 2021 parliamentary elections in Bulgaria.4 Bulgaria, the poorest EU member state, was ravaged by COVID-19, and its governing coalition was both blamed for its poor response and challenged by several far-right parties that denied the disease’s lethality while criticizing the leadership for its late masking and lockdown strategies. What made matters worse was that the leadership of the governing coalition was embroiled in a corruption scandal that forced the former prime minister to be detained by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office for his alleged role in a blackmail and tax evasion scheme.5 Although the charges were eventually dropped, the center-right GERB Party lost its governing coalition, and as a result, a new radical right-wing party, Vazrazhdane (Revival), gained seats in the country’s parliament.6 Poverty and corruption are thus endemic in many places in the region, and the COVID-19 pandemic has only worsened the situation. A recent study has determined that the “effects of lockdown and social distancing” in Southern and Eastern Europe have had a more negative effect than their peer states in Central and Northern Europe.7 Because many of the states of Eastern Europe lack the technology and economic structure to allow for employees to telecommute, they were forced to keep their economies somewhat open during 2020–2021 and as a result witnessed surges in hospitalizations and deaths. A lack of economic strength amidst weak institutions generated a perfect storm for corruption and inequality from which most have yet to recover. These factors demonstrate a correlation between poverty, COVID-19, and corruption. It is no accident, then, that the poorest countries in Eastern Europe—Ukraine and Moldova—faced such high levels of corruption as well as the highest numbers of COVID-19 hospitalizations and fatalities. Furthermore, the states of Eastern Europe are also having to deal with a surge of refugees who have been displaced due to the war in Ukraine. As of the writing of this chapter, more than 5.2 million refugees have fled Ukraine.8 Although many refugees have found their way to EU countries (e.g., Germany has more than 780,000 Ukrainian refugees), the states of Eastern Europe have accepted the greatest burden. Poland, for example, has

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taken in almost 1.2 million refugees.9 The uncertainty of the war’s outcome in the presence of states that have struggled to grow their economies could potentially worsen weak institutions and/or strengthen political parties that seek division instead of unity. COVID-19 AND THE RADICAL RIGHT: THE RECENT EXPERIENCES OF HUNGARY AND POLAND COVID-19 has exacerbated economic inequalities within Eastern Europe. Its transmissibility and lethality overburdened systemically corrupt institutions and led to increases in black market operations, political scandals, and radical political parties. However, there are differences between those Eastern European states that are members of the EU and those that are not. Ironically, two of the most established Eastern European states—Hungary and Poland— have seen their radical right-wing political parties use COVID-19 as a way of enhancing their already strong political control. The chaos that led to the collapse of certain parties in the region was used by the ruling parties in Hungary and Poland to their electoral and political advantage. This was a measure employed that was not available to the poorer states in the region. In this sense, COVID-19 helped politically stable states with radical right-wing governing parties gain more political power and influence. The following section will analyze the relationship between COVID-19 and the enhancement of right-wing policies in Hungary and Poland. Hungary: COVID and the Continued Dominance of Fidesz Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán rose to prominence during the tumultuous 1990s and solidified his role as the ultimate political outsider. His long hair, unshaven countenance, and nontraditional attire made him the antithesis of every politician Hungarians had ever seen. Orbán and his cohorts in Fidesz signaled a future for Hungary that was free, equal, and young, three qualities that were absent throughout most of Hungary’s history. Orbán’s political ambitions, however, changed in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The scorn of his political message—the communists/ socialists of yesteryear—were replaced by a new target: liberal globalists and their supporters in the West. Orbán no longer placed the Cold War and its central planners in Budapest as his antagonists. Orbán’s power now stems from his ability to connect international banks and capital markets to liberal Western values and package them as the main culprits of the financial uncertainties of twenty-first-century Hungary. Orbán’s solution is a brand

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of populism that is based on his belief that democracy does not need to be “liberal” to be successful. It is a hybrid of hyper-nationalism and religious traditionalism. For Hungary to be successful, it must place Hungarian identity above all else. This has been Orbán’s message, and it has resonated throughout the country since he and Fidesz came to power. Fidesz’s coalition has ruled the country for more than a decade and has consolidated power in the legislature by reducing the number of overall seats, making electoral districts more favorable to Fidesz while passing legislation that is at odds with traditional liberal democracies. The protection of minority rights—the bulwark of the evolution of democracy since the end of World War II in the West—is not seen as necessary for its Hungarian variant. Minority rights (including those of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community), freedom of the press, and the right to dissent have all come under attack under the Orbán regime. Most recently, Fidesz has used COVID-19 to further crack down on political dissent and those who seek to challenge its authority. In March 2020, the Hungarian parliament passed a series of laws designed to limit what the government termed “false information.” As a result of such measures Hungarian journalists were barred from speaking to health care workers and hospital administrators. If an independent journalist violated the law, he or she could face up to five years in prison.10 State-run media depicted a government that was very much in control of the early days of the pandemic, while independent journalists provided a conflicting narrative. The Orbán administration’s handling of the early days of the pandemic was catastrophic. After a year of the pandemic, more Hungarians succumbed to COVID-19 than almost every other country in Central Europe.11 “In an open letter published by most of the country’s independent news outlets (in March 2020) reporters said they had been blocked from hospitals and barred from speaking to medics, making it impossible to alert the public to the crisis.”12 This type of intimidation continues to this day. On May 3, 2022, a new legal order was submitted to the Hungarian parliament “empowering the government to declare a state of emergency in the ‘event of an armed conflict war, or humanitarian catastrophe in a neighboring country.’”13 This was Orbán’s way of taking advantage of the war in Ukraine and further expanding his control (Orbán is also the only head of state in the EU not to condemn Putin’s actions in Ukraine). This “emergency measure,” which resulted in a change to the Hungarian constitution’s Tenth Amendment, is designed to provide cover for further restrictions on speech. Since Fidesz controls a majority of the seats in parliament, there is little that the opposition parties or the Hungarian Constitutional Court can do. Over the past eight years, Hungary has dropped twenty-five places in the World Press Freedom Index and, as of this writing, is ranked eighty-ninth out of 180 countries.14 Much of this has to do with the government’s takeover of much of Hungary’s

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private media outlets. According to Reporters Without Borders, “Fidesz has de-facto control of 80% of the country’s media through political-economic maneuvers and the purchase of news organizations by friendly oligarchs.”15 Twenty years ago, it would have been unimaginable for the Hungarian government to attempt to arrest and prosecute independent journalists. But today’s Hungary is a much different place than the state that was one of the first in the region to gain accession into the EU. Today’s Hungary is a populist-driven state that is rewriting democratic norms. As a result of this changing landscape, the number of independent journalists has dropped. This decline has forced many media outlets to seek alternative funding for its journalists. “Many introduced crowdfunding campaigns and paywalls . . . and produced content in a variety of formats such as podcast and videos.”16 This has therefore changed the overall nature of the media. It has forced interested consumers of information into a choice: pay for news from independent journalists or rely on the government-controlled media. This is not an ideal arrangement because placing a price tag on independent journalism is not sustainable. Furthermore, just as the number of independent journalists has fallen, so too has the number of citizens who might at one time have cared about this loss. For the most part, Hungarians seem to support such actions—partly because of the state-driven media misinformation campaign—and partly because of Orbán’s Hungary-first narrative. Independent journalists have found themselves defined by Orbán as enemies of the state who persuade the people into believing pro-Western, liberal propaganda. News that defines the state as weak or corrupt plays into this narrative. Orbán’s populism and appeal stem from his ability to create an “us versus them” narrative and self-fulfilling prophecy. The more that the independent press criticizes the status quo, the more Orbán makes them look like enemies of Hungary. Restrictions on members of the press is only one feature of Fidesz’s attack on individual liberties. Women and members of the LGBTQ+ community have also been victimized by the Orbán regime in the wake of COVID-19. Gender inequality has historically been a major feature in Eastern Europe due to the traditional intersection of the family, Christianity, and the labor process. But Orbán’s recent attacks on the concepts of “gender” and more specifically “gender equality” is unique in a state whose initial acceptance in the EU was based on such determinations. Not only did Orbán prohibit the teaching of gender studies in Hungary’s two accredited colleges and universities that teach the subject, but he also forced EU officials to remove the phrase “gender equality” from a 2021 EU social summit.17 In October 2018, Orbán’s spokesperson said, “The Government’s standpoint is that people are either born male or female and we do not consider it acceptable for us to talk about socially-constructed genders, rather than biological sexes.”18 As a result,

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Budapest’s prestigious Central European University was forced to drop its gender studies programs, a move that demonstrated not only a continued attack on gender but also an attack on academic freedom. At the core of such policies is Orbán’s hesitancy to accept views that he claims stand in contrast to Hungary’s Catholic traditions. His support (both political and financial) of the traditional family structure has placed women in the unenviable position of choosing between motherhood and a career. Orbán’s rhetoric focuses on the value that women contribute to society within the family setting. There is little messaging that focuses on girls and women gaining equal pay, equal treatment, and access to reproductive care. COVID-19 has made matters worse. For example, in December 2020, the Hungarian minister for families, Katalin Éva Novák (now the president of Hungary), posted a video instructing women on how best to manage life during the pandemic. Novák advised that women should “relish their roles as child bearers and caretakers” and “shouldn’t give up their privileges over some misguided fight for emancipation.”19 This advice was not only packaged as propaganda for Fidesz supporters but also delivered during the time in the pandemic when violence directed against women was soaring. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “Domestic violence reported by women increased by 62% and homicides by 51% in 2020.”20 As society dealt with lockdowns, women bore the brunt of the policy. Furthermore, Orbán has continuously promoted the idea that motherhood—the practice of bearing and raising children—can be financially incentivized. In the fall of 2019, Hungary passed a law giving mothers with four or more children a lifetime, personal tax exemption as well as “a subsidy of $8,825 toward the purchase of a seven-seat vehicle for families with three or more children.21 Although the stated goals of such policies were the reestablishment of the family at the center of Hungarian life, it was also an attempt to raise more Hungarian children in the face of immigration from non-European states. What this policy has done is to weaken a women’s ability to live a free existence, but it has also created a scenario in which women are dependent on their husbands for life, which in Hungary means having to face continued discrimination and violence. Men and women in Hungary face different challenges. In fact, the European Institute for Gender Equality has determined that “55.8% of Hungarian women do housework every day, compared to only 13.8% of men.”22 This contributes to the gender pay gap, as men are more likely to take advantage of education and training opportunities that yield higher wages and more access to gender-specific occupations. Since women are facing a concerted effort to stay in the home and raise children, Hungarian society has seen a shift in wages. According to Statista, “In 2012 and 2013, females working

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in the public sector earned more than men. In 2020, the female employees’ earnings were on average 17.2% lower than men’s in the private sector and 2.9 percent lower than men’s in the public sector.”23 This trend coincides with Fidesz’s takeover of the government. These family policies, couched in both religiosity and nationalism, underscore the state’s efforts to reshape not only the family but also the workforce. Yet amidst all these recent changes, Hungary elected its first female president, the aforementioned Katalin Éva Novák. The Hungarian constitution gives its parliament (the National Assembly) the power of choosing its president, who has less formal power than its prime minister. The president is therefore much more of a symbolic figure who can veto legislation and/ or send legislation to the Constitutional Court for review but is usually a product of the largest party/coalition in government. Novák is thus like the position she occupies, a symbol of the way women are supposed to be seen in twenty-first-century Hungary. Politically, Orbán might have felt compelled to have a woman in his orbit. The legislation that has been passed is damning, but his own words are even more disturbing, as they shed light into his ideology. “In 2015, when asked why there were no female ministers in his government . . . Orbán said that women would not be able to handle the pressure of political smear campaigns. In 2017, when asked about the recall of Hungary’s ambassador (a woman) to Washington, he said he didn’t care about women’s issues.”24 To a certain degree, Novák provides Orbán cover. She represents everything that he stands for but also as a mother of three children and a symbol of how Orbán thinks women should be viewed. Orbán has made a case that the family in Hungary is under attack, and thus so too are traditional Hungarian values. His party’s attacks have precipitated the mistreatment of women and forced discussions about gender out of the halls of Hungarian academia. However, the legislation is directed not only at the preservation of the family but also at the dissolution of the concept of gender itself. Legislation passed against members of the LGBTQ+ community has been some of the harshest passed by any modern democracy. In June 2021, the National Assembly passed a seemingly innocuous law directed at those convicted of sex crimes against children. However, after much deliberation, members of Fidesz incorporated language that made it illegal to “restrict or show homosexuality and content (on television) that promotes a gender that diverges from the one assigned at birth.”25 Human rights groups around the country protested these amendments and argued that such language conflates homosexuality and pedophilia. To clearly demarcate the lines between the two competing ideologies, the government erected billboards asking Hungarians, “Are you afraid your child could be exposed to sexual propaganda?”26 The question, written in the most

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explicit of terms, told Hungarians that sex and gender must remain the same and that any efforts to the contrary will weaken their families, communities, and ultimately their state. The propaganda was designed as a precursor to a nationwide referendum to be given on the same day as parliamentary elections: April 3, 2022. The idea was that voters who overwhelmingly support Fidesz would also have the opportunity to cast a ballot in the general election. The results of the election saw Fidesz remain in power. The results of the referendum, however, were not as clear. “While the vast majority (over 90 percent) of valid voters were cast in favor of restricting what has been called ‘LGBT propaganda,’ the referendum was ultimately declared invalid because it did not reach the required threshold of 50 percent of the electorate casting a valid vote.”27 So human rights groups proclaimed victory, but to a large degree so did Orbán, who saw the support translate into a legislative mandate that shows little signs of slowing down. The LGBTQ+ community has sought legal protection from the leadership of the EU but continues to face discrimination. Orbán’s populism is centered on what he labels as Hungarian values: plainly put, a set of principles and ideas that stand in contrast to the liberal principles of the EU. However, there is a great deal of xenophobia tied into Orbán’s message as well. His populism is not merely confined to attacks on civil liberties. They are also directed at immigrants from non-Christian locales who he claims will erode Hungarian identity. In the summer of 2015, for example, nearly 400,000 individuals seeking asylum entered Hungary. As a result, the government erected barbed-wire fences along its border with Serbia and created “transit zones” designed to keep asylum seekers away from the general public. These transit zones are essentially camps where asylum seekers remain until their processing is completed. According to the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC), the conditions of the camps are unacceptable. “The HHC contends rejected asylum seekers inside the transit zones are denied food, to the point of starvation.”28 Orbán’s brand of nationalism is deeply wedded to his belief that Hungarian culture is under attack. It is a hybrid of racial and religious animus that ties non-Hungarians mostly from Muslim countries to the policies of the EU. As the EU has attempted to embrace a stronger human rights agenda focused on the inclusion of those seeking asylum, Hungary has built fences and drafted policies that limit immigration. Since 2015, Orbán has made immigration a key component of his government and reelection strategy and a method of creating a dynamic of “us versus them.” Thus, the treatment of the Roma minority in Hungary has been appalling. According to Minority Rights Group International (MRGI), Roma families face a lack of social services, employment opportunities, and school segregation. Although there have been a variety of government programs designed

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to reduce the mistreatment of the Roma community, focus groups consisting of Roma conducted by MRGI have consistently stated that “prejudices are widespread” in the areas of housing, health care, and education.29 “In the interviews there were several complaints about labor and healthcare-related problems, as well as issues involving police proceedings and education; and there was a consensus among the civil society focus groups that the coronavirus pandemic had led to increased discrimination.”30 Still, the most troublesome piece of immigration/minority legislation was the “Stop Soros Law,” a 2018 law that criminalized providing aid to asylum seekers. George Soros, a Hungarian billionaire, is often portrayed by Orbán and leading Fidesz party officials as a primary financial supporter of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that seek to bring illegal immigrants into Hungary for the purposes of destabilizing the region. While the main target of the law was human rights–based NGOs in Budapest, the law’s language was so “broadly worded, that in theory, the government could arrest someone who provides food to an undocumented migrant on the street or attends a political rally in favor of their rights.”31 In November 2021, however, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) struck down the law. “The CJEU, responding from a complaint of the European Commission, ruled that the law violates EU norms by threatening to imprison people who assist asylum-seekers and seeking ‘to criminalize organizing activities.’”32 Although this was considered a victory for human rights groups and asylum seekers, it unfortunately provided fodder to Fidesz and their 2022 election campaign because it played into the narrative that the EU, in conjunction with foreign investors, is jeopardizing the independence of Hungary. This is what has made Fidesz’s political strategy so successful. Even when legislation is defeated, it provides greater rationale for their overall efforts. In fact, Orbán used illegal immigration as the main talking point leading up to the April 3, 2022, election. Falsely claiming that there are more illegal immigrants attempting to cross into Hungary today than in 2015, Orbán was able to foment rage against the international community and turn it into a winning strategy. Fidesz picked up two more seats in the National Assembly and solidified its position as the defender of Hungarian values in a hostile European community. The back-and-forth between Hungary and the EU will most likely intensify over the next few years, as the EU has recently attempted to pull its funding from Hungary.33 If the Hungarian economy continues to weaken and Fidesz loses the faith of the people, then things could change. But for the time being, Fidesz will continue to dominate Hungarian politics and pose a threat to liberal democracy in Europe and elsewhere.

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Poland: Law and Justice (for Whom?) Although Fidesz and its charismatic leader, Viktor Orbán, has garnered substantial media attention over the past few years, Poland’s PiS has also altered its electoral processes and social policies in the wake of COVID-19. The free market, economic success story of the 1990s made Poland an early entrant into the EU. The 1990s was spent on writing and amending its constitution to conform to the democratic model of checks and balances and an independent judiciary. Recently, however, Poland too has witnessed a slide in its democratic institutions and norms. The following section will look at the decline in democracy in Poland and how such changes have been exacerbated by COVID-19. The citizens of Poland have seen their electoral system change because of COVID-19. The presidential election, originally scheduled for May 10, 2020, was canceled and postponed. As a result, the ruling party attempted to “change the provisions related to organizing the presidential election” and the “essence of the democratic system.”34 According to Skrzypek, the Polish Constitution provides for three reasons to delay an election: a state of emergency, martial law, and a natural disaster.35 If any of these is determined, then an election may be postponed. Although COVID-19 clearly fulfills the first criterion, the special act that consequently delayed the election never mentioned any of the constitutional criteria. Time lines for when the elections were to be held were disregarded, as were agreed-on methods of voting. According to Driniczi and Bien-Kacala, the PiS-led government “chose not to activate the available constitutional extraordinary measures . . . applied the statute-based regime for the coronavirus pandemic, regardless of its direct and severe impact on the society and economy, and passed a new law . . . (that essentially) bypassed the Constitution of 1997.”36 As a result, the election was deeply flawed and violated several international recommendations, including one from the World Health Organization. President Andrzej Duda has remained in office by the slightest margin of victory since the end of communism in 1989. Election monitors and human rights organizations were concerned by the ruling party’s manipulation of election law during a state of emergency but have been unable to change its outcome. If COVID-19 provided the ruling party with a strong cover to change the electoral laws, it also gave it the ability to create legislation in line with its ideology. The Law and Justice Party was formed in 2001 but did not see any significant growth in the Sejm (Poland’s lower house) or in the Senate until it formed a coalition with the League of Polish Families and the Self-Defense Party.37 It ruled the government briefly between 2005 and 2007 but did not see any legislative power until it won in 2015. Its victory was significant

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because it was the first time since “1989 where the winning party was able to create a single-party majority government and implement its election pledges without the need to compromise with coalition partners.”38 It also meant that it could seriously influence the configuration of the courts. By the spring of 2018, Law and Justice had direct control over the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Council of the Judiciary (the body that appoints Polish judges).39 This meant that PiS controlled both the legislature and the judiciary. Although the PiS did not have to make concessions and was largely free to govern as it pleased, its backing in terms of both its supporters and its ideological platform has been the Catholic Church. Law and Justice’s conservatism is thus a product of its association with the Catholic Church. It is therefore a nationalist-populist party whose focus (much like Fidesz in Hungary) is centered around its conception of the traditional family. Policies that promote the rights of members of the LGBTQ+ community or provide women with access to abortions are strongly prohibited. According to Fomina and Kucharczyk, “The PiS divides society into two antagonistic groups: the people who are ‘true’ Poles and Poles who belong to ‘the worst sort.’”40 The former consists of members of rural communities who frequent church on a weekly basis and exhibit what is perceived of as traditional morality. The latter is made up of former communists, “immigrants, and members of the LGBTQ+ community.”41 The narrative that has been created is thus a version of Poland that is defined by Catholicism and anti-liberal globalism. Law and Justice benefits from this dichotomy, as the church has become its largest advocate and institutional supporter for votes. When the COVID-19 pandemic struck Poland, Law and Justice, which had been reelected in 2019, began to implement its ideological program through both the legislature and the courts. The attack on reproductive rights emerged in the summer and fall of 2020. Although abortion has been prohibited in Poland, Article 4a 1–2 of the 1993 act called for several exceptions: if the life of the mother is in danger, if the mother was a victim of rape or incest, or if there are any fetal anomalies. However, what has transpired since 2020 is an attack on reproductive rights and more specifically on medical professionals who perform abortions. During the spring of 2020, the “Director of the National Health Fund issued guidelines calling for a case-by-case assessment of healthcare services . . . which meant that many hospitals practically stopped providing abortion services.42 Later in the year and in a far more overt manner, the Constitutional Tribunal found Article 4a 1–2 unconstitutional. Article 4a was deemed unconstitutional because it violated Article 38 of the Polish Constitution of 1997, which argues that every person deserves the protection of life. The court determined that the unborn have Article 38 protection. What resulted was a situation in which women saw their access to abortions entirely disappear. The only option women would have had was

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to travel to another EU state that allows abortions. However, this changed as well. According to Amnesty International, the situation facing women was worsened as COVID travel restrictions were adopted, preventing women from seeking abortions in other countries.43 The ruling came into effect in January 2021 and was immediately condemned by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on the grounds that the Constitutional Tribunal does not have the legitimate authority to make independent decisions because of its connections to Law and Justice. However, the decision still stands to this day. Polish women who have always faced the difficult decision pertaining to reproductive rights have seen COVID policies make the situation even more dire. The situation facing members of the LGBTQ+ community in Poland has also grown worse during the global pandemic. Before the pandemic, Poland established what the government termed, “LGBTQ+ Free Zones.” These places proclaimed to be free of “LGBTQ+ ideology. As a result, members of the LGBTQ+ community were labeled and thus targeted for discrimination. “Survey results published in 2019 by the Polish public opinion survey center, the CBOS, found that although public acceptance of homosexuality had been growing slowly for a number of years before 2017, it had decreased since.”44 This decrease in support for diversity has seen Poland “fall to 42nd place in the 2020 Rainbow Index of the International Lesbian Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association (ILGA), which measures the level of respect for LGBTI people’s human rights in 49 European countries.”45 The European Union has objected to this type of scapegoating, threatened to cut off funding, and helped pro-LGBTQ+ groups gain standing in court. Nevertheless, the battle lines have been drawn. The ruling party sees itself as the vanguard of the Catholic Church and defender of traditional Polish life. As a result, Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General Zbignew Tadeusz Ziobro “announced the creation of a bill to prevent same-sex couples from adopting children.”46 In April 2020, Ziobro also “lodged an Extraordinary Complaint to question the first case in which a Polish court confirmed that transgendered people are protected from discrimination in employment and occupation based on sex.”47 Similar proposals have made their way to the floor of the Sejm as a means of restricting the rights of members of the LGBTQ+ community and reinforcing the whims of the Catholic Church and Law and Justice. The amplification of hate is also the result of Poland’s decline in media freedom. Just as Hungary’s independent journalists faced difficulties during the pandemic, so too have members of the Polish press. According to the latest report from the World Press Freedom Index, Poland has dropped from eighteenth to sixty-sixth place out of 180 countries in just seven years.48 This coincides with the rule of Law and Justice, which came to power in 2015.

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The assault on press freedom is based on the prevailing narrative that there exists in Poland two camps. As was previously noted, Law and Justice portrays the media as either serving the Polish people’s interests or serving those of foreign interests. As a result, Law and Justice has floated the proposal that “foreign-owned companies would be limited to a stake of 15%–30% in domestic media.”49 Although legislation has never come to fruition, the government (the Treasury) has begun to purchase media infrastructure. “The process began in November of 2020 when the government-controlled state oil giant PKN Orlen completed the purchase of a 65% stake in newsstand operator Ruch, which owns a network of 1300 newspaper kiosks.”50 As the government purchases more shares from independent media outlets, press freedom will continue to decline in Poland, and Law and Justice’s message will become more challenging to counter. The model that was established in Hungary appears to be the one that has emerged in Poland. The future of liberal democracy is being challenged through illiberal means, and Hungary and Poland are championing this new model. CONCLUSION The states of Eastern Europe had faced terrible economic and political hardships before the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the years 2020–2022 have seen an expansion in executive authority and political centralization. The new strongmen, led by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, are challenging the liberal democratic order and making authoritarianism a viable choice in the twenty-first century. If the struggling economies of the former communist bloc turn away from the liberal democratic norms that were established in the 1990s, then the entire region might see a change in their institutions. Orbán has provided his neighbors with a governing option that stands in sharp contrast to the liberal systems of the West. This model is democratic but hardly free. It allows for elections but little room for dissent. It provides ample amounts of security for those who conform to standard norms of national identity but little in the realm of choice. For years, the world had been divided over an ideological struggle between open markets and planned economies. Now it appears that a new argument has emerged, one that is centered on how citizens think about freedom itself. Furthermore, the EU has consistently rejected these assertions but due to its institutional constraints has relied on public condemnation or the threat of ending financial support. Hungarian and Polish opposition to the fundamental values of the EU has placed them out of step when it comes to issues related to immigration, especially those individuals who sought asylum after the Syrian civil war. Budapest’s and Warsaw’s insistence on targeting certain groups to

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receive financial support (i.e., women who have multiple children) diverges from the norms that have defined the evolution of the EU since its inception. As the world moves beyond the confines of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is going to be interesting to see if Hungarians and Poles are ready to move beyond the confines of their own systems. We will all have to wait and see. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  How has COVID-19 affected the states of Eastern Europe? 2.  Why has Viktor Orbán been so successful in changing Hungarian society? 3.  What influence does the Catholic Church have in both Hungary and Poland? How does this influence impact policy? 4.  Why has press freedom declined so rapidly in Hungary and Poland? 5.  Why do the governing coalitions in Hungary and Poland target Western values when campaigning? NOTES 1. Michael Korda, Journey to a Revolution: A Personal Memoir and History of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007), 55. 2. World Population Review, “Happiest Countries in the World 2022,” https:​//​ worldpopulationreview​.com​/country​-rankings​/happiest​-countries​-in​-the​-world. 3. Ana Poenariu and Andrei Ciurcanu, “The Players and the Paperwork: Romania’s Trade in Blackmarket Masks,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, Bucharest, Romania, July 2, 2020, https:​//​www​.occrp​.org​/en​/coronavirus​/the​-players​ -and​-the​-paperwork​-romanias​-trade​-in​-black​-market​-masks. 4. Milana Nikolova, “Corruption and COVID-19 Dominate Bulgaria’s Election Campaign,” Emerging Europe, March 22, 2021, https:​//​emerging​-europe​.com​/news​/ corruption​-and​-covid​-19​-dominate​-bulgarias​-election​-campaign. 5. “Bulgaria’s Former PM Borissov Released from Custody without Charge,” Reuters, March 18, 2022, https:​//​www​.reuters​.com​/world​/europe​/police​-detain​ -bulgarias​-former​-pm​-borissov​-blackmail​-investigation​-2022​-03​-18. 6. Paulina Paunova and Tony Wesolowsky, “It Denies COVID and Wants Out of NATO and the EU. Now Bulgaria’s Pro-Kremlin, Far Right Revival Party Is in Parliament,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 22, 2021, https:​//​www​.rferl​.org​ /a​/bulgaria​-revival​-party​-parliament​-eu​/31572826​.html. 7. Juan C. Palomino, Juan G. Rodrigues, and Racquel Sebastian, “Wage Inequality and Poverty Effects of Lockdown and Social Distancing in Europe,” European Economic Review 129 (October 2020), https:​//​doi​.org​/10​.1016​/j​.euroecorev​.2020​ .103564.

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8. BBC News, “How Many Ukrainian Refugees Are There and Where Have They Gone?,” June 23, 2022, https:​//​www​.bbc​.com​/news​/world​-60555472. 9. Ibid. 10. Mia Speier, “COVID-19 and the Threat to Press Freedom in Central and Eastern Europe,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 20, 2021, https:​//​www​.cfr​.org​/in​ -brief​/covid​-19​-and​-threat​-press​-freedom​-central​-and​-eastern​-europe. 11. Zoltan Simon, “World’s Worst Hit COVID Nation Hungary Plans to Ease Curbs Soon,” Bloomberg, March 31, 2021, https:​//​www​.bloomberg​.com​/news​/articles​/2021​ -03​-31​/world​-s​-worst​-virus​-hotspot​-hungary​-posts​-big​-jump​-in​-deaths​#xj4y7vzkg. 12. Martin Dunai, “Hungarian Journalists Say State Conceals Impact of World’s Deadliest COVID-19 Outbreak,” Reuters, March 31, 2020, https:​ //​ www​ .reuters​ .com​/article​/us​-health​-coronavirus​-hungary​-media​/hungarian​-journalists​-say​-state​ -conceals​-impact​-of​-worlds​-deadliest​-covid​-19​-outbreak​-idUSKBN2BN0XI. 13. Sanjay Sethi and Emese Pasztor, “Are Orbán’s COVID powers, the new normal in Hungary?,” EUobserver, May 23, 2022, https:​//​euobserver​.com​/opinion​/155023. 14. European Center for Press and Media Freedom, “Hungary’s Two Pandemics: COVID-19 and Attacks on Media Freedom,” June 17, 2020, https:​//​www​.ecpmf​.eu​/ hungarys​-two​-pandemics​-covid​-19​-and​-attacks​-on​-media​-freedom. 15. Reporters Without Borders, “Hungary,” 2022, https:​//​rsf​.org​/en​/country​/ hungary. 16. Eva Bognar, “Hungary,” Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021, June 23, 2021, https:​//​reutersinstitute​.politics​.ox​.ac​.uk​/digital​-news​-report​/2021​/hungary. 17. Gabriela Baczynska, “Poland, Hungary Block ‘Gender Equality’ from EU Social Summit,” Reuters, May 7, 2021, https:​//​www​.reuters​.com​/world​/europe​/ poland​-hungary​-push​-against​-gender​-equality​-eu​-social​-summit​-2021​-05​-07. 18. Lauren Kent and Samantha Tapfumaneyi, “Hungary’s PM Bans Gender Study at Colleges Saying People Are Born Either Male or female,” CNN, October 19, 2018, https:​//​www​.cnn​.com​/2018​/10​/19​/europe​/hungary​-bans​-gender​-study​-at​-colleges​ -trnd​/index​.html. 19. Lydia Gall, “Hungary’s Family Minister Undermines Equality for Women,” Human Rights Watch, December 17, 2020, https:​//​www​.hrw​.org​/news​/2020​/12​/17​/ hungarys​-family​-minister​-undermines​-equality​-women. 20. OECD Economic Surveys: Hungary 2021, “Violence Against Women Has Increased during the Pandemic,” 2021, https:​//​www​.oecd​-ilibrary​.org​/sites​/1d39d866​ -en​/1​/3​/1​/index​.html​?itemId​=​/content​/publication​/1d39d866​-en​&​_csp​_​=2b76ff9 39a2e7a8fa5319efab7497579​ & itemIGO​ = oecd​ & itemContentType ​ = book ​ # figure​ -d1e2590. 21. Associated Press, “Hungary Axes Income Tax for Women with Four or More Kids,” NBC News, February 11, 2019, https:​//​www​.nbcnews​.com​/news​/world​/ hungary​-axes​-income​-tax​-women​-4​-or​-more​-kids​-n969936. 22. Julia Bako, “Hungary’s First Female President Is Hardly a Win for Women,” Open Democracy, March 24, 2022, https:​//​www​.opendemocracy​.net​/en​/5050​/hungary​ -first​-female​-president​-hardly​-a​-win​-for​-women. 23. Flora Medve, “Gender Pay Gap in Hungary from 2007–2020 by Sector,” Statista, March 10, 2022, https:​//​www​.statista​.com​/statistics​/1012968​/hungary​-gender​-pay​

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-gap​-by sector/#:~:text=In%202012%20and%202013%2C%20females,men’s%20 in%20the%20public%20sector. 24. Bako, “Hungary’s First Female President Is Hardly a Win for Women.” 25. Benjamin Novak, “Hungary Adopts Child Sex Abuse Law That also Targets L.G.B.T. Community,” New York Times, June 15, 2021, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​ /2021​/06​/15​/world​/europe​/hungary​-child​-sex​-lgbtq​.html. 26. Krisztina Than, “Analysis: Hungary’s Orbán Banking on Anti-LGBT Campaign in Tough Re-Election Bid,” Reuters, December 13, 2021, https:​//​www​.reuters​ .com​/world​/europe​/hungarys​-orban​-banks​-anti​-lgbt​-campaign​-tough​-re​-election​-bid​ -2021​-12​-13. 27. Abby Klinkenberg, “Activists Defeat Hungary’s Anti-LGBT Referendum,” Fair Planet, April 10, 2022, https:​//​www​.fairplanet​.org​/editors​-pick​/activists​-defeat​ -hungarys​-anti​-lgbtq​-referendum. 28. Elzbieta M. Gozdziak, “Using Fear of the ‘Other,’ Orbán Reshapes Migration Policy in a Hungary Built on Cultural Diversity,” Migration Policy Institute, October 10, 2019, https:​//​www​.migrationpolicy​.org​/article​/orban​-reshapes​-migration​-policy​ -hungary. 29. Minority Rights Group International, “Roma in Hungary: The Challenges of Discrimination,” March 2021, https:​//​minorityrights​.org​/publications​/roma​-hungary. 30. Ibid. 31. Zack Beauchamp, “Hungary Just Passed a ‘Stop Soros Law’ That Makes It Illegal to Help Undocumented Migrants,” Vox, June 22, 2018, https:​//​www​.vox​.com​/ policy​-and​-politics​/2018​/6​/22​/17493070​/hungary​-stop​-soros​-orban. 32. Open Society Foundation, “EU Top Court Strikes Down Hungarian ‘Stop Soros Law,’” New Open Society Justice Initiative, November 16, 2021, https:​//​www​ .justiceinitiative​.org​/newsroom​/eu​-top​-court​-strikes​-down​-hungarian​-stop​-soros​-law​ ?utm​_campaign​=osfacct​&utm​_medium​=referral​&utm​_source​=twitter. 33. Alexander Conway, “The 2002 Hungarian Elections: Orbán’s Renewal,” Institute of International and European Affairs, April 21, 2022, https:​//​www​.iiea​.com​/blog​ /the​-2022​-hungarian​-elections​-orban​-renewal. 34. Maciej Skrzypek, “Democratic Backsliding in Poland on Example Drafts Amendments in Electoral Code during the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Polish Political Science Yearbook 50, no. 2 (2020): 37. 35. Ibid., 41. 36. Timea Drinoczi, “COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland: Extraordinary Situation and Illiberal Constitutionalism,” The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 8, no. 1–2 (2020): 180. 37. Anna Gwiazda, “Right-Wing Populism and Feminist Politics: The Case of Law and Justice in Poland,” International Political Science Review 42, no. 5 (2020): 5. 38. Ibid. 39. Christian Davies, “Hostile Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s Courts,” Freedom House, 2018, https:​//​freedomhouse​.org​/report​/analytical​-brief​ /2018​/hostile​-takeover​-how​-law​-and​-justice​-captured​-polands​-courts.

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40. Gwiazda, “Right-Wing Populism and Feminist Politics,” 5. See also Joanna Fomina and Jacek Kucharczyk, “The Specter Haunting Europe: Populism and Protest in Poland,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 4 (2016): 58–68. 41. Gwiazda, “Right-Wing Populism and Feminist Politics,” 5. 42. Atina Krajewska, “Connecting Reproductive Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law: Lessons from Poland in Times of COVID-19,” German Law Journal 22, no. 6 (September 15, 2021): 1072–97, https:​//​www​.cambridge​.org​/core​/journals​ /german​-law​-journal​/article​/connecting​-reproductive​-rights​-democracy​-and​-the​-rule​ -of​-law​-lessons​-from​-poland​-in​-times​-of​-covid19​/CE048E79D093FFEE33326F7C4 E889BB7. 43. Amnesty International, “Poland: Regression on Abortion Access Harms Women,” January 26, 2022, https:​//​www​.amnesty​.org​/en​/latest​/news​/2022​/01​/poland​ -regression​-on​-abortion​-access​-harms​-women. 44. Commissioner for Human Rights—Council of Europe, Belgium, “Memorandum on the Stigmatization of LGBTI People in Poland,” December 3, 2020, 2, https:​//​rm​.coe​.int​/memorandum​-on​-the​-stigmatisation​-of​-lgbti​-people​-in​-poland​ /1680a08b8e. 45. Ibid. 46. ILGA Europe, “Poland: Anti-LGBTI Timeline,” June 6, 2022, https:​//​www​.ilga​ -europe​.org​/files​/uploads​/2022​/06​/Poland​-Anti​-LGBT​-Timeline​.pdf. 47. Ibid. 48. Ben Koschalka, “Poland Falls in World Press Freedom Index for Seventh Year Running,” Notes from Poland, May 4, 2022, https:​//​notesfrompoland​.com​/2022​/05​ /04​/poland​-falls​-in​-world​-press​-freedom​-index​-for​-seventh​-year​-running. 49. Jamie Wiseman, “Democracy Declining: Erosion of Media Freedom in Poland,” Media Freedom Rapid Response, Press Freedom Mission to Poland, November–December 2020, 9–10, https:​//​ipi​.media​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2021​/02​ /20210211​_Poland​_PF​_Mission​_Report​_ENG​_final​.pdf. 50. Ibid., 10.

Chapter 8

The Pandemic, Politics, and Populism in Three Western European Democracies A Comparative Analysis of Britain, France, and Italy1 Kenneth L. Campbell

On March 16, 2020, as governments around the world struggled to learn how to deal with the vexatious and newly identified coronavirus, British authorities advised those individuals experiencing symptoms of the disease to self-quarantine for seven days. A week later, Parliament passed a law granting police the authority to enforce lockdown regulations as the government had become increasingly aware of just how virulent, contagious, and deadly the coronavirus, COVID-19, could be. Just a week earlier, on March 8, Italy had become the first country in Western Europe to impose a lockdown, with Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte imploring Italian citizens to abide by the new regulations. At the time, Italy had more coronavirus cases (9,172) than any other country besides China and a death count of 463.2 Despite these early proactive measures, the number of cases and deaths from the virus escalated in the following weeks, with many people blaming the government for the deaths of their loved ones and demanding some sort of retribution. By imposing strict quarantine measures for the first few months of the pandemic, Conte’s government put itself in a no-win situation, blamed by some for not doing enough to prevent deaths and by others for violating the constitutional rights of the Italian people. Already notions of “herd immunity” were being bandied about, with some in Britain suggesting that Britain should be 181

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prepared to allow up to 60 percent of the population to contract the disease to achieve such immunity.3 While it took France longer to impose a complete lockdown, it was among the earliest Western nations to recognize the threat the coronavirus posed to public health and to take measures aimed at preventing the spread of COVID-19 and the flooding of hospitals with sick patients, which early on threatened to overwhelm doctors and other health care workers. On February 28, the French government announced the cancellation of the Paris halfmarathon and restrictions on gatherings of more than 5,000 people in indoor spaces. While such a ban would appear negligible when compared to later restrictions of the near-total lockdown imposed shortly thereafter in Italy, at the time, the French minister of health, Olivier Véran, tried to reassure the public that even this measure was only temporary and that France hoped to have the virus under control shortly. By contrast, on March 8, Jens Georg Spahn, the German federal minister of health, recommended a ban on any gathering of more than 1,000 people, as an increasing number of coronavirus cases were being reported there. By March 16, most day cares and primary schools in Germany had been closed, disrupting parents’ child care plans and providing an early indication of how disruptive the virus would prove to people’s everyday lives. In France, Véran strongly urged people to begin telecommuting and to stay home as much as possible without making it clear whether his recommendation was merely advice or an actual government mandate. Then, on March 22, the French Parliament passed a law declaring a “state of health emergency.” The law authorized the government to take measures it deemed most effective in combating the virus. Senator Philippe Bas, who served on a fourteen-person committee that proposed the law, defended it, saying, “Everyone knew the collective responsibility to reach an agreement, without jeopardizing fundamental freedoms or the control of Parliament, to give the government the means to fight this scourge.”4 The powers the law granted to the president included the power to restrict the movements of French citizens, impose quarantines, close or limit nonessential businesses, and prohibit or curtail public gatherings. By May, the French legislature had promulgated further restrictions and guidelines, including the introduction of a contact tracing system that drew concerns from across the political spectrum about privacy rights. In Britain, Boris Johnson had reversed course by the end of March from resisting the need to impose lockdowns to granting police broad powers to enforce them, resulting in a backlash from those who saw Britain as abandoning its “policing by consent” philosophy. In Italy, the government went so far as to impose jail terms of up to three months for those who tested positive and traveled in public, leading right-wing politician

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Matteo Salvini to accuse the government of “importing infected immigrants to create new clusters and extend the state of emergency.”5 THE RISE OF POPULISM Thus, even in these earliest stages of the pandemic, an issue that had begun as a public health crisis had already become a political flashpoint in the culture wars and an issue on the front line of the battle between democracy and autocracy increasingly confronting Western European countries as well as many other countries around the world. The rise of populism in the 2010s would mark one of the main political trends of that decade, creating new stresses on the political structure of Western democracies that would have carried over into the 2020s, even without the pandemic. Of course, in retrospect, one can trace the rise of populism in the Western Europe even before the financial crisis of 2008 that did so much to foster it. Feeling left behind by a system of global capitalism that enriched a tiny minority of the population and left working-class and middle-class voters struggling to maintain their quality of life, an increasing number of people found any challengers to the established political and economic system appealing. Political scientist Jonathan Hopkin calls this phenomenon “anti-system politics,” writing, “The greater the economic distress caused by the failures of the market system, and the smaller the share of voters that unambiguously benefit from it, the bigger the pool of potential anti-system voters.”6 The financial meltdown of 2008 was only the most epic failure of a system that since the 1980s left even many precariously people who considered themselves middle class poised on the borderline between solvency and bankruptcy. One of the earliest indications of the rise of the development of anti-system politics came in Italy, which already had a disturbing association with fascism during from the 1920s to the 1940s under the dictator Benito Mussolini. Mussolini’s fascist agenda of aggressive nationalism, a corporate economy that blended elements of capitalism and socialism, and promotion of traditional family values and gender roles had a strong appeal in Italy that never entirely disappeared even after Mussolini’s disgrace and Italy’s defeat and economic collapse in World War II. Then, in 1993, a media mogul with heavy investments in real estate named Silvio Berlusconi sought to inject a new vitality into an Italian political system mired in corruption by forming a new political party called Forza Italia, translated as “Come On Italy.” Berlusconi completely altered the face of Italian politics and made the country an outlier in the 1990s and early 2000s as the first Western European democracy to shift in a decidedly populist direction.

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In the 2010s, the influx of migrants seeking entry into Italy from northern Africa and the Middle East, combined with economic woes stemming from the financial meltdown of 2008 to enhance populist sentiment in Italy, culminated in the collapse of the moderate left-center government headed by Matteo Renzi in December 2016. In May 2018, the populist Five-Star Movement, along with Matteo Salvini, leader of the anti-immigrant party the League, joined a coalition government under Giuseppe Conte. Interestingly, this development represented both a victory and a challenge for populism, according to legal scholar Lucia Corso. In a 2019 article, Corso pointed to a “foundational paradox” confronting populist movements once they achieve power, one that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson also found himself struggling with while in power: the necessity of wielding power without succumbing to the temptations, trappings of power, and corruption against which populists originally campaigned. In the case of the Five-Star Movement, it sought to retain its oppositional stance even as it participated in a coalition government, thus preserving its reputation as an outside party, keeping the government honest and disassociating itself from taint of compromising its principles or succumbing to the temptations of power and corruption. Insofar as the Five-Star Movement has tried to use its power as part of the Italian government, Corso argues, it has done so through the law and the judiciary rather than through merely political attacks on its opponents.7 In France, in the past three decades, populism had first reared its head as a significant threat to the status quo when Jean-Marie Le Pen became head of the conservative National Front in 1972. Since then, Le Pen has remained a powerful voice in French politics, coming closest to actual power when he advanced to the second round of French presidential elections in 2002. Le Pen was even farther out of the mainstream of liberal democratic politics than Berlusconi, having taken controversial stands on immigration and other issues, including voicing anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic views, including casting doubt on the importance (if not the reality) of the Holocaust while also advocating a law-and-order platform and promising to address France’s high unemployment rate. His daughter, Marine Le-Pen, has tried to soften the image of her party by eschewing some of her father’s more extreme views, but she remains in the far-right, nationalist, populist tradition she inherited from him. In France, as elsewhere, the financial crisis resulted in strict austerity measures and heightened concerns about immigration draining state resources at the expense of native or longtime residents and greater mistrust of traditional political parties. However, by the mid-2000s in France, neither far-right nor extreme-left parties emerged as the beneficiaries of a desire for change, but a new centrist, liberal, pro-European party called En Marche did, founded by a former minister of economics, Emmanuel Macron.

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Macron won a decisive victory in the 2017 presidential election, temporarily alleviating concerns about the rise of populism in France and the West more generally, especially after the election of Donald J. Trump to the American presidency in 2016. However, one emergent trend was that a majority of young people voted for either the far-right populist Marine Le Pen or the candidate of the radical left, the communist Jean-Luc Mélanchon.8 Still, Macron had reinvigorated French politics and injected some youthful enthusiasm and optimism into what had become a bitter and emotionally depressed country. France was still recovering psychologically from a wave of Islamist terrorist attacks in 2015. The atrocities began in early January with attacks on the offices of the weekly magazine Charlie Hebdo and a burst of attacks across Paris, including one on a Jewish supermarket. The attacks killed seventeen people within a 48-hour period. Such episodes inflamed populist, anti-Islamic, and anti-immigrant sentiment and might very well have resulted in a Le Pen victory in 2017, so in that sense, Macron emerged as a great hope for the survival of liberal democracy not only in France but in countries like Britain and the United States as well. Prior to Macron’s victory, the combined impact of Trump’s election and the Brexit vote seemed to point toward the triumph of populism over democracy in the West; Macron’s victory indicated that this might not be the case. In each country, the exact combination of factors related to the theoretical concept of intersectionality, which examines the ways in which social distinctions such as class, race, gender, and ethnicity relate to and overlap with one another, plays a role in how people vote and how political developments play out. In Britain, the stark cultural and political divisions remained largely submerged until an issue arose in the mid-2010s that exposed the fault lines, showing how little the two sides had in common with one another: Brexit. Adrian Williamson has argued that, whichever political party, the Conservatives or Labour, held power, in the roughly sixty years after World War II, a consensus existed among the British people in support of social democracy that he describes as an explicit commitment to full employment as a central goal of macro-economic strategy; egalitarian and redistributive approaches to taxation and public spending; strong trade unions, with a substantial role in both industrial and political affairs; a mixed economy, with utilities held in public ownership; comprehensive education; the welfare state; and a substantial public rented housing sector.9

This changed, Williamson argues, with the financial crisis of 2008, which seemed to indicate just how little the elites who ruled the country and presided over the world of business and finance cared about the average voter. One strong indication of this shift in government priorities came with a

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decline in the percentages of gross national product devoted to government expenditure to 42 percent in Britain by 2019, compared with the 56 percent laid out by the French government.10 This became a further spur to “anti-system politics,” in which voters began to turn their backs on traditional political parties to embrace outsiders who promised radical solutions to their problems and economic plight, often by scapegoating immigrants as outsiders and arguing for a nation-first approach to both international relations and domestic politics. In Britain, this led to the rise of Nigel Farage and his United Kingdom Independence Party, which, although it never even gained serious representation in the British Parliament, did exert enough pressure on the Conservative Party to lead David Cameron to promise a vote on leaving the European Union (Brexit), which he fulfilled in June 2016. Although a mixture of motives animated those who voted either for or against leaving the European Union in the Brexit referendum, the ballot seemed to provide an opportunity for the disaffected to reaffirm their national and group identity while sticking it to the liberal elite who favored multiculturalism, tolerance, and other liberal values. Even the Conservative Party was split on Brexit, which Prime Minister Cameron opposed, leading to his resignation as party head when the vote did not go his way by a 52–48 percent margin. The Brexit vote revealed stark differences between different regions of the United Kingdom but otherwise revealed a split based more along the lines of ideology than specific race, class, or gender differences. A majority of voters in England and Wales supported leaving the European Union, while a large majority in both Scotland and Northern Ireland cast their votes to have the United Kingdom remain part of Europe. Beyond that, many of the voters who chose Remain seem to have been motivated largely by economic concerns since Britain would lose access to European markets and prices were expected to go up once the country left the single-market European Union. Many of those who voted Leave later admitted to not knowing exactly what they were voting for or the likely consequences of such a vote. Still, ethnic nationalism and a populist concern with regaining control over the country’s borders was a populist concern that had drawn support first to Farage and then to Brexit. In the end, ideology or worldview played a larger role in determining support for the Leave campaign than did other factors related to intersectionality, though a majority of working-class and white voters favored Leave, while a plurality of younger voters and those of non-white ethnicities expressed their support for Remain in the Brexit vote.11

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THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 Against this backdrop, a major crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, was likely to roil politics in Western democracies even further. Such, indeed, did turn out to be the case, but the responses in Britain, France, and Italy reveal some of the similarities in the threats these democracies face as well as some subtle differences that provide insight into the current state of populism in the West and the extent to which it might constitute a threat to democracy in these countries and in the West more generally. In Britain, the ruling Conservative Party headed by Boris Johnson attempted to impose relatively strict guidelines for public behavior during the pandemic even as Johnson and senior members of his administration flouted those same guidelines. In particular, revelations in late 2021 and early 2022 concerning parties at Johnson’s Downing Street residence that violated all kinds of protocols greatly weakened his government and contributed to his ultimate forced resignation in July 2022. As of this writing, Conservatives were running well behind the Labour Party in polls anticipating the result of the next general election. In France, by contrast, Emmanuel Macron managed to retain much of his support from moderates on both the right and the left and win reelection in July 2022 despite the polarizing influence of the pandemic and the antigovernment and populist sentiments it heightened. Italy also reached a critical turning point in July 2022, with the collapse of the coalition government of Mario Draghi portending the triumph there of right-wing populism, with Giorgia Melloni, the head of the neofascist, anti-immigrant Brothers of Italy, perhaps poised to become Italy’s first female prime minister. Interestingly, two countries that had female leaders during the pandemic, Germany with Angela Merkel as chancellor and New Zealand with Jacinda Arderin, had good track records in confronting the pandemic, and both were strong supporters of science and using the medical expertise of doctors and epidemiologists to confront the coronavirus. Whether the populist Melloni would follow in their footsteps remains to be seen. What accounted for these divergent results in three Western European democracies? First, we will trace and compare the response of each of these countries’ governments to the pandemic and then conclude with some general observations on what recent history might tell us about the current state of populism and democracy in each country. By April, Italy seemed to be, in pandemic parlance, “flattening the curve,” with the increase in the number of coronavirus cases lessening while elsewhere in the Western world the growth rate was increasing. Lockdowns and restrictive policies seemed to be working in Italy. By the summer, the Italian government would not only be largely vindicated for its response to the

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virus but also held up as an exemplar for other Western countries where the death toll continued to mount while the numbers of cases and deaths in Italy sharply decreased. Italy was ahead of other countries in contact tracing and monitoring the spread of the virus daily with the help of the scientific and technological communities. Although the government still drew criticism for its handling of the pandemic from inside Italy, the Italian people for the most part cooperated with the lockdowns and governmental restrictions. In one public opinion poll from Italy released in December 2020, almost 58 percent of those surveyed indicated support for the government to take whatever steps it deemed necessary to control the spread of COVID-19, even if it meant sacrificing some personal freedoms.12 Italy had entered the pandemic with a stronger track record of stable governments, and its handling of the pandemic might have furthered its political stability, but with sixty-five governments in the previous seventy years, it should have come as no surprise that Prime Minster Conte would resign in January 2021 when former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi withdrew his support from the coalition headed by Conte. The pandemic stood as the focal point of the crisis, with both sides accusing the other of using it for their own political purposes. Renzi accused Conte of mishandling the pandemic, of using it as an excuse to impose antidemocratic measures, and of refusing to employ a bailout package from the European Union because of the populist and nationalist sentiments of his supporters. This illustrates how confusing was the political dilemma caused by the pandemic, where autocratic measures by government to address a public health crisis came in for criticism from both the right and the left, depending on who was in power in a given country. In early May 2020, the French Senate extended the state of health emergency, which now included an information-gathering system to allow for contact tracing with respect to the virus, until July 10. Similarly, on May 26, Germany extended lockdown and social distancing mandates through June 29, although gatherings of up ten people were cleared for resumption as of June 6. The Senate passed the measure amid a debate about privacy concerns, leading them to stipulate that the precedent for establishing contact tracing did not extend to private businesses. One notable exception included in the legislation was a stipulation that abused women would not be required to isolate with their partners. (The provision said nothing about abused men.) In December 2020, the French National Academy of Medicine issued a press release stating that domestic violence had risen in France by 30 percent during the first stage of the pandemic.13 In these early months, the French people seemed relatively supportive of their government and its efforts to keep them safe, but signs of discontent began to appear as the summer wore on. In August, an anti-masking rally in Paris drew several hundred protesters; the crowd also consisted of people carrying signs against enforced vaccinations

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and the general encroachment on French liberties by a government using the pandemic as an excuse to deprive citizens of their rights.14 A lack of information and understanding about the disease hindered public policy in the early stages of the pandemic. For example, in April, Germany wanted to issue immunity cards to those who had already had the virus, but no clear scientific evidence existed at the time as to whether one case of COVID provided immunity against contracting the virus a second or even multiple times. Early advice about frequent handwashing made it seem as if this would be enough to protect one from the disease, but this measure proved relatively ineffective since it turned out that the virus is actually airborne. Mask wearing and social distancing certainly helped but proved not totally effective either, especially since we later learned that standard surgical masks provide limited protection when compared to the N94 and N95 models, while cloth masks, which many people adopted, provided almost no protection, though this was clearly unbeknownst to their wearers. Quack or, at best, unproven remedies or preventives not approved by medical authorities, including hydroxychloroquine, promoted by President Trump in the United States, misled many members of the public. At first, even Boris Johnson, like Trump and President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, had attempted to minimize the serious nature of the threat until he realized that he would come under even greater criticism if he did not take strong measures to hinder the spread of the virus. Still, from the beginning, the lockdown and travel restrictions met with a mixed response. Anti-lockdown demonstrations in Italy led to dozens of arrests at the end of April. President Attilio Fontana of Lombardy opposed lockdowns as too harmful to the economy, especially to the working classes, though he said he was fine with social distancing. In June, a study conducted by the University of Bologna added support to Fontana’s concerns, showing that across twelve countries, the pandemic had adversely affected semiskilled and unskilled workers when compared to white-collar workers who could afford to work at home. Furthermore, the study showed that Italy had the largest percentage of people who had stopped working during the pandemic (47 percent), compared, for example, to 38 percent in France and only 13 percent in Australia and 10 percent in the United States.15 Meanwhile, the Dutch were praised for self-quarantining, social distancing, and working from home, even without a government mandate imposing such restrictions.16 Critics of the lockdown in Italy received ammunition in May when Dr. Alberto Zangrillo, head of intensive care at San Raffaele Hospital in Milan, was quoted as saying, “Clinically speaking the virus doesn’t exist anymore,” even though Italy’s strong lockdown policy was the main reason for the decline in numbers, which were likely to rise again if the authorities were to lift the lockdown.17

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Meanwhile, the summer brought increasing heat on British Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Labour Party Leader Keir Starmer criticized Johnson not only for his government’s response to COVID-19 but also for his lack of a response to the murder of the African American George Floyd in the United States and the resulting protests and civil disorder occurring across the Atlantic. Johnson faced pressure from right-wing groups in Britain over the government lockdown policy, including demonstrations in London that led to clashes between those protesters and the police. In Germany, far-right populists associated with the Reichsbürger movement, including some wearing Nazi symbols, brazenly stormed the Reichstag building in an attempt to break in, foreshadowing the efforts of far-right groups in the United States to overturn the results of the 2020 election by forcefully entering the Capitol building. On May 16, anti-lockdown protests spread to several cities throughout England, promoted by an online group calling itself the UK Freedom Movement. On June 13, even as the death toll from the coronavirus increased to 41,162, ignoring government restrictions, far-right protesters clashed with police in London in response to the Black Lives Matter movement and threatened historical monuments, with some even giving Nazi salutes. But Johnson himself had previously been hospitalized with COVID in April, a case that nearly killed him, and he could hardly ignore the rising number of cases through the summer and fall, which would reach 10.1 million in Britain by the end of November, with the death toll by that date numbering 145,000.18 In fact, in September, the British government announced a series of new, stricter regulations in response to another rise in the number of coronavirus cases; these guidelines included having office workers resume working remotely, requiring masks in all public places except where individuals were actively eating or drinking, and restricting the size of all private celebrations to fifteen people, except for funerals, which up to thirty people could attend. This new round of guidelines provoked an additional outcry from the right and from backbenchers in his own party against the prime minister, but Johnson unflappably defended the new restrictions, saying he refused to allow the virus to simply “run its course.” However, when around 100 members of his party threatened to withdraw their support from his government, Johnson relented and allowed for a parliamentary vote on the lockdown measures he had imposed. The affable Johnson survived that crisis but again faced opposition from dozens of Conservative Party members when he proposed a tiered plan for reopening the country from lockdown in November. Hopes for any easing in the pandemic proved premature; by November 5, Parliament voted to approve another monthlong lockdown after another spike in coronavirus cases. This did not sit well with some members of Johnson’s party, including Tom Tugendhat, member of Parliament from Kent, who argued that

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lockdowns clearly did not work because the pandemic seemed to be getting worse in spite of them, at great harm to the economy in his constituency.19 As the second wave of the pandemic hit France, the government reinstituted the state of emergency that had expired in July, while President Emmanuel Macron sought to strike the right balance between public safety and individual freedom in meeting this challenging situation. Macron sought to take a broader view of the pandemic, saying he wanted to avoid opening and closing the country every other week, by opting for a more measured and consistent long-range plan. In November, a judge allowed a protest, which the government had banned to prevent the further spread of the coronavirus, to take place at which demonstrators voiced their opposition to a “global security bill” that proposed outlawing the filming of police. In France, as in the United States and elsewhere, the police had come under fire for episodes of unwarranted or excessive violence, so the bill was understandably quite controversial. In explaining his decision, the judge observed that the government had allowed other protests to take place during the pandemic, so it seemed inconsistent for it to single this one out, especially since it aimed at protesting a law. However, the so-called Freedom Marches, slated for the end of the month, got out of control, with police in Paris using tear gas to subdue the protesters. When videos appeared showing the police using excessive force and administering beatings to the protesters, Macron criticized the police, calling one particular video of a man named Michel Zecler enduring a brutal attack by police in his studio “shameful.” On December 14, the British government once again tightened restrictions, including another decree mandating mask wearing in all public places, prompting ninety-nine Conservative members of Parliament to once again rebel and vote against party leadership, this time in the midst of a brewing scandal involving a costly refurbishing of Johnson’s apartment at government expense. In addition, Britain still faced a dire situation. For example, during the first wave (the first twenty-seven weeks of the pandemic), the total number of coronavirus cases in England numbered 242,763 cases, resulting in 39,005 deaths, while during the remainder of the year, cases skyrocketed to 2,037,895, resulting in an additional 33,173 deaths.20 Conservative backbenchers would drop their opposition to new restrictions added in January to deal with the new Omicron variant of COVID, but the air of scandal surrounding Johnson would only increase in the course of the next eighteen months. In Italy and France, the year ended with far-right politicians such as Matteo Salvini and Marie Le Pen calling for closer relations with Russia and a lifting of sanctions imposed on Vladimir Putin’s regime by the European Union, seeing the pandemic as an opportunity to gain Putin’s support and undermine the regimes then in power that were hamstrung by the pandemic. For Salvini, this turned out to be a prelude to his continued disruption that helped bring down

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the governments of Giuseppe Conte and Mario Draghi in 2021 and 2022, respectively. In France, Macron benefited from the splintering of extremist opposition to his centrist government but could not escape the feeling that the two sides were gaining on him as he struggled to control the pandemic and manage France’s economic recovery at the same time. Le Pen was joined on the French right by a new presidential candidate, Eric Zemmour, a former television commentator who took an even harder stance on immigration than Le Pen and thus positioned himself even farther to the right. Essentially, by the end of the annus horribilis of 2020, the coronavirus pandemic was proving too powerful for even the best-prepared and most well-intentioned governments and political leaders, destabilizing politics in an already turbulent age fraught with political minefields that threatened democratic norms. In the United States, even the January 6, 2021, insurrection was carried out against the larger backdrop of the pandemic, which had stoked antiestablishment and populist tendencies among the supporters of Donald J. Trump, whose bogus claims of election fraud fell in line with people’s lack of trust in the government and scientific authorities on issues like vaccines and mask wearing to combat the virus. In the United States, the insurrection ultimately failed but not without a frightening scene at the Capitol and a few moments when the fate of both democracy and the lives of prominent politicians hung in the balance. (Seven people actually did die as a result of the insurrection, including three police officers.) Presidentelect Joseph R. Biden did take the oath of office on January 20 as scheduled, promising to heal the “soul of the nation.” It is worth mentioning these American developments here because they cast a light on European politics and demonstrated the dangers of populism in the COVID-19 era. In fact, six days after Biden’s inauguration, Prime Minister Conte of Italy resigned. Conte’s resignation roiled Italian politics at a critical moment when governments were just beginning to roll out vaccinations and the road through the pandemic still seemed so uncertain, Italy’s death toll from the coronavirus having just topped 85,000. The surprising thing about Conte’s resignation was that he still enjoyed about a 56 percent approval rating at the time, leading many pundits to speculate that he resigned in the hopes of forming a stronger coalition with additional support. It seemed that Italy might fall into another period of political chaos if Conte could not cobble together another coalition government after former Prime Minster Matteo Renzi had withdrawn the support of his democratic party. Meanwhile, the far right in Italy saw this as an opportunity to return Italy to a fascist-style authoritarian regime. European leaders breathed a sigh of relief when two weeks later Italy’s President Sergio Mattarella asked Mario Draghi, a former president of the European Central Bank, to form a government. In April 2021, Draghi spoke on a webinar video call, offering

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the gloomy prognostication that COVID would likely remain a permanent threat to public health that would require international coordination to prevent future outbreaks of the disease. He also called for additional measures to combat the economic effects of the pandemic, which at the time had already led to more than 3 million deaths around the globe. Draghi was an effective manager who sought to use his administrative skills to handle both the public health crisis and Italy’s economic recovery sensibly and effectively. Yet from the beginning, Draghi walked a precarious political tightrope, trying to balance the competing factions within his own government, which included four members of the left-wing populist Five-Star Party and three members each from the anti-immigration League (Lega) and Forza Italia in his twenty-three-person cabinet. The Five-Star Party indicated from the start that they might withdraw their support from Draghi at any time, which they eventually did in July 2022, causing the collapse of Draghi’s coalition government. Draghi’s alliance with the other populist parties would prove problematic as well. In October, the leader of the League, Matteo Salvini, faced charges of kidnapping and abuse of office for his role in preventing 147 migrants from entering the country in August 2019, when Salvini was minister of the interior. Italian courts ultimately dismissed the case against him, and Salvini remained head of the League and, heading into the autumn of 2022, was poised to join a coalition government with far-right leader Giorgia Meloni and her fascist-inspired Brothers of Italy Party. In June, the founder of Italy’s left-wing populist Five-Star Party, Beppe Grillo, asked Conte to consider becoming the new head of the party. Conte had relied on the support of the Five-Star as prime minister but as the head of a coalition government had not committed himself to one particular party. Conte wanted a fresher approach that would bring the party more into the political mainstream and attract established politicians, but Grillo insisted that the party retain its initial mandate as a party of outsiders whose aim was to challenge the political status quo. Conte’s leadership would undoubtedly have strengthened the Five-Star Party, as rumors swirled that he had enough support from voters to found his own party. Meanwhile, Macron and Johnson continued to face problems of their own in 2021. When a third wave of coronavirus hospitalizations hit France that spring, Macron proved reluctant to reimpose the extent of the previous restrictions he had decreed in the interest of public safety during the earlier outbreaks in what seemed to be a reversal of his attitude and policy toward the pandemic. For a time, the pandemic may have overshadowed the problems besetting France and other Western democracies, but on May 1, more than 100,000 demonstrators gathered throughout France to protest against the widespread economic inequality in France that had predated the arrival of the coronavirus and in support of “employment, salaries, public services, social

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protection, freedoms and world peace.”21 In May 2021, in the face of mounting criticism, including from an organization calling itself the COVID-19 Bereaved Families for Justice Group, Johnson finally acknowledged that an inquiry into the government’s handling of the crisis would take place, though this did little to appease those who believed it should have occurred much sooner. Johnson faced yet another rebellion from within his party when ninety-nine Conservative members of Parliament openly opposed a proposed requirement for a vaccination certificate. In addition to the criticism Johnson faced from within his own party and from right-wing groups that thought the government’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic was too heavy-handed, his government also drew the ire of human rights group over a new Police and Crime Bill introduced in September 2021 and becoming law as the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act in April 2022. Among the myriad regulations on a variety of issues, the act most significantly, in the eyes of many, awarded police additional powers to control and restrict protests (while still acknowledging the ability to protest as a fundamental human right). Italy, the first to impose lockdowns when the pandemic struck the country, now became the first country in Western Europe to mandate vaccinations. Strengthened by a high court ruling that Conte, when he was prime minister, did not violate Italy’s laws or constitution in issuing decrees intended to combat the pandemic in 2020, the Italian government introduced a vaccine mandate in the workplace in October 2021 and extended the mandate to all citizens over the age of fifty on January 8, 2022. Polls showed that the majority of Italians supported these measures, but they still stirred controversy and provoked opposition from many people. For example, Matteo Salvini questioned the efficacy of vaccines, as did conservative populist leader Marine Le Pen in France. Salvini, who refused to get vaccinated himself, drew criticism even from other senior members of his own League for his attack on mandatory vaccines and his implication that they are not only salutary but also dangerous. Naturally, he attacked the required Green Passes allowing people to return to work as of October. The measure provoked protests and strikes by unvaccinated workers, including a massive rally in Rome led by the extreme right-wing party AREA, which threatened to slow Italy’s economic recovery.22 Macron’s vow to push the French toward vaccination and require health passes for access to public places such as restaurants had provoked widespread protests in July 2021, largely supported by Le Pen, who sought to avoid alienating her anti-vaccination supporters despite the fact she had encouraged elderly and at-risk people to get the vaccine. In short, once vaccines became widely available, they became another source of controversy and another issue for populists suspicious of governmental and scientific authorities. In demonstrations in France on July 14, 2021, France’s national holiday, Bastille Day, protestors wore yellow stars

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to protest a proposed requirement that French citizens carry health passes indicating whether they had been vaccinated. The yellow stars, like those the Nazis forced Jews to wear during their reign of terror on Germany, provoked widespread outrage from local and national politicians and officials as well as leaders of several Jewish organizations at the implied comparison between twenty-first-century France and Hitler’s Germany. Violence broke out at demonstrations in Paris and Lyons between police and protestors, who were also upset at Macron’s announcement delaying the start of the school year because of the pandemic. However, demonstrations had started to wane by the end of the summer, with the majority of the French people supporting vaccination mandates. The arrival of the omicron variant of the coronavirus in December found Macron and the French government wrestling once again with whether to impose new restrictions to stop the spread of this incredibly contagious iteration of the disease. However, by February, Macron had become convinced that further restrictions were needed, including mandatory vaccines, saying of the unvaccinated in one interview, “I really want to piss them off.”23 CONCLUSION So what did the pandemic mean for democracy and populism in Britain, France, and Italy? And what lessons do the experience of these countries hold for other countries around the world? First, one of the great ironies of the pandemic is that it featured on a regular basis populists opposing conservative governments and charging them with fascism and authoritarian tendencies, which they would have been likely to support on issues such as immigration and even racial discrimination, under other circumstances. Conte’s government in Italy had always relied heavily on populist support until it fell in January 2021 accompanied by charges that the government had acted draconically in imposing restrictions, vaccinations, and lockdowns to deal with the pandemic. Boris Johnson had helped transform the Conservative Party by uniting it with the populist support for Brexit, initially campaigning for the job of prime minister by promising that he would “get Brexit done.” When he was found to have flouted his own government’s restrictions and lied about it, he lost much public credibility as his approval ratings plummeted to around 20 percent, and he ultimately lost the support not only of the Conservative rank and file but also of those within his own administration. Once admired, as Trump was in the United States, as an antiestablishment rule breaker, Johnson now appeared as another entitled politician who would have others abide by onerous lockdowns and restrictions on movement and seeing family members while ignoring them himself.

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Second, in the three countries surveyed here and in the West in general, the pandemic exposed a greater tendency to distrust both scientists and the government than in more authoritarian regimes in Asia, such as China and Singapore, where the public accepted mask wearing and other government restrictions as a matter of course, leading to greater efficacy in those countries’ attempts to contain the spread of the coronavirus. Third, while the pandemic roiled politics in Britain, France, and Italy, the recent history and political situation at the time of this writing illustrate that it did not do so in uniform ways or produce identical or even similar results. In Britain, Johnson’s bumbling and cavalier approach to politics and the truth ultimately undermined his popular appeal. His approval ratings sank with each new scandal or faux pas, leading his own Conservative Party to unseat him in July 2022. Neither of his potential successors, Rishi Sunak or Liz Truss, while they share certain aspects of Johnson’s political agenda, seem likely to follow his polarizing example. As of this writing, the Labour Party is widely expected to win a majority in Parliament and thus provide a new prime minister at the next election. In France, the right-wing populist Marine Le Pen provided a legitimate threat to the centrist Emmanuel Macron in the 2022 election there. Her efforts to coordinate with other right-wing populist leaders, such as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary and Jaroslaw Kaczynski of Poland, threatened to make populism a force in the European Parliament, but Le Pen’s electoral defeat, though by a narrower margin than in the previous election, suggested that French democracy might survive without yielding to populist rule, even though Le Pen had tried to moderate her earlier positions as well as those of her controversial father and founder of her party, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Italy, despite its record of relative success addressing the pandemic, saw the biggest growth in populism during the pandemic years to the point where a coalition of populist parties felt strong enough to bring down the coalition government led by Mario Draghi in July 2022, raising the possibility that Giorgia Melloni, the leader of the nativist party, the Brothers of Italy, might become the first female prime minister in Italian history. In January 2022, Draghi had previously indicated his willingness to serve as president, which would have put him a position to select the new prime minister. (The Italian president, a largely ceremonial office but with increasing influence because of the fractious nature of Italian politics, serves a seven-year term independent of the rise and fall of parliamentary governments.) Instead, the Christian Democrat Sergio Mattarella reluctantly agreed to serve a second term. Mattarella’s reelection bolstered Draghi’s government temporarily and allowed him to carry on with reforms and the administration of recovery funds granted to Italy by the European Parliament. By July, however, Draghi had been unsuccessful at building a consensus among

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his coalition partners, leading to the collapse of his government. He stood accused of offering a weak package of economic aid earmarked specifically to help small businesses and families out of the financial mess created by the pandemic despite a proposed package totaling €23 billion. Mattarella, a noncontroversial figure who enjoyed enormously high approval ratings even throughout the pandemic may have no choice but to ask Meloni or another far-right leader to form a government, raising fears that Italy would return to its fascist past, with all that meant for the general direction of European politics during the interwar years of the 1920s and 1930s. This chapter has found that the intersection of the economic and financial implications of COVID policies with individual freedoms was evident throughout. Following the financial crisis of 2008 and the rise of populism in many countries around the world in the following decade, the pandemic in many respects could not have come at a worse time. An adequate response to the pandemic required imagination, leadership, intense scientific activity, and the cooperation of the public in order to control the spread of the coronavirus and prevent as many illnesses and deaths as possible while simultaneously trying to find effective treatments and cures for those who contracted the disease. Unfortunately, much public misinformation, a cultural and political divide in most countries that led to the politicization of the virus instead of treating it as a medical crisis best treated in a systematic manner using the most advanced scientific knowledge available, and leadership in many countries that wavered between appeasing a public wary of believing political and scientific authorities and not wishing to take the blame for a high death toll led to a suboptimal situation in terms of COVID-19. In Britain, Boris Johnson and members of his administration brazenly and blatantly ignored their own rules and guidelines, repeatedly lied to Parliament and the British public, and furthered the distrust of the people toward public authorities. In Italy, populists sought to capitalize on the pandemic for their own political purposes rather than continuing to support a unified coalition government and posed the most serious threat to democracy in any of the three countries surveyed here. Only in France did Emmanuel Macron retain the confidence of a majority of his people in the face of the pandemic, the economic breakdown that it caused, and attacks from populists on both the right and the left. Yet even in France, populist parties gained rather than lost support during the pandemic, making the future of democracy there a bit more precarious than it was when the pandemic began.

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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  Define populism. What role did it play during the pandemic in Britain, France, and Italy? 2.  How did Prime Minister Boris Johnson respond to the pandemic in Britain? Did his actions and policies serve the best interests of the British people? 3.  Why did Italy have two changes in government during the pandemic while the same parties and individuals stayed in power in Britain and France between March 2020 and July 2022? 4.  Why was France considered so important as a test case for democracy in other parts of the Western world? 5.  What reasons do you see for optimism or pessimism about the future of democracy in the West in general based on the recent history of these three countries? NOTES 1. Special thanks to Killian Mann, MA student in the Department of History and Anthropology, Monmouth University, who assisted with the research for this chapter. 2. Melissa Godin, “Why Is Italy’s Coronavirus Outbreak So Bad?,” Time, March 10, 2020, https:​//​time​.com​/5799586​/italy​-coronavirus​-outbreak​/#. 3. Sarah Boseley, “New Data, New Policy: Why UK’s Coronavirus Strategy Changed,” The Guardian, March 16, 2022, https:​//​www​.theguardian​.com​/world​/2020​ /mar​/16​/new​-data​-new​-policy​-why​-uks​-coronavirus​-strategy​-has​-changed. 4. Patrick Roger, “Coronavirus: Ce que contient la loi instaurant un ‘état d’urgence sanitaire’ votée par le Parlement,” Le Monde, March 22, 2020, https:​//​www​.lemonde​ .fr​/politique​/article​/2020​/03​/22​/coronavirus​-ce​-que​-contient​-le​-projet​-de​-loi​-urgence​ _6034040​_823448​.html. 5. Jason Horowitz, “How Italy Turned around Its Coronavirus Calamity,” New York Times, July 31, 2020, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​/2020​/07​/31​/world​/europe​/italy​ -coronavirus​-reopening​.html. 6. Jonathan Hopkin, Anti-System Politics: The Crisis of Market Liberalism in Rich Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 67. 7. Lucia Corso, “When Anti-Politics Becomes Political: What Can the Italian Five-Star Movement Tell Us about the Relationship between Populism and Legalism,” European Constitutional Law Review 15, no. 3 (2019): 462–87, doi:10.1017/ S1574019619000282. 8. Sophie Pedder, Revolution Francaise: Emmanuel Macron and the Quest to Reinvent a Nation (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 125. 9. Adrian Williamson, Europe and the Decline of Social Democracy in Britain: From Attlee to Brexit (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2019), 4–5.

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10. Ibid., 45. 11. See especially Maria Sobolewska and Robert Ford, Brexitland: Identity, Diversity and the Reshaping of British Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), esp. 235–40. 12. Angelo Amante, “Over Half of Italians Back Giving Up Freedoms for Public Health amid COVID-19: Survey,” Reuters, December 4, 2020, https:​//​www​.reuters​ .com​/article​/us​-health​-coronavirus​-italy​-survey​/over​-half​-of​-italians​-back​-giving​-up​ -freedoms​-for​-public​-health​-amid​-covid​-19​-survey​-idUSKBN28E1VM. 13. “Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Domestic Violence,” press release, French National Academy of Medicine, December 18, 2020, https:​//​www​.academie​ -medecine​.fr​/impact​-of​-the​-covid​-19​-pandemic​-on​-domestic​-violence​/​?lang​=en. 14. Patrick Roger, “Coronavirus: Ce que contient la loi instaurant un ‘état d’urgence sanitaire’ votée par le Parlement,” Le Monde, August 29, 2020, https:​//​www​ .lemonde​.fr​/politique​/article​/2020​/08​/29​/a​-paris​-un​-rassemblement​-anti​-masques​-aux​ -revendications​-multiples​_6050332​_823448​.html. 15. V. Galasso and M. Foucault, “Working during COVID-19: Cross-Country Evidence from Real-Time Survey Data,” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, no. 246, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2020, https:​//​doi​.org​/10​.1787​ /34a2c306​-en. 16. Paul Tullis, “Dutch Cooperation Made an ‘Intelligent Lockdown’ a Success,” Bloomberg News, June 4, 2020, https:​//​www​.bloomberg​.com​/news​/features​/2020​-06​ -05​/netherlands​-coronavirus​-lockdown​-dutch​-followed​-the​-rules. 17. Tania Suggs, “Coronavirus: Former Italy PM Silvio Berlusconi Responding ‘Optimally’ to COVID-19 Treatment,” Sky News, September 6, 2020, https:​//​news​ .sky​.com​/story​/coronavirus​-former​-italy​-pm​-silvio​-berlusconi​-responding​-optimally​ -to​-covid​-19​-treatment​-12065270. 18. Of the approximately 145,000 coronavirus deaths in the United Kingdom, about 126,000 occurred in England, 9,500 in Scotland, 6,300 in Wales, and 2,900 in Northern Ireland. 19. Peter Walker, Jessica Elgot, and Josh Halliday, “Up to 70 Tories May Refuse to Back Boris Johnson’s COVID Tiers, Say MPs,” The Guardian, November 26, 2020, https:​//​www​.theguardian​.com​/world​/2020​/nov​/26​/up​-to​-70​-tory​-mps​-could​ -vote​-against​-boris​-johnsons​-covid​-tiers. 20. “COVID-19 Confirmed Deaths in England (to 32 December 2020): Report,” Gov.UK, May 3, 2022, https:​//​www​.shorturl​.at​/otU05. 21. “1er-Mai: Entre 106 000 et 170 000 manifestants dans toute la France,” May 1, 2021, https:​//​www​.lemonde​.fr​/politique​/article​/2021​/05​/01​/le​-second​-1er​ -mai​-syndical​-en​-temps​-de​-covid​-19​-mais​-a​-nouveau​-dans​-la​-rue​_6078753​_823448​ .html.

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22. Hannah Roberts, “Vaccine Rebels Vow to Paralyze Italy over Incoming COVID Passport,” Politco, October 14, 2021, https:​//​www​.politico​.eu​/article​/italy​ -anti​-vaccine​-protestors​-against​-covid​-passport. 23. Tracy McNicoll, “In Vaccine-Sceptic France, Candidates Walk Tightrope on COVID Measures,” France 24, February 16, 2022, https:​ //​ www​ .france24​ .com​ /en​ /europe​/20220216​-in​-vaccine​-sceptic​-france​-candidates​-walk​-a​-tightrope​-on​-covid​ -measures.

Chapter 9

“Speech Now,” but Not with a Bullhorn Political Misinformation in the Age of Super PACs in the United States Joseph N. Patten

As some of the framers of the Constitution were outside reveling in the successful completion of the newly created US Constitution on September 18, 1787, Benjamin Franklin walked ahead when a local Philadelphia woman called out from the window of her home to ask, “Dr. Franklin, what is it—a monarchy or a republic?” Franklin stopped in his tracks, turned toward the woman, and pointedly said, “A republic, Madam, if you can keep it.”1 Franklin’s ominous response is a reminder that all of the constitutional safeguards in place, such as the Bill of Rights, the system of checks and balances, and federalism, are of little value if these democratic principles are not upheld by elected officials, political institutions, and, most important, the citizenry itself. Many Americans have become socially conditioned to believe that the United States is immune from the worrisome cultural trends that have caused other democratic nations to stumble into authoritarianism. However, democratic backsliding is rarely brought about by full frontal assaults on the types of constitutional principles put in place by the American framers. Democracies instead tend to grow weak by the subtle but powerful force of repeated political lies of would-be autocrats who declare war on truth itself as a political tactic to undo institutional rules that were put in place to check executive powers. Autocrats are typically supported by large donors and tend to use political misinformation to chip away at the very democratic guardrails 201

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ensconced to protect democracies against despots. One scholar referred to this phenomenon as the “tragic paradox” of how “democracy’s assassins use the very institutions—gradually, subtly, and even legally—to kill it.”2 POLITICAL MISINFORMATION AND THE PANDEMIC ELECTION Approximately eighteen months after the January 6 raid on the US Capitol, the US Department of Justice has made 855 arrests of the “stop the steal” rioters on charges ranging from trespassing to seditious conspiracy.3 The US House of Representative’s Select Committee to Investigate the January 6 attack on the US Capitol has also since interviewed more than one thousand witnesses under oath to unearth the potential legal culpability of top White House and campaign officials.4 One strongly worded federal judicial opinion remarked that President Trump’s strategy to overturn the election results represented “a coup in search of a legal theory” and that the “illegality of the plan was obvious.”5 President Trump’s legal team of Sidney Powell and former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani called nationally televised press conferences to assert a dizzying array of theories as to how the election was stolen from President Trump. One of their more outlandish claims was that computer software associated with the former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who died in 2013, was used in Dominion voting machines to flip votes from Trump to Biden.6 Other more mainstream theories asserted that changes in voting procedures across states brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic made it easier to commit voter fraud. To address long voting lines and other voting challenges caused by the coronavirus during the 2020 primary elections, many states expanded methods of voting for the general election. For example, more than twice as many general election voters cast their ballot by mail during the 2020 presidential election (43 percent) compared to 2016 (21 percent).7 However, there has been no credible evidence suggesting this increased access to voting through mail ballots or early voting has led to coordinated, wide-scale efforts to commit voter fraud in any state. President Trump’s own attorney general, William Barr, said that the US Department of Justice has not “seen fraud on a scale that could have effected a different outcome in the election.”8 Ultimately, the election turned on the voting outcomes in the six battleground states of Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, which President Biden narrowly won by a combined 311,257 votes. The most comprehensive voting analysis in these six hotly contested states conducted by the Associated Press found only 475 individual cases of voter fraud out of the 25.5 million votes cast, and many of these fraudulent

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votes had been earlier detected and were not included in the states’ final vote tallies.9 There is also ample evidence to suggest that former President Trump and his legal team did not themselves believe the voter fraud claims they were making to the American public. Less than a week before the election, former White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon told a group of supporters that there was a preexisting plan in place for Trump to declare victory on election night regardless of the outcome. On a recently discovered tape, Bannon said, “What Trump’s gonna do is just declare victory, right? . . . He’s just gonna say he’s a winner.”10 Former Republican Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers testified that President Trump’s legal team tried to convince him that Arizona’s election results were invalid because large numbers of deceased residents voted in the election. When Bowers asked for a list of names of deceased Arizona voters, Trump’s lawyer Giuliani reportedly replied, “We’ve got lots of theories, we just don’t have the evidence.”11 There was also wide variance in the claims that Trump’s legal team made in televised press conferences and the legal claims they made in courts of law. When asked by a judge at trial if Trump’s lawyers were claiming electoral fraud, his legal team, constrained by the legal rules of ethics that requires evidence to support claims, responded that “this is not a fraud case.”12 This chapter examines the role of political money in funding and promoting political misinformation in the United States as it relates to inciting the January 6 raid on the US Capitol and the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, it provides an overview of how changes to the US campaign finance system, brought about by the creation of super political action committees (PACs) in the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) and SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission (2010) court cases, have supercharged the ability of hyper-partisan mega-donors to finance the spreading of political misinformation for the purpose of promoting out of the mainstream agendas. While much has been written on the negative impact of right-wing and left-wing populist movements in fanning the flames of political division, much less has been written on the critical role that super PACs have played in financing political misinformation campaigns put forward by wealthy extremists. Super PACs have become a major force in funding the spreading of political misinformation because they are singularly permitted to receive and spend unlimited amounts of money from individual donors and even foreign actors looking to destabilize the American system of government. Because of the excessively complicated array of campaign finance loopholes that will be addressed later in this chapter, super PACs are also able to receive and spend unlimited amounts of dark money, where the original source of the funding is never publicly disclosed. After reviewing how congressional legislation and court opinions paved the way for

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the creation of super PACs in 2010, this chapter will examine the role that super PACs played in spreading political misinformation as it relates to the January 6 raid on the US Capitol and the public response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These two cases were selected because they continue to represent the two most politically salient issues in the United States, and both highlight how political misinformation is used to weaken public trust in the American system of government. Free Speech Rights versus the War on Truth in the United States In the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant wrote about the immorality of lying and the destructive impact that public lies can have on democratic systems of government. He maintained that lying is wrong in much the same way that using coercion or violence to achieve one’s goal is wrong. Kant reasoned that lying is immoral because it attempts to overpower the “autonomous will of another person” to form their own opinions and degrades human dignity by treating others as a means to our own ends.13 Political misinformation has played a harmful role in the US response to the coronavirus pandemic, which has already taken more than 1 million American lives. Recent polling shows that 25 percent of Americans continue to be skeptical about the safety of the vaccine almost two years out from the start of the pandemic.14 Disinformation campaigns have been effective in raising doubts about the vaccine despite scientific research showing that unvaccinated people are fourteen times more likely to die from COVID than vaccinated people.15 Additionally, the scale of political misinformation used to incite more than 2,000 Trump supporters to raid the US Capitol to stop members of Congress from counting Electoral College votes is unprecedented in US history. Subsequent court hearings revealed that many of the US Capitol rioters believed that they were doing their patriotic duty by raiding the Capitol based on what they were told by former President Trump and social media sites. During his seventy-minute speech at his “Save America” rally preceding the US Capitol raid, President Trump told supporters that if they did not take immediate action to stop Congress from counting Electoral Votes, they “will have an illegitimate President. That is what you will have, and we can’t let that happen.” A few moments later, he told the crowd that “if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a county anymore.”16 Social media companies grew so concerned about President Trump’s incendiary speech that Facebook and Twitter banned Trump from their platforms “due to the risk of further incitement of violence.”17 It is now hard to fathom that the person singularly entrusted with the nuclear codes of the United States was deemed too reckless to possess a Facebook and Twitter account.

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One recent Washington Post study found that former President Trump told 30,573 “untruths” during his four year in office, which averages out to twenty-one public falsehoods per day.18 It also showed that the number of misleading statements increased dramatically in October, the month leading up to national elections, which suggests that political misinformation about the pandemic and other important issues were being used as a political tactic to win national elections. The number of public lies increased each year of the Trump presidency, from six public falsehoods per day in his first year in office to thirty-nine untruths per day in his fourth year of office during the pandemic. By comparison, a New York Times study early in the Trump presidency found that President Trump told six times as many “blatant lies” in his first ten months of office (103) as President Obama told in his eight years as president (eighteen).19 Limiting Political Misinformation through Criminal Incitement Laws In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the US Supreme Court for the first time equated campaign contributions and expenditures with the free speech rights of donors and candidates. That is why, to regulate against political misinformation, it is essential to have a general understanding of how campaign finance regulations intersect with the constitutionally protected free speech rights of all Americans. One of the most difficult challenges in limiting political misinformation stems from the fact that Americans mostly have a constitutional right to lie. Free speech was one of the bedrock natural rights promoted by the seventeenth-century social contract theorist John Locke. One of the ways the US Constitution later enshrined these natural rights is by severely restricting the ability of government to curb free expression, especially when it involves political speech. According to the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”20 However, in Scheck v. United States (1919), the Supreme Court limited free speech rights of antiwar protesters by upholding provisions of the Espionage Act that made it illegal to interfere with the government’s role in carrying out the military draft. It was in this case that Holmes famously asserted that free speech rights should not “protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic.”21 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), the Supreme Court established the “fighting words” doctrine that allows government to limit words that “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”22 This standard mostly empowers governments to regulate

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face-to-face interactions that could reasonably illicit an immediate violent reaction. However, later, in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Court reversed course by expanding speech rights in requiring states to clear a high legal bar when attempting to prosecute suspects for criminal incitement. In this case, the court ruled that only speech that is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” can be restricted.23 In other words, to establish criminal incitement, prosecutors carry the heavy burden of establishing cause and effect by proving that the speech was intended to bring about immediate violent acts. It is now up for debate in the legal community as to whether President Trump’s speech at the January 6 rally rose to the level of criminal incitement. Limiting Political Misinformation through Defamation Law Another way to fight against political misinformation is to file civil suits against those who use falsehoods to harm the reputation of political rivals. The Supreme Court has ruled that free speech rights do not extend to defamation law. While Americans mostly have a right to lie, we do not have a right to tell lies that unfairly harm others. The verbal form of defamation law is referred to as slander, and the written form of defamation law is known as libel. After the 2020 presidential election, Dominion Voting Systems filed a number of ongoing billion-dollar defamation suits against Trump attorney Sidney Powell, Rudolph Giuliani, Fox News, the One American News Network, My Pillow CEO Mike Lindell, and others for falsely claiming that Dominion rigged their voting machines, which are now widely used in twenty-eight states, to flip votes from Trump to Biden.24 Sidney Powell unsuccessfully tried to have the defamation case against her dismissed by oddly claiming that no one should have believed her claims because her statements were made in the context of the “2020 presidential election, which was both bitter and controversial.”25 Some legal experts believe the pharmaceutical companies Pfizer, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson could follow Dominion’s lead by bringing defamation suits against anti-vaccine groups spreading misinformation about the safety of their COVID-19 vaccines.26 Political Misinformation and Campaign Finance Laws There are currently vastly different regulatory standards of campaign finance laws, depending on who contributes political money (i.e., individuals or corporations) and who is receiving political money (i.e., federal candidates or outside organizations). Campaign finance laws are made even more confusing by the competing federal regulatory agencies now responsible for

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enforcing how political money is raised and spent. For example, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) is charged with enforcing campaign finance laws related to how candidates raise and spend political money in federal elections. However, the FEC does not as closely regulate how super PACs raise revenue for purposes of electioneering in federal campaigns. Super PACs are instead formed according to obscure tax codes established by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The overly complicated array of legal distinctions inherent in campaign finance laws today makes little sense if federal candidates and super PACs are both raising and spending political money for the purpose of influencing outcomes in federal elections. Dissimilar regulatory standards for campaign finance formed out of a fundamental disagreement on the Supreme Court about whether the primary purpose of campaign finance law is to limit the corrupting influence of large donors or to protect the free speech rights of large donors. This chapter will now briefly review how many of the problems stemming from super PAC financing of political misinformation could be significantly alleviated by extending campaign finance laws that now exist for federal candidates to super PACs. Limiting the Influence of Large Donors: The Tillman Act (1907) and the Federal Election Campaign Act (1974) Political money went mostly unregulated in the United States throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, campaign finance became a major issue in the 1904 presidential election after Democratic challenger Alton B. Parker accused Theodore Roosevelt of accepting corporate contributions in exchange for blocking antitrust suits against certain industries.27 While Roosevelt went on to win reelection, he remained bruised from Parker’s attack and sought to bolster his trust-busting credentials. In a speech before both houses of Congress, Roosevelt directed his ire against the growing influence of corporate robber barons in saying that “all contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose should be forbidden by law.”28 Congress heeded President Roosevelt’s call by enacting the first major federal campaign finance law via the Tillman Act of 1907, which banned corporate contributions in federal elections.29 A few decades later, the contribution ban was extended to labor unions over President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s veto in the Smith-Connally Act of 1943.30 The Tillman Act (1907) and the Smith-Connally Act (1943) are still in force today in that corporations and labor unions are still banned from using their treasuries to contribute directly to federal candidates. But campaign finance laws have historically been “more loophole than law” in that corporations and labor unions were able to circumvent contribution bans by creating outside

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organizations to fund campaigns on their behalf.31 These outside organizations are better known today as PACs. The first PAC was created immediately after the enactment of the Smith-Connally Act in 1943 by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO-PAC). Today, there are more than 4,600 corporate PACs organized by businesses, labor unions, and nonprofit organizations. So just as the Tillman Act of 1907 and the Smith-Connally Act of 1943 led to the creation of PACs, upcoming sections will shed light on how the Citizens United and SpeechNow court cases led to the creation of super PACs in 2010. The Watergate Scandal and the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 The most sweeping campaign finance reforms were enacted in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal during the Nixon administration. In the months leading up to President Nixon’s 1972 reelection bid against Democratic nominee George McGovern, Republican operatives were arrested for breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate complex in Washington, DC.32 Ignoring the adage that the cover-up is usually worse than the crime, President Nixon became personally involved in the scandal by agreeing to pay hush money to the jailed burglars in exchange for their pledge not to implicate Nixon’s campaign in the operation. He was recorded telling White House Counsel John Dean that he could get $1 million from political slush funds to, as Nixon put it, “keep the cap on the bottle” and “buy time” and “tough it through” the widening scandal.33 Of course, things did not go as planned, as Nixon went on to become the first American president to resign from office over his role in the conspiracy. During almost two years of televised congressional hearings over the Watergate affair, the nation came to learn about a number of unscrupulous campaign activities that included “coercion to induce campaign contributions, money laundering,” and other unethical fundraising behavior.34 The public outcry over the Watergate scandal unsurprisingly catapulted campaign finance regulation onto the national agenda. In enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Congress for the first time sought to curb the corrupting influence of wealthy donors by placing $1,000 individual contribution limits (now $2,900) per election on donors and $5,000 contribution limits (now $5,600) on PACs.35 It also required federal candidates to disclose all campaign contributions over $200 in quarterly report filings to the newly created FEC.36 Not surprisingly, the legality of these groundbreaking reforms was quickly challenged on free speech and due process grounds in the Supreme Court. In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Court made important legal distinctions between campaign contributions and campaign expenditures by

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upholding contribution limits and public disclosure requirements but striking down campaign expenditure limits. While the Supreme Court recognized that contribution limits on individuals and PACs marginally infringe on the free speech rights of large donors, they were upheld because they were believed to serve a larger “governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process.”37 In explaining the Court’s rationale for limiting the corrupting influence of wealthy donors, the Court declared that contribution limits were essential in serving as the “primary weapon against the reality or appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on large contributions.”38 What is most striking about this anti-corruption standard is the Court’s contention that even the public appearance that wealthy donors might be improperly influencing elections is justification enough to overpower any free speech claim made on behalf of large donors. However, the Supreme Court offered greater free speech protection to political campaigns to spend political money by striking down expenditure limits on campaigns. The Court reasoned that allowing Congress to limit campaign spending could unfairly harm candidates with low name recognition and pose a “direct and substantial restraint on the quality of free speech” of political candidates.39 The Court also justified regulatory distinctions between donor contributions and campaign expenditures in reasoning that political corruption is more likely to occur in the process of raising political money than at the point of spending it. Protecting Free Speech Rights of Large Donors: Citizens United, SpeechNow, and the Creation of Super PACs in 2010 The Citizens United case was brought about during the closely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. In the closing months of the campaign, a conservative PAC named Citizens United filed suit after they were prohibited from airing a fault-finding documentary about Hillary Clinton called Hillary: The Movie. The airing of the film was blocked as a violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act, which prohibited corporations from funding “electioneering communications” that advocate for or against federal candidates.40 A similar case was first heard by the Supreme Court twenty years earlier. In Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce (1990), the Court upheld a state law in Michigan that prohibited corporations from contributing to independent organizations that engage in electioneering. The Court once again upheld corporate bans on electioneering communications in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003).41 However, in Citizens United, the Court overturned the precedent from Austin and McConnell in extending free speech rights to corporations by striking down corporate contribution bans to

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political organizations. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy argued that banning corporations from contributing to outside organizations that engage in electioneering is unlawful because it represents a form of government censorship.42 Super PACs were created two months later as a result of the DC Court of Appeals case SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission (2010). Whereas Citizens overturned corporate contribution bans to outside political groups, SpeechNow addressed whether it is constitutional to apply contribution limits that now exist for federal candidates to outside political organizations. The SpeechNow organization filed suit claiming that donor contribution limits that applied to their organization violated their free speech rights. Ultimately, the justices sided with SpeechNow in ruling all contribution limits to outside organizations unconstitutional. The SpeechNow decision created a bifurcated campaign finance system by striking down contribution limits to outside political groups while keeping contribution limits to federal candidates in place. SpeechNow extended the same dubious assumptions made in Citizens United that because “independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance of corruption, contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.”43 Super PACs were thus formed from the tragically misguided assumption that outside political groups cannot corrupt federal elections. Some legal scholars have made the same point more plainly in claiming that the SpeechNow decision is based entirely on the “untenable proposition that candidates cannot be corrupted by funds paid to and spent on their behalf by others.”44 The fallacy that outside groups cannot have a corrupting influence on federal elections was borne out in the 2020 midterm congressional elections, where super PACs were legally permitted to run satellite campaigns that outspent the real campaigns of both major party candidates combined in thirty-four congressional elections.45 Referring to super PACs as outside organizations might also be a form of political misinformation in that many are run by political insiders and referred to as “shadow parties” because some have assumed the role traditionally played by political parties. For example, some of the most impactful super PACs tend to strategically funnel large sums of political money into targeted toss-up congressional races for the purpose of swaying party control in the US House and Senate. The Corrosive Impact of Super PACs and Misinformation on the American Republic The role of super PACs in spreading political misinformation is already having a negative impact on the stability of American democracy. A recent

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Freedom House study found that after “experiencing a gradual decline in respect for political rights in civil liberties over the past decade, the United States is now facing an acute crisis for democracy.”46 This study points to increased levels of political polarization, high levels of public mistrust of government, and the outsized influence of extremist mega-donors brought about by weak campaign finance laws.47 The role of super PACs in destabilizing the political system might partially explain why the federal government had difficulty forming a national consensus on COVID-related policies given that public trust in government is now at record-low numbers. Only 20 percent of Americans today trust that the federal government is primarily motivated to do what is right by the American people, which is a sharp decline from the 77 percent level in 1964.48 What’s worse, Americans today do not even trust each other, as approximately 60 percent of Americans now claim to have no faith in the wisdom of the American people.49 The linkage between super PACs and political misinformation closely correlates with high levels of political polarization and increased trends toward negative partisanships, where party loyalty is held together primarily by hatred of the other major party’s leaders. When feelings of hostility toward political opposites is the glue holding parties together, the inclination to seek out and spread political misinformation increases dramatically.50 With the benefit of hindsight, it has become clear that the SpeechNow decision has had a far greater negative impact on the US political system than Citizens United. Striking down contribution limits to outside organizations in SpeechNow has created a forked campaign finance system where contribution limits are required for federal candidates but unlimited contributions are permitted to flow into super PACs. The SpeechNow decision eviscerated the importance of donor contribution limits put forth in the post-Watergate era by providing mega-donors an indirect route to contribute unlimited amounts of money to influence federal elections. In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld contribution limits because it believed they were the “primary weapon against the reality or appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on large contributions.” Inherent in this legal standard is the sense that it is corrosive to American democracy to allow affluent donors outsized influence to broadcast their views over electronic bullhorns to a national audience because it has the effect of drowning out the voices of the vast majority of less wealthy citizens. Since super PACs were created in SpeechNow in 2010, the top twelve individual donors have contributed $3.4 billion of political money, which accounts for one in every thirteen dollars (i.e., 7.5 percent) spent in American elections.51 Studies have also shown that super PACs have had a corrupting influence on our democracy by serving as the “attack dogs of modern politics,”52 by over-relying on synchronized negative advertising that increases political polarization,53

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and by impeding effective governance, as demonstrated in the government’s COVID response.54 Super PACs and the Corrupting Influence of Dark Money One of the most corrupt features stemming from the SpeechNow decision is the political loophole it created in allowing dark money into the political system. Dark money super PACs have emerged in 2020 as a “shadow political infrastructure that is reshaping American politics” by allowing large donors “to take advantage of loose disclosure laws to make multi-million-dollar outlays in total secrecy.”55 Total political spending in the 2020 national election cycle was $14.4 billion, which more than doubled political spending in the 2016 national elections.56 Approximately $3.4 billion of that $14.4. billion was raised by super PACs,57 and approximately one-third of all super PAC revenue was derived from dark money sources.58 While Democrats have been much more vocal in condemning the negative impact of dark money on American politics, they actually raised significantly more dark money than Republicans in 2020.59 One of the leading liberal dark money groups in the 2020 election was the Sixteen Thirty Fund, which raised more than $410 million of dark money, with much of it going to fund advertisements against former President Trump.60 More than half of these funds came from four anonymous donors who contributed sums of $86.2 million, $52.7 million, $45.7 million, and $45 million, which would not be permitted if not for the SpeechNow ruling.61 However, two months prior to the 2022 midterm congressional elections, a conservative dark money super PAC called Marble Freedom Trust announced a $1.65 billion donation, the largest political contribution ever made in US history, which will be used to promote conservative issues and candidates.62 It is difficult to remedy the glaring problems caused by dark money because the laws that undergird our campaign finance system are so needlessly complicated that they are mostly understood only by their well-financed benefactors. Grasping how dark money groups gain access into American elections requires a cursory understanding of the different types of outside political organizations that now exist. There are different classification systems for outside organizations dependent on esoteric tax-exempt codes created by the IRS. Groups like Citizens United and Emily’s List are coded as 527 groups, which means that their primary purpose for existing is to play a role in our political system. These groups are required to disclose donors. Other groups, such as Planned Parenthood and the National Rifle Association, are coded as 501 C (4) social welfare groups, which are not required to disclose donors yet may engage in elections as long as electioneering is not their primary

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purpose.63 This has created yet another loophole since the IRS has never clearly defined a primary purpose standard for distinguishing 527 political groups from 501 C (4) social welfare groups. Because SpeechNow struck down contribution limits to outside organizations, donors can now clandestinely give millions of dollars to those designated as 501 C (4) social welfare groups and have those funds directed into federal elections or misinformation campaigns. THE ROLE OF SUPER PACS IN FUNDING THE JANUARY 6 RALLY Dark money super PAC groups were unsurprisingly the revenue stream of choice for those planning the “Save America” rally that led up to January 6 raid on the US Capitol. Permits for the rally were secured from the National Park Service by a group called Women for America First, which is classified as a dark money 501 C (4) social welfare organization by the IRS. While the funding sources for this group are not disclosed, it was reported that the group’s Web page at the time displayed a logo from the bedding company MyPillow, which is owned by Mike Lindell, who spoke at the rally.64 The MyPillow CEO claims he has so far spent approximately $35 million to $40 million in his personal crusade to prove that the 2020 election was rigged against former President Trump.65 While Trump campaign officials claim that it was not involved in organizing the January 6 rally, the Associated Press has reported that the permit for the rally was signed by at least six former Trump campaign staffers.66 One study also found that super PACs affiliated with former President Trump and Republican Party PACs contributed more than $12.6 million to rally planners after the 2020 presidential election.67 Former President Trump’s main super PAC, named Save America, had more than $103 million on hand as of the summer of 2022.68 Tracking the Trump campaign’s role in financing the rally is made even more opaque since the campaign created a shell company named American Made Media Consultants to route campaign expenditures. This firm processed more than $759 million of campaign expenditures during the 2020 presidential election.69 It was also reported that Kimberly Guilfoyle, a Trump fund-raiser and fiancée of Donald Trump Jr., sent a private text to another Trump associate where she claims to have raised more than $3 million for the rally.70 Guilfoyle was paid $60,000 for delivering a two-and-a-half-minute introduction of Donald Trump Jr. at the rally.71 However, another Trump staffer claims to have raised $3 million for the rally from the Publix supermarket heiress Julie Jenkins Fancelli.72 Two other dark money super PACs, Turning Point Action and

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Rule of Law Defense Fund, have also been reported to have played a role in sponsoring the event.73 The US House of Representative’s Select Committee to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the US Capitol is now following the money trail as Congress did in the Watergate scandal in the hopes of bringing transparency to the funding sources for the January 6 rally. The Role of Super PACs in Spreading Political Misinformation about COVID-19 Dark money super PACs have also facilitated the spread of anti-vaccine misinformation during the pandemic from foreign and domestic sources. While it is illegal for foreign nationals to contribute to federal elections, 501 C (4) social welfare organizations are permitted to receive funding from foreign sources, which is illegally used in federal elections and to spread misinformation about vaccines. Because of the lack of transparency of dark money super PACs, no one knows exactly how much foreign funding has been used to spread anti-vaccine misinformation across the unregulated frontiers of social media platforms. However, the US Department of Justice recently indicted thirteen Russian nationals in a Kremlin-backed scheme to fund online advertisements aimed at fueling political discord in the United States.74 The term “disinformation” itself is derived from the Russian word dezinformatsiya, which describes the Soviet propensity to use political misinformation as a form of psychological warfare against Western democracies during the Cold War.75 Congress was recently warned by US intelligence agencies that foreign adversaries will “continue using propaganda, social media, and other means of influence to try to exacerbate social and political fissures in the United States.”76 Since dark money groups are not required to disclose donors, China and Russia have been able to fund online disinformation networks about COVID-19 for the purpose of weakening public trust in the American government.77 Russia and China viewed the race for a vaccine through a realpolitik lens and actively spread misinformation about the safety of American-made vaccines.78 Studies show that Russia and China created an online pandemic misinformation ecosystem that falsely placed blame on the United States for intentionally creating COVID-19 as part of a national security strategy and spread false narratives about health risks associated with American-made vaccines.79 This misinformation threat from foreign adversaries can be significantly reduced by applying contribution limits and transparency rules that now exist for federal candidates to super PACs. A small group of domestic sources have also been instrumental in spreading political misinformation about the safety of the COVID-19 vaccine on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube. The Center for Countering

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Digital Hate refers to this small but powerful group of anti-vaccine advocates as the “Disinformation Dozen.”80 The Disinformation Dozen is responsible for spreading anti-vaccine misinformation to 59 million followers and are responsible for 73 percent of anti-vaccine disinformation on social media.81 Without question, the national leader in spreading anti-vaccine misinformation is Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the nephew of former President John F. Kennedy and the son of the former Attorney General Bobby Kennedy, both of whom were assassinated in the 1960s. Kennedy formed a dark money super PAC called Children’s Health Defense, which funds an anti-vaccine Web page that gets 4.7 million visits per month, an internet show, and a movie studio that was built for the purpose of spreading anti-vaccine misinformation.82 Critics also allege that his recently produced documentary, titled Medical Racism: The New Apartheid, targets African American populations by drawing parallels between the COVID vaccine and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study from the 1930s.83 Other groups have targeted younger women by spreading false narratives linking COVID-19 vaccines to miscarriages and infertility on social media sites tailored to pregnant women, which helps explain why only 35 percent of pregnant women are now fully vaccinated.84 Other leading figures from the disinformation dozen include Ty and Charlene Bollinger, who recently formed the United Medical Freedom super PAC. They made millions of dollars monetizing anti-vaccine misinformation through the sales of books, tapes, dietary supplements, and anti-vaccine training seminars.85 Political misinformation is now highly profitable, as Alex Jones and others helped create a new “lie economy” that peddles profitable conspiratorial merchandise to followers.86 Super PACs are now financing the spread of political misinformation about COVID-19 through advertisements on poorly regulated social media sites. Regulating against this form of misinformation is made more difficult by laws that were drafted mostly before the internet age. Regulating against online misinformation requires stronger sanctions against social media companies since online “cheap speech” is inexpensive to produce and is frequently not vetted by anyone with a credentialed scientific background.87 One recent study found that Facebook and other social media companies have reneged on their promises to check anti-vaccine misinformation on their platforms.88 Social media companies are not held accountable for spreading anti-vaccine misinformation because they are designated as distributors of information rather than publishers of information in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Accordingly, some scholars are now calling for taking legal immunity away from social media companies by reclassifying them as publishers rather than distributors of information. This step would place social media platforms on an equal legal footing with newspapers and television networks by subjecting them to lawsuits when they spread misinformation that unfairly harms vulnerable populations.89

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CONCLUSION Some legal critics of the Buckley v. Valeo (1976) decision accuse it of being guilty of the “original sin” of equating political money with constitutionally protected free speech rights.90 However, this chapter argues the opposite in postulating that the Buckley standard that upheld contribution limits and donor transparency rules to federal candidates should be the model for regulating super PACs. Creating one universal campaign finance standard for federal candidates and outside political organizations would limit the influence of wealthy extremists to spread political misinformation, close the dark money loophole, and safeguard against foreign adversaries looking to enflame partisan and racial divisions in the nation. In “Federalist No. 10,” James Madison warned that the greatest threat to the stability of the American republic comes from factions that naturally form between those with “various and unequal distributions of property.”91 He counseled that regulating against the inherent dangers of income inequality to political stability “is the most necessary and ordinary operation of government.”92 By eliminating contribution limits and allowing unlimited amounts of dark money to spread political misinformation, the SpeechNow decision has done the opposite by allowing wealthy and politically extreme mega-donors to overpower the voices of the vast majority of lower-income citizens. Reversing the corrosive impact of SpeechNow on our republic should be the most important goal for this generation of citizens looking to “keep it” over the course of their lifetimes. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  How did the Tilman Act (1907) and the Federal Election Campaign Act (1974) limit the influence of wealthy donors? 2.  How did the Citizens United and SpeechNow court decisions lead to the creation of super PACs in 2010? 3.  What is meant by the term “dark money,” and why is it potentially destabilizing to our system of government? 4.  How did political misinformation contribute to the January 6 raid on the US Capitol? 5.  How did political misinformation about the COVID-19 vaccine make it more difficult to form a national consensus on pandemic strategies?

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NOTES 1. Josh Levy, “‘A Republic if You Can Keep It’: Elizabeth Willing Powell, Benjamin Franklin, and the James McHenry Journal,” January 6, 2022, https:​//​blogs​ .loc​.gov​/manuscripts​/2022​/01​/a​-republic​-if​-you​-can​-keep​-it​-elizabeth​-willing​-powel​ -benjamin​-franklin​-and​-the​-james​-mchenry​-journal. 2. Steve Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (London: Penguin Random House, 2018), 8. 3. Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein, “Where Jan. 6 Prosecutors Stand, 18 Months after the Attack,” Politico, July 7, 2022, https:​//​www​.politico​.com​/news​/2022​/07​/07​/ jan​-6​-prosecutions​-months​-later​-00044354Ivan Kasten. 4. Mary Clare Jalonick, “Jan. 6 Panel’s 1,000 Witnesses: From Trump Aides to Rioters,” Associated Press, https:​//​apnews​.com​/article​/jan​-6​-hearing​-targets​-interviews​ -029d6a76146b4735b9e05bb70f41916. 5. Luke Broadwater, Alan Feuer, and Maggie Haberman, “Federal Judge Finds Trump Most Likely Committed Crimes over 2020 Election,” New York Times, July 12, 2022, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​/2022​/03​/28​/us​/politics​/trump​-election​-crimes​ .html. 6. Ali Swenson, “AP Fact Check: Trump’s Legal Team’s Batch of False Claims,” Associated Press, November 19, 2020, https:​//​apnews​.com​/article​/fact​-check​-trump​ -legal​-team​-false​-claims​-5abd64917ef8be9e9e2078180973e8b3. 7. Zachary Scherer, “Majority of Voters Used Non-Traditional Methods to Cast Ballots in 2020,” United States Census, April 29, 2022, https:​//​www​.census​.gov​/ library​/stories​/2021​/04​/what​-methods​-did​-people​-use​-to​-vote​-in​-2020​-election​.html. 8. Michael Balsano, “Disputing Trump Barr Says No Widespread Election Fraud,” Associated Press, June 28, 2022, https:​//​apnews​.com​/article​/barr​-no​-widespread​ -election​-fraud​-b1f1488796c9a98c4b1a9061a6c7f49d. 9. Christina Cassidy, “Far Too Little Vote Fraud to Tip Election to Trump, AP Finds,” Associated Press, December 14, 2021, https:​//​apnews​.com​/article​/barr​-no​ -widespread​-election​-fraud​-b1f1488796c9a98c4b1a9061a6c7f49d. 10. Aaron Blake, “The Significance of the New Steve Bannon Tape,” Washington Post, July 13, 2022, https:​//​www​.washingtonpost​.com​/politics​/2022​/07​/13​/ significance​-new​-steve​-bannon​-tape. 11. Maggie Haberman, “I Took an Oath,’ Rusty Bowers the Arizona Speaker Says of Rejecting Efforts to Overturn the Election,” New York Times, June 21, 2022, https:​ //​www​.nytimes​.com​/2022​/06​/21​/us​/rusty​-bowers​-testimony​-hearing​-jan​-6​.html. 12. Lisa Lerer, “Giuliani in Public: It’s Fraud. Giuliani in Court: This is Not a Fraud Case,” New York Times, November 18, 2020, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​/2020​/11​/18​/ us​/politics​/trump​-giuliani​-voter​-fraud​.html. 13. Michael Blake, “From Washington to Trump, All Presidents Have Told Lies (but Only Some Have Told Them for the Right Reason),” September 17, 2020, https:​ //​theconversation​.com​/from​-washington​-to​-trump​-all​-presidents​-have​-told​-lies​-but​ -only​-some​-have​-told​-them​-for​-the​-right​-reasons​-145995.

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14. Justine Coleman, “A Quarter of Americans Report Vaccine Skepticism,” Morning Consult poll, August 18, 2022, https:​//​morningconsult​.com​/covid19​-vaccine​ -dashboard. 15. Denise Lu and Albert Sun, “Why Covid Deaths Rates are Rising for Some Groups,” New York Times, December 28, 2021, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​/interactive​ /2021​/12​/28​/us​/covid​-deaths​.html. 16. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, a Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” National Public Radio, February 10, 2021, https:​//​www​.npr​.org​/2021​/02​/10​ /966396848​/read​-trumps​-jan​-6​-speech​-a​-key​-part​-of​-impeachment​-trial. 17. Will Oremus, “Tech Giants Banned Trump. But Did they Censor Him?,” Washington Post, January 7, 2022, https:​//​www​.npr​.org​/2021​/02​/10​/966396848​/read​ -trumps​-jan​-6​-speech​-a​-key​-part​-of​-impeachment​-trial. 18. Glenn Kessler, Salvador Rizzo, and Meg Kelly, “Trump’s False or Misleading Claims Total 30,573 over 4 Years,” Washington Post, https:​//​www​.washingtonpost​ .com​/politics​/2021​/01​/24​/trumps​-false​-or​-misleading​-claims​-total​-30573​-over​-four​ -years. 19. David Leonhardt, Ian Prasad Philbrick, and Stuart A. Thompson, “Trump Lies vs. Obama’s,” New York Times, December 14, 2017, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​/ interactive​/2017​/12​/14​/opinion​/sunday​/trump​-lies​-obama​-who​-is​-worse​.html​?mtrref​ =www​.google​.com​&gwh​=B4F0CF1CF80B53777BB0CFA9EE86510C​&gwt​=pay​ &assetType​=PAYWALL. 20. The Constitution of the United States, 2nd Ed. National Center for Constitutional Studies, Washington, DC, 2016. 21. Ibid. 22. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942), https:​//​supreme​.justia​.com​ /cases​/federal​/us​/315​/568. 23. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969), https:​//​supreme​.justia​.com​/cases​/ federal​/us​/395​/444. 24. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, “Dominion Voting’s Libel Suit, the First Amendment, and Actual Malice,” Brennan Center for Justice, March 28, 2022, https:​//​ www​.brennancenter​.org​/our​-work​/analysis​-opinion​/dominion​-votings​-libel​-suits​-first​ -amendment​-and​-actual malice. 25. Ibid. 26. Jann Bellamy, “Covid Manufacturers Should Explore Legal Action against Anti-Vaxxers Spreading Disinformation,” Science-Based Medicine, May 6, 2021, https:​//​sciencebasedmedicine​.org​/covid​-vaccine​-manufacturers​-should​-explore​-legal​ -action​-against​-anti​-vaxxers​-spreading​-disinformation. 27. Thomas J. Baldino and Kyle L. Kreider, US Election Campaigns: A Documentary and Reference Guide (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2011), 45–46. 28. Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Addresses (Frankfurt: Outlook Verlagsgesellschaft, 2018), 147, http:​//​www​.shorturl​.at​/KNSU4. 29. Anthony Corrado, “Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law,” in The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook, ed. Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel R. Ortiz, and Trevor Potter (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 28.

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30. Ibid., 17. 31. William David Deiss, “The Regulation of Campaign Finance in Vermont: More Loophole Than Law,” Vermont Law Review 6 (1981): 237, https:​//​heinonline​.org​/ HOL​/Page​?handle​=hein​.journals​/vlr6​&id​=243​&collection​=journals​&index=. 32. Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 7. 33. Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, “Nixon Debated Paying Blackmail, Clemency,” Washington Post, May 1, 1974, https:​//​www​.washingtonpost​.com​/wp​-srv​/ national​/longterm​/watergate​/articles​/050174​-2​.htm. 34. Robert K. Goidel, Donald A. Gross, and Todd G. Shields, Money Matters: Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform in US House Elections (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 1999), 26. 35. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance, 9. 36. Goidel et al., Money Matters, 29. 37. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976), https:​//​supreme​.justia​.com​/cases​/federal​/ us​/424​/1. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Federal Election Commission, “Citizens United v. FEC,” https:​//​www​.fec​.gov​/ legal​-resources​/court​-cases​/buckley​-v​-valeo. 41. Ibid. 42. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 205 US 1 (2010), https:​//​www​ .law​.cornell​.edu​/supct​/html​/08​-205​.ZS​.html. 43. SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 389 US App. DC 424, 599 F.3d 686 (2010), https:​//​www​.lexisnexis​.com​/community​/casebrief​/p​/casebrief​ -speechnow​-org​-v​-fec. 44. Albert W. Alschuler, Laurence H. Tribe, Norman L. Eisen, and Richard W. Painter, “Why Limits on Contributions to Super PACS Should Survive Citizens United,” Fordham Law Review 86, no. 5 (April 2018): 2299–2358. 45. Open Secrets, “Races in Which Outside Spending Exceeds Candidate Spending,” https:​//​www​.opensecrets​.org​/outsidespending​/outvscand​.php​?cycle​=2020. 46. Sarah Repucci, “From Crisis to Reform: A Case to Strengthen America’s Battered Democracy,” Freedom House Special Report, March 2021, https:​//​freedomhouse​ .org​/sites​/default​/files​/2021​-03​/US​_Democracy​_Report​_FINAL​_03222021​.pdf. 47. Ibid. 48. Pew Research Center, “Public Trust in Government: 1958–2022,” June 6, 2022, https:​//​www​.pewresearch​.org​/politics​/2022​/06​/06​/public​-trust​-in​-government​ -1958​-2022. 49. Michael Dimock, “How Americans View Trust, Facts, and Democracy Today,” February 19, 2020, https:​//​www​.pewtrusts​.org​/en​/trust​/archive​/winter​-2020​/how​ -americans​-view​-trust​-facts​-and​-democracy​-today. 50. Mathias Osmundsen, Michael Bang Peterson, and Alexander Bor, “How Partisan Polarization Drives the Spread of Fake News,” Brookings Institution, May 13, 2021, https:​//​www​.brookings​.edu​/techstream​/how​-partisan​-polarization​-drives​-the​ -spread​-of​-fake​-news.

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51. Issue One, “Outsized Influence,” Issue One Special Report, April 20, 2021, https:​//​issueone​.org​/articles​/outsized​-influence​-12​-political​-megadonors​-are​ -responsible​-for​-1​-of​-every​-13​-in​-federal​-elections​-since​-citizens​-united​-and​-25​-of​ -all​-giving​-from​-the​-top​-100​-zip​-codes​-a​-total​-of​-3​-4​-bil. 52. Jeremy Peters, “Conservative Super PACs Synchronize Their Messages,” New York Times, September 24, 2012. 53. E. Heberlig, M. Hetherington, and B. Larson, “The Price of Leadership: Campaign Money and the Polarization of Congressional Parties,” Journal of Politics 68, no. 4 (2006): 992–1005. 54. Mike Norton and Richard Pildes, “How Outside Money Makes Governing More Difficult,” Election Law Journal: Rules Politics and Policy 19, no. 4 (2020): 486–502. 55. Kenneth Vogel and Shaun Goldmacher, “Democrats Decried Dark Money. Then They Won with It in 2020,” New York Times, January 29, 2022, https:​//​www​ .nytimes​.com​/2022​/01​/29​/us​/politics​/democrats​-dark​-money​-donors​.html. 56. Karl Evers-Hillstrom, “Most Expensive Ever: 2020 Election Cost $14.4,” Open Secrets, February 11, 2021, https:​//​www​.opensecrets​.org​/news​/2021​/02​/2020​-cycle​ -cost​-14p4​-billion​-doubling​-16. 57. Open Secrets, “2020 Outside Spending by Super PAC,” https:​//​www​.opensecrets​ .org​/outsidespending​/summ​.php​?cycle​=2020​&chrt​=V​&disp​=O​&type​=S. 58. Anna Massoglia and Karl Evers-Hillstrom, “Dark Money Topped $1 Billion, Largely Boosting Democrats,” Open Secrets, March 17, 2021, https:​//​www​ .opensecrets​.org​/news​/2021​/03​/one​-billion​-dark​-money​-2020​-electioncycle. 59. Ibid. 60. Scott Bland, “Liber ‘Dark-Money’ Behemoth Funneled More Than $400M in 2020,” Politico, November 17, 2021, https:​//​www​.politico​.com​/news​/2021​/11​/17​/ dark​-money​-sixteen​-thirty​-fund​-522781. 61. Ibid. 62. Kenneth P. Vogel and Shane Goldmacher, “An Unusual $1.6 Billion Donation Bolsters Conservatives,” New York Times, August 22, 2022, https:​//​www​.nytimes​ .com​/2022​/08​/22​/us​/politics​/republican​-dark​-money​.html. 63. Open Secrets, “Dark Money Basics,” https:​//​www​.opensecrets​.org​/dark​-money​ /basics. 64. Richard Lardner and Michelle R. Smith, “Records: Trump Allies behind Rally That Ignited Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, January 17, 2021, https:​//​apnews​.com​/ article​/election​-2020​-donald​-trump​-capitol​-siege​-campaigns​-elections​-d14c78d53b3 a212658223252fec87e99. 65. Peter Stone, “MyPillow Chief Spends Tens of Millions in Fresh Crusade to Push Trump’s Big Lie,” The Guardian, August 4, 2022, https:​//​www​.theguardian​.com​ /us​-news​/2022​/aug​/04​/mypillow​-mike​-lindell​-trump​-big​-lie​-election​-fraud. 66. Lardner and Smith, “Records.” 67. Anna Massoglia, “Trump’s Political Operation and Republican Party Committees Have Paid Over $12.6 Million to Jan. 6 Rally Organizers since the 2020 Election Cycle,” Open Secrets, June 16, 2022, https:​//​www​.opensecrets​.org​/news​/2022​

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/06​/trumps​-political​-operation​-and​-republican​-party​-committees​-have​-paid​-over​-12​ -6​-million​-to​-jan​-6​-rally​-organizers​-since​-the​-2020​-election​-cycle. 68. Open Secrets, “Pac Profile: Save America,” https:​ //​ www​ .opensecrets​ .org​ / political​-action​-committees​-pacs​/save​-america​/C00762591​/summary​/2022. 69. Anna Massoglia, “Shell Companies and ‘Dark Money’ May Hide Details of Trump Ties to Protest,” Open Secrets, January 22, 2021, https:​//​www​.opensecrets​.org​ /news​/2021​/01​/trump​-tied​-to​-dc​-protests​-dark​-money​-and​-shell​-companies. 70. Joaquin Sapien and Joshua Kaplan, “Texts Show Kimberly Guilfoyle Bragged about Raising Millions for Rally That Fueled Capitol Riot,” ProPublica, November 18, 2021, https:​//​www​.propublica​.org​/article​/texts​-show​-kimberly​-guilfoyle​-bragged​ -about​-raising​-millions​-for​-rally​-that​-fueled​-capitol​-riot. 71. Isaac Stanley-Becker and Beth Reinhard, “Publix Heiress Paid Kimberly Guilfoyle $60,000 Speaking Fee on Jan. 6,” Washington Post, June 14, 2022, https:​//​www​ .washingtonpost​.com​/national​-security​/2022​/06​/14​/kimberly​-guilfoyle​-turning​-point​ -action​-jan​-6. 72. Sapien and Kaplan, “Texts Show Kimberly Guilfoyle Bragged about Raising Millions for Rally That Fueled Capitol Riot.” 73. Anna Massoglia, “Dark Money Groups That Helped Sponsor Jan. 6 Rally Saw Its Revenue Boom,” Open Secrets, July 22, 2022, https:​//​www​.opensecrets​.org​/news​ /2022​/07​/dark​-money​-group​-that​-helped​-sponsor​-jan​-6​-rally​-saw​-its​-revenue​-boom. 74. Matt Apuzzo and Sharon LaFraniere, “13 Russians Indicted as Mueller Reveals Efforts to Aid Trump Campaign,” New York Times, February 16, 2018, https:​//​www​ .nytimes​.com​/2018​/02​/16​/us​/politics​/russians​-indicted​-mueller​-election​-interference​ .html. 75. Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020). 76. “Getting Foreign Funds Out of America’s Elections,” Brennan Center for Justice, April 6, 2018, https:​//​www​.brennancenter​.org​/our​-work​/policy​-solutions​/getting​ -foreign​-funds​-out​-americas​-elections. 77. Ben Dubow, Edward Lucas, and Jake Morris, “Jabbed in the Back: Mapping Russian and Chinese Information Operations during the Covid-19 Pandemic,” Center for European Policy Analysis, December 2, 2021, https:​//​cepa​.org​/jabbed​-in​-the​-back​ -mapping​-russian​-and​-chinese​-information​-operations​-during​-covid​-19. 78. Robin Emmott, “Russia, China Sow Disinformation to Undermine Trust in Western Vaccines,” Reuters, April 28, 2021, https:​//​www​.reuters​.com​/world​/china​ /russia​-china​-sow​-disinformation​-undermine​-trust​-western​-vaccines​-eu​-report​-says​ -2021​-04​-28. 79. US Department of State, “GEC Special Report: Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem,” August 2020, https:​//​www​.shorturl​.at​/yCH18. 80. Center for Countering Digital Hate, “The Disinformation Dozen: Why Platforms Must Act on Twelve Leading Online Anti-Vaxxers,” Center for Countering Digital Hate, https:​//​counterhate​.com​/wp​-content​/uploads​/2022​/05​/210324​-The​ -Disinformation​-Dozen​.pdf. 81. Ibid.

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82. Michelle E. Smith, “How a Kennedy Built an Anti-Vaccine Juggernaut amid Covid-19,” Associated Press, December 15, 2021, https:​//​apnews​.com​/article​/how​-rfk​ -jr​-built​-anti​-vaccine​-juggernaut​-amid​-covid​-4997be1bcf591fe8b7f1f90d16c9321e. 83. Keziah Weir, “How Robert F. Kennedy Jr. Became the Anti-Vaxxer Icon of America’s Nightmares,” Vanity Fair, May 13, 2021, https:​//​www​.vanityfair​.com​/news​ /2021​/05​/how​-robert​-f​-kennedy​-jr​-became​-anti​-vaxxer​-icon​-nightmare. 84. Ashley Fetters Maloy and Will Oremus, “Pregnancy Apps Have Become a Battleground of Vaccine Misinformation,” Washington Post, December 23, 2021, https:​ //​www​.washingtonpost​.com​/technology​/2021​/12​/23​/pregnancy​-apps​-covid​-vaccine​ -misinformation. 85. Liz Essley Whyte, “Spreading Vaccine Fears. And Cashing In,” Center for Public Integrity, June 8, 2021, https:​//​publicintegrity​.org​/health​/coronavirus​-and​ -inequality​/spreading​-fears​-cashing​-in​-anti​-vaccine. 86. Jack Shafer, “Alex Jones and the Lie Economy,” Politico, August 10, 2022, https:​//​www​.politico​.com​/news​/magazine​/2022​/08​/10​/alex​-jones​-and​-the​-lie​ -economy​-00050731. 87. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech: How Disinformation Poisons Our Politics and How to Cure It (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022). 88. Aoife Gallagher, Mackenzie Hart, and Ciaran O’Connor, “Ill Advice: A Case Study in Facebook’s Failure to Tackle Covid-19 Disinformation,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2021, https:​//​www​.isdglobal​.org​/isd​-publications​/ill​-advice​-a​-case​ -study​-in​-facebooks​-failure​-to​-tackle​-covid​-19​-disinformation. 89. Hasen, Cheap Speech. 90. Jessica Levinson, “The Original Sin of Campaign Finance Law: Why Buckley v. Valeo is Wrong,” Richmond Law Review 47, no. 3 (2013): 881–938. 91. James Madison, “Federalist No. 10,” in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 77–84. 92. Ibid.

Chapter 10

Guided by the Light of Freedom Black Women’s 100-Year Struggle for the Ballot in the United States, 1865–1965 Hettie V. Williams and Denis Long‌‌

Historically, African American women have waged a multifaceted quest for liberation. This was particularly evident with the dawn of freedom in 1865 when abolitionists, such as Harriet Tubman and Sojourner Truth, became more actively involved in the suffrage movement. African American women, from Maria Stewart to Stacey Abrams, have consistently adhered to an intersectional approach to empowerment that has simultaneously included calls to end racism and sexism. Historians, such as Martha Jones, have identified a protest tradition among Black women that first thrived within the confines of the Black church and among Black women abolitionists and that was predicated on the belief that women’s rights were human rights bound up with the quest for Black freedom and ultimately the extension of American democracy. This chapter traces the history of Black women’s 100-year struggle for equality with an emphasis on Black women’s quest for the ballot from 1865 to 1965 and their intersectional approach to empowerment. It is pertinent to note here that Black women continued to face intimidation, violence, and other obstacles in securing complete suffrage, particularly in the American South, until 1965, when the Voting Rights Act was signed into law. Historian Bettye Collier-Thomas contends that Black women’s broadly defined feminism “did not exclude racial issues” and that Black women “recognized that in black America women’s status was often defined by sex, necessitating an internal struggle for their rights as women.”1 Power in America was defined through race, sex, and gender as systems of oppression for these women. Therefore, Black women abolitionists and advocates of 223

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women’s suffrage placed racial justice and women’s rights at the forefront of their writings and deeds with uncompromising clarity, thereby illuminating their larger concerns for human liberation. In other words, they understood white supremacy as patriarchal and representative of an interlocking system of oppression based on race and sex difference. For the nation to be free from racism and sexism, Black women must lead because it was Black women who experienced the double bind of race and sex oppression, giving them an immediate insight into racial and gender oppression simultaneously. For America to be more democratic, both racism and sexism had to be challenged. Black women’s voices were central to abolitionism and women’s rights causes, such as suffrage through the nineteenth century, during the era of American reform, and into the twentieth century.2 Further, Black feminism and Black women’s activism were well in progress before the Black women’s club movement came into fruition at the end of the nineteenth century. By espousing universal (feminist) principles, Black women reformers understood that their liberation was connected to concerns about racial equality, gender oppression, and economic opportunity. An intersectional approach to empowerment was the only way to extend democracy in America to all. Their agenda was broad based in that it was an all-encompassing human rights platform. Understanding American reform in the nineteenth century is incomprehensible without a sustained discussion of Black women’s voices and activism. This chapter is divided into two major sections. While the first section has a discussion of Black women’s quest for equality in the nineteenth century, the second focuses on Black women and the demand for the ballot through 1965. BLACK WOMEN ABOLITIONISTS AND SUFFRAGISTS IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY Patricia Hill Collins has recognized the central themes in Black women’s feminist consciousness in her text Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. She has identified the core themes in Black women’s standpoints as the legacy of struggle, the interdependence of experience and consciousness, consciousness and the struggle for a self-defined standpoint, and, finally, the interdependence of thought and action.3 The legacy of the struggle against racism and sexism is a constant theme of Black women’s writings in the nineteenth century and beyond, while at the same time, the consciousness that many Black women experienced sexual violence during enslavement and after is a core subject of Black women’s writings, such as with both spiritual autobiographies and slave narratives. Black women have used writing as a path to self-articulation,

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understanding that cultivating a self-defined standpoint is integral to Black women’s liberation. Collins contends that Maria W. Stewart was the first Black women to record the core themes of Black women’s consciousness. Stewart was born free as Maria Miller in Hartford, Connecticut, in 1803 and later orphaned at the age of five. She was as an indentured servant until age fifteen and later supported herself as a domestic servant, eventually moving to Boston. In 1826, Maria Miller married James Stewart, an independent Black shipping agent and veteran of the War of 1812. In Boston, among the region’s Black elite, the Stewarts maintained the acquaintance of Thomas Paul, founder of the African Baptist Church, and the ardent Black abolitionist David Walker. James died in 1829, and Maria was forced to reenter domestic service on the confiscation of her inheritance by white businessmen claiming to be the executors of her husband’s estate. In 1831, following a profound experience of religious conversion, Maria wrote the essay “Religion and the Pure Principles of Morality, the Sure Foundation on Which We Must Build,” which was published in William Lloyd Garrison’s Liberator. In her various writings and speeches, as Collins has argued, Stewart recognizes the interlocking nature of race, gender, and class oppression while advancing a belief in Black women’s activism as mothers, teachers, and leaders of the community.4 The writings and speeches of Stewart also reveal an awareness of sexual politics.5 Stewart’s writings and speeches served as a call to action, as revealed in her essay on religion and the principles of morality: O, ye daughters of Africa, awake! Arise! No longer sleep nor slumber, but distinguish yourselves. Show forth to the world that ye are endowed with noble and exalted faculties. O, ye daughters of Africa! What have ye done to immortalize your names beyond the grave?6

She urged “the daughters of Africa” to preach, teach, and actively build up the infrastructure of the Black community in this same essay: Let every female heart become united, and let us raise a fund ourselves, and at the end of one year and a half, we might be able to lay the cornerstone for the building of a High School, that the higher branches of knowledge might be enjoyed by us.7

Stewart developed the foundation of Black feminist thought, and several Black church women engaged in preaching, writing, and public addresses as Stewart’s contemporaries. The core themes of Black feminist thought first advanced by Stewart are present in the writings and public addresses of Black church women.

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African American women claimed identity and voice in the nineteenth century by challenging the monopolization of authority by Black men in the organizational structure of the Black church. The Black women’s public voice, in many respects, begins with the activism of Black church women. Through church auxiliary groups and mutual aid societies, such as the Daughters of Conference created in 1816 by women of the African American Episcopal Church (AME), Black women expanded their power within and beyond the Black church. Jualynne E. Dodson has noted that through mutual aid societies, such as the Daughters of Conference, the Independent Daughters of Hope, and the Sisters of Good Shepherd, the Black church movement expanded dramatically.8 These societies not only attracted new members but also raised substantial funds to support Black churches.9 Many Black women began to openly challenge the autonomy of Black men in the church by demanding to speak publicly as a result of the organizational work of Black women’s church-based mutual aid societies.10 Jarena Lee and Zilpha Elaw were active in the free Black community in the North. Lee, born in 1783 in New Jersey, began experiencing spiritual “visions” as a child that led her, as an adult, to tell Richard Allen, founder of the AME in Philadelphia, that God “spoke to her” to preach the Gospel. Lee would go on to deliver hundreds of sermons across thousands of miles, as far north as Canada and as far south as Maryland. Lee was also one of the first American women to have her work Life and Religious Experience of Jerena Lee (1836) reach a mass audience through print. Elaw, born near Philadelphia to free Black parents, was an itinerant minister and one of the earliest published African American female ministers along with Lee. In her autobiographical narrative Memoirs of the Life, Religious Experience, Ministerial Travels and Labours of Mrs. Zilpha Elaw, an American Female of Colour, she proclaims that a spiritual awakening influenced her to become a preacher. Elaw founded a school for Black women in Burlington, New Jersey, in 1823 and included in her sermons discussions about her status as a woman and how Christianity made it possible for her to attack the injustice of racism and women’s inequality. She would eventually go on to preach in homes, revival camps, and welcoming pulpits in America and England. Spiritual autobiographies advanced by Black men and women espoused a gospel of divine knowledge that was connected to a deep sense of self-awareness.11 The spiritual autobiographers and the slave narratives written later allowed Black writers to “accrue authority and power via the word.”12 This appropriation of God’s word for individual purposes signified an audacious form of self-authorship on the part of Black men and women who wrote spiritual autobiographies in the nineteenth century. William L. Andrews has argued that the intellectual foundation of Black reformist

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thought was first developed by men and women who authored spiritual autobiographies by stating, the black spiritual autobiographer had to lay the necessary intellectual groundwork by proving that black people were as much chosen by God for eternal salvation as whites. Without the black spiritual autobiography’s reclamation of the Afro-Americans spiritual birthright, the fugitive slave narrative could not have made such a cogent case for black civil rights.13

Black women spiritual autobiographers, such as Lee and Elaw, laid the groundwork for the reform-minded feminist consciousness that led to the rise of the Black women’s club movement at the end of the nineteenth century. Jarena Lee’s 1836 autobiography The Life and Experience of Jarena Lee challenged male autonomy in the Black church by examining traditional gender roles among whites as well as Blacks. Lee’s text is likely the first sustained discussion of Black women’s roles in the church coupled with a discussion concerning resistance to these traditional roles. Lee describes her call to preach with utter surprise: “But to my utter surprise there seemed to sound a voice which I thought I distinctly heard, and most certainly understood, which said to me, ‘Go preach the Gospel!’”14 Lee is subsequently informed by Richard Allen that the denomination “did not call for women preachers.”15 In response to Allen’s edict, Lee provides a rationale as to why woman should be allowed to preach, stating that “nothing is impossible with God” and further that “why should it be thought impossible, heterodox, or improper for a woman to preach? Seeing the Savoir died for the woman as well as the man.”16 Lee then provides a more eloquent defense of women preachers: If a man may preach, because the Savior died for him, why not the woman? Seeing he died for her also. Is he not a whole Savior, instead of a half one? As those who hold it wrong for a woman to preach, would seem to make it appear. Did not Mary first preach the risen Savior, and not the doctrine of the resurrection the very climax of Christianity . . . then did not Mary, a woman, preach the gospel? For she preached the resurrection of the crucified Son of God.17

Lee goes on to conclude that she was called to preach by “the gift of heaven” and divine inspiration, stating, “As for me, I am fully persuaded that the Lord called me to labor according to what I have received, in his vineyard.”18 The notion of the “sanctification of the spirit” was later deployed by church women such as Elaw and Foote. Zilpha Elaw’s Memoirs and Julia Foote’s A Brand Plucked from the Fire follow the pattern of Lee’s autobiography while at the same time exhibiting some of the core themes of Black feminist consciousness. Elaw speaks of her conversion at a camp meeting: “It was at one of these great meetings of the

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saints in the wilderness.”19 Elaw describes her conversion in evocative terms: “I saw no personal appearance while in this stupendous elevation, but I discerned bodies of resplendent light; nor did I appear to be in this world at all, but immensely far above those spreading trees.”20 Julia Foote’s autobiography begins with a retelling of her mother’s enslavement: She had one very cruel master and mistress. This man, whom she was obliged to call master, tied her up and whipped her because she refused to submit herself to him, and reported his conduct to her mistress. After the whipping, he himself washed her quivering back with strong salt water.21

The recounting of gender-specific sexualized violence is one of the core themes of Black feminist consciousness. Foote’s conversion and call to preach is as evocative as Lee’s and Elaw’s in that Foote claims that an angel came to her declaring that she must follow the commands of God.22 In the second half of the nineteenth century, women such as Sara Duncan, Pricilla Baltimore, Mary Prout, and Florence Spearing Randolph became convinced that they were called by God to preach. Sara Duncan, as a member of the AME Church, and Florence Spearing Randolph, through AME Zion, among others, secured positions as stewardesses, evangelists, and deaconesses. These women founded women’s missionary societies and clubs, such as the Women’s Home and Foreign Missionary Society and the New Jersey Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs, to maintain leadership positions and advance social causes. Florence Spearing Randolph became convinced that God called her to preach. She joined the New Jersey conference of the AME Zion Church in 1898 and was ordained a deacon in 1901. Randolph became an elder in 1903 and founded the New Jersey Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs in 1915. She was also a recognized lecturer on temperance. The AME Zion Church granted full ordination to women in 1898, while the AME Church did not do so until 1948. Black women’s activism reformed the Black church in fundamental ways that ultimately led to a new and independent Black church movement at the turn of the century, as illustrated in Pentecostalism, which is predicated on spiritual gifts and sanctification. To understand more succinctly the evolution of nineteenth-century perfectionism and the development of evangelical Christianity, we must look to Black women’s writing, speeches, public addresses, and, more important, the spiritual autobiographies produced by these women. Further, Black women involved themselves in a host of reform movements beyond the Black church to include the quest for the ballot. The work of religious Black women and men in the Black church movement provided the foundation of Black leadership in the abolitionist

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movement. Williams Lloyd Garrison’s New England Anti-Slavery Society was formed in 1832, the same year that the first women’s antislavery society was founded by Black women in Salem, Massachusetts, known as the Female Anti-Slavery Society. (This society eventually became known as the Salem Female Anti-Slavery Society.) The development and activities of the American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS), founded in 1833, involved the participation of several prominent African Americans, such as James Forten, Frederick Douglass, and Sarah Remond. Jarena Lee joined the AASS movement after publishing her autobiography, believing that the abolition of slavery would lead to a more Christian nation. The divinely inspired Maria Stewart wrote for Garrison’s Liberator on subjects related to abolitionism and women’s rights, while Sojourner Truth is likely the most formidable preacher-abolitionist Black woman of the nineteenth century. Henry Highland Garnet, a Presbyterian minister, educator, and orator, was instrumental in the formation of the American Foreign Anti-Slavery Society along with several other Black church men. Alexander Crummell, an Episcopal priest, lectured on the antislavery circuit, and AME Bishop Henry McNeal Turner was also a major voice advocating for Black rights before, during, and after the Civil War. Sarah J. Tompkins, Garnet’s second wife, was the first African American female school principal in New York as well as a suffragist, abolitionist, and education reformer. Abolitionists generally viewed slavery as a “great sin” against the nation. The Second Great Awakening evolved into an era of reform that produced multiple movements, such as abolitionism, women’s rights, and temperance. By the mid-nineteenth century, African American women were preaching, writing, speaking, and organizing efforts to call for the end to slavery. In the 1830s, the Female Literary Society of Philadelphia was formed, and in Boston, the Afric-American Intelligence Society was created. William Lloyd Garrison’s New England Anti-Slavery Society invited Black women to join and write for the Liberator. African American women, such as Margaretta Forten, helped to organize both the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society in 1833 and the Salem Female Anti-Slavery Society in 1834. Sarah Paul was instrumental in the formation of the Massachusetts Female Anti-Slavery Society. African American women abolitionists such as Sojourner Truth and Harriet Tubman are well known, but several Black women made abolitionism a subject of their speeches, writings, and activism. Sarah Parker Remond, Margaretta Forten, and Sarah Mapps Douglass actively engaged in the work of abolitionism. Remond assisted in the activities of the Salem Female Anti-Slavery Society, which raised money to support the AASS, sought to pursue women’s rights, and encouraged education reform. As an agent of the AASS, she traveled nationally to deliver lectures on the antislavery cause. Remond reportedly delivered her first antislavery

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speech at the age of sixteen. Sarah Mapps Douglass worked with Angelina and Sarah Grimke in Philadelphia to form the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society in 1833. The women who signed the constitution of the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society included seven Black women of the total eighteen women. Margaretta Forten was one of these women. This society raised money for the AASS, attacked segregation in the city, and sought to raise funds for the building of schools. Mapps Douglass; the Grimke sisters; and Margaretta, Sarah, and Harriet Forten, daughters of Black businessmen James Forten, who helped to fund Garrison’s Liberator, also sought to confront the AASS on the issue of women’s participation in the society. This Philadelphia society also secured 3,000 signatures on a petition to end slavery in 1836, held annual fairs to raise money to support the Underground Railroad, and raised an estimated $13,845 for the antislavery cause between the years 1836 and 1854. Several African American women attended the Convention of American Women held in New York in 1837, and Sarah L. Forten wrote a poem that was printed as a part of the convention program. The theme of universal human rights for all women and consciousness of the necessity of solidarity is reflected in this poem.23 James and Charlotte Forten made their home at 92 Lombard Street in Philadelphia a meeting ground for reformers in the nineteenth century. James Forten, a Revolutionary War veteran and sailmaker worth $100,000 by the 1830s, was present at the organizational meeting to develop the AASS in New York in 1833. Charlotte Forten participated in the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society and served as one of the cofounders of the society. Her daughters, Margaretta, Harriet, and Sarah, tutored at home, met William Lloyd Garrison, Harriet Martineau, and John Greenleaf Whittier in their parents’ home. Whittier later published a poem titled “To the Daughters of James Forten” in the Liberator. Margaretta Forten was a secretary for the Female Anti-Slavery Society, and Harriet married Robert Purvis, a prominent Black abolitionist who became president of the Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Society. Harriet and Purvis maintained a special room in their home located fifteen minutes from Philadelphia that was reached only by a trapdoor for runaway slaves. Sallie Holley, a lecturer on the abolitionist circuit, visited the home of Harriet and Robert Forten and described her visit in such a way: “I am now staying at the elegant country home of Robert Purvis. It may be called ‘Saints Rest’ for here all the abolitionists find that ‘the wicked cause from troubling and the weary are at rest.’”24 Sarah Forten contributed dozens of essays and poems to the Liberator and the Abolitionist. She was also an avid letter writer. Her letters detail the work of Black women abolitionists who organized the annual fairs to raise funds for the abolitionist cause. In a letter to Elizabeth Whittier, dated

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December 25, 1836, Sarah describes one of the annual fund-raising fairs that was organized by the Female Anti-Slavery Society: I have delayed replying to your kind letter until now because I wished to give you an account of our Anti-Slavery Fair—and I knew you would be gratified by a description of it-and of the good success we had. Our Society have been making preparations for the last four months to get up this Sale—and many very beautiful fancy productions did they manufacture for the occasion.25

An activist intellectual tradition of Black public leadership was cultivated in the home of James and Charlotte Forten. Black women abolitionists took part in one of the most important reform movements of the nineteenth century. They spoke and performed tasks that greatly advanced the abolitionist cause as lecturers, treasurers, newspaper editors, public speakers, and writers. That said, many scholars have noted that the fund-raising activities of the Black women’s abolitionist societies, such as the Women’s Association of Philadelphia, became the model for other abolitionist associations, as they were so successful. Antislavery fairs orchestrated by women included the participation of Black women as documented by the Fortens. These activities were first associated with Black women’s church-based organizing. Mary Ann Shadd Cary’s Provincial Freeman newspaper, founded in 1853, was an important antislavery publication alongside Garrison’s Liberator. Several Black women served as premiere speakers on the antislavery lecture circuit and important writers of abolitionist literature, such as with poems and slave narratives. Black women conscientiously produced narratives, novels, poems, letters, plays, and journals during this era of writing. The writings of Black women appear abundantly in the antislavery literature of the period in terms of their letters to individuals such as John Brown and William L. Garrison as coupled with the essays, poems, and editorials written for such outlets as the Liberator and the Provincial Freeman. Frances E. W. Watkins Harper wrote and sold books of poems about slavery to support the abolitionist cause. The extra income she secured for her texts went to “conductors,” such as William Still, to help finance the Underground Railroad. Watkins wrote a letter to John Brown’s wife while he was in prison awaiting execution after the Harpers Ferry incident: I want to say something to you, the noble wife of the hero of the nineteenth century. Belonging to the race your dear husband reached forth his hand to assist, I thank you for the brave words you have spoken. A republic that produces such a wife and mother may hope for better days. Not in vain has your dear husband periled all.26

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Harper sent money for gifts to be given to the other condemned men in prison with Brown stating in a letter to Still, “please send me the bill” and “spare no expense.”27 Harper wrote many poems on the theme of slavery and freedom, such as with her “Bury Me in a Free Land”: I could not rest, if around my grave I heard the steps of a trembling slave; His Shadow above my silent tomb Would make it a place of fearful gloom.28 Many Black women, such as Sarah M. Douglass, served as recording secretaries for various female antislavery societies and associations, providing a record of the activities of these associations for posterity. The essay titled “Family Worship,” written by Douglass and published in the Liberator, reveals a deep concern for reading, writing, and the acquisition of knowledge. In it, she states, “Yes, religion and education would raise us to an equality with the fairest in our land.”29 The Forten sisters maintained a regular correspondence with abolitionists also recording the activities of the antislavery societies organized by Black women. Elleanor Eldridge, a Black domestic servant from Warwick, Rhode Island, had her life story recorded by a white abolitionist named Frances McDougall. Eldridge traveled throughout New England to sell copies of writings about her life and secured enough money to purchase a house. By the turn of the century, Black women, such as Ida B. Wells and Mary Church Terrell, helped to establish civil rights organizations to seek the extension of the franchise and democracy more generally. These women played active roles in the rise of civil rights organizations in the early twentieth century, including as members of the National Association of Colored Women’s Clubs (NACW), which was founded in 1895 as the first major modern secular civil rights organization in the United States focused on Black civil rights with Terrell as the first president. Other organizations are the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), cofounded by Ida B. Wells in 1909; the National Urban League (NUL), created by a group of interracial social scientists in 1911; and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), founded by Black nationalist Marcus Garvey in 1916. It was during the civil rights era working within these associations that Black women made their greatest strides in moving the nation toward a more perfect democratic union.

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BLACK WOMEN AND VOTING RIGHTS FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA TO THE ERA OF COVID-19 African American women, such as Florence Spearing Randolph, became increasingly involved in the suffrage movement in the early twentieth century. This was amid the rise of the secular organizations, such as the NAACP and the NUL. Her activism as an advocate of women’s suffrage was advanced largely through the New Jersey Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs. Randolph’s federation was among several other associations and institutions that emerged in New Jersey at the turn of the century. New Jersey’s first branch of the NAACP was organized in 1913. By 1914, the Black women’s club movement was well under way largely under the auspices of the NACW, with 50,000 members across 1,000 clubs nationwide.30 Randolph was the main organizer in the creation of the New Jersey Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs in 1915. The Montclair NAACP was formed in 1916. The Newark branch of the NUL became the first New Jersey chapter of this organization in 1917 as one of only six state branches in the nation at the time. This New Jersey branch of the NUL was under the direction of social worker William Ashby. Randolph was a pivotal figure in early progressive reform in New Jersey as a lecturer with the New Jersey Women’s Christian Temperance Union, founding president of the New Jersey Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs, and an executive member of the New Jersey State Suffrage Association. She brought together thirty women’s clubs in Trenton, New Jersey, to coordinate the activities of Black women’s clubs more efficiently in the state in 1915.31 The first annual meeting of the federation took place in Englewood, New Jersey, in 1916. By 1917, the federation included fifty-six clubs with 2,600 members; by 1924, this number increased to eighty-five clubs with 3,500 members statewide. Historian Bettye Collier-Thomas notes, “While many of the club representatives were teachers and businesswomen and the wives of lawyers, physicians, and other professionals, there were also many representatives who were domestic servants, day laborers, and other service workers” involved in the federation.32 Violet Johnson, who served as vice president of the federation from 1926 to 1931, was a domestic servant. She eventually went on to develop in New Jersey a training school for young Black women to become domestics, patterned after the National Training School for Girls in Washington, DC, which was founded by Nannie Helen Burroughs and a women’s auxiliary unit of the National Baptist Convention.33 Rosa Parks, Ella Baker, Jo Ann Robinson, Fannie Lou Hamer, and Daisey Bates were among the many women who continued to fight for the vote into the civil rights era. Their activism through groups such as the NAACP and

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the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) took place at both the grassroots and national levels. Parks was actively involved in the NAACP long before the Montgomery bus boycott began in December 1955. In the 1940s, Parks was a chief investigator for the NAACP in Alabama, where she investigated violations of Black civil rights, including the sexual assault of Black women by white men. She and Robinson were active in local groups, such as the Women’s Political Council, to secure civil rights for African Americans in places such as Montgomery, Alabama. Ella Baker was a leader in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, founded by Martin Luther King Jr. and other Black ministers after the Montgomery bus boycott in 1957, and instrumental in leading the students of the SNCC into organizing mass direct-action campaigns, such as sit-ins at lunch counters and voter registration projects across the Deep South. She is considered by many to be a cofounder of the SNCC. The SNCC was founded at Shaw University, located in South Carolina, in April 1960 following the mass sit-ins orchestrated by American students across the nation that same year. Hamer became actively involved with the SNCC during the Freedom Summer voter registration campaign in 1964. Hamer learned of her right to vote through the SNCC, and on hearing this, she became more directly involved in the civil rights activism of this organization. On August 31, 1961, she led a group of activists to Indianola, Mississippi, to register to vote. This group was met with the literacy test and eventually denied access to registration. Hamer was fired from her job once her white boss found out about her civil rights activities, but this did not deter her. She was shot at, brutally beaten, and continuously intimidated by white supremacists for her stance. She was forced to take the literacy test three times through 1963. Hamer eventually passed the test on her third try that year, but on passing it, she was faced with several poll taxes. This led her to become more actively involved in the SNCC. Hamer’s work with the Freedom Summer Project led to the creation of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. This group was organized to challenge the all-white primary in Mississippi and push for Black voter rights. Mississippi Freedom Democrats faced the all-white Mississippi delegation at the 1964 Democratic Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, where Hamer gave a passionate speech about the need for Black inclusion in the larger politics of the state and the nation. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed this same year, and a year later, the historic Voting Rights Act became law in 1965. Yet, considering the recent evisceration of the Voting Rights Act, we still have a long way to go. This act, signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson, ensured that federal protections would be implemented to protect Black voter rights across the South.

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In the time since the Voting Rights Act of 1965, African Americans continue to face adversity from lawmakers who aim to restrict voting rights. A major blow to the enfranchisement of African Americans was the US Supreme Court case Shelby County v. Holder from June 25, 2013. The outcome of this case ruled that Sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were unconstitutional. Both sections of the Voting Rights Act established federal protections for voters, requiring federal authorization for any changes to laws regarding a state’s election processes so that it “‘neither has the purpose nor will have the effect’ of negatively impacting” the right to vote of minority voters, especially racial minorities.34 While the terms of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act were consistently renewed, the Supreme Court decision ruled that these protections were no longer necessary and infringed on states’ control over elections.35 In the years following this decision, African American women took charge in political movements against the Supreme Court’s decision to help enfranchise Black voters. Joyce Beatty, a Democratic congresswoman from Ohio’s Third Congressional District, hosted a “tele-town hall” in July 2013. This conference call discussed the case as well as ways to protect the rights of voters, including voters themselves collecting “voter disenfranchisement data” and monitoring “changes at the polls that undermine the right to vote.”36 A few years later, in 2016, activists LaTosha Brown and Cliff Albright founded the nonprofit organization Black Voters Matter. This organization, according to its website, focuses on voter registration for African Americans, involvement in social issues beyond elections, enfranchisement of Black Americans in rural areas, and the recognition of African American women as political and social leaders.37 During the 2017 US Senate special election in Alabama, Black Voters Matter was pivotal to the election of Democrat Doug Jones over Republican Roy Moore. African American voters gave an impressive turnout in the special election, as 98 percent of Black women voted for Jones.38 This monumental turnout, along with numerous sexual assault allegations against Moore, spearheaded Jones’s victory and gave Black Voters Matter the momentum it needed to spread its message and activist work further, especially in the South. Black Voters Matter became known for its bus during their “The South Is Rising” bus tour across rural areas in the South, with “its vivid, black empowerment design,” which has brought its members across the country and created an emotional connection with Black voters.39 Another important voting rights organization led by African American women is Fair Fight Action. Founded in 2018 by former Congresswoman Stacey Abrams, Fair Fight engages in activism, promoting “fair elections around the country, [encouraging] voter participation in elections, and [educating] voters about elections and their voting rights.”40 Abrams founded Fair

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Fight following the 2018 Georgia gubernatorial election, and the organization promptly filed a lawsuit against the Georgia secretary of state, who, at the time, was her opponent, Republican Brian Kemp, and the Board of Elections, citing a “gross mismanagement” of the election.41 Prior to the election, the Georgia secretary of state’s office “closed several polling stations in predominantly Black areas” and delayed thousands of voter applications, causing Abrams and many of her supporters to believe that Kemp had intentionally suppressed voters. Since then, Abrams has focused her attention on the state of election affairs in Georgia, turning down bids for election for the Senate and even the presidential election.42 Fair Fight, now directed by Cianti Stewart-Reid, continues to fight for voter rights as well as Medicaid expansion and medical debt relief across the United States. The culmination of the disenfranchisement of African Americans, the initiative taken by African American women, and the organizations that have done tireless amounts of activism led to the results and aftermath of the 2020 election. Brown, Abrams, their voter organizations, and thousands of African American voters played a pivotal role in the election of President Joe Biden as well as the election of Senators Raphael Warnock and Jon Ossof. Additionally, developments in the claims of voter fraud by former President Donald Trump and his allies have entangled Black women into the fold in some cases, including the targeting of election workers Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss. Arguably, the 2020 election is one of the greatest accomplishments by African American women activists since the rise of the civil rights movement in the twentieth century. In the months leading up to the 2020 presidential election, Black Voters Matter continued to make its message and mission known. In a tweet from November 2019, shown in figure 10.1, LaTosha Brown continued to push the

Figure 10.1.  Stacey Abrams thanks numerous organizations, including Black Voters Matter, for their part in the Georgia 2020 election results. Source: Stacey Abrams (Twitter, 7:17 a.m., November 6, 2020).

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message of Black Voters Matter forward and showed its dedication to enfranchising Black voters for the 2020 election.43 During that year, Brown and Black Voters Matter cofounder Cliff Albright, along with several members of the organization, continued their bus trips to areas of the country with a large Black electorate. One of the highlights was a stop in Flint, Michigan. An article from NBC from October 2019 makes note of Brown’s focus on communicating with the people of Flint and how they have tried to combat the issues facing their community, including the water crisis that gained national attention in 2014.44 The article states that Brown did not say the word “vote” and similar words in a majority of her visit to Flint and that it is exactly Black Voters Matter’s strategy to not talk about voting. Instead, the group focused on talking with the people of Flint about their community organizations and the challenges they face because of problems with government at the local, state, and federal levels. This strategy has been accredited to “an understanding of Black life and culture” that does more to make African American voices heard instead of being tools for a politician’s vote count.45 Stacey Abrams and Fair Fight Action also took the time before the election to continue their anti–voter suppression efforts in Georgia. By June 2020, Fair Fight helped register 800,000 new voters in Georgia.46 In addition, almost half of newly registered voters were people of color or people under thirty.47 These efforts proved to be nothing but successful. Abrams, Brown, Fair Fight, and Black Voters Matter helped flip Georgia in favor of Joe Biden, the first time Georgia turned blue in more than two decades. Following the results of the election, Stacey Abrams thanked numerous activist organizations in a tweet (shown below), including Black Voters Matter, for the victory in Georgia.48 African American women continued to organize and fight for equal access to voting during the era of COVID-19. African Americans live in the wake both figuratively and literally, according to Christina Sharpe, as expressed in her groundbreaking book In the Wake: On Blackness and Being. In it, Sharpe examines the visual, literary, and everyday representations of Black life that she argues help to illustrate the “orthography of the wake.” This has been made resoundingly clear in the era of COVID-19, as a disproportionate number of Black Americans have fallen victim to the coronavirus. According to the Centers for Disease Control, African Americans were twice as likely to die from COVID-19 than white Americans in the first wave of the pandemic through 2020. This was due largely to structural inequality, including standard of care protocols. Some Black men and women were turned away from hospitals in the initial stages of the pandemic, including the author’s aunt Ann Cunningham. Cunningham died, having been turned away from the hospital twice complaining about her health and fearing that she had the coronavirus. This is what it means to live in the wake. In the wake of structural inequality, evidenced in health

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disparities, mass incarceration, and gentrification, it seems as if Vic Mensa is correct when he states in his lyrics to “Go Tell ’Em,” “We have been under water since they threw us in the ship.” In fact, to be in the wake, as Sharpe suggests, is to be in the belly of the ship of disaster. African Americans in cities such as Atlanta and Detroit found ways to respond to the devastation that came with the pandemic by mobilizing voter registration groups and through commemorative practices. Black Voters Matter and Fair Fight were developed during a time when Georgia had some of the largest Black COVID-19 death rates in the nation. Georgia’s Republican governor’s response to the pandemic helped to galvanize Black grassroots organizations. And, to make sense of it all, Black communities in Atlanta and Detroit found ways to commemorate loss. These cities contain some of the hardest-hit Black communities suffering from the impact of COVID-19. According to medical researcher Jerry Shannon, “Increased mortality during the COVID-19 outbreak disproportionately affected African Americans” in the state of Georgia.49 In Detroit, the numbers were likely far worse with an average of 15.6 Black residents per million dying on a daily basis in the early phase of the pandemic, making up about 40 percent of the total deaths.50 In the wake of mass death, Black Detroiters and the Black residents of Atlanta produced public commemorations to honor their dead, including the citywide Memorial Day in Detroit and the Broken Heart Memorial in Atlanta, which took place in the summer of 2020. CONCLUSION The influx of enfranchised African Americans due to the efforts of Black women also led to the election of Senators Raphael Warnock and Jon Ossoff in the Senate runoff election two months following the 2020 presidential election in January 2021. A few weeks prior to the runoff election, polls revealed that about 96 percent of Black voters who had voted in the 2020 election had already voted in the runoff far before the date of the election. LaTosha Brown referred to this as “astounding” and continued her positive message by saying that “we are showing up and showing out. Let’s do it again!”51 This momentum, started by Brown and Abrams, caused the Georgia senate seats to flip as well, adding another victory to Black voters and the women who led their charge. Despite these victories, African American women still faced troubles following the 2020 election, especially from the far right. Ruby Freeman and her daughter, Wandrea Moss, worked as election workers in Georgia for the election and became the targets of conspiracy theories spearheaded by Rudy Giuliani, who claimed they were moving suitcases of illegal ballots. Donald

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Trump and thousands of members of the far right ate up this conspiracy, which led to Freeman and Moss being doxed and harassed online for months on end to the point where Freeman had to live away from her home for two months at the suggestion of the FBI.52 The suitcase of “illegal ballots” turned out to be filled with normal ballots that were counted legally, but despite the truth, conspiracy theorists believed it and continued to harass the mother and daughter. Freeman and Moss described the hardships they have endured during the Senate’s January 6 Committee hearings. Moss stated in her testimony that she had gained sixty pounds from the stress of the racism and that she no longer felt safe going to the grocery store in case someone she knew said her name and caught the attention of a conspiracy theorist.53 Life for the mother and daughter has since slowed down, but the threat of alt-right conspiracists invading their private lives once again still looms. Even through dark times, it is undeniable that African American women played a pivotal role in the 2020 election. Following setbacks, such as the overturning of Shelby County v.. Holder and the 2018 Georgia gubernatorial election, Black women took the initiative to ensure the enfranchisement of Black voters for years to come. LaTosha Brown, alongside Cliff Albright, founded Black Voters Matter and took their message cross-country on their famous bus not only to register voters but also to discuss with African American communities the issues they face and how to play a role in fixing them. Similarly, Stacey Abrams recovered from her defeat in the 2018 Georgia gubernatorial race by founding Fair Fight Action to help register new voters and ensure that their votes are counted following the possibly rigged election at the hands of now governor of Georgia Brian Kemp. Both organizations have proven effective in advancing Black voting rights. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  How did Florence Spearing Randolph help to organize Black women in New Jersey during the Progressive Era? 2.  Who was Fannie Lou Hamer? What role did she play in advancing Black voting rights during the civil rights movement? 3.  What was the Civil Rights Act of 1965? 4.  How did the Supreme Court decision in Shelby v. Holder change the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1965? 5.  In what ways have Black women continued to advance voting rights and the extension of democracy after 1965?

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NOTES 1. Bettye Collier-Thomas, Jesus, Jobs, and Justice: African American Women and Religion (New York: Knopf, 2010), 121. 2. The similar argument to this premise that I advance here has been thoroughly applied not by historians but rather by a scholar of English and film studies at the University of Alberta in Canada, Teresa Zacodnik, in a text titled Press, Platform, Pulpit: Black Feminist Publics in the Era of Reform (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2011). This is the only text that we know of that places African American women squarely at the center of American reform in the nineteenth century, although there are various texts devoted to the participation and presence of Black women in American reform during this period. My argument is that Black women were indeed central to the movements of this period. There are obviously countless books on the widely known Black women reformers and their presence in the movements of the period, but Black women are generally defined as at the margins or within specific contexts, such as the Black church. 3. Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (London: Routledge, 1990), 22–33. 4. Ibid. 5. Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 23. 6. Maria Miller Stewart, “Religion and the Pure Principles of Morality, the Sure Foundation on Which We Must Build, in Words of Fire: An Anthology of African-American Feminist Thought, ed. Beverly Guy (New York: New Press, 1995), 27. 7. Ibid., 28. 8. Jualynne E. Dodson, Engendering Church: Women, Power, and the A.M.E. Church (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 46. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 47. 11. William L. Andrews, “Introduction,” in Sisters of the Spirit: Three Black Women’s Autobiographies of the Nineteenth Century, ed. Williams L. Andrews (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 1. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., 1–2. 14. Jarena Lee, “The Life and Religious Experience of Jarena Lee,” in Andrews, Sisters of the Spirit, 35. 15. Ibid., 36. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid., 37. 19. Zilpha Elaw, “Memoirs of the Life, Religious Experience, Ministerial Travels of Mrs. Zilpha Elaw,” in Andrews, Sisters of the Spirit, 66. 20. Ibid., 66–67. 21. Julia Foote, “A Brand Plucked from the Fire: An Autobiographical Sketch by Mrs. Julia Foote,” in Andrews, Sisters of the Spirit, 166.

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22. Ibid., 201. 23. Dorothy Sterling, ed., We Are Your Sisters: Black Women in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Norton, 1984), 114. 24. Sallie Holley, “Letter-Visit to Home of the Purvises,” in Sterling, We Are Your Sisters, 121. 25. Sarah L. Forten, “Letter to Elizabeth Whittier,” in Sterling, We Are Your Sisters, 123. 26. Frances E. W. Harper, “Letter to Mary Brown,” in Sterling, We Are Your Sisters, 163. 27. Frances E. W. Harper, “Letter to William Still,” in Sterling, We Are Your Sisters, 164. 28. Frances E. W. Harper, “Bury Me in a Free Land,” in The Norton Anthology of African American Literature, 2nd ed., ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Nellie Y. McKay (New York: Norton, 2004), 499. 29. Sarah M. Douglass, “Family Worship,” in Sterling, We Are Your Sisters, 112. 30. Darlene Clark Hine, William C. Hine, and Stanley Harrold, African Americans: A Concise History, 5th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2013), 383. 31. Bettye Collier-Thomas, “For the Race in General and Black Women in Particular: The Civil Rights Activities of African American Women’s Organizations, 1915– 1950,” in Sisters in the Struggle: African American Women in the Civil Rights-Black Power Movement, ed. by Bettye Collier-Thomas and V. P. Franklin (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 23. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., 25. 34. “Shelby County v. Holder,” Oyez, https:​//​www​.oyez​.org​/cases​/2012​/12​-96. 35. Ibid. 36. Congresswoman Beatty Hosts Voting Rights Tele-Town Hall in Response to US Supreme Court’s Shelby County v. Holder Decision (Washington, DC: Federal Information and News Dispatch, LLC, 2013). 37. “Our Purpose,” Black Voters Matter, https:​ //​ blackvotersmatterfund​ .org​ /our​ -purpose. 38. Leah Asmelash, “Why This Bus Tours the South to Get Disenfranchised Voters to the Polls,” CNN, November 2, 2020, https:​//​archive​.ph​/20210424234158​/https:​//​ www​.cnn​.com​/2020​/11​/01​/us​/black​-voters​-matter​-latosha​-brown​-trnd​/index​.html. 39. Susan Chira, “Driven by South’s Past, Black Women Seek Votes and a New Future,” New York Times, October 4, 2018, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​/2018​/10​/04​/us​/ politics​/black​-women​-voters​-south​.html. 40. “Our Purpose: About Fair Fight Action,” Fair Fight, https:​//​fairfight​.com​/about​ -fair​-fight. 41. “Meet Our Founder: About Stacey Abrams,” Fair Fight, https:​//​fairfight​.com​/ about​-stacey​-abrams. 42. Astead W. Herndon, “Stacey Abrams Will Not Run for President in 2020, Focusing Instead on Fighting Voter Suppression,” August 13, 2019, https:​//​www​ .nytimes​.com​/2019​/08​/13​/us​/politics​/stacey​-abrams​-fair​-fight​-2020​.html.

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43. LaTosha Brown (@MsLaToshaBrown), “The 2020 election will NOT be determined by polls, political pundits or Trump’s tweets. This election will be decided by the people. This is why we must take this fight to the streets. Stop watching the news and let’s go knock some doors! Support our work http:​//​BlackVotersMatterFund​ .org,” Twitter, November 8, 2019, https:​//​mobile​.twitter​.com​/mslatoshabrown​/status​ /1192800985279815686. 44. Janell Ross, “A Radical Way to Mobilize Voters in 2020: Work on Issues, Not Voting,” NBC News, October 20, 2019, https:​//​www​.nbcnews​.com​/news​/nbcblk​/ radical​-way​-mobilize​-black​-voters​-2020​-work​-issues​-not​-voting​-n1068681. 45. Ibid. 46. Michelle Ruiz, “How Stacey Abrams Is Turning the Tide in Georgia,” Vogue, November 5, 2020, https:​//​www​.vogue​.com​/article​/stacey​-abrams​-georgia​ -vote​-turning​-the​-tide. 47. Ibid. 48. Stacey Abrams (@staceyabrams), “So many deserve credit for 10yrs to new Georgia:@gwlauren, @fairfightaction, @nseufot, @NewGAProject, @AAAJ_ Atlanta, @GALEOorg, @BlackVotersMtr, Helen Butler, @GeorgiaDemocrat, @ RebeccaDeHart, DuBose Porter, @DPGChair.Always John Lewis. Charge any omissions to my head. My heart is full,” November 6, 2020, https:​//​twitter​.com​/ staceyabrams​/status​/1324687447259779072​?ref​_src​=twsrc​%5Etfw. 49. Jerry Shannon, Amanda Abraham, Grace Bagwell Adams, and Mathew Hauer, “Racial Disparities for COVID-19 Mortality in Georgia: Spatial Analysis by Age Based on Excess Deaths,” Social Science and Medicine 292 (2022): 114549. 50. Sara Powers, “COVID-19 Deaths Dropped among Black Michigan Residents Report Says,” 62 CBS Detroit, March 4, 2022, https:​//​detroit​.cbslocal​.com​/2022​/03​ /04​/covid​-19​-deaths​-dropped​-among​-black​-michigan​-residents​-report​-says. 51. LaTosha Brown (@MsLaToshaBrown), “96% of Black voters in Georgia that voted in the general election have voted already in the runoff. That is absolutely astounding! We are showing up and showing out. Let’s do it again! @ BlackVotersMtr,” December 21, 2020, https:​//​twitter​.com​/MsLaToshaBrown​/status​ /1341181167068880896. 52. Adam Edelman, “Mother-Daughter Election Workers Targeted by Trump Say There’s ‘Nowhere’ They Feel Safe,” NBC News, June 21, 2022, https:​//​www​.nbcnews​ .com​/politics​/congress​/election​-workers​-targeted​-trump​-ruby​-freeman​-shaye​-moss​ -say​-s​-nowhere​-rcna34640. 53. Ibid.

Chapter 11

Coloniality and COVID-19 in Mexico Manuel Chávez

The origins of modern Mexico emerge from the first widespread pandemics to occur in the Western Hemisphere. The importation of “Old World” diseases, such as smallpox, malaria, measles, and influenza, drastically upended and devastated indigenous societies.1 This “Columbian exchange” served as the basis not only for the current state of Mexico but for modern globalization as well. The contemporary COVID-19 pandemic differs from those of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, yet in a similar manner, its presence has demanded explanation and interpretation. While there have been global investigations and debates about the origins of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and the conditions for its transmission, pundits and intellectuals have also attempted to make sense of its socioeconomic impacts and ethico-political implications. While the first hemisphere-wide pandemics were contemplated primarily in religious terms,2 this current pandemic has provoked differing interpretations of what it reveals about today’s society. The writer Ricardo Homs argues that the early pandemic reactions revealed uniquely Mexican “societal idiosyncrasies,” expressing its “collective unconscious.”3 He contends that the pandemic showed a particular cultural attitude toward life that is both stoic and fatalistic. This attitude explains, he states, why so many are willing to attend public places without masks or adhere to preventive measures. Yet, Homs claims, the pandemic also has revealed a “collective tendency for discrimination,” demonstrated by the aggression toward health care workers as well as an increased rate of domestic violence. These “Mexican idiosyncrasies,” he decries, also includes a tendency toward 243

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authoritarian leadership that expresses itself in loyalty to and approval for military control in exchange for governmental aid among the poorer classes.4 In contrast to Hom’s culturalist interpretation, Andres Rivarola Puntigliano offers a more historical, comparative approach, considering Latin America as a whole. He highlights the similarities between the COVID-19 pandemic and the situation wrought by the “Spanish flu” in the early twentieth century.5 Acknowledging differences, Puntigliano contends nonetheless that in both cases, the pandemics called attention to the dynamics of “multiple crises” that characterize the global and local contexts of Latin American countries. These crises include economic vulnerabilities, social inequalities, health disparities, and geopolitical weaknesses. Both pandemics highlight the institutional challenges facing Latin American governments. Puntigliano believes that the COVID-19 pandemic could provide an opportunity for Latin American governments to learn from the past and create cooperative strategies.6 While there might be disagreement with the essentialism in Hom’s perspective, there is merit in his recognition that the pandemic does offer a glimpse into underlying issues in Mexican society. The perspective in this chapter is aligned with the historical approach provided by Puntigliano. However, his comparative analysis omits the wider and longer connections spanning even deeper into Latin America’s past. Along those lines, in this chapter, several key questions regarding the interpretation and implications of the pandemic will be addressed: How should the COVID-19 pandemic be understood? What does the impact of and response to the pandemic reveal about global society and about Mexico in particular? What do these say about what can and should be done about the problems exacerbated by the pandemic? My goal is to analyze its scope and structure, focusing primarily on the first year of the pandemic (February 2020 to early 2021) until the time that the first vaccines were distributed. Among the many reasons why Mexico is a good case study for such an analysis is that it serves as a nexus point between North America and the Global South. It is important to understand the COVID-19 pandemic in the context of social power in order to discern the pattern of its widespread effects. With the lens of coloniality, the social theorist Anibal Quijano offers just such an analytical framework for understanding contemporary globality. In highlighting the coloniality of power, the purpose is to widen the scope for understanding the challenges posed by the pandemic. COLONIALITY OF POWER The first major pandemics in the Western Hemisphere created the social conditions for European colonization of the “New World.” The Spanish defeat

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of the Mexica (Aztec) regime in Tenochtitlán was in part due to an alliance with the Tlaxcalans against the ruling group, but it also was a consequence of a smallpox pandemic that devastated and greatly weakened the population of the capital. The foreign conquest congealed around the loss of indigenous labor that resulted from subsequent pandemics occurring in the late 1500s and early 1600s. The Spanish set up their own administration centered on the Spanish monarchy and the Roman Catholic Church. However, the legitimacy of this political order depended on consent from local elites, which was gained in exchange for some legal protections and entitlements for indigenous nobility. These legal rights involved the right to landed property; however, it did not involve the power to control labor. With each wave of a deadly pandemic sweeping through central Mexico, the number of indigenous survivors available for labor dwindled significantly. The Spanish essentially held a monopoly over indigenous labor (as well as enslaved African labor), leading to the inability of many indigenous landowners to grow and harvest crops and thus maintain their land. By the early 1600s, the Spanish colonial system was firmly institutionalized.7 This colonial system generated a particular matrix of power that continued to evolve even after formal political independence was achieved not only in Mexico but also throughout the world. Anibal Quijano referred to the logic of this social system as “the coloniality of power.”8 This colonial matrix of power affects all areas of social existence. Quijano argues that coloniality originates in the conceptual and material construction of “America” by colonizers. The making of “America” solidifies as the idea of race codifies the relation between colonizers and colonized and materially via the colonizers’ management of the exploitation of various forms of labor (not only wage labor but also slavery, serfdom, petty-commodity production, and reciprocity) for the sake of a globalizing market.9 In the division of labor, white (manual and intellectual) labor has value, while the colonized (non-whites: indios, negros, mestizos, and mulattos) are associated with unpaid, disposable (manual) labor. In this new model of world power, not only is intellectual labor done primarily by Westerners, but thinking itself is identified with whiteness. Western knowledge is universal, and only Europeans are rational knowers (discoverers). Under “European or Western hegemony,” the working assumption is that the colonized do not have their own thinking and thus must accept the dominant worldview as their own.10 Within the logic of coloniality, there is only one world of meaning: modernity. To think within the framework of modernity is to accept a Eurocentric conception of human history. This viewpoint, Quijano states, is based on two key ideas: a dualistic view of human nature (rational mind vs. nonrational body) and an aspatial sense of time that is linear and progressive.11 According to

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this perspective of modernity, human civilization rationally advances along a singular historical trajectory away from a natural state of primitiveness. It is within this logic of modernity, Quijano highlights, that the notion of the modern nation-state is articulated. Within the framework of modernity, the nation-state is conceived of as a single entity based on citizenship (equality), democracy (free political participation), and national identity (social belonging).12 Yet its construction is “linked and distinguished by coloniality of power.”13 This is especially clear, Quijano argues, in places where a great majority of the population is made up of black and brown non-European peoples, such as in countries in Latin America. In these places, the formation of citizenship, democracy, and national identity was exclusive to “modern individuals,” that is, white and Western, while non-whites were perceived as stuck in a state of nature, culturally backward, and needing to be controlled for the sake of the nation-states’ progress. For the ruling white elites, there was no shared consciousness or interests with Black, indigenous, and mestizo peoples. A key problem is that “in Latin America the Eurocentric perspective was adopted by the dominant groups as their own, leading them to impose the European model of nation-state formation for structures of power organized around colonial relations.”14 Within modernity/coloniality, the building of the modern nation-state depended on the domination of non-whites. With the theory of coloniality, Quijano’s main point is that even as the world economy changed between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries through industrialization and several financial crises, a particular logic of power continues to operate and define the current state of globality at macro and micro levels. Quijano cites Mexico as a nation-state where the coloniality of power was partially and temporarily disrupted because of the Mexican Revolution in the first half of the century.15 Nonetheless, even today, Mexico is still structured by coloniality. Quijano’s concept of the coloniality of power enables us to understand the complexity of the pandemic in Mexico without reducing it to a simplistic view based on sociopsychological generalizations or to a narrow view that is independent and distinct from previous historical moments. By understanding the pandemic in Mexico through the analytical scope of coloniality, it is possible to make sense of it in its depth and breadth. COVID-19 IN MEXICO For many countries, the COVID-19 pandemic burdened an already weak health care system and so too in Mexico, where many hospitals lacked proper medical equipment or sufficient staff. Within weeks of the start of the pandemic, Mexico was one of the countries with the highest rates of death and highest number of cases in the world. In January 2021, Mexico was deemed

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to have had the second-worst pandemic response.16 Almost two years after the start of the pandemic, Mexico was in the top ten countries in the number of deaths and cases due to COVID-19. As of March 2022, Mexico had more than 5.5 million confirmed cases and more than 320,000 confirmed deaths due to the virus.17 At this point in the history of the pandemic, a complete survey of its impact is yet to be undertaken. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern, through some of its effects, how the coloniality of power manifests in various realms and levels of Mexican society as well as in the responses by political authorities. Coloniality and Mexican Politics By early March 2020, most Latin American countries had implemented COVID-19 restrictions related to travel and major events. However, the Mexican government downplayed the severity of the pandemic and responded less aggressively to contain the spread of the virus.18 It was criticized by local political officials, medical experts, and Human Rights Watch for its low testing and for greatly undercounting the actual numbers of cases and deaths.19 In addition to its lack of testing, the government continued to allow large public events, such as concerts and sporting events, to proceed. The Mexican president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, to the dismay of many of his supporters, echoed right-wing leaders, such as the US president, Donald Trump, and the Brazilian president, Jair Bolsonaro, in minimizing the seriousness of COVID-19.20 López Obrador was accused of “trivialization and magical thinking” and expecting that “voluntarism and a utopian discourse will be enough.”21 The government’s lack of urgency and transparency was criticized for serving to fuel fears and panic rather than to minimize them.22 The government’s slow response and mixed messaging allowed for misinformation to spread on social media by the general public, resulting in some instances of looting and public acts of violence.23 In some locales, drug cartels stepped into the vacuum left by the government’s inaction by not only distributing food, money, and medical supplies to residents but also by enforcing preventive measures, such as curfews.24 López Obrador, well known as a left-leaning populist, became president of Mexico in 2018. He campaigned on fighting corruption within the government and increasing funding for social programs and infrastructure. He promised to usher in the “Fourth Transformation” of the country (the previous three being independence, liberal reform, and the revolution).25 A stated goal of his policies is to fulfill the promise of the modern nation-state: social equality and free democracy. Obrador had been a strong critic of neoliberal reforms that privatized Mexico’s national energy industries and undermined food sovereignty.26 He was described as working in the tradition of

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“revolutionary nationalism” that goes back to the Cardenas administration of the 1930s. In his political priorities, it is also possible to recognize López Obrador’s politics as falling within the dependentista, or dependency school of thought, championed by scholars of the Global South. Ramón Grosfoguel explains the emergence of the dependentista political position in the twentieth century. The dependentistas oppose modernization theory, which assumes a universal rational progress of human history, where “backward” traditional societies can and should “advance” themselves by becoming modern, emulating and following the models of Western capitalist societies.27 In the long history of the debates between free trade and protectionism, modernization theorists argued for Latin American countries to integrate themselves into the (US/Euro-centered) world economy. In contrast, Grosfoguel explains, the dependentistas, such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso, criticize the modernist assumptions of capitalist development and instead advocate for national autonomy and socialist policies as the main ways for Latin American states to escape poverty. In this manner, López Obrador’s political goals follow this dependentistas tradition. While Grosfoguel credits the insights of the dependentistas, he argues that this school of thought never really escapes the logic of modernity/coloniality. Although critics of capitalism, dependentistas were still embedded within “developmentalist ideology,” which assumed the modernist idea of social and economic advancement through rational policymaking.28 Grosfoguel criticized the dependentistas for reproducing “the illusion that rational organization and development can be achieved from the control of the nation-state.”29 This is an illusion of modernity because it fails to recognizes how “no ‘rational’ control of the nation-state would alter the location of a country in the international division of labor.”30 In other words, the modern nation-state is embedded within global coloniality. And relatedly, he states, the dependentistas do not fully address racial/ethnic hierarchies created during European colonization. As a consequence, dependentistas assumed a “denial of co-evalness,” where non-whites lack the proper intellectual and moral abilities to escape poverty and thus must be saved by the “educated” elite, who are mostly white Creoles: “Poor and marginalized regions within the nation-state, where black, mulatto, and Indian populations frequently live, are portrayed by left-wing regimes as ‘backward’ and ‘underdeveloped’ due to the ‘laziness’ and ‘bad habits’ of these regions’ inhabitants.”31 Without questioning this developmentalist ideology, Grosfoguel argued, the dependentistas reproduce the coloniality of power. In a similar vein, López Obrador’s politics perpetuated the illusion of the dependentistas. The Mexican president pursued his developmentalist agenda by making sure that large-scale infrastructures projects did not stop during the pandemic. Extractive industries (mining, oil, and deforestation) continued.

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Obrador did not sway from his two large public projects, which serve as the main pillars of his domestic agenda.32 The “Tren Maya” and the “Corredor Interoceánico Istmo de Tehuantepec” are high-speed railway projects central to the Mexican president’s agenda. The former will serve the tourist industry on the Yucatán peninsula, while the latter will serve international trade by facilitating transport between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The Mexican president has defended continuing the projects based on the potential economic benefits for poorer communities. He claims that the construction of these transportation systems will produce thousands of jobs, which will in turn spur further economic activity in impoverished areas and counter the negative effective of pandemic-related job losses. As part of these megaprojects, the government has pursued the privatization of land, which has undermined the ability of communities to maintain their local food sovereignty. In response, local indigenous communities have protested the government’s priorities. Indigenous groups have demanded that their needs for health care, sanitation, and clean water be given higher priority than these megaprojects. However, in her article “Putting Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects First: The COVID-19 Pandemic in Indigenous Mexico,” Susanne Hoffman claims, “There is evidence that the government is taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic, as it can more easily impede injunctions issued against megaprojects with the argument that the works cannot be stopped because they are now a ‘national priority.’”33 As result, the government has been able to legally sidestep resistance from local indigenous communities. As the pandemic progressed in Mexico, the government attempted to keep its focus on its developmentalist goals. Ultimately, the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic did not threaten the Mexican president’s political authority. However, it did reveal the internal and external forces—the logic of modernity/coloniality—shaping his administration’s response and its consequences for country. Within the first few months, researchers found that indigenous people, who make up about 10 percent of the total population, died at a higher rate (16.5 percent) than nonindigenous peoples (11.1 percent).34 This difference is blamed on higher rates of comorbidities, limited medical information in indigenous languages, and lack of access to proper health care services for many living in rural communities. Coloniality and the Mexican Economy Illustrative of Mexico’s imbrication in global coloniality is the Art With Me festival, which took place in Tulum in November 2020. Comparable to the Burning Man festival in the United States, the organizers described it as “a 5-day & night international arts, music and cultural festival curated to inspire us to be more connected to ourselves and build awareness about the

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environmental issues that affect us locally and globally.”35 Given that the festival attracts wealthy international tourists, some from the United States as well as from other parts of Latin America, organizers were keen to have the event despite the pandemic. Although some health protocols, such as temperature checks and mask mandates, were implemented, many attendees ignored them. Soon afterward, the festival gained international notoriety for being a super-spreader event when several foreign attendees contracted the virus.36 In the beginning of the pandemic, the economic effect on the Mexican tourist industry, which accounts for about 8.5 percent of the overall economy, was significant.37 The secretary of tourism reported there was 57.5 percent decrease (5.7 million tourists) in tourist international air travel in the first half of 2020 compared to the first half of 2019.38 The tourism industry claimed that thousands of hotels and restaurants had closed, with the airline industry losing about US $1.3 billion (30 billion pesos).39 Along with the tourism industry, the oil industry faced a downturn due to decreases in prices, and the Mexican Stock Exchange dropped significantly.40 Foreign investors withdrew US $6.3 billion (150 million pesos) in the first weeks after the first COVID-19 case was confirmed in Mexico.41 According to the International Monetary Fund, Mexico’s real gross domestic product growth rate declined by 8.2 percent in 2020, which is lower than during the Mexican peso crisis in 1995.42 The Mexican government attempted to prevent the weakening of the economy by offering funds and loans to companies that maintained their workforce.43 The government provided financial aid to millions of people and also allowed for members of high-risk groups, such as those who are pregnant or over the age of sixty-five years, to stay home while retaining their salary without work.44 The Mexican government was pressured by international analysts to do more in order to counter the contraction of the economy and criticized for not supporting those unemployed due to the pandemic, especially workers in the informal sector. Most of Mexico’s economy is made up of informal jobs: almost 60 percent.45 By the end of 2020, Mexico’s unemployment rate was 4.4 percent, rising from 3.5 percent in 2019.46 The percentage of Mexico’s population living below the official national poverty line increased to approximately 56 million, about 44 percent of the nation’s population, while those living in extreme poverty grew to approximately 11 million, about 8.5 percent of the population.47 In attempt to quell fears early in the pandemic, the governor of Puebla, Miguel Barbosa Huerta, claimed that the poor had immunity and that it was the wealthy who were more likely to catch the coronavirus.48 Not only were these claims not based on any reality, but in fact, as the pandemic unfolded, it became clear that poorer communities were more likely to get sick from and die as a result of COVID-19. Research indicates that there is a notable

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association between high rates of economic inequality and pandemic deaths: “The results demonstrate that countries with high levels of income inequality have performed significantly worse when dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak in terms cases and deaths.”49 The most unequal nations are the ones facing the worst pandemic situations. The Gini coefficient is used by researchers to measure economic inequality. Countries with the highest coefficient numbers, indicating greater disparity (between .45 and .60), include Brazil, Peru, South Africa, and the United States. While countries with low coefficient numbers, such as some European countries as well as Australia, have a number between .25 and .34, Mexico has a Gini coefficient of .45 in 2020.50 One study of seventy countries in the first twenty-one weeks of the pandemic found that a one-point increase in a country’s Gini coefficient indicated a weekly 1.34 percent increase in infection rates. Over 21 weeks, that meant 32.3 percent more cases.51 In addition to being vulnerable to higher rates of infection and mortality, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) stated that countries with higher coefficient numbers have a mortality curve that diminishes slower than countries with a lower Gini coefficient. This meant that infection rates in Latin America and the Caribbean have not diminished as quickly compared to European countries. The research made clear that those communities in Mexico that had fewer resources and were socially marginalized encountered the worst effects of the pandemic.52 Not only did economic inequality shape the impact of the pandemic, but the pandemic in turn made such disparity worse. Research indicates that the pandemic’s disruption of economic activities widened the gap between the wealthy and the labor classes.53 While some workers were able to work from home, many were not. In September 2020, the Mexican state-owned oil company Pemex had the largest number of COVID-19 deaths among its workers in the world.54 This difference reflected not only the domestic division of labor but also the international division of labor. News reports claimed that thousands Mexican workers outside the country, working primarily in the United States, had died due to COVID-19.55 The Mexican government protested when the governor of Nebraska threatened that undocumented meatpacking workers would not receive the vaccine.56 While the pandemic disrupted the economy, it highlighted the coloniality of labor that structures Mexican society both internally and externally. Coloniality and Women’s Health in Mexico Quijano pointed to the family sphere as another a place where the coloniality of power operates. Defined by the “bourgeois family,” it structures the relation of men over women. However, María Lugones argues that the notion of

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coloniality troubles the very idea of gender relations as framed by “natural” binary categories. She emphasizes that the gender system itself, not simply the patriarchal family, is inseparable from coloniality. Working with Kimberlé Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality, Lugones elaborates Quijano’s argument to show how gender is constructed by way of coloniality and how coloniality is (re-)produced via gender.57 According to Lugones, the heterosexualist gender system is a structural cause of modernity/coloniality. Within this paradigm, she argues, gender identity itself is racialized, and racial identity is gendered. The “coloniality of gender” reveals how the ideas of “man” and “woman” were utilized to differentiate between the colonizers and the colonized. While the modern gender binary system excluded and exploited white-identified women under the logic of patriarchy, among the colonized, she argues, it “was and is thoroughly violent.”58 For indigenous and black women, Lugones makes clear, social existence in modern nation-states is made especially precarious by the social fractures created by the coloniality of gender. Even before the pandemic, indigenous women in Mexico faced many structural and intersecting barriers. They have less access than nonindigenous women to proper medical care, especially sexual and reproductive health care, and as a result have higher infant mortality rates.59 Indigenous women have lower levels of schooling than indigenous men, where indigenous communities have almost six-times-higher rates of illiteracy. Indigenous women have lower rates of participation in the formal job market, and indigenous women who do wage labor earn less than indigenous men, who themselves earn less than nonindigenous groups. As the coloniality of gender indicated, indigenous women lived in a society structured against their interests. As part of its austerity measures in response to the pandemic, the government ended funding for Casas de la Mujer Indígena y Afromexicana (Indigenous and Afro-Mexican Women’s Shelters), resulting in the closure of one-third of such shelters, which provided medical resources and legal aid. In modern nation-states, the coloniality of gender reveals how political authority is controlled by men who identify with the heterosexualist binary gender system. As noted by Maria Noel Vaeza, a UN official, COVID-19 response committees in Latin America and the Caribbean are populated and controlled primarily by men.60 This underrepresentation of women of all backgrounds resulted in their interests being marginalized or excluded in the COVID-19 response policies of national and local governments. Research shows that the pandemic worsened the situation for many women throughout Mexico. Gender-based violence was already a significant issue in Mexican society, with rates increasing every year since 2006. Coinciding with the Mexican government’s increased efforts in the “war on drugs” against cartels, rates of femicide rose by 137 percent from 2015 to

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2020.61 As COVID-19 policies were implemented, the cartels’ illicit drug business slowed down due to travel restrictions,62 yet calls to 911 centers for gender-based violence tripled in some parts of the country.63 While the social isolation policies encouraged families to stay at home, the pressures of confinement and economic vulnerability were factors in the physical abuses by men against their partners and families. Some domestic shelters experienced a 61 percent increase in the number of individuals seeking help.64 According to Wendy Figueroa Morales, director of the Red Nacional de Refugios (National Network of Shelters), women in Mexico were murdered at a rate of ten per day; however, in the first six months of 2020, there were perhaps up to 2,243 cases of femicide, a number four times higher than listed in official government statistics. Despite the evidence of the high rates of gender-based violence, Morales states that many officials do not recognize it as a serious problem. As a result, she argues, current institutions fail to help many women who seek help. In the justice system, women must demonstrate physical harm first to receive a protection order, even if the person claims to be in danger, and some hospitals, even before COVID-19, refused to treat women whose injuries were deemed not to be “serious,” and the pandemic only exacerbated the situation. Morales argues that COVID-19 policies must pay attention to gender-based violence, and this is possible only when survivors are heard and patriarchal norms are confronted. The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean published a study showing that the number of women unemployed and those living in poverty increased significantly in 2020—about 23 million more women lived in poverty—and female unemployment increased to an estimated 22.2 percent. The pandemic thus dramatically and negatively affected female workers. The COVID-19 pandemic aggravated the social isolation of women. It is not only domestic violence but also the added burden of being caregivers for sick family members.65 Caregiving labor has a gender imbalance. According to Nadine Gasman, president of the Instituto de las Mujeres (Inmujeres), women spend three times as much as men on care labor per week. In addition, the gender disparity is apparent in the medical professions, where the great majority of workers in the field of public health are women (73.2 percent) yet tend to earn almost one-quarter less (23.7 percent) than men. Gender difference is a major indicator of the unequal burden of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic amplified the patriarchal social system, in which women are treated as objects of control, using means of humiliation, discrimination, and violence. It is clear that the effects are not homogeneous among different racial and ethnic groups of women, and in this way, the coloniality of gender was highlighted during the pandemic.

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CONCLUSION More than two years after it began, the COVID-19 pandemic has not disappeared. Data on its impact are still being collected; nonetheless, the pandemic’s first year accentuated the coloniality of power underpinning the poverty, inequalities, corruption, and violence that are present in Mexico. In addition to exposing the weaknesses of the health care system, the pandemic highlighted the fault lines of the economy between the formal and informal sectors. Some workers were able to work from home, while others were fired. Some of these unemployed workers swelled the ranks of the informal sectors and faced the most vulnerabilities. The strained social fabric and forced social isolation resulted in increased domestic violence, especially against women and children. The proliferation of violence, especially from drug cartels, seems to be a special danger since they aim to gain control over political authority at local levels. Social and criminal violence was exacerbated by economic pressures due to trade restrictions, precarious employment, and the scarcity of consumer goods. Throughout Latin America, governments struggled to maneuver through the problems posed by the pandemic. It was not only that certain governments, such as Mexico’s, were criticized, but even the ideal of democracy seemed to be challenged by the pandemic. The Colombian writer Santiago Villa observed that the pandemic seemed to make authoritarianism appealing for its apparent ability to better control the spread of the virus. He contended, however, that while democracy functions more slowly, authoritarian governments would ultimately create a situation of “fear,” leading to more political problems. For example, while China was credited for eventually implementing effective pandemic policies, Villa explained, the pandemic crisis began when officials hesitated to notify the public about the extent of the initial outbreak. He concluded that what really mattered for a society to contain the coronavirus was not its political structure but rather more its financial resources, institutional strength, strong economy, and shared sense of responsibility among its citizens. These conditions, he claimed, are more present in democracies than in authoritarian societies.66 The production of vaccinations at the conclusion of 2020 seemed to show the end of the pandemic. However, for semi-peripheral countries such as Mexico, which are “technology dependent” (to use Grosfoguel’s term) on the Global North, the logistics of vaccine distribution reinforced the coloniality of power. Even though Mexico was a partner in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), an update of the North American Free Trade Agreement that officially took effect in July 2020, it did not provide any special access for Mexico to vaccines produced by the United

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States or Canada.67 In fact, a key provision of the USMCA extended pharmaceutical patents, protecting the intellectual property and financial interests of drug manufacturers. As a result, even before the first COVID-19 vaccines were developed, the Mexican government had entered into an agreement with Argentina and AztraZeneca for the potential production of a vaccine in Latin America.68 After the creation of the first vaccines, Mexico engaged in geopolitical maneuvering and negotiations by importing vaccines from China and Russia as well as from the United States and Great Britain. It was clear to President Obrador that ultimately his country was vulnerable to the patent monopolies of foreign corporations and the demands of core states.69 In addition, the domestic distribution of vaccines was, in some cases, corrupted by nepotism and favoritism—in which high-ranking officials and their family members received vaccinations before frontline workers.70 Furthermore, the limited supply and distribution of the vaccination resulted in wealthier Latin Americans traveling to the United States to receive shots. This “vaccination tourism” was out of reach for most Latin Americans.71 According to PAHO, more than two-thirds of the dosages in the Americas had been administered in the United States. The United Nations created COVAX to facilitate equitable vaccine distribution; however, the program had a limited supply due to pharmaceutical companies prioritizing richer countries. As the distribution of the vaccines unfolded globally and domestically, the logic of coloniality was consistently highlighted. The pandemic did not radically threaten democracy in Mexico, but it did highlight the coloniality in which it is situated. The logic of domination between the colonizers and the colonized evolved to undergird institutions of modern globality. The colonial matrix of power, constituted by the interlocking mechanisms of racial difference and capitalism, outlined the general effects of and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. A “post-pandemic” globality will not be any less unequal or more peaceful. Nevertheless, to view coloniality already implies taking on the historical perspective of the colonized and the survivors of colonization. It means recognizing the structures of power and assessing decolonial inferences in the face of global problems and future pandemics. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  Why is it important to have an interpretive framework of the COVID-19 pandemic that is historical and global? 2.  What is the meaning and significance of the coloniality of power? Why is a conceptual lens that is based solely on modernity (separate from coloniality) problematic?

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3.  Why is the coloniality of power a key concept for understanding the COVID-19 pandemic in Mexico? 4.  Select another country (other than Mexico) and determine how the coloniality of power manifests itself in its social, political, economic, and educational institutions. 5.  What should a decolonial approach to a future pandemic look like? NOTES 1. Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972). 2. Charles Mann, 1491: New Revelations of the Americas before Columbus (New York: Knopf, 2005), 124–33. 3. Ricardo Homs, “Idiosincracia mexicana” [Mexican Idiosyncrasy], El Universal, April 25, 2020, https:​//​www​.eluniversal​.com​.mx​/opinion​/ricardo​-homs​/idiosincracia​ -mexicana. 4. Ibid. 5. Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano, “Pandemics and Multiple Crises in Latin America,” Latin American Policy 11, no. 2 (2020): 313–19. 6. Ibid. 7. James Lockhart, The Nahuas after the Conquest: A Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 94–202. 8. Anibal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” Nepantla: Views from South 1, no. 3 (2000): 533–80. 9. Ibid., 533–34. 10. Ibid., 540–41. 11. Ibid., 551–53. 12. Ibid., 557. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., 570. 15. Ibid., 568. 16. “México, el segundo peor país en ranking de 98 naciones en manejo de la pandemia” [Mexico, the Second Worst Country in the Management of the Pandemic in a Ranking of 98 Nations], Proceso, January 28, 2021, https:​//​www​.proceso​.com​ .mx​/nacional​/2021​/1​/28​/mexico​-el​-segundo​-peor​-pais​-en​-ranking​-de​-98​-naciones​-en​ -manejo​-de​-la​-pandemia​-257172​.html. 17. “Mexico,” World Health Organization, https:​//​www​.who​.int​/countries​/mex. 18. Azam Ahmed, “Hidden Toll: Mexico Ignores Wave of Coronavirus Deaths in Capital,” New York Times, May 8, 2020, https:​//​www​.nytimes​.com​/2020​/05​/08​/world​ /americas​/mexico​-coronavirus​-count​.html.

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19. “Mexico: Mexicans Need Accurate COVID-19 Information,” Human Rights Watch, March 26, 2020, https:​//​www​.hrw​.org​/news​/2020​/03​/26​/mexico​-mexicans​ -need​-accurate​-COVID​-19​-information. 20. Maria Verza and Christopher Sherman, “Experts Decry Mexico Coronavirus Policy Delay,” America: The Jesuit Review, April 1, 2020, https:​ //​ www​ .americamagazine​.org​/politics​-society​/2020​/04​/01​/experts​-decry​-mexico​-coronavirus​ -policy​-delay. 21. José Antonio Crespo, “¿Es la realidad un contrapeso de AMLO?” [Is Reality a Counterweight to AMLO?], El Universal, March 30, 2020, https:​//​www​.eluniversal​ .com​.mx​/opinion​/jose​-antonio​-crespo​/es​-la​-realidad​-un​-contrapeso​-de​-amlo. 22. Alonso Cedeño, “AMLO vs. la realidad” [AMLO vs. Reality], El Universal, March 17, 2020, https:​//​www​.eluniversal​.com​.mx​/opinion​/alonso​-cedeno​/amlo​-vs​-la​ -realidad. 23. “Comercios mexicanos se blindan ante alza en robos durante contingencia” [Mexican Businesses Shield Themselves from the Rise in Robberies during Time of Uncertainty], Informador.mx, April 14, 2020, https:​//​www​.informador​.mx​ /mexico​/Comercios​-mexicanos​-se​-blindan​-ante​-alza​-en​-robos​-durante​-contingencia​ -20200414​-0081​.html. 24. Camilo Tamayo Gomez, “Organised Crime Governance in Times of Pandemic: The Impact of COVID-19 on Gangs and Drug Cartels in Colombia and Mexico,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 39, no. S1 (2020): 12–15. 25. “Qué es la cuarta transformación de México que presume AMLO?” [What Is the Fourth Transformation Presumed by AMLO?], Nación321, December 1, 2018, https:​//​www​.nacion321​.com​/elecciones​/que​-es​-la​-cuarta​-transformacion​-de​-mexico​ -que​-presume​-amlo. 26. Fania Rodrigues, “Who Is López Obrador, the Progressive Leading Mexico’s Polls?,” Alborada: Latin America Uncovered, June 27, 2018, https:​//​alborada​.net​/ lopez​-obrador​-mexico​-election​-left. 27. Ramón Grosfoguel, “Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America,” Nepantla: Views from South 1, no. 2 (2000): 359. 28. Ibid., 361. 29. Ibid., 362. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid., 369. 32. Hofmann, Susanne. “Putting Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects First: The COVID-19–19 Pandemic in Indigenous Mexico,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 39, no. 51 (2020): 47–51. 33. Ibid., 49. 34. Ismael Ibarra Nava, Kathia G. Flores-Rodriguez, Violeta Ruiz-Herrera, Hilda C. Ochoa-Bayona, Alfonso Salinas-Zertuche, Magaly Padilla-Orozco, and Raul G. Salazar-Montalvo, “Ethnic Disparities in COVID-19 Mortality in Mexico: A Cross-Sectional Study Based on National Data,” PLoS One 16, no. 3 (2021), https:​//​ doi​.org​/10​.1371​/journal​.pone​.0239168. 35. “Art With Me * GNP Festival Tulum 2020,” Travel To-Tulum, https:​//​travelto​ -tulum​.com​/art​-with​-me​-gnp​-festival​-tulum​-2020.

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36. “Tourists in Mexico Party Like There’s No COVID-19,” The Straits Times, March 21, 2021, https:​//​www​.straitstimes​.com​/world​/tourists​-in​-mexico​-party​-like​ -theres​-no​-covid​-19​-pandemic. 37. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Tourism Policy Review of Mexico, OECD Studies on Tourism (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017), http:​ //​dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1787​/9789264266575​-en. 38. Maricarmen Cortés, “Turismo: En riesgo del 10% del PIB mundial” [Tourism: 10% of the Global GDP at Risk], Dinero en imagen, March 26, 2020, https:​//​www​ .dineroenimagen​.com​/maricarmen​-cortes​/turismo​-en​-riesgo​-el​-10​-del​-pib​-mundial​ /120916. 39. “CDMX: Al menos 13,500 restaurantes han cerrado definitivamente por la pandemia” [Mexico City: At Least 13,500 Restaurants Certainly Have Closed due to the Pandemic], Infobae, January 8, 2021, https:​//​www​.infobae​.com​/america​/mexico​ /2021​/01​/08​/cdmx​-al​-menos​-13500​-restaurantes​-han​-cerrado​-definitivamente​-por​-la​ -pandemia. 40. Angélica Tenahua, “Sin rumbo, el gobierno federal ante la pandemia: Coparmex” [The Employers’ Confederation of the Mexican Republic: The Federal Government Is Aimless in Face of the Pandemic], Milenio, March 29, 2020, https:​//​www​ .milenio​.com​/negocios​/sin​-rumbo​-el​-gobierno​-federal​-ante​-la​-pandemia​-coparmex. 41. “Coronavirus en Mexico: extranjeros retiran 150 mmdp del país por COVID-19” [The Coronavirus in Mexico: Foreigners Withdraw 150 Billion Pesos from the Country due to COVID-19], Infobae, April 1, 2020, https:​//​www​.infobae​ .com​/america​/mexico​/2020​/04​/01​/coronavirus​-en​-mexico​-extranjeros​-retiran​-150​ -mmdp​-del​-pais​-por​-COVID​-19. 42. “Mexico,” International Monetary Fund, https:​//​www​.imf​.org​/en​/Countries​/ MEX. 43. “Policy Responses to COVID-19,” International Monetary Fund, https:​//​www​ .imf​.org​/en​/Topics​/imf​-and​-COVID​-19​/Policy​-Responses​-to​-COVID​-19​#M. 44. “Social Protection during the Pandemic: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico,” Center for Global Development, https:​//​www​.cgdev​.org​/publication​/social​ -protection​-during​-pandemic​-argentina​-brazil​-colombia​-and​-mexico. 45. Carlos Alcaraz, Daniel Chiquiar, and Alejandrina Salcedo. “Informality and Segmentation in the Mexican Labor Market,” Banco de México Documentos de Investigació, https:​//​www​.banxico​.org​.mx​/publicaciones​-y​-prensa​/documentos​ -de ​ - investigacion ​ - del ​ - banco ​ - de ​ - mexico ​ / ​ % 7BEA76DFED​ - 4A93​ - 15C6​ - 0049​ -F20CC556C5ED​%7D​.pdf. 46. “Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor force) (Modeled ILO Estimate— Mexico,” World Bank, https:​//​data​.worldbank​.org​/indicator​/SL​.UEM​.TOTL​.ZS​ ?locations​=MX. 47. Diego Ore, “Ranks of Mexican Poor Swell to Reach Nearly Half the Population,” Reuters, August 5, 2021, https:​//​www​.reuters​.com​/world​/americas​/ranks​ -mexican​-poor​-swell​-reach​-nearly​-half​-population​-2021​-08​-05. 48. David Agren, “Mexican Governor Prompts Outrage with Claim Poor Are Immune to Coronavirus,” The Guardian, March 26, 2020, https:​//​www​.theguardian​

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.com​/world​/2020​/mar​/26​/mexican​-governor​-miguel​-barbosa​-prompts​-outrage​-with​ -claim​-poor​-are​-immune​-to​-COVID​-19​-19. 49. John Wildman, “COVID-19 and Income Inequality in OECD Countries,” European Journal of Health Economics 22 (2021): 455–62, https:​//​doi​.org​/10​.1007​/ s10198​-021​-01266​-4. 50. “Gini Index (World Bank Estimate)—Country Ranking,” Index mundi, https:​//​ www​.indexmundi​.com​/facts​/indicators​/SI​.POV​.GINI​/rankings. 51. Paul von Chamier, “Inequality, Lockdown, and COVID-19: Unequal Societies Struggle to Contain the Virus,” Center for International Cooperation, https:​//​cic​.nyu​ .edu​/sites​/default​/files​/nyu​_cic​_​-​_inequality​_lockdown​_and​_COVID​-19​_unequal​ _societies​_struggle​_to​_contain​_the​_virus​_​-​_april​_2021​.pdf. 52. Luis Ortiz-Hernández and Miguel A. Pérez-Sastré, “Inequidades sociales en la progresión de la COVID-19 en población Mexicana” [The Role of Social Inequalities in the Progression of COVID-19 in the Mexican Population], Rev Panam Salud Publica, 2020; 44:e106, https:​//​doi​.org​/10​.26633​/RPSP​.2020​.106. 53. “COVID-19 and Inequality,” Inequality.org, https:​//​inequality​.org​/facts​/ inequality​-and​-COVID​-19. 54. Amy Stillman, “How AMLO’s Crown Jewel Became the World’s Deadliest COVID-19 Company,” Bloomberg, September 10, 2020, https:​//​www​.bloomberg​.com​ /news​/features​/2020​-09​-10​/oil​-producer​-pemex​-has​-the​-most​-COVID​-19​-deaths​-of​ -any​-company​-in​-the​-world. 55. Kevin Sieff, “MexicanmMigrant Deaths in the US Have Surged during the Pandemic. Getting Bodies Home Is a Challenge,” Washington Post, April 11, 2021, https:​//​www​.washingtonpost​.com​/world​/2021​/04​/11​/coronavirus​-mexico​-migrant​ -death​-repatriate​-remains. 56. “Mexico to Use Trade Deal to Ensure US Vaccinates Workers,” Yahoo! News, January 13, 2021, https:​//​news​.yahoo​.com​/mexico​-trade​-deal​-ensure​-us​-182500775​ .html. 57. María C. Lugones, “Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System,” Hypatia 22, no. 1 (2007): 186–209. 58. Ibid., 206. 59. “COVID-19’s Impact on Indigenous Women in Mexico,” Justice in Mexico, October 9, 2020, https:​//​justiceinmexico​.org​/COVID​-19​-impact​-indigenous​-women. 60. José Meléndez, “América Latina, en dueda en materia de igualdad” [Latin America, in Debt in the Matter of Equality], El Universal, March 8, 2021, https:​ //​www​.eluniversal​.com​.mx​/mundo​/america​-latina​-en​-deuda​-en​-materia​-de​-igualdad. 61. Ines de la Morena, “Machismo, Femicides, and Child’s Play: Gender Violence in Mexico,” Harvard International Review, May 19, 2020, https:​//​hir​.harvard​.edu​/ gender​-violence​-in​-mexico​-machismo​-femicides​-and​-childs​-play. 62. Sandra Weiss, “How the Coronavirus Lockdown Is Hitting Mexico’s Drug Cartels,” Deustche Welle, April 4, 2020, https:​//​p​.dw​.com​/p​/3aOBU. 63. Albert Triana, “Se triplican llamadas al 911 por violencia hacia las mujeres” [Calls to 911 Have Tripled due to Violence against Women], El Sol de la Laguna, April 7, 2021, https:​//​www​.elsoldelalaguna​.com​.mx​/local​/se​-triplican​-llamadas​-al​ -911​-por​-violencia​-hacia​-las​-mujeres​-6571529​.html.

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64. Wendy Figueroa Morales, “La violencia contra la mujer” [Violence against Women], Nexos: Sociedad, Ciencia, Literatura 42, no. 515 (2020), https:​//​go​.gale​ .com​/ps​/i​.do​?p​=LitRC​&u​=west25972​&id​=GALE|A645638829​&v​=2​.1​&it​=r​&sid​ =summon​&asid​=13bac145. 65. Andrea Vega, “Las recomendaciones de Salud e Inmujeres para evitar violencia y trabajo desigual durante la emergencia por COVID-19” [The Recommendations of the National Institutes of Women and Health for Avoiding Violence and Labor Inequality during the COVID-19 Emergency], Animal Politico, March 26, 2020, https:​//​www​.animalpolitico​.com​/2020​/03​/mujeres​-salud​-violencia​-confinamiento​ -covid​-19. 66. Santiago Villa, “Para el coronavirus: ¿Dictadura o democracia?” [Confronting the Coronavirus: Dictatorship or Democracy?], El Espectador, April 1, 2020, https:​ //​www​.elespectador​.com​/opinion​/columnistas​/santiago​-villa​/para​-el​-coronavirus​ -dictadura​-o​-democracia​-column​-912321. 67. Margarita Guerrero, “Effects of the USMCA (US-Mexico-Canada Agreement) in the Mexican Pharmaceutical Industry,” Uhthoff, March 18, 2020, https:​//​en​.uhthoff​ .com​.mx​/articles​/effects​-of​-the​-usmca​-us​-mexico​-canada​-agreement​-in​-the​-mexican​ -pharmaceutical​-industry. 68. Emilio Lezama, “La geopolítica de la vacuna” [The Geopolitics of the Vaccine], El Universal, August 16, 2020, https:​//​www​.eluniversal​.com​.mx​/opinion​/emilio​ -lezama​/la​-geopolitica​-de​-la​-vacuna. 69. Matt Spetalnick, David Graham, and Frank Jack Daniel, “Exclusive: Mexico’s President to Ask Biden to Share US Vaccines, Say Sources,” Reuters, February 28, 2021, https:​//​www​.reuters​.com​/article​/us​-usa​-mexico​-exclusive​-idINKCN2AS086. 70. “Se investigará irregularidad en aplicación de vacuna Covid-19 a director de hospital en Edomex y su familia: AMLO” [AMLO: Irregularities in the Administration of the COVID-19 Vaccine of the Hospital Director of Edomex and His Family Will Be Investigated], El Universal, December 30, 2020, https:​//​www​.eluniversal​ .com​.mx​/nacion​/se​-investigara​-irregularidad​-en​-aplicacion​-de​-vacuna​-covid​-19​ -director​-de​-hospital​-en​-edomex. 71. “OPS: Turismo de vacunación agrava desigualdad ante el COVID-19” [Pan American Health Organization: Vaccine Tourism Aggravates Inequality in Face of COVID-19], Listin Diario, May 12, 2021, https:​//​listindiario​.com​/las​-mundiales​/2021​ /05​/12​/670175​/ops​-turismo​-de​-vacunacion​-agrava​-desigualdad​-ante​-el​-COVID​-19.

Chapter 12

Inequality and Governance across World Regions A Concluding Perspective Stephen J. Chapman‌‌

Throughout this volume, readers have been offered a dynamic picture of how inequality and governance impact different regions and countries of the world. Moreover, the chapters have used various ways to highlight inequality and governance, from traditional indicators to aspects of inequality and governance that became apparent during the COVID-19 pandemic. The current chapter presents a view of the different measures of democracy employed by scholars, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. While there are too many measures to cover in a single chapter, this analysis centers on the measures most widely used at the country level. Where the preceding chapters provided analyses of an array of different settings and how outcomes are often felt disparately among a population, this concluding chapter offers a broad, quantitative perspective on the concept. Prior to thrusting into a discussion of the different measures of inequality, the chapter begins with a brief overview of the various measures employed by scholars to study the concept. It then provides a discussion of the levels of inequality, ranging from country to region to global levels, allowing for incorporation of the governance factor as well. From there, the chapter provides a view of the many dimensions of inequality affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the chapter offers an analysis of how inequality varies along important indicators, such as form of government and access to basic rights. What emerges is a comprehensive view of the components of inequality, 261

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some of the important factors that explain its variation, including how governance can shape inequality in differing manners. Within various chapters in this book, there have been discussions of how a multitude of societal factors creates intersectional relationships with inequality and governance. There are also multiple measures of inequality that could be employed when focusing on divisions within a society. This includes, for example, understanding how race and gender impact wage differences. While these are important and useful approaches at the case level, when attempting to provide an operationalized view of inequality, most measures rely on three distinct categories: consumption, wealth, and income.1 Consumption inequality measures variation in consumption across a population rather than income or accrued wealth. Economists argue that this may be a more comprehensive view of economic inequality than those relying on income. The logic is that consumption of goods is more consistent than potential fluctuations in year-to-year income, as a household tends to rely on the same package of basic goods year over year. These “income shocks” could cause changes in economic behavior, which could account for demand changes in certain goods across markets and could unlock a different perspective on the gap between the rich and poor. However, measuring consumption across the population is not an easy task. Attanasio and Pistaferri note, “In contrast [to income inequality], household surveys on household expenditure are rare, small, and lack a consistent longitudinal component.”2 Furthermore, most studies focus solely on an individual country, such as the United States,3 China,4 and India.5 This is caused mainly by the specific micro-level data necessary to measure this component of inequality. There are some studies that provide a comparative view of consumption inequality across settings,6 but there are still limitations in analyzing consumption across cases. Clearly, consumption inequality can be of use to analysts striving for a different perspective of the larger concept of inequality, but the current chapter is unable to make large-scale comparisons in consumption across world regions. Still, it is important to highlight this major component of inequality, as it is of interest to scholars of inequality. Wealth inequality is another major aspect of economic inequality. It concentrates on the differences across the population in accrued wealth. While there are nuances in what is included in the varying measures of wealth, the general view is that wealth inequality can be thought of as any accrued wealth via property, pensions, or investments. More important, wealth inequality is measured as a percentage, making it an easily comparable measure across settings, as scholars can gain an intuitive comparison across cases. The standard measure of wealth inequality looks at the percentage of wealth held by different percentiles of the population. For example, in the United States, the

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top 10 percent hold more than 70 percent of accrued wealth, while the top 1 percent hold just under 35 percent.7 This is contrasted with the bottom 50 percent holding just 1.5 percent.8 Analyzing such gaps further, this chapter will subsequently demonstrate how the different dimensions of inequality can provide more nuanced perspectives on the complexities surrounding the concept of inequality. Finally, the most commonly used dimension of inequality relies on income inequality. Income is considered as any earned income over a certain period of time, usually yearly. Income can come from normal sources, such as employment, but can also be thought of as gained from investments, self-employment, or government transfers. It is essential to note that the income from investments, such as through dividends or selling off investments, is different from the worth of any individual investment that would be included in measures of wealth inequality, meaning that actively holding investments would fall under wealth, while income from selling investments would constitute income. Furthermore, most income inequality measures deduct any taxation on an individual or household, thereby focusing on disposable income. This introductory section has emphasized the main components of inequality from a quantification perspective. While this lies in contrast with the intersectional theme of many of the previous chapters, it provides a useful lesson of the potential of combining aspects of the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Where qualitative research offers a deeper perspective for specific cases, providing rich detail of outcomes, quantitative measures can provide a different perspective when analyzing phenomena at the macro level. One should be thought of not as superior but simply as a different way of analyzing our world. In the following section, the chapter moves to examining specific measures employed in subsequent analyses. For example, in previous chapters, authors have dealt with in-depth analyses of various forms of inequality. The chapter on Bangladesh focused on how specific societal factors lead to varying levels of poverty. The chapter on the Middle East and North Africa highlighted the importance of economic, gender, and digital equality. Finally, the chapter on Nigeria analyzed the comparative state of inequality in the country. The current chapter adopts a wider view to serve as a complement to the micro-level analyses of the previous chapters. MEASURES OF INEQUALITY As referenced above, this section will focus on the aspects of inequality most fit for comparisons. It will begin with the methodology of the measures of wealth and income inequality from the World Inequality Database (WID).

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This will be followed by an analysis of other specific measures of inequality used within the summary comparisons across countries to intertwine the governance dimension into the conversation. The WID provides numerous measures of inequality. The methodology behind the distributional inequality measures of wealth and income relies on the Distributional National Accounts guidelines.9 Both measures achieve the goal of computing workable variables based on the Lorenz curve, which essentially places all income earners on a horizontal axis ranked by income, where perfect equality would be a forty-five-degree line splitting the graph. The curve reveals what portion of total income is held by a certain percentage of the population. For our analyses, we will focus on the top 1 and 10 percent of income earners/wealth holders. For wealth measures, the WID employs multiple data sources to come to its distributional measures. It uses a Mixed Income Capitalization–Survey method (MICS) that includes income tax data, surveys, and national accounts.10 From the capitalization process, the authors ascertain wealth via housing assets, business assets, financial assets, and financial liabilities.11 Of course, not all observations can be gleaned from this process, hence the choice of the MICS approach. When certain observations are not available via microdata, data are imputed using household surveys to produce a workable measure. They note that this is especially important for certain countries where data are limited or reporting processes are not uniform across cases. While this can become complex depending on specific cases, this should at the very least offer a sufficient view of the approach used within the distributional wealth inequality measures within the WID.12 When assuming comprehensive income microdata, they are able to compute distributional estimates aligned with national accounts.13 However, this is dependent on the availability of data as well as the size of any informal economy. When tax data are comprehensive, income surveys are used only as a complement. They note that in regions of the world such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America, income surveys move to a primary role in order to account for missing data and the presence of an informal economy that may not be captured in tax data files.14 Aside from these important measures of inequality that will be used for the analysis later in the chapter, there are additional measures that are employed for a wide range of reasons, running from descriptive to analytical. Such measures include the Gini coefficient, the Palma ratio, the mean log deviation, and the broader Thiel index. These measures are most appropriate for making country-level comparisons. There exist many nuances within these metrics. While some take on a more rigid structure, other measures can be more agile depending on the wishes of the researcher. Many of the measures are strictly making comparisons, with others offering the opportunity to apply some type

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of function to allow for societal demands or theoretical levels of aversion to inequality. Choosing one measure over another should take thoughtful consideration on the part of the researcher. Some indicators may reveal somewhat different information. When possible, a good strategy is to employ multiple measures. If one can show a trend across similar yet distinct measures, it increases the validity of any findings. In the next section, there will not be an opportunity to display all the measures presented above, but this discussion should equip readers with the background knowledge to understand some of the subsequent comparisons across regions and countries. LEVELS OF INEQUALITY This section provides a general analysis of the differences in inequality across countries and regions of the world. The country-level analysis relies on the countries employed in previous chapters. Again, this analysis offers a complement to more in-depth studies, such as the chapter on Mexico or the chapter on China, that reveal how societal inequalities led to varying responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Where those chapters put inequality and governance under a microscope, this section offers a broad view of inequality at the country, regional, and global levels. The goal is more to show the slight differences across measures than to make any generalizable comparisons. The three key indicators used for this summary analysis will be the share of income held by the top 10 and 1 percentiles, the share of wealth held by the same percentiles, and the Gini coefficient. All data are sourced from the WID.15 Because some of the preceding chapters focused on specific countries, I will include a summary analysis of these measures across India, Bangladesh, China, Russia, Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Mexico. It is important to note that the WID does not have a distinct measure of inequality for Britain versus the United Kingdom, so the U.K. measure will be used for that case. A regional analysis follows prior to discussing global trends in inequality. Country-Level Inequality Prior to discussing the differences in wealth and income inequality throughout the nine countries listed above, it should be noted that the data-reporting reliability varies widely across cases. The WID rates its quality of data for each year on a five-point scale, giving five stars to the highest-quality data availability. For example, the United States is the only country in the analysis with a five-star data rating. Mexico, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, and France are labeled as four stars. Russia, China, Hungary, and India all hold three-star ratings, while Bangladesh holds a one-star rating.

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A few things are of interest, as shown in table 12.1. There are clear differences in the level of wealth inequality across these cases, with the top 10 percent in Mexico holding the highest concentration, and the lowest concentration of wealth can be found in Italy. It is also fascinating that the Western European countries in the sample hover generally around the same level of inequality, indicating that governmental processes at the country and regional levels of Europe could be a factor. Additionally, moving from the top 10 percent of wealth holders to the top 1 percent, there are some dramatic shifts in wealth concentration. Russia and Mexico have the highest concentration of wealth at the top 1 percent, with just under half of all wealth being held by the top 1 percent. While not attempting to generalize, both countries suffer from high levels of corruption, as expressed in their poor ranking on the Corruption Perceptions Index,16 which could be a contributing factor. Again, this strengthens the idea that governance plays a role in both positive and negative manners. These figures can glean vital information about how scholars and policymakers view the state of a society, as wealth is more tangible and durable than year-to-year income. Table 12.2 displays the income distribution of the top 10 and 1 percent earners as well as the Gini coefficient for 2021. Keep in mind that whereas the Gini coefficient offers a generalized view of inequality, the income share percentages can offer a more tangible view of inequality, especially for those who are neophytes working with quantitative data. The income shares show some interesting differences, especially when comparing them with the wealth inequality measures. First, Mexico remains with the highest income inequality, similar to wealth. In fact, it has the highest income inequality across all three measures included. However, where Russia has high concentrations of wealth, its income inequality is on par with that of the United States. Similar Table 12.1. Wealth Share Measures, Country Level, 2021 Country Nigeria India Bangladesh China Russia Poland Hungary United Kingdom France Italy United States Mexico Source: Table prepared by the author.

Top 10%

Top 1%

58.8% 64.6% 58.7% 68% 74.1% 61.8% 67.3% 57.1% 59.5% 56.2% 70.7% 78.8%

25.5% 33% 25.1% 31% 47.7% 30.2% 33.5% 21.3% 27% 22.1% 34.9% 46.9%

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Inequality and Governance across World Regions Table 12.2. Income Inequality Measures, Country Level Country Nigeria India Bangladesh China Russia Poland Hungary United Kingdom France Italy United States Mexico

Top 10%

Top 1%

Gini Coefficient

42.7% 57.1% 42.9% 41.7% 46.6% 38.1% 32.5% 35.6% 32.3% 32.6% 45.7% 61.1%

11.6% 21.7% 16.3% 14% 21% 15.2% 11.1% 12.6% 9.9% 8.9% 19.1% 28.4%

.55 .63 .53 .56 .55 .49 .43 .46 .43 .45 .58 .71

Source: Table prepared by the author.

to the wealth inequality measures, the European countries within the sample hold the lowest levels of inequality across all three indicators. This yet again highlights the importance of governance relating to inequality outcomes. This brief country overview illustrates the variation in wealth and income inequality measures and the information they provide. It also illuminates the cases covered in the preceding chapters a bit more by giving context to the level of inequality within a particular country. Regional-Level Inequality To provide a view of regional-level variations in inequality, the wealth and income inequality are highlighted across seven regions of the world. The choice of regions is based on the preceding chapters, but I also include others not covered to provide a comprehensive analysis. The seven regions include sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Asia (excluding the Middle East), Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North America, and Latin America. Again, all data are from the WID data set and are for the year 2021. Table 12.3 displays the wealth inequality indicators across the seven regions. Latin America holds the highest concentration of wealth in both indicators, aligning with country-level analysis of Mexico. This is followed closely by the MENA region. Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and North America all hold generally the same levels of inequality on this metric. The European groupings have the lowest concentration of wealth, with the Western European region holding the lowest figures across both measures (58.5 percent). These trends continue with the top 1 percent category, with some slight variations. There are far too many country-specific variables to make any reasonable

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Table 12.3. Wealth Inequality, Regional Level Region

Top 10%

Top 1%

73.5% 75.8% 71.7% 62.2% 58.5% 70% 77.7%

38.1% 43.6% 35.2% 28.6% 25.1% 34.4% 46.1%

Sub-Saharan Africa MENA Asia Eastern Europe Western Europe North America Latin America Source: Table prepared by the author.

explanation for this variation, indicating the need for thoughtful research on the subject to ascertain the factors that hold a significant correlation. Moving to income inequality at the regional level, table 12.4 contains the same three indicators of income inequality used for the country-level analysis. Using these metrics, it is clear there are some minor yet noticeable differences relative to the wealth concentration variables. Where Latin America possesses the highest share of wealth, we see some divergence in the measures of income inequality. Latin America holds the second-highest share at the top 10 percentile and the highest at the top 1 percentile, yet the Gini coefficient is not significantly different from other regions, such as Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The MENA region represents the highest share of income at the top 10 percent grouping, a slight difference in comparison to wealth, where they trailed Latin America. Again, the European groupings report the lowest concentration of income, with the lowest to highest concentration ranging at nearly 25 percent. This summary analysis presented some growing trends in certain countries and regions, reinforcing how different measures can offer slightly different information. For a more comprehensive perspective, a global analysis is offered, with a short overview of how inequality has changed over multiple years. Table 12.4. Income Inequality, Regional Level Region Sub-Saharan Africa MENA Asia Eastern Europe Western Europe North America Latin America Source: Table prepared by the author.

Top 10%

Top 1%

56% 58.1% 49.9% 37.4% 34.9% 45.8% 57.8%

21.6% 22.3% 17.5% 13.4% 11.2% 19% 24.8%

Gini Coefficient .67 .69 .63 .50 .46 .58 .68

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Global Inequality This section explains how global inequality has ebbed and flowed over the course of multiple decades. For wealth inequality, the WID covers the years 1995–2021, and for the income inequality, it measures the years 1980–2021. This offers the opportunity to see long-term trends across the different measures. Beginning with the wealth inequality measures, the top 10 percent share of wealth has fallen since the mid-1990s, when 79.9 percent of global wealth was held by the richest 10 percent. However, there has been a slight yet consistent decline in this trend since then, being exacerbated by the 2008–2009 economic crisis. Currently, the share of global wealth held by the top 10 percent sits at 77.1 percent. The top 1 percentile reveals a different type of trend relative to the top 10 percent grouping. The level of wealth held at the top 1 percent has come full circle from where it began in 1995. During that year, the top 1 wealthiest percentage held 38.5 percent of global wealth. This ticked up to a high of 40.5 percent in 1999 before falling to a low point of 37.4 percent in 2009 following the global economic crisis. Since then, it has made slight increases and decreases but is on the rise again, with the 2021 figure sitting a shade under the 1995 figure at 38.3 percent. This trend of diminishing shares at the top 10 percentile and slight shifts at the top 1 percentile continues in the income share measures. Within the top 10 percent of income earners, the world is essentially where it was in 1980. In that year, the share of income held by the top 1 percent of earners was 52.3 percent. This steadily rose over the next few decades, reaching a peak of 57.6 percent in 2000. Since then, however, the income share of this grouping has fallen back to near-1980 levels. For 2021, the income share was 52.4 percent. For the top 1 percent of income earners, the 1980 level was 17.4 percent. This then decreased to a low of 16.6 percent in 1983 before consistently rising to a high of 21.1 percent in 2007. Since a somewhat sharp shift downward to 20 percent in 2009, the income share of the top 1 percent has seen slight variation, with the 2021 figure holding at 19.3 percent. Finally, the Gini coefficient offers a differing view of inequality relative to the other measures. It is important to keep in mind that the Gini coefficient is a more generalized view than the specific income and wealth share brackets. As of 1980, the global Gini coefficient was .69, and 1999–2001 saw the highest level for the global coefficient at .71. Since 2001, there has been a general decline in the global Gini coefficient, remaining unchanged since 2014–2021 at .67. Again, it needs reiterating that looking at any measure of inequality at the global level misses a lot of relative information about particular countries. Still, this should again reinforce the variations in indicators of inequality.

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INEQUALITY AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC Before moving to the statistical analysis of inequality, a special feature of many of the preceding chapters has been an examination of the impacts resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the chapter on Russia analyzed how Putin’s regime was slow to respond, causing a variety of negative outcomes. The chapter on Hungary and Poland highlighted how the pandemic exacerbated the consolidation of power by radical right-wing parties. To illustrate the inequalities attributable to COVID from a generalized perspective, this section offers four distinct areas in which the pandemic impacted inequality: income, wealth, death tolls, and gender issues. Given the complexity in measuring inequality, as seen in the preceding section, providing a clear-cut answer to how the pandemic impacted income inequality can be difficult. Deaton’s recent work offers a comprehensive view of how the income share shifted depending on the chosen dimension. He adopts three different views of inequality to offer a deeper view of the pandemic’s consequences. Deaton finds that when looking at unweighted inequality, that is, treating all countries as equal, comparative inequality between countries actually fell, continuing the long-term trend highlighted in the previous section.17 However, he goes on to present evidence that when considering population, the level of income inequality between countries rose in 2020 directly as a result of the pandemic. He contends that this reversal of a declining trend can be attributed to the large economic contraction in India18 during that year. An additional salient point presented by Deaton is that per capita income in richer countries fell more than in poorer countries as a result of the large variation in deaths between developed and developing countries, as this section discusses in more detail below. Complementing Deaton’s work, a study by the World Bank brings forth another dimension of income inequality: losses in income. The authors show that the losses in income were felt more by lower-income individuals. They present evidence that the top 20 percent of income earners lost about 5 percent of their income and that the poorest 20 percent lost about 6 percent. While this does not seem like a large difference, there is a larger divergence over time.19 They note that while the top earners are projected to recover much of their 2020 losses in 2021, “the poorest of the two deciles on average are expected to further lose 5 percent of their income.”20 These two studies reinforce the complicated nature of understanding inequality but do show how the pandemic has negatively impacted the lives of individuals, particularly those in the lower portions of the income distribution, further highlighting the impact of governmental decisions related to the working class.

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The pandemic had a large impact on the distribution of wealth throughout the world. Again, this has had an unequal effect depending on the severity of the pandemic in a given country. However, looking at the richest and poorest, we can get an idea of how the pandemic affected the share of wealth held by different portions of the population. In terms of overall wealth share, the highest portions of the economic distribution saw the largest gains over the course of the pandemic. The wealthiest 10 percent held a 76 percent share of global wealth in 2019, a figure that had been declining since 2011. However, over the course of the pandemic, the top 10 percent share increased to 77.1 percent, wiping out ten years of declining inequality to return to 2011 levels.21 Similarly, the top 1 percent also saw increases in wealth shares over the course of the pandemic. In 2019, the top 1 percent held 37.7 percent of all wealth. By 2021, this had increased to 39.6 percent.22 To give a bit more tangible detail to these figures, an analysis by Oxfam states that the richest ten individuals more than doubled their wealth from $700 billion pre-pandemic to $1.5 trillion during the first two years of the pandemic.23 Looking specifically at the United States, the highest levels of concentrated wealth occurred in October 2021, with 745 billionaires holding a combined $5.1 billion, a 70 percent gain, or $2.1 trillion relative to pre-pandemic levels.24 While these levels have dropped somewhat given fluctuations in the stock market, as of November 2022, that gain still sat at $1.7 trillion.25 While wealth increased at the top end of the economic spectrum, the same cannot be said for those at the opposite end. A study by the World Bank analyzes how many additional people were pushed into poverty during the pandemic. They isolate the increase in poverty attributable to the pandemic by comparing pre-pandemic projections with the latest growth forecasts. They show that 97 million additional people experienced poverty because of COVID. This alone is troublesome, but it caused a spike in a declining trend from 655 million people in 2019 to 732 million in 2020.26 It is clear that it will take additional time for poverty levels to return to pre-pandemic levels. Arguably the most striking inequality to come out of the pandemic was the uneven death tolls across class, race, and gender. While the global trend is that richer countries suffered a larger loss in life years than poor countries,27 the evidence shows that when delving deeper into the available data, the inequalities were stark in many countries. For example, Arceo-Gomez and her coauthors analyze how an individual’s income decile in Mexico affected the probability of COVID mortality. By linking employee-patient data, they conclude that those with the lowest incomes were five times more likely to die from the virus than those with the highest incomes.28 This trend is consistent in other countries, particularly the United States, which holds the highest death toll of any country. Pathak and her coauthors

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analyze how class, race, and gender impacted COVID mortality throughout the United States. They note that a higher proportion of Hispanics, African Americans, and Indigenous peoples are within the working class, indicating the higher probability of exposure to the virus. Similar to Arceo-Gomez et al.’s work, they find that being a member of the working class increased the probability of COVID mortality by fivefold compared with college graduates.29 The authors go on to show that socioeconomic standing, Hispanic ethnicity, and male gender resulted in a mortality rate twenty-seven times higher compared with white, college-educated women.30 The APM Research Lab, an independent, nonpartisan research lab, employed data directly from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to track the impacts of the pandemic. Gawthrop reports that adjusting for age, every minority group aside from the Asian population had a higher mortality rate compared with the white population.31 The minority groupings included Indigenous (586 per 100,000), Pacific Islander (488 per 100,000), Black (470 per 100,000), and Latino (494 per 100,000). The white population held an age-adjusted 290 deaths per 100,000 and the Asian grouping 212 per 100,000.32 Of course, mortality is not the only impact of concern stemming from the pandemic. Much of the worry of the pandemic related to the impact on wages and employment. EuroStat, the statistical office of the European Union, compared how EU countries were affected from a labor perspective. They note that those in the lowest-skilled positions were more likely to see a reduction in their wages or hours.33 Furthermore, the likelihood of losing a position altogether was also highest in the lowest-skilled portions of the population. Risk is also another dimension they highlight; when considering income, the combination of low skill and low pay increases the probability of exposure.34 Taken together, these studies indicate a deeper view of how inequality impacted risk, death, and loss of income from the pandemic in addition to how, in many cases, governmental decisions led to catastrophic outcomes for the lowest end of the economic spectrum. One final dimension that should be noted before moving to the generalized inequality analysis is how women faced a mounting level of pressures related to the pandemic. While women tended to have lower death rates than men, they faced several different challenges throughout the first two years of the pandemic. Most notably, women were more likely to see an increase in child care responsibilities over the course of the pandemic, particularly in the first year, when lockdowns shuttered schools and day care centers. A UN analysis of eighteen countries indicated that, on average, women had an additional 5.2 hours per week of child care, up to thirty-two hours per week.35 Not surprisingly, this had spillover effects into other areas of their lives. Goldstein and his coauthors show that the probability of a women-led firm closing was 4 percent higher compared with male-led firms.36

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However, a spillover effect of even more concern is the increased level of spousal and child abuse that occurred throughout the pandemic, stemming mostly from increased lockdowns and loss of employment/income. Bourgault, Peterman, and O’Donnell, writing for the Center of Global Development, produced a meta-analysis of more than 100 studies on spousal and child abuse, providing clear evidence that most studies find increases in the level of violence against children and women, in mental and emotional abuse, and in harassment.37 This section supports the growing trend throughout the literature as well as throughout this book that inequality is a multifaceted concept. The impacts deriving from inequality during the COVID-19 pandemic are no exception. VARIATIONS OF INEQUALITY Following these trends, this section will analyze some of the reasons behind variations in inequality at the global level by using a random selection of forty-five countries. All regions and countries touched on in the previous chapters are included in the sample. For our analysis, the two dependent variables will be the top 10 percent share of both income and wealth from the WID.38 Included are several different indicators that may explain some of the variation in inequality around the world. To explain some of the variation in inequality, two important indicators offer a basic view of the governmental structure of a country. A theme of this chapter and book has been the impact of governance related to inequality, so it is only natural for it to be a part of the statistical model. The first is a categorical measure of democracy using the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index for 2021.39 This categorizes states on the basis of four categories: autocracy, hybrid regime, flawed democracy, and full democracy. The second is the Freedom House categories. This measure provides insight into the general restrictions placed on the population and press within a country. Similar to the EIU measure, a three-category measure is used, based on Freedom House’s demarcation of a country’s status as free, partially free, or not free.40 The logic behind the inclusion of these measures is somewhat straightforward. Inequality can be a by-product of the type of regime put in place by the government. If there are extreme levels of restrictions of individual freedoms or opportunities, wealth and income may be shared by only a small minority of the population, at least as related to countries with capitalistic systems. Furthermore, if a government imposes harsh restrictions on portions of the population, it could signal that the full potential of wealth and income earning is artificially inhibited. To start with the analysis, two analysis of variance

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(ANOVA) tests are used to see if there are significant differences in average inequality between these groupings for both wealth and income. A linear regression analysis is done, employing the same two dependent variables of wealth and income. In addition to the EIU and Freedom House variables, additional variables of interest to explaining inequality are presented, as is a measure of overall wealth, quantified as gross domestic product (GDP) in millions from the World Bank.41 As a country grows more prosperous, this could offer the potential for a divergence between the rich and poor whereby the wealthier citizens are able to accrue more and more wealth at the expense of the lower portions of the distribution. Thus far, the variables focus on the governmental structure and size of a given country’s economy. However, two additional variables within the regression models measure the living conditions of the population as a whole. First, the model uses a variable for health spending, measured as the percent of GDP dedicated to health care.42 The higher the level of equality to accessing health care and the more dedication a government has toward its health care system, the more likely individuals of any background will be able to thrive. Second, the model includes two different measures of access to education. Both measures are from the UN Human Development Report for 2020.43 The first measure is the average years of schooling received. This measure is calculated by taking the average of the mean years of schooling for both males and females. This should allow for an understanding of how basic access to education impacts inequality. An additional measure is employed to estimate the impact of education when considering gender inequalities. This is measured via the inequality-adjusted education index. This index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher numbers indicating less inequality in education. This is a complementary measure to understand the divergence between access for male and female children. Of course, education should be a key factor to understanding inequality. As access to education becomes more widespread, the possibility is higher that individuals will be able to attain gainful employment, causing the distribution of wealth and income to become more equitable. Including this measure also alludes to many of the gender and racial disparities highlighted by previous chapters, indicating that it is important to highlight such disparities as best as possible within the statistical model. Having explained the above variables, the analysis now moves to discussing some of the interesting findings. Table 12.5 shows the average levels of wealth and income by the EIU democracy categories. For wealth, there is a significant difference in the overall ANOVA test, indicating a significant difference between groupings. An additional post hoc test allows the opportunity to gain more understanding of the divergence between groups. The starkest difference exists between the “Autocracy” and “Full Democracy” groupings, with autocratic countries holding just over 9 percent more wealth at the top 10

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Inequality and Governance across World Regions Table 12.5. Democracy Analysis of Wealth and Income EIU Categories Autocracy Hybrid Flawed Democracy Full Democracy

Mean Wealth Share, Top 10%

Mean Income Share, Top 10%

68.1% 66.8% 67.4% 58.9%

50.7% 52.4% 47.1% 38.6%

Source: Table prepared by the author.

percent. This is most likely the main driver of the overall significance level. Interestingly, the “Flawed Democracy” grouping is also significantly different from the “Full Democracy” grouping, holding a little over 8 percent more wealth at the top 10 percentile. For the income share analysis, this trend continues. While not as pronounced as the wealth variable, there is a trend toward less income being hoarded at the top 10 percentile moving from autocratic countries to democratic states. The ANOVA test shows overall significance, and the post hoc test shows a similar divergence between groupings. The income shares of the “Full Democracy” grouping are significantly different from both the “Autocracy” and the “Hybrid” categories. The “Flawed Democracy” grouping is not significantly different from any other groupings. This initial analysis shows that governmental structure could be playing a strong role in understanding inequality across settings. Moving to a related measure of freedoms, the Freedom House categories do not show trends as consistent as those of the EIU categories, as can be seen in table 12.6. None of the categories are significantly different for the wealth analysis, alluding to the idea that there are factors other than guaranteed freedoms that are related to wealth accumulation. For income, there are only two groupings significantly different from one another, albeit at the .10 level of significance. These groupings are the “Partly Free” and “Free” categories. Again, it seems that the Freedom House categories do not perform as well as the EIU categories in explaining the variation in inequality across countries. Now that this initial step of the analysis is complete, a regression analysis is performed, which includes the additional control variables of wealth, health care spending, and education. Table 12.7 reports the findings for the income analyses. Model 1 includes the mean years of schooling education variable, while Model 2 includes the education index variable to show consistency across different measures. Looking at the results, it becomes clear that education is the only significant factor included in the model. All other factors do not reach the level of statistical significance. However, education can be seen as an important antidote to income inequality. For each additional mean year of schooling, the share of wealth held by the top 10 percent drops by 1.7

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Table 12.6. Freedom House Analysis of Wealth and Income Freedom House Categories

Mean Wealth Share, Top 10%

Mean Income Share, Top 10%

66.8% 67.8% 64.6%

49.4% 51.7% 43.5%

Not Free Partly Free Free Source: Table prepared by the author.

Table 12.7. Income Inequality Regression Models Model 1 EIU Freedom House Health spending Mean years of school Inequality-adjusted education index Constant N R2 *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05.

−2.25 (2.3) 1.65 (3.08) −7.26E-8 (.000) −1.71** (.001) 64.77*** (4.9) 45 .336

Model 2 −1.19 (2.35) −.875 (3.18)

−24.15** (9.06) 62.54*** (4.36) 45 .343

Source: Table prepared by the author.

percent. The explained variance for this model sits at 33.6 percent, indicating that while the model accounts for a good share of the variance around the mean of income inequality, there are additional factors at play that are not within the bounds of this model. This education impact continues in Model 2 when using the education index. Given that this ranges only from 0 to 1, it is essentially looking at the impact of going from completely unequal to completely equal education, hence the large coefficient. Again, this model performs generally well, accounting for 34.3 percent of the variance of the dependent variable. However, the models do not perform nearly as well with the wealth dependent variable. None of the variables included in the income inequality analysis reached statistical significance, signaling that these models are only scratching the surface of the potential impacts of inequality. Most strikingly, the democracy variables remain insignificant, indicating that democratization does not have a large impact on inequality. This is somewhat alarming given

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that democratic theory indicates that there should be responsiveness from the masses, providing public policy that adheres to the wishes of the people. While this small analysis shows some interesting findings, it should motivate budding scholars to attempt to build out from this foundational overview and use it as a launching pad to new and interesting scholarly work surrounding inequality. CONCLUSION This chapter has covered multiple aspects related to measuring inequality. It began with a discussion of how scholars tend to think about the specific dimensions of inequality. This is an important step when attempting to quantify something as diverse as the concept of inequality. This was followed by a detailed discussion of some of the specific measures of inequality. Readers were exposed to the nuances of different measures, with some taking a more rigid structure and others a more dynamic one. This progressed to a summary analysis of inequality related to the countries and regions covered in the preceding chapters of this volume. The chapter intertwined the theme of governance and how it is related to the many facets of inequality, including income, wealth, and the inequalities faced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, all this information was pulled together into an introductory analysis that attempted to highlight indicators that are important in trying to understand the variation of inequality. This concluding chapter sparks more questions than answers. There is ample opportunity for scholarship into inequality and governance from a range of different perspectives. While this chapter focused on quantitative analysis, the concept of inequality calls for a diverse set of scholarship. Quantitative and qualitative scholars create a synergistic relationship that equates to increasing the accrued knowledge on a topic. Inequality is a prime example of how scholars cannot be myopic in how they go about providing evidence. Only with thoughtful and comprehensive approaches can real progress on a topic be made. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.  This chapter took a large-scale look at inequality across multiple settings. What could be some of the pros and cons of this approach? 2.  What are potentially alternative ways to measure/quantify inequality? 3.  What are some other variables that could explain the variation in inequality across regions of the world?

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4.  How could other approaches of inequality used throughout this book be incorporated into a quantitative approach? 5.  In what ways are the current measures of inequality flawed? NOTES 1. Jonathan Fisher, David Johnson, Timothy Smeeding, and Jeffrey Thompson, “Inequality in 3-D: Income, Consumption, and Wealth,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018–001, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC, https:​//​doi​.org​/10​.17016​/FEDS​.2018​.001. 2. Orazio P. Attanasio and Luigi Pistaferri, “Consumption Inequality,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 30, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 26. 3. Bruce D. Meyer and James X. Sullivan, “Consumption and Income Inequality in the US since the 1960s,” NBER Working Paper 23655, August 2017, revised January 2022, 1–74. 4. Hongbin Cai, Yuyu Chen, and Li-An Zhou, “Income and Consumption Inequality in Urban China: 1992–2003,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 58, no. 3 (2010): 385–413. 5. Amit Basole and Deepankar Basu, “Non-Food Expenditures and Consumption Inequality in India,” Economic and Political Weekly 50, no. 36 (September 2015): 43–53. 6. Carlos Gradin and Binbin Wu, “Income and Consumption Inequality in China: A Comparative Approach with India,” China Economic Review, 62 (2020): 1–25. 7. “Income Inequality, USA, 1913–2021,” World Inequality Database, https:​//​wid​ .world​/country​/usa. 8. Ibid. 9. World Inequality Lab, Distributional National Accounts Guidelines: Methods and Concepts Used in the World Inequality Database, June 28 2021, 1–186, https:​//​ wid​.world​/document​/distributional​-national​-accounts​-guidelines​-2020​-concepts​-and​ -methods​-used​-in​-the​-world​-inequality​-database. 10. Ibid., 123. 11. Ibid., 124. 12. Like the wealth inequality measures, the income inequality measures within the WID employ tax data and, when necessary, are supplemented with surveys on household income. This is another example of the difficulties in providing a uniform measure of inequality across settings. The specific dimensions of income are a bit too detailed to go into in this chapter, but the authors provide a comprehensive view of the macro and micro components within the second chapter of their explanation of the DINA guidelines. 13. World Inequality Lab, Distributional National Accounts Guidelines, 101. 14. Ibid., 102. 15. World Inequality Database, https:​//​wid​.world​/data. 16.“Corruption Perceptions Index, 2021,” Transparency International, https:​//​www​ .transparency​.org​/en​/cpi​/2021.

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17. Angus Deaton, “COVID-19 and Global Income Inequality,” NBER Working Paper 28392, 2021, https:​//​www​.nber​.org​/papers​/w28392. 18. Ibid. 19. Nishant Yonzan, Christoph Lakner, and Daniel Gerszon Mahler, “Is COVID-19 Increasing Global Inequality?,” World Bank Blogs, October 2021, https:​ //​ blogs​ .worldbank​.org​/opendata​/covid​-19​-increasing​-global​-inequality. 20. Ibid. 21. “World Inequality Database.” 22. Ibid. 23. “Ten Richest Men Double Their Fortunes in Pandemic while Incomes of 99 Percent of Humanity Fall,” Oxfam, January 2022, https:​//​www​.oxfam​.org​/en​/press​ -releases​/ten​-richest​-men​-double​-their​-fortunes​-pandemic​-while​-incomes​-99​-percent​ -humanity. 24. “Updates: Billionaire Wealth, US Job Losses, and Pandemic Profiteers,” Inequality.org, 2022, https:​//​inequality​.org​/great​-divide​/updates​-billionaire​-pandemic. 25. Ibid. 26. Daniel Gerszon Mahler, Nishant Yonzan, Christoph Lakner, R. Andres Castaneda Aguilar, and Haoyu Wu, “Updated Estimates of the Impact of COVID-19 on Global Poverty: Turning the Corner on the Pandemic in 2021?,” World Bank Blogs, 2021, https:​//​inequality​.org​/great​-divide​/updates​-billionaire​-pandemic. 27. Francisco H. G. Ferreira, “Inequality in the Time of COVID-19,” International Monetary Fund, 2021, https:​//​www​.shorturl​.at​/bcjnz. 28. Eva O. Arceo-Gomez, Raymundo M. Campos-Vazquez, Gerardo Esquivel, Eduardo Alcaraz, Luis A. Martinez, and Norma G. Lopez, “The Income Gradient in COVID-19 Mortality and Hospitalisation: An Observational Study with Social Security Administrative Records in Mexico,” The Lancet Regional Health–Americas 6 (2022): 100115. 29. Elizabeth Pathak, Janelle Menard, Rebecca B. Garcia, and Jason L. Salemi, “Social Class, Race/Ethnicity, and COVID-19 Mortality among Working Age Adults in the United States,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 9 (2022): 54–79. 30. Ibid. 31. Elisabeth Gawthrop, “The Color of Coronavirus: COVID-19 Deaths by Race and Ethnicity in the US,” APM Research Lab, November 2022, https:​//​www​ .apmresearchlab​.org​/covid​/deaths​-by​-race​#key​-findings. 32. Ibid. 33. “COVID-19 Labour Effects across the Income Distribution,” Eurostat, October 2020, https:​//​ec​.europa​.eu​/eurostat​/statistics​-explained​/index​.php​?title​=COVID​-19​ _labour​_effects​_across​_the​_income​_distribution​#A​_more​_in​-depth​_cross​-country​ _analysis. 34. Ibid. 35. “The COVID-19 Pandemic Has Increased the Care Burden, but by How Much?,” United Nations Women, December 2020, https:​//​data​.unwomen​.org​/features​ /covid​-19​-pandemic​-has​-increased​-care​-burden​-how​-much​-0.

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36. Markus Goldstein, Paula Gonzalez-Martinez, Sreelakshmi Papineni, and Joshua Wimpey, “Childcare, COVID-19, and Female Firm Exit,” World Bank Blogs, April 2022, https:​//​blogs​.worldbank​.org​/opendata​/childcare​-covid​-19​-and​-female​ -firm​-exit. 37. Shelby Bourgault, Amber Peterman, and Megan O’Donnell, “Violence against Women and Children during COVID-19—One Year On and 100 Papers,” Center for Global Development, April 2021, https:​//​prevention​-collaborative​.org​/wp​-content​/ uploads​/2021​/08​/CGD​_2021​_VAWC​-Covid​-19​-Fourth​-Research​-Round​-Up​.pdf. 38. “World Inequality Database.” 39. “Democracy Index 2021,” The Economist, https:​//​www​.eiu​.com​/n​/campaigns​/ democracy​-index​-2021. 40. “Countries and Territories,” Freedom House, https:​ //​ freedomhouse​ .org​ / countries​/freedom​-world​/scores. 41. “GDP (Current US$),” World Bank, https:​//​data​.worldbank​.org​/indicator​/NY​ .GDP​.MKTP​.CD. 42. “Current Health Expenditure (% of GDP),” World Bank, https:​//​data​.worldbank​ .org​/indicator​/SH​.XPD​.CHEX​.GD​.ZS. 43. Pedro Conceicao, “Human Development Report 2020: The Next Frontier— Human Development and the Anthropocene,” United Nations Development Program, https:​//​hdr​.undp​.org​/system​/files​/documents//​hdr2020pdf​.pdf.

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Index

Note: Page locators in italics refer to figures and tables; Locators followed by ‘n’ refer to notes. AASS. See American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS) Aba Women’s War (1929), 24 abductions, 30–31 Abdulazeez, Yusuf, 28 Abeokuta Women’s Union (AWU), 25 Aberdour, Rotimi, 31 Abkhazia, 142 abolitionism, 229 Abrams, Stacey, 14, 223, 235–36 abuse, 69 accredited social health activist (ASHA) workers, 66 Achebe, Chinua, 33 Action Group (AG), 22 Adekunle, Julius O., 10 Ademoyega, Adewale, 23 Afghanistan, 141; women’s justice in, 50 African American Episcopal Church (AME), 226 African American women, 14, 223–39. See also Black women African countries: COVID-19 pandemic in, 19–20, 31–32; gender inequality in, 23–26; health care

system, 19; inequality in, 19–34. See also Nigeria; politics, 23; women in, 24–26 African Perspectives on Colonialism (Boehner), 23–24 “African Women in Politics” (O’Hare and Firmin-Sellers), 24 aggressive nationalism, 183 Akintoye, Banjo, 31 Albright, Cliff, 235, 239 Alexander III (1881–1894), 143 Algeria, 54; economic participation/ opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/eparticipation, 53; female/male unemployment rate, 44; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; internet growth, 51; ratio of female to male labor force participation rate, 44; woman versus men income, 44; youth unemployment percentages, 44 Ali, Aruna Asaf, 77 Allen, Richard, 226, 227 All-India Women’s Conference, 76 Alva, Margaret, 77, 78 285

286

Index

American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS), 229 American Declaration of Independence, 4 American democracy, 2 American Pledge of Allegiance, 4 AME Zion Church, 228 Amini, Mahsa, 47 Amnesty International, 174 Andrews, William L., 226 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), 141 anti-colonial protests, 24–25 anti-lockdown demonstrations, 189–90 anti-system politics, 13, 183, 186 anti-vaccine misinformation, 215 Arab Spring, 7, 39, 145 Arborisade, Oladimeji, 25 Ardern, Jacinda, 187 Argentina, 255 Aric-American Intelligence Society, 229 Arizona, 202 Art With Me festival, Mexico, 249–50 ASHA. See accredited social health activist (ASHA) Asia: income inequality, 268; wealth inequality, 268 Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce (1990), 209 authoritarianism, 1–2, 6, 12, 162 autocracy, 1–3, 5–9, 12–15, 137–38, 143, 201–2; versus democracy, 183 autocrats, 201–2 AWU. See Abeokuta Women’s Union (AWU) AztraZeneca, 255 Babangida, Ibrahim, 27 Bahrain, 43; economic inequality, 43; economic participation/opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/ e-participation, 53; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; women’s justice in, 50

Baker, Ella, 233–34 Baltimore, Pricilla, 228 banditry, 30–31 Banerjee, Mamata, 77–78 Bangladesh, 11, 91–110; agricultural sector, 97–99; aquaculture sector, 97–99; Biharis in, 93; Buddhist/ Hindu communities, violence against, 100–101; child marriage in, 101–2; Child Marriage Restraint Act (2017), 102; climate change affects, 97; core curriculum in, 94–95; COVID-19 impact in, 92–93, 98, 102–5; development policies, 92; duty-free quota-free (DFQF) access, 108; economy, 92, 104–7; educational system, 92–96; environment, 103–4; exports from, 105; FDI, 99, 105–6; food security in, 96–99; future outlook, 107–8; garment industry, 106; GDP, 105; governance in, 92, 108–10; government, 107; Grameen Bank, 106; gruel kitchens in, 97; health care in, 101–3; higher education in, 94; Hindu community in, 100; human rights in, 99–101; income inequality measures, 267; inequality in education, 95–96; Islam in, 99, 107; land grabbing in, 100; literacy rates, 94; Madrasahs education system in, 93; maternal and child health services in, 101; mental health issues in, 102; minor religions, 99; natural disasters, susceptible to, 92, 103–4; new national education policy in, 94–95; nutritional deficiencies, 98; nutritional intake, 98; overview, 91–92; politics, 99, 107; population, 92; poverty in, 95–96; primary education in, 93–94; primary source of income, 97; refugee population in, 93; religiosity, 99–101; religious violence in, 100–101; Rohingya in, 93; rural education in, 95–96;

Index

secondary education in, 94; Sixth Five Year Plan (2011–2015), 99; small and medium-sized enterprises in, 106–7; Sunni Muslims in, 99; Sylhet program, 95–96; wealth share measures, 266 Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), 107 Bannon, Steve, 203 Bano, Shah, 72, 78 Barber, Benjamin R., 40 Barr, William, 202 Bas, Philippe, 182 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992), 47, 52 Bastille Day, 194–95 Bates, Daisey, 233–34 BDR. See Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) Beatty, Joyce, 235 Beijing, 127 Belarus, 137, 146, 162 Berezovskii, Boris, 141 Berlusconi, Silvio, 183 “Beti Bachao Beti Padhao” scheme, 83 Better Life Program, 25 Bhatt, Ela, 76 Biden, Joe, 192, 202, 236–37 Bielefeldt, Heiner, 99–100 Biharis, 93 Black church movement, 226, 228 Black church women, 225–26 Black civil rights, 232 Black feminism, 224–25 Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (Collins), 224 Black freedom, 223 Black Lives Matter movement, 3, 190 black market, 163–64 Black men, 226 Black Voters Matter, 235–37, 239 Black women, 14, 223–39; abolitionists, 223–32; activism, 224–25; Black church, power in, 226; club movement, 224; Collier-Thomas on, 223; consciousness, 224–25;

287

COVID-19 effects on, 237–38; empowerment, 223–24; freedom, 223, 225; identity, 226; inequality, 226; legacy of struggle, 224–39; overview, 223; power, 223; quest for equality, 223–24; racial justice, 224; racism, 224; in reform movements, 228–29; rights, 223–24; roles in church, 227; school for, 226; selfarticulation, 224–25; sex oppression, 224; slave narratives, 224–25; spiritual autobiographies, 224–25, 226–27; status, 223; suffragists, 224– 32; voices, 224, 226; voting rights, 223, 233–38; women’s antislavery society, 229; writings, 224–25 Boahen, Adu, 23–24 Boko Haram group, 28, 28–30 Bollinger, Charlene, 215 Bolsonaro, Jair, 189, 247 Bowers, Rusty, 203 Boyko, Oksana, 147 brain drain, 149–50 Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), 206 A Brand Plucked from the Fire (Foote), 227–28 Brazil: Bolsonaro, Jair, 189; COVID-19 in, 2; economic inequality, 251 Brexit, 185–86 Britain, 13; anti-lockdown protests, 190; Brexit, 185–86; Cameron, David, 186; coalition government, 184; Conservative Party, 186; COVID-19 pandemic in, 181–82; Farage, Nigel, 186; financial crisis (2008), 185–86; impact of COVID-19 pandemic, 187–95; income inequality measures, 267; Johnson, Boris, 182, 184, 187, 190; Leave campaign, 186; lockdown in, 181–82; parliamentary system, 20–21; social democracy, 185–86; Starmer, Keir, 190; United Kingdom Independence Party, 186; wealth share measures, 266; Williamson, Adrian, 185–86

288

Brothers of Italy, 187 Brown, John, 231–32 Brown, LaTosha, 235–37, 239 Brussels, 161 brutality against women, 67–68 Buckley v. Valeo (1976), 205, 208– 9, 211, 216 Budapest, 161, 165, 171 Buhari, Muhammadu, 32 Bulgaria, 162–64 Bunza, Mukhtar Umar, 27 Burlington, 226 Burning Man festival, United States, 249–50 Burroughs, Nannie Helen, 233 Bush, George H. W., 139 Bush, George W., 141 Cameron, David, 186 campaign finance laws, 206–7 Campbell, Kenneth, 13 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 248 Cary, Mary Ann Shadd, 231 Casas de la Mujer Indígena y Afromexicana, 252 caste, 9–11, 65, 75, 77, 83 CCP. See Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, 84 Chad, COVID-19 in, 2 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), 205 Chapman, Stephen J., 15 Chatterji, B., 72 Chattogram, 105 Chavez, Hugo, 202 Chávez, Manuel, 14 Chechnya, 139–41 child marriage, 101–2 Child Marriage Bill (1927), 76 Child Marriage Restraint Act (1929/2017), 76, 102 Children’s Health Defense, 215

Index

China, 11–12, 115–31; background of pandemic, 116–17; Beijing, 127; CCP, 115–16; corruption in, 125–26; COVID eradication strategies, 115–16; COVID-19 pandemic in, 7, 12, 115–31; Dynamic Zero COVID Policy, 7, 12, 117–29; ethnic tensions in, 12; food distribution inequality/ discrimination in, 125; Fujian Province, 127; human rights in, 117, 126; income inequality, 11–12, 267; Minhang District, Shanghai, 127; PCR tests in, 115; Qian’an, Hebei Province, 126; Shanghai, 125; Shenzhen City, 128, 129; Siping City, Jilin Province, 127; Wuhan, 115, 130; Wuxi City, 128; Zhejiang Province, 117; Zhuanghe City, Dalian, Liaoning Province, 126 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 12, 115–17, 129–30 Chittagong Hills Tract (CHT), 100 Christianity, 27, 226, 228 Christian–Muslim clash, 29–30 CHT. See Chittagong Hills Tract (CHT) Chuku, Gloria, 25 Çiller, Tansu, 49–50 Citizens United, 212 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), 13, 203, 209 civil war, 2 CJEU. See Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Clinton, Bill, 139 Clinton, Hillary, 145, 209 coalition, 22–23 Collier-Thomas, Bettye, 223, 233 Collins, Patricia Hill, 224 colonialism, 23–24 coloniality in Mexico, 244–55; Mexican economy, 249–51; and Mexican politics, 247–49; and Mexican women’s health, 251–53 Conservative Party, 186 consumption inequality, 262

Index

Conte, Giuseppe, 181, 184, 188, 192 Coronavirus Preparedness Group, 32 “Corredor Interoceánico Istmo de Tehuantepec” project, 249 Corso, Lucia, 184 country-level inequalities, 265–67, 266–67 coup d’état attempt (2016), 39 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 171 COVAX, 255 COVID-19 pandemic, 1–2, 5–7, 243; in African countries, 19–20, 31–32; Bangladesh, impact in, 92–93, 98, 102–5; in Brazil, 2; in Chad, 2; in China, 7, 12, 115–31; Delta variant, 32; Eastern Europe, impact in, 159–60, 162–76; in France, 2; in Germany, 2, 187–89; in India, 2, 5–6, 83–85; in Iran, 39; lockdowns in, 6–7; in MENA region, 6, 39, 46, 51; in Mexico, 14, 246–53; in Nicaragua, 2; in Nigeria, 19–20, 31–32; Omicron mutation, 32; racial disparities during, 7; in Russia, 150–51; versus Spanish flu, 244; in Türkiye, 39; in United States, 7–8; in Yemen, 2 Crenshaw, Kimberlé W., 9, 252 Crimea, 12, 138, 145–46 Crummell, Alexander, 229 Cuba, 97 cybersecurity, 61n60 Czech Republic, 162–63 Daley, Beth, 26 Dalit Mahila Samiti, Uttar Pradesh, 76 dark money, 212–13 Datta, Rekha, 72, 74, 77 Daughters of Conference, 226 Dean, John, 208 defamation law, 206 Delta variant of COVID-19, 32 democracies, 1, 34, 40; American, 2–3, 201–2; attacks on, 65; versus

289

autocracy, 183; equality and, 40–42; freedom and, 40–42; Hungarian, 160; inclusion in, 3; Indian, 65–83; intersectionality in, 9–10; liberal, 160; managed, 140–42; in Nigeria, 33–34; social, 185–86; status of, 65; sustainable development and, 41; unity in, 3 Democracy in Crisis around the World, 1 dependentistas, 248 development policies, 92 dezinformatsiya, 214 Dhaka, 105 digital equality, 42 digital inequality, 41; MENA region, 51–54 digitalization, negative effects of, 42 discrimination, 3, 11–14, 30–31, 33–34, 44, 46–47, 50, 52, 55, 68, 75, 77 disinformation, 214 disinformation dozen, 215 Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Bill (1938), 72 Dodson, Jualynne E., 226 Dominion Voting Systems, 206 Donbas, 145–46 Donetsk, 137 Dooley, Kevin L., 12 Douglass, Frederick, 229 Douglass, Sarah Mapps, 229–32 Draghi, Mario, 187, 192–93 Drèze, Jean, 5–6 Duda, Andrzej, 172 Duncan, Sara, 228 Dutch, 189 Dynamic Zero COVID Policy, China, 7, 12, 15, 117–29; absolute lockdown, 118, 118–20, 125; collective punishment, 128; consequences, 128–29; forced isolation, 121; freedom of movement, stripping, 126–27; “health code,” ever-changing colored, 122–23; illegal breaking and entering, 127;

290

Index

mandatory vaccination, 123–24; masking for entire population, 123– 24; repeated PCR tests for all, 120; in Shanghai, 129; social problems caused by, 125–28; traditional media/ social media absolutely muzzled, 124; unlawful detention and arrest, 127 Eastern Europe, 12, 159–76; authoritarianism, 162; background on, 162–65; corruption, 163–65; COVID-19 impact in, 159–60, 162–76; democracy, 159–60; health protocols, 159; income inequality, 268; non–health-related policies, 159; populism, 159–60, 162; poverty, 164–65; refugees in, 164–65; states, 159, 162; wealth inequality, 268 economic equality, 41 economic inequality: history, 4–5; in MENA region, 42–46 economic viability, 6 Education for All. See Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) egalitarianism, 4 E-Government Development index, 52, 52, 70n62 Egypt, 3, 55, 145; economic inequality in, 43; economic participation/ opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; female/ male unemployment rate, 44; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; ratio of female to male labor force participation rate, 44; woman versus men income, 44; women’s political representation in, 48 Ekpo, Margaret, 25 Elaw, Zilpha, 226–28 Eldridge, Elleanor, 232 Emily’s List, 212–13 empowerment, 70–74 Enemy Property Act (1965), 100

England, 190–91 En Marche, 184 E-Participation index, 52, 52, 62n71 epidemics, 7 equality, 40–42; and economic history, 4–5; in political/social theory, 4–5 equity, 7 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 47 Espionage Act, 205 ethnic tensions, 12 European Union (EU), 161 Fair Fight Action, 14, 235–37 Falola, Toyin, 24, 25 Farage, Nigel, 186 fascism, 138, 143 FDI. See foreign direct investment (FDI) FDMNs. See Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs) FEC. See Federal Election Commission (FEC) Federal Election Campaign Act (1974), 207–10 Federal Election Commission (FEC), 207 Federal Security Service (FSB), 139 Female Anti-Slavery Society, 229–31 female goddesses, 67 Female Literary Society of Philadelphia, 229 Fidesz, 12, 160–61, 165–71 Firmin-Sellers, Kathryn, 24 fisheries, 97 Five-Star Movement, 184 Five-Star Party, 193 Floyd, George, 3, 7, 190 Fontana, Attilio, 189 Foote, Julia, 227–28 Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs), 93 foreign direct investment (FDI), 99, 105–6 Forten, Charlotte, 230 Forten, Harriet, 230 Forten, James, 229–30

Index

Forten, Margaretta, 229–30 Forten, Robert, 230 Forza Italia, 183 Fox News, 206 France, 13; anti-masking rally, Paris, 188–89; Bastille Day, 194–95; Charlie Hebdo magazine, attacks on, 185; COVID-19 pandemic in, 2, 182; financial crisis, 184–85; Freedom Marches, 191; health emergency in, 182; impact of COVID-19 pandemic, 187–95; income inequality measures, 267; Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 184; lockdown in, 182; Macron, Emmanuel, 184–85, 187, 191–94; politics, 184–85; populism in, 184– 85; quarantines rule in, 182; second wave of pandemic, 191; wealth share measures, 266 Franklin, Benjamin, 201 freedom, 40–42, 92 Freedom House, 8, 40, 159, 163 Freedom Marches, 191 Freeman, Ruby, 236 free market capitalism, 4 free speech rights, 205 French National Academy of Medicine, 188 French Revolution, 4 Frye, Timothy, 140, 148–49 FSB. See Federal Security Service (FSB) Fujian Province, 127 Gaddafi, Muammar, 145 Gandhi, Indira, 77–78 Gandhi, Rajiv, 72, 78 Gandhi, Sonia, 78 Garnet, Henry Highland, 229 Garrison, William Lloyd, 225, 229 Garvey, Marcus, 232 Gasman, Nadine, 253 gender-based violence, 67, 75 gender equality, 41–42 gender identity, 252

291

gender inequality: apropos of, 56; in MENA region, 46–51; in Nigeria, 23–26 Georgia, 202 GERB Party, 164 Germany, 187, 195; child care plans, 182; COVID-19 pandemic in, 2, 182, 187–89; lockdown in, 188; Merkel, Angela, 187; Putin’s experience/ contacts in, 138; Reichsbürger movement, 190; Ukrainian refugees in, 164 Gezi Park movement (2013), 39 Gini coefficient, 251, 264 Giuliani, Rudolph, 202, 206 global financial crisis, 13 Global Gender Gap, 47–48 global inequality, 269 globalization, 14 Global Terrorism Index, 30 good governance, 5 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 143–44 governance, 4–5, 261; in Bangladesh, 92, 108–10; and economic history, 4–5; good, 5; and inequalities, 262; in Nigeria, 23; in political/social theory, 4–5; Putin, Vladimir, 146–52; in uncertain times, 2–3, 5–8 Grameen Bank, 106 Great Patriotic War (1941–1945), 143 greed, 69 Grillo, Beppe, 193 Grimke, Sarah, 230 Grosfoguel, Ramón, 248 Group Health Code, 128 Grozny, 141 gruel kitchens, 97 guerrilla war, Donbas, 145–46 Guilfoyle, Kimberly, 213–14 Gulabi Gang, 82 Gulf countries, 43, 59n26 Gusinskii, Vladimir, 141 Hamer, Fannie Lou, 233–34 Haq, Mahbub ul, 92

292

harassment, 69 Harper, Frances E. W. Watkins, 231–32 Hasina, Sheikh, 101 Hausa/Fulani, 22 He, Bin, 130 health alert bracelets, 127 health crises, 5–6 heterosexualist gender system, 252 Hezbollah, 45 Hillary: The Movie, 209 Hindu Inheritance Act (1929), 72 Hindu Succession Acts (1956), 72 Hindu Widow’s Remarriage Act (1856), 72 Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act (1937), 72 Hoffman, Susanne, 249 Holley, Sallie, 230 Holocaust, 184 The Holy Wives, 82 Homs, Ricardo, 243–44 Hopkin, Jonathan, 183 How to Stand Up to a Dictator: The Fight for Our Future (Ressa), 15 Huerta, Miguel Barbosa, 250 Human Rights Watch, 101–2 human well-being, 92 Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC), 170 Hungary, 144, 162–63; constitution of, 169; COVID-19 in, 165–71; democracy, 160; Fidesz in, 12, 160–61, 165–71; freedom of press in, 166; gender equality, 168–69; identity, 166; illiberal democracy, 160, 162; income inequality measures, 267; LGBT propaganda, 170; minority rights, 166; Orbán, Viktor, 12, 144, 160–61, 165–72, 175; right to dissent in, 166; Roma minority in, 170–71; Socialist Party, 160; wealth share measures, 266 hydroxychloroquine, 189 Igbo, 22

Index

Ilana Omo Oodua Worldwide, 31 illiberal democracy, 160, 162 illiberal government, 160 IMF. See International Monetary Fund (IMF) immigration, 13 income inequality, 11–12, 262–70, 267–68, 276, 278n12 Independent Daughters of Hope, 226 India, 2, 5–6, 11; Child Marriage Bill (1927), 76; Child Marriage Restraint Act (1929), 76; COVID19 impact in, 2, 5–6, 83–85; daughters in, 67; democratic culture in, 6, 11, 65–83; Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Bill (1938), 72; government’s education budget, 71; Hindu Inheritance Act (1929), 72; Hindu Succession Acts (1956), 72; Hindu Widow’s Remarriage Act (1856), 72; Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act (1937), 72; income inequality measures, 267; literacy, 68–71; lockdowns in, 5–6; Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 74; Muslim Personal Law Application Bill (1937), 72; National Commission for Women (NCW) Act, 82; pandemic effects in, 5–6; Right to Education Act (2010), 70; Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), 69; wealth share measures, 266; women’s groups and their activism, 75–83; women status in, 66–75 Indian Constitution (1950), 65 Indian women, 66–75; as ASHA workers, 66; contribution in informal economy, 66–67; cultural continuity, burden of, 73; disempowerment of, 78, 82; economic empowerment of, 73–74; elimination, 78, 82; empowerment, 70–74; gender-based violence, 75; as health and social workers, 66; high fertility, 76–77; high mortality

Index

rate, 76–77; inequality in access to education for, 68–69; inheritance/ access to property, 71–73; level of education, 66, 68–69; literacy, 68–71; low female birth rate, 76–77; marginalization, 78, 82; Muslim, 72, 78; participation in workforce, 66; political representation, 77; selfdetermination, 66; as self-effacing, 72–73; sexual violence in home against, 67; socioeconomic status/ class, aligned with, 66, 69; violence against, 67–68 Indian women’s groups and their activism, 75–83; Dalit Mahila Samiti, Uttar Pradesh, 76; legislative initiatives, 78, 79–81, 82–83; National Council of Indian Women, 76; Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), Ahmedabad, Gujarat, 76, 78; self-help model, 76; Women’s Indian Association, 76 inequalities, 1–2, 261; consumption, 262; country-level, 265–67, 266–67; and COVID-19 pandemic, 270–73; and economic history, 4–5; global, 269; and governance, 262; income, 262–70, 267–68, 276, 278n12; levels of, 265–69; measures of, 263–65; in Nigeria, 10, 19–34; in political/ social theory, 4–5; in Putin, Vladimir dictatorship, 146–52; regional-level, 267–68, 268; region of, 39–56; in uncertain times, 2–3, 5–8; variations of, 273–77, 275–76; wealth, 262–70, 267–68, 276, 278n12 inequities, 14, 41 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 207 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 73–74, 261 internet, 42 intersectionality, 9–10, 252 In the Wake: On Blackness and Being (Sharpe), 237

293

Iran, 45; COVID-19 in, 39; demonstrations (2022), 39; economic participation/opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; Facebook’s penetration rate, 51; gender inequality, 47–48; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; poverty in, 45; ratio of female to male labor force participation rate, 44; woman versus men income, 44; women’s political representation in, 48; youth unemployment percentages, 44 Iraq: educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/eparticipation, 53; female/male unemployment rate, 44; gender inequality, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; ratio of female to male labor force participation rate, 44; woman versus men income, 44; women’s political representation in, 48; youth unemployment percentages, 44 IRS. See Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Islam, 27–28, 99 Israel, 45; digital gap/illiteracy, 53; economic participation/opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/ e-participation, 53; gender inequality in, 47–48; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; poverty in, 45; social justice protests in, 39; woman versus men income, 44; women’s justice in, 50; youth unemployment percentages, 44 Israeli Declaration of Independence (1948), 47 Italy, 13; aggressive nationalism, 183; anti-lockdown demonstrations in, 189; anti-system politics in, 183; Conte, Giuseppe, 181, 188; COVID19 pandemic in, 181–83; Five-Star

294

Index

Movement, 184; Forza Italia, 183; impact of COVID-19 pandemic, 187–95; income inequality measures, 267; lockdown in, 181, 189, 194; migrants in, 184; Renzi, Matteo, 188; wealth share measures, 266 Itzik, Dalia, 50 Jayalalitha, J., 78 Johnson, Boris, 182, 184, 187, 190 Johnson, Lyndon B., 234 Johnson, Violet, 233 Johnson & Johnson, 206 Johnson-Sirleaf, Ellen, 34 Jonathan, Goodluck, 29 Jones, Alex, 215 Jones, Doug, 235 Jones, Martha, 223 Jordan: economic participation/ opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; ratio of female to male labor force participation rate, 44; youth unemployment percentages, 44 Kabeer, Naila, 70 Kaczyński, Jaroslaw, 161 Kaczyński, Lech, 161 Kadryov, Akhmad, 141 kafala, 43 Kant, Immanuel, 204 Katsina state-owned security corps, 31 Kazakhstan, 137 Keller, Bill, 145 Kemp, Brian, 236 Kennedy, Anthony, 210 Kennedy, Bobby, 215 Kennedy, John F., 215 Kennedy, Robert F., Jr., 215 Khodorkovskii, Mikhail, 142 kidnapping, 30–31 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 234 Kipnis, Boris, 151

Korda, Michael, 162 Kremlin, 138, 140–50, 214 Kuchins, Andrew, 141 Kuwait, 43; economic inequality, 43; economic participation/opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/ e-participation, 53; Facebook’s penetration rate, 51; gender inequality, 48; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; women’s political representation in, 48 labor, division of, 245 labor rights, 43–44 laissez-faire, 4 Lal, Jayati, 84 Latin America, 248; income inequality, 268; wealth inequality, 268 Law and Justice Party, Poland, 12, 161–62, 172–75 leaders of Nigeria, 22 League of Polish Families, 172–73 Leave campaign, Britain, 186 Lebanon, 48, 55; economic participation/opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/eparticipation, 53; gender inequality, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; Human Development Index value, 45; ratio of female to male labor force participation rate, 44; women’s political representation in, 48 Ledeneva, Alena, 140 Lee, Jarena, 226, 229 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 184–85, 191 Le-Pen, Marine, 184, 194 LGBT propaganda, 170 LGBTQ community, 147 LGBTQ+ community, 173–74 Li, Wenliang, 116, 130 liberal democracy, 160

Index

Liberator (Garrison), 225, 229 liberty, 4 Libya, 3; e-government development/eparticipation, 53; female/male unemployment rate, 44; internet growth, 51; women’s political representation in, 48 Life and Religious Experience of Jerena Lee (Lee), 226–27 Lincoln, Abraham, 2 Lindell, Mike, 206, 213 Lipman, Masha, 142 literacy, 68–71 Liu, Peter, 11–12 lockdowns, 6–7; in Britain, 181–82; in France, 182; in Germany, 188; in India, 5–6; in Italy, 181, 189, 194 Long, Denis, 14 López Obrador, Andrés Manuel, 247–49 Lorenz curve, 264 Lugard, Frederick, 20 Lugones, María, 251–52 Luhansk, 137 Lukashenko, Alexander, 137 Macaulay, Herbert, 24, 35n14 Macron, Emmanuel, 13, 184–85, 187, 191–94 Madison, James, 216 Madrasah (Islamic religious school) education system, 93 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, 74, 84 managed democracy, 140–42 Mandela, Nelson, 23 Marble Freedom Trust, 212 marriages, 77 Marx, Karl, 4 mask wearing, 189 Massachusetts Female Anti-Slavery Society, 229 Mathbor, Golam M., 11 Mattarella, Sergio, 192

295

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003), 209 McGovern, George, 208 mean log deviation, 264 Medical Racism: The New Apartheid, 215 Medvedev, Dmitrii, 144 Meir, Golda, 49 Mélanchon, Jean-Luc, 185 Melloni, Giorgia, 187 Meloni, Giorgia, 193 Memoirs (Elaw), 227–28 Memoirs of the Life, Religious Experience, Ministerial Travels and Labours of Mrs. Zilpha Elaw, an American Female of Colour (Lee), 226 MENA. See Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Merkel, Angela, 187 Mexico, 14, 243–55; Art With Me festival, 249–50; citizenship, 246; coloniality in, 244–55; COVID-19 pandemic in, 14, 246–53; COVID19 vaccines to, 254–55; democracy, 246; dependentistas tradition, 248; economy, 249–51; gender-based violence in, 252–53; gross domestic product, 250; income inequality measures, 267; labor, division of, 245; modernity, 245–46; national identity, 246; as nation-state, 246; politics, 247–49; power, coloniality of, 244–55; Quijano, Anibal views on, 244–46, 251–52; societal idiosyncrasies, 243–44; technology dependent, 254; wealth share measures, 266; women’s health in, 251–53 Michigan, 202 MICS. See Mixed Income Capitalization–Survey method (MICS) Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 10–11, 39–56, 57n1;

296

Index

COVID-19 in, 6, 39, 46, 51; digital inequality in, 51–54; economic inequality in, 42–46; E-Government Development index, 52, 52, 62n70; E-Participation index, 52, 52, 62n71; equitable future, steps toward, 51–56; Facebook users within, 52, 52; female economic participation, 44–45; female unemployment in, 44–45; gender inequality in, 46–51; in Human Development Index, 45; income inequality, 268; inequality between men and women in, 47–48; internet penetration within, 51–52, 52; labor force participation, 43, 43–44; labor rights in, 43–44; natural resources in, 45; oil wealth in, 45; poverty in, 45; Sustainable Development Goals, 41, 55–56; unemployment rates, 43, 44; wealth inequality, 268; in Women, Peace and Security Index 2020/22, 50; women in parliament (2008–2021) in, 49 Minhang District, Shanghai, 127 Minority Rights Group International (MRGI), 170–71 Mixed Income Capitalization–Survey method (MICS), 264 Moderna, 206 modernity, 245–46 Moldova, 162 Montu, Jashim Uddin, 100 Moore, Roy, 235 Morales, Wendy Figueroa, 253 morality, 225 Morocco, 54; economic participation/ opportunity, 50; gender gaps, 52; gender inequality, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; ratio of female to male labor force participation rate, 44; women’s political representation in, 48 Moscow, 145 Moss, Shaye, 236 motherhood, 47

MRGI. See Minority Rights Group International (MRGI) Mubarak, Hosni, 145 Mundhra, Smitri, 82 Mundt, Robert, 25 Muslim Brotherhood, 45 Muslim Personal Law Application Bill (1937), 72 Muslims, 27 Mussolini, Benito, 183 Mustapha, Boss, 32 MyPillow, 213 NAACP. See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) NACW. See National Association of Colored Women’s Clubs (NACW) Al Nahyan, Khalifa bin Zayed, 48 Naidu, Sarojini, 76, 77 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 232–34 National Association of Colored Women’s Clubs (NACW), 232–33 National Commission for Women (NCW) Act, 82 National Congress of Nigerian and Citizens (NCNC), 22 National Council of Indian Women, 76 National Crime Records Bureau, 75 nationalism, 13 National Rifle Association, 213 National Training School for Girls in Washington, DC, 233 National Urban League (NUL), 232–33 NATO, 142, 145, 151–52 Navalny, Alexei, 146–47 Nehru, Kamala, 77 Nemtsov, Boris, 146–47 Nevada, 202 New Arab Spring, 39 New England Anti-Slavery Society, 229 New Jersey, 226

Index

New Jersey Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs, 228 NGOs. See nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Nicaragua, COVID-19 in, 2 Nicholas I, Tsars (1825–1855), 143 Nigeria, 10, 19–34; amalgamation of, 20–21; Boko Haram group, 28, 28–30; COVID-19 pandemic in, 19–20, 31–32; democracy, 33–34; democratic process in, 23–24; gender inequality in, 23–26; in Global Terrorism Index, 30; income inequality measures, 266, 267; inequality factor of, 26–30; kidnapping/government inaction, 30–31; military governance in, 23; needs, 33; past and present leaders, 22; polarization factor of, 26–30; political inequality in, 20–23; politics of violence, 23; protectorates, 20–21; Public-Private Partnership policy in, 32; regions prior to independence, 21, 21; religion in politics in, 26–30; security problems, 30–31; wealth share measures, 266; women’s political participation in, 20, 24–26, 26 Nigeria Governors’ Forum (NGF), 31 Nigerian Civil War (1967–1971), 23 Nigerian National Democratic Party, 24 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 70–71, 78 North America: income inequality, 268; wealth inequality, 268 Northern People’s Congress (NPC), 22, 35n5 Novák, Katalin Éva, 168 NUL. See National Urban League (NUL) Obama, Barack, 144–45, 209 O’Barr, Jean, 24 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 23

297

OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) OIC. See Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi, 26 oligarchs, 163 Oman, 43; economic inequality, 43; economic participation/opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/ e-participation, 53; female/male unemployment rate, 44; gender inequality, 48; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; women’s political representation in, 48 Omicron variant of COVID-19, 32, 191 One American News Network, 206 Operation Amotekun, 36n38 oppression, 223–24 Orbán, Viktor, 12, 144, 160–61, 165–72, 175; brand of nationalism, 170–71; as enemies of state, 167; on false information, 166; Fidesz with, 160–61, 166; gender, attacks on, 167–69; on gender equality, 168–69; Hungary-first narrative, 167; illiberal government, 160–62; on immigration, 170–71; on LGBTQ+ community, 169; on minority rights, 166; on motherhood, 168; pandemic handling, 166; political ambitions, 165; popularity, 161; populism, 166–67, 170; power, 165–72; war in Ukraine, taking advantage of, 166–67 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 46, 168 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 27 Osinbajo, Yemi, 32 Ossetia, 142 Ossof, Jon, 236

298

Index

PACs. See political action committees (PACs) PAHO. See Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) Pakistan, 92 Palkhivala, N. A., 66 Palma ratio, 264 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), 251 Pande, Mrinal, 77 pandemic election, 202–13 Pandit, Vijayalakshmi, 76 Paris, 188–89 Parker, Alton B., 207 Parks, Rosa, 233–34 Patten, Joseph N., 13 Paul, Sarah, 229 Paul, Thomas, 225 Pearson, Thomas S., 12 Pelewura, Alimotu, 24 Pennsylvania, 202 Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Society, 230 Pentecostalism, 228 People’s Democratic Party, 23 Pfizer, 206 Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society, 229–30 Planned Parenthood, 213 “PM Cares” fund, 84–85 Poland, 160, 162–63; Constitution, 172–74; Constitutional Tribunal (high court), 161; COVID-19 effects on, 172–73; economic success, 172; electoral system, 172–73; free market, 172; income inequality measures, 267; Law and Justice Party, 161–62, 172–75; League of Polish Families, 172–73; LGBTQ+ community, 173–74; media freedom in, 174–75; PiS, 172–73; politics, 161; on Rainbow Index of the International Lesbian Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association, 174; refugees in, 164–65; Self-Defense

Party, 172–73; wealth share measures, 266 polarization, 26–30 Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act (April 2022), 194 political action committees (PACs), 13–14, 201–16; in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), 203; dark money, corrupting influence of, 212–13; political misinformation about COVID-19, role in spreading, 214–16; role in funding January 6 rally, 213–16; in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission (2010), 203 political misinformation, 202–13; and campaign finance laws, 206–7; corrosive impact on American Republic, 211–12; criminal incitement laws, limiting through, 205–6; defamation law, limiting through, 206; Federal Election Campaign Act (1974) and, 207–10; free speech rights versus war on truth in United States, 204–5; Super PACs, corrosive impact of, 211–12; Tillman Act (1907) and, 207–8; Watergate scandal, 208–10 political money, 207–10 Politics (Aristotle), 4 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests, 115 populism, in Britain, 13 Poshan Abhiyaan, 83 Powell, Sidney, 202, 206 power, 70, 223 Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana, 83 Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund (PMNRF), 84–85 privatization, 14 Prout, Mary, 228 public health, 5–6 Puntigliano, Andres Rivarola, 244 Purple Skies, 82

Index

Purvis, Robert, 230 Putin, Vladimir, 12, 137–52; administrative reforms, 140; Chechnya in war of 1999–2004, pacification of, 141; decision-making process, 140–41; dictatorship, 146–52; experience/contacts in Germany, 138; governance, 146–52; inaccessibility, 145; inequality in, 146–52; Kadryov, Akhmad and, 141; market reforms, 141; palace on Black Sea, 147; pivot to dictatorship (2008–2014 and beyond), 143–46; religious toleration, promotion of, 140–41; Russia’s evolution from managed democracy to his break with West, 138–42; seclusion, 145; self-purification campaign, 148; siloviki, 139, 141, 145; sistema, 140– 41; structural reforms, 149; television and, 143; war against Ukraine, 148– 50; Yeltsin and, 138–39; YouTube channel, 147 Putin 2.0, 144–46 Qatar, 43; economic inequality, 43; economic participation/opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/ e-participation, 53; Facebook’s penetration rate, 51; gender inequality, 48; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; internet growth, 51; women’s justice in, 50; women’s political representation in, 48; youth unemployment percentages, 44 Qian’an, Hebei Province, 126 quarantines, 182 Quijano, Anibal, 244–46, 251–52 race/racism, 3, 7, 223–24 Ramadhane, Najla Bouden, 49–50 Randolph, Florence Spearing, 228, 233 Ransome-Kuti, Funmilayo, 25

299

Ransome-Kuti, Olufunmilayo, 24–25 regional-level inequalities, 267–68, 268 religion, 26–30, 225; Christianity, 27; Islam, 27; in politics, 26–30 religious fundamentalism, 28 Remond, Sarah, 229–30 Renzi, Matteo, 184, 188, 192 Republic (Plato), 4 Ressa, Maria, 15 Rice, Condoleezza, 23 Richards Constitution (1946), 21 rights, 40 Right to Education Act (2010), 70 Robinson, Jo Ann, 233–34 Rohingya, 93 Roma community, 170–71 Romania, 162–63; black market, 164 Roosevelt, Theodore, 207 Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), 142 Russia, 12, 137–52, 162; annexation of Crimea, 146; black market, 163; brain drain, 149–50; COVID-19 pandemic impacts on, 150–51; demographic prospects, 149–50; evolution from managed democracy to Putin’s break with West, 138–42; as exceptional Eurasian state, 143; free market economy, 139; global financial crisis (August 1998), 139; government corruption, 163; income inequality measures, 267; invasion of Ukraine, 1, 12, 137–38, 146, 148–52; multi-confessional status, 140–41; multiethnic status, 140–41; personalist autocracy, 137–38; Putin, Vladimir and, 138–52; referendum in, 146; shock therapy (January 1992), 139; Victory Day (May 9, 1945), 143; wealth share measures, 266; World Cup soccer competition in, 149 Russian Penal Code, 146 Salem Female Anti-Slavery Society, 229 Salvini, Matteo, 183, 184, 191, 193–94

300

Index

Sarsar, Saliba, 10 Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), 69 Saudi Arabia, 43; digital inequality in, 52; economic inequality, 43; economic participation/opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/ e-participation, 53–54; female/ male unemployment rate, 44; gender inequality, 48; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; woman versus men income, 44; women’s justice in, 50; women’s political representation in, 48 Scheck v. United States (1919), 205 SDGs. See Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Sechin, Igor, 142 self-authorship, 226 self-awareness, 226 Self-Defense Party, 172–73 Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), Ahmedabad, Gujarat, 76, 78 self-purification campaign, 148 self-quarantining, 189 Sen, Amartya, 5–6, 92 senseless violence, 69 sex-based violence, 67 sexism, 223–24 sexual violence, 67 shadow parties, 210 Shanghai, 125; corruption in, 125–26; food distribution inequality/ discrimination in, 125; human rights abuses in, 126 Shari’a (Islamic law), 27–29, 28 Sharpe, Christina, 237 Shelby County v. Holder, 235 Shenzhen City, 128, 129 Singh, Jyoti, 67–68 Siping City, Jilin Province, 127 sistema, 140–41 Sisters of Good Shepherd, 226

Skrzypek, Maciej, 172 Slovakia, 162 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 106–7 smartphones, 42 SMEs. See small and medium-sized enterprises Smith, Adam, 4–5 Smith-Connally Act (1943), 207–8 SNCC. See Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) Snyder, Timothy, 138 Sobchak, Anatoli, 138 social democracy, 185–86 social distancing, 189 Socialist Party, Hungary, 160 social justice protests in Israel (2021), 39 social media, 147, 204, 214 sociopolitical inequality, 30–31 Song, Zheng, 129 Sood, Abha S., 11 Soros, George, 171 Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 234 Soyinka, Grace Eniola, 25 Spahn, Jens Georg, 182 Spanish flu versus COVID-19 pandemic, 244 SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission (2010), 13, 203, 210–11, 216 spiritual autobiographies, 226–27 SSA. See Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) Stalin, Joseph, 143–44, 148 Starmer, Keir, 190 Stewart, James, 225 Stewart, Maria W., 223, 225, 229 Still, William, 231–32 Stop Soros Law (2018), 171 St. Petersburg, 138, 145 Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), 234 Sub-Saharan Africa: income inequality, 268; wealth inequality, 268

Index

A Suitable Girl (Mundhra and Tiexera), 82 Sun, Ming, 128 Sunni Muslims, 99 Surkov, Vladislav, 140 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 41, 55–56, 69–70, 73–75 Sylhet program, 95–96 Syria: educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/ e-participation, 53; Facebook’s penetration rate, 51; female/male unemployment rate, 44; gender inequality, 48; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; internet growth, 51; organized violence rank, 50; ratio of female to male labor force participation rate, 44; women’s justice in, 50 Syrian civil war (2015), 146 systemic inequalities, 13 tablets, 42 Telecommunications Act (1996), 215 temperance, 229 Tenochtitlán, 245 Terrell, Mary Church, 232 terrorism, 28, 99, 139–40 Thiel index, 264 Tiexera, Jennifer, 82 Tillman Act (1907), 207–8 Tlaxcalans, 245 Tokayev, Kassym-Jomart, 137 Tompkins, Sarah J., 229 Trenin, Dmitri, 145 “Tren Maya” project, 249 Trump, Donald J., 5, 185, 192, 195, 202–6, 212–14, 236, 239 Truth, Sojourner, 223, 229 Tubman, Harriet, 223, 229 Tunisia, 3; economic participation/ opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; female/ male unemployment rate, 44;

301

gender gaps, 52; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; ratio of female to male labor force participation rate, 44; youth unemployment percentages, 44 Türkiye, 45; COVID-19 in, 39; economic inequality in, 43; economic participation/opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/eparticipation, 53; gender inequality in, 47; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; poverty in, 45 Turner, Henry McNeal, 229 UK Freedom Movement, 190 Ukraine, 12, 137, 142, 162–63; Donetsk, 137; Luhansk, 137; physical violence, 163; Russia invasion of, 1, 12, 137–38, 146, 148–52 UN Charter, 40 unemployment, 14 UNIA. See Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) Uniform Civil Code, 78 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 43, 48, 55; economic inequality, 43; economic participation/opportunity, 50; educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/ e-participation, 53; Facebook’s penetration rate, 51; gender inequality, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; internet growth, 51; women’s justice in, 50; women’s political representation in, 48; youth unemployment percentages, 44 United Kingdom Independence Party, 186 United Nations, 40–41, 145 United States, 2–3, 97, 142, 190; African Americans in, 9–10; Burning Man festival in, 249–50; campaign finance laws, 206–7; Civil War in,

302

Index

2–3; in Cold War, 139; COVID-19 pandemic in, 2, 7, 192; defamation law, 206; democracy, 201–2; Federal Election Campaign Act (1974), 207– 10; free speech rights versus war on truth in, 204–5; income inequality measures, 267; insurrection in, 192; Nixon’s campaign, 208; political action committees, 13–14, 201–16; political money in, 207– 10; presidential election (2020), 202–3; slavery in, 2–3; Super PACs, corrosive impact of, 211–12; Tillman Act (1907), 207–8; Watergate scandal, 208–10; wealth share measures, 266 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), 14–15, 254 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 40 Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), 232 US Capitol riot in Washington, DC, 2, 7–8, 192, 202 USMCA. See United States-MexicoCanada Agreement (USMCA) vaccines, 32, 194–95, 214–15 Vaeza, Maria Noel, 252 Véran, Olivier, 182 Vested Property Act, 100 Vested Property Return Act (2001), 100 Victory Day (May 9, 1945), 143 Villa, Santiago, 254 violence against Indian women, 67–68 Volodin, Vyacheslav, 146 Voting Rights Act (1965), 234–35 Wailoo, Keith, 7 Walker, David, 225 Warnock, Raphael, 236 warrant chiefs, 24 Washington, DC, 208 Watergate scandal, 208–10

wealth inequality, 262–70, 267–68, 276, 278n12 The Wealth of Nations (Smith), 4 WeChat, 125 Weiss-Wendt, Anton, 143 welfare, 70, 92 Wells, Ida B., 232 Western Europe, 13, 181–97; COVID19 pandemic, impact of, 187–95; democracy versus autocracy, 183; income inequality, 268; populism, rise of, 183–86; wealth inequality, 268 white supremacy, 224 Whittier, Elizabeth, 230–31 WID. See World Inequality Database (WID) Williams, Hettie V., 14 Williamson, Adrian, 185–86 women: African American, 14, 223–39; in African countries, 24–26; antislavery society, 229; Black, 14, 223–39. See also Black women; brutality against, 67–68; empowerment, 70–74; health in Mexico, 251–53; in Iran, 47; Israeli, 47; literacy, 68–71; political participation in Nigeria, 20, 24–26, 26; preachers, 227; rights in MENA region, 46–51; status in India, 66–75; Turkish, 47; in Yemen, 55 Women’s Equal Rights Law (1951), 47, 54 Women’s Home and Foreign Missionary Society, 228 Women’s Indian Association, 76 Wong, Xueli, 128 working from home, 189 World Bank, 74, 96–97, 104, 261 World Food Program, 98 World Health Organization, 32 World Inequality Database (WID), 263–64 World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, 146

Index

Writing with Fire, 82 Wuhan, China, 115, 130 Wuxi City, 128 Xi, Jinping, 12, 15, 116–17, 129–30 Xue Lang Middle School, Wuxi City, 128 Yanukovych, Viktor, 137, 142 Yeltsin, Boris, 137–39 Yemen, 54; COVID-19 in, 2; educational attainment gender gap, 50; e-government development/eparticipation, 53; Facebook’s penetration rate, 51; female/male unemployment rate, 44; gender inequality, 48; in Global Gender Gap index, 48; health and survival, gender gap in, 50; Human Development Index value, 45; inclusion issues, 3; internet growth, 51; ratio of female to male labor force participation

rate, 44; unity issues, 3; woman versus men income, 44; women’s justice in, 50; women’s political representation in, 48 Yoruba people, 22, 30–31 youth rallies in Türkiye (2021), 39 Yugoslavia, 162 Yunus, Mohammed, 106 Yusuf, Mohammed, 29 Zamfara State, 27–28 Zangrillo, Alberto, 189 Zecler, Michel, 191 Zelensky, Volodymyr, 151 Zemmour, Eric, 192 Zhejiang Province, 117 Zhou, Shengni, 128 Zhuanghe City, Dalian, Liaoning Province, 126 Ziobro, Zbignew Tadeusz, 174 Zygar, Mikhail, 145 Zyuganov, Gennadi, 139

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About the Editors and Contributors

EDITORS Rekha Datta, PhD, is professor of political science at Monmouth University, where she holds the Freed Endowed Chair in Social Sciences. Her PhD is from the University of Connecticut. She was also educated at Presidency University and the University of Calcutta in India. She was a US Fulbright Senior Scholar (2017–2018) and is an affiliate faculty member of the South Asia Center at the University of Pennsylvania. An award-winning educator, her teaching and research interests include political theory, international relations, gender and development, and comparative politics of South Asia, East Asia, and developing areas. A selection of her scholarly publications includes her most recent coedited book Democracy in Crisis around the World (2021), Contemporary India: The Basics (2017), Beyond Realism: Human Security in India and Pakistan in the Twenty-First Century (2010), and Why Alliances Endure: The United States-Pakistan Alliance, 1954–1971 (1994). She is also coeditor of Women in Developing Countries: Assessing Strategies for Empowerment (2002). Saliba Sarsar, PhD, is professor of political science at Monmouth University and visiting research collaborator at the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. His teaching and scholarly interests focus on the Middle East, Palestinian–Israeli affairs, Jerusalem, and peace building. His most recent authored books are Peacebuilding in Israeli-Palestinian Relations (2020) and Jerusalem: The Home in Our Hearts (2018). His most recent edited books are The Holy Land Confederation as a Facilitator for the Two-State Solution (2022) and What Jerusalem Means to Us: Christian Perspectives and Reflections (2018). His most recent coedited books are Democracy in Crisis around the World (2021), Continuity and Change in Political Culture: Israel and Beyond (2020), and What Jerusalem Means to Us: Muslim Perspectives and Reflections (2021). He is the guest editor of 305

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About the Editors and Contributors

a special issue of the Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, focusing on “Israel, Palestine, and the Challenge of Peace” (2020). He was featured in several publications, including the New York Times, and is the recipient of the Award of Academic Excellence from the American Task Force on Palestine, the Global Visionary Award and the Stafford Presidential Award of Excellence from Monmouth University, the Humanitarian Award from the National Conference for Community and Justice, and the Holy Land Christian Ecumenical Foundation Award. CONTRIBUTORS Julius O. Adekunle, PhD, is professor of African history at Monmouth University. He was educated in Nigeria and Canada. He is the author and editor of several books, including Culture and Customs of Rwanda (2007), and editor of Religion in Politics: Secularism and National Integration in Modern Nigeria (2009), coeditor of Democracy in Africa: Political Changes and Challenges (2012), and coeditor of Converging Identities: Blackness in the Modern African Diaspora (2013). His research interests include culture, politics, religion, and leadership. Kenneth L. Campbell, PhD, is professor of history at Monmouth University, where he has taught Western civilization in world perspective and a variety of upper-level and graduate courses in British and European history for more than thirty years. He received his doctorate in British and European history from the University of Delaware. In addition to other administrative posts at Monmouth, he spent seven years as associate dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and another seven as chair of the Department of History and Anthropology. He has presented scholarly papers at numerous academic conferences and received the Monmouth University Distinguished Teacher Award in 1995. He is the author of eight books, including Western Civilization: A Global and Comparative Approach (two volumes) (2012), Ireland’s History: Prehistory to the Present (2014), and, most recently, A History of the British Isles: Prehistory to the Present (2017). Stephen J. Chapman, PhD, is associate professor of political science at Monmouth University. Much of his work focuses on how individuals are represented within government. In addition, he has done previous work on democratic indicators and how they vary across regions of the world. Much of his work includes quantitative analyses. Aside from his political science work, he also has conducted research on educational interventions.

About the Editors and Contributors

307

Manuel Chávez, PhD, is the philosophy program director in the Department of History and Anthropology at Monmouth University. His research interests include social and political philosophy, Latinx and Latin American philosophy, the philosophy of race and gender, and decolonial theory. His recent publications include “Toward a Decolonial Ethics” in Speaking Face to Face/Hablando Cara a Cara: The Visionary Philosophy of María Lugones and “The Chicano/a Movement and Philosophy” in The Inter-American Journal of Philosophy. Kevin L. Dooley, PhD, is associate professor of political science at Monmouth University, where he teaches courses in political theory and comparative politics. His research is focused on two main areas. One aspect examines the role that globalization has played in the revival of certain Central and Eastern national minorities. The other examines the role that allegories have played in the development of political philosophy. He is the author of Politics Still Matters (2008), Why Politics Matters: An Introduction to Political Science (2013), Allegories and Metaphors in Early Political Thought: From Plato to Machiavelli (2018), and States of Nature and Social Contracts: The Metaphors of the Liberal Order (2021). Peter W. Liu, PhD, is associate professor of criminal justice at Monmouth University. He teaches multiple courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels: criminology; juvenile justice; research methods; senior seminar; crime control in Japan, China, and the United States; advanced data analysis; and comparative justice. His research interests include juvenile delinquency, comparative justice, issues in policing, and crime prevention. He has authored and coauthored three books and texts and published several journal articles. Denis Long is a graduate student at Monmouth University, specializing in American history. His primary focus includes African American and LGBTQ+ history across many time periods, more recently taking interest in the civil rights movement and similar movements. He received his bachelor’s degree in history from Rowan University. Golam M. Mathbor, MSS, MSW, PhD, is professor in the School of Social Work at Monmouth University. He has taught in Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Latvia, Kosovo, and the United States. His teaching areas include qualitative and quantitative research methods, program planning and evaluation, social welfare policy and planning, issues in international development, management of nongovernmental organizations, migration and intercultural cooperation, and international social work. He has published extensively on climate change, disaster relief, community preparedness, social development,

308

About the Editors and Contributors

coastal zone management, migration, health, aging, economics, higher education, and international social work. He is the author of Effective Community Participation in Coastal Development (2008). Currently, he is serving as cochair of the Global Social Work Education Commission of the Council on Social Work Education in the United States. Joseph N. Patten, PhD, is associate professor and former chair of the Department of Political Science and Sociology at Monmouth University. He earned his doctorate from West Virginia University. His specializations are in public policy; political campaigns at the national, state, and local levels; the US Congress; the American presidency; and media law. He serves as the adviser to Monmouth’s debate team and as the university liaison to the Washington Center Internship Program. His primary research interests include the US Congress and American politics. He is coauthor of Introduction to Political Science: Why Politics Matter (2015). Thomas S. Pearson, PhD, former provost and vice president of academic affairs at Monmouth University, is professor of history at Monmouth and a specialist in modern Russian history. He is the author of Russian Officialdom in Crisis: Autocracy and Local Self-Government, 1861–1900 (2004) and coauthor of Modern Russian History: The Search for National Identity and Global Power (2021). His publications also include numerous articles and book chapters on state–peasant relations, the role of the law and judicial institutions in prerevolutionary Russia, the politics of Russia’s leadership, and the development of civil society in Russia in the imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet eras. His current research focuses on Count M. T. Loris-Melikov and the significance of his military career and political reforms for the Russian Empire. Abha S. Sood, PhD, has her doctorate in African American literature from the HUSS Department, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, India. She received a Fulbright Fellowship to complete her dissertation on Toni Morrison’s fiction in the Department of African American Studies, Yale University. She previously taught at the University of Delhi, India, and worked for various publishers in editorial capacities. Her current appointment is with the Department of English at Monmouth University, where she teaches contemporary African American and world literature. Her publishing interests include multiethnic, women’s, African, South Asian, postcolonial, and Australasian Aboriginal literature. Hettie V. Williams, PhD, is a historian of American history with a focus on the twentieth century, African Americans, race, and women’s history. Her doctoral degree in history and culture is from Drew University, and she is an

About the Editors and Contributors

309

associate professor of African American history in the Department of History and Anthropology at Monmouth University. She has coedited or authored five books, with the latest being a work of nonfiction titled Bury My Heart in a Free Land: Black Women Intellectuals in Modern US History (2017). She is currently a research historian for the upcoming documentary “My Buddy: The WWII 369th Documentary Project.” Her most immediate project is a nonfiction book on the history of black women in rock and roll titled “The British Invasion in Reverse: Black Women Rockers in the US and Europe from Rosetta Tharpe to Grace Jones.”