Indias Nuclear Security 9781626373631

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INDIA’S NUCLEAR SECURITY

INDIA’S NUCLEAR SECURITY EDITED BY

RAJU G. C. THOMAS AMIT GUPTA

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2000 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 2000 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data India’s nuclear security / edited by Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-928-4 (hc. : alk. paper) 1. Nuclear weapons—India. 2. India—Military policy. 3. National security—India. I. Thomas, Raju G. C. II. Gupta, Amit, 1958– . UA840.I4822 2000 355.02'17'0954—dc21 00-028261

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

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Contents

1 Introduction Raju G. C. Thomas and Amit Gupta

2 Why Did India “Go Nuclear”? Stephen P. Cohen

3 Explaining the Indian Nuclear Tests of 1998 Sumit Ganguly 4 India’s Strategic Doctrine and Practice: The Impact of Nuclear Testing Deepa M. Ollapally 5 India’s Nuclear and Missile Programs: Strategy, Intentions, Capabilities Raju G. C. Thomas

6 India’s Nuclear Decision: Implications for Indian-U.S. Relations Mohammed Ayoob

7 Pakistan’s Elusive Search for Nuclear Parity with India Farah Zahra

8 South Asia’s Ballistic Missile Ambitions Ben Sheppard

9 Technology for Defense and Development: India’s Space Program Dinshaw Mistry v

1 13 37 67 87 123 145 171 201

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CONTENTS

10 The Indian Economy After Pokhran II Prem Shankar Jha

11 Is an Otherwise Sensible Agreement with India and Pakistan Precluded Because It Would “Reward” Nuclear Testing? Clifford E. Singer 12 Lest We Forget: The Futility and Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons for India S. R. Valluri 13 A Nuclear Arms Control Agenda for India Amit Gupta

List of Acronyms Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

221 241 263 275 293 297 305 309 325

1 Introduction Raju G. C. Thomas and Amit Gupta

The series of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 has substantially altered the regional and global security environments. The nature of the domestic and international political debates has now shifted from the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation to the management of a “proliferated” South Asia and its implications for potential proliferation elsewhere. Efforts at one time to establish a nuclear weapons free zone are now being directed toward the maintenance of a nuclear weapons safe zone. This book examines some of the problems that have arisen in the Indian case and proposed Indian policies to resolve them. It attempts to address the following questions:

• Why did India decide to resume testing after a gap of twenty-four

years? • What are the political and economic consequences of this decision? • What type of nuclear doctrine and force structure is likely to emerge, and how does India’s technological capability support it? • What impact will the tests have on the future of India’s relationship with the United States, the main bulwark against nuclear weapons proliferation? The question is especially important since the United States is now the sole superpower, and it is perhaps the only country that can influence policy in both Islamabad and New Delhi. India views its future economic and technological modernization

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as requiring U.S. financial and technological inputs. Pakistan cannot do without them. • What factors drive Pakistani nuclear policy? Is Pakistani policy simply a mirror image of India’s policy, or does it have its own autonomous domestic and international variables that sustain its nuclear weapons program? • Finally, what types of arms control measures might succeed in stabilizing the South Asian nuclear rivalry? BACKGROUND

TO THE INDIAN

NUCLEAR DEBATE

The debate in India as to whether it should acquire a nuclear weapons capability has been perennial ever since China tested its first atomic bomb in October 1964, two years after the crushing military defeat inflicted by Chinese forces on the Indian army in the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Subsequently, during the East Pakistani secessionist movement in 1971, Pakistan’s two allies, the United States and China, threatened to intervene militarily if India were to resolve the crisis by force. Concurrently, there were moves by President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to forge a quasi-alliance relationship with the communist regime in China to counter the growth of Soviet military power, thereby aggravating indirectly India’s security concerns. To deter the possibility of military intervention by the United States or China, India entered into a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union in August 1971 that included military clauses. Then in early December 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proceeded to use military force to resolve the Bangladesh issue and the refugee burden imposed on India by the Pakistani civil war. Two years later in May 1974, India conducted its first underground atomic test at Pokhran in Rajasthan. This was partly a delayed Indian response to strategic conditions in the aftermath of Sino-U.S. rapprochement, where the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence provided by the Soviet Union to India appeared dubious. However, Prime Minister Gandhi’s underlying motive may also have been to distract the Indian public’s attention from the deteriorating domestic political and economic conditions. Having exploded the only nuclear device it had assembled, India returned to the status of a non–nuclear weapons state after the 1974 atomic test. However, Pakistan escalated its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability as a response to its defeat and dismemberment in the 1971 IndoPakistani war and the newly demonstrated Indian nuclear capability. As

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Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared at the time, Pakistanis were willing “to eat grass” to match India’s nuclear capability. Thus before 1974, the Indian debate on whether to acquire a nuclear deterrent revolved around the Chinese nuclear threat, but after 1974 the Indian debate focused primarily on the potential Pakistani nuclear threat, with the added danger of nuclear collusion between Pakistan and China. In the 1990s, when the threat from China had receded considerably, especially following the 1994 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement between the two countries, the threat from Pakistan continued to rise over continuing Pakistani military, material, and manpower support for the Kashmiri separatist movement. Yet when India proceeded to conduct the series of nuclear tests in May 1998, the initial reason provided by the newly formed coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was the growth of Chinese nuclear capabilities. However, the BJP and its predecessor, the Hindu nationalist party Jana Sangh from which the BJP emerged, had been declaring since the 1960s that they would turn India into a nuclear weapons power if the Hindu nationalists ever gained the reins of the central government. This promise was reiterated during the election campaign of January–February 1998, and the promise was fulfilled within two months of the BJP achieving power in March. Domestic support for the Indian nuclear tests was overwhelming, with almost every party, including the Congress, endorsing the new policy. The lines between domestic politics and interparty rivalries and international politics and nuclear proliferation issues had become blurred. Pakistan responded immediately with its own series of nuclear tests in May 1998, and China reacted angrily to the Indian tests and the claim that India’s nuclear capability was directed at China. By mid-1999, India’s arguments for a nuclear deterrent had shifted to general and global considerations that included a weak Russia dependent on the West, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) expansion and massive use of force against Yugoslavia over its province of Kosovo, and the general lack of countervailing power in a Western-dominant unipolar military world. There were other Indian concerns about global security arrangements. The perpetual discrimination between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” was reiterated by the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995. Western pressures on India to sign the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would require India to forgo further testing, acquired added significance in India’s rationalization for maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent. Following the Indo-Pakistani border war that took place in the Kargil sector along the line of control (LOC) in Kashmir in mid-1999, the nuclear

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question in South Asia moved from an intellectual and theoretical level of discussion to a crisis and practical level of policy. The strategic adage that nuclear weapons states do not even engage in conventional war for fear of escalation to nuclear levels was severely tested in the border war over Kargil, which Pakistani forces seized temporarily on the Indian side of the LOC. Unstable governments in India and Pakistan in the 1990s have given the nuclear question in South Asia added urgency. The Kargil crisis demonstrated that India’s problems of external conventional and nuclear military threats cannot be separated from problems of internal security arising from violent ethnic separatist movements in Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, and the tribal states in the northeast. Kashmiri and Sikh separatists have received sanctuary in Pakistan to conduct guerrilla warfare and terrorist activities in Kashmir and Punjab. If combating insurgency through the deployment of 500,000 troops in Kashmir proved inadequate in the past, the deployment of nuclear weapons in the face of increasing resort to terrorist strategies by Kashmiri separatists would appear to be irrelevant. When Pakistani nationals in support of Kashmiri militants wishing to annex the state to Pakistan hijacked an Indian Airlines plane in late December 1999, thus endangering more than 170 passengers and crew, it illustrated the complexity of defending India against a variety of threats, both internal and external. The benefits of a costly program of establishing nuclear deterrence under such security conditions are dubious. However, these arguments may also be advanced against the five nuclear-armed permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Thus, when examining India’s nuclear motives, we need to examine also the search for power and prestige on the world stage and the Indian desire to be treated on par with China, Britain, and France, respect that it has failed to achieve thus far. INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS

The May 1998 tests were viewed with concern by the international community because they were the first case of overt weaponization since the coming into force of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970. India’s earlier test in 1974 was considered an aberration because India did not subsequently proceed with a weapons program. In addition, the tests reversed a process of nuclear rollback that had been in progress since the end of the Cold War. Nonproliferation appeals and measures appeared to have partially succeeded in stemming the programs of Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa, although it was subsequently revealed that South

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Africa’s apartheid regime had covertly and successfully built and stockpiled six nuclear bombs. All three former “holdout” states have now adhered to the NPT and the full-scope safeguards of the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelelco, an NPT substitute. South Africa signed the NPT in 1993, Argentina in 1995, and Brazil in 1998. Following reports in the early 1990s that North Korea had successfully assembled the bomb at its Yongbyon nuclear facilities, the United States was able to reach an agreement with North Korea to reorient the direction of its nuclear program. Intensive diplomatic efforts also induced Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to return all their Soviet-origin nuclear weapons to Russia. That left only India, Pakistan, and Israel as the main NPT holdout states. Israel has allegedly stockpiled between 300 and 400 untested bombs, the so-called bombs-in-the-basement. In such a global environment, the Indian and Pakistani tests suggested that the nuclear genie was once again being let loose into a world that appeared to have successfully contained the spread of the bomb. Indeed, at the end of the Cold War, one U.S. analyst had even gone as far as to proclaim that Washington should no longer think in terms of managing the war against proliferation but in terms of winning the war against it. The nuclearization of South Asia has also raised the fear that India and especially Pakistan may transfer nuclear and delivery systems technology to other countries. The old concern that Pakistan was building an Islamic bomb to be shared with other Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and Libya appears less critical and convincing today. But the worry remains that Indian and Pakistani efforts to secure their nuclear establishments and arsenals are inadequate and the two nations could lose a portion of their nuclear arsenals through clandestine transfers, theft, or even terrorist infiltration. The lack of sophisticated and sufficient facilities and capabilities for command, control, communications, computerization, intelligence, and information (C-4/I-2) could cause a sudden breakdown in mutual deterrence between India and Pakistan leading to catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear South Asia also brought about a more fundamental problem for Western and particularly U.S. nonproliferation policy. Post–Cold War nonproliferation policy was formulated to deal with rogue states—authoritarian regimes that sought to upset the status quo in the international or regional spheres. India and Pakistan, however, were democratic nations and considered to be friendly states. Dealing with friendly proliferation presented an entirely different set of problems, as was evidenced by the subsequent soft-line approach the major powers took to proliferation in the region. Halfhearted and apologetic disapprovals were expressed by

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Western leaders. The Indian and Pakistani decisions were regretted. Almost all immediate enforcement of economic sanctions in the aftermath of the May 1998 tests was lifted a year later. The pro-bomb lobby in India had calculated rightly that the West would get used to a nuclear India and learn to live with it. What they had not calculated was the resolve and ability of Pakistan to match India test for test, with both bombs and missiles. At the regional level, there was the danger that a conventional conflict between the two states might escalate into a nuclear conflict. Coupled with this was the possibility that the two countries’ nuclear forces lacked sufficient safeguards to prevent accidents or even an accidental launch. Unlike the great territorial distances between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War, no such distance exists between India and Pakistan, which are geographically smaller countries, uncomfortably adjacent to each other, and heavily populated. The danger of catastrophic nuclear war in South Asia may be greater. Indeed, many nuclear analysts, including those in the U.S. and British governments, believe that if a nuclear war did ever take place, it would be in South Asia. From the perspective of the Indian and Pakistani governments, nuclearization provided a different set of problems. Tests were carried out on both sides without a coherent nuclear doctrine or any appreciation of the technological capabilities that would be required to bring the doctrine to fruition. Part of the purpose of this volume is to suggest a doctrine that would serve to maintain Indian security interests yet, at the same time, not lead to an escalation of sanctions and threats against the country. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the rationale for testing and the political implications of the tests. THE NATURE

OF THE

DISCUSSIONS

Chapter 2 by Stephen Cohen and Chapter 3 by Sumit Ganguly attempt to explain the rationale for going nuclear. Cohen asks, “How did India reach a point at which four or five men could and did step across an important threshold and order the detonation of nuclear devices that were unashamedly designed as weapons—and then publicly declare that India was a nuclear weapons state?” He argues that a set of medium-term factors that emerged since 1990 influenced the decision to test, including the deterioration of the strategic environment caused by the rise of China, the reluctance of the United States to become a declining power, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and Pakistan’s arrival at nuclear parity. Further, India’s political system underwent changes, with the rise of the BJP, that

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made the bomb issue more salient, and for the first time in decades the economic cost of going nuclear was viewed as a minor issue by most Indians. Ganguly discredits the belief that a jingoistic BJP tested nuclear devices to appease the more radical sections of the party and to gain domestic political benefits. Instead, he suggests that three reasons led to the decision to test: (1) an incremental and fitful acquisition of capability to develop nuclear weapons; (2) the shifting calculations of the Indian leadership in responding to a mix of ideological, statecraft, and domestic pressures; and (3) the continued perception of external threats and the absence of a security guarantee from friendly nuclear states. Ganguly concludes by discussing the prospects for negotiating peace with Pakistan and China. Having once been a major proponent of India’s signing the NPT as a way of optimizing India’s strategic and economic interests, Raju Thomas argues in Chapter 5 that an Indian nuclear deterrent may be a necessary evil. His earlier arguments had rested on the belief that going nuclear would bring India less security at a higher economic price. Such a decision would compel Pakistan to follow suit and aggravate the Chinese nuclear threat rather than alleviate it. A three-way nuclear arms race, even if stable and manageable, would be a costly affair. However, if India’s signature on the NPT could compel Pakistan to sign it, then India would win the conventional arms race in South Asia, ending the Pakistani threat to Kashmir and stabilizing Indo-Pakistani relations. Meanwhile, India had lived with the Chinese nuclear threat for more than thirty-five years under more hostile conditions and could continue to do so under friendlier conditions. As far as vertical nuclear proliferation by the five nuclear weapons states was concerned, if the rest of the world could live with it, so could India. An Indian decision to exercise its threatened nuclear weapons option would not resolve this problem but lead to further proliferation in the Middle East, Central Asia, and East Asia, thus making the world and India less secure. From this “regional-to-global” security perspective, Thomas now takes a “global-to-regional” perspective, arguing that a nuclear weapons deterrent may be necessary in a unipolar military world where an unrivaled and powerful U.S.-led NATO is expanding and threatening to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states on humanitarian grounds. NATO’s use of massive conventional force in the former Yugoslavia, with Russia unable to deter the attack against its close ally Serbia, holds lessons for India as well. Although Russia’s nuclear arsenal may deter another “humanitarian intervention” by NATO over its war against Chechen

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rebels, Moscow could no longer deter potential Western military intervention in Kashmir. At the beginning of a new century, India may find it comparatively more advantageous to adopt China’s defense posture of maintaining strong conventional and nuclear weapons capabilities since the security concerns of the two countries are not fundamentally different. Thomas concludes that although a regional analysis suggests that going nuclear may be expensive, a global analysis suggests that security concerns have shifted in favor of an independent Indian nuclear deterrent. According to Thomas, a draft Indian nuclear doctrine that goes beyond “minimum deterrence” (defined as the minimum capability for a retaliatory strike against Pakistan and China) to a posture of “credible deterrence” (based on development of intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs] providing a credible global nuclear reach) may be unavoidable. All five nuclear powers have flexed their conventional military capabilities over Kosovo, Chechnya, and Taiwan with no fear of military actions against them from each other. However, the costs of a global nuclear deterrent capability must avoid destabilizing the Indian economy. The dubious luxury of India’s global nuclear deterrence posture could be domestic economic and political destabilization. Economic power has become an essential component of world power and influence, as the economic prosperity of nuclear China and the economic plight of nuclear Russia have demonstrated. In any case, the entire discussion of whether India did the right thing may be moot because the BJP’s nuclear decision now seems irreversible. Future governments may also find it difficult to reverse India’s nuclear and missile momentum. In Chapter 6 Mohammed Ayoob addresses two interrelated issues: the reasons that led to testing and the short- and long-term impacts this decision will have on U.S.-Indian relations. Ayoob points out that both the United States and India will have to make significant tradeoffs to strengthen their long-term relationship. Future U.S. policy would have to aim at removing the discrepancy between China’s international status and that of India. It would also address India’s genuine security concerns vis-à-vis China. To achieve the first goal, Ayoob recommends U.S. support for India’s becoming a permanent member of the Security Council. To achieve the second goal, the United States should accept India’s position of minimum deterrence, put pressure on China to adopt confidence-building measures (CBMs), and persuade China to terminate its missile and nuclear collaboration with Pakistan. In return, India must initiate serious security dialogues with China and Pakistan and put a command and control structure in place that would remove concerns about accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons.

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In examining the future of the Indian nuclear deterrent, critics have argued that postindependence India usually lacked a coherent strategic doctrine, which is unusual for a country of its size and stature. The absence of a strategic doctrine leads to a situation in which first a solution is found and then a threat or problem is sought to justify it. India’s acquisition of an aircraft carrier in the late 1950s and its leasing of a Charlieclass Soviet nuclear submarine in the 1980s are cases in point. The Indian nuclear tests appeared to be part of a similar pattern, and as a consequence, significant problems have emerged in India’s relationship with China, the strategic environment in South Asia has worsened, and India will face increased pressure in international forums and through treaties to constrain its nuclear program. Deepa M. Ollapally takes a more optimistic approach to the doctrinal issue in Chapter 4, arguing that although there has been an underdevelopment of strategic doctrine in India, its policymakers have functioned within this ambiguity for nearly a quarter of a century. India, however, now has to move away from a position of ambiguity in its strategic doctrine to one explicitly stating its objectives and the force structure required to achieve them. In doing so, it has to project a “convincing yet nonprovocative and economical nuclear posture.” She discusses the alternative doctrines that India might adopt and the force levels required to operationalize them and then concludes that India is unlikely to end up with a “maximalist” nuclear deterrent. Instead, the centrist and accommodative tendencies that have traditionally driven Indian politics will lead to the creation of a more modest and nonprovocative force structure. In Chapter 10 Prem Shankar Jha examines the impact of the tests on the Indian economy, argues that the tests escalated India’s plunge into a recession that had been caused by shortsighted economic policies, and specifies the major negative consequences of the nuclear tests on the economy. Jha further suggests that Indian economic policies provided a disincentive to foreign investments, and consequently when the Indian nuclear devices were exploded, the country did not have a set of economic interest groups to argue its case in Washington and other Western capitals. He concludes by arguing that if the country is to be militarily strong, it has to be economically strong. Dinshaw Mistry looks at the political, economic, and geostrategic implications of the Indian space program in Chapter 9. He contends that the space program may give India the ability to upgrade its nuclear deterrent, which would have consequences for regional security. An improved Indian capability would weaken the Pakistani deterrent and would effectively counter the Chinese conventional threat to India’s borders. He con-

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cludes by arguing that although the space program is not cost-effective, it does provide military spin-offs as well as the international prestige that India desires. In Chapter 8 Ben Sheppard examines the implications of ballistic missile proliferation in South Asia, pointing out that the ballistic missile programs of India and Pakistan have led to four possible dangers. The deployment of the Prithvi missile erodes the conventional balance/imbalance between India and Pakistan that maintained peace in South Asia. Missiles may have also hurt the ability to maintain nuclear deterrence. Further, the risk of an inadvertent nuclear conflict has increased. Finally, surface-tosurface missiles serve as weapons of terror against the civilian populations of both countries. On balance, Sheppard considers the Indian missile program so viable and effective that it could make India a major player on the world stage, but given the degree of hostility and the geographical proximity of India and Pakistan, the danger remains of compulsive or inadvertent nuclear war between them. Chapter 11 by Clifford Singer is one of two that focus on arms control. It discusses a “win-win” settlement of the current impasse over Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs that eliminates sanctions for these “nuclear capable” states. This is contingent on their maintaining and cooperating with verification of a global moratorium on nuclear testing, refraining from weaponizing missiles, and limiting production of special nuclear material. Restraint in these areas must continue at least as long as states that previously declared nuclear weapons tests adopt and make identifiable progress toward a goal of themselves becoming nuclearcapable states, rather than indefinitely maintaining sizable, alerted, longrange nuclear weapons delivery systems. By resolving international discord over sanctions and fully integrating a global approach to nuclear export controls, such an outcome should also become a “win” result with respect to declared non–nuclear weapons states. In Chapter 7 Farah Zahra examines Pakistan’s nuclear rationale and the costs and consequences of Islamabad’s actions to match India, bomb for bomb and missile for missile. She points out the immense and complicated juggling act that Pakistani decisionmakers must perform. On the domestic level, the policymaker must juggle the demands and interests of the military, the Islamists, general public opinion, economic pressures, and opposing political parties. At the international level, Pakistan must counter Indian nuclear moves while appeasing U.S. nonproliferation policy directives and ensuring that multilateral lending agencies and foreign investors remain confident about Pakistan’s economy.

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According to Zahra, the central driving force of Pakistan’s nuclear policy remains India-specific despite periodic rhetoric or allegations about Pakistan’s development of the Islamic bomb in support of Islamic causes. It is in Pakistan’s interests to dispel such suspicions of wider nuclear objectives. But there are few in Pakistan who will argue that Pakistan unilaterally give up its right to nuclear weapons without an equivalent Indian response. Thus, according to Zahra, irrespective of India’s claim that its nuclear policy is globally oriented and not directed at Pakistan, it cannot avoid the complicating Pakistani nuclear factor. Under such locked-in and predetermined circumstances and with little room for maneuver, she argues that for the sake of regional nuclear stability, it would be important for the West to ensure that democracy and political and economic stability prevail in Pakistan. A prosperous and democratic Pakistan would more likely lead to a search for friendship and peace with India and would, in turn, become the best insurance for regional nuclear stability. As a scientist writing in a philosophical vein, S. R. Valluri, the director of a leading Indian scientific research laboratory in Bangalore, reflects in Chapter 12 on the futility of nuclear weapons in general and for India in particular. He invokes the dread and despair expressed by Robert Oppenheimer, one of the developers of the atomic bomb. On seeing the destructive power unleashed into the world in 1945, Oppenheimer recalled a line from the ancient Hindu scripture, the Bhagwad Gita: “Now I am become death, the destroyer of the world.” Valluri argues that the horrendous consequences of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be sufficient to convince the world that no issue or crisis can justify the use of these weapons of mass destruction. In the continued development of such weapons, the scientist has shirked his or her responsibility. In the Indian context, Valluri deplores the claims of a leading Indian strategic analyst who, in 1998, argued for at least 150 thermonuclear devices to establish a minimum Indian nuclear deterrent, at the cost of U.S.$70 billion. He points out that in 1999, India’s education minister claimed that a similar amount would be necessary to provide a minimum education to all school-age children. But the minister claimed that funds were not available to achieve such a goal. How could the funds not be available for educating children if they are available for building bombs? Valluri fails to see the advantage of building costly nuclear weapons that leaders declare will never be used first, instead of spending the same amount of money to build schools and universities that will contribute to the industrial and economic betterment of the country.

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Amit Gupta’s concluding chapter proposes the development of both a regional and an international arms control agenda to help India to cope with the post-test environment and to achieve the two stated goals of nuclearization: to deter its regional rivals, China and Pakistan, and to attain increased status in the international system. Political, economic, and military-strategic constraints would necessitate the use of arms control to stabilize the nuclear option at the regional level. At the international level, a carefully crafted arms control policy would work to reduce India’s security dilemma, help improve relations with the remaining superpower, and allow India to play a significant role in world affairs—something that lowlevel nuclearization by itself does not allow.

2 Why Did India “Go Nuclear”? Stephen P. Cohen

How did India reach the point at which four or five men could and did step across an important threshold and order the detonation of nuclear devices that were unashamedly designed as weapons—and then publicly declare that India was a nuclear weapons state? Reconstructing the events that led to the May 1998 tests is not merely a historical exercise. The decision to test these weapons tenuously set India on the path of nuclear weaponization (tenuously because two years later, there is no consensus in India as to what “weaponization” means) and led directly to the subsequent Pakistani tests. The decision to test may also have dealt a death blow to the U.S.-led process of containing proliferation by a strategy whose centerpiece was treaty adherence. The tests certainly made South Asia a more dangerous place and possibly a less stable one. It has been known for some time that even a smallscale nuclear incident would produce casualties of unprecedented magnitude given the region’s weak medical and emergency infrastructure and the close proximity of urban areas to likely targets. Even a single nuclear detonation over a major South Asian city would produce considerable devastation. A “small” nuclear war would be an unprecedented catastrophe for the region, and a major one would have global physical, environmental, and biological repercussions.1 In the future there will be thresholds to cross and perhaps even a reconsideration of India’s nuclear policy. The decision to conduct these tests was initially greeted with widespread praise, but euphoria has given way to an increasingly sober consideration of the new risks and costs that they engendered. 13

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Although I do not know all the details, in this chapter I can draw the broad contours of the history of decision and indecision that led to these tests. Aristotle suggests that the beginning of wisdom is to classify, followed by the development of theories that more fully explain events, decisions, and actions. My approach is primarily an attempt at classification: to sort out the major variables and trends that made possible the final decision to test. Whether India and Pakistan convert their present devices into deliverable weapons, develop a command and control structure and doctrine, and deploy them are questions beyond the immediate scope of this chapter. The framework of this chapter derives from the literature that tries to systematically explain why complex events occur.2 Such events as military coups, airplane crashes, or championship basketball seasons do not happen randomly or by accident and are usually the product of a complex chain of factors, variables, and decisions (or the absence of decision).

• In the case of important decisions by states, key long-term factors typically include geography, the economic and human resources available to leaders, and the deepest assumptions and beliefs held by the Indian policymaking community. The latter is especially important in this case because it was least understood by many foreign observers. • A number of intermediate, mid-term factors, such as economic circumstances, security considerations, and domestic politics, also influence foreign and security policy. Such factors do not usually change rapidly, and predictions of tomorrow’s events, if based upon today’s policies, are frequently correct. • Finally, there are short-term variables: a matter of hours, days, or weeks during which the play of events might lead decisionmakers down one path or another. The coup takes place, the plane crashes, or the final basket is scored.

Overall, the decision to test or at least to break out of India’s strategic cul-de-sac had been influenced by medium-term events that took place largely since the early 1990s. Most, but not all medium-term factors pointed in the direction of a strategic “breakout,” although not necessarily in the shape it finally assumed. For example, immediately before the tests took place, the head of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) foreign policy cell suggested that India might not test a weapon but could still declare itself to be a nuclear weapons state—until the tests actually took place, this seemed at the time to be the most plausible step that the government might take.

WHY DID INDIA “GO NUCLEAR”?

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The long-term factors that framed this decision had not significantly changed since the mid-1960s, nor were the short-term calculations that critical. The decision may not have been prudent, and certainly its implementation left much to be desired (India’s post-test diplomacy has been roundly criticized by many of those who supported the test itself), but this conclusion only highlights the significance of the medium term over the long or short term. THE LONG TERM: A FRUSTRATED GREAT STATE

Several nearly immutable factors influence New Delhi’s foreign and security policy. India’s geographical location, its relative paucity of energy and other natural resources, its environmental circumstances, and the uneven level of its technology are all background variables that have been slow to change. So, also, are the civilizational variables of culture and self-image: the way in which Indians see their own country and the way in which India is believed to have special place into the larger world.3 Two such attitudinal/cultural factors are closely linked to nuclear decisions and have partnered those decisions at critical historical junctures. The first is the way in which nuclear weapons and nuclear energy might contribute to India’s domestic strength, especially its economic growth; the second is the way in which Indians see nuclear weapons as helping or hindering India’s “emergence” as a great state. Nuclear technology—and now, by extension, nuclear weapons—have long been seen as contributing to an economic and technical base that could transform India from a poor country to a modern, relatively rich state. This theme long predates the Chinese test in 1964 and is at the core of the scientists’ recent arguments in favor of weaponization. Their central proposition is that the technologies underlying nuclear weapons can help make India a great scientific and “modern” power.4 Even if his views have been adapted (and sometimes distorted) by elements of the Hindu right, Jawaharlal Nehru led the way in developing this argument. It is gospel within India’s government-supported strategic-scientific enclave, although the newly emerged environmentalists, as well as the remnants of the Gandhian movement, would challenge it. Nehru saw nuclear power, in its peaceful capacity, as providing India with the ability to leapfrog many technologies. India could go from dung Reborn India

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power to nuclear power in a single step. He proclaimed India’s new dams and power stations to be modern “temples.” Nehru and the Indian government set out to create one of the finest science-training systems in the non-Western world (neglecting primary and secondary education in the process). Without much of a sense of irony, Indians worship science, particularly nuclear science. The adulation of scientists is widespread among the Indian strategic elite. The Nehruvians see science as salvation, and the more rustic backwaters of the political and security elite agree and argue, as did Nehru, that India was a supremely advanced scientific state when the West and the Islamic world were mired in ignorance. For both groups, the nuclear program only reclaims India’s birthright. Nehru was strongly opposed to an Indian nuclear weapons program, although he did not foreclose the possibility of the “option” strategy. His closest confidant and adviser, V. K. Krishna Menon, was even more antibomb. Menon scorned K. C. Pant’s advocacy of nuclear weapons and in 1965 told me that Pant was reading from a text figuratively and literally prepared by Homi Bhabha (the head of the Indian nuclear program). Nehru and Menon could keep Bhabha and the scientists in check by diverting their energy to the civilian (i.e., “peaceful”) program with a bit of fudging on the side. Although the full story of the sheltering of the bomb program within the Indian nuclear establishment has yet to be told, two recent books provide an initial overview.5 However, the civilian nuclear energy program staggered under its own conceptual limitations. India’s badly conceived and even more poorly implemented power program was hard put to compete with cheaper energy sources and was crippled by restrictions on the transfer of technology from Canada, the United States, and other states. At this point, beginning about 1985, support for the weapons program began to draw upon existing support for the rebirth of India through a number of new and seemingly marvelous science and technology programs. This shift was one reason why India made technological cooperation the central focus in its attempt to develop a new relationship with the United States in 1984–1986, and even today technology transfer is singled out as a key demand made of the United States in exchange for future restraint on the weapons program. Policymakers hoped that high-technology programs would produce spin-offs to benefit the development effort. The nuclear program, space program, and other dual-use technologies were all assumed to be costeffective when these spin-offs were taken into account. However, when other countries denied India access to various technologies, as in the case

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of the second U.S. supercomputer, the enhanced effort put into developing an indigenous technology was thought to make India that much stronger because the country was forced to be self-reliant. The scientific-strategic enclave and their publicists boast that technology denial thus helps India. Additionally, these efforts at self-reliance have become important rallying points for nationalist sentiments, as principled India is portrayed as defying the combined might of the West (and Japan). Lacking an accurate understanding of how little such advanced technologies actually contribute to development and the opportunity costs incurred by trying to cobble together cutting-edge systems given India’s poor industrial and technology base, the programs have become totems and are patriotically supported and defended by a wide variety of scientists, journalists, and politicians. Thus, support for civilian programs, including the defunct power program, mutated into support for the nuclear weapons program, and academic critics of the civilian nuclear program have been harshly dealt with by the government while critics of the test have been accused of being foreign agents. Ominously, the BJP’s home minister, L. K. Advani, has stated that the new “threat” to India comes not from the “secularists” (by which he meant Indians not sympathetic with the BJP’s notion of Hindutva) but from “liberals” (those few Indians who dared to speak out openly against the tests). The BJP understood perfectly how nuclear weapons had come to stand for much more than a military device. The tests were gleefully welcomed as evidence of the great accomplishments of Indian culture. From the beginning, a prominent theme surrounding the tests was that they demonstrated how outside powers tried but failed to keep these technologies out of Indian hands. The fact that one of the key scientists was a Muslim reinforced the linkage between national integration, national unity, national pride, the atom, and science. Ironically, the Hindu-oriented BJP’s greatest public triumph came through an event widely seen as an accomplishment of India’s secular identity. Most Indians, especially those in the Delhi-centered strategic and political community, strongly believe that their country is once again destined to become a great state, one that matches the historical and civilizational accomplishments of the Indian people. This view is encountered at nearly all points along the Indian political spectrum. Over the years, there developed a complex linkage between the greatness of India and the nuclear question. Nuclear weapons were first seen as India as a Great State

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an evil badge worn by Cold War great powers. This position, first and best expressed by Nehru, concluded that India would demonstrate its global leadership by rising above and attempting to end the global nuclear arms race. At the other extreme, the militant Hindu nationalists, such as the Jana Sangh (the BJP’s precursor party), and some of the secular nationalists, such as those inspired by Subhas Chandra Bose and Ram Manohar Lohia (George Fernandes’s mentor), favored nuclear weapons because they would demonstrate Indian civilizational superiority through the acquisition of the most destructive and advanced form of military power known to mankind. They assured their followers that because of India’s inherent greatness such weapons would only be used for peaceful and defensive purposes, an argument that is prominent in the government’s white paper and all recent official statements on the bomb. For thirty years the compromise between these pro- and antinuclear positions was maintained by the inherently ambivalent “nuclear option” policy. The hawks could be assured that work would continue on the bomb, and the doves could hope that the problem would go away or that political progress would make the bomb unnecessary. In the end both antinuclear and pro-nuclear positions have merged. Although the secularists and modernizers and the BJP come at the nuclear question from two different perspectives—the former began with a faith in the peaceful use of atomic energy, whereas the latter always emphasized the military use of the atom—the two positions have been synthesized in the writings of several Indian strategic writers, most notably K. Subrahmanyam and George Fernandes, the minister of defense in the BJPled coalition government. Subrahmanyam is a secularist but spent much of his career trying to prove that Nehru really would have favored nuclear weapons.6 Like many of his generation he respected Nehru’s commitments to a democratic, secular state but felt that Nehru had been too weak and pliable, and bore some of the responsibility for India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and India’s failure to deal decisively with Pakistan (and Kashmir) at an early stage. More recently, Subrahmanyam has tried to make the case that Mahatma Gandhi, also, would have favored nuclear weapons. The formula he and others developed thirty years ago has now become fairly widely accepted: India would acquire nuclear weapons in order to pressure the nuclear “haves” to disarm (a theory reminiscent of the notion that the village in Vietnam had to be destroyed to be saved). Indians could have their nuclear cake and eat it: an Indian nuclear program came to be seen as an instrument of resistance to the blackmail tactics of the nuclear weapons

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states and thus entirely justified. Further, if nuclear weapons were evil, then the so-called disarmament plans by the nuclear weapons states (whose hands were dirtied by their use or threat of use of nuclear weapons) were also evil, and such arrangements as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and even the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could be opposed on moral grounds. Some Indian advocates of nuclearization have always seen nuclear weapons in terms of realpolitik. In a world based on self-help, nuclear weapons were both a mark of a nation’s greatness and an instrument of power because of their deterrent effect. Such long-standing advocates of weaponization, such as Pant (who gave his first public speech in 1965 advocating the acquisition of nuclear weapons and was defense minister at the time of India’s 1974 test), have favored nuclear weapons for military and strategic purposes. Although Pant and the BJP leadership speak of the moral, defensive, and principled qualities of an Indian weapons program, their primary perspective is that these devices bring status, power, and military capability to India vis-à-vis its neighbors and other states, especially the United States. The most articulate proponent of this position is the conservative strategist Bharat Karnad, who has argued that to be taken seriously India needs a deterrent capability that will be able to reach the United States.7 The argument in favor of a large-scale nuclear capability was successfully countered until recent years by some of India’s leading strategists. “What purpose would weaponization serve,” they asked, “if India only became the sixth or seventh nuclear weapon state, with a nuclear capability far weaker than all of its likely rivals except Pakistan?” A number of mainstream Indian strategists (most prominently retired lieutenant general V. R. Raghavan and retired chief of the navy staff Admiral L. Ramdas, certainly not doves) pointed out after the tests that overt weaponization has done Pakistan more good than India and has brought Delhi down to Islamabad’s level rather than raising it to Beijing’s.8 This group, which includes a number of foreign policy specialists associated with the Congress Party and Janata Dal, would have preferred to delay weaponization until India could be taken seriously, that is, until India had already developed an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and perhaps a blue-water nuclear capability. To summarize, several long-term attitudes affected the decision to test nuclear weapons:

• The original moral impetus against nuclear weapons that dominated Indian thinking from 1947 onward has not disappeared but

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has been projected upon those states that are regarded as nuclear “haves.” This shift, in turn, made it possible for Indians to argue that their own acquisition of nuclear weapons was a moral act, in that it was one way in which Delhi could pressure the nuclear weapons states into eliminating nuclear weapons. • The number of Indians who saw nuclear weapons as instruments and symbols of national power has increased gradually over the years. As we shall see, their ranks were swelled by the diplomacy surrounding the extension of the NPT and the passage of the CTBT, which were effectively portrayed as treaties that would forever keep India as a second-rate state. • The original faith in nuclear technology as a way in which India could leapfrog intermediate technologies and dramatically improve the lot of the average citizen was appropriated by the nuclear weapons lobby: they have turned the argument of nonproliferationists inside out. Instead of arguing that nuclear weapons were closely linked to nuclear technology and the latter must be controlled in order to eliminate or reduce the former, they argue that weaponization is necessary if India is to maintain an independent civilian nuclear program.

Thus, a gradual shift in Indian attitudes has occurred since the 1970s. From widespread hostility toward weaponization, a majority of Indians came to believe by 1990 that because of considerations of both idealism and self-interest, the weapons option had to be preserved. But a majority of both the strategic elite and the broader public did not believe that the option had to be immediately exercised. Several events since the early 1990s significantly eroded this long-standing Indian opposition to exercising the option. THREE MEDIUM-RANGE VARIABLES

Although cultural assumptions do not change quickly, it is possible for a state’s economic, political, and strategic environment to alter within a matter of months or years. India’s strategic position seemed (to many Indians) to have dramatically worsened after 1990; the calculation of the economic price of “going nuclear” seemed, in the minds of many Indians, a rather minor issue; and its political system underwent important changes, making the bomb issue politically salient for the first time in decades. Thus, strategy and politics, and to a lesser extent economic calculations, changed

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rather quickly from 1988 to 1998 and in such a way as to strengthen markedly the pro-bomb position in the strategic elite and the larger public. The Strategic Environment: Pakistan, China, and the United States

Many observers, especially in India, have stressed the worsening of India’s strategic position as critical in leading to the decision to test. They also argue that this perception explains the enthusiasm with which the tests were received. However, a review of the strategic situation in the years and months before the decision to test reveals a more complicated situation, one of ebb and flow rather than a sharp deterioration. Indeed, if a disadvantaged security position was the critical factor, then India should have tested much earlier than 1998. India emerged from the 1971 war with Pakistan as the dominant power of South Asia. Three years later the first Pokhran nuclear test demonstrated Delhi’s nuclear potential. However, an unsettled domestic political order, plus an unwillingness to press the advantage over Pakistan, turned India away from the nuclear option and led to strategic stagnation. Yet neither China nor Pakistan were standing still, and by 1979 China had put its economic house in order and was actively assisting Pakistan in the latter’s attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon. Direct Chinese nuclear assistance to Islamabad was paralleled by a revival of the U.S.-Pakistani alliance after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union on Christmas Day, 1979. Washington was suddenly willing to overlook Islamabad’s nuclear program, as the Carter administration lifted its sanctions against Islamabad. Suddenly Indians were relegated to a back bench in South Asia. From a position of supreme dominance in 1971, India had fallen to the position of a strategic (and nuclear) also-ran. By 1981, Delhi saw its relative position vis-à-vis Pakistan and China rapidly deteriorate. The United States, which had moved closer to both of India’s adversaries, appeared to be an additional enemy. New Delhi attempted to meet this situation by increasing its dependence on Moscow and embarking on the largest arms-buying spree in the subcontinent’s history. Fully aware of Islamabad’s nuclear weapons program, Delhi may have contemplated direct action against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons facility, Kahuta, in the mid-1980s, and it is very likely that the Brasstacks crisis was conceived in part to provide cover for an attack on Pakistan before its nuclear program reached fruition.9 In 1984–1987 the Indian government attempted to “wean” the United States

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away from Pakistan, which was mirrored by a U.S. attempt to wean India away from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and led to a brief conjunction of policies, if not of strategic objectives. The threat of war, as epitomized by the Brasstacks crisis, only accelerated the Pakistani nuclear program. India’s two other military gambits in 1987–1988 also led nowhere: there was a brief, inconclusive confrontation with China at Somdurong Cho and a catastrophic military intervention in Sri Lanka, an operation that came to be regarded by the Indian army as their “Vietnam.” The confrontation with China raised the issue of what response was available to the Indian army should the Chinese threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons in the Himalayas. The story, heard from several military sources, is that the local division and corps commanders and ultimately the eastern corps commander all asked what response India would have to the Chinese use of tactical nuclear weapons or even a nuclear threat—and that there was no specific response from New Delhi. Thus, even before the fall of the Soviet Union, India’s expectations that it would emerge as South Asia’s truly dominant and unchallenged power met with frustration. The final calamity was the 1989 outbreak of insurgency in Kashmir, which, coming after several years of bloody struggle with Sikh and Naga separatists, drove home the lesson that India’s internal security problems had become acute. Hitherto, domestic insurrectionary or separatist groups were active in the far south or the inaccessible northeast, but Punjab and Kashmir were closer to home and turned the Indian capital into one of the most insecure cities in the world. Not only had the Indian position vis-à-vis China and Pakistan deteriorated during the 1980s, but also New Delhi’s relations with the United States had never normalized. India deeply resented Washington’s renewed support for Pakistan because of the Afghan war and the U.S. propensity to turn a blind eye to the Pakistani nuclear program (and its Chinese connection). But India was helpless—it had no leverage against Washington, especially since the Soviet Union was fading fast as a serious power. There were several years when Indians expected that Washington itself would begin to decline, and the origins of the “look east” policy lay in an effort to establish India as a significant factor in Southeast Asia and with Japan (which was widely believed, in India no less than Washington, to be the most likely candidate to emerge as Asia’s greatest state, and one that would eventually supplant the United States). This prospect did not worry India. The core Indian strategic view holds not only that New Delhi is potentially one of the four or five great states of the world, but that its true emergence would come about through a combination of its own movement from middle power to great power

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status and the decline of the superpowers. The Soviet Union had gone, and “declinist” theorists—Japanese, Chinese, British, and U.S.—found a ready audience in India. The United States would soon retreat from Asia in general and South Asia in particular. This scenario never materialized. The United States not only refused to go into decline, but its logical successor, Japan (from the Indian perspective, a benign and friendly state), tentative and cautious in its post–Cold War diplomacy, showed no interest in a special relationship with New Delhi. India wound up with the worst of all possible worlds: the continuation of a China-Pakistan relationship, a still-meddling United States, no likely new Asian partners, the collapse of the Soviet state, and a burgeoning domestic insecurity problem abetted by a Pakistan that, after 1990, had to be treated as if it were a nuclear weapons state. India’s security environment seemed worse than it was because of the very high expectations of a strategic breakthrough in the 1970s and again after Rajiv Gandhi’s accession to power. These expectations were sustained through 1992 by the hope that China and the United States would abandon Pakistan. The latter did reduce its commitment to Islamabad after the end of the Afghan war, but the Chinese remained Pakistan’s good friends. The long-held (if fantastic) Indian view that the United States was guided in its Asian policy by a desire to contain India and by a willingness to use both China and Pakistan for that purpose remained one of the core assumptions of a good portion of the Indian strategic elite. A final component of India’s worsening strategic position came from an unlikely direction: the surprising ease with which the NPT was permanently extended and the strong effort made to subsequently develop a treaty to comprehensively ban nuclear explosions. The idea of a CTBT had been introduced originally by India but in its new incarnation was seen by many Indians as a way of permanently closing off India’s nuclear option. This belief was strengthened by the many statements issued by U.S. officials to the effect that the U.S. goal was to cap, reduce, and then eliminate India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capabilities. It is harder to imagine a formulation that was more threatening to the vast majority of Indian security experts, whose chief goal was to retain the option, not to exercise it or to abandon it. Incredibly, senior U.S. officials continue to use this formulation in public speeches, ensuring that the bomb lobby’s interpretation of a malign U.S. policy will remain dominant for the foreseeable future. No better example of the consequences of this misguided U.S. strategy can be found than that of George Fernandes, who became minister of defense in the BJP-led government that finally decided to exercise the option. Fernandes came out of the liberal trade union movement and had

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been vehemently antinuclear during his entire political career. He has stated that he remained opposed to the bomb “from Day One till the nineteenth of July, 1996,” when the Lok Sabha began its debate over the CTBT.10 For Fernandes, who was morally opposed to nuclear weapons, the pressure from the five nuclear “haves” was even more obnoxious. When the BJP leadership informed him of their decision to go ahead with the tests, he heartily concurred. One of the central issues in the first Indian debate on nuclear weapons (which took place immediately after the Chinese test of 1964 and lasted through the end of 1965) was financial cost. A number of economists weighed into the debate, and various politicians argued the merits of a weapons program versus those of maintaining a strong conventional force or seeking other strategic remedies, such as an alliance with a friendly nuclear weapons state. The cost of a nuclear program was less important in the subsequent (1967–1968) Indian debate triggered by the question of whether or not to sign the NPT. The dominant concern in 1967–1968 was preventing India’s option from being foreclosed by the NPT. By the time of the Indian test (1974), cost had become a minor issue, and the entire bomb issue was swallowed up by domestic politics. India had emerged as the dominant South Asian power after its defeat of Pakistan, and there was no strategic pressure to exercise the option. In the 1970s it was widely thought that India could easily afford a nuclear weapons program, but with Pakistan crushed and China in domestic disarray (and the United States a distant factor), there was no urgency. The U.S.-led response to the 1974 Pokhran test revived the economic factor in Indian nuclear calculations. Delhi was surprised at the intensity of the international reaction and shocked by the severity of the sanctions imposed upon the Indian civilian nuclear program. Subsequent U.S. legislation (the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act), and the establishment of various international regimes to deny dual-use technology to incipient nuclear weapons states reintroduced and transformed the idea of “cost.” Until then, cost was a purely Indian calculation of economic advantage or disadvantage. The burden of investing in a weapons program (when weighed against strategic need) had, for years, led to the conclusion that the decision could be deferred. The various sanction and technology denial regimes developed after 1974 changed this calculation. Technology denial regimes were seen as The Cost of the Bomb

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not merely targeting India’s military programs but as being punitive and vindictive, directed against the civilian energy program if not the whole Indian economy and the very emergence of India as a modern state. Although not much is known about the internal debate, it is possible that the decline of the civilian program (for reasons noted above) strengthened the hand of the weapons scientists. There had been a group of Indian scientists (largely associated with the civilian program) that cautioned against the military program on the grounds that the latter would further damage the civilian effort. If this was the case, then U.S. and other restrictions on the Indian civilian nuclear program directly stimulated the weapons program. By 1998 the “cost” argument had become inverted. Early in India’s nuclear program supporters argued that a strong civilian program was necessary to provide the wherewithal for a military program. By 1995 it was clear that the civilian program was in shambles, and supporters claimed that the military program had to be sustained in order to keep a critical mass of scientists and engineers together. These arguments went virtually unchallenged in India, since the data and information needed to counter them were either suppressed or secret. Two other cost-related factors also seemed to suggest that a nuclear weapons program would be more feasible in 1998 than ten years earlier. First, India had undergone a severe economic crisis in 1990–1991, which led to the introduction of a number of economic reform measures. These were welcomed by many pro-bomb publicists, who assumed that the Indian economy, now traveling down the road to reform, would generate the resources to develop massive and sophisticated nuclear and missile programs. Second, with every passing year, the actual investment in the weapons infrastructure had slowly grown, and by 1997 India had acquired the technical base to test a variety of systems. These might not have added up to a comprehensive, highly advanced weapons and delivery capability, but the additional cost of a full-fledged weapons program could be kept low (so the advocates of a bomb claimed) as long as India avoided an arms race and developed a “minimum” deterrent. “How much is enough?” was never really debated in India, and future decisions to build and deploy will be influenced by the balance between strategic requirements and new costs. India’s domestic politics influenced the decision to hold nuclear tests in at least four ways. First, they are seen by the Delhi-centric elite as strengthNuclear Weapons and Indian Politics

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ening the hand of New Delhi itself against the states. To the degree that the center proposes large, secret, and expensive projects that can be justified in the name of national security, the center has more resources at hand and a continuing claim on revenue. Second, the aura of crisis and danger that surrounds nuclear weapons demands a powerful political center as well as a correspondingly powerful administrative mechanism to guard them and decide upon their use. This is very appealing to once-powerful regional elites, and the bomb lobby has a disproportionate number of high-caste Hindus, members of religious minorities, and others who have been dispossessed from regional politics by the emergence of mass politics. The bomb lobby is dominated by Indians with a common understanding of the importance of maintaining the political primacy of New Delhi. A nuclearized Delhi would be marginally stronger administratively and politically and could better withstand the pressures from the states for more revenue and less spending on defense. Third, the nuclear program is one in a series of important symbolic projects that the center has undertaken to develop a sense of Indian nationhood and identity. The content of that nationhood is, when projected through the prism of the bomb, a scientifically adept, multicultural people capable of achieving great things with minimum resources. Originally, these symbolic meanings were attached to the civilian nuclear program, and its leadership often boasted of the way in which Indian talent and innovativeness thrived under the adverse conditions brought about by Western economic sanctions and technology restraint regimes. Tamils, Telugus, Parsis, Punjabis, Bengalis, high-caste and low-caste, Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu all contributed to the effort. The underlying philosophy is that no single Indian state is capable of such a project and that only by working together can the diverse peoples of India accomplish such great deeds. A. J. P. Kalam became the central icon of the program not only because of his technological skills but also because they were largely acquired within India and because, although a Muslim, he has a strong interest in broader Indian philosophy and culture. In addition, the program’s civilian nature is a reminder to the military (and the Indian public) that Indian civilians still reign supreme. Fourth, changes in the political process that led to various “bomb” decisions over the years bear examination, especially the changes in the coherence of the Congress Party and its major rivals. As in most countries, India’s bomb-related decisions have been very tightly held, even though they have been intensively debated from 1964 onward. What has changed

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since 1990 is the political context in which these decisions have been made. Four prime ministers (Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi) were secure in their positions in that they headed Congress Party governments that had a clear majority. Except for Indira Gandhi during her first term as prime minister, none of them faced any severe internal challenge. Most nuclear decisions were made in terms of strategy and cost—none of these governments would face defeat at the polls or in internal party struggles because of a nuclear decision. Nevertheless, they were challenged from within the party on critical foreign policy issues. Nehru, in particular, was pressured into several decisions, including the invasion of Goa and the pursuit of a confrontational policy vis-à-vis China. At one time an attempt to trade territory with China (and resolve the territorial issue) was blocked by a longtime Congress stalwart (Pandit Pant, K. C. Pant’s father), who threatened to bring the government down if one inch of Indian territory was transferred to the Chinese. With the advent of weak and coalition governments in the 1990s, a challenge to the government on foreign policy was possible from outside as well as from inside the dominant party. This occurred during Narasimha Rao’s prime ministership. Although he was widely respected as a shrewd manager of Indian foreign policy (he had been Indira Gandhi’s foreign minister for a number of years), he was otherwise politically vulnerable and could have been removed from office on a number of issues. The subsequent Janata-led coalition was even more precarious, and both Deve Gowda and Inder Gujral continued in office only through the tolerance of a very disparate group of coalition partners. None of these were as vehemently pro-bomb as the BJP, but during this period the BJP picked up new members from Congress and other parties, some of whom (such as K. C. Pant’s wife, and then K. C. Pant himself) were nuclear hawks. To summarize, the potential for nuclearization was enhanced by the following medium-term variables:

• India’s strategic environment grew both more complex and dangerous after 1990 because of the renewal of the threat of war with Pakistan, Islamabad’s nuclearization, strong evidence of Chinese support for Pakistan (despite the apparent improvement of IndianChinese relations), and the rise of serious domestic insurrections in Punjab, the northeast, and Kashmir. Although objectively India’s security position was manageable, the sense of insecurity grew in New Delhi, partly because of an earlier expectation of a more secure

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post–Cold War world, the decreasing stability of successive Indian governments after 1990, and the emergence of what appeared to be a Western (i.e., U.S.) attempt to eliminate India’s nuclear option via a series of increasingly restrictive treaties. • The financial burden of developing a nuclear weapon was seen as diminished (in view of the major investments made in the nuclear and missile programs over the years); indeed, the failure of the civilian power program led to the inverted argument that the weapons program could provide a means to sustain the infrastructure for an eventually expanded civilian program. In addition, the real (but limited) economic reforms initiated after 1991 seemed to suggest that the money would be there if the option were exercised. • The medium-range political calculations seemed to have made it easier to reach a decision to go nuclear. It was not just that the BJP had come to power (both a Congress and a Janata government were apparently on the edge of ordering tests and certainly authorized the preparations for subsequent tests), but that all political parties from 1990 onward were more vulnerable to pressure on a variety of different issues from within their ranks and from coalition partners. This development, coupled with a larger shift away from opposition to nuclear weapons per se and the growth of militant “nuclearism” (the belief that nuclearization could solve a wide range of national, cultural, and strategic problems) created an environment in which the decision to go nuclear was domestically politically acceptable and, perhaps, politically essential for those on the Indian right. THE TIMING

OF THE

TEST

These long- and medium-term factors provide a frame through which we can view the events of 1998. Clearly, widespread support existed for any decision seen as preserving Indian greatness and its strategic capabilities. The debate over the CTBT had been structured by the dovish Inder Gujral so that India presented itself as a moral authority on strategic and nuclear issues that was openly defying the West (especially the United States) to punish it. As Gujral said in one of his speeches, Indians were proud of their willingness to address these great moral issues (especially when India’s own strategic position was affected) and would not mind—even welcomed—the consequences.11

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I now turn to a series of events and short-term factors that together formed the end game of the decision to test and move toward a declaration of nuclear weapon status. Less is known about them at the moment, but undoubtedly the full story of the actual decision to proceed with the tests will emerge over the next year or two.

• Internal BJP considerations. Immediately after the tests, several informed observers noted that “domestic politics” and the internal politics of the BJP-RSS (Rashtritya Swayamsevak Sangh) nexus were responsible for the decision. Stephen Solarz and others have argued that to meet pressure from within the party (and, by extension, the Sangh Parivar—the larger community of Hindu nationalist organizations and groups), Atal Behari Vajpayee and others had to demonstrate that they were capable of fulfilling at least one of the party’s major planks. They had yielded to coalition partners on the revocation of Article 356 of the Constitution (which provided Kashmir with a special constitutional status), on the further destruction of mosques built upon temple sites, and on “Swadeshi” economics. Only the bomb was left. • Electoral calculations. Several Indian press reports claim that the decision to test a weapon was made by the first BJP government (in 1996) but was not implemented since it failed to achieve a parliamentary majority and quit office. This possible sequence of events was cited by some as indicating the strength of the bureaucracy and its ability to resist a radical decision by a government with less than complete authority. However, another factor may have been involved, especially if there was a decision to test in 1996. It could be that the BJP leadership felt that they had to test quickly because it would be one of the few major accomplishments they could bring to the voters, should there be an election. This was probably the case in 1996, but perhaps somewhat less so in 1998 because India had grown election-weary, and expected that the BJP-dominated coalition would hold office for at least a year. The core group that made the decision to test in 1996 and 1998 could have felt that for electoral reasons, it would be better to test sooner rather than later. • The Ghauri test. Pakistan’s test of a medium-range missile has been termed especially provocative. However, this was only one in a series of provocations offered up by each side, and it does not quite square up with the Indian government’s repeated insistence that the tests were carried out primarily because of concern with Beijing rather than Islamabad. In any case, the decision to go ahead

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with a test had already been made in Delhi: the Ghauri only confirmed the wisdom of that decision and further weakened the position of any Indian official or citizen who opposed weaponization. Ironically, the Ghauri test may have made it more important for Islamabad to subsequently test a nuclear weapon in order to continue its strategy of one-upping New Delhi. • The Clinton visit and false “signals.” Some Indian strategists thought that the likely Clinton visit presented the best opportunity to engage the Americans on issues of real concern to New Delhi. According to some sources, it was thought that getting the test out of the way as soon as possible would provide enough time for India and the United States to sort out residual differences and still permit a Clinton visit in 1998. And some had drawn the conclusion that the United States no longer regarded proliferation as that critical an issue in its dealings with India. A number of U.S. studies, later echoed in official statements, called for a broad-ranging relationship with India and a deemphasis on proliferation and formal treaty adherence. Was this taken (by some Indians) as a sign that the United States had a more nuanced (i.e., tolerant) view of Indian strategic ambitions and might even welcome an Indian nuclear program as strengthening India’s capability to stand up to China? It should be emphasized that the Indian strategic community is deeply divided as to the origin of the threat as well as the means to meet it and that the same individuals who held these views could (and usually did) strongly criticize the United States for its strategic insensitivity and hegemonic inclinations. The perception that U.S. statements sent false signals may have had more to do with Indian wishful thinking than any changes in U.S. strategy toward South Asia, which during this period was still in a state of flux. CONCLUSION

The “bomb” has always been a subject of intense controversy in India, and the debate has often been one-sided or incomplete because of the poor quality of knowledge about nuclear weapons and strategy. Nevertheless, from 1964 onward the long- and medium-term factors discussed above— politics, strategy, cost, national identity—were thoroughly aired in public and within the government. Over the years pro-bomb arguments grew stronger but never dominated. This is evident in the shift of public opinion (as measured by a long-

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running series of polls) from strongly opposing nuclear weapons to cautiously favoring them, although a majority of Indians would still favor nuclear abstention if there were no threat from Pakistan or China. The most important change in the structure of Indian public debate has been to propel the “identity” argument forward as a key issue and to reduce the importance of economic cost. The rise of a more splintered domestic political order in India is indirectly but importantly linked to foreign policy. This splintering makes governments more vulnerable to pressure on highly visible foreign policy issues, but also it seems to enhance the importance of national consensus and a common approach to foreign policy. The greater the division on other issues, the more important it seems to be to have a common front on security issues, and both the BJP and the greater Indian strategic community have engaged in an attempt to define the parameters of that consensus. The bomb tests have important strategic consequences, but Indian strategic decisions are also at the mercy of an increasingly tumultuous domestic political system. What does this analysis have to say about our understanding of regional proliferation dynamics, and what major surprises emerge from this brief note? Two single-variable models for predicting Indian decisions can be readily dismissed. One has been favored by “realist” analysts, the other by elements of the nonproliferation community. Realists argue that states will always go nuclear if vital security interests are threatened and that Indian and Pakistani interests have been threatened, hence the tests and the eventual weaponization that will follow. This view does not explain why India did not restart its weapons program much earlier or why it then hesitated for nearly nine years, poised on the brink of testing and declaring itself a nuclear weapons state (or, for that matter, why it did not refrain from testing and declare itself a nuclear weapons state). Nor does it begin to explain the present situation, in which India has declared itself a nuclear weapons state but has apparently made few changes in the actual arrangements to deliver nuclear weapons that prevailed before the May 1998 tests. “Going nuclear” can be a complex process, not a discrete event, as the Indians and Pakistanis have both shown. A theory that explains proliferation must also attempt to explain these nuances, which have enormous practical and strategic implications. Some arms controllers have argued that prestige is a critical variable in the decision to go nuclear. Unlike the realists, who see threats everyExplaining the Decision

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where, they do not grasp why even the most serious security threat would lead a state to develop a weapon that seemingly cannot be used for any rational military purpose. Further, in the South Asian case the argument that states go nuclear because of the prestige factor also fails to persuade largely because of the evident reluctance—stretching over decades—of many successive Indian governments to test or to declare India to be a nuclear weapons state without a test. All these governments have had to deal with a difficult strategic environment under circumstances of economic stringency. There is a small but growing military literature on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the subcontinent. This discussion has been inhibited until now because neither Pakistan nor India had declared themselves to be nuclear weapons states, but we can expect a full-scale discussion of nuclear doctrine to emerge in the next few years. It is highly unlikely that prestige will play much of a role in the discussion, as compared with hardcore strategic, economic, and political considerations. If single-variable explanations seem weak or limited, it is no less imprudent to aggregate all variables and assume that today’s policies, which might be the same as yesterday’s, will continue on tomorrow. Like the weather, tomorrow’s weather will not be the same as today’s, even though today’s may be the best single predictor. This is because what happens today is not a factor or variable but an outcome. My approach has been to disaggregate a large number of factors into their short-, medium-, and long-term mutability. It suggests that in the Indian case (and Pakistan’s as well), it will be especially important to track changes over time and remain alert to the appearance of seemingly irrelevant factors and the reappearance or disappearance of others. In the case of the 1998 tests, some old factors (cost) reappeared in a new guise, and some new ones (political instability at the center) were unprecedented. In addition, opposition to nuclear weapons had steadily eroded since the 1970s. To my mind, however, three significant developments were systematically underestimated by outsiders (and many Indian analysts). First, India’s apparent strategic position deteriorated. To outsiders India looked as prosperous and as secure as before, but for many Indians the loss of its strategic anchors and the prospect of facing a new and unexpected world without a full complement of weapons (when three hostile states had them) demanded more self-confidence than could be expected of a country also undergoing simultaneous economic, political, communicaSome Surprises

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tions, and cultural revolutions. It remains to be seen whether the bomb will ease the sense of insecurity that pervaded the Indian strategic elite in the mid-1990s. My own view is that it will provide some temporary respite, but without significant progress at home (and a more adept diplomacy abroad), the deeper insecurities that made the bomb decision possible will remain. Second, U.S. policy, no matter how well-meaning, served as an accelerant as far as the nuclear decision was concerned. Washington seemed to be trying to foreclose some important Indian options, opening the way for the proliferation hawks to decide on tests and weaponization. (The options before recent governments included a test with no weaponization and the declaration of weaponization without testing. The BJP did both, although it and the scientific-strategic enclave that was responsible for the technical side of the tests skillfully misled outsiders and Indians alike as to their intentions.) Third, although being a democracy has an impact on Indian foreign policy, weak governments are especially vulnerable. The great stress in India on the importance of a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy meant that once earlier governments moved toward a nuclear test by preparing the test site and allowing the design teams to continue their work, then successor governments could claim that their predecessors supported their policies because they had literally prepared the ground. It will be difficult to move the new “consensus” back from this position to a point where declaration of nuclear weapons status does not include deployment. I conclude with a theme that has not been discussed in the strategic literature or in Indian statements immediately after the tests—but that is evident in any reading of the Indian press. India is simultaneously undergoing a variety of domestic changes, some of which are revolutionary in their implications. There is a stalled economic revolution, which began about the time that India’s global strategic position changed (1990); there is a social revolution, epitomized by the emergence of regional middlecaste and even low-caste political parties whose fixed agenda is nothing short of social transformation; there is also a cultural revolution under way led by the BJP, which seeks to redefine and homogenize the meaning of “Indian.” Finally, there is a federal revolution under way in the country, in which the states battle for greater freedom from the center. Each of these revolutions has important implications for Indian foreign policy: my point here is that together and separately they remain far more important for most Indians than issues such as nuclear weapons or arms control. Strategic and military issues become politically salient only when they are linked to these deeper causes. It has been a major accomplishment of the BJP to once again (as Nehru did) link India’s foreign pol-

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icy with its larger civilizational aspirations. Both Nehru, his daughter, and the BJP saw this as a way of strengthening their hand at home. Such a domestic situation suggests that in the long run purely strategic considerations will eventually be displaced or supplanted by considerations of economics and politics—hardly a surprising conclusion for a democracy. The BJP will not win the next election because of the bomb, but it may do marginally better (or worse) depending on how the nuclear issue is linked to the concerns of India’s voters. Only a few of those voters are concerned about foreign policy issues; many more are concerned about economic issues, caste and ethnic conflict, growing social violence, and loosening the heavy hand of New Delhi. NOTES

A version of this chapter was originally presented to the Harvard/MIT Transnational Security Project Seminar on Intergroup Conflict, Human Rights, and Refugees on November 23, 1998, and that in turn had its origins in a report prepared by the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois for the Department of Energy. I am grateful to the Department of Energy, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Alton Jones Foundation for past individual and institutional support. 1. The baseline study remains that of S. Rashid Naim, “Asia’s Day After,” in Stephen P. Cohen, ed., The Security of South Asia: Asian and American Perspectives (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987); a revised version appears in Stephen P. Cohen, ed., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990). 2. For a summary of the literature and an application to U.S. and other nuclear weapons programs, see Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 3. For two recent explorations of Indian strategic culture, see George Tanham’s major essay in Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996); and Jaswant Singh, Defending India (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), which applies the “strategic culture” literature to modern South Asian security. 4. The most complete statement of this science-led strategy is in A. P. J. Kalam, with Y. S. Rajan, India 2020: A Vision for the New Millennium (New Delhi: Viking, 1998). 5. See Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed Press, 1998); and George Perkovich’s history of the nuclear program, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 6. Subrahmanyam has written profusely on the subject, both in books and newspaper columns. For his personal history of the Indian nuclear program, see “Indian Nuclear Policy—1964–98: A Recollection,” in Jasjit Singh, ed., Nuclear India (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998).

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7. See Bharat Karnad, “A Thermonuclear Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1998). 8. See the widely circulated document signed by Admiral Ramdas and other Indian army officers (and several retired Pakistani officers), “Joint Statement Against Nuclear Tests and Weapons by Retired Pakistani and Indian Armed Forces Personnel,” July 1998; and General Raghavan’s contribution to the debate, “India’s Nuclear Dilemma,” Hindu, June 6, 1998. 9. See Kanti P. Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995). 10. See Amitav Ghosh’s interview with Fernandes in Ghosh, “Countdown: Why Can’t Every Country Have the Bomb?” The New Yorker, October 26–November 2, 1998. 11. Inder Kumar Gujral, A Foreign Policy for India (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1998), 50.

3 Explaining the Indian Nuclear Tests of 1998 Sumit Ganguly

On May 11 and 13, 1998, in a departure from an extended period of twenty-four years of mostly self-induced restraint, India tested five nuclear devices at Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert. The explosions not only had powerful regional reverberations but also sent off shock waves throughout much of the nonproliferation communities in the United States and elsewhere. The long-held concern about the dangers of the growth of new nuclear-armed states beyond the original five was resurrected. Renewed fears were expressed that other nuclear aspirants would escalate their programs. These fears were heightened when India’s long-standing adversary, Pakistan, followed suit on May 30, 1998.1 Proponents of the emerging nonproliferation regime expressed increasing dismay about its continuing viability and demanded renewed efforts to curb the activities of these two recalcitrant states. The almost uniformly adverse international reactions to both Indian and Pakistani tests were hardly unanticipated. Some evidence suggests that India had actually assessed the likely economic costs of the sanctions that came to be imposed on it. Why, then, did India conduct the nuclear tests despite ample knowledge of the costly economic and political fallout? More to the point, why did India abandon its policy of nuclear restraint that it had pursued since the initial test of 1974? PROFFERED EXPLANATIONS

Three major arguments have been proffered to explain the Indian nuclear tests. One argument holds that the Indian government had pursued the 37

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nuclear weapons program for purposes of garnering status and prestige in the international system. The advocates of this perspective claim that it was India’s unrequited quest for status in the global order that inexorably led to the nuclear tests. The possession of a demonstrated nuclear weapons capability would underscore India’s technical prowess and thereby enhance its standing in the international arena. Though superficially attractive, this argument is fundamentally flawed. India’s quest for status and prestige in the international arena is of long standing. Indeed, it had been one of the lodestars of India’s foreign policy, harking back to the era of its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Even prior to India’s independence, he had envisaged a significant role for India in the emerging international order. During his term in office, despite the challenge of endemic poverty at home, he ardently sought to raise India’s international profile. Most pertinently, along with the Irish, in 1954 Nehru cosponsored a United Nations resolution calling for a complete ban on all nuclear testing. At another level, he boosted India’s role in early UN peacekeeping operations in Asia and elsewhere. Long after his demise, his successors sought to pursue similar goals. In effect, the search for international standing has been a constant in Indian foreign policy. Consequently, one cannot adduce an unvarying factor to explain a discrete event. A second argument holds that a bureaucratic-scientific-technological momentum culminated in the nuclear tests of 1998. This argument suggests that key members of India’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) pursued a somewhat surreptitious path to the acquisition of nuclear weapons as part of a quest for technological mastery in a scientific arena that was largely the preserve of advanced industrial states. There is some merit to this argument. Nevertheless, it amounts to an incomplete and misleading explanation for the nuclear tests. Even though members of the scientific community can proffer technological choices to the political leadership, the ultimate decisions still rest in the hands of political authority. Consequently, attributing the quest for nuclear weapons to a technological imperative borders on reification and overlooks the primacy of political choices in a democratic state. A third argument, which has acquired considerable currency in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear tests, holds that the tests were emblematic of the jingoistic Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) quest for a more virile and muscular Indian state. Again, this position is not entirely bereft of merit. The BJP and its supporters do have a more militaristic outlook. Nevertheless, the argument is ahistorical. It ignores the fitful historical evolution of the Indian nuclear program and the key political choices

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that sustained it over nearly five decades. It also ignores that fact that in December 1995, a non-BJP prime minister, Narasimha Rao, allowed serious preparations to be made for testing nuclear weapons. When U.S. surveillance satellites picked up evidence of these preparations, the U.S. ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, confronted Rao with the satellite imagery of India’s test preparations. Rao, a perennially indecisive decisionmaker, called off the tests. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION

The explanation for the Indian tests must be sought elsewhere. In this chapter I argue that the tests resulted from three distinct sources. First, they stemmed from a security dilemma posed for India by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) military capabilities and behavior. Second, in a haphazard fashion, specific political choices responding to the Chinese (and on occasion, Pakistani) threats propelled the weapons program and culminated in the tests. Third, through foreign assistance and its own efforts, India developed the requisite scientific base to manufacture nuclear weapons. I discuss these three issues in a historically contextualized fashion and then briefly address the emerging issues of force configuration, strategic doctrine, and arms control. PHASE 1: THE ORIGINS NUCLEAR PROGRAM

OF INDIA’S

In a sense, the Indian nuclear program predates India’s independence from the British empire in 1947. The civilian program can be traced to the work of the Indian physicist Homi J. Bhabha, who had studied with the eminent nuclear scientist Lord Ernest Rutherford at Cambridge University in the 1930s. Upon his return to India, Bhabha convinced one of India’s principal industrial barons, the Tata family, to contribute money toward the creation of a center for the study of nuclear physics. The Tata Institute for Fundamental Research opened in Bombay in 1945. After India’s independence, Bhabha convinced India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, of the signal importance of atomic energy research in enabling India to build an industrial base and to tackle the overwhelming problems of entrenched poverty. Bhabha’s views impressed Nehru, who had a fundamentally scientific demeanor.2 From the outset the Indian atomic energy establishment, under the direction of the prime minister, enjoyed a high

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degree of autonomy and was largely shielded from public scrutiny.3 Bhabha, as the first head of the Department of Atomic Energy created on August 3, 1954, zealously worked to preserve the organizational autonomy of India’s nuclear energy estate. Shortly after India’s independence, the AEC had been established under the Department of Scientific Research, and in keeping with India’s strategy of economic self-reliance, every effort was made to keep the program indigenous. However, India had to obtain some assistance in reactor design from the United Kingdom and Canada. Publicly, Nehru opposed the development of nuclear weapons.4 His opposition to nuclear weapons accorded with his deep-seated opposition to the use of force to resolve international disputes. This conviction stemmed in part from the Gandhian legacy of the Indian nationalist movement. Nehru’s aversion to nuclear weapons also drew from his fundamental fear of the militarization of Indian society.5 Additionally, his opposition was an outgrowth of his firm beliefs about the role of the use of military force in world affairs.6 He believed that military spending was, at best, a necessary evil.7 As prime minister, Nehru enunciated a policy of nonalignment, principally to distance India from the superpower struggle. Both the Western and Soviet blocs derided this doctrine, especially when it was inconsistently applied. Nevertheless, Nehru refused to be swayed. He spoke out vigorously against the growing nuclear arsenals of both superpowers and sought to reduce international tensions in various parts of the world.8 Despite his public opposition to nuclear weapons, Nehru granted Bhabha a free hand in the development of India’s nuclear infrastructure and sought to lay the necessary foundations should a political decision to acquire nuclear weapons be made. In pursuit of this end, Bhabha worked inexorably toward a complete mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and a completely indigenous production process. As early as 1958, Bhabha had a conversation with British physicist and defense adviser Lord P. M. S. Blackett about his interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons.9 Four years later, India’s disastrous war with China no doubt reinforced Bhabha’s interest in pursuing the nuclear weapons option.10 A turning point in the Indian foreign policy establishment’s attitude toward defense spending came in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian border war of October 1962. After invading India along the Himalayan border, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army routed the ill-equipped and ill-preThe 1962 Sino-Indian Border War and Its Aftermath

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pared Indian army and came to occupy some 14,000 square miles of Indian territory. Worse still, the Chinese declared a unilateral cease-fire after achieving their territorial objectives, thereby humiliating Nehru and the Indian political leadership.11 The significance of this war on India’s foreign and security policymakers cannot be underestimated. The Chinese attack fundamentally called into question Nehru’s varied attempts to court the Chinese and bring China into the comity of nations: he had expressed the mildest condemnation of the harsh Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950; had in 1952 readily ceded India’s extraterritorial privileges in Tibet, inherited from the British colonial period; and had championed China’s entry into the UN. Through these measures Nehru had hoped to avoid a conflict with China, which he knew would force him to increase defense spending. The border war compelled Nehru to reappraise his strategy and his most cherished ideals. PHASE TWO: THE CHINESE TEST

AT

LOP NOR

The second phase of India’s nuclear program started shortly after the first Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor on October 16, 1964.12 There is little question that segments of India’s political and scientific establishments evinced a greater interest in acquiring nuclear weapons following that test. By this time Bhabha had begun to articulate the politico-military significance of nuclear weapons. In a paper delivered at the Twelfth Pugwash Conference in January–February 1964, he elaborated his views as follows: “Nuclear weapons coupled with an adequate delivery system can enable a State to destroy more or less totally the cities, industry, and all important targets in another State. It is then largely irrelevant whether the State so attacked has greater destructive power at its command. With the help of nuclear weapons, therefore, a State can acquire what we may call a position of absolute deterrence even against another having a many times greater destructive power under its control.”13 Bhabha’s stance toward nuclear deterrence would find many adherents and some critics in India in the wake of the Chinese test. To no one’s surprise, the news of the Chinese nuclear test released a firestorm of controversy across India. The Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war dealt a further blow to India’s national security. Sisir Gupta, one of India’s ablest diplomats, spelled out the concerns of most Indian strategists: “Without using its nuclear weapons and without unleashing the kind of war which would be regarded in the West as the crossing of the provocation-threshold, China

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may subject a non-nuclear India to periodic blackmail, weaken its people’s spirit of resistance and self-confidence, and thus achieve without a war its major political and military objectives in Asia.”14 Minoo Masani, a leader of the small, pro-Western Swatantra Party, expressed the fears of many of India’s leaders: “The Chinese explosion cannot be ignored; it cannot be written off; it cannot be played down; it is of major significance. We are the country for which it has the most immediate importance.”15 Masani and other opposition members rebuked the government for not undertaking a more thorough review of the changed security situation in the subcontinent following the Chinese test and for not developing an appropriate response. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (the forerunner to the BJP) condemned India’s policy of nuclear abstinence.16 Even normally pro-government newspapers questioned the government’s seeming complacency in the wake of the Chinese nuclear tests.17 Nehru, however, remained opposed to the development of nuclear weapons. Nine days before his death, in a television interview in New York on May 18, 1964, he stated, “We are determined not to use weapons for war purposes. We do not make atom bombs. I do not think we will.”18 However, his defense minister, Y. B. Chavan, felt compelled to reaffirm India’s commitment to the modernization of its conventional forces in the wake of the Chinese test.19 In December 1964 at a press conference in London, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri revealed India’s efforts to obtain a nuclear guarantee from the nuclear weapons states.20 He pursued this course even though a number of India’s politicians, including some within the ruling Congress Party, feared that it would compromise nonalignment. At the same time, political analysts with close connections to the government argued that India’s credentials for boosting the nuclear disarmament agenda could be strengthened if the country refrained from developing nuclear weapons even in the face of potential aggression by an adversary armed with nuclear weapons.21 These sentiments were first aired in a vigorous debate that took place at the All India Congress Committee (AICC) meeting from January 7 to 9, 1965. In the aftermath of the Chinese tests, a number of Congress Party members of parliament (MPs) favored dropping India’s rigid stance on disarmament. They forcefully and repeatedly called for a reorientation of India’s foreign policy in light of the new perceived threat from China. However, the Congress leadThe Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee

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ership refused to address their central demand—a fundamental shift in India’s nuclear policy—contending that the prohibitive costs of embarking on a nuclear weapons program, India’s historical commitment to a nuclear-free world, its belief in Gandhian principles, and misgivings about alienating world opinion undermined the case for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons option.22 In effect, the AICC chose to defer the question of acquiring nuclear weapons.23 Interestingly, several individuals severely upbraided Homi Bhabha at this conference for a recent public statement in which he had spelled out the potential economic costs of a modest nuclear force for India.24 These sentiments, which rallied against a drastic shift in India’s security policy, were again expressed, despite continuing dissension, at the next meeting of the AICC held on January 8, 1966.25 The arguments for rejecting the call to nuclear arms were made mostly along moral and ethical lines. One of the more prominent critics of nuclear weapons, senior Congress politician Morarji Desai, led the charge against the proponents of a shift in India’s nuclear policies. Desai argued that India should not jettison its moral objections to nuclear weapons at the first sign of danger. Simultaneously, Prime Minister Shastri argued that the superpowers could not afford to be indifferent to India’s plight in the face of a nuclear threat from China; however, he did not completely forswear the nuclear option. There is some evidence that Shastri allowed Bhabha to work toward reducing the time needed to develop nuclear explosives.26 Shastri concluded that, for the present term, India should strengthen its conventional forces to defend itself against a possible Chinese attack.27 Amid these debates, Shastri dispatched Sardar Swaran Singh, his foreign minister, to ascertain the views of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. Swaran Singh’s initial assessment suggested that the requisite guarantees would materialize. Subsequently, however, during a debate on May 10, 1965, in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian parliament), he admitted that the nuclear weapons states had ultimately failed to provide any such guarantees. During this period, the United States and the Soviet Union, exercised by the Chinese nuclear tests, sought to forge a multilateral treaty to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons.28 Accordingly, in November 1965 the UN Political Committee adopted a resolution detailing the guidelines for a treaty on nuclear nonproliferation. The Indian delegation to the UN had played a key role in drafting the central provisions of the text, which The Beginnings of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

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embodied two principles of special significance to India’s concerns. First, the treaty specified a balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations on the part of the nuclear and nonnuclear powers. It offered the nonnuclear states access to peaceful nuclear technology in return for their agreement not to obtain or develop nuclear weapons. Second, the treaty indicated that the attempts to promote nonproliferation would be merely a first step toward the ultimate goal of universal nuclear disarmament. Later, as discussions on the proposed treaty progressed, India added another qualification: nonnuclear states should be able to carry out “peaceful nuclear explosions.”29 The United States firmly opposed this last proposal on the grounds that no meaningful distinction could be made between “peaceful” and “nonpeaceful” nuclear explosions.30 The various Indian delegations to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) in Geneva in April and June 1965 nevertheless continued to press this distinction.31 As the proposed treaty started to take shape, Indian diplomats outside the ambit of the ENDC again raised the question of nuclear guarantees for nonnuclear powers, but to little avail.32 Meanwhile, a second Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir broke out in September 1965. During this conflict China provided diplomatic support for Pakistan and threatened to open a second front along India’s Himalayan border.33 Although this crude ultimatum was never carried out, Indian decisionmakers, still reeling from the debacle of 1962, took the Chinese warnings seriously and maintained a high level of alert along the Himalayan border. The war ended in a stalemate. Because the United States was unwilling to involve itself in promoting an Indo-Pakistani postwar accord, the Soviets stepped in, helping negotiate a settlement in January 1966 at the then-Soviet Central Asian city of Tashkent. Under the terms of the Tashkent agreement, the two sides agreed to return to the status quo ante. Just before the war ended, 100 members of the Lok Sabha wrote to Prime Minister Shastri calling for India to exercise the nuclear weapons option.34 The pressures confronting Shastri were genuine: India was faced with the possibility of a two-front war. Amid the growing public and political pressure, Shastri revealed a slight shift in the government’s public pronouncements on nuclear weapons. While answering a question asked in the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of the Indian parliament), Shastri stated that if the Chinese perfected their nuclear delivery systems, India would be forced to reconsider its nuclear policies.35 During this period The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War

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India’s apprehensions continued to mount as increasing evidence emerged about China’s growing nuclear capabilities.36 Shastri died in January 1966, shortly after negotiating the postwar accord with Pakistan. His successor, Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi, continued the quest for a nuclear guarantee from the major powers against a future Chinese threat. To this end, in April 1967 she dispatched a distinguished senior bureaucrat, Laxmi Kant Jha, to Moscow and Washington, D.C., to discuss the possibility of a guarantee designed to deter a possible Chinese attack. Despite India’s pleas, the United States was prepared to offer a guarantee only with significant qualifications. Among other matters, the guarantee would not have had the force of law because it would not be formally ratified by the U.S. Senate.37 The Soviets were even less forthcoming. At best, they were prepared to make a joint declaration under UN auspices not to employ nuclear weapons against nonnuclear powers.38 In the event, the qualified guarantees that both sides offered failed to satisfy India’s requirements. The discussions under way at the ENDC to formulate a nonproliferation treaty had a significant impact on India’s disarmament and security plans. The country’s earlier emphasis on the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament had been based upon fundamental moral premises. Now the terms of discourse at the international level shifted markedly. This movement was clearly reflected in the positions that India adopted at various multilateral forums. Three shifts were evident in India’s negotiating stance: a reduced sense of urgency about the need for international agreements in disarmament matters, a withdrawal from an active role in international arms control negotiations, and the pursuit of more traditional goals of statecraft (such as national security based upon military power, as opposed to reliance on the force of moral arguments).39 When the major powers agreed on a draft treaty, India was quick to register its opposition. On January 18, 1968, the Soviet Union and the United States presented identical drafts of the treaty to the ENDC. Three of the great powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union—signed the treaty on July 1, 1968. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force on March 5, 1970. The government of India refused to accede to the terms of the treaty because it failed to address India’s misgivings—specifically that the continued nuclear abstinence of the nonnuclear states was not linked to explicit reciprocal obligations on the part of the nuclear weapons states.40 Although India’s argument was Back to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

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couched in moral terms, a more pragmatic consideration—namely, keeping its nuclear weapons option open—guided its decision to remain outside the ambit of the treaty.41 PHASE THREE: THE ROAD

TO

POKHRAN I

The third phase of the nuclear program began with India’s first nuclear test in May 1974. Both structural and proximate factors led up to this decision. The repeated failure of the great powers to address India’s security concerns and the emergence of a different brand of political leadership within India had led to important, if subtle, shifts in India’s nuclear policies. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, while repeating the platitudes of nonalignment, reoriented India’s foreign policy, basing it less on adherence to moral principles and more on the imperatives of statecraft. In place of her predecessors’ carefully forged equidistance from the superpowers, she steadily tilted in a pro-Soviet direction, especially after significant policy differences with the United States in 1967 on trade, investment, and foreign aid issues.42 Furthermore, some Indian analysts argue that U.S. pressure on India during the 1971 war also convinced Indira Gandhi of the signal importance of developing India’s military nuclear capabilities.43 While insisting upon India’s adherence to the principles of nonalignment, she signed a twenty-year treaty of “peace, friendship, and cooperation” with the Soviet Union in August 1971. Article 9 of that treaty virtually included a Soviet security guarantee.44 Although it is often overlooked in Western strategic analyses of India’s security, there is little question that for the duration of this treaty, India’s fears about military pressures on its borders from a recalcitrant and nuclear-armed China were greatly assuaged. India’s failure to influence the creation of a global regime that would address its security concerns pushed the country farther down the nuclear path. Subsequent events bolstered the Indian elite’s commitment to acquire nuclear weapons. In 1971 India and Pakistan became embroiled in a third war, which resulted in the breakup of the Pakistani state and the emergence of Bangladesh in place of the former East Pakistan. In the aftermath of this war, India emerged as the preeminent power on the subcontinent. In the interim, after Homi Bhabha’s death in 1966, his successor, Vikram Sarabhai, continued to broaden India’s nuclear infrastructure.45 On May 25, 1970, in a public document Sarabhai spelled out the key features and goals of India’s nuclear and space programs for the coming

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decade. Specifically, the document called for important developments in the arena of space research, including a commitment to develop rocket systems capable of placing 1,200-kilogram payloads into geosynchronous orbit, the development of flight guidance systems for rockets, and the construction of large solid-propellant blocks.46 The discovery of uranium deposits in northern India had also helped boost India’s nuclear programs.47 Thus, as the 1970s started, India had both the capability as well as the political motivation to conduct a nuclear test. The only question that remained about weaponization was the political decision to proceed based upon some assessment of the likely external costs of such a test. In an effort to bolster India’s newfound political status in South Asia after its victory in the 1971 war, Indira Gandhi authorized a nuclear test. The precise timing of the test, however, had much to do with her sagging domestic popularity in the aftermath of the 1973 OPEC-induced (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil crisis. The test was carried out on May 18, 1974. Billed as a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” the test had a 15-kiloton yield.48 Subsequently, Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram argued that the test had few or no military implications and was simply part of India’s ongoing attempts to harness the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.49 The two scientists closely associated with the nuclear test, R. Chidambaram and Raja Ramanna, maintained the same public posture.50 The Indian explanation for the test found few adherents abroad, however. Of the great powers, only the French congratulated the Indians on the success of their first nuclear test.51 The Chinese and Soviet reactions were muted but critical. The United States and Canada cut off all nuclear cooperation with India. Canada accused India of having diverted nuclear materials from a Canadian-supplied reactor to make the bomb.52 The U.S. reaction, however, was the most severe: in 1976 Congress introduced the Symington amendment to the foreign aid bill, thereby cutting off certain forms of economic and military assistance to countries that received enrichment or reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology without full-scale International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.53 Further restrictions soon followed under the Carter administration, which made nonproliferation one of the key elements of its foreign policy platform. Most important, the Carter administration introduced and successfully passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA), omnibus legislation designed to severely curb nuclear sales to recalcitrant nations.54 The The First Nuclear Test

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United States also undertook significant efforts to limit proliferation at the multilateral level, taking the lead in the formation of the London Suppliers Group, which sought to coordinate and limit the sales of sensitive and dual-use technologies to countries outside the ambit of the NPT. The raft of U.S. legislation that the U.S. Congress passed after the Indian nuclear test significantly hobbled India’s ability to further its civilian nuclear program. The sharpness of international reactions and the variety of nuclear export restrictions that the major industrial powers placed on India came as a surprise to the Indian political elite.55 However, this body of restrictive legislation also had a perverse and unintended consequence: it made the Indian program increasingly indigenous. Despite the initial wave of public support following the test, pressing domestic concerns diverted the public’s attention from the pursuit of a nuclear weapons option. In fact, within two years of the test Indira Gandhi had declared a “state of emergency” to avoid prosecution for a number of minor electoral violations. With her personal political survival at stake, she could ill afford to devote significant time and resources to the nuclear question. PHASE FOUR: A PERIOD

OF

RESTRAINT

The next stage in India’s nuclear program was marked by restraint of any further public progress toward nuclear weapons status amid increasing public and military, and even some political, support for acquiring nuclear weapons. Two factors explain this restraint. At one level, Indira Gandhi had taken stock of the adverse international reactions to India’s nuclear test. At another level, a robust Indo-Soviet strategic relationship assuaged India’s security concerns. In 1977 Indira Gandhi ended the state of emergency and called for new national elections. Her sycophantic advisers convinced her that she would win with wide margins at the polls. Their expectations were completely belied when the Indian electorate turned against her and the Congress Party. An eclectic collection of political parties and leaders who had been opposed to the draconian features of the state of emergency, when personal rights and civil liberties had been dramatically curtailed, formed a coalition government.56 Morarji Desai, a senior Gandhian and former Congress politician, assumed the prime ministership. Long an opponent of nuclear weapons, primarily on moral grounds, Desai reversed the direction of Indian nuclear planning. He even derided the potential scientific or tech-

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nological benefits of “peaceful nuclear explosions” and publicly promised that during his regime India would not conduct nuclear tests.57 Desai’s term in office lasted only until July 1979. His anti-Congress coalition split amid conflicting ideologies and personal predilections. The caretaker regime of Prime Minister Charan Singh altered Desai’s ironclad commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, stating that the decision was a sovereign Indian prerogative. Many in New Delhi also believed that the incoming Congress government would reverse Desai’s policy.58 In January 1980, when new national elections were held, Indira Gandhi and the Congress Party returned with a significant majority. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in late December 1979 had significant ramifications for the security of South Asia. The resulting transformation of U.S.-Pakistani relations was nothing short of dramatic. Under the Carter administration, Pakistan had been scorned because of its poor human rights record and its quest to clandestinely acquire nuclear weapons. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration’s offers of a limited arms and economic assistance package to Pakistan were dismissed by General Mohammed Zia-ul Haq, the Pakistani military dictator, as “peanuts.” During the Reagan administration, Pakistan’s relations with the United States entered new territory. General Zia managed to turn the potentially destabilizing civil war across the Afghan border to his advantage, becoming the beneficiary of significant U.S. largesse. Specifically, the Reagan administration offered his regime a package of concessionary loans and grant aid totaling $3.2 billion over five years. In return, the Pakistani regime was to give the Central Intelligence Agency a largely unrestricted hand in organizing, training, and arming the Afghan resistance. Simultaneously, to assuage Pakistani fears of Indo-Soviet collusion, the Reagan administration agreed to sell Pakistan several squadrons of F-16 fighter jets. India, as expected, vehemently lobbied against the sale of the F-16s to Pakistan, but with little success. Unhappy with the potential transformation of the South Asian security outlook, India turned to the Soviet Union for military assistance.59 The Soviets were extraordinarily forthcoming in terms of providing arms at concessional rates, but at another price: India had to refrain from publicly criticizing the Soviet invasion and abstain from the UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

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As the arms transfer relationship between the United States and Pakistan was renewed and India’s conventional military superiority eroded, the clamor for India to exercise the nuclear weapons option resumed. Prominent newspaper commentators and security analysts argued that India needed to have a nuclear edge over Pakistan to cope with the emerging security situation in the region. The earlier preoccupation with Chinese nuclear capabilities was redirected toward Pakistan’s growing nuclear status. The argument ran along the following lines: the United States, with full knowledge of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, was nevertheless supplying Pakistan with sophisticated weaponry and potentially nuclear-capable aircraft. Growing evidence of Chinese collusion in the Pakistani nuclear weapons program fueled Indian concerns.60 Under these changed security circumstances, India had to reevaluate its nuclear policies.61 In the early 1980s the clamor for the acquisition of a nuclear option grew as, ironically, U.S. sources increasingly provided evidence of Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons and the Chinese supply of a nuclear weapons design to Pakistan.62 India’s bomb-making capabilities also expanded during this period.63 Specifically, in February 1983 reports surfaced of India’s ability to reprocess plutonium to weapons-grade level.64 Also in 1983, the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) was given increased funding and a new mandate, the integrated guided missile development program (IGMDP).65 A space scientist, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, who had previously worked for the civilian Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) was shifted to the DRDO and placed in charge of the IGMDP.66 Kalam’s transfer to the military component of India’s rocketry program was significant, because he had a personal passion for the development of indigenous ballistic missile technology.67 Indira Gandhi’s faith in Kalam’s ability was not misplaced. Under his leadership, the DRDO developed and successfully test-fired India’s first intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Agni (the name literally means “fire”) on May 22, 1989, from a test range at Chandipore in the eastern coastal state of Orissa. Since then, the DRDO has developed a panoply of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, some of which are still in the prototype stage. They have met with varying degree of success.68 In the wake of Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984, her son, Rajiv Gandhi, assumed the prime ministership. During Rajiv’s tenure in office, India pursued contradictory policies on the nuclear question.69 On Acquisition of Greater Capabilities

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the one hand, he proposed a comprehensive plan for the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons, popularly referred to as the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan. This plan, which he presented in an address to the Third Special Session on Disarmament at the UN General Assembly, called for the elimination of all nuclear arsenals by the year 2010. It spelled out particular stages and targets that were to be achieved by all nuclear weapons states and imposed reciprocal restrictions on all nuclear threshold powers.70 It is not entirely clear whether this proposal was merely a symbolic gesture or represented a serious effort by the government to reclaim its Nehruvian roots. In the event, the great powers showed scant attention to the proposal. Also during Rajiv’s term, India and Pakistan reached an accord not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities.71 This treaty was not formally ratified, however, until 1991. On the other hand, despite this renewed attempt at multilateral diplomacy and some movement on the bilateral front with Pakistan, the scientific-military establishment received a considerable boost under Rajiv. A newspaper account based upon a conversation with M. R. Srinavasan, the chairman of the AEC, soon confirmed that India had made substantial progress toward the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. Specifically, the report stated that India had stockpiled between 100 and 200 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient to build between twelve and forty weapons.72 Furthermore, a belated realization that hortatory efforts toward encouraging multilateral disarmament were next to meaningless influenced Rajiv’s decision to boost India’s nuclear capabilities. K. Subrahmanyam, a key participant in many of the critical decisions of India’s nuclear weapons policy, argues along these lines in a work published shortly after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests. According to him, it was under Rajiv Gandhi that India made the decision to acquire the missiles and other technology to form an effective nuclear deterrent.73 Rajiv’s interest in India’s military modernization may have also contributed to South Asia’s first nuclear crisis in 1987, in the wake of a major military exercise by India code-named “Brasstacks.”74 The precise dimensions of the nuclear component of this crisis remain somewhat murky.75 It is known, however, that toward the end of the crisis in late January 1987, Abdul Qadeer Khan, widely known as the “father” of the Pakistani nuclear program, gave an interview to a prominent Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar. In this interview, Khan made clear to Nayar that Pakistan had succeeded in producing weapons-grade uranium.76 There is little or no question that the Indian political leadership took Khan’s claim about uranium enrichment seriously.

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Within three years India became embroiled in another crisis with Pakistan; this one clearly had a nuclear dimension. This crisis, unlike the 1987 Brasstacks crisis, stemmed directly from the outbreak of a secessionist, ethno-religious insurgency in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.77 Soon Pakistani infiltrators began crossing the porous border to join forces with the Kashmiri insurgents.78 The dramatic rise in the incidence of violence within the Kashmir valley, the principal locus of the insurgency, is widely believed to have led Indian decisionmakers to consider deep strikes into Pakistani territory to destroy insurgent training camps and sanctuaries. Pakistani intelligence sources, it is asserted, learned of India’s plans and, fearing a wider invasion, placed key portions of the Pakistani air force on alert. Pakistani decisionmakers also allegedly considered resorting to the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a concerted Indian incursion into Pakistan’s heartland.79 As the crisis peaked in May 1990, on the basis of reports from U.S. intelligence agencies President George Bush sent Robert Gates, the deputy national security adviser, to India and Pakistan. In New Delhi Gates counseled restraint. In Islamabad he warned Pakistani decisionmakers that in every war game scenario that the Pentagon had developed, Pakistan emerged as the loser. Consequently, he argued, it was not in Pakistan’s interest to provoke India.80 Later in the year, President Bush invoked the Pressler amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act and declared that Pakistan had failed to meet its expectations, stating that he could not certify to Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. This conclusion led to a cutoff of the substantial U.S. economic and military assistance that had been flowing to Pakistan since the beginning of the civil war in Afghanistan.81 Despite the aid cutoff, the Pakistani nuclear program proceeded apace, and the Chinese continued to support Pakistan’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.82 Within the next two years Pakistani political leaders as well as diplomats openly confirmed that it had acquired the ability to manufacture a nuclear bomb.83 These developments were carefully noted in New Delhi. The 1990 Crisis

PHASE FIVE: THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECURITY GUARANTEE

The final phase of the Indian nuclear program started in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse in 1991, which had profound implications for India’s security and foreign policies. It meant the loss of the support of a veto-

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wielding power in the UN on the critical question of Kashmir. It also brought to an end a highly favorable arms-transfer relationship. But most important from the standpoint of Indian security, it resulted in the loss of a critical counterweight to the Chinese threat: the security guarantee implied in the 1971 treaty with the Soviet Union disintegrated with the Soviet collapse. Russia had become now too debilitated to provide much reassurance to India.84 In 1995 the NPT came up for its twenty-five-year review. The United States, one of the principal proponents of the NPT regime, sought an “unconditional and indefinite extension” of the treaty. India, which had chosen to stay outside the NPT regime, decided not to participate in the proceedings in New York during April–May 1995 and did not even seek observer status.85 The Indian hope was that the United States would fail to cobble together a coalition that would unconditionally and indefinitely extend the treaty. Such expectations and fears were belied, as able and relentless U.S. diplomacy ensured the achievement of the U.S. goal.86 After the treaty was extended, only India, Pakistan, and Israel remained outside its scope. The U.S. success came as a dramatic shock to the Indian security policy establishment, which now realized that India would come under acute pressure to sign the NPT or at least to agree to full-scale safeguards on its nuclear power plants, including those of indigenous origin. The NPT Renewal

In the fall of 1995 the Clinton administration sought to obtain some leverage over Pakistan to contain its quest for nuclear weapons. Specifically, the administration, in concert with Senator Hank Brown (R.-Colo.), introduced legislation designed to override the provisions of the Pressler amendment. The Brown amendment allowed the provision of economic and some military assistance to Pakistan without any attached conditions. Despite vigorous opposition from senators committed to nonproliferation, the amended bill passed.87 The Brown Amendment

The extension of the NPT and the passage of the Brown amendment, which led to a renewal of up to $368 million in U.S. military assistance to Pakistan, inevitably provoked Indian security concerns.88 At one level, the The “Near Test”

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Indian leadership under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao feared, justifiably or not, that the renewal of U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan would lead to a larger U.S. security relationship with Pakistan. On another level, the Indians were anxious about the pressures that would be brought upon them in the wake of the extension of the NPT. Additionally, moves toward the finalization of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were also under way at the United Nations Disarmament Conference (UNDC) in Geneva. It is reasonable to infer that the Indian government believed that its window of opportunity was rapidly closing. In this politico-strategic context, Prime Minister Rao permitted the preparations for carrying out a nuclear test in December 1995.89 The test was stymied when U.S. reconnaissance satellites picked up signs of activity at the test site, and in response, the U.S. ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, prevailed upon the infamously indecisive prime minister to call off the tests.90 In 1996, following two years of extensive negotiations, the CTBT process gathered speed in Geneva.91 Although it had been one of the principal sponsors of the treaty in its initial form, India had three objections to the treaty as negotiated in Geneva. First, the Indians insisted that they would accede to the treaty only if the nuclear weapons states agreed to a timebound plan for universal nuclear disarmament. For the most part, this position was little more than a ploy; Indian policymakers knew only too well that none of the nuclear weapons states would agree to this proposition. Consequently, the inevitable failure to include such a time-bound objective would give India the option to remain outside the treaty. The second objection stemmed from the demand of some states that the treaty could come into force only after forty-four countries that had ongoing nuclear research and power facilities ratified the treaty. Again, although the argument against the “entry into force” clause was questioned on the grounds of fairness, India’s interest in challenging the clause was purely pragmatic. As a state with an ongoing but largely untested nuclear weapons program, India would come under enormous pressure to accede to the CTBT.92 The final Indian objection was more substantive.93 It dealt with the treaty’s allowance of computer simulations of nuclear tests and hydronuclear tests. In the Indian view, the failure to close these two technological loopholes undermined the larger goal of taking steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the end, India unsuccessfully attempted to block the reporting of the treaty from the UNDC to the General Assembly in New York.94 Its efforts to modify the treaty text or to prevent The CTBT Decision

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its adoption by the General Assembly also proved fruitless. The treaty was passed on September 10, 1996, by an overwhelming majority of the member states.95 Two factors explain the Indian shift from support to rejection of the CTBT. At one level, as has already been discussed, the Indians were acutely concerned about the “entry into force” clause and the likely effects of this upon the Indian nuclear weapons program. The other concern, not surprisingly, had to do with the spate of Chinese nuclear tests just prior to China’s accession to the CTBT. The Indian strategic community correctly inferred that the Chinese were willing to accede to the treaty only because they had reached such a level of competence in their weapons development that they felt no need to test further.96 The years 1997–1998 proved momentous for India in terms of its domestic politics. Within the span of one year, three different governments ruled the country.97 With the collapse of the shaky United Front coalition government in December 1997, new national elections were called for February–March 1998. In these elections, the BJP emerged as the largest single party within parliament, and with the support of a number of regional parties, it assumed power. The BJP’s election manifesto had spoken of the perceived need to “induct” nuclear weapons into India’s arsenal as well as to conduct a “strategic review” of India’s security environment. Most Western analysts, however, had dismissed the BJP’s electoral promise as bluff and bluster meant for domestic political consumption.98 Yet a more careful perusal of the BJP’s public stance toward perceived security threats from Pakistan and China, as well as its position on defense spending and nuclear weapons, should have suggested otherwise.99 Given the BJP’s proclivities and the substantial scientific, military, and public support for the nuclear program, only a useful catalytic event was necessary to propel the BJP to break from India’s long-standing policy of nuclear abstinence. This moment came when Pakistan tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile, code-named Ghauri, on April 6, 1998. The Ghauri, built with either Chinese or North Korean technology, had a range of 1,500 kilometers and could carry a payload of 750 kilograms. Its range enabled Pakistan to target twenty-six cities.100 This new Pakistani capability may have reinforced prior perceptions in India about the deterioration of India’s immediate security environment. For example, in 1997 under the United Front government, the Ministry of Defense’s Annual Report had Return to Pokhran

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expressed considerable misgivings about China’s support for Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs as well as China’s own growing ballistic missile capabilities.101 In any case, the Ghauri test provided the BJP-led government a useful rationale for carrying out nuclear tests. On May 9–10, 1998, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee instructed key ministers and the highest-ranking bureaucrats as well as the three service chiefs of his decision to proceed with the nuclear tests.102 It is tempting to argue that a different Indian regime would not have responded with similar alacrity to the Ghauri test. To this question there can be no definitive answer. It is well known, however, that several previous governments had made careful preparations for the nuclear test. In fact, had not U.S. reconnaissance satellites discovered India’s nuclear test preparations, there is every likelihood that Rao would have given the word to proceed. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE

OF

NUCLEAR INDIA

As my discussion of the evolution of India’s nuclear program has shown, the three factors outlined at the beginning of this chapter were fundamental to the decision to test in 1998. The first was the incremental and fitful acquisition of the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. This process was haphazard, discontinuous, and ridden with setbacks. Nevertheless, from the outset of the civilian nuclear program, Homi Bhabha harbored aspirations to make India a nuclear weapons state. His successors moved the program along to varying degrees, depending on their personal predilections and the political directions from New Delhi. The fitful movement toward a nuclear weapons capacity closely followed the shifting calculations of Indian leaders, who responded to a mix of ideology (initially a force for restraint), statecraft, and domestic pressures reflecting security concerns.103 The evolution of the nuclear program, as well as the 1998 tests, was the product of calculated political choices based upon considerations of national security. Certain regimes and specific political leaders brought definite ideas about India’s national security needs to office and acted upon those beliefs and assumptions. In large part, decisions (sometimes secret or subtle) made by Indian prime ministers advanced the nuclear weapons program without a full-fledged commitment to develop weapons. The final factor is the perception of external security threats and the absence of security guarantees from friendly nuclear states. Perceived

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threats from China and Pakistan repeatedly accelerated the program, with the period of the Soviet security guarantee providing an interlude. Most foreign and several Indian political commentators have dismissed the security imperatives underlying the Indian nuclear weapons program as well as the Indian tests while privileging other explanations based on considerations of status, prestige, and the short-term exigencies of domestic politics.104 Worse still, much of the conventional wisdom dismisses India’s felt security needs and blithely asserts that India would be better off without nuclear weapons. The purveyors of this perspective, with important exceptions, had evinced little or no interest in India’s security concerns prior to the nuclear tests.105 Yet there is ample evidence to suggest that India’s security misgivings did play an important role in the evolution of the program as well as in precipitating the nuclear tests of May 1998. Two key questions now confront India’s political leadership. The first is, where are India’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs headed? Unfortunately, few scholars or security analysts have devoted much thought to the development of a strategic doctrine for India.106 A year after the BJP government’s decision to test nuclear weapons, India’s strategic minds began to grapple with this difficult issue. In mid-August 1999, the newly constituted National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) released a draft outline for a nuclear strategic doctrine.107 Second, will the force configuration envisaged in the document suffice against potential Chinese and Pakistani threats and contribute to stability in the region? Despite U.S. and other international pressures, for now neither India nor Pakistan is likely to eschew its nuclear weapons program. Consequently, instead of focusing upon unrealistic and chimerical goals, it may be more useful for all parties to discuss ways to bring some stability to the region. Three distinct forms of stability—strategic stability, crisis stability, and arms race stability—deserve discussion. Strategic stability will occur when both sides are assured that each has a secure second-strike capability—adequate numbers of invulnerable nuclear weapons to inflict unacceptable damage after sustaining a nuclear attack. Crisis stability is said to exist when neither side fears a preemptive strike. And finally, arms race stability exists when neither side has concerns that its adversaries are trying to build weapons that undermine either strategic or crisis stability.108 To what extent do these conditions now obtain in the subcontinent?109 India’s concerns in these three realms involve two potential adversaries, China and Pakistan. Strategic stability does exist between India and

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Pakistan. Neither side can be certain that its extant capabilities will enable it to carry out a decapitating first strike. Consequently, a condition of mutual vulnerability will exist. Similarly, crisis stability is also likely to endure because neither side would be confident of destroying a substantial portion of the other’s forces in a preemptive strike. However, if India does proceed with its stated vision of developing a triadic system, Pakistan may fear a serious degradation of its ability to deter India. The reasons for this outcome are straightforward. A strategic triad could grant India second-strike capabilities, a status that Pakistan could ill afford to match. The question of arms race stability is more vexing. The growth of ballistic missile capabilities on both sides may endanger strategic or crisis stability. Consequently, one of the first priorities of the proponents of nuclear nonproliferation should be measures to ensure arms race stability. To this end, India and Pakistan need to discuss missile production and deployment issues and move toward the creation of an arms control regime. India’s conventional forces are more than a match for China’s capabilities. However, China’s substantial nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities present problems for Indian defense planners. The current SinoIndian relationship fails to meet the demands of strategic stability. India does not yet possess ballistic missile capabilities to target significant Chinese military or civilian assets.110 The Chinese, however, can inflict unacceptable damage on India.111 Crisis stability may be a bit stronger in this relationship, however. Given the acute secrecy surrounding the Indian nuclear weapons program and its dispersed assets, few Chinese decisionmakers would contemplate a disarming preemptive strike, and India lacks the capability to similarly strike China. Finally, arms race stability between India and China is also problematic. The Chinese already possess intermediate-range ballistic missiles that can target portions of the Indian heartland.112 India, in turn, is developing the Agni 2, which would be able to reach targets in southern China. The extant Chinese capabilities and incipient Indian capabilities threaten arms race stability. Worse still, the nuclear posture that is outlined in the draft nuclear doctrine statement, which calls for a triadic system with land, sea, and air assets, is bound to provoke Chinese anxieties. Thus, once mutual recriminations about the nuclear tests subside, it is imperative that both sides start discussions in conjunction with Pakistan about future force levels, deployments, and acquisitions. Now that the nuclear genie has escaped the bottle in South Asia, an arms control regime that involves China may offer the best hope of containing the genie’s reach.113

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The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and comments of Stephen P. Cohen, Ted Greenwood, Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., Traci Nagle, Andrew Polsky, Jack Snyder, and Rahul Mukherji in the preparation of this chapter. Research support was provided by the U.S. Institute of Peace. An earlier version of this chapter was published in International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999). 1. For a survey of the factors that may have contributed to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, see Neil Joeck, “Nuclear Development in India and Pakistan,” Access Asia Review 2, no. 2 (July 1999): 1–51. 2. On this point, see Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Praeger, 1962), 136. 3. For particularly strident criticisms of the lack of accountability in the Indian nuclear program, see David Brown, Nuclear Power in India: A Comparative Analysis (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983); also see Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed Books, 1998). 4. There has been some speculation during the last decade that, despite his public stance, Nehru wanted to keep India’s weapons option open. On this point, see the discussion in George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 5. Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). 6. Western commentators have often noted his willingness to use force in Kashmir in 1947–1948 and subsequently in Goa in 1960. These charges of hypocrisy are largely polemical. The Kashmir war involved the defense of a besieged state. In the Goan case, all negotiated attempts to induce the Portuguese to withdraw peacefully from their anachronistic colonial enclave failed. Only under these conditions did Nehru authorize the use of force. The literature on Kashmir’s accession to India and the subsequent war is voluminous; for a dispassionate account, see H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1985). For a particularly thoughtful account of the Goa question and India’s resort to force, see Arthur Rubinoff, India’s Use of Force in Goa (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971). 7. Even a quick perusal of his many writings reveals the depth of these convictions. See, for example, Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995). 8. For a discussion of the philosophical origins of nonalignment and the quest for an alternative world order, see A. P. Rana, The Imperatives of Nonalignment (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1976). For a discussion of the practice of nonalignment and Nehru’s attempt to defuse international tensions in a neighboring region, see D. R. Sardesai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, 1947–1964 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). 9. See Shyam Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad, India: Vikas, 1979), 114. 10. For a discussion of Bhabha’s concerns about Chinese capabilities and intentions, see “Incoming Telegram,” U.S. Department of State, November 14, 1964, available in file “Nuclear Proliferation: India-Pakistan,” National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. 11. On this point, see Steven Hoffman, India and the China Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

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12. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 13. H. J. Bhabha, “Safeguards and the Dissemination of Military Power,” paper presented to the Twelfth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, January 27–February 1, 1964. 14. Sisir Gupta, “The Indian Dilemma,” in Alastair Buchan, ed., A World of Nuclear Powers? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 55–67. 15. Quoted in Lok Sabha Debates 35, November 16–27, 1964 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1964), 1239–1240. 16. A representative sample is Eskayji (pseudonym), “Why India Must Have the Bomb,” Organizer (India), December 28, 1964, 5. 17. Editorial, “Time for Rethinking,” Hindustan Standard (Delhi), October 20, 1964, 4. 18. Quoted in G. G. Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), 23. 19. “New Strategy on Defence: Impact of Chinese Atomic Test,” Statesman (Calcutta), October 20, 1964, 1; Express News Service, “Chavan Urges a Look at the Bomb from Defence Angle: Chinese Threat Not Yet Over,” Indian Express (Delhi), December 1, 1964, 1. Also see “Incoming Telegram,” U.S. Department of State, October 27, 1968, available in file “Nuclear Proliferation: India-Pakistan,” National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. 20. For a discussion of India’s attempts to obtain a nuclear guarantee, see A. G. Noorani, “India’s Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee,” Asian Survey 7, no. 7 (July 1967): 490–502. 21. Some flavor of the strategic debate within India can be gathered from R. K. Nehru, “The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb,” India Quarterly 21 (1965): 3–14. 22. Shastri’s concerns about the economic burden of pursuing a nuclear weapons program were entirely understandable: he had inherited an unenviable economy legacy. See Michael Brecher, Nehru’s Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India (New York: Praeger, 1966), 138–150. 23. Thomas W. Graham, “Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control, and Confidence Building Measures in South Asia,” in Eric H. Arnett, ed., New Perspectives for a Changing World Order (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1991), 127. 24. Special Correspondent, “AICC Split on Atomic Issue,” Statesman, November 8, 1964, 1. 25. K. Rangaswami, “Atom Bomb to Meet China’s Threat: Vigorous Support in AICC for Independent Deterrent,” Hindu (Madras), January 8, 1966, 3. 26. Albert Wohlstetter, Victor Gilinsky, Robert Gillette, and Roberta Wohlstetter, Nuclear Policies: Fuel Without the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1978), 58. 27. See, for example, Express News Service, “The Bomb to Loom Large at AICC Meet,” Indian Express, January 5, 1965, 4. 28. John Simpson and Anthony G. McGrew, eds., The International Nuclear NonProliferation System: Challenges and Choices (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984). 29. Ashok Kapur, “India’s Nuclear Politics and Policy: Janata Party’s Evolving Stance,” in T. T. Poulose, ed., Perspectives of India’s Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1978), 172. 30. For a useful discussion, see Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma, 121–150. 31. Ashok Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1976). 32. Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma, 139.

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33. For a description and analysis of the three Indo-Pakistani wars, see Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: The Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994). 34. “Time for A-Bomb—Say 100 M.P.’s,” Indian Express, September 23, 1965, 1. 35. Lal Bahadur Shastri, “If China Develops Nuclear Weapons India Will Have to Consider What to Do,” India News (Washington, D.C.), December 3, 1965, 4. 36. See, for example, Hanson W. Baldwin, “China’s Atomic Potential,” New York Times, March 15, 1966, 3. 37. Noorani, “India’s Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee,” 498–499. Interestingly enough, U.S. government analysts not only were cognizant of the Chinese threat to India but also concurred that “the military security argument for an independent Indian nuclear deterrent to a Chinese attack is a particularly powerful one, given the looseness of India’s collective security arrangements.” See “Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions Concerning Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons,” SECRET/NOFORN Background Paper from the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, January 21, 1965, available in file “Nuclear Proliferation: India and Pakistan,” National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. 38. Richard B. Freund, “Indian-Soviet Discussion of Nuclear Guarantees,” Memorandum of Conversation, February 16, 1965, available in file “Nuclear Proliferation: India and Pakistan,” National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. 39. Michael J. Sullivan III, “Re-orientation of Indian Arms Control Policy, 1969–1971,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association, Philadelphia, April 14, 1972. 40. Sisir Gupta, “India and Non-Proliferation: Hard Choices Ahead,” Times of India (Delhi), January 29, 1968, 6. 41. K. Subrahmanyam, “India: Keeping the Option Open,” in Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus, eds., Nuclear Proliferation: Phase II (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1973). For a formulation that argues that India refused to accede to the NPT on both moral and pragmatic grounds, see Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb. 42. For a discussion of the sources of discord, see Sumit Ganguly, “Of Great Expectations and Bitter Disappointments: Indo-U.S. Relations During the Johnson Administration,” Asian Affairs 15, no. 4 (Winter 1988–1989): 212–219. For an analysis of the pro-Soviet tilt, see Robert Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Influence (New York: Praeger, 1982). 43. Subrahmanyam, “India: Keeping the Option Open.” 44. For an analysis of the significance of Article 9 of the treaty, see Linda Racioppi, Soviet Policy Towards South Asia Since 1970 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 45. For a discussion of India’s weapons-making capabilities, see Brahma Chellaney, “South Asia’s Passage to Nuclear Power,” International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 43–72. For a more skeptical view of India’s nuclear infrastructure, see Ravindra Tomar, “The Indian Nuclear Power Program: Myths and Mirages,” Asian Survey 20, no. 5 (May 1980): 517–531. For a contrary argument that suggests that Sarabhai was more ambivalent about the expansion of India’s nuclear complex, see Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb. 46. Vikram Sarabhai, “India’s Nuclear and Space Programs: A Design for Decade 1970–80,” Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis Journal (New Delhi) 3, no. 1 (July 1970): 90–91. 47. David Gosling, “India on Way to Nuclear Independence,” Statesman (New Delhi), November 23, 1971, 8.

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48. The slightest doubt of the military significance of the test was effectively ruled out in October 1997 when Raja Ramanna, one of the key scientists involved in conducting the test, explicitly stated that the 1974 test was that of a nuclear weapon. See Adirupa Sengupta, “Scientist Says Bomb Was Tested in ’74,” India Abroad (New York), October 17, 1997, 14. The yield of the test is the subject of contestation. For a discussion, see Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb. 49. On this point see “India Rules Out Atomic Arms’ Use,” New York Times, May 23, 1974, 5. 50. R. Chidambaram and R. Ramanna, “Some Studies on India’s Peaceful Nuclear Experiment,” Peaceful Nuclear Explosions IV (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1975). 51. “New Delhi Assailed at Parley in Geneva for Atom Explosion,” New York Times, May 22, 1974, 3. 52. Robert Trumbull, “Canada Says India’s Blast Violated Use of Atom Aid,” New York Times, May 21, 1974, 4. 53. Brahma Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation: The U.S.-Indian Conflict (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993), 74–75. 54. For a detailed discussion, see Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, 56–66. 55. Personal communication with Indian diplomat, Washington, D.C., September 1985. 56. For a discussion of many facets of the “state of emergency,” see Henry Hart, ed., Indira Gandhi’s India: A Political System Re-Appraised (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978). 57. On this issue, see Prime Minister Morarji Desai, “Statement on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions,” Rajya Sabha, press release, July 31, 1978, official text (New Delhi: Press Information Bureau, Government of India). 58. Mohan Ram, “The South Asian Arms Race,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 16, 1979, 38–39. For an analysis of the mounting pressures on the Indira Gandhi regime to weaponize, see Rajiv Desai, “Nuclear Shadow on Subcontinent,” Chicago Tribune, August 17, 1981, 21. 59. For a discussion of the Soviet willingness to transfer advanced weaponry to India, see G. S. Bhargava, South Asia After Afghanistan (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1983). 60. William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). 61. See, for example, Jonathan Power, “Mrs. Gandhi’s Nuclear Nuances,” International Herald Tribune, December 18, 1981, 5. 62. K. Subrahmanyam, “Pak Bomb in Basement,” Times of India, November 7, 1986, 5. 63. Suman Dubey, “India, Keeping Its Nuclear Options Open, Monitors Arms Program in Neighboring Pakistan with Concern,” Wall Street Journal, November 26, 1984, 36. 64. Clyde H. Farnsworth, “India Now Producing Plutonium of Arms Grade at Bombay Plant,” New York Times, February 21, 1983, 7. According to another source, India had been processing weapons-grade plutonium as early as 1965. See Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb. 65. Significantly, these changes came about when allegations of Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan gathered steam. 66. Chris Smith, India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? (Oxford: Oxford University Press for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1994), 201; and Burrows and Windrem, Critical Mass, 372–373.

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67. On this point, see Sunil Dasgupta, “A Quiet Launch,” India Today International, June 30, 1994, 93. 68. Smith, India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal, 199–203. 69. A particularly thoughtful discussion of the contradictions in India’s declaratory nuclear weapons policy can be found in Bhabhani Sen Gupta, “The Nuclear Option: Ambivalent Stand,” India Today International, May 31, 1985, 47. Also see K. Subrahmanyam, “Indian Nuclear Policy, 1964–1998: A Personal Recollection,” in Jasjit Singh, ed., Nuclear India (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1988), 26–53. 70. Rajiv Gandhi, “Address to the Third Special Session on Disarmament,” UN General Assembly, New York, June 9, 1988. 71. Steve Coll, “India, Pakistan Pursue Peace by Creating Nuclear Standoff,” Washington Post, December 29, 1990, A13. 72. Steven R. Weisman, “India’s Nuclear Energy Policy Raises New Doubts on Arms,” New York Times, May 7, 1988, 1. 73. Subrahmanyam, “Indian Nuclear Policy, 1964–1998,” 44. 74. For a detailed description and analysis of the “Brasstacks” crisis, see Kanti Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995). 75. See Lawrence Lifshultz, “Doom Thy Neighbour,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 4, 1998, 30–34. 76. Steven R. Weisman, “Pakistan Stiffens on Atomic Program,” New York Times, March 22, 1987, A4. The other key individual in the bomb-making project was Munir Ahmed Khan, the director of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. 77. Sumit Ganguly, “Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay: Explaining the Crisis in Kashmir,” International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 76–107. 78. On Pakistan’s involvement in the insurgency, see Edward Desmond, “Pakistan’s Hidden Hand,” Time, July 22, 1991, 23; and John Ward Anderson and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan Shelters Islamic Radicals,” Washington Post, March 8, 1995, A21–22. 79. It is not entirely clear whether the Pakistani air force squadrons were equipped with nuclear weapons. The initial tocsin was sounded by Seymour Hersh in “On the Nuclear Edge,” The New Yorker, March 29, 1993, 56–73. For a more temperate analysis of the crisis, see Stephen P. Cohen, “1990: South Asia’s Useful Nuclear Crisis,” paper presented to the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Chicago, February 6–7, 1992, 2–10. Also see Michael Krepon and Mishi Faruqee, eds., Conflict Prevention and Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia: The 1990 Crisis, occasional paper no. 17, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., April 1994. 80. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995). 81. Michael R. Gordon, “Nuclear Issue Slows U.S. Aid to Pakistan,” New York Times, October 1, 1990, A3. 82. Steven A. Holmes, “China Denies Violating Pact by Selling Arms to Pakistan,” New York Times, July 26, 1993, 6. 83. Stefan Wagstyl, “A Damaging Diversion,” Financial Times, August 26, 1994, 7. 84. For an especially thoughtful discussion of the challenges facing India’s security and foreign policies, see Ashley Tellis, Changing Grand Strategies in South Asia, Rand Studies in Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

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85. India’s reservations about the NPT regime can be found in Rakesh Sood, “The NPT and Beyond,” paper presented at a seminar on “Non-Proliferation and Technology Transfer,” University of Pennsylvania, October 3–6, 1993, 1–20. In this paper, Sood, the director of the Disarmament and International Security Division of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, traces some of the early history of the NPT negotiations and discusses the possibilities of expanding the scope of the regime to address India’s concerns. 86. Lewis A. Dunn, “High Noon for the NPT,” Arms Control Today 25, no. 6 (July–August 1995): 3–9. 87. Elaine Sciolono, “Despite Nuclear Fears, Senate Acts to Lift Pakistan Curbs,” New York Times, September 22, 1995, 4. 88. Aziz Haniffa, “Arms for Pakistan Near Passage; India Hurt,” India Abroad, November 3, 1995, 14. 89. The Indian “near test” of December 1995 decisively shows the fallacy of the “domestic imperatives” argument for the Indian tests of 1998. Obviously, the 1998 tests briefly boosted the BJP’s domestic ratings. However, larger security concerns propelled the BJP, just as they had driven the Narasimha Rao regime less than two years earlier. For an alternative formulation, see Gaurav Kampani, “From Existential to Minimum Deterrence: Explaining India’s Decision to Test,” The Nonproliferation Review 6, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 12–24. 90. Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian, “Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Preparations in the Rajasthan Desert,” Science and Global Society 6 (1996): 101–189. Some allegations also exist that India toyed with another nuclear explosion in early 1982. On this issue, see Shubharrata Bhattacharya, “Another Nuclear Blast at Pokhran?” Sunday (Calcutta), May 12, 1982, 12–14. 91. For an analysis of India’s negotiating stances at the Committee on Disarmament (CD), see C. Raja Mohan, “India and the CTBT: Time to Quit,” Hindu, June 10, 1996, 11. For discussions of subsequent developments, see John F. Burns, “Old Foe of Atom Arms, India Now Blocks Test Ban,” New York Times, August 17, 1996, 2; and Barbara Crossette, “India Vetoes Pact to Forbid Testing of Nuclear Weapons,” New York Times, August 21, 1996, A1. For an extended discussion of the impact of the CTBT negotiations on India’s decision to test nuclear weapons, see Dinshaw Mistry, “Domestic-International Linkages: India and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” The Nonproliferation Review 6, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 25–38. 92. Stephen W. Young, “A Test Ban Treaty That Doesn’t Ban Tests,” BASIC Reports (British-American Security Information Council, Washington, D.C.), September 23, 1996, 1–2. 93. K. Subrahmanyam, “The CTBT Puzzle,” Economic Times (Bombay), June 8, 1996, 5. 94. Tarun Basu, “Nation Ignores Veiled Threats, Blocks CTBT,” India Abroad, August 23, 1996, 4. 95. Jim Wurst, “Comprehensive Test Ban Overwhelmingly Adopted,” Disarmament Times (New York) 19 (September 20, 1996): 1. The treaty passed with 158 votes in support, 3 opposed, and 5 abstentions. 96. Seth Faison, “China Sets Off Nuclear Test, Then Announces Moratorium,” New York Times, July 30, 1996, 4; and Sanjay Suri, “Chinese Test Seen Behind Indian CTBT Stand,” India Abroad, August 23, 1996, 8. 97. Sumit Ganguly, “India in 1997: Another Year of Turmoil,” Asian Survey 38, no. 2 (February 1998): 126–134. 98. Tim Weiner, “Every Nation’s Just Another U.S.,” New York Times, June 7, 1998, 5.

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99. See the section entitled “Our Nation’s Security,” in the BJP’s 1998 “Election Manifesto,” http://www.bjp.org. 100. Muhammad Najeeb, “After Ghauri, It Is Long-range Ghaznavi’s Turn,” India Abroad, April 24, 1998, 18; Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Exploding Myths,” New Republic, June 6, 1998, 17–19; and Tim Weiner, “U.S. and China Helped Pakistan Build Its Bomb,” New York Times, June 1, 1998, A6. For a detailed discussion and analysis of the Chinese role in supporting Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, see Nayan Chanda et al., “The Race Is On,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 11, 1998, 20–22. 101. Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 1996–1997 (New Delhi: Government of India, 1997). Also see International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1997–98 (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), 164. 102. One could well ask why the BJP did not simply declare India to be a nuclear weapons state without actually testing five nuclear devices. Two plausible answers can be suggested. First, India’s nuclear weapons establishment would not feel that they possessed the requisite confidence in their weapons designs short of a series of tests. Second, if the press reports are accurate, one of the devices tested was thermonuclear. A thermonuclear device requires a nuclear triggering device. See Manoj Joshi, “Nuclear Shock Waves,” India Today, May 25, 1998, 12–20. 103. Ideological beliefs, on occasion, acted as forces for restraint. For example, Prime Minister Morarji Desai, a staunch Gandhian, opposed India’s development of nuclear weapons. The BJP-led government that came to power in March 1998, however, included a number of individuals who believed that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was critical to India’s security. On Desai’s beliefs, see Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option. 104. For an Indian feminist critique of the test, see Madhu Kishwar, “BJP’s Wargasm,” Manushi (New Delhi) no. 106 (May–June 1998). For other dissenting voices from India, see Vinod Mehta, “How a ‘Tired’ PM Became a ‘Bold’ PM,” Outlook (New Delhi), May 25, 1998, 28–29. For an extraordinarily shallow U.S. analysis of the dynamics of Indian politics ridden with factual errors, see Peter Beinart, “The Return of the Bomb,” New Republic, August 3, 1998, 22–27. In this article, for example, the author asserts that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao attempted to revive secularism in India. In fact, he did nothing of the sort. It was during his tenure in office that Hindu fanatics destroyed the Babri mosque in Uttar Pradesh on December 6, 1992. Rao also did little to control the anti-Muslim rioting that followed in the wake of the mosque’s destruction. 105. An important exception is Stephen P. Cohen, “India’s Strategic Misstep,” New York Times, June 3, 1998. 106. George K. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1992). For a thoughtful discussion of a possible strategic posture for India in the aftermath of the nuclear tests, see Kapil Kak, “Strategic Template for Nuclear India,” Times of India, August 11, 1998, 6. 107. The full text of the document can be accessed from the Indian Embassy’s homepage in Washington, D.C. The URL is http://www.indianembassy.org. 108. On this point, see the discussion in Leon V. Sigal, “Warming to the Freeze,” Foreign Policy 48 (Fall 1982): 54–65. 109. I am grateful to Ashley Tellis of the Rand Corporation for suggesting the application of these categories to the subcontinental nuclear context. The particular interpretations developed in this chapter are mine, however. 110. R. Ramachandran, “Developing a Delivery System,” Frontline 16, no. 9 (May 7, 1999), on http://www.indiaserver.com.

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111. Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s Nuclear Forces: An Assessment,” Current History 98, no. 629 (September 1999): 260–265. 112. International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1997–98. 113. For a thoughtful discussion of Chinese perspectives on arms control prior to the conclusion of the CTBT negotiations and the Indian nuclear tests, see Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control,” International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995–1996): 43–78.

4 India’s Strategic Doctrine and Practice: The Impact of Nuclear Testing Deepa M. Ollapally

Since the nuclear tests of May 1998, some analysts have pointed to the lack of strategic doctrines and command and control capabilities to accompany India’s and Pakistan’s weapons program as dangerous and unstable. In the talks between Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh and U.S. deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott, one of the main topics of discussion related to India’s nuclear posture.1 However, Indian prime minister Atal Behari made statements to the effect that India’s command and control system as it stood was adequate for India’s security purposes in the post-testing environment. With the release of the draft nuclear doctrine in August 1999, a new round of speculation began as to how far India will adhere to the doctrine and exactly how it will take shape. Despite its articulation of “minimum deterrence,” there is a good deal of room left open in terms of specifics. In addition, there is still scope for revisions once the draft doctrine is introduced into parliament for discussion. Whatever the outcome may be, there is little doubt that India is attempting to confront its most critical dilemma at this juncture, that is, how to project a convincing yet nonprovocative and economical nuclear posture. This search for the right mix of policies goes to the heart of Indian thinking on the country’s new status. As such, it offers a glimpse into not only emerging conceptions but also earlier perspectives and how they might be reconciled or reconstituted. Thus it is important to look at India’s strategic practices and past positions for any important insights. 67

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THE NEW DRAFT NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

Although some expressed impatience with the pace of Indian strategic planning, both in the United States and among sections of the strategic elite in India (albeit for different reasons), prior to the draft doctrine being made public, the doctrine as stated has hardly been welcomed by Western analysts. Among the factors that could have motivated the new Indian draft doctrine, the U.S. attempt to draw out India was one likely catalyst. Clearly, the United States was trying to steer India toward as muted and restrained a posture as possible. But India has tended to be much more responsive to domestic elite conceptions of security interests than to outside influence. Thus U.S. pressure was not likely to be heeded, in part because it has never been easy to square U.S. nuclear profligacy with appeals for nuclear abstinence and restraint in the developing world. In addition, no convincing evidence has ever surfaced to suggest that the “bean-counting,” arcane, and even incendiary strategic discourse and postures associated with the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship are somehow superior to the virtues of a version of strategic ambiguity coupled with a concerted policy of reassurance, which India appeared to be adhering to subsequent to the tests. But nuclear doctrines themselves tend to take on a life and logic of their own, and it is not entirely surprising if the Indian draft looks very much like such doctrines elsewhere, not some unique Indian version. India’s current nuclear stance seems to be designed to leave little doubt that the country is serious about developing its nuclear weapons. The rather explicitly belabored draft doctrine would seem to be the near antithesis of the prior position. Indeed, the draft seems aimed at countering the earlier vagueness. Yet even though the document is unambiguous on strategic intentions, it is much less specific on the size and design of the so-called minimum deterrent. The time period for developing the deterrent appears to be long term—up to thirty years, according to some of the doctrine’s architects. Thus the elements of ambiguity have not entirely evaporated. In giving practical shape to the contours of India’s nuclear posture, the political decisionmakers who are placed Janus-like at the intersection of the international and domestic spheres will have to heed both internal and external forces and strike a balance. In a resource-poor country such as India, they will also have to make a careful tradeoff between military expenditures and economic priorities. In doing so, they are most likely to fall back on the centrist and accommodative tendencies of Indian politics and fashion a broad consensus at the elite level that tends toward gradual-

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ism and symbolism, buttressed by the declared nuclear doctrine and capability. Even if significant changes have occurred in the nuclear realm, prospective policy is still likely to have important predictable elements. In putting forth this perspective, I consider the main trends in strategic thinking over time, focusing particularly on the post-1994 period. It has seen an unprecedented flurry of international negotiations on nuclear issues, which in turn has deeply impacted India’s own strategic practices, in many ways for the first time since Pokhran I in 1974. Taking the draft nuclear doctrine as the sum total of strategic thinking would seem to involve losing sight of the larger picture. STRATEGIC SCHOOLS

OF

THOUGHT

Although there has been significant consensus regarding India’s lack of an articulated strategic doctrine, there is disagreement over whether this implies a critical lack of strategic thinking per se.2 The varying strands of opinion may be surmised as follows: 1. Strategic thinking is nearly absent in Indian tradition and is ad hoc at best. 2. It is clouded by normative considerations. 3. It is a function of strategic compulsions that India does not have. 4. It is discernible in some sectors and is based on strong historical tradition. 5. Strategic thinking, along with an emphasis on national security, is growing in India but needs to be eschewed.

To be sure, these statements are approximations, but it is possible to identify some of the adherents of the positions. The first position has been most forcefully put forward by George Tanham, who posits that Indian thinking is informed by multiple factors, particularly geography, history, culture, and British rule, none of them suffused with enduring strategic content.3 He finds that the strategic tradition has been woefully inadequate in Indian history, although his reference to Kautilya’s mandala concept as the basis for current thinking in New Delhi might suggest the obverse. Kautilya’s Arthasastra has long been considered one of the earliest treatises of classical realism, elaborating dictums all too familiar to later students of Niccolò Machiavelli.4 Tanham’s forays into the cultural sphere led him to make some deterministic findings on such subjects as the effects of the Hindu notions of time and planning, which are open to chal-

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lenge. But in the extremely difficult terrain of strategic culture, what is required are more systematic interpretations before such observations can be simply admitted or dismissed.5 In a more recent essay, Tanham sees the potential for strategic theorizing but is not entirely convinced and tends to hedge what he sees as a situation “in flux.” Tanham’s views are to some extent shared by key political decisionmakers and defense analysts such as Jaswant Singh and K. Subrahmanyam, but although the latter two rue the lack of institutional structures in place for coordinating national security policy, the former is relatively unconcerned.6 Subrahmanyam’s position may be closer to the second school of thought, which while decrying the poor state of strategic thinking in the country, blames this outcome on excessive moralism and normative concerns in Indian foreign and security policy rather than a historical or cultural inability to think in strategic terms.7 Here, the Nehruvian paradigm with its seeming neglect of realpolitik concerns is viewed as having led India to hold moralistically, normatively, and ideologically charged rhetorical positions in international forums that ultimately could not be supported and that others came to view as even hypocritical. This school of thought would have the most adherents among Indian policy analysts today. An innovative third viewpoint based largely on structuralism notes that the development of strategic doctrines is intimately related to the functional need for such in a country’s historical trajectory.8 The history of the war-prone European states thus produced the most elaborate set of security doctrines. This idea may be viewed as a variation on Charles Tilly’s classic proposition, which may be paraphrased as “war makes the state, and state makes the war.”9 Although this rendering may be intellectually and historically compelling, the accompanying view that India does not face major strategic compulsions in the contemporary period, particularly from China, is not likely to be shared by many analysts. The fourth perspective, which argues that India indeed has a strong tradition of strategic thought that is missed by outsiders such as Tanham because they are searching for the wrong things in the wrong places based on Western models (like open, written documents and coordinated institutional structures), has some currency.10 However, this thesis remains rather undeveloped, although in part it resembles the critique that has emerged from Southeast Asia regarding strategic practices and norms in the East versus the West.11 The view that strategic analysis is increasing in India but should be eschewed is offered as a critique of India’s current nuclearization. Much of this critique appears to be based on the rise of the so-called national

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security state in the United States during the Cold War and the abuse of national security in the service of secrecy, intervention, and spiraling defense budgets.12 Adherents worry that if Indian politics becomes dominated by security concerns, “piercing the veil of national security” would become increasingly difficult, which would have an unhealthy impact on democracy. This view is not yet widespread.13 In light of the above discussion, a rather fundamental point may be worth stating. In assessing the state of India’s strategic thinking, two factors need to be kept in mind. Such thinking involves definitional questions, as well as relative or comparative aspects. In politics, strategy is critical, and survival depends on it. Strategic thinking can take different forms, but the simplest way of conceiving it is that a country pursues its self-interest (however it may be defined). In international politics, this means that a country acts in ways that protects its security.14 Strategic action can be informed by strategic vision or military strategy. If the latter is taken as the leitmotif of strategic thought, then India in comparative terms could be found lacking in a tradition. But that would not hold true if the former is viewed as a hallmark of strategy. It may be argued, for example, that in the postindependence period, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s approach was well crafted to protect India’s autonomy in a postcolonial, bipolar world by emphasizing a rulebased system, which could work to the advantage of independent, smaller powers, rather than a force-based international one. Nehru’s rejection of the specific, militarized ideological Cold War and the two-camp realpolitik approach has in many ways been misinterpreted as a simultaneous rejection of realist thinking narrowly and strategic thinking more broadly. Under the circumstances, Nehru’s nonalignment and multilateralism could be understood more in terms of strategic vision than strategic naiveté. In Nehruvian terms, India’s nuclear program fit into this broader scheme for national autonomy. THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM

There has been no dearth of research and writing on India’s foreign and security policy since 1947 or, for that matter, since 1974, but sustained discussion and thinking on the Indian nuclear issue was relatively dormant and occurred only sporadically until 1995.15 This situation reflected not only the lack of public information available on the nuclear program but also the generally widespread perception that nuclear weapons did not figure centrally in India’s approach to the world.

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The nuclear program itself proceeded apace from government to government, with hardly a break since the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in August 1948. The key architect of India’s atomic program, Homi Bhabha, enjoyed a close relationship with Nehru, who gave the former wide latitude to pursue this effort. Bhabha had recommended to Nehru that the administration of this program be entrusted to a small high-powered body such as the AEC, answerable directly to the prime minister without any intervening link.16 This setup laid the groundwork for an atomic energy program that enjoyed top support and remained insulated to a great extent from outside critical review. Nehru remained opposed to nuclear weapons publicly and used this issue to attack U.S. and Soviet policies. Whatever his true persuasions were regarding a nuclear weapons program for India, there is no mistaking his enormous commitment to the development and advancement of Indian science and technology, particularly those technologies seen as the critical bridges to self-reliance.17 In the postcolonial environment, to a great extent, advanced scientific capability became identified as a measure of national pride and autonomy at both the elite and popular levels, which also helped to sustain fairly uncritical support for the nuclear program. However, after the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the public declaration by the Chinese in 1964 of their intention to develop atomic weapons, followed by a fission test that same year and a second test in 1965, India became embroiled in a wide-ranging debate about appropriate Indian nuclear strategy, but without the benefit of Nehru’s views (he had died before the Chinese went nuclear). Then AEC chairman Vikram Sarabhai and the director of the newly set up Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Major General Som Dutt, were among those unconvinced that India required nuclear weapons. However, in a speech to the International Atomic Energy Agency after the second Chinese nuclear test, Bhabha stated that it would be difficult to follow a policy of restraint given the introduction of nuclear weapons in the neighborhood. Soon after the Chinese thermonuclear test in 1967, a scientific effort was begun to study the nuclear design of an explosive.18 THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD STALEMATE

The political debate over India’s nuclear stand seemed to come to a rest by 1970, with the decision not to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (open for signature from 1968 to 1970) but not to join the nuclear club either. The official public position, keeping the “nuclear option” open

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without committing one way or the other, provided Indian decisionmakers political and strategic space for the sometimes contradictory policies that followed. The notion of strategic ambiguity allowed India to pursue multiple objectives, including global disarmament, dual-use technological capabilities, a fairly autonomous foreign and security policy, a substantial defense, and an elevated status internationally. This threshold period is best characterized as one of “technology demonstrations,” which may be interpreted as a form of strategic posturing with strong symbolic significance for the credibility of the latent nuclear option but was also marked by public self-restraint.19 The establishment of the integrated guided missile development program (IGMDP) in 1983 and the successful test firing of the short-range ballistic missile Prithvi in 1989, as well as the intermediate-range Agni in 1994, were viewed as critical steps in maintaining the option vis-à-vis Pakistan and China, respectively.20 India’s technical achievements on the civilian side in the space program, such as the first operational launch of the polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) in 1997 and the successful indigenous Param computer project using parallel processing architecture to match the speed of modern supercomputers after the U.S. denied the sale of the Cray supercomputer, underscored India’s dual-use capabilities. Over time, India’s threshold position, symbolically shared by Pakistan and Israel, came to be perceived as a nearly semipermanent state of being. Such an ambiguous status gained in import by being theoretically formalized as nonweaponized deterrence or recessed deterrence.21 Moreover, India basically adhered to the principles of nonproliferation that underlie the NPT while not formally committing itself to do so. But technically, it continued to fall outside the confines of the NPT, and in the eyes of the United States in particular, India’s image was that of a revisionist state destined to be at odds with the United States, which saw the NPT as representing the core of global nonproliferation efforts.22 As a threshold nuclear state, India neither tested nor deployed nuclear weapons; nor did it transfer sensitive nuclear technology or train nuclear experts from other countries. Although there was a broad consensus for protecting the country’s nuclear option among the scientific, military, and political elites, there was no significant lobby for “going nuclear.”23 During this time, neighboring China was steadily advancing the size and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal as well as providing critical input into Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs. Meanwhile, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had continued their intense competitive buildup as well. Given that military planners assess capabilities rather than intentions when making strategic choices, India’s

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past restraint could be viewed as exceptional. Yet, India’s self-imposed restraint received little acknowledgment, either from the United States or the international community. This would prove to be an important factor as India moved to cross the threshold in May 1998. THE TURNING POINT FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Maintaining the threshold status appeared to have widespread support inside and outside government, even as India entered the difficult decade of the 1990s.24 Indeed, in 1991 India faced twin crises of historic proportions in both the security and economic realms. India’s carefully crafted relationship with the USSR (of nearly two decades) lay in disarray in the stunning wake of the Soviet collapse, leaving Indian foreign policy adrift. A financial crisis reduced India to barely a fortnight’s worth of foreign exchange reserves to cover its imports amid growing skepticism regarding the limits of the Nehruvian state-led economic development model. Thus two paradigms that had reigned supreme in the postindependence period were coming undone at exactly the same time. The task of negotiating these crises fell to the coalition government led by the Congress Party (which was just short of a majority) under P. V. Narasimha Rao, elected in 1991. A combination of economic liberalization, improvement of ties with the United States, a “look east” policy toward Southeast Asia, all suggesting a new and more variegated Indian external approach, served to put India on sounder footing than might have been expected under the circumstances. Yet India’s improving relations with the United States, fueled in part by greater convergence of economic interests, could not contain the strategic divergences that persisted. The Clinton administration’s pursuit of nonproliferation in one of the most intense efforts since the NPT was first conceived made it inevitable that this issue would not disappear or even recede. In this context, the NPT Review Conference in May 1995 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in 1996 became critical junctures for India to reconsider the “threshold” policy publicly. India’s decision to veto the CTBT in Geneva in 1996 placed it in the unenviable position of having to reject something that it had been on record as championing since 1955. Indeed, Nehru had successfully instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have India be the first to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. India had cosponsored the CTBT resolution twice with the United States in the UN General Assembly in 1993 and

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1994, without engendering opposition from the Indian scientific, military, or policy communities.25 Thus India’s about-face on the CTBT needs explanation, since this policy shift represented in important ways the beginning of a break with traditional strategic thinking and practice. The outcome of the NPT Review Conference in May 1995, extending the treaty indefinitely and unconditionally, came as a shock to most Indian analysts. The expectation was that there was enough support from key middle-power developing countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, Egypt, and Indonesia to extend the treaty for only another twenty-five years and even make that conditional on firmer commitments by the nuclear weapons states to move toward eliminating their arsenals according to Article 6 of the NPT. This view was clearly a miscalculation on the part of India, given the vulnerable positions of countries such as Mexico, which was trying to weather one of its worst financial crises, and Egypt, which was highly susceptible to U.S. pressure. Indications that it would be difficult to sustain a push for disarmament came clearly only toward the end, however, for example, with the inability to get support for secret balloting. For Indian decisionmakers, the NPT Review Conference was thus the dawning that India’s traditional agenda—disarmament coupled with nonproliferation—was unlikely to get serious results. India learned an object lesson from the NPT extension: the ability of the nonnuclear states to influence the nuclear weapons states by “holding their feet to the fire” was fast eroding. Indian diplomacy began to be viewed as increasingly out of step with changing international realities, and at the same time, discussions within India became increasingly self-critical.26 This critique found its fullest expression during the CTBT negotiations. Indeed, until the NPT extension, the CTBT had not come under the scrutiny of public debate, but after May 1995, the treaty began to be looked upon in a different light.27 A number of concerns converged to impinge on India’s CTBT decision, not all directly related to the intricacies of the negotiations at hand at the 1996 Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, including some that had been simmering for a long time. During the intense domestic debate occurring in 1996, Indian diplomacy on security was faulted along a number of lines: the inability to change a persistent outside tendency to equate India and Pakistan and to not take Indian concerns vis-à-vis China more seriously; the failure to gain external acknowledgement of India’s broad restraint in the nuclear arena; the inability to put forth national interest in strategic, realpolitik terms as a result of being boxed in with past “moralist” baggage; the possibility that the nuclear option for India would be closed “in effect” after the CTBT, since twenty-two years of nontesting made it less “credible”; and the perception that the treaty was aimed

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specifically at India, since the other two threshold states had nuclear patrons, and India did not. All this was being assessed against the rising conviction that the nuclear weapons states would continue to retain their advantage indefinitely.28 Thus in January 1996, without warning India introduced “time-bound disarmament” as a condition for its signature.29 In light of these concerns, the introduction of such an increasingly unviable condition would suggest that it also served as an “exit strategy” for India. The entry into force clause of the CTBT in the final stage of negotiations only reinforced the Indian perception that the treaty was indeed aimed at India and produced a profound domestic reaction that sealed the decision to veto. The evolution of India’s CTBT position also sheds some light on how domestic and international factors may interact in this arena. The period 1995–1996 witnessed three ruling coalitions in a row. In May 1996, the Rao coalition government lost power, followed by a thirteen-day interim government during the same month led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which failed to secure enough support to actually form a government by consent. Subsequently, the United Front, a fourteen-party coalition with outside support from Congress, formed a government that managed to last from May 1996 to March 1997. Despite the wide spectrum of political leanings encompassed within these three ruling groups, the entry into force clause saw a closing of the ranks supporting a veto, which was seen as necessary to avoid being painted into a corner. In anticipation of this outcome, India had been willing to withdraw from the Committee on Disarmament and let it run its course without its participation, which turned out to be unacceptable, in particular, to China. This unexpected turn of events at the Committee on Disarmament contributed significantly to the hardening of India’s stand against the CTBT and strengthened those who favored a stronger posture, with India’s chief negotiator Arundhati Ghose declaring that India would not sign the treaty, “not now, not later.” The Indian veto was an important symbolic turning point in strategic posture, and with Ambassador Ghose’s speech citing national security concerns in a way not specified before, it provided the opening for a reduction of traditional normative discourse that had until then been central to Indian strategic thinking. In this context, the perceived international pressure via the entry into force clause left little credible space for those in favor of India signing the CTBT. One point of near unanimity among the political parties in India during the CTBT debate was the need to continue to support India’s nuclear “option.”30 A key question related to just how to safeguard it, however, including whether testing was necessary or not in order to lend credibility

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to an option that had been kept open for twenty-four years without much public display. The veto at the CTBT was presented as evidence of India’s “resolve” to maintain this position and not give in to international pressure. Indeed, in some quarters there was almost relief that by being “forced” to take such a strong action at the Committee on Disarmament, India was able to establish the credibility of the nuclear option without having to test. Since India has gone one step further and tested, the question of credibility has again come to the fore in a different fashion. STRATEGIC THINKING AFTER

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TESTS

The question that may be posed at this stage is the extent to which the nuclear tests have fundamentally changed the strategic thinking in India and what it means for Indian security policy. Do India’s dramatic tests mean a complete break with India’s past strategic thinking? Prior to the tests, India had straddled a unique position on the threshold, with a blend of normative rhetoric on disarmament and some level of realpolitik action in its ongoing nuclear program. The draft doctrine’s two focal points— minimum deterrence and the credibility of the deterrent—pull in opposite directions, and one challenge will be to resolve the two tendencies. The Indian government initially announced elements of its post-testing posture, which included a no first use doctrine, minimum deterrence weaponization, a moratorium on testing with broad hints of signing the CTBT, and a willingness to participate in the on-again, off-again fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) negotiations in Geneva. The Vajpayee government maintained an ambiguous position on what it meant by minimum deterrence but provided some outline by way of declarations and overtures. This approach was consistent with India’s past practice of taking a strategic position perceived as economical, nonprovocative, credible, and flexible; not spelling it out in detail; but assuming it enjoyed a fairly widespread consensus among the ruling and influential elites. This finely balanced act came under increasing pressure from a variety of quarters, and the draft nuclear doctrine suggests that this balance has been tipped, at least on paper. In the past, Indian strategic elite or political decisionmakers have shown little support for following a fast track nuclear weaponization program. In the avid debate regarding the level of weaponization, the two levels most often discussed were either in the low range of 60–130 weapons, depending on the source, or in the high range of 300–400 warheads, which approximates the Chinese, British, and French so-called minimum deter-

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rents.31 The triadic “survivable” nuclear force mentioned in the draft doctrine subsequent to the strategic review on long-term policy options would suggest that the lowest numbers mentioned are likely to be surpassed. The release of the draft doctrine has not fully resolved this question, though the issue now appears to have shifted to whether a low three-digit number would be better than a higher three-digit number. If the draft is taken as a statement of “general principles,” as some members of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) have said, nothing definitive about the configuration of the nuclear force can be concluded.32 Independent analysts such as C. Raja Mohan, K. Subrahmanyam, and Jasjit Singh, the director of the government-supported Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, all of whom enjoy influence across political parties, seem to be forging a clear consensus against the higher numbers.33 The National Security Advisory Board, which was set up in November 1998 with twenty-seven members and Subrahmanyam as the convener, continues to be broadly representative. The NSAB complements the three-tiered National Security Council headed by the prime minister, which was established earlier.34 The long-unanswered nuclear “demonstration versus deployment” question has been resolved toward the latter with the tests, and although the space for nuclear restraint has narrowed, there is evidence that India is still seriously searching for ways to reduce the danger from an overt nuclear position. One such proposal by some Indian analysts is de-mating, that is, keeping warheads separated from their delivery vehicles. Accidental or precipitous use of nuclear weapons would be inhibited by this posture, which stops short of full readiness. One of the world’s foremost scholars on nuclear safety concludes that if this route is taken in India, it could become a model for other nuclear states.35 Another expert notes that India, and even Pakistan in the past, may have followed a “deliberate policy to maintain a de-alerted status” and a delayed launch procedure strategy to minimize accidents, which if continued in some fashion would address some of the most critical command and control problems.36 There were indications that India did not plan to go down the path toward full-scale deterrence as practiced in the West, with the attendant intelligence, delivery systems, and communication support, the cost of which might prove to be prohibitive and derail its economic experiment in the process. Economic priorities have been at the forefront since 1991, and political parties of all types agree on the need for staying this course. On a number of occasions, Vajpayee stated that a secure command and control system was already in place for the Indian nuclear arsenal, thereby deflecting further preparation that could spiral out of economic control.

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Others suggested that under conditions of minimum deterrence, a fully delineated nuclear doctrine was not needed. As a well-placed Indian expert pointed out, “We don’t fall into the standard pattern of declared doctrines, specific weapons, delivery capabilities or force postures,” and he added that minimum deterrence would make the likelihood of a response to “aggressive acts” more credible, even without the doctrinal apparatus.37 Another well-known analyst from the army pointed to differences between the grand deterrence strategy of the United States and the minimum deterrence India is practicing, emphasizing that although the U.S. philosophy is complex and designed to achieve a large number of variable objectives, the Indian deterrent is required “purely as a defensive instrument to ensure that no outside power is tempted to coerce the country or initiate a nuclear strike in a conflict situation. Therefore the size [numbers] and capability [range] of the strategic forces need to be limited to deterring regional nuclear powers.”38 India’s minimum deterrence thinking is not dissimilar in theory to the principles followed by Britain, France, and China. In a comprehensive study of these three countries’ nuclear doctrines, Bruce Larkin notes the striking difference between their “answers” (in terms of numbers of missiles) to the following question and those of the United States and Russia: “In a world in which my forces could be attacked first, what is the smallest force that guarantees deterrence?”39 Larkin emphasizes that the logic of their choice is driven by the notion that “deterrence is not achieved by vast numbers, but by the credible capability to strike at all.”40 China is believed to possess roughly twenty missiles that can reach the United States and approximately 300 nuclear weapons that can reach Japan, Russia, and India. U.S. commentators have referred to China’s nuclear weaponry as a “bare-bones arsenal compared with the thousands of warheads still maintained by the United States and Russia.”41 It has been pointed out by other Western experts that China’s minimum deterrent was designed to retain the ability, after a major attack by a nuclear adversary, to launch at least one or two missiles that could destroy a major city.42 The learning curve based on the U.S.-Russian overkill of nuclear weapons acquisition seems to be steep when one considers the choices of China, France, and Britain. The experience of the second-tier nuclear powers could in turn have a similar impact on India. In a statement to the Indian parliament, Vajpayee made the following oblique reference to China, noting: “We are not going to enter into an arms race with any country. Ours will be a minimum credible deterrent, which will safeguard India’s security.”43 Thus the draft doctrine does not seem to be country- or threat-specific.

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In the post-testing environment, continuing talks between India and Pakistan sought to reduce the volatility of the new nuclear situation, culminating with the historic bus ride to Lahore in February 1999. The talks extended important agreements already concluded, such as the agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities.44 Immediately after the tests, both then Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee spoke of negotiating from “strength,” which suggested that they saw some sort of a deterrence paradigm operating. However, they also expressed serious concern that competition did not get out of hand, or “spiral.”45 Subsequent to the Kargil conflict of 1999—where Pakistan sent armed insurgents into the Kargil and Drass sectors of Indian Kashmir— however, the presumption that the worst fears of the spiral theorists would be more than moderated by a rational commitment to make deterrence work needs to be reconsidered in light of Pakistan’s apparent willingness to engage in such risky behavior. It begs the question of just how the nuclear equation is being interpreted by Islamabad. That the Kargil intervention was launched just as the nuclear fear was being dampened through diplomacy such as the Lahore summit is particularly sobering. In this connection, the effect of the U.S. and even the Chinese reaction to Pakistan regarding Kargil has no doubt been to deflate Pakistani expectations about what it might accomplish behind the nuclear curtain. India’s challenge will be to demonstrate restrained behavior vis-à-vis Pakistan. CONCLUSION

For India, a period of flux in its strategic thinking seems to be in the offing. How far the nuclear tests and weaponization breaks with India’s past tendency to fashion security policies that were convincing but economical is still an open question. Indian decisionmakers functioned within an ambiguous nuclear realm for nearly a quarter of a century. India’s past strategic doctrine of ambiguity has in some ways led to the underdevelopment of strategic theory in Western terms. However, historically speaking, doctrine has often followed action rather than the other way around. For example, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) was spawned by the recognition that the Soviet Union and United States could inflict unacceptable damage on each other.46 Within the broad posture being outlined by India, it remains unclear whether the elements of lower risk and lower costs (domestic economic and international political costs) will predominate. The possibility that technological momentum gained with the nuclear tests and the “logic” of

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nuclear deterrence may push India into a more “maxi-mimalist” minimum deterrent position cannot be ruled out. To posit this as a likelihood based on the U.S.-Russian experience or organizational theory, however, is misplaced. These arguments would have to also then explain how political decisionmakers in India resisted the technological drive for testing for more than two decades.47 Moreover, in the current nuclear debate, the technical elite is not monolithically in favor of a rapid or large-scale buildup of capabilities. Indeed, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, one of India’s chief architects of its missile and nuclear program, has publicly stated that India could sign the CTBT without compromising the country’s security. According to Kalam, “From the scientific and technical angle, it is our considered view that no further nuclear tests are necessary.”48 In the short to medium term, the exigencies of the military-economic tradeoff cannot be avoided by India. India’s ability to absorb the costs of a triadic nuclear force remains a matter of contention, in part based on differing assumptions of the size of the nuclear force, projected economic growth rates, and the time horizon. Two examples are useful here. In the case of the United States, as early as 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara had concluded that the existing arsenal of approximately 400 nuclear weapons amounted to a credible deterrent. The mindless growth in numbers of U.S. weapons to more than 70,000 and the staggering costs of more than $5 trillion stand as the worst possible case.49 Likewise, the Soviet Union collapsed under its military weight. But if the actions of second-tier countries are taken into account, particularly those of Britain and France, neither country would appear to have careened out of control because of weapons acquisitions. Of course, security is a highly elastic concept that is open to wide interpretation. If Indian past behavior is any guide, the dominant tendency will be to craft an economically viable posture. India’s party politics have historically pushed policies toward the center, and with the onset of serious coalition politics, this tendency will get even stronger.50 The coalitions are increasingly being made up of smaller, regional parties with policies driven by local interests. They will be forced to carefully consider the economic-military tradeoffs and their impact on votes. Moreover, should India move toward signing the CTBT and participate in a successful prospective FMCT, these treaties together would impose qualitative as well as quantitative limitations on India’s nuclear weapons development. In light of the nuclear weapons states already having conducted more than 2,000 tests and with the United States and Russia awash in plutonium and highly enriched uranium, an agreement by India to cap itself at a much lower level of capability and thereby for all practi-

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cal purposes be locked into a position of genuine “minimum deterrence” needs to be seen as a historic step. It would then guarantee that the blind buildup by the current purveyors of nonproliferation would not be emulated, indeed, could not be emulated. Of course, these treaties would have the likely effect of freezing the status quo, which would in relative terms give India an advantage over Pakistan, China an advantage over India, and the United States and Russia an advantage over China. In the past, India kept its so-called nuclear option open for nearly twenty-five years without exercising it. In a sense, the draft nuclear doctrine appears to have been charted in such a way that the shape of the nuclear capability is left open without closing off any options in the future. Thus, although the draft doctrine could be seen as rhetorically fairly ambitious, it still leaves the possibility in practice of a nuclear posture that reflects India’s traditional aversion to risky and expensive military solutions. NOTES

1. Strobe Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (March–April 1999): 118–119. 2. The best compendium of writings on Indian strategic thinking is Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996). This volume was spurred by George Tanham’s Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1991). 3. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought. 4. For an accessible rendition, see R. P. Kangle, The Kautilya Arthasastra (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1988). 5. One of the best studies in this genre that focuses on Chinese strategic culture is Alastair Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 6. See, for example, Jaswant Singh, What Constitutes National Security in a Changing World Order? India’s Strategic Thought, occasional paper no. 6 (Philadelphia: Center for the Advanced Study of India, June 1998), 4–7. 7. The most articulate exponent of this view is C. Raja Mohan, who has aired this consistently in the pages of the daily newspaper Hindu. See also his article, “Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and the Security Link,” in Deepa Ollapally and S. Rajagopal, eds., Nuclear Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects (Bangalore: Tyrox Press, 1997), 14–15. 8. Kanti Bajpai, “State, Society, Strategy,” in Bajpai and Mattoo, eds., Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice. 9. Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European Statemaking,” in Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

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10. W. P. S. Sidhu, “Of Oral Traditions and Ethnocentric Judgements,” in Bajpai and Mattoo, eds., Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice. 11. See, for example, Nicola Baker and Leonard Sebastian, “The Problem with Parachuting: Strategic Studies and Security in the Asia Pacific Region,” Journal of Strategic Studies 8, no. 3 (September 1995): 26–29. 12. The strongest proponent of this perspective is Praful Bidwai, journalist and political commentator. In this regard, see Daneil Yergin, Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977). 13. For an analysis compatible with this argument, see Itty Abraham, “Towards a Reflexive South Asian Security Studies,” in Marvin Weinbaum and Chetan Kumar, eds., South Asia Approaches the Millennium: Reexamining National Security (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995). 14. Self-interest defined in security terms is more narrowly rooted in realism. For the best exposition of realism or neorealism, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). This definition is not only consistent with realist political theory; self-interest may be defined in other ways. For example, Sweden’s internationalist and nonmilitaristic security policy could be entirely consistent with the Swedish view of national interest at this historical juncture. 15. Some important exceptions include Ashok Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1976); K. Subrahmanyam, ed., Nuclear Myths and Realities: India’s Dilemma (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1981); and Kanti P. Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995). 16. See C. V. Sundaram, L. V. Krishnan, and T. S. Iyengar, Atomic Energy in India: 50 Years (New Delhi: Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy, 1998), 9. 17. As Nehru noted in a speech, “You know that whenever the chance offers itself I say something about the importance of science and its off-shoot, technology. . . . Science has developed at an ever-increasing pace since the beginning of the century, so that the gap between the advanced and backward countries has widened more and more. It is only by adopting the most vigorous measures and by putting forward our utmost effort into the development of science that we can bridge that gap.” Quoted in Sundaram, Krishnan, and Iyengar, Atomic Energy in India, 255. 18. Ibid., 178. 19. Some experts have noted that Indian decisionmakers have a proclivity to think of deterrence economically, in symbolic terms, and in a generalized fashion. See, for example, Neil Joeck, ed., Maintaining Nuclear Stability in Asia, Adelphi paper no. 312 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 55. See also Francine Frankel, “Prologue,” in Frankel, ed., Bridging the Nonproliferation Divide: The United States and India (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995). 20. Indeed, the Agni has been described as a “technology demonstrator.” See, for example, Rodney Jones and Mark McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), 114. 21. These specific terms are generally identified with George Perkovich and Jasjit Singh, respectively. For one of the best extended arguments in favor of what is termed nuclear “opacity,” see Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), especially 177–193.

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22. For a full discussion of this dichotomy, see Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna, “U.S.-India Tensions: Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January–February 1995). 23. Ibid., 14. 24. However, it needs to be recognized that frustration with “sitting on the fence” without clearer benefits (for example, softening of the embargo regimes in place since 1974) was increasing. Reports of possible preparations to test under Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao suggest some level of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Although the BJP government conducted the tests, top leaders of other political parties have noted that it was the previous governments’ continuing support for the nuclear program that laid the groundwork. See, for example, Hindu, May 15, 1998. 25. See Giri Deshingkar, “Indian Politics and Arms Control: Recent Reversals and New Reasons for Optimism,” in Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia After the Test Ban (New York: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1998), 23. 26. Discussions in New Delhi and elsewhere made this clear. See, for example, report of a workshop held at the National Institute for Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bangalore, on March 28, 1996, comprising leading experts offering a variety of viewpoints: India’s Options on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, NIAS report (ISSP1996-1), June 1996. 27. Observers of varying political persuasions have noted this development. See, for example, Deshingkar, “Indian Politics and Arms Control,” 23. 28. For a sampling of the debate and positions, see NIAS, India’s Options on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; K. Sundarji, “Meeting the Nuclear Threat: A Plan for India,” Indian Express, March 11, 1996; Brahma Chellaney, “The Grand Delusion of Non-Weaponised Deterrence,” Pioneer, March 27, 1996; K. Subrahmanyam, “A Democratic and Balanced Debate,” Economic Times, March 21, 1996; P. R. Mudan, “India at a Nuclear Crossroads,” Hindustan Times, March 22, 1996; and K. Subrahmanyam, “Tailoring a Poll for Nuclear Haves,” The Times of India, April 10, 1996. 29. Arundhati Ghose, “The CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament: The Indian View,” Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 1 (Summer 1997). 30. This included the left-wing political parties, which have not been in favor of India signing the NPT. 31. In this debate, K. Subrahmanyam and former chief of the army General K. Sundarji may be seen as having represented the low end of the spectrum and Bharat Karnad the most vocal proponent of the higher level. See Bharat Karnad, “A Thermonuclear Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publishers, 1998), 128, 134–143. Subrahmanyam offers a level of sixty weapons as sufficient in “Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy,” in Bharat Karnard, ed., Future Imperiled: India’s Security in the 1990s and Beyond (New Delhi: Viking Press, 1994), 190. Sundarji, the earliest analyst to spell out a minimum deterrent for India, believed that India could achieve it even without testing. He calculated that 90–135 fission bombs would be sufficient. See Indian Express, April 6, 1996. Outside technical analysis has estimated that by the year 2000, India would have enough separated weapons-grade plutonium for at least sixty-five early-generation nuclear weapons. See Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 111. 32. See Roddham Narasimha’s talk on “Perspectives on the Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine” at the workshop on Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine, held at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India, November 26–27, 1999.

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33. See C. Raja Mohan, Hindu, November 26, 1998, and K. Subrahmanyam, Times of India, November 17, 1998. 34. Hindustan Times, November 29, 1998. 35. Bruce Blair, “Cooperation on Nuclear Weapons Safety,” lecture delivered at a seminar on Preventive Diplomacy: Reflections on Overcoming Enmity Through Contacts, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., April 9, 1999. 36. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “India’s Security and Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures,” in Sidhu, Brian Cloughley, John Hawes, and Teresita Schaffer, Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures in Southern Asia, Henry L. Stimson Center report no. 26, November 1998, 36–37. 37. See interview with S. Rajagopal, Times of India, February 11, 1999. 38. Brigadier General (ret.) Vijai K. Nair, “The Structure of an Indian Nuclear Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond, 83. 39. Bruce Larkin, Nuclear Designs: Great Britain, France and China in the Global Governance of Nuclear Arms (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 329. 40. Ibid., 298 (emphasis added). 41. David Sanger and Erik Eckholm, “Will Beijing’s Nuclear Arsenal Stay Small or Will It Mushroom?” New York Times, March 15, 1999, 1. 42. Ibid., 8. 43. Statement before the Indian Parliament on December 15, 1998. 44. For an excellent discussion of confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan in the nuclear field, see C. Raja Mohan and Peter Lavoy, “Avoiding Nuclear War,” in Michael Krepon and A. Sevak, eds., Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996). 45. For an excellent discussion of deterrence and spiral theories, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 46. See for example, Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 47. The importance of the technological drive is argued by Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed Books, 1998). 48. News (Karachi), September 22, 1998. 49. The best analysis of U.S. expenditures on nuclear weapons and supporting systems is found in Stephen Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998). 50. See, for example, Atul Kohli, “Can the Periphery Control the Center? Indian Politics at the Crossroads,” Washington Quarterly 19, no. 4 (Autumn 1996).

5 India’s Nuclear and Missile Programs: Strategy, Intentions, Capabilities Raju G. C. Thomas

RETHINKING INDIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY At the end of the twentieth century, expectations were high that the new forces of mass telecommunications, international travel, marketization, globalization, and economic interdependence would gradually soften and eliminate the old forces of nationalism, nuclear deterrence, alliances, and the use of force. The experience of the 1990s after the Cold War ended suggests that these expectations were optimistic. The old forces still remain and cannot be ignored. Many regional conflicts remain unresolved, new ones arise, and nuclear proliferation pressures have not been contained among the “nuclear have-nots.” Among the “nuclear haves,” especially the three North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, nuclear deterrence and counterproliferation programs are being pursued vigorously even as they urge others not to acquire nuclear weapons. The buildup of sophisticated high-tech conventional arms continues unabated. At the regional level, India and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998, thereby undermining the nuclear nonproliferation regime that had held since the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was finalized in 1968. Although ambiguity and confusion surrounded India’s strategic and political intentions when it suddenly conducted the tests at Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert in May 1998, the regional and global rationales and objectives of an Indian nuclear deterrent have now begun to emerge. The May 1998 tests were followed in April 1999 with the successful testing of the Agni 2 missile, which has a range of 2,000 kilomeStrategic Transformation at Century’s End

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ters. This missile range constitutes a retaliatory strike deterrent capability that could reach much of the Middle East, Central Asia, China, and Southeast Asia. Thus far, Pakistan has responded in kind to all of India’s nuclear and missile tests. Islamabad claims to have conducted six tests in the Chagai mountains of Baluchistan in late May 1998. The extra test claimed by Pakistan to counter India’s five tests was done to bring about overall parity with India’s earlier atomic test in 1974. A month earlier in April 1998, Pakistan successfully tested the Ghauri 1 missile, which has a range of 1,000 kilometers. Within a month of India’s testing the Agni 2 missile in early 1999, Pakistan tested the Ghauri 2 missile, which has a similar range. In May 1999, the Indian government sanctioned a major missile development program, including the proposed deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Although India’s strategic vision and security concerns extend beyond the subcontinent, it continues to be checkmated and frustrated within the subcontinent by Pakistan. Within a year of the nuclear and missile tests on the subcontinent, India was faced with intensified guerrilla warfare by Muslim Kashmiri and Pakistan-supported mujahideen. India responded to the seizure of Kargil in Indian Kashmir by Pakistani forces in May–June 1999 with a restricted and localized conventional military counterattack. The situation reached the brink of another full-scale Indo-Pakistani war, which this time raised the specter of a nuclear war. There were warnings from Pakistan that if India attempted to extend the war across the international frontiers outside the line of control in Kashmir, Pakistan might counter with a nuclear attack. The military coup by General Pervez Musharraf in October, followed by the hijacking of an Indian plane in December 1999, added to the tensions. Sino-Indian relations had shown considerable improvement until the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998. The Indian defense minister, George Fernandes, argued that the tests were partly in response to the growing economic power and military threat from China. However, the SinoIndian border dispute had been resolved de facto with the signing of the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreements in 1994, and, following a brief suspension in 1998, meetings continued between the two sides’ Joint Working Group to finalize their mutual borders. At the global level, without sanction from the UN Security Council, an expanded NATO launched a full-scale assault against Serbia on March 24, 1999, for refusing to submit to the terms proposed at Rambouillet on the Kosovo issue. The continued and routine bombing of Iraq since 1992 without a fresh UN Security Council resolution has raised some concerns in India that the United Nations may eventually meet the same fate as the

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League of Nations. The U.S. use of high-tech conventional force in the Middle East and southeastern Europe and the unwillingness of the five permanent members of the Security Council to give up their nuclear capabilities have demonstrated that force and the threat to use it remain instruments of state policy and an important currency in world politics. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union intervened in the civil wars of Vietnam and Afghanistan and were defeated. The explanation for this phenomenon, in which major nuclear superpowers were humbled after ten years of war by minor and even backward states, may be extrapolated from Glen Snyder’s “stability-instability paradox.” Snyder’s paradox would suggest that when mutual nuclear deterrence prevails between two nuclear powers, they are forced down to lower levels of conventional or unconventional warfare. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union were compelled to fight each other’s armed proxies in Vietnam and Afghanistan and suffer defeat. However, without the support of the other noncombatant superpower, Vietnam and Afghanistan could not have emerged victorious in their wars of attrition. A similar pattern has prevailed in Kashmir since 1989. With India and Pakistan being latent nuclear weapons states from the mid-1980s onward, India has been compelled to fight Pakistan’s proxies—the well-armed and -trained Kashmiri and non-Kashmiri mujahideen. Since both India and Pakistan have become overt nuclear weapons states, the paradox appears to have been tested and sustained during the crisis over Kargil, in which India conducted a localized but full-scale war against Pakistani irregular and regular forces. Unlike Vietnam and Afghanistan, victory has thus far eluded the Kashmiri separatists and their Pakistani sponsors. The difference may be Indian motivation, logistical convenience, and the willingness to suffer casualties to keep Kashmir. However, India was constrained from expanding the war across the international frontiers into Pakistani Punjab and Sind for fear of escalation to a nuclear war. India’s defense of Kashmir against a Pakistani assault from its side of the line of control has always been difficult. In earlier wars in 1965 and 1971, India expanded the wars across the international frontier by driving its forces toward Lahore and Karachi, threatening to seize the two main cities of Pakistan. This military option now seems dubious, since Pakistan has declared that it will respond with nuclear weapons if India were to resort to the earlier war strategies. The empirical observation during the Cold War that nuclear weapons states will avoid direct conTheory and Practice

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ventional wars for fear of escalation to nuclear levels was severely tested during the 1999 Kashmir crisis. The nuclearization of South Asia initiated by India in May 1998 may be working to New Delhi’s disadvantage. The global military balance that prevailed during the Cold War has been replaced by a unipolar military world, although this observation has been disputed by some Western analysts. The state of the global military balance has always had implications for the regional military balance in South Asia. No countervailing conventional power exists between the United States and Russia, at least in regard to the new qualitative hightech weapons in the U.S. arsenal. And for the United States there will be no more “Vietnams.” The United States is capable of inflicting enormous death and destruction on other states in the pursuit of what it sees as moral and humanitarian causes while suffering insignificant or no casualties. There are other factors that have strengthened the West. Germany is now united and powerful again, thereby adding to the power of the Western alliance. Now that the Cold War is over, Washington has declared that an expanding U.S.-led NATO alliance system faced with no threats to itself is a good thing for the world. Peace, security, and justice for all will prevail under the new Pax Americana. There is some value in the system of hegemonic stability. In a study of the European balance of power system over several centuries undertaken by A. F. K. Organski of the University of Michigan, he concluded that balance of power politics was likely to generate instability and wars, whereas a preponderance of power was more likely to produce peace and stability.1 According to Organski, under conditions of military preponderance, the weaker state dare not attack, and the stronger state need not attack, and therefore there was peace. Especially when the dominant state or group of states is considered to be benevolent, just, and without territorial ambitions, a noncompetitive military preponderance of power may be the most desirable condition for world peace.2 For example, perhaps it was the military supremacy of Israel and the divisive rift among the Arab states after the 1991 Gulf War that compelled the Palestinians and their Arab state sponsors to accept the existence of Israel and a territorial peace settlement that was worse than what the Palestinians could have obtained in 1948 through the UN partition plan. Although the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement has proved tenuous, Israeli preponderance and the distancing of other major Arab states from the Palestinian cause make another Arab-Israeli war less likely. Likewise, it was India’s military preponderance after the 1971 IndoPakistani war and the breakup of Pakistan that deterred Pakistan from engaging in another war with India over Kashmir in the early 1990s.

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However, peace and stability achieved through a preponderance of power does not necessarily guarantee the territorial integrity of the weaker state against an uncompromising and aggressive stronger state, nor does it necessarily imply the promotion of justice from the standpoint of the weaker state if the prevailing status quo is perceived to be unjust. Palestinian hopes of regaining its pre-1948 territory has dissipated, and its prospects for gaining independence of the Occupied Territories depend on the benevolence and goodwill of Israel. Similarly, Pakistani hopes of seizing Kashmir by force have faded, although it continues to believe that only a military balance with a larger India would guarantee its existing territorial integrity. Unable to match India’s conventional superiority, Pakistan has found the balance at a higher level of military capability, that is, a deterrent posture based on nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. At the nuclear level, a quantitative balance is irrelevant. Possessing a retaliatory strike capability, Pakistan is now able to deter India from launching even conventional wars for fear of escalation to nuclear war. A nuclear security guarantee from the United States could not have provided Pakistan with such assurance. Herein lies the predicament. A nuclear weapons state possessing an assured retaliatory strike capability may be able to deter an attack on itself, but it cannot deter attacks on its allies and friends. Russia’s inability to prevent an attack by NATO on its close ally, Serbia, illustrates the problem of defending allies and friends under nuclear balances and conventional imbalances. The message is clear. Russia can no longer provide India with a nuclear or conventional guarantee against attacks by other great powers. States that feel severely threatened by existing nuclear powers must be able to deter or to defend themselves on their own if such an attack were to take place. External guarantees do not appear credible. These conditions imply a reversal to a Hobbesian and Machiavellian world where power determines morality. Under these circumstances, threatened states have three options. First, nonnuclear states that have the means to acquire independent nuclear deterrents may be tempted to break the nonproliferation regime, as India and Pakistan have done. Second, those weaker states no longer able to fight the sole superpower armed with high-tech conventional weapons may be forced down to anarchic forms of violence: for example, the strategy of terrorism using chemical and biological weapons that would be taken to the heartland of great powers with no restrictions on targets and no moral restraints on methods used. The threat of indiscriminate terrorism may become a preferred form of deterrence in an unequal world.

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Third, unable to invoke either option, weak states may capitulate and seek some minimum acceptable accommodation with the great powers. The underlying problem in the post–Cold War era is that mutual nuclear deterrence among existing nuclear powers cannot deter a conventional attack against third-party states, especially where there is no balance of conventional military power between the nuclear weapons states. Such a situation prevailed between the United States and Russia in the 1990s. Balance of power theory in Western strategic literature taught that only a system of countervailing power may ensure the sovereignty and independence of states, both large and small.3 A dominant state system cannot ensure such security for middle and small powers. Although U.S. leaders and observers argue that world peace and justice have a better chance without a prevailing global balance of military power, they are unwilling to accept such preponderance in regions where it does not advance U.S. foreign policy goals, such as South Asia and the Middle East.4 A conventional military balance between Israel and the Arab states or Pakistan and India is deemed essential, but the same is considered unacceptable between the West and the rest. Germany’s reunification was not expected to threaten the rest of Europe outside NATO, although the first action of a united Germany was to push for the secessions of Slovenia and Croatia. Likewise, at the end of the Cold War, preserving NATO without much military opposition was not enough. The expansion of NATO to make it even more powerful is now the U.S. objective. At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting in December 1994, Russian president Boris Yeltsin condemned U.S. efforts to project Russia as a future threat in order to justify NATO’s expansion. According to Yeltsin, “We hear explanations to the effect this allegedly is the expansion of stability just in case there are undesirable developments in Russia.”5 U.S. military dominance, backed by the ability to threaten economic punishments or to promise economic rewards to those who oppose or support U.S. policies, has changed the character of the United Nations. The UN system has been reduced to an obedient organization of the United States and the West, a return to the early years of the UN when its membership did not include the emerging independent Afro-Asian bloc of states. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact alliance, voting in the Security Council is now almost always unanimous in favor of U.S. policies, with an occasional abstention or negative vote.6 States with veto powers, including Russia and China, have rarely ventured to veto U.S.-sponsored or U.S.-supported UN resolutions. In the Iraq and Yugoslav crises, the unusual phenomenon of what Stephen Walt has called

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“bandwagoning” with the dominant power—instead of “balancing”—has become commonplace.7 Even more disturbing is that NATO has demonstrated itself to be a docile group of states following the wishes of U.S. leadership. One of the basic problems with Organski’s preponderance theory is that under these conditions, the preponderant power is not supposed to initiate a war against a weaker state. NATO’s massive and full-scale assault on tiny Serbia, bypassing the UN Security Council and violating a slew of international laws, demonstrated the weakness of the “preponderance equals peace” theory and the strength of the arguments underlying the need to maintain a balance of power among states to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states. Reflecting the widespread strategic sentiment in India regarding the new unipolar security environment, a Times of India editorial noted the dangerous new U.S.-dominated world, the U.S. development of new missile defense systems, the legitimization of wars of intervention abroad on self-determined moral grounds, and the U.S. ability to fight them with very few or no casualties to Americans because of high-tech weapons systems. In these circumstances two major trends are likely to emerge. Independent powers like Russia and China are bound to develop their own military capabilities to deter US dominance to the extent possible and to defend their own national interests and sovereignty. In this, the nuclear weapons and long range missiles are bound to play a crucial role. Secondly, the deep resentment against US hegemonism is bound to unleash various terrorist activities by nonstate actors against US interests and personnel in various parts of the world. India has to take note of these developments and formulate its own national security strategy to safeguard its strategic autonomy. That calls for the country to accelerate its acquisition of a credible minimum deterrent programme of ballistic and cruise missiles.8

While India issued a draft nuclear security doctrine in August 1999, Russia proceeded to declare a more comprehensive security doctrine in January 2000 that linked nuclear, conventional, and unconventional problems of security with its economy and resource capabilities.9 NATO’s use of force against Serbia over Kosovo when Russia could only stand by helplessly, the growing number of terrorist bomb attacks in Russian cities, and the ongoing war against Chechen rebels were among a range of issues that the new Russian security doctrine addressed. The doctrine sought to define a more comprehensive approach to security. The 2000 doctrine referred to “allies and strategic partners—China, India and other countries.”10 The new military doctrine indicated that the main military threats to Russia came from the United States and other Western nations: from

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“NATO’s military activities outside the bloc’s zone of responsibility.” The security doctrine noted that the “bipolar confrontation” of the Cold War era has been replaced by a conflict of two “mutually exclusive tendencies”: Russia and other countries seek to establish a multipolar world based on “multi-sided control of international processes,” while the U.S.led Western nations try to use “military force to decide key international problems in circumvention of international law.” What attracted the most attention in the West were the new conditions for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons. While Yeltsin’s strategy declared that nuclear weapons could only be used “if the very existence of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state is threatened,” President Vladimir Putin’s doctrine lowers the nuclear threshold to repelling “armed aggression if all other means of resolving a crisis situation have been exhausted or turn out to be ineffective.”11 Some Chinese military strategists responded to the prevailing absence of a level playing field by proposing new rules of “unrestricted war,” which include the resort to terrorism, ecological destruction, cyberwarfare through the spread of computer viruses, and trafficking in drugs to undermine the enemy population, thereby bringing destruction into the heart of the Western countries, especially the United States.12 To Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, the authors of “unrestricted war,” this strategy was the only viable method of balancing unequal military states. “Unrestricted war is a war that surpasses all boundaries and restrictions. . . . It takes nonmilitary forms and military forms and creates a war on many fronts. It is the war of the future.” In an interview, Colonel Wang declared: “We are a weak country. So do we need to fight according to your rules? No. War has rules, but those rules are set by the West. But if you use those rules, then weak countries have no chance. But if you use nontraditional means to fight, like those employed by financiers to bring down financial systems, then you have a chance.” According to John Pomfret of the Washington Post, the Chinese military strategists saw a direct connection between Kosovo and Taiwan and Tibet. According to Colonel Wang, “If today you impose your value systems on a European country, tomorrow you can do the same to Taiwan or Tibet.” Similar concerns exist in India about potential Western “humanitarian interventions” in Kashmir and other parts of India that may want to secede. Writing in the New York Times on October 22, Barbara Crossette suggested that the United States now turn its attention to Kashmir following the successful severance of Kosovo from Serbia and East Timor from Indonesia. Against such U.S. tendencies, Prem Shankar Jha, a leading Indian journalist and former adviser to Prime Minister Inder Kumar

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Gujral, noted in the Hindustan Times on November 5, 1999, that “two days ago, the Congress of the United States began a hearing on human rights. It was not an enquiry into the state of human rights in America but in Kashmir, in a country that did not elect them, over which it does not have the remotest jurisdiction, and where even the most calamitous events would not affect America’s political or economic well-being.”13 As we enter the new millennium, questions as to whether India should return to the nuclear weapons option, reverse itself again and sign the NPT, or continue ahead so as to become a full-fledged nuclear weapons state appear to have been resolved in favor of the last choice. The one-time overwhelming antibomb (but also anti-NPT) lobby in India embodied mainly in Congress, Janata, and United Front government policies has been eclipsed by the pro-bomb lobby given expression by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government. Those who were once antibomb (but also anti-NPT) have quickly converted to the new cause. Whatever the conviction of earlier arguments for a nuclearized India (e.g., Defense Minister George Fernandes’s justification in May 1998 that India needed nuclear weapons to counter the Chinese nuclear threat), NATO’s global hegemony and its willingness to use force based on self-determined humanitarian grounds have provided added fuel to the pro-nuclear lobby in India. Amid the above trends and uncertainties, the strategic context of India’s nuclear policy is examined here first from two opposing directions: from a regional-to-global perspective and from a global-to-regional perspective. CHANGING SECURITY DIMENSIONS

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Before the nuclear tests of May 1998, I had argued that it was in India’s interests to sign the NPT rather than acquire a nuclear weapons capability.14 According to my previous reasoning, the real choice for India was as follows: (1) either India could obtain the security advantages of an independent nuclear deterrent capability, but at a high economic price, including the imposition of Western sanctions; or (2) India could pursue the advantages of signing the NPT, which would enable it to receive economic and technological assistance for its nuclear energy program and other dual-use technology while living without the dubious value of an independent nuclear deterrent. Whatever the values of these two options, the long-standing and prevailing Indian middle course of neither the NPT nor the bomb provided neither the security benefits of an independent nuclear deterrent nor any The Old Regional-to-Global Perspective

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Western assistance for a full-fledged nuclear energy program, which is becoming the world’s energy choice of the future. However, if India was never going to go for the bomb despite the periodic public rhetoric that it had the right to exercise the nuclear weapons option, then it might as well sign the NPT and get on with the business of rapid economic growth. Compelling Pakistan to sign the NPT jointly (since it offered to do so if India did) would also mean that India would win the conventional arms race in South Asia. Pakistan’s lack of a comparable economic and technological base would make it difficult for that country to keep up with the Indian conventional arms buildup. The strategic and security status of Pakistan relative to India would be reduced to that of a “Bangladesh.” However, if South Asia were to be nuclearized, then ten Pakistani nuclear bombs would be equal to 100 Indian nuclear bombs, nuclear weapons being the great equalizer among unequal states. Thus, it was in Pakistan’s interest to nuclearize the subcontinent, not India’s. Indeed, by going nuclear, India played into Pakistan’s hands. Meanwhile, since India had lived with the Chinese nuclear threat for more than thirty-five years under more hostile conditions, it could afford to live with the same threat for the next thirty-five years under more hospitable conditions. Yet the virtually dormant Chinese threat was invoked by Defense Minister George Fernandes to rationalize India’s nuclear tests in May 1998. The demonstration of India’s nuclear capability has not brought it power and prestige, which in the twenty-first century are likely to be determined by the economic rat race rather than the nuclear arms race. Clearly, China and the other East and Southeast Asian countries (until the great economic crash of 1998) had outdone India in the economic arena, where economic success may carry greater power and influence in the world. India’s advantage in signing the NPT and thereby forcing Pakistan to do so too was demonstrated in the crisis over Kargil in June 1999. If both states had signed the NPT, India could have launched a full-scale conventional war against Pakistan to end the military incursion into and seizure of Kargil, especially because India now has clear conventional military superiority over Pakistan. Since India has no military advantage in defending Kashmir from within Kashmir because of the difficult terrain and access from the Indian side of the line of control, India’s defense of Kashmir in the past has always involved expanding the war across the international frontiers of Indian Punjab and Rajasthan into Pakistani Punjab and Sind. During both the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars, an Indian military onslaught toward the two main Pakistani cities of Lahore and Karachi immediately relieved the pressure of Pakistani military thrusts into Kashmir. With both sides now nuclear weapons states, India’s

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ability to do this is limited or nonexistent. Any full-scale conventional war raises the risk of a nuclear confrontation and nuclear Armageddon. The situation has increased Pakistan’s ability to conduct a major guerrilla and terrorist war through its proxies in Kashmir. India’s increasing helplessness against such means of warfare was demonstrated in December 1999 when an Indian Airlines plane with more than 170 passengers on board was hijacked by Pakistani militants in support of pro-Pakistani Kashmiri separatists. India was compelled to concede to the demands as IndoPakistani tensions continued to mount over the issue. Much of my earlier argument along these lines was based on this regional-to-global perspective, that is, an analysis of how traditional regional threats to India from Pakistan and China are affected by politics, arms races, and military crises at the global level. Undoubtedly, even those who argued for an Indian nuclear deterrent during the 1990s pursued this line of reasoning: that is, nuclearization of the subcontinent would bring about greater strategic stability in the Beijing–New Delhi–Islamabad triangle, just as it had in the Washington-Moscow-Beijing strategic triangle. But we came to different conclusions in determining the optimum strategic policy for India. An opposing global-to-regional strategic perspective is argued here, namely, that an independent nuclear deterrent for India may have become relatively more important in a unipolar world, especially where there is no countervailing conventional military power between the old West and the new East. This perspective is derived from the post–Cold War experience of the unrestrained use of military force against Iraq and Yugoslavia by a U.S.-led all-powerful Western alliance. An expanding NATO now looms as an all-white colonial-type imperial expeditionary force determined to enforce its political diktats and moral standards on the rest of the world. It is not a defensive alliance but a massive military machine bringing together the economic resources of the most advanced industrialized states with a total population of nearly 800 million. India’s Ministry of External Affairs criticized NATO’s actions in Yugoslavia and its new doctrine declared in Washington on April 25, 1999, which permits operations beyond the Euro-Atlantic region and outside the territory of the alliance This doctrine was stated to be a danger to the rest of the world. Any such action would contravene international law, norms of peaceful coexistence between the nations, and the UN Charter. According to India, NATO’s usurpation of the power and function of the The New Global-to-Regional Perspective

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UN Security Council was unacceptable. At a meeting on August 5, 1999, to discuss NATO’s actions on Kosovo, former prime minister Inder Kumar Gujral flayed NATO countries for demanding a change of government in Yugoslavia and said that Western actions had relevance for India. “It is surprising that foreign countries are demanding that the Yugoslav people change their government,” he said. “It sounds strange that now outside powers will decide what kind of government will come and who will rule.”15 Speaking at the same function, N. N. Jha, part of the BJP’s foreign affairs cell and a former Indian ambassador to Belgrade, condemned NATO for bombarding Yugoslavia for eleven weeks. He warned that if India did not vigorously oppose NATO’s doctrine of intervention, “the rule of the jungle will prevail.” And Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar observed that the lesson of NATO’s war against Yugoslavia was that India should not allow itself to be weak militarily, politically, or economically. The analysis of Siddharth Varadarajan in the Times of India reflects a widespread Indian assessment of NATO and the danger it posed to the rest of the world:16 Confirming its belief in the maxim that theory must always follow practice, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has adopted a new “Strategic Concept” which incorporates all the principles on which its current aggression against Yugoslavia is based. These include: an expanded definition of what constitutes a threat to the security of the “Euro-Atlantic area,” the subordination of European strategic interests to that of the US, and, above all, the same unilateralism which led NATO to attack a sovereign country in violation of international law. The new Strategic Concept was adopted by the alliance at its 50th anniversary conclave in Washington last month. Though not quite the victory summit the US thought it would be when NATO planes began bombing Yugoslavia on March 24, the meeting was conducted in an extravagantly triumphal register.

Varadarajan pointed out that the term North Atlantic no longer refers to a specific geographical region: “Like Vamana, the diminutive avatar of Vishnu, the ‘NA’ in NATO has an immense capacity to expand across the three worlds.” Arguing humanitarian grounds that it will define subjectively for itself, NATO has claimed the right to intervene in regional conflicts, ethnic and religious rivalries, and territorial disputes “beyond alliance territory”; the abuse of human rights; and the dissolution of states. Even some things as vague as “inadequate or failed efforts at reform’’ and “the uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people’’ are said to “pose problems for security and stability affecting the alliance.” Varadarajan warned that “every country on the ‘periphery of NATO’ or ‘beyond

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alliance territory’ should make sure none of the above crises hits it, or else it could find itself in the firing line of cruise missiles and smart bombs.” Interventions will be massive “do or die” operations even against tiny countries, as exemplified in the case of Yugoslavia. According to Varadarajan, one factor triggering NATO’s right to intervene is weapons of mass destruction. This is found in the NATO summit’s “defense capabilities initiative” for operations outside alliance territory. Obviously, we are talking about operations that are pretty far afield. In line with this, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery is identified as a threat to NATO. “The principal nonproliferation goal of the Alliance . . . is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means.” The nonreference to “diplomatic means” of preventing proliferation is not accidental; the use of force is clearly what NATO has in mind. . . . Far from forswearing the first use of nuclear weapons, as German foreign minister Joschka Fischer had suggested last year, NATO’s new Strategic Concept affirms the centrality of first strike: “[The nuclear forces] will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the allies’ response to military aggression.” What is more, the utility of “substrategic forces”—i.e., tactical nuclear weapons—is reaffirmed, and a hint is made that NATO nukes might be stationed anywhere on alliance territory.

Varadarajan concluded: “NATO’s nuclearism, its aggressive selfimage, and its conduct in Yugoslavia can only inspire anxiety in those who believe in peace and democracy. The new Strategic Concept is a nihilist text, filled with destructive intent. It is as if its authors have learned nothing from the history of the millennium—or even century—which is just about to end.” Likewise, C. Raja Mohan argued that NATO’s nuclear doctrine declared at its fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999 was a testament to their conviction that “nuclear weapons are here to stay. That is one of the central messages which emanated from last week’s 50th anniversary summit in Washington of the most powerful and successful military alliance the world has ever seen.”17 NATO would have none of any thought of accepting a “no first use” policy, let alone nuclear disarmament. It reiterated that the core of Western security must be guaranteed by the strategic nuclear forces of the alliance, especially those of the United States, backed by the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France. It has also declared a role for tactical and substrategic nuclear forces: “The US, through NATO, has also declared its policy of sharing nuclear weapons with its Alliance partners, despite protests from the

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members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nonnuclear members have argued that sharing nuclear weapons undermines the two basic principles of the treaty on nontransfer of nuclear weapons (Article I) and their nonreceipt by nonnuclear powers (Article II).”18 With reference to the unrestrained and full-scale NATO assault on Yugoslavia, former foreign secretary A. P. Venkataswaran reminded India of the old adage that “power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”19 Likewise, former foreign secretary Muchkund Dubey warned India of the advancing “NATO juggernaut” and argued that NATO’s pulverzing of tiny Serbia in defiance of Russian protests had strengthened the case for an independent Indian nuclear deterrent.20 K. Subrahmanyam, a longtime advocate of a nuclear India, provides the renewed and urgent case for a strong nuclear force posture in an article entitled “Clear and Present Danger: U.S. Path to Unipolar Hegemony”: When in May 1998, India conducted the nuclear tests and justified them on the ground that the security environment had deteriorated, many in the world and in India raised the question as to what precisely had happened to arrive at that conclusion. Now it must be clear to everyone that the present international security environment is the worst since the end of World War II. . . . The UN has been rendered redundant since there is no balance of power in the world and the entire industrial world, barring a ramshackle Russia, is under US overlordship. If this is not a dangerous international security environment, what is? It is not accidental that the only countries voicing strong protests against the bombing in Yugoslavia happen to Russia, China and India, all nuclear weapon powers.21

Indeed, if the 1971 USS Enterprise episode during the Bangladesh crisis were to repeat itself today (when the United States sent its nuclear carrier into the Bay of Bengal in a show of gunboat diplomacy against India’s military intervention in East Pakistan), the outcome could be quite different. If Russia could not deter an attack on its closest ally, Serbia, over Kosovo, which was indisputably in Serbian territory, then Russia cannot deter a potential future threat to its one-time ally, India, over Kashmir, which Pakistan claims is disputed territory. Only an independent Indian nuclear deterrent based on the eventual acquisition of nucleartipped ICBMs and cruise missiles can thwart the threat of Western military intervention on ostensibly moral grounds. NATO’s military actions against Serbia and declarations of new security and nuclear doctrines at its summit in Washington in April 1999 have also led to a public discussion on India’s forging an alliance relationship with Russia and China. Indeed, Russian premier Yevgeny Primakov had

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proposed such a strategic partnership among Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, which would bring together the old Russo-Indian and SinoPakistani alliances of the Cold War era. Quasi-alliance strategic partnerships between Russia and India, and Russia and China, were pursued in response to NATO expansion instead of a four-way alliance. According to M. D. Nalapat of the Times of India, “NATO’s new policy of intervention anywhere, has all the ingredients for a new world war, one that will pit NATO against Russia, China and India. . . . The Panchantantra says that there can only be friendship between equals. This implies that either the NATO countries accept India, China and Russia as equals, or they are in danger of being treated in a way that will make them enemies. Kosovo has shown the need for Indian power, and the need for diplomacy that can bring the three giants of Asia together, not to begin a world war but to stop the NATO planners from igniting one with their racist arrogance.”22 Endorsing the prospect of a Moscow–Beijing–New Delhi trilateral security relationship, an editorial in the Hindustan Times noted that “NATO’s ruthless action in Yugoslavia may bring India and Russia (and possibly China) even closer together as they realise the danger of a world with only one superpower.”23 The probability of a Sino-Indian strategic partnership would seem unlikely, given India’s earlier declaration that its nuclear weapons tests were directed against China. Besides, China’s close military ties with Pakistan following the 1962 Sino-Indian and 1965 Indo-Pakistani wars remain an obstacle to establishing a Sino-Indian strategic partnership. However, NATO’s “unprovoked aggression” (as Indian observers called NATO’s claim of “humanitarian intervention”) against Yugoslavia has now brought India and China closer. On June 14, 1999, India and China established a “security dialogue,” which was stated by their respective foreign ministers to be a response to NATO’s actions.24 China also distanced itself from Pakistani actions in Kargil and moved toward a more neutral stance. Much of the above Indian reactions may seem polemical, unconvincing, and temporary to Western analysts. However, just as NATO sought new justifications for its continuation and expansion when no opposing hostile power or alliances existed to threaten the security of the West, India has found additional justification for developing an independent nuclear deterrent to counter NATO’s expansion and new nuclear doctrines. And just as NATO has found a dubious role in its full-scale assault on Yugoslavia on “humanitarian” grounds in violation of the UN Charter, India now perceives that such policies could be enforced against India

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over violent separatist movements in Kashmir, Punjab, and elsewhere. And from the Indian standpoint, having taken the step to become a nuclear weapons state, it would seem pointless to acquire a token number of nuclear weapons for the purpose of enhancing prestige. Indeed, India would have been better off reversing itself on nuclear weapons or even joining South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil, former NPT holdout states who adhered to the NPT in the 1990s. The capabilities-intentions dilemma and the new round in the global nuclear arms buildup would appear to have begun with decisions made by the United States and other NATO countries, not with India. THE CAPABILITIES-INTENTIONS DILEMMA

India’s nuclear policy, whether based on a narrower regional or a broader global assessment, needs to conditioned by both the short- and long-term consequences of any particular policy adopted. Going nuclear may have some positive political and strategic benefits in the short run but will have adverse strategic and economic consequences in the long run. The spread of nuclear weapons is not in any country’s interests, as is acknowledged by all, including India, and the costs of a major nuclear arms race could prove economically destructive for developing countries. However, the capabilities-intentions dilemma suggests that such long-term wisdom is not likely to prevail. According to the BJP-led coalition government (which fell from power in May 1999 and was then returned to office with stronger alliance support and a majority), the newer global conditions justified the Indian development of a minimum deterrent (MD) But defining a minimum deterrent is always subjective. First, against whom is deterrence directed? Is it Pakistan or China or both? Or is it the Islamic Middle East and Central Asia? Or could it be NATO? The answer may be “all of the above.” If so, how much weapons capability constitutes a sufficient and credible deterrence? The answer may well be some indeterminate quantity and quality of Indian short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), ICBMs, and SSBNs (ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-fueled) to provide deterrence against threats within the subcontinent and those that may arise from other parts of Asia and the world. That would sound more like an overreaching capability and a maximum deterrent, the certain path to India’s economic and social selfdestruction. But drawing the line somewhere in between or even further down to a bare minimum capability would be difficult.

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The draft of India’s nuclear doctrine issued by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), established in 1998, proposed instead a credible deterrent (CD).25 The NSAB’s credible deterrent seemed to imply a greater force capability than an MD. A CD would be a more appropriate but also a changing and, perhaps, elusive goal. It seems as difficult to pursue as an MD, since both are self-propelling and constantly moving targets. The point is that either deterrence works, or it does not. What may seem logical and effective in theory may not be practical and credible in practice. A nuclear force calculated to provide a minimum retaliatory strike capability may be costly in economic terms and worthless in strategic terms. Thus, if the Indian nuclear decision is now irreversible, then there would be no point in India pursuing a nuclear and missile program that is halfhearted, apologetic, and ineffective in deference to U.S. criticisms and threats of sanctions. What the Soviet Union learned after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was that in a psychological nuclear war of nerves, minimum deterrence has no credibility and leads to political capitulation. Having more or less equal nuclear capabilities and delivery systems—as if the Soviet Union and the United States were playing the game of conventional military balance of power politics—was important, even if only a minimum retaliatory strike capability was needed to ensure a nuclear military balance. However, there is a serious problem with pursuing such a policy of equal nuclear deterrence. The decision by the Soviet Union that they would settle for nothing less than nuclear equality with an economically powerful United States led to economic catastrophe and political collapse. Thus, a sufficient CD must be something between MD and nuclear equality without leading to economic self-destruction. Projecting such a wider threat environment may prove to be a self-fulfilling exercise by creating the threats India seeks to deter—which may not have existed before. For example, developing a nuclear deterrent may create or aggravate the Chinese nuclear threat. However, not responding to such potential threats could undermine Indian security in the long run. When it comes to nuclear threats and deterrent postures, there is no such thing as mobilization potential, short or long term. In the case of conventional threats and the likelihood of conventional war, it is possible to mobilize even after the attack has taken place. In the case of potential nuclear threats or a conventional attack backed by nuclear threats, only the actual possession of nuclear capabilities can prevent political capitulation or military subjugation. In response to criticisms in the West that India’s draft nuclear doctrine was full of dangerous flaws and wishful thinking, two of its authors have

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asserted the necessity of laying out India’s nuclear intentions and strategy. Nuclear deterrent relationships among the existing nuclear powers were not perfect either during the Cold War. Subrahmanyam, chairman of the NSAB, observed: The core of deterrence, especially for a country which commits itself to nofirst-use is its ability to carry out punitive unacceptable retaliation. This is not cold war language but the appropriate language to communicate to the nuclear warriors who believe in the use of nuclear weapons first. Unless one opts to allow his society and nation to be destroyed in a cold-blooded first strike by the adversary and not do anything to deter him, it is logical to make it clear to such nuclear adversaries the consequences of his resorting to a first strike. The word unacceptable damage does not carry today the connotations of the MAD (mutual assured destruction) age of Robert McNamara and Zbigniew Brezinski. It is now recognised that one bomb on one city is unacceptable. Therefore, those who believe in wielding nuclear weapons to intimidate other nations and in the first-use of nuclear weapons have to be deterred by spelling out the consequences of their actions. The Indian nuclear doctrine totally rejects the western approach to nuclear theology as is evident from the preamble and the last section which reiterates Indian commitment to disarmament. India was compelled to go nuclear because of the obduracy of nuclear weapon powers, the legitimisation of nuclear weapons by the international community and the rising trend in interventionism by the industrialised nations in the affairs of the developing world. It became necessary to protect the autonomy of decision-making in the developmental process and in strategic matters which are inalienable democratic rights of one sixth of mankind living in India. The Indian nuclear doctrine aims at providing India a credible minimum deterrent at an affordable pace of expenditure to create uncertainty in the minds of would-be nuclear intimidators, aggressors and interventionists that those actions against this country would not be rational options.26

Arguing against India signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) under U.S. pressure, Bharat Karnad, a member of the NSAB, declared: Nothing is better appreciated and better guaranteed to create respect—the vital aim always missing in Indian foreign and military policies—in the world than a country that stands up for itself and its national interests whatever anybody else may think or do. China is respected and allowed every consideration. India is badgered and asked to behave because Washington is convinced that the threat of punitive actions is enough to turn Indian resolve to jelly. Or, it is tempted by offers of freer access to high technology or whatever else New Delhi puts a policy premium on, because it is believed that India (and Indians) can be bought off or won over with blandishments. That is the principal difference in the American treatment of China and India.27

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The Indian government has on many occasions indicated its willingness to consider signing the CTBT provided certain conditions are fulfilled. These conditions often include a demonstration by the five permanent members of the Security Council who are accepted nuclear weapons states that they are moving toward comprehensive nuclear disarmament as required by Article 6 of the NPT. There was some debate in late 1999 as to whether India should sign the CTBT if it had no plans to conduct further tests. However, with the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify the CTBT, which the Clinton administration has already signed, there are some doubts as to whether India will adhere to the CTBT soon. It may follow the old NPT policy of ambivalence, namely, of not signing and not testing. Accordingly, during current and past occasions, Indian government officials and private sector security analysts have pointed to the actual or potential nuclear capabilities of China and Pakistan, with whom India has fought wars, and the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States, the Soviet Union (now Russia), France, and Great Britain. Clandestine nuclear weapons programs in the Middle East and Pakistan’s links in the Middle East and Central Asia are additional concerns. The continued existence of these nuclear weapons and accompanying delivery systems, whether increasing or declining, constitutes a standing threat to India. As to why India did not go nuclear earlier in response to its nuclear security dilemma that had existed for decades in some form or another, the Indian answer may perhaps be summed up as better late than never. The possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in itself means little beyond pride and prestige, unless they can be delivered to designated locations in enemy territory. Deterrence requires credible delivery systems. Although appropriate combat aircraft—such as the retrofitted F-16s that Pakistan unsuccessfully sought to obtain and the Mirage 2000s already deployed by India—may be used for attacking targets within a radius of 500–1,000 kilometers from forward bases, they are liable to be shot down. Successful strategic nuclear bombing missions and thereby nuclear deterrence are not guaranteed. Development of short-range ballistic missiles appears crucial. Therefore, development and deployment of various versions of the Prithvi short-range ballistic missiles in India (and also the Hatf SRBM in Pakistan) have accompanied the procurement of nuclear weapons. With respect to China, the development of IRBMs is essential for a credible Indian deterrent posture, which may explain Bombs, Missiles, and Deterrence

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India’s decision to declare an overt nuclear weapons capability only after the Agni missile program had advanced to a 2,000-kilometer-range capability. This version, the Agni 2, was tested in April 1999 after prolonged pressure from the United States not to do so.28 Pakistan immediately followed with the test of the Ghauri 2, which has a similar range. The Ghauri 1, which has a range of 900 miles, was tested a year earlier. The capabilities-intentions dilemma works between two or among multiple states within a mutually hostile environment. Decisions by India to proceed with the procurement of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems in May 1998 triggered responses from China and Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan’s response was immediate. Within a month of India’s five tests— one thermonuclear device of 43 kilotons, one atomic device of 12 kilotons, and three subkiloton devices with yield of 0.2 to 0.6 kilotons—Pakistan claimed to have tested six atomic/nuclear devices with a total yield of 43 kilotons in the Chagai hills of Baluchistan.29 The number and the nature of the detonations claimed by Pakistan have been questioned, and the actual yield of the Indian tests has been disputed.30 Although Sino-Indian relations had improved considerably in the 1990s, there was a sudden and precipitous decline in 1998 following the Indian tests. The meetings of the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group were postponed. China’s anti-Indian rhetoric escalated. However, NATO’s war against Serbia brought about a quick turnaround in China’s policy toward India. Relations have reverted back to the friendlier conditions that existed before the May 1998 Indian tests. If the security risks faced by India of not going nuclear were unacceptable before the May 1998 tests, those risks may have been substantially aggravated after the tests. The economic costs to India of a potential nuclear arms race with Pakistan and China have yet to be determined. Meanwhile, economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Japan, Canada, and other Western nations have produced immediate consequences, slowing down the robust economic growth of an average of 7 percent of gross national product (GNP) since the Indian economy was liberalized in 1991–1992. In the case of Pakistan, economic sanctions brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy in 1998, and it is now being bailed out only by Washington’s willingness to soften sanctions. Some sanctions were lifted on both countries in June 1999, although neither India nor Pakistan had changed their nuclear policies. The Costs of Deterrence

INDIA’S NUCLEAR Table 5.1 Atmosphere Underground Total

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Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide, 1945–1998 USA

215 815 1,030

USSR 219 496 715

France 50 159 209

UK 21 24 45

China 23 22 45

India 0 6 6

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Pakistan 0 3–6a 3–6a

Source: Adapted from United Nations Physicians for Social Responsibility (reproduced in the New York Times, September 11, 1996). Updated by the author. Note: a. Pakistan has claimed six tests, but more likely it did three. There are some doubts whether all of India’s tests in 1998 were successful.

Has India now achieved less security at a higher economic price? The advocates of a nuclear India have argued that the tradeoffs are an intangible commodity that is not easily assessed. In any case, just as right-wing U.S. conservatives and security analysts have argued, Hindu nationalists claim that no price is too high for the security of the motherland. In retrospect, it may be very well for Americans to claim now that the obscene nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was irrational, futile, and self-destructive. But if this was not apparent to them then, then how could it be obvious to India and Pakistan under similar mutually hostile conditions? Consider the following: The United States and the Soviet Union possessed about 70,000 warheads in 1986.31 In 1996, the number had been reduced to 40,000, which even so amounted to a total destructive power equal to 700,000 bombs like the ones dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And between the two of them, they had conducted almost 1,800 nuclear tests (see Table 5.1). In comparison, France had conducted 209, Britain forty-five, and China forty-five. Until the five tests in 1998, India had conducted only one. The cost of the arms race to the United States was about $5 trillion. The cost to the Soviet Union was economic ruin, collapse, and disintegration, something that Pakistan appeared to face within a year of going nuclear. Yet despite the advantage of hindsight and experience, the United States and Russia insisted on retaining 3,500 nuclear warheads under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). The Clinton administration has even sanctioned the development of a national ballistic missile defense project. Resources are being poured into a “counterproliferation” program, which is hardly an arms reduction program. NATO is not being dismantled but expanded. If there are no more nuclear threats to the nations of the world, as the United States tells India, why embark on these policies and programs that to others seem irrational

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and costly? Why do Britain and France insist on retaining their independent nuclear deterrents? TECHNOLOGY

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Sometimes decisions by states to acquire certain types of weapons may arise primarily from the technological capacity to do so. To a certain degree the U.S. weapons acquisition program during the Cold War was fueled by this belief, thus generating an arms race based on what has been called a “mad military momentum.” In the Indian case, much of the motivation no doubt arose because China already possessed a nuclear and missile arsenal and Pakistan was perceived as covertly acquiring the same. However, the motivations to acquire nuclear weapons and missiles also arose from the growth of technology in the nuclear energy and space programs. Moreover, the Indian educational system continued to churn out an abundance of scientists and engineers capable of developing bombs and rockets who needed to be employed. Otherwise, they would be lost to the West or remain within India as an unemployed or underemployed, disgruntled, underprivileged class of workers. Technological capacity in India has no doubt generated perceptions of external threat conditions that required an Indian nuclear deterrent. In India, there are differences in the expectations, criteria, and strategies for indigenous acquisition of technological self-sufficiency in sophisticated conventional weapons, as opposed to such acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles. Unlike conventional capabilities, the technological sophistication of nuclear weapons and perhaps even missiles developed in India need not match the quality of those found in the United States, Britain, or France. At present, the minimum expected requirement of nuclear weapons and missiles is that the bomb must detonate and the missile must land in the approximate target area. That would constitute minimum deterrence. Technological comparisons with the capabilities of existing nuclear weapons states, including China, are not considered important, although this attitude may change if India decides to embark on an overt nuclear arms buildup to rival that of the second-tier nuclear powers—Britain, France, and China. However, the designated range, payload, accuracy, and other operational requirements of missiles must be reasonably assured. In the case of short-range tactical missiles to be used by the army on the battlefield, Indian military expectations of comparative technological quality Technology and Performance Criteria

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are that such missiles must match those available to India’s adversaries, not unlike expectations for other major conventional weapons. Mediumand intermediate-range missiles intended for strategic deterrence need to fulfill less stringent requirements of sophistication and accuracy, since they serve a somewhat more flexible and ambiguous purpose. Ultimately, missiles developed and produced in India need only demonstrate their own predefined and projected range, payload, and accuracy and not necessarily the missile capabilities possessed by China, Pakistan, or other countries. The indigenous development of nuclear weapons and missiles in India carries another major advantage over the similar development of major conventional weapons: a parallel “peaceful” civilian program being undertaken by the Departments of Atomic Energy and Space that more directly contributes to India’s nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Indeed, despite all the technical setbacks, cost overruns, and prolonged delays in India’s nuclear energy programs and schedules, nuclear reactors and reprocessing facilities have provided India with the crucial plutonium for the development of atomic and thermonuclear bombs. The civilian program feeds the military program. Similarly, the civilian space program shares with the military missile program common needs such as cryogenic booster engines, special aluminum alloys, launch motors, gyroscopes, liquid and solid propellants, stabilizers, and guidance systems. No doubt civilian technological development in the areas of aeronautics, shipbuilding, automotive, and electronics also carries benefits for the defense sector, but they do not tend to be as comparable in the technical standards required or as technologically compatible as in the case of nuclear energy and space programs. The spinoffs and spin-ons from civilian to military endeavors in nuclear and space technologies have been much more direct and beneficial. Irrespective of whether the civilian nuclear energy program is economically viable or is intended primarily to maintain India’s nuclear weapons option, the nuclear program has achieved considerable technological selfsufficiency. Frank Barnaby noted that India had “developed and constructed a self-sufficient nuclear fuel cycle, with uranium mines and mills, a uranium purification UO2 plant, fuel fabrication plants, plutonium reprocessing plants, nuclear power reactors and research reactors. In addition, it has a small uranium conversion UF6 plant, a pilot uranium-enrichment plant, and heavy-water production plants. . . . India is experimenting with gas centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.”32 Nuclear Capabilities

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Since India also has about 50,000 tonnes of uranium deposits, found mainly in Bihar, and substantial resources of thorium in Kerala, it is almost self-sufficient in the basic raw materials needed to conduct the nuclear program. But the civilian program has run into technological snags and breakdowns. India’s projected goal in 1970 of attaining 10,000 megawatts of electricity by the year 2000 has not been achieved. It produced only 5,770. However, the Indian ability to swiftly siphon off a major nuclear weapons program is not in doubt. The gestation period of converting civilian programs to weapons programs was at one time as long as two years, the period needed to prepare for the test of the first atomic device at Pokhran in Rajasthan in May 1974. However, today the period might be much shorter, as demonstrated by Pokhran II in early May 1998, less than two months after the BJP-led coalition government took office in mid-March. By the end of 1995, India’s stock of weapons-grade plutonium was estimated to be about 420 kilograms, enough for about eighty-five nuclear weapons.33 Following the 1998 tests, an estimated 375 kilograms of plutonium remain, enough for at least seventy-five bombs. Much of the plutonium has come from the Dhruva research reactor, which is not under international safeguards, and partly also from the Canadian-supplied Cirus research reactor, which began operating in 1960. Further progress on India’s fast breeder reactor (FBR) program (a research FBR has already been established at Kalpakkam in Madras) and waste fuel generated at other reactors at Kota, Kakrapur, and Kaiga would provide India with more plutonium for bombs. However, problems of safety in the civilian program may slow down India’s weapons technology capabilities. Periodic reports in the Indian media have mentioned serious safety problems and close calls at all of the above atomic power plants. According to one report, twenty-four “incidents” took place in India’s nuclear plants between 1988 and May 1994.34 A significant difference exists between the Indian and Pakistani drives to acquire nuclear weapons on the one hand and missiles on the other. Although neither India nor Pakistan has signed the multilateral and nearuniversal NPT, the threat of Western sanctions or Indian self-interest had, until 1998, set restraints on pursuing an overt and full-blown nuclear weapons program. In contrast, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a U.S.-initiated informal agreement among seven industrialized countries (the others being the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Missile Capabilities

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and Japan) not to transfer missile and rocket technology to those countries aspiring to develop missiles. An overt program to acquire missile technology may be pursued by India and Pakistan without legal restraints or moral qualms but with the expectation that the United States and other parties to the MTCR will take all measures to prevent the transfer of such technology. Thus India was able to pursue a full-blown missile development program while continuing to deny that it was developing nuclear weapons until the tests of May 1998. Like the nuclear weapons program, which draws its technology and manpower from the peaceful atomic energy program, the Indian missile program draws similar resources and advantages from the space program conducted within the umbrella of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). Unlike Indian attempts to achieve technological self-sufficiency in the other areas of combat aircraft, ships, and tanks, the missile program in India had a clear-cut mission: to acquire various types of missiles where these could not be obtained through outright purchase overseas or produced in India under license with foreign manufacturing collaborators. Indranil Banerjie noted: The “Mission,” the development of a particular missile, was made paramount, everything else (organization, procedures, personnel, finances, etc.) was made subservient. Obvious as this approach might seem, in practice it was nothing short of revolutionary. Bureaucratic procedure for the first time took a back seat. Results [were] what counted. Review teams for every missile met once a month to not only review progress but also take on spot decisions without need to refer to any higher body.35

The integrated guided missile development program (IGMDP) was authorized by the Indian government in July 1983 under the authority of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). The program involved the development of four missile systems: Trishul, a shortrange surface to air missile (SAM) for tactical battlefield use; Akash, a medium-range SAM, also for tactical use; Nag, a fire-and-forget ATGM; and Prithvi, a battlefield support surface to surface missile (SSM).36 There are now two versions of Prithvi deployed: one with a 150-kilometer range that can carry a 1,000-kilogram payload and another with a range of 250 kilometers that can carry a payload of 500 kilograms. A naval version called Danush is now ready for deployment. The development of an IRBM named Agni was also pursued at the same time along with these IGMDP missiles. The first version of this missile, which has been successfully tested three times since 1994, has a range of 1,500 kilometers and can carry a payload of 1,000 kilograms.

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Agni 2, which has a range of 2,000 kilometers, was tested successfully in April 1999. A sixth missile, Astra, a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), is still on the drawing board; little is known as yet about the intended program. In short, the creation of the IGMDP along with its specific missile programs has generated a vast missile research establishment in India (see Table 5.2). Nineteen units of the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) and the missile Research Center Imarat (RCI) sit at the center of this military-scientific complex spread throughout India. Supporting missile development in India are key organizations such as the ISRO and the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR), as well as seven universities or institutes of technology, public sector undertakings, ordnance factories, and private corporations.37 Almost every need of the missile program is supplied from within India, including computers, computer software, special alloy aluminum, precision gyroscopes, rocket propellants, and special radar. Thus IGMDP represented “a monolithic scientific industrial edifice” probably unparalleled in any other area of development and manufacture in India, military or civilian.38 Although U.S. analysts tend to discount the success of India’s nuclear weapons and missile development programs, it should be remembered that they had also miscalculated Iraq’s progress on nuclear weapons and North Korea’s development of long-range missiles. Ben Sheppard of Jane’s Sentinel in Britain noted that India “has developed one of the most sophisticated SSM programmes in the developing world. The full potential of New Delhi’s SSM indigenous production capability has only been held up by the political will to embark on a wider programme” (see Chapter 8 in this book). Sheppard observed that the ISRO’s development of a polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) and a geostationary satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) would give India ICBM capabilities with ranges of 8,000 and 14,000 kilometers, respectively. With that range, India could hit Europe, Japan, and Australia. By mid-December 1999, news reports indicated that in 2001 India would be ready to launch an ICBM with a range of 5,000 kilometers without a nuclear warhead or 2,000 kilometers with a warhead. The cost of the missile, named Surya, was estimated at $50 million.39 In a May 1999 plan that was adopted by the Indian government, a wide range of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads was approved for development. Certainly, questions of comparative international quality of the Indian missile program may be raised with considerable justification, but the acquisition and absorption of technological know-how here has been relatively more successful compared to other areas of defense technology

INDIA’S NUCLEAR Table 5.2 India

Pakistan

China

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Regional Nuclear and Missile Capabilities Nuclear Capabilities

Atomic test (1974): Fission 15–20 kt Atomic and thermonuclear tests (1998) Fusion: 43 kt; fission: 12 kt and 3 subkiloton devices 1997 stockpile: 370 kg weapons-grade plutonium for 75 bombs Plutonium from Dhruva reactor: 20 kg/5 bombs per year Bombs from Kalpakkam and other reactors undetermined

Atomic and thermonuclear tests (1998) Total yield claimed by Pakistan: 43 kt Indian and U.S. estimates of yield: 8 kt 1998 stockpile: 400 kg weaponsgrade uranium for 16–20 bombs Khushab reactor plutonium: 1–3 bombs per year

Number of nuclear warheads: N.A.

Missile Capabilities

Prithvi 150 SRBM: Range: 150 km/Payload: 1,000 kg Prithiv 250 SRBM: Range: 250 km/Payload: 750 kg

Agni 1 IRBM (3 tests): Range: 1500 km/Payload: 1,000 kg Agni 2 IRBM (tested 1999): Range: 2,500 km PSLV/ICBM technology potential: Range: 8,000 km GSLV/ICBM technology potential: Range: 14,000 km Hatf I SRBM: Range: 80 km Hatf II SRBM: Range: 300 km Hatf III/M-11 SRBM (Chinese): Range: 300 km Hatf V (Ghauri 1) IRBM (tested): Range: 1,500 km Hatf VI (Ghauri 2) IRBM (tested 1999): Range: 2,000 km Hatf VII (Ghaznavi) (untested): Range: 2,000+ km 17 ICBMs (7 MIRVs tested) 46+ IRBMs 1 SSBN with SLBMs SRBM Range: 120–600 km In development: DF-31 with range of 8,000 km; DF-41 with range of 12,000 km; and second-generation SLBMs on newer SSBNs

Notes: kt = kilotons; kg = kilograms; km = kilometers; N.A. = not available. GSLV: geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile IRBM: intermediate-range ballistic missile MIRV: multiple independent reentry vehicle PSLV: polar satellite launch vehicle SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile SRBM: short-range ballistic missile SSBN: ballistic missile submarine, nuclear-fueled

procurement. For example, U.S. objections to the Russian sale of the cryogenic engine along with the transfer of its technology have been dismissed by officials of the ISRO as merely delaying the procurement of the engine.40 According to Indian arguments, the cryogenic engine for India’s

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peaceful space program had no military application, and, in any case, the technology was within India’s grasp. This Indian claim is not accurate. The development of booster rockets would surely advance India’s ICBM capabilities. Indeed, the United States claimed that the cryogenic engine fell under Category Two of the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex, which covers the area of propulsion systems and propellants. However, although the purchase of the Russian rocket engine was expected to speed up India’s launch of the GSLV, the relevant space technology was already within the grasp of Indian scientists and engineers working at ISRO. After considerable negotiations among the United States, Russia, and India, the Russians were allowed to sell the engines but not transfer the technology. India has developed three variants of the Prithvi SRBM: the first has a range of 150 kilometers and can carry a 1,000-kilogram warhead; the second a range of 250 kilometers and can carry a 500-kilogram warhead; the third is a SAM variant with a minimum range of 40 kilometers. The accuracy of the missile is approximately 0.1 percent of the missile’s range, that is, 25 meters circular error probable (CEP) at its maximum range of 250 kilometers.41 The development of the Prithvi missile alone involved several defense and nondefense research and development (R&D) organizations, public sector organizations, ordnance factories, and private sector industries.42 The missile’s imported content had been reduced steadily from about 20 percent in 1990 to about 5 percent by 1993, when Bharat Dynamics began to manufacture it for the army at an expected production rate of forty to fifty missiles per year.43 The Kolos Tatra transporter erector launcher (TEL) for the missile is being produced by Bharat Earthmovers. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) manufactures the Prithvi’s DRDLdesigned gyroscopes and DRDL its terminal guidance systems. However, the computer system for onboard guidance and control systems is the imported Intel 8086 microprocessor. The missile’s lightweight aerospacequality aluminum alloy frame and fuel tanks and its magnesium-based aerodynamic wings are manufactured by Bharat Aluminum. The hypergolic liquid fuel that the missile uses was developed by Solid State Physics Laboratory and is now produced at Explosives Research and Development Laboratory. The Agni 1 missile, officially declared to be a “technology demonstrator” (i.e., to demonstrate to the world that India possesses the technological capabilities to produce IRBMs if it chooses to do so), has a range of 1,500 kilometers when carrying a 1,000-kilogram warhead. According to Indian claims, the CEP is 0.1 percent of its intended range.44 The Agni

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was first tested in 1989 (not entirely successfully), and then again in 1992 and 1994. The motor for the first stage of the launch is the same as the ISRO’s space launch vehicle (SLV 3), with the second short-stage motor being the same as that mounted on the Prithvi.45 Much of the Agni’s technology is derived from ISRO and the Prithvi program, with the addition of the indigenous development of heat shields, reentry systems, and more sophisticated design infrastructure. Development of the control and guidance systems was undertaken by DRDL in collaboration with the Indian Institute of Science. The imported content of the Agni was less than 6 percent. Agni 2 was tested in April 1999, providing India with an assured IRBM capability.46 OUTCOMES: STRATEGY, POLITICS,

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The strategic rationale for the BJP’s decision to turn India into an overt nuclear weapons state may have had much to do with the traditional threats from Pakistan and China. After all, the BJP in its earlier incarnation as the Jana Sangh had consistently demanded over the last three decades that India exercise its nuclear weapons option in response to these two threats. The BJP’s political manifesto prior to the March 1998 elections stated that the party, if elected, would take India nuclear. The party fulfilled that promise within two months of taking office in March 1998. The prevailing external strategic environment appeared to have little to do with the decision, despite the weak claim after the tests that India needed a nuclear deterrent against China. The issue of discrimination between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” had also been a persistent theme among the pro-bomb advocates. In a keynote address at a conference on India and the nuclear question at the University of California at Los Angeles in October 1998, K. Subrahmanyam noted the dangers of this new world order and further claimed that the West was practicing a policy of nuclear apartheid and promoting nuclear “Bantustans.” Under these circumstances, it was essential for India to develop an independent nuclear deterrent capability to avoid Western nuclear monopoly and Western pressures during times of crisis that might affect Indian national interests. India’s rationale for an independent nuclear deterrent was given an added boost following NATO’s massive assault on Yugoslavia for refusing to sign its proposed “agreement” at Rambouillet in March 1999, which among other things demanded the stationing of NATO forces in Kosovo and the right of Albanians to secede through a referendum three years

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later. After all, India is Yugoslavia writ large in terms of having several distinct ethnic groups and religions, and the Kashmiri Muslim separatist movement is not fundamentally different from the Kosovo Albanian Muslim separatist movement. Indeed, India’s focus on the regional nuclear threat has now shifted to the dangers of NATO intervention in internal conflicts for humanitarian reasons. Prem Shankar Jha concluded that the “watershed” in such arrogant U.S. behavior in the internal affairs of sovereign states was NATO’s illegal attack against Serbia from March to June 1999 over its sovereign territory of Kosovo.47 Thus, the lack of credibility of nuclear or conventional military guarantees from Russia, the new high-tech weapons in the U.S. arsenal against which there is no defense, and the increasing appearance of NATO taking on Rudyard Kipling’s white man’s burden of civilizing the backward natives have reinforced arguments in India for sufficient military preparedness against the West while pursuing cordial political and economic ties. India’s perceptions of new threats to its security initially led it to pursue strategic partnerships with Russia and China. However, a triangular strategic partnership among Russia, China, and India—perhaps a trilateral treaty of peace and friendship—will be difficult to achieve. Russia is dependent on the United States and the West for economic survival, most of China’s markets are in the United States and West, and much of India’s foreign investments are provided by the same countries. The West has the capacity to break up such a potential quasi-alliance formation through economic incentives and disincentives. In addition, the need for status and deterrence were inextricably intertwined in India’s decision to go nuclear. India has complained repeatedly that it does not get enough respect, especially compared with China. Until the mid-1980s, before China forged ahead with sustained economic growth rates of between 8 and 12 percent of its GNP, the average per capita incomes in India and China were about $300–400. The large populations of the two countries also put them in the same bracket. But India pursued economic development and population control through the democratic process, rejecting the authoritarian measures and totalitarian conditions found in China. Yet the West and particularly the United States equated India with Pakistan, a country one-fifth the size of India before the separation of Bangladesh in 1971 and afterward only one-eighth the size of India. Going nuclear was expected to distinguish India from Pakistan in the eyes of other countries, but this project failed when Pakistan matched India in testing bombs and missiles. Ultimately, the political trigger for the nuclear tests of May 1998 appears to have been domestic political survival rather than external

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threats. Shortly after forming the coalition government, the BJP had to address pressures from Jayalalitha Jayaram’s All India Annadurai Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) party of Tamil Nadu, which constantly threatened to withdraw from the coalition and bring down the government unless its demands were met. The situation was similar to the internal political pressures faced by Indira Gandhi’s Congress government in 1974 that prefaced the atomic test in May 1974. But even if the decisions made in 1974 and 1998 were wrong, there may be no reversal of policy by the BJP government this time, unlike the reversal by the Congress government in 1974. The Congress Party’s endorsement of the nuclear tests suggests that future non-BJP governments may find it difficult to reverse the new nuclear momentum. A nuclear buildup and arms race with China, if not Pakistan, will be expensive. In the first budget presented to parliament in May 1998, the BJP raised military outlays by 14 percent, the largest increase in peacetime.48 From an average allocation of about 14 percent of the central government budget in earlier years, this percentage went up to 19 percent. But these military increases appeared relatively minor in comparison to an increase of 68 percent for the Department of Atomic Energy, which oversees civilian and military nuclear programs. The Department of Space budget increased by 62 percent. The increases in the budget allocations to these two departments were expected to speed up projects in space launch rockets and satellites. Advances in the civilian technology in the Departments of Atomic Energy and Space would soon enable India to tip rockets with nuclear warheads. According to Bharat Karnad, an advocate of a major nuclear weapons and missile buildup in India, “the costs of a full and robust deterrent” between 2000 and 2030 were expected to be Rs600 billion (approximately U.S.$15 billion) for nuclear weaponization, including missile development and deployment.49 The opportunity costs of lost trade and development that would arise from international sanctions and other domestic transfers from civilian to military production were estimated at Rs2 trillion (approximately U.S.$50 billion). These may be highly optimistic assessments about the affordability of a nuclear deterrent. But both the nuclear and missile programs in India are sometimes perceived as incremental costs over its nuclear energy and space programs. The civilian programs enable the military programs, and the military programs justify the pursuit of the civilian programs, whether or not either civilian or military programs are desirable or viable. The economic costs to India of a potential nuclear arms race with Pakistan and China have yet to be determined. Moreover, these costs may

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constantly move upward if India gets caught up in a regional and global nuclear arms race. Meanwhile, economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Japan, Canada, and other Western nations have produced immediate consequences, slowing down the robust economic growth of an average of 7 percent of GNP that had occurred since the Indian economy was liberalized in 1991–1992. The denial of multilateral loans from the International Monetary Fund and the Export-Import Bank affected India’s ability to build up its infrastructure—the bottleneck to faster economic growth. Whereas sanctions devastated the Pakistani economy, in the Indian case the sanctions had only a temporary impact on its robust annual growth, which by 1999 had returned to 6.5 percent, with expectations of 7 percent in 2000. Some sanctions have also since been lifted, demonstrating that the BJP-led Indian government had played its international political cards right. The debate in India at the beginning of the year 2000 was not over whether India should withdraw back to a pre-nuclear posture as it did after the 1974 atomic test but whether it should sign the CTBT while proceeding with its buildup of an independent nuclear deterrent. The BJP had indicated earlier in 1999 that it would be willing to consider signing the CTBT, but the mood in early 2000 was against doing so, especially following the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify the treaty in 1999. Nuclear disarmament by India is likely to take place when the other nuclear weapons states also agree to do so in fulfillment of Article 6 of the NPT. No doubt, nuclear weapons may be useless against Pakistani-sponsored secessionist guerrilla warfare and terrorism, the main threats that India faces, especially in Kashmir. But all nuclear weapons states, especially Russia and China, face similar problems. If these countries plus France and Britain feel compelled to hang on to their nuclear weapons, then why should India act differently? However, the continuing credibility and utility of nuclear deterrence strategy is in doubt as the threat of cyberwarfare and terrorism looms large. Indeed, nuclear weapons may be obsolete. Indian inclinations in early 2000 were reflected in the 1999 draft nuclear doctrine drawn up by the NSAB. India will adopt a “China posture” of presenting an independent nuclear deterrent against vague and general global and regional threats, including proliferation elsewhere. Meanwhile, India will pursue informal strategic ties with Russia and China to provide countervailing power to an expanding NATO alliance while also pursuing friendly relations with the West. The costs of such a policy are now deemed harmless and acceptable. In the ultimate analysis, the tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of a nuclear arms race indulged in by India are not easily measured.

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Resources allocated to the Indian defense program are tangibles that may be measured, but the economic and social opportunity costs of the diversion to defense are intangibles. How much security is enough, when it is reached or whether it can ever be reached, and whether nuclear weapons aggravate or alleviate existing threat conditions or even add new ones are vexing questions to which there are no objective answers. National security remains an ambiguous and elusive concept. Nuclear security may prove even more so. NOTES

1. See A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958); and Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). 2. The conclusion reached in a study of this issue by James Schampel was that “parity predicts war” more than preponderance. See James H. Schampel, “Parity or Preponderance: One More Look,” International Studies Notes 19, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 1–6. Note that there is a growing belief that the spread of democracies produces peace irrespective of whether there exists a military balance or military preponderance. The empirical observation here is that democracies have not gone to war against each other. However, the spread and rise of democracies has been a fairly recent phenomenon, and this observation may have limited value. For a discussion of this theme, see Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace,” and David E. Spiro, “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace” and “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace” all in International Security 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 5–125. 3. One of the more persuasive arguments for balance of power conditions was made by Inis L. Claude, Jr., in Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), 41–66, 88–93. 4. A report and analysis about the growing Russian resentment toward U.S. domination may be found in Fred Hiatt, “Whose New World Order? Russia Is Wondering Who Left the U.S. in Charge of Everyone Else,” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, November 14–20, 1994. 5. New York Times, December 6, 1994. See also Daniel Williams, “The Cold Peace Between America and Russia,” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, December 19–25, 1994. 6. The need for a power balance in the manipulations at the United Nations is provided by Inis L. Claude, Jr., “The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations,” in Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., The United Nations and a Just World Order (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 143–152. 7. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning,” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., International Politics (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2000), 110–117. 8. See Times of India editorial, “Securing Our Future,” April 3, 1999. 9. See report in the New York Times, January 14, 2000. 10. See Vladimir Radyuhin, “Russia Names India, China as Allies,” Hindu, January 17, 2000. 11. New York Times, January 14, 2000.

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12. See John Pomfret, “China Ponders New Rules of ‘Unrestricted War,’” Washington Post Foreign Service, August 8, 1999. 13. Prem Shankar Jha, “The Making of a Rogue State,” Hindustan Times, November 5, 1999. 14. See my chapter, “Should India Sign the NPT/CTBT?” in Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Prospects for the 21st Century (Bassingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1998; New York: St. Martin’s Press 1998, 284–309. 15. Hindu, May 12, 1999. 16. Siddharth Varadarajan, “Ruses for War: NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” Times of India, May 10, 1999. 17. C. Raja Mohan, “NATO’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Hindu, April 30, 1999. 18. Ibid. 19. A. P. Venkataswaran, “The Arrogance of Power,” Hindustan Times, April 1, 1999. 20. Muchkund Dubey, “The NATO Juggernaut: Logic of an Indian Defence Deterrent,” Times of India, April 8, 1999. 21. K. Subrahmanyam, “Clear and Present Danger: U.S. Path to Unipolar Hegemony,” Times of India, May 3, 1999. 22. M. D. Nalapat, “Need for Asian Counterweight,” Times of India, May 4, 1999. 23. Hindustan Times (editorial), May 31, 1999. 24. Times of India, June 15, 1999. 25. Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine. Full text was posted on http://www. indianembassy.org/ctbt/nuclear_ doctrine_aug_17_1999.html. 26. K. Subrahmanyam, “Credible Deterrent: The Logic of the Nuclear Deterrent,” Times of India, October 4, 1999. 27. Bharat Karnad, “Policy on CTBT,” Hindustan Times, November 4, 1999. 28. “Test Firing of Agni Put Off Under Pressure,” India News/Indolink, January 22, 1999 (www.indolink.com/indnews). 29. See Steven Dolley, “Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests: Frequently Asked Questions,” Washington D.C., Nuclear Control Institute, June 9, 1998 (www.nci.org/ip-faq.htm#ans1). 30. See David Albright, “The Shots Heard Around the World,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54, no. 4 (July–August 1998) (www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1998). 31. From The Defense Monitor, Center for Defense Information, Washington, D.C., December 1996. 32. Frank Barnaby, How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s (London: Routledge, 1993), 68. 33. Ibid., 73. 34. Pioneer, September 24, 1995. See also Frontline, June 6, 1994; Telegraph, June 23, 1994; Statesman, December 26, 1994; and Economic Times, May 22, 1995. 35. Indranil Banerjie, “The Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme,” Indian Defence Review (July 1990): 101. 36. Timothy V. McCarthy, “India: Emerging Missile Power,” in William Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers’ Network (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 201–233. 37. Banerjie, “Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme,” 100. 38. Ibid. 39. See Times of India, December 15, 1999. The Indian newspaper’s source was Defense Week (Washington, D.C.).

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40. For a discussion of the sale, see India Abroad (New York), December 20, 1991; Hindu, April 26, 1992; Times of India, May 4, 1992; Statesman, May 13, 1992. For a report of the more recent status of the sale, see Indian Express, May 20, 1995. 41. McCarthy, “India: Emerging Missile Power,” 206. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., 207; Banerjie, “Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme,” 101. See also Shankar Bhaduri, “Weapons Overview: Prithvi SS-150,” Indian Defence Review (October 1992): 97–102. 44. McCarthy, “India: Emerging Missile Power,” 209. 45. Ibid., 208. 46. Banerjie, “Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme,” 101. 47. Prem Shankar Jha, “Making of a Rogue State.” 48. New York Times, June 2, 1998. 49. Bharat Karnad, “Going Thermonuclear: Why, with What Forces, at What Costs,” United Services Institute Journal (New Delhi) 128, no. 533 (July–September 1998): 310–337.

6 India’s Nuclear Decision: Implications for Indian-U.S. Relations Mohammed Ayoob

India’s decision in May 1998 to explode five nuclear devices of varying yields, including a thermonuclear device, posed the most serious challenge to the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime since the coming into force of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. It led to a Pakistani nuclear response, thus setting off fears of a nuclear arms race in South Asia. Furthermore, it provided Islamabad with a fresh opportunity to put the Kashmir issue on the international agenda by pointing to escalating tensions in the subcontinent in the wake of the tests. The nuclearization of the subcontinent evidently encouraged Pakistan to undertake military infiltration across the line of control (LOC) in Kashmir with the intention of occupying Indian-held territory, thus setting off the Kargil crisis in May–June 1999. Islamabad apparently calculated that India would not respond decisively to this act for fear of setting off a nuclear crisis. Alternatively, if the Indian response escalated the crisis, it was likely to provide Pakistan with an excellent opportunity to convince the major powers that the Kashmir issue and the nuclear standoff between the two countries were interlinked and that the latter could not be addressed without international intervention to resolve the former to Pakistan’s satisfaction. The Indian decision also led to a marked deterioration in Indian-U.S. relations, with mutually hostile rhetoric reaching levels not seen since the Nixon-Kissinger “tilt” toward Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971. The U.S. imposition of economic sanctions on India, triggered automatically by congressional legislation, and Washington’s leading role in prompting other Group of Eight (G-8) countries to impose similar sanc123

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tions added to the deterioration in Indian-U.S. relations. India’s relations with China also plummeted because of India’s open identification of the Chinese threat as a major, if not the prime reason for its decision to go overtly nuclear.1 Now that the world has had time to digest the import of the Indian nuclear tests, it is time to take stock both of the reasons that led to the Indian decision and the short- and long-term impacts it is likely to have on Indian-U.S. relations. In order to do so, one must place the Indian decision to test nuclear weapons within the overall context of Indian foreign policy objectives as well as examine the immediate domestic and external compulsions faced by New Delhi. Divorcing the discussion of the future prospects for Indian-U.S. relations from such compulsions and contexts will not contribute to the desired improvement in relations because it ignores the basic wellsprings of Indian foreign policy. One must, therefore, begin by analyzing the major objectives of Indian foreign policy and how each of these objectives is related to the others. The latter is essential because most objectives are inextricably intertwined with each other and cannot be viewed in isolation from one another. In almost all major foreign policy decisions taken by New Delhi, different objectives have to be balanced against each other, and the implications of individual decisions on several of the interrelated objectives must be taken into account. Therefore, any analysis that attempts to explain major Indian foreign policy decisions on the basis of just one variable, however important that variable may appear in a particular context and at a particular point in time, is likely to be simplistic and, consequently, at best misleading and at worst counterproductive. NATION BUILDING

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REGIONAL PREDOMINANCE

It may appear paradoxical, but a primary objective of Indian foreign policy has been, and even after fifty years of independence continues to be, the enhancement of the country’s nation-building goals. India has attempted to build a national identity on the basis of inclusive and civic criteria rather than exclusive and ethnic ones. This civic nature of Indian nationalism is currently under serious challenge from militant Hindu chauvinists who would prefer to define India’s national identity in religious-cultural terms. However, the ideology of civic nationalism, termed “secularism” in India, continues to exercise hegemony in the Gramscian sense despite the coming to power in 1998 of a coalition government led by the Hindunationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its reelection in September–

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October 1999. In fact, the BJP has had to adopt the language, if not the spirit, of Indian secularism in order to be able to put together a viable coalition government in New Delhi and to be seen as the legitimate party of governance in the country. The problem of nation building in India on the basis of civic criteria was greatly compounded by the interreligious strife that immediately preceded and accompanied independence and led to the partition of India between a predominantly Hindu but secular India and a self-consciously Muslim Pakistan. The problem of Kashmir was born out of this partition and remains a symbol of the clash between the secular self-perception of much of the Indian elite and the communal/religious self-perception of their counterparts in Pakistan. The Kashmir issue, therefore, is not just a bilateral territorial dispute between two neighbors. It is intimately linked to the self-definitions of the Indian and Pakistani states and, therefore, among other things, to the place of the 140 million Muslims within the Indian polity, of whom barely 4 million are Kashmiris. Indian-Pakistani relations, therefore, are intimately tied to the process of nation building in India and as a result form an important component of Indian foreign policy concerns, bridging the gap as they do between New Delhi’s international and domestic preoccupations. However, Indian objectives are not limited to building an effective and legitimate state and fashioning a civic and territorial form of nationalism. In the perception of the Indian elite, shared widely by the political public, the Indian state is the legitimate successor to the British Raj as the strategic and political manager of the Indian subcontinent.2 As the preeminent and pivotal power in the region, India perceives itself much as the United States has traditionally perceived itself in relation to the Americas.3 The Indian vision of its managerial role in South Asia was most clearly embodied in the so-called Indira Doctrine, which was formulated in 1983 during the early stages of the Sri Lankan civil war and named after the then prime minister, Indira Gandhi. Propounded with the express purpose of deterring external powers from meddling in South Asian affairs in general and the Sri Lankan conflict in particular, it was clearly intended to be an Indian version of the Monroe Doctrine.4 The more recent Gujral Doctrine, named after former prime minister Inder Kumar Gujral and propounded in the mid-1990s, is the more benign version of the Indira Doctrine. It attempts to acquire greater legitimacy for India’s predominance in South Asia by demonstrating its capacity as well as its willingness to act as the provider of collective goods in the region. The Gujral Doctrine builds on the premise that, as far as possible,

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India should accommodate the major concerns of its smaller neighbors and make concessions on issues of vital importance to them, without insisting on an immediate quid pro quo for the concessions it makes.5 However, since the dawn of independence, India’s managerial aspirations have run into headlong opposition from Pakistan, the regional “spoiler” in Indian perceptions. Pakistan’s resistance to India’s gaining acceptance as the managerial power in South Asia was and continues to be related in substantial part to the legitimacy concerns of the Pakistani state. If India’s predominance in South Asia went unchallenged, it may have dashed Pakistan’s aspirations to evolve a national identity separate from India’s and on an ideological basis largely antithetical to the Indian secular experiment. The latter concern mattered to Pakistan’s ruling elite because India’s secular ideology stood in sharp contrast to their attempt to build a state on the foundations of an exclusivist religion-based ideology. EXTERNAL ACTORS

IN THE

REGION

Pakistan could thwart Indian aspirations to become the legitimate security manager of the region primarily because of its ability to borrow power from external patrons to neutralize to a substantial extent India’s inherent power superiority in South Asia. It entered into an alliance with the United States during the heyday of the Cold War by advertising the fact that its military and political potential could help protect Western strategic and economic interests in the predominantly Muslim but volatile Middle East and the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Pakistan reinforced this image in the 1980s by acting as the conduit for U.S. military aid to the insurgents fighting the Soviet-supported regime in Afghanistan. This action led to a U.S. aid package to Pakistan during the Reagan administration amounting to $3.2 billion, half of which was earmarked for military assistance. As a part of this package Pakistan received, among other things, F-16 fighter-bombers that could be used as potential delivery systems for nuclear weapons. There were unconfirmed reports that during the Indian-Pakistani crisis of spring 1990 over the Pakistani support to the insurgency in Kashmir, Pakistan had readied the F-16s for possible nuclear use.6 From the early 1960s onward, Pakistan was also able to enlist China in its support as a result of the deterioration in Indo-Chinese relations that led to the border war of 1962. Beijing not only became Pakistan’s major supplier of conventional arms but also transferred nuclear material and technology, reportedly including blueprints for a nuclear weapon and

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components and technology for missile development, that helped Pakistan to further its nuclear weapons program and augment its delivery capacity. According to a leading Pakistani analyst of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, during the Zia regime (1977–1988), “China became a major supplier of nuclear know-how and hardware [to Pakistan] in a bid to counter India’s military capabilities. Chinese assistance included the provision of weapons-grade uranium, technical information on uranium enrichment, and help in setting up the Kahuta ultracentrifuge uranium enrichment plant, which became operational in the mid-1980s.” The same analyst goes on to maintain that “U.S. intelligence reports [concluded] in 1983 and 1984 that China provided Pakistan the design for a low-yield uranium device, based on data China had obtained during its fourth series of tests in 1964.”7 Pakistan’s utility during the 1980s to the United States in its proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan led Washington to turn a blind eye to the development of Pakistan’s China-supported nuclear capability, despite repeated warnings by the U.S. intelligence community. By 1987, it was commonly assumed that Pakistan possessed untested nuclear weapons capability.8 However, it took another three years, the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, and the end of the Cold War for President Bush to officially recognize this fact and allow the sanctions against Pakistan under the Pressler amendment to take effect. The Pakistani capacity to borrow military power from abroad in both the conventional and nuclear arenas has, in Indian perceptions, been responsible for much of the tensions in Indian-Pakistani relations. New Delhi thus holds Pakistan’s external patrons largely responsible not only for thwarting what it considers to be its legitimate role in the region but also for fueling the arms race between the two neighbors. It also holds Pakistan’s allies responsible for undermining the “natural” balance of power in the subcontinent to such an extent that it emboldened Pakistan in the 1990s to actively plan and militarily support the insurgency in Kashmir, including infiltration of Pakistani-trained insurgents and foreign mercenaries into the Kashmir valley. The Indian perception of the threat from Pakistan has, therefore, become inextricably tied to the Indian assessment of the extent of external support Islamabad can garner from the major powers at a particular point in time. Since New Delhi always considered the Pakistani challenge on its own to be manageable, it laid much of the blame for Pakistan’s capacity to threaten Indian interests at the door of Pakistan’s external great power allies. Therefore, in Indian perceptions, the sources of such assistance bear the real responsibility for the damage that Pakistan has been able to do to Indian interests and aspirations in South Asia.

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In Indian calculations, therefore, the actions of China and the United States cannot be separated from those of Pakistan in the formulation of Indian foreign policy and are, in fact, seen as more important in terms of India’s long-range security considerations. However, New Delhi has always made a qualitative distinction between the threats it perceives to its security from Chinese and U.S. policies and the long-term implications of these policies for its interests. The Chinese threat is perceived as more imminent and direct for several reasons, primarily because there are outstanding bilateral disputes between India and China that reinforce the China-Pakistan axis against India. The most explicit Chinese threat to India comes from the unresolved border dispute between the two countries that led to the war of 1962, in which India suffered a humiliating defeat. Despite several rounds of negotiations among officials since Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988, there has been hardly any movement toward the resolution of this dispute. Equally, if not more important from New Delhi’s perspective is China’s active and deliberate collusion with Pakistan to restrain India from playing what it considers to be its rightful role in South Asia for reasons that have to do with broader Chinese concerns about a potential Indian challenge. This Chinese policy, as pointed out above, has been manifested most dramatically in its supply of weaponry to Pakistan and the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to that country. The Chinese threat to India has also been apparent in China’s support, currently muted but capable of being reactivated, to anti-Indian insurgents in the sensitive northeastern region of the country. Chinese attempts to wean Nepal away from economic and security dependence on India through the medium of arms transfers, road construction, and so on, are also seen by India as a part of Beijing’s overall design to restrict the Indian sphere of influence. More recently, Chinese collaboration with the military regime in Myanmar and especially reports about Chinese naval bases being built in that country have alarmed Indian strategic analysts and policymakers who see this as evidence of Chinese naval expansion into the Indian Ocean close to India’s maritime boundaries. The periodic belligerence demonstrated by China in regard to its claims in the South China Sea and vis-àvis Vietnam and Taiwan also act as reminders to New Delhi of Chinese intransigence on the India-China border issue. India’s perceptions of the United States are usually more benign. New Delhi recognizes that U.S. policy is truly global in character and that its regional spin-offs are frequently unintentional. Furthermore, U.S. policies

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that have deleterious effects on Indian interests are often seen as demonstrating U.S. ignorance and naiveté rather than deliberate malevolence toward India. At the same time, however, the United States is accused of permitting itself to be used against India by Pakistan or China or both. India also blames Washington for not being adequately sensitive to Indian security concerns and to New Delhi’s aspirations to play a managerial role in the Indian subcontinent and an international role more commensurate with its size, population, gross national product (GNP), and technological prowess. Indian analysts often point out that strong IndoSoviet relations during much of the Cold War era did not depend on ideological affinity or shared mistrust of the United States but on Moscow’s willingness to recognize India’s preeminent role in South Asia and defer to New Delhi’s assessment of India’s security needs. This consideration, they argue, contrasted sharply with Washington’s proclivity to lecture India regarding the latter’s “real” security requirements and to equate India with Pakistan in its approach to the South Asian region. Since the 1970s, the U.S. rapprochement with China and the increasing consideration shown by Washington to Beijing in regional and international affairs have added to Indian disenchantment with U.S. policy. There have been two primary reasons for this Indian attitude. The first has to do with the Indian perception that the United States colluded with China to bolster Pakistan against India, initially during the 1971 crisis over Bangladesh and then in the 1980s in the context of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Second, Indian policymakers and analysts are irritated by the way Washington treats authoritarian and communist China as a near equal while adopting a condescending and patronizing approach toward democratic India and belittling its security and status concerns. THE NUCLEAR PIVOT

To the Indian political public, one major variable appears to explain the discriminatory nature of U.S. policy. This factor, in Indian perceptions, is China’s demonstrated nuclear capability and India’s vacillation until May 1998 about going overtly nuclear. The nuclear issue has thus brought together separate although interlinked perceptions in a manner that few other Indian foreign policy decisions have done so far. This complex interlinking of perceptions and variables has determined India’s nuclear decisionmaking to a large extent. The inability to capture this complex process has drastically limited the explanatory power of the two main paradigms used in the United States to analyze and eval-

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uate the Indian nuclear decision. The first paradigm considers the current nuclear nonproliferation regime to be indisputably beneficial in nature and, therefore, treats the provisions of its component treaties, the NPT and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in particular, as sacrosanct. According to this framework, the Indian tests threaten the legitimacy of this regime, and consequently New Delhi must be subjected to harsh punishment for this brazen act of defiance to maintain the credibility of the regime. The second paradigm adopts the Indian-Pakistani equation as its central concern and builds on the premise that the Indian nuclear tests, followed by the Pakistani ones, have destabilized that equation and increased the likelihood of conflict and war in South Asia. Therefore, again, India deserves to be condemned and penalized for its actions.9 Although both of these frameworks may be successful in capturing a part of the reality, especially a part of the reality after the tests, they miss the most essential ingredient of that reality, namely the constellation of factors that was responsible for the Indian decision to go overtly nuclear. It is, therefore, necessary to comprehend adequately Indian foreign policy objectives, strategic concerns, and security interests in order to analyze and understand the Indian decision to test nuclear weapons in May 1998. The preceding appraisal of Indian concerns, undertaken with this goal in mind, should sensitize one above all to the fact that major Indian foreign policy and security decisions cannot be explained on the basis of a monocausal analysis. This is especially the case in relation to the nuclear decision. Two major factors, in conjunction with each other and as a result of a mutually interactive process between them, were primarily responsible for the Indian decision in 1998 to go overtly nuclear. One other factor was secondary in determining the substance of the Indian decision, although it may have had great influence in determining the timing of that decision and its rapid implementation. The two factors primarily responsible for the Indian decision were (1) India’s multifaceted concerns regarding China and (2) the mounting pressure on India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the latest instrument in what the Indians consider to be the attempt by the nuclear powers to perpetuate a discriminatory nonproliferation regime and close the Indian option to go nuclear in future. Although the two concerns can be considered distinct for analytical purposes, they are closely intertwined with each other because India perceives its nuclear status to be intimately linked to its equation with China. The multiple nature of India’s security concerns vis-à-vis China has been spelled out earlier in this chapter. These concerns intensified as China launched a major military modernization program in the 1990s,

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including purchase of state-of-the-art aircraft from cash-strapped Russia. In Indian perceptions, this process threatened to upset the conventional balance on the Indo-Chinese border, especially since the Indian defense budget decreased dramatically during the 1990s, thus adversely affecting both the level of weapons sophistication and the degree of combat readiness of the Indian armed forces. China’s continuing assistance during the first half of the 1990s to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs, acknowledged by U.S. intelligence agencies and by State Department officials in congressional testimonies, increased Indian concerns about a nuclear pincer movement against India. According to testimony before a Senate subcommittee in April 1997 by Robert Einhorn, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, it was not until May 1996 that the United States was able to get an assurance from Beijing that it was cutting off supplies of material and technology to Pakistan that were crucial for the latter to build and augment its nuclear and missile delivery capabilities.10 The U.S. inability to rein in the Chinese on this issue until it was too late and the increasing deference demonstrated by the Clinton administration to Chinese sensibilities drove home two major lessons to New Delhi. The first of these was that being good children on the nonproliferation front and relying on U.S. assurances regarding the Chinese-Pakistani nuclear and missile relationship would most likely lead to a further deterioration in the Indian strategic environment. The possibility of this happening had increased because U.S. restrictions on the transfer of dual-use technology to India, imposed under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1978 following the first Indian test in 1974, remained firmly in place, while Pakistan continued to benefit from its nuclear relationship with China. This lesson was driven home dramatically by the Pakistani test-firing of the intermediate-range Ghauri missile on April 6, 1998, within days of the Vajpayee government’s taking office in New Delhi. The Ghauri’s range of 1,500 kilometers meant that it could reach most of India, including all the metropolitan centers. After evaluating the characteristics of the Ghauri missile, New Delhi concluded that the prototype of this missile was either transferred directly by China to Pakistan or was a North Korean device supplied to Islamabad with Beijing’s knowledge and endorsement. Although U.S. intelligence agencies confirmed that the Ghauri was of North Korean origin, this did little to assuage Indian concerns about Chinese involvement in the missile transfer. This assessment was reflected in New Delhi’s immediate reaction to the test-firing of the Ghauri missile. The Indian statement declared: “We

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are aware of Pakistan’s clandestine acquisition of missiles and missile technology and the country would take resolute steps to meet any threat to its national security.”11 One can, therefore, argue that the Ghauri missile acted as the immediate trigger for the Indian decision a few days later to undertake the overt testing of nuclear weapons in May 1998. The second lesson learned by India was that the only way to gain attention from the United States equal to that showered on China was to demonstrate a degree of symmetry with China in the nuclear arena. This could only be done if India went overtly nuclear and posed a direct challenge to the nuclear establishment just as China had done in 1964. At the same time, it was argued, India’s demonstrated nuclear and missile capability could also serve as a warning to China and deter it from making antiIndian moves while simultaneously forcing Beijing to reevaluate the dangers inherent in its policy of nuclear and missile collaboration with Pakistan.12 The process involved in drafting the CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva during 1995 and 1996 further alarmed Indian policymakers, especially because it came on the heels of the indefinite extension of the NPT by the Review Conference of 1995. The NPT, in Indian perceptions, was the cornerstone of the discriminatory nuclear regime imposed upon the international system by the five nuclear powers. Its indefinite extension meant that there was little chance of the inequitable nuclear order undergoing mutation in the foreseeable future unless the terms of nuclear debate changed dramatically. This conclusion strengthened India’s resolve that a test ban treaty must be clearly linked to a timebound program for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. This linkage was the last weapon, short of going overtly nuclear, that India possessed to make a dent in the frozen attitudes adopted by the five nuclear weapons powers on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation. India had been one of the earliest proponents of the CTBT. However, its very strong concern that the treaty was being used to forward the goal of horizontal nonproliferation, thereby serving as an adjunct to the NPT, rather than the goal of nuclear disarmament for which it was originally intended was summarily dismissed by the nuclear powers. Furthermore, the Indians were very perturbed by the fact that a devious stratagem, by means of an Australian-sponsored resolution, was employed by the nuclear powers to bring the draft treaty before the UN General Assembly, although technically it could not be reported to that body since the Conference on Disarmament had failed to approve it because of Indian opposition. This perceived subterfuge made New Delhi even more wary of the real intentions of the treaty’s promoters.

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Above all, the entry into force (EIF) clause, introduced into the treaty at the insistence of Britain, China, and Russia, made it clear that the CTBT could not take effect unless and until all forty-four “nuclear-capable” countries signed and ratified the treaty. For all practical purposes, this made the treaty’s entry into force dependent upon India’s decision to sign and ratify it since, of the others, forty-one had endorsed the draft, Pakistan’s signature was tied to that of India, and North Korea remained the “rogue” state that would have to be cajoled or coerced into signing. This provision alarmed New Delhi greatly because it saw the EIF clause of the CTBT as the crowning act of a strategy to isolate India and tremendously increase the international pressure on it to sign the document. A projected Review Conference of signatories to the treaty that could be held as early as September 1999 was also seen as part of a strategy to condemn India and pave the way for the application of sanctions against it by way of forcing New Delhi to sign and ratify the CTBT.13 In many ways the CTBT was the last straw that broke the camel’s back. It tied together many of the concerns that Indian policymakers harbored regarding the impact of a discriminatory nonproliferation regime on India’s security interests. Above all, to the Indians it demonstrated the collusion between China and the United States to make the Indian strategic environment more ominous by making the nuclear asymmetry between India and China permanent. But if this was the broader context for the Indian decision to test nuclear weapons, one final factor added to the urgency of the decision. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

AND

DOMESTIC POLITICS

This new element was the accession to power of a BJP-led government in March 1998. When in opposition, the Hindu-nationalist BJP had been an advocate of India going overtly nuclear. This demand had traditionally formed a part of the party’s manifesto, although not its most salient one, during the past several elections in the 1990s. Furthermore, it has now been revealed that Atal Behari Vajpayee, the prime minister of the first BJP-led government, had ordered nuclear tests when his government came to power for a brief period of twelve days in May 1996. He rescinded the order when it became clear that his government would not survive a vote of confidence in parliament.14 Some of the urgency regarding the nuclear decision in the spring of 1998 can be attributed to the desire on the part of the BJP, in power for a second time at the head of a motley coalition, to shore up the legitimacy

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of its shaky government. However, most of the pressure this time seems to have been generated by the fear among India’s policymakers, and especially the strategic community, that New Delhi might be railroaded by the major nuclear powers into signing the CTBT. The debate over whether India should sign the CTBT and under what conditions had preoccupied Indian security analysts for most of 1996 and 1997.15 Several of them had argued persistently that time was running out on the Indian nuclear weapons program and that New Delhi had to carry out a series of tests before it was forced to succumb to international pressure and sign the CTBT from a position of permanent disadvantage. Their pleas took on greater urgency once the BJP replaced the lame-duck Gujral government in March 1998. Some among the Indian strategic community advocated a strongly defiant posture and argued that India should conduct tests but in no case sign the CTBT. A few others argued that India should sign the CTBT without testing, as a non–nuclear weapons state. Some respected analysts continued to hold to the earlier orthodoxy that India could retain its nuclear option indefinitely while not signing the CTBT, and therefore that there was no reason for nuclear tests to be undertaken urgently.16 Their position, however, was severely undermined by the EIF clause of the CTBT, which was perceived as designed to mount pressure on India to sign the CTBT quickly, as a nonnuclear state. In this context, a consensus seemed to emerge around the position that India should carry out a sufficient number of tests of different magnitudes and sophistication to demonstrate a credible deterrent capacity and gather scientific data in order to be able to proceed with its nuclear weapons program without further testing and then sign the CTBT as a nuclear weapons power.17 This position was based on the assumption that a demonstrated nuclear capacity, in conjunction with a modest stockpile of weapons and a delivery capacity that would eventually include intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), was the minimum needed, in particular to deter China from attempting to take political advantage of India’s conventional military weakness in the future. It was argued further that such a credible deterrent capacity was achievable within the limits of the CTBT if New Delhi successfully carried out a series of six to twelve tests of different yields before signing the treaty.18 Prime Minister Vajpayee may also have believed that if he did not order the series of tests quickly, the opportunity might never reappear, as his government could fall at any time because of infighting among the coalition partners. This assessment gained added weight, as had been the case during the short-lived Vajpayee government of May 1996, from the open secret that the Congress government under Narasimha Rao had can-

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celed a nuclear test at the last minute in December 1995 in large part because of U.S. pressure. This pressure was generated in turn by the intelligence gathered by U.S. spy satellites regarding unusual activity at the Pokhran test site in Rajasthan. Vajpayee feared that the fall of his shaky coalition government could well mean that New Delhi might never again have the opportunity to conduct nuclear tests. This view was reportedly shared by the head of the Defence Research and Development Organization and India’s senior defense scientist, Abdul Kalam, and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, R. Chidambaram, who had been greatly dismayed by Rao’s last-minute cancellation of the nuclear tests planned for December 1995. In all likelihood, this shared concern between the prime minister and his closest political advisers, Brajesh Mishra and Jaswant Singh, and the “strategic enclave” consisting of the top defense and atomic scientists, served as the primary domestic determinant affecting Vajpayee’s decision to order the nuclear tests.19 This concern was, in turn, probably based on the assessment that a weak-kneed coalition government led by the Congress, which was likely to come to power if the Vajpayee government fell, would be bullied by the United States into signing the CTBT as a non–nuclear weapons state, thus permanently foreclosing the Indian nuclear option. LIVING

WITH THE

BOMB

Clearly, Indian policymakers have realized that the international nuclear context has changed dramatically with the Indian tests, as have Indian interests in regard to the nonproliferation regime. As one of India’s leading strategic analysts pointed out a month after the tests, “The objective of India’s nuclear diplomacy has been radically transformed last month, when India declared itself a nuclear weapon power. Until May 11, the purpose was to create and sustain the option to make nuclear weapons when needed. Since mid-May, the diplomatic task has been to defend India’s nuclear deterrent, reduce the political and economic costs of exercising India’s nuclear option, and eventually gain international acceptance of its new status.”20 Since India has clearly demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability and seems to be set on the road to acquiring a credible IRBM capacity, it no longer gives the highest priority in its nuclear diplomacy to the objective of dismantling the discriminatory nuclear regime within a time-bound framework. Although still interested as a matter of principle in the elimi-

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nation of nuclear weapons, New Delhi realizes that it will take a long time. In the interim (which might last decades), Indian security interests have to be ensured in a world divided between nuclear haves and have-nots, with India now falling in the former category regardless of the nuclear establishment’s refusal to accord it that status currently. That this new status carries with it certain responsibilities is clearly recognized by New Delhi. Its willingness to impose a moratorium on further testing, to signal its readiness to sign the CTBT if certain conditions are met, to adopt controls on the export of nuclear-related materials mandated by the NPT, and to promise “no first use” of nuclear weapons indicates its appreciation that this is the case. During the time that has elapsed since the tests, Indian policymakers have made it clear that New Delhi will seriously consider signing the CTBT if there is adequate reciprocity from the nuclear powers, especially the United States, and if the government can build a political consensus on this issue. The formation of such a consensus, it is implied, will be crucially dependent upon the quid pro quo that New Delhi is promised for signing the CTBT. The Indian stance was made very plain on August 4, 1998, when Prime Minister Vajpayee went on record in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian parliament, announcing that by imposing a voluntary moratorium after the nuclear tests in May, “India accepted the basic obligation of a test ban.” He added further that India had also announced its “willingness to move towards a de jure formalization of our voluntary undertaking.” He went on to say that the dialogue with the United States on the issue of adhering to the CTBT had been started after “satisfying ourselves that India no longer requires to undertake nuclear explosions.”21 New Delhi, however, expects the U.S. quid pro quo to its signing the CTBT to take the form not only of the lifting of sanctions imposed in the wake of the May tests but, more important, the easing, if not the total removal, of restrictions imposed on the sale of dual-use technology to India. Furthermore, India has stated clearly that it will join in negotiations on the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), a commitment reiterated on August 11, 1998, by its permanent representative to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. As one Indian strategic analyst has pointed out, “The key question in relation to the FMCT is not if it is global and nondiscriminatory. It is whether India has sufficient nuclear material at hand to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. . . . The very offer by the government to negotiate an FMCT suggests that it is confident of maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent under a worldwide ban on further production of the material.”22

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The United States, for its part, also expressed a keen interest in putting Indian-U.S. relations back on track following the acrimony born out of the nuclear tests. Washington realized that the damage done to the nuclear nonproliferation regime by the South Asian tests needed to be repaired quickly in order to preserve the residual legitimacy and credibility of that regime. This goal could only be accomplished through a serious dialogue with India that would lead to the latter signing the CTBT and agreeing to accept at least in de facto form those provisions of the NPT essential to keeping such a regime in place and strengthening its operation. On the basis of parallel calculations, New Delhi and Washington came to the conclusion that negotiations could at least narrow the differences between them, if not resolve the dispute over nuclear testing altogether. As a result, a series of talks between U.S. deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott, and the Indian prime minister’s special envoy and later foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, began in June 1998. Nine rounds of talks were held until November 1999. Although the dialogue was temporarily disrupted because of elections in India, it resumed almost immediately after a freshly elected government took office in New Delhi in October 1999. However, one must also recognize the major obstacles that continue to hinder the process of dialogue and rapprochement between India and the United States. The most fundamental of these hurdles is the wide difference between the frameworks used by the two sides when approaching these negotiations, which is most clearly demonstrated by the disjuncture in the analytical and prescriptive positions reportedly adopted by the United States at these talks. As a result of these talks, the United States has come to accept the fact that the Indian decision to test nuclear weapons was driven primarily by its multifaceted concerns about China (including China’s relations with Pakistan and the United States). However, the U.S. prescriptive position on this issue still rests primarily on a concern for the impact of the nuclearization of the subcontinent on Indian-Pakistani relations. Thus the U.S. side emphasizes the need for nonweaponization and nondeployment of Indian nuclear capabilities, resolution of bilateral differences with Pakistan with special emphasis on Kashmir, and confidence-building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan. U.S. demands, therefore, seem to heavily dilute if not totally ignore the perceived threat from China that has been principally responsible for driving the Indian nuclear weapons program. Similarly, U.S. negotiators recognize that the Indian concerns about the security implications of the CTBT for India are genuine and are tied

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especially to the issue of nuclear asymmetry between India and China. Consequently, they realize that these concerns need to be addressed in such a creative way as to permit India to sign the CTBT without giving up its minimum nuclear deterrent capability. Nevertheless, major U.S. demands have emphasized the need for India to immediately and unconditionally sign the CTBT as a nonnuclear state and to refrain from further testing and deployment both of nuclear weapons and of missiles. U.S. pressure on India to sign the CTBT is, however, likely to diminish with the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify the treaty. With no likelihood of the ratification process being resuscitated until 2001, the United States and India now appear to be in almost identical positions vis-à-vis the CTBT— one of self-imposed acceptance of the ban on further nuclear testing. The Senate’s rejection of the CTBT has, however, put a big question mark on the future of the treaty itself. When coupled with U.S. intentions to revise the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty and deploy national and theater missile defenses, it may have sounded the death-knell for the treaty process. Initially, the U.S. negotiating position also contained a demand that India should sign the NPT as a non–nuclear weapons state. However, the United States realized from the very beginning that this was a nonstarter and therefore it has emphasized attaining the substance of this demand without directly pressuring India to sign the NPT. At the same time, in the U.S. view, it is clear that the NPT cannot be revised in the near future to accommodate India, Pakistan, and possibly Israel as nuclear weapons states without a major risk that the treaty and the regime it attempts to legitimize would suffer irrevocable damage.23 It is evident that the U.S. and Indian negotiators perceive the issue through very different lenses. The United States still seems to be committed to approaching the problem of the Indian nuclear tests through the twin frameworks of Indian-Pakistani relations and the sacrosanct nature of the nuclear nonproliferation regime as presently constituted. However, the Indians approach the issue through the two interrelated frameworks of the Sino-Indian equation and the negative implications of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, especially of the CTBT as currently drafted, for Indian security interests. The Indian objection to the CTBT also derives from the treaty’s failure to ban subcritical tests and computer simulations of tests that are likely to help nuclear powers, especially the United States, to improve the sophistication of their arsenals while foreclosing the nuclear option for other states. This provision will also allow the five “legitimate” nuclear powers to freeze the international status quo in the security arena, thus

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giving them permanent advantage over other powers that aspire to great power status. It should be noted, however, that on two issues the Indian and U.S. positions are reasonably close. These relate to India participating in a positive way in negotiations for the FMCT and to New Delhi providing assurances against transfer to third countries of sensitive material that can be used for the production of weapons of mass destruction. Both these measures are in India’s long-term interest, and New Delhi has already indicated that it is willing to accept these obligations voluntarily if it is not forced into doing so from the permanently inferior position of a non–nuclear weapons state. FUTURE U.S.

AND INDIAN

STRATEGIES

It seems that the beginning of wisdom for U.S. policymakers would be to realize that the nuclear issue goes to the heart of India’s security and status concerns and that important powers find it impossible to disentangle status from security. They should, therefore, take heed of what the director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Holum, wrote in a different context: “Real gains in arms control and disarmament depend not on what is desired or even demanded, but on what is possible as a matter of security.”24 Future U.S. strategy toward India will, therefore, require an emphasis above all on reducing the discrepancy between China’s international status and that of India as well as addressing India’s genuine security concerns vis-à-vis China. The first objective can be advanced by actively promoting India’s permanent membership on the Security Council while formally delinking this issue from that of India’s nuclear status. The second goal can be served by a three-pronged strategy. First, it would require accepting India’s need for minimum nuclear deterrence against China and deliberately leaving the definition of terms like “weaponization” and “deployment” so fuzzy as to permit India to have a credible deterrent while adopting a nuclear posture that Washington can technically accept as nonthreatening, especially to Pakistan. Second, Washington must put pressure on China to adopt confidence-building measures, especially in the arena of missile deployment, that would make the Indians feel less insecure. Finally, China must be persuaded to end its nuclear and missile collaboration with Pakistan and, if possible, roll back the supply of material and technology it has already provided to Pakistan.

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India, in turn, must recognize that the United States has genuine concerns about the escalation of Indian-Pakistani tensions following the tests. The Indian offer of a no first use agreement to Pakistan should assuage some U.S. fears on this score, but it is not enough. India must enter into a serious strategic dialogue with Pakistan over deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles as well as strategic doctrine in order to promote confidence-building measures and delink the nuclear question from other issues bedeviling Indian-Pakistani relations. India should offer to start a strategic dialogue with China as well. India must also work diligently to put into place and streamline a command and control structure that would eliminate concerns about accidental or unauthorized launching of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, the United States must put greater pressure on Pakistan to desist from pursuing the dangerous strategy of training and infiltrating terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan’s escalation of cross-border incursions into territory on the Indian side of the LOC could well be the harbinger of another Indian-Pakistani war. This was demonstrated by the Kargil crisis, in which the United States found itself in India’s corner because of its concern for the security and stability of a nuclearized South Asia. Furthermore, Indian patience is wearing thin over massacres of civilians by Pakistani-trained terrorists, many of them foreign nationals. This situation puts tremendous domestic pressure on New Delhi to hit terrorist bases beyond the line of control in Kashmir and across the international border in Pakistan. Islamabad is playing with fire in this matter, and it is imperative that it should be made to behave more responsibly in the nuclearized context of the subcontinent. Now that economic sanctions imposed on India in the wake of the 1998 tests have been removed for all practical purposes, the main sticking point in the Indo-U.S. dialogue continues to be the removal of restrictions on the transfer of dual-use technology to India in the context of India’s projected adherence to the CTBT. New Delhi is likely to make its formal signature on the CTBT contingent upon the gradual relaxation, if not the total removal, of such restrictions on technology transfer. However, it is possible to find a formula palatable to both the United States and India while awaiting a more opportune moment to resolve these contentious issues. India has endured restrictions on nuclear-related and dual-use technology since the 1970s and can possibly wait for several more years without any great damage to its vital security interests. But India’s long-term interests require an agreed formula with the United States by which such restrictions can be relaxed substantially in return for an Indian commitment to sign the CTBT.

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In conclusion, it is worth pointing out that had President Bill Clinton visited New Delhi without preconditions, as planned in the autumn of 1998, it might have succeeded in reestablishing rapport between the top leaders of the two countries. Coming reasonably soon after his visit to China, such a visit would have also demonstrated to the Indians that the United States was ready to adopt a more evenhanded approach regarding India and China and might have helped to neutralize some of the negative impact of the joint U.S.-China communiqué denouncing the Indian tests that was issued in Beijing in June 1998 during President Clinton’s visit to China. That the U.S. president should condemn Indian actions in Beijing jointly with Chinese leaders was perceived by the Indians as the height of U.S. insensitivity toward India’s security concerns, especially since India had made no bones about the fact that its nuclear decision was determined in large measure by its perception of threat from a nuclear-armed China. However, President Clinton’s preoccupation with domestic scandals and pressure by the dogmatic advocates of nuclear nonproliferation (the nuclear “theologians”) both within and without his administration forced him to call off his visit to India in the wake of the nuclear tests in May 1998. This reaction could easily have led to further acrimony between the two countries, had it not been for the Indian interest in cultivating an intensive and extensive dialogue with the United States in the form of the Talbott-Singh talks. That these talks have led to a greater understanding of the Indian position by the United States has been demonstrated by Washington’s low-key reaction to India’s test firing of the Agni 2 intermediate-range missile, which has a range of 2,000 kilometers, on April 11, 1999.25 Because the missile was obviously intended as a delivery system for nuclear warheads and, therefore, an essential component of India’s minimum deterrent capability (especially vis-à-vis China), testing it in the absence of the IndianU.S. dialogue would have evoked a strongly negative response from Washington.26 However, the response in this case was muted, with relatively mild statements of disapprobation issued both by the State Department and the U.S. embassy in New Delhi. The former merely expressed “regret” that the missile test appeared to be “out of step” with recent positive developments and “hope[d] that India will provide tangible indications that it is prepared to practice restraints consistent with its declared intentions.”27 Obviously, despite the intensive and extensive dialogue that has taken place between Indian and U.S. policymakers since mid-1998, several

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important concerns divide the two countries on the nuclear issue. It is important that India and the United States attempt to bridge these differences over the question of nuclear weapons. However, it is even more important that Washington and New Delhi should insulate the rest of their relationship from an issue on which they are likely to disagree for some time. This step will prevent the rest of their potentially very profitable economic and political interactions, including their increasingly converging concerns about China, from being held hostage to their disagreement over the nuclear issue.28 True statesmanship lies only in such a course. NOTES

This chapter is a revised and updated version of my article, “Nuclear India and IndianAmerican Relations,” Orbis 43, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 59–74. 1. This concern was clearly implied in the Indian prime minister’s letter of May 11, 1998, to President Clinton following the nuclear tests. A few days before the tests, Defense Minister George Fernandes had also clearly identified China as the principal security threat to India. For a perceptive journalistic analysis of India’s threat perceptions, see Dinesh Kumar, “India’s Threat Perceptions: The Sino-Pakistan Nexus,” Times of India (New Delhi), May 18, 1998. 2. For an analysis of the similarities and differences between the strategic objectives pursued by the Raj and independent India, see A. Martin Wainwright, “Regional Security and Paramount Powers: The British Raj and Independent India,” in Marvin G. Weinbaum and Chetan Kumar, eds., South Asia Approaches the Millennium (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 41–62. 3. For details of this argument, see Mohammed Ayoob, “India in South Asia: The Quest for Regional Predominance,” World Policy Journal 7, no. 1 (Winter 1989/90): 107–133. 4. According to this formulation, “India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs of any states in the region, unless requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention by an outside power; if external assistance is needed to meet an internal crisis, states should first look within the region for help.” Quoted in P. Venkateshwar Rao, “Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: India’s Role and Perception,” Asian Survey 28, no. 4 (April 1988): 422. 5. For details of the Gujral Doctrine, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, “India in the Twenty-first Century,” International Affairs 73, no. 2 (1997): 308–310. 6. For one such report, see Seymour Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge,” The New Yorker, March 29, 1993, 94. 7. Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 186, 187. 8. In an interview given to a leading Indian journalist in early 1987, A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani scientist in charge of developing nuclear weapons from enriched uranium, acknowledged that Pakistan had the ability to assemble a nuclear weapon. According to General Mirza Aslam Beg, who was Pakistan’s army chief during the late 1980s, Pakistan had the ability to assemble a nuclear device by 1988. Both statements were quoted in Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 188.

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9. For a well-reasoned critique of both these paradigms, see Muthiah Alagappa, “International Response to Nuclear Tests in South Asia: The Need for a New Policy Framework,” Asia Pacific Issues, no. 38 (June 15, 1998). 10. Statement of Robert J. Einhorn, deputy assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, April 10, 1997. In the same statement, Einhorn acknowledged: “In the nuclear area, we have long had concerns about China’s assistance to Pakistan’s efforts to produce unsafeguarded fissile materials and to Pakistan’s program to develop nuclear explosives. These concerns were especially acute in the 1980s but have continued even after China acceded to the NPT in 1992. During 1995 we received compelling information that a Chinese entity transferred a large number of custom-built ring magnets to the entity in Pakistan responsible for that country’s unsafeguarded gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment program.” It was not surprising that the Indians saw the Chinese commitment made to the United States in May 1996 as a case of closing the stable gates after the horse had bolted. 11. “Government Assessing Pakistan Missile Test Impact,” Hindu (Chennai), April 8, 1998. 12. For a perceptive analysis of India’s assessment of the China factor in relation to its nuclear decision, see Ashutosh Varshney, “The Folly of America’s Nuclear Diplomacy: US-China Relations, Not India-Pakistan, Are the Real Cause for Concern in South Asia,” Financial Times (London), August 6, 1998. 13. For details of Indian perceptions of and arguments against the draft treaty, see Arundhati Ghose, “Negotiating the CTBT: India’s Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament,” Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 239–261. Ghose was the Indian ambassador to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament when the CTBT was discussed in the conference. 14. For details, see George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 371–376. 15. For one competent summary of the debate, see Savita Pande, “CTBT and India,” Strategic Analysis (New Delhi) 19, no. 2 (May 1996): 157–182. 16. For an eloquent statement of the position defending India’s policy of nuclear restraint and “recessed deterrence,” see Jasjit Singh, “The Challenges of Strategic Defence,” Frontline (Chennai), April 24, 1998, 13–16. 17. These observations are based on the author’s conversations in New Delhi in March–April 1998. 18. This argument is based on the author’s conversations with strategic analysts in New Delhi, March–April 1998. 19. For a very well informed discussion of the critical role played by the strategic enclave in shaping India’s nuclear weapons program, see Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb. 20. Raja Mohan, “Rethinking CTBT and FMCT,” Hindu (Chennai), June 16, 1998. 21. “Talks on to Arrive at a Decision on CTBT: PM,” Hindu (Chennai), August 5, 1998. 22. Mohan, “Rethinking CTBT and FMCT.” 23. Observations regarding the U.S. position are based on conversations with people in well-informed policymaking circles and analysts in Washington, D.C., August 1998. 24. John D. Holum, “The CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament—The U.S. View,” Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 278.

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25. The test firing of the Agni 2 led to a predictable Pakistani response in the form of the Ghauri 2 missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers, the same as Ghauri 1. For details of the Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese missile arsenals, see Raj Chengappa, “Boom for Boom,” India Today (New Delhi), April 26, 1999, 28–30. 26. This was clearly stated by the head of the Indian Defence Research and Development Organization and the father of India’s missile program, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, in an interview to a leading Indian weekly newsmagazine. When asked if nuclear warheads had been mated with the Agni missile, Kalam responded: “Yes. Agni II is designed to carry a nuclear warhead if required. In any case, we had already tested an Agni-class payload at Pokhran last year.” See “If Government Permits We’ll Sell Our Know-How” (interview with A. P. J. Abdul Kalam), India Today, April 26, 1999, 31. 27. Sridhar Krishnaswami, “Agni Testing Unlikely to Hit Talks with U.S.,” Hindu (Chennai), April 13, 1999. 28. For a detailed analysis of converging U.S. and Indian interests, with particular emphasis on the China factor, see Mohammed Ayoob, “India Matters,” Washington Quarterly 23, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 27–39.

7 Pakistan’s Elusive Search for Nuclear Parity with India Farah Zarah

Pakistan’s nuclear program has a symbiotic relationship with Indian nuclear policy. Pakistan has always claimed that it developed a nuclear capability in response to a security threat from India. More specifically, it traces the genesis of its nuclear program to the 1974 Pokhran nuclear test. Between 1974 and 1998, Pakistan’s twofold strategy was to develop a credible nuclear deterrent against India and to fight international pressure against its program. Smarting under years of punitive sanctions, particularly those imposed by the United States, in 1995 Pakistan assured the world that it was pursuing a policy of nonweaponized nuclear deterrence. But the Indian nuclear tests of May 11 and 13, 1998, forced Pakistan to exercise its option of a minimum nuclear deterrent. Pakistan said that it was left with no choice but to respond to the Indian tests so as to restore the “regional strategic balance.” One can also objectively establish that the initiation and maturation of the Pakistani nuclear program has hinged on India and Indian nuclear policy. In the 1998 postdetonation phase, this pattern of correlation has continued and become intertwined with the determination of a minimum deterrent for both India and Pakistan. In the 1950s Pakistan became apprehensive of Indian nuclear acquisitions. The first Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, stated of India’s nuclear policy: “Indian scientists will use atomic force for constructive purposes. However, if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal.”1 Such statements induced Pakistan to monitor (and develop fears about) the Indian nuclear program. After the 1962 Sino-Indian war, when India started developing its nuclear weapons program in earnest, Pakistan initiated a process of espionage and clandes145

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tine acquisition of nuclear technology and design. With the 1971 IndoPakistani war and subsequent nuclear explosion by India in 1974, Pakistan pursued nuclear weapons in a more serious and organized fashion. Since the mid-1980s, two parallel processes can be discerned. First, a series of declaratory statements emanated from the establishment confirming Pakistan’s “capability.”2 Second, a spate of sanctions imposed on Pakistan continued in one form or the other until May 1998 and afterward. The May 1998 Indian tests brought Pakistan to the point at which it finally “jumped into the flames with courage.”3 Shortly afterward, Pakistan briefly “delinked” itself from Indian nuclear policy, particularly on the question of the signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but this delinkage was only an ephemeral phenomenon. The Indian Agni 2 missile test on April 11, 1999, prompted Pakistan to test its own missiles—the Ghauri 2 and Shaheen—on April 14 and 15, 1999. Knowing that India was going to test, Pakistan delayed its own tests so India would bear the brunt of international opprobrium.4 Pakistan’s statements afterward, that the retaliatory missile tests by Pakistan were merely a national security requirement, did not sound totally plausible. Similarly, although Pakistani leaders had repeatedly announced that they would not link their decision to sign the CTBT to a similar decision by India, they became nervous following the collapse of the Vajpayee government and started dropping hints about relinkage. Thus Pakistan finds itself in a highly fluid situation, whereby its own nuclear policy keeps evolving on an ad hoc basis vis-à-vis India. Delinking and relinking nuclear policies, doing belated homework for the elaboration of doctrines, and keeping its defense decisionmaking in flux have catapulted Pakistan into uncharted territory where it cannot make completely independent decisions. After acquiring an overt nuclear status, Pakistan faces myriad challenges that can be broadly categorized into four areas. First, Pakistan has to calibrate its policies and responses to highly fluid and uncertain Indian policymaking dynamics in the nuclear and missile fields, complicated by the fragility of Indian coalition politics. Second, Pakistan has to remain engaged with the United States on nonproliferation benchmarks to avert punitive sanctions. Third, it has to grapple with the imperative of conducting internal consultations to prepare a blueprint of a nuclear doctrine, an elaboration of command and control systems, and a definition of minimum deterrence. Fourth, Pakistan must mount a gigantic effort to keep its economy afloat and strengthen it to sustain its minimum nuclear deterrent. Discussions of these four problematic areas overlap in the sections to follow.

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India’s nuclear tests resonated with a deafening force in Pakistan, which was consumed by outrage at India and at the Pakistani government’s ambitions to prove its own nuclear capability. The leader of the fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic Party) called for an “immediate” response. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the head of Pakistan’s nuclear program, said “it is a question of hours and not days” for Pakistan to carry out nuclear tests.5 The images of Pakistani children burning Indian flags and youngsters shouting “Qadeer Khan bumb nikalo!” (“Qadeer Khan take out the bomb!”) reflected what the masses wanted then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to do. They were more concerned with encouraging a “tit-for-tat” response to India than with the dire economics of sanctions. For them, sanctions were nothing new; the United States had repeatedly imposed them to punish Pakistan for its nuclear program. Extremist elements in Pakistan had pressed for a test since the late 1980s, soon after Pakistan was known to possess bomb-making capabilities. The majority favored maintaining the status quo, that is, an ambiguous nuclear posture. However, an overwhelming consensus supported going ahead with a test if India tested its bombs (as India reportedly made preparations to do in December 1995). Though Prime Minister Sharif held the biggest public mandate in Pakistan’s history and faced no direct threat to his government in May 1998, he was acutely conscious of the fact that sitting tight on the nuclear test decision would erode his popularity drastically. Former prime minister and opposition leader Benazir Bhutto’s prediction that “either Pakistan detonates a nuclear test device or it risks a possible war with India over Kashmir” was endorsed the very next day by Indian home minister Lal Krishna Advani’s threatening statements on Kashmir. With all eyes focused on Sharif and his expected announcement that Pakistan would carry out nuclear explosions, it was difficult for him to bargain over international aid and incentives that the Pakistani government considered “too little, too late.” In a joint telephone call before Pakistan’s tests, British prime minister Tony Blair and U.S. president Bill Clinton unsuccessfully sought to persuade Sharif not to go through with threatened nuclear tests.6 A U.S. delegation headed by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott flew to Pakistan on May 13, 1998, but came away without any evidence to support Clinton’s hopes that Pakistan was moving away from conducting a test. The delegation did make it “very, very clear” to Pakistan that it would face horrible consequences if it chose to conduct its nuclear test. This visit

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was deja vu for Pakistan. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had flown to Pakistan in 1976 to deliver a similar warning that he would make “a horrible example” out of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan if Islamabad went ahead with a nuclear weapons program. U.S. officials had not offered any concrete proposal but rather suggested “possibilities,” such as waiver of the 1985 Pressler amendment (which conditions U.S. aid to Pakistan on a presidential certification that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons); delivering F-16 fighter aircraft that Pakistan had purchased from the Bush administration but that had been held up under the Pressler amendment; and possibly some debt retirement. The Clinton administration appeared to focus primarily on preventing a Pakistani nuclear test rather than on identifying tangible measures that could alleviate Pakistan’s broader security concerns.7 From Islamabad, it appeared that the United States was belatedly offering a warm hug, which Pakistan could not reciprocate.8 Prime Minister Sharif also charged that the United States had been discriminating against Pakistan on the basis of religion, arguing that the U.S. government had “ignored” India’s nuclear activities and sanctioned Pakistan’s because “we are an Islamic country.” The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was quick to respond by expressing its solidarity with Pakistan after the Indian explosions. If the United States had pushed Pakistan against the wall by intensifying existing sanctions, it would have risked Pakistan’s drift toward its “Islamic brethren,” raising the specter of nuclear technology transfers to “rogue states.” Despite China’s clandestine nuclear assistance to Pakistan, the former’s ongoing détente with India in the last decade had been a source of anxiety for Islamabad. Thus, even as Indian defense minister George Fernandes cited China as India’s prime enemy, China condemned the Indian tests, and the Indians charged China with “hypocrisy,” Pakistan’s fears were not assuaged as it grappled with the new “explosive” threat from India. Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmed’s visit to China immediately after the Indian tests was probably designed more to assess China’s potential reaction to an escalating South Asian crisis than simply to push its diplomatic offensive against India. Pakistani calculations were that as Russian assistance to India increased, China would be more pivotal for Pakistan than the jubilant Arab states. Pakistan wanted to know where China stood as Islamabad charted its response to India and prepared contingency plans for any ensuing crisis. Indian home minister Lal Krishna Advani affirmed India’s “resolve to deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan’s hostile designs and activities in Kashmir” and solicited a more “pro-active” posture against Pakistan.

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Coming on the heels of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s warnings that India could use nuclear weapons in cases of “aggression from outside,” this statement was viewed in Pakistan as a threat. Indian analysts initially welcomed the prospect that Pakistan would conduct a nuclear test of its own in response to India’s explosions. However, the Indian government was apparently rattled by the suggestion in the New York Times that by refraining from testing, Pakistan could get its debts written off. India’s renewed vows to proceed with its nuclear weapons program despite sanctions and to develop a new longer-range missile capable of delivering nuclear warheads may well have been intended to push Pakistan into carrying out a nuclear test. Even more dangerous were Advani’s threatening statements, which were read as promising a nuclear strike on Pakistan if Islamabad continued to pursue its “anti-India” policies. Leaders in Islamabad believed the world community had not fully grasped the implications of the Indian tests and of the provocative statements that had been issued from Delhi in their aftermath. Even more incomprehensible to Pakistanis were assertions from the U.S. State Department advising Pakistan that “they would be far, far better off if they chose the diplomatic road, the high road.”9 This was not the road chosen. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION: BEFORE

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In the midst of a serious balance of payments crisis, in 1998 Pakistan’s fragile economy was heavily dependent on International Monetary Fund (IMF) support and was on the verge of defaulting on its international debt obligations, despite the fact that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Export-Import Bank, and the Trade Development Authority (TDA) had restored their operations in Pakistan and the IMF had expressed cautious optimism about the success of the package launched a year earlier. A nuclear test by Pakistan that accelerated an arms race with India could easily lead to additional military spending commitments far beyond what its economy could sustain. Statements by then finance minister Sartaj Aziz suggested that Pakistan was aware of this risk. In contrast, Indian analysts claimed that U.S. sanctions (excluding the lending by international financial institutions) would amount to a mere 1 percent loss of gross national product (GNP). Some U.S. legislators and opinionmakers claimed that the sanctions would hurt the United States more than India. The European Union appeared resolved not to isolate India; France and Russia resisted sanctions against India; and the Europeans seemed ready to grab any Indian business from U.S. companies frozen out by U.S. penalties.

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The Pakistani government seemed to understand that sanctions that might be only a pinch for India could bite deeply into its own economy. Even though the decision to test went beyond economics, the impact of sanctions was worse than Pakistani decisionmakers had expected. The suspension of the IMF package, termination of lending by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and the mounting debts created arguably the worst financial crisis in Pakistan’s history. Euphoria over the bomb was replaced by a sobering realization. The freezing of foreign currency accounts by the government hit the Pakistani expatriates hard and eroded confidence in Pakistan’s overall financial viability. Nervous Pakistani economic managers fended off growing debate about an impending implosion and a failed state. Then the United States came to Pakistan’s rescue. In early 1999, the IMF approved a package of about $1.69 billion to support structural adjustment and trade liberalization efforts. The World Bank also released $350 million at the same time. But before that, Pakistani leaders had dexterously played on the fears of the Americans and even the Indian leaders about the extremely negative results of Pakistan’s economic collapse. Various arguments were used, but basically three themes were recurrent: (1) in the face of severe economic difficulties, Pakistan might be tempted to share its sensitive nuclear technology and information with Islamic states or even rogue states like North Korea; (2) Pakistan was a moderate Islamic country; chaos in Pakistan could in fact affect neighboring Islamic states and the Middle East; (3) an economic breakdown in Pakistan could have a domino effect on India. These factors, combined with the desire to “reward” Pakistan for not testing first, prompted the U.S. government to help Pakistan in getting an IMF package reinstated. Of course, this decision was subtly linked to U.S. nonproliferation benchmarks.10 The Indian government, in fact, complained that President Clinton’s exercise of waiver on sanctions in November 1998, shortly before Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington, was tilted in favor of Pakistan. The economic bailout was further buttressed when the United States returned to Pakistan $466.97 million for the undelivered F-16 aircraft. In March 1999, the Republicans in the U.S. Congress moved legislation to wrest the initiative on removal of sanctions from the administration.11 Senator Sam Brownback, backed by the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, introduced legislation that would provide a five-year suspension on sanctions, mainly economic ones, with a possibility that the Pressler amendment could be repealed. Under the Brownback amendments of 1988 and 1999 the president was given the power to waive most of the provisions of these amendments.

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The very signal from the Republicans that waiver on sanctions could go through without India and Pakistan signing the CTBT led Pakistan to the conclusion that there could be no negative economic consequences. In April 1999, Pakistan once again sought to take high moral ground by flight-testing Ghauri 2 and Shaheen missiles in response to the Indian test of Agni. India was blamed for accelerating the missile race, and Pakistan presented itself as a respondent, not an initiator.12 The White House and the State Department only expressed regrets and concerns and did not impose any new sanctions. Another factor favoring India, and indirectly Pakistan, has been that corporate America and U.S. businesses in general have opposed economic sanctions. The U.S. Engage, a group of U.S. businesses, has spearheaded a campaign to convince senators and members of Congress to roll back all unilateral sanctions or, at least, to introduce some measure of moderation in them. In October 1999, Clinton waived sanctions against India. Pakistan got waivers only for agricultural commodities and U.S. loans while the Pressler amendment remained in place. Under the Glenn amendment, both countries were barred from buying weapons from the United States, military financing, and dual-use technology. The economic situation remains precarious: General Pervez Musharraf’s government claims the foreign currency reserves are at $1.6 billion.13 Pakistan is still heavily dependent on World Bank, IMF, and London and Paris Consortium loans and faces the challenging task of financing a gap of more than $5 billion in its balance of payments.14 The breathing space provided by the international creditors is set to expire by December 2000. Analysts predict there are very clear and definite limits beyond which Pakistan cannot increase its military outlay.15 THE ARMY

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DEFENSE DECISIONMAKING

In the past, the army was more or less the sole arbiter of Pakistan’s defense requirements, and civilian leaders were comfortable with arrangements whereby the army alone dealt with these matters. During the Sharif government, this practice seemed to be changing because of two developments: overt incorporation of nuclear weapons into Pakistan’s defense doctrine, and the authoritarian direction of Prime Minister Sharif’s government, whereby he diminished the powers and independence of major state institutions. The decade after the death of General Mohammed Zia-ul Haq in 1988 was the longest time that the military had been out of direct rule since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, though it remained the pivotal power

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behind the curtains. From backstage, it supervised the ouster of four governments since 1985 through forced resignations of prime ministers or dissolution of parliament.16 However, the proof of the army’s reluctance for a takeover became evident on several occasions. Most recently in June 1997, when the government was at loggerheads with the judiciary and the president, the military could easily have climbed back into the saddle. Instead, from behind the scenes the military arbitrated the stalemate in the government’s favor. In 1997, after the presidential powers to remove the prime minister were limited, the army had little option but to stage a naked coup without the facade of constitutionality that they had maintained in earlier coups.17 In his statement to the UN General Assembly in September 1998, Sharif announced Pakistan’s willingness to “adhere to” the CTBT. A day before Sharif was supposed to address the assembly, Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat had issued a statement that Pakistan should not sign the CTBT. It was reported that the prime minister changed his speech at the last minute and desisted from making a categorical announcement on the CTBT.18 Not appeased by the prime minister’s backtracking, the army chief issued another stricture against government policies.19 He expressed dissatisfaction over the unilateral decisionmaking process and proposed establishing a National Security Council; both statements were considered to indicate the military’s mistrust of the Sharif government. During the events that followed, General Karamat had to resign. Musharraf’s sacking on October 12, 1999, a year after he had replaced General Karamat, proved to be the last straw for the army. It reacted by overthrowing the Sharif government. As chief executive, Musharraf formulated an interim government without a time frame for restoration of democracy. In Pakistan, successive civilian governments until 1998 were willing to leave nuclear matters to the armed forces. The white paper on higher defense organization commissioned by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the early 1970s was the first and last attempt made by the political leadership to introduce a more active civilian role into defense planning and decisionmaking. In the mid-1970s, Bhutto also formulated the central hierarchical system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), with the military subservient to the political leadership. However, Bhutto’s attempts to place civilians at the helm of defense decisionmaking were doomed: General Zia-ul Haq established the supremacy of the army from 1977 to 1985.20 The Ministry of Defense, the Defense Cabinet Committee (DCC), and the Defense Council have all been criticized for neither having an inde-

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pendent source of information nor providing useful inputs in decisionmaking. The nuclear establishment in Pakistan faces the problem of lack of coordination. Some of its entities are controlled by the Ministry of Science and Technology and others by the Ministry of Defense. A few are independent financially and only liaise with the army. Reportedly, when Prime Minister Sharif consulted A. Q. Khan, who heads the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), about the time required for Pakistan to prepare for a test, Khan said it would take a month; PAEC chairman Samar Mubarikmand said that they would need only two days’ notice and some enriched uranium to test.21 According to the Pakistani navy’s director of research, these entities are “like small islands not connected to each other.”22 PAEC and KRL have both made contributions to Pakistan’s nuclear program and claimed credit for the success of the nuclear tests. However, the overall coordination and supervision of Pakistan’s nuclear strategic planning and execution may be done by the Combat Development Directorate (CDD) of the armed forces. The rudiments of a central command and control system may have started taking shape in Pakistan. Newspaper reports indicated that in a meeting held on May 5, 1999, nearly a year after Pakistan tested nuclear weapons, the JCSC was deliberating on the proposed structural framework of such a system. Its basic components would be (1) a national command authority comprising some ministers and three services chiefs to be headed by the prime minister, who will have the authority to order the use of nuclear weapons; (2) a development control governing body; (3) a strategic force command in the hands of the JCSC chief; and (4) a secretariat for all these commands. COORDINATION

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Coordination does not seem to be one of the government’s strong points. After the Indian tests, Sharif stated that no decision on a Pakistani test had been taken, but Foreign Minister Gohar A. Khan nearly simultaneously said that it was not a question of “if, but when” Pakistan would test. Having assured its public of a “befitting response,” Pakistan was still conducting negotiations with the United States on an “aid package.” Nearly a year after the tests, the foreign minister said there was “no possibility” of a war with India, whereas Pakistan’s permanent representative to the UN tried to convince world opinion that there were serious chances of war with India. General Musharraf said there is “zero” percent chance of war with India, but a minister of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir government

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said that a serious danger of a nuclear war with India exists. So, the Pakistani government still must determine not only who the ultimate decisionmakers will be in the nuclear realm but also what kind of doctrine would best suit Pakistan’s threat perceptions and capabilities. There is a long history of miscalculations and misinterpretations by Indian and Pakistani leaders seeking to enhance their security through steps that send confusing signals. In 1987, large-scale Indian military exercises dangerously close to the Pakistani border prompted Pakistan to deploy its own military divisions in preparation for war, which was defused only at the last minute. A second such crisis unfolded in May 1990, when fighting in Kashmir almost triggered a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan when both countries had acquired covert capabilities. The incident was defused by high-level U.S. intervention. South Asia has seen three full-fledged wars between India and Pakistan; an ongoing military conflict at the Indo-Pakistani border on the Siachen glacier that has lasted for sixteen years; and a so-called low-intensity conflict in Kashmir coupled with violence sponsored by intelligence agencies across the Indo-Pakistani border. An incipient dialogue between India and Pakistan after the tests had helped to develop a blueprint for nuclear restraint, though little progress was made in truly showing restraint. An essential adjunct of this exercise was the Lahore process, agreed to by Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Atal B. Vajpayee and hailed by the rest of the world. The objective of this process was to avoid a conventional war between India and Pakistan, which had the potential of escalating into a deadly nuclear conflict. While the world and the political leaderships of India and Pakistan were constructing these underpinnings of deterrence, the armed forces of Pakistan conceived a “brilliant” plan to extract optimal benefit from Pakistan’s newly acquired capability. In their hopes of internationalizing the Kashmir dispute, they seriously miscalculated the response of the international community. Prior to the developments at Kargil, serious concerns were being expressed about the inadequacy or absence of nuclear doctrines in India and Pakistan. India had started a strategic defense review, but it was not clear when it would be completed. Pakistan had also begun internal consultations on these issues. It was against this backdrop that the misadventure at Kargil was played out. As the fighting along the line of control (LOC) intensified, defense strategists began to grapple with the following questions: Would the current crisis ignite a wider conflict and possibly the use of nuclear weapons? What was the threshold of provocation on either side to warrant

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use of a nuclear weapon? Were any command and control systems in place in Pakistan, even in their most rudimentary form? Was nuclear threat a political hyperbole meant just to scare the adversary when, because of the real fears of devastation of the civilian population of both countries, the nuclear option would never be exercised? There is plenty of evidence to suggest that Pakistan’s armed forces engineered the Kargil plan to, inter alia, test the strength of their unwritten nuclear doctrine. They assumed that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent would hamstring India in making massive strikes against the guerrillas for fear of nuclear conflict. They were proved wrong. Humiliated at their intelligence failure, nervous and flustered Indian soldiers pounded at the guerillas, and the Indian army introduced air power for the first time. Pakistan did succeed in “internationalizing” the Kashmir issue, but its leadership discovered to its horror that this meant Pakistan’s total diplomatic isolation. The world community did not seem to care too much about Kashmir or the right of self-determination. Their priority was to avert a deterioration of the situation toward a nuclear war. The United States led the Group of 8 (G-8) countries in delivering a stern message to Pakistan that it had to reverse infiltration. Pakistan was told to assimilate the new reality that nuclear states cannot attempt to alter borders through conventional wars. Pakistan first balked at the suggestion but had to cave in under enormous international pressure. Sharif’s hastily arranged meeting with President Clinton on July 4, 1999, was aimed at strengthening his position vis-à-vis his recalcitrant armed forces and involving the Americans in mediation efforts on Kashmir. Despite these efforts, the denouement of the Kargil crisis does not guarantee nuclear stabilization in the region or avoidance of accidental confrontation. “MINIMUM” CREDIBLE DETERRENCE

The concept of minimum deterrence has always been in currency in South Asia. After the tests of May 1998, this term came to be used more often, though it remains to be defined. It has also been argued that a precise definition cannot be developed because it is merely a “concept.” The more one tries to understand it, the more it defies applicability to South Asia. Lawrence Freedman defines minimum deterrence as “the possession of sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict grievous harm on the enemy in retaliation and no more.”23 Going by that definition, it is problematic to determine what would be “grievous harm” and “no more.” The concept of “no

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more” does not fit into the picture comfortably with the inclusion of China in India’s security calculus. In terms of arsenal, if India wants to equip itself well enough to deal with China, then the quantity and quality of nuclear weaponry goes beyond South Asian requirements. Will Pakistan be able to match India’s capabilities in this realm for long? Can it afford to sit back and relax now that it has acquired “the capability”? Can it define for itself where it should stop refinement of nuclear weapons and missiles? Does it have a doctrine whereby it can spell out (even to itself) its requirement in concrete terms? In spite of indications that there are no clear answers to these questions, the usage of minimum deterrence serves to tacitly appease the international community that a nuclear race in earnest has not begun in South Asia. The United States has repeatedly solicited from India and Pakistan, both directly and indirectly, an elaboration of their ideas on minimum deterrence, but it has remained unsuccessful in obtaining a quantitative answer. The Indian foreign minister is quoted as saying: “Minimum credible deterrence is not a physical quantification which is finite or fixed and limited in time. The policy has certainly a physical shape when translated physically, but that physical shape is determined by the security requirements of the time and that certainly is not something that can be spoken out.”24 Prime Minister Vajpayee categorically stated the following before the Indian parliament: “While our decision is to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum and credible, I would like to reaffirm to this House that the government will not accept any restraints on the development of India’s R&D capabilities.”25 The Pakistani ambassador to the UN criticized this approach as “practically open ended” and not even remotely defining anything concrete.26 He added: “Given Pakistan’s lack of ‘strategic depth,’ any threat of India launching a decisive and lightning conventional strike due to its overwhelming preponderance in conventional weapons will force Pakistan to adopt a more pro-active nuclear posture.” Conventional military imbalance is repeatedly cited as the motivation for Pakistan’s search for a nuclear deterrent. The two reasons given by Pakistan are that 75 percent of India’s conventional assets, and especially its strike formations, are deployed on Pakistan’s borders; and that India will continue to gain a decisive edge in the conventional field, with its indigenous defense production and its continued procurement of weapons from a variety of sources, especially from Russia and France. As the asymmetry between India’s and Pakistan’s conventional capabilities increases, the role of nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s security is likely to increase proportionally.

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Pakistan’s nuclear policy revolves around three basic tenets: (1) a nuclear threat warrants a nuclear response; (2) nuclear force will act as a force multiplier to balance the asymmetry in conventional forces; and (3) there should be a regional solution of nonproliferation issues.27 Soon after testing and restoring “strategic parity” where India had disrupted the “strategic balance,” Pakistan delinked its nuclear policy from that of India. This delinking has been a rather dicey affair. Despite public pronouncements of delinking its decision to sign the CTBT from India’s nuclear practice, Pakistani leaders have had to belabor the point that they would continue to “monitor” what the Indians were doing. Pakistan also emphasizes that if India were to resume nuclear testing, Pakistan would review its position, and in case it had “adhered to” the CTBT, it would invoke the supreme interests clause as provided under Article 9. This unmistakably relinks Pakistan’s nuclear policy to Indian nuclear policy. Clearly, Pakistan will be conducting more work in the future to strengthen its nuclear capability. One such area will be missiles, since Pakistan has only forty frontline aircraft, as opposed to India’s 300. This gap in capabilities would increase Pakistan’s reliance on its missiles as a substitute for the air force’s conventional role, thereby requiring Pakistan to build more and better nuclear missiles.28 In addition, Indian air superiority would keep Pakistan under the constant fear of India’s launching a preemptive surgical strike against its strategic assets. Finally, if India were to destroy Pakistani planes, which are more vulnerable to attack, Pakistan would be short of delivery vehicles for retaliation. Another area that needs more effort is miniaturization and bomb design, and the third area is production of fissile material at a hectic pace before Pakistan gets roped into the CTBT. After the release of India’s Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine in August 1999, Pakistan’s three bestknown strategists suggested induction of mobile nuclear-tipped missiles into the Pakistani arsenal, a “high state of alert” (as India deployed its bombs), and dispersal of these nuclear weapons.29 Such deployment, however, will make the command and control system more decentralized and accident-prone, as commanders at the operational level must attempt, under the tremendous pressures and uncertainties of battle, to prevent a decapitating attack against their nuclear forces. Deployment of nuclear weapons would pose difficult resource and technical challenges for a country like Pakistan, which lacks the heavy infrastructure and expertise required. Construction of new facilities, establishment of secure communications channels, and the rigorous personnel selection, training, and organization needed to maintain high levels of nuclear system security, con-

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nectivity, and responsiveness under alert conditions of dispersal, deception, and concealment may prove to be a formidable task. Deployment will also require attention to the daunting problems of passive defense of cities and industry against a nuclear attack.30 In the most authoritative statement so far on coupling and deployment, General Musharraf claims that “one of the main issues is geographical separation of the warheads and the delivery system. When that is so, there is no button. It is only when you couple them that you are ready, the button is on. But that is not the case. When the time comes, yes, there will be a button. And that button will be with me, of course. But we have not got to that as yet.”31 CONSTRUCTING DOCTRINES

Before beginning a discussion on Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, two factors must be kept in mind. First, the government of Pakistan has made no elaborate public statements on the issue of doctrines, though Pakistani leaders and officials have made some laconic remarks on the subject from time to time. In a press conference in Islamabad on May 30, 1998, Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed said, “Our nuclear doctrine is premised on deterring aggression, whether conventional or nuclear.” Second, the government has initiated a process for evolving the doctrines, but it remains veiled in secrecy. Pakistani officials have stated: “It is a fact that while India and Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons they are still in the process of evolving their respective nuclear doctrines.”32 Thus, Pakistani decisionmakers have clearly established a linkage between the development of their doctrine and that of India. This linkage, however, will lead them down a tortuous and unpredictable path. Their hopes to “evolve a common strategic vocabulary” via the Lahore memorandum of understanding (February 1999), so that India and Pakistan would move toward “meaningful arms control measures,” seems anomalous. India does not want to “accept any arms control fetters.”33 Furthermore, Pakistan cannot have a substantive dialogue with India on minimum deterrents unless both countries are prepared to exchange information on capabilities in the nuclear and missile fields. Discussion on confidence-building measures (CBMs) has been a regular feature of the dialogue between the governments of India and Pakistan. On paper, there exist at least seventeen official CBMs. The prime ministers of Pakistan and India have a direct hotline to communicate with each other. A dedicated communication link (DCL) between the Pakistani and Indian directors general of military operations (DGMOs)

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exists to avert an accidental war. Both countries have agreed on several measures to notify each other of any military exercises to maintain transparency. CBMs have also been affirmed in the Tashkent Declaration, Simla Accord, Agreement on the Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities, and Joint Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. However, the history of these official CBMs is replete with betrayals on the part of both countries. On numerous occasions, both sides have cheated each other. Instead of restoring confidence, these measures have been used to take advantage of each other. Mutual trust has been conspicuously missing. The most telling example of this relates to chemical weapons. In August 1992, Pakistan and India agreed to a joint declaration on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. Pakistan alleged that later, at the time of joining the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), India declared having stocks as well as production facilities for the express purpose of dealing “with any situation arising out of possible use of chemical warfare against India.”34 Another example is the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, signed by Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto and her Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in December 1988. Among other things, it required an annual exchange of lists detailing the location of all nuclear facilities in each country. However, when the lists were finally exchanged in 1992, each side reportedly left off one facility.35 Similar experiences have occurred with other official CBMs like nonintrusion of air space and nonharassment of diplomatic personnel. For instance, a commitment to keep delivery systems nonweaponized (as mentioned in the Lahore memorandum) has not met with any progress because neither side will agree to data exchanges at a nascent stage of missile production programs or revelation of missile characteristics and numbers. Verification might require data exchanges on missile inventories, their location, periodic radiation checks on missile nose cones, and investigation of their absence outside designated sites in situations of doubt.36 (Because some of these weapons are road mobile, if they are not in their location they may have been deployed.) Given the state of Indian-Pakistani relations, agreeing to all this certainly would be a tall order. Against this backdrop, the Pakistani and Indian foreign secretaries, meeting for their first formal dialogue following the test in October 1998 in Islamabad, exchanged a new cluster of rather ambitious but largely mutually exclusive CBMs. Addressing a press conference on October 18, 1998, following the dialogue, Ahmed said that Pakistan had proposed CBMs “which will signify our commitment to the reduction of tension, nonuse of force and peaceful settlement of disputes.” The framework sug-

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gested by Pakistan included proposals for the conclusion of an agreement on nonuse of force (a nonaggression pact), the prevention of a nuclear and ballistic missiles race, risk reduction mechanisms, the avoidance of nuclear conflict, the formalization of a moratorium on nuclear testing, the noninduction of antiballistic missile (ABM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems, a nuclear doctrine of minimum deterrent capability, and the mutual and balanced reduction of forces and armaments. With regard to Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan proposed some nine security-related and twenty-three human rights–related “interim” CBMs. India matched them by suggesting its own proposals on an agreement on prevention of nuclear war, including through accidental or unauthorized use of these weapons, extension of the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, advance notification of ballistic missile tests, improved communication links for verification of data exchange, and implementation of existing agreements. At the foreign secretaries’ meeting in October 1998, the two sides only exchanged their proposals. However, at the Lahore summit, the prime ministers of India and Pakistan agreed to “take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.” Their foreign secretaries, on the same occasion, agreed to provide each other with advance notification of ballistic missile flight tests and undertook to conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard. However, these pious intentions were put to the test when the two countries tested their ballistic missiles in April 1999. Pakistan complained that India failed to notify it about the Agni 2 test on April 11, 1999. Pakistanis said that they learned about the test after an inquiry made by their high commissioner in New Delhi. Although confirming their intention to test, India did not provide information about the time and the date, they alleged. This drove home the point that efforts by both sides were tentative and primarily designed to gain international respectability. However, an enunciation of nuclear policies, objectives, and doctrines may be more achievable. Pakistani experts have urged the government to “make a clearer declaration, linking its doctrine to realistic and rational strategic objectives. An ambitious or ill-conceived decision on nuclear deterrence by Pakistan may push India into a more competitive nuclear stance. Over-reliance on nuclear deterrence by Pakistan could thus prove counter-productive, dangerous, and financially exorbitant.”37 Pakistan has declined to accept India’s offer of an agreement on no first use and countered this proposal by suggesting negotiation on a comprehensive nonag-

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gression treaty encompassing both nuclear and missile fields. Some Indian analysts have taken it for granted that a nuclear first strike is a principal part of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine: “Unless a nation wishes to practice deterrence through solely a first-strike posture, as Pakistan is doing, it has to invest in second-strike assets.”38 The director general of interservices public relations in Pakistan has ruled out any move to downsize the army but did clarify that various options were under consideration to engage the military in the uplift of the country.39 This statement leads one to speculate whether Pakistan is planning to resort to a nuclear war with India at the first serious provocation and may well want to reinforce its conventional capabilities to tackle such a situation. It is not clear how far Pakistan will have to be pushed to decide on a first nuclear strike. In the ultimate analysis, situational variables may make all the difference. Pakistan’s doctrine will also have to take into account whether its nuclear capabilities should be limited to preparation for first strike or whether it should develop second-strike capabilities. It is generally assumed that Pakistan’s doctrine will inherently revolve around a first strike. A number of factors support that assumption. First, Pakistan’s asymmetry with India in the conventional field makes a first strike an equalizer. That is why Pakistan has repeatedly rejected India’s proposal for an agreement on no first use. Second, the development of a first-strike capability is less cumbersome for Pakistan. Investment in retaliatory or second-strike capabilities requires intense planning and enormous resources, which Pakistan cannot afford. One may also assume that Pakistan’s pattern of fighting wars may necessitate the targeting of population centers and cities rather than strategic and military facilities; Pakistan does not have the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons to deal with sophisticated targets and, therefore, may just opt for inflicting “grievous harm” against population centers. Big population centers wiped out by nuclear bombs constitute unacceptable damage. PUBLIC OPINION

Pakistan’s public opinion has been traditionally supportive of its nuclear policy. Following the Indian tests, an overwhelming majority of the public wanted Pakistan to test. A survey, sponsored by the Joan B. Kroc Institute of the University of Notre Dame, before India’s detonation showed 61 percent of the Pakistani elite supporting Pakistan’s official policy of keeping “the option open,” whereas 32 percent favored acquisition of the overt

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nuclear weapons capability. As many as 73 percent cited another Indian test as sufficient justification for Pakistani weaponization.40 A Gallup poll published just a day before Pakistan took the nuclear plunge found that 70 percent of the urban population surveyed favored a nuclear test; only 30 percent advised restraint. More than 80 percent said there was a high or modest chance of war with India, and 64 percent believed that India would use its nuclear weapons in case of war.41 Support for the nuclear weapons program remained after the tests. Nevertheless, the last few years have seen the formation of small pockets within the elite ruling class that are prepared to think “rationally” on these issues. There has been no consensus on a reactionary policy based on the Indian nuclear policy after the tests. Some Pakistani analysts have called for an opening up of the defense policymaking process so as to make it more responsive to public opinion. This trend has been accompanied by a new mood for deliberation on nuclear doctrines, command and control systems, permissive action links (PALs) to prevent the unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons, intelligence, and transparency. Movement in these areas is circumscribed by (1) the defense and foreign policy establishment’s unwillingness to share sensitive information, (2) inadequate substantive work in these areas, (3) a shortage of expertise on defense and nuclear issues in Pakistan, and (4) a very narrow base of educated people interested in the substantive terms of the debate. According to a Stimson Center report published before the detonations, there were nearly forty dialogue channels operating in South Asia, ranging from nonofficial forums that serve as testing grounds for new policy initiatives to people-to-people exchanges that enhance transborder links. However, when the debate whether Pakistan should go ahead with a tit-for-tat answer to India’s nuclear detonation was at its peak, the group suggesting restraint was too small to be counted. Although it was intensely debated whether Pakistan should test or not, those opposing it were branded as traitors. An overwhelming majority called for detonation. The major chunk of the population—the lower-class and lower-middle-class sectors in urban areas as well as the rural areas of Pakistan—supported a nuclear race with India. This huge segment of the society, whose opinion was also influenced by the press and the government’s pro-nuclear statements, clamored for Pakistan’s retaliatory tests in May 1998. Hardly any subscribers to the view that Pakistan should unilaterally give up its nuclear program reside in Pakistan. According to polls, a marginal 6 percent favor the renunciation of nuclear weapons.42 Opinion in Pakistan on the nuclear issue revolves around two mainstream schools of thought: one that supports full “bomb-for-a-bomb and missile-for-a-mis-

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sile” nuclear competition with India and another that takes the middle ground. The second school advocates neither a dismantling of the nuclear program and renunciation of nuclear weapons nor a full-fledged nuclear competition with India. No matter which group held power—democratic leaders or the military—public thinking about the nuclear program would not undergo any drastic change. Politicians frustrated with the moderate elements in public opinion have even demanded that the public abide by their promise “to eat grass but make the bomb.”43 It has been suggested that at certain times Indo-Pakistani leaders tried to address the nuclear and Kashmir issues rationally, but public opinion was not ripe for compromise. Former prime ministers Sharif and Inder Kumar Gujral tried to bridge differences between their countries, but the domestic atmosphere in these two countries forced them to pause. The Sharif government’s decision to open trade with India came under severe criticism. When the Pakistan-India People to People Forum organized a get-together of people on the Wagah border to mark the fiftieth anniversary of their freedom on the eve of August 14, 1997, the press made a big issue out of it. Jamaat-i-Islami issued warnings that people trying to participate in the function would do so “at the risk of their lives.” Only a handful of people dared to turn up at the border. Similarly, when a seminar was organized to discuss the repercussions of Pakistan’s detonation of the bomb, the participants, including respected academic and known pacifist Abdul Hameed Nayyar, were physically assaulted by right-wing journalists and workers from Shabab-i-Milli, the youth wing of Jamaat-iIslami.44 In contrast, Sharif and Vajpayee were better prepared to handle public opinion when they met in Lahore in February 1999, although after the summit, they had to peddle their particularistic interpretations of the declaration in Lahore to pacify their domestic constituencies. ISLAMIC GROUPS

Traditionally, religious parties like Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-iIslam have never mustered enough votes to play a dominant role in parliamentary politics. But their influence as a pressure group is disproportionately significant. The last few years have seen a resurgence of extremist religious groups in Pakistan deriving strength from the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, and the sectarian Shia-Sunni strife fueled by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Their frontline role in the proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir gave further impetus to their growth. For most of these groups, people like

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Ramzi Yousaf, the accused in the World Trade Center bombing; Aimal Kansi, who was sentenced to the death penalty for killings outside the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters in Virginia; and more recently, Osama bin Laden, are crusaders, not criminals. Lashkar-eTayyaba, the military wing of the Ahle Hadith sect, is considered as “the most effective fighting unit” among these groups after Harkatul Ansar, a party declared by the U.S. State Department to be a terrorist group.45 Both these groups are involved in the Islamic jihad (holy war) extending from Afghanistan to Kashmir. Mujahideen (Islamic warriors) return from the front to report on their fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan to the annual congregations, attended by hundreds of thousands of volunteers from as far away as Myanmar, the Philippines, Chechnya, and Eritrea.46 Not only are religious parties more prominent in the country, but also the mainstream political parties are becoming increasingly religious in their orientation. Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has entered into a political alliance with religious parties. Nawaz Sharif tried to please religious elements by attempting to introduce an amendment to Pakistan’s constitution that sought to implement the shari’a (Islamic code of life). If this amendment had been passed by the Senate (it had already succeeded in the National Assembly), Pakistan would have more closely resembled theocratic states like Saudi Arabia and Iran than the “moderate” nation that it claims to be. Almost all religious parties were happy at Sharif’s ouster in October 1999. The major reason was his withdrawal from Kargil. Both the Lahore declaration and the Washington accord were resented by religious groups. General Musharraf was initially seen as the savior who would pursue a hawkish agenda against India. The inclusion of a religious scholar in the newly formed National Security Council was allegedly an attempt to appease the religious groups. But reports of Musharraf’s “secular inclinations” and his liking for a Turkish model when he spent a few years in Turkey as a youth have already caused concern among religious parties. Jamat-i-Islami’s Qazi Hussain Ahmad censured the induction of liberals from the IMF and World Bank in the cabinet. On the nuclear issue, religious parties are extremely hawkish, rallying against the government whenever it tries to go “soft” on issues like the signing of the CTBT.47 THE U.S. ROLE

Between 1974 and May 1998, Pakistan advocated nuclear restraint in South Asia while at the same time developing its nuclear capabilities. Its

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proposals on a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in South Asia, renunciation of acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, simultaneous signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards remained unanswered by India. The United States and other nuclear weapons states were lukewarm toward Pakistan’s proposals. In the aftermath of the May 1998 tests, the United States acted as an ardent promoter of the four nonproliferation benchmarks for India and Pakistan, namely the CTBT, the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), export controls, and a restraint regime. Taking its lead from the Americans, Pakistanis developed their own proposals on a restraint regime and presented them to India in October 1998 during the talks between the foreign secretaries. In 1991, Pakistan had proposed convening a five-nation conference to discuss conventional and nuclear restraint, but this proposal was not accepted by India. After the tests, India’s dialogue with the United States on security and nonproliferation issues seemed to work to Pakistan’s advantage. In a sense, the trilateral dialogue initiated in 1998 between the United States, India, and Pakistan was a revival of Pakistan’s proposal for multilateral talks on the whole range of security and nonproliferation issues, which Pakistan would have liked the United States to discuss eight years before. This time, India did not veto such talks because their modified format, with the United States talking to India and Pakistan separately, gave India sufficient leeway. The Pakistani government repeatedly asked the United States to remove all sanctions against Pakistan, particularly those imposed under the Pressler amendment. Larry Pressler is seen as a symbol of the discriminatory U.S. policy toward Pakistan on nonproliferation. However, Pakistan’s debacle at Kargil severely damaged both U.S. support for Pakistan and the nonproliferation aims that were being pursued in South Asia by the United States. In addition, the military coup in October 1999, though not condemned by the United States, prevented “business as usual” with Pakistan.48 As of this writing, the Pressler amendment has not been repealed by the U.S. Congress, and sanctions against Pakistan are currently more extensive than sanctions on India, a situation further complicated by U.S. legislation against countries under military rule. Thus the United States has a critical role to play. For Pakistan it would remain the primary interlocutor, not only in removing sanctions but in engaging India in a dialogue. U.S. involvement would not alter any element of the Indo-Pakistani dynamic. However, Pakistan hopes that the United States would use its leverage with India, which could be decreasing as analysts suggest, to help address the most difficult issues, including

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the issue of Kashmir. The United States would also work closely with Pakistan on the modalities and rules and regulations governing export controls of tangible and intangible technology. Pakistan has repeatedly stated that it would welcome any assistance from the United States in the area of command and control systems. Further, Pakistan would remain amenable and sensitive to U.S. criticism on such issues as the functioning of democracy, good governance, human rights, narcotics, and terrorism. Pakistan would also aggressively solicit U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI). CONCLUSION

The release of the Indian Draft Report in August 1999 delivered a decapitating blow to the strategic restraint regime (SRR) being advocated in South Asia. The question of whether this may also force an unacknowledged delinkage of Pakistan’s nuclear policy from that of India remains to be answered. Despite promises to “upgrade” its capability to ensure “survivability and credibility,” the new Pakistani foreign minister has also categorically denied engaging in “any nuclear competition or arms race.”49 India continues to say that its concerns are not Pakistan-specific and that India’s wider considerations about its own security, particularly regarding China, will have to be addressed for any viable dispensation of arms control and a restraint regime. Pakistan insists that its program is India-specific. This response also conditions Pakistan’s behavior and responses, yet an arms race per se may not necessarily be the outcome. Pakistan’s development of its own nuclear capabilities need not necessarily follow rigidly the tit-for-tat (or knee-jerk) formula that it has been accused of using. Having consecutively responded to India’s developments in the nuclear and missile fields, especially since May 1998, Pakistan has already established the veracity of its “respondent” plea. Even if Pakistan’s economy were to reach its optimal level in a fairly short period, the gap between India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capabilities can continue to widen. Deployment of nuclear weapons may be an area where Pakistan is put under considerable pressure to closely monitor and match India, which will be of crucial importance in high-tension and near-conflict situations. Nevertheless, a restraint regime, though in Pakistan’s interest, is unlikely to succeed with its South Asian parameters. Pakistan would like to put U.S. weight behind its own effort to persuade India to agree to a strategic restraint regime. It would also like the United States to use its clout with India to convince the latter to address

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outstanding unresolved issues, particularly the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. General Musharraf has not only shown a keen interest in the IndoPakistani dialogue but has given no indications of massive investments in an elaborate nuclear deterrent. Though Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar has admitted to Pakistan’s intentions of periodic upgrades, Pakistan may prefer to be reticent on matters such as the exact threshold of provocation required for Pakistan to make a preemptive nuclear strike. Therefore, neither Kargil nor the Draft Report have altered Pakistan’s nuclear policy. After the release of the report, Pakistan’s complaints of the damage it had dealt the SRR in South Asia and nonproliferation in general seem to have been taken in stride by the international community, which is fast adjusting to a nuclear South Asia. Even after India’s definition of its rather elaborate “minimum credible nuclear deterrent” in the draft, Pakistan seems to prefer to take time to deliberate upon its policies and keep its pronouncements ambiguous and noncommittal. Reticence could serve Pakistan’s interests as it hesitates over precipitously declaring its assets or divulging information that could compromise its “supreme national interests.” It should also give Pakistan sufficient room for maneuver and flexibility. However, Pakistan cannot escape from the inevitable responsibility of doing its homework on developing a nuclear doctrine and streamlining command and control systems, which according to General Musharraf has been taken care of to quite an extent.50 The exercise of internal consultations and discussions in this regard will have to be brought to a conclusion, but Pakistan will not be obliged to share with India or the rest of the world its conclusions on Pakistani strategic thinking until a higher degree of transparency vis-à-vis India becomes a reality. And while Pakistani decisionmakers wait for India to provide more information, they can harmonize their own positions, improve coordination between various agencies responsible for nuclear and missile management, and strengthen the institutional framework dealing with them. In the meantime, emerging trends of extremism in Indian and Pakistani politics need to be watched closely. The ascendancy of extremist forces in either country could heighten volatility in South Asia and make the nuclear situation highly fissiparous. A developing, prosperous Pakistani society will be less prone to espousing and fortifying an environment of chronic hostility. In this context, the role of U.S. FDI and regional cooperation between India and Pakistan in economic and commercial fields will be of crucial importance. A sustained dialogue, launched imaginatively by Vajpayee and Sharif, may offer prospects for

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peace and development in the region, as Pakistan delicately balances its reactionary syndrome vis-à-vis India. NOTES

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Unity of India: Collected Writings (London: Lindsay Drummond, 1946), 353–354. 2. These include A. Q. Khan’s interview, General Zia’s statements, and Foreign Secretary Shehreyar Khan’s disclosure right up to Nawaz Sharif’s admission at Neela Butt that Pakistan had the bomb. 3. Prime Minister Sharif, quoted in Kathy Gannon, “Pakistan Sets Off 5 Nuclear Explosions,” Washington Times, May 29, 1998. 4. Aktar Hasan, “Second Round Completed: Short-range Missile Shaheen Tested,” Dawn (Karachi), April 16, 1999. 5. “All Aspects of Nuclear Tests Evaluated,” bureau report, Dawn (Karachi), May 14, 1998. 6. Paul Bedard, “Pakistan Rejects Clinton: G-8 Says No Sanctions on India,” Washington Times, May 19, 1998. 7. Former Pakistani federal minister Chaudhary Anwer Aziz’s view that the United States should offer some kind of a security umbrella, like those extended to Japan or Germany, may have been a bit far-fetched, but UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also spoke of extending some kind of security guarantees to Pakistan. 8. Though apparently open to more tangible economic and security alternatives to allay its fears vis-à-vis India, Pakistan remained wary of temporary warm hugs that turned quickly into cold shoulders in times of crisis, as in the 1965 and 1971wars with India, when U.S. military assistance was withheld. 9. U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing Transcript, Friday, May 15, 1998, James P. Rubin, http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9805/980515db.html. 10. On the occasion of announcing a presidential waiver on sanctions, White House spokesperson Mike McCurry, in a press statement on November 7, 1998, said: “Like our decision in July to support IMF negotiations with Pakistan, this decision is in response only to Pakistan’s financial emergency . . . further progress on the benchmarks agreed by the P-5 and G-8 is necessary and achievable.” 11. A bill entitled “Suspension of Certain Sanctions Against India and Pakistan” was introduced in the Senate by Senator Sam Brownback on March 16, 1999. It was sponsored, among others, by Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 12. On April 11, 1999, reacting to the Indian test of an Agni 2 missile, the Pakistani foreign office spokesperson said: “India was continuously engaged in massive acquisition of weaponry from all sources in addition to its large indigenous production. . . . Pakistan is obliged to maintain a deterrence in the interest of its security and peace and stability of the region. Our indigenous missile program is part of this deterrence.” 13. Nadeem Malik, “Country Living Beyond Its Means: Shaukat Aziz,” News (Karachi), November 20, 1999. 14. Ibid. 15. See Pervaiz Hoodbhoy, in Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).

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16. Nawaz Sharif resigned in 1993 as the chief of army staff (COAS) sat in the Prime Minister House. The government of Mohammed Khan Junejo (1988) and Benazir Bhutto’s two governments (1990 and 1997) were dissolved by the president. 17. See note 16. The military was aware that a coup would further isolate Pakistan internationally at a time when it needed help from abroad. The Cold War days, “when the United States supported a Pakistani dictator as part of a proxy war to parry the Soviet Union’s influence in Afghanistan,” were over. 18. Amir Mateen, “Vaj Bhai Has the Last Laugh,” The Tribune (Islamabad), October 1–7, 1998, 4. 19. “Time to Focus on Smaller Provinces’ Fears: COAS for National Security Council,” Dawn (Karachi), October 6, 1998. 20. Ayesha Siddiqua, director of naval research, “Defense Decision Making in Pakistan,” paper read at CSIS, Washington, D.C., April 1999. 21. Lawrence Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 17. 22. Siddiqua, “Defense Decision Making in Pakistan.” 23. Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 24. Quoted in speech by Ahmad Kamal, Pakistani ambassador to UN, at Ninth Annual International Arms Control Conference, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 16, 1999. 25. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s speech to the Indian parliament, December 15, 1998. 26. Kamal, speech at Ninth Annual International Arms Control Conference. 27. Masood Khan, political counselor at the Pakistani embassy, statement at Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs symposium at Carnegie Endowment, Washington, D.C., February 22, 1999. 28. Kamal, speech at Ninth Annual International Arms Control Conference. 29. Agha Shahi, Zulfiquar Ali Khan, and Abdul Sattar, “Securing Nuclear Peace,” Dawn (Karachi), October 5, 1999. 30. Rodney W. Jones, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture II: Arms Control Diplomacy,” Dawn (Karachi), September 15, 1999. 31. Amit Baruah, “We Don’t Have a Nuclear Button, Says Musharraf,” Hindu (New Delhi), November 24, 1999. 32. Kamal, speech at Ninth Annual International Arms Control Conference. 33. Brahma Chellaