Indo-Pacific and ASEAN (Indo-Pacific in Context) 9781032906324, 9781032906881, 9781003559245

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INDO-PACIFIC AND ASEAN

This book examines Indo-Pacific issues from a SoutheastAsian perspective and goes beyond discourses such as ASEAN–China or ASEAN–US–China. It analyses the new regional balances in the ASEAN and Indo-Pacific region at the diplomatic, strategic, and economic levels while taking into account the ongoing uncertainty of the international order, reshaped by the postCOVID-19 crisis and characterised by the increasingly adversarial China– US relations, the sensitive context of South China Sea and Taiwan crisis, and the impact of the war between Russia and Ukraine. It highlights Indo-Pacific not only from a geostrategic angle but also an economic one, considering ASEAN amidst competing connectivity strategies and integration challenges. The book offers an inclusive outlook capturing diversity and convergence of strategies in a key region where the stage of tomorrow’s global order will be decided. It will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of politics and international relations and Area Studies, especially Southeast-Asian Studies and Indo-Pacific Studies. Claire Thi-Liên Tran is Historian of Contemporary Vietnam and Associate Professor at Université Paris Cité and Researcher at Cessma (Centre d'études en sciences sociales sur les mondes africains, américains et asiatiques). Suthiphand Chirathivat is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Chulalongkorn University and Co-executive Editor of the Journal of Asian Economic Integration. He was the former Executive Director of ASEAN Studies Center and Chairman of Chula Global Network, Dean at the Faculty of Economics and Chairman of the Center for International Economics. Prabir De is Professor at Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), New Delhi, India.

Indo-Pacific in Context

This series brings together topical research on contemporary and longstanding issues encompassing the Asia-Pacific region. With countries steeped in history, communities diverse in cultures, developing economies and emerging markets, Asia-Pacific has emerged as the key stakeholder in a world order in flux. The region has solidified its presence in the global political discourse through multilateral initiatives, defence agreements, and strategic partnerships. It has emerged as a zone of contestations, conflict, and cooperation. The works published in this series showcase interdisciplinary research in the arts, the humanities, and the social sciences, including a range of subject areas such as politics and international relations, international economy, sociology and social anthropology, women, gender and sexuality studies, history, geo-politics, military studies, area studies, cultural studies, environment and sustainability, development studies, migration studies, urban development, digital humanities, and science and technology studies. Works in the series are published simultaneously in UK/US and South Asia editions, as well as in e-book format. We welcome a range of books aimed at furthering scholarship and understanding of the Asia-Pacific region. Authors and researchers interested in contributing to this series may get in touch with rioeditorial​@ tandfindia​.​com Handbook of Indo-Pacific Studies Edited by Barbara Kratiuk, Jeroen J. J. Van den Bosch, Aleksandra Jaskólska and Yoichiro Sato Japan and Its Partners in the Indo-Pacific Engagements and Alignment Edited by Srabani Roy Choudhury The New World Politics of the Indo-Pacific Perceptions, Policies and Interests Edited by Josukutty C A and Joyce Sabina Lobo

For more information about this series, please visit: www​.routledge​.com ​/ Indo​- Pacific​-in​ -Context ​/ book​-series​/ IPC

INDO-PACIFIC AND ASEAN New Balances and New Challenges for Asian Integration and Stability

Edited by Claire Thi Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat and Prabir De

First published 2025 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2025 selection and editorial matter, Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat and Prabir De; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Thi Liên Claire Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat and Prabir De to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-032-90632-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-90688-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-55924-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245 Typeset in Sabon by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

CONTENTS

List of Figures viii List of Tables ix About the Authors x Foreword xvi Preface xxi 1 Indo-Pacific and ASEAN: New Balances and New Challenges for Asian Integration and Stability Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De

1

PART I

The Indo-Pacific from Southeast Asian Perspectives: Centrality and Multilateralism in Uncertain Times 2 Positioning ASEAN in a Multipolar Indo-Pacific Joefe B. Santarita

17 19

3 Understanding Indonesia’s Approach towards Indo-Pacific Discourse Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad

32

4 A Strategic New Equilibrium for Thailand: ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific Panitan Wattanayagorn and Tita Sanglee

49 

vi Contents

5 Vietnam’s Perspective on Indo-Pacific Claire Thi-Liên Tran

60

6 A Cambodian Perspective: An Evolving Indo-Pacific Concept 78 Cheunboran Chanborey and Chheang Vannarith 7 Myanmar’s Perspective on the Indo-Pacific Chaw Chaw Sein

92

PART II

Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific: The Intersecting Interests of Other Major Powers

105

8 Divide and Rule: China’s Responses to the Various IndoPacific Initiatives and Its Changing Relations with the ASEAN 107 Jean-Pierre Cabestan 9 Where “Act East” Meets Indo-Pacific: Mapping India’s Eastward Engagement Rahul Mishra 10 Japan and the Indo-Pacific: Forging a Region Guibourg Delamotte

119 135

11 US Strategy toward the Indo-Pacific: Is the United States Back? 144 Murray Hiebert 12 Russia’s Foreign Policy Objectives and the Outlook on the Indo-Pacific Igor Denisov and Danil Bochkov

159

13 France within the European Rediscovery of the Indo-Pacific 173 David Camroux

Contents vii

PART III

ASEAN Amidst Competing Connectivity Strategies and Integration Challenges

195

14 Digital Connectivity in ASEAN: Opportunities and Challenges 197 Sineenat Sermcheep 15 India, ASEAN, and the QUAD: Economic Imperatives of the Indo-Pacific Amita Batra

217

16 ASEAN’s Perspectives in Asia–Africa Growth Corridor Partnership: In the Indo-Pacific Realm Thi Anh-Dao Tran

229

17 Looking Ahead: Shifts in Global Geopolitical Trends 2030 – a Foresight Exercise Piti Srisangnam

251

18 Between the Two Seas of Indo-Pacific: From Kra Isthmus to Thai Canal and Land Bridge in Southern Thailand Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

267

Index 293

FIGURES

2.1 Indo-Pacific 20 9.1 Geographic Scope of India’s Look East, Act East, and Indo-Pacific Engagements 123 13.1   176 13.2 Views of the geography of a strategic concept: Where is the Indo-Pacific?180 16.1 Average Intra and Extra-regional Participation in GVCs across Regions in 2011 237 16.2 Extra-African Exports (2001–2019) 238 16.3 Grubel and Lloyd Index by Industry Groups in ASEAN and SSA (1967–2019) 239

18.1 Map of Kra Isthmus (Thai Canal) and Strait of Malacca 18.2 The 9A Route, the New Route for Thai Canal as Proposed by the Thai Canal Association Study and Development 18.3 Result of the Site Selection for the Location of the Ports 18.4 Location of the Land Link between the Two Ports (Laem Riew Port to Ao Ang Port) 18.5 Estimated Trans-Peninsular Traffic across the Land Bridge in 2047 18.6 Estimates of Cargo Handling at Ranong and Chumporn Ports

268 276 282 283 284 285

Maps

13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4

Indo- Pacific Seen from European Union, 2021 Indo- Pacific Seen from France, 2021 Indo-Pacific Seen from Germany, 2021 Indo- Pacific Seen from United Kingdom, 2021

179 182 186 188

TABLES

14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.8 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 17.1 18.1 18.2 18.3

Network Coverage and Access to Internet in ASEAN 201 Speed of Fixed-line and Mobile Connection in ASEAN 202 Mobile Phone Ownership in ASEAN 203 ICT Price in ASEAN 204 Self-Perceived Level of Digital Literacy by Country (Unit: % of Respondents) 205 ICT Skills of Individuals in ASEAN 205 Privacy and Cybersecurity Regulations 206 Key Features of the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) between Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand 211 Merchandise Exports to Different Regions (% of Total Merchandise Exports) 230 Overview of Policy Areas Covered in Africa’s Sub-regional Preferential Trade Agreements 232 Population, GDP, Trade in Goods and Services (Values in 2019) 241 Share of First Ten Partner Countries (in % of All Partners), 2019 242 Comparison of “Industry 4.0” and “Society 5.0” 257 The Proposed Routes for the Canal Project 274 Time Comparison for Traffic With and Without Project Cases 286 Estimated Land Bridge Project Costs 287



ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Amita Batra is a Professor of Economics and former Chairperson, the Centre

for South Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. Prof. Batra has undertaken research and published extensively on International trade and trade policy issues, preferential trade agreements, global value chains and regional economic integration in South and Southeast Asia. Her most recent book is titled India’s Trade Policy in the 21st Century, 2022, published by Routledge: London. Prof. Batra holds an M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D. in Economics from the Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, India. Danil Bochkov is Expert at the Russian International Affairs Council. He

earned his Master of Economics at MGIMO University. He also has a Master’s degree in World Economy from the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE, Beijing). He is currently doing PhD at MGIMO University on China–India relationship in the Indo-Pacific region. His op-eds were featured in the SCMP, Nikkei Asia and Diplomat Magazine, among others. He has also co-authored "China–India Relations in Eurasia: Historical Legacy and the Changing Global Context”, featured in the 2020 issue of Human Affairs, volume 30(2). Jean-Pierre Cabestan is Senior Researcher Emeritus at the French National

Centre for Scientific Research (Centre national de la recherche scientifique), attached to the French Research Institute on East Asia (IFRAE) of the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations, and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Hong Kong Baptist University. He is also



About the Authors xi

Associate Research Fellow at the Asia Centre, Paris, and at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China in Hong Kong. His major themes of research are China’s political system and reform, Chinese law, China’s foreign and security policies, the relations across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese politics, and Sino–African relations. David Camroux is Honorary Senior Research Fellow within the Centre de

Recherches Internationales (CERI) at Sciences Po, Paris, where he is also an Adjunct Professor teaching on contemporary Southeast Asian politics and society, EU–Asia relations and Asian regional integration. Working at the interface between Comparative Politics and International Relations, he is the author of numerous refereed articles on Southeast Asian politics and history and the international and intra-regional relations of the Indo-Pacific. He is at present working on a book manuscript on EU–ASEAN relations. He is the co-editor of The Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs and co-coordinates the Franco–German Observatory of the Indo-Pacific. Vannarith Chheang is Public Policy Analyst and Government Relations

Strategist. Currently he is serving as the President at the Asian Vision Institute (AVI). He has over 12 years of professional experience in leadership, management, scenario planning and decision-making, partnership building, and process innovation. He received his PhD in Asia Pacific Studies from the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan and a certificate in leadership from the East–West Center in the United States. His research interest focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of the Mekong region. Cheunboran Chanborey is Member of the Board of Directors of the Asian

Vision Institute and is also an Advisor to the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. He received his PhD in International Political and Strategic Studies from the Australian National University and earned a Master in Public Management from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in conjunction with the Harvard Kennedy School. The areas of his interest include Cambodia’s foreign policy, small state foreign policy, and security studies and international relations in the Asia-Pacific. Suthiphand Chirathivat is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Chulalongkorn

University and Co-executive Editor of the Journal of Asian Economic Integration. He was the former Executive Director of ASEAN Studies Center and Chairman of Chula Global Network, Dean at the Faculty of Economics and Chairman of the Center for International Economics. His academic interests are international trade, investment, finance, regional integration and development, and global economy and society in Asia. His latest publications are China’s Belt and Road Initiative in ASEAN: Growing Presence,

xii About the Authors

Recent Progress and Future Challenges (co-eds) (2022), ASEAN–India: Strengthening Partnership and Post-Pandemic Future (co-eds) (2022), and Between the Two Oceans of Indo-Pacific: Strengthening Myanmar–Thailand Southern Corridor (2022). Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad is Associate Professor at the Department of

International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. He serves as the Executive Secretary of the University’s ASEAN Study Center. His research interests are issues on the entanglements between multiple scales of governance. Shofwan looks at how local and national political economic dynamics continuously and mutually interact with the evolution in global and regional orders. His works have appeared in academic and popular platforms, including Asia Europe Journal, Asian Perspective, Pacific Affairs, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Asian Politics & Policy, Indonesia, Nikkei Asia, Jakarta Post, Kompas, and Media Indonesia, among others. Prabir De is Professor at Research and Information System for Developing

Countries (RIS), New Delhi. He was a Visiting Fellow at IDE-JETRO and the ADBI, Tokyo, and also at the UNESCAP, Bangkok. His research interests are international trade and development. His recently edited book includes Thirty Years of ASEAN–India Relations: Towards Indo-Pacific (2024) and Geopolitical Shifts and Opportunities: New Horizons in India–Southeast Asia Relations (2024). He is the Founding Editor of the Journal of Asian Economic Integration and Journal of Land Ports and Border Economy. Guibourg Delamotte is French–Australian tenured Full-Professor of Political

Science in Japanese Studies at the French Institute of Oriental Studies (INALCO), which she presently heads, and a Research Fellow of the French Research Institute on East Asia (IFRAE). She was Senior Research Fellow of the University of Tokyo’s Research Centre for Advanced Science and Technology, and Tokyo College (2021–2023). She works on Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. She most recently published Le Japon, un leader discret (2023), La Démocratie au Japon, singulière et universelle (2022), and coedited The Abe Legacy. How Japan Has Been Shaped by Abe Shinzô (2021). Igor Denisov is Senior Research Fellow at the MGIMO University, Moscow.

Research interests extend to the areas of Russia–China relations, SCO, AsiaPacific regional security, China’s elite politics, cross-strait relations, US–China relations. Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Russian China Studies journal. His latest works include co-authored articles “Russia's China Policy: Growing Asymmetries and Hedging Options”, Russian Politics, 2021, 6(4); “Russia, China, and the concept of Indo-Pacific”, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2021,

About the Authors xiii

12(1), chapter “Belt and road initiative: Evolution of China's approach” in edited volume The “Roads” and “Belts” of Eurasia (2020). Murray Hiebert is Head of Research for the strategic consulting company

Bower Group Asia and serves as a senior associate of the Southeast Asia Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. He earlier served as a Journalist for the Far Eastern Economic Review and Wall Street Journal for two decades in Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and China. Hiebert is the author of Under Beijing’s Shadow: Southeast Asia’s China Challenge (2020). Rahul Mishra is former Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the European

Studies programme, Asia–Europe Institute, and an Associate at the Centre for ASEAN Regionalism, University of Malaya. Presently, he is an Associate Professor at the School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He is specialized on politico-security affairs of Southeast Asia, role of major and middle powers in the Indo-Pacific region, and the ASEAN–EU regionalism. His latest publications include Asia and Europe in the 21st Century New Anxieties, New Opportunities (2021) and India’s Eastward Engagement from Antiquity to Act East Policy (2019). He writes for many media in Asia and Europe. Joefe B. Santarita is Professor and former Dean of the University of the

Philippines’ Asian Center. In 2012, he was conferred the Doctor of Philosophy in South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. His research interest focuses on India–ASEAN relations, data diplomacy, renewable energy, and maritime history, and has published several books, chapters, and journal articles. He also served as Associate Editor and Editorial Board Member of three leading journals in the Philippines and as reviewers of international publications. Currently, he serves as the President of the ASEAN Studies Association of the Philippines. Tita Sanglee is Independent Analyst with a focus on Thailand’s relations with

the great powers and security policies. Her writings have been published by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and The Diplomat. She obtained a bachelor’s degree from the University of Bristol, and a War Studies Master’s degree from King’s College London. Chaw Chaw Sein served as the Pro-Rector at Yangon University of Foreign

Languages in 2021. Priorto this, she held the position of Head of the International Relations Department at the University of Yangon since 2006. She earned her PhD in IR from the University of Yangon in 2004. She is the author of research papers such as "Myanmar Foreign Policy under the New

xiv About the Authors

Government", published in Myanmar Reintegrating into the International Community, World Scientific Publishing, 2016, and "Institutions in Myanmar's 2015 Election: The Election Commission, International Agencies, and the Military”, featured in Conflict in Myanmar, ISEAS publication, Singapore, 2016. Sineenat Sermcheep is Assistant Professor in Economics at the Faculty of

Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. She is also the Director of ASEAN Studies Center, Chulalongkorn University. She has received her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Utah, USA. Her recent publications include “Digital Investment and the Post-Pandemic Recovery in ASEAN” in Age of Ferment: Developments in Asian-Europe Trade Relations (2022), “China’s BRI and FDI in Mainland ASEAN” in China’s Belt and Road Initiative in ASEAN: Growing Presence, Recent Progress and Future Challenges(2022), and Services Export and Economic Growth in ASEAN Countries (2019). Her academic interests involve the issues related to foreign direct investment, digital economy, trade in services, movement of labour, economic integration, and ASEAN. Piti Srisangnam is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Economics,

Chulalongkorn University and also Executive Director of the ASEAN Foundation. Specializing in International Economics and ASEAN Studies, he served as Deputy Director for Academic Affairs at the ASEAN Studies Center (2012), Director of Academic Affairs (2013) and Executive Director (2020). He received the 2019 Rising Star Royal Thai Government Scholarships Association Award and the 2021 Dongfang Scholar from Peking University. He did his PhD in Economics at the University of Melbourne, and was honored with the Australian Alumni of the Year award in 2023. He hosts four radio and social media programs addressing current ASEAN issues. Charit Tingsabadh was Director of the Centre for European Studies at

Chulalongkorn University for more than 10 years, he taught at the faculty of economics at Chulalongkorn University between 1975 and 2009. He specialized in Environmental Economics, but also worked extensively on consulting assignments covering diverse areas of transport, migration, renewable energy, regional development, and economics of innovation. Now he is continuing his diverse interests in the economics of different things, and working on projects at the ASEAN Studies Center at Chulalongkorn University. Thi Anh-Dao Tran is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of

Rouen Normandy (France) and Research Associate at the Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC, Bangkok). She is currently seconded to the French Embassy in Cambodia as Attaché for Scientific and

About the Authors  xv

Higher Education Cooperation. Her main fields of interest are the macroeconomic issues of international integration from the perspective of the Global South, with comparative studies in East and Southeast Asia. Her recent research work deals with the interaction between South–South trade integration and sustainable development, China’s threat for the other emerging economies, and the impact of climate change on relative trade positions. Claire Thi-Liên Tran is Historian of Contemporary Vietnam, Associate

Professor at Université Paris Cité and Researcher at Cessma (Centre d'études en sciences sociales sur les mondes africains, américains et asiatiques). As the Director of IRASEC (Institute for Research on Contemporary Southeast Asia, Bangkok) from 2016 to 2021, she was the Editor of the annual publication Asie du Sud-Est, Bilan, enjeux et perspectives. She has developed cooperation with Thai and Asian universities and research institutes among which are the ASEAN Studies Center (Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok) and the ASEAN–India Center (RIS, New Delhi). Her recent publication (ed.) is Masters of Their own Destiny: Asians in the First World War (NUS Press, 2024). Panitan Wattanayagorn is Political Scientist and Associate Professor in the

Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, where he has been teaching and lecturing on international relations and security issues since 1993. Until recently, he was a Faculty Member of the Department of International Relations, Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand. He has held advisory and executive positions in the Government of Thailand administrations over the past two decades; between 2019 and 2023 he served as Chairman of Thai Prime Minister’s Security Advisory Committee and Advisor to Thailand’s National Security Council. He received a PhD in political science, specialising in comparative defence policy, from Northern Illinois University.

FOREWORD

Constructing the Indo-Pacific Amitav Acharya1 It is my great pleasure to offer a few reflections on the central theme of this volume, namely, the emergence of the Indo-Pacific and the importance of ASEAN in constructing the Indo-Pacific architecture. During the past decade, the term “Indo-Pacific” has become an increasingly visible term in academic and policy discussions, competing with, if not replacing the once popular notion of “Asia-Pacific”. While the concept is not new, the current notion of Indo-Pacific, i.e., one that emerged in the 21st century, has some novel elements that require careful reflection. But before turning to these features, it is important to remind ourselves that there are no “natural” regions, and that all regions are to a large extent socially and politically constructed. Hence, regions are not permanent entities and their names and boundaries change. And building regions is not the monopoly of any one state or group. Hence, while addressing the conference that led to this volume, I had said, “’Asia’ was built by nationalists, ‘Asia-Pacific’ by economists, ‘East Asia’ by culturalists, [and] ‘Indo-Pacific’ by strategists”. 2 A reader of a social media

1  A mitav Achary is the UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and a Distinguished Professor at the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC. He is also the Chair of ASEAN and Indo-Pacific Studies Initiative (AIPSI) at American University. 2  https://x.com/AmitavAcharya/status/1413139276561145861?s=20; Amitav Acharya, “Flawed Geopolitics: Turning the Idea of the Indo-Pacific into Reality,” East Asia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, January–March 2024), 21–22. 

Foreword xvii

post quoting my speech suggested that “Far East” was coined by imperialists, and I agreed. The term “Far East”, like “Near East” and “Middle East”, was essentially a hangover from the imperial era, first mentioned by the Portuguese and becoming familiar under the British empire. When the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was established in Bangkok in 1947, some Asian leaders were wondering: “far from where? east of what?”. The body was renamed in 1974 as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Even the term Southeast Asia was shaped by external geopolitics and influence. It was the South-East Asia Command (SEAC) of the World War II period that made the term popular. Yet, the definition of what constitutes Southeast Asia has changed over time. It is not well known that India, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and Pakistan – were members of a group called the Conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers, the group that officially sponsored the 1955 Bandung Conference, along with Indonesia and Burma (now Myanmar). Today, the first three are part of South Asia, while the last two are identified with Southeast Asia. But regions can also be built from “inside”. Regionalism or regional organisations can advance a particular regional idea that may be more durable than the outside naming of regions. Hence the creation of ASEAN in 1967 was a major boost to the idea of Southeast Asia, as its members not only built ASEAN into a viable organisation of states, but also developed a sense of regional identity to go with it. It is fair to say that without ASEAN the notion of Southeast Asia might not have been alive today. The term Asia Pacific grew out of economic interdependence between the United States, and Western Pacific nations, before an inter-governmental institution, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989 made it an influential construct. But soon it was challenged by the term East Asia, which although used in academic circles before, became more politically visible with the idea of East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), mooted in 1990 by the then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, who was resentful of US and Australian participation in APEC. A decade later, the term was promoted by expert groups – the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) and the East Asia Study Group (EASG), organised by South Korea’s leader Kim Dae-Jung, before the establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 made gave it an official stamp. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific idea in the past decade has been different. It has been pulled together not by economic linkages as was the case with Asia-Pacific, nor by sense of cultural identity which underpins the East Asia regional concept. Rather, mainly strategic considerations – especially

xviii Foreword

the rivalry between the United States and China, have driven the emergence of the Indo-Pacific idea. To put it broadly, while the Asia-Pacific idea recognises links across the Pacific Ocean, the Indo-Pacific idea is centred on the Indian Ocean and its extended links with the Pacific. But the Indo-Pacific idea brings in a different sense of conflict and prosperity than the Indian Ocean region during the Cold War. Then, the Indian Ocean region was recognised as an arena of great power rivalry and regional conflict, such as the India–Pakistan wars or the conflicts in the Persian Gulf, including the Iran–Iraq War. The idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a Zone of Peace highlighted the primacy of strategic factors in the Indian Ocean. This became stronger with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan late that year, and the US military response to these events. These made the Indian Ocean a major theatre for the Second Cold War, which spanned for a decade after the Soviet invasion. While its strategic importance grew, the Indian Ocean had seriously lagged behind Asia-Pacific and East Asia in terms of economic growth and integration. This has changed today, especially with the economic rise of India. Hence the Indo-Pacific conveys a greater sense of economic dynamism than did the Indian Ocean of the Cold War period. But strategic and geo-economic competition remain decisive in shaping the Indo-Pacific. During much of the Cold War period China was hardly a major economic or strategic player in the Indian Ocean. India’s links were stronger, due to its geographic centrality in the Ocean, but India was still economically and militarily much weaker than it is now. In contrast, the Indo-Pacific idea today is economically more vibrant and strategically more polarised. As noted, the Indo-Pacific is in large measure a strategic response to the changing geopolitics of the region, triggered by the rise of China. It is being shaped by a multi-power rivalry, featuring China, the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. This gives Indo-Pacific a wider impact in global strategic landscape than was the case with the Indian Ocean of the Cold War period, but it also makes it a more fragile construct. Do these differences make the Indo-Pacific a more viable notion? Since regions change, it is legitimate to ask whether the Indo-Pacific will perish or endure. I think its longevity depends on three conditions. First, thanks to its immense cultural diversity, the Indo-Pacific lacks a natural sense of identity, similar to Southeast Asia or even East Asia. Hence it must, like Asia-Pacific, rely on economic interdependence, just like AsiaPacific did and still does. Until now, despite its overall dynamism, the IndoPacific remains less well connected and integrated. It is a wider and more diverse region than East Asia or even the Asia-Pacific. Especially when taking into consideration its western parts, the Indo-Pacific as a whole lacks the extensive production networks that bind the East Asian concept. This makes

Foreword xix

building Indo-Pacific cooperation more challenging. Economic links within Indo-Pacific are weaker than those in Asia-Pacific or East Asia. India is not well integrated into East Asia and transpacific production networks that were crucial to Asia-Pacific idea. New Delhi, a key player in the Indo-Pacific, is not an APEC member, and has pulled out the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations. Developing such connectivity, institutions, and economic and political linkages is essential to make IndoPacific an enduring idea. The second condition is that the Indo-Pacific must be an inclusive notion. There are already competing ideas about its meaning and purpose: exclusionary and inclusionary. As things stand now, the US vision of the IndoPacific excludes China, which the United States views as its main competitor for influence regionally and globally. But a different version of Indo-Pacific is promoted by Indonesia and embedded in the ASEAN Outlook on IndoPacific which is inclusive of China. The tension between the two approaches must be reconciled in favour of the ASEAN approach for the Indo-Pacific idea to take off. Third, and closely related to the above, the Indo-Pacific must avoid great power dominance. No one single power, or two or a handful of powers, must dominate it. To achieve this, ASEAN must remain at the centre of the Indo-Pacific idea. This is indeed the most important concern of this book. An Indo-Pacific that is led by great powers, whether the United States, or China, or India, is likely to be fragile because of the rivalry between United States and China and China and India. But an Indo-Pacific that is led by ASEAN, a neutral broker acceptable to all major powers, is more likely to survive, even flourish. This means multilateralism, not just bilateralism or minilateralism must be the main pathway to build the Indo-Pacific. Yet, this is not the case so far. While Asia-Pacific and East Asia are anchored on multilaterals – such as APEC, ARF, EAS, the Indo-Pacific so far rests on minilaterals, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) consisting of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) promoted by the United States is another such minilateral. In this United States’ or QUAD’s vision of the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN does not enjoy the centrality it has in Asia-Pacific. While ASEAN centrality is a key principle of East Asia or Asia-Pacific, it has been diminished in the Indo-Pacific. Some would say ASEAN has been relieved of its driver’s seat role and placed on the passengers’ seat in the Indo-Pacific construct. Changing this and applying the idea of ASEAN centrality is a must to sustain the notion of the Indo-Pacific. This brings us to another time period in the history of the Indian Ocean, well before the Cold War era, before the advent of European colonial powers in the 15th century AD. Then, the Indian Ocean was an open region where

xx Foreword

“freedom of seas”, and free trade, now wrongly credited to Western nations, had flourished. No great power including China, India, and Persia dominated the ocean or monopolised trade in the maritime space. The sea was a common space for humanity; the writ of empires and kingdoms essentially stopped at their land boundaries. The idea of extending imperial rule to sea, as was the case in ancient Rome, or dividing the sea to establish monopolies, as was the case the early modern Mediterranean or during the era of European hegemony in the Indian Ocean was very much alien to the countries of the Indian Ocean. This open Indian Ocean system produced vibrant trade and exchange of culture and ideas. It was a prototype of what I have called a “multiplex world order”.3 Such an order is not dominated by one or two powers, but organised by a multiplicity of large and small nations, each contributing to the stability and prosperity of all. This offers a powerful model for organising the Indo-Pacific now, rather than by adopting the model of dominance set by European powers during the colonial era. To conclude, drawing on the Indian Ocean history before European colonialisation to develop and realise these three conditions – openness, inclusivity, and avoidance of great power dominance through ASEAN centrality – will be crucial to making Indo-Pacific a lasting and productive concept. It is too early to say whether this will be possible, but the contributors to this volume are extremely well qualified to provide answers and insights into these and other issues about the future of the Indo-Pacific. In so doing, this volume makes a major contribution to the study of Indo-Pacific interactions for scholars and policymakers.

3  A mitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014).

PREFACE

Southeast Asia considered itself as the core of the Indo-Pacific located at the intersection of the Indian and Pacific oceans. However, the ASEAN countries have long been reluctant to address the new context of the Indo-Pacific dynamics. Despite their interest in counter-balancing China’s growing military ambitions in the region, in particular in what the Chinese are calling the South China Sea (East West Philippine Sea for Philippines, East Sea for Vietnam, and North Natuna Sea for Indonesia) and in finding an alternative to China’s increasing economic influence, thus including the BRI’s projects, their views on how to join the new defining region of the Indo-Pacific remain cautious in politics, security, and economies. Given the ongoing global uncertainties, Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN member states and Timor Leste) have been facing similar challenges and the same geopolitical turbulence. Meanwhile the growing rivalry between the United States and China poses a significant challenge for the region. Southeast Asian countries engaged in a regional diplomacy which takes into account their Chinese neighbour, distinguish themselves from the dominant US Indo-Pacific discourse. To strengthen their shared interest in the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN has introduced its own “Indo-Pacific Vision” in 2019, known as “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” with a view that a peaceful, stable, and prosperous IndoPacific region will be established. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) reasserts ASEAN’s long-standing norms of centrality, dialogue, and cooperation based on multilateralism, in addressing the great power competition and the interest in becoming a significant player in the Indo-Pacific. The AOIP is clearly more compatible with Japan’s FOIP strategy and India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) than with the United States’ FOIP.



xxii Preface

Southeast Asian countries also have diverse interests and strategies. In 2023, ASEAN extended another structural shift with introduction of the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum (AIPF) to transform rivalry into cooperation. With this background, the aim of this book is to highlight this diversity of views in Asia, from the Southeast Asian countries in the core of the region to other Asian great powers, without excluding the perspectives of Western great powers and Russia’s view. Indo-Pacific is not only a central hub for the world economy crossed by major sea lanes of communication (SLOC) but comprises groups of countries which interact to defend their own geostrategic vision of the region. In other words, this book sheds light on the changing profile of the ASEAN’s approach to the Indo-Pacific and underlines the desire of the Southeast Asian countries to diversify and further strengthen the relations in this challenging time. The analyses of ASEAN and Indo-Pacific discourses should not be viewed as one or binary (China and the rest (Asia/Indo-Pacific)), but should bring diversity back into the study in a rapidly changing global environment. Thus, the aim of the book is to provide an update on the outlook of ASEAN on the Indo-Pacific, seen first by Southeast Asian stakeholders, and then by other regional major actors such as China, India, Japan, Russia, the United States, and Europe. The book intends to promote an inclusive outlook of scholars from different fields, countries and regions, capturing both diversity and unity of insights on regional challenges confronting ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific. This book is an outcome of the international conference “Asia’s PostPandemic Order and Integration: Outlook of ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific at Crossroads”, which took place in Bangkok on 8–9 July 2021. The objective of this joint conference was to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of French Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC), and the 10th Anniversary of the ASEAN Studies Center (Chulalongkorn University) and our long-standing collaboration on issues concerning contemporary Southeast Asia. Organisers were of the view that it is important to deal with the issue of Indo-Pacific from the Southeast Asian perspective. The parallel long-standing collaboration of the ASEAN Studies Center of Chulalongkorn University and the ASEAN-India Centre (RIS, New Delhi), has been a great opportunity to enlarge the partnership to a major Asian actor of the IndoPacific strategy. In writing this book, we are immensely grateful to Chulalongkorn University and IRASEC for providing technical support. With their valuable support, we managed to organise the international conference on 8–9 July 2021 at Bangkok in hybrid mode. In accepting to open the conference, Ms Usana Berananda, Director-General, Department of ASEAN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, H E Dr Thierry Mathou, Ambassador of France in Thailand (and at the moment Ambassador of

Preface xxiii

France in India) and the H E Dr Mohan Kumar, formerly Ambassador of India in France and Chairman of the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) offered us their extensive experiences in the diplomatic field and their academic expertise. We are also thankful to all the authors, discussants, and conference participants for their wholehearted support to this project and for coming forward with valuable chapters. We gratefully acknowledge the copy-editing done by Ruchi Verma. We are also grateful to Dr Teh Lip Li and Ms Thitiya Saramul (ASEAN Studies Center, Chulalongkorn University) and the financial support of the two French Research Units, IRASEC, Bangkok, and the Centre for Social Sciences Studies on the African, American, and Asian Worlds (CESSMA) Paris, for the copy-editing. Finally, we are grateful to Routledge India for the timely publication of this volume. We hope this publication will be able to fill the gap in literature, which will fulfill the need felt by the researchers and teachers in this field. This book will be a great resource for those studying Asian relations in general and Indo-Pacific in particular. Needless to say, the suggestions in this book will strengthen the policymaking process. May 2024 Claire Thi-Liên Tran Suthiphand Chirathivat Prabir De

Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group

http://taylorandfrancis.com

1 INDO-PACIFIC AND ASEAN New Balances and New Challenges for Asian Integration and Stability Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De

Introduction From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: An American Vision?

In less than ten years, the “Indo-Pacific”, a region defined as “stretching from the Indian Ocean, through the South and East China Seas, and out to the Pacific Ocean” or more largely as the region “spanning from the West Coast of the United States to the eastern coast of Africa” (Wada, 2020) has become a major strategic concept. Behind the revival of this classical geopolitical concept is an “ambiguous and hotly contested regional security construct deployed through different national lenses” (Doyle & Rumley, 2019). Indeed, the term has reigned in the current denomination of the term, “Asia-Pacific”, which was used during World War II and then increasingly used to refer to post-1989 Asia, during the global triumph of the United States (US) model after the fall of the Soviet model and Fukuyama’s “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). Back then, the creation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989 was encouraged by the United States across the Pacific Rim. It remained in function during and later until the Obama administration’s 2012 “Pivot to East Asia” regional strategy. However, the regional concept was questioned by the historian Arif Dirlik as “a Euro-American invention, but with an Asian and Pacific content” (Dirlik, 1992, 1993). A new departure and use of the Indo-Pacific concept undeniably testify to a moving of the cursor from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean, giving its place to the whole of Asia, not only East and Southeast Asia but also South Asia till the African coasts, as the major economic and strategic area. Numerous publications on the Indo-Pacific have flourished during this DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-1

2  Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De

last decade, in the specific context of the preeminence of the United States’ Indo-Pacific and its rivalry with China. The former US President Donald Trump pursued the policy of the preceding US President Obama to rebalance in Asia-Pacific when he first used the Indo-Pacific terminology while outlining his “vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific” at the APEC Summit in Vietnam in November 2017. His motivation for this approach was to confront China’s threat to US leadership in the region. This approach considered the Indo-Pacific as the theatre of a geopolitical competition between the United States’ free vision of world order (Curtis, Fitt, & Stokes, 2021) and China’s repressive vision. This perspective was confirmed in 2018 at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and at the East Asia Summit (EAS) by then US Vice-President Mike Pence, where the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy was promoted in 2019 by US Admiral Philip Davidson, the Indo-Pacific Commander, during his tour in Southeast Asia. With the United States as the most influential promoter of the IndoPacific strategy, Japan, India, and Australia have also joined as the three other important actors in the region that form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Commonly known as the QUAD, this strategic security dialogue was launched in 2007 as a policy symbol of regional engagement in the “Indo-Pacific”. In between, the interagency Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative (IPTI) created in 2018 to combat the rising Chinese pressure on the Indo-Pacific’s democracies advanced democratic and free-market values to counter China’s authoritarian capitalism. Indeed, according to Templeman: Democracy is a relatively recent transplant to most of Asia. (…) The growing power of the People’s Republic of China is making the task of democratic consolidation increasingly difficult in the countries of East and Southeast Asia, and it threatens to reshape a regional order that has, until now, fostered broadly shared prosperity, increasing economic interconnectivity, and political liberalization—and one that has also served US interests well. (Templeman, 2020) This understanding of the US-dominated Indo-Pacific is only one narrative. Many other perspectives on the Indo-Pacific need to be heard, representing different parts of Asia. As has been described by Rory Medcalf, who in his paper entitled “Many Players, Many Layers”, insists on the importance of transcending a “binary choice” to discuss: the game of many nations [which] are interacting in a great game with multiple participants and dimensions and notes that the Indo-Pacific’s boundaries are fluid – it is, after all, a maritime place – and this helps

Indo-Pacific and ASEAN 3

explain why various countries define it differently (and why that is no great problem). For example, is coastal East Africa part of the Indo-Pacific? Perhaps the answer depends on how the interests of key Indo-Pacific powers are engaged in African affairs. Whatever perspectives one could provide, it comes down to the region’s core, which is clear: the sea lanes of maritime Southeast Asia. As for the periphery, it is defined by connections, not borders. This corresponds with the ancient Asian concept of the mandala that originated from Hindu cosmology, which defined the universe according to concentric circles and central points. This informed ancient statecraft in India and Southeast Asia: polities were defined by their centre, not by boundaries. In the mandala model of sovereignty, as opposed to the traditional “middle kingdom” worldview of China, centrality does not automatically bestow superiority to sovereigns. Rather, the model recognises a world of many places, many islands, each with their own qualities. In modern parlance, this equates to multipolarity, equal sovereignty, and mutual respect – many belts and many roads (Medcalf, 2019, pp. 10–11). With this background, the aim of this book is to highlight this diversity of views in Asia, from the Southeast Asian countries in the core of the region to other Asian great powers, without excluding the perspectives of Western great powers and Russia’s view. The Indo-Pacific is not only a central hub for the world economy crossed by major Sea Lanes Of Communication (SLOC) but also comprises groups of countries that interact to defend their own geostrategic vision of the region. Asian Perspectives on Indo-Pacific

The consideration of various Asian perspectives lends to certain observations. First, we can question if it is China that initiated a shift in focus to the Indo-Pacific area when President Xi Jinping defined the new strategy of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. Also called “One Belt One Road”, the BRI aims to initiate an alternative region to the United States’ Asia-Pacific and develop a regional economic integration that fits China’s sphere of influence by connecting Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks. For BRI projects alone, China has planned to invest around US$ 1.3 trillion by 2027 in infrastructure development projects throughout the region (Brattberg & Soula, 2018). The BRI seeks to create a “community of shared destiny”. Without using the term Indo-Pacific, the policy signals China’s de facto attempt to redefine a new space of connection from East Asia to West and South Asia to Africa, in the wake of the ancient Silk Road – the ancient network of trade routes that connected China to the Mediterranean via Eurasia for centuries. This space has been, for centuries,

4  Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De

shaped/modelled in another sense, by the circulation of Westerners from Europe to Africa and Asia, to the Far East. Moreover, another great Asian power, Japan, which initiated in 2013 the oldest and most developed Indo-Pacific vision, is less guided by the American vision of rivalry with China and is more focused on development and connectivity. The aim is to achieve sustainable development and promote stability and prosperity in a secure environment through economic diplomacy. The former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who talked about the confluence of the two seas, also initiated the strategic security dialogue with Australia, India, and the United States (QUAD) in 2007 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007). Finally, the other Asian great power, India, initiated the Act East Policy in 2014, replacing the Look East Policy of 1992, to strengthen relationships with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asian countries (De, 2020). Indian Prime Minister Modi introduced India’s Indo-Pacific vision at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018. Today, India seeks to play a crucial role in the Indo-Pacific strategy (De, 2023). Southeast Asia or ASEAN is commonly considered as the core of the IndoPacific, located at the intersection of the Indian and Pacific oceans. However, the ASEAN countries have long been reluctant to address the new context of the Indo-Pacific dynamics. Indeed, despite their interest in counterbalancing China’s growing military ambitions in the region, particularly in the South China Sea, and in finding an alternative to China’s increasing economic influence, including the BRI’s projects, their views on how to join the newly defining region of the Indo-Pacific remain cautious in politics, security, and economics. According to Le Thu Huong, ASEAN’s resistance “to act more decisively (and more importantly, more supportively of the Australian and American policies)” is partly because of “sensitivities towards the relationship with Beijing, but also partly because it remains unclear to them what support for the Indo-Pacific would entail or commit to” (Le, 2020). To her, Southeast Asian states are facing similar challenges and the same geopolitical turbulence as the great powers of the region, but they have to deal with much more heavy pressure from China: “They prefer ‘not standing up enough’ against China in the South China Sea, ‘not pushing back enough’ against the Belt and Road Initiative or even not supporting the Indo-Pacific concept enough” (Le, 2020). However, they finally adopted ASEAN’s own “Indo-Pacific Vision” in 2019, known as the “ASEAN Outlook on the IndoPacific” (ASEAN, 2019). ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific: Strategic and Economic Challenges

The growing rivalry between the United States and China poses a significant challenge for the ASEAN region. Southeast Asia’s capacity to overcome greatpower rivalry during the Cold War is confronted with another

Indo-Pacific and ASEAN 5

challenge, as China is an integral part of the international economy and security dynamics. Although it has to respond to these pressures, the Southeast Asian countries have diverse interests and strategies. In broad terms, a growing greatpower rivalry between the United States and China poses a significant challenge for the whole ASEAN region. After the end of the Cold War, ASEAN’s capacity to overcome greatpower rivalry is confronted with increasing complexity, when viewing notably China’s nascent rise as a significant global and regional player in security dynamics and economic integration, in addition to traditional players like the United States and Japan. To deal with such new challenges, the Southeast Asian countries find it difficult to hold a common voice on greatpower rivalry issues as they are after all so diverse, with each of them having their own specific interests and strategies. Despite their diverse perspectives, ASEAN countries share some common concerns (Hanada, 2019). First, they view China’s ambitions as increasingly concerning, though these are not new to them. Unlike Western countries, Southeast Asian countries have lived with China as a giant neighbour long back in history. Second, most Southeast Asian nations do not embrace the confrontational approach of the United States towards China, which considers Beijing as a long-term strategic competitor and a challenger to the rulesbased international order – they reject the FOIP’s pressure to “take sides”. Third, they question Washington’s reliability and perceive the substantial decline of the US commitment to Southeast Asia, even since the Obama administration’s reluctance to address China’s assertiveness which has deepened since the 2016 Trump’s “America First” policy, continuing into the Biden’s administration. On the issue of security, ASEAN is not opposed to the importance of keeping the balance of power and maintaining the rules-based order and freedom of navigation. However, one of ASEAN’s primary concerns with the FOIP is that it can lead to an erosion of its neutrality (“centrality”) in the midst of the greatpower rivalry between the United States and China. The QUAD is viewed as an anti-China alignment which presses ASEAN to choose between the two great powers. Some ASEAN members also worry about possible external interventions in domestic politics through the FOIP, as the United States’ vision for the Indo-Pacific clearly states that it wants societies of the various Indo-Pacific countries to become progressively more free – free in terms of good governance, fundamental rights, transparency, and anti-corruption. Even if it clearly targets the Chinese and Russian authoritarian regimes, the FOIP is perceived as an interventionist policy that may destabilise their domestic political systems. On the economic front, most of the ASEAN countries have to deal with the fact that China is the largest and thus the most influential trading partner. The Southeast Asian countries are economically interdependent and are

6  Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De

not ready to lose ties with China. The Chinese BRI and its promises already made of US$ 173 billion between 2013 and 2019 (Chirathivat, Rutchatorn, and Devendrakumar, 2022) for regional connectivity projects have been attractive to many countries that need investment, especially infrastructure. However, their anxiety is growing because of lack of project ownership in recipient countries, rising debt levels, and the risk of over-reliance on a single power. No wonder ASEAN countries are eager for alternative infrastructure initiatives from other sources including Japan, Australia, the United States, and others. The decision of the ASEAN leaders to define their own version of the “Indo-Pacific” at the 34th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in 2019 accounted for the multifaceted needs of the region, giving priority to maritime cooperation, connectivity, and infrastructure. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) reasserts ASEAN’s long-standing norms of centrality, dialogue, and cooperation based on multilateralism, in addressing the greatpower competition and the interest in becoming a significant player in the Indo-Pacific. The AOIP is clearly more compatible with Japan’s FOIP strategy and India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) than with the United States’ FOIP. Beyond the discussion on whether ASEAN supports the FOIP, the most important missing word here “concern” for ASEAN is to present its own vision of AOIP for regional order in the broader Indo-Pacific region. The emergence of FOIP can be viewed by ASEAN as an opportunity rather than a threat, for all its member states, regardless of their size. Another way to consider the FOIP strategy of India, Japan, the United States, and Australia is to extend their assistance to maritime law-enforcement agencies and navies to maintain the balance of power with their Chinese neighbour and to uphold a rules-based order. It can also contribute to deter China from the regional status quo by force and to enhance ASEAN’s unity and capacity to build its own regional security strategy. Indeed, China’s tactics are divisive to ASEAN, especially in the South China Sea, with some states preferring bilateral negotiations and others called for ASEAN’s direct involvement in the issue. Moreover, despite the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) by former President Donald Trump, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP-TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) free trade agreement, led by Japan and Australia, ASEAN member nations themselves represent a large market opportunity with a population of almost 670 million, which is expected to grow to over 700 million by 2030. The response of AOIP can be seen as a possible counterbalance to China’s overwhelming power without the need to choose between Washington and Beijing as seemed to be suggested by FOIP.

Indo-Pacific and ASEAN 7

Indo-Pacific and ASEAN: New Balances and New Challenges for Asian Integration and Stability

This book is the result of the conference “Asia’s Post-Pandemic Order and Integration: Outlook of ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific at Crossroads”, which took place in Bangkok on 8–9 July 2021. The objective of this joint conference was to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of IRASEC and the 10th Anniversary of the ASEAN Studies Center (Chulalongkorn University) and our long-standing collaboration on issues concerning contemporary Southeast Asia. The organisers were of the view that it is important to deal with the issue of the Indo-Pacific from the Southeast Asian perspective. The parallel collaboration of the ASEAN Studies Center of Chulalongkorn University, the ASEAN-India Centre (RIS, New Delhi), and the Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC) has been an opportunity to integrate a major Asian actor in the Indo-Pacific strategy. This fruitful scientific collaboration between our three research institutes on the important issue of the Indo-Pacific met the interest of different actors of the Indo-Pacific strategy, who opened the conference: Ms Usana Berananda, Director-General, Department of ASEAN Affairs of Thailand; H.E. Dr Thierry Mathou, Ambassador of France in Thailand and former Director of the Asia Direction at the French MOFA; and H.E. Dr Mohan Kumar, Formerly Ambassador of India in France and Chairman of the RIS, New Delhi. After the four keynote speakers, Prof Amitav Acharya (American University, Washington, D.C.), Prof Jean-Pierre Cabestan (Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong), Dr Rahul Mishra (Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya), and Asst Prof Surat Horachaikul (Chulalongkorn University), offered their global view on the Indo-Pacific issue, more than 30 researchers from all over the world (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Europe, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States) took part in the conference, which was held online during the pandemic. Two-thirds of the speakers submitted chapters for this book. The manuscript has been coordinated by three of us, Professor Suthiphand Chirathivat (ASEAN Studies Center Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok); Associate Professor Claire Thi Lien Tran (IRASEC, Bangkok); and Professor Prabir De (ASEAN-India Centre, New Delhi), with the precious contribution of Dr Teh Lip Li and Ms Thitiya Saramul (ASEAN Studies Center, Chulalongkorn University) and the financial support of IRASEC and CESSMA University Paris Cité for the copy-editing. The aim of the book is to provide an update on the outlook of ASEAN on the Indo-Pacific, seen first by Southeast Asian stakeholders and then by other regional major actors such as China, India, Japan, Russia, the United States, and Europe. The analyses of ASEAN and Indo-Pacific discourses

8  Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De

should not be viewed as one or binary (China and the rest (Asia/IndoPacific)) but should bring diversity back into the study in a rapidly changing global environment. The book intends to promote an inclusive outlook of scholars from different fields, countries, and regions, capturing both diversity and unity of insights on regional challenges confronting ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific. A decade since the promotion of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) by the United States and other great powers, characterised by a strategy of hedging against the growing influence of China in Asia, ASEAN has defended an alternative position of “dialogue and cooperation, and not rivalry with China” in the context of high geostrategic and geo-economic competition between the United States and China. Since the AOIP was introduced in 2019, to what extent did the COVID-19 crisis, the new US administration led by Joe Biden, and Xi Jinping’s triumph at the head of China may reshape the regional order? What are the perspectives of ASEAN countries when addressing the great power rivalry and the “divide and rule” strategies of the United States and China in the long run? What about ASEAN’s alliances with other players like Japan, India, Australia, and the EU? Will the ASEAN countries and institutions be able to defend a stable multipolar world order in the Indo-Pacific region without isolating China, and avoid becoming the centre theatre of conflicts, as was the case during the Cold War? The context of these recent years affects the entire region of the IndoPacific. The post-pandemic moment has represented a new step of integration – decoupling or recalibration with China, the United States, and many others – through global and regional supply chains (Suzuki, 2021), or interregional connectivity, which could trigger a global realignment as well as new fragilities or opportunities. Post-pandemic Asia calls for all countries to further integrate trade, technology, investment, and the people. Is ASEAN prepared to consider new trading and market access provisions with broader trade agreements with RCEP and CPTPP that appear to have far-reaching impacts on enhancing global and regional value chains? What could represent increasing risks among competing global players when decoupling or recalibrating patterns of consumption, production, and upgrading technology? How and in what way would the Indo-Pacific add value to Asia’s postpandemic integration, and to ASEAN as a whole? Moreover, the sensitive issue of the South China Sea, on the one hand, and Taiwan, on the other, makes the Indo-Pacific a key region with major strategic challenges. Finally, to what extent did the uncertainty caused by the Russian–Ukrainian conflict at the beginning of 2022 impact the regional balances in the Indo-Pacific region at the diplomatic, strategic, and economic levels?

Indo-Pacific and ASEAN 9

The Structure of the Book

The book gathers the contributions of 18 authors and is divided into three parts. Part I begins with discussions on the Indo-Pacific from the perspectives of Southeast Asian nations, where priority is given to centrality and multilateralism in a context of uncertainty. The discussions in the second part highlight the extent to which the Indo-Pacific intersects the interests of the great powers in Asia. Finally, the third part focuses on the economic angle, considering ASEAN amidst competing strategies and challenges surrounding connectivity and integration. Part I presents the ASEAN perspective since the adoption of the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” in 2019, which asserted the “ASEAN centrality” and its willingness to become a significant player in the recent context of the new Biden administration’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific and the confirmation of Xi Jinping as the President of China. ASEAN has defended an alternative position of “dialogue and cooperation, and not rivalry with China” in the context of trade disputes and conflicts between the United States and China. This first part questions ASEAN’s multilateral strategy and the different perspectives of the Southeast Asian countries. How do the ASEAN countries and institutions defend a stable multipolar world order in the Indo-Pacific region in a period of great instability? The following chapters present the Indo-Pacific issue from the perspective of different Southeast Asian countries. Chapter 2 by Joefe B. Santarita (University of the Philippines’ Asian Center) presents the Philippines’ perspective of ASEAN and argues that ASEAN should play a pivotal role in the multipolar Indo-Pacific in the context of growing competition between China, the United States, and other middle-power countries. It also examines the nature of the Indo-Pacific as an evolving geographical and strategic frame of reference and considers the opportunities and risks it could bring to ASEAN. Moreover, this chapter explores how ASEAN can continue to leverage the Indo-Pacific concept and its unfolding possibilities to promote and defend its interests. Such leverage is triggered by its non-threatening stance and its ability to navigate the dynamics of international affairs. In Chapter 3, Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad (Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta) aims to present Indonesia’s response towards the Indo-Pacific discourse, showing how it was shaped by historical as well as institutional factors in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking. It also describes how Indonesia has promoted a reinterpretation of the regional construct by insisting on inclusivity and not strategical use for politics of containment by great powers, emphasising ASEAN Centrality and economic cooperation and development rather than strategic competition. In Chapter 4, Panitan Wattanayagorn (Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok) and Tita Sanglee describe the Thai policy to address the US–China

10  Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De

competition. They argue that “ASEAN Centrality” is an important element in Thailand’s national security strategy and foreign policy in order to achieve a “strategic new equilibrium” for a more stable regional order. But recent developments also indicate that Thailand is moving or “hedging” towards China. Indeed, in the case of an open conflict between China and the United States, Thailand may align itself with China. In Chapter 5, Claire Thi-Liên Tran (University Paris Cité/IRASEC, Bangkok) shows how the Indo-Pacific strategy is in line with the Vietnamese global foreign policy and why this policy of balance of powers is an opportunity to enhance Vietnam’s leadership as a regional emerging middle power. More than ever, Vietnam seeks multilateralism and uses the Indo-Pacific framework to manage the strong military pressure of neighbouring China in the East Sea (South China Sea). She also suggests that the Indo-Pacific strategy can address economic challenges. At the very least, she describes the deepening of partnerships with the Indo-Pacific key players (Japan, India, the United States, Australia, and more recently European powers) while maintaining a partnership with its Chinese neighbour. In Chapter 6, Cheunboran Chanborey and Chheang Vannarith(Asian Vision Institute), expose the Cambodian perspective on the Indo-Pacific and seek to discuss the Indo-Pacific concept, which aims to contain or at least check the rising power of China in the region. And lastly, Chaw Chaw Sein (University of Yangon) presents, in Chapter 7, the perspective of Myanmar. The chapter aims to assess the implications of the ASEAN centrality defined by the Indo-Pacific strategy of ASEAN and its implications for Myanmar in the complex interplay of major powers politics. Myanmar, as a member of ASEAN, considers the implications of the AOIP due to its strategic location and the competition of major powers in terms of both security and economy. In Part II, the chapters analyse Indo-Pacific geopolitics from the perspectives of the other regional great powers. Indeed, great powers have redefined their strategies in the region in the last 15 years, replacing the concept of Asia-Pacific with that of the Indo-Pacific, to manage China’s rise. What are the strategies of the three Asian great powers – China, Japan, and India? How will the Western powers (the United States and the European Union) reposition themselves in this new Indo-Pacific architecture? How will they manage their influence in diplomacy and partnership building, and their security priorities in this growing economic and strategic Indo-Pacific super-region connecting two oceans? What are the consequences of the war between Russia and Ukraine on the regional balance and economies in the Indo-Pacific region? First, in Chapter 8, Jean-Pierre Cabestan (CNRS, IFRAE, Paris) presents China’s responses to the Indo-Pacific initiatives in three words: “divide and rule” and examines how these responses have impacted China–ASEAN relations. It is China’s rise and, in 2013, Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative

Indo-Pacific and ASEAN 11

(BRI) that have been the main drivers of all the Indo-Pacific initiatives (the United States, India, Australia, the EU, and the ASEAN). These initiatives have directly contributed to intensifying China’s activism on all fronts with the risk of antagonising more countries, including among its ASEAN partners. To Cabestan, Beijing’s divide-and-rule strategy is successful and is likely to be maintained, even if it is facing more pushback among ASEAN and the QUAD’s members. Then, in Chapter 9, Rahul Mishra (Jawaharlal Nehru University) examines the Indian Indo-Pacific strategy in the continuity of the “Act East policy” and the “Look East policy” and how it engages India in the region in terms of its political, strategic, cultural, and connectivity aspects. In contrast with the Asia-Pacific, India intends to play a prominent role in the IndoPacific framework. He analyses how it contributes to fulfilling India’s IndoPacific vision defined by Prime Minister Modi in 2018 to build stronger defence trade ties and to strengthen infrastructure and connectivity linkages. Despite China’s lukewarm response, support for the Indo-Pacific is gathering momentum, with the United States and its allies – Japan and Australia – acting as its leading proponents. In Chapter 10, Guibourg Delamotte (INALCO/IFRAE, Paris) shows how Japan has become a subtle and determined leader of the new Indo-Pacific architecture through a proactive role in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, it has been the first to shape the Indo-Pacific region with its Indo-Pacific strategy. To Japan, the Indo-Pacific is a diplomatic tool to counterbalance China. With the FOIP, Japan intends to generate international cooperation and further development in the region. Japan also renewed regional partnerships and reformed its defence policy to be a more “active player” in regional security. In Chapter 11, Murray Hiebert (CSIS, Washington) questions the new US strategy towards the Indo-Pacific under Joe Biden, after intermittent attention under Donald Trump. Indeed, for Biden, the Indo-Pacific is a top policy priority, which focuses on building a free and open region. It fosters security, inviting the Southeast Asian leaders for a summit in Washington and visiting its regional allies (Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam). On the contrary, the US Indo-Pacific Economic Framework appears too weak to its allies even if a dozen countries are ready to work on an economic cooperation agreement. When Washington views China as the “most serious long-term” threat to the global order, most Asian countries want to avoid conflict and hostilities, while trying not to choose sides. In Chapter 12, Igor Denisov and Danil Bochkov ( MGIMO University, Moscow and Russian International Affairs Council) present Russia’s outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The two primary goals of Russian foreign affairs are to frame regional stability and security on a non-aligned foundation within the framework of multilateral and regional institutions and dialogue platforms. To the authors, Russia perceives the United States’ Indo-Pacific

12  Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De

strategy as a way to contain China. Beyond a US-centric logic, Moscow aims to harmonise its interests with the Indo-Pacific strategies of regional and extra-regional players (including ASEAN). India is particularly important as a balancing force between Beijing and Moscow. The interest of Russia is to promote a diversification of its partnerships in Asia to counter the regional bipolarity of China/United States and to maintain its influence in the IndoPacific mega-region. Lastly, Chapter 13 by David Camroux (SciencesPo, CERI, Paris) starts with the publication in September 2021 by the European External Action Service on a Strategy for the Indo-Pacific as the (re)used term in contemporary European policy debates. He argues that there is no one monolithic European view of the Indo-Pacific, but varied interpretations exist, albeit ones often sharing common elements. The chapter focuses on France as the only resident European middle power in this newly defined region and then suggests four other categories of European nations. The first of these is that of globalising middle powers, where he examines the case of Germany, then the second is the middle power in political and economic terms, where he analyses the United Kingdom, and two other broad categories, which he calls the “motivated fellow travellers” and the “indifferent fellow travellers”. Part III of the book focuses on economic issues across ASEAN in the context of post-COVID-19 pandemic and discusses the competing connectivity strategies and integration challenges that the ASEAN countries are facing. Indeed, ASEAN faces uncertainties with respect to the new geopolitical changing landscape and whether the major power rivalries will be positive for region building. The main objective of the Indo-Pacific is to focus on security issues, and its economic and connectivity potential is not yet well defined. Without downplaying the significance of the Indo-Pacific, the issue is, however, about how ASEAN connectivity will be forged with a broader region of the Indo-Pacific, in addition to the pre-existing initiatives like the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, and regional connectivity among the ASEAN Plus Three countries that the region has built up over the years. What does the acceptance of the Indo-Pacific construct mean for AOIP and ASEAN Connectivity in particular? Chapter 14 by Sineenat Sermcheep (Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok) focuses on the opportunities and challenges of digital connectivity, as it is critical for ASEAN’s post-pandemic recovery, as well as sustainable growth and development. Many ASEAN economies and industrial sectors have accelerated digitalisation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. They have focused on improving digital connectivity, including digital infrastructure, digital literacy and skills, and privacy and cybersecurity, to facilitate the regional digital transition. Digital connectivity is also a requirement for national and regional competitiveness, as well as a key driver of development in the digital age. ASEAN countries intend to develop investment in digital

Indo-Pacific and ASEAN 13

infrastructure, particularly in digitally skilled training and mobility of professionals, and to increase trust and security in ASEAN’s digital economy. Indeed, collaboration with RCEP partners and countries in the Indo-Pacific region provides opportunities for ASEAN to further develop its digital connectivity and become more competitive in the global market. In Chapter 15, Amita Batra (Centre for South Asian Studies, JNU, New Delhi) addresses the economic strategy of India to ASEAN and the QUAD countries, which defines itself as a regional free and open construct with a rules-based order. The four-member QUAD, while originally conceived to strengthen the strategic dimension of the Indo-Pacific, has evolved into a forum with a more broad-based agenda that is inclusive of developmental goals for the region. The new formulation of the AUKUS by the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom has, meanwhile, assumed the strategic aims of the regional formulation: to counterbalance the expansionist tendencies of China. Batra highlights how the economies of the region have the potential to serve the underlying motivation of the Indo-Pacific revival and objectives. The strengthening of the ASEAN and India’s economic partnership allows the states to correct the imbalances of the regional strategy. In Chapter 16, Thi Anh-Dao Tran (University of Rouen/IRASEC, Bangkok) examines ASEAN’s perspective in the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor partnership in the Indo-Pacific realm. Starting with the growing interest in South–South trade cooperation, she describes the increasing trade ties between ASEAN and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the Indo-Pacific vs RCEP context. How has this trade segment developed in general to connect Africa and Asia on the one hand, and inter-regional South–South relations on the other? What are the major obstacles to developing this commercial momentum in the Indo-Pacific, and what kinds of policies would be required to support such a strategy? The issue of genuine economic integration is a matter of determining its ability to establish an integrated area, powerful enough to be a key player in the region and in the “Global South”. Chapter 17 by Piti Srisangnam (ASEAN Studies Center, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok) investigates the ASEAN community amidst postCOVID-19 conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. As the year 2021 has been marked by the lowest Global Value Chains (GVCs), many believe the GVC will fully recover to US$ 18 trillion again in 2023. International trade advantages through the new trade negotiations are desirable to improve the integration momentum from this GVCs recovery. However, the authors notice that the conflict between the great powers and the transformation of the new world order complicate the situation in the Indo-Pacific region. Chapter 18 by Suthiphand Chirathivat (ASEAN Studies Center, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok) and Charit Tingsabadh (Centre for European Studies and Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University,

14  Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De

Bangkok) is a case study of connectivity in ASEAN, the Kra Isthmus to Thai Canal and the land-bridge in Southern Thailand. Recent regional strategic changes have generated an exceptional relooking of the two seas’ linkages of the Indo-Pacific, in conjunction with the revival of the Kra Isthmus in Southern Thailand. As it is the narrowest part of the Malay-Thai peninsula, it represents the most direct maritime route to link the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and the wider world. Until China’s BRI takes shape, the Klong Thai (Thai canal) has been promoted by the Prayuth government to advance an interim alternative, a landbridge linking the two provinces of Chumporn and Ranong between the two seas of the Indo-Pacific. The chapter examines the revival of interest in the Kra Isthmus, including the benefits and costs. Will this landbridge open a new era for Thailand–ASEAN connectivity and BRI linking the Indo-Pacific? Each chapter contributes to shed light on the changing profile of ASEAN’s approach to the Indo-Pacific and underlines the desire of the Southeast Asian countries to diversify and further strengthen their relations in this challenging time. Hopefully this book will be useful for those studying Asian relations in general and the Indo-Pacific in particular. References ASEAN. (2019). ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN Statements & Communiques. https://ASEAN​.org​/ASEAN2020​/wp​- content​/uploads​/2021​/01​/ ASEAN​- Outlook​-on​-the​-Indo​-Pacific​_ FINAL ​_ 22062019​.pdf Brattberg, E., & Soula, E. (October 19, 2018). Europe’s Emerging Approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment​.org​/ 2018​/ 10​/ 19​/europe​- s​- emerging​- approach​- to​ -china​-s​-belt​-and​-road​-initiative​-pub​-77536 Chirathivat, S., Rutchatorn, B., & Devendrakumar, A. (eds.). (2022). China’s Belt and Road Initiative in ASEAN: Growing Presence, Recent Progress and Future Challenges. World Scientific, Singapore. Curtis, L., Fitt, J., & Stokes, J. (2021). Advancing a Liberal Digital Order in the Indo-Pacific. Center for a New American Security. De, P. (2020). Act East to Act Indo-Pacific: India’s Expanding Neighbourhood. Knowledge World, New Delhi. De, P. (ed.). (2023). Thirty Years of ASEAN-India Relations: Towards Indo-Pacific. Knowledge World, New Delhi. Dirlik, A. (1992). The Asia-Pacific Idea: Reality and Representation in the Invention of a Regional Structure. Journal of World History, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 55–79. Dirlik, A. (1993). What Is In A Rim? Critical Perspectives On The Pacific Region Idea. Routledge, New York. Doyle, T., & Rumley, D. (2019). The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific. OUP, Oxford. Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press, New York. Hanada, R. (2019). Asean’s Role In The Indo-Pacific: Rules-Based Order and Regional Integrity. In S. Stirling (Ed.), Mind The Gap: National Views of The

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Free And Open Indo-Pacific. German Marshall Fund of the United States. https:// www​.gmfus​.org​/news​/mind​-gap​-national​-views​-free​-and​-open​-indo​-pacific Le, T. H. (2020). Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific Concepts: From Resistance to Reticence to Reaction. Security Challenges, Vol. 16, No. 3, Special Issue: The Indo-Pacific: From Concept to Contest, pp. 53–57. Medcalf, R. (2019). Many Players, Many Layers: The Indo-Pacific Long Game. SWP Working Papers, Research Division Asia, Session 1. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. https://www​.swp​-berlin​.org​/publications​/ products​/projekt ​_papiere ​/ BCAS ​_ 2019​_ Medcalf​_ Indo​-Pacific ​_ Long ​_Game​.pdf Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2007, August 22). 二 つ の 海 の 交 わ り [The Intersection of Two Seas]. https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/mofaj​/press​/enzetsu ​/19​/eabe​ _0822​.html Suzuki, H. (2021). Building Resilient Global Supply Chains: The Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Templeman, K. (2020). Democracy under Siege: Advancing Cooperation and Common Values in the Indo-Pacific. Issue Brief. Atlantic Council. Wada, H. (2020). The “Indo-Pacific” Concept: Geographical Adjustments and Their Implications. RSIS Working Paper, No. 326. Singapore: Nanyang Technological University. https://hdl​.handle​.net ​/10356​/143604

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PART I

The Indo-Pacific from Southeast Asian Perspectives Centrality and Multilateralism in Uncertain Times



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2 POSITIONING ASEAN IN A MULTIPOLAR INDO-PACIFIC Joefe B. Santarita

Introduction

The term “Indo-Pacific” has gained currency in recent years, especially during periods when the rivalry between China and the United States of America (USA) has been intense. Through the years, however, this nomenclature has generated many meanings, visions, and actions from different stakeholders. One of these stakeholders with a clear vision is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The regional body has the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) that acknowledges the importance of the Indo-Pacific as a geographical space that spans the Indian Ocean through to the western part of the Pacific Ocean. In recent times, ASEAN has found itself in a strategic position in the context of increasing competition between China, the USA, and other middlepower states. Such leverage is triggered by its non-threatening stance and its ability to navigate the dynamics of international affairs. This chapter, therefore, examines ASEAN’s pivotal role in the multipolar Indo-Pacific. In particular, it examines the nature of the Indo-Pacific as an evolving geographical and strategic frame of reference, as well as the opportunities and risks that it could bring to ASEAN. Moreover, this chapter explores how ASEAN can leverage this concept of the Indo-Pacific and its unfurling potential to defend its interests. Indo-Pacific: One Nomenclature, Many Meanings

The idea of “Indo-Pacific” is believed to have started when Shinzo Abe, the then Prime Minister of Japan, mentioned the “Confluence of the Two DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-3

20  Joefe B. Santarita

Seas” – in his speech before the Indian Parliament in the summer of 2007. The phrase was drawn from the title of a book written by Dara Shikoh, a Mughal prince, in 1655. Abe believed that “peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from the conditions similarly occurring in the Indian Ocean” (Abe, 2007). In recent years, however, political developments affecting each area surrounding the ocean have been more closely connected than ever before (see Figure 2.1). Hence, it becomes a strategy primarily of “Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii to form a security diamond that is designed to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific” (Abe, 2007). The Indo-Pacific has gradually gained currency among bureaucrats, scholars, and the like. In more recent times, however, the term has taken on numerous meanings from different voices. In fact, a good number of individuals view “Indo-Pacific” as a new geographical and strategic frame of reference to replace the “Asia-Pacific” construct (Wacker & Gudrun, 2020). One of the popular definitions is associated with the USA’s efforts to contain the rising military and economic capabilities of China, a situation that many observers inevitably likened to a cold-blooded, Cold War-style geopolitical strategy. These efforts are further triggered by the rise of China and the subsequent implementation of the near-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Through this initiative, China has expanded its economic (and, some argue, military) foothold in the Indian Ocean (Avdaliani, 2020). As the concept can

FIGURE 2.1 

Indo-Pacific

Source: https://en​.m​.wikipedia​.org​/wiki​/File​:Indo​-Pacific​_map​_outlines​_with​_ASEAN​_overlay​ .jpg. Eric Gaba (Annotated on 4 November 2020).

Positioning ASEAN in a Multipolar Indo-Pacific 21

also be read as code for containing China; Australia, India, Japan, and the USA have recently revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) to emphasise interconnectivity and inclusivity and promote interregional engagement and stability (Reeves & Wallis, 2020). In fact, this kind of framing, according to some officials and scholars, suggests the possibility that states, particularly the smaller ones, will unavoidably have to make a rational selection between the USA and China if the rivalry is not managed well in the near future. The Indo-Pacific approach from an Indian perspective, on the other hand, covers three specific features. India perceives the “Indo-Pacific” as an opportunity that allows for the expansion of India’s imprint across the region, as it faces considerable limitations in terms of capital and capacity. At the same time, this approach places several collaborations at the centre of India’s interests in the Indo-Pacific area. While partnerships with Australia, France, Japan, and the USA have provided a greater platform for India to expand its diplomatic imprint, India’s relationship with island states will influence its role in the Indo-Pacific region. Due to the geographic closeness of island states such as the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and Seychelles to India, the foreign policy choices of these island states will have a direct effect on the security landscape of India (Baruah, 2020). For France, the space of the “Indo-Pacific” is a geographic reality since its presence in the area is felt through its overseas territories wherein 93 per cent of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is located in the Indian and Pacific oceans. The territories surrounding the two oceans are home to 1.5 million French people as well as 8,000 soldiers. Furthermore, this space has also become a geo-economic reality because of the shifting of the centre of gravity of the global economy from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It should be noted that six members of the Group of Twenty (G20), such as Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea, are situated in the region (France Diplomacy, 2021). In the case of Australia, the term “Indo-Pacific” has different meanings. A geographical definition brings in the Indian Ocean, and at the state level, it brings in India. These themes are aptly reflected in the Australian government’s National Security Strategy of 2013. In the said document, the term “Indo-Pacific” is vividly defined as a space covering: the region from the Indian Ocean through to the western Pacific Ocean. The “Indo-Pacific” emphasises the growing significance of this geographic corridor and that of India. The former (bringing in the Indian Ocean) has maritime implications for highlighting a two-ocean sphere of operations for Australia. The latter (bringing in India), on the other hand, has strategic implications for bilateral state-to-state collaboration between Australia and India, and potential trilateral India–Australia–USA frameworks. (Scott, 2013)

22  Joefe B. Santarita

The Philippines has an interesting definition of the Indo-Pacific. Some quarters in the archipelago consider the Indo-Pacific as a precursor of another Cold War. They see India as a proxy for the USA in its rivalry with China. At the regional and official levels, however, the Philippines, along with the other nine member states of ASEAN, adopted a definition of the Indo-Pacific in 2019 at the 34th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok, Thailand. Despite the many meanings of the term and visions of the Indo-Pacific region, the member states of ASEAN have taken note of the idea. The ten member countries, including the Philippines, adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in 2019. This document officially serves as a guide for ASEAN in its engagements with countries located along the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Furthermore, the said document also acknowledges the potential for collaborations with numerous regional mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions on issues of common interest through innovative, interdisciplinary, and complementary approaches, based on the significant ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) (ASEAN, 2019). The document recognises that the regions along the Pacific and Indian Oceans are among the most dynamic in the world and have been the core of economic growth for decades. These regions continue to witness geopolitico-strategic developments which present opportunities as well as challenges. On the one hand, the economic growth of the region opens up the potential for partnerships to lessen poverty and raise the living standards of millions of people. On the other hand, the rise of material powers, such as economic and military capabilities, requires avoiding the deepening of mistrust, miscalculation, and patterns of behaviour based on a zero-sum game. In this calculation, Southeast Asia lies at the heart of these dynamic regions and aptly serves as a very important linkage to these countries. Therefore, it is in the interest of ASEAN to lead the development of economic and security architectures and ensure that such dynamics will continue to bring peace, security, stability, and prosperity to the residents of Southeast Asia and beyond (ASEAN, 2019). Given these factors, ASEAN needs to build its collective leadership to influence the vision for closer partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and maintain its pivotal role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia and beyond. ASEAN also needs to seriously perform its role as an honest mediator within the strategic environs of competing interests (ASEAN, 2019). This framework is a continuation of ASEAN’s open and inclusive vision and is considered in many aspects as the “same old wine in a newly packaged bottle” (Ha, 2019). Thus, ASEAN approaches the Indo-Pacific as a closely integrated and interconnected region of dialogue and cooperation, development, and prosperity for all (ASEAN, 2019). It is a space where ASEAN can play a central

Positioning ASEAN in a Multipolar Indo-Pacific 23

and strategic role by taking advantage of the opportunities and managing risks associated with the Indo-Pacific. Opportunities, Risks, and Uncertainties

The ASEAN has acknowledged the implications of the Indo-Pacific to the Southeast Asian region. Foremost are the opportunities for economic expansion, maritime cooperation, and connectivity, among others. Economic expansion: Through economic connectivity, island states and larger countries such as South Korea, Vietnam, as well as the greater China and India will substantially interconnect economically and collectively; these countries will become the biggest trading markets in the world. Several studies also demonstrate that at least 50 per cent of global GDP is contributed by these countries that are located in the Indo-Pacific region (Avdaliani, 2020). There are also promising consequences that can result from regional cooperation, if they materialise, such as on South–South Cooperation; trade facilitation and logistics infrastructure and services; micro, small, and medium enterprises (SMEs); and science, technology research and development, and smart infrastructure. Additional areas of cooperation are climate change and disaster risk reduction and management; active ageing and innovation; and deepening economic integration, ensuring financial stability and resilience. Strengthening and promoting trade and investment by supporting the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 and other free trade agreements, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), are also expected to strengthen the expansion of the economy. Furthermore, cooperation on preparing for the Fourth Industrial Revolution by facilitating the sharing of experiences and expertise on ways to benefit from, and address challenges of, the digital revolution; and the development of the private sector as well as the development of the digital economy and the facilitation of cross-border data flow can also be further explored to enable their participation in the regional and global value chains. (ASEAN, 2019) Maritime cooperation: Among the many issues related to maritime concerns that several countries may encounter are the unresolved maritime disputes that have the potential for open conflict and competition. Such problems are worsened by the unsustainable exploitation of maritime resources and maritime pollution. Thus, it is imperative to seriously consider the prevention, management, and resolution of these issues through more focused and diplomatic means. Areas of maritime partnerships should be seriously considered to maximise the potential of collaborations among countries in maritime

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concerns in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (ASEAN, 2019). Connectivity: The other realm of collaboration is connectivity. “The existing and future connectivity efforts in the Indo-Pacific region should complement and support the existing Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025”. It is important that the ASEAN vision on connectivity be realised soon in order to facilitate competitiveness, inclusiveness, and integration of the community. With the increasing integration and interconnection among countries located in the Indian and Pacific oceans, there is a need to invest in building connectivity infrastructures, including physical, institutional, and people-to-people connectivity. In order to sustain these initiatives in the long run, environmental and ecological consequences and considerations must be seriously taken into account (ASEAN, 2019). Along with the above-mentioned opportunities, there are risks associated with the Indo-Pacific vision. These include risks of conflict with China, military confrontation, and food insecurity. The US Indo-Pacific strategy may provoke a conflict with China. The US strategy vis-à-vis China has four important components: the presence of military capability build-up of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region; provision of strategic alternatives under the name of “Free and Open IndoPacific” to undermine China’s growing influence via BRI or other means in the region; mobilise the allies and friends to balance against Chinese influence; and lastly, to capitalise on regional issues like the South China Sea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong to contain China (Hu, 2020). If one of these components is roused, provocation is likely to happen and poses a great risk to countries in the Indo-Pacific, including ASEAN members. This provocation is tantamount to direct confrontation and may lead to military face-offs. If this happens, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the key regions where a tussle for power and influence between China and the USA will take place. The USA–China strategic competition will affect almost every geographic region in the world and contemporary international engagements (Hu, 2020). Another risk is the cumulative impact of the tensions created by disputes over the region’s shared fishery resources. It should be noted that the swift depletion of fishery stocks in the South China Sea due to unmanaged fishing will trigger a fisheries crisis and will destabilise the affected areas. To securitise the fishery crisis as an extension of the region’s territorial disputes, “maritime law enforcement agencies are compelled to adopt similar sovereignty-based norms when managing the region’s fishery crisis” (Salleh, 2020). It should be emphasised, however, that the implementation of such sovereignty-based approaches does not automatically protect the migratory and fluid nature of fish. Given the migratory nature of marine resources such as fish that obviously do not abide by territorial boundaries, the fish may

Positioning ASEAN in a Multipolar Indo-Pacific 25

spawn in one nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), move to another EEZ during their juvenile stage, and spend the end-stage of their life in a third nation’s EEZ. Hence, the conduct of individual and aggressive illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices would prevent fish from migrating to another zone and diminish the sustainability of the fishery stock in the region (Salleh, 2020). This problem will lead to other problems including transnational crimes if continuously under-addressed. The said crimes include child labour, illicit trade, drug trafficking, people smuggling, and illegal transshipment, which will have cumulative repercussions on the socio-economic conditions, security, and health across the region (Salleh, 2020). ASEAN’s Pivotal Role in the Indo-Pacific

Given the opportunities and risks associated with the Indo-Pacific, it is best for ASEAN to be careful while playing a pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific, despite its decades of experience. First, ASEAN is non-threatening and could work with both the USA and China. ASEAN’s multilateral arrangements can serve as a buffer in case China and the QUAD challenge each other in the near future. Second, although the notion of ASEAN centrality is criticised, it is still useful to promote the concept, to preserve stability and progress in the region, especially with the trade contestation and military rivalry between the USA and China. A less influential ASEAN would heighten the tension between the USA and China in the region. Conversely, a less peaceful ASEAN would be a less attractive investment destination and hurt the region’s economic growth (Iwamoto, 2021). It is, therefore, in the interests of stakeholders to preserve ASEAN’s centrality through multilateral fora like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the EAS, and the plethora of other ASEAN-anchored mechanisms as a way of maintaining ASEAN’s relevance and capacity to manage the regional distribution of power (Nabbs-Keller, 2020). Third, ASEAN has a secretariat and organisational structure. While ASEAN’s organisational structure is weak, ASEAN has already an existing mechanism which can be enhanced to address the rivalry between the great powers. Established in 1967, ASEAN has earned global respect. The main function of the secretariat is to coordinate the work of the ASEAN organs and to implement regional projects and activities (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021). Furthermore, the secretariat could potentially serve as the coordinating agency of the RCEP. Fourth, ASEAN has the experience to coordinate and navigate diplomatic and economic mechanisms, as manifested by its success with the EAS, sectoral dialogue partners, dialogue partners, and development partners. This

26  Joefe B. Santarita

enables ASEAN to maintain its central role in regional cooperation mechanisms (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021). Fifth, several ASEAN states are also members of the China-supported RCEP, and some are members of the US Trans-Pacific Partnership. These countries could better serve as interlocutors to the major players of two mega-trade arrangements in the Indo-Pacific. It should be noted that the best hope for ASEAN to maintain its place in a divided world lies in its cooperative and economic potential. Thus, it is imperative for ASEAN to play an active role in the conduct of international affairs and regional collaboration through the ASEAN-centred frameworks (Iwamoto, 2021). Furthermore, ASEAN is a viable platform to harness the benefits of the economic opportunities of the Indo-Pacific and the China-led RCEP. It is worthy to note that RCEP has no structure and office as of now that will coordinate planning activities and monitor the BRI projects which the ASEAN Secretariat could better manage. Lastly, the prospects of the AOIP by ASEAN are promising if it is fully implemented. To realise the potential for partnerships with other regional mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific region on common issues, ASEAN should pursue strategic discussions and practical collaborative activities at ASEANled mechanisms, including the EAS, ARF, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), and the ASEAN Plus One mechanisms, among others (ASEAN, 2019). The above-mentioned institutional frameworks and qualities enable ASEAN to act as ballast in the ever-dynamic relations of superpowers in the Indo-Pacific. These factors will also prepare ASEAN to diffuse tensions when necessary. The first step for ASEAN to exercise a pivotal role is to replicate or revive the spirit of non-alignment. The emergence of the term Indo-Pacific and its gradual acceptability by many stakeholders in the region has generated some trepidation. They witness the continuing competition of military and economic giants in the area. The said tension is a reminder of the Cold War and the significance of the Non-Aligned Movement. The concept of nonalignment was never perceived in the narrow sense – as “neutral” in the military conflict between the two rival blocs (Mohite, 1992). It is worthy to note that the idea of non-alignment should not be automatically defined as not cooperating with the West or other present and future power centres (Keethaponcalan, 2016). Moreover, “non-alignment does not necessarily mean either neutrality or isolation in the context of bloc politics and instead seeks to influence the two parties to change their geopolitical stance” (Chopra, 2021) and work instead for a peaceful and stable environment. Such a regional initiative can draw on ASEAN’s experiences. In many ways, ASEAN appears “as the middle ground between the loose members of the original Non-Aligned Movement and the tight coalitions of states”. Even

Positioning ASEAN in a Multipolar Indo-Pacific 27

as the individual “ASEAN states retain full agency, and non-interference in the affairs of its member states, ASEAN makes decisions through consultation and consensus. More importantly, ASEAN maintains open dialogue and engagement with many countries” (Chopra, 2021). By doing so, ASEAN can facilitate interaction between rivals in a globalised and interconnected world. Of late, Vietnam as well as South Korea have expressed their intention to mediate the growing competition between China and the USA (Chopra, 2021). ASEAN should also promote cooperation on maritime issues, economic expansion, and connectivity. In the case of maritime cooperation, ASEAN should cooperate in the peaceful settling of disputes, promote maritime safety and security, and ensure freedom of navigation and overflight. Moreover, ASEAN should also try to address transnational crimes such as robbery and armed robbery against ships at sea, trafficking in persons or of illicit drugs, sea piracy, and many more. Furthermore, ASEAN should also collaborate with partners in the sustainable management of marine resources, protect the livelihood of coastal communities, and support small-scale fishing communities. In addition, ASEAN should develop the blue economy, promote maritime commerce, as well promote maritime connectivity, among others. Moreover, partnerships to address sea-level rise, marine pollution, marine debris, preservation and protection of the marine environment and biodiversity, green shipping, and other areas will reinforce ASEAN’s maritime cooperation efforts in the Indo-Pacific. To maximise this potential, ASEAN should promote technical collaboration in marine science, such as on “research and development, sharing of experience and best practices, capacity-building, managing marine hazards and debris, and raising awareness on marine and ocean-related issues” (ASEAN, 2019). In order to enhance connectivity, ASEAN should explore cooperation on priority areas to support the prevailing MPAC 2025 and promote growth and progress in the regions. ASEAN should also: strengthen several principles and replicate best practices to regulate digital transactions in the area, invest more in setting standards for critical emerging technologies, and heighten engagement at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) level to reach an agreement in the formulation of rules on digital commerce. Additionally, ASEAN should improve the digital infrastructure to link individuals to the global trading system; help micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to participate lucidly in digital trade and enable them to compete in global markets; share policies and best practices on the retraining of workers and improving the mobility of human capital by conducting

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a workshop with ASEAN; and lastly strengthen partnerships against cyber threats (Goodman et al., 2019). ASEAN should also develop the agenda on regional partnerships between the private and public sectors to mobilise resources for connectivity projects, including infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, it should explore potential collaborations with sub-regional frameworks, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Brunei Darussalam–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), and Mekong sub-regional cooperation frameworks, including the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), among others. ASEAN should work towards the realisation of a Seamless ASEAN Sky. This can be done by making the region’s airspace a “seamless block of airspaces with harmonised and interoperable procedures and operations and by increasing air traffic management capacity and efficiency while enhancing safety”. Likewise, it should also address challenges caused by rapid urbanisation through the initiatives associated with the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN). Lastly, ASEAN should further encourage people-to-people connectivity through collaboration and exchanges between the academe and business, and others (ASEAN, 2019). ASEAN can also enhance its pivotal role by addressing the structural causes of economic frictions in order to enhance the economic potential of China, India, and ASEAN and also increase trading opportunities for the USA and Australia (Goodman et al., 2019). In terms of infrastructure, ASEAN should push for an optimistic outlook for connectivity in the region. This can be realised by building a consensus around public and private infrastructure investment in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the G20. Furthermore, such visions can be reinforced through the creation of a regional mechanism to advocate for quality infrastructure, expand infrastructure financing options, enhance infrastructure governance, and supervise regional infrastructure projects (Goodman et al., 2019). In order to facilitate investment, ASEAN can elevate investment standards and set best practices for investment retention. It can also “collaborate with and widen sub-regional private sector initiatives, actively shape the investment facilitation agenda in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and lastly, promote full implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) to realise the investment plans” (Goodman et al., 2019). In terms of energy, ASEAN can prioritise well-functioning domestic energy systems by taking advantage of support systems and accelerating a stable energy transition in the region. It should also lift public confidence in the sustainable extraction of gas, starting with small group workshops, strengthen regional gas markets to ensure energy security in the Indo-Pacific,

Positioning ASEAN in a Multipolar Indo-Pacific 29

through APEC energy ministers, and finally hasten the governance reform introduced by the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Goodman et al., 2019). Lastly, in terms of financial systems, ASEAN can intensify and widen the “financial systems and capital markets across the Indo-Pacific” and expand trade in financial services to strengthen several largest financial markets in the world. ASEAN can also facilitate the reduction of imbalances in trade, ease possible tensions in trade, and assist the economies along the IndoPacific region to liberalise their financial systems through expanded competition (Goodman et al., 2019). Conclusion

The term Indo-Pacific, in recent years, has drawn the attention of bureaucrats, scholars, and the like, and carries both opportunities and risks. However, the term has drawn numerous meanings from different stakeholders. Many observers and enthusiasts view the “Indo-Pacific” as a new geographic and strategic frame of reference. One of the popular definitions is associated with the efforts of America to contain the rising military capabilities and economic might of China. Many believe that a cold-blooded, Cold War-style geopolitical mentality motivates the emergence of this new concept. Such a scenario could force countries, particularly small and middle-power polities, to confront another dilemma that they encountered in the 1950s and 1960s. This situation may be avoided if ASEAN is able to utilise its experience and institutional mechanisms. ASEAN should not be forced to choose sides and should be given the chance to employ its centrality and maximise its leverage. This can be done by revitalising the spirit of non-alignment, which calls for cooperation and friendly competition rather than conflict and coercion. Indeed, the geographical space of a multipolar Indo-Pacific offers many opportunities as well as risks. It is important for ASEAN to consciously leverage the opportunities of cooperation on maritime issues, economic expansion, and connectivity, among other areas. At the same time, ASEAN should pay attention to the risks associated with the Indo-Pacific, including the possible confrontation with China, the emergence of a military encounter, and threats to maritime and food security. In order for ASEAN to navigate the multipolar Indo-Pacific to its advantage, it should consistently maintain its centrality and the domestic concerns of its member states. It should be noted that the kind of response of the member states at the regional or global level is affected by their domestic affairs. Thus, it is important that ASEAN capitalise on the AOIP by making ASEAN centrality the main principle in promoting collaboration in the Indo-Pacific region. This is only possible with the strategic use of ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the EAS as platforms for dialogue and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific while preserving its other

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external relations frameworks. Furthermore, ASEAN should also build collaborations with other regional and sub-regional mechanisms available in the Indo-Pacific region on complementary areas of common interest. ASEAN is expected to maximise the potential of the said opportunities and manage the risks well, particularly the possible confrontation between China and the USA. In the current scenario, ASEAN is the best institution to navigate the course towards a peaceful and economically vibrant megaregion, in the case of conflict arising from the rivalry of the major powers and, more importantly, as a facilitator of cooperation among the states and partners in the region. References Abe, S. (2007). Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond. LiveMint. Accessed August 29, 2021. https://www​.livemint​.com​/Opinion​/viq​g 2XC​8fhR​fjTU​Icctk0M​/Asias​ -democratic​-security​-diamond​.html. ASEAN. (2019, June 23). Asean Outlook on The Indo-Pacific. Accessed July 2, 2021. https://asean​.org​/asean2020​/wp​- content​/uploads​/ 2021​/01​/ASEAN​- Outlook​- on​ -the​-Indo​-Pacific​_ FINAL​_ 22062019​.pdf. ASEAN Secretariat. (2021). External Relations. Accessed August 29, 2021. https:// asean​ . org​ /our​ - communities​ /asean​ - political​ - security​ - community​ /outward​ -looking​- community​/external​-relations/. Avdaliani, E. (2020, July). The Rise of the Indo-Pacific. BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,639. Accessed August 28, 2020. https://besacenter​.org​/indo​-pacific/. Baruah, D. (2020, June 30). India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed July 17, 2021. https://carnegieendowment​.org ​/2020​/06​/30​/india​-in​-indo​-pacific​-new​ -delhi​-s​-theater​-of​-opportunity​-pub​-82205. Chopra, S. (2021, July 16). Is Non-alignment Making a Comeback in Asia? East Asia Forum. Accessed July 17, 2021. https://www​.eastasiaforum​.org ​/2021​/07​/16​ /is​-non​-alignment​-making​-a​- comeback​-in​-asia/. France Diplomacy. (2021). France's Indo-Pacific Strategy. Diplomatie, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French. Accessed July 12, 2021. https://www​ .diplomatie​.gouv​.fr​/en ​/country​-files​/asia​-and​- oceania​/the​-indo​-pacific​-region​-a​ -priority​-for​-france/. Goodman, M., Brouwer, G. de., Armstrong, S., and Triggs, A. (2019, April). Delivering Prosperity in the Indo-Pacific: An Agenda for Australia and the United States. CSIS Briefs. Accessed July 12, 2021. https://www​.csis​.org ​/analysis​ /delivering​-prosperity​-indo​-pacific​-agenda​-australia​-and​-united​-states. Ha, Hoang Ti. (2019). ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Old Wine in New Bottle? Yusok Ishak Institute (ISEAS). Accessed July 18, 2021. https://www​ .iseas​.edu​.sg ​/images​/pdf​/ ISEAS ​_ Perspective​_ 2019​_ 51​.pdf. Hu, W. (2020). United States, China, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy. China Review, 20(3), 127–142. Iwamoto, K. (2021, June 22). ASEAN Defends its Indo-Pacific ‘centrality” between QUAD and China. Asia Insight. Nikkei Asia. Accessed July 10, 2021. https://asia​ .nikkei​.com ​/ Spotlight ​/Asia​- Insight ​/ASEAN ​- defends​-its​- Indo ​- Pacific​- centrality​ -between​- QUAD ​-and​- China. Keethaponcalan, S. (2016). Reshaping the Non-Aligned Movement: Challenges and Vision. Bandung Journal of Global South; 3(4), 1–14.

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Mohite, D. (1992). Ideological Foundations of Nehru’s Nonalignment. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 24–38. Nabbs-Keller, G. (2020). ASEAN Centrality and Indonesian Leadership in a Contested Indo-Pacific Order. Security Challenges, 16(3), 21–26. Reeves, J., & Wallis, J. (2020). A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Opportunities for Engagement. Asia Policy, 15(4), 1–6. Salleh, A. (2020). Preventing the Tyranny of the Commons: A Regional Perspective to Fishery Management. Maritime Issues in the Indo-Pacific: Building a Shared Vision of “Free and Open. Honolulu: Pacific Forum, 28–33. Scott, D. (2013). Australia’s Embrace of the ‘Indo-Pacific’: New Term, New Region, New Strategy? International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13(3), 425–448. Wacker, F., & Gudrun, H. (2020). From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Significance, Implementation and Challenges. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper. Accessed August 1, 2021. https://www​.swp​-berlin​.org ​/10​.18.

3 UNDERSTANDING INDONESIA’S APPROACH TOWARDS INDO-PACIFIC DISCOURSE Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad

Introduction

On 14 July 2023, the then President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, received the courtesy call of Foreign Ministers from ASEAN member countries who attended the 56th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and its related conferences. During the meeting, the President called for “developed countries and partner countries to forsake zero-sum approach” and quoted a popular Javanese proverb to illustrate the approach that ASEAN must take amidst the increasing geopolitical tension. He said: There is a proverb in Indonesia, “to win without making others lose”, which means that we can be a winner without making the other losers. I call upon us all to be dignified winners, a winner who does not make others lose. (Widodo, 2023b) The complete proverb (not fully mentioned by the President), “To be wealthy without (material) wealth, to be powerful without power, to fight without an army, to win without making others lose”,1 can be seen as a guidance for political leaders in Indonesia. The first three sentences illustrate the importance of not looking at material capabilities as the sole arbiter of social relations (and in this case, interstate relations) and that in the right context and with the right strategy, those in the lower part of the power distribution pyramid can actually shape the trajectory of the relationship. The last one, quoted by the President, provides the normative goal as well as the enabling factor required by these lesser powers to be influential: the ability to provide DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-4

Understanding Indonesia’s Approach towards Indo-Pacific Discourse 33

mutually beneficial alternatives acceptable to everyone in the system. Great Powers, individuals or states, are often blinded by the competition with their rivals and thus are unable to see better possibilities. The proverb illustrates well Indonesia’s approach towards the changing global and regional order, driven by the increasing tension between the Great Powers, which in recent years manifested into the emergence of the “Indo-Pacific” regional imagination. In understanding Indonesia’s approach towards the emerging Indo-Pacific regional imagination, there is a need to look at two levels: (1) the normative level and (2) the institutional level. At the normative level, I argue that Indonesia is guided by its persistent belief that international order must not be defined by the raw struggle for power, shaped by a zero-sum game between Great Powers, and that a stable and mutually beneficial international order is possible. Embedded in this normative position is the confidence in the agency not controlled by Great Powers and the insistence towards the recognition of equal sovereignty of all nations. To achieve this, as shown throughout its history, the best pathway is inclusive multilateralism, in which Indonesia plays a significant role. This normative principle is then manifested at the institutional level through the “ASEAN Centrality” strategy, in which Indo-Pacific regional imagination is reinterpreted with ASEAN at its centre. While accepting the usage of the Indo-Pacific concept, Indonesia promotes reinterpretation of the regional construct by insisting on three important features: (1) inclusivity (that the emerging regional architecture must be inclusive and not strategically used for Great Power politics of containment); (2) ASEAN centrality (that ASEAN needs to be central in the wider regional architecture); and (3) centrality of economic development and cooperation (this must be the primary concern of the Indo-Pacific regional architecture rather than strategic competition). Regional Order and Regional Imagination

To begin the discussion, it is important to clarify what I mean by “regional (international) order” and “regional imagination” in this chapter. However, this clarification serves more as an attempt to explain the position of this chapter rather than an attempt to join the conceptual debate, which might be better placed in a different context. The first concept to be clarified is “regional order”, which I understand as “regional international order”, or the international order of a specific region. In this context, our discussion starts with the conceptualisation of international order. While frequently used, there is no commonly agreed definition of international order. McMillan English Dictionary defines international order as “the political, economic, or social situation in the world at a particular time and the effect that this has on relationships

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between different countries” (McMillan English Dictionary, quoted in Acharya, 2018, pp. 4–5). This descriptive conceptualisation of international order is quite in contrast to Hedley Bull’s definition of international order as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states or international society” (Bull, 1977), which implies that international order is an arrangement to pursue some normative objectives. Another contentious aspect of the conceptualisation of international order is the elements that build international order. Some scholars believe in the primacy of material factors, while others stress the importance of ideational factors (Baylis et al., 2020). Some have also attempted to simultaneously integrate material and ideational factors in explaining the construction and maintenance of international orders, such as Robert Cox (Cox, 1981; Cox & Schechter, 2002), Amitav Acharya (Acharya, 2017, 2018), or Andrew Phillips (Phillips, 2011). This is the position on which this chapter stands. This chapter follows the conceptualisation of international order put forward by Andrew Phillips, which provides a systematic combination of normative and empirical approaches to understand international order while taking the freedom to simplify and contextualise it in the regional context. He conceptualises international orders as “systemic structures that cohere within culturally and historically specific social imaginaries” (Phillips, 2011, pp. 23–24). According to this conceptualisation, there are two important components of international order: (1) “Order-producing normative complex”, which confers a shared collective identity, provides ethical prescriptions to regulate actors’ behaviour, and justifies and maintains relations of an organised domination; and (2) “fundamental institutions”, which arrange the legitimate authority and decision-making power, legal and ritualistic framework for cooperation and conflict mitigation, and authorised practices of violence to enforce the values of the order (Phillips, 2011, p. 24). Phillips also argues that these two components are built upon and within an “order-enabling material foundation/context” (Phillips, 2011, p. 29). To contextualise it as “regional international order”, I believe that we can put an additional adjective in the conceptualisation, which provides the spatial framework. Thus, regional orders could be understood as “systemic structures that cohere within culturally, historically, and spatially specific social imaginaries”. This is where we need the term “regional imagination”, because the spatial aspect of the social imaginary in which the “order-producing normative complex” and “fundamental institutions” are manifesting is also socially constructed. Thus, I use the term “regional imagination” to refer to the “socially constructed spatial boundaries of a given international order”, in which the normative complex is able to provide a collective regional identity with distinct values and norms, and where the fundamental institutions can be established.

Understanding Indonesia’s Approach towards Indo-Pacific Discourse 35

The construction of a regional imagination is always a social process, in which some actors, for some purposes, introduce a particular conceptualisation of a spatial limit for a certain set of identities, norms, and institutions to govern the relations between the supposed members of the regional international order. Since it is a social process, it always involves contestations over conceptualisation, including what set of identities, norms, or institutions that specific regional imagination would be built upon. Before IndoPacific, regional imaginations such as Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Asia-Pacific were promoted by different actors for different purposes, but the conceptualisation of these regional imaginations themselves continued to evolve. The Indo-Pacific concept is an emerging regional imagination that is discursively used to reconstruct the spatial limit of regional international orders. Previously identified as separate regional imaginations, the IndoPacific regional imagination merged the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions into a single region. In this context, the emergence of “Indo-Pacific” discourse is an attempt to construct a particular “regional imagination”, which will bring along a specific set of norms and establish some fundamental institutions to implement those constitutional norms. As one regional imagination can overlap and coexist with another regional imagination, for example, Southeast Asia can overlap and coexist with Asia-Pacific, it could bring conflicting sets of norms and institutions. Indo-Pacific as Contested Regional Imagination

Despite the increasing usage of the Indo-Pacific concept, one must be aware that even the geographic conceptualisation is marked by differences, continuous adjustments, and ambiguity (Haruko, 2020). Japan’s geographic conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific evolved from including Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and the East African littoral countries to including Pacific Island countries and North and South American countries. This expanding map is coherent with the US conceptualisation, which puts the boundaries of the Indo-Pacific from “the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States”. India’s conceptualisation is more aligned with Japan’s, with India and Southeast Asia at the centre, thus contradicting the US conceptualisation, which states that the west coast of India is the westernmost boundary of the Indo-Pacific (Haruko, 2020). While Japan and India have a wider conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific, Australia initially had a narrower version of it. In the early use of Indo-Pacific in Australia’s official documents, it was limited to the eastern Indian Ocean and the western Pacific Ocean. After the US officially conceptualised “Indo-Pacific”, Australia gradually aligned its conceptualisation to match Washington’s. Indonesia does not have an official map that clearly defines the Indo-Pacific

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region yet, but Marty Natalegawa, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, conceptualised it as an important triangular spanning two oceans, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, bounded by Japan in the north, Australia in the southeast, and India in the southwest, with Indonesia at the centre (Haruko, 2020; Sambhi, 2020; Scott, 2019). I believe that these persistent differences, continuous adjustments, and ambiguities are the functions of the geopolitical calculations behind the different conceptualisations of the Indo-Pacific regional imagination. This contentious construction of regional imagination also brought along a contestation on expected identity and norms. As early as Abe’s speech in 2007, the regional imagination included the insistence that: by Japan and India coming together in this way, this “broader Asia’ will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia. Open and transparent, this network will allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely. (Abe, 2007) The use of the “Democratic” adjective in the Democratic Security Diamond by Japan also shows the normative connotation of the Indo-Pacific. The United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy also proclaimed that “Our vital interests and those of our closest partners require a free and open Indo-Pacific, where governments can make their own sovereign choices, consistent with their obligations under international law; and where seas, skies, and other shared domains are lawfully governed”, juxtaposed with the identification of China as the main antagonist, which “pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power” and its “coercion and aggression spans the globe, but it is most acute in the Indo-Pacific” (The White House, 2022). Australia also used the term “rules-based global order” and “open, inclusive” as its normative vision of the Indo-Pacific (Government of Australia, 2017). On the other hand, India and Indonesia, wary of being drawn into Great Power competition, insist on stressing that the region must be characterised by cooperation and not by competition. Both also used the term “inclusive” as the central narrative vision (Haruko, 2020). Indonesia, which sees ASEAN as its primary platform for international engagement, also sees that ASEAN’s norms, especially the peaceful settlements of disputes and trust-building through dialogue, can be projected to the emerging region. To manifest their geopolitical and economic interests as well as to promote the norm and identity associated with each conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific, countries also develop different institutions. While frequently acknowledging the important role of ASEAN, the United States, Japan,

Understanding Indonesia’s Approach towards Indo-Pacific Discourse 37

Australia, and India feel that it is inadequate to be the core institution of the emerging region. The United States states that ASEAN is too diverse and too weak to be reliable in containing China’s influence. Japan and Australia see the importance of strengthening their alliance with the United States. India, while insisting that it is not building an alliance against a particular country, also needs stronger strategic partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia. These dynamics lead to the establishment of minilateral arrangements such as the QUAD and AUKUS. Indonesia, on the other hand, still insists on and relies on ASEAN centrality. From the discussions above, we can see that there is increasing convergence in the spatial conceptualisation and normative visions for the IndoPacific among Japan, the United States, and Australia, which manifest in the establishment of minilateral arrangements such as the QUAD and AUKUS. Thus, it is understandable that China consistently rejected the Indo-Pacific concept, seeing it as the United States’ plot to contain its rise. Beijing officials frequently criticised the Indo-Pacific concept as “a return of Cold War mentality”. Furthermore, China sees that the regional imagination will dilute its initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Community of Common Destiny (Jaknanihan, 2022). India, while joining the QUAD, carefully avoided being perceived as part of an anti-China or anti-Russia alliance by insisting on “inclusive” and “positive” normative characterisation of the regional imagination. In terms of strategic and economic interests related to the Indo-Pacific concept, India shares more in common with Indonesia. However, regarding the institutional vision for the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia understandably puts more weight on ASEAN centrality. Indonesia’s Approach: Normative and Institutional Visions

Since the emergence of the Indo-Pacific, regional imagination has been a function of geopolitics (which can be conceptualised as part of the changes in “order-enabling material context”). Indonesia’s approach towards the emergence of the Indo-Pacific discourse should not be framed merely as a “response”. Even before the concept of Indo-Pacific was introduced, or even before the famous Shinzo Abe’s Confluence of the Two Seas speech in 2007, Indonesia and other ASEAN member countries were already anticipating the changing geopolitical landscape by gradually pushing for a more proactive role of ASEAN in shaping the geopolitical dynamics beyond Southeast Asia. While other factors did matter, such as the market-driven process of East Asian regional integration and the East Asian Crisis (Soesastro, 2006), the geopolitical concerns on how to maintain their strategic autonomy amidst the already visible increasing tensions between Great Powers were clearly present in the establishment of ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Summit.

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This, at least according to an insider of the process, Marty Natalegawa, was among the rationales why Indonesia supported the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand, and India in the East Asia Summit. By including these countries, ASEAN would be “the undoubted centre with Northeast Asia to its north, India/the Indian Ocean to its west and southwest, and the southern Pacific to its east and southeast” (Natalegawa, 2018, p. 89). Looking at it this way, it is not far-fetched that the contemporary emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept could be traced back not only to Abe’s speech in 2007 but also to the establishment of the East Asia Summit in 2005, which already included India, Australia, and New Zealand. Indonesia was already imagining that ASEAN should be geographically, as well as geopolitically, central in the increasingly interconnected regions around the two oceans. Even before the Indo-Pacific concept was officially formulated by any of its current proponents, there was a strong belief that ASEAN must be central in the wider region. Indonesia’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, then, must be understood as the continuation of the country’s approach towards the anticipated increasing geopolitical tension in the region and beyond. The core idea is that Indonesia must be proactively shaping the regional dynamics, rather than letting global and extra-regional dynamics, marked by increasing great power rivalry, jeopardising regional peace and stability upon which Indonesia’s economic development is built. To implement this, ASEAN is the preferred main platform, although there are some prominent voices advocating for a post-ASEAN foreign policy (Sukma, 2009). It must be noted that though ASEAN is the main platform, it does not mean that Indonesia’s initiatives are confined to ASEAN. Indonesia also attempts to proactively shape the wider region, which is now identified as the “Indo-Pacific”, through other channels – bilateral and multilateral. But how can Indonesia proactively shape the Indo-Pacific regional order? What shape does Indonesia want to give to the international order in the region? In terms of material capabilities, Indonesia is of course constrained by its own limitations. It does try to strengthen its capability through initiatives such as the Minimum Essential Force policy launched in 2007, but it cannot really change the balance in the material distribution of power (except probably by siding clearly with one of the Great Powers, which Indonesia avoids). In conceptual terms, it could not significantly alter the “order-enabling material context”. However, material factors are not the only determinants of international order and the behaviour of the members of the regional international order. Indonesia sees that it can influence the norms and collective identity to “regulate” how actors (states) behave in the region, as well as shape the institutional framework in which interactions between states are legitimately managed. By understanding the Indo-Pacific as a regional imagination to

Understanding Indonesia’s Approach towards Indo-Pacific Discourse 39

construct the spatial limit for an emerging regional international order with a set of norms and institutional frameworks, we can understand that Indonesia aims to proactively influence the patterns of relationship between the expected members of that regional international order by setting the norms and identities, as well as defining the main institutional framework for the region. Thus, despite the variations in channels, names, or specific policies, Indonesia’s initiatives to shape the regional order can be understood as advancing two kinds of visions: (1) normative vision and (2) institutional vision. Normative Vision: Indo-Pacific as an Inclusive Region

While embracing the Indo-Pacific regional imagination, Indonesia promotes the reinterpretation of regional construct by insisting on a set of norms and identities for the region that is more of an alternative than the set of norms and identities promoted by the United States and Japan. In the normative vision, the Indo-Pacific is envisioned as an inclusive region and a region of cooperation and dialogue, in which countries – big and small – have sovereign equality, prefer peaceful settlement of disputes, and are continuously involved in trust-building despite their rivalries. The consistent highlight on the importance of “inclusivity” as the norm and identity of the emerging region in Indonesia’s discourses on the Indo-Pacific shows Indonesia’s rejection of the preponderance of Great Power politics as the determinant of regional dynamics. During the leadership of President Yudhoyono (2004–2009 and 2009– 2014), Indonesia carried out an “all direction foreign policy” in which Indonesia hoped to have “a million friends, zero enemy” (Yudhoyono, 2009). This foreign policy doctrine shows that Indonesia’s normative conceptualisation of international order, although not yet specified to the Indo-Pacific, is marked by the possibility of cooperation amidst great power rivalry. It showed Indonesia’s resistance towards accepting the balance of power and great power politics as the main determinant of the patterns of international relations. While recognising the reality of great power politics and its impact on regional and global dynamics, Indonesia seeks to constrain and manage it by nesting it in a web of norms and institutional frameworks, a strategy which is identified by Evelyn Goh as “omni-enmeshment” (Goh, 2008, pp. 120–122). Although not explicitly mentioned, such a strategy is based on the assumption that identity and interests are socially constructed, and the Great Powers can learn that they are not bound to conflict. In this context, Indonesia has a role conception as a “bridge-builder” or “honest-broker” that can help facilitate the process of trust-building among competing rivals by “enmeshing” them into a web of sustained relationships.

40  Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad

At the regional level, this “all direction foreign policy” and “a million friends, zero enemies” doctrine was further developed into the concept of “dynamic equilibrium”. Marty Natalegawa conceptualised “dynamic equilibrium” as an alternative to the realist traditional concept of “balance of power”. He sees dynamic equilibrium as a situation marked by: the absence of a preponderant power, and with power dynamics managed among the states of the region…brought about not through a classical policy of containment, … (but) through the management of the exercise of power and the promotion of predictability of interstate behaviour based on commonly agreed principles and norms. (Natalegawa, 2018, p. 101) Note that Natalegawa criticises the tendency for containment policy, which is clearly present in many normative conceptualisations of the Indo-Pacific. Based on this thinking, one of the first specifically clear Indo-Pacific policies of Indonesia is the idea to expand the influence of ASEAN’s principles and norms, which is viewed as among the main reasons why Southeast Asia is relatively peaceful and prosperous, to the emerging Indo-Pacific region. During Yudhoyono’s presidency and Natalegawa’s service as Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Indonesia began to promote the norms of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as the governing norms of the Indo-Pacific. In 2011, Indonesia successfully gained the commitment for the Bali Concord III, or Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations, which explicitly supported the promotion of ASEAN norms and principles such as the TAC and even the goal to pursue the accession of all five nuclear weapon states to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) protocol (ASEAN, 2011). However, when it tabled a proposal to develop an Indo-Pacific Treaty for Friendship and Cooperation, it did not gain significant traction. Nevertheless, it was an important step upon which Indonesia’s initiatives would continue. Indonesia continues to pursue ASEAN normative centrality by promoting ASEAN’s norms into the wider region during Joko Widodo’s presidency, although it is not without some interruptions. The political succession brought a new thinking to Indonesia’s foreign policy, which is characterised by a more realist undertone in its Indo-Pacific conceptualisation. This is most evident in the doctrine of Global Maritime Fulcrum (Poros Maritim Dunia). Unlike the “a million friends, zero enemies” and “dynamic equilibrium” that are closer to the constructivist understanding of international relations, the Global Maritime Fulcrum is closer to the realist one, by focusing on Indonesia’s geostrategic position as the “gateway” and a “gatekeeper” of the increasingly interconnected Indian and Pacific oceans (Gindarsah, 2016), to developing itself as a maritime power (Scott, 2019).

Understanding Indonesia’s Approach towards Indo-Pacific Discourse 41

It must be noted, though, that some observers speculated about the different approaches between Istana Negara (the President’s Office), which tend to be more realist and less interested in multilateral mechanisms, and Pejambon (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), which continues to believe in the importance of using ASEAN as the platform to manage the increasing geopolitical tensions through the promotion of ASEAN’s normative and institutional centrality in the Indo-Pacific. In the early period of Widodo’s presidency, the pendulum was swinging towards realism with the Global Maritime Fulcrum as the doctrine. However, complications and limitations in implementing the doctrine resulted in its faltering and becoming more economic and inwardlooking rather than being strategic. As a result, Indonesia’s approach to the Indo-Pacific returned to the promotion of ASEAN normative and institutional centrality, through the promotion of the Indo-Pacific cooperation concept, which puts the emphasis on ASEAN centrality (Scott, 2019, pp. 202–203). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also developed the concept for an ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which is characterised as “a peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive region” (Agastia, 2020). In 2019, Indonesia successfully convinced other ASEAN member countries to adopt the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific ( Agastia, 2020; Ardhani et al., 2023). The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) recognised the increasing importance of the Indo-Pacific and the challenge of geopolitical shifts in the region, which could lead to “deepening of mistrust, miscalculation, and patterns of behaviour based on a zero-sum game”. To avoid this situation, the Outlook called for ASEAN member countries to “consistently come up with its collective leadership in forging and shaping the vision for closer cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and to continue to maintain its central role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia and its surrounding regions” as well as “continue being an honest broker within the strategic environment of competing interests”. After setting the spatial framework for the Indo-Pacific by stressing that it sees the “Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, not as contiguous territorial spaces but as a closely integrated and interconnected region, with ASEAN playing a central and strategic role”, it defines the normative foundation for the emerging regional imagination, which is “an Indo-Pacific region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry” and “an Indo-Pacific region of development and prosperity for all” (ASEAN, 2019). The AOIP clearly adopted Indonesia’s normative vision for the Indo-Pacific, which was rooted in the rejection of the primacy of power politics (“might is right”) in the regional and global dynamics and the belief that norms can help competing states to learn that they all can win without making others lose. Indonesia’s effort to project ASEAN norms into the Indo-Pacific region does not stop at the AOIP. In his speeches, especially in front of important Indo-Pacific countries, President Joko Widodo continues to reiterate the

42  Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad

importance of replacing the “zero-sum game” approach with a “win–win paradigm” (Widodo, 2020, 2023a). He also reiterated Indonesia’s belief that through accepting AOIP’s normative vision, “rivalry can turn into cooperation” and “trust deficit can turn into strategic trust”, which will turn the Indo-Pacific into an epicentrum of economic development rather than an epicentrum of geopolitical conflict (Widodo, 2020). In the Opening Remarks for the 30th ASEAN Regional Forum, Indonesia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi also insisted that countries must “turn trust deficit into strategic trust by continuing to promote norms of self-restraint and the non-use of force” (Marsudi, 2023). The Foreign Minister also continues to nudge dialogue partners to accept ASEAN norms such as those outlined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Bali Principles (Antara, 2023). Among the central initiative to promote ASEAN norms is the effort to convince nuclear weapon states, many of which have strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, to ratify the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. While this initiative was started during Yudhoyono’s period, it was reinvigorated due to the announcement of the AUKUS security partnership in 2021, which gives Australia access to nuclear-powered submarines and caused concerns in Indonesia about the possibility of an emerging arms race in the region. While the AUKUS might not automatically imply nuclear weapon proliferation in the region, it opened the path for nuclear-powered submarines, which will open the path for legitimate and illegitimate claims for highly enriched uranium (Tertrais, 2021). However, until the latest ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in July 2023, progress is still limited. Institutional Vision: ASEAN Centrality and Economic Centrality

As Foreign Minister Marsudi acknowledged, norm-setting is important but not enough (Marsudi, 2023). Constitutional values in the order-producing normative complex need an institutional framework to be practically realised. Thus, Indonesia’s normative vision for the Indo-Pacific is complemented by its institutional vision for the emerging regional imagination. In the institutional vision, ASEAN centrality is seen as the most effective framework to manage cooperation and conflict, not only in Southeast Asia but also in the wider Indo-Pacific. The vision that ASEAN must be the centre of the wider region to anticipate the emerging geopolitical rivalry was already in place in Indonesia even before the official use of the Indo-Pacific term by Japan or the United States. To proactively shape the regional dynamics, ASEAN’s institutional centrality must go beyond Southeast Asia. This was among the rationales behind the establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 and Indonesia’s

Understanding Indonesia’s Approach towards Indo-Pacific Discourse 43

strong insistence on not limiting the EAS to ASEAN Plus Three countries. According to Natalegawa, Indonesia’s support for the inclusion of these countries, which were traditionally considered outside the boundaries of East Asia, was aimed at three purposes: (1) provide ASEAN with more geostrategic space to manage the role of non-ASEAN states in the region; (2) dilute or place in a wider context the increasing influence of any particular state; and (3) make diplomacy and peaceful resolution of disputes the preferable option to manage relations over the use of force (Natalegawa, 2018, pp. 89–90). The criteria for EAS membership are also designed to ensure ASEAN centrality: a prospective member must be a dialogue partner of ASEAN, have acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and have substantive relations with ASEAN (Natalegawa, 2018, p. 90). The concept of “ASEAN centrality” is mentioned in the ASEAN Charter as one of the principles that must be adhered to by ASEAN and its Member States, as described in Article 2 Paragraph 2 (m) of the Charter: “the centrality of ASEAN in external political, economic, social and cultural relations while remaining actively engaged, outward-looking, inclusive and non-discriminatory” (ASEAN, 2015). Despite the general explanation, the term was frequently invoked by ASEAN and its dialogue partners. The frequent use of the term even made Marty Natalegawa comment that it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between “facts”, “aspirational goals”, and “diplomatic platitudes and deference” (Natalegawa, 2018, p. 141). I would like to argue that it is simultaneously, but also partially, all of them. It is a fact in the sense that ASEAN currently is acknowledged to have the “convening power” and “in the driving seat of the region’s diplomatic arrangements” (Djalal, 2021), and ASEAN has a structural position as “the node in the cluster of networks”, which places it as a central hub in the regional architecture (Caballero-Anthony, 2014). However, it is also true that ASEAN has limited capabilities to influence the behaviour of major powers in the region despite the frequent iterations of their acceptance of the concept (Weatherbee, 2014). Because of this situation, the term also indicates the aspirational goal of ASEAN to remain at the centre of the regional architecture with the expanding imagination of the region, from Southeast Asia to East Asia to Indo-Pacific. Since the expansion of regional imagination is driven by geopolitical circumstances, ASEAN must be ahead of the curve and constantly shaping and moulding its architecture (Natalegawa, 2018, p. 141). It is a race between ASEAN’s ability to provide the institutional framework versus the ever-changing geopolitical dynamics. In this context, the proliferation of minilateral arrangements such as the QUAD and AUKUS that come together with the increasing convergence of the Indo-Pacific regional imagination among US allies was often seen with anxiety by ASEAN, as it might challenge ASEAN’s position as the region’s central hub. Indonesia and ASEAN’s continuous insistence on the ASEAN

44  Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad

centrality concept is a social cue to the major powers that while ASEAN would not and could not intervene in the foreign policy of these powers, the new minilateral arrangements should not rival or replace ASEAN as the primary venue for managing their relations, including with their rivals. Indonesia still believes that ASEAN is the most cost-effective way to manage Great Power rivalry, for Indonesia as well as for the competing Great Powers. The platform for diplomacy is there, and all major powers are represented in ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ARF, EAS, or ADMM Plus. Indonesia promotes ASEAN centrality in all of its Indo-Pacific initiatives, from the Indo-Pacific Treaty for Friendship and Cooperation to the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific. The Outlook “envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, with ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), as platforms for dialogue and implementation of the Indo-Pacific cooperation, while preserving their formats”. However, it does not mean that ASEAN rejects the presence of other mechanisms initiated from outside ASEAN. It also seeks to “develop, where appropriate, cooperation with other regional and sub-regional mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions on specific areas of common interests to complement the relevant initiatives”. While being anxious about the proliferation of different external initiatives in the emerging Indo-Pacific region, Indonesia (and ASEAN) is also hopeful that they could shape the direction of these initiatives in a way that does not jeopardise ASEAN centrality and the stability of the region. An important but often overlooked component of ASEAN centrality is the centrality of economic development and cooperation. Indonesia sees that economic cooperation and development, rather than strategic competition, must be the primary concern of the Indo-Pacific regional architecture. This is especially visible during the leadership of President Joko Widodo, whose personal view also focuses very much on the economic development of Indonesia and that all diplomatic relations must lead to concrete economic benefits. Furthermore, Indonesia also sees that the prioritisation of economic cooperation not only provides real benefits for the people but also “provides strategic habit of cooperation in the current geopolitical settings” (Marsudi, 2023). Hence, we can understand why Indonesia put “ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth” as the slogan of its Chairmanship in 2023. Indonesia also seeks to implement the AOIP through economic cooperation, such as through the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Forum. Concluding Remarks: Future Trajectory of Indo-Pacific

This chapter discusses Indonesia’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific regional imagination. Rather than “response”, Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific policy is the continuation of Indonesia’s anticipation of increasing geopolitical

Understanding Indonesia’s Approach towards Indo-Pacific Discourse 45

tension in Southeast Asia and beyond, even before the contemporary emergence of the Indo-Pacific regional imagination. Indonesia believes that it must be proactively shaping the regional dynamics, rather than letting global and extra-regional dynamics take the place. To implement this, ASEAN is the preferred main platform, and ASEAN centrality is the main concept. While there are some changes and modifications along the way, Indonesia’s initiatives to shape the regional order can be understood as advancing normative and institutional visions for the emerging region. In the normative vision, the Indo-Pacific is envisioned as an inclusive region and a region of cooperation and dialogue, in which countries – big and small – have sovereign equality, prefer peaceful settlement of disputes, and are continuously involved in trust-building despite their rivalries. In the institutional vision, ASEAN centrality is seen as the most effective framework to manage cooperation and conflict not only in Southeast Asia but also in the wider region of the Indo-Pacific. But how successful is Indonesia in advancing its normative and institutional visions for the Indo-Pacific? The record has been mixed. Indonesia successfully convinced other ASEAN members to adopt the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The Outlook is also generally welcomed by all dialogue partners, including China, which until now had viewed the Indo-Pacific regional imagination negatively. For example, the Joint Statement between the Republic of Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China, made on the sidelines of the G20 Summit, declared that: The two sides shall promote mutually beneficial cooperation to implement the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), as well as on synergizing the BRI and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025, and for an effective implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022) The dialogue partners also frequently reiterated their respect and adherence to ASEAN centrality. President Joe Biden of the United States even declared at the US–ASEAN Summit 2022 that “The ASEAN centrality is the very heart of my administration’s strategy in pursuing the future we all want to see. And I mean that sincerely” (Biden, 2022). However, words are easy, and it is often difficult to differentiate sincerity and, borrowing Natalegawa’s term “diplomatic platitudes”. The geopolitical tension seems to continue and even accelerate, with the US–China relationship increasingly becoming more and more antagonistic. ASEAN unity and centrality are also internally challenged due to different positions on various

46  Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad

issues, from the US–China rivalry to the Myanmar crisis. ASEAN might be losing its speed to be ahead of the curve. Against this backdrop, Indonesia needs to strengthen its commitment and leadership in ASEAN, while simultaneously managing its own bilateral relationships with the increasingly assertive Great Powers. Indonesia also needs to complement the ASEAN centrality strategy with a web of bilateral and possibly minilateral arrangements which might help cover the limitations of ASEAN. Acknowledgements

Parts of this chapter are based on research conducted by the author during his participation in the US–ASEAN Visiting Scholar Program, March–June 2022, hosted by the ASEAN Studies Initiative, American University. The author would like to thank Professor Pek Koon Heng, Ambassador Piper Campbell, and Professor Amitav Acharya for their support during the visiting scholarship. Note 1 “Sugih tanpa banda, Digdaya tanpa aji, Nglurug tanpa bala, Menang tanpa ngasorake”.

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4 A STRATEGIC NEW EQUILIBRIUM FOR THAILAND ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific Panitan Wattanayagorn and Tita Sanglee

Introduction

In 2007, the concept of “Indo-Pacific” was introduced by the Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, to describe the Indian and Pacific oceans as a single interconnected region (Abe, 2007). The two oceans are vital to global prosperity and, as Abe asserted, it is imperative for “like-minded countries” to join forces and responsibly guard these sea lanes. A decade later, the term “Indo-Pacific” became widely employed by governments, regional institutions, and think tanks. While there is no universally agreed definition, the term “Indo-Pacific” is deeply intertwined with the (re)construction of regional order that governs the interaction of states (Heiduk and Wacker, 2020). Who should lead? Which states are included? Should China’s demands be accommodated? Different states respond to these questions and interpret the term “Indo-Pacific” differently based on their strategic interests and threat perceptions. For the United States and China, the two superpowers engaged in fierce strategic competition, the Indo-Pacific concept is primarily viewed from a zero-sum lens. For the United States, the Indo-Pacific expansion to include India is an enhancement of the US-led rules-based order and a rejection of China’s sphere of influence. The United States vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) was put forward by President Donald Trump at the 2017 Vietnam-hosted Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. In a clear jab at China, Trump stressed the need for freedom of navigation and overflight, fair and reciprocal trade, transparent governance, and the rule of law (Trump, 2017). The FOIP is essentially a continuation of the “pivot” or “rebalancing” policy introduced by the Obama administration DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-5

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to counter China’s seemingly rapid rise. One key difference, however, is that the United States no longer hesitates to label China as a threat. Shortly after the APEC Summit, the United States released a National Security Strategy (NSS) paper with a detailed section on the Indo-Pacific. In a paragraph dedicated to China, the paper explicitly states that China “is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda” (The White House, 2017, p. 46). China’s speedy military modernisation is, as underlined in the NSS, designed to “limit US access to the region and provide China a freer hand there”. Ultimately, from the Chinese perspective, the Indo-Pacific narrative is nothing more than a containment strategy towards China. Adding to China’s frustration, there is a growing collaboration between members of the re-energised Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the QUAD, consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India (Smith, 2021). All four democratic nations have had a complex relationship with China. They also share growing concerns about China’s rapid advances and have, to varying degrees, endorsed the FOIP framework. The QUAD is thus commonly portrayed as a NATO-like alliance against China. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a non-threatening regional organisation that seeks to maintain good relations with both the United States and China, released the ASEAN Outlook on the IndoPacific (AOIP) in 2019 to present its own conceptualisation of the IndoPacific. Cooperation, inclusivity, and ASEAN centrality are the main themes of the AOIP. Despite collectively issuing the AOIP, ASEAN member states have remained uncertain about how to approach the Indo-Pacific discourse due to factors such as territorial disputes and China’s economic leverage. Some states naturally perceive the AOIP as a work in progress rather than a complete framework. Furthermore, unforeseen circumstances such as the COVID-19 pandemic, which has fuelled dependency on Chinese and US-made vaccines, can push a nation to bend its non-aligned stance and choose one great power over another. Much analysis of ASEAN and the AOIP has focused on Indonesia – a country that has been pushing for its own Indo-Pacific cooperation concept since 2017 (Weatherbee, 2019). Thailand, despite being one of the founding ASEAN members and the ASEAN Chairman in 2019, has been largely overlooked. To address the gap, this chapter explores Thailand’s longstanding support for ASEAN regionalism and its adjustment to the region’s Indo-Pacific shift. The chapter also considers the “what-if” scenario of war between the United States and China, and how Thailand can best maintain its independence.

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ASEAN and the Great Powers

Great power politics is an indispensable element of international relations, and the desire to maintain independence from “unwanted interference” is the key driving force behind the development of ASEAN (Yates, 2019). The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 was motivated primarily not by a shared economic or cultural vision but by security concerns amid the rapid expansion of Communism in Indo-China. The five founding states of ASEAN – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – were united by anti-Communist feelings and saw cooperation among themselves as a means to safeguard their respective regimes. Collaborations – be it in economic, social, or strategic sense – were intended to limit conflict among ASEAN member states, which would, in turn, enable member states to devote their time and resources to combat the growing Communist threat. In the 1970s, against the backdrop of the Cold War, ASEAN became more vocal about its non-alignment and non-confrontational nature. ASEAN’s first serious attempt to promote regional peace and stability came in the form of a call for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). ASEAN, in its 1971 ZOPFAN declaration, stated that Southeast Asia’s “neutrality” is a desirable objective and that the “means of bringing about” this realisation should be explored (ASEAN Secretariat, 1971). The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation adopted in 1976 to outline ASEAN’s norms, including the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, further underpins ASEAN’s desire to stay out of conflicts (Yates, 2019). ASEAN’s non-alignment assertion does not necessarily equate to the rejection of great powers. The United States has, since the release of the ZOPFAN declaration, continued to engage closely with ASEAN member states through bilateral arrangements. In a similar fashion, the Commonwealth pact consisting of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore, has continued to uphold the non-binding Five Power Defence Agreements (FPDA). The FPDA, established in 1971 shortly before the ZOPFAN declaration came into view, commits its members to engage in consultations in the event of a conflict that threatens the security of Malaysia and Singapore (Graham, 2020). Fundamentally, the FPDA is a form of security protection for Malaysia and Singapore which, in turn, allows the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand to preserve their relevance in Southeast Asia. For ASEAN, non-alignment is better defined as the desire to engage with all major powers without the need to take sides. This line of thinking is reflected in the adoption of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 as platforms to discuss regional security issues and build mutual trust. The EAS, in particular, is broadly depicted as the most high-profile summit in the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific

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region (Yates, 2019). By inviting all major regional powers and players to join these meetings, ASEAN has essentially become a driver for inclusive engagement as well as a mediator between the two great powers, the United States and China, both of whom favour bilateral dialogues to address security problems (Australian Parliament House, 1998, p. 195). In other words, ASEAN-led meetings are a mechanism that facilitates ASEAN’s quest to maintain a balance of power in the region. Thailand and ASEAN

Since the dawn of European imperialism in the 19th century, some analysts have described Thailand as adopting a flexible “bending with the wind” approach to foreign policy (this common view may not be totally accurate or represent the complicated approaches that Thailand has been adopting in foreign affairs. A complex engagement approach accommodating different interests of great powers and others by playing them against one another is probably more logical). The kingdom would accommodate the needs of any great power if Thai national interests and territorial integrity were in danger. Yet, at the same time, Thailand would try to find ways to ward off the great power’s excessive influence. A good example to illustrate this point is Thailand’s diplomacy during the Second World War. Although Thailand welcomed Japanese occupation and declared war on the Allied powers, the kingdom managed to avoid paying for costly war reparations by secretly collaborating with the United States (Buszynski, 1982). Even when Thailand became a treaty ally of the United States during the Cold War, the kingdom sought to expand its hedging options (Wattanayagorn and Acharya, 2021a). On the one hand, Thailand’s “bending with the wind” diplomacy has been praised for enabling the country to survive colonialism and forceful foreign occupation. On the other hand, Thailand’s credibility and consistency have been seriously questioned (Buszynski, 1982). ASEAN hence offers a new ground for Thailand to justify and advance its principles of non-interference and non-alignment. In 1993, the Thai civilian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, invited the Dalai Lama to Bangkok in an attempt to display Thailand’s commitment to “democratic values” to the world following the disappearance of the Communist threat (Buszynski, 1994). This move drew considerable criticism from the Thai military, particularly Army Chief Vimol Wongwanich, who was concerned that the visit could send the “wrong signals” to China. Prime Minister Chuan, however, insisted that the visit was “an internal matter” of Thailand with no geopolitical motivations (Buszynski, 1994). In the same year, Chuan travelled to China to discuss trade issues, which demonstrated that the Dalai Lama’s earlier visit to Bangkok did not undermine the ties between Thailand and China. Again, in 1997, the re-elected Chuan

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government rejected the United States call to establish an offshore military base in Thailand on the grounds that it violated regional peace and stability (Wannabovorn, 2021). By citing the ASEAN principles, Thailand was able to dodge scrutiny over its alliance commitment to the United States. The larger and more integrated ASEAN is, the more voice and leverage it has on the international stage. Seeking to utilise ASEAN to support its endeavours, Thailand has been a strong supporter of ASEAN regionalism. The fact that the many historic “firsts” of ASEAN, including its birth in 1967 and the inaugural meeting of the ARF in 1994, took place in Bangkok has further compelled Thai leaders to remain committed to ASEAN regionalism. Notably, the “Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015” containing detailed blueprints of the three pillars towards regional cooperation – the Political-Security Community, the Economic Community, and the Socio-Cultural Community – was endorsed during Thailand’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2009. The Indo-Pacific Shift

Since the 2010s, ASEAN – now with ten member states – has found itself increasingly stressed by the geopolitical turbulence driven by the strategic competition between the United States and China. Each ASEAN member is subject to different pressures from the United States and China, resulting in the erosion of ASEAN unity and its ability to play the role of a regional mediator. There is no greater demonstration of the political divisions in ASEAN than the failure to issue a joint statement on the South China Sea dispute in 2012. The Philippines and Vietnam sought to issue a joint ASEAN Communique to address the escalating South China Sea conflict, but their efforts were blocked by Cambodia, the 2012 ASEAN Chair and a close ally of China (Wattanayagorn and Acharya, 2021b). The United States announcement of its FOIP vision and the language of China’s threat, together with China’s rising nationalism and efforts to promote its grand initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), have increased the pressure on the ASEAN states to take sides. ASEAN’s reluctance to embrace the United States’ FOIP concept, in the way the QUAD members do, obviously stems from the desire to maintain a healthy working relationship with China. Nonetheless, as Le Thu (2020) points out, the fear of US abandonment is another contributing factor to ASEAN’s lack of enthusiasm towards the FOIP. This fear is deeply ingrained within ASEAN member states, especially since the Obama era. The United States under the Obama administration, notwithstanding its increased presence in the disputed South China Sea, declared that it “will not go to war over some rocks” (Le Thu, 2020). This raised concerns over the United States reliability among the Philippines and

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nations involved in territorial disputes with China. The ASEAN perception of the United States as an unreliable and uncommitted power became widespread during the Trump administration as a result of President Trump’s erratic foreign policy conduct. Overall, for Southeast Asian nations, China may be assertive, but its behaviour is much more stable and predictable when compared to the United States. The member states recognised that ASEAN needed its own Indo-Pacific concept to avoid taking sides and being sidelined by major powers. In June 2019, at the 34th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN member states adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) which places a strong emphasis on ASEAN centrality and inclusive engagement in areas such as maritime cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development, and economic affairs (Chongkittavorn, 2020). Most notably, the AOIP stresses the need to avoid “the deepening of mutual trust, miscalculation, and patterns of behaviour based on a zero-sum game” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019). While many argue that the AOIP lacks serious substance, it reflects ASEAN’s renewed unity and efforts to retain its role as a regional moderator. Thailand, as the ASEAN Chair of 2019, deserves some credit for ASEAN’s historic endorsement of the AOIP. Given the ASEAN deadlock over the Rohingya crisis, as well as the domestic challenges faced by many ASEAN members at the time, Thailand’s ability to successfully push for the release of the AOIP was quite remarkable. In addition to the AOIP, ASEAN under Thailand’s Chairmanship succeeded in concluding key elements of the long-awaited Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to boost regional trade (Wattanayagorn and Acharya, 2021b). Other significant achievements include the incorporation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into ASEAN’s agendas, the development of the ASEAN Digital Integration Framework Plan 2019–2025 to enhance connectivity, and the adoption of environmentally friendly frameworks such as the ASEAN Plan of Action to combat marine debris. Another outstanding accomplishment was the deepening of cooperation between ASEAN and the Republic of Korea (ROK), an important middle power in the Indo-Pacific. The Commemorative Summit to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the ASEAN–ROK partnership and the first Mekong–ROK Summit were held in November 2019 (Phuangketkeow and Ganjanakhundee, 2020). These summits were intended to demonstrate the ROK’s newfound commitment to ASEAN and India. Like ASEAN member states, the ROK seeks to maintain independence from excessive interference from the United States and China. Hence, amid the growing United States– China rivalry, the ROK under the then President Moon Jae-In promoted its New Southern Policy to lower the pressure to join the US-led QUAD, which would most certainly trigger the anger of China (Nilsson-Wright and Yu, 2021).

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The successive ROK government, headed by President Yoon Suk Yeol, has also sought to bolster ASEAN–ROK relations, notably in the realm of defence, through the establishment of the Korea–ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (Martinus, 2023). However, the Yoon administration’s pronounced emphasis on strengthening the United States–ROK alliance and its increased willingness to cooperate with Japan in the security field under the United States’ leadership have raised concerns about the formation of a “NATO in the East” to counter Chinese influence. This could cause unease among ASEAN nations, particularly those occupied by Imperial Japan during the Second World War, making them reluctant to fully engage in collaborative security efforts with the ROK under Yoon’s presidency. Despite these developments, the ROK’s economy remains highly dependent on the Chinese market (Wang, 2023). Consequently, it is reasonable to assert that the ROK’s overarching objectives of maintaining a balance between its security reliance on the United States and economic dependence on China, while actively seeking to expand its international partners southward, continue to persist. On the whole, Thailand made some key achievements to increase ASEAN’s role in regional peace and security during its 2019 Chairmanship. This paints a very different picture from Thailand’s disastrous Chairmanship in 2009, which was dominated by political unrest. Thailand’s success may come as a surprise to many who believed that Thailand might not be able to effectively chair ASEAN due to its domestic priorities. As argued by Searight (2019), Thailand’s 2019 ASEAN Chairmanship “is likely to amount to little more than a hyphen between Singapore’s 2018 and Vietnam’s 2020 chairmanships”. In terms of foreign relations, Thailand under the leadership of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha is widely perceived as pro-China. The military coup in 2014 undermined Thailand’s relations with the United States and Western allies which, in turn, pushed Thailand closer into China’s open arms. Following the arrival of the Trump administration in early 2017, United States–Thailand relations have warmed up considerably. Evidently, Prime Minister Prayut was invited to meet President Trump at the White House in October 2017 (Bangkok Post Reporters, 2017). This high-profile meeting managed to ease the pro-China criticisms against the Prayut government, but only to a limited extent. With growing Chinese investments and arms sales to Thailand, the China–Thailand ties appeared to be stronger than ever. Naturally, observers did not expect Thailand to make significant progress on the Indo-Pacific issues. Contrary to popular opinion, Thailand, under the military government, has been keen to engage with key players around the world and maintain a balanced stance in its international relations. Since Prime Minister Prayut’s first year in power, Thailand has adopted a “complex engagement” approach – defined as the interaction with major powers through many channels of

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engagement over a wide range of issues – to encourage cooperation and interdependence (Ganjanakhundee, 2020). A further highlight of Thailand’s strong desire to preserve a peaceful regional balance of power was the keynote speech delivered by Prime Minister Prayut at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 15th Asia Security Summit in 2016. The speech touched on the urgent need to build a new “strategic equilibrium” in Asia to guard against growing regional challenges and uncertainties. To achieve this new equilibrium, countries must think beyond zero-sum terms and pursue common goals based on the “Three M’s” consisting of mutual trust, mutual respect, and mutual benefit (Charoenpo, 2016). The AOIP ultimately complements Thailand’s search for a new strategic equilibrium in the region. Growing Pressure to Pick Sides: A Strategic New Equilibrium for Thailand

The tension between the US-led alliance and China has heightened dramatically in recent years. Armed vessels from the United States and China have made many “close encounters” at sea, and the United States has created its new military pact with Australia and the United Kingdom. The alliance between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom – the socalled “AUKUS” pact – which involves the transfer of nuclear submarine technology to Australia, has caught ASEAN nations off guard (Chin, 2021). This, as many Southeast Asian countries fear, paves the way for Australia’s acquisition of nuclear weapons which would subsequently escalate the regional arms race. In addition, the tensions between Taiwan and China have also risen, due to several factors, including the visit of the United States former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi. Against the backdrop of the intensifying competition in the Indo-Pacific region, Thailand has remained largely passive. The kingdom has been overwhelmed by a continuing youth protest campaign, as well as the economic and social troubles resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. As previously discussed, Thailand’s foreign policy is well known for its pragmatism. While Thailand has the capacity to adjust to changes quickly, there is a risk that Thailand will be drawn into a conflict – much like Thailand’s forced alliance with the Japanese Empire during the Second World War. Without a clear stance on the Indo-Pacific or a demonstration of a strong commitment to the AOIP, Thailand may eventually be forced to align with China if an armed conflict erupts. After all, Thailand is a non-claimant state in the South China Sea and does not see China as a major threat. Governments of Thailand have also expressed support and understanding for the One China Policy which, in recent times, has become a controversial subject. For many states, the One China Principle is becoming increasingly associated with the forceful unification of Taiwan and areas in disputed waters.

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In 2016, Thailand officially announced a new foreign policy initiative called the “Strategic New Equilibrium” at the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue (Chan-o-cha, 2016). The policy calls for greater trust and mutual benefits among players in the Indo-Pacific. It also requires Thailand to recalculate its positions with greater powers and engage more in the areas of common interest. It also articulates more rigorous support for ASEAN multilateralism, its non-alignment and non-militaristic principles, and the AOIP to lower the prospect of being thrust into a conflict with catastrophic consequences. At the same time, the new initiative calls for well-developed procedures or responsive measures to be established in the event of conflict escalation. It remains to be seen if Thailand can successfully move into the new equilibrium. With a more coherent policy framework, Thailand has a higher probability of escaping great power competitions, conflicts, or even wars unharmed. Conclusion

Despite its relative quietness in international affairs, Thailand remains an important contributor to regional order. Through its complex engagement approach and call for a strategic equilibrium, Thailand subtly yet significantly strengthens ASEAN’s commitment to actively engage with all major powers to avoid aligning with any particular side. In the face of growing interconnectivity between Asian and Pacific Rim nations, which results in more players and competition, Thailand needs to enhance its multi-alignment strategy by ramping up engagement in the areas of common interest with all great and middle powers. References Abe, S. (2007). ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/region​/asia​-paci​/ pmv0708​/speech​-2​.html. ASEAN Secretariat. (1971). Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration. Unofficial text available at https://cil​.nus​.edu​.sg​/wp​- content​/uploads​/2019​/02​ /1971​-Zone​-of​-Peace​-Freedom​-and​-Neutrality​-Declaration-1–1.pdf. ASEAN Secretariat. (2019). ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. https://asean​.org​ /asean2020​/wp​- content​/uploads​/ 2021​/01​/ASEAN​- Outlook​- on​-the​- Indo​- Pacific​ _FINAL ​_ 22062019​.pdf. Australian Parliament House. (1998). Australia and ASEAN: Managing Change. Canberra: Parliament of Australia. Bangkok Post Reporters. (2017, October 5). White House Trip Seen as Win for PM. Bangkok Post. https://www​.bangkokpost​.com ​/thailand ​/politics​/1336559​/white​ -house​-trip​-seen​-as​-win​-for​-pm. Buszynski, L. (1982). Thailand: The Erosion of a Balanced Foreign Policy. Asian Survey, 22(11), 1037–1055.

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Buszynski, L. (1994). Thailand’s Foreign Policy: Management of a Regional Vision. Asian Survey, 34(8), 721–737. Chan-o-cha, P. (2016). ‘Towards Strategic New Equilibrium of the Asia-Pacific’ Keynote Speech by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister of Thailand at the IISS 15th Shangri-La Dialogue [Speech transcript]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand. https://www​.mfa​.go​.th​/en​/content​/5d5​bcff​ 715e​39c3​06001c97e​?cate​=5d5​bcb4​e15e​39c3​060006832. Charoenpo, A. (2016, June 5). Prayut Urges New ASEAN ‘Equilibrium’. Bangkok Post. https://www​.bangkokpost​.com ​/thailand ​/general ​/1002077​/prayut​-urges​ -new​-asean​- equilibrium. Chin, J. (2021, September 22). Commentary: Why Southeast Asia is Nervous about AUKUS and Australia’s Nuclear Submarines. Channel News Asia. https://www​ .channelnewsasia​.com ​/commentary​/aukus​-australia​-nuclear​-asean​- china​- south​ -sea​-tension​-2191776. Chongkittavorn, K. (2020, September 29). The More the Merrier in Indo-Pacific. Bangkok Post. https://www​.bangkokpost​.com​/opinion​/opinion​/1993275​/the​ -more​-the​-merrier​-in​-indo​-pacific. Ganjanakhundee, S. (2020). Thailand’s ‘Complex Engagement’ Approach in Foreign Policy: A Balancing Act. ISEAS Perspective, 23, 1–9. Graham, E. (2020, December 10). The Five Power Defence Arrangements at 50: What Next? International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www​.iiss​.org ​/ blogs​/analysis​/2020​/12 ​/five​-power​-defence​-arrangements. Heiduk, F., and Wacker, G. (2020). From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Significance, Implementation and Challenges. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Le Thu, H. (2020). Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific Concepts: From Resistance to Reticence to Reaction. Security Challenges, 16(3), 53–57. Martinus, M. (2023, September 15). The Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative: Recalibrating Socio-Economic Connectivity. Fulcrum. https://fulcrum​.sg ​/ aseanfocus​/the​-korea​- asean​- solidarity​-initiative​-recalibrating​- socio​- economic​ -connectivity/. Nilsson-Wright, J., and Yu, J. (2021). South Korean Foreign Policy Innovation amid Sino-US Rivalry. London: Chatham House. Phuangketkeow, S., and Ganjanakhundee, S. (2020). Thailand’s Chairmanship of ASEAN: Unshackling Thai Diplomacy and Charting the Association’s Way Forward. ISEAS Perspective, 2, 1–10. Searight, A. (2019, January 15). Southeast Asia in 2019: Four Issues to Watch. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www​.csis​.org ​/analysis​/ southeast​-asia​-2019​-four​-issues​-watch. Smith, S. A. (2021, May 27). The QUAD in the Indo-Pacific: What to Know. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www​.cfr​.org​/in​-brief​/quad​-indo​-pacific​-what​-know. The White House. (2017). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: The White House. https://trumpwhitehouse​.archives​ .gov​/wp​- content ​/uploads​/2017​/12​/ NSS ​-Final​-12​-18​-2017–0905​.pdf​. Trump, D. J. (2017, November 10). Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit, Da Nang, Vietnam. The White House. https://trumpwhitehouse​ .archives​.gov​/ briefings​- statements​/remarks​-president​-trump​- apec​- ceo​- summit​ -da​-nang​-vietnam/. Wang, O. (2023, July 27). Why South Korea Needs China Even as it Teams Up with US on Chips and More. South China Morning Post. https://www​.scmp​.com​ /news​/china ​/diplomacy​/article​/3228899​/ why​- south​-korea​-needs​- china​- even​-it​ -teams​-us​- chips​-and​-more.

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Wannabovorn, S. (2021, May 28). ป ั น่ กระแสตั ง้ ฐานข ีปนาวุธในไทยสร้างเร ื อ่ งใหญ่เพ ื อ่ ให้ ได้ส ิง่ ท ีเ่ ล็กน้อยกว่า [Spreading the Trend of Setting Up a Missile Base in Thailand, Big Deal with Small Returns]. Naewna. https://www​.naewna​.com ​/politic ​/columnist ​/47861. Wattanayagorn, P., and Acharya, A. (2021a). Introduction: Thailand’s Role in the Origins and Evolution of ASEAN. Thailand’s First Year in the ASEAN Community: Problems and Prospects. Bangkok: ASEAN Studies Center Chulalongkorn University. Wattanayagorn, P., and Acharya, A. (2021b). Conclusion: Can Thailand Lead ASEAN (Again)? Thailand’s First Year in the ASEAN Community: Problems and Prospects. Bangkok: ASEAN Studies Center Chulalongkorn University. Weatherbee, D. E. (2019). Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept. ISEAS Perspective, 47, 1–9. Yates, R. (2019, July 27). Spotlight on ASEAN. E-International Relations. https:// www​.e​-ir​.info​/2019​/07​/27​/student​-feature​-spotlight​-on​-asean/.

5 VIETNAM’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDO-PACIFIC Claire Thi-Liên Tran

Introduction

General Phung Si Tân, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese People’s Army, took part in the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defence (CHOD) Conference1 in Sydney in July 2022. It brought together officials from 30 countries from the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and North America to discuss security challenges and other issues, such as the impact of climate change and the conflict in Ukraine. This participation shows the challenge for Vietnam, the second largest Communist country after China, one deeply anchored in the Communist bloc during the Cold War, as to how to assert itself as a pivot to promote strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific. How can the country change its geopolitical status from the incarnation of the danger of Communism in the high age of the domino theory to a key non-threatening actor in the Indo-Pacific? Since the Indo-Pacific concept entered the geopolitical discourse of the great powers of the Asia-Pacific in the early 2000s, Vietnamese leaders have seized upon the concept of Ấn Độ-Thái Bình Dư ơng in their own official discourse (Hoang, 2020). This has been the case variously in the context of disputes over rights in the East Sea (Tranh chấp quyền trên Biển Đông), as well as in the Chinese South China Sea (SCS), and that of Sino-American rivalry (Đối đầu Mỹ -Trung Quốc). Vietnam has to manage two facets of its relations with China: the tensions in the SCS (which are the major causes of disputes since the occupation in 1974 of the Paracel Islands by China), and its economic dependence on China. As a member of ASEAN, which has promoted its autonomous strategy through the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (2019), Vietnam refuses to choose between the United States DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-6

V ietnam’s Perspective on Indo-Pacific 61

and China and tries to defend its own national interests. It supports IndoPacific initiatives as part of an overall process that began with the Đổi Mới (Renovation) in 1986 (Le, 2018). After being a theatre of Great Powers confrontation during the Cold War, Vietnam has made economic development a priority. This chapter argues that the Vietnamese discourse on the Indo-Pacific is less a break than an expression of continuity in the subtle Vietnamese practice of multilateralism, one required by its geographical position next to the Chinese giant (Le, 2005). This chapter explains why the Indo-Pacific construct provides an opportunity for Vietnam to deal with Chinese ambitions in the SCS and, also, to achieve its goal of becoming a major regional middle power by 2040 (Pham, 2020). It also highlights the deepening of its bilateral relationships with the major powers of the Indo-Pacific and how Vietnam has been progressively seen by them as a key player in Southeast Asia, able to contribute to balancing growing Chinese power in the region. The Indo-Pacific Discourse as a Part of Vietnam’s Multidirectional Foreign Policy

The Vietnamese Indo-Pacific discourse is fully consistent with its global multidirectional foreign policy, often characterised by using the terms “balancing” or “hedging”, in order to maintain its autonomy faced with the interests of the larger regional powers (Le, 2013; Tran & Yoichiro, 2018). In minimising the influence of the Chinese model in its economic opening (Đổi Mới), Phan Xuan Dung and To Minh Son (2022) argue that Vietnamese “bamboo diplomacy” – a more flexible rather than ideologically rigid doctrine – could be the basis for a new “ĐổiMới” in the country’s foreign relations. They argue: Vietnam’s diplomatic achievements in the past decades have provided sufficient empirical basis for this conceptualisation of a Vietnamese school of diplomacy. With Doi Moi, Vietnam shifted from an ideology-driven foreign policy to one that is based primarily on national interests and the principles of independence, self-reliance, multilateralism, and diversification. This has allowed the country to build a diverse network of comprehensive and strategic partnerships to maintain a high level of socioeconomic development and to gain prestige regionally and internationally. (Phan & To, 2022) The Indo-Pacific discourse can, therefore, be seen as a part of Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy”, which defends a “Vietnamese middle way” that is neither pro-United States nor pro-China. Vietnam defends its national interests without depending on either of them. This “bamboo diplomacy” uses

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multiple tools in its bilateral relationships; those in the regional organisations of which it is a member (ASEAN, APEC) and those in large economic agreements (the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)). The Indo-Pacific framework provides a way for Vietnam to deal with security issues in the SCS and decrease its economic dependence on China: “Vietnam has to carefully balance taking a tough stance against China over national security interests and preserving the economic benefits of the relationship” (Dang, 2019). The Indo-Pacific: A Geostrategic Opportunity to Face Chinese Incursions in SCS

Chinese claims on the Paracel (Hoàng Sa) and Spratly (Trường Sa) Island chains have been for more than a decade the most serious national security challenges for Vietnam. Vietnamese claims over these territories are historically well-founded, while Chinese claims only date from its occupation in 1974. Since then, the PRC has tried to legitimise its sovereignty claims by developing bases or drilling and, also looking for other great powers’ support. The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan also claim parts of the same maritime area, but the main claimant state is China, which considers the Spratly and Paracel as Chinese territories, included in the “Nine Dash Line” or “Ox Tongue”, a U-shaped line encompassing the entire SCS. The discovery of oil and gas in the 1970s has highly exacerbated the dispute between Vietnam and China. The aim of China is to control this major international sea route access to the much-needed energy sources. Having the world’s largest navy, with around 335 ships, provides it with the means to do so. Territorial tensions increased in mid-2014 when China sent an exploration oil rig into the contested waters, leading to clashes between the Chinese and Vietnamese coast guards. Vietnam’s own oil and gas activities in the SCS have been regularly disrupted by China, which continues to enter the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, sinking fishing boats and harassing their oil and gas exploration activities. Moreover, China’s construction and militarisation of artificial islands in the Spratly represent a major threat to Vietnamese security. Faced with these violations of Vietnam’s EEZ and its continental shelf – as defined under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) − Vietnam established a long-term diplomatic strategy. This involves, on the one hand, improving its bilateral relationships with China and, on the other, working within the ASEAN framework and developing cooperation with international organisations. In addition to this direct threat from China, Vietnam also has to deal with non-traditional security

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challenges including piracy, illegal fishing, smuggling, natural disasters, and the effects of climate change. Moreover, Vietnam prioritises its maritime security in order to guarantee the safety and openness of its maritime trade routes. These are crucial for its economy. In 2019, given the need to maintain good relations with all its neighbours, Vietnam defined a policy of what became labelled as the “four nos”. These are, “no military alliance; no alignment with one country against another; no foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil; and no use of, or threat to use, force in international relations”. However, there is a caveat to the “four nos”: the national defence strategy allows for the possibility to initiate defence cooperation with strategic partners to “safeguard the Homeland and in order to be ready to defeat (an adversary) in any form of war or foreign invasion” (Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam, 2019). Aware of the difficulty of reaching an ASEAN consensus on these key strategic issues, Vietnam sees the Indo-Pacific framework as an opportunity to obtain additional support. Indeed, Vietnam’s Indo-Pacific strategy does not contradict any of the “four nos” but enables it to improve its defence capacity in order to face Chinese pressure in the SCS. The goal is to diversify its strategic relations so as to not rely on any one partner to counter China. For ideological and historical reasons, Vietnam has signed Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs) with three great regional powers. The first CSPs were signed with the Communist, or former Communist comrades − China (2008) and Russia (2012). In 2016, a CSP was signed with a “neutralist” India. Since then, Vietnam has signed many strategic partnership agreements with other regional powers. By 2020, Vietnam had established 14 strategic partnerships and 13 comprehensive partnerships. Indo-Pacific: An Opportunity for Vietnam’s Economic Development

The Indo-Pacific framework provides not only an opportunity for Vietnamese security but also for its economic development. After almost three decades of war followed by a difficult period of enduring trade embargos because of the occupation of Cambodia, economic development has become the main priority of the Vietnamese Communist regime. The economic reform of ĐổiMới, launched in 1986, has enabled Vietnam to catch up economically and to fully integrate itself into the world economy at the same time when the East European Communist States of the Comecon were collapsing. It took almost 35 years for the “socialist oriented market economy” (Kinh tế thị trư ờng định hư ớng xã hội chủnghĩa) to attain a certain level of prosperity. Seen from Hanoi, the maintenance of a peaceful environment is a necessary condition for Vietnam to continue to develop. China remains Vietnam’s largest trading partner, while Vietnam is China’s largest trading partner in ASEAN and its sixth largest trading

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partner in the world, with bilateral trade of US$ 165.8 billion in 2021, up by 33.5 per cent from a year earlier (Nhân Dân, 2022). This is significant even considering the negative impacts of COVID-19 on global trade. Vietnam has no choice but to avoid any risks that may disrupt these strong economic ties. Concomitantly, Vietnam’s multilateralist strategy has enabled it to strengthen its regional and world integration. Today, with the 17 free trade agreements (FTAs) it has signed, Vietnam is one of the most open economies in Asia, surpassed only by the city-state of Singapore. These significant trade and investment ties with diversified economic partners in the IndoPacific have contributed to decreasing its economic dependence on China. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, Vietnam’s GDP growth rate remained positive at 2.6 per cent in 2021 (World Bank, 2022). This was partly due to its improved export performance and sustained foreign investment facilitated by the free trade agreements mentioned above. Vietnam’s GDP growth rate improved to a pace of 5.3 per cent year-over-year (y/y) in the third quarter of 2023, compared with 4.1 per cent y/y in the second quarter. Due to the US–China trade war, many foreign investors have relocated part of their activities from China to Vietnam. They have done so for three reasons: geographical proximity to China, political stability, and its relatively young and low-cost labour force. From the Vietnamese perspective, while openness to the world economy may make Vietnam more vulnerable, the Indo-Pacific framework can help achieve its ambition of becoming a regional manufacturing and logistics hub. For this reason, Vietnam was a founding member of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) proposal promoted by the Biden administration. The IPEF is the third major regional economic agreement after the CPTPP and the RCEP. In May 2022, PM Pham Minh Chinh attended the inaugural IPEF conference held in Tokyo, where he promoted Vietnam’s multilateralist approach, citing the “need to deal collectively with critical regional and global issues for a sustainable and resilient growth” (Vu, 2022). Launched by the United States, the IPEF is expected to cover 40 per cent of the world’s GDP and seeks to offer Indo-Pacific countries sustainable growth based on “a fair, connected, resilient and clean economy”. The proposal offers a means to deal with the COVID-19 impacts on the region and global economic instability. At the same time, members do not have to choose between the United States and China. In its present form, the IPEF remains an “abstract” conceptual framework. It is neither a free trade agreement nor a security bloc (like the QUAD), and it will take almost two years to be negotiated. Nevertheless, in the context of growing uncertainty in the SCS – and in light of recent events such as the coup in Myanmar or the war in Ukraine – the priority for Vietnam is to maintain its strategic autonomy by diversifying its partners in the Indo-Pacific and becoming less dependent on China. Thus, the IPEF is seen as a way to facilitate a higher level of

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Vietnamese exports to the US market. The objective is to attain the status of an upper-middle-income economy by 2030 and a high-income economy by 2045 (Pham, 2022). While economic considerations would appear to dominate in Vietnamese thinking on the Indo-Pacific, in the background, the challenge of China is a constant concern. This can be found, for example, in an article published in Tạp chí Cộng sản [Communist Magazine] (Hoang, 2020), the theoretical and political organ of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). The article dates China’s economic take-off to 2012, the year Xi Jinping came to power, and presents the way the VCP views the place of the different Indo-Pacific actors in coping with that rise. The author mentions the United States as occupying the first place, but Japan and India appear as other significant regional actors in the Indo-Pacific. Given a convergence of strategic and economic interests, Vietnam has significantly deepened its relationships with these two Asian powers and seeks to create an informal trilateral axis involving both of them (Chaudhury, 2021). Vietnam–Japanese Bilateral Cooperation within the Indo-Pacific Framework

Since the 1990s, Vietnam and Japan have developed a strong bilateral partnership covering economic, political, and security cooperation. According to the article in Tạp chí Cộng sản mentioned above: Japan plays an important role in shaping and advancing the Indo-Pacific strategy, but Japan’s interest differs from the US and Australia with their emphasis on military security cooperation as the core, while Japan emphasises issues of freedom of navigation, respect and compliance with the law. For Japan, the Indo-Pacific is essentially a maritime zone. The author mentions the role of former PM Shinzo Abe as the first to describe in 2007 the Indo-Pacific as “the confluence of two oceans” and as the initiator in 2017 of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” (FOIP). Abe’s FOIP lists four priorities: the promotion of connectivity between Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; the Indian Ocean as the strategic geopolitical core of Japan’s security; Japan as a major country able to balance China; and the reinforcement of cooperation with other powers (United States, India, Australia) and Southeast Asian countries. Vietnam has a key place among the latter. For Vietnam, Japan is an essential economic partner. Japan has supported Vietnam’s economic development since the early 1990s through its Official Development Aid (ODA) (Japan is the largest provider of ODA) and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). In 2021, bilateral trade reached nearly US$ 43 billion. With US$ 64.5 billion of investments in 2021, Japan is the

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second-largest foreign investor (General Statistics Office, Vietnam, 2022). Japan’s FDI contributes to responding to major challenges for Vietnam such as transport infrastructure, digital transformation, climate change, energy transition, healthcare, and dealing with pandemic diseases. This is a “win– win” situation for Japan, because an economically strong Vietnam contributes to building supply chain resilience as basing production in China becomes more problematic. Besides these synergies in the economic sphere, security cooperation with Japan has been reinforced since 2011, when the two countries established a strategic partnership. This was followed by an Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in 2014, which allows for arms transfers. In 2018, a Joint Vision Statement on Defence Relations increased its maritime capacity-building assistance from joint maritime training exercises (between navies and coast guard forces) to equipment transfers, such as that of patrol vessels and maritime security-related equipment (Nguyen, 2021). Indeed, both countries have shared interests. Both are engaged in territorial disputes with China in the East and South China Seas and have the same goal. Japan and Vietnam want a free and open Indo-Pacific region able to withstand China’s hegemony. The new PM, Fumio Kishida, who has had a special relationship with Vietnam over some 25 years, as the secretary general of the Japan–Vietnam Friendship Parliamentary Union, has pursued Abe’s policy. This was reflected in talks held during PM Pham Minh Chinh and Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son’s visit to Japan in November 2021. They were the first foreign leaders to visit Tokyo since the pandemic lockdowns. Their visit was reciprocated by PM Fumio Kishida’s visit to Vietnam in May 2022 (Viet, 2022). Japan has supported Vietnam’s territorial claims for the last decade, contributing, at least indirectly, to the Vietnamese hedging strategy towards China in the SCS (IPD Forum, 2022). In its quest for military modernisation, the Vietnamese leadership has greatly appreciated Japan’s maritime capacity-building assistance and the transfer of maritime security-related equipment. Japan–Vietnam cooperation involves “the provision of coast guard vessels, interoperability training, maritime domain awareness enhancement, and visits by Japanese naval ships to Vietnamese ports” (Tuoi Tre News, 2021). Thanks to the military agreement signed in September 2021, Japan can transfer defence equipment and technology, including cybersecurity, to Vietnam. For Japan, Vietnam represents a long-standing constructive partner in its FOIP Vision and is considered one of the most willing and capable parties among the SCS claimant states to face China’s growing assertiveness. Japan makes a link between its own dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands and Vietnam’s territorial disputes in the SCS. Both threaten Japanese maritime trade, not to mention the risk of spreading turmoil to Japan in case of

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a Chinese military operation against Taiwan. Japan appreciates Vietnam’s support for its candidature for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2023–2024 and, in the longer-term perspective, for a permanent seat. The Indo-Pacific framework provides Vietnam with an additional opportunity to reinforce its bilateral strategic partnership with Japan and to further its multilateralist strategy (Vu & Lies, 2022). Strategic Partnership with India and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific

For Vietnam, India, one of the main supporters of the Indo-Pacific, is a key partner in Asia in hedging/balancing against China. As for India, Vietnam has become a crucial pillar in its own Indo-Pacific strategy, in parallel with membership in the QUAD. The relationships between the two countries are long-dating from the time of the fight for independence2 and “20thcentury camaraderie of anti-colonial struggles to the 21st-century geopolitics prodding a whole range of robust defence-centric partnerships” (Singh, 2022). India has put ASEAN at the core of its “Look East Policy” initiated in 1991 with the aim of developing connectivity between the two regions through the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC) project. This initiative was launched in 2000 along with five ASEAN countries, namely, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand, to promote tourism, culture, education, and transportation links between India and ASEAN members. Later, the Mekong–India Economic Corridor (MIEC) connecting four Mekong countries, namely, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, with India was launched in 2013. An ASEAN–India Free Trade Area (AIFTA) agreement was signed in 2010. India seeks to play a pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific strategy and to provide a response echoing ASEAN’s “IndoPacific Vision” adopted in 2019 by improving economic and strategic cooperation as outlined in the India–ASEAN Action Plan 2021–2025. Among the ASEAN members, Vietnam has become a major actor in furthering the Indian strategy. Cooperation between Vietnam and India began to improve in the late 2000s. Bilateral ties were upgraded during PM Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to India in 2007, when India became the third country (after Russia and China) to sign a strategic partnership agreement with Vietnam (Tran, 2018, p. 418). Bilateral cooperation was significantly strengthened in 2016 within the framework of the “Act East Policy” launched by PM Narendra Modi. PM Modi was determined to “Act, not only talk” (Jha & Vo, 2020, p. 47) when he outlined India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region. The same year, a comprehensive strategic partnership was signed during the visit to Hanoi of the Minister of Defence, Parrikar, and PM Modi. In 2018, Vietnamese PM Nguyen Xuan Phuc and President Tran Dai Quang visited Delhi, while three Indian high officials (Minister of Defence, Nirmala Sitharaman; Minister of

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Foreign Affairs, Sushma Swaraj; and President Ram Nath Kovind) visited Vietnam. The two countries have deepened their commercial ties with the signing of a “Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People” in December 2020. Bilateral trade has more than doubled, rising from US$ 7 billion for 2015–16 to US$ 14.14 billion for 2021–22 (Rajagopalan, 2022). India today has become Vietnam’s major partner for oil exploration, agriculture, and manufacturing. Above all, India and Vietnam share the same approach towards multipolarity and seek a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, they are faced with similar security challenges with their shared Chinese neighbour’s increasing engagements across the Indo-Pacific region. China has sought naval access to ports in Bangladesh and Myanmar in South Asia and militarisation of the Spratly Islands in the SCS and has built naval facilities in Vietnam’s neighbour Cambodia. But, at the same time, like Vietnam, India wants to avoid “antagonistic statements against China as these have certain regional and global costs” (Jha & Vo, 2020, p. 14). The first major strategic impulse to heighten cooperation occurred during the visit of Indian Defence Minister Parrikar to Vietnam in 2016. Since then, the partnership has involved a large spectrum of security-related activities. These include military training, joint naval exercises, defence supplies, and joint production of military equipment, such as the Akash short-range ground-to-air missiles, supersonic cruise missiles, anti-submarine torpedoes, as well as high-speed ships for their coast guards.3 Other cooperation is in the area of intelligence sharing and on a project for nuclear energy (Tran, 2019, p. 423). The most recent step in this defence partnership has been the signing of a “Joint Vision Statement on an India–Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030” in June 2022 during the visit of Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to Hanoi. The “joint vision” foresees the possibility of their militaries using each other’s bases for repairs or supplies. As Vietnam is traditionally reluctant to give open access to its military facilities to foreign countries, this places India in a privileged position. The “joint vision” will greatly enhance their naval exploration: for India across the SCS and for Vietnam in the Indian Ocean rim (Singh, 2022). Seen from Hanoi, India’s support is very important in ensuring compliance with international law, such as UNCLOS (1982), and for reinforcing Vietnam’s presence in the SCS through the offshore oil exploitation contract between the Indian firm ONGC Videsh and PetroVietnam (Tran, 2018, p. 447). For India, maritime defence ties with Vietnam serve its multilateralist maritime policy and protect its economic activities in the SCS. According to Swaran Singh: Both believe in socialising and restraining China’s behaviour by engaging with it and not by confronting or alienating it altogether. This is

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what promises to see the India-Vietnam axis emerging as a novel alternative locomotive of change in evolving realignments in the Indo-Pacific region. (Singh, 2022) Vietnam and the US Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Strategy

For Duy Hoang, a Vietnamese official writing in Tạp chí Cộng sản: “although not the first country to propose the Indo-Pacific concept, the US is a pioneer in implementing the FOIP strategy (…) The US being the strongest promoter of this strategy”. According to him, the idea of the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) emerged during the US–India Strategic Dialogue of 2013 and was prompted by the “Asian pivot/rebalancing to Asia” strategy of the US President Barack Obama. Then at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, which took place in Danang (Vietnam) in November 2017, his successor, Donald Trump declared that Vietnam was “in the very heart of the Indo-Pacific” and soon after launched the FOIP, which became the “top priority” of the Trump administration (Hoang, 2020). The choice of Hanoi for the second summit between President Trump and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, in February 2019 confirmed the place of Vietnam as a major partner in implementing the US strategy in the region (Tran & Võ, 2020, pp. 414–15). During the Trump administration, the US strategy in the Indo-Pacific region “was readjusted”. China was designated as its main strategic competitor, and countering China’s rise in relation to Southeast Asia was designated as the “frontline” of the US FOIP strategy. Yet, this security priority in the FOIP seems contradicted by the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade agreement, very soon after Trump came to power. Since the 2020 presidential elections, the Biden administration has clearly reaffirmed the US commitment to Asia in defending a free and open IndoPacific. The place of Vietnam as a major partner has been confirmed by Vice President Kamala Harris, who visited Hanoi in August 2021. Harris, who was the first Vice President to visit Vietnam since diplomatic relations were established in 1995, reaffirmed that the US “will continue (our) high-level security cooperation in support of a strong, prosperous, and independent Vietnam (…) Vietnam holds a particular importance and significance to the United States, as does the first stop on this trip” (The White House, 2021). In May 2022, President Biden himself launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), which he foreshadowed seven months earlier in October 2021 at the East Asia Summit (EAS). Presented by the United States as promoting “a fair, clean, resilient and connected economy”, the IPEF will “explore with partners the development of an Indo-Pacific economic framework around common interests” (The White House, 2022).

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Vietnam clearly supports these initiatives, which it sees as compatible with its strategic interests. As argued above, for Vietnam, building a rules-based regional order, promoting freedom of navigation, building open infrastructure, and securing open trade are major goals. Vietnam also recognises the United States as the Indo-Pacific nation which has developed the strongest multilateral and bilateral partnerships and alliances in the region. Yet, like the other Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam is unenthusiastic about the proposed economic framework, which remains “too elusive and noncommittal” (Le Thu, 2021) while being wary of the risk of a return to American isolationism. Hanoi insists on the collective dimension of the tasks at hand: “the costs and responsibilities necessary to maintain the Indo-Pacific structural system in terms of military security, economic cooperation, etc. must be shared among allies in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean” (Hoang, 2020). In the context of heightened Sino-American tensions, how then can Vietnam engage, at the same time, with Washington’s regional strategy while maintaining a constructive strategic partnership with China? Will Hanoi upgrade its relations with the United States from a comprehensive partnership to a full strategic partnership? Vietnam’s regional and bilateral partnerships with Indo-Pacific powers such as Japan, India, the United States, and Australia are definitely useful for its negotiations with China in the SCS. Nevertheless, like other Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam remains wary of the “over-emphasis on democracy by the US and its allies” (Le Thu, 2021). Hanoi welcomes Washington in the region as long as its presence contributes to regional peace, security, and economic prosperity (Nguyen, 2021). In concrete terms, this means investment in infrastructure development projects and support for developing Vietnam’s defence capabilities by providing maritime defence equipment, cybersecurity, intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and joint military exercises. However, at the same time, Vietnam does not want to be part of an anti-China coalition and seeks to maintain its policy of not aligning with one country against the other. Vietnamese leaders must handle the situation carefully, in order not to upset the PRC. For example, from the perspective of Hanoi, an increased presence of the US Navy in Vietnamese waters might be seen by China as a critical threat to its own sense of regional security and lead to a new regional arms race. Vietnam and Australia: Two Middle Powers in the Indo-Pacific

Like Vietnam in the SCS, Australia has to deal with a growing Chinese influence in the South Pacific. Both countries are members of comprehensive free trade agreements, including the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANFTA), the CPTPP, the RCEP, as well as more recently the

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IPEF. Australia and Vietnam signed an Enhanced Economic Engagement Strategy in 2019 with the aim of lessening their economic dependence on China and increasing their resilience in the context of repeated crises and rising challenges in the Indo-Pacific. While Australian investment in Vietnam has remained quite limited (only 0.5 per cent of the total foreign investment), bilateral trade has grown by nearly 50 per cent in 2021, despite the COVID19 pandemic. In that year, bilateral trade reached a record of US$ 12.4 billion and Vietnam became Australia’s 12th largest trading partner. Australia had become Vietnam’s 10th largest trading partner in 2022 (Bao, 2022). Vietnam seeks Australian support over the SCS issue, in particular the enforcement of decisions resulting from UNCLOS, which have recognised the violation by China of Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf. Moreover, “Vietnam could possibly play a bridging role between Australia and ASEAN, given its constructive contribution and growing role in the region” (Huynh, 2022). From the Australian side, the active development of its Indo-Pacific strategy since the late 2000s has strengthened cooperation not only with leading regional partners such as India and Japan but also with Southeast Asian countries. Vietnam has emerged as a crucial partner for Canberra. Both countries have significantly increased their defence cooperation from a comprehensive partnership in 2009 to a strategic partnership in 2018. PM Scott Morrison visited Vietnam in August 2019. He was the first Australian PM to travel to Vietnam. Two years later, in May 2021, Vietnam proposed to upgrade bilateral ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) by 2023 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. In December 2021, both countries launched the Australia– Vietnam Enhanced Economic Engagement Strategy. With the election of Labour leader PM, Anthony Albanese, in May 2022, Australia’s engagement with Southeast Asia and the bilateral ties between Hanoi and Canberra, have been boosted. Indeed, the visit of the new Australian Foreign Minister, Penny Wong, to Vietnam in June 2022 confirmed its central place in Canberra’s policy towards Southeast Asia. The unique aspect of the Australia–Vietnam partnership lies in their similar experience of being middle powers: “As middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, Australia, and Vietnam also enjoy a similarly strategic place in great powers considerations” (Huynh & Pham, 2022). European Union (EU): From Free Trade Agreement to Indo-Pacific Strategy

Partnerships with EU member states and the EU as a whole form an increasingly important part of Vietnam’s omnidirectional foreign policy. At the same time, Vietnam plays a significant role in the Indo-Pacific strategy of the European Union, particularly in the SCS, through which pass maritime

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routes that are essential to Europe’s economy. In December 2020, during Vietnam’s rotating chairmanship of ASEAN, the EU–ASEAN relationship was upgraded to a Strategic Partnership. In 2021, the EU published its “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”. In this document, the EU promoted its role in stabilising Sino–US relations in the Asia Pacific due to it being a powerful external regional organisation with strong ties to both China and the United States without itself being a party in the Asia-Pacific. Among the 17 strategic partners of Vietnam, five are from the Europe, including France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain. Regular exchanges and high-level official visits have led to the establishment of bilateral cooperation, covering not only economic issues but also defence and security questions. Despite the opposition of some voices protesting Vietnam’s human rights record, the EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) was signed in 2019 and became effective in 2020. The EU gave its support to the election of Vietnam as a non-permanent member at the United Nations Security Council in 2020–2021. Moreover, Vietnam has boosted its strategic partnerships with these five European countries through the signature of MOUs on defence cooperation with Germany (in 2004 and a new Strategic Action Plan for 2019–2022); with France (in 2009 with the establishment of a Joint Committee on Defence Cooperation); with Spain (2010); with the United Kingdom (2011 and 2017); and with Italy (2013). Among these relationships, the most advanced relationship is that with France. During a visit of the Minister of Defence of France Hervé Morin to Vietnam in 2010, the two countries upgraded their defence ties to that of a strategic partnership. In Paris, in 2018, a joint vision statement on defence cooperation for 2018–2028 was signed (Nguyen, 2022). European support for a peaceful resolution of disputes in the SCS according to the principles of UNCLOS, and the effective implementation of the Code of Conduct signed in 2002, is important for Vietnam. This is even more the case as the ASEAN countries remain divided on the issue. The Partnership with Russia and the Consequences of the War in Ukraine

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Hanoi has avoided openly the policy of its traditional ally, Russia. Vietnam has justified its neutrality for strategic reasons. Vietnam abstained from the UN General Assembly’s vote in March 2022 to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and to call for the withdrawal of its troops. A month later, in April, Vietnam also abstained from the resolution to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. The official Vietnamese position was that “international disputes should be resolved by peaceful measures and in compliance with the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, especially the principle of

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respecting the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of countries” (Vu, 2022). Nevertheless, the outbreak of the war in February 2022 has upset the delicate balance established by Vietnam in its foreign policy. Indeed, Russia remains by far the largest supplier of defence equipment (around 80 per cent) as well as the largest provider of nuclear technology. Russian oil and gas companies are engaged in many energy projects in Vietnam, particularly in the SCS within the framework of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries (Pham, 2019). In 2021, bilateral trade had risen 25 per cent to US$ 7.1 billion, and the total value of Russian investment had increased to US$ 950 million. Vietnam signed an FTA with the Russia–Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which englobes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. The visit to Hanoi of Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, just prior to the G20 meeting in Bali in July 2022, at the invitation of his Vietnamese counterpart, illustrates the weight of this long-standing partnership (Vu, 2022). Despite these signs of continuity, the war has clearly had an impact on the Vietnamese Indo-Pacific strategy. First, the rapprochement between Russia and China following the invasion calls into question the support of Russia in the SCS. Second, the inflationary pressures and economic consequences linked to the increasing price of oil, fertilisers, and food stuffs threaten Vietnam’s economic growth. Third, Western sanctions since the invasion of Ukraine will have an impact on Russia’s weapon exports to Vietnam in the long term. While Moscow remains Hanoi’s single-largest supplier of weapons, Vietnam is working to develop its defence industry in cooperation with other strategic partners. In this context, the Indo-Pacific partners (United States, Japan, India, Australia, and the EU member states) have become more salient (To, 2022). While the United States would certainly like Hanoi to join in condemning Russia, Vietnam’s non-alignment strategy will probably not face any consequences under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which holds out the threat of sanctions for countries that engage in “significant transactions with Iran, North Korea, or Russia”. From the perspective of Washington, Vietnam is viewed as an important partner in containing China (Fischler, 2022). Conclusion

Given the country’s long experience in dealing with China, Vietnam has a particular place in the Indo-Pacific. While it is close to China from an ideological and economic point of view, Vietnam has to constantly cope with a major strategic threat in the SCS from its giant neighbour. The SCS is the core of the Indo-Pacific area. Since the instauration of ĐổiMới, the Vietnamese strategy has been to promote active multilateral initiatives which

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have fostered Vietnam’s economic development and its integration into the regional and world economy. More than ever in this post-pandemic era, these two objectives remain a priority. The Indo-Pacific strategy of Vietnam consists in avoiding a direct confrontation with China in the SCS through engaging in wider multilateral action and diplomacy. In this context, the Indo-Pacific framework appears to offer an opportunity for Vietnam to achieve its ambition of becoming a middle power in Asia through the deepening of its bilateral partnerships with regional powers, both great and middling. Looking forward, Vietnam intends to enhance its economic integration in an interconnected, inclusive, and open Indo-Pacific extending to the east coast of Africa, and to seek responses to other major challenges in non-traditional security areas involving climate change and energy supplies. It remains to be seen to what extent Russia will support Vietnam in the SCS and to what extent it will be impacted by the Russian– Chinese rapprochement due to the conflict in Ukraine. Notes 1 The CHOD conference since 1998 brings together the chiefs of defence of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region to discuss security challenges and other urgent issues. 2 For a short historical perspective on India’s policy with Vietnam, see Chakraborti (2012). 3 India is constructing 12 high-speed coast guard vessels: five being built by the Indian company Larsen & Toubro in India and seven by the Hong Ha Shipyard Company in Vietnam.

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Hoang, D. (2020, December 15). “Chiến lư ợc Ấn Độ Dư ơng - Thái Bình Dư ơng: Tầm nhìn và thực tiễn” [Indo-Pacific Strategy: Vision and Practice]. TạpchíCộngsản [Communist magazine]. https://www​.tapchicongsan​.org​.vn ​/web​/guest​/the​-gioi​ -van​-de​-su​-kien/-​/2018​/820763​/chien​-luoc​-an​-do​-duong--​-thai​-binh​-duong-​-tam​ -nhin​-va​-thuc​-tien​.aspx Huynh, T. S. (2022, January 24). Are Australia-Vietnam Relations Set to Reach New Heights in 2022? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2022 ​/01​/are​ -australia​-vietnam​-relations​-set​-to​-reach​-new​-heights​-in​-2022/ Huynh, T. S. & Pham, D. A. (2022, July 20). Ample Opportunities to Level Up Australia-Vietnam Relations. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2022 ​/07​/ ample​-opportunities​-to​-level​-up​-australia​-vietnam​-relations/ IPD Forum. (2022, July 18). Japan, Vietnam Defense Transfer Deal Signed, Elevating Partnership. Indo-Pacific Defence (IPD) Forum. https:// ipdefenseforum ​. com ​/ 2022 ​/ 07​/ japan ​- vietnam ​- defense ​- transfer ​- deal ​- signed​ -elevating​-partnership/ Jha, P. K. & Vo, X. V. (2020). India, Vietnam and the Indo-Pacific: Expanding Horizons. London: Routledge. Le, H. H. (2005). Living Next To The Giant: The Political Economy of Vietnam’s Relations with China under Doi Moi. Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. Le, H. H. (2013, December). Vietnam's Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 35(3), 333–368. ISEAS – Yusuf Ishak Institute. Le, H. H. (2018). Vietnam’s Foreign Policy under Doi Moi (co-edited with Tsvetov A.). Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. Le Thu, H. (2021, December). Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Traps to Avoid in Southeast Asia. Global Asia, 16(4). https://www​.globalasia​.org​/v16no4​/cover​/ bidens​-indo​-pacific​-strategy​-traps​-to​-avoid​-in​-southeast​-asia​_ huong​-le​-thu Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam. (2019). Viet Nam National Defence White Paper. http://www​.mod​.gov​.vn ​/wps​/wcm ​/connect ​/08963129​- c9cf​- 4c86​ -9b5c​ - 81a9e2b14455​ / 201​ 9 Vie​ t nam​ N ati​ o nal​ D efence​ . pdf​ ?MOD​ = AJPERES​ &CACHE​​I D​= 08​​96312​​9​- c9c​​f​- 4c8​​6 ​-9b5​​c​-81a​​9e2b1​​4 455 Nguyen, H. (2021, November 16). Maritime Capacity-building Cooperation between Japan and Vietnam: A Confluence of Strategic Interests. ISEAS Perspective, 2021/148. https://www​.iseas​.edu​.sg ​/articles​- commentaries​/iseas​-perspective​ /2021​-148​-maritime​- capacity​-building​- cooperation​-between​-japan​-and​-vietnam​ -a​- confluence​-of​-strategic​-interests​-by​-hanh​-nguyen/ Nguyen, H. H. (2022, May 30). Vietnam’s Growing Strategic Partnerships with European Countries. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2022 ​/05​/vietnams​ -growing​-strategic​-partnerships​-with​- european​- countries/ Nguyen, H. T. (2021, March 4). Is Vietnam Open to Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. East Asia Forum. https://www​.eastasiaforum​.org ​/2021​/03​/04​/is​ -vietnam​-open​-to​-washingtons​-indo​-pacific​-strategy/ NhânDân [The People]. (2022, January 23). Vietnam-China Trade Enjoys Strong Growth in 2021. https://en​.nhandan​.vn ​/vietnam​- china​-trade​- enjoys​-strong​ -growth​-in​-2021​-post110092 ​.html Pham, C. (2022, June 17). The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and What it Means for Vietnam. Vietnam Briefing. https://www​.vietnam​-briefing​ .com ​/news​/indo​-pacific​- economic​-framework​-for​-prosperity​-and​-vietnam​.html/ Pham, L. (2019, September 10). Vietnam, Russia Strengthen Oil Cooperation Amid China Aggression in South China. Hanoi Times. https://hanoitimes​.vn ​/vietnam​ -russia​- strengthen​- oil​- cooperation​- amid​- china​- aggression​-in​- south​- china​- sea​ -45763​.html

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Pham, Q. H. (2020, April 15). Regional Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific: Vietnam’s Role as the 2020 Chair of ASEAN. Governance, Security and Justice Series n° 3, East West Center, 10 p. Phan, X. D. & To, M. S. (2022, July 22). What’s Behind Vietnam’s ‘Bamboo Diplomacy’ Discourse? Fulcrum: Analysis on Southeast Asia. https://fulcrum​.sg​ /whats​-behind​-vietnams​-bamboo​-diplomacy​-discourse/ Rajagopalan, R. P. (2022, June 7). India-Vietnam Ties Deepen in Dynamic IndoPacific. Observer Research Foundation. https://www​.orfonline​.org ​/research ​/ india​-vietnam​-ties​-deepen​-in​-dynamic​-indo​-pacific/ Singh, S. (2022, June 10). Novel India-Vietnam Axis Emerging in Indo-Pacific. Asia Times. https://asiatimes​.com ​/2022​/06​/novel​-india​-vietnam​-axis​- emerging​-in​ -indo​-pacific/ Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Joint Communication To The European Parliament And The Council The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Brussels, 16.9.2021, 17p. https://www​.eeas​.europa​.eu ​/sites​/default ​/ files​/jointcommunication​_ 2021​_ 24​_1​_ en​.pdf To, M. S. (2022, March 18). Explaining the Vietnamese Public’s Mixed Responses to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2022​ /03​/explaining​-the​-vietnamese​-publics​-mixed​-responses​-to​-the​-russia​-ukraine​ -crisis/ The White House. (2021, August 26). Remarks by Vice President Harris in a Press Conference in Hanoi. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/ briefing​-room ​/speeches​ -remarks ​/ 2021 ​/ 08​/ 26​/remarks​-by​-vice ​-president​-harris​-in​-press​- conference ​-in​ -hanoi​-vietnam/ The White House. (2022, May 23). Fact Sheet: In Asia, President Biden and a Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/ briefing​-room ​/statements​-releases​/2022​ /05​/ 23​/fact​- sheet​- in​- asia​- president​- biden​- and​- a​- dozen​- indo ​- pacific​- partners​ -launch​-the​-indo​-pacific​- economic​-framework​-for​-prosperity/ Tran, C. T. L. (2018). Vietnam, la reprise en main [Vietnam, Taking Back Control], in Pesses, A. & Tran, C. T. L. (eds.), Asie du Sud-Est 2018, Bilan, enjeux et perspectives [Southeast Asia 2018, Assessment, Challenges and Outlooks]. Paris / Bangkok: Les Indes Savantes/IRASEC, pp. 429–459. Tran, C. T. L. (2019). Un parti communiste tout puissant face au défi d’un Doi Moi II [An Almighty Communist Party Facing the Challenge of Doi Moi II], in Cabasset, C. & Tran, C. T. L. (eds.), Asie du Sud-Est 2019, Bilan, enjeux et perspectives. Paris / Bangkok: Les Indes Savantes/IRASEC, pp. 407–436. Tran, C. T. L. & Võ T. D. (2020). Đổi Mới 2.0 ou comment devenir une puissance moyenne [Đổi Mới 2.0 or How to Become a Middle Power] in Cabasset, C. & Tran, C. T. L. (eds.), Asie du Sud-Est 2020, Bilan, enjeux et perspectives. Paris / Bangkok: Les Indes Savantes/IRASEC, pp. 401–428. Tran, T. B. & Yoichiro, S. (2018, January). Vietnam's Post-Cold War Hedging Strategy: A Changing Mix of Realist and Liberal Ingredients. Asian Politics & Policy, 10(1). https://onlinelibrary​.wiley​.com ​/doi ​/epdf ​/10​.1111​/aspp​.12368doi​ .org​/10​.1111​/aspp​.12368 Tuổi Trẻ News [Youth]. (2021, November 26). Vietnam-Japan Relations to Deepen as Leaders Cement Strategic Partnership. https://tuoitrenews​.vn ​/news​/politics​ /20211126 ​ / vietnamjapan ​ - relations ​ - to ​ - deepen ​ - as ​ - leaders ​ - cement ​ - strategic​ -partnership​/64388​.html) Viet, A. (2022, May 5). Enhanced Trust Key Outcome of Japanese PM's Vietnam Visit. Vn Express net. https://e​.vnexpress​.net ​/news​/news​/enhanced​-trust​-key​ -outcome​-of​-japanese​-pm​-s​-vietnam​-visit​- 4458886​.html

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Vu, M. (2022, May 24). Vietnam Highlights Multilateralism at Indo-Pacific Forum. Hanoi Times. https://hanoitimes​.vn ​/vietnam​-highlights​-multilateralism​-at​-indo​ -pacific​-forum​-320854​.html Vu, K. (2022, July 5). Russia’s Lavrov to Visit Hanoi Ahead of G20 meeting. Reuters. https://www​.reuters​.com ​/world ​/asia​-pacific​/russias​-lavrov​-visit​-hanoi​ -ahead​-g20 ​-meeting​-2022​- 07​- 05/ Vu, K. & Lies, E. (2022, May 1). Vietnam, Japan Agree to Boost Trade, Security Ties. Reuters. https://www​.reuters​.com ​/world ​/asia​-pacific​/vietnam​-japan​-agree​ -boost​-trade​-security​-ties​-2022​- 05​- 01/ World Bank. (2022). Vietnam Data. https://data​.worldbank​.org​/country​/vietnam

6 A CAMBODIAN PERSPECTIVE An Evolving Indo-Pacific Concept Cheunboran Chanborey and Chheang Vannarith

Introduction

The “Indo-Pacific” concept was initiated by Japan’s the then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, during his state visit to India in 2007, when he introduced the concept of the “confluence of the two seas” and a “broader Asia.” He said, “the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A ‘broader Asia’ that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007). After becoming the Prime Minister for the second time in late 2012, Prime Minister Abe gave the concept a second chance to take off under the new name of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) with remarkably fruitful outcomes. It was subsequently endorsed by Australia in its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and later by the Trump administration. Indeed, the shift from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” is aimed at engaging a reluctant India to play in a more broadly conceived Asia. The Modi administration has been hooked up with the promotion of its Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). As it geographically sits in the middle of the Indo-Pacific, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) swiftly moved to adopt its own “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)) at the 34th ASEAN Summit in 2019. By putting forth this concept, ASEAN is expected to assert its role in reshaping, if not managing, the emerging IndoPacific regional order. Other European countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and more recently, the European Union (EU), have crafted their own Indo-Pacific strategies.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-7

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The word “Indo-Pacific” has increasingly been used to replace “AsiaPacific.” Some are sceptical of the Indo-Pacific concept, perceiving that the concept aims to contain or at least check the rising power of China in the region. This chapter seeks to unpack the Cambodian perspective on the evolving Indo-Pacific strategy. Indo-Pacific: A Geostrategic Construct

There is no agreement concerning the geographical scope and definition of the Indo-Pacific region. Regional consciousness and the “we-feeling” of the Indo-Pacific are weak (Wilkins, 2018). Therefore, it is safe to say that the term “Indo-Pacific” is a geostrategic construct, as it is mainly driven by geopolitical interest calculation and strategic grand design. Interestingly, the European Union has also developed its version of the Indo-Pacific strategy, with the aim to increase its engagement with the region, to promote its sources of normative power such as rules-based international order, democracy, human rights, rule of law, and to promote universally agreed commitments such as the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (European Commission, 2021). The reintroduction of the concept has been arguably driven by global power transformations resulting from the rise of China, India, and ASEAN, as well as the strategic rebalancing strategies and reconfiguration of the United States and some of its treaty allies. The Pacific Rim and the AsiaPacific were previously designed to support the US-led hegemonic order during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War and with the emergence of Asian economies, the term “Asia-Pacific” and the Asia-Pacific century gained traction from both policymakers and observers. The United States’ interests are to gain access to the expanding Asian market and prevent any potential competing powers from challenging the power and influence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific (De Castro, 1994). There are different versions of the Indo-Pacific, which prevent the IndoPacific concept from being harmonised and synchronised. The revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, including Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – widely known as the QUAD – is generally believed to be the anchor of the Indo-Pacific. The key binding factor of the QUAD is the shared concern that, as China continues to rise, the Sino-centric regional order would be inevitable. In March 2021, the United States convened the first summit meeting virtually among the leaders of the four countries. The second QUAD Summit was held in person in September 2021 in Washington DC to reassert the shared commitment to uphold the free, open, rules-based order with an emphasis on the rule of law and freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity of states (The White House, 2021).

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Notably, the revival of the Indo-Pacific concept took place in the context of an intensifying US–China rivalry. The Trump administration (2016– 2020) opted for a confrontational approach towards China by launching a trade and tech war against China. The COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated the rivalry between the two competing powers. The launching of FOIP in 2017 was, therefore, understood as the United States’ strategic offensive policy against China, together with the effort to institutionalise the QUAD. The China factor is, therefore, the main factor driving the formation of the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy. Since the inception of the FOIP, China and Russia have viewed it with suspicion and labelled it, along with the QUAD, as part of the “containment strategy” against China. Chinese policymakers and media have warned against attempts to contain China, calling the Indo-Pacific in general and FOIP in particular an “outdated” initiative and a “zero-sum Cold War mentality.” It is argued that the FOIP aims to construct an exclusive regional group to prevent China from obtaining absolute power in the Indo-Pacific and to maintain the US supremacy in the region (Wu and Jayanath, 2020). Beijing perceives the QUAD as the “NATO of the East.” State councillor and Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi said, “What the QUAD pursues is to trumpet the Cold War mentality and to stir up confrontation among different groups and blocks and to stoke geopolitical competition” (Rozman, 2021). Moscow shares a similar perception, stating that the objective of forming the Indo-Pacific is to contain China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2020). The creation of the new trilateral security alliance between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, widely known as AUKUS, in September 2021 has reinforced the perception of Beijing and Moscow. Facing the pressures of the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, China and Russia have strengthened their strategic alignment. In 2019, both countries issued a joint statement titled “Development of Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Interaction Relations Entering a New Era.” Strategic communication and coordination have been enhanced over the years, together with deepening economic integration. Both sides plan to increase bilateral trade to US$ 200 billion by 2024 (Nikkei Asia, 2021). Moreover, bilateral defence cooperation has been strengthened remarkably as the two neighbours are pursuing “some high-profile cooperative defence ventures” with the key message sent to Washington (Rumer and Sokolsky, 2021). China and Russia also share a similar worldview that they need to work together to shape a new world order and form a multipolar world (Global Times, 2021). Three Tails of the Indo-Pacific

After failing to introduce the Indo-Pacific concept in 2007, the former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pushed the concept for the second time

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in late 2016 as Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) with remarkably fruitful outcomes. It was subsequently endorsed by Australia in its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and later by the Trump administration. Indeed, the shift from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” is aimed at engaging a reluctant India to play in a more broadly conceived Asia. The Modi administration has been hooked up with the promotion of its Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). Situated in the middle of the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN swiftly moved to adopt its own “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP) at the 34th ASEAN Summit in 2019. By putting forth this concept, ASEAN is expected to assert its role in reshaping, if not managing, the emerging Indo-Pacific regional order. Other European countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and more recently, the European Union, have crafted their own Indo-Pacific strategies. Broadly, there are three main visions for the Indo-Pacific: (a) the QUAD’s FOIP; (b) the AOIP; and (c) the EU’s strategy on cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. QUAD’s FOIP: An Exclusive, Security-Focussed Approach

The QUAD powers – the United States, Japan, India, and Australia – have promoted different narratives of the Indo-Pacific under various labels. For instance, while the United States and Japan have advanced the FOIP strategy, Australia has promoted a “Secure, Open, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific.” Nevertheless, the QUAD powers share a familiar, if not the same, strategic depth in their Indo-Pacific strategies, which is to contain China. Such a vision is therefore exclusive and security-orientated, despite claiming otherwise. Indeed, after identifying the Indo-Pacific as its main strategic theatre, the United States endorsed a very robust FOIP strategy and upgraded the QUAD to a quasi-alliance; the battlelines were drawn around China as the security problem. The rest in the QUAD have apparently followed suit for various reasons. With the US’s activism, the QUAD mechanism has been upgraded to a summit level. At their first summit on 12 March 2021, QUAD leaders expressed a strong commitment to doubling their efforts to promote “a free, open rules-based order, rooted in international law to advance security and prosperity and counter threats to both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.” Based on such a central tenet, the QUAD’s Indo-Pacific vision is mainly perceived to be an exclusive minilateral security arrangement. The grouping itself is composed of democratic countries that wish to strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, and anchored by democratic values. By basing its coalition on ideological affinity, the QUAD is self-constrained in its objectives to advance security and prosperity in the region. On top of that, the QUAD powers have their own conflicting interests with China, ranging from land-border disputes to maritime territorial conflicts and the

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quest for regional and global supremacy. In this regard, the QUAD countries support the rule of law and freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, and territorial integrity. In the maritime domain, they prioritise the primacy of the 1982 UNCLOS and facilitate collaboration in maritime security, including the promotion of a rules-based maritime order in the East/South China Seas. Even on non-security issues, the QUAD powers have enhanced their policy coordination to counter Beijing’s increasing influence and reduce their dependence on China’s regional supply chains. For instance, the QUAD’s pledge to ensure affordable and safe vaccines against coronavirus to IndoPacific countries is implicitly considered to be part of their efforts to counterbalance China’s vaccine diplomacy. Their commitment to addressing shared challenges, especially in cyberspace, critical technologies, and quality infrastructure investment, has also been seen as their economic decoupling strategy from China. The AOIP: An Inclusive, Development-Oriented Framework

The unfolding intense geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China has put ASEAN in a strategic dilemma. As ASEAN is geographically located at the most strategic position connecting the Pacific and Indian oceans, it stands to economically benefit from a more connected and integrated region. However, the stress on security and strategic cooperation among the key members of the Indo-Pacific (the QUAD members) has posed certain challenges for ASEAN. There are different views within ASEAN regarding the impacts of the QUAD on the centrality of ASEAN. ASEAN members also have responded to varying degrees to the China-proposed “Community with Shared Future for Mankind and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)”. Cambodia and Lao PDR have fully embraced China’s initiatives, while other ASEAN member countries have a certain degree of reservations. Notably, ASEAN members do not wish to take sides between the United States and China. Most of them are implementing a hedging strategy. Singapore and Vietnam are the heavy hedgers, and Cambodia and Lao PDR are the reluctant hedgers. Interestingly, Southeast Asian countries “do not see US–China rivalry as an ideological competition between ‘democratic’ states versus ‘authoritarian’ states – rather, for them, it is a matter of ensuring survival” (Nurliana, 2021). Survival is, therefore, the core national interest of ASEAN members. To survive and thrive within the context of multiple crises and challenges caused by geopolitical rivalries, the COVID-19 pandemic, and climate change, ASEAN members prioritise regional cooperation and integration, post-pandemic socio-economic recovery, and the preservation of a peaceful and conducive international environment to serve national economic development.

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To navigate China–US power competition and rivalries, ASEAN, with the leadership role of Indonesia, adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the IndoPacific (AOIP) in 2019. It is perceived as the most inclusive concept that can accommodate the interests of various stakeholders while maintaining the norms and roles of ASEAN in shaping regional architecture. However, as Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan warned, the AOIP “will not stop strategic forces from pulling individual ASEAN Member States in different directions. ASEAN unity – the prerequisite for ASEAN centrality – will be tested. Our inherent diversity will make internal coherence difficult, but ultimately more necessary too” (Ha, 2021). Hence, ASEAN should continue to leverage the Indo-Pacific concept and its unfolding opportunities and possibilities to its interest (Ha, 2021). Some have suggested that ASEAN needs to move from norm-setting to the expansion of actual implementation and practical cooperation under the AOIP (Aristyo, 2021). Despite early hesitation, ASEAN has embarked in full swing upon the Indo-Pacific debate. By placing itself at the centre of the Indo-Pacific construct, ASEAN hopes to assuage and reconcile confrontation among major players and their competing interests and, at best, create a peaceful and healthy competition in the region. Through the AOIP, ASEAN has strongly advocated for an inclusive approach to regionalism consistent with its longheld normative approach of open and inclusive regionalism. ASEAN has also engaged actively with its dialogue partners to advance its Indo-Pacific version by staying flexible and pragmatic. The AOIP is not aimed at creating new mechanisms or replacing existing regional initiatives; rather, it aims to enhance ASEAN centrality and agency in regional community building while shaping regional architecture in favour of ASEAN. The AOIP adds momentum to the existing ASEANled mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), serving as platforms for nurturing dialogue, building strategic trust and win–win cooperation, and reinforcing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in a wider Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, by envisioning the Indo-Pacific as a region of “dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry”, the AOIP diverts attention from strategic competition to economic and functional cooperation. In other words, ASEAN wishes to leverage power competition dynamics through the promotion of a development-oriented approach. To this end, the AOIP prescribes four areas of cooperation, namely maritime cooperation, connectivity, SDGs, and economic and other possible areas of cooperation. On maritime cooperation, the AOIP stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and the promotion of functional cooperation to address transnational crimes, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime pollution and marine debris, and marine environment and biodiversity. Regarding connectivity, it highlights the importance of building synergy between and among different regional initiatives and connectivity plans, the

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enhancement of public–private partnerships for infrastructure projects, and the advancement of people-to-people ties, cultural corridors, and interfaith dialogue. Concerning sustainable development, the AOIP proposes a better alignment of regional development strategies, promoting an inclusive digital economy, tackling climate change and disaster risk reduction and management, promoting women's empowerment and the Women, Peace, Security agenda. Other areas of cooperation include science, technology, and innovation, small and medium enterprises, and start-ups. The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: A Middle Pathway?

The recent conclusion of the “EU’s Strategy for Cooperation in the IndoPacific” demonstrates Brussels’ growing interests in the region. The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy seems to recognise the QUAD’s vision and the AOIP in order to provide a value-added and alternative foresight on the strategic debate of the Indo-Pacific. Similar to the FOIP, the EU calls for a stable IndoPacific based on democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and international law. To this end, the EU underscores the promotion of effective rules-based multilateralism to tackle various challenges, encompassing climate change and biodiversity, ocean governance, disaster risk reduction, and pandemic management and prevention policies. On the economic front, the EU will try to conclude new trade and investment agreements, further diversify their supply chains, as well as advocate for stronger collaboration on innovation through joint research and development projects and higher education. In security and defence domains, the EU claims to address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including maritime security, nonproliferation, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism. The EU’s tackling of the China question has been carefully crafted as a middle-course endeavour. First, the document stresses “principles” over “actors”, thus avoiding “naming and shaming”. In other words, the EU does not point fingers at any (major) players. Moreover, the strategy does not exclude China but opens room for cooperation in “areas where they can find common ground based on shared principles, values or mutual interest”. Brussels even emphasises the importance of the China–EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) as well as the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) in which Beijing is a member. The establishment of the trilateral security pact between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, known as AUKUS, might prompt Brussels to present an alternative strategic option to the region amid the increasingly sharpened rivalry between the United States and China, which in turn might help the region to circumvent the bifurcation of regional order. However, it is too early to jump to any conclusion. The EU–China ongoing tensions as a result of sanctions and counter-sanctions over the human

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rights situation in Xinjiang and the European Parliament’s suspension of the EU–China Bilateral Investment Treaty might constrain Brussels’ flexible engagement with Beijing. More importantly, the EU’s commitment to “further developing partnerships and strengthen synergies with likeminded partners in security and defence to respond to international security challenges, including maritime security” implicitly entails a confrontational dimension that would further complicate the security environment in the region and potentially provoke China. A Cambodian Perspective

Regional integration is one of Cambodia’s key foreign policy objectives. Since the development of the first five-year national development strategy in 1998, international integration has been highlighted. The three pillars of the Triangle Strategy are “building peace, restoring stability and maintaining security”, “rapid integration into the international community, especially into the community of regional nations, and the normalisation of relationships with the international financial institutions”, and “implementing key reform programmes”. Regional integration has been featured in the subsequent national development plan strategies since then. During a media interview in 1998, the then Prime Minister Hun Sen said: Regional economic integration will generate positive externalities in stimulating economic development in Cambodia. Active membership in the ASEAN, the Great Mekong Sub-region program and accession to the WTO are expected to bring about many challenges as well as opportunities for the country which, if well managed, will promote economic take-off. Cambodia can play a positive role in transforming the entire subcontinental Southeast Asia from a region stricken by backwardness and poverty into an epicentre of peace, security, stability and cooperation. It is my conviction that this sub-regional cooperation, within a framework of an open economy, will pave the way for a more rapid transformation of this part of the world into a region of prosperity. This will contribute substantially to narrowing the gaps in development across our region and enable all our people to truly enjoy the benefits of prosperity and peace. (World Investment News, 1998) Since 1998 when Cambodia attained total peace, “economic pragmatism” has been the key characteristic of Cambodia’s foreign policy, and regional integration has been a means to achieve economic development (Chheang, 2018). Economic development, poverty reduction, and narrowing the development gaps are the key elements of economic pragmatism. In 2021, the

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Cambodian government issued for the first time an articulated “economic diplomacy’ with the aim to further promote trade and investment, economic diversification, tourism, and cultural identity. Moreover, in addition to domestic agendas and interests, the promotion of multilateralism and ASEAN-driven regional architecture has also been featured strongly in Cambodia’s foreign policy (Chheang, 2021). In the Rectangular Strategy Phase III for 2013–2018, Cambodia is committed to “actively integrating itself into the regional and global architecture and playing a dynamic role in all regional and global affairs on equal footing and with equal rights as other nations”. The Rectangular Strategy Phase IV for 2018–2023 focusses on four key pillars, namely, human resources development, economic diversification, promotion of private sector development and employment, and inclusive and sustainable development. The economic diversification pillar focusses on four key areas: (a) improving the logistics system and enhancing transport, energy, and digital connectivity; (b) developing key and new sources of growth; (c) readiness for the digital economy and the Fourth Industrial Revolution; and (d) promoting the development of the financial and banking sector. Concerning regional cooperation initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the Cambodian government emphasises the complementarities and synergies of these two competing initiatives by empowering the centrality of ASEAN. Connecting the connectivities has been the guiding approach of Cambodia’s regional integration strategy. The Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity 2025 and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 are the key regional policy instruments and linchpins of wider regional integration and connectivity. Cambodia stresses economic and functional cooperation. As far as the Indo-Pacific is concerned, Cambodia has reacted differently to various versions of the Indo-Pacific. So far, Phnom Penh only supports AOIP and the Japanese version of FOIP. Cambodia puts AOIP at the front and centre because it believes that the AOIP is an inclusive mechanism focussing on functional cooperation. Cambodia firmly believes that ASEAN is the foundation of regional peace, stability, and prosperity. Therefore, strengthening ASEAN unity and centrality in shaping regional architecture is vital for regional peace, prosperity, and progress. Cambodia does not support any initiatives or mechanisms that undermine ASEAN centrality. In a message to grace the ASEAN Day on 8 August 2021, Hun Sen stated: Cambodia cherishes ASEAN as an outward-looking organisation. While seeking to bind all Southeast Asian nations as a strong family, we will strive to further deepen and broaden relations and cooperation with external partners in the spirit of equality, mutual interest, and mutual respect. Cambodia will explore the possibility of elevating partnerships

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with existing ASEAN dialogue partners and expanding the list of external partners based on ASEAN principles, including those outlined under the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Toovercome the negative geopolitical trend, we resolve to promote the agenda that nurtures a collaborative spirit and support for ASEAN centrality and regional tranquillity and progress. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia, 2021) At the meeting with the Universal Peace Federation in January 2022, the Cambodian Prime Minister recommended three suggestions with regard to the evolution of the Indo-Pacific strategy. First, within the Indo-Pacific framework, there must be a goal to support peace and development. Second, the Indo-Pacific strategy must not target any country or group, thereby implicitly referring to China. Third, ASEAN centrality must be promoted and observed. Cambodia also believes that the Mekong subregion can be a hub embracing and connecting various state and non-state actors that can work together to achieve peace and prosperity – that explains why Cambodia has initiated the Mekong Peace Park to provide a platform for multi-stakeholder dialogue and collaboration, building synergies between and among different competitive regional initiatives. Cambodia perceives Japan’s FOIP as less strategic and security-oriented compared with the US version of FOIP. Japan’s FOIP aims to promote functional and economic cooperation. Economic rationale underpins Japan’s FOIP. More importantly, Cambodia perceives Japan as a benign regional power. Unlike the US–China rivalry, the Japan–China relationship is stable, and their competition is relatively constructive. Japan’s efforts towards FOIP focus on three pillars: (a) the promotion and solidification of the rule of law and freedom of navigation; (b) the pursuit of economic prosperity through enhancing connectivity and quality infrastructure development; and (c) commitment to peace and stability that includes assistance for capacity building in maritime law enforcement, cooperation in such fields as disaster risk reduction and nonproliferation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019). Cambodia was the first country from Southeast Asia to endorse Japan’s FOIP during the official visit of Prime Minister Hun Sen to Japan in 2017. Political trust and economic interests are the main reasons explaining Cambodia’s position on Japan’s FOIP. Japan has significantly contributed to the peace and prosperity of Cambodia. As a result, Japan has earned political as well as social trust from Cambodia. Cambodians across socio-economic classes and political orientations have positive view towards Japan. In other words, Japan enjoys the highest level of soft power in Cambodia (Luo and Un, 2021). The personal friendship between Hun Sen and Shinzo Abe is instrumental in deepening the bilateral trust and partnership.

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Moreover, Cambodia understands that Japan’s FOIP has a strong economic component and fundamental principles compatible with those of ASEAN. Therefore, FOIP will complement ASEAN connectivity and community building. Japan’s FOIP, in principle, is an open and comprehensive concept, given it aims to neither exclude any country nor create a new institution to override or undermine existing regional mechanisms (Khmer Times, 2019). ASEAN–Japan and Mekong–Japan cooperation mechanisms are instrumental in realising FOIP. The ASEAN–Japan partnership will continue to evolve positively notwithstanding the uncertainties and constraints caused by geopolitical rivalries (Sok, 2020). Cambodia is cautious and sceptical of the QUAD, as this group is evolving to become a quasi-military alliance against China. Cambodian leaders have expressed their concerns over the QUAD and the creation of geopolitical faultiness in the region. Addressing the first Russia–ASEAN political party dialogue on 29 June 2021, Hun Sen warned that a new Cold War was emerging and divisions in the world order seemed to be gaining steam. He added, “The world is witnessing an intense competition between mutually exclusive systems, an escalating clash of values and competition for global leadership, all of which could bring military confrontation or even a new arms race” (Phnom Penh Post, 2021). As stated above, the grouping itself is composed of democratic countries that wish to strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, and anchored by democratic values. By basing its coalition on ideological affinity, the QUAD is self-constrained in its objectives to advance security and prosperity in the region. On top of that, the QUAD has built a united front against China to counter Beijing’s increasing “coercive behaviour” and reduce their dependence on China’s international supply chains. Although the latest joint statement of the QUAD in September 2021 did not mention China, it does implicitly refer to China. The statement reads: Together, we recommit to promoting the free, open, rules-based order, rooted in international law and undaunted by coercion, to bolster security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. We stand for the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity of states. (The White House, 2021) Amidst rising concerns over geopolitical tensions, Cambodia pursues its opening-up and international integration policy based on the principles of mutual respect, equal sovereignty, mutual trust, and mutual interest. Promoting a rules-based, open, and inclusive regionalism and multilateralism will remain Cambodia’s key guiding foreign policy strategy. Concerning FOIP, Cambodia only supports the versions developed by

A Cambodian Perspective 89

ASEAN and Japan because these two versions are perceived as more inclusive and neutral. A more active engagement of the EU in the Indo-Pacific is a welcome move. Although Cambodia does not have a clear, official stand on the EU’s IndoPacific strategy, by looking at the key cooperation areas, Cambodia would welcome the active roles of the EU in the region as long as it is complementary to ASEAN integration and connectivity projects, and more importantly, the EU proves that it acts independently from the United States. There are seven priority areas that the EU is interested in advancing under the framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy: (a) sustainable and inclusive prosperity, (b) green transition, (c) ocean governance, (d) digital governance and partnerships, (e) connectivity, (f) security and defence, and (g) human security. Cambodia is trying to promote a stronger partnership between the EU and ASEAN because these two regional organisations can work together to build an inclusive, just, and multipolar world order. In other words, the EU should not reinforce the binary choice that ASEAN is increasingly confronting as a result of the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China. It is also in the EU’s interest to join ASEAN to advance inclusivity, complementarity, and multilateralism to ensure peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. In this connection, given the absence of an Indo-Pacific institution, the EU and ASEAN can further empower open and inclusive regionalism. The EU is perceived in Cambodia as one of the key economic and strategic partners that can help ASEAN mitigate the impacts and pressures caused by China–US rivalry. The ongoing US–China tense relations are detrimental to regional peace and stability and put enormous foreign policy constraints and challenges on small states. Maintaining ASEAN’s unity and centrality is a matter of survival for small states. ASEAN is widely perceived as the shield to protect the interests of small states and middle powers in Southeast Asia. By exercising collective agency, ASEAN could enhance its relevance and leverage. In this connection, Cambodia has sent a clear signal that any major initiatives shall be open, inclusive, transparent, and rules-based. Cambodia welcomes all major initiatives that are not aimed at fuelling rivalry but instead complementing the existing mechanisms so that they would bring about stability, security, peace, and prosperity to the region based on mutual respect, mutual understanding, and mutual benefit. All Indo-Pacific strategies should focus on functional and economic cooperation. The AOIP is one of the key regional initiatives to navigate ASEAN through the US–China rivalry by strengthening and socialising ASEAN norms, promoting ASEAN centrality and engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and connecting ASEAN with other regional mechanisms in the Pacific and Indian oceans. Therefore, operationalising the AOIP is critical to enhancing the collective agency of ASEAN.

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Conclusion

With these uncertainties and anxiety over FOIP, it is imperative to ensure that all Indo-Pacific projects are open, inclusive, and complementary, and more importantly, support regional stability, security, peace, and prosperity. Truth be told, any temptation to impose a unilateral approach to regional security will be denounced, as will attempts to encircle or contain others in the region. The consensus among great powers is clearly vital for the promotion of the Indo-Pacific concept and thus regional peace and prosperity. However, small powers and regional institutions must be part of the process as well. Rather than taking sides in the US–China rivalry and the emerging bifurcation of the regional order, other major powers, including the EU, need to work with ASEAN in order to ensure an inclusive, transparent, rules-based regional order. Cambodia has raised concerns over the impact of the strategy on geopolitical bifurcation in the region. So far, Cambodia has registered support for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific, given these two versions are more inclusive and focus on economic and functional cooperation. The AOIP has set basic norms of international relations that fit well into Cambodia’s foreign policy principles, such as inclusivity, openness, non-interference, equality, mutual respect, mutual benefit, and the respect of international law. References Aristyo, R. D. (2021, September 29). Reformulating ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. East Asia Forum. https://www​.eastasiaforum​.org ​/2021​/09​/29​/ reformulating​-aseans​-outlook​-on​-the​-indo​-pacific/ Chheang, V. (2018). Economic Pragmatism and Regional Economic Integration: The Case of Cambodia. Asia Pacific Bulletin, East-West Centre. https://www​ .eastwestcenter​.org​/publications​/economic​-pragmatism​-and​-regional​- economic​ -integration​-the​- case​- cambodia Chheang, V. (2021). Cambodia’s Multifaceted Foreign Policy and Agency in the Making. The Pacific Review. DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1998203 De Castro, R. (1994). U.S. Grand Strategy in Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific. Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 342–353. European Commission. (2021). The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. https://ec​.europa​.eu ​/info​/sites ​/default ​/files ​/jointcommunication ​_ indo​_ pacific ​_ en​ .pdf Global Times. (2021, July 20). US and its Allies are the Past; Russia and China are the Future: Russian Scholar. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/202107​/1229130​ .shtml Ha, H. T. (2021). ASEAN Navigates between Indo-Pacific Polemics and Potentials. ISEAS Perspective 2021/49. Khmer Times. (2019, May 17). Cambodia Supports Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. https://www​ . khmertimeskh ​ . com ​ / 605150 ​ /cambodia​ - supports ​ - japans ​ - indo​ -pacific​-strategy/

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Luo, J. J. and Un, K. (2021). Japan Passes China in the Sprint to Win Cambodian Hearts and Minds. ISEAS Perspective. https://www​.iseas​.edu​.sg ​/articles​ -commentaries​/ iseas​-perspective ​/ 2021​-59​-japan​-passes​- china​-in​- the​- sprint​- to -win​- cambodian​-hearts​-and​-minds​-by​-luo​-jing​-jing​-and​-kheang​-un/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia. (2021). ASEAN Day Message by Prime Minister Hun Sen. https://www​.mfaic​.gov​ .kh ​/files ​/ uploads ​/ R5YT34UWWFQ7​ / STPM ​_ ASEAN​%20Day​%20Message​ %202021​%20English​%20(Final%20for%20Release).pdf Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2007). Confluence of the Two Seas. Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India. https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/region​/asia​-paci​/pmv0708​/speech​-2​.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2019). Diplomatic Bluebook 2019. https:// www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/policy​/other​/ bluebook​/2019​/ html​/chapter1​/c0102​.html​#sf01 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. (2020). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Questions at a Plenary Session of the Raisina Dialogue International Conference, New Delhi. https://www​.mid​.ru ​/en ​/foreign​_policy​/ news/-​/asset​_publisher​/cKNonkJE02Bw​/content​/id​/3994885 Nikkei Asia. (2021, September 29). U.S. Sanctions Spur China and Russia to Build Up Cross-border Links. https://asia​.nikkei​.com ​/ Politics​/ International​-relations​ /U​. S.​-sanctions​-spur​- China​-and​-Russia​-to​-build​-up​- cross​-border​-links2 Nurliana, K. (2021, July 22). US-China Rivalries: What Matters for ASEAN. The Interpreter. https://www​.lowyinstitute​.org ​/the​-interpreter​/us​- china​-rivalries​ -what​-matters​-asean Phnom Penh Post. (2021, June 29). PM Warns of Great Power Divide. https://www​ .phnompenhpost​.com​/national​-politics​/pm​-warns​-great​-power​-divide Rozman, G. (2021, April–June). The QUAD: Contrasting Chinese and US Perceptions. The Asan Forum, Vol. 9, No. 2. https://theasanforum​.org ​/the​-quad​ -contrasting​- chinese​-and​-us​-perceptions/ Rumer, E. and Sokolsky, R. (2021, June 17). Chinese-Russian Defence Cooperation is More Flash than Bang. Commentary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment​.org ​/2021​/06​/17​/chinese​-russian​-defense​ -cooperation​-is​-more​-flash​-than​-bang​-pub​-84787 Sok, S. (2020). Reflections on ASEAN-Japan Partnership. AVI Policy Brief, No. 16. The White House. (2021). Joint Statement from QUAD Leaders. https://www​ .whitehouse​.gov​/ briefing​-room ​/statements​-releases ​/ 2021​/ 09​/ 24​/joint​- statement​ -from​-quad​-leaders/ Wilkins, Thomas S. (2018). Australia and the Indo-Pacific Concept – Disambiguating the Idea and the Region from Quadrilateral Strategy. The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Policy Brief. https://www​.jiia​-jic​.jp​/en​/policybrief​/pdf​/ PolicyBrief​_Wilkins​_ Australia​_ and​_the​_ Indo​_ Pacific​_ comcept​.pdf World Investment News. (1998). Interview with Hun Sen, Prime Minister Royal Government of Cambodia. http://www​.winne​.com​/topinterviews​/sen​.html Wu, S. and Jayanath, C. (2020). Indo-Pacific Strategy and China’s Response. Institute for China-America Studies. https://chinaus​-icas​.org ​/staging ​/6779​/wp​ -content​/uploads​/2019​/10​/ Indo​-Pacific​- Strategy​-and​- Chinas​-Response​.pdf

7 MYANMAR’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE INDO-PACIFIC Chaw Chaw Sein

Introduction

Since assuming office in 2021, President Biden has renewed the commitment of the United States to the Indo-Pacific by cooperating with its allies to overcome economic and security challenges and address the COVID-19 pandemic. The aim is believed to be an extension of US President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” policy, which signalled Washington’s attempt to maintain the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Under former President Trump, it was clear that the United States paid more attention to the Middle East rather than to the Indo-Pacific, even though the President highlighted “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) and renamed the United States Pacific Command (US–PACOM) to the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) in May 2018. Unlike President Obama, President Trump only attended one ASEAN Summit during his tenure (Trump meeting with ASEAN leaders in 2019). The Trump administration’s first presidential trip to Asia in November 2017 introduced a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework”. In September 2017, Japan released a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” foreign policy to broaden Japan’s foreign policy vision by combining “Two Continents, Two Oceans” as an overarching, comprehensive concept. It was accepted by the Trump administration as well (Consulate-General of Japan, n.d.). At the APEC CEO Summit, Trump emphasised the importance of the rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation and overflight, particularly open marine lanes, when discussing the FOIP framework (Storey and Cook, 2017, p. 7). As a member of ASEAN located at the junction of the Indo-Pacific, it is crucial for Myanmar to pay attention to the Indo-Pacific strategy without DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-8

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ignoring China’s position in the region. In implementing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Myanmar is inevitably in either a risky or safe situation in the domain of the US attempt to balance China. ASEAN adopted the “ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific” at the 34th ASEAN Summit in 2019 in response to the FOIP. The AOIP was initiated by Indonesia. The ASEAN Charter emphasises “the centrality of ASEAN in external political, economic, social and cultural relations while remaining actively engaged, outward-looking, inclusive and non-discriminatory” (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2008). The Charter expresses ASEAN’s aspiration to maintain its centrality in the regional processes and in the conduct of its external affairs. In conformity with ASEAN’s centrality, the AOIP expresses ASEAN’s intention to retain its critical position in the growing regional architecture in Southeast Asia and the surrounding region. Although ASEAN adopted the AOIP, the national interests and interactions with the major powers informed the different perspectives of ASEAN member states on the Indo-Pacific concept. For instance, the ways in which Indonesia and Vietnam’s national interests framed their perspectives on the Indo-Pacific can be explored. For Indonesia, ASEAN centrality acts as a key strategy in its Indo-Pacific vision to manage its external affairs in the IndoPacific region and attempt to enhance Indonesia’s leadership role in ASEAN as well as its reputation as a global middle power. Indonesia’s view on the Indo-Pacific focusses on boosting maritime trade, connectivity, and conserving marine resources instead of delving into the great power rivalry (Ha, 2021, p. 5). Vietnam’s embrace of the Indo-Pacific is more concerned with leveraging its own security and economic interests than with promoting the AOIP. Vietnam intends to keep a rules-based regional order and avoid the dominance of a single hegemonic power in the regional security structure. In this context, the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States with its allies, such as Japan, India, and Australia, will render Vietnam’s strength in its bargaining and negotiations with China, particularly on the South China Sea issue (Ha, 2021, p. 5). The economic recovery and political changes brought on by the COVID19 pandemic have created uncertainty for countries in the ASEAN region. These uncertainties provide an opportunity for the major powers to transform from competition to cooperation. China was on the move from mask diplomacy to vaccine diplomacy by providing assistance to ASEAN member states to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, the United States has introduced the FOIP to counter the Chinese BRI in order to meet the infrastructure development needs of low- and middle-income countries in the developing world. Indeed, President Biden launched “Build Back Better World” (B3W) at the G-7 Summit (The White House, 2021). In addition, the visits of US Vice-President Kamala Harris to some ASEAN countries have

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shown how the United States has paid attention to the ASEAN region to fulfil its commitment to the Indo-Pacific. In this regional context, where the great powers aim to assert their regional influence, what is Myanmar’s perspective on the Indo-Pacific? Being the only country in Southeast Asia with extensive borders with China and India, two significant regional actors, Myanmar holds a pivotal position at the heart of the Indo-Pacific. After a short discussion on the Indo-Pacific and its implications on ASEAN, the chapter examines Myanmar’s outlook on the Indo-Pacific and highlights the implications of the Indo-Pacific in the post-pandemic world. Indo-Pacific and Its Implications on ASEAN

As the powerful militaries of the United States and its allies enlarge their footprints in the Indo-Pacific, the region has become an arena for cooperation and confrontation, and the complex interplay of power politics. To formulate Trump’s policy, the US Department of State issued three significant reports. In December 2017, the United States issued a “National Security Strategy”, calling China “a revisionist power”. In June 2019, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued the 64-page Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. It recommended the 3Ps: “Preparedness, Partnerships, and the Promotion of a Networked Region” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2019, p. 4). In November 2019, the Department of State published the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision”. It underlined how the United States would work together with partners and identified India as a partner to address shared challenges and advance a shared vision (Paskal, 2021, p. 12). Moreover, the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Admiral Phil Davidson’s statement in the APCSS1 Alumni Newsletter focussing on the Indo-Pacific is noteworthy: The current global security and economic system, coupled with the strong commitment of like-minded allies and partners, will sustain economic growth for the benefit of all of the Indo-Pacific … and not one belt one road to one country. Similarly, acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan, in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee stated on 14 March 2019: Starting in the Indo-Pacific, our priority theater, we continue to pursue many belts and many roads by keeping our decades-old alliances strong and fostering growing partnerships. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2019, p. 2)

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In its response to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, ASEAN introduced its AOIP at the 34th ASEAN Summit, held in Thailand. It was the first official expression of ASEAN’s view on the concept that clarifies areas of cooperation rather than sidelines the rival powers. The AOIP is not a new concept as it is in line with ASEAN’s norms and values contained in the ASEAN Charter. When President Biden embarked on the presidency, he reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific region by attending the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) meeting. Secretary of Defense Lloyd George reemphasised the focus on the Indo-Pacific when he visited some countries in Southeast Asia (Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam) (Vuving, 2021). Many geographers, politicians, scholars, and military planners adopt different approaches to the Indo-Pacific. Asian countries have different perspectives on the Indo-Pacific concept. Japan, an important ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, takes an interest in the concept and plays a crucial role in the cooperation and promotion of the Indo-Pacific. India is a key advocate of the Indo-Pacific concept because it can use this opportunity to promote the justification and rationalisation of its interests in the South Asia and Asia region and can strengthen its political, economic, and military cooperation with the United States and its allies. With this interest in mind, India became a signatory to QUAD. Another driving factor for India is its interest in countering the threat of China, particularly China’s naval aspirations to move towards the Indian Ocean. As for Australia, the Indo-Pacific strategy has become a significant strategic consideration, based on the country’s geographic location and interest in ensuring its security in a stable and prosperous neighbourhood. For several decades, the security and economic prosperity of the Asia-Pacific have been a key strategic consideration for Australia. The origin of the idea of the Asia-Pacific emerged during the 1970s and 1980s at the initiation of Japan and Australia, who sought the United States’ participation in establishing a politically stable and economically prosperous East Asia. This paved the way for Australia to associate itself more closely with East Asia through the concept (Brewster, 2021). Based on its geographic proximity and the changing international and regional circumstances, Australia’s consideration of the Indo-Pacific began in the 2010s. The official use of the term “Indo-Pacific” in Australia’s policies can be traced to 2011–2012 (Scott, 2013, p. 5). Its interpretation of the term “Indo-Pacific” is based on the structural maritime trends in Asia, in which China’s rising power has focused on accomplishing the Maritime Silk Road strategy. The burgeoning economic and security interests of China, along with Japan and other East Asian states’ strategic engagements in the Indian Ocean, and India’s growing role in the Pacific, have effectively erased the traditional separation between India and the Pacific Ocean. These circumstances contributed to Australia’s policies, strategic agreements, and

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logic on the Indo-Pacific (Scott, 2013, p. 5). In its 2013 Defence White Paper, Australia noted the formation of a single strategic arc in the Indo-Pacific by expressing its first official adoption of the term, “Indo-Pacific region” (Parliament of Australia, 2013). For Australia’s strategic imperatives, the idea of an interdependent strategic and economic space between India and the Pacific Ocean provides it a more cohesive and unified regional strategy and connects the broader region. Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy embarked on growing defense and security cooperation between India as well as the QUAD. For the ASEAN member states, the question is whether embracing the Indo-Pacific will allow them to preserve ASEAN centrality. Some ASEAN member states have embraced the AOIP, while others fear the concept due to their close relationship with China. Their reactions to the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” are varied. While Indonesia and Singapore embrace the concept of an “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, small countries like Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV), which are geographically and economically linked with China, are cautious about this regional concept as they need to sustain their relationship with China. Instead of developing a coherent view on this concept, each member country will prioritise its economy rather than its security, especially as they recover from the uncertainties of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, ASEAN’s centrality and unity remain the core priority in their relations with dialogue partners. ASEAN has sustained its relations with dialogue partners due to the notion of “centrality” enshrined in the ASEAN Charter. The Indo-Pacific is a critical test of ASEAN centrality. Several cases have been on ASEAN’s agenda. Recalling the case of the South China Sea in 2012, ASEAN failed to issue a joint communique when Cambodia took ASEAN Chairmanship. When Chinese President Xi formulated the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative (later coined the Belt and Road Initiative) in 2013, there were different views on China’s OBOR among the ASEAN member states. Before formulating the BRI, China invited many actors, including civil society organisations, media, and scholars of ASEAN countries to explore the possible meanings of the OBOR. Three years later, some ASEAN countries fell into the domain of both the OBOR orbit and China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Taking cognisance of China’s manoeuvres, the US extended its Asia-Pacific strategy into the FOIP and this concept has been incorporated into President Biden’s foreign policy. The US FOIP and China’s BRI can have implications for the region and the ASEAN member states. In order to avoid power politics, ASEAN centrality is of major importance, as it can defend a multipolar world order in the IndoPacific. It may be assumed that the AOIP will either be a loss or a gain for ASEAN. The advantage for ASEAN is that it is now becoming a commercial corridor for major countries in the region. The Indo-Pacific articulated

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by the US administration recognises ASEAN as a strategic point between the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. At this juncture, it is important for ASEAN to take care to preserve its collective norms and centrality to avoid a loss. ASEAN is the world’s fifth-largest economic bloc. The region is also a key geostrategic and trade sphere of influence for the United States and its other external partners. The Mekong sub-region is geopolitically significant and strategically important to ASEAN’s dialogue partners. The region comprises the North–South economic corridor, East–West corridor, South corridor, Northwestern corridor, and Western corridors (Hill and Menon, 2020, p. 9). ASEAN is now becoming a commercial corridor for major countries in the region, as its dialogue partners such as China, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are eager to play a role in establishing regional connectivity and economic corridors in the context of the sub-regional cooperation mechanisms. The external major powers’ involvement in the sub-regional frameworks are China’s Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), the US’s Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), now the Mekong–US Partnership, Japan’s Mekong–Japan Cooperation, South Korea’s Mekong–Republic of Korea (ROK) Cooperation, and India’s Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC). Myanmar’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific

Myanmar’s geostrategic position is central to the strategies of the two major powers, the US’s FOIP and China’s BRI. Its deep-sea ports could be potential hubs for commercial and naval strategy. Its maritime territory is located in the Bay of Bengal, near choke points of the Indian Ocean Sea lanes and a crucial area that cannot be ignored by all great powers in the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, it is key for ocean access to Southern China and India’s supremacy in the Indian Ocean. With such a strategic location, Myanmar has balanced its foreign policy with pragmatic engagement diplomacy since 2010, after its political transition from military to civilian rule, in an effort to avoid major power politics. Myanmar has been under a Provisional Government since the military seized power on 1 February 2021 and has been facing various domestic challenges while a democratic transition is underway. Myanmar’s geography will play a significant role in securing its national interest and national security, regardless of which government or leader is leading the country. In order to ensure its stability and its national interests, Myanmar will adhere to the non-aligned policy towards both the United States and China, which has been at the core of its foreign policy since independence. In its bilateral interactions with the United States, the Myanmar military began its engagement with the United States in 2013 by participating in the annual Thai-Cobra Gold exercise and attending security training at the Asia-Pacific Centre for

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Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii. Since then, the Indo-Pacific concept has captured Myanmar’s attention. Intentionally or unintentionally, the US policy formulation of “AsiaPacific” by Obama and Trump, and their framing of the “FOIP” coincide with Myanmar’s opening of a new chapter of international relations, particularly with the United States and China. Following the remarkable visits of President Obama to Myanmar in 2012 and 2014, to formulate his Asia-Pacific Strategy, Myanmar was in the political transition to democracy. Myanmar’s rapprochement with the United States demonstrates its new foreign policy orientation, even though it did not deviate from its core foreign policy practices. President U Thein Sein’s foreign policy approach from 2011 to 2016 emphasised a reconfiguration of foreign policy, by providing an opening to the West to bring about economic development and narrow the gap with the other countries in the region. In the regional context, Myanmar’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014 experienced hurdles with the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. As an ASEAN member state, as well as a non-claimant state, Myanmar determined its position on the South China Sea in line with its national interests and solidarity with ASEAN, the regional organisation. Myanmar, as ASEAN Chair, was also the coordinator for ASEAN–US dialogue relations and played a major role in engaging the ASEAN–US dialogue process, while the US policy on Asia agenda was referred to as the “Pivot to Asia”. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar was courted by some ASEAN member countries which are claimants to SCS. Several rounds of Track II diplomacy were conducted among the ASEAN think tanks. In order to avoid tensions and remain neutral, Myanmar handled the summit by issuing a statement concerning SCS. In an interview with “The Diplomat”, a Southeast Asian expert and emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales, Carl Thayer, said: The statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers highlights ASEAN unity on the fact that ongoing developments in the South China Sea are a source of serious concern because they have raised tensions. (Heijmans, 2014) When the Trump administration formulated the FOIP in 2017, Myanmar was under the administration of the National League for Democracy, on which many Myanmar people had placed high hopes to restore its relations with the West, particularly with the United States. However, due to the internal crisis of Northern Rakhine State on the Bengali issue, the relationship became complicated and brought Myanmar closer to China again. When China’s BRI policy gained diplomatic momentum, Myanmar was positive, participating in its AIIB initiative and signing Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) for BRI projects on infrastructure, deep-sea ports, highways, railway

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links, and industrial complexes. Bearing in mind the need to upgrade the seaports, and land and rail links to improve connectivity to ASEAN, Myanmar sees the BRI as an opportunity to support economic development and integration towards the ASEAN Economic Community. In considering the Indo-Pacific, Myanmar cannot neglect India’s presence in the Indian Ocean, its immediate neighbour. Myanmar’s location is between the military power of India and the rising military power of China. China has been building or upgrading ports around India: in Kyaukphyu (Myanmar), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Gwadar (Pakistan) and also by extending significant military, economic, and political support to these countries (Kaplan, 2013, p. 250). Myanmar is an immediate neighbour of China, which invested in the development of the Kyauk Phyu (Rakhine State) deep-sea port and special economic zone. In this context, India’s response to China’s action can be found in the context of three strategic circles. India considers the insurgency in Northeast India, which borders Myanmar, one of its inner strategic circles. The Indian Ocean and maritime security is India’s second strategic circle, while East Asia is part of its outer strategic circle (Sein, 2017, p. 8). India and Myanmar can strengthen the second strategic circle for India in the Indian Ocean and maritime security, for example, by bolstering their friendship and naval diplomacy through cooperation in tackling maritime security issues. Both Myanmar and India have already cemented naval-tonaval cooperation since Myanmar joined the India programme of the multinational naval exercise (MILAN) in 2008. Myanmar’s strong support for bilateral maritime collaboration in the Bay of Bengal is captured in a joint statement released on the occasion of President U Htin Kyaw’s state visit to India in August 2016. The India–Myanmar Coordinated Patrol (IMCOR) took place four times between 2013 and 2016. In 2016, India hosted the International Fleet Review at Vishakhapatnam port. It was the first time the Myanmar navy participated in the longest naval tour to engage with other countries’ navies. Myanmar’s navy has cooperated closely with India and has participated in India’s MILAN naval exercise, which focuses on maritime terrorism, piracy, humanitarian and search-and-rescue operations in recent years. From an academic point of view, rather than as a military planner, Myanmar Navy’s participation in MILAN is expected to improve its naval capacity in expanding its footprint in the Indian Ocean (Ministry of Defence of Myanmar, 2016, p. 34). When India became a signatory to the QUAD, Myanmar had to be cautious, as this security dialogue aims to balance China, and it may further stoke Chinese fears of encirclement. India is vital in the QUAD-based IndoPacific strategy, due to its strategic location and its growing maritime power. The question of why India’s vision of the Indian Ocean has transformed into the Indo-Pacific is one for the littoral countries to consider. It can be

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explained that China’s expanding influence in the Indian Ocean is due to its implementation of the BRI, which includes the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that connect China to the Indian Ocean. In the late 1990s, India and China established the sub-regional cooperation mechanism. The “Kunming Initiative” in 1999 was the foundation to launch the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) Forum for Regional Cooperation. This sub-regional cooperation mechanism connects China’s Southwest and India’s Northeast regions via Myanmar and Bangladesh to India’s Eastern seaboard in order to boost regional connectivity and enhance economic, trade, and people-to-people relations. As the BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation can connect the two major markets between China and India, Myanmar is the important link within this sub-regional mechanism. It complements the goals of the economically backward regions of China’s Yunnan Province and India’s Northeast region along the Myanmar, Bangladesh, China, and India borders. However, the BCIM was excluded from China’s BRI umbrella due to India’s anxieties over China’s influence in South and Southeast Asia (Karim and Islam, 2018, p. 297). Since India has not actively participated in the BCIM sub-regional cooperation initiative, China proposed initiating the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Myanmar in November 2017. China attempted to cooperate with Myanmar bilaterally while simultaneously waiting for India’s participation in BCIM (Aneja, 2019). CMEC is also a key component of China’s BRI. The corridor is estimated to be 1,700 kilometres long and will connect Kunming (Yunnan Province, China) and Myanmar (Thiha, 2018). Myanmar is committed to taking part in the implementation of the CMEC, which consists of three major components, including the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ); the China–Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone; and an urban development plan for Yangon (Lwin, 2018). The CMEC will link Kunming to Myanmar’s major economic hubs, first to Mandalay in central Myanmar, then to Yangon, and finally to the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) on the Bay of Bengal. It will lay the groundwork for implementing the “one belt, one road” (OBOR) idea by enabling the CMEC to access the Indian Ocean via Myanmar. The geopolitical landscape is changing, with a handful of major powers trying to improve their defence capabilities by forming alliances. Under these circumstances, Myanmar must stay cautious in preserving its national interest without swaying to either side. Indo-Pacific in the post-Pandemic World: Implications for Multilateralism

The Indo-Pacific region is undeniably the main arena for global power competition in the 21st century, with the growing emergence of the QUAD as

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a military power. Under this security complex, the COVID-19 pandemic has become a global challenge and has seriously affected the politics, governance, economy, and social stability of countries located along the IndoPacific. These countries have the opportunity to transform their competition for power into cooperation and extend their public diplomacy. At the 30th anniversary of ASEAN–China Dialogue Relations, which was held in Chongqing on 7 June 2021, the COVID-19 took centre stage on the agenda. China promised to help ASEAN in its economic recovery and pandemic recovery efforts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2021a). Based on China’s active cooperation with regional organisations like the LMC and its implementation of the BRI in the ASEAN region, one can assume that China’s assistance for the COVID-19 recovery efforts to the ASEAN states may be incorporated into the BRI projects and LMC projects. There is strong evidence that China will extend its pragmatic assistance to the LMC through its contributions to projects under the LMC Fund, which aim to reduce poverty, as this meets the needs for post-COVID-19 economic recovery (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2021b). China is interested in the LMC countries due to their strategic locations, abundant natural resources, market for investments, and connections to the BRI. From 2016 to 2021, six LMC Foreign Ministerial Meetings were held. China has been developing synergies between the LMC projects and the New International Land–Sea Trade Corridor (NILSTC). The NILSTC is a trade corridor that links western Chinese provinces and several ASEAN countries, including Myanmar and other Mekong countries. The corridor aims to boost Chongqing as a hub linking direct rail to Europe by reducing the need for cargo transportation. Since the establishment of the LMC, China has been advancing cooperation with the Mekong member countries by coordinating these efforts with the corridors under the BRI (Chen, 2019). In response to China’s active role in the region, the United States has shown its interest in the Mekong countries by transforming the Lower Mekong Initiative of 2009 into the Mekong–US Partnership (MUSP) in 2020 (U.S. Mission to ASEAN, 2020a). This partnership identifies several areas of cooperation, such as connectivity, energy, and non-traditional security issues. It is noteworthy that the MUSP resembles the AOIP (U.S. Mission to ASEAN, 2020b). The Mekong–US partnership is navigated by values that are also enshrined in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and the United States’ Indo-Pacific vision. The partnership’s complementarities with ACMECS, ASEAN, the Mekong River Commission, and other Mekong development partners and cooperation mechanisms are also guided by these values (United States Department of State, 2021). The Joint Ministerial Statement of the Mekong–US partnership in 2020 allocated millions to Mekong sub-region cooperation to support Mekong River Commissions and organise policy dialogue series by engaging policymakers, business communities, and other stakeholders (U.S. Mission to ASEAN,

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2020a). The action and engagement of the United States within the Mekong sub-region have reinforced and encouraged other major regional players such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia to strengthen and deepen their ties with the Mekong countries through their existing cooperative arrangements. These different sub-regional arrangements stand in contrast to the China-led LMC, which binds China closely with the Mekong countries. However, it is too early to predict if this partnership will bear fruit, as the economies of these countries have yet to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the US Department of State, the United States has delivered over 23 million vaccine doses and nearly US$ 158 million in emergency health and humanitarian aid to ASEAN states to combat the COVID-19 pandemic (Blinken, 2021). At the G-7 Summit in 2021, President Biden introduced the “Build Back Better World” initiative, known as B3W, which aims to meet the infrastructure needs of low- and middle-income countries stretching from Latin America to Africa and to the Indo-Pacific (The White House, 2021). China may assume that the B3W initiative will counter its BRI under the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. In this regard, the United States needs to clarify how revisiting the US Indo-Pacific Strategy will complement ASEAN’s existing mechanisms, not only with security matters but also with economic factors, especially to meet the economic development needs of the ASEAN member states as they recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. In light of this complex regional security architecture, it would be wise for ASEAN to encourage multilateralism through collaboration between the ASEAN countries and their external partners and pursue international cooperation in order to be free from dominance by any regional or external power. In recent years, multilateralism has been undermined, and the significance of liberal values in international institutions and global norms has decreased as many states prioritised their national interest by practising protectionism and nationalism. Nonetheless, ASEAN’s efforts to work together in the face of COVID-19 exemplify the strength of multilateralism in achieving common goals. ASEAN’s centrality is critical and urgently required to avoid the miscarriage of multilateralism. Note 1 The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) is a US Department of Defense institute in Honolulu, Hawai. The centre deals with regional security issues and advises the US Indo-Pacific Command.

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.com ​/ news ​/ international ​ / bangladesh ​ - china​ - india​- myanmar ​- bcim ​- economic​ -corridor​-no​-longer​-listed​-under​-bri​-umbrella ​/article26971613​.ece Blinken, A. J. (2021, August 5). The United States and ASEAN: Strategic Partners for the Indo-Pacific. U.S. Mission to ASEAN. https://asean​.usmission​.gov​/the​ -united​-states​-and​-asean​-strategic​-partners​-for​-the​-indo​-pacific/ Brewster, D. (2021, January 5). Australia’s view of the Indo-Pacific concept. India Foundation, New Delhi. https://indiafoundation​.in ​/articles​-and​- commentaries​/ australias​-view​-of​-the​-indo​-pacific​- concept/ Chen, Y. (2019, September 28). New international land-sea trade corridor becomes one of China’s key projects 2019. iChongqing. https://www​.ichongqing​.info​ /2019​/ 03​/ 25​/chongqing​- key​- project​-2019​- new​- international​- land​- sea​- trade​ -corridor/ Consulate-General of Japan. (n.d.). A new foreign policy strategy: Free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. Consulate-General of Japan, Sydney. https://www​.sydney​ .au​.emb​-japan​.go​.jp​/document ​/english ​/ Indo​-PacificStrategy​.PDF Ha, H. T. (2021). ASEAN navigates between Indo-Pacific polemics and potentials. Paper No.2021 - 49. ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. https://www​.iseas​.edu​.sg ​/wp​ -content​/uploads​/2021​/03​/ ISEAS​_ Perspective​_ 2021​_49​.pdf Heijmans, P. (2014, May 12). South China Sea dispute overshadows ASEAN Summit. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2014​/05​/south​- china​-sea​ -dispute​-overshadows​-asean​-summit/ Hill, H., and Menon, J. (2020). Economic corridors in Southeast Asia: Success factors, impacts and policy. Paper No. 2020 - 03, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. Kaplan, R. D. (2013). The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and The Battle Against Fate. Random House Trade Paperbacks. Karim, M. A., and Islam, F. (2018). Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor: Challenges and prospects. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 30(2), 283–302. https://doi​.org ​/10​. 22883​/ kjda​. 2018​. 30​. 2 ​.008 Lwin, N. (2018, September 13). Gov’t signs MoU with Beijing to build ChinaMyanmar economic corridor. The Irrawaddy. https://www​.irrawaddy​.com ​/news​ /burma​/govt​-signs​-mou​-beijing​-build​- china​-myanmar​- economic​- corridor​.html Ministry of Defence of Myanmar. (2016). Myanmar Navy Annual Magazine. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (2021a, June 7). Wang Yi attends special ASEAN-China foreign ministers' meeting in celebration of the 30th anniversary of dialogue relations. https://www​.fmprc​.gov​.cn ​/mfa ​_ eng ​/zxxx ​_ 662805​/ t1882097​.shtml Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (2021b, June 9). Ushering in another "Golden five year" of Lancang-Mekong cooperation. https://www​.fmprc​.gov​.cn ​/mfa ​_ eng​ /zxxx​_ 662805​/t1882522​.shtml Parliament of Australia. (2013). Defence White Paper. https://www​.aph​.gov​.au​/ About​_ Parliament​/ Parliamentary​_ Departments​/ Parliamentary​_ Library​/pubs​/rp​ /rp1516​/ DefendAust ​/2013 Paskal, C. (2021, March). Indo-Pacific strategies, perceptions and partnerships. The View from Seven Countries. Research Paper, Chatham House – Royal Institute of International Affairs. https://www​.chathamhouse​.org​/sites​/default​/files​/2021​- 03​ /2021​- 03​-22​-indo​-pacific​-strategies​-paskal​.pdf Scott, D. (2013). Australia’s embrace of the ‘Indo-Pacific’: New term, new region, new strategy? International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13(3), 425–448. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/irap​/ lct009 Sein, C. C. (2017, September 7). Myanmar-India Interaction in the context of dynamic international environment. The Global New Light of Myanmar, pp. 8–9.

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Storey, I., and Cook, M. (2017). The Trump administration and Southeast Asia: Enhanced engagement. Paper No. 2017–87, ISEAS Yusuf Ishak Institute. https:// www​.iseas​.edu​.sg ​/images​/pdf​/ ISEAS ​_ Perspective​_ 2017​_ 87​.pdf The ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta. (2008). The ASEAN Charter. https://asean​.org​ /wp​- content​/uploads​/ 2012​/ 05​/ 3.​- November​-2019​-The​-ASEAN​- Charter​-27th​ -Reprint​_ rev​-2711191​.pdf The White House. (2021, June 12). President Biden and G-7 leaders launch Build Back Better World (B3W) partnership. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/ briefing​ -room ​/statements​-releases​/2021​/06​/12 ​/fact​-sheet​-president​-biden​-and​-g7​-leaders -launch​-build​-back​-better​-world​-b3w​-partnership/ Thiha, A. (2018, August 29). Can Myanmar afford China’s belt and road? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2018​/08​/can​-myanmar​-afford​- chinas​-belt​ -and​-road/ U.S. Department of Defense. (2019). Indo-Pacific Strategy Report Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. https://media​.defense​.gov​ /2019​ / Jul ​ / 01 ​ / 2002152311/​ -1/​ -1 ​ / 1 ​ / DEPARTMENT​ - OF ​ - DEFENSE ​ - INDO​ -PACIFIC​- STRATEGY​-REPORT​-2019​.PDF U.S. Mission to ASEAN. (2020a, September 16). Mekong-U.S. Partnership Joint Ministerial Statement. https://asean​.usmission​.gov​/mekong​-u​-s​-partnership​ -joint​-ministerial​-statement/ U.S. Mission to ASEAN. (2020b, September 16). Launch of the Mekong-U.S. partnership: Expanding U.S. engagement with the Mekong region. https:// asean​ .usmission​ . gov​ / launch​ - of​ - the​ - mekong​ - u​ - s​ - partnership ​ - expanding​ - u​ - s​ -engagement​-with​-the​-mekong​-region/ United States Department of State. (2021, August 3). The Mekong-U.S. partnership and the friends of the Mekong: Proven partners for the Mekong region. https:// www​. state ​. gov​/ the ​- mekong ​- u ​- s ​- partnership ​- and ​- the ​-friends ​- of​- the ​- mekong​ -proven​-partners​-for​-the​-mekong​-region/ Vuving, A. L. (2021, August 20). Will Vietnam be America’s next strategic partner? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2021​/08​/will​-vietnam​-be​-americas​-next​ -strategic​-partner/

PART II

Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific The Intersecting Interests of Other Major Powers



Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group

http://taylorandfrancis.com

8 DIVIDE AND RULE China’s Responses to the Various Indo-Pacific Initiatives and Its Changing Relations with the ASEAN Jean-Pierre Cabestan

Introduction

The concept of Indo-Pacific is rather new. First coined by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016, it has rapidly been adopted by the United States, under the Trump presidency, and many US allies and partners, including Europe, Australia, India, France, the European Union (EU), the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and ASEAN. China, for its part, does not like this concept and prefers to stick to an older and more restrictive regional qualification – the Asia-Pacific region (Yataidiqu), underscoring its willingness to keep as much as possible South Asia, and in particular India as well as the Indian Ocean, outside of its strategic competition and increasing rivalry with the United States. But for ASEAN, it was hard to ignore the notion of the Indo-Pacific. Obvious geographical reasons have naturally persuaded ASEAN to embrace it (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019). More importantly, perhaps, China’s unprecedented rise and assertiveness of power have convinced ASEAN to adopt it and, as a result move closer to the United States and its allies. True, this balancing or hedging strategy has not been endorsed by each ASEAN member state. Nonetheless, as we will see, this trend is visible among the most significant ASEAN countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam. This chapter aims to understand first what has been the main driver of the emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept: China. Then, it explores China’s reaction to it, as well as the strategies attached to it, and how this reaction has affected this country’s relationship with its major partners. Finally, it attempts to assess both Beijing’s strategy towards the ASEAN and Southeast DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-10

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Asian nations’ reaction to it in this new context. It concludes that, despite some setbacks, Xi Jinping’s activism and assertiveness have been able to limit ASEAN’s rapprochement with the United States and, more importantly compel all its members to maintain decent working relations with China. China: The Main Driver of the Indo-Pacific Concept

In retrospect, it is clear that China’s rise has been the main driver of the emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept as well as the various strategies attached to it. In this respect, we need to be clear about the sequencing. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, more than the 2008 Beijing Olympics which confirmed China’s growing influence and power, the real turning point was the global financial crisis which broke out not long after in the same year. Since then, Chinese officials and experts think that the West, and especially the United States, is in decline. After Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as CCP General Secretary in late 2012, this assumption was summarised by the following formula: “The East rises, the West falls” (dongshengxijiang) (Yang, 2014; Chen, 2021). China’s growing assertiveness in the later years of Hu’s rule convinced the US administration to give more attention to the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, in November 2011, when visiting Australia, President Barack Obama launched a new “pivot” or “rebalancing” strategy aimed at giving priority to the region. He then announced that 60 per cent of the US Navy ships would be deployed in the Asia-Pacific, reducing the US military footprint in Europe, and opening a new US base in Darwin where around 2,500 Marines would be stationed. As soon as he acceded to power, Xi Jinping went further than his predecessor. In the autumn of 2013, in Astana, Kazakhstan, and then in Jakarta, Indonesia, he launched the now-famous Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, yidaiyiluchangyi), then called in English – One Belt, One Road (OBOR) (Schneider, 2021). Presented as a purely economic project, this initiative clearly had from its outset a strong strategic component: to minimise the impact of the United States’ rebalancing by leveraging China’s new financial and entrepreneurial capacities across both the Eurasian continent and the Indian Ocean all the way to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. A year later, in November 2014, at an important foreign policy conference, Xi finally buried for good Deng Xiaoping’s cautious diplomacy, known as “avoid the light and keep a low profile” (taoguangyanghui), replacing it with a new slogan: “thrive for achievements” (fenfayouwei) (Cabestan, 2022: 67–68). China then decided to take more initiatives and, step by step play a leading role in international affairs, more directly competing with the United States with the ultimate aim to supplant it. This objective became

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even more obvious after the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held in October 2017. In 2014, Xi’s priority was to establish a “new type of great power relationship” with the United States, hoping that he would be able to stabilise it as long as China would remain weaker. However, his ambition was already clear: knowing that the Chinese economy would surpass the American economy around 2030, Xi wanted to gradually move his country to the “central stage” of the world, a formulation that would be endorsed by the 19th Congress. In other words, as soon as he came to power, Xi aspired to “make China great again”! In the same period, Xi adopted a much more aggressive strategy in the South China Sea: between 2012 and 2016, he ordered the construction of artificial islands on the rocks, shoals, and reefs that Beijing controlled in the Spratly archipelago and later had them militarised, despite the promise made in 2015 to Obama not to do so. Moreover, after independence-leaning Tsai Ing-wen was elected president of Taiwan in 2016, Xi ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and Air Force to intensify their intimidation operations in the Taiwan Strait, regularly crossing its middle line and violating the island’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), and sometimes territorial waters and airspace (Cabestan, 2023: 102–106). In implementing this strategy, Xi has underscored his willingness to speed up Taiwan’s reunification with China, at all costs and whatever the means used. More generally, since Xi’s accession to power, China’s foreign and security policy has become both more proactive and more assertive. The Emergence of Various Indo-Pacific Strategies

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe coined the very concept of Indo-Pacific in 2016. Then, Abe promoted for the first time his “free and open IndoPacific strategy” (jiyū de hirakaretaIndotaiheiyōsenryaku), which ambition has been to bring together nations and regional organisations that value freedom, the rule of law, and market economy, and that are “free from force or coercion”. Since then, the Japanese government has often emphasised that this strategy does not aim at countering China’s BRI, let alone containing its rise. However, this was clearly a balancing act prepared in close coordination with the United States (Szechenyi and Hosoya, 2019). Yet, it is the Trump Administration’s own Indo-Pacific strategy, launched in November 2017 in Da Nang, Vietnam, that has been the real game changer. There, Donald Trump called for an “open and free Indo-Pacific”, integrating US strategy towards East Asia and South Asia and including in this region all the territories and seas from the “West coast of India to the western shores of the United States” (Congressional Research Service, 2018). This speech and all the documents issued by the Trump Administration in

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the following years were clearly targeting China, aimed at managing its rise and, if not containing it, at least constraining it in the major regional flashpoints (South and East China Seas, Taiwan Strait) and preventing it from dominating the region (The White House, 2017). Additional Indo-Pacific initiatives were taken later by other actors such as India, Australia, France (France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, 2022; France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, 2021), the European Union (The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 2021), Germany, Canada, and ASEAN. But issued by middle powers or regional organisations and often privileging soft security and connectivity over hard security, they have been much less targeted against China or even aimed at balancing this country’s rise. As a result, they have had much less impact on China’s foreign policy, particularly its policy towards Southeast Asia. After coming into office, contrary to what some Chinese experts had hoped – they were dreaming of a “reset” – Joe Biden has carried on and even amplified Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy. While he has abandoned Trump’s Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s plan to push for a “regime change” in China, he has increased US pressure on all the fronts on which Xi had tried to push forward: the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the East China Sea (The White House, 2021). On commercial issues, he has kept many of the custom duties imposed on Beijing by his predecessor. But he went further: in September 2021, he announced the conclusion of the AUKUS Pact, a security agreement between Washington, Canberra, and London that includes the delivery of eight nuclear-propelled submarines to Australia. It is the first time ever that a non-nuclear country is promised nuclear submarines. This pact also enhances Australia’s and, to some extent the United Kingdom’s security commitments in case of a military crisis or conflict in one of the flashpoints where the US Navy and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may clash, particularly the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Finally, after Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Biden Administration put additional pressure on the Chinese government to prevent it from cooperating too closely with the Putin regime, with whom, three weeks earlier, on 4 February 2022, Xi had established a “partnership without limits” and issued a highly anti-Western and anti-US joint statement. For example, the US government threatened Beijing with sanctions on any Chinese company that would provide military equipment or high-tech products to Russia. The war in Ukraine has also contributed to unifying the United States and its allies both in Europe (NATO) and in Asia (Japan, South Korea) in their willingness to impose unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia, a unity that has worried Xi, now compelling him to think twice before launching a military attack against Taiwan (Cabestan, 2023: 108–110).

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China’s Reaction: Driving a Wedge between the US and Its Allies

All these initiatives and developments have forced China to react and adapt. Its main reaction has been to try as much as possible to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, both in Europe and in Asia. It has also developed a more aggressive style of public communication, the nowfamous “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy. In the EU, the Chinese government has continued to privilege its relations with Germany, and even more with France, a country that, known for its Gaullist penchant, is supposed to be more independent from the United States and more recalcitrant to American bossiness. For example, the Chinese government has tried to take advantage of France’s angry reaction to the AUKUS Pact and, especially, Australia’s decision to cancel its submarine construction contract with the French group DSN, to woo Paris and convince it to adopt a more accommodating policy towards Beijing. With the same objective in mind, it has utilised and even exaggerated France’s friction with the United Kingdom, painting the latter as a servile junior partner of the United States. China has more generally attempted to move the European Union away from the United States in developing a more understanding, but in substance not very different, policy towards the former. In East Asia, the Chinese government has adopted an identical strategy towards Japan and South Korea. In spite of Tokyo’s close security relationship with Washington, Beijing has softened its policy towards Prime Minister Kishida’s government. With Seoul, Beijing has rapidly left behind the 2017 Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) crisis after President Moon Jae-In had promised Xi not to add any new antimissile systems. The election of Yoon Suk-Yeol as South Korean president in March 2022 has given Xi the occasion to propose to establish with this country a much closer partnership with the hope that it will take some distance from the United States, even if Yoon, a conservative, is less ready than his predecessor to move in that direction. In other words, divide and rule has been China’s major reaction to the various Indo-Pacific initiatives and the United States’ attempt to unite its allies. Whether such a strategy can succeed is another matter. Led since December 2021 by Olaf Scholz, a social democrat Prime Minister less ready to cooperate with China than Angela Merkel and pressured by his green Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, Germany has become significantly more cautious. Likewise, under President Emmanuel Macron, France has not been seduced by Xi’s sirens. After his visit to China in April 2023, Macron had to rectify some of his unwise comments made on his way back about Taiwan: if a war breaks out in the Strait, France has no choice but to side with the United States. And more generally, influenced by these two key

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member states, the EU has embarked since 2019 on a policy that has turned China into a “systemic rival”. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has strengthened rather than weakened NATO. It has contributed to more rapidly overcoming the tensions that had emerged between Paris and London in September 2021. Finally, in the IndoPacific region, India and Australia have had to face a more aggressive China, which has convinced them to move closer to the United States. True, on the war in Ukraine, like Beijing, Delhi abstained from condemning Moscow because of its long-time dependence upon Russian armaments. Nonetheless, Sino–Indian relations have remained tense since the deadly confrontation on their shared border in the Himalayas in June 2020. Despite a change of government and the return of the Labour Party to power in May 2022, Australia has not compromised; it has gradually stabilised its relationship with China only after this country lifted the restrictions it had imposed on the import of some of its products as retaliation against Canberra’s pushback against Beijing’s increasingly blatant interferences in its domestic affairs. Simultaneously, the Chinese government has adopted a more aggressive form of international communication: the “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy. The expression comes from a 2017 Chinese blockbuster called “Wolf Warrior 2” that shows how far Beijing and the PLA are ready to go to protect Chinese nationals overseas, in this case in a lawless African country. Actually, as early as 2014, Xi had instructed his diplomats to be more outspoken and to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy every time China is attacked. But the Wolf Warrior diplomacy has become much more widespread and visible after the 19th Party Congress, contributing to antagonising more countries, particularly in the Global North. In contrast, with the Global South, with which it identifies and that it claims to lead, and ASEAN in particular, Beijing has been more cautious, avoiding adopting too aggressive discourse and diplomatic style. Likewise, in ASEAN, China’s divide and rule policy seems to have borne more fruit for reasons that we are going to develop now. Intensifying Relations with ASEAN

It must first be indicated that despite the above-mentioned multiple attempts of pushback against China, there has been in reality much more continuity than change in China’s policy towards Southeast Asia. Since 2017, Beijing has continued to develop close political, economic, and educational/cultural relations with ASEAN and its member states. It has kept promoting its “good neighbourhood” policy with the region. In 2019, China–Southeast Asia trade overtook China–EU trade, turning the ASEAN into China’s first trade partner (US$ 644 billion against US$ 635 billion), representing 14 per cent of China’s foreign trade. Three years later, in 2022, the gap was wider:

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US$ 970 billion against US$ 900 billion, highlighting East Asian economies’ growing integration and their trade regionalisation. Simultaneously, Chinese investment in Southeast Asia increased: while its stock amounted to US$ 155 billion in 2022, its flow is now higher than the US investment flow to the region. Besides, Chinese tourism in Southeast Asia continued to grow until the beginning of the pandemic, and again since early 2023. These data also show how much Southeast Asia has been a strong supporter of and an active participant in Xi Jinping’s BRI, endorsing a large number of Chinese infrastructure projects (Jakarta–Bandung high-speed train, Boten–Vientiane railway line, Kunming–Shwe oil and gas pipelines, to mention some of the most ambitious ones) and economic corridors (BCIM or Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar, Yunnan–Singapore). The Chinese government has also been a great promoter of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) initiated by ASEAN and concluded in November 2020. The Trump Administration’s decision made in early 2017 to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a much more ambitious and compelling trade agreement concluded by Obama with like-minded countries (such as Australia, Japan, Vietnam, and Singapore) to precisely prevent China from economically dominating the region, has enhanced the importance of the RCEP and opened a boulevard to Beijing’s regional ambitions. Carried forward by Japan, including Asia-Pacific countries such as Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam and concluded in March 2018, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) has tried to save the TPP. But the Biden Administration is unlikely to join in, preferring to launch in May 2022 a more ambitious but also more unrealistic and rather empty pact, the IndoPacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Yet, the various new Indo-Pacific strategies have directly contributed to intensifying China’s activism on all fronts in Southeast Asia: economic, diplomatic, cultural, ideological, geostrategic and military. In other words, while the BRI started to scale down in 2018 because Chinese banks’ reduced funding and recipient countries’ growing and unsustainable debt, instead of moderating its policy, Xi Jinping’s policy decided to double down, with the risk of antagonising more countries, including among its ASEAN partners. First, it has strengthened its presence in the South China Sea, a body of water whose land features are occupied by four different claimants (Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan) and claimed in totality (Vietnam, Taiwan) or in part (Malaysia, the Philippines) by them. In addition, two other countries, Brunei and Indonesia, question China’s nine-dash line, which puts nearly 90 per cent of the South China Sea under this country’s jurisdiction. Their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) clearly overlap this line. In the case of Indonesia, these conflicting claims have triggered tensions and sometimes face-offs between Chinese and Indonesian fishing

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boats and coast guards around the Natuna islands, leading to the destruction of a number of Chinese fishing trawlers by the Indonesian authorities. Moreover, while strengthening its defence of the Paracels (Xisha), the PLA has carried on its militarisation of the seven artificial islands that China has built in the Spratly (Nansha). In these circumstances, there is little chance that the ongoing negotiation between China and ASEAN on the adoption of a binding code of conduct in the South China Sea can yield any significant results in the coming years, contrary to what Beijing pretends. Simultaneously, implementing its “divide-and-rule” strategy, Beijing has been promoting close economic integration with ASEAN as a whole while privileging diplomatic and geostrategic closeness with the weakest and most vulnerable Southeast Asian nations, such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, and to some extent Burma. In Cambodia, China has strengthened its economic and strategic footprint, encouraging many Chinese companies to invest there, particularly in the Sihanoukville area and developing a port in nearby Ream that, many observers suspect, has the potential to be regularly used by the PLA Navy. Likewise, the completion of the railway line between Boten, Yunnan’s border city with Lao PDR, and Vientiane (422 km) in December 2021 will allow Beijing to become much more influential in this country. And the Chinese government has rapidly adjusted to the “new normal” in Burma after the 1 February 2021 military coup, taking advantage of the various sanctions imposed by the West to enhance its political engagement and economic cooperation with Naypyidaw. The various ethnic rebellions taking place in the north of Burma, particularly in 2023, compel the Chinese and the Burmese authorities to cooperate more rather than less in the future. With other ASEAN nations, the Chinese leadership has embarked on a strategy aimed at leveraging their internal political divisions, trying hard to rally the rulers or politicians (such as Prayuth Chan-o-cha and, since August 2023, Strettha Thavisin in Thailand and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines) who have been more inclined to cooperate with it while keeping pressure on the more hesitant (such as Mahathir Mohamad, then Muhyiddin Yassin in Malaysia, Lee Hsien Loong in Singapore, and Joko Widodo in Indonesia) or critical governments (such as Vietnam or Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr.’s Philippines). For example, despite the US–Thailand security treaty, Beijing has intensified its arms sales to Bangkok. In 2018, Prime Minister Prayuth ordered 49 VT-4 main battle tanks and three submarines from China (US$ 1 billion). Both countries also plan to open in Khon Kaen a joint commercial arms factory which will assemble and maintain land weapon systems for the Royal Thai Army. The Chinese state-owned group Norinco is involved. After Duterte’s election in 2016, Xi promised the Philippines an impressive economic package of investment, contributing to directly mellowing Manila’s stance on the South China Sea issue: as a result, Duterte stopped referring to

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the 12 July 2016 international tribunal’s arbitration decision which largely supported his country’s maritime claims there and embarked on a much more cooperative policy towards Beijing (Chang, 2021). However, after the election of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in May 2022, there have been growing threats in the South China Sea against the land features that the Philippines controls, especially Second Thomas Shoal. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has tried to rebalance his country’s relationship with China, strengthening its alliance with the United States. The growing PLA menace in the Taiwan Strait has also contributed to this evolution, with Marcos allowing the United States to potentially use more bases in northern Luzon, in case of a Taiwan contingency. Likewise, when Mahathir became Malaysian Prime Minister again in 2018, he suspended some of the infrastructure projects (railways, pipelines) funded by China, fearing that his country would face an unsustainable level of external debt. For instance, in September 2018, Minister of Finance Lim Guan Eng cancelled two oil and gas pipeline contracts, worth nearly US$ 3 billion, with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Nonetheless, economic and trade relations have continued to prosper, especially after Yassim succeeded Mahathir, while Malaysia has kept a low profile and stuck to a rather accommodating strategy in its dispute with China in the South China Sea (Ngeow, 2021). Singapore is more and more obviously worried about Xi’s assertiveness and is increasingly counting on the United States and its allies, namely Japan and Australia, to balance China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia. Step by step, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has enhanced Singapore’s security relations with the United States, and more generally with the West. Yet, by and large, he has remained cautious, supported by his public opinion, to keep close economic and people-to-people relations with Beijing (Choong, 2021). As the ASEAN’s largest country, Indonesia enjoys more leverage to balance China’s rise. Despite its frictions with Beijing on the delimitation of its EEZ, Jakarta has economically and politically moved closer to China, partly thanks to the BRI and the amount of Chinese money funding projects in the country. The United States’ lack of engagement or interest in Indonesia, together with a lighter economic presence there, also explains this evolution (Grossman, 2021). However, more recently, the Biden Administration has tried to correct this relative disengagement, elevating in November 2023, on the occasion of President Joko Widodo's visit, US–Indonesia ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Including both economic and security dimensions, this closer partnership is clearly aimed at balancing China’s ambitions in the region. Finally, China’s relations with Vietnam have remained mediocre, particularly because of the renewed tensions between both countries’ fishermen

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and coastguard vessels in the South China Sea. The strategic rapprochement between Hanoi and Washington, and also with Tokyo and New Delhi, is also complicating Sino–Vietnamese relations. Nonetheless, the CCP has been able to instrumentalise its party-to-party relations with the Vietnamese Communist Party, as well as Vietnam’s strong economic dependence upon China, to mitigate these tensions, especially in the South China Sea. In other words, since it has become more assertive, China has been facing some pushback from some ASEAN countries (Patey, 2021). The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has also shown the limits of China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia. While Vietnam and Laos also abstained from criticising Russia in the United Nations because of their close military partnership with this country, all other ASEAN countries have condemned, in their UN votes, Putin's aggression. Nonetheless, China’s activism and its sheer economic and geostrategic weight have compelled all ASEAN countries, including the most recalcitrant, to maintain decent, if not always smooth, relations with it. Conclusion

The Indo-Pacific strategy introduced by Japan, the United States, and other countries has been a reaction to China’s rise and assertiveness as well as to Xi Jinping’s BRI. It is clear now that to balance China’s growing influence, the concept of Asia-Pacific is outdated. The second world economy’s international outreach and ambitions in the Indian Ocean, Africa, and the Middle East amply justify the adoption of the notion of the Indo-Pacific. As we have seen, Beijing, in return has reacted in kind, doubling down on all fronts, and introducing a more aggressive style of public communication, the “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy. The Chinese government’s new attitude has directly damaged its relations with the United States, Japan, the European Union, and more generally the “Global North”, creating a vicious circle out of which it has become very hard to get out. In other words, China and the West are very much in a new type of Cold War. Moreover, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has deepened the fault line that splits China from the West. In the ASEAN region, China’s growing activism and influence have triggered both concerns and pushback from a number of nations, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. Today, these countries, especially the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam, are more openly tempted to hedge against China by developing closer relations with the United States, Japan, India, or the European Union. Yet, no ASEAN country is in a position to openly antagonise, let alone confront, China: all of them are too dependent upon the Chinese market, Chinese investments, and infrastructure projects. Their armed forces cannot

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match whatsoever the increasingly powerful and menacing PLA. The United States and its allies have reacted by strengthening the QUAD and concluding the AUKUS Pact. Nevertheless, the well-known weakness of the United States in the region is not military but economic, a lack of economic engagement that it won’t be able to overcome in the foreseeable future. Only Japan, the European Union, and perhaps India have potentially the means to balance economically China in the ASEAN. All in all, Beijing’s divide-and-rule strategy has been rather successful and is likely to be maintained even if today it is facing more pushback among ASEAN capitals and among other capitals, especially Washington, Tokyo, Delhi, and Canberra; in other words, the QUAD and AUKUS. References ASEAN Secretariat. (2019). ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. https://asean​.org​ /asean2020​/wp​- content​/uploads​/ 2021​/01​/ASEAN​- Outlook​- on​-the​- Indo​- Pacific​ _FINAL ​_ 22062019​.pdf Cabestan, J. P. (2022). La politique internationale de la Chine. Entre intégration et volonté de puissance. Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po, 3rd edition. Cabestan, J. P. (2023). Facing China: The Prospect for War and Peace. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Chang, F. K. (2021, July 7). Hot and Cold: The Philippines’ Relations with China (and the United States). Analysis, Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www​ .fpri​.org ​/article ​/ 2021​/07​/ hot​-and​- cold​-the​-philippines​-relations​-with​- china​-and​ -the​-united​-states/ Chen, Y. (2021, January 15). Chuandayantaobanjinshen; “Dongsheng Xijiangshiqushi, guojigejufazhantaishi dui wo youli [Chen Yixin Conveys the Spirit of the Seminar: “The East is Rising, the West is Descending” is the Trend and the Development of the International Patterns Benefits China]. Guanchazhe (The Observer). https://www​.guancha​.cn ​/politics​/2021​_ 01​_15​_ 578007​.shtml Choong, W. (2021, July 14). Chinese-U.S. Split Is Forcing Singapore to Choose Sides. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy​.com ​/2021​/07​/14​/singapore​- china​-us​ -southeast​-asia​-asean​-geopolitics/ Congressional Research Service. (2018). The Trump Administration’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’: Issues for Congress. Washington DC, Updated 3 October. https://crsreports​.congress​.gov​/product ​/pdf​/ R ​/ R45396 European Commission. (2021, September 16). The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. https://www​.eeas​.europa​.eu ​/sites​/default​/files​/jointcommunication​ _2021​_ 24​_1​_ en​.pdf French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. (2021, April). France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. https://www​.diplomatie​.gouv​.fr​/en​/photos​-publications​-and​ -graphics ​/publications ​/article ​/france ​- s ​- partnerships ​- in ​- the ​- indo ​- pacific ​- apr​ -2021 French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. (2022). France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. https://www​.diplomatie​.gouv​.fr​/ IMG​/pdf​/en​_ dcp​_ a4​_ indopacifique​ _022022 ​_v1​- 4​_web​_ cle878143​.pdf Grossman, D. (2021, June 7). Indonesia Is Quietly Warming Up to China. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy​.com​/2021​/06​/07​/indonesia​- china​-jokowi​-natuna​ -sea​-military​-bri​- cooperation​-biden​-united​-states/

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Ngeow, C. B. (2021, July 16). Have Friendly China Malaysia Relations Gone Awry? Article, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment​ .org ​/2021​/07​/16​/ have​-friendly​-malaysia​- china​-relations​-gone​-awry​-pub​-84981 Patey, L. (2021). How China Loses. The Pushback Against Chinese Global Ambitions. Oxford University Press. Schneider, F. (ed.). (2021). Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Asserting Agency Through Regional Connectivity. Amsterdam University Press. Szechenyi, N. and Hosoya, Y. (2019, October). Working Toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Alliance Policy Coordination Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Japan Forum on International Relations​.https:/​/ carnegieendowment​.org​/files​/Chi​naRi​skOp​portunity​- Open​_ Indo​​-Pacific​.pdf The White House. (2017). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: The White House. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/wp​ -content/ uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017–0905​.p​df The White House. (2021, March 3). Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. Washington, DC: The White House. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/ briefing​-room​ /statements​-releases​/2021​/03​/03​/interim​-national​-security​-strategic​-guidance/ Trump, D. (2017, November 10). Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit. Da Nang, Vietnam, The White House. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/ briefings​-statements/ remar​kspre​siden​t-tru​mp-ap​ec-ce​o-sum​mit-d​a-nan​g-vie​ tnam Yang, J. (2014). Shuping: Guojigeju “dongshengxijiang” de shidai (Book Review: The Era of International Patterns “The East is Rising, the West is Falling” Era is the New International Pattern). Huanqiuwang.

9 WHERE “ACT EAST” MEETS INDO-PACIFIC Mapping India’s Eastward Engagement Rahul Mishra

Introduction

Stretching between the Indian and the Western Pacific oceans, the IndoPacific has triggered immense politico-diplomatic curiosities and deliberations. While the geographic scope of the Indo-Pacific is still being debated, in strategic terms it brings about two fundamental changes in the way strategists look at the region. First, the Indo-Pacific discourse brings the strategic dynamics of the Indian and Pacific oceans into the same frame. This means that the United States is no longer an “external” stakeholder in the region. Second, the term “Indo” in the Indo-Pacific also denotes the inclusion of India in addition to bringing the Indian Ocean dynamism in sync with the Pacific Ocean. With this as the central thrust, this chapter attempts to situate India in the Indo-Pacific construct. Regions are widely seen as artificially designed social constructs that are shaped and reshaped, constructed and deconstructed to suit the needs of rapidly changing international and regional systems over time. The emergence of the idea of Asia-Pacific was a manifestation of the rise of Japan (and later China) in the international system. In the 1980s and 1990s, Asia-Pacific accommodated the rise of two major Asian powers – China and Japan. Back then, India was not considered a part of the Asia-Pacific region by several countries. This was not surprising, though – India did not have enough economic clout, had an inward-looking economy, and its military capabilities were capped by persistent disputes with China and Pakistan. With the profound increase in its military capabilities and economic rise from the last decade of the twentieth century, India has slowly but surely become a key member of the Indo-Pacific order. With the effective DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-11

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implementation of its Look East and Act East policies, India has also engaged countries of the Indo-Pacific region on economic, strategic, and diplomatic fronts, thereby making the Indo-Pacific a key component of its foreign policy. This has been amply illustrated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2018. That was the first time India clearly listed its priorities in the IndoPacific. Two of the most important features of India’s Indo-Pacific Policy, as highlighted by PM Modi, are the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and “placing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the core of India’s Indo-Pacific construct”. At the sixth Indian Ocean Dialogue and ninth Delhi Dialogue in 2019, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar reiterated major attributes of India’s Indo-Pacific construct – “openness, freedom, inclusion, rules-based architecture and equality of all nations” (Jaishankar, 2019a). Kalidas Nag, a noted historian and expert on international relations, was the first to use the term Indo-Pacific in its more or less current form. Jawaharlal Nehru also mentioned a possibility where India would hold a central position when the Indian and Pacific worlds come together.1 In recent times, the credit for the use of the term Indo-Pacific goes to an Indian scholar, Gurpreet Khurana, who in an article titled “Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India–Japan Cooperation” defined the term “Indo-Pacific” as “the maritime space comprising the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. Littoral to it are the states of Asia (including West Asia/Middle East) and eastern Africa” (Khurana, 2007). At the official-political level, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was the first leader to refer to the Indo-Pacific construct. In August 2007, he visited India and gave a speech at the Indian Parliament titled “Confluence of the Two Seas”. He remarked: The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A broader Asia that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form. Our two countries have the ability – and the responsibility – to ensure that it broadens yet further and to nurture and enrich these seas to become seas of clearest transparency. (Abe, 2007) The United States was among the first countries to endorse the Indo-Pacific construct. In 2010, the then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during her speech titled “America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific”, stated: Our military presence must evolve to reflect an evolving world. The Pentagon is now engaged in a comprehensive Global Posture Review. That plan will reflect three principles: Our defense posture will become more politically sustainable, operationally resilient, and geographically

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dispersed … We have increased our naval presence in Singapore. We are engaging more with the Philippines and Thailand to enhance their capacity to counter terrorists and respond to humanitarian disasters. We have created new parameters for military cooperation with New Zealand and we continue to modernize our defense ties with Australia to respond to a more complex maritime environment. And we are expanding our work with the Indian navy in the Pacific, because we understand how important the Indo-Pacific basin is to global trade and commerce. (Clinton, 2010) The United States’ interests in the Asian region were rejuvenated with Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia/Rebalancing strategy. In 2012, Leon Panetta, the then US Secretary of Defense remarked while in New Delhi: America is at a turning point. After a decade of war, we are developing a new defense strategy for the 21st century – a central feature of which strategy is “rebalancing” toward the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, we will expand our military partnerships and our presence in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. (Panetta, 2012) The idea of the Indo-Pacific has been actively promoted by leading democratic powers of the region – Japan, India, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union (and its members countries and the US – the resident superpower. The ten-member countries of ASEAN have also endorsed the Indo-Pacific construct. The AOIP bears testimony to the fact that ASEAN countries are open to the Indo-Pacific construct. However, China and Russia perceive the Indo-Pacific as the US-led containment strategy. Nevertheless, China’s rise and its assertiveness have aided countries’ willingness to adopt the Indo-Pacific framework. While China’s assertive posture is undeniably an important factor, the motivations on the part of the Indo-Pacific supporters go beyond the China factor, seeking preservation, protection, and strengthening of the liberal regional and international order. India’s Idea of the Indo-Pacific

India was not the most enthusiastic supporter of the Indo-Pacific when it was proposed and launched in its current form. Over the past decade and a half, India has shown incremental changes in its approach, shaped by its ties with both China and the United States, as well as its own rise and ambitions. One of the biggest anxieties on the part of the Indian policymakers at the time was the uncertainty linked with getting closer to the United States

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as a strategic and military partner. The fragility of India–China equations, China’s opposition to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and a softer approach to engage China prevented India from embracing the Indo-Pacific as a strategic tool. However, the failure of informal dialogue mechanisms with China (Wuhan and Mamallapuram), and the Doklam (2017) and Galwan valley (2020) stand-offs pushed India into a closer embrace with the United States and its allies. Relationship with Japan, Australia, and the United States also made quantum leaps during this period. India’s clearer stand on the Indo-Pacific, and several statements issued in the recent past substantiate this. That said, India’s approach is still not confrontational towards China, and New Delhi still has not opted for a China containment strategy. For India, the Indo-Pacific is defined by its inclusive, free, and open nature. This approach is also in perfect alignment with ASEAN’s AOIP. India’s Indo-Pacific approach and engagements are multifaceted. There are three major features of India’s Indo-Pacific approach and engagements. First, the centrality of ASEAN in India’s Indo-Pacific approach, which is furthered through the Act East Policy – launched in 2014 as a more “proactive” and “action-oriented” version of the Look East Policy, launched in 1992. It may be noted that in 2010, during his visit to India, President Barack Obama urged India to be pro-active in the region. He remarked, “we want India not only to ‘look East’, we want India to ‘engage East’” (Obama, 2010). When the National Democratic Alliance came to power in 2014, it initiated a series of policies to forge ties with the immediate and extended neighbourhood. With the Modi-led NDA government coming to power, one of the most important decisions taken was to improve ties with the countries in the South Asian region under a well-defined “Neighbourhood First” policy. The focus was also on going beyond the neighbourhood in terms of sustained attention and priorities. With the objective of injecting more vigour, dynamism, and an action-oriented approach, the Look East Policy was elevated to the Act East Policy. One of the first announcements in that regard was by India’s former External Affairs Minister, the late Sushma Swaraj, in August 2014. She stated, “It is time for India to not only look towards East but also act East”. This was similar to what Barack Obama had mentioned in 2010. Later, in November 2014, during his participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS) at Nay Pyi Taw, PM Modi declared, “Since entering office, my government has moved with a great sense of priority and speed to turn our Look East Policy into Act East Policy. The EAS is an important pillar of this policy” (Modi, 2014). With the change in name, the scope of the policy was also expanded to include the countries from India’s expanded neighbourhood in the IndoPacific. In an answer to a parliamentary question on the scope of India’s

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Act East Policy, M. J. Akbar, the then Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs of India, replied: The policy, which was originally conceived as an economic initiative, has gained political, strategic, and cultural dimensions including establishment of institutional mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation. The key principles and objectives of “Act East Policy” is to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties and develop strategic relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific region through continuous engagement at bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels thereby providing enhanced connectivity to the States of Northeastern Region with other countries in our neighbourhood. (Akbar, 2017) In many ways, India’s Indo-Pacific approach is a direct and logical extension of the Act East Policy. In terms of the geographical scope of India’s Look East, Act East, and Indo-Pacific engagements, there has been an expansion, shown in Figure 9.1. At the time of its launch, the focus of the Act East Policy was to reach out to countries beyond ASEAN/Southeast Asia and build stronger, more institutionalised relations with East and Northeast Asia, Oceania, and the Pacific Island countries as part of its Act East engagements. Under the Act East framework, India established the Forum for Indo-Pacific Islands Indo-Pacific Engagements (Act East continues)+IPOI+ SAGAR Act East Policy (2014-)

Look East Policy

FIGURE 9.1  Geographic

Scope of India’s Look East, Act East, and Indo-Pacific Engagements

Source: Author

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Cooperation (FIPIC). Launched during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Fiji in November 2014, FIPIC includes 14 island countries, some of which are also among the poorest. However, despite their smaller size and distance from India, many of these countries possess large Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) thus offering possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation. In addition to India, the members include Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The first summit of the forum took place in Suva, Fiji, in 2014. The second summit was held in Jaipur, India, in 2017. The third forum for FIPIC Summit was held in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, in May 2023. In order to revive its age-old engagement with the East, India has demonstrated willingness to play a more important and meaningful role in the Indo-Pacific region. 2 To showcase this, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) changed the name of the division dealing with the ASEAN to the Indo-Pacific division in 2020 (Live Mint, 2020). MEA also created the Oceania division, which focusses on Southeast Asian nations, Pacific Island states, and the larger Indo-Pacific region. The division now includes the ASEAN, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (commonly known as the QUAD), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). This makes sense as India’s Indo-Pacific Policy is closely aligned with its Act East Policy. It is worth noting that the Ministry of External Affairs of India still has a separate division to deal with the relations with the ASEAN member countries at the bilateral level. This was a crucial step as the “Indo-Pacific Consultations” at the secretary level among the four QUAD countries did not have a parent division at the Ministry. Over the past 10 years, under the Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific engagements, India has made several efforts to not only strengthen its position at the multilateral level with ASEAN but also to reinforce ties at the bilateral level with the member countries of the grouping. The ASEAN leaders visited India to participate in the India–ASEAN commemorative summit in January 2018. Having ten world leaders as Chief Guests at the Republic Day celebration was an unprecedented event highlighting the significance India attaches to ASEAN and its member states. It has also elevated ties with several ASEAN members. In May 2018, during PM Modi’s visit to Jakarta, India and Indonesia elevated their bilateral relations to a New Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Prior to that, in 2016, India–Vietnam relations were elevated from a bilateral partnership to that of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. During PM Modi’s Singapore visit in 2015, the India–Singapore relations were elevated to the level of Strategic Partnership. Similarly, relations with Malaysia were elevated to the Enhanced Strategic Partnership in 2015. India has been reinforcing ties in the Indo-Pacific through the exchange of high-level visits and the signing of a series of agreements.

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Significant improvements in ties with both Australia and New Zealand are also part of India’s Act East endeavours. While ASEAN is the core of India’s Indo-Pacific Policy, the fulcrum of this policy is the growing cooperation among like-minded partners. The QUAD, comprising Australia, Japan, India, and the United States, is an important mechanism in India’s Indo-Pacific Policy. The QUAD is one of the several arrangements India is willing to participate in under the framework of the Indo-Pacific. Apart from the QUAD, India is effectively collaborating and strengthening ties with these three countries at different levels. As mentioned earlier, the critics of the Indo-Pacific construct (primarily China) argue that it is the United States’ new strategy to contain China. While most of these initiatives appear to be a counter to China’s increasing footsteps, keeping the Indo-Pacific region inclusive is an important component of India’s policy. In fact, the External Affairs Minister of India, Dr Jaishankar, while addressing a gathering at the Moscow-based Valdai Discussion Club, highlighted that “containment is not a part of India’s history … The idea that [sovereign] countries are working for or against one country is an old mindset”. The two informal summits held between India and China may also be seen in that context. Such informal formats of meetings are noteworthy as India holds such meetings only with two countries – China and Russia. The first India–China informal summit took place in the aftermath of the Doklam Stand-off, which proved beneficial in easing tensions between the two countries. China hosted the first informal summit in Wuhan in April 2018, resulting in a few crucial outcomes. One of the important decisions was to jointly train Afghan diplomats. The second informal summit was held in Mamallapuram, India, in October 2019. The two countries have even revived the bilateral military exercise codenamed Hand-in-Hand. The eighth round of the exercise was held in India’s Meghalaya state in 7–20 December 2019. It was heralded as an anti-terror drill and for Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. However, India’s attempts to reach out to China have failed to pay off. China’s incursions in and around the Galwan valley have made a huge dent in India–China ties, and it does not seem likely that the relations will improve anytime soon. The Modi government seems to have realised that its power parity with China is essential to have meaningful dialogue and engagement moving forward. India has also taken steps to ensure that China does not get undue access to Indian markets. Driven by its concerns over China’s misuse of the rules of origin clause, India walked out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, which include the ASEAN members and five of its dialogue partners – Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. India’s decision to join the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) along with Japan and Australia, and efforts to inch closer to Australia, Japan, and the United States are motivated by both its desire to play a greater role in

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the Indo-Pacific and to have greater maneuvering space in dealing with an assertive China. Despite all this, India has never opposed ASEAN’s efforts to include China in the Indo-Pacific regional mechanisms. India’s Indo-Pacific vision also includes Russia. In May 2018, Prime Minister Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin met for their first informal summit in Sochi, Russia. During the summit, the two leaders “agreed on the importance of building a multipolar world order. They decided to intensify consultation and coordination with each other, including on the IndoPacific Region” (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2018). Modi attended Russia’s Eastern Economic Forum in September 2019 and stated, “India– Russia partnership will further deepen and flourish. Then the Far East will become a confluence of the Eurasian Union on one side and the open, free, and inclusive Indo-Pacific on the other” (Modi, 2019). He announced the initiation of the “Act Far East” policy, which left little doubt about Russia’s inclusion in India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific. Thus, India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific does not believe in excluding either China or Russia and is inclusive in nature. This is in contrast with the US approach. Another important feature of India’s Indo-Pacific construct is that it is institutionalising its network of relations in the Indo-Pacific region. India is working on increasing its outreach through a series of dialogues and policies. Such dialogues are important for clarifying New Delhi’s position with regard to the Indo-Pacific. In the Indian Ocean region, mechanisms such as the Indian Ocean Dialogue and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium play an important role in providing a common multilateral platform for dialogues and consultations on issues of collective interest and mutual concern. In addition to that, while the Act East Policy remains central to India’s Indo-Pacific Policy, it has taken several initiatives to bolster its position in the Indo-Pacific. The Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiative was essentially launched to strengthen India’s engagement with the countries of the Indian Ocean region. India participates in a range of regional and sub-regional initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and the Mekong–Ganga Economic Cooperation (MGC). In November 2019, during his participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS), PM Modi even proposed forming the “Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative”. The aim of such an initiative would be “to conserve and sustainably use the maritime domain, and to make meaningful efforts to create a safe, secure and stable maritime domain” (Roy, 2019). To be sure, India’s definition of the Indo-Pacific has its own distinct features. In 2019, delivering the valedictory address at the Delhi Dialogue, External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar announced the expansion of the policy to include the western Indian Ocean. He remarked, “there is room for a western Indian Ocean version of this concept too. In line with our

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own view that the Indo-Pacific naturally includes our western ocean neighbours in the Gulf, the island nations of the Arabian Sea, and our partners in Africa” (Jaishankar, 2019b). He added a new dimension to India’s IndoPacific approach, stating that Indo-Pacific is not only about India’s eastward engagement, but it will also actively focus on its southwestern neighbours as part of the policy. This statement is in alignment with the Ministry of External Affairs’ decision to revamp the divisions dealing with the Indian Ocean countries (The Wire, 2019). India has, on several occasions, clarified that its vision in the Indo-Pacific is inclusive, and, therefore, it welcomes all countries’ participation. This is an indication of the fact that India’s Indo-Pacific Policy is not shaped and influenced only by the interests of other countries. Such an approach showcases India’s aspirations to achieve greater strategic autonomy in formulating its approach to the Indo-Pacific. Key Drivers of India’s Indo-Pacific Policy

India under the PM Modi administration has displayed both continuity and change in its foreign policy; the Indo-Pacific is no exception to that. The long-cherished Indian objective of maintaining strategic autonomy in foreign policy is manifested in its “multi-alignment” policy but at the same time, it is not oblivious to the importance of strategic collaboration/alignments to protect its national interests. India’s “multi-alignment” approach gives it the wiggle room to keep its defence ties intact with Russia and strategic cooperation with Iran functional while inching closer to the US and its Asian allies via the QUAD. The sudden withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan and its willingness to engage China again is a sure sign of the unpredictability of international politics. India seems cognisant of these developments and has tried to keep its multi-alignment policy intact as the mainstay of foreign policy formulation. India’s insistence on multi-alignment policy also serves as a fine tribute to its cherished normative principles of non-alignment, even as multi-alignment has brought in strong elements of hard-headed and pragmatic notions of foreign policy-making. (Mishra, 2023) India’s Indo-Pacific construct is driven by this and several such related factors. First, the biggest driver for India to embrace and advocate the IndoPacific construct is that it gives India, which was earlier not included in the regional mechanism, an opportunity to be a part of the international high-table. The Indo-Pacific construct not only includes but also celebrates India’s return to the regional high-table set by countries that were either

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against India occupying the centre-stage or were uncomfortable with such a proposition. The substantive change brought about by India’s improved ties with Japan, Australia, the United States, South Korea, and several ASEAN countries has worked as a driving force in bringing India to the Indo-Pacific centre-stage. Geographically, India and the wider Indian Ocean region itself were largely excluded from the dynamism of the Pacific. Indo-Pacific rectifies that flaw and brings in India and several important Indian Ocean countries into the Pacific dynamics by bringing the two together. Second, the Indo-Pacific addresses the flaws existent in all mechanisms defining the “region”, for it is the first time that all the key economic/military powers – China, Japan, India, the United States, the European Union (EU), and even Russia (at least by Indian definition) – figure in the emerging regional construct. For instance, while the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) does not have India as a member, the United States is not a part of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the East Asia Summit (EAS) does not have the EU as a member. Some have argued that the IndoPacific does not include Europe and thus is not a viable mechanism. However, such arguments are flawed in that they overlook the fact that in addition to the EU, leading powers of Europe – France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and even the United Kingdom (a former EU member country) − have all come up with their respective Indo-Pacific strategies. Third, the US’s Rebalancing to Asia/Pivot to Asia launched during Obama presidency was carried forward by the Trump administration and subsequently by the Biden administration, albeit with different nomenclatures and levels of engagement. President Biden’s enhanced focus on the IndoPacific is also indicative of the United States’ desire to benefit from the rise of the “non-western” countries or what has been termed as “the Rest” in the “West vs. the Rest” debate. The Trump administration believed in a hardheaded, inward-looking mercantilist logic and expected its Asian allies and partners to shoulder their military responsibilities. Former President Trump often indicated that rather than just being beneficiaries of US support, Asian partners of the United States should contribute to strengthening US efforts to keep the international order intact. Despite being a Democrat, Biden continued many policies of the Republican Trump administration. The United States’ stance on the Indo-Pacific has shown remarkable continuity under three successive American presidencies, beginning with Barak Obama. Fourth, the Indo-Pacific provides India with a platform to align with the policies of like-minded countries and work on strengthening ties with the United States and Japan, and also improve relations with Australia. Arguably, the most important factor contributing to India’s key role in the Indo-Pacific is its steadily growing strategic partnership with the United States. During the then-President Donald Trump’s visit to India, the two countries decided to elevate their bilateral relations to a “Comprehensive

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Global Strategic Partnership”. The joint statement, issued on 25 February 2020, states: Noting that a strong and capable Indian military supports peace, stability, and a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and reaffirming his pledge to support the transfer to India of advanced U.S. military technology, President Trump welcomed India’s recent decision to procure MH-60R naval and AH-64E Apache helicopters. These capabilities will advance shared security interests, job growth and industrial cooperation between both countries. As India works to acquire new defence capabilities, President Trump reaffirmed India’s status as a Major Defense Partner affording it the highest consideration for procurement and technology transfer purposes. The leaders looked forward to early conclusion of defence cooperation enabling agreements including Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement. (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2020) Clearly, the growing India–US strategic and military cooperation has not only strengthened the prospects of the Indo-Pacific but has also elevated India’s role in the regional dynamics. It is allowing India to understand the commonalities and differences in the interests, policies, and approaches of the United States and its partners. This is a clear sign of bonhomie among the QUAD countries as well. In fact, these countries motivated India to play an active part in the Indo-Pacific. The United States has worked as the anchor for India, while Japan is actively facilitating India in playing a greater role in shaping the Indo-Pacific order. On 12 November 2017, the first meeting of the India–Australia–Japan–US Consultations on Indo-Pacific was convened. The participation was at the secretary level. The four countries issued separate statements after the meeting. The Indian statement read: a free, open, prosperous, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region serves the longterm interests of all countries in the region and of the world at large. The officials also exchanged views on addressing common challenges of terrorism and proliferation linkages impacting the region as well as on enhancing connectivity. The Indian side highlighted India’s Act East Policy as the cornerstone of its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2017) Fearing that India would align with the United States in the latter’s China containment strategy, China extended an olive branch to India by proposing the initiation of an informal meeting. Subsequently, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi met in Wuhan in an informal summit in 2018 and then again in 2019. Despite such efforts, irritants continue to exist. India’s

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anxieties about China are shared by several countries as well. The United States’ desire to socialise and assimilate China into the international system has failed to yield positive results. Even the European Union has called China a “systemic rival” in a report published in March 2019. Japan too has perennial problems with China. Then there is the US–China trade war. India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific will harden and strengthen further, coupled with the commitment to the QUAD, as India’s relations with China continue to be marred by challenges. One of the major positive contributions of India to the Indo-Pacific order is the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). The IPOI aims to provide the Indo-Pacific region with a comprehensive institutional framework. The IPOI is already gaining traction with like-minded countries such as Australia, France, Japan, and Vietnam supporting India’s IPOI initiative. New Delhi’s latest initiative is poised to lend greater credibility to the Indo-Pacific construct while establishing India as a responsible stakeholder and a “rule-maker’ rather than a “rule-taker’ in the region. These budding shoots of IPOI are promising and can bring home tangible gains provided sustained efforts are put in to ensure gains on all seven pillars of the IPOI. (Mishra, 2021) The emerging Indo-Pacific construct allows India to foster principles such as a liberal and rule-based international order. It portrays India as a responsible stakeholder and fulfils India’s aspiration to play a greater and leading role in the region. Despite shared interests and mutual concerns, India is inclined towards preserving its long-practised strategic autonomy. For India, the Indo-Pacific is not restricted to keeping a check on China. India’s IndoPacific vision is wide and elaborated. It not only includes collaboration with like-minded democracies but also emphasises on countries such as China and Russia. India’s position on the Russia–Ukraine conflict is a classic example of how New Delhi wants to exercise its strategic autonomy in keeping relations with Russia intact while also embracing QUAD. How far India will be able to maintain this fine balance remains to be seen. The Road Ahead

India’s Indo-Pacific engagement is facilitated by a range of minilateral and multilateral arrangements. The QUAD is one such example. At the time when the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was launched in 2007, it had all four founding members – India, Japan, the United States, and Australia. However, Australia withdrew from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2008, which led to the grouping’s collapse.

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A decade later, the grouping was revived in 2017 on the sidelines of the 2017 ASEAN Summits in Manila. For India, the revival of the QUAD was seen in the context of the Doklam Stand-off with China on the India– Bhutan–China tri-junction after China encroached into Bhutanese territory. India’s willingness to work closely with the QUAD is closely linked to China’s assertive postures and territorial incursions. With the Galwan stand-off with China, India seems to have realised that minilateral groupings such as the QUAD are essential to act as security providers in the region. India’s stand on the AUKUS, comprising Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, is also driven by the realisation that minilateral military groupings are needed to protect and preserve the strategic equilibrium and a rules-based order in the region. Despite the continued dialogue and high-level interaction, irritants in India–China relations continue to exist. In September 2019, Dr S. Jaishankar participated in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting of the QUAD on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York. That was also the first time that India used the term “quadrilateral dialogue” for the meeting. Indian side did not issue any official statement, but the United States’ Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Alice Wells remarked in a special briefing: Today, we had another important multilateral session, a meeting with the QUAD partners – the US, Australia, India, and Japan. This grouping has met four times in the past two years at the senior officials’ level, at my level, but today’s event, which was hosted by Secretary Pompeo with his counterparts, was a significant elevation of the level of our dialogue and really demonstrates the leadership of all four countries in institutionalising this gathering of like-minded Indo-Pacific partners ... We had a wideranging discussion of our collective efforts to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific. (Wells, 2019) In September–October 2019, Dr Jaishankar attempted to increase India’s diplomatic outreach in the United States’ strategic community. In what may be termed as an unprecedented move, Dr Jaishankar delivered speeches at a number of US’s leading think-tanks and interacted with several US scholars. India and the United States hold a 2+2 dialogue (a dialogue comprising foreign and defence ministers), and the second round was held in December 2019. The joint statement of the 2+2 dialogue read: The Ministers reiterated their commitment to a free, open, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. Appreciating the convergence in their respective Indo-Pacific visions, they reiterated their support

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for ASEAN centrality, rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, and sustainable and transparent infrastructure investment. They reaffirmed that closer India–U.S. cooperation is instrumental to promoting security and prosperity in the broader IndoPacific region and beyond. (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2019) To increase interoperability and strengthen defence ties, India and the United States concluded the four foundational agreements, namely the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA). Of all the countries, Japan is proving to be a natural partner for India in the Indo-Pacific. One of the key achievements of “India’s Eastward Engagement” has been its growing engagement with Japan, which has gained strength, particularly under the framework of the Act East Policy. Under Modi 2.0, there is convergence between the Neighbourhood First and Act East policies. The two countries are expanding their cooperation in different areas. At the bilateral level, the two countries held their first 2+2 dialogue in November 2019. They are also attempting to provide a credible alternative to the BRI. The two countries are developing the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). In an attempt to address the infrastructure gap in South Asia, provide an alternative to China’s BRI in Sri Lanka and offer a solution to the mounting debt problem in Sri Lanka, in 2019, India and Japan concluded a trilateral agreement with Sri Lanka to develop the Colombo port. India has trilateral dialogues at both leadership and official levels. Some of the examples include Japan–America–India (JAI), Russia–India–China (RIC) at the Prime Minister level; India–Australia–Japan at the Foreign Minister level; and India–Australia–Indonesia (IAI) at the senior official level. While countries such as Australia, the United States, and even ASEAN have released dedicated papers on the Indo-Pacific, India’s Indo-Pacific construct is largely communicated through speeches and statements. This leaves room for India to keep it open-ended and fine-tune its position accordingly in the future. For India, Indo-Pacific is not a rigid mechanism but a framework to establish a new regional order. This leaves room for countries to opt in and out based on their interests. However, Indo-Pacific is gaining traction and endorsement. While groupings such as the ARF and EAS exist with widespread representation from the region, these institutions fall short in dealing with the emerging security challenges in the region, thus opening new avenues for minilaterals such as the QUAD in the Indo-Pacific. Despite

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differences in approaches, there is much scope for countries to work on their convergent interests. Indo-Pacific provides countries with a platform to operate simultaneously. One noteworthy example is that, unlike the United States, India does not use the term strategy for the Indo-Pacific. That said, India and the United States are natural partners in the Indo-Pacific. India is expanding cooperation and collaboration with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific based on a carefully crafted and balanced policy. India’s Indo-Pacific construct is definitive, inclusive, and widespread. Acknowledgement

This study was conducted as part of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence project (Project Number: 586907- EPP-2-2018-2-MY-EPPJMO-CoE). Notes 1 A detailed account of the genesis of Indo-Pacific can be found in Muni and Mishra (2019). 2 For further details, see Muni and Mishra (2019).

References Abe, S. (2007, August 22). Confluence of the Two Seas. Speech by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/region ​/asia​-paci ​/pmv0708​/ speech​-2​.html, accessed December 10, 2019. Akbar, M. J. (2017, February 2). Answer to Question No. 26 on Act East Policy. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://www​.mea​.gov​.in ​/ rajya​-sabha​.htm​?dtl​/27982​/question​+no26​+act​+east​+policy. Clinton, R. (2010, October 28). America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific. Remarks by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. US Department of State. https://2009–2017.​​state​​.gov/​​secre​​tary/​​20092​​013cl​​inton ​​/rm ​/2​​010​/1​​0​/​150​​141​.h​​tm. Jaishankar, S. (2019a, December 13). Welcome Remarks by Minster of State for External Affairs at Ministerial Session of 6th Indian Ocean Dialogue and 11th Delhi Dialogue. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https:// www​ . mea ​ . gov​ . in ​ / Speeches ​ - Statements ​ . htm ​ ?dtl ​ / 32211 ​ / Welcome ​ _ remarks​ _by​_ Minster​_ of ​_ State ​_ for​_ External ​_ Affairs ​_ at ​_ Ministerial ​_ Session ​_ of ​_ 6th​ _Indian ​_Ocean ​_ Dialogue​_ and​_11th ​_ Delhi​_ Dialogue​_ December​_13​_ 2019 Jaishankar, S. (2019b, December 14). Valedictory Address by External Affairs Minister at 11th Delhi Dialogue. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://www​.mea​.gov​.in ​/Speeches​- Statements​.htm​?dtl ​/32212​/ Valedictory​ _Address ​_ by​_ External ​_ Affairs ​_ Minister​_ at ​_11th ​_ Delhi ​_ Dialogue ​_ December​ _14​_ 2019. Khurana, G. S. (2007). Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India–Japan Cooperation. Strategic Analysis, 31(10), pp. 139–153. Live Mint. (2020, September 29). New MEA Division to Focus on Indo-Pacific. https://www​. livemint ​ . com ​ / news ​ / india ​ / new​ - mea ​ - division ​ - to ​ - focus ​ - on ​ - indo​ -pacific​-11601342184071​.html. Ministry of External Affairs of India. (2017, November 12). India-Australia-JapanU.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific. https://mea​.gov​.in ​/press​-releases​.htm​?dtl​

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/29110​/ Ind​iaAu​stra​l iaJ​apanUS​_ Consultations​_ on​_ IndoPacific​_ November​_12​ _2017. Ministry of External Affairs of India. (2018). Informal Summit between India and Russia. https://mea​.gov​.in ​/press​-releases​.htm​?dtl ​/29908​/ Informal​+Summit​ +between​+India​+and​+Russia​+May​+21​+2018. Ministry of External Affairs of India. (2019, December 19). Joint Statement on the Second India-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. https://mea​.gov​.in ​/ bilateral​ -documents ​. htm​?dtl ​/ 32227​/ Joint​+ Statement​+ on​+the​+ Second​+IndiaUS​+2432​ +Ministerial​+Dialogue. Ministry of External Affairs of India. (2020, February 25). Joint Statement: Vision and Principles for India-U.S. Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. https://mea​.gov​.in ​/ bilateral​- documents​.htm​?dtl ​/32421​/ Joint ​_ Statement ​_Vision​ _and ​_ Principles ​_ for​_ IndiaUS ​_Comprehensive ​_Global ​_ Strategic ​_ Partnership. Mishra, R. (2021, August). Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative: Providing Institutional Framework to the Indo-Pacific Region. AIC Commentary, No. 20, RIS. https:// aic ​. ris ​.org​. in ​/sites ​/aic​. ris ​.org​. in ​/files ​/ 2021​- 09​/AIC​%20commentary​%20No​ %2020​%20August​%202021​%20final​.pdf. Mishra, R. (2023). From Non-alignment to Multi-alignment: Assessing India’s Foreign Policy Shift. The Round Table, 112(1), pp. 43–56. DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2023.2165367. Modi, N. (2014, November 13). English Rendering of PM’s Remarks at the East Asia Summit, Nay Pyi Taw. PM India. https://www​.pmindia​.gov​.in​/en​/news​_ updates​/english​-rendering​- of​-pms​-remarks​-at​-the​- east​-asia​-summit​-nay​-pyi​-taw/​ ?tag ​_term​= east​-asia​-summit​&comment​=disable. Modi, N. (2019). PM Modi Addresses Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russia. https://www​.narendramodi​.in​/pm​-modi​-s​-remarks​-at​-plenary​-session​-of​ -5th​- eastern​- economic​-forum​-in​-vladivostok​-russia​-546302. Muni, S. D., & Mishra, R. (2019). India’s Eastward Engagement: From Antiquity to Act East Policy. New Delhi: Sage Publication. Obama, B. (2010, November 8). Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, India. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. https://obamawhitehouse​.archives​.gov​/the​-press​-office​/2010​/11​ /08​/remarks​-president​-joint​-session​-indian​-parliament​-new​-delhi​-india. Panetta, L. E. (2012, June 6). Remarks by Leon E. Panetta, Defence Secretary, United States on Indo-US Defence Relations Panetta at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, India. https://www​.idsa​.in ​/ keyspeeches​/ Leo​ nEPa​nett​aonP​artn​ersi​nthe​21st​century. Roy, S. (2019). Delhi Proposes New Initiative to Conserve Indo-Pacific Region. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress​.com ​/article​/india ​/delhi​-proposes​-new​ -initiative​-to​- conserve​-indo​-pacific​-region​- 6103416/. The Wire. (2019). MEA Expands Indian Ocean Division to Include Islands off African Coast. https://thewire​.in ​/external​-affairs​/ministry​- external​-affairs​ -indian​-ocean. Wells, A. (2019, September 26). Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Alice Wells At the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Special Briefing. https://2017–2021.​​state​​.gov/​​actin​​g​-ass​​istan​​ t​- sec​​retar​​y​-for​​-the-​​burea​​u​- of-​​south​​-and-​​centr​​al​-as​​ian​-a​​f fair​​s​-ali​​ce​-we​​lls​-a​​t​-the​​ -74th​​-sess​​ion​-o​​f​-the​​-​unit​​ed​-na​​tions​​-gene​​ral​-a​​ssemb​​ly/.

10 JAPAN AND THE INDO-PACIFIC Forging a Region Guibourg Delamotte

Introduction

Japan has often been portrayed as lacking regional leadership (Calder, 2000). This impression was partly triggered by Japan’s overwhelming economic weight. It also stemmed from a comparison with Western Europe, where states of similar political values, regimes, and levels of development established unprecedented coordination (Dieter et al., 2006). Europe was considered a model of regional construction even though it was exceptional. Japanese initiatives, however useful,1 were often disregarded. Furthermore, Japan was described as politically “reactive” (Calder, 1988; Funabashi, 1991) in the context of United States–Japan relations. 2 Yet, this criticism is unfair. When the United States in 1990 wanted Japan to send soldiers to the Gulf War, Japan declined. Two years later, a law allowed Japan to take part in the United Nations Peacekeeping operations. The law banned any association with force. Later on, the United States requested that Japan accede to collective self-defence (Armitage et al., 2000). Japan did not do so until 2015.3 “Foreign pressure” producing such unexpected results or over so long cannot be considered the primary decision-making factor (Delamotte, 2010). Nevertheless, Japan was a discreet participant in international security until the early 2000s. From 2012, it took an uncharacteristically active defence and security role. Asia now appears ever more central in world politics. As Japan has come to display leadership in the Indo-Pacific world, the perception of its international stature has changed. One could even say that Japan invented the Indo-Pacific (IP) region. It has contributed to a change in alliances and partnerships with the rise of DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-12

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the small multilateral (“minilateral”) format. It negotiated large trade agreements, positioning itself as a “norm-maker” rather than a “norm-taker.” This chapter will show that Japan has become a de facto “gentle leader” in the new Indo-Pacific architecture. Yoshihide Soeya, in his book titled Japanese Diplomacy: Understanding the Post-War, wrote that Japan should adopt a “middle power diplomacy” (Soeya, 2017). This implied an acceptance of limited power. It also questioned its nature, defined by the 1952 United States–Japan bilateral security treaty, premised on Japanese rearmament, and the Japanese Constitution’s Article 9, the letter of which forbids armament. Those two norms were incompatible and one should be dropped so that the contradiction would cease. Notwithstanding the two norms, still in place, Japan, under Prime Minister Abe, arguably applied middle power influence. Japan’s Contribution to the Birth of a Region

From being absent, the Indo-Pacific region has become a geostrategic focal point. In 2019, the Department of State of the United States stated: “The United States is and always will be an Indo-Pacific nation” (Department of State, 2019). If any one state is responsible for the Indo-Pacific becoming so significant, it is Japan. The Japanese “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision” was pioneering. Now the United States (2019), Australia (Foreign Policy White Paper, 2017), India (Modi, 2018), France (Macron, 2018; Stratégie de défenseenIndopacifique [Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific], 2019), Germany (Leitlinienzum Indo-Pazifik [Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific], 2020), the Netherlands (Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia, 2020), the United Kingdom (Integrated Review, 2021) have Indo-Pacific visions or strategies, as well as ASEAN (ASEAN Outlook, 2019) and the European Union (EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 2021). The similarity of terms hides differences, which stem from historical and geographic or geopolitical contexts and which, in regional groupings, are a compromise between different viewpoints. The dividing line is how to tackle China. All states or regional groupings share a preoccupation with respect to China, which they word more or less mildly, and their acceptance or rejection of a military level in their diplomatic action. Prior to the FOIP, Japan had come up with other concepts. Diplomatic and National Security Advisor Kanehara Nobukatsu’s “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” was first introduced in a speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan Asô Tarô (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [MOFA Japan], 2006). This predated Indo-Pacific cooperation and put emphasis on values alone. The “Confluence of the Two Seas” discourse equally conceived by Kanehara and pronounced by Prime Minister Abe in India was the first

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international statement uniting those two oceans under a common banner and destiny and addressing the future of this “broader Asia” which was “taking shape” (MOFA Japan, 2007). None was as successful as Ichikawa Keiichi’s FOIP vision, first introduced by Shinzô Abe in Nairobi, Kenya (MOFA Japan, 2016). Why the greater attraction of FOIP? Japan’s IP vision was apposite for being more than just descriptive (“Confluence of the Two Seas”). It offered a timely programme and met a jointly shared concern. Many countries share strategic interests in the IP. Though the limits of the “IP” may differ from one vision or strategy to another, the Indian and Pacific oceans border India, the East Coast of Africa, and South-East Asia. The world’s seven major powers have economic and/or military interests in the Indo-Pacific. Trade in the region is worth US$ 17.9 trillion per year (Prime Minister’s Office, Japan, 2018). Former colonial powers have bonds with the region – the French with their territories in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific; Queen Elizabeth II was the Head of State of Australia, New Zealand, and many South-Pacific states. The strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific stems from an overmighty China vis-à-vis a series of underpowered regional states, whose independence could easily be threatened, leading to other members of the international community being excluded. There is, therefore, a sense of urgency, which French President Emmanuel Macron’s speech of 27 August 2019, conveyed: “Europe will disappear with the obliteration of this Western period, and the world will be centred around two main focal points: the United States and China. And we will have to choose between the two powers. (…) There is another strategy – adaptation. This means that we essentially need to run faster in the face of a world that is changing” (Macron, 2019). Japan’s “FOIP”

Japan’s FOIP was more than a conceptual innovation. It provided an overarching instrument to generate international cooperation and promote development in the region. To Japan, the FOIP is a diplomatic tool destined to counterbalance China. However, FOIP was dubbed a “vision” rather than a “strategy” (MOFA Japan, 2017, 2018) intended not to antagonise China. Its “open” character emphasises that any state willing to engage in cooperation with Japan is welcome to join – including China.4 The “free” in FOIP refers to freedom of navigation, respect for liberal norms, and international law – FOIP’s primary goal. The second goal is the promotion of economic development – through free-trade agreements, investments, and assistance to ensure “shared connectivity”. As for free trade, Japan was an active negotiator in three major free trade agreements. First, the Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which replaced the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) rejected by the US President Donald Trump, signed by Japan in March and which came into

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force in November 2018. Second, Japan accelerated negotiations with the EU for the signature of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which entered into force in February 2019 (along with a Strategic Partnership Agreement). Third, Japan decided to participate in negotiations launched by China for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which came into effect in January 2022. Shared connectivity can be physical connectivity (quality infrastructure developments), people-to-people connectivity (a transfer of know-how), or institutional connectivity (information on good practices). Japan wishes for others to join forces to further these objectives. The discreet implication is that China’s investments or aid bear no consideration for environmental sustainability or for local populations and their autonomy from the donors. International cooperation through infrastructure projects is more difficult to achieve than anticipated. For instance, the 2019 Roadmap signed by France and Japan sought to promote concrete cooperation projects, but interagency cooperation proved difficult (MOFA Japan, 2019a). The EU and Japan also signed a Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure in September 2019 (MOFA Japan, 2019b). EU–Japan cooperation is likely to step up with the EU’s adoption of the Global Gateway – a plan to invest €300 billion in infrastructure (EU Commission, 2021). In the South-Pacific, Japan, Australia, and the United States have agreed to jointly fund an undersea cable to provide faster internet to Nauru, Kiribati, and the Federated States of Micronesia (Packham, 2021). The third goal of FOIP displays a commitment to peace and stability by contributing to capacity-building in the fields of maritime law enforcement and maritime domain awareness, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, anti-piracy, counter-terrorism, and non-proliferation. Many of Japan’s security-related initiatives, for instance in the field of maritime security, which include assistance to ASEAN maritime countries or the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, now take place under the FOIP banner, as do infrastructure projects financed by Japan’s Official Development Assistance (tunnels, bridges, ports in Vietnam or Laos, for instance).5 In addition to FOIP, which is the basis of Japan’s actions to promote freedom of the seas and economic development, Japan is also involved in alliance dynamics: Japan has strengthened its bilateral defence cooperations and is at the crux of the “minilateral” (IISS, 2021) alliance structures now taking place, involving numerous joint military exercises. Japan and Alliance Dynamics

Increasing Chinese power is compelling states to establish new defence partnerships. Japan was an initiator and a leader in the move and is a part-taker in most (Delamotte, 2023).

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From 2007, Japan developed its network of partners beyond its alliance with the United States. This movement was encouraged by President George Bush Jr. In January 2007, Congress approved the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) Act for Vietnam and in October 2008, the President signed an agreement with India by which the latter gained access to US military technology in exchange for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its civilian nuclear facilities. Japan stepped up cooperation in the field of security with Vietnam and India, and foremost with Australia from then on. Almost 10 years later, President Barack Obama was to encourage US allies to establish links among themselves so as to end the “hub-and-spokes” system of alliances6: Japan had anticipated the move. By then, Japan had established substantial defence exchanges with Australia, India, and to a lesser extent with Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines to provide assistance in the field of maritime law enforcement. Furthermore, in 2011–2012, it established industrial and intelligenceexchange dialogues with the main European defence powers – the United Kingdom and France. From 2007, Japan also led the way in reshaping the quadrilateral security cooperation between the United States, Australia, Japan, and India, known as “QUAD”. The formation of the grouping followed the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and India, when the United States raised the idea of a coordinated quadrilateral reaction (Joshi, 2021). Japan pushed for cooperation among the four to continue. The QUAD country officials started meeting regularly from 2017, the first QUAD Foreign Ministers meeting took place in 2019, and the first QUAD leaders meeting in 2021 (online). The four countries also carried out joint security cooperation in the form of military exercises. Joint naval exercises have long existed, and Japan has been keen to join the “Rim of the Pacific” (RIMPAC), a biennial exercise organised by the United States in the Pacific, since 1980 (Pacific Bulletin, 1984). Japan thereby interacted with other navies, albeit generally with observer status. It could thereby train in simulated combat situations. The Japan Self-Defence Force (JSDF) naval exercises developed from 2006 when a joint operational structure was established in the Self-Defence Forces. Japan now takes part or organises a great number of exercises each year (74 exercises in 2021) (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2021), few of which are solely national.7 From 19–30 November 2021, for example, the Japan Self-Defence Forces (SDF, Japan’s armed forces) conducted a large-scale joint exercise with units from the United States, Australian, Canadian, and German navies (ANNUALEX). From 11–16 May 2021, the ARC-21 exercise took place, which involved France, Canada, Australia, Germany, the United States, as well as Japan. As Japan’s joint exercises multiplied, its diplomatic horizon in the field of security broadened. From the point of view of Japan’s defence doctrine

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and diplomacy, the Indo-Pacific is an extended Asia-Pacific with a security dimension that the “Asia-Pacific” never reached as a region. Japan, an Active Player

The horizon of Japan’s defence policy after the Second World War was first the Far East (1960 Japan–US Security Treaty) and then the Asia-Pacific (1997 Bilateral Security Guidelines). The Indo-Pacific furthers the expansion of this horizon through increased military capability and a change in the defence doctrine. Japan’s defence doctrine was long based on an “isolationist pacifism” (the term was “one-country pacifism” in the context of a “strictly defensive defence policy”). Japan has to a large extent ceased to be isolationist and is much less “reluctantly realist” (Green, 2001). Japan’s defence posture stretches Article 9 of the Constitution, which bans the use of force (or the threat thereof) and aggressive military potential. This Article has been the subject of much political debate. Reflecting again on the “reactive state” notion etched out in the introduction, Japan did not cease to be “isolationist” because the United States so requested, but because opinions changed in Japanese decision-making circles, and isolationism could give way to “proactive pacifism”. The concept of proactive pacifism (積 極 的 平 和 主 義) appeared in the 2013 National Security Strategy and the subsequent National Defence Guidelines. Prior to this, when the Democrats were in power, in 2010, they had released the National Defence Guidelines which opted for a “proactive and flexible role” (積 極 的 能 動 的 な) in the international community and, specifically, a variety of domains – indeed the word proactive was used 19 times in the 19-page document (Kantei, Japan, 2010). Those two terms taken up by the Democrats had interestingly appeared in the 2004 Constitutional Reform proposal drafted by their opponents, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).8 Being “proactive” meant being able to better contribute to international security challenges, foremost in the region. In 2015, Prime Minister Shinzô Abe undertook a vast reform of Japan’s security legislation. This enabled Japan to provide logistic support in international crises, which bear “important consequences” for Japan’s security, and to exercise collective self-defence if an ally is attacked and Japan’s “survival” or the constitutional rights of its people are imperiled. Such is the support the US could expect from Japan in the context of a crisis in the Indo-Pacific (Delamotte, 2021). •

Conclusion: A Subtle Leader

Through Prime Minister Abe’s two mandates in 2006–2007 and in 2012– 2020 Japan found its diplomatic style. Japan was cautious in exercising

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regional leadership in the 1990s when regional grouping construction might have been reminiscent of the 1930s. With the expansion of the regional limits through Japan’s diplomatic action and the rising interest of the world in the Indo-Pacific, Japan has gained the ability to further its interests and found its style of leadership – a gentle yet determined one. Notes 1 The Pacific Forum for Trade and Development or the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, for instance. 2 Kent E. Calder (1988) defined “reactive” as: (1) failing to undertake major independent foreign-policy initiatives although it [would have] the power and national incentives to do so; (2) responding to outside pressure for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely. 3 “Legislation for Peace and Security”, 2015: Act amending the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws to ensure the peace and security of Japan and the international community (No. 76 of 30 September 2015); Act on the cooperation and support activities to the armed forces of foreign countries, etc., in situations where the international community is acting for international peace and security (No. 77 of 30 September 2015). Both came into force on 29 March 2016. 4 The Blue Books of 2017 and 2018 used the term “strategy” which was dropped later to appear less confrontational: https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/mofaj​/gaiko​/page25​ _001766​.html – as explained by Mori (2018). 5 For example, cf. MOFA website: https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/mofaj​/gaiko​/page25​ _001766​.html 6 Barack Obama (16 Nov. 2015), White House: “As we pursue these efforts, we are moving beyond the “hub-and-spokes” model of the past, toward a more networked architecture of cooperation among our allies and partners – including through expanded trilateral cooperation frameworks – built on shared values and interests”. 7 Japan’s first amphibious exercise with the GSDF was in 2015 with France. 8 「 国 際 平 和 に 積 極 的 、 機 動 的 に 貢 献 す る 国 家 で あ る 」[Anationthatproactively and flexibly contributes to international peace], quoted by Yasuhiro Nakasone in 2004.

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.vie​-publique​.fr​/discours​/ 206113 ​- declaration​- de​-m​- emmanuel​-macron​-president​ -de​-la​-republique​-sur​-les-r Macron, E. (2019, August 29). Speech to French Ambassadors. Elysée Palace, Paris. https://otan​.delegfrance​.org​/ Discours​-du​-President​-de​-la​-Republique​-a​-la​ -conference​-des​-ambassadeurs​- et​-des [Official translation]. Ministère de la Défense, France. (May 2019). Stratégie de défense en Indopacifique. https://www​.defense​. gouv​. fr​/dgris​/action​- internationale​/enjeux​- regionaux​/ la​ -strategie​-de​-defense​-francaise​- en​-indopacifique2 Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2021, December). Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) – Exercises. https://www​.mod​.go​.jp​/msdf​/en ​/exercises​/ 2021​ .html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2006, November 30). 自 由 と 繁 栄 の 弧[Arc of Freedom and Prosperity]. https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/mofaj​/press​/enzetsu ​/18​/easo​ _1130​.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2007, August 22). 二 つ の 海 の 交 わ り [The Intersection of Two Seas]. https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/mofaj​/press​/enzetsu ​/19​/eabe​ _0822​.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2016, August 5). Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI). Nairobi, Kenya. https://www​ .mofa​.go​.jp​/mofaj​/afr​/af2​/page4​_ 002268​.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2017, 2018). Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan. https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/mofaj​/gaiko​/page25​_ 001766​.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2019a). Roadmap on Japan-France Cooperation for Opening New Horizons between Japan and France Under an Exceptional Partnership (2019–2023). https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/files​/000492473​ .pdf Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2019b). The Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between Japan and the European Union. https://www​.mofa​.go​.jp​/files​/000521432​.pdf Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. (2020, November 13). Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia. Government of Netherlands. https://www​.rijksoverheid​.nl​/documenten​ /publicaties ​ / 2020 ​ / 11 ​ / 13 ​ / indo ​ - pacific ​ - een ​ - leidraad ​ -voor ​ -versterking ​ -van ​ - de​ -nederlandse​- en​- eu​-samenwerking​-met​-partners​-in​-azie Modi, N. (2018, June 1). Keynote Speech by Prime Minister of India. https://www​ .iiss​.org ​/events​/shangri​-la​-dialogue​/shangri​-la​-dialogue​-2018 Mori, S. (2018, October 9). Opportunities and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific: A Japanese Perspective on Great Power Dynamics. Inalco, Paris. Pacific Bulletin. (1984, March). Stop RIMPAC 1984. Pacific Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 7. Packham, C. (2021, December 11). US, Australia and Japan to Fund Undersea Cable in the Pacific. Reuters. Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. (2018, September 28). Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and Cooperation on Maritime Law Enforcement Capacity Building. https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​= clDpaclFApo Soeya,Y.(2017).日 本 の 外 交 。 戦 後 を 読 み 解く[JapaneseDiplomacy:Understanding the Post-War]. Tôkyô, Chikuma. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2021, December 22). Changing Alliance Structures.

11 US STRATEGY TOWARD THE INDO-PACIFIC Is the United States Back? Murray Hiebert

Introduction

Indo-Pacific nations could be forgiven for wondering whether and how vigorously the United States would engage the region when President Joe Biden first took office in early 2021. During the several centuries of US engagement with the region, Washington has vacillated between periods of intense focus (Vietnam War) and times of near benign neglect. Over the past dozen years, the Indo-Pacific, especially Southeast Asia, got more attention from President Barack Obama’s administration (beginning in 2009) than it had received since American troops pulled out of Vietnam in 1975. With the election of President Donald Trump in 2016, US policy again slipped largely into a period of qualified neglect and intermittent diplomacy with much of the Indo-Pacific. One exception, of course, was China, a growing competitor of the United States with which Trump mounted a trade war that had wide-ranging implications for the region. He also pulled out of what is now the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which would have tied the United States economically more closely into the Indo-Pacific. Biden’s team declared it would refocus US policy on the Indo-Pacific soon after taking office. In February 2022, just before Russia invaded Ukraine, the administration released an ambitious Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), which focused on advancing a free and open region, building connections with allies and partners, driving prosperity, and building security in the region (The White House, 2022a). The release of the IPS was followed in May 2022 by Biden hosting a summit in Washington for 8 of the 10 leaders of the countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A week later, DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-13

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Biden took his first visit to the Indo-Pacific since becoming president to meet the leaders of two long-time US allies, South Korea and Japan. While the president was in Tokyo, his administration released its longawaited economic strategy towards the region, dubbed the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) (The White House, 2022c). Many in the IndoPacific complained that the IPEF was too little too late and wished that Biden had announced instead that the United States was rejoining the CPTPP. Still, a dozen countries signed up in the initial round, pleased that Washington was once again reengaging the region economically. In late May 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken spelt out the administration’s policy towards China in a speech, declaring that Beijing poses the “most serious long-term” threat to the global order. Blinken said the United States would “compete with China to defend our interests,” but added that Washington would seek to avoid “conflict or a new war” (Blinken, 2022). Many in Southeast Asian countries which seek good relations with both China and the United States are wary that they will be called on to choose sides and they are determined not to be caught in hostilities between the two superpowers. Some in the Indo-Pacific were concerned when Biden was elected that the new president would be reticent to use “hard power to counter China’s assertiveness”, wrote Bilahari Kausikan, a blunt-speaking former permanent secretary of the Singapore Foreign Ministry, just before Biden’s summit with ASEAN leaders (Kausikan, 2022). But Kausikan added that Biden’s early use of US warships in the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea to assert the right of freedom of navigation in “the face of extravagant Chinese maritime claims and attempts at intimidation” reassured the region that Biden would not try to replace the “exercise of military muscle” with “eloquent speeches”. Separately, the Biden administration also sought to rejuvenate the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or QUAD, including Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, to address economic and security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Originally promoted by Japan in 2007, the grouping largely went dormant before being resurrected by Trump to stand up to China. Biden breathed new energy into the QUAD by organising the first meeting of leaders in early 2021 focused on COVID-19 vaccines, climate change, technological innovation, and supply-chain resilience. The results of an annual survey released in early 2022 by Singapore’s Institute for Southeast Asian Studies found that 43 per cent of Southeast Asian elites are “confident” or “very confident” that the United States is a reliable strategic partner, and 53 per cent said they trust the United States to do the right thing (ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022, p. 50). Just 27 per cent said that about China (ibid., p. 42). Half of those surveyed said they were worried China would use its economic and military power to threaten their country’s interests and sovereignty (ibid.,

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p. 43). Asked if they were forced to align with either China or the United States, 57 per cent said they would choose the United States compared to 43 per cent who chose China (ibid., p. 32). Some 18 months into the Biden administration, Indo-Pacific officials and academics are noting distinct differences between it and its predecessor. They say that Trump had a more “America First” feel and was more unilateralist in his approach. Biden is more focused on working with allies and partners in the region. Observers from the region note that Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and neglect of multilateralism on issues like climate change narrowed his ability to engage on regional issues beyond China. Biden also mostly sings from the same book as the officials in his administration. Trump’s erratic personal views often diverged from the policies of his bureaucracy, which regularly made it difficult for capitals in the Indo-Pacific to figure out what US policy was. These differences came out most starkly in the declassified Trump Indo-Pacific Strategic Framework in 2021 (O’Brien, 2021). New Indo-Pacific Strategy of the US

The Biden administration’s IPS released on 11 February 2022 reaffirmed that the United States would focus on “the most dynamic region in the world” and work to strengthen the “resilience” of American allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. The IPS declared that the region is “vital for the security and prosperity” of the United States and that the United States would work for a “free and open, connected, prosperous, secure and resilient” IndoPacific (The White House, 2022a). The Biden team sought to differentiate its use of “free and open” Indo-Pacific from that touted in 2017 by the Trump administration. Many ASEAN countries saw the earlier iteration as aimed at containing China, which made them uncomfortable. Biden officials say they recognise that their policies cannot target competition with China, a non-starter for most Southeast Asian governments. Still, the United States’ policy towards the Indo-Pacific cannot be understood separately from Washington’s wider strategic and economic competition with Beijing. Interestingly, China is only hinted at indirectly in the IPS, which meant that a full understanding of the Biden administration’s policy towards the region had to wait several months until the Biden strategy for Beijing was rolled out. But much of the IPS only makes sense through the lens of relations with China and the Biden administration’s determination to counter Beijing’s assertive behaviour in the region. References to a “free and open Indo-Pacific” in which “governments can make their own choices” are a clear allusion to the fact that the administration views China as putting undue pressure on its neighbours. The IPS said Washington would “support open societies” that are “free of coercion” by investing in “democratic

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institutions, a free press and a vibrant civil society”. It also pledged to work for fiscal transparency to “expose corruption and drive reform” and support an open, reliable, and secure internet. The Biden Indo-Pacific Strategy differs sharply from that of the Trump administration’s by declaring that the United States would work closely with five alliance partners – Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand – and would seek to strengthen relationships with India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands. The IPS is committed to working closely with partners in the QUAD on global health, climate change, critical technology, infrastructure, and cyber issues. It also affirmed that the United States endorses “ASEAN centrality” and pledged to deepen cooperation with the grouping. “The prosperity of everyday Americans is linked to the Indo-Pacific”, the IPS declared. It pointed out that two-way trade between the United States and the region totalled US$ 1.75 trillion and that cumulative US foreign investment in the area reached US$ 969 billion in 2020. Washington pledged to put forward an economic framework that would boost technological transformation and adapt to the energy and climate transition. The IPS did not spell out details of US economic engagement. That would have to wait for the release of the IPEF in May. The IPS said bolstering Indo-Pacific security was a key priority and that “integrated deterrence” would be the “cornerstone” of the US approach. It declared that Washington would focus on innovation to respond to evolving threat challenges, including space, cyberspace, and emerging technology. The administration said it would deepen interoperability with partners and allies and work to expand Taiwan’s selfdefence capabilities. One striking omission in the IPS is the Mekong River. Despite the inroads made by the US–Mekong Strategic Partnership, the river and the challenges it is facing from the 11 dams China has built in the upper reaches of the river are not mentioned in the strategy. “Without greater US engagement, Beijing’s dam-building along the upper reaches of the Mekong River gives it a potential stranglehold over the five ASEAN members through which the river runs”, Kausikan said (Kausikan, 2022). China’s dams not only threaten a massive ecological risk, but along with Chinese north–south railways and roads could create a dependence on Beijing that would “reshape the strategic geography of Southeast Asia and could turn the boundaries between southwestern China and Southeast Asia into just lines on maps,” he warned (Kausikan, 2022). The US Summit with ASEAN

When Biden took office, his team recognised that Southeast Asia had long felt neglected, and that Washington would have to do something dramatic to

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catch the region’s attention and demonstrate that it is on the US agenda. Highlevel US officials visited the region, including Vice President Kamala Harris (Solomon and Parti, 2021), Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin (Wee, 2021), Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo (U.S. Department of Commerce, no date), and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Still, Biden seemed focused on developing security ties in the Indo-Pacific with Australia, India, and Japan in the QUAD and with Australia and the United Kingdom in the AUKUS security arrangement. “This left [ASEAN] uncertain about how central it really is in American eyes, an insecurity enhanced by Biden’s not having bothered to nominate an ambassador to ASEAN until recently”, Kausikan of Singapore wrote (Kausikan, 2022). After an earlier aborted effort, Biden hosted eight Southeast Asian leaders at the first-ever summit in Washington in mid-May 2022, highlighting that his administration is committed to the region following several years of neglect under the previous administration. Myanmar was excluded because of the 2021 military coup, and outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte chose to skip the summit scheduled days before the Philippine presidential elections. The Philippine foreign secretary attended in his place. During the twoday summit, the US president held talks with the ASEAN leaders on China, Myanmar, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including a session over a dinner. On the second day, US cabinet officials had discussions with the leaders on climate, infrastructure, and energy. The administration announced US$ 150 million for various initiatives with the biggest packages going to maritime security cooperation and clean energy initiatives. Smaller amounts went to digital economy rulemaking, disease surveillance, and capacity-building for Southeast Asian teachers. These funds supplemented just over US$ 100 million pledged to ASEAN last year (The White House, 2022b). The US$ 60 million maritime security component will be led by the US Coast Guard, which will launch training and capacity building. Using the Coast Guard in the South China Sea was intended to raise fewer alarm bells than the use of the US Navy. This initiative complemented another US$ 425 million that the United States had committed for regional maritime security in the four years leading up to 2020 (Seah & Choong, 2022). The administration also rolled out several initiatives with individual countries. Thailand and the United States launched their first two-plus-two meeting between the foreign and defence ministers of the two countries. Malaysia and the United States signed an agreement to bolster security for the semiconductor supply chain. The US International Development Finance Corporation signed an agreement to provide US$ 37 million to the independent Fulbright University in Vietnam. Biden declared that the summit marked a “new era” in United States– ASEAN ties and announced that he was appointing the first ambassador to

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ASEAN. The two sides agreed to speed up negotiations on a comprehensive strategic partnership (something China achieved last year) with the goal of completing the process at the ASEAN summit in November 2022, when Biden is tentatively slated to attend three regional meetings in Southeast Asia. Most ASEAN leaders viewed the summit as a positive first step in bolstering ties with the United States, but felt the ultimate success could only be measured when they see whether Washington follows through in the months and years to come. Many observed that the United States’ pledge of US$ 150 million was pretty small compared to China’s earlier US$ 1.5 billion pledge. It wasn’t lost on Southeast Asians that a few days before the summit, the US House of Representatives had passed a US$ 40 billion aid package for Ukraine, raising doubts about how much Washington is committed to the Indo-Pacific in the face of other global challenges. Several leaders were disappointed that Biden did not propose a more robust trade agenda than the then-still-not-unveiled IPEF, which was discussed in only notional terms with the leaders (the IPEF was unveiled in Tokyo shortly after the summit). The ASEAN visitors were told that the IPEF included opportunities for increased cooperation in the digital economy, boosting supply-chain resilience and clean energy initiatives. Some Southeast Asian leaders told their hosts that they were hoping for increased market access for their products, but US officials told them that that was not on the table. The United States scored points with ASEAN leaders just by hosting the summit. The US military is viewed as deeply engaged in the region and a provider of security, but Washington is widely seen as having a long way to go to catch up with the economic thrust China has established in the region. Some leaders said it would be better if the United States rejoined the CPTPP, which Biden officials have long said is untenable in the sharply divided US Congress. Even after the summit, some Southeast Asians wondered just how important they were in US policy. “Even though US officials ritually invoke the importance and ‘centrality’ of ASEAN, the regional organisation is not as central to US policy as many once thought it to be”, Kausikan said. He added that “practicing diplomacy as usual will not win the United States many prizes in its strategic competition with China” (Kausikan, 2022). Indo-Pacific Economic Framework

Southeast Asians often say the most important piece missing from US policy in the Indo-Pacific is economic engagement, particularly since Trump pulled out of the CPTPP. These countries want US investment, even though China is emerging as the most important economic partner. The United States finally launched the IPEF while Biden was visiting Japan in May 2022, shortly after the ASEAN summit. A dozen countries signed on, including Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines,

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Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam, which Washington found encouraging. Fiji signed on shortly after the launch. Together, these countries account for 40 per cent of global GDP. The goal of the IPEF is “to advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness and competitiveness” (The White House, 2022c). The IPEF is not a regular free trade agreement that covers a wide swath of issues affecting trade between two countries, such as market access, intellectual property rights, digital trade, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals. For negotiations to move ahead, trade agreement negotiators need to find a consensus on all these issues to complete the agreement. In contrast, the IPEF has four main pillars. The first, called “connected economy” covers the digital economy, labour and environmental standards, and corporate accountability. The second, dubbed “resilient economy” focuses on the strength and reliability of the global supply chain. The third pillar targets a “clean economy” and aims at climate change and renewable energy, while the fourth, called the “fair economy,” focuses on promoting fair competition and taxes, and anti-money laundering and anti-corruption platforms. IPEF allows participants to engage in one or more of the pillars. Participating economies will negotiate for some 12 to 18 months with the goal of completing negotiations by the time the United States hosts the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 2023. The countries that signed up agreed to engage in consultations that will discuss the range of the negotiations. Without the incentive of market access, some ASEAN trade analysts say, it is far from certain how many economies will agree to make concessions (Pitakdumrongkit, 2022). For example, during negotiations for the CPTPP earlier, Vietnam made concessions on labour standards in exchange for more access to the US market. Agreements under the IPEF will not be legally binding. Participating economies will not have to get ratification for an agreement by their legislatures, so a country can presumably back out at any time. The Biden administration did not want to seek congressional ratification because it had no confidence an agreement would pass in the currently fraught environment on trade in Washington. ASEAN analysts note that this also means that a successor to Biden could quickly pull out of an agreement. The future of the IPEF faces some critical questions. “Will most of the countries that signed on at the launch – including India, Indonesia, and other ASEAN countries critical to the initiative’s success – stay constructively engaged once the negotiations start and the United States presses for binding commitments to high standards?” asks Matthew Goodman, an Asian economics expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Goodman, 2022). Apart from Singapore, few countries in the Indo-Pacific have been as active as Vietnam in negotiating trade agreements in recent years. Just before

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the US–ASEAN Summit, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh said in a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies that Hanoi would be ready to work with the United States on the IPEF, but in the end, its response would depend on what Washington was offering compared to what other countries were putting on the table and domestic considerations (Chinh, 2022). It is far from certain that the United States, which lags behind China in economic cooperation in Southeast Asia, can do much to displace China from its dominant role in the region. The US companies are still the largest cumulative investors in Southeast Asia, while China comes in fourth, but is rapidly catching up. The US cumulative direct investment in ASEAN in 2020 totalled US$ 328.5 billion (Office of the United States Trade Representative [OUSTR], n.d.), which is more than the combined investment by China, India, Japan, and South Korea in the region (East West Centre, 2021). The United States is ASEAN’s fourth-largest trading partner with goods and services trade topping US$ 362 billion in 2020 (OUSTR, n.d.), but US two-way trade is only about half that of China’s (US$ 685 billion) (China International Import Expo, 2021). The amount of money the United States puts on the table is not the full story. The US standing in the Indo-Pacific will also depend on Washington’s ability to demonstrate that it is committed to the region for the long haul. “The key now is for the Biden administration to demonstrate that it is committed to a long-term, strategic economic relationship with partners in the region”, Goodman said (Goodman, 2022). Beijing has not been sitting on its laurels since the United States pulled out of what is now the CPTPP. China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has helped build a good number of badly needed infrastructure projects even if some of them faced domestic protests (Indonesia), displaced people without proper compensation (Laos), created debt repayment challenges (Laos), and in at least one case facilitated corruption at the highest levels (Malaysia). China earlier negotiated a free trade agreement with the ASEAN countries and then joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), including ASEAN, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Beijing has also applied to join the CPTPP as well as the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) between Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand. Beyond that, Beijing launched the Global Development Initiative (GDI), which Singapore joined as one of a Group of Friends of the GDI (Loong, 2022). The IPEF provides none of the scope and heft of a full-fledged trade agreement with ASEAN, but depending on how vigorously Washington pursues the framework, it has initiated at least partial engagement until Washington can rejoin the CPTPP or initiate a more robust regional agenda.

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US Strategy towards China

Biden continued many of Trump’s China policies, including maintaining most of the former president’s tariffs. It took 16 months before the new president’s team hammered out its collective strategy towards Beijing. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in a late May 2022 speech systematically spelling out US strategy, said that Beijing is the “most serious long-term challenge to the international order”. He added: “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it” (Blinken, 2022). The top US diplomat said the United States could not rely on China to “change its trajectory”, so Washington would seek to change the strategic environment around China to advance the US “vision for an open and inclusive international system”. Blinken stressed that Washington would not seek to topple the Chinese political system, adding, “We don’t seek to block China from its role as a major power.” He said the two countries should be able to cooperate in areas like climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the global food crisis. But this will not necessarily be easy because Chinese officials view the US effort to bolster alliances in the Indo-Pacific, such as the newly established AUKUS between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as an effort to contain China. China’s integration into the global economy gives Beijing huge clout. Blinken said, “Beijing wants to put itself at the centre of global innovation and manufacturing, increase other countries’ technological dependence to impose its foreign policy preferences”. He said China is taking advantage of open economies “to spy, to hack, to steal technology and know-how to advance its military innovation”. Today, there is a widely held consensus in the United States that China’s economic behaviour, such as providing subsidies to critical companies and allowing the theft of intellectual property, is harming US companies. Blinken said Chinese firms have long had greater access to the US market than American companies have had in China. “This lack of reciprocity is unacceptable and it’s unsustainable” he added. The US policy towards China has an important role at home. He urged the United States to invest more in high-tech industries focusing on the future so American companies can compete with their Chinese counterparts. He did not discuss the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration and continued under Biden, although some senior US officials have called for them to be lifted to help ease inflation. The IPEF, launched a few days before Blinken’s speech, is intended in part to hammer out some economic standards with US partners in the IndoPacific to restrain China’s efforts to take advantage of the trading system. The Secretary sought to tamp down differences over Taiwan, one of the most fraught points of tension between the two countries. He repeated a

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long-held US “strategic ambiguity” policy towards Taiwan after Biden had said a few days earlier that Washington has a “commitment” to respond militarily to protect Taiwan if Beijing attacked the island. Blinken called China’s pressure against Taiwan, such as flying fighter jets near the island, “deeply destabilising”. Blinken insisted that the United States does not expect other countries to have the same assessment of China as Washington does. He said that the administration knows many countries have “vital economic or people-to-people ties with China”, adding, “this is not about forcing countries to choose”. The QUAD and AUKUS

The United States in recent years has brought in other allies and partners to form regional initiatives to respond to an assertive China. ASEAN countries have less than enthusiastic responses about these new groupings, the QUAD and AUKUS. One common concern is that they could undercut ASEAN centrality and marginalise the Southeast Asia group. Some are anxious that the QUAD will exacerbate tensions with China. The Biden team inherited the QUAD, which includes Japan, India, Australia, and the United States, from the Trump administration as a vehicle to engage the Indo-Pacific and stand up to China. The QUAD got a boost early in the new administration for a combination of reasons including the COVID-19 pandemic and China’s deteriorating relations with India and Australia. The QUAD – Australia and Japan are US allies, while India is a strategic partner – began in 2004 to boost cooperation among the four in response to the devastating tsunami that struck the Indian Ocean. Its activities since then have progressed in fits and starts, but its priorities now include security, economic, and health issues. All four countries are disturbed by China’s growing aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific. In November 2020, the four partners participated in their first joint naval exercise in a decade. In March 2021, Biden hosted a virtual summit of the four leaders, and they agreed to set up working groups on COVID-19 vaccines, climate change, technological innovation, and supply-chain resilience (Smith, 2021). The QUAD is focused on public goods such as the economic and humanitarian crises resulting from the pandemic. The QUAD Summit that met in Japan in May 2022 announced a new partnership on maritime domain awareness, reiterated its support for a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, and agreed to support the rule of law, democratic values, and territorial integrity. The meeting reported that in 2021 QUAD partners had provided US$ 5.2 billion to COVAX, the global vaccine fund, accounting for some 40 per cent of total donations by governments (Smith, 2022). The meeting also announced a new Indo-Pacific initiative for maritime domain awareness to help tackle illegal fishing and agreed to respond to

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natural disasters by providing technology and training. The QUAD leaders also discussed helping the region address infrastructure gaps and providing assistance to tackle climate change and enhance cybersecurity challenges. The leaders discussed China’s assertive behaviour in the disputed South and East China Seas and its use of coercive economic measures to push its political goals in the region. To demonstrate their views of the QUAD, half a dozen Chinese and Russian bombers, accompanied by surveillance planes, flew around Japanese territory on the day of the meeting (Kyodo News, 2022). Southeast Asians do not have a uniform view of the QUAD and express different opinions about the possible benefits and challenges of the QUAD. Evan Laksmana, an Indonesian senior researcher at the National University of Singapore, pointed out that Indonesia is concerned that the QUAD will sideline ASEAN, while Singapore is more focused “on the sharpening of the US competition” with China. Cambodia and Laos, which have close ties with Beijing, are wary that the QUAD will emerge into an “anti-China” coalition (Laksmana, 2020, p. 107). A bigger concern among ASEAN leaders was that the QUAD would detract from “ASEAN centrality”, meaning that the grouping would lose its role as the “primary driving force” in shaping external relations in a regional architecture, said Laksmana (Laksmana, 2020, p. 109). A key feature of ASEAN centrality is focused on whether great and regional powers agree to “surrender regional initiatives and agenda setting to ASEAN”. An early 2022 survey of regional elites released by the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asia Studies found that 59 per cent of those who responded “strongly agree” or “agree” that the strengthening of the QUAD will be constructive for Southeast Asia. Three out of five thought ASEAN countries should participate in the QUAD’s joint military exercises or security initiatives (ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022, p. 28). The AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States was launched by their leaders in September 2021. It has a narrower focus than the QUAD. What prompted the formation of AUKUS were the increasing security challenges facing the Indo-Pacific from China. The goal of AUKUS was to “raise the cost to Beijing of using military power and intimidation to achieve its ends”, wrote Michael Shoebridge, a national security expert at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Shoebridge, 2021, p. 2). The key focus of the grouping was the US agreement to allow Australia, for the first time, to build nuclear submarines, which are faster and harder to detect than conventional submarines, using US technology. AUKUS also aims to boost military capabilities in artificial intelligence, cyber technologies, and undersea technologies. Shoebridge said that AUKUS is a “trilateral technology accelerator” seeking to boost the military power of the militaries in all three countries (Shoebridge, 2021, p. 3).

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Southeast Asian governments have expressed diverse opinions about AUKUS. Indonesia and Malaysia are concerned that nuclear submarines could cause potential destabilisation in the region. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said Singapore welcomed the grouping by quoting Australia’s assurance that AUKUS would “support ASEAN centrality, deepen economic integration and promote a stable and secure Asia-Pacific region and rules-based order” (Shoebridge, 2021, p. 5). The ISEAS opinion survey released in early 2022 highlighted the differences in the views of Southeast Asians on AUKUS. About 60 per cent of people responding to the survey in the Philippines said the grouping would help “balance China’s growing military power”. That number was 51 per cent in Singapore and 47 per cent in Vietnam. The overall attitude in all ASEAN countries was 36 per cent. Some 23 per cent of respondents in ASEAN said AUKUS would prompt a regional arms race, 18 per cent said it would weaken ASEAN centrality, and 12 per cent it would weaken efforts against the proliferation of nuclear weapons (ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022, p. 29). Conclusion

Despite the Biden administration’s stepped-up engagement with the IndoPacific, particularly Southeast Asia, Washington still has some way to go to convince the region that the United States is back. For starters, regional governments are aware of the volatile state of American politics and the possibility that a Trump-like leader could return to the presidency in 2024. The Biden administration must demonstrate that it is fully engaged in the region and regularly exchange high-level visits and participate in regional summits such as ASEAN leaders’ meetings, the East Asia Summit, and APEC. It’s not enough to focus only on visits by the Pentagon’s battle carrier groups. Washington also needs to demonstrate a commitment to an economic partnership and ensure that regional countries find some benefit to engaging in the IPEF negotiations. A number of Southeast Asian officials and academics warned the Biden administration that it was hurting relations with the region by framing relations as a contest between democracy and authoritarianism, as happened with the December 2021 Summit of Democracy. Thai academic Thitinan Pongsudhirak pointed out that a number of countries could be considered “democratic” if Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, and Pakistan were included. Only Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines were invited from Southeast Asia. “But if Malaysia with its democratic ‘backsliding’ of rights violations can be included, then why not Thailand?” Thitinan added, “The polarization of the world into autocracies and democracies makes more critics and enemies than winning friends” (Pongsudhirak, 2021).

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It is also important for Washington to remember that ASEAN does not share all US views about Beijing, even though they all have some anxieties about China’s rise. “While Washington is trying to build alliances in the region to contain the rise of China, ASEAN has accepted China’s growing power and tries to include, rather than exclude, Beijing in the regional architecture”, wrote Endy Bayuni, a long-time editor of the Jakarta Post, shortly after the US–ASEAN summit (Bayuni, 2022). The United States also needs to be humble about how its own often-heavy footprint plays in the region. As a senior Southeast Asian official pointed out to Prashanth Parameswaran, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Centre: “The United States does not want anyone to dominate Southeast Asia except itself; we don’t want anyone to dominate the region including the United States” (Parameswaran, 2022). To be sure, US long-term economic, security, and people-to-people engagement as a partner in the region is more than welcome by the nations of the Indo-Pacific. References ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Isak Institute. (2022). State of Southeast Asia 2022: Survey Report. https://www​.iseas​.edu​.sg​/wp​- content​/uploads​/2022​ /02 ​/ The​- State​-of​- SEA​-2022 ​_ FA ​_ Digital ​_ FINAL ​.pdf Bayuni, E. (2022, May 19). ASEAN-US: On the Same Page, but Not in the Same Boat on Indo-Pacific. The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, Indonesia. https://www​ .thejakartapost​.com ​/opinion ​/ 2022​/05​/18​/asean​-us​- on​-the​-same​-page​-but​-not​-in​ -the​-same​-boat​-on​-indo​-pacific​.html Blinken, A. J. (2022, May 26). The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China. U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. https://www​ .state​.gov​/the​-administrations​-approach​-to​-the​-peoples​-republic​-of​- china/ China International Import Expo. (2021, September 13). China-ASEAN Bilateral Trade Annually Growth Rate Hits 16.5% from 1991 to 2020: Customs. Shanghai, China. https://www​.ciie​.org ​/zbh ​/en ​/news​/exhibition ​/news​/20210913​ /29410​.html Chinh, P. M. (2022, May 11). Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh ahead of U.S.ASEAN Summit, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. https://www​.csis​.org ​/events​/prime​-minister​-pham​-minh​- chinh​ -ahead​-us​-asean​-summit East-West Center. (2021). ASEAN Matters for America/ America Matters for ASEAN. East-West Center, US-ASEAN Business Council and ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute. https://asi​amat​ters​fora​merica​.org​/uploads​/publications​/2021​-ASEAN​ -Matters​-for​-America​.pdf Goodman, M. P. (2022, June 10). A Transactional Mindset Won’t Win in the IndoPacific. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. https:// www​.csis​.org​/analysis​/transactional​-mindset​-wont​-win​-indo​-pacific Kausikan, B. (2022, May 11). Threading the Needle in Southeast Asia: How Biden Can Work with Countries That Can’t Afford to Alienate China. Foreign Affairs. https://www​.foreignaffairs​.com ​/articles ​/southeast​- asia ​/ 2022 ​- 05 ​-11 ​/threading​ -needle​- southeast​-asia​?check ​_ logged ​_ in​=1​&utm ​_ medium​=promo ​_ email​&utm​ _source​=lo​_ flows​&utm​_ campaign​=registered​_user​_welcome​&utm​_ term​= email​ _1​&utm ​_ content​=20220628

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Kyodo News. (2022, May 25). China, Russia Fly 6 Bombers over Waters near Japan during QUAD Summit. https://english​.kyodonews​.net ​/news​/2022​/05​/ a9eb3e528919​- china​-russia​-fly​- 6​-bombers​- over​-waters​-near​-japan​- during​-quad​ -summit​.html Laksmana, E. A. (2020). Whose Centrality? ASEAN and the QUAD in the IndoPacific. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. https://media​.defense​.gov​/2021​/ Mar​/12​ /2002599864/​-1/​-1​/0​/6​-LAKSMANA​.PDF​/ TOC​.pdf Loong, L. H. (2022, May 26). Speech by PM Lee Hsien Loong at Nikkei’s 27th International Conference on the Future of Asia, in Tokyo, Japan. https://www​ .pmo​ . gov​ . sg ​ / Newsroom ​ / PM ​ - Lee ​ - Hsien ​ - Loong ​ - at​ - the ​ - 27th ​ - International​ -Conference​-on​-the​-Future​-of​-Asia O’Brien, R. C. (2021, January 12). A Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Statement from National Security Advisor Robert C. O’Brien, National Security Council, Washington, DC. https://trumpwhitehouse​.archives​.gov​/ briefings​-statements​/ statement​-national​-security​-advisor​-robert​- c​-obrien​- 011221/ Office of the United States Trade Representative. (n.d.). Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Washington, DC. https://ustr​.gov​/countries​-regions​/ southeast​-asia​-pacific​/association​-southeast​-asian​-nations​-asean Parameswaran, P. (2022). Elusive Balances: Shaping U.S.-Southeast Asia Strategy. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Pitakdumrongkit, K. (2022, June 1). The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework: Can the US Pull It Off? S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. https:// www​.rsis​.edu​.sg​/rsis​-publication​/rsis​/the​-indo​-pacific​- economic​-framework​- can​ -the​-us​-pull​-it​-off/#​.YryNO ​-zML9F Pongsudhirak, T. (2021, December 19). The Misguided US Democracy Summit. Bangkok Post. Bangkok, Thailand. https://www​.bangkokpost​.com ​/opinion ​/ opinion​/2229587​/the​-misguided​-us​-democracy​-summit Seah, S., & Choong, W. (2022, May 17). US-ASEAN: Summitry Is Not a Strategy, Fulcrum, ISEAS-Yusuf Ishak Institute, Singapore. https://fulcrum​.sg ​/u​-s​-asean​ -summitry​-is​-not​-a​-strategy/ Shoebridge, M. (2021, December). What is AUKUS and What it is Not? Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, Australia. https://www​.aspi​.org​.au ​/report ​/ what​-aukus​-and​-what​-it​-not Smith, S. A. (2021, May 27). The QUAD in the Indo-Pacific: What to Know. Council on Foreign Relations, New York. https://www​.cfr​.org​/in​-brief​/quad​-indo​-pacific​ -what​-know Smith, S. A. (2022, May 27). The QUAD is Getting More Ambitious in the IndoPacific. Council on Foreign Relations, New York. https://www​.cfr​.org ​/in​-brief ​/ quad​-getting​-more​-ambitious​-indo​-pacific Solomon, F., & Parti, T. (2021, August 20). Vice President Kamal Harris to Focus on Countering China on Southeast Asia Trip. The Wall Street Journal. New York. https://www​.wsj​.com ​/articles​/vice​-president​-kamala​-harris​-to​-focus​-on​ -countering​- china​-on​-southeast​-asia​-trip​-11629462039 The White House. (2022a, February). Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/wp​- content​/uploads​/2022​/02​/ U​ .S.​-Indo​-Pacific​- Strategy​.pdf The White House. (2022b, May 12). Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in Washington, DC. Washington, DC. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/ briefing​ -room ​/statements​-releases ​/ 2022 ​/ 05​/12 ​/fact​- sheet​-u​- s​- asean​- special​- summit​-in​ -washington​-dc/ The White House. (2022c, May 23). Fact Sheet: In Asia, President Biden and a Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. Washington, DC. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/ briefing​-room​

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/statements ​ - releases ​ / 2022 ​ / 05​ / 23 ​ / fact​ - sheet​ - in ​ - asia ​ - president​ - biden ​ - and ​ - a​ -dozen​-indo ​-pacific​-partners​-launch​-the​-indo ​-pacific​- economic​-framework​-for​ -prosperity/ U.S. Department of Commerce. (no date). U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo Announces First Travel to Asia. Press Release. https://www​.commerce​ .gov ​ / news ​ / press ​ - releases ​ / 2021 ​ / 11 ​ / us ​ - secretary ​ - commerce ​ - gina ​ - raimondo​ -announces​-first​-travel​-asia U.S. Department of State. (2022, July 5). Secretary Blinken’s Travel to Bali and Bangkok. Press Statement. Washington, DC. https://www​.state​.gov​/secretary​ -blinkens​-travel​-to​-bali​-and​-bangkok/ Wee, S.-L. (2021, July 29). After Years of Chinese Influence, U.S. Tries to Renew Ties in Southeast Asia. The New York Times. https://www​.nytimes​.com​/2021​/07​ /27​/world ​/asia ​/austin​-us​-southeast​-asia​-diplomacy​.html

12 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THE OUTLOOK ON THE INDO-PACIFIC Igor Denisov and Danil Bochkov

Introduction Post-Soviet Russia: Exploring a Way of Dealing with the West and the East

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation inherited not only vast swathes of the USSR’s land but also many of the country’s foreign policy problematic issues and economic challenges, both of which required immediate attention. For this reason, the most important foreign policy priorities of Russia in 1990–2010 were mostly concentrated on the relations with the border states of the former Soviet Union and its nearest neighbours, such as the countries of the European Union in the West and China and Japan in the East. Immediately after the collapse of communism, the idea of integrating the new Russia into the liberal Western world began to define the country’s foreign policy (Denisov & Lukin, 2021). At the same time due to the many factors of global concern (e.g., international terrorism, arms control, local and regional conflicts) Moscow, which remained to be one of the global leading states in setting international order, engaged in closer interaction with Washington and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in order to seek more stable global environment. Trenin (2019) argues that President Vladimir Putin in 2000 was actively calling for Russian membership in NATO, pursuing the goal of building a Greater Europe that would stretch from Lisbon to Vladivostok. In 2001, Moscow was seeking to become the US most important ally. For this reason, Russia was ready to provide any assistance to American troops in Afghanistan (Trenin, 2019).

DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-14

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This engagement was not flawless with frictions started budding in 1999 when the NATO went on its first wave of expansion followed by a string of national uprisings in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 dubbed “colour revolutions”, which Russia mostly described as being orchestrated by the United States (Light, 2008). However, this period was dominated by the Western vector in Russian foreign policy with major breakthroughs to be a successfully negotiated multilateral treaty on conventional forces in Europe in 1990, which remained effective until 2007, as well as the agreement in 1990 on a charter for European security and stability after the Cold War. These two agreements opened up a path for further security dialogue that resulted in the treaty on reduction of the strategic nuclear weapons (START II) in 1993, which was followed later by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in 2002 (Rumer & Sokolsky, 2019). As Tayyem and Habashneh (2012) argued, Russian foreign policy in 2000–2008 was framed as “Putin’s Principles” as he tried to mix between the Euro-Atlantic and the New Eurasian. It all changed in 2007 following several rounds of NATO eastward expansion which resulted in the famous speech of Russian president Vladimir Putin at the Munich Security Conference, where he warned Washington and its NATO allies against continuation of the policy of expansion, which, he stressed, would destabilise Europe and threaten Russian security. The relations lowed even further following the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo from Serbia in February 2008, which President Putin then condemned as “a terrible precedent, which will de facto blow apart the whole system of international relations, developed not over decades, but over centuries” (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2008). In the same year, Ukraine and Georgia were granted a full endorsement from the US president George W. Bush to commence the process of joining NATO (Spetalnick, 2008), which has had its reverberations nowadays causing in early 2022 one of the worst political crises in Russian relations with the West over the recent decades. Recognising the limits of true engagement with the West, Russia started to look more attentively to the East. The need to develop the Far Eastern territories has been long identified by Russian authorities as one of the most important priorities. However, this tendency has accelerated following the crisis in Russian-European and Russian-American relations in 2014, which was spurred by the Ukrainian political turmoil and Russian move on Crimea, for which Moscow fell under the US-led sanctions being accused of “annexing the peninsula”. As Blakkisrud and Rowe (2018) argued, following those events “Moscow has, with increasing urgency, been pushing the idea of turning the Russian Far East into a new gateway.” At the same time Moscow’s “turn to the East” in 2014 could be seen mostly as a political shift, since the economic one had occurred long before that time.

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Thus, the dynamics of the Russian foreign trade of 1995–2013 depicts that the share of the country’s trade with Asian countries was continuously on the upward trend rising 10 per cent over the decade, while it demonstrated the opposite trend in the trade with the European and American states. Hence, it speaks of the long-term set of socio-economic priorities, which Moscow attributed to its Far Eastern territories, while the political impetus was given in 2014 and only reinforced already fomenting economic dynamics pushing it to more vigorous cooperation between Russia and the East. However, some critics point out to the fact that it was actually “a pivot to nowhere” with “Moscow’s hopes that a new business relationship with Asia would make up for Russia’s losses have not materialised” (Gabuev, 2016). But, the true problems of the laggard dynamics of Russian trade and economic ties with the East derived from the fluctuations of global commodities prices and structural problems of the Russian economy, which included shrinking purchasing power of Russian companies and households accompanied by the devaluation of the rouble and drop in imports. Russian “Pivot to Asia”: Security and Economic Dimensions

Russian “pivot to Asia” is motivated by its longer-term priorities for promotion of its national interest in the Indo-Pacific region. Broadly speaking, Russia’s foreign policy in Asia is aimed at achieving two primary goals: the creation of reliable mechanisms for regional security on a non-aligned basis and the development of regional and sub-regional integration within the framework of multilateral international institutions, dialogue platforms, and regional associations. These goals imply specific requirements for the security architecture and interstate interaction that rule out unilateral approaches and revision of the status quo. Moscow pays a huge chunk of attention to developing bilateral relations with key regional players, such as China, India, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN. Most importantly, all those states also constitute the Indo-Pacific region, which although has been routinely downplayed by Moscow and Beijing – as the US-crafted strategy to challenge China and law-based regional order in Asia is gaining momentum in foreign policy institutions of both the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai (Denisov et al., 2021). The Indo-Pacific concept in its various explanations and meanings has been elaborated separately by India, Japan, Australia, ASEAN, and the United States with the most recent addition of the EU, which came up with its first ‘Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ in September 2021. Despite all the different interpretations available, Russia and China have been leaning towards the ASEAN centrality architecture of the regional order in which neither global power wields its own hegemony. China was reported to recognise the Indo-Pacific concept under its Indian interpretation

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with ASEAN’s primary role in November 2021, when Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesman Zhao Lijian told the media on the sidelines of the 30th Anniversary of the ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations that “China has noted India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative,” adding that “We seek highquality Belt and Road cooperation with ASEAN and cooperation between the Belt and Road Initiative and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (Business Standard, 2021). Russia on the official level has never endorsed the Indo-Pacific as a separate political concept. It could be attributed to its extremely dire state of bilateral relations with the United States, which, unlike other states, has elevated the Indo-Pacific to its prime foreign policy planning focus, effectively turning it into the instrument of advancing its interest and power to the region. As the latest version of the US “Indo-Pacific Strategy” published in February 2022 reads, “American interests can only be advanced if we firmly anchor the United States in the Indo-Pacific and strengthen the region itself, alongside our closest allies and partners” (The White House, 2022, p. 5). Moscow has acknowledged that there is “the importance placed by ASEAN on the principles and objectives in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which are inclusive in nature and aimed to guide cooperation of ASEAN in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region” on 28 October 2021 at the 4th ASEAN-Russia Summit (ASEAN, 2021c). Still, it has limited its usage of the term only to ASEAN-related exegesis since they promote only ASEAN-led mechanisms, which Moscow favours as platforms for facilitating its regional interests in an equal and rival-free environment. Hence, Moscow is specifically active on various regional fora and platforms with a special priority being attributed to the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Security Forum, ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM), and Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). The promotion of ASEAN vision on the Indo-Pacific concept also meshes with Moscow’s increasing focus on the block as one of its key diplomatic priorities in Asia. Russian president Vladimir Putin noted on the sidelines of the 4th ASEAN-Russia summit held in October 2021 that Moscow sees its relations with the block among top priorities of its foreign policy. The chairman’s statement following the summit also highlighted “Russia’s continued support for ASEAN Centrality and unity, and its active participation in various ASEAN-led mechanisms” (ASEAN, 2021a). Much attention of the document was dedicated to the security issues which are also widely endorsed by Moscow as a foundation of the close Russia-ASEAN partnership. Particularly both sides stress their vibrant collaboration within the ASEANRussia Work Plan on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC), which was upgraded for 2021–2024 with a view to deepen cooperation in

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solving traditional and non-traditional security challenges (ASEAN, 2021a). On the same day, Russia and ASEAN agreed on a Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) to implement the ASEAN-Russia Strategic Partnership (2021– 2025), which is aimed at guaranteeing that “ASEAN and Russia have an important role in fostering peace, stability and inclusive growth in the AsiaPacific” (ASEAN, 2021b). Russian military-to-military cooperation with ASEAN member states is also reflected in their energetic arms trading with Moscow, which was Southeast Asia’s largest weapons supplier between 2000 and 2019 accumulating US$ 10.7 billion of sales, while the United States accounted for US$ 7.9 billion and China just for US$ 2.6 billion; Vietnam constitutes the largest portion of Russian arms dealings with the block occupying more than 60 per cent of all the sales to ASEAN with Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Indonesia being among other top arms purchasers of Russian military goods (Simes, 2021). In recent times security issues become more pertinent locus of Russia-ASEAN collaboration. A new level of military partnership was reached following the first-ever naval military drills held between Russia and ASEAN in the Indian Ocean in December 2021 (Bochkov, 2021). However, Russia-ASEAN economic cooperation lags far behind their military ties. The trade turnover has been on a negative trend dropping yearly by 22.64 per cent to US$ 14.08 billion in 2020; the foreign direct investment from Russia to ASEAN also experienced similar dynamics shrinking from US$ 83.45 million in 2019 to US$ 71.82 million in 2020 (ASEAN, 2021d). Despite this fact, both sides struggle to find the basis for the intensification of trade relations with Moscow tripling its contribution to the ASEANRussian Federation Dialogue Partnership Financial Fund in 2021 to US$ 1.5 million (ASEAN, 2021d). A majority of ASEAN states have lobbied for a free trade agreement with Russia since 2019, after they elevated their dialogue to the strategic level in 2018 and launched an annual business dialogue a year earlier (Bochkov, 2021). Under Shinzo Abe’s leadership, Moscow and Tokyo were pursuing a more collaborative approach to the bilateral relationship. Russia believed that Japan was juggling two foreign policy dynamics: first, the strengthening of its military-political partnership with the United States, motivated by the perceived rising threats from North Korea and China. On the other hand, Tokyo tried to form an independent course on Chinese and Russian tracks (Panov et al., 2019). Such a policy resulted in the Japanese abstinence from the anti-Russian sanctions pursued by the United States and EU countries. Russian-Japan relations slowed down significantly under the two subsequent administrations of Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida, with the latter giving the top priority of his administration’s foreign policy to the relations with the United States and regional allies. Although Japanese mainstream media portrays Kishida’s foreign policy approach to Russia as

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nothing consequential from Abe (Miyake, 2022), in reality, he seems less willing to negotiate territorial issues and more prone to toe lines drawn by the United States. Unlike Abe’s decision to impose less restrictive sanctions against Russia in 2014 (Fackler, 2014), in 2022 Kishida rushed to mimic the US response by introducing the same package of sanctions as those earlier applied by Washington (Japan Times, 2022). It was done in response to Russia’s decision to recognise Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent entities, which was condemned internationally as a violation of international law. Later Tokyo joined another bunch of restrictions associated with Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. For example, it froze Russian central bank assets, constituting 10 per cent of Russia’s foreign currency reserves (Easton, 2022). Japan also reinstated its long-time muted claims on the disputed island of its Northern territories which are called the Kuril Islands in Russia. Such a provocative move made Moscow halt peace talks with Japan and suspend dialogue with Tokyo on establishing joint economic activities on the Kuril Islands in a sign of protest over Tokyo’s “clearly unfriendly position” (Teslova, 2022). Russian relations with South Korea for the largest part were mostly concentrated on developing trade and economic ties since Seoul has always remained adherent to deepening its political and military collaboration with the United States. The epic of Russia-Korean economic rapprochement happened amid the Russian “pivot to the East” in 2017, when President Moon Jae-in came up with his “Nine Bridges” programme, citing the areas in which South Korea and Russia could jointly expedite closer cooperation: gas, rail, seaports, electricity, Arctic shipping, shipbuilding, job creation, agriculture, and fisheries (Stanley, 2018). It was also a part of the South Korean president’s larger “New Northern Policy,” which focused especially on economic collaboration with Russia. However, both initiatives seemed to be stalled because of repeated escalations of the North Korean nuclear crisis over 2017–2018 and sluggish economic development within the Russian Far East (Rinna, 2019). As a testimony of the very slow development of the common projects between both countries in December 2021, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development noted that it was necessary to start the practical implementation of joint projects under the Nine Bridges Plan (Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, 2021). The very slow pace of the economic development of Russia and South Korea is also reflected in their minuscule trade and investment cooperation. As of 2021, Korea’s exports to Russia reached US$ 9.98 billion and its imports were at US$ 17.35 billion, while Korea’s investment in Russia accumulated to US$ 4.02 billion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2022). Under the new president Yoon Suk Yeol, South Korea is expected to forge closer ties with the United States and its regional allies, which would drift it further apart from Russia and China. Seoul is considering accelerating its participation in Washington-led regional blocks,

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including embracing many of its formats such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and updated Indo-Pacific strategy (Swanström, 2022). Korea’s joining Western sanctions will put on hold not only the political dialogue between Moscow and Seoul but also many economic commercial projects on Russian soil. Russia’s relations with India are more stable and deprived of the impact of international political turbulences. Importantly enough, the 2021 version of Russia’s National Security Strategy prioritises relations with New Delhi as a “special privileged strategic partnership,” effectively placing them in the same paragraph as Russia-China ties (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2021). The personal chemistry between Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi is also enchanting and could only be second to Putin’s friendship with Xi Jinping. It was reinforced by the fact that the Indian prime minister was the second leader after President Joe Biden whom Vladimir Putin met in person on a foreign voyage amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Russian president embarked on a special trip to India in November 2021 in order to infuse vigour in the Russia-India partnership. PM Narendra Modi was also extremely enthusiastic about the occasion, which demonstrated that Russia is a “time-tested friend” of India. PM Modi specifically stressed that “Despite the challenges posed by COVID-19, there is no change in the pace of growth of India-Russia relations. Our special and privileged strategic partnership continues to become stronger” (Roy, 2021). India remains one of the globe’s most active purchasers of weapons accounting for 9.5 per cent of the total global arms imports during 2016– 2020, as data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows with Russia being the largest arms supplier for the period constituting 49 per cent of total imports (Pandit, 2021). Military cooperation was also looming large during the leaders’ summit in December 2021. Moscow and New Delhi sealed several military and technical cooperation pacts until 2031 and pledged to boost annual trade to US$ 30 billion by 2025 (News Wires, 2021). In addition to the deal for India to produce more than 600,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles, Russia also reassured that it is willing to continue to provide S-400 air defence missile systems based on a 2018 contract (News Wires, 2021). New Delhi was also widely hailed in Russia as exercising neutrality on the Moscow-Kiev escalating conflict of early 2022. Along with China, India did not criticise Russia in any form over its military operation and turned to ramping up purchasing of energy and commodities at discounted prices while also expressing a huge interest in intensifying trade in national currencies (Bochkov, 2022). Blossoming Cooperation with China

Russia’s relations with China have been blossoming over recent years with the sharp acceleration of cooperation on all the levels and domains

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– from economic and political to military, technological, and ideological. In February 2022, Russian and Chinese leaders hailed bilateral cooperation as having “no limits” and pledged to cooperate on building a new world order based on their own understanding of human rights and democracy (Munroe et al., 2022). Most importantly, they have formally consolidated their official positions on a wide range of global affairs (Presidential Executive Office, 2021). Notable, China not only endorsed Russia’s security claims amid mounting threat of confrontation with Ukraine over NATO’s expansion but also joined Moscow in laying down additional ones, including opposition to the global enlargement of NATO as well as other blocks all over the globe, including the Asia-Pacific region. The United States was largely pummelled over alliance building and its Indo-Pacific strategy as well as the AUKUS partnership unveiled earlier between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States with a paramount aim to deepen diplomatic, security, and defence cooperation. As a precursor to this celebration of Russia-China “unprecedented” partnership, the sides reached in 2021 their highest ever bilateral trade turnover of US$ 147 billion with a 35 per cent year-on-year uptick. Besides, Russia and China saw their closest military cooperation in 2021 with joint military exercises reaching unprecedented scope and scaling with Russia-China interaction on land, at sea, and in the air. Russia and China reached historic levels of military cooperation in 2021 by holding their first bilateral combat manoeuvres on the Chinese territory. The rationale behind the joint exercises was to showcase a coordinated response to increased US activity in the Indo-Pacific and express opposition against Washington’s welcome of newcomers to the region, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Moscow and Beijing also signed a defence cooperation roadmap until 2025 and raved up their cohesiveness in monitoring security in the Indo-Pacific by conducting first-ever joint passage through the Tsugaru Strait in the Japanese archipelago in October 2021 and the following month, they also carried out a joint strategic air patrol over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. On 24 May 2022, the Ministry of Defence of Russia reported that the Russian Aerospace Forces and Chinese PLA Air Force conducted a new joint air patrol in the Pacific Rim (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2022). Russia naturally sides with China on the regional security issues in the Indo-Pacific as being challenged by the increasing involvement of the United States. Washington has openly proclaimed both Moscow and Beijing as “threats” to its national security (Garamone, 2022); and in February 2022 it revised the 2019 edition of its flagship Indo-Pacific strategy taking more belligerent language on China and accusing it of “coercion and aggression [which] spans the globe, but is most acute in the Indo-Pacific” (The White House, 2022, p. 5). Russia and China have many times slammed the

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United States for its activities in the region with Sergey Lavrov, top Russian diplomat, saying that “some countries are introducing outright confrontational schemes to deter other countries” in the region (TASS Russian News Agency, 2021). Confrontation between Russia and China on the one side and the United States with its allies on the other is set to be growing in the years ahead. In October 2020 Chinese foreign ,inister Wang Yi compared Washington-sponsored Quadrilateral security group (or QUAD) which also includes Australia, Japan, and India to the “Indo-Pacific NATO” (Jaipragas & Sukumaran, 2020). In September 2021 US president Joe Biden conveyed first-ever in-person meeting of the QUAD leaders, which promoted its extensive agenda ranging from cooperation in climate and infrastructure building to jointly developing space and cybersecurity technologies. Another point of conflict between Russia-China and the United States is Washington’s newly minted strategic defence alliance, which was formed in September 2021 between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) and officially aimed at building a class of nuclear-propelled submarines for Australia and strengthening collaboration in the Indo-Pacific region. However, its goals are seen broadly as gaining an advantage over the military technology race with Beijing and countering the erosion of the military balance of power in the region (Bowman & Montgomery, 2021). Russia and China have branded the format as a threat to the regional security architecture and an attempt to overhaul the balance of power which was stabilised by the leading role of ASEAN. Sergey Lavrov severely lambasted the AUKUS, saying that such alliances aim to dilute ASEAN and contain China as well as seek dismantling of the system based on a commitment to respect the security principles (Interfax, 2021). Ukrainian Crisis and Future of the Russia’s Policy in Asia

Amid the sharp deterioration of relations with the collective West, Russia specifically priorities its relations with China, India, and ASEAN as cornerstones of its deeper economic, political, and strategic penetration into the region. During his visits to China and India in April 2022, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov many times spotlighted the importance of the “Troika” forum for stabilising international relations and ensuring “equity in international affairs” (Times of India, 2022). Russian and Chinese focus on India and ASEAN becomes even more visible if one looks closer at the 4 February 2021 joint statement on the international relations entering a new era, which stipulates that Moscow and Beijing “intend to develop cooperation within the ‘Russia-India-China’ format, as well as to strengthen interaction on such venues as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum on Security, Meeting of Defence Ministers of the ASEAN Member States and Dialogue Partners” (Presidential Executive Office, 2021).

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Ukraine crisis will also be looming large over the US strategies in the Indo-Pacific. In March 2022, the QUAD leaders unanimously agreed that what was happening to Ukraine should never be allowed to happen in the Indo-Pacific. With a guised nod at Russia and China, they stressed that “the sovereignty . . . of all states is respected and countries are free from military, economic, and political coercion” (Brunnstrom & Takenaka, 2022). Beijing endorses Russian security concerns in Europe and extrapolates them on its own home region, lambasting the US Indo-Pacific strategy. At the same time, against the backdrop of the protracted military clashes in Ukraine, China will not get deeply involved in the crisis, nor will it act as a third party in Russia’s relations with the West (Denisov, 2022). However, when the parties feel coordinated pressure from the United States and allies, their cooperation find common ground more easily. The US proactive actions of promoting its various security mechanisms and alliances in Asia are viewed equally negatively both in China and Russia. Russian deputy foreign minister Igor Morgulov argued that under the brand of “Indo-Pacific,” aggressive “closed” formats are being created that aim to “weigh down” the region with an additional conflict-generating component (Morgulov, 2022). China’s vice foreign minister Le Yucheng said in March 2022 that the “Indo-Pacific Strategy is as dangerous as the NATO strategy of eastward expansion in Europe” (Le, 2022). The Ukrainian crisis may become an important watershed moment for the Indo-Pacific strategic planning with Taiwan gearing itself up with Kyiv’s tactics to conduct asymmetric warfare, which was closely studied on the example of the Ukrainian military manoeuvres of offsetting Russian attacks. Taipei also set up a specially dedicated working group within the Ministry of Defence to learn all the nuances of the Russia-Ukraine confrontation in collaboration with the United States. Taiwan has also imposed a ban on the sale of modern chips to Russia and Belarus (Taiwan News, 2022). The United States could reconsider its paramount adherence to European security and delegate this responsibility to Europe which has already claimed to increase military spending and boost its defence while Washington could focus more on its Indo-Pacific strategy and challenge China’s rise (Walt, 2022). Russia should consider these shifts in the US regional strategic planning and add them to its own calculations when drawing regional foreign policy, which has to be balanced between proactivity and cautiousness so as to avoid extreme overextension of efforts simultaneously competing with the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. The recalibration of Russian foreign policy may be determined by the future contours of the Indo-Pacific vision in the region. If the trend towards an American-centric system, that is, the power dimension of the Indo-Pacific strategy, is established, it will lead to the swift advance towards a new bipolarity in Asia and an intensification of China-US confrontation. Some

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Russian pundits believe that this shift is beneficial for Moscow because it strengthens Russia’s indispensability in the Sino-Russian nexus and opens the way to a full-scale military alliance. However, we agree with Kortunov (2018) that the costs of a new Eurasian bipolarity would outweigh any possible benefits for Moscow. Strengthening those elements of the Indo-Pacific vision that are designed to contain great power rivalry and the movement towards a new regional bipolarity would be in Russia’s interests. Provided the American “bloc” version of Indo-Pacific does not become a consensus, Russia should take a neutral position with regard to the active presence of extra-regional middle powers in the region. In some cases, conditions may arise for a more active incorporation of Russia into multilateral cooperation structures, which would be impossible if the US-led security agenda prevailed. In the long run, intensified attempts by China and the United States to divide the Indo-Pacific megaregion into spheres of influence would prevent the strengthening and diversification of Russia’s partnerships in Asia. References ASEAN. (2021b, October 28). Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) to Implement the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and The Russian Federation Strategic Partnership (2021–2025). https://asean​.org ​/comprehensive​-plan​-of​ -action​- cpa​- to ​-implement​- the ​- association​- of​- southeast​- asian​- nations​- and​- the​ -russian​-federation​-strategic​-partnership​-2021​-2025/ ASEAN. (2021c, October 28). Joint Statement of the 4th ASEAN-Russia Summit: Building a Peaceful, Stable and Sustainable Region. https://asean​.org​ /joint​-statement​- of​-the​- 4th​-asean​-russia​-summit​-building​-a​-peaceful​-stable​-and​ -sustainable​-region/ ASEAN. (2021a, October 28). Chairman’s Statement of the 4th ASEAN-Russia Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of Dialogue Relations. https://asean ​ . org ​ /chairmans ​ - statement​ - of​ - the ​ - 4th ​ - asean ​ - russia​ - summit​ - to​ -commemorate​-the​-30th​-anniversary​-of​-dialogue​-relations/ ASEAN. (2021d, November). Overview: ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations. https:// asean​.org ​/ wp ​- content ​/ uploads ​/ 2021 ​/ 11 ​/ Overview​-ASEAN ​- Russia​- Dialogue​ -Relations​-as​-of​-November​-2021​-fin​.pdf Blakkisrud, H., & Rowe, E.W. (2018). Gateway or Garrison? Border Regions in Times of Geopolitical Crisis. In Blakkisrud, H. & Rowe, E.W. (eds) Russia's Turn to the East. Domestic Policymaking and Regional Cooperation (pp. 1–9). Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi​.org ​/10​.1007​/978​-3 ​-319​- 69790 ​-1_1 Bochkov, D. (2021, December 20). Putin’s Indo-Pacific Play Rattles Existing Regional Alliances. Nikkei Asia. https://asia​.nikkei​.com ​/Opinion ​/ Putin​-s​-Indo​ -Pacific​-play​-rattles​- existing​-regional​-alliances Bochkov, D. (2022, March 18). Ukraine Crisis Leaves India’s Modi Walking a Fine Line between the US and Russia. South China Morning Post. https://www​ .scmp​.com ​/comment ​/opinion ​/article ​/3170766​/ukraine​- crisis​-leaves​-indias​-modi​ -walking​-fine​-line​-between​-us​-and Bowman, B., & Montgomery, M. (2021, September 28). AUKUS: Good Goals, Bad Implementation. Defense One. https://www​.defenseone​.com ​/ideas​/2021​/09​/ aukus​-good​-goals​-bad​-implementation​/185652/

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Brunnstrom, D., & Takenaka, K. (2022, March 3). QUAD Leaders Agree Ukraine Experience Should Not Be Allowed in Indo-Pacific – Japan, Australia. Reuters. https://www​.reuters​.com​/ world​/ biden​- quad​-leaders​- discuss​-ukraine​- thursday​ -white​-house​-2022​- 03​- 03/ Business Standard. (2021, November 23). China for the First Time Acknowledges Indo-Pacific Initiative. https://www​.business​-standard​.com ​/article​/international​ /china​-for​-the​-first​-time​-acknowledges​-indo​-pacific​-initiative​-121112301297​_1​ .html Denisov, I. (2022, March 24). ‘No Limits’? Understanding China’s Engagement with Russia on Ukraine. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com​/2022​/03​/no​-limits​ -understanding​- chinas​- engagement​-with​-russia​-on​-ukraine/ Denisov, I., & Lukin, A. (2021). Russia’s China Policy: Growing Asymmetries and Hedging Options. Russian Politics, 6(4), 531–550. https://doi​.org ​/10​. 30965​ /24518921​- 00604007 Denisov, I., Paramonov, O., Arapova, E., & Safranchuk, I. (2021). Russia, China, and the Concept of Indo-Pacific. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 12(1), 72–85. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/1879366521999899 Easton, Y. (2022, March 8). What Ukraine Means for Japan. The Diplomat. https:// thediplomat​.com​/2022​/03​/what​-ukraine​-means​-for​-japan/ Fackler, M. (2014, August 5). Japan Imposes New Sanctions on Russia but Keeps a Diplomatic Door Open. The New York Times. https://www​.nytimes​.com​/2014​ /08​/ 06​/ world ​/asia ​/ japan​-keeps​- door​-to ​-russia​- open​-while​-imposing​- sanctions​ .html Gabuev, A. (2016, April 22). A Pivot to Nowhere: The Realities of Russia's Asia Policy. Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegiemoscow​.org ​/commentary​ /63408 Garamone, J. (2022, March 8). U.S. Intel Officials Detail Threats from China, Russia. U.S. Department of Defense. https://www​.defense​.gov​/ News​/ News​ -Stories ​/Article ​/Article ​/ 2960113​/ us ​- intel​- officials ​- detail​- threats ​-from ​- china​ -russia/ Interfax. (2021, October 2). Lavrov uvidel v sozdanii al'yansa AUKUS popytku razmyt' formaty ASEAN [Lavrov Saw in the Creation of the AUKUS Alliance an Attempt to Erode ASEAN Formats]. https://www​.interfax​.ru​/russia​/ 794943 Jaipragas, B., & Sukumaran, T. (2020, October 13). ‘Indo-Pacific Nato’: China’s Wang Yi Slams US-led ‘QUAD’ as Underlying Security Risk at Malaysia Meeting. South China Morning Post. https://www​.scmp​.com ​/week​-asia​/politics​/article​ /3105299​/indo​-pacific​-nato​- chinas​-wang​-yi​-slams​-us​-led​-quad​-underlying Japan Times. (2022, February 23). Japan Imposes Sanctions on Russia and Separatist Regions of Ukraine After Actions by Moscow. https://www​.japantimes​.co​.jp​/ news​/2022 ​/02 ​/23​/national ​/japan​-russia​-sanctions/ Kortunov, A. (2018, May 28). Indo-Pacific or Community of Common Destiny? Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). https://russiancouncil​.ru​/en​ /analytics​- and​ - comments ​/analytics ​ / indo​ - pacific​- or​- community​- of​- common​ -destiny/ Le, Y.   (2022, March 19). Cherish Peace, Work Together in Unity, and Pursue a Win-Win Future for the Asia-Pacific. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China. https://www​.mfa​.gov​.cn ​/eng ​/wjbxw​/202203​/t20220319​ _10653460​.html Light, M. (2008). Russian-American Relations under George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 19, 25–32. http://www​.jstor​.org​/ stable​/25469833 Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. (2022, May 24). Russian Aerospace Forces and Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force Conduct Joint Air

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13 FRANCE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN REDISCOVERY OF THE INDO-PACIFIC David Camroux1

Introduction

The term “Indo-Pacific” was invented in Europe at the same time as the study of geopolitics. The celebrated German strategic thinker General Karl Haushofer created the geographical denomination “Indo-Pacific” in his 1924 opus Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozean (Haushofer {1924}, 2002). A century later, in October 2020, the German Foreign Ministry framed its Asia policy guidelines as directed towards what it described as the IndoPacific region (Federal Foreign Office, Germany, 2020). As is often the case in Europe, it was its French counterpart that paved the way by publishing in mid-2018 a policy paper on an “inclusive IndoPacific region” (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France, 2018). The French president, Emmanuel Macron, in meetings with the prime ministers of India and Australia, respectively, in March and May 2018, found the term indeed rather salient in defining France as “an Indo-Pacific nation”, given its overseas territories in both the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. Completing the initial duo on 13 November 2020, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs joined the chorus with its own Indo-Pacific policy paper (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, 2020). In October 2022 the Czech Republic and, a year later, Lithuania also published Indo-Pacific strategies joining a category of “motivated fellow travellers”. As for the United Kingdom, since Brexit, promoting a “Global Britain” involves a “very British tilt towards the Indo-Pacific” (Harper et al., 2020) to use the title of a policy paper issued in November 2020. It was launched by the then Australian prime minister Scott Morrison to flag the misleading notion of a return kind of return to empire in a post-Brexit Britain. A change of DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-15

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British prime ministers and foreign ministers in September 2022 saw a reinforcement of the commitment towards the Indo-Pacific linked to the war in Ukraine (Sadayasu, 2022). As for Europe overall, in 2018, in a seminal briefing paper by the EU Institute of Strategic Studies the term Indo-Pacific entered into the lexicon of the Brussels-linked foreign policy community (Pejsova, 2018). The pivot towards the Indo-Pacific has been followed by some limited hard security efforts: the sending of Royal Navy’s flagship, HMS Queen Elizabeth, accompanied by a Dutch frigate, for freedom of navigation exercises in the region as well as Berlin’s dispatch of a frigate to exercise with the Royal Australian Navy. This dispatch had been mooted for some six years. In hard power terms, these are symbolic gestures, and that is the point (Parakilas, 2020). With a post-Trump renewed commitment to multilateralism on both sides of the Atlantic it means combining the EU’s market/regulatory power with the hard and soft power of the United States to ensure that they, collectively, frame a renewed “liberal international order” alongside like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific. Although the EU would not claim to be embracing the US concept of the Indo-Pacific, there is a transatlantic dimension to its evolution. On 2 December 2020, the High Representative for European Security and Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrel, issued a Joint Communication to the European Council and the European Parliament proposing a new EU-US agenda for global change (Borrel, 2020). The document called inter alia for aligning EU and US strategic objectives concerning the Indo-Pacific, a region within which they should promote democratic change. The previous day, on 1 December, the EU signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with ASEAN (Council of the EU, 2020). This adds to an SPA and an Economic Partnership Agreement ratified with South Korea in October 2010 and two similar agreements signed with Japan in February 2019. While a SPA was signed with India in 2004, talks on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) launched three years later are still on hold (European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2018). As for China, after a launch in 2013 and 34 rounds of negotiations, an EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment has been abandoned and is increasingly unlikely to resurface (European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2019). Embracing the Indo-Pacific idea has four interrelated goals for the EU. Firstly, it is a way of giving overall coherence to its wider Asia policy and, partly, compensating for the lacuna in this patchwork of arrangements. Secondly, as shown by the Global Gateway initiative, it is a political statement on the salience of Europe’s regulatory power in Asia (Bradford, 2020; Matthijis & Meunier, 2023). Thirdly, it provides a foundation for a shared Euro-American understanding to articulate a joint response to the PRC.

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Finally, embracing the Indo-Pacific idea has allowed the EU to add a transatlantic dimension to its bilateral relations in the region. For example, by participating in US president Biden’s “Summit for Democracy” Europeans have indicated the ideological dimension to their objectives in Asia (Toosi, 2020). The EU Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

The Brussels’ institutions had been reluctant to take on the terminology of the “Indo-Pacific”. It was only in early 2021 that the European Union (EU) adopted the concept and released an official strategy in September of that year. The EU had largely avoided what was seen as a conflict-laden term in order to avoid aligning itself with the more confrontational regional approach of the United States and, therefore, not alienating China. For example, its 2016 Global Strategy mentioned the word “Indo-Pacific” only once, in regard to promoting human rights and democratic transitions in Myanmar. Instead, it continued using a conventional Asia-Pacific framework. This involved pursuing bilateral strategies with partner countries in the region (namely, China, India, Japan, and South Korea) as well as focusing on its partnership with ASEAN. The first clear sign of the EU’s gradual adoption of the Indo-Pacific as a conceptual basis for its strategy was High Representative Josep Borrell’s remarks during a Council meeting in January 2021, where he indicated that it would be the interest of the EU as a whole to develop its own common approach to the region. This was, and is, problematical given that such a putative strategy would clearly be a part of the EU’s common foreign and security policy and, therefore, subject to unanimous decision-making requiring a broad consensus among the EU member states. The plan to create a separate strategy was eventually given approval in April 2021, when the European Council voiced its consensus “that the EU should reinforce its strategic focus, presence and actions in the Indo-Pacific”. The European Union then formally published its final Indo-Pacific Strategy in September 2021, an event that was overshadowed by the AUKUS a day earlier. The strategy’s aspects pertaining to security and defence were further emphasised in the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence of March 2022 which described the Indo-Pacific “as a new centre of global competition” (Council of the European Union, 2022, p. 10). Publishing the strategy involved finding a large consensus between the differing strategic interests (in both economic and security terms) within the EU. As mentioned earlier three member states had previously formulated strategies for the region while many others would prefer to keep focusing on other pressing strategic concerns. The requirement for consensus is a twoedged sword. On the one hand, it is a limiting factor on the content of the final strategy and the EU’s subsequent actions in the region. On the other

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hand, the weight of a consensus based on the approval of all 27 EU foreign ministers should not be underestimated. The final EU strategy defined the Indo-Pacific as the “geographic area from the east coast of Africa to the Pacific Island States”, thereby following the geographical definition of the more powerful EU member states (Grare & Reuter, 2021). It is based on the premise that the Indo-Pacific is “increasingly strategically significant for Europe”. Four aspects are highlighted: trade and investment; meeting global environmental challenges; coping with increasing geopolitical competition in the region; and defending democratic principles and human rights. The four aspects can also be directly connected to “the seven priority areas” in which the EU is aiming to pursue its strategic goals in the IndoPacific which are depicted in Figure 13.1. The EU’s Indo-Pacific approach therefore reflects both primarily its economic motivations and the policy competencies of the Brussels-based institutions. For this reason, environmental, normative, and geopolitical factors are other significant elements. The EU is also by systemic design neither a security actor nor does it have the capabilities to become one in the IndoPacific, even if there was the political will to do so. Geo-economics therefore predominates over geopolitics in the EU Indo-Pacific strategy. While outlining the need for a separate strategy, the Council conclusions from April 2021 not only mentioned the already existing relevance of the region for the EU in terms of economic, development, and environmental concerns but also highlighted the “intense geopolitical competition” in the

FIGURE 13.1  

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Indo-Pacific. The potential negative repercussions on “trade and supply chains” and “technological, political and security areas” of this competition were described as directly affecting the EU’s interests. And, above all, its economic security. The EU is among the leading trading partners and investors in the region. The Indo-Pacific is also the second largest destination of EU exports and is dependent on the supply chains that cross certain contested maritime zones. To safeguard its economic security, the EU is able to leverage a wide array of economic tools by concluding more bilateral free trade agreements (such as those that exist with South Korea, Japan, and New Zealand and being negotiated with Australia and India) or diversifying supply chains. The EU also has the means to combat unfair trading practices or to develop programmes with regional actors on digital cooperation or infrastructure connectivity. Nevertheless, the EU’s lack of capability and inability to create alliances, unlike State actors, limits the possibilities of pursuing alone a particular strategy. Instead, it is left with three types of security instruments: cooperation, capacity-building, and the coordination of its member states’ assets. Firstly, the EU is pursuing a policy of “Partnership and Cooperation”. Thereby it aims to engage with partners in the region – both bilaterally and multilaterally – to “promote effective rules-based multilateralism”. This involves intensifying dialogues on counterterrorism, cybersecurity, non-proliferation and disarmament, space and maritime security, and deploying of additional military advisors to EU delegations. As well as the enhancement of existing nationally oriented programmes to the inter-regional level is envisaged. These include the pilot project of Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (with pilot partners in Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam) as well as the Framework Participation Agreements for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations (currently with Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam). The multilateral effort is focused on the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), with additional engagements in the East Asia Summit and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. Other means envisaged are the planned establishment of an EU Cyber Diplomacy Network and multilateral initiatives on arms export control and dual-use export control. The second instrument is the strategic contribution to capacity-building initiatives in the region. This includes expanding the Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (CRIMARIO) project to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific to counter drug trafficking, human trafficking, and that of wildlife. The EU also seeks to tackle illicit financial flows linked to terrorism, encouraging more effective information-sharing mechanisms on maritime security through the regional information fusion centres, supporting partners on cybersecurity, countering terrorism/extremism by developing peacekeeping capacities, and supplying tools to counter disinformation and interference.

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Nevertheless, other than wielding these instruments, the EU is forced to rely on the capabilities of its member states. There, it seeks to take a coordinating role in what is familiarly known as the “Team Europe” approach. Specifically, it aims to ensure a “meaningful” European naval presence based on Intra-European Coordination and to continue existing EU naval operations such as European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Somalia – Operation Atalanta and European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mozambique. As well the EU seeks to further enhance joint naval activities/ exercises, port calls, and multilateral exercises between EU member states and regional partners. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the member states with the most capabilities in the region – which also happen to be those with the most ambitious strategies – will really allow themselves to be coordinated within the context of a naturally less ambitious consensus in Brussels. Overall, within its inclusive and partnership-centric approach, the EU is largely following its established modus operandi. It pursues a flexible approach to switch pursuing any of the four policy areas to seek potential cooperation with a number of regional actors. This pragmatic approach is designed to safeguard the EU’s strategic autonomy and avoid becoming entangled in intra-regional power competition. The EU places emphasis on “like-mindedness”, i.e., the sharing of common values and, especially, economic interests in determining the hierarchy of its partnership. Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Singapore are in the first-tier grouping. These are countries with which the EU has FTAs or, in the case of Australia, is at the point of ratifying such an agreement. The EU’s historic inter-regional partner, ASEAN, is also the only entity that the EU strategy addresses by name as a “strategic” partner. The EU emphasises the importance of “ASEAN centrality”, even if it could be argued that ASEAN as a regional organisation does not have the institutional capacity to form an economic bloc. Meanwhile, the other existing “strategic” partnerships the EU has signed with other regional actors go largely unmentioned in the September 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy. While the EU sees a potential for cooperation with the QUAD countries – namely Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – this is limited to non-controversial aspects of a common interest such as climate change, technology, and vaccines. The EU is cautious about the QUAD, which is seen as an informal alliance to contain China. Europeans do not wish to be seen as joining an anti-China coalition. On China, the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy is based on the trilogy of defining the PRC as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival. The EU strategy reiterates its interest in cooperation with China as an essential partner. Curiously, a putative China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) is invoked even though in 2024 such agreement has little chance of

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MAP 13.1 Indo-Pacific

seen from European Union, 2021

coming into existence, given hostility in the European Parliament, those of some member states, and civil society groups (Meijer, 2022). Multilateral fora such as the Asia-Europe Meeting are also mentioned. The strategy also highlights “fundamental disagreements” in normative questions with China echoing the notion of the PRC as a systemic rival. In the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy (2021) and, later, in the Strategic Compass (Council of the European Union, 2022) there is mention of China contributing to a “military build-up” in the Indo-Pacific and the growing reaction to its assertive regional behaviour. Furthermore, the EU strategy mentions the potential of the South and East China Sea in the Taiwan Strait to have “a direct impact on European security”. The Strategic Compass puts an emphasis on promoting “an open and rules-based regional security architecture, including secure sea lanes of communication, capacity-building and (an) enhanced naval presence” (Council of the European Union, 2022, p. 43). It also highlights “the constructive security and defence consultations and security cooperation with countries such as Japan, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, South Korea and Vietnam”. Furthermore, it reiterates

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a commitment to working with “like-minded partners” through operational cooperation in the region itself. The new strategy also reiterates Taiwan’s rank as a “partner” of the EU, although only in issues related to economic, environmental, and technological policy issues. High Representative Borell in October 2021 claimed the incursions of Chinese planes into “Taiwan’s air defence identification zone” had the potential to “have a direct impact on European security and prosperity”. The same month, the EU Parliament voted for the need for closer relations with Taiwan, a vital player in the EU’s semiconductor supply chain. The challenge for the EU in the Indo-Pacific is to reconcile these new developments with its established threefold approach to China, one subordinate to its official one-China policy, while not becoming entangled in regional coalitions directed against the PRC. Convergences and Divergences on the Indo-Pacific among European Countries

Frédéric Grare and Manisha Reuter of the European Council of Foreign Relations based on interviews with European officials and policymakers illustrate the differing geopolitical imaginings of EU member states as in Figure 13.2. Historical legacies and contemporary transnational concerns come into play in these imaginings with, for example, the Netherlands having a view

FIGURE 13.2  Views

of the geography of a strategic concept: Where is the Indo-Pacific?

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of the Indo-Pacific with Indonesia at its eastern border. Given the significant proportion of the population of Irish origin, it is not unsurprising that Australia should be at the centre of Ireland’s Indo-Pacific definition. A similar argument could be made for Italy which also has a large diaspora in Australia. I would suggest for heuristic purposes, breaking down European countries into five groups. The first of these is the category of a resident middle power/nation. This category only has one member, France. The second is that of globalising mercantile powers, above all Germany and the Netherlands. As mentioned earlier, these are only two major EU member states (MSs) alongside France to have developed and articulated a national Indo-Pacific strategy. Britain, especially a Britain outside the EU is in a category of its own. However, unlike France despite possessing some territories, it cannot be considered a resident power; rather, I would describe it as a resident landlord. In a sense, the United Kingdom straddles the first two categories and constitutes, in itself, a third category. While certainly a globalising mercantile middle power yet, it is not a resident middle power given that its sovereign presence is questionable. A fourth category, that of the “motivated followers”, includes more or less significant European countries with a global economic outlook. This category encompasses not only the larger economies such as Italy and Spain but also smaller countries with a global outlook such as Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxemburg, Portugal, and Sweden. As a crude generalisation, I would suggest that normative considerations, such as defending democracy and human rights, also enter into their Indo-Pacific visions. For this reason, the Baltic state of Lithuania should also be included in this group given the way the PRC has sought to punish it for its pro-Taiwanese sympathies. Within this group only, the Czech Republic and Lithuania have published formal national strategies towards the Indo-Pacific. A fifth and final category could be described as the “indifferent followers”. These include smaller states such as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia. Larger actors such as Greece, Hungary, and Poland, given their essentially Eurocentric orientations, could also be added to this group. In this group, Hungary under the illiberal leadership of Viktor Orban stands out because of its sympathy towards the PRC. Yet, Greece also has had a more pro-Chinese approach given its greater need for foreign investment due to its fragile economy. Nevertheless, the inclusive aspect of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy – and the neutrality of the language used in relation to the PRC – provides sufficient leeway for both countries to acquiesce in the EU strategy.

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Space does not permit an examination of all five categories, so this chapter is limited to the first three and, above all, to a more extensive examination of France. French Exceptionalism: A Resident Middle Power

For France, unlike other European countries, the Indo-Pacific involves questions of sovereignty. The country sees itself as a “sovereign nation of the Indo-Pacific” with interests in the region due to its French overseas territories, located both in the South Pacific (New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna) and in the Indian Ocean (La Réunion, Mayotte alongside some largely uninhabited islands and the southern Indian Ocean). There are two aspects to the sovereignty dimension. In population terms, there are around 1.6 million French citizens living in these French territories. Some, 8,000 military personnel are permanently based there. 2 To this French population could be added the 300,000 French citizens resident in other countries of the Indo-Pacific. The other aspect of sovereignty is France’s maritime domain: 93 per cent of France’s exclusive economic zone lies in the Indo-Pacific (amounting to 9 million sq. km).

MAP 13.2 Indo-Pacific

seen from France, 2021

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Previously, in the 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security France’s main “strategic axis” was defined as “stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean, with possible extension towards Asia” (Présidence de la République, 2008). Just over ten years later in its 2019 Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, the French Ministry of the Armed Forces defined the Indo-Pacific as “[spanning] from Djibouti to Polynesia”, with “vital maritime routes [running] from Indonesia to Madagascar, from Oman to Singapore, from Japan to Australia, and from China to Polynesia” (Ministry of the Armed Forces, France, 2019). In his speech in La Reunion in October 2019, President Macron affirmed that, seen from Paris, “the Indo-Pacific stretches from the shores of East and Southern Africa to the coasts of America” (Macron, 2019). As a result, France’s defence strategy stresses that the country’s main security interests in the Indo-Pacific region are “to protect our sovereign territories, secure our strategic supplies, ensure our freedom of action in the commons, and foster stable regional environments,” in a context where, because of new security dynamics, “France needs to reaffirm its strategic autonomy, the importance of its alliances and its commitment to multilateralism.” President Emmanuel Macron defined the broad lines of France’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific in several speeches. At the Garden Island naval base in Sydney, on 2 May 2018, he first outlined France’s new orientations and commitments in the Indo-Pacific region (Macron, 2018) by asserting that “France [was] fully committed to this part of the globe and France now [wanted] to endorse this role as an . . . Indo-Pacific power alongside its partners”, highlighting “a new series of game changers” that includes “the evolution of Chinese strategy in the region”. He proposed creating a new “Indo-Pacific axis” involving France, India, and Australia. He also presented “France’s four key commitments in the Indo-Pacific” involving, firstly, support for the peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue; secondly, contributing to regional peace and security; thirdly, respect for state sovereignty; and, fourthly, promoting action against climate change. In a later speech in October 2019 in La Réunion (Macron, 2019), he identified three strands in French strategy: security, climate and biodiversity related, and economic considerations. Following the impetus provided by the president, both the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs published documents further defining this strategy. The Ministry of the Armed Forces’ White Paper, France’s Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, listed five strategic priorities (Ministry of the Armed Forces, France, 2019). It defines France’s commitments in the Indo-Pacific and sets the ministry’s strategic orientations in this region. The French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs published The French Strategy in the Indo-Pacific which states

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that France’s actions are underpinned by two principles. On the one hand, protecting and promoting a rules-based multilateral order. Hence, there is opposition to any hindrances to freedom of navigation in the international air-sea commons. On the other hand, France seeks to preserve “strategic balances”, to combat transnational terrorism, to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to counter influence operations “aimed at eroding the legitimacy of democratic regimes”. According to the same document, the two main French priorities for its action in the region are strategic autonomy and multilateralism. These encompass more specific strategic priorities of a domestic and multilateral nature. At the “domestic” level, France seeks to “defend the integrity of France’s sovereignty and to protect nationals, territories and its EEZ [exclusive economic zone]”. This extends to contributing to the security of the regional spaces around its Overseas Territories by promoting military cooperation. At the multilateral level, France seeks to maintain with its partners “a Free and Open Access to the Commons”, i.e., “integrity of the air and maritime routes, as well as of the terrestrial hubs” of the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, France seeks to “maintain strategic stability and security balances through a global multilateral action” by upholding the respect for international law, strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and strengthening the multilateral dialogue and consultation process. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2019, the then French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, added tackling climate change to the list. She argued that cooperation was “more necessary than ever, given Asia’s evolving security order and its challenges”, with the emergence of “the building blocks of a global confrontation”. France has been increasingly involved in the region in the new millennium. Rather than a unilateralist Gaullist vision, French behaviour has been characterised by efforts to establish strategic partnerships in order to build both an inclusive architecture of norms and also the pooling of resources with designated partners. Nevertheless, the French Indo-Pacific strategy deems the overseas territories as “essential to France’s security activities in the Indo-Pacific”. This is because, from a “domestic” perspective, they “play a key role in securing access to vital areas and routes that could otherwise come under threat, such as maritime straits”, and they also play a role in protecting the integrity of French “sovereign territories as well as the commons around them”. Moreover, from a multilateral perspective, they “facilitate military cooperation, crisis anticipation and regional integration” and, importantly, “provide safe platforms for power projection in the whole region”. France, like most middle powers, has historically been a promoter, not only of multilateralism but also of minilateralism. France is present in a number of regional multilateral fora, institutions, and dialogues and

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supports the strengthening of multilateral institutions in the region. Since 1986 these include the Indian Ocean Commission, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which France joined in December 2020, as well as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, created in 2008. France is also a member of the Pacific QUAD (Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group) and part of the FRANZ agreement, signed in 1992 with New Zealand and Australia. As a resident middle power, given this stress on minilateralism, establishing partnerships is a key component of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Three countries in particular stand out: India, Japan, and Australia. France has had a long-standing and strong bilateral partnership for several decades with India and has negotiated several arms deals with New Delhi. Following the launching of a strategic partnership in 1998, cooperation has been strengthened through the development of a “new strategic agenda”, illustrated in 2018 by the signing of a Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region. That year, the two countries also signed a logistic support agreement. They have deepened their cooperation, notably in the fields of maritime security and renewable energies. Unlike with Japan, France has not yet been in a position to enhance the economic dimensions of this partnership under the umbrella of a European FTA. France and Japan established a strategic partnership in 1995 and today cooperate in a large array of domains. In June 2019, the two countries issued a five-year roadmap with the aim of reinforcing their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region in the fields of maritime security, climate, environment and biodiversity, infrastructure, and health. However, it is the Japan-EU Free Trade Agreement which came into force in February 2019 that has offered a unique means for France to further enhance long-standing economic relations. Until the AUKUS announcement of September 2021, the partnership with Australia involved strong security and defence cooperation. In 2017, France and Australia signed a Joint Statement for an Enhanced Strategic Partnership as well as cooperation agreements in 2018. They also signed a contract for conventionally powered submarines, derived from France’s nuclear-powered Barracuda class, which were to be built by the French state-owned Naval Group for the Royal Australian Navy. As mentioned, President Macron called for the creation of a strategic Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis, which he saw as “a key for the region and our joint objectives in the Indian-Pacific region”, the three countries to cooperate in the fields of maritime security, environment and marine resources management, and collaboration in multilateral organisations. In 2019, France and Australia launched a bilateral security dialogue. However, in September 2021, a new trilateral security pact entitled “AUKUS” was announced by the United States, the United Kingdom, and

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Australia. This pact involves several pillars, the first being a nuclear-powered submarine deal between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States that meant the scrapping of the contract with the Naval Group. The cancellation of the submarine contract with France was a major shock damaging one of the elements of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, that of contributing to regional security with the provision of weaponry. Although there is no causal link, following the cancellation of the submarine contract, Paris turned to Jakarta: Indonesia has joined India as a major client for the Rafale fighter aircraft. After a change of government in Australia in March 2022 and the subsequent visit to Paris of the new Labor prime minister, Anthony Albanese, there was some evidence of a rewarming of relations and the strengthening both of bilateral relations and the Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis. On questions of climate change and countering Chinese encroachments in the South Pacific there remains a convergence of views and interests. Germany and the Indo-Pacific

Germany’s interest in the Indo-Pacific is, above all, driven by its place as a global mercantile power or what Gudrun Wacker (2021) aptly describes as a big trading nation. The German policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific (Federal Foreign Office, 2020) enumerate seven “principles” and eight “interests” in a

MAP 13.3 Indo-Pacific

Seen from Germany, 2021

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somewhat confusing catalogue of good intentions. The seven principles are: European action, multilateralism, the rules-based order, UN Development goals, human rights, inclusivity, and partnership among equals. The eight “interests” are: peace and security, diversification and deepening of (multilateral) relations and avoiding unilateralism, avoiding a unipolar or bipolar regional order, protecting open shipping routes, maintaining open markets and free trade, promoting the digital revolution and connectivity, protecting the planet, and ensuring access to fact-based information. Three elements come to the fore in a perusal of these guidelines. The first is that they represent a general statement of Germany’s foreign policy outlook and orientation without being specifically applicable to the IndoPacific. The second is the use of the terms “inclusivity” and “the avoidance of unilateralism and bipolarity”. This can be interpreted as an oblique way of suggesting that the German view of the Indo-Pacific is one that does not seek to contain China and that seeks to defend an Indo-Pacific not determined by the contours of Sino-American rivalry. Finally, a textual analysis suggests that the EU strategy on the Indo-Pacific borrows more of its language from the German document than from those of France. This can be found in the relegation of hard security questions to a lesser level than geo-economic questions. This can be explained in three ways. Firstly, Germany shares with the other 25 member states the fact that it has no sovereign presence (unlike France). Secondly, the priority given by Germany to trade, and investment, is one shared by all member states as the lowest common denominator. This is also a shared concern among the majority of member states on normative questions to do with human rights and the environment. Thirdly, Germany, like the majority of member states, does not have the military capacity to meaningfully contribute to addressing hard security issues in the Indo-Pacific. The stress in both the German and EU documents on more non-traditional security issues is an acknowledgement of this reality. The United Kingdom and the Indo-Pacific

Cutting across these two categories and constituting, in itself, a third category is the United Kingdom. While certainly a globalising mercantile middle power yet, it is not a resident middle power, and it does have sovereignty issues in the Indo-Pacific. Like Germany and France, the United Kingdom has significant trade and investment interests in the Indo-Pacific and these are certainly highlighted in the post-Brexit “Global Britain” strategy. Thus, the United Kingdom has negotiated trade agreements with Japan and South Korea which are basically copies of the existing EU preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with these countries. It has negotiated or is in the

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MAP 13.4 Indo-Pacific

Seen from United Kingdom, 2021

process of negotiating agreements with India and Australia, which will also emulate elements of those in negotiations with the EU, although providing more favourable terms to both these countries. Besides the economic factors, the choice of Australia and India has another minor aspect. The “Global Britain” strategy is an element of what I would describe as imperial nostalgia. The term “Indo-Pacific” came more easily to policy planners in London because of the centrality given to India – the Jewel in the Crown of Empire – in this construct. Above all from an economic perspective initiating strong partnerships with these major Commonwealth countries, a postBrexit United Kingdom can demonstrate the opportunities available now it is outside of the EU. Compared to Germany, and much more like France, as a great power not hesitant to use military force, hard security issues figure prominently in the United Kingdom’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific. In its Integrated Defence Review of 2021 (UK Government, 2021) the British government argued that the country needed to engage with the Indo-Pacific more fully for its own security given that it is at the “centre of intensifying geopolitical

France within the European Rediscovery of the Indo-Pacific 189

competition with multiple potential flashpoints” (Brooke-Holland, 2021, p. 1). The review highlights the impact of China’s military modernisation and the fact that much of the United Kingdom’s trade with Asia depends on shipping routes that go through maritime choke points. In these observations, the British view of the Indo-Pacific is not very different from that in the EU strategy and in the German and Dutch strategies. The difference is in the commitment to actually contribute on a permanent basis to security in the Indo-Pacific. The Integrated Defence Review of 2021 led to a strengthening of the presence of the Royal Navy in the Indo-Pacific through the deployment of Offshore Patrol Vessels from 2021, a Littoral Response Group from 2023, and Type 31 frigates later in the decade. As an expression of this hard security commitment, in late 2021 Royal Navy’s flagship, HMS Queen Elizabeth, accompanied by a Dutch frigate, was dispatched for freedom of navigation exercises in the region. Although not directly linked, this marked naval presence followed the signing of the AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which will potentially have significant benefits for British industry. Above all, AUKUS inscribes the United Kingdom as a hard power in the Indo-Pacific and gives a fillip both to its alliance with the United States and military ties with Australia. There is, however, another aspect to the United Kingdom’s Indo-Pacific orientation that has remained somewhat neglected, that of protecting its sovereignty. The British South Pacific territory of the Pitcairn Islands in the South Pacific has a population of only 50 and is largely administered from New Zealand, although its EEZ is large. British sovereignty there is uncontested. This is not the case for British territory in the Indian Ocean. Britain has remained intransigent on its contested claims to sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean. These have been constituted since 1965 as the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The International Court of Justice ruled in February 2019 that the islands should be returned to Mauritius (Sands, 2022). However, the neighbouring Maldives is in dispute with Mauritius over the EEZ and, above all, over fishing rights complicating the situation further. London derives some revenues from fishing licences in this EEZ and royalties on selling the internet domain name “io”. However, these are of marginal concern. Britain may not be a resident middle power in the Indo-Pacific but it is a resident landlord. In 1966, it awarded a 50-year lease to the United States to create an aviation and naval base on Diego Garcia, the largest and, then, the only inhabited island in the BIOT. This lease has been extended till 2036. As the US most important strategic outpost in the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia is of crucial importance for American great power projection justifying the investment of some US$3 billion in the base. Mauritius has proposed renting the island to the

190  David Camroux

United States on a 99-year lease at a cost and conditions to be determined. Maintaining the status quo would not only be cheaper and less constraining for the United States, it would also enable the British to deploy unhindered its own naval vessels and, above all, gives a very tangible expression to the United Kingdom’s claim to be a middle power in the Indo-Pacific. Conclusions

It would be foolhardy at this point in time to draw firm conclusions on European engagement in the Indo-Pacific. With both the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, we are living in a watershed moment. For example, from the geo-economic perspective, both of these developments have led to searching for new supply chain sources in the Indo-Pacific (e.g. Taiwan and Vietnam), lesser reliance on China, and re-sourcing back to Europe. Economic nationalism in Europe is no longer a taboo subject, clothed in terms of protecting sovereignty in certain areas. As I write Germany has just scuppered a Chinese takeover of a German high-tech company. Moreover, with President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of a sovereign European state, investment in military capacity is no longer a taboo subject. The German government has announced a massive 100 billion euros rearmament programme while President Macron of France has announced less involvement in Africa to concentrate on preparing for armed conflict in Europe. The implications for the Indo-Pacific are still a matter of conjecture. However, the French government is in the process of re-establishing a partnership with Australia and has signed a major defence contract with Indonesia. Germany has signed a defence cooperation agreement with Japan as has the United Kingdom. After several changes of government in London, the commitment to the Indo-Pacific has been confirmed, symbolised by the permanent deployment of two naval vessels as well as a joint fifth-generation fighter project with Japan and Italy. One way of interpreting these developments is to suggest that Europe has returned to the Indo-Pacific as part of the West. Both Russian president Putin and Chinese president have contributed indirectly and unwittingly to this situation, by lumping Europe with the United States as their adversary. Recent European engagement in the Indo-Pacific has gone hand in hand with the strengthening of transatlantic relations. The Indo-Pacific for Europeans today is a crucial point in a triangular outlook on global affairs. Postscript

Since 7 October 2023 following the brutal Hamas invasion of Israel and the devastating punishment perpetrated on the Palestinian people of Gaza, the Middle East has become the centre of global geopolitical instability. There

France within the European Rediscovery of the Indo-Pacific 191

are fears that a major regional conflict involving Iran and Arab nations could be ignited. Already the Red Sea and access to the Suez Canal has replaced the Malacca Straits as the major preoccupation for maritime transport and supply chains. It is an open question as to whether European countries will continue to remain concerned with the Indo-Pacific, with now not only a war in Europe itself but one in its closest neighbourhood. Notes 1 This chapter has an intellectual debt to the collective efforts of the FrancoGerman Observatory of the Indo-Pacific that the author co-coordinates. In particular, the contribution of Peer Braak, Raphaëlle Khan, and Thibault Fournol is gratefully acknowledged. 2 France has five military command headquarters and three main bases in the region: the French Armed Forces in Southwest Indian Ocean (FAZSOI) in La Reunion and Mayotte, the French Armed Forces in New Caledonia (FANC), and French Polynesia (FAPF) in the Pacific Ocean.

References Borrel, J. (2020, December 2). Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change. Brussels. https://ec​.europa​.eu ​/info​/sites​/info​/files​/joint​- communication​ -eu​-us​-agenda​_ en​.pdf Borrel, J. (2021, January 25). Main Results. Foreign Affairs Council of the EU. https://www​.consilium​.europa​.eu ​/en ​/meetings​/fac ​/2021​/01​/25/ Bradford, A. (2020). The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World. Oxford University Press. https://global​.oup​.com​/academic​/product​/the​ -brussels​- effect​-9780190088583 Brooke-Holland, L. (2021, October). Integrated Review 2021: The Defence Tilt to the Indo-Pacific. Research Briefing, House of Commons Library. https:// commonslibrary​.parliament​.uk ​/research​-briefings​/cbp​-9217/ Council of the European Union. (2020). Co-chairs’ Press Release of the 23rd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting. https://www​.consilium​.europa​.eu ​/fr​/press​ /press ​ - releases ​ / 2020 ​ / 12 ​ / 01 ​ / co ​ - chairs ​ - press ​ - release ​ - of ​ - the ​ -23rd ​ - asean ​ - eu​ -ministerial​-meeting/# Council of the European Union. (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. https://data​.consilium​.europa​.eu ​/doc​/document​/ST​-7371​-2022​-INIT​/ en ​/pdf European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2018). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements of an EU Strategy on India. Brussels. https://eeas​.europa​.eu ​/ sites​/eeas​/files​/jc ​_ elements ​_ for​_ an ​_ eu ​_ strategy​_on ​_ india_-​_ final ​_ adopted​.pdf European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2019). Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: EU-China – A Strategic Outlook. Strasbourg. https://commission​.europa​.eu ​/system ​/files ​/ 2019 ​- 03​/communication​- eu​- china​-a​ -strategic​-outlook​.pdf

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Federal Foreign Office, Germany. (2020, September). Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific: Germany-Europe-Asia. Shaping the 21st Century Together. https:// www​.auswaertiges​-amt​.de​/ blob​/ 2380514​/f97​84f7​e3b3​fa1b​d7c5​4 46d​274a4169e​ /200901​-indo​-pazifik​-leitlinien-​-1-​-data​.pdf Grare, F. & Reuter, M. (2021). Moving Closer: European Views of the Indo-Pacific. Paris: European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr​.eu ​/special ​/moving​ -closer​- european​-views​-of​-the​-indo​-pacific/ Harper, S., et al. (2020). A Very British Tilt: Towards a New UK Strategy in the Indo-Pacific. London: Policy Exchange. https://policyexchange​.org​.uk​/wp​ -content ​/uploads​/2022​/05​/A​-Very​-British​-Tilt​.pdf Haushofer, K. ({1924} 2002). Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean: Studies on the Relationship between Geography and History (updated edition by L. Tambs, translated by E. Brehm). Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. Macron, E. (2018, May 2). Discours à Garden Island, base navale de Sydney. Elysee. https://www​.elysee​.fr​/emmanuel​-macron ​/ 2018​/ 05​/ 03​/discours​- a​- garden​-island​ -base​-navale​-de​-sydney Macron, E. (2019, October 23). Choose La Réunion: unis dans l’espace IndoPacifique. https://www​.elysee​.fr​/emmanuel​-macron​/2019​/10​/23​/choose​-la​ -reunion​-unis​-dans​-lespace​-indo​-pacifique Matthijis, M. & Meunier, S. (2023). Europe’s Geoeconomic Revolution: How the EU Learned to Wield its Real Power. Foreign Affairs, September–October. https:// www​.foreignaffairs​.com ​/europe ​/european​-union​-geoeconomic​-revolution Meijer, H. (2022). Awakening to China’s Rise: Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy towards the People’s Republic of China. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France. (2018). 2030 French Strategy in Asia-Oceania: Towards an Inclusive Asian Indo-Pacific Region. White Paper, June. https://www​.diplomatie​.gouv​.fr​/ IMG​/pdf​/ livre​_blanc​- com-​_ fr​- eng​ _cle876fb2​-1​.pdf Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands. (2020, November 13). Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia. Government of Netherlands. https://www​.rijksoverheid​.nl​/documenten​ /publicaties ​ / 2020 ​ / 11 ​ / 13 ​ / indo ​ - pacific ​ - een ​ - leidraad ​ - voorversterking ​ - van ​ - de​ -nederlandse​- en​- eu​-samenwerking​-met​-partners​-in​-azie Ministry of the Armed Forces, France. (2019). France’s Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific. https://apcss​.org​/wp​- content​/uploads​/2020​/02​/ France​_ Defence​ _Strategy​_ in​_the​_ Indo​-Pacific​_ 2019​.pdf Parakilas, J. (2020, November 25). Europe as a Major Military Power in Asia? Don’t Bet on It. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2020​/11​/europe​-as​-a​-major​ -military​-power​-in​-asia​-dont​-bet​-on​-it/ Pejsova, E. (2018, March). The Indo-Pacific, A Passage to Europe. EUISS Brief. https://www​.iss​.europa​.eu ​/content ​/indo​-pacific-​%E2​%80​%93​-passage​- europe Présidence de la République. (2008). The French White Paper on Defence and National Security. Odile Jacob Publishing Corporation. Sadayasu, S. (2022, September 28). Interview: Indo-Pacific more Crucial because of Ukraine War: U.K.’s Top Diplomat. Nikkei Asia. https://asia​.nikkei​.com ​/ Editor​-s​ -Picks​/ Interview​/ Indo​- Pacific​-more​- crucial​-because​- of​- Ukraine​-war​- U​. K.​-s​-top​ -diplomat Sands, P. (2022). The Last Colony: A Tale of Exile, Justice and Britain’s Colonial Legacy. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Toosi, N. (2020, November 29). Are You on the List? Biden’s Democracy Summit Spurs Anxieties — and Skepticism. Politico. https://www​.politico​.com​/news​ /2020​/11​/28​/ biden​-democracy​-summit​- 440819

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UK Government. (2021). Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy. London: CP403, HMSO. https://www​.gov​.uk​/government​/publications​/global​-britain​-in​ -a​- competitive​-age​-the​-integrated​-review​- of​- security​- defence​- development​-and​ -foreign​-policy Wacker, G. (2021, March 9). Europe and the Indo-Pacific: Comparing France, Germany and the Netherlands. Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 29. http:// www​ . realinstitutoelcano​ . org ​ / wps​ / portal​ / rielcano​ _ en ​ / contenido​ ? WCM ​ _ GLOBAL ​_CONTEXT=​/elcano​/elcano​_ in ​/zonas​_ in ​/ari29​-2021​-wacker​- europe​ -and​-the​-indo​-pacific​- comparing​-france​-germany​-and​-the​-netherlands

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PART III

ASEAN Amidst Competing Connectivity Strategies and Integration Challenges



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14 DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY IN ASEAN Opportunities and Challenges Sineenat Sermcheep

Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region has been one of the world’s fastest-growing regions. The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted economic progress in the region, as it has in other parts of the world. In 2020, the ASEAN GDP declined by 5.59 per cent (World Bank, 2021). The total trade of the ASEAN-6 countries, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, has dropped by 13.68 per cent, while foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have decreased by 25 per cent (UNCTAD, 2021). Consumers have changed their buying and payment behaviours to online in response to the pandemic, and businesses have adapted by incorporating digital technology into their manufacturing and sales. The pandemic has disrupted global supply chains, which must be redesigned to become more resilient. Digital technology, such as cloud, mobile platforms, the Internet of Things (IoT), and data analytics, can be used to automate manual operations and develop new ways to transport products (Goel, 2021). Businesses can also use digital selling platforms as alternative sales channels. Furthermore, digital technology can help accelerate progress towards the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 9, by supporting inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and fostering innovation (ITU, 2021a). Digital connectivity is an essential component of the digital-friendly ecosystem that will support the country’s digital transformation (Chen & Ruddy, 2020). Three aspects of digital connectivity development, namely digital infrastructure, digital skill and literacy, and privacy and cyber DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-17

198  Sineenat Sermcheep

security regulations, are discussed. Countries should prioritise and enhance these three factors in order to increase digitalisation penetration rates, particularly in developing nations (Erh, 2021). Even though ASEAN’s digital infrastructure development is better than the global average, infrastructure gaps exist between and within member countries (Chen & Ruddy, 2020). It is critical to examine the progress of digital connectivity development across the ASEAN region as well as how individual ASEAN countries can collaborate to improve digital connectivity in order to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and facilitate the region’s digital transformation and long-term growth. ASEAN is prioritising the digital connectivity development at both the national and regional levels. The primary six ASEAN countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, all have policies relating to digital connectivity development. Regional cooperation among ASEAN countries, on the other hand, continues to be a challenge (Erh, 2021). As a result, it is important to consider what ASEAN should do to improve digital connectivity inside the region and with its external partners. How can ASEAN develop digital connectivity with a broader IndoPacific region, given the cooperation between the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions under the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)? As a result, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate the significance and progress of digital connectivity in ASEAN. What should ASEAN do at the national and regional levels, including in the broader Indo-Pacific region, to boost digital connectivity development? What opportunities and challenges will ASEAN face as it develops digital connectivity? Digital Connectivity and Its Roles in Digital Economy Digital Connectivity

A good data flow is required for a transition into a digital economy, and enhanced digital connectivity helps with that. Countries need to develop three components to increase digital connectivity: digital infrastructure, digital literacy and skills, and privacy and cybersecurity laws and regulations. Digital infrastructure, which serves as the backbone of digital connectivity, is the initial phase of digital development (UNCTAD, 2017). Improved digital infrastructure involves (1) more network coverage, (2) better network connection speeds, and (3) more affordable network access. Better connection speed, according to Chen (2020), refers to a faster, more stable, and more secure network, and the cost of using the internet is also an essential component in developing digital connectivity. Countries with extensive coverage and high-quality networks may not achieve high levels of digital connectivity if people cannot afford to buy devices and pay network fees.

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Participation in the digital economy requires digital literacy and skills. Countries with more digitally skilled people have higher levels of social wellbeing and economic productivity; but, a lack of these skills is a significant barrier to people’s access to the internet. Digital literacy includes the ability to collect, create, and evaluate content on digital platforms. Countries must support continuous upskilling, reskilling, and training to be capable in the digital economy, where digital technology is continuously growing, as well as prepare the workforce for demand in the future generation (Erh, 2021). Since the economy requires balanced growth from increased connectivity and cybersecurity, privacy and cybersecurity are crucial for the development of digital connectivity. The risk of data misuse raises the cost and risk of doing business online, impeding the development of digital connectivity (Chen & Ruddy, 2020). Roles of Digital Connectivity in Digital Economy

Improved digital connectivity contributes to recovery and sustainable growth through a variety of channels, including increased access to ICT and the transformation of industry into a smart factory and production. Better digital connectivity improves digital trade and encourages more FDI into the economy. Digital connectivity development also benefits the development of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). First, an increase in digital infrastructure investment, more affordable devices and communications costs, and greater digital skills result in increased access to ICT. This contributes to the SDGl 9, “Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure”, which intends to significantly enhance access to information and technology as well as provide universal and affordable internet access (UNCTAD, 2017). This helps bridging the digital divide and allowing people to move from digital exclusion to digital inclusion. Second, better digital connectivity facilitates data flow, which is a critical component of the smart factory transition. With a smart factory, the system becomes more efficient and agile, with less production downtime and a stronger ability to predict and adjust to changes in the facility or broader network (Deloitte, 2017). Third, advancements in digital connectivity enable digital trade, which is not only a solution during the COVID-19 pandemic but also a platform for a new business model such as a startup, which offers future growth opportunity. Furthermore, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) can use digital platforms to gain access to the global market at lower cost. This increases their chances of benefiting from trade (López González, 2019). Fourth, the spread of the pandemic and the disruption of supply chains have pushed multinational corporations (MNCs) to rethink and redesign their supply chain systems in order to avoid future supply bottlenecks. They

200  Sineenat Sermcheep

may strengthen their supply chains by diversifying their investment into competitive countries with strong healthcare systems, digital-friendly infrastructure, and R&D resources (Kaveevivitchai & Srithongkul, 2020). As a result, ASEAN countries need to improve their digital infrastructure to remain attractive to foreign direct investment (FDI). Fifth, building an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) requires seamless regional connectivity. When the region is moving to a digital economy, physical connectivity alone is insufficient; digital connectivity is also required. Digital connectivity provides channels for digital trade, particularly e-commerce, which is a fast-growing business in ASEAN. Improved digital connectivity also improves trade facilitation, which boosts regional trade flows and regional economic integration. Progress of Digital Connectivity in ASEAN

With approximately 360 million internet users and a market value of US$ 72 billion in 2018, ASEAN is one of the world’s fastest-growing online markets (Chen & Ruddy, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated digital technology adoption and resulted in a permanent widespread digital adoption in the region. In 2020, an additional 40 million users from the region’s six largest digital economies, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, joined the online platform for the first time, bringing the region’s total number of internet users to 400 million (Google et al., 2020). The level of development of digital connectivity is a major factor influencing the country’s internet penetration and the establishment of a digitalfriendly ecosystem, which will accelerate the region’s digital transformation. It is crucial to examine the current state of digital connectivity in each ASEAN country to understand where we are and what we need to do to improve digital connectivity for future recovery and sustainable growth and development. Three digital connectivity elements are utilised as a framework for analysing ASEAN’s digital connectivity progress. These are digital infrastructure, digital literacy and skills, and privacy and cybersecurity laws and regulations. Digital Infrastructure

ASEAN’s digital development levels range from more developed digital economies such as Singapore and Malaysia, which focus on people development through retraining and reskilling, as well as the provision of relevant tools, to less developed digital economies, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, which emphasise on infrastructure development (Erh, 2021). The overall quality of ASEAN’s digital infrastructure is higher than the global average; however, each country’s development is uneven. This section

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examines three aspects of digital infrastructure development which are network coverage, speed of network connectivity, and affordability. The first aspect of digital infrastructure is network coverage. The majority of ASEAN’s population is covered by a mobile cellular network and has internet access. More than 90 per cent of the population in Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia has access to at least a 4G mobile network, in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Myanmar about 80 per cent of the population has access to at least 4G network, whereas less than half of Laos’ population has access to the 4G network. These gaps emphasise the need for Cambodia, the Philippines, Myanmar, and Laos to accelerate the development of 4G networks (Table 14.1). Mobile broadband subscriptions are a popular way for ASEAN citizens to connect to the internet. Most ASEAN countries have at least 80 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, with Singapore having the most at 144 subscribers per 100 inhabitants. Because ASEAN residents prefer to access the internet via mobile phones, fixed broadband subscribers are generally low in ASEAN (Chen, 2020), with Singapore having a maximum of 26 subscribers per 100 persons (Table 14.1). The second aspect of digital infrastructure is network connection speed. Table 14.2 shows that, while almost all ASEAN countries meet the minimum requirement of 2.5 Mbps for advanced cloud applications download TABLE 14.1 Network Coverage and Access to Internet in ASEAN

Country

Network Coverage Population covered by a mobilecellular network (% of population)

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

99 99a 98 95a 97 95b 99c 100 99 100

Population covered by at least a 4G mobile network (% of population)

95 80a 96 43b 93 75b 80c 100 98 99

Access and Use Active mobilebroadband subscriptions(per 100 inhabitants)

Fixed-broadband subscriptions(per 100 inhabitants)

120 96a 89 49a 120 93b 68c 144 90 80

Source: ITU (2021b).Note: The data was collected up to November 2020. (a), (b), and (c) represent data from 2019, 2018, and 2017, respectively. n.a. represents a value is not available.

16 1a 4 1a 10 0b 5a 26 17 17

202  Sineenat Sermcheep TABLE 14.2  Speed of Fixed-line and Mobile Connection in ASEAN

Country

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

Bandwidth capacity

Fixed-line connection

Mobile connection

Total bandwidth (Gbps)i

Per internet user (Kbps)

Average download speed (Mbps)

Average download speed (Mbps)

~44 102~174 1784~2072 ~32.2 1078~1424 83~92 1101~2534 4522~4544 1764~4364 4038~6100

~108.2 19~32 21~25 ~18.4 43~56 6~7 19~44 954~959 48~120 91~137

n.a. 7.4 9.5 n.a. 16.7 22.7 11.7 76.0 15.4 14.3

n.a. 13.0 15.6 n.a. 21.9 8.8 15.2 132.2 48.8 29.5

Source: Chen (2020). Note: (i) Calculated by internet bandwidth per user multipled by the total number of internet users. Gbps = gigabits per second, Kbps = kilobits per second, Mbps = megabits per second.

(Chen, 2020), some countries still need to develop and improve network quality in order to create a regional network ready for further transition into the digital economy. As assessed by bandwidth capacity, there is a significant variation in network quality between Singapore and Laos. On average, each user in Singapore has nearly 1 Mbps of bandwidth, while a user in Myanmar only has 6–7 Kbps. Fixed-line connections in Singapore can download ten times faster than Cambodian connections, and mobile connections in Singapore can download fifteen times faster than Myanmar’s mobile network. The third aspect of digital infrastructure is affordability. A user must have an internet-enabled device and broadband connectivity to participate in the digital economy. For the connecting device, the smartphone is the most affordable and widely available internet access point (Erh, 2021). Table 14.3 shows the affordability of mobile phones in each ASEAN country based on the proportion of individuals who own one. The proportion of persons who own mobile phones increases as affordability increases. Malaysia has the highest share of mobile phone ownership, with 96 per cent of the population owning one, while Indonesia and Myanmar have only 63 and 62 per cent, respectively. The affordability of broadband connectivity is a key issue in digital connectivity because it is the primary barrier to internet access (Ingram, 2020).

Digital Connectivity in ASEAN 203 TABLE 14.3 Mobile Phone Ownership in ASEAN

Country

Individual owning a mobile phone (% of total population)

Female mobile phone ownership (% of total female population)

Male mobile phone ownership (% of total male population)

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

94a 93 63 n.a. 96 62c 79a 88 84 79

99a 93 58 n.a. 95 57c n.a. 88 84 79

91a 94 68 n.a. 98 68c n.a. 89 83 80

Source: ITU (2021b). Note: The data was collected up to November 2020. (a), (b), and (c) represent data from 2019, 2018, and 2017, respectively. n.a. represents a value is not available.

The cost of internet access has lately been significantly decreased as a result of technology advancements and market competition, particularly for mobile connections (Chen, 2020; Ingram, 2020). Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar’s mobile networks improved considerably between 2014 and 2018. Significant evidence can be found in the case of Myanmar, where mobile connections are more affordable than in other countries in the same group. The ASEAN mobile broadband market is generally more competitive than the fixed broadband market, resulting in lower mobile broadband basket costs in all ASEAN countries (Ingram, 2020) (Table 14.4). When the cost of mobile broadband is measured as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) per capita, Laos has the highest relative cost of 2.4 per cent of GNI per capita, while Brunei and Singapore pay only 0.3–0.4 per cent of their income for the same services. Digital Literacy and Skills

Digital literacy and skills are required for labour force participation in the digital economy. The majority of the region’s young people have a moderate level of digital literacy, according to a UNICEF study of 8,585 ASEAN youths. However, there remains a large digital divide among ASEAN countries (UNICEF, 2021). Singapore has the highest degree of digital literacy (Table 14.5), followed by Malaysia and Brunei. Lower digital literacy rates

204  Sineenat Sermcheep TABLE 14.4 ICT Price in ASEAN

Country

Fixed broadband basket

Mobile cellular basket

Mobile data and voice basket (low consumption)

Mobile data Mobile and voice broadband basket (high basket consumption)

(% of GNI per capita) Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

1.0 12.2 10.9 9.4 2.2 11.6 7.9 0.7 3.3 3.9

1.0 11.0 2.4 8.3 1.2 2.5 3.0 0.4 2.7 2.0

0.6 5.2 1.8 4.6 1.0 1.1 2.9 0.4 1.6 1.9

0.3 5.0 1.3 3.5 0.9 1.0 2.9 0.4 1.2 1.9

0.3 1.6 1.3 2.4 0.6 0.8 1.4 0.4 0.6 1.0

Source: ITU (2021b). Note: The data was collected up to November 2020.

exist in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV), with Myanmar having the lowest assessment of digital literacy among this group. Digital skills represent a similar trend of development based on the proportion of persons who have information and communication technology (ICT) skills. Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei are countries with a high level of digital skills, with almost half of the population having basic digital skills, and 40 per cent of individuals in these three countries are having standard skills. In terms of acquiring digital skills, the rest of ASEAN still has a long way to go (Table 14.6). Privacy and Cybersecurity Laws and Regulations

When using online platforms, internet users require privacy and security. The free flow of data with trust is crucial for the use and spread of digital connectivity as well as for realising the benefits of the digital economy. Cybersecurity is also an essential component of digital networking. Policy on data governance in ASEAN is underdeveloped and fragmented. Table 14.7 demonstrates that ASEAN countries’ cyber readiness, as defined by personal data protection and cybersecurity laws, varies widely. Based on the level of development of privacy and cybersecurity regulations, ASEAN countries can be divided into four groups: (1) advanced group (Singapore and Malaysia), (2) established group (Thailand and Philippines), (3)

Digital Connectivity in ASEAN 205 TABLE 14.5  S elf-Perceived Level of Digital Literacy by Country (Unit: % of

Respondents) Country

1 (Poor)

2

3

4

5 (Excellent)

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

0 1 2 6 1 7 3 0 1 5

10 9 6 6 0 27 4 3 0 11

20 44 28 34 26 40 36 6 40 47

30 41 44 38 45 20 27 62 38 23

40 5 19 16 27 5 30 29 20 14

Source: UNICEF (2021). Note: Responses to the question: How would you rate your own literacy (the ability and skills to navigate the digital world)? TABLE 14.6  ICT Skills of Individuals in ASEAN

Country

Individual with basic skills (%)

Individual with standard skills (%)

Individual with advanced skills (%)

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

57a 29b 49c n.a. 52a n.a. n.a. 54a 17a n.a.

40a 5a 25c n.a. 42 n.a. n.a. 40 10 8

28a 1a 4c n.a. 11 n.a. 1a 8 1 0

Source: ITU (2021b). Note: The data was collected up to November 2020. (a), (b), and (c) represent data from 2019, 2018, and 2017, respectively. n.a. represents a value is not available. Basic skills: The highest value among the four computer-based activities: copying or moving a file or folder; using copy and paste tools to duplicate or move information within a document; sending e‑mails with attached files; and transferring files between a computer and other devices. Standard skills: The highest value among the four computer-based activities: using basic arithmetic formula in a spreadsheet; connecting and installing new devices; creating electronic presentations with presentation software; and finding, downloading, installing, and configuring software. Advanced skills: The values for writing a computer programme using a specialised programming language.

206  Sineenat Sermcheep TABLE 14.7  Privacy and Cybersecurity Regulations

Country

Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) Cybersecurity

Brunei

• No comprehensive law on data •

Cambodia

• •

Indonesia

• •

Laos

•

Malaysia

• •

protection Guided by a Data Protection Policy since 2014 No specific personal data protection law Guided by general law (Civil Code and Criminal Code) and in specific laws regulating such as Prakas on Credit Reporting 2011 and Law on Electronic Commerce 2019 No general data protection law Guided by regulations relating to the use of electronic data: Information and Electronic Transaction Law (2008); Electronic System and Transaction Operation and its implementing legislation (2012) and Personal Data Protection in an Electronic System (2016); Implementation of Electronic System and Transaction (2019) Law on Electronic Data Protection (2017) PDPA (2010) Establishment of Personal Data Protection Commissioner

• No national cybersecurity strategy

• No national cybersecurity strategy

• Cybersecurity Bill (2020) • (Draft) National Cyber Security Strategy

• Cyber Body and National Encryption Agency

• (Draft) National

Cybersecurity Strategy

• (Prepare) Cybersecurity Law

• National Cybersecurity Policy (2016)

Myanmar

Philippines

Singapore

• No specific data protection law • Guided by several laws such as Law

• •

Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017) and Electronic Transactions Law (2004) Data Privacy Act (2012) Establishment of National Privacy Commission

• PDPA (2012) – in force in 2014 • Establishment of Personal Data Protection Commissioner

• Cybersecurity Malaysia • No national cybersecurity strategy

• National Cybersecurity

Plan 2022 launched (2017)

• Department of

• • •

Information and Communication Technology Cybersecurity Act (2018) National Cybersecurity Strategy (2016) Establishment of Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (Continued)

Digital Connectivity in ASEAN 207 TABLE 14.7 (Continued)

Country

Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) Cybersecurity

Thailand

• PDPA (2019) – will come into full •

Vietnam

effect on June 1, 2022 Establishment of Personal Data Protection Committee

• (Draft) Decree on Personal Data

Protection – plan to take effect on December 1, 2021

• Cybersecurity Act (2019) • National Cybersecurity Strategy

• National Cyber Security Committee

• Law on Cybersecurity (2018)

Source: Author’s summary from various papers: Kearney (2018), Deloitte (2018), Zico Law (2020), Anjani (2021), Erh (2021), and UNIDIR (2021).

nascent group (Vietnam, Indonesia, and Laos), and (4) absent group (Brunei, Cambodia, and Myanmar) (updated from Kearney, 2018). Singapore and Malaysia have the most advanced digital laws in ASEAN, with Personal Data Protection Acts (PDPAs) in effect since 2012 and 2010, respectively. Singapore has also passed a cybersecurity act since 2018, while the Malaysian government is working on cybersecurity legislation suggestions for 2021 (Table 14.7). Thailand and the Philippines have both enacted PDPAs and formed committees to coordinate personal data protection agendas, namely Thailand’s Personal Data Protection Committee and the Philippines’ National Privacy Commission. Thailand was one of the first ASEAN countries to pass a Cybersecurity Act. Vietnam, Indonesia, and Laos have gradually developed data governance policies and regulations. Vietnam released a draft regulation on personal data protection that would go into effect on 1 December 2021, as well as enacted a Cybersecurity Law, whereas Indonesia passed a cybersecurity bill and developed a National Cybersecurity Strategy. Laos has lately made significant progress, moving from a lack of privacy and cybersecurity regulation to the adoption of an Electronic Data Protection Law and the creation of a National Cybersecurity Strategy. Improving Digital Connectivity and Its Opportunities and Challenges

ASEAN governments have developed policies and measures to boost connectivity for the digital economy in order to further expand digital connectivity in their countries. The momentum of digital development is also visible at the regional level, as indicated by ASEAN initiatives on digital connectivity development.

208  Sineenat Sermcheep

National Level

In terms of digital infrastructure, most ASEAN countries are still in the early phases of the digital revolution, with considerable gaps in quality, access, and affordability. For ASEAN individuals, affordability is a key barrier to using online platforms. Physical infrastructure costs and market competition are significant determinants of network costs. Increased market competition and investment in network businesses can increase network quality and reduce network expenses (Ingram, 2020). Governments in ASEAN should support more investment in this industry in order to increase services. Furthermore, governments should provide incentives to attract domestic and foreign private enterprises to provide universally accessible and affordable services. This helps to bridge the digital divide in countries. To achieve universal access, all stakeholders must work together. Governments can form public-private partnerships (PPPs) with the private sector to speed this development. The majority of ASEAN youths have a moderate degree of digital literacy, and only four countries, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have about half of the population with basic ICT skills. National policies in ASEAN countries should be adjusted to speed the development of digital capabilities. Education strategies must involve investment in reskilling and retraining as well as the skills required for the digital economy. Due to the continuing evolution of digital technology, upgrading digital capabilities must be a continuous process in order to prepare workers for future-generation digital jobs. Furthermore, governments can make digital opportunities more inclusive by providing education and training to all sectors of the economies. Governments and the private sector can collaborate to help their people obtain skills. With this strategy, the private sector can play a key role in identifying market demands and skill gaps, allowing for skills upgrades. In terms of privacy and cybersecurity regulation landscape, the majority of ASEAN countries are in the early stages of development, and the region’s cyber resilience is low, particularly in terms of policy, governance, and cybersecurity capabilities. As ASEAN’s participation in the digital economy grows, online transactions will increase resulting in larger data footprints. This increases the region’s cybersecurity challenges, and the region has to make more progress in terms of transparency, accountability, and safe data management (Kearney, 2018). Each ASEAN country should adopt comprehensive national privacy and cybersecurity regulations to avoid duplication and inconsistency. A method for data security and administration as well as a concrete application of the regulations are also required. Furthermore, ASEAN countries should focus on the development of physical and soft cybersecurity infrastructure while

Digital Connectivity in ASEAN 209

also emphasizing the necessity of data security. A scarcity of cybersecurityskilled professionals is another obstacle to advancement in cybersecurity. The governments of ASEAN are responsible for developing cybersecurity capabilities for the future ASEAN (Ingram, 2020). Cross-border transactions are becoming more common among ASEAN digital businesses. Multinational corporations (MNCs) face challenges due to a lack of regionally aligned data governance or a unified framework (Ingram, 2020). To bridge the gap, the region’s governments must align existing data privacy and cybersecurity laws. ASEAN should also evaluate the relevance of cybersecurity risk at the regional level for ASEAN’s data security and cybersecurity to develop further in the region, and ASEAN countries’ cybersecurity development commitments should be secure and maintained. For this execution, the ASEAN integration platform is a viable option. Regional and International Levels

At the ASEAN level, regional digital development policy, particularly for cross-border transactions, is a major facilitator of regional growth. Policies for data openness, cross-border flow, privacy and cybersecurity, and interoperability should be introduced, developed, and coordinated. The Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025, ASEAN Digital Integration Framework, ASEAN Framework on Personal Data Protection (2016), ASEAN Framework on Digital Data Governance (2018), ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce (2019), and ASEAN Digital Master Plan 2025 (2021) are the seven existing ASEAN frameworks, agreements, and master plans for digital connectivity development. The Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 maintains the role of creating the connected platform for ASEAN’s integration and development by addressing the digital technology aspect of the ASEAN Community 2025 vision. It is structured on five major areas: sustainable infrastructure, digital innovation, seamless logistics, regulatory excellence, and people mobility. When the region has transformed to a digital economy, one of the AEC Blueprint 2025 aspects is ICT connectivity and cooperation in the e-commerce business. ASEAN is gradually building more digital development frameworks and strategies. Recent developments include frameworks and master plans for data protection and management, as well as electronic commerce. The ASEAN Framework on Personal Data Protection was adopted in November 2016 to address the cyber risks, with the goal of establishing a set of principles to guide the implementation of measures at both national and regional levels to promote and strengthen personal data protection in the region.

210  Sineenat Sermcheep

The ASEAN Framework on Digital Data Governance, launched in 2018, emphasises the importance of harmonising policy and regulatory measures by outlining a set of guidelines. The framework focuses on four important areas: the data life cycle and ecosystem, cross-border data flows, digitalisation and emerging technologies, and legal and regulatory issues (ASEAN Secretariat, 2018). The ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce was launched in 2019 to facilitate the growth of cross-border e-commerce transactions in ASEAN, foster trust and confidence in the region’s use of e-commerce, and deepen cooperation among member countries to further develop and intensify the use of e-commerce to provide the ASEAN region with inclusive growth and to narrow development gaps (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019a). Following the introduction of the personal data protection framework and the digital data governance framework, the ASEAN Digital Master Plan 2025 was published in June 2021, with the purpose of guiding countries’ cooperation in the area of digital technologies over the next five years. The master plan outlines the region’s vision for a safe and transformative, as well as a digital, ecosystem for businesses and consumers. To achieve that goal, the master plan recognises the need for harmonised and principles-based data protection policies as well as robust cybersecurity and data governance best practices (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021). To summarise, ASEAN’s existing digital development frameworks and policies provide an opportunity to member countries and ASEAN as a whole to further promote digital connectivity. ASEAN policies prioritise all three components of digital connectivity development: digital infrastructure development, digital literacy and skills building, and data security and management, as well as policies and regulations that promote competition, transparency, and a business-friendly environment. These priorities enable ASEAN countries to use regional frameworks as a guide to develop national digital connectivity policies that are aligned with regional priorities. However, regional challenges to digital development remain. ASEAN has developed a framework for data protection and data governance to serve as a reference for developing data privacy laws that are consistent across the region, but regional coherence can only be improved if countries implement comparable effective data protection and governance laws and regulations. This requires collaboration among all ASEAN countries in developing and implementing digital development policies. Another challenge is the importance of promoting an interoperable data governance framework to ASEAN’s digital economy and data ecosystem (US-ASEAN Business Council, 2019). This interoperability refers not just to the interoperability of ASEAN members’ systems but also to their interoperability on a worldwide scale. Interoperability throughout the region

Digital Connectivity in ASEAN 211 TABLE 14.8  Key Features of the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA)

between Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand Key Features

Components

Facilitate end-to-end digital trade

• Digital Identities • E-Invoicing • Paperless Trade • FinTech and E-Payments • Personal Data Protection • Open Government Data • Cross-Border Data Flows • Data Innovation and

Enabling trusted data flows

Regulatory Sandboxes

Build trust in digital systems and facilitate opportunities for participation in the digital economy

• Artificial Intelligence • SMEs Cooperation • Online Consumer Protection • Digital Inclusivity

Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore (2020).

and around the world will enable ASEAN and the global economy to integrate seamlessly. Digital connectivity with international interoperability can help ASEAN’s recovery and long-term growth and development. Adopting internationally recognised interoperability best practices, such as the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, the APEC Privacy Framework, and the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), is thus critical for ASEAN’s continued digital economy development. At the bilateral level, Singapore is the only ASEAN country that collaborates digitally with countries beyond the region. Singapore signed the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) with Chile and New Zealand in June 2020 and with Australia in January 2021. The DEPA is the first digital agreement, introducing new approaches and partnerships in digital trade collaboration, promoting interoperability among different regimes, and addressing new issues arising from digitalisation. DEPA’s three primary aspects are facilitating seamless end-to-end digital trade, enabling trusted data flows, and increasing trust in digital payments (Table 14.8) (Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore, 2020). According to the Singapore government, the DEPA helps the country expand its digital connectivity with its partners and enables Singaporean firms to better capitalise on digital economy prospects. This seamless transaction and trade is even more crucial for the country in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. This agreement can serve as a model for ASEAN countries to further expand their market access.

212  Sineenat Sermcheep

Another digital collaboration can be found in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) e-commerce chapter. This chapter focuses on promoting e-commerce use among members and globally, enhancing the trust and confidence of e-commerce users, and improving e-commerce development among member states. The member countries commit to the following e-commerce aspects:

• Implementing initiatives to enable paperless trading and acceptance of electronic documents.

• Recognising the validity of e-signatures. • Enacting and maintaining legal frameworks for personal data protection and consumer protection measures.

• Regulating unsolicited commercial electronic messages. • Maintaining the current practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions between member states.

• Strengthening capabilities of local cybersecurity authorities and encouraging member countries’ cooperation in tracking such matters.

• Prohibiting data localisation requirements by requiring the use or loca-

tion of computing facilities onshore as a condition for conducting business in the member state and restrictions on cross-border data transfers via electronic means when such activity is for business purposes.

As a result, the RCEP offers ASEAN an opportunity to further improve digital connectivity for the following reasons. First, the RCEP serves as a launching pad for ASEAN’s future digital connectivity expansion in the global market. ASEAN countries might begin by connecting with their major trading partners, which are China, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Second, the RCEP agreement’s key features, namely modern, comprehensive, high-quality, and mutually beneficial economic partnership, can help in fine-tuning and improving ASEAN’s preparation for global digital connectivity. Third, components of the e-commerce commitment have solved ASEAN’s challenges and increased future connectivity, both directly and indirectly. For decades, the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions have been among the world’s most dynamic economies and centres of economic growth. In 2019, ASEAN leaders launched the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) initiative, which aims to strengthen regional integration and connectivity. AOIP’s goal is to (1) provide an outlook to guide regional cooperation; (2) help to promote an enabling environment for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region; (3) enhance ASEAN’s community-building process and further strengthening the existing ASEAN-led mechanisms; and (4) implement

Digital Connectivity in ASEAN 213

existing and explore other ASEAN priority areas of cooperation, such as maritime cooperation, connectivity, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and economic and other possible areas of cooperation. In order to realise the Indo-Pacific region’s development and prosperity, ASEAN will engage in four areas: maritime cooperation, connectivity, the Sustainable Development Goals 2030, and economic and other possible areas of cooperation. As part of the objective, the AOIP has prioritised connectivity cooperation, allowing ASEAN to increase its connectivity and cooperation with the Indian Ocean region. The existing and future connectivity initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region should complement and support the existing Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025, according to the second area of AOIP cooperation – connecting the connectivities. The Indo-Pacific countries should encourage seamless, competitive, and inclusive connectivity. Countries in the Indo-Pacific region may also (2) create a regional public-private partnership (PPP) development agenda in order to mobilise resources for connectivity projects, including infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region; and (2) promote people-to-people connectivity through cooperation, collaboration, and exchange between academia and businesses (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019b). The AOIP allows ASEAN digital connectivity to expand further by collaborating with countries in the Indian Ocean region. ASEAN can collaborate with countries such as India, which is becoming a digitally advanced nation (McKinsey Global Institute, 2019), to develop digital connectivity through activities such as the joint investment project on digital infrastructure to expand broadband access, the mobility of digitally skilled professionals, and the development of ICT capacity. Conclusion

Digital connectivity, including digital infrastructure, digital literacy and skills, and privacy and cybersecurity laws and regulations, is crucial for ASEAN’s post-pandemic recovery and sustainable growth and development. ASEAN must improve connectivity because there are significant gaps in quality, access, digital skills, and data security and management regulations throughout the region. ASEAN countries must collaborate at the national and regional levels to streamline and improve digital development as well as with RCEP and Indo-Pacific partners to create seamless digital connectivity. ASEAN, as a member of the global economy, must also align regulations such as data protection and privacy laws with international best practices in order to promote seamless integration into the global economy.

214  Sineenat Sermcheep

The development strategy for digital connectivity should consider all three levels: national, regional, and global. While some developments, such as infrastructure investment and training programmes, can be formed and implemented at the ASEAN level, data protection and privacy laws require ASEAN to think beyond the regional level in order to remain competitive in the global digital economy. The following are policy recommendations for ASEAN:

• Increase investment in digital infrastructure to provide universal access

and affordability: The affordability of network costs is a major barrier to ASEAN citizens’ network access. Governments in ASEAN should take the lead in infrastructure investment projects. ASEAN governments can form public-private partnerships (PPPs) with the private sector, whether domestic or foreign, to ensure the financial sustainability of the project and the provision of affordable services to their people, and they can collaborate at the intergovernmental level. • Collaborate in digitally skilled training and facilitate the mobility of digitally skilled professionals: To strengthen local digital economy capabilities, ASEAN should collaborate within the region as well as with more advanced digital countries such as China, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand via RCEP and India via AOIP. • Increase trust and security in ASEAN’s digital economy: ASEAN can create a free flow of data with trust by combining national strategies, regional collaboration, and global best practices. The regional platform serves as a framework for aligning national privacy and cybersecurity regulations and ensuring compliance with global standards. Global interoperability facilitates ASEAN’s seamless integration into the global economy and increases its global competitiveness. References Anjani, N.H. (2021, March). Cybersecurity Protection in Indonesia. Policy Brief, Center for Indonesian Policy Studies. https://c95e5d29​- 0df6​- 4d6f​-8801​ -1d6926c32107​.usrfiles​.com​/ugd​/c95e5d​_ 30f​0713​c838​c4d2​a88b​8c41​9838b695f​ .pdf ASEAN Secretariat. (2018). ASEAN Data Management Framework: Data Governance and Protection Throughout the Data Cycle. https://asean​.org ​/wp​ -content ​/uploads​/2​-ASEAN​-Data​-Management​-Framework ​_ Final​.pdf ASEAN Secretariat. (2019a). ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce. http:// agreement​.asean​.org ​/media ​/download ​/20190306035048​.pdf ASEAN Secretariat. (2019b). ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. https://asean​ .org ​/storage​/ 2019​/06​/ASEAN​- Outlook​- on​-the​- Indo​- Pacific ​_ FINAL ​_ 22062019​ .pdf ASEAN Secretariat. (2021). ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025. https://asean​.org ​/wp​ -content ​/uploads​/2021​/09​/ASEAN​-Digital​-Masterplan​-EDITED​.pdf

Digital Connectivity in ASEAN 215

Chen, L. (2020). Improving Digital Connectivity for E-commerce: A Policy Framework and Empirical Note. In L. Chen & F. Kimura (Eds.), E-commerce Connectivity in ASEAN (pp. 7–30). Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Indonesia. https://www​.eria​.org ​/uploads​/media ​/ Books​ /2020 ​ - E ​ - commerce ​ - Connectivity​ - in ​ - ASEAN ​ / E ​ - commerce ​ - Connectivity​ - in​ -ASEAN ​_ Full​-Report​.pdf Chen, L. & Ruddy, L. (2020). Improving Digital Connectivity: Policy Priority for ASEAN Digital Transformation. ERIA Policy Brief, No.2020-07. https://www​ .eria​.org ​/ uploads ​/media ​/policy​- brief ​/ Improving​- Digital​- Connectivity​- Policy​ -Priority​-for​-ASEAN​-Digital​.pdf Deloitte. (2017). The Smart Factory: Responsive, Adaptive, Connected Manufacturing. A Deloitte Series on Industry 4.0, Digital Manufacturing Enterprises, and Digital Supply Networks. Deloitte University Press. https:// www2 ​.deloitte​.com ​/content ​/dam ​/insights ​/us ​/articles ​/4051​_The​- smart​-factory​/ DUP​_The​-smart​-factory​.pdf Deloitte. (2018). Data and Privacy Protection in ASEAN - What Does It Mean for Business in the Region? https://www2​.deloitte​.com​/content​/dam​/ Deloitte​/sg​/ Documents​/risk ​/sea​-risk​-data​-privacy​-in​-asean​.pdf Erh, J. (2021). Assessing Digital Economy Policies in Six Southeast Asian Countries. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute Perspective, Issue No. 50. https://www​.iseas​.edu​.sg ​/ wp​- content​/uploads​/2021​/03​/ ISEAS​_ Perspective​_ 2021​_ 50​.pdf Goel, A. (2021, January 28). How Technology Can Help with Covid-19 Supply Chain Disruptions. Forbes. https://www​.forbes​.com ​/sites​/for​besb​usin​essd​evel​ opme​ntcouncil​/ 2021​/ 01​/ 28​/ how​- technology​- can​- help​-with​- covid​-19​- supply​ -chain​-disruptions/​?sh​=25a83def52ff Google, Temasek, & Bain & Company. (2020). E-Conomy SEA 2020. https://www​ .bain​.com ​/insights​/e​- conomy​-sea​-2020/ Ingram, G. (2020). Development in the Southeast Asia: Opportunities for Donor Collaboration. Chapter 2 in The Digital World. Brookings Institute. https://www​ .brookings​.edu​/wp​- content​/uploads​/ 2020​/12​/ Development​- Southeast​-Asia​- Ch2​ -Digital​.pdf International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2021a). Digital Technologies to Achieve the UN SDGs. https://www​.itu​.int​/en​/mediacentre​/ backgrounders​/ Pages​ /icts​-to​-achieve​-the​-united​-nations​-sustainable​-development​-goals​.aspx International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2021b). Digital Development Dashboard. https://www​.itu​.int ​/en ​/ ITU​-D​/Statistics​/ Dashboards​/ Pages​/ Digital​ -Development​.aspx Kaveevivitchai, M. & Srithongkul, C. (2020, December 14). From a Star to a Stump, What Is Causing Thailand FDI to Fall Out of Track? Focused and Quick (FAQ) Issue 182, Bank of Thailand. Retrieved from https://www​.bot​.or​.th ​/ Thai ​/ MonetaryPolicy​/ArticleAndResearch​/ FAQ​/ FAQ​_182​.pdf Kearney. (2018). Cybersecurity in ASEAN: An Urgent Call to Action. https:// www​. kearney​. com ​/documents ​/ 20152 ​/ 989824​/Cybersecurity​+in​+ASEAN ​.pdf​ /2e0fb55c​-8a50​-b1e3​- 4954​-2c5c573dd121 López González, J. (2019). Fostering Participation in Digital Trade in ASEAN MSMEs. OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 230, OECD Publishing, Paris. http:// dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1787​/63561b11​- en McKinsey Global Institute. (2019). Digital India: Technology to Transform a Connected Nation. https://www​.mckinsey​.com/~​/media ​/mckinsey​/ business​ %20f unctions ​ / mckinsey ​ % 20digital ​ / ou r ​ % 20insig hts ​ / digital ​ % 20india​ %20technology​ % 20to​% 20transform​ % 20a​% 20connected​ % 20nation ​ / mgi​ -digital​-india​-report​-april​-2019​.pdf

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Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore. (2020). The Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). https://www​.mti​.gov​.sg ​/ Improving​-Trade ​/ Digital​-Economy​ -Agreements​/ The​-Digital​-Economy​-Partnership​-Agreement UNCTAD. (2017). World Investment Report 2017: Investment and the Digital Economy. https://unctad​.org ​/webflyer​/world​-investment​-report​-2017 UNCTAD. (2021). World Investment Report 2021: Investing in Sustainable Recovery. https://unctad​.org ​/webflyer​/world​-investment​-report​-2021 UNICEF. (2021). Digital Literacy in Education Systems Across ASEAN: Key Insights and Opinions of Young People. https://www​.unicef​.org ​/eap​/media ​/ 7766​/file ​/ Digital​%20Literacy​%20in​%20Education​%20Systems​%20Across​%20ASEAN​ %20Cover​.pdf United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). (2021). UNIDIR Cyber Policy Portal. https://unidir​.org ​/cpp​/en/ US-ASEAN Business Council. (2019). Digital Data Governance in ASEAN: Key Elements for a Data-Driven Economy. https://www​.usasean​.org ​/system ​/files​/ downloads​/digital​_ data​_ governance​_ in​_ asean​-key​_ elements​_ for​_ a​_ data​-driven​ _economy​.pdf World Bank. (2021). World Development Indicators (WDI). https://databank​ .worldbank​.org​/source​/world​-development​-indicators Zico Law. (2020, September). Personal Data Protection in ASEAN. ASEAN Insiders Series. https://www​.zicolaw​.com ​/wp​- content ​/uploads​/2020​/09​/ASEAN​ -INSIDERS ​_ PDPA​-in​-ASEAN​-3​.pdf

15 INDIA, ASEAN, AND THE QUAD Economic Imperatives of the Indo-Pacific Amita Batra

Introduction

Indo-Pacific as a regional construct has seen a recent revival after having been dormant for a decade. Notwithstanding the fluidity of the geographic profile, the major participant nations, that is, the United States, ASEAN, Japan, India, and Australia, have underlined certain common principles in defining the region as free and open with a rules-based order. The fourmember sub-construct of the QUAD, while originally conceived towards strengthening the strategic dimension of the Indo-Pacific, has now evolved into a forum with a more broad-based agenda inclusive of developmental goals for the region. The new formulation of the AUKUS by the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom has meanwhile assumed the strategic aims of the regional formulation. The developments so far make clear the fact that the underlying motivation for the revival of the regional construct is an attempt to counterbalance the expansionist tendencies of China and to have the region progress along a peaceful non-contentious path. Towards this objective, though, the economic component seems to have received relatively little attention. This chapter highlights how the economics of the region, while constituting diverse dimensions, has the potential to serve the underlying motivation of the Indo-Pacific revival and objectives. Towards this objective, the necessity for ASEAN and India to strengthen their economic partnership is also put forward as a possible means to correct the imbalance between the strategic and economic aspects of the regional strategy. The impetus provided by the pandemic is discussed as an additional and timely contributory factor in this process. DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-18

218  Amita Batra

The Geographic Fluidity

While the revival of the concept and construct of the Indo-Pacific was initially among the United States, Japan, ASEAN, Australia, and India, more recently other countries have shown interest and strategic motivation to be a part of the Indo-Pacific. Each participant, however, defines the regional construct differently, lending a certain fluidity to the geographic bounds of this regional construct. The EU as a whole as well as individual member economies, like France and Germany, have expressed interest in extending their diplomatic activities in the region. The United Kingdom has similarly pivoted its strategic and economic interests towards the Indo-Pacific postBrexit. For each of these participants, however, the geographic expanse of the term Indo-Pacific varies. In the case of the United States, the Trump administration in its 2017 National Security Strategy defined the region from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States (Congressional Research Service, 2018). Australia, in its 2017 foreign policy white paper, describes the region as ranging from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia, including India, North Asia, and the United States. The Japanese conception of the Indo-Pacific has been the broadest and inclusive of the Middle East and African littoral nations aside from the Indian and Western Pacific oceans. Within this broad regional expression emphasis is laid on the critical role of Southeast Asia, India, and the United States. There are also additional dimensions that have been emphasised in the individual country definitions of the region. For example, the Japanese Indo-Pacific policy highlights aspects such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the central placement of the ASEAN, and the necessity to strengthen connectivity in ASEAN as a means to enhancing its role as the link between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. India perceives the regional expanse in the broadest terms to extend from the Indian to the Pacific Oceans – and all nations within – from Africa to the Americas. The ASEAN vision of the Indo-Pacific, originally conceived by Indonesia, has been presented in the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” that was released in 2019. While including both the oceans, the document brings forth the centrality of ASEAN and ASEAN-led forums as vital to the regional construct. The need to strengthen these existing forms as the mainstay of progress in cooperative efforts across the region is stressed in the document. The geographical fluidity in defining the Indo-Pacific is also to a certain extent reflected in the expression of the underlying motivation by the main participating member economies. While the United States has made clear its perspective of being driven by a need to contain the Chinese aggressive and expansionist tendencies in the region, the others, including India, Japan, and ASEAN, are not so explicit in stating this as an obvious objective

India, ASEAN, and the QUAD 219

of the regional construct. The intention to maintain the Indo-Pacific as an “inclusive” regional construct has been apparent in their definition of the region. Significantly though, India has over the last couple of years also been explicit in orienting its strategic and economic interests and alliances so as to not accord any position of dominance to China in its regional alliances. India’s withdrawal from the RCEP and its trade policy objectives of reducing import dependence on a single source have been indications in this direction. ASEAN, given its economic interdependence with China, does not lay out any such explicit policy intentions. However, ASEAN’s post-pandemic comprehensive recovery plan does specify the desirable objectives of diversifying economic integration beyond the region and strengthening its supply chains to emerge as a possible alternative to China as large corporations look for other, equally attractive investment locations. So, while geographic delineation of the Indo-Pacific varies across participating nations, the underlying motivation for balancing is apparent even if not explicitly stated as such by member economies. The emphasis on evolving a regional order that is rules-based is further indicative of the common apprehension of all regional economies vis-a-vis China. Its expansionist activity in the South China Sea has, in particular, been seen as a violation of principles of sovereignty and international statutes regarding exclusive economic zones (EEZs). In this context, it is relevant to highlight the fact that the Chinese expansionist tendencies in the region have been derived from its growing economic weight and centrality in the region. China’s rapid economic growth and emergence as the major trading partner of almost all countries in the world, and more significantly, for the ASEAN and East Asian economies, over the past two decades has been a major contributory factor in this context. In addition, the production networks in the region have helped create a dense network of interdependence among the regional economies wherein China plays a critical central role – importing intermediates from these economies, assembling into final products, and exporting final products to the rest of the world. The emergence of these regional supply chains and China as the regional hub of supply chain activity has emboldened China to expand its influence beyond the economic realm and limited, simultaneously, any explicit expression of resistance from regional economies. We elaborate on these aspects later in this chapter. China’s Growth Trajectory

China has been a high-growth economy for over two decades now. China’s take-off in the 1990s and its emergence as the fastest-growing economy in the first decade of the 2000s have been attributable to facilitative trade policies and investment liberalisation. In particular, China’s investment policies

220  Amita Batra

through the joint venture mechanism enabled domestic enterprises to take advantage of the necessary spillover benefits in the form of technology transfer. China has, as a consequence, experienced a spectacular increase in its growth and at the same time contributed significantly and positively to global growth. At the end of the first decade of the 2000s, as the world economy grew at 2.73 per cent in 2011, the Chinese contribution in this amounted to 0.56 per cent (Yang, 2013). China’s open economy and liberalisation policies were further reinforced by its accession to the WTO and the consequent reforms in its economic policies. These factors, combined, helped China emerge as the centre of the global assembly line production network as well as a major trading economy of the world. China’s Rise as a Major Trading Partner

China had assumed the position of a leading trading economy in the world in the early 2000s following its accession to the WTO in 2001. China has, over these last two decades, retained its export competitiveness in the global trade context. Even during the pandemic, China has led global goods trade recovery. China has been the leading economy in terms of gains in global export market share during the pandemic period. The maximum positive change in exports of 8 per cent and 17 per cent in the third and fourth quarters of 2020 was observed for China and has been cause for global goods trade rebound in the Asia-Pacific during the COVID-19 time (UNCTAD, 2021). Furthermore, despite the recent inward reorientation of its economy, China continues to be the largest exporter in the world with a share of 13 per cent of global exports (WTO, 2021). In comparison, the United States and Germany in the second and third place, respectively, have a share of only around 8 per cent of global exports. More significant to our analysis are China’s trade linkages in the regional Asian context, which have intensified over time. China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner for more than a decade. In the last five years, the share of trade with China in total trade of the ASEAN has increased from 16 per cent in 2015 to over 19 per cent in 2020. China’s export share in total exports of ASEAN has similarly increased from about 12 per cent to over 16 per cent over the same period. For the ASEAN-4,1 the same ratios have increased from export share: a little over 11 per cent to 16 per cent; and trade share: from a little over 15 per cent to over 19 per cent during the same period. The index of export intensity of the ASEAN-4 with China has similarly been more than 1 and increased consistently over the last decade from 1.32 in 2010 to 1.86 in 2020. 2 China’s investments in the region are significant and major, particularly so with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects that are aimed at assisting regional economies plug their infrastructure gaps. This has been particularly important not just for the lesser developed

India, ASEAN, and the QUAD 221

regional economies like Cambodia but also for the relatively larger and more developed economies of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. China’s Centrality to Regional Value Chains in Asia

In the same context, it is relevant to highlight the fact that China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 and its subsequent trade and investment liberalisation led to its integration with global value chains (GVCs). China has been at the centre of regional production networks in Asia as well. Regional economies, Southeast Asia and East Asia, have close and deep linkages with China in dense regional production networks. It is observed that the Southeast Asian economies have the maximum backward linkages with China in the most GVC-intensive sector of electronics and computers. China is also the regional economies’ largest partner in forward linkages, followed by other regional economies like Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia (RIVA). The ASEAN-China FTA has been a facilitating factor for the regional production networks, particularly in the electronics sector. RTAs and Regional Supply Chains

An additional factor that contributes further to the regional economic landscape is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that has been signed by 153 economies, including China, in 2020. The fact that the RCEP was signed in the midst of the pandemic highlights its significance to the regional economies. The trade and investment facilitating provisions of the RCEP, specifically the cumulative rules of origin (RoOs), create further scope and opportunity for the member economies to intensify and consolidate their value chain linkages. China, the economy central to the regional value chains, is a member of the RCEP and has in September 2021 also put in a formal application for membership to the other Asian trade formulation, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). With its growing participation in regional trade formulations, there is a very real possibility of regional economic integration among these RCEP economies becoming deeper with further consolidation of China’s centricity in the process. Therefore, China may continue to dominate the regional economic landscape. At the same time, however, given China’s tendencies, as evident over the last decade, to extend its regional economic dominance to the strategic and territorial spheres poses a challenge for regional economies, which, in turn, necessitates their diversification away from China. China’s aggressive and expansionist activities in the South China Sea have included the construction of military and industrial outposts on the artificial islands that it has built in disputed waters. This has been a source of great consternation for regional economies such as Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Taiwan,

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and the Philippines that have made competing sovereignty and territoriality claims with regard to the seas. It has also increased its military activity in the region through frequent naval exercises.4 The pandemic has further aggravated the China challenge. The centricity of regional and global supply chains in China has meant an increased element of risk and uncertainty, overcoming which calls for a strategy for diversification away from China. It is these diverse elements that present an opportunity for ASEAN and India to enhance their economic linkages and hence provide the necessary economic heft to the Indo-Pacific. While India has been cautious in defining its Indo-Pacific strategy in terms of a single country, and, hence, chooses to define it as an inclusive construct, it is not to be denied that India’s interest in keeping the IndoPacific free, open, and rules-based is in its interest. In fact, India’s interests have been growing not just in the Indian Ocean but also in the Western Pacific. While the former has been largely on account of China’s efforts to establish its footprints in South Asia through trade and investment, particularly port investments in smaller South Asian economies, under the BRI, the latter has been on account of its increasing sea-borne trade and energy imports. After all, the critical importance of the Indo-Pacific arises from, among other aspects, the volume of trade, commerce, and oil trade passing through its sea lanes (Batra, 2020). We explore the different dimensions of India’s potential to emerge as the “balancer” economy in the region later in the chapter. India as the Counterbalancing Economy?

During the first decade of the 2000s, India also emerged as the second fastest-growing economy in the world. India registered a 6 per cent plus rate of growth in the 2000s. India was among the first countries to recover to its pre-crisis growth rate in 2009/2010 after the global financial crisis. Prior to the crisis, India registered an impressive average growth rate of around 8 per cent between 2000 and 2008. India has experienced a steady growth for almost three decades now. India’s growth has also been accompanied by an increasing share of trade in its GDP. The trade-to-GDP ratio for India increased from 17 per cent in 1991 to over 49 per cent in 2010. India’s contribution to global trade, however, remains rather small, of around 2 per cent, and has been constant at this level for over a decade now. Given India’s growth profile and its size, India is naturally considered as an economy that can provide the necessary counter to the growing economic heft of China in the region. This has been among the major reasons for reimagining the Asia-Pacific as the Indo-Pacific. The necessity to include India arises from both its increasing economic weight in the last three decades

India, ASEAN, and the QUAD 223

and the growing discomfort with the expansionist tendencies of the rapidly growing Chinese economy in the region. India’s Trade and Supply Chain Linkages

In this context, it needs to be understood that while ASEAN’s trade linkages with India have increased in the last two decades, these remain small. The India-ASEAN trade relationship was institutionalised in 2010 with the implementation of an FTA agreement. From a pre-FTA level of US$ 45 billion in 2008–2009, India’s trade with ASEAN has increased to US$ 91 billion in 2019. However, pre- and post-FTA, the share of ASEAN in India’s total trade has not increased by any substantial margin, remaining between 10 and 11 per cent throughout this period. For ASEAN, trade with India is an even smaller share, of less than 3 per cent and has also remained at this level throughout the last decade. Within this, the share of exports (in India’s total exports) has also remained roughly constant between 10 and 11 per cent over the same period. Imports, however, have registered some increase, with the share in India’s total imports increasing from a little over 8 per cent in 2010 to almost 12 per cent in 2019. Overall, bilateral trade between India and ASEAN has been in favour of ASEAN. More importantly, the composition of India’s trade with ASEAN shows little increase in manufactures trade. Post-FTA maximum gains have been registered in the import share of palm oil and the export share of meat and meat products. Commodity categories like mechanical appliances, electronics and electrical equipment, that are leading sectors in ASEAN trade with the world or with China, have registered a fall in import and export shares, respectively, in India’s trade with ASEAN post-FTA. This is indicative of the fact that India’s export structure is not in accordance with ASEAN’s demand that is to a large extent driven by its participation in regional production networks. ASEAN trade in these categories is built through its participation in GVCs. ASEAN participation in GVCs through backward linkages, as indicated by import content of exports, has remained high over the past decade, at more than 50 per cent in categories like machinery and appliances and transport equipment and subcategories like motor vehicles, and almost 60 per cent for electrical and electronic equipment. In comparison, India’s backward linkage with GVCs is comparatively lower with the import content at around 20–30 per cent in 2011. India’s forward linkages with ASEAN, as a source of value addition in ASEAN exports in these industries, are insignificant. The origin of value added in ASEAN exports is mainly other ASEAN and APEC economies. Not surprisingly, therefore, India’s share in ASEAN total trade remains below 3 per cent (Batra, 2018). 5 This is also evident from the fact that Southeast Asian economies have the lowest level of backward linkages with

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India (RIVA) (UNESCAP, 2021). India’s economic linkages with ASEAN, therefore, need to be strengthened. Trade enhancement with ASEAN, in particular, export enhancement, can happen only if India enhances its value chain integration with ASEAN. However, India’s absence from the regional trade formulations, like RCEP and the CPTPP, does not make this an easy task. Several factors have been responsible for both – the increasing bilateral trade deficit and India’s low-value chain participation. While India’s relatively higher applied MFN tariffs and hence the higher preferential margin offered by India have to a certain extent been responsible for the increased imports from ASEAN and would need to be rationalised for fruitful outcomes of the FTA, ASEAN also needs to make the necessary concessions for India. Indian industry has also indicated that while tariffs have been lower in ASEAN, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) have impeded India’s ability to exploit fully its export potential with ASEAN. It would, therefore, be appropriate that such matters be taken up expeditiously, particularly now that the India-ASEAN FTA review has also been announced. In fact, the review process that was announced in 2019 must not only be initiated at the earliest but also aim at an early conclusion. In light of these developments, it becomes imperative that before the review process of the India-ASEAN FTA is initiated, which should be soon, a detailed database of NTBs be created and explicitly discussed so that necessary revisions be undertaken. It is also necessary that both sides undertake a detailed analysis of sectors with the potential for enhancing bilateral trade through supply chain linkages. This is significant given the fact that ASEAN is central to the Asian production network (Batra, 2021). Scope for India-ASEAN Economic Integration

On the ASEAN front, there are some conducive conditions. Predominant among these are three: first, the recovery plan laid out in ASEAN’s Comprehensive Recovery Framework (ACRF) endorsed in the 37th ASEAN Summit meeting in November 2020. Second, as ASEAN progresses towards its redefined goals of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), 2025, ASEAN’s depth and dynamism in regional supply chains are likely to be further facilitated. ASEAN’s aim of the AEC is to emerge as a globally competitive production base. Third, the ASEAN vision document on the Indo-Pacific that views ASEAN centrality as an integral component of the Indo-Pacific strategy. We discuss each of these below. The ACRF has developed five pillars as part of the exit strategy from the pandemic. Among these of relevance is that which focuses on maximising intra-ASEAN market potential and broader economic integration. The latter, in particular, is conceived around deepening economic integration

India, ASEAN, and the QUAD 225

through the ASEAN-plus-one trade agreements. Even as the other plus-one agreements have found convergence under the RCEP, India can seek an enhanced regional integration programme under the aegis of the ACRF in its FTA review with the ASEAN. A particularly favourable development in this respect has been relatively quicker than expected trade recovery globally as well as in the East Asian region, inclusive of some of the ASEAN countries. Vietnam has been among the major leading economies in this respect. The fact that global demand has shifted to sectors like office machinery and electronics during the pandemic has been of further advantage to the regional economies. These positive developments add to the possibility of a deeper ASEAN-India FTA making a significant contribution to the regional recovery process. In addition, potential of India’s connectivity initiatives with ASEAN countries under the “Act East Policy” can be harnessed towards this objective. Envisioning infrastructural connectivity and economic corridors alongside trade enhancement is a possible means to evolving long-term solutions against future vulnerabilities. The second aspect of ASEAN’s achievement of the AEC objectives is also very significant. Having achieved the AEC 2015, the AEC 2025 objectives were laid out with an aim to deepen economic integration within the region as well as with the global economy. While ASEAN has been successful in intra-regional economic integration through ASEAN+1 agreements and the RCEP, its own agenda of internal services and investment liberalisation remains a task in progress. If the AEC is able to move forward with its ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) liberalisation objectives, it is considered that it would significantly facilitate taking forward the India-ASEAN review. For a long time, India’s position on services liberalisation has been met with a certain amount of hesitation from the ASEAN. The AEC 2025 objectives coupled with work on the NTBs would go a long way in deepening India-ASEAN economic integration and possibly in contributing to the early conclusion of the process of the bilateral FTA. The third aspect of ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific is significant to the realisation of the regional construct. ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific vision states the need for an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. At the same time, as stated by India’s external affairs minister at the UN Security Council in April 2021, India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific is premised on the centrality of ASEAN and the common pursuit of prosperity and seeks coordinated action against security challenges in the region. The centrality of ASEAN has also been integral to India’s Act East Policy. These elements need to be constructively used, and the commonality of perspective in this aspect must be built upon by proposing and utilising the ASEAN-centred and ASEAN-inclusive forums for the Indo-Pacific. The future meetings of ASEAN-centred forums need to be utilised to build a consensus on matters of regional growth and

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stability. ASEAN’s geographic centrality to the Indo-Pacific combined with its partnership with regional powers in Dialogue mechanisms and trade formulations provides ASEAN with the necessary ability to evolve an inclusive forum. The added advantage of being at the core of trade and value chain linkages in the broader region will further help ASEAN enhance its role in the regional construct. Towards achieving this objective though, it would also be important that ASEAN be able to maintain its internal cohesiveness, not only with respect to issues within ASEAN member economies but also and more importantly with reference to issues important to maintain an open, free, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. This would be a positive attribute for ASEAN to be able to perform the role of a neutral nucleus of the Indo-Pacific. A stable and secure Indo-Pacific will make a positive contribution to global stability and prosperity. At a time when the world has been overcoming a raging pandemic, it is imperative that regional peace and stability be maintained. The impact of the pandemic has been intense not just in terms of health outcomes of individual countries but also in terms of economic growth and trade. Significantly, large-scale, pandemic-induced unemployment across the world brings forth a very real possibility of social unrest. It is, therefore, necessary that national efforts to revive economies be supplemented by coordinated regional and global efforts. It is in this context that the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) among the three-member economies (Japan, India, and Australia) of the QUAD has been among the most important initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region. While the trend of supply chain diversification and shifts away from China has been evident in the past few years, it has been accelerated during the pandemic. The pandemic having begun in the hub of global electronics supply chains in China and its spread in the region and then globally has led to large-scale supply chain disruptions. The uncertainty and loss that has ensued as a consequence in the production and supply of not just essential commodities but for other commodities as well has meant large-scale economic losses at a global level. While supply chain shifts away from China have been undertaken even earlier, the pandemicinduced supply chain disruptions have made it imperative that each region/ country evolve a strategy for more resilient supply chains. Coordinated action among the Indo-Pacific economies, spread as they are across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, covering strategic trade and energy routes, can be a very important part of the long-term solution, regionally and globally. In this context, therefore, the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) among the three QUAD members is a very positive indicator of recognition of this imperative. India’s participation in the SCRI as also working groups that are focused on technology and innovation-based

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production strengthens the scope for building new-age technology-based alternatives. While the SCRI is presently engaged in ensuring supplies of vaccines across the region, the working groups’ initiatives towards technology and innovation advancement can help further deepening of regional partnerships. The ASEAN’s emphasis on technology-based solutions in its Comprehensive Recovery Framework gives this possibility more teeth. As ASEAN progresses with its agenda of economic integration in the broader region beyond the RCEP, these elements of commonalities acquire significance and relevance, even if these are, at present, components of different strategies. Conclusion

Given the economic and strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific for global growth and trade, coordinated action and commonality of the purpose of the regional economies, some of which are among the world’s largest and most dynamic and anchor global supply chains, hold the potential for contributing significantly to the world emerging safe and prosperous from the pandemic. As a large regional economy and member of the QUAD, India is important and central to the vision of a rules-based, free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific. ASEAN, as a neutral nucleus, and dynamism in the regional supply chain acquires equal salience. Strengthening ASEAN-India economic integration should be a part of the recovery strategy for the Indo-Pacific. Notes 1 Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. 2 Based on ARIC database, ADB (2021). 3 ASEAN-10, China, Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. 4 Refer Global Conflict Tracker (2021). 5 This part of the chapter draws from Batra (2018).

References Asian Development Bank. (2021) Asian Regional Integration Centre. https://aric​ .adb​.org>datacentre Batra, A. (2018, January). Trade Integration with ASEAN an Imperative. Business Standard. Batra, A. (2020). India’s Economic Relevance in the Indo Pacific. Asian Perspective, Summer. Batra, A. (2021, June 17). Opportunities Galore in the East. Business Standard. Congressional Research Service. (2018). The Trump Administration’s “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific: Issues for the Congress. crsreports​.congress​.​gov Global Conflict Tracker. (2021). www​.cfr​.org>global-conflict-tracker UNCTAD. (2021). Global Trade Update, February.

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UNESCAP. (2021) Regional Integration and Value Chain Analyzer (RIVA). www​ .unescap​.org World Trade Organisation (WTO). (2021). World Trade Statistical Review. Yang, L. (2013). China’s Growth Miracle: Past, Present and Future. Seminar paper, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. www​.unrisd​.org

16 ASEAN’S PERSPECTIVES IN ASIA–AFRICA GROWTH CORRIDOR PARTNERSHIP In the Indo-Pacific Realm Thi Anh-Dao Tran

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, developing countries (DCs, here referred to as “the South”) have been engaged in processes of integration that are both regional and multilateral. In 2006, total exports from the South accounted for 37 per cent of world trade, surpassing the earlier peak in 1950 (UNCTAD, 2009). At the same time, economic relations among them have expanded rapidly. UNCTAD statistics show that between 1995 and 2007 the share of exports from countries of the South to other countries of the South increased from 11 per cent to 15 per cent of world trade. Although this so-called “SouthSouth” trade is still a relatively small share of total world trade, it has nevertheless increased at a quicker and more sustained rate than global trade: 13 per cent per year on average during the period 1995–2007, compared with 9.8 per cent for North-South trade and just 7 per cent for North-North trade. Over the same period, the volume of South-South trade increased by 7 percentage points for total exports from African DCs, by 4 in Asia, and by 2 in Latin America (UNCTAD, 2008). Evidence does seem to show a renewed and growing interest in SouthSouth trade cooperation. The recent development of economic relations between Asia and Africa aptly illustrates this geographical restructuring of global trade around a South-South trade pattern (Broadman, 2007). Two phenomena have played key roles in the establishment of this new geography of international trade. The first is the rapid growth of some middle-income DCs in East Asia and Pacific (EAP), and the other is the strengthening of regional integration processes between Southern economies (UNCTAD and JETRO, 2008).​ DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-19

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In 2018, total South-South exports accounted for 25.6 per cent of world trade; the share of exports from DCs to other Southern counterparts amounted to 57.6 per cent of their total exports.1 A prominent feature of this trade expansion has been the growing importance of DCs outside the region. Inter-regional trade in all developing continents increased sharply, as depicted in Table 16.1: from 7.2 per cent in 1990, the share of merchandises exported outside the region was over 20 per cent in 2018. 2 Although it has increased at an accelerated rate, exports among DCs are highly concentrated geographically within Asia. In 2018, merchandise exports to the Asian area ranked first from whatever the developing region. This hub-and-spoke pattern has developed as a result not only of the region’s economic size but also of its high level of regional integration and involvement in global production networks. On the eve of the world economic crisis of 2008, almost 50 per cent of exports from the Asian DCs were destined for other DCs but most of these South-South exports were destined for DCs within Asia (43.9 per cent out of 49.1 per cent). By way of comparison, exports to other DCs in the same region accounted for only 9.7 per cent and 18.8 per cent, respectively,

TABLE 16.1  Merchandise Exports to Different Regions (% of Total Merchandise

Exports) To

The North

The South outside region

All DCs EAP LAC MENA South Asia SSA

78.8 85.1 77.3 74.1 68.4 80.6

7.2 4.9 6.4 11.3 8.5 4.5

All DCs EAP LAC MENA South Asia SSA

64.1 66.5 69.9 56.5 63 41.5

20.1 16.6 17.5 38.4 26.8 36.3

From

EAP

LAC

MENA

South Asia

SSA

3.3 0.6 10.6 3 0.4 0.7

2.6 1.4 2.2 4 2.8 1

1.5 1.6 0.4 2.4 3.4 1

1.8 1 0.9 0.6 1.5 7.8

4.4 4 11.9 1.7 3.2 1.2

2.5 1.9 1.7 3.2 3.3 0.7

5 4.8 1.9 13.6 8 12.1

3.1 2.6 0.7 1.6 5.6 19.1

1990 3.3 5.7 2.3 1.5 3 1.1 2018 15 16.8 12 16.5 11.8 21.3

Source: Author’s calculation from WDI database, World Bank. Notes: Regional groupings exclude high-income economies. Data in italics corresponds to intra-regional exports. EAP: East Asia and Pacific; LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA: Middle East and North Africa; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa

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of total exports from Africa and Latin America (UNCTAD and JETRO, 2008). Some reasons lead us to focus in particular on trade between Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the DCs of Asia (here referred to as developing Asia, DA). Firstly, they are among the countries with the largest and fastest growth projections as their involvement in global trade increases. With non-OECD countries’ share of global gross domestic product (GDP) set to rise well beyond that of the current OECD area by 2060, Africa is forecast to have the world’s highest economic growth rate, while the coming 50 years will see a major shift of economic balance towards the emerging economies of Asia (Braconier et al., 2014). Secondly, the annual growth rate of exports from Africa to Asia exceeded 30 per cent from 2003 onwards. What is striking is that China and India overtook Japan (formerly known as the largest Asian investor and aid donor in Africa) and South Korea as the biggest Asian markets for African exports (Yoshino, 2008). Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the first markets for SSA exports remained China, India, and South Africa (see Table 16.2). Lastly, DA has become the main destination for exports to the South from African DCs with a share of 64.4 per cent (or 33 per cent of their total exports in 2018, compared with 10.2 per cent in 1995), which is one reason why Africa has experienced the greatest increase in South-South trade (albeit from a small share in world trade). Since the 2008 financial crisis, the weight of South-South exports for African DCs has exceeded that of South-North exports. In light of the above, this chapter aims to identify the specific background of the increasing trade ties between DAs and their counterparts of SSA. First, we seek to analyse the contribution of access to Southern markets to the export performance of SSA countries by focusing on the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), especially the developing members (labelled here as ASEAN8). In the wake of intensified trade between ASEAN8 and SSA, how has this trade segment developed into a more general trend connecting Africa and Asia, on the one hand, and interregional South-South relations, on the other hand? Second, this commercial momentum provides perspectives in tackling the challenges that have revealed the COVID-19 pandemic. Participation of a growing number of DCs in globalisation has increased their vulnerability3: as it makes nations more interdependent, how economic and trade cooperation between ASEAN8 and SSA could promote resilient international integration and development? What are the major obstacles to this commercial momentum in the Indo-Pacific realm, and which kind of policies would be required to cope with them? We argue that an ASEAN “centrality” could be built up through a revitalised partnership between Africa and Asia, provided this reviving axis is rethought from an international political economy perspective.

Source: World Bank (2020), The African Continental Free Trade Area, Washington DC: the World Bank.

TABLE 16.2  Overview of Policy Areas Covered in Africa’s Sub-regional Preferential Trade Agreements

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The chapter is structured as follows: after this introduction, the next section presents a broad overview of the two regions by analysing their geography of trade. Our objective is to rethink globalisation in South-South trade perspectives. Therefore, the next section sets the scene by analysing countries’ participation in global and regional value chains (GVCs), one of the most prominent features of globalisation. Then the next section weighs the major implications in terms of political economy for the ASEAN community. In the final section some conclusions are drawn. Asia’s Growing Share in Africa’s Trade

For a long time, DCs suffered from the widely held view that since their products were largely similar (mainly raw materials and basic goods), complementary relationships with other DCs did not exist. This absence of complementarity, combined with a lack of outlets because of limited markets, was supposedly the reason why DCs tended to favour trade relations with developed countries. Over the last decades, however, a new geography of international trade has begun to emerge, based on complementary dynamics between the increased involvement of Southern countries in international trade, on the one hand, and an expansion of South-South trade, on the other. The share of South-South trade in total world exports more than trebled over the last 30 years, led by DAs while African participation was growing. Moreover, South-South trade from the least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa climbed significantly in value over the figure for 1995. African LDCs have increasingly benefited from commercial exchanges with DAs, although there is wide heterogeneity. One way that regional integration allows for economies of scale (the unit cost of production drops as the size of a sector or industry grows) is by creating a larger market for local businesses, most commonly under a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). By creating a unified market of over 1.3 billion people, the recent African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which is as big as India’s domestic market, is expected to give a major boost to the regional businesses across all 55 members of the African Union. This new agreement aims at harmonising the heterogeneity of rules across overlapping subregional trade agreements (Table 16.2 and UNCTAD and JETRO, 2008). Having access to a bigger market is also expected to help SSA develop industries by resolving the challenges of small and fragmented markets. Table 16.2 compares the weights of selected areas in world population, GDP, and trade. With the aim of boosting trade and economic growth around EAP, the ASEAN+5 countries participating in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) account for almost 29 per cent of the world population, 30 per cent of global GDP, and over one-quarter of world trade. ASEAN includes countries of various sizes, with 607 million people living primarily

234  Thi Anh-Dao Tran

in middle-income countries. With the exception of Brunei and Singapore (two high-income nations with a population of less than 1 per cent of the region), emerging demand combines with rapid urbanisation to capture trading partners’ attention. In 2019, ASEAN’s GDP in current US dollars was 110 per cent of India’s, 22 per cent of China’s, 12 per cent of EAP, and 3.6 per cent of the whole world. Until the military takeover in February 2021, Myanmar had the highest annual GDP and GDP/capita growth rates in the region: respectively, 9.6 per cent and 8.7 per cent on average between 2000 and 2019. In contrast, with only 2 per cent of global GDP and world trade, SSA lags far behind in spite of its tremendous market (the population in Africa is expected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050). Emerging evidence of trade between Africa and Asia raises hopes and expectations. According to Braconier et al. (2014), the shift in trade patterns over the coming 50 years will reflect shifting economic balances, with exports from non-OECD countries expected to rise from 35 per cent of world exports in 2012 to 56 per cent in 2060. This changing geography of international trade can shape the evolution of the South’s future path through “trade spillovers”, i.e., transmission of any shock or dynamic from one country to the others in a highly interconnected global trading system. An initial set of studies focused on export rivalry in third-country markets by exploring the spillover effect of competition between China and other DCs (Fu et al., 2012). As a large country with rapid economic growth and a huge volume of trade, China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 has exerted a profound influence on the world economy. However, the “flying geese” pattern, which saw China moving into the upper level of manufacturing countries, created the potential for the exports of all developing economies to grow in harmony. Despite common export-oriented industrialisation policies, major economic disparities across EAP reflect a broad pattern of complementarity between China and its neighbours. What the World Bank dubbed an East Asian “Renaissance” has been restructured around China to determine the region’s economic development paths (Gill and Kharas, 2007). In this context, new prospects are emerging for the role of DA in general and China in particular, in the economic revival of the developing world. With export-led growth, access to foreign markets has become a driving force for a country’s economic development by encouraging structural transformation and the diversification of its productive capacities. However, because it is at the heart of agglomeration processes, the interaction between market access and the development of supply capacities depends on trading partners and the way they shape the distribution of economic activities. Against this backdrop, Diaw et al. (2012, 2014) demonstrate the role of spillover effects related to international demand (“demand spillovers”) on

A SEAN’s Perspectives in Asia–Africa Growth Corridor Partnership 235

export performance within the framework of South-South trade relations. From a theoretical point of view, market access generates two contradictory effects on a country’s supply capacities. On the one hand, it exerts pressure on the factor markets, which damages export supply capacities; on the other hand, it produces demand externalities which, conversely, stimulate them. The authors found that SSA countries’ export performance in the 2000s was governed primarily by the dynamic of their productive capacities. Nevertheless, while productive capacities are country specific, the contribution of market access differs considerably by destination: the SSA countries’ export performance was better when they were exporting to Southern markets. Outside the region, DA confirmed its primacy in driving export growth from the South; within the African area, trade strengthened as a result of infrastructure upgrading and the acceleration of subregional integration processes (Coulibaly and Fontagné, 2005; Diaw and Tran, 2011). This expansion of South-South trade has been explained by a number of factors, including:

• Substantial increases in demand for natural resources from fast-growing Asian DCs.

• A growing demand for new markets, especially for manufactured exports.

• A growing interest on the part of DCs to enter into new bilateral, regional, or inter-regional trade arrangements.

• An increased access to market information networks through, among other things, access to the internet.

• Regional and global supply chain strategies from both Northern and Southern transnational corporations (TNCs).

In other words, South-South trade has opened a “vent for surplus”, allowing DCs to take advantage of formerly underutilised factors to expand output (UNCTAD, 2009). For example, this has been the case for primary exporters from Africa and Latin America. Besides, it has allowed DA to raise productivity, to exploit scale economies and learning opportunities with the spread of production networks in some manufacturing sectors. Therefore, the growing interdependence of DCs does not result from regional FTAs but mainly from intensifying intra-industry linkages (simultaneous bilateral flows within a single industry): this brings us back to the debate on the causal link between regional cooperation and participation in GVCs. Participation in GVCs and South-South Trade

DCs have been deeply involved in GVCs since the early 2000s, opening opportunities for them to engage in global markets without having to

236  Thi Anh-Dao Tran

develop complete products or value chains. As a consequence of an international division of labour that has intensified with globalisation, countries can contribute to the manufacture of one product at separate stages of its production process. The pattern of specialisation arising from this vertical integration is that production functions differ from stage to stage and that, consequently, the fragmented segments of the production process are located in different countries with differentiated tasks or business functions. In fact, a country may have both a comparative advantage in a given stage and a disadvantage either upstream or downstream of that stage (World Bank, 2017). On the other side, however, a country’s overall export performance may conceal different areas of specialisation depending on its various partners. For example, a country’s participation in this vertically fragmented production may be more highly regionalised for some products than for others such that a “localised” vertical specialisation with specific partners remains invisible in the overall trade figures (Gaulier et al., 2007). The rise of GVCs interlinks with policies to liberalise trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Just as when Japan adopted its relocation strategy following the Plaza Accord in 1985, extensive literature supports the idea that the international fragmentation of production has placed China at the heart of a regional clustering. As the East Asian giant moves into the product space vacated by the first-tier Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), Chinese exports have become the driving force of an interconnected trade system deriving from the formation of regional production and distribution networks within the area (Gaulier et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2012). For example, export competitiveness is linked to having access to competitively priced intermediate products: with easier GVC-related transactions, China imports products from neighbourhood countries to be processed and re-exported to the rest of the world. As a result, exports from other Asian DCs have become more complementary than competition for those of China. Analysing this form of production allows us to measure DCs’ participation in the international division of labour and to identify the nature of their specialisation. The GVC participation index suggests significant crossregional differences in the way countries integrate into GVCs around the world (Figure 16.1 in OECD and WTO, 2015). Among developing regions, Southeast Asian economies show the highest indices of GVC participation; in contrast, South Asia and SSA lag behind but have seen their participation grow by 34 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively, between 2001 and 2011 (OECD and WTO, 2015). Southeast Asia is also the region where the most comprehensive and deepest regional integration agreements can be found: usually well connected with their neighbours, the ASEAN members have the highest average share of intra-GVC (58 per cent in 2011). In the rest of the developing world, the share of intra-GVC is lower than extra-regional links:

A SEAN’s Perspectives in Asia–Africa Growth Corridor Partnership 237

in Eastern and Southern Africa, this share was 16 per cent in 2011, down from 21 per cent in 2001. The Middle East and North Africa, Western and Central Africa, and South Asia lag behind with intra-GVC below 10 per cent in 2011, though very slightly up from the values recorded in 2001. Given their high degree of integration into the global economy and their significant dependence on primary commodities, African exports to Asia are positively correlated with exports to the rest of the world. Mineral fuels and raw products are dominant in SSA (accounting for 70 per cent of extra-African exports, Figure 16.2) against manufactured goods in DA with Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore being the most important trading partners of ASEAN with SSA.4 These differences provide some scope for enhanced trading opportunities. In light of this, Diaw et al. (2014) analysed the characteristics of SSA-DA trade disaggregated by broad stages of production and produced two major results. Firstly, access to the markets of DA has a considerable multiplier effect on the development of SSA countries’ supply capacities at all stages of production; this effect is particularly strong in exports of final goods. Secondly, there is a dual inter-regional specialisation closely linked to the role of the Asian DCs and their integration into GVCs (UNCTAD,2013). While SSA countries’ comparative advantage in primary commodities or products based on natural resources may support the traditional pattern of specialisation, some of them are gradually diversifying their exports to other stages of production in order to take advantage of DA’s role in driving their export growth. In fact, import demand from DA has increased twice as quickly as in the developed economies (UNCTAD, 2008). Nevertheless, the manufactured products that are traded are being pulled by the expansion of semi-finished goods following the establishment of production-sharing systems as well as by exports of finished goods. This

FIGURE 16.1  Average

Intra and Extra-regional Participation in GVCs across Regions in 2011

238  Thi Anh-Dao Tran

pattern of specialisation is increasing trade at the various stages of production and is placing the Asian DCs (and, consequently, the dynamic of their demand for imports) at the heart of a cumulative process that is contributing to export growth in SSA. Figure 16.3 compares ASEAN’s and SSA’s patterns of intra-industry trade as measured by the Grubel and Lloyd index; the indicator calculated at the level of bilateral flows with partner countries varies between 0 (exclusive trade between industries) and 1 (exclusive intra-industry trade). Overall, countries with more diversified exports tend to have greater shares of intraregional exports under a bidirectional relationship: regional import demands allow for export diversification which, in turn, offers opportunities to serve the regional market. While electrical and electronic activities are the most visible features of ASEAN’s participation in GVCs with related intra-industry trade, SSA has witnessed a recent growth in vehicles and non-ferrous products and to a lesser extent in food and chemicals. Actually, there is little sign of a “factory Africa” as only 10 per cent of intermediate inputs are sourced from within the region (OECD, 2013). However, fragmented modes of production imply multiple border crossings where competitiveness is more strongly associated with global rather than regional sourcing of intermediate inputs. Albeit the largest FTA in the world measured by the number of countries participating, AfCFTA represents only limited trade potential and implies that African trade will remain largely outside the continent. It is yet possible to turn the limitations into potential opportunities. First, some manufactured products with higher value added have emerged in SSA countries’ exports to DA and have expanded very rapidly (Yoshino, 2008). This trend reflects not only the reactivation of trade relations due to

FIGURE 16.2  Extra-African

Exports (2001–2019)

A SEAN’s Perspectives in Asia–Africa Growth Corridor Partnership 239

historical ties but also the establishment of a new interconnectivity based on production fragmentation across the developing regions. Second, recent studies drawn on the concept of product space found that South-South exports could provide commodity-dependent and low-income countries with better export opportunities than their exports to Northern markets. For African economies, trade among DCs offers opportunities for diversification away from commodity dependence and perhaps more so than their trade with the North (UNCTAD, 2009). Nevertheless, even though it has contributed to their growth performance, there is a danger that trade driven by GVC participation organised around TNCs locks DCs into a narrow pattern of specialisation with limited resilience. In fact, trade opportunities that the global trading system creates (mostly by the organisation of worldwide production) do not always convert into market presence. DCs, especially the least developed ones, suffer disproportionally from asymmetries in market access, trade costs, and bargaining powers – hampering their integration and development. In addition, from the 2008 financial crisis to the more recent COVID-19 pandemic, GVCs have been affected by a series of unpredictable dynamics through which external shocks are transmitted into the domestic economies. There is significant scope to strengthen economic resilience on a multi-country basis. South-South interrelationships would not act as a source of structural transformation if supportive links between trade and investment are not settled – and if monetary and financial cooperation is not built to support a rapid pace of domestic capital formation and to help manage any potentially damaging shocks. Both these statements are corroborated by recent studies

FIGURE 16.3  Grubel

and Lloyd Index by Industry Groups in ASEAN and SSA (1967–2019)

240  Thi Anh-Dao Tran

that make a case for the importance of cross-country linkages in explaining macro-resilience. In her opening speech at the 15th quadrennial conference held in Barbados, UNCTAD Secretary-General Rebeca Grynspan said: “The current international trading system has so far failed to provide many developing economies with the opportunity to build back better. In this light, it is critically important to conceive regional integration and cooperation arrangements as part and parcel of an enabling environment for a more resilient, inclusive and sustainable future.”5 Firstly, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused major disruptions to trade, including in critical goods such as vaccines, medical supplies, and food. Thus, building more resilient supply chains through inter-regional cooperation would provide “collective economic resilience” in a Global South perspective. Secondly, evidence is given that FTAs have a higher impact on trade flows of intermediate goods in manufacturing sectors than on aggregate trade flows (OECD, 2013). Therefore, a consensus emerges on the groundbreaking role to be played by GVCs in shaping SouthSouth cooperation. ASEAN at the Centre of a Multipolar Asia

China and the United States are the principal trading partners of most countries in Asia and the Pacific Rim (Table 16.3 and Table 16.4). Regardless of the geographical configuration, the negotiations to establish an FTA in the heart of EAP are actually hiding a battle of power between the two key players for control of the region (Phi and Tran, 2020). It is no coincidence that, on China’s initiative, the RCEP treaty was instantly relaunched following the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). But while RCEP was signed without India during the 37th ASEAN Summit on 15 November 2020, the intensifying US-China rivalry has shaped an IndoPacific axis through which the United States and its allies have come closer together such as the most recent AUKUS. The Indo-Pacific strategy, deployed under the initiative of the United States, Australia, Japan, and India (under the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, QUAD), does not overlook the important role that ASEAN may play in regional rebalancing. Yet these developments mean that the ASEAN member states have less room to leverage their relations among the major powers. Rising trade tensions, in addition to the country’s long-term “Made in China 2025” strategy, may result in imports decreasing at a faster rate than exports in China. Accordingly, the Asia-Pacific Rim countries (especially the least developed ones) will suffer the most from the US-China rivalry. But a major element in this great power competition is the tremendous trading opportunities across countries in Africa and Asia. At the crossroads of various possible axes that could

2 213 25 744 39 283 11 635 17 754 5 356 2 219 3 137 4 522 2 219 2 303 1 045 1 303

Population (millions) Current GDP (billions US$) PPP GDP (billions international $) Current GDP per capita (US$) PPP GDP per capita (international $) Exports of goods - intra - extra Imports of goods - intra - extra Exports of services Imports of services

Source: Regional profiles database, CEPII.

RCEP

​

28.8 29.4 30.2 102.1 104.6 29.3 12.2 17.2 24.8 12.2 12.6 17.8 23.2

World (in % of) 1 406 14 716 22 952 10 464 16 320 2 480 47 2 433 2 055 47 2 008 330 574

China and Hong-Kong

TABLE 16.3 Population, GDP, Trade in Goods and Services (Values in 2019)

18.3 16.8 17.6 92 96 13.6 0.2 13.3 11.3 0.2 11 5.6 10.2

World (in % of) 607 3 058 7 783 5 041 12 832 1 357 264 1 093 1 259 264 996 416 387

ASEAN

7.9 3.5 6 44.3 75.5 7.4 1.4 6 6.9 1.4 5.4 7.1 6.9

World (in % of)

1 109 1 758 4 522 1 586 4 079 355 50 305 370 50 320 71 143

SSA

14.4 2 3.5 13.9 24 1.9 0.3 1.7 2 0.3 1.7 1.2 2.5

World (in % of)

A SEAN’s Perspectives in Asia–Africa Growth Corridor Partnership 241

3.2 2.6

2.5

India Germany

Taiwan

Switzerland

Japan

Germany Spain

2.6

2.6

3.3 3.1

United Kingdom Netherlands 3.3 2.8

4.5

5.9

Hong Kong

1.9

4.0

4.6

Italy

Japan 2.4

2.8

United 3.4 Kingdom Netherlands 3.2 South Korea 3.1

India

Germany

Exports

ASEAN​

14.2 China

SSA​

19.0 China

Imports

ASEAN​

2019

Netherlands

Australia

Germany Taiwan

India

2.1

2.4

2.6 2.4

3.7

3.6 India Spain 3.3 Germany United 3.3 Australia Kingdom Netherlands 3.1 United Arab Emirates France 2.6 Saudi Arabia

Germany

United States 13.2 India 8.7 Japan Japan 7.3 United Arab 6.6 South Korea Emirates Hong Kong 6.1 Switzerland 5.1 United States South Korea 3.8 United States 5.0 Taiwan

11.9 China

11.0 United States 5.4 7.5 France 5.0

India 2.5 Saudi 2.3 Arabia Australia 2.2

Germany

12.1 Japan 5.9 United States 4.2 South Korea 3.4 Taiwan

14.6 China

SSA​

Source: Author’s calculation from Regional profiles database, CEPII.

Netherlands 2.4

4.0

Australia

South Korea 4.1

France

6.4

Hong Kong

Imports

ASEAN​

1990

United States 16.2 China

10.4 China 9.5 India

10.7

SSA​

United States China Japan

Exports

ASEAN​

(a)  In extra-regional trade

TABLE 16.4 Share of First Ten Partner Countries (in % of All Partners), 2019

1.6

1.9

2.3 2.0

2.5

4.4

6.1

7.4 7.1

4.1

6.7 4.6

21.8

3.2 2.8

3.5

United 2.2 Kingdom Japan 2.1

France Belgium

Netherlands

United States 4.1

India United Arab Emirates Germany

25.2 China

SSA​

242  Thi Anh-Dao Tran

Mozambique 0.7

Côte d’Ivoire 0.7

0.2

Brunei 0.2 Darussalam

Source: Regional profiles database, CEPII.

Cambodia

Philippines Viet Nam Myanmar Brunei Darussalam Laos

Laos

1.1 0.8 0.8 0.7

1.9 1.7 0.5 0.3

Viet Nam Philippines Cambodia Myanmar

4.0 1.6 1.4 1.3

Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia

South Africa Namibia Botswana Equatorial Guinea Nigeria Zambia Angola Zimbabwe

6.3 4.5 3.8 3.1

Singapore Malaysia Indonesia Thailand

ASEAN​

Imports

SSA​

1990

Exports

ASEAN​

(b)  In intra-regional trade

TABLE 16.4 (Continued)

0.1

0.1

1.4 1.3 0.4 0.2

7.9 6.0 4.6 3.7

Swaziland

Zimbabwe

Ghana Angola Kenya Botswana

South Africa Nigeria Namibia Côte d'Ivoire

SSA​

0.3

0.4

1.0 0.8 0.7 0.5

7.1 2.8 1.1 1.0

Brunei Darussalam

Laos

Viet Nam Philippines Cambodia Myanmar

Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia

Exports

ASEAN​

0.1

0.3

2.6 2.1 1.0 0.7

5.0 3.7 3.3 2.8

Viet Nam Philippines Myanmar Cambodia

Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia

0.6 Laos

1.1 0.9 0.9 0.7

3.3 1.4 1.3 1.2

Imports

ASEAN​

0.3

1.9 1.0 0.5 0.4

5.8 5.3 4.5 3.3

Côte d’Ivoire 0.6 Brunei 0.2 Darussalam

Mozambique Zambia Nigeria Congo, Dem. Rep. Zimbabwe

South Africa Namibia Ghana Botswana

SSA​

2019

Zimbabwe

Senegal

Côte d'Ivoire Ghana Namibia Kenya

South Africa Nigeria Swaziland Zambia

SSA​

0.4

0.5

0.8 0.7 0.7 0.5

6.3 3.1 0.9 0.8

A SEAN’s Perspectives in Asia–Africa Growth Corridor Partnership 243

244  Thi Anh-Dao Tran

integrate the African continent, Asia lies at the heart of a multilateral policy in which ASEAN would be central (Diaw and Tran, 2020). What would be required to cope with the major obstacles to Africa-Asia “connections”? South-South cooperation is placed here in the context of historically conditioned macro-structural factors that are spawned by global capitalism (Tran, 2022). Devoted to a historical-structural analysis in the process of economic development, Raul Prebisch and the structuralist school argue that the challenges of development depend on the way in which economic, social, and political relations are structured in different societies which, in turn, are members of a hierarchical and unequal global system. The international economy is here characterised by differentiated relations and functions where countries are seen as part of an interdependent whole that has its own dynamics. Because both of them are variable, they highlight the importance of historical context in the development process.6 In light of this, a consequent matter of concern is the position of the ASEAN community in the regional and international arenas, where geopolitical configurations are crucial in the functioning of global markets. ASEAN was founded in Bangkok in 1967 by five Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) to encourage regional cooperation for peaceful development in a Cold War context. Today, it is the second largest regional organisation worldwide behind the EU and has gained international recognition as the leading force for dialogue and cooperation in Southeast Asia. But never has the ASEAN community been so under pressure from external forces (a multipolar global system) as well as within itself (as illustrated by the crises in Thailand and Myanmar), putting its ability for internal cohesiveness to the test. If there is genuine economic integration, it is a matter of determining its ability to build an integrated area powerful enough to be a key player in the region and the place for a redistribution of power. First, ASEAN must embrace the opportunity of three concomitant factors arising in China to build a common project: a decline in cost competitiveness,7 a shift upmarket with a transition to higher value-added sectors, and a structural rebalancing in favour of domestic consumption. The dynamism of China’s labour-intensive industries has peaked, giving way to other DCs such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (Tran, 2022). In the long term, these patterns will strengthen, reproducing a flying geese pattern to the benefit of ASEAN8. It is therefore critical to define and target industrial and commercial policies that can orient the ASEAN centrality first and foremost towards itself, an essential engine for its internal cohesion and its credibility to the rest of the world. For this purpose, inter-regional SouthSouth cooperation could be instrumental in helping ASEAN to consolidate the community that it has aspired to be since 2015. One option is to enhance

A SEAN’s Perspectives in Asia–Africa Growth Corridor Partnership 245

the role of ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms in the capacity to initiate new routes for another geopolitical nomenclature. Second, the fragmentation of production processes on which the ASEAN countries have gained a foothold has triggered a geographical redistribution of trade in their favour, with a proliferation of preferential agreements at various levels. This partly explains why the ASEAN8 group faces the lowest costs among the developing regions; the master plan on ASEAN connectivity has also contributed by upgrading physical infrastructure and facilitating trade (showcased by the Great Mekong Sub-region project). However, empirical evidence suggests that trade growth at the “extensive margin” is predominant for DCs, within which geographical diversification seems to matter by adding new markets (IMF, 2014). This pattern of diversification among trading partners is driven by the globalisation of both trade and capital flows, which are now much stronger than in the previous century. Accordingly, an integrated framework can emerge from ASEAN8-SSA cooperation, where SSA countries could provide a fast-growing alternative destination for FDI outflows from ASEAN in accordance with its open regionalism (i.e. regionalism without hampering multilateralism). On the one hand, the challenge for ASEAN today is to foster reciprocity of demand within the community rather than competition: those who succeed in climbing the successive rungs of the technological ladder make way for countries positioned lower on the global scale and can, in turn, become a source of demand for their exports. Thus, by going through successive stages of development, the most advanced DCs in the community must crowd in rather than crowd out others. However, this requires recognising the strengths and weaknesses of each and then creating complementarities so as to build an integrated production base conducive to intra-industry trade. In other words, creating internal cohesion requires a convergence of objectives and a common project. The ASEAN community grasped this well by pushing the notion of “centrality,” but it actually remains to be built. On the other hand, the increasing trade ties between ASEAN8 and SSA must be favourable to productive diversification and role sharing. Both result from a combination of geographical proximity (playing on agglomeration effects in intra-trade), the exploitation of scale economies (including with extra-regional partners), and diversity of levels of development (playing on the effects of complementarity). Inter-regional cooperation along the Asian flying geese model could help facilitate externalities, technology, and knowledge transfers while simultaneously connecting supply chains. Improved information, communications, and transportation technologies are crucial here in order to coordinate geographically dispersed production activities. Singapore could be the centrepiece of this economic chessboard to build an internal production block. It is the leading partner within ASEAN (see Table 16.3) and the ASEAN’s largest investor in SSA, followed by Malaysia and

246  Thi Anh-Dao Tran

Indonesia. By deploying its hub within the area (world-class financial and logistics platform), it would extend a variety of production networks which would join SSA at the other end, whose trade specialisation would complement that of the most advanced DCs. Malaysia gave more consideration to the spirit of what the Third World declared at the Bandung conference of 1955, giving birth to the non-aligned movement during the Cold War. On the political ground, the country could support the community to find a common language in order to legitimise its foreign relations with SSA. For example, seven ASEAN states created the ASEAN-Pretoria Committee to boost trade with South Africa. Besides, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos strengthened economic ties with French-speaking African countries within the framework of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). Today, more than 200 ASEAN companies operate in SSA, mainly in sectors like agribusiness, manufacturing, oil, and urban development (Kohnert, 2021). The question of diversifying supply capacities towards products with higher added value or technological content will therefore be decisive for ASEAN. On the one hand, economies of scale exist in these products, and on the other hand, they are the markets that have the most significant global opportunities. A scenario would be to coordinate the improvement of productive capacities in a sequenced manner within the zone (“manufacturing poles” scattered throughout the ASEAN members) which, through interand intra-regional demand spillovers, will broaden the scope for intra-industry trade and diversification in SSA at the other extreme of the spectrum. However, one of the main magnets of ASEAN’s trade remains China and the United States and help drive growth in the region (Table 16.3). Getting through this “front door” is impossible unless a multi-country industrialisation plan with mutually supportive relationships is set. Accordingly, a proposal for focus areas on ASEAN-SSA cooperation must be centred on strengthening market access on both sides in order to make supply chains resilient and less vulnerable to the major powers. After the long-standing debate between globalisation and regionalisation, it appears that large geographic areas can engage more in international trade than they currently do inside. Southeast Asia, which stretches from India to southern China and located between Asia and Australia-Oceania, is at a crossroads open to the outside world. We come at a historical moment where inter-regional South-South cooperation can contribute to strategic alliances in a multipolar system. The ASEAN community, which is being put to the test by China’s New Silk Road initiative as well as Western powers in the Indo-Pacific realm, must preserve its position as a “multidirectional” development hub. In this perspective, the transition from competition to cooperation will depend on unified policies that allow the best use of the current

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situation. Hopefully, in the midst of external tensions and the slowdown in global trade, the COVID-19 pandemic provides it with an opportunity. Conclusion

Global trade plays a central role in linking nations; however, recent decades have seen major changes in its pattern. Firstly, the shift towards more outward-looking policies has pushed an ever-growing number of DCs into the international markets. Secondly, much of the increase in export flows from these DCs has occurred with other DCs. Lastly, the internationalisation of production has consolidated GVCs that have been behind the rapid growth of some emerging economies. With a new geography of trade that seems to be taking shape since the beginning of the new millennium, the United Nations believes that it is an unprecedented opportunity to develop a SouthSouth interrelationship of nations, an instrument of primary importance, in staking out economic and monetary cooperation as engines of growth and structural transformation. South-South trade, as both a vent for surplus and a source of diversification and upgrading, might take on even greater importance over the coming years. There is room for improvement in this area. From 2000 to 2019, Africa had the highest level of export dependence on the rest of the world and the lowest share of intra-regional exports in total exports, compared with other regions. In 2019, however, the value of world merchandise trade fell by 3 per cent after two years of dynamic growth. According to data available on UNCTADstat, exports of African economies decreased more than average. This occurred while African LDCs recorded the highest growth in their trade openness index as measured by the ratio of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP: +21.4 per cent in 2018 compared with 3.6 per cent for DCs as a whole. In 2005, the establishment of the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) aimed to revive the Bandung spirit of the non-alignment movement of 1955. However, the initiative received little attention because the historical-structural factors were inappropriate and political determination was not strong enough. In 2017, when ASEAN celebrated its 50th anniversary under the chairmanship of the Philippines, the slogan was “Partnering for Change, Engaging the World”. However, a multipolar world order has emerged and defending ASEAN’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific context will require more resources and real political will. Rather than picking sides, building ASEAN’s genuine community, based on its economic diversity, is the major challenge in the coming years, and it must be a collaborative endeavour in order to obtain the adhesion of its members. In that respect, inter-regional South-South cooperation under the ASEAN initiative could be an implementation mechanism through which new routes are expanded for another geopolitical nomenclature.

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We have seen the Asian zone expand more and more over time to include countries through open regionalism, a strategy to enlarge market access outside the region. In the global situation we are currently facing, the time has come for DCs to rely on strategic alliances in order to strengthen collective economic resilience. This chapter illustrates how critical the choice of trading partners is. Because of geographic proximity and involvement in numerous free trade arrangements, the ASEAN community is firmly embedded in strong trade interlinkages within the Asia-Pacific region and outside the geographic area. We argue that reorientating patterns of trade through appropriate efforts to diversify export markets or import suppliers could help shift economies onto resilient growth paths. This should not prevent policymakers from promoting an integrated development strategy to reduce their reliance on the major powers. Notes 1 See the United Nations Statistical Division, https://comtrade​.un​.org/. International trade has grown at a sluggish pace that has deteriorated considerably since the COVID-19 shock. Consequently, we will mainly use illustrative statistics up to 2019. 2 South-South intra-trade is the trade between DCs belonging to the same area or region. South-South extra-trade is the trade of DCs of the same region with all DCs outside the region. 3 Economic vulnerability is the exposure of an economy to exogenous adverse shocks (also arising out of economic openness) while economic resilience is defined as the ability of an economy to withstand or minimise the effects of such shocks. 4 See Kohnert (2021) for in-depth case studies. 5 UNCTAD15, 3–7 October 2021: “From inequality and vulnerability to prosperity for all”. See: https://unctad15​.org/. 6 For more information, see: https://biblioguias​.cepal​.org ​/prebisch ​_ en ​/ home. 7 According to Deloitte’s 2016 Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index (GMCI), China consolidated in 2016 its rank as the country with the most competitive manufacturing sector in the world. However, five countries (“Mighty Five”, MITI-V) were potentially among the top 15 in 2020, namely, Malaysia, India, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam. India and Vietnam were the two economies that rose the most in the rankings (+6), reaching 5th and 12th place, respectively.

References Braconier, H., Nicoletti, G. and Westmore, B. (2014). Policy challenges for the next 50 years. OECD Economic Policy Paper, No. 9. Broadman, H.G. (2007). Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier. Washington, DC: World Bank. Coulibaly, S. and Fontagné, L. (2005). South-South trade: Geography matters. Journal of African Economies, 15(3), pp. 313–341. Diaw, D. and Tran, T.A.D. (2011). Regional integration and South-South trade expansion: The case of Senegal in WAEMU. In P. Goulart, M. Murshed and

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L. Serino (eds.), South-South Globalization. Challenges and Opportunities for Development. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies (pp. 321–324). Diaw, D. and Tran, T.A.D. (2020). Les relations commerciales entre l’Asie du SudEst et l’Afrique subsaharienne: les promesses d’une coopération Sud-Sud [Trade relations between South-East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa: The promises of further South-South cooperation]. In C. Tran et C. Cabasset (eds.), Asie du Sud-Est 2020. Bilan, enjeux et perspectives [Southeast Asia 2020. Assessment, Challenges and Perspectives]. Paris: Irasec et Les Indes Savantes. Diaw, D., Rieber, A. and Tran, T.A.D. (2012). International demand spillovers in South-South exports: Application to Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing Asia. Journal of Economic Integration, 27(3), pp. 410–436. Diaw, D., Rieber, A. and Tran, T.A.D. (2014). Performance à l’exportation et commerce Sud-Sud: une analyse sectorielle appliquée à l’Afrique Sub-Saharienne [Export performance and South-South trade: A sectoral analysis applied to SubSaharan Africa]. Revue Economique, 65(6), pp. 931–956. Fu, X., Kaplinsky, R. and Zhang, J. (2012). The impact of China on low and middle-income countries’ export prices in industrial-country markets. World Development, 40(8), pp. 1483–1496. Gaulier, G., Lemoine, F. and Ünal, D. (2007, April). China’s emergence and the reorganisation of trade flows in Asia. China Economic Review, 18(3), pp. 209–243. Gill, I. and Kharas, H. (2007). An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth. Washington, DC: The World Bank. IMF. (2014, March 5). Sustaining long-run growth and macroeconomic stability in low-income countries: The role of structural transformation and diversification. IMF Policy Papers. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Kohnert, D. (2021, November 20). ASEAN and African relations: Towards a renewed partnership? AfricArXiv. DOI: 10.31730/osf​.io​/ph35​m. OECD. (2013). The Participation of Developing Countries in Global Value Chains: Implications for Trade and Trade-Related Policies. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD and WTO. (2015). Aid for Trade at a Glance 2015: Reducing Trade Costs for Inclusive, Sustainable Growth. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and World Trade Organization. Phi, M.H. and Tran, T.A.D. (2020). Should I stay or should I go? The role of the renminbi in trade partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region. Post-Communist Economies, 32(8), pp. 1062–1088. Tran, T.A.D. (ed.). (2022). Rethinking Asian Capitalism. The Achievements and Challenges of Vietnam under Doi Moi. London,United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan. UNCTAD. (2008, November 26). Coopération Sud-Sud et intégration régionale: état des lieux et perspectives. Note du secrétariat de la CNUCED TD/B/C.II/ MEM.2/2 [South-South cooperation and regional integration: Current situation and perspectives. Note from the UNCTAD Secretariat TD/B/C.II/MEM.2/2]. Geneva, United Nations. UNCTAD. (2009, November). Making South-South trade an engine for inclusive growth. UNCTAD Policy Briefs, No. 8. UNCTAD. (2013). Global Value Chains and South-South Trade: Economic Cooperation and Integration among Developing Countries. New York and Geneva: United Nations. UNCTAD and JETRO. (2008). South-South Trade in Asia: The Role of Regional Trade Agreements. New York and Geneva: United Nations and Japan External Trade Organization.

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World Bank. (2020). The African Continental Free Trade Area. Washington, DC: The World Bank. World Bank. (2017). Global Value Chain Development Report 2017. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Yoshino, Y. (2008, April). Africa-Asia Trade and Investment: Opportunities and Challenges. Washington, DC: World Bank.

17 LOOKING AHEAD Shifts in Global Geopolitical Trends 2030 – a Foresight Exercise Piti Srisangnam

Introduction

In an increasingly complex global landscape, strategic foresight, specifically analytical methods and scenario planning, holds crucial importance for Thailand in navigating trade and development challenges. A notable approach is Strategic Intelligence Scanning (SIS), focusing on identifying impactful future events. Second part of this chapter categorises geopolitically significant issues concerning the United States, China, the European Union, Japan, and India as a major player in South Asia. A foundational overview of global geopolitical trends, national political economic and security agendas, and key technologies and economic strategies crucial to Thailand’s objectives will be presented in this part. The aim is to discern “plausible futures” for intra-regional matters from Thailand’s perspective during 2021–2030. Hence, third part of this chapter presents policy recommendations fostering favourable future for Thailand in the context of the ASEAN Community and then concluding remarks are made. Geopolitical Changes: A New World Order in the Making

Geopolitics explores the political impact of geographical factors on human behaviour and decisions, particularly in international politics, especially in terms of international relations and balances of power (Johnston, 2000; Devetak, George and Percy, 2017). The current global geopolitical landscape is undergoing significant transformations, ushering in a “new world order” with potential radical shifts in power dynamics. These changes stem from various phenomena, including the rise of new global powers, rapid DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-20

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technological advancements, environmental crises, and the emergence of persistent pandemics (Srisangnam, 2021). Understanding the repercussions of these geopolitical shifts is crucial as they surpass the capacity of individual nations to manage. Noteworthy regions influencing Thailand’s trade include the United States, China, the EU, Japan, India and South Asia, and the ASEAN Community. The ongoing adjustments towards a new world order equilibrium have profound implications for global trade and development patterns. Given the interconnectedness of Thailand with these regions, it is imperative to monitor developments in potential future trends. Acknowledging the far-reaching consequences of geopolitical changes on trade and development is essential for strategic planning in this dynamic international landscape. The United States and a Situation of Declining International Power

The global geopolitical landscape has been witnessing a gradual shift since the 2010s, challenging the US long-standing position as the sole superpower in a unipolar world. Professor Amitav Acharya’s work, “The End of American World Order”, argues that the era of Western-dominated global influence has concluded. This decline in the US hegemony signals the advent of a “Multiplex World Order”, marked by increased complexity and volatility in global politics due to the intertwined economic, political, and sociocultural diversities of nations. The traditional state-centric approach to world order is evolving, with various entities like international organisations, regional collaborations, and non-state actors playing significant roles (Acharya, 2014). An essential question arises regarding whether the United States can adapt to this decline in influence. A study of the 2017 US National Security Strategy provides insights into this adaptation (Weaver, 2018). The US strategy focuses on four pillars: (1) national security, (2) economic prosperity, (3) social and cultural goals, and (4) advancing US influence globally (The White House, 2017). Notably, the United States views China as a threat across all of these pillars, while Russia is considered a threat in two pillars, namely Pillar 1 and Pillar 4 (Weaver, 2018). These strategies, designed for a 15- to 20-year timeframe, are resilient to changes in presidential agendas, emphasising long-term continuity. As President Biden assumed leadership, the White House outlined policy priorities such as addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, tackling climate change, promoting racial equality, economic growth, healthcare and welfare system strengthening, immigration screening, and restoring US global leadership (The White House, 2021). However, the potential for intense conflicts between the United States and China, as discussed in Professor Graham Allison’s “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s

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Trap?”, remains a significant concern. Allison’s Thucydides’s Trap suggests that as China rises as a superpower, tensions and the risk of conflict with the declining United States may increase, drawing parallels to historical conflicts where shifts in power dynamics led to wars (Allison, 2017). The analogy emphasises the precarious nature of the current situation, with the United States losing its uncontested dominance and China rapidly ascending. Thucydides’s Trap, rooted in historical conflicts, underscores the challenge of maintaining peace when power dynamics undergo substantial changes. As the world navigates this multiplex era, understanding and addressing these geopolitical shifts become paramount for shaping a stable global order. The People’s Republic of China and Development Goals towards Economic Opportunities

The Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) serves as the primary legislative mechanism in China, featuring 2,953 members who convene annually to ratify legal and regulatory drafts proposed by the Standing Committee. The significance of the NPC meeting held from 5 to 11 March 2021 lies in China’s recent attainment of the world’s largest economy status, surpassing the United States in terms of population size and GDP (PPP). This meeting unveils China’s strategic directions for the future. 1. Success in Overcoming COVID-19 Pandemic and Future Development Thrusts: China’s adept handling of the COVID-19 outbreak contributed to positive economic growth in 2020. The central committee credits this success to demand-driven macroeconomic policies, government employment initiatives ensuring job retention, removal of obstacles to policymaking, national reform efforts, emphasis on science, technology, and innovation, simultaneous urban and rural development, and a focus on creating a peaceful and secure society. (Yang, 2020) 2. Achievements in the 13th National Economic and Social Development Plan (2016–2020): China celebrated success in alleviating poverty for 55.75 million citizens and relocating 9.6 million from inhospitable environments. Volunteer efforts, especially by students, played a crucial role. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe is considered pivotal for China’s economic growth, offering advantages such as utilising excess production capabilities, accessing abundant natural resources, tapping

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into diverse human resources, reaching high-purchasing power markets, and enhancing international standing. (Srisangnam, 2021). 3. Launch of the 14th National Economic and Social Development Plan (2021–2025): The 14th Plan, personally overseen by President Xi Jinping, focuses on achieving a new balance between internal and external economic circuits through the “Dual Circulation” concept. Internal Circulation emphasizes creating domestic demand and reducing external dependency, while External Circulation aims to maintain global economic shares through initiatives like the BRI. The plan sets goals for 2035, part of the longterm vision known as “the Chinese Dream”, striving for a fundamentally strong and modern society. The 14th National Development Plan consists of six continuous plans, with nine key principles emphasising developmental quality, efficient economic development, innovation, a sizable internal market, revitalisation of rural areas, regional economic planning, green development, citizen well-being, and national security. Implications and Perspectives

While the United States perceives China as a threat to its hegemony, China’s legislative focus emphasises economic opportunities, mutual benefits, and international harmony rather than pursuing global hegemony. Nonetheless, the inherent tensions between the United States and China pose challenges. From the perspectives of Thailand and the ASEAN Community, strategically positioned at the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the geopolitical impacts of the superpowers’ movements inevitably influence the region (Office of the Secretary of State, 2020; Tantayakul, 2021). In navigating this complex geopolitical landscape, understanding China’s legislative priorities and strategic plans becomes paramount for nations and regions worldwide. The continuous evolution of China’s economic, social, and political strategies will undoubtedly shape global dynamics in the years to come. The European Union: An Arbiter of International Norms

The European Union (EU) consists of 27 nations, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,

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Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia. (The United Kingdom left the EU on 1 February 2020.) The EU nations operate within a common market system, enabling the free movement of goods, services, labour, and capital. This collective entity forms a customs union that manages economic affairs and external trade as a unified entity. Additionally, 20 member states share the euro as their common currency, establishing the Eurozone. Despite the setback of Brexit in 2016, the EU remains a significant global market with over 447 million people and a joint GDP of US$ 17 trillion, positioning it as one of the chief regional value chains (RVCs) alongside Southeast Asia and North America within the global value chains (GVCs) (International Monetary Fund, 2021A). Following the departure of the United Kingdom from the EU, the regional bloc faced market volatility due to uncertainty, impacting investor risk appetite. This, combined with the ongoing challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and persistent economic and political uncertainties, poses threats to the EU’s long-term unity and stability. The EU must adapt to address challenges such as social and economic issues, nationalism, xenophobia, anti-immigrant sentiments, and varying member states perspectives on relations with China. These factors potentially undermine the EU’s spirit of solidarity and the foundational principles inspired by Immanuel Kant, possibly impacting the structure and progress of the EU. While Europe lost its hegemonic status after World War II (Ikenberry, 2005), it has remained a powerful economic superpower contributing significantly to international trade standards. Europe has set global norms in industrial standards, safety, environmental conservation, labour rights, human rights, product design, and lifestyles. Thailand’s approach to Europe and the EU emphasises cooperation based on common liberal, democratic, and environmental values, fostering trade expansion, investment promotion, tourism growth, and technological partnerships. This includes efforts to restore the Thai-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Thailand and the EU. Russia, a significant geopolitical player, holds sway over regional and international cooperative initiatives. Leading the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) comprising Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Russia, Russia strategically positions itself as a gateway between Western Europe and Asia. Russia, the 11th largest economy globally, faces challenges in economic growth due to factors such as fluctuating oil prices, Western sanctions, the impact of COVID-19, and, most importantly, the conflict with NATO in Ukraine. The focal point of global observation remains Russia’s military expansion efforts, especially its alignment with China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Russia conducts joint military exercises

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with China in various maritime areas, demonstrating their combined military prowess. Russia’s military engagement in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Crimea, and Ukraine, underscores its capacity to exert influence beyond its borders. Recent close military ties between Russia and Myanmar’s military junta have raised concerns in Southeast Asia. The dynamic interactions of the EU, Russia, and China on the global stage necessitate strategic analyses. The EU’s ability to navigate challenges, Russia’s economic resilience, and its military collaborations with China showcase evolving geopolitical landscapes. Thailand, ASEAN, and the wider global community must keenly observe these developments, recognising the interconnectedness of economic, political, and security dimensions. Japan: A Major Investor and Determining Force in ASEAN’s Manufacturing Sector

Since the mid-1970s, Japan has been the primary investor in Southeast Asia, fostering connections that extend beyond manufacturing, trade, investments, and technological transfers. The Japanese influence in the region goes beyond economic realms; it encompasses a significant sociocultural impact, identified as one of Joseph Nye’s three forms of national “soft power” (Nye, 2004). This influence has persistently and steadily contributed to the widespread acceptance and integration of Japanese lifestyles, culture, and consumption norms in Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand. Historically, post-World War II, Japan witnessed a shift from its imperialistic ambitions to a pursuit of economic progress. The Plaza Accord Agreement in 1985, however, triggered a prolonged economic recession, termed “the Lost Decades”, curbing Japan’s military and economic expansions. Despite being the world’s third most valuable economy (Perry, 2020), Japan faced limitations in these dimensions. Consequently, Japan redirected its focus towards sociocultural expansion, emphasising soft power. Notably, Japan’s expansion transcends its physical boundaries, and since the mid2010s, it has dedicated substantial efforts to reforming its society under the concept of “Society 5.0”. While many nations are striving for “Industry 4.0”, a technological shift with the industrial sector at its core, Japan’s trajectory is distinct. It has proposed Society 5.0. Society 5.0 represents a vision of a technological revolution centred on social dimensions rather than industry. Japan envisions this development as “a people-centric society founded on the merging of cyberspace and physical space”, placing humans at the core of interactions between the physical and digital/cyber worlds. This innovative approach sets Japan apart, reflecting a qualitative development strategy that embraces the evolving societal landscape in the era of technological integration. In detail,

Looking Ahead 257 TABLE 17.1 Comparison of “Industry 4.0” and “Society 5.0”

​

Industry 4.0 (Germany)

Society 5.0 (Japan)

Initiatives

• High-Tech Strategy

• The 5th Science and

•

Objectives and Scopes Key technologies and implementation

• • • • •

2020 Action Plan for Germany, by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) (2011) Recommendations for implementing the Strategic Initiative INDUSTRIE 4.0, by the Industrie 4.0 Working Group, in 2013 Smart Factories Focuses mainly on revolutionising the production sector Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) Internet of Things (IoT) Mass Customisation

•

Technology Basic Plan (2016) Comprehensive Strategy on Science, Technology and Innovation for 2017 (2017)

• Super-Smart Society • Covers all aspects of society and life

• High-Level

•

•

Convergence of Cyberspace and Physical Space Balance between economic development and addressing social problems Human-Centred Society

Source: Deguchi et al. (2020).

the comparison between Industry 4.0 and Society 5.0 can be made in Table 17.1. Japan has embarked on a transformative journey, classifying human societal progress into four distinct eras: Society 1.0 – the Hunting Society; Society 2.0 – the Agricultural Society; Society 3.0 – the Industrial Society; and Society 4.0 – the Information Society. Each era marked a significant phase in Japan’s historical and socio-economic development. Building upon this trajectory, the Japanese government envisions Society 5.0 as a future society that transcends the Information Society, bringing forth substantial improvements over the current Society 4.0 (Japan Cabinet Office, n.d.; Keidanren, 2018). The transition from Societies 1.0 to 4.0 was characterised by evolving economic models, societal structures, and technological advancements. Society 5.0, however, represents a paradigm shift with key features that

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differentiate it from its predecessors. The anticipated improvements include a departure from economies of scale to a production system focused on solving real-life problems and creating values. Unlike earlier societies, which often suppressed individuality for uniformity, Society 5.0 is designed to support diversity, allowing individuals to pursue their unique potential. Historically, inequalities have persisted from Societies 1.0 to 4.0, favouring the rich and privileged. In Society 5.0, Japan aims to address this by emphasising decentralisation, ensuring that all individuals have access to life’s opportunities regardless of their background or location. Additionally, the new societal model places a strong emphasis on resilience, enabling inhabitants to thrive even in the face of various threats and negative factors. One of the significant shifts in perspective is the focus on sustainable development and harmonious coexistence between human activities and the environment. Previous eras witnessed dire consequences of resource consumption and environmental strain, necessitating a more conscientious approach in Society 5.0. Japan recognises the need to actively support sustainable practices to ensure the well-being of future generations (The Government of Japan, n.d.). To realise the vision of Society 5.0, the Japanese government initiated comprehensive reforms starting in 2016–2017. Two strategic plans, namely the 5th Science and Technology Basic Plan (2016) and the Comprehensive Strategy on Science, Technology, and Innovation for 2017, were introduced. These plans are geared towards establishing new social and economic paradigms, empowering individuals, reforming businesses, and addressing global challenges such as an ageing society, natural disasters, terrorism, and environmental crises (Japan Cabinet Office, n.d.). Overcoming obstacles is crucial for the successful transition to Society 5.0. Japan identified five key barriers: bureaucracy, regulatory and legal, scientific, technological, and innovation, human capital, and social acceptance. The government emphasises the importance of abolishing bureaucratic barriers through national strategies, amending outdated laws and regulations, fostering interdisciplinary collaboration, engaging public participation across age groups, and integrating advanced technologies to tackle social problems. An innovative example of tackling social challenges is the establishment of a “no-competition” zone in Japan. This initiative encourages collaboration between Japanese and foreign companies, fostering joint projects and sharing benefits. The “no-competition” zone aims to create jobs, promote inter-sectoral cooperation, increase public understanding of Society 5.0, and encourage employee-friendly practices, thereby addressing long-standing issues related to fierce business competition and workplace stress. Japan’s adoption of the Society 5.0 approach extends beyond its borders, contributing to the nation’s soft power. Close business partners, such

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as Thailand and neighbouring ASEAN economies, stand to benefit from shared experiences and collaborative solutions. As Thailand transitions into a fully aged society, the challenges it faces align with those Japan is addressing, opening avenues for mutual learning and cooperation. Looking ahead, Japan’s progress in economic, trade, investment, and social development holds promising prospects. Anticipated advancements in public health, energy, agriculture, and industry reflect a commitment to smart solutions, sustainability, and improved quality of life. The Society 5.0 framework positions Japan as a global leader in shaping a future that balances technological innovation with societal well-being. Japan’s pursuit of Society 5.0 signifies a forward-looking and adaptive approach to societal development. The envisioned transition reflects a commitment to addressing contemporary challenges, fostering resilience, and ensuring sustainable coexistence with the environment. As Japan navigates this transformative journey, it provides valuable insights for other nations seeking to navigate the complexities of societal evolution in an era of rapid technological advancement. India and South Asia: An Emerging Market Next Door

In 2023–2024, Thailand has been bestowed with the prestigious role of chairing and hosting the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Summit. With Thailand playing a pivotal role in the founding of this initiative in 1997, BIMSTEC now encompasses seven member countries around the Bay of Bengal – Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka. These nations share intertwined histories, extensive trade relationships, collaborative efforts, religious interactions, and a sense of shared social and cultural heritages spanning centuries. Geographically, Thailand shares a substantial 2,401 kilometres of land borders with Myanmar, and its western maritime borders, known as the Andaman Sea, connect with the eastern part of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. This maritime linkage also establishes a sea border with India, placing Thailand’s renowned island province of Phuket in proximity to the city of Port Blair on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. BIMSTEC, functioning as a subregional cooperative initiative, encompasses 14 dimensions of cooperation (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2021). These dimensions include trade and investment, transport and communication, energy, tourism, technology, fisheries, agriculture, public health, poverty alleviation, counterterrorism and transnational crime, environment and disaster management, people-to-people contact, cultural cooperation, and climate change.

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From an economic perspective, the Bay of Bengal holds strategic importance for trade and investment, driven by several key factors: 1. Sizeable market potential: The Bay of Bengal region, with a population exceeding 1.7 billion and a combined GDP of over US$ 3.8 trillion, presents a substantial market with high growth prospects. The region has witnessed average annual growth rates surpassing 6.5 percent over the last decade, making it a promising destination for Thailand’s trade and investment (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2021). 2 . Abundance of natural resources: The region boasts diverse natural resources, ranging from the Himalayan mountains to the Indian Ocean. Recognised historically as a vital source of production and trade routes, the Bay of Bengal area is poised to play a crucial role in the emerging concept of the “Blue Economy”, focusing on fisheries, alternative energy, maritime transport, tourism, waste management, and leveraging the ocean’s potential in addressing climate change (World Bank, 2017). 3. Young and promising population: With India as the second most populous country and Bangladesh as the eighth most populous (India National Population Clock, 2021), the Bay of Bengal region, including other member states, comprises a young and diverse population with varying labour skills and experiences. This demographic diversity offers significant opportunities for businesses seeking suitable labour characteristics and individuals aspiring to build their future and advance in life. 4. Proximity to Thailand: The region is located in close proximity to Thailand, with approximately four hours of air transit facilitating convenient travel. This geographic advantage ensures efficient oversight of operations for entrepreneurs, seamless travel for workers, and the overall management of time and commuting costs. 5. Cultural proximity: Cultural and social proximities between the Bay of Bengal region, Southeast Asia, and Thailand foster a deeper understanding of shared lifestyles, thinking patterns, and social norms. This shared cultural foundation facilitates businesses, from SMEs to multinational corporations, in developing goods and services that align with the needs of the Bay of Bengal region. 6. Free trade agreements: Thailand’s participation in multiple free trade agreements, including the Thai-India Free Trade Agreement, ASEANIndia Free Trade Agreement, and the forthcoming BIMSTEC Agreement, positions the country strategically. Additionally, ongoing impact studies for the Thai-Bangladesh Free Trade Agreement and the potential benefits from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

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contribute to Thailand’s integration into global value chains, fostering economic expansion and job creation. Thailand’s role as the chair and host of the BIMSTEC Summit in 2023–2024 signifies its commitment to fostering regional cooperation and economic development. The Bay of Bengal region’s potential as a dynamic market, coupled with its abundant resources and cultural affinities, presents valuable opportunities for Thailand to strengthen trade, investment, and collaborative initiatives. As Thailand navigates its leadership role in BIMSTEC, the region’s economic landscape is poised for positive transformation, laying the foundation for shared prosperity and sustainable development. Thailand and the ASEAN Community amidst the Conflict between the two Superpowers

The ASEAN Community, established as a comprehensive framework, embraces diverse dimensions of cooperation across political, economic, and sociocultural realms, catering to more than 667 million people in ten Southeast Asian countries. These nations, including Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam, form a collective association known as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thailand, a founding member, plays a pivotal role in shaping and participating in the cooperative framework, contributing significantly to the region’s development (Sukhonthasap et al., 2017). The cooperative framework of ASEAN operates through three interconnected pillars: the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). These pillars work synergistically to foster collaboration and unity among member states, addressing various aspects of governance, economic integration, and cultural exchange. From a sociopolitical and economic standpoint, the strategic location of Thailand and the Southeast Asian region holds immense significance. This region acts as a crucial connector between the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean to the west and the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean to the east, facilitated by the Malacca Strait. This geographical positioning places ASEAN countries at a pivotal “choke point” for transportation routes between continents and regions. The ASEAN region, endowed with abundant natural resources and a substantial labour force exceeding 667 million people, represents a sizable market with a total GDP surpassing US$ 3,355,655 million. The region’s considerable purchasing power, coupled with an average middle income of US$ 4,849/person/year (International Monetary Fund, 2021B), makes it an

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attractive destination for international investment. Moreover, the region has become an integral part of global value chains (GVCs), contributing significantly to the global economic landscape. As global dynamics shift and witness the decline of US hegemony and the rise of China’s influence, the strategic importance of the ASEAN region becomes more pronounced. China, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has rapidly expanded its economic influence since 2012, emphasising economic corridors on the continent and at sea. Several of these corridors directly involve the Southeast Asian region, such as the China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor, the Bangladesh-China-Myanmar Corridor, and the maritime link from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean under the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative (The Diplomat, 2017; Parameswaran, 2019). Simultaneously, the United States has adapted its military strategy, renaming the US Pacific Command to the US Indo-Pacific Command in 2018. This move highlights a broader area of operation spanning from the Pacific Ocean to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy, with its principles of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), aims to balance the scales of power and counter China’s expansion by emphasising sovereignty, peaceful conflict resolution, free and fair trade, and adherence to international standards (USINDOPACOM, 2018; Strategic Studies Center, 2019). In its pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific, the United States has prioritised partner countries, categorising them into groups based on the level of cooperation. Thailand is recognised as one of the highest-priority allies, alongside Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and others. The United States also aims to strengthen relationships with countries like Singapore, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Mongolia and establish cooperative ties with nations in the Indian Ocean Region and Southeast Asia. Recognising the strategic importance of ASEAN member nations, the US Ministry of Defense emphasises their role in containing and counterbalancing China’s expansion of power. In addition to military alliances, the United States is actively engaging in economic partnerships in Southeast Asia to counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This dual approach aims to address both security and economic concerns in the region (Department of Defense of the US, 2019; Department of State of the US, 2019). Amidst these geopolitical complexities, Thailand and the ASEAN Community find themselves at the crossroads of a shifting global order. The ongoing rivalries between the United States and China, efforts to set global standards from Europe, Japan’s innovative approaches to economic and social progress, and emerging opportunities in India and South Asia will collectively shape the trajectory of the region up to around 2030.

Looking Ahead 263

In this dynamic environment, Thailand and Southeast Asia must closely monitor changes across various dimensions, including disruptive technologies, alterations in GVCs, shifts in logistics systems, changes in trade restrictions or barriers, and new risks and opportunities in trade and investment expansions. Navigating these challenges will be essential for the region’s economic resilience and sustained growth. Expanding on the role of ASEAN, the cooperative framework has evolved over the years, adapting to the changing global landscape. The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) focuses on political and security cooperation, aiming to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and enjoy stability, fostering a sense of community and common identity. The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) endeavours to create a single market and production base, enhancing economic competitiveness and integration into the global economy. Lastly, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) strives to build a community that prioritises human development and social welfare, emphasising cultural heritage, environmental sustainability, and social justice. From a political security perspective, the APSC plays a critical role in maintaining regional stability. With the rise of geopolitical tensions and territorial disputes, the APSC serves as a platform for dialogue and conflict resolution. The South China Sea territorial disputes, involving several ASEAN member states and China, have been a focal point for regional security discussions. The APSC provides a framework for diplomatic initiatives and negotiations, promoting peaceful coexistence among nations. In terms of economic cooperation, the AEC is geared towards creating a more competitive and integrated economic region. This involves the removal of trade barriers, harmonisation of economic policies, and the facilitation of seamless cross-border trade. The AEC envisions a region where goods, services, investment, and skilled labour can flow freely, fostering economic growth and development. Thailand, as a key player in the ASEAN economic landscape, has benefited from increased market access and collaborative initiatives that enhance its economic resilience. The ASCC, focusing on sociocultural aspects, underscores the importance of human development and inclusivity. It recognises the diversity of cultures within the region and strives to create a community that values and preserves this diversity. Initiatives under the ASCC include programmes for education, healthcare, environmental sustainability, and disaster management. Thailand, with its rich cultural heritage, actively participates in ASCC initiatives that promote social well-being and inclusivity. The success of ASEAN lies in its ability to balance diverse interests and foster collaboration among member states. The ASEAN Way, characterised by consensus building, non-interference in internal affairs, and gradual integration, has been a guiding principle. The region’s commitment to diplomacy

264  Piti Srisangnam

and dialogue has enabled it to navigate complex geopolitical challenges and maintain a semblance of unity. As the ASEAN Community looks towards the future, several challenges and opportunities lie ahead. Geopolitical shifts, economic uncertainties, and global health crises pose challenges to regional stability. However, ASEAN’s resilience, adaptability, and commitment to cooperation position it to overcome these challenges. Regional initiatives such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), which includes China, Japan, and South Korea, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest trade bloc, further demonstrate ASEAN’s efforts to strengthen ties and enhance regional integration. Amidst geopolitical tensions, China and the United States emerged as rivals in the Southeast Asian region. Thailand, along with Indonesia, developed the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)” document, which became a pivotal focus during the ASEAN Summit in 2019, hosted by Thailand. This document established the direction for ASEAN to maintain centrality, acting as a hub for policy coordination among major powers seeking influence in this strategic area. This initiative is based on four dimensions: 1. Sustainability Dimension: ASEAN shifts the focus from power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific towards sustainable development, aligned with the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs). 2 . Economic Dimension: ASEAN promotes the Indo-Pacific as an area for economic cooperation, especially through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), concluded in Thailand in 2019. 3. Connectivity Dimension: Infrastructure initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the US’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) must align with ASEAN’s Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC), launched by Thailand in 2009. 4. Security Dimension: ASEAN adheres to the United Nations and ASEAN principles. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), initiated by Thailand in 1995, serves as a supporting platform. This approach positions the ASEAN region at the centre of these dimensions. Conclusion

In conclusion, the ASEAN Community stands as a testament to the power of regional cooperation in navigating complex global dynamics. Thailand, with its active participation and contributions, plays a crucial role in

Looking Ahead 265

shaping the future of Southeast Asia. As the region continues to evolve, the ASEAN Way provides a foundation for diplomacy, dialogue, and collaboration. Thailand’s commitment to the ASEAN framework positions it as a key player in regional development and stability. The coming years will undoubtedly bring new challenges, but ASEAN’s collective strength and unity will be essential in overcoming them and building a resilient and prosperous Southeast Asia. References Acharya, A. (2014). The End of American World Order. Wiley. ISBN: 9781509517114. Allison, G. (2017). Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? HMH Books. ISBN 9781328915382. BIMSTEC Secretariat. (2021). About BIMSTEC. https://bimstec​.org/​?page​_ id​=189 Deguchi, A., Hirai, C., Matsuoka, H., Nakano, T., Oshima, K., Tai, M., and Tani, S. (2020). What Is Society 5.0? In Society 5.0: A People-Centric Super-Smart Society. Hitachi-UTokyo Laboratory (H-UTokyo Lab.), The University of Tokyo. Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, Japan: SpringerOpen. Department of Defense of the US. (2019, June 1). Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. http://www​ .andrewerickson​.com ​/wp​- content ​/uploads​/ 2019​/06​/ DoD​_ Indo​- Pacific​- Strategy​ -Report​_ 201906​.pdf Department of State of the US. (2019, November 4). A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision. https://www​.state​.gov​/wp​- content​/uploads​/2019​/11​/ Free​-and​- Open​-Indo​-Pacific​- 4Nov2019​.pdf Devetak, R., George, J., and Percy, S.V. (eds.). (2017). An Introduction to International Relations (Third edition). Cambridge University Press, pp. 816. ISBN 978-1-316-63155-3. OCLC 974647995. The Diplomat. (2017, May 12). Belt and Road Attendees List. https://thediplomat​ .com ​/2017​/05​/ belt​-and​-road​-attendees​-list/ The Government of Japan. (n.d.). Realizing Society 5.0. https://www​.japan​.go​.jp​/ abenomics/​_userdata​/abenomics​/pdf​/society​_ 5​.0​.pdf Ikenberry, J.G. (2005). Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World Order in Transition. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 133– 152. Oxford University Press. https://www​.jstor​.org​/stable​/26156571 India National Population Clock. (2021). Open Government Data Platform India. Archived from the Original on 19 June 2016. https://data​.gov​.in/ International Monetary Fund. (2021A, April). World Economic Outlook Database. https://www​.imf​.org ​/en ​/ Publications​/ WEO​/weo​-database ​/2021​/April International Monetary Fund. (2021B, February 18). Special Drawing Rights (SDR). https://www​. imf​.org ​/en ​/About ​/ Factsheets ​/ Sheets ​/ 2016 ​/ 08​/ 01 ​/ 14 ​/51 ​/ Special​ -Drawing​-Right​- SDR Japan Cabinet Office. (n.d.) Society 5.0. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. https://www8​.cao​.go​.jp​/cstp​/english​/society5​_ 0​/index​.html Johnston, R. (2000). Human Geography. In Johnston, R., Gregory, D., Pratt, G., Watts, M., and Whatmore, S. (eds.), The Dictionary of Human Geography. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 353–360. Keidanren. (2018). Society 5.0: Co-Creating the Future. Washington, DC: Keidanren; Japanese Business Foundation. https://www​.keidanren​.or​.jp​/en ​/policy​/2018​/095​ _summary​.pdf

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Nye, Joseph S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Office of the Secretary of State. (2020). The Elements of the China Challenge. The Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of State, US. https://www​.state​.gov​ /wp​- content ​/uploads​/2020​/11​/20 ​- 02832​-Elements​-of​- China​- Challenge​-508​.pdf Parameswaran, P. (2019, May 7). What's in China's New Belt and Road Recalibration? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2019​/05​/whats​-in​- chinas​ -new​-belt​-and​-road​-recalibration/ Perry, M.J. (2020), The World’s Top 10 Manufacturing Nations Since 1970. Foundation for Economic Education. https://fee​.org​/articles​/the​-world​-s​-top​-10​ -manufacturing​-nations​-since​-1970/ USINDOPACOM. (2018, May 30). U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Holds Change of Command Ceremony. https://www​.pacom​.mil ​/ Media ​/ News​/ News​-Article​-View​/ Article​/1535776​/us​-indo​-pacific​-command​-holds​-change​-of​-command​-ceremony/ Weaver, John M. (2018). The 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States. Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 62–71. https://doi​.org​/10​. 5038​ /1944​- 0472​.11​.1​.1655. http://scholarcommons​.usf​.edu ​/jss​/vol11​/iss1/5 The White House. (2017, December 18). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. https://trumpwhitehouse​.archives​.gov​/wp​- content​/uploads​ /2017​/12​/ NSS ​-Final​-12​-18​-2017​- 0905​.pdf The White House. (2021). The Biden-Harris Administration Immediate Priorities. https://www​.whitehouse​.gov​/priorities/ The World Bank. (2017). What is the Blue Economy? https://www​.worldbank​.org ​/ en ​/news​/infographic ​/2017​/06​/06​/ blue​- economy

Reference in Thai Language Srisangnam, P. (2021, March 8). The Two Sessions Conference: China Weaves Dreams towards Modern and Completely Sovereign Objectives. The Standard. https://thestandard​.co​/china​-two​- councils​- conference/ Strategic Studies Center. (2019). Case Study: Indo-Pacific Strategy: The Development of USINDOPACOM. Strategic Studies Center. National Defence Studies Institute. Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters. https://sscthailand​.org​/uploads​_ ssc​/ research ​_ 201​9090​9156​8011​553528354​.pdf Sukonthasap, D., Wahaawisat, T., and Ariyaprasart, S. (2017). 50 Years of Thailand in ASEAN. ASEAN Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ISBN 9786163410542. https://image​.mfa​.go​.th​/mfa​/0​/OcXc7u4THG​/ Mini​_ Library​/ THAILAND50ASEAN_-​_Copy​_ compressed​.pdf Tantayakul, C. (2021). Movements in the Two Meetings of China (Consultative Political Conference of the Chinese People's Republic and the National People's Congress) in Beijing. Thai-China Strategic Research Center, National Research Office (NRO). http://www​.vijaichina​.com ​/articles​/2174 Yang, X. (2020). Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People’s Republic of China to Thailand, Exclusive Interview: Fighting COVID-19 for the Chinese People and the World. Seminar on Moving Forward to the Thai-China Economy. Thai-China Journalists Association.

18 BETWEEN THE TWO SEAS OF INDO-PACIFIC From Kra Isthmus to Thai Canal and Land Bridge in Southern Thailand Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

Introduction

Connectivity between the two sides of the Indo-Pacific through the Kra Isthmus linking both the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand is not that new. This narrowest stretch of the upper Malay peninsula had served trade in relation to local production and people for thousands of years. It was also an alternative to land route to supplement the maritime trade of both seas. But the inconvenient truth is that this land crossover takes time and was impractical in reality back then. That was why at one point the idea to build a canal cutting Kra Isthmus was proposed (Figure 18.1), the first time, more than 300 years ago, to King Narai of Ayutthaya (1629–1688) in 1677.1 Since then, the proposed Kra Canal has often been resurfaced in debate and discussion, so many times in history – looking at new angles, insights, possibilities to build – but was never materialised. The subject of Kra Isthmus, and the construction of Kra Canal, in particular, remains up to these days a distant dream. Whenever the proposal to make it becomes a topic in public discourse, it ends up in a blurred territory of project ownership. For instance, the present Thai government has never expressed clearly about the support to the project. 2 Rather, it seems to leave this to interest groups to show their interests and ideas, before anything could be drawn. As for the Southeast Asian region, it is not a topic of surprise, or even less, the subject of any conflicts with regional governments, Singapore, or even Malaysia, as a viable alternative to the congested Straits of Malacca.3 The ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan, so far, has not figured or placed any indication of Kra Isthmus or any similar infrastructure building in its roadmap. DOI: 10.4324/9781003559245-21

268  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

FIGURE 18.1  Map

of Kra Isthmus (Thai Canal) and Strait of Malacca.

Source: Bangkok Post, 7 June 2015.​ https:/​/www​.bangkokpost​.com​/thailand​/special​-reports​ /584473​/kra​-canal​-dream​-still​-far​​-from​-reality.

However, the timing for such project feasibility has arisen again in a broader context of regional development and changes in recent years. Kra Isthmus, or Kra Canal, as proposed by interest groups in Thailand, as Klong Thai, or Thai Canal, has become a subject of debate among those concerned and the public beyond Thailand and ASEAN. In the meantime, Thailand has definitely its own master plan for infrastructural building and connectivity to serve the country’s own future. This includes revamping major highways, rapid and high-speed trains, major ports, and industrial areas of the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), possibly linking to the planned Southern Economic Corridor (SEC). And precisely because of SEC, if realised, the proponents of the Thai Canal use this opportunity to advance such a project to the public. For sure, all of these infrastructural built-up projects, once realised, will help position Thailand in a more competitive advantage as a key logistic hub

Between the Two Seas of Indo-Pacific 269

in mainland ASEAN. However, the cost burdens of all these projects have also added to the public debt. It will not be easy under the present COVID19 environment since 2020, if that has to shoulder another huge budget for mega projects such as the Thai Canal, as proposed by those interest groups. In one way or another, the Prayuth government has such a rationale behind, so better to discard the subject of the Thai Canal for discussion in the government circle after all. This leaves the space for his minister of transport to propose the Southern land bridge project instead, as an alternative to the Thai Canal, linking Chumphon and Ranong, the two sides of the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea. Suddenly, Thailand is facing fresh controversies over these two connecting projects – the Thai Canal, which is huge in size and budget and will likely take a long time to complete, or a smaller scale, Southern land bridge, which will cost relatively less and might be more practical to realise in comparison. Of course, both aim to link the two seas of the Indo-Pacific. The issue is whether it is worthwhile to build big, small, or not at all, under the present environment. Who will benefit? And at what costs? The debate is still open, in particular, if extending beyond national parameters, to include great power rivalry and interests. Old Saga of Kra Isthmus: Early Settlements between Both Seas’ Trade

Back into the historical context, Kra Isthmus was the landscape of the early corridor, connecting and integrating the Gulf of Siam, the Andaman Sea, and the world beyond. The two seas have displayed potential regional contact zones that existed for over thousands of years. This early emerging form of regional linkages – through trade, beliefs, and travellers, and the reach to local peoples who inhabited the areas – is key to our understanding about this overlapping land and sea activities. Despite the given name, IndoChina, to designate the whole areas of mainland Southeast Asia, including Kra Isthmus, modern days’ conclusion is that this “Golden Peninsula”, or “Suvarnabhumi”, has never been Indianised or Sinosated states in early time as shown by many recent archaeological discoveries. Indeed, local people had developed quite their societies and lifestyles with local resources used from forestry down to stones and metals like tin, metal, and gold.4 The same is true for the area in Kra Isthmus with more and more historical facts, like pottery, ornaments, working tools, studying by researchers. coming into the picture. In addition to early archaeological discoveries in other parts of the Southern region like Klong Tom, Krabi, back to BC 2 to AD 3, more recent artefacts found in Khao Sam Kaeo, Chumporn, situated on the Kra Isthmus corridor, proved to be even older than the ones in Krabi. Another major recent finding included the old capsized boat next to the bay in Amphoe

270  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

Suk Sam Ran, Ranong, which dated back to around BC 5.5 If included Ban Khema, Aw Ayi, situated between the Andaman Sea and the Kra River, in Myanmar today, it was clear that this land route had served as trade for locals. All these historical facts have shown clearly early settlements of indigenous people all along both coastal areas before the arrival of “Indianisation” and “Sinotisation”, as often referred by Western scholars. True, the contact with them later on made the region richer in terms of exchanges, trade, beliefs, and culture, which resulted later into the creation of the Sri Vichaya Buddhist kingdom, for example. For this reason, Kra Isthmus seems to be known to travellers from the early Buddhist era as the shortest route to cut across the peninsular. For sure, with the introduction of local indigenous people, the landscape had evolved over the years to develop into land corridors to serve both travellers and the locals. Next to the Chumporn estuary, the island was also called “Bardia” in the old times for travellers, probably a stopover before moving up to the Chao Phraya River delta, or the South China Sea.6 Commercial motives may well play a crucial role later on in expanding the role of South Asia, and India, in particular, to link beyond the trans-Asiatic overland routes. And China has begun to investigate the maritime network of routes, thus the Kra Isthmus also coming into the picture, for this crossover of the peninsular stretch. Either way, Kra Isthmus was closely linked to the seaborne trade between India, China, and the rest of Southeast Asia, once these areas seemed ready to make such linkages of trade, tradition, culture, and beliefs, which were followed. If taking up land routes up to Tavoy, Takuapa, down to Singgora (Songkla) in Southern Thailand, at one point, there were some 12 different trading corridors across this narrow Southern peninsular.7 No wonder Western scholars like to describe early on the areas as Indianisation or Sinotisation to indicate the influence of these two countries without realising the local people had already developed mode of production and exchanges, well before the arrival of this influence. Of course, these influences had added to reinforce the blend, linkages, and integration of all, making the richness and continuation of such ways of life in later periods.8 To substantiate the evidence, archaeological discoveries of Rouletted Ware, which originated from India and South Asia, were found in many places of Kra Isthmus, which included La-oun, Ranong, Khao Talu, and Chumporn, possibly between BC 2 and AD 4. The same is true for the presence of Chinese artefacts from the Han period at sites of Kra Isthmus in Southern Thailand, in particular, at Khao Sam Kaeo in Chumphon province.9 From written Chinese record, dated back to the late second century, the time of Emperor Wu (141–87 BC), it seems likely the Chinese merchants took the voyage, “a ten-day land journey sandwiched between months of sailing”, which has reasonably been interpreted as a traverse of Kra Isthmus.10

Between the Two Seas of Indo-Pacific 271

From the point on that crossover, the dangerous voyages that could be11 China used foreign merchant ships, probably Southeast Asian ships, which took another two months to reach Southeast India, which may possibly be Kanchipuram (in modern Tamil Nadu). From Kra Isthmus to Kra Canal

Kra Isthmus has been well documented in literature to include even the Kra Canal.12 Indeed, the Kra Canal itself has created a legend in the history, not only for Thailand but Southeast Asia as a whole. As a matter of fact, the first proposal for excavating the Kra Canal emerged in 1677 during the reign of King Narai of Ayutthaya, by a French engineer, M. de la Mar, who made the survey to find an alternative to the maritime trading route between the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea.13 However, the project never took place.14 The idea to build Kra Canal came back in 1793, during the reign of King Rama I,15 to defend the invasion of Burmese troops. However, that threat had declined afterwards,16 so the security reason was unjustified. Soon after, the project was not taken up. Up until the mid-19th century, the opening of Siam to Western trade, with the signing of the Bowing Treaty of 1855, marked Siam’s entry into the Western modern world. This period also marked the return of the old idea of digging the Kra Canal. No longer this belongs to Thai or Siam’s dreams but rather to the new powerful Western powers. On one side, the British got the permission to excavate the canal from Chumphon to Ranong but seeing the exorbitant costs and other interests already booked from the Strait of Malacca,17 the British opted to abandon the project. The French, on the other hand, got otherwise ideas. In 1866, France requested King Rama IV’s consideration to build the Kra Canal. However, it was refused because Siam wanted a compromise with the British and did see the permission as affecting the British interests in the Strait of Malacca. France continued to push the project during the reign of King Rama V (1868–1910), by sending several representatives18 on behalf of Ferdinand de Lesseps – the former French diplomat who was the key person in the construction of the Suez Canal – to ask permission to excavate once again the Kra Canal.19 In 1893, Comte A. Mahe de la Bourdonnais, a French naval officer and also engineer with the French East India Company, favoured for a Kra Canal project in order to facilitate maritime trade interests in the region. For him, once the canal was finished, French-controlled Saigon would have an upper hand over Britishrun Singapore as Southeast Asia’s most important port. 20 The project was this time denied due to the concerns of Siamese security, maintenance relationship with the British interests in the region, as well as the perception of French greater role in the Mekong region, which endangered the Siamese sovereignty. By the end of the 19th century, the Isthmus trade had all but

272  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

disappeared due to the picking-up role of Singapore as port and entrepot and the changes in local conditions that included natural silting up of rivers in Southern Thailand and the introduction of railway lines in the region. 21 By the turn of the 20th century, Thailand also faced a depression in the following years after World War I. In between, the country also changed the political system to a constitutional monarchy in June 1932, given the kind authority to the parliament and civilian government. It was in 1935, during the former prime minister Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena, that the Kra Canal resurfaced as a possibility to rescue the downturn of the Thai economy. However, the proposal was shot down due to the lack of huge funding to undertake and support such a project. Thailand sided with Japan during World War II, under Field Marshal Por Phibul Songkram, which caused Thailand to pay the war reparation, which included signing a peace treaty with Britain and India in 1946.22 To cite the seventh article which stated: “Siam undertakes to construct no canal linking the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Siam (i.e., across the Kra Isthmus) without a British consent”. According to the same treaty, the Kra Canal project was blocked in the following years. Post-War Kra Canal Proposals

While the treaty had yet to phase out in the 1950s, the Kra Canal was brought back to life once more. With a background of some years earlier, a French delegate suggested in October 1949 at the Singapore meeting of delegates for the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) that the commission should consider sponsoring the Kra Canal. However, the idea was rejected by Prince Sukonwanakon as nothing more than a “myth”. 23 Years after, up to the mid-1950s, the war treaty between the two had ended thus giving diplomatic exchanges on the subject. For the British, it was still needed to ensure that the Kra Canal should not be taken off the ground. But for the Thais, the country was free to pursue the canal project at its own initiative. 24 Between times, the British had been able to secure the interests in the Malacca Straits, with Singapore playing a clear role in this part of the world once separated from Malaysia from 1964 and onwards. On the other hand, the French lost the Indo-China war at Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam, in 1954, so such a defeat also meant a retreat of all ideas generated during the colonial time. This void was filled by the American move into the region, which also appeared to lead a survey for the Kra Canal in 195625 and years after, mainly for security reasons. However, according to the British officials at the time, the whole idea of the Kra Canal was technically not feasible but would not take off the ground beyond talk for financial and political reasons. In a way, this was a new twist in modern times where project feasibility had been

Between the Two Seas of Indo-Pacific 273

clearly discussed in a multidimensional sphere beyond trade, security, or other dimensions per se. Obviously, outsiders’ interests had injected a kind of encouragement for Thai officials at the time to express their interests for building the Kra Canal for Thailand too. The Thai Minister of Communications expressed in 1962 to informed journalists that “a number of foreign countries had offered to conduct a survey of the Kra Isthmus”. 26 In fact, the Kra Canal name was officially pronounced for the first time as the Golden Peninsula Development Company (GPDC) was formed and seemed to gain Thai government approval for a new canal proposal at the location further south of the isthmus. American and European firms also lent support in canal construction for more than a decade.27 Precisely, because the project feasibility was not justified even in terms of economic value and real costs of huge investment, apart from other considerations, the wave of canal construction speculation that started from the late 1950s until the end of the 1960s started to wane down as no show of real supporters. The canal project feasibility was revisited in the early 1970s. This time, it was more concreted with a survey, operational costs, and benefits to be extracted from the Kra Canal (Table 18.1). The proposed location was a bit lower than the Kra Isthmus itself, named as Route 5A, with a 102-kilometre long canal, from Satun province on the west coast to Songkla province on the east. 28 According to the consultancy company, 29 funded by Chow Kwan Yeun for this feasibility study, the construction would take 12 years to complete at a cost of US$ 5.6 billion – or ten years and US$ 3.5 billion if the excavation work employed small nuclear explosives.30 The study, itself consisting of four volumes, was delivered to the Thai government in 1973, costing US$ 400,000 for Chow paying to several American companies.31 However, the oil crisis of 1973, which caused a downturn in the global economy, that included Thailand, made a real impact to the project to be postponed. Despite another interest from the Japanese side throughout the 1970s and 1980s, also from the security reason for oil shipping transiting via the Straits of Malacca, and Japan’s Mitsubishi Research Institute recommendations following the Chow-sponsored survey report, nothing happened to the project construction.32 At the turn of the century, the Kra Canal came back on Thailand’s infrastructure agenda during the Prime minister Thaksin regime. It was initiated by deputy prime minister and defense minister at the time, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, a retired general and former prime minister briefly in the mid-1990s, just before the Asian Financial Crisis. He was so proponent of the issue of benefits to get from the canal in terms of job creation and project returns in a short to medium span of time – plus China, one of the important East Asian countries’ interests in financing the canal construction – as to commission of another feasibility study. In 2005, Prime minister Thaksin,

148

118

102

3A

4

5A

Source: Authors’ own.

168

3C

Water channels

West 8 East 108 Total 284 West 35 East 67 Total 284 West 28 East 63 Total 210 West 50 East 70 Total 222

Over land

Route no

Route length (km)

5500

5600

7000

6300

2500

2800

3200

3400

1 lane

Soil excavation (m)

TABLE 18.1 The Proposed Routes for the Canal Project

3800

3900

5000

4400

2 lane

Lowest

High

High

Low

Level of development

Lowest

High

High

Low

Population density

Good

Good

Good

Bad

Best

Good

Good

Bad

East bank West bank

Suitability for port

Good

Bad

Bad

Bad

East bank

Best

Good

Good

Good

West bank

Suitability for industry

Most

Medium

Medium

Least

Distance saved

274  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

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himself, even suggested the construction of an oil pipeline as an alternative to the full construction of the Kra Canal. Any idea for such a project did not materialise due to the collapse of Prime minister Thaksin’s regime in the following year due to allegations of government mishandling so many policies and corruption that had followed. Morphed into Thai Canal Dilemma: Post-2014 Attempts under the Prayuth Regime

The Kra Canal has once again emerged under the Prayuth regime since 2014. At certain instances, the issue has been moved to the forefront of national policy debate. But this time, under a different name, the “Klong Thai” or “Thai Canal”, a kind of new metaphor that aims at gaining acceptance of the public, unlike the old name Kra Canal, which has connotations with past unsuccessful ideas and proposals.33 According to the Thai Canal Association Study and Development, the new route for Thai Canal is 9A – which is a 135-kilometre open canal, without locks, at least 30 metres in depth and 400 metres in width thus allowing two-way traffic. The route runs from Ranod District in Songkhla Province on the Gulf of Thailand to Sikao District of Trang Province on the Andaman Sea (Figure 18.2).34 Cutting the Thai Canal will shorten a maritime journey of well over 1,000 kilometres between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, instead of making the detour through Singapore at the Straits of Malacca. With a canal in place, it could save approximately between two and three days of navigation.​ The latest attempts of the Thai Canal construction are formed as a part of three interest groups: The Thai Canal Association for Study and Development (TCASD), the Thai-Chinese Commercial and Industry Trade Association (TCCITA), and the Klong Thai Party.35 Contrary to its claims, the Klong Thai Party was unpopular among voters during Thailand’s 2019 general elections. None of its party candidates won even one seat during those elections. The TCCITA is, however, a different story, led by a retired general Chetta Thanajaro, a former army chief with close ties to General Chavalit Yongchaiiyuth, also a former army chief and former prime minister. The TCCITA has been active up to these days in advancing the canal construction topics to the attention of Thai senators and MPs; however, they have yet to work out the agenda with the Chinese leaders, as the Thai Canal has no mention in China’s BRI. No one knows for sure the official version of Chinese leaders on the issue of the Thai Canal up to these days. The TCASD is by far the most significant player among these parties. With the latest attempts, it advocates the promotion of Route 9A as the most feasible – Gulf of Thailand on one side of Route 9A, the landscape for special economic and industrial zones in the land at the middle, with an international airport, and the Andaman Sea on the other side, which is suitable for oil refinery complex.36

276  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

FIGURE 18.2  The

9A Route, the New Route for Thai Canal as Proposed by the Thai Canal Association Study and Development

Source: NESDC cited in Bangkok Post 11 September 2020. https://www​.bangkokpost​.com​/business​/1983399​/nesdc​-to​-reboot​-thai​-canal​-plan.

There is an interesting timeline of how the TCASD was formed back in 2015, with General Pongthep Tesprateep as head and director of the General Prem Tinsulanonda Stateman Foundation. And again, the House of Representatives set up in January 2020 an ad hoc committee, with its head, Major General Songklod Tiprat, leader of the Thai Nation Power Party, to review the Thai Canal as well as the new proposal for the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC), in connection to the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC). These recent changes and developments have shown how the proponents of the Kra Canal to Thai Canal have been trying to advance once more their construction agenda. However, it is not without meeting with resistance or opposition from those who disagreed with such new attempts. At one point, even among the committee members, one environmental activist, Prasitchai Noonuan, voiced concerns and resigned in July 2020. He blamed the working committee as being “biased” in favour of the Thai Canal project, citing that the committee members were not honest and interested in evaluating the pros and cons of the canal. Rather, most of them were interested in finding ways and means to make this project get going. 37

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Critical Arguments for Building Thai Canal

One of the latest proponents to build the Thai Canal, the TCCITA, started in 2015, with the proposal using C. K.Chow’s survey of the 1970s, which favoured Route 5A, and the estimates seem to cost around US$ 20 billion to construct and could take up to eight years to complete.38 During the same year, it was speculated that two parties – Thailand’s Asia Union Group (AUG), led by former prime minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, and the China-based China-Thailand Kra Infrastructure Investment and Development Company (CTKIID) – had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to build a canal across the Kra Isthmus.39 However, all parties involved denied such an involvement that included the Thai and Chinese governments and agencies, so the MOU between the two was again not advanced into concrete form. Another latest estimated figure for the Thai Canal building in 2020, according to Major General Songklod, could cost up to 2 trillion baht, or about US$ 66 billion.40 Such a total cost could derive not only from the construction of Thai Canal perse but also other costs involved from the beginning until the completion of the project, until the Thai Canal could function properly as transit port canal – land expropriation, relocation of affected villagers, dredging across Kra Isthmus channels, constructing expanded highway and railway bridges to support, and across the canal, and a decent international airport – which could also put more costs to the real figure given by 2020. Cost estimates to build overall to make it function are one of the contentious issues the proponents will face in terms of total investments and loans which will burden the Thai government budget while there are still risks about the returns, not only opportunities and benefits as quoted by the advocates of the Thai Canal. Another major round of proponents discussed their proposals made at the sub-committee set up by the Thai parliament in January 2020 to review this route of 9A of the Thai Canal. The canal itself will cut through five provinces, from Songkla to Trang, passing through Pattaloeng, Nakorn Srithammarat, and Krabi, in order to link both the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea. The land surface that will be affected involves at least 1,400 square kilometres, including dredging from coastal areas, at least 30–40 kilometres on the Gulf of Thailand, and 50–55 kilometres on the Andaman Sea. The latest proponents had shown a price tag of the canal at around 2.4 trillion baht, which will include, in addition to the canal,41 projects like industrial and economic zones of around 400 square kilometres, port islands (83 square kilometres), tourist areas (240 square kilometres), and tourist islands (80 square kilometres). Land expropriation will impact up to around 63,500 villagers, while another 30,000 import migrants will consist of both experts and technicians to support the project during the construction. This has to also include

278  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

the details in the Chinese proposal, to change Koh Muk, Trang into a new area of energy and petrochemical centre of around 92 square kilometres and part of Koh Kradan, Trang, and Koh Ngei, Krabi, to be petrochemical support, and the needs to land refiled to link Koh Lanta Yai, Koh Lanta Noi, and Khob Boh. The same report mentioned Kong Tom, Krabi, will turn into a seafood industrial area, with 47 square kilometres, and the area between Koh Lanta and Koh Ngei will turn into a major space before entering into the Thai Canal from the Andaman Sea.42 Once completed, the 135-kilometre Thai Canal will be able to serve as an alternative route for the Strait of Malacca in the long run. According to a 2017 report published by the Stockholm-based Institute for Security Study, “more than 30 per cent of the world’s seaborne trade and 80 per cent of China’s energy imports pass through the Malacca Strait”, which is equivalent to around 84,000 vessels passed in 2016, easily increasing to almost double at the end of 2020s. For this, proponents made it a strong case as they also persuaded China, to involve the Thai Canal, with BRI, in reshaping trade routes around Asia. A complete project could possibly create up to 2.5 million jobs, in particular, to support the slow growth the country has suffered quite in recent years. By increasing employment, it could eventually help to disperse the long-time cause of separate South and terrorist’s movements as well. The canal proponents estimate some 30 per cent of the Malacca global shipping traffic would use this option as an alternative to the heavy congested Strait of Malacca as long as the canal becomes more active in use.43 Risk and Return Considerations

Despite the proponents of the Thai Canal would argue a whole set of economic and strategic benefits in so many areas – ranging from construction, port infrastructure, manufacturing setups, and special economic zones down to job creation, and growth to support overall economy and security – there are still arguments left on the other side that they have not yet answered very clearly. This leaves many unanswered issues that need to be responded before the canal project takes place. Simply put, questions remain with regard to risks and returns, whether there is a clear economic rationale to support the canal, like transport time, and money that could be saved, and if putting Singapore into the picture, whether the project could really draw traffic from there in short to long run. Beyond economic benefits, one has also to add other dimensions like environmental impact, social adjustment and transformation, and strategic security implications, as some of the most important aspects that need to be compared side by side with the pros and cons of canal building. Starting with the economic rationale of the project, the numbers as advanced by project builders are still varied and do not speak up to address

Between the Two Seas of Indo-Pacific 279

the real problematic issues with this project. The canal has to have the right width and the depth, and will need to be constantly maintained, in order to bring the shipping cargos sailing through it. And in reality, unspoken remaining tasks will be tremendous when compared with the already functional, and yet congested, Malacca Strait as argued by canal advocates. Time and transport cost saving is another area that is still questionable and perhaps does not make any sense from business and economic rationale, and perhaps not even offer anything of interest to shipping operators.44 Adding all these unclear economic gains to the cost burden to Thailand, as the canal is in itself a mega project which will involve the country’s budget and finance for so many years ahead, it is not clear where those regular sums of money spent, at the beginning and years after, will derive from unless huge loans from abroad are secured for project construction and long-term functioning of the canal. And in this case, it seems that Chinese interests are the most apparent at the moment, although unsaid officially. Will Thailand accept to be in a so-called “debt trap”, if financing the project goes beyond Thailand’s own financial capabilities? This question has not been discussed thoroughly at present. Another economic and environmental trade-off for the Thai Canal, once built, is that it will put massive economic and environmental pressure on places in parts of Southern Thailand. Not only productive agricultural and natural resources will be dramatically transformed but also the natural beauty and livelihoods of people who live with such natural resources, and tourism income will be affected. A wide range of inhabitants will find themselves shifting their works, into a new unpredictable economic and industrial infrastructure. There are still issues like vessels’ inspection for things that could destroy marine resources and species from all kinds of pollution these vessels could cause, given that the east coastline is a prime tourist area, and the west coastline is also a very sensitive conservation area, and also a prime tourist area. Adding such a trade-off to the other side of the argument, economic-related environmental impact to the region, it is not yet clear how several hundred large vessels would be subject to monitoring and anchoring off both sides of the coast as they queue to enter this hypothetical canal.45 For sure, the Thai Canal project would require building new cities, inland development, huge complex, like ports, and next major industrial facilities, which could be colossal than coastal port facilities like Laem Chabang and Map Tha Phut. The whole idea of the economic and environmental rationale requires Thailand to think of the overall implications of the project in a much clearer manner. Adding last, but not the least, the most contentious issue facing the Thai Canal is its strategic and security dimension implications. If operated, Thailand will cover a whole new range of international waterways to link both seas of the Indo-Pacific. It will also cut Thailand’s southern region

280  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

into two, despite the famous direct land links of five major bridges between them, leaving a new landscape of domestic security of the Muslims in south to be solved. For this, Thailand will face more domestic and regional challenges which should be a new scope of strategic and security implications to deal with. Assuming the domestic security issue will be solved accordingly, regional strategic and security issues from major players, in particular, China, India, Japan, and the United States, for instance, will put greater pressure. China is at the forefront in such a set of debates, with its own BRI version. China’s rise in mainland ASEAN is well documented. The Thai Canal might respond better than the Southern land bridge to China’s geo-economic and geo-strategic ambitions to secure another passage in this part of the world, instead of only the Malacca Straits. But again, Thailand alone cannot handle this mega project while the Beijing government has never expressed openly its support – neither the Thai canal nor Southern land bridge was mentioned in its BRI or China’s Maritime Silk Road. The United States, on the other hand, is more clearly feeling a threat from China’s expansion within the region. If allowing China to play such a role in building the Thai canal, in this part of the world – as already countered China’s aggressive move in cases of the South China Sea and the Mekong region – the United States has yet to reframe the Indo-Pacific to include the Kra Isthmus in the roadmap. China always dreams big, and this might go beyond pure economic interests for what the host country like Thailand could manage. A likely US position would be desirable in this case of the Thai Canal. India, on the other hand, has its own policy in the Indian Ocean, as it is not comfortable with the expanding role of China in strategic places in the South Asian region. A smaller but more practical project, like the Southern land bridge, if properly managed, might correspond more to the needs of regional value chains where India is still a weak link with the East Asian region. India is in a good working relationship and cordial exchanges with Thailand, and this might be one of the advantages India should explore more implications about whatever the corridor project linking the two seas of Indo-Pacific might likely be taken. Land Bridge as Possible Option: Looking at the Recent History of Land Bridge

Compared to the Kra Canal, Thailand’s southern region land bridge has a much more recent history. The timeline of the Southern land bridge may be summarised as follows. In 1989, the Cabinet approved the preparation of a Master Plan for the development of the Southern Seaboard. In 1993, the study proposed the development of the “Economic Landbridge”; consequently, during 1999–2003, the road from Krabi to Kanom (Highway 44) was enlarged. In 1996, the study proposed deep sea ports at Kanom and Phangga as part of

Between the Two Seas of Indo-Pacific 281

the land bridge. However, nothing came of the proposal. In 2007, a study was commissioned to examine the feasibility of developing a rail link between the Songkhla 2 port and the Pakbara port in Satun province. This also came to nothing, and in 2020, the Harbour Department signed an agreement to cease the development of the Pakbara port. In 2017, the planned development of the Songkhla port was met with local opposition. In the same year, the Transport Planning Office commissioned a study of the rail link between Chumpon and Ranong, and this was found to be uneconomical, but it went ahead with a study of a Strategic Impact Assessment of the Southern Seaboard. This lasted up to 2021, then it commissioned a Design and Feasibility Study of the Chumpon-Ranong Raillink, as well as a study of the feasibility of developing a transport link between the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea. Thus, it is clear that the idea of linking the two seas by land transportation is still being considered. What is clear also is that the location of the link has shifted somewhat, from the southerly areas of the southern region, KrabiNakonsithammarat and Satun-Songkhla, to a more northerly location of Chumpon and Ranong. As well the scope of the impact has broadened from a focus on the southern region to a more regional perspective, that includes a look at the broader region as far as Northeast Asia and ASEAN to the east and to the Indian subcontinent and beyond to the west. The Chumpon-Ranong Land Bridge

This section deals with the current status of the Chumpon-Ranong Land Bridge project, based on working papers prepared for the Office of Transport Planning, Ministry of Transport and Communication, of the Royal Thai Government. Two issues are discussed: (1) the location of the land link, including ports and connecting infrastructure, and (2) traffic estimates for the land bridge once it is in operation. (1) Location of the Land Link At present Chumpon and Ranong are connected by Highway 4 which turns west-south of Chumpon until it reaches the Kraburi River. During World War II it was used by the Japanese army who built a rail connection to transport troops and war supplies to reach Myanmar until it was abandoned due to bombing by the Allied forces.46 The present road connection is a four-lane highway, supporting quite heavy traffic and is already developed. It is also limited by the topography, being a narrow strip between the river and the hilly area inland to allow for expansion. The current plan, therefore, envisages a further location to make the connection, between a suitable port located in Chumpon on the Gulf of

282  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

Thailand side and one in Ranong on the Andaman Sea side. After consideration of alternative sites, Laem Riew in Chumpon and Ao Ang in Ranong have been selected (Figures 18.3 and 18.4). The criteria for the site selection are: proximity to the deep channel of 16 metres and the cost of construction and operation. The ports are designed to handle 20 million TEUs initially and be capable of expanding to 40 million TEUs eventually. In addition to the ports, the project will install road and rail links to connect the ports for both kinds of traffic. The road link will be a motorway with six to eight traffic lanes, while rail links will be both a doubletrack narrow (1 metre) gauge to connect with the country’s rail system and a standard gauge double-track rail for freight originating at the ports.

FIGURE 18.3  Result

of the Site Selection for the Location of the Ports

Source: Drawn by authors based on Google Map.

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FIGURE 18.4  Location

of the Land Link between the Two Ports (Laem Riew Port to Ao Ang Port)

Notes: The total distance between the two ports is 89.7 kilometres. Source: Drawn by authors based on Google Map.

(2) Traffic Estimates The feasibility of the land bridge hinges on the potential to support the anticipated traffic. The main consideration here is that the land bridge provides an additional option rather than an alternative to the Malacca Strait which is expected to suffer from congestion. The relevant flows here are the transpeninsular flows from east to west and vice versa, i.e., from ASEAN west to

284  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

India and the subcontinent, namely the BIMSTEC countries, and further to the Middle East and Africa, and vice versa, as well as the trade flows from Thailand to these destinations. The consultant’s report considers that cargo from and to further East Asia would be carried by large container ships via Singapore as they are at present. Nevertheless, taking into account the prospective growth of global trade and the growth of these neighbourhood economies, the flow of traffic would still be substantial, as shown in Figures 18.5 and 18.6. A major consideration related to the expected traffic is what would be the advantage of using the new route. Clearly, there has to be savings in terms of time and costs from using the new route compared to the present ones, using Singapore as a transshipment point and going through the Malacca Strait (the Without Project WO case). The consultant compares the expected time required to transport the cargo through the new route, defined as the With Project (WP) case. For illustrative purposes, we choose a number of origins and destination points, namely, for origins, China (Shanghai) and Thailand, and for destinations, BIMSTEC (Nhava Port and Chennai Port) and Europe (Rotterdam Port). Results are shown in Table 18.2.​ As can be seen clearly from Table 18.2, in all cases except China-Europe, time can be saved by using the land bridge for the selected destinations. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that cost savings can be made if the cost of port operations can be minimised to be competitive in regard to Without Project situation. Clearly, this also raises challenges for the project implementation. Assuming that it is considered feasible to go ahead with the land bridge, the consultant has prepared cost estimates for the project as shown in Table 18.3.

FIGURE 18.5  Estimated

Source: Authors’ own.

Trans-Peninsular Traffic across the Land Bridge in 2047

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FIGURE 18.6  Estimates

of Cargo Handling at Ranong and Chumporn Ports

Source: Drawn by authors based on Google Map.

As of now, estimates of the benefits from the project are not available, but they can be roughly categorised as time-saving costs and operation cost savings, in the typical transport analysis. More significantly, however, it may be expected that the project will generate considerable additional economic benefits, in terms of new economic activities and new agglomeration-induced economies. These should be the subject of future studies. However, the Thai government seems to be encouraged by the results to date, and the minister of transport has announced the preliminary results and suggested that the government would be seeking external financing for the project, possibly from international transport business interests. Media

286  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh TABLE 18.2  Time Comparison for Traffic With and Without Project Cases

Time Comparison with the Singapore-Strait of Malacca Route (WO Case) (days) Time taken

Inland (road)

Inland (rail)

Sea Total transport time

Route: China (Shanghai)-BIMSTEC (Nhava Port) Without Project (WO) 1–2 ​ 14–20 With Project (WP) (LB) 1–2 1–2 12–18 WP, rail+ship from ​ 4–5 5–10 Ranong Route: China (Shanghai)-BIMSTEC (Chennai Port) Without Project (WO) 1–2 ​ 13–30 With Project (WP) (LB) 1–2 1–2 11–28 WP, rail+ship from ​ 4–5 4–8 Ranong Route: China (Shanghai)-Europe (Rotterdam Port) Without Project (WO) 1-2 ​ 23–40 With Project (WP) (LB) ​ ​ ​ WP, rail+ship from 1–2 1–2 23–38 Ranong Route: Thailand-BIMSTEC (Nhava Port) Without Project (WO) 1–1.5 ​ 9–24 With Project (WP) (LB) ​ 1–2 5–10 Route: Thailand-BIMSTEC (Chennai Port) Without Project (WO) 1–1.5 ​ 8–28 With Project (WP) (LB) ​ 1–2 4–8 Route: Thailand-Europe (Rotterdam Port) Without Project (WO) 1–1.5 ​ 25–42 With Project (WP) (LB) ​ 1–2 17–32

Time saving (Max)

15–22 14–22 9–15

​ ​ 7

14–32 13–32 8–13

​ ​ 19

25–42 ​ 25–42

​ ​ 0

10–25 6–12

​ 13

9–29.5 5–10

​ 19.5

26–43.5 ​ 18–34 9.5

Source: Authors’ own.

reports suggest that international shipping lines have expressed interest in investing in the project. Conclusion

The idea of building a canal/land bridge of Kra Isthmus between the two sides of the oceans is coming back in the context of the present time as major changes are taking place in the Southeast Asian region. Controversies always remain in Thai people’s minds, in particular, the locals who are directly going to be impacted by the project. The big question is whether such a huge project is feasible, as a possible option, for maritime passage, as compared to the main congested route of the Malacca Strait via Singapore. And to make it work, the project rationale must spell out loud and clear its

Between the Two Seas of Indo-Pacific 287 TABLE 18.3 Estimated Land Bridge Project Costs

Land Bridge Project Cost, Least Cost Option Port Location

Laem Riew, Chumpon and Ao Ang, Ranong

​

Chumpon

​ Port Dredging/1 Land links Road Road tunnel Rail Rail tunnel Pipeline Total Capital cost

Ranong

Total

(Million baht, 2021 prices) 37,163.27 122,899.77 ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

75,725.39 218,836.92 ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

112,888.66 341,736.69 ​ 43,545.00 29,000.00 20,595.00 12,000.00 18,860.00 578,625.35 236,888.66

Source: Authors’ own.

strategic intent, overall consideration, and frank assessment, and, in particular, response to the need of users; time and operation saving costs; and by placing all these into the regional context of ASEAN connectivity; road, rail, air, and maritime; and by linking Thailand to the Indo-Pacific. By reviewing several historical attempts to link the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea through the Kra Isthmus, the case study offers interesting perspectives on how complexity and understanding of challenges at the time are real important impetus behind ongoing pending project for years, even up to these days. It is also shown clearly that the project size is beyond Thailand’s own stake and perhaps capabilities to handle alone. For this reason, there is also the need to consider so many other dimensions with many interested parties involved and to make sure about the kind of the project ownership on its own soil, as well as the management operations which will affect the economy, security, society, and environment, in particular, at the local level. Despite all these, the revival of the Kra Isthmus project is still real as it has come back this time, morphed under the name of the Thai Canal in recent years. However, opportunities offered by project proponents still cause concerns for many who struggled with the old, despite the new paradigm. In conjunction with fast-changing geopolitical landscape of China’s rise and BRI, India’s emergence too, and the recent initiative of the Indo-Pacific, thus including seamless ASEAN and Thailand’s own look west to link with BIMSTEC, Thailand needs to recalibrate all these new challenges but also

288  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

must aim to be realistic about the potential of project implementation and thereafter that must fit into Thailand’s future. The earlier Prayuth government decided to move with the land bridge as a preferred option to the costly Thai canal. And yet, the project cannot be taken lightly as it must continue to weigh carefully, risks and returns, in particular, as shown by time and operation saving costs which are basic ingredients to make the project running. In addition, the preliminary study finding suggests that possible funding must be from both public and private sources, with both sectors working in close collaboration as public-private partnerships (PPPs) in each step of the project implementation, to make sure this venture is a successful and sustainable one.

Notes 1 See Ngui Yew Kit (2012), p. 71. 2 After silencing for years, Thai prime minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha ordered in November 2018 national planning and security agencies to look into building a possible canal across the narrow Kra Isthmus in Southern Thailand; see Zawacki (2018). But since nothing seems to happen that much in terms of action plan. 3 Traffic congestion is a real serious issue with 80,000 ships transiting a year through the Malacca Strait and a potential increase of 50 per cent in the present decade of 2020s, according to the International Maritime Organisation. See Storey (2019). 4 See Songsiri (2020), คอคอดกระ-Kra Isthmus ในจ�ดท��โลกจากอ�าวเบงกอลและทะเลจ�น ใต�พบก�น (มลููนิิธิเิ ลก็็ประไพวิิรยิิะพััน์ธ์ ). 5 See Songsiri (2020). 6 Colonel CL. E. Gerini cited Pedro Teixeir, another traveller to the court of King Narai, in the 16th century, being mentioned lastly about “Bardia”, as the usual name among Western travellers back then. The same island is called Koh Samed today; see Songsiri (2020). 7 Ngui Yew Kit (2012), op. cit. p. 79. 8 See Acharya (2017). 9 Some Han-period bronze artefacts and a large number of fragments of Chinese ceramics dated back to the Western Han period. Cited from Borell (2013). 10 See Borell (2013), ibid., p. 64. 11 Between Shenli, probably on the east coast, and Fugandula, on the west coast. See Borell (2013), ibid., p. 64. 12 According to the Columbia Encyclopedia, “Kra, Isthmus of, narrow neck of the Malay Peninsula, c.40 mi (60km) wide, SW Thailand, between the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Thailand.” It has long been the proposed site of a ship canal that would bypass the congested Straits of Malacca. See The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, Columbia University Press, 2001. 13 France felt, once excavated, the Kra Canal could serve it well to gain commercial advantages over other European countries that controlled the Straits of Malacca. 14 Part of it due to the deterioration of bilateral relationships after King Narai’s death. 15 By PhraRajawangborwornMahasurasihanat, King Rama I’s brother.

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16 As Burma was invaded by China in 1766, and Burmese control in this part was weakened years after. 17 Following Raffle’s claim on Singapore in 1819, Britain found itself the master of the most strategic maritime hub in Southeast Asia, further strengthening its expansive seaborne trade. See Dobbs (2015), p. 166. Also, after numerous surveys by British engineers, they concluded that while a railway or a canal was technically possible, the costs were prohibitive. See Storey (2019). 18 Starting with Mr Ternisien, then, Mr Deloncle. 19 Suez Canal was completed in 1869, and operating for more than a decade, while his other venture was on the Panama Isthmus just getting underway. See Dobbs (2015), op. cit. p. 172. 20 See Storey (2019), op​.cit​., also cited from Bourdonnais (2014). 21 See Ngui Yew Kit (2012), op. cit., p. 79. 22 See Keesing’s contemporary archives. London: Keesing Limited (1931-c1986), p. 7695a. Cited in Thongs in (2002). 23 As Thailand was still concluded in Art. 7 of the peace treaty with Britain that expressly prohibited the construction of the Kra Canal. See Dobbs (2015), op. cit., p. 178. 24 What followed were the “Exchanges of Notes” between Thailand and Britain in 1954 to drop the restriction to build the canal, as Thailand had committed earlier in 1952 to Britain not to “try to build a canal”. See Dobbs (2015), op. cit., p. 179. 25 Dobbs (2015), op. cit., p. 179. 26 Dobbs (2015), pp. 179–80. 27 The new Kra Canal, designed by GPDC, aimed as a grand one with large ports on either side of the peninsula and a fleet of coastal vessels to shuttle goods around the region. The canal-building justification was widely beyond Thailand’s imagination to get even remarked from Singapore’s new prime ,inister, Lee Kuan Yew, at the time, and also an article published in The Economist in 1963. See Dobbs (2015), p. 180. 28 Storey (2019). 29 Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton (TAMS). 30 Storey (2019). 31 Chow, himself, the GPDC director, with close links with the Thai National Executive Council (NEC) at the time, was a strong proponent and so instrumental in pushing the Kra Canal construction, by making visits to the United States in July and August 1972 to promote the project where he also discussed with representatives of the Atomic Energy Agency to explore nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. See Dobbs (2015), pp. 180–81. 32 See Graham (2019), cited in Storey (2019). 33 It was during the Thaksin regime in 2004 when the Senate endorsed Route 9A, to be called Klong Thai, or Thai Canal. See Report of Senate Ad Hoc Committee on the Feasibility Study to Dig the Kra Canal, May 2004, p. 17 (in Thai), cited in Chalermpalanupap (2021). 34 See Chalermpalanupap (2021). 35 See Chalermpalanupap (2021). 36 According to TaschaiInthavises, head of TCASD’s Trang Provincial Chater, cited in Chalermpalanupap (2021). 37 Chalermpalanupap (2021). 38 According to TCCITA’s deputy director, Pakdee Tanapura, who also worked under Bhokin Palakula, a former president of the House of Representatives, also under the Thaksin regime back in 2004. See Storey (2019) 39 See Storey (2019).

290  Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh

40 See Siam Focus Time (in Thai), 3 December 2020, cited in Chalermpalanupap (2021). 41 Price tag varies from between US$ 20 and 30 billion. For some, it will cost US$ 28 billion, with another US$ 22 billion for special economic zones. See Kerdphol and Wagner (2018), p. 67 and p. 76. 42 Manager online, 3 September 2020. 43 For Harald Wagner, a former World Bank consultant, also a proponent of the project, “Technically, it is easy to solve”, as the Kra route would be at sea level and require no elaborate system of locks, unlike canals in Europe and Panama, for example. See Kerdpholand Wagner (2018), p. 78. 44 The Thaiger (2020). 45 The Thaiger (2020). 46 Chirathivat, Tingsabadh, and De (2022).

References Acharya, A. (2017). East of India, South of China: Sino-Indian Encounters in Southeast Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bangkok Post. (2015, June). Kra Canal dream still far from reality. https://www​ .bangkokpost​.com ​/thailand ​/special​-reports​/584473​/ kra​- canal​- dream​- still​-far​ -from​-reality Borell, B. (2013). Han period glass vessels in the early Tongking Gulf region in Cooke, N., Tana, L., and Anderson, J. A. (eds) The Tongking Gulf Through History. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p. 65. Bourdonnais, Comte A. Mahe de la. (2014). A French Engineer in Burma and Siam (1880): With a Discussion on the Kra Canal. Bangkok: White Lotus. Chalermpalanupap, T. (2021, January 22). Canals and land bridges: Megainfrastructure proposals in Southern Thailand. ISEAS Perspective. Chirathivat, S., Tingsabadh, C., and De, P. (2022). Between the Two Oceans of Indo-Pacific: Strengthening the Myanmar-Thailand Southern Corridor. India: SAGE Publishing. Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. Dobbs, S. (2015, January). Thailand’s Kra isthmus and elusive canal plans since the 1850s. Trans-Regional and National Studies of Southeast Asia, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 166. Graham, E. (2019). Japan’s Sea Lane Security, 1940–2004: A Matter of Life and Death? London and New York: Routledge, p. 165. Kerdphol, S. and Wagner, H. (2018). Kra Canal: Spanning the Oceans Partnership Continents. Bangkok: Kra Isthmus Development Company Limited, p. 67 and p. 76. Ngui Yew Kit, C. (2012). Kra canal (1824–1910): “The elusive dream”. Akademika, Vol. 82, No. 1, p. 71. Songsiri, V. (2020). ค  อคอดกระ-Kra Isthmus ในจ�ดท��โลกจากอ�าวเบงกอลและทะเลจ�นใต� พบก�น (มลููนิิธิเิ ลก็็ประไพวิิรยิิะพััน์ธ์ ).� [Kra Isthmus - Kra Isthmus at the point where the worlds from the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea meet. (Lek-Prapai Foundation Viriyabhan)] (in Thai). Storey, I. (2019, September 24). Kra canal project: Pros, cons and potential game changers. ISEAS Perspective, No. 76. The Thaiger. (2020, September 12). Thai Kra canal – numbers don’t stack up (mimeograph).

Between the Two Seas of Indo-Pacific 291

Thongsin, A. (2002). The Kra canal and Thai security. Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School (mimeograph). Zawacki, B. (2018, November 9). Thailand: The missing link in China’s Maritime Silk Road. The Daily Report.

Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group

http://taylorandfrancis.com

INDEX

13th National Economic and Social Development Plan (2016-2020) 253–254 14th National Economic and Social Development Plan (2021-2025) 254 15th Shangri-La Dialogue 57 1952 United States–Japan bilateral security treaty 136 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 24, 62, 68, 71, 72, 82 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security 183 2017 ASEAN Summits 131 2017 US National Security Strategy 218, 252 2019 Defence Strategy in the IndoPacific (France) 183–184 30th anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations 101 30th anniversary of the ASEAN-ROK partnership 54 34th ASEAN Summit 6, 22, 54, 78, 81, 93, 95 56th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 32 5th Science and Technology Basic Plan (2016) (Japan) 257, 258 A Act East Policy (India) 4, 11, 67, 122–124, 126, 129, 132, 225–226

Africa-Asia connections 1, 3, 13, 34, 65, 74, 102, 107, 112, 116, 120, 127, 132, 137, 176, 183, 190, 218, 230, 233, 237, 244, 253, 284 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) 222, 233, 238 African exports to Asia 220, 222–224, 226, 229, 231, 233, 234, 237, 238 alliance dynamics 138–139 America’s Engagement in the AsiaPacific 120 America First 5, 146 American economy 109 APEC Privacy Framework 211 ASEAN’s Comprehensive Recovery Framework (ACRF) 224–225 ASEAN’s digital economy and data ecosystem 210 ASEAN’s digital infrastructure development 198 ASEAN’s GDP 197, 234 ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific vision xxi 4, 24, 67, 93, 225 ASEAN’s post-pandemic recovery 12, 213 ASEAN8 group 245 ASEAN8-SSA cooperation 245 ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce (2019) 209 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANFTA) 70 

294 Index

ASEAN Centrality xix, xx, 9–10, 25, 29, 33, 37, 41–46, 50, 54, 83, 86, 87, 89, 93, 96, 132, 147, 153–155, 161, 162, 178, 224–225, 244 ASEAN-China FTA 221 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) 26, 44, 162, 177 ASEAN Digital Integration Framework 54, 209 ASEAN Digital Master Plan 2025 209, 210 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 23, 99, 199, 200, 209, 224–225, 261, 263 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 23 ASEAN Framework on Digital Data Governance (2018) 209–210 ASEAN Framework on Personal Data Protection (2016) 209 ASEAN-led mechanisms 162 ASEAN mobile broadband market 203 ASEAN multilateralism 57 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) xxi 4, 6, 8–10, 12, 19, 22, 26, 29, 41–42, 44, 45, 50, 54, 56, 57, 60–61, 78, 81–84, 86–87, 89, 90, 93, 95, 96, 101, 121, 122, 162, 198, 212–214, 218, 264 ASEAN Plus One mechanism 26 ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) 261, 263 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) xix, 25, 26, 42, 44, 51, 53, 132, 167, 264 ASEAN-Russia Strategic Partnership 162, 163 ASEAN-Russia Work Plan on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) 162–163 ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) 28 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) 261, 263 ASEAN vision 24, 162, 218, 224 Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) 132 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 84, 128, 162 Asian great powers xxii 3, 10 Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions 22, 35, 41, 44, 198, 212 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) xvii, xix 1, 28, 49, 62, 69, 92, 128, 150, 155, 162, 211, 223

Asia-Pacific Rim countries 240 Asia-Pacific xvi, xvii–xviii, xix, 1–3, 10, 11, 20, 22, 28, 35, 41, 49, 51, 60, 69, 70, 72, 78, 79, 81, 95, 96, 98, 107, 108, 113, 116, 119–121, 123, 128, 140, 150, 155, 162, 163, 166, 198, 212, 220, 222, 240, 248 AUKUS 13, 37, 42–43, 56, 80, 84, 110– 111, 116–117, 131, 148, 152–155, 166–167, 175, 185, 189, 217, 240 Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy xvii, xix 2, 4, 6, 8, 10–11, 13, 20–21, 28, 35–38, 42, 50–52, 56, 65, 70–71, 73, 78–81, 84, 93, 95–96, 102, 107, 110–113, 115, 121–122, 125, 128–132, 137–139, 145, 147–149, 151–155, 161, 166–167, 173–174, 177–178, 181, 183, 185–186, 188–190, 211–212, 214, 217–218, 226, 240, 246, 262 Australian government’s National Security Strategy of 2013 21 Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) 28, 101 B Bali Concord III 40 Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations 40 Bandung conference of 1955 xvii, 246 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Forum 100, 113 Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA) 132 Bay of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) 28, 126, 259–261, 284 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) xxi 3, 4, 6, 10–11, 14, 20, 24, 26, 45, 53, 82, 93, 96–102, 109, 113, 115, 116, 132, 146, 151, 220, 222, 253–254, 262, 264, 275, 278, 280, 287 Brunei Darussalam–Indonesia– Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) 28 Build Back Better World initiative 102 C Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) 96, 204, 261

Index 295

Cambodia ‘s Indo-Pacific strategy 10, 67, 79, 85–90, 201 Cambodia-China relations 82, 96, 114, 154, 244, 246 China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 53, 96, 98 China’s assertiveness 5, 145 China’s labour-intensive industries 244 China’s Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) 97, 101, 102 China’s naval aspirations 95 China’s rise 10, 69, 108, 115, 116, 121, 156, 168, 220–221, 280, 287 China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) 84, 178–179 China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) 100 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 115 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 100 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 108, 109, 116 Chinese economy 109, 203 Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) 253 Chinese strategy 3, 6, 8, 10, 20, 24, 26, 36-37, 49-50, 52-55, 62, 68, 80, 82, 98-102, 107-109, 110-116, 119, 121, 125, 129, 147, 151, 161, 166, 168, 174, 183, 219-222, 231, 234, 236, 240, 253, 262, 270, 280 Chumpon-Ranong Land Bridge 281 Chumpon-Ranong Raillink 281 Cold War xviii, xix 4–5, 8, 20, 22, 26, 29, 37, 51, 52, 60, 61, 79, 80, 88, 116, 160, 244, 246 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 177 Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) 132 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 8, 62, 64, 70–71, 113, 134, 137–139, 144–146, 149–151, 224 Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) 163 Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSP) 63, 71 Comprehensive Strategy on Science, Technology, and Innovation for 2017 258

conceptualisation of international order 33–34, 39 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) 162 Confluence of the Two Seas 4, 37, 78, 120, 133, 136–137 containment strategy 50, 80, 121, 122, 129 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) 73 Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) 162–163 COVID-19 pandemic 8, 12–13, 50, 56, 64, 71, 80, 82, 92–93, 96, 101–102, 140, 144, 147–148, 152–153, 165, 190, 197–200, 211, 220, 231, 239–240, 247, 252–253, 255 Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (CRIMARIO) 177 D Developing Asia (DA) 231, 233–235, 237, 238 Developing countries (DCs) 229–231, 233–239, 244–248 digital connectivity in ASEAN 197, 198, 200 digital economy 13, 23, 84, 86, 148– 150, 198–200, 202–204, 207–211, 214 Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) 151, 211 digital infrastructure 12, 27–28, 197–202, 208, 210, 213–214 digital literacy and skills 12, 198–200, 203–204, 210, 213 digital technology 197, 199, 200, 208, 209 disruption of supply chains 199 divide-and-rule strategy 11, 114, 117 E East Asia and Pacific (EAP) 229, 230, 233–234, 240 East Asia Summit (EAS) xvii, xix, 2, 22, 25, 26, 29, 37, 38, 42–44, 51–52, 69, 83, 122, 126–128, 132, 155, 162–167, 177 East-West corridor 97 EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 84, 89, 109, 133, 176, 175–181 EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 211 EU naval operations 178

296 Index

EU preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 187 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) 73, 255 exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 21, 25, 62, 71, 113, 115, 124, 182, 184, 189, 219 F Five Power Defence Agreements (FPDA) 51 Forum for Indo-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC) 123–124 France’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific 12, 21, 72, 78, 81, 107, 110–111, 128, 130, 133, 136, 138–139, 173, 175, 181–190, 218, 254, 271 Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) xxi 2, 5, 6, 8, 11, 24, 36, 49, 50, 53, 65, 66, 69, 78, 80, 81, 84, 86–88, 90, 92–94, 96–98, 109, 120, 131, 136–138, 146, 153, 218, 262, 264 G G-7 Summit 93, 102 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 132 geopolitics xvii, xviii, 37, 67, 173, 176, 251 German strategy in the Indo-Pacific 12, 72, 78, 81, 107, 110, 136, 139, 166, 173, 181, 186–188, 190, 218, 220, 254, 257 Global Development Initiative (GDI) 151 Global Gateway 138, 174 Global South 13, 112, 240 global value chains (GVCs) 13, 23, 221, 233, 235–240, 247, 255, 261, 262 great powers xix, xxii, 3–5, 8–10, 13, 25, 33, 37–39, 44, 46, 51–52, 60–62, 71, 90, 94, 97 Group of Twenty (G20) 21, 28, 45, 73 I India’s ‘multi-alignment’ approach 127 India’s Act East endeavours 125 India’s Indo-Pacific vision 4, 11, 13, 21, 68, 71, 95, 120–124, 126–127, 130, 132, 133, 218

India’s Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) 67, 97, 126 India’s MILAN 99 India’s trade with ASEAN xviii n.67, 117, 124, 149–151, 214, 217, 222– 225, 227, 240–242, 260, 280, 287 India-ASEAN commemorative summit 124 India-Australia-Indonesia (IAI) 132 India-Australia-Japan 132, 178 India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations 129 India-China relationships 23, 122, 125, 129–131, 165, 167 India–Myanmar 99, 100 Indian and the Western Pacific Oceans 119, 137 Indian Ocean Commission 185 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 28, 124, 126, 185 India-Russia partnership 126, 130, 161–162, 165, 167 India-US cooperation 129, 131–132, 147, 218 Indonesia’s economic role 44–45, 149, 177, 197–198, 200–201, 206, 208, 218, 221, 237, 243–244 Indonesia’s Indo Pacific strategy xix 9, 33, 35–43, 45, 83, 93, 107, 121, 139, 150, 154–155, 186, 190, 245, 264 Indonesia-China 108, 113–116 Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defence (CHOD) Conference 60, 74 Indo-Pacific construct xix, 12, 61, 83, 119–121, 125–128, 130, 132, 133 Indo-Pacific Consultations 124 Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept 41, 50 Indo-Pacific Discourse xxii, 7–9, 25, 37, 50, 61, 119 Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) 69 Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) xix, 11, 64, 69, 71, 113, 144, 145, 147, 149–152, 154–155, 264 Indo-Pacific engagements 123, 124 Indo-Pacific framework 10, 11, 62–65, 67, 74, 87, 121 Indo-Pacific geopolitics 10 Indo-Pacific Initiative(s) 10, 11, 44, 61, 107, 110, 111, 153–154 Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) xxi 6, 78, 81, 126, 130, 162

Index 297

Indo-Pacific region 10, 11, 13, 21–24, 26, 29, 30, 40, 41, 44, 56, 66–69, 79, 83, 93, 95, 96, 100, 112, 120, 124–126, 129–132, 136, 161, 167, 173, 183, 185, 198, 213, 226 Indo-Pacific shift 50, 53–54 Indo-Pacific strategy(ies) (IPS) 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 24, 36, 63, 65, 67, 71, 73, 79, 80, 84, 87, 89, 92, 93, 95, 96, 99, 102, 109, 110, 116, 144–147, 162, 165, 168, 175, 176, 178, 179, 181, 184–186, 224, 240, 262 Indo-Pacific Treaty for Friendship and Cooperation 40, 44 Industry 4.0 256–257 Integrated Defence Review of 2021 188–189 intense geopolitical competition 176–177 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 139 International Energy Agency (IEA) 29 Inter-regional cooperation 240, 245 isolationist pacifism 140 J Japan’s defence doctrine 139, 140 Japan’s FOIP xxi, 2, 5–6, 8, 11, 49–50, 53, 65–66, 69, 78, 80–81, 84, 86–88, 90, 92–93, 96–98, 133–134, 136–138, 262, 264 Japan’s Mekong-Japan Cooperation 97 Japan-America-India (JAI) 132 Joint Vision Statement on an IndiaVietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030 68 K Klong Thai 14, 268, 275, 289 Kra Canal 267, 268, 271–273, 275, 276, 280, 288, 289 Kra Isthmus 14, 267–273, 277, 280, 286–288 L least developed countries (LDCs) 233, 243, 247 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) 132 Look East Policy 4, 11, 67, 122–123 Lower Mekong Initiative of 2009 101

M Malacca Strait 191, 261, 272, 278, 280, 283, 284, 286 maritime cooperation 6, 23–24, 27, 54, 83, 213 Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 12, 24, 27, 45, 209, 213, 245, 264 Mekong 28, 54, 87, 97, 101 Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) 67, 97, 126 Mekong Peace Park 87 Mekong-ROK Summit 54 Mekong sub-regional cooperation frameworks 28 Mekong-US Partnership (MUSP) 97, 101 minilateralism xix, 37, 43–44, 46, 130–132, 136, 138, 184–185 multilateralism xix, xxi 6, 9–11, 25, 33, 38, 41, 57, 61, 70, 73–74, 84, 86, 88, 89, 100, 102, 123–124, 126, 130–131, 146, 160, 161, 169, 174, 177–179, 183–185, 187, 229, 244–245 multipolar 8, 9, 19, 29, 80, 89, 126, 240, 244, 246, 247 Munich Security Conference 160, 163 Myanmar’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 10, 92–94, 96–98, 201–207, 234, 244 N NATO of the East 80 Neighbourhood First 122, 132 New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) 247 New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor (NILSTC) 101 new normal 114 new regional bipolarity 169 New World Order 13, 80, 166, 251–252 Nine Bridges programme 164 non-alignment 26, 29, 51, 52, 73, 246–247 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 50, 55, 80, 110, 112, 159–160, 166–168, 187,255 North-North trade 229 North-South economic corridor 97 North-South trade 229 Northwestern corridor 97

298 Index

O OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 211 Official Development Aid (ODA) 65 One Belt One Road (OBOR)/Belt Road Initiative (BRI) 3, 94, 96, 100, 108, 110 P Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Thailand and the EU 255 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 117, 166 people-to-people connectivity 24, 28, 138, 213 Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) Act 139 Philippines ‘s Indo-Pacifique strategy 22, 51, 62, 107, 113–116, 149, 155, 198, 200, 207, 244, 261–262 proactive pacifism 136, 140 Q Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) xix 2, 21, 50, 66, 84, 95, 96, 99–101, 116, 117, 122, 124, 125, 127, 129–132, 135, 139, 140, 142, 145, 147, 148, 153, 154, 167, 168, 178, 185, 217, 226, 227, 240 QUAD Summit 79, 153 R rebalancing strategy 108, 121 recalibration of Russian foreign policy 168 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) xix 6, 8, 13, 23, 25, 26, 45, 54, 62, 64, 70, 113, 125, 134, 138, 151, 212–215, 219, 221, 224, 225, 227, 233, 240, 260–261, 264 regional international order 33–35, 38, 39 Regionalism xvii 50, 53, 83, 88, 89, 245, 248 regional stability 11, 90, 263, 264 regional value chains (RVCs) 8, 221, 233, 255, 280 RIMPAC (“Rim of the Pacific”) 139 Russia’s economic policy in Asia 156, 164–165, 255–256

Russia’s relations with China 165–168, 190 Russia’s relations with India 165 Russia’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific xxii, 3, 5, 7, 11–12, 63, 67, 73–74, 80, 88, 112, 121, 125–128, 132, 159–169, 255 Russia-India-China (RIC) 132, 167 Russian-American relations 160 Russian-Japan relations 163–164 Russian pivot to the East 164 S Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) 126 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 255 Sino-American rivalry 60, 187 Sino-Indian relations 112 Sinotisation 270 Society 5.0 256–259 South China Sea (SCS)/East Sea xxi, 4, 6, 8, 10, 14, 24, 53, 56, 60–64, 66, 68, 70–74, 93, 96, 98, 109, 110, 113–116, 145, 148, 219, 221, 261–263, 270 South corridor 97 Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) protocol 40, 42 Southern land bridge 269, 280 South Korea’s Mekong-Republic of Korea (ROK) Cooperation 97 South-South Cooperation 23, 240, 244, 246, 247 South-South trade 13, 229, 231, 233, 235–236 Strategic equilibrium 56, 57, 131 strategic foresight 251 Strategic new equilibrium 10, 56–57 Strategic Partnership Agreement(s) 63, 67, 138, 174 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 13, 230 Summit of Democracy 155 Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) 125, 226 systemic rival 112, 130, 178, 179 T Taiwan Strait 8, 15, 24, 56, 109-110, 115, 145, 179 THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) 111

Index 299

Thai’s Indo-Pacifique strategy 10, 14, 22, 50–57, 107, 114, 121, 139, 147, 244, 254, 256, 259–265, 268, 287 Thai Canal 14, 267–269, 275–280, 287, 288 Thai-Cobra Gold exercise 97 Thai-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 255 threat of China 95 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 6, 26, 69, 113, 137, 240 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 40, 42, 43, 51, 83 U Ukrainian crisis 10, 60, 64, 72–74, 110, 112, 116, 130, 144, 148, 149, 160, 164, 166, 168, 174, 190, 255, 256 UN General Assembly (UNGA) 72, 131 United Kingdom’s strategy in the IndoPacific 12–13, 51, 56, 72, 78, 80–81, 84, 111, 128, 131, 136, 139, 148, 152, 154, 166–167, 173, 181, 185, 187–190, 218, 219, 255 United States-ASEAN ties 148 United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) 92, 94 United States Pacific Command (US-PACOM) 92 US’s Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) 97 US-ASEAN Summit 2022 45, 151, 156 US-China rivalry 46, 80, 82, 87, 89, 90, 240 US-Indonesia ties 115

US Indo-Pacific Economic Framework 11, 264 US-led containment strategy 121 US strategy 11, 24, 69, 109, 145, 152, 252 US Summit with ASEAN 147–148 US-Thailand security treaty 114 US-Vietnam 61, 64, 70 V Vietnam’s Indo-Pacific strategy 63, 69 Vietnam’s maritime policy in South China Sea 61, 63, 65, 68, 70 Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy 61, 65, 71, 73 Vietnam- China relationships 63–65, 70, 72 W West coast of India 35, 109, 218 Western corridors 97 western Indian Ocean 126 Western powers 10, 246, 271 western shores of the United States 35, 109, 218 Wolf Warrior diplomacy 111, 112, 116 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 27, 28, 85, 220, 221, 234 WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) 28 Z zero-sum game 22, 33, 41, 42, 54 ZOPFAN declaration 51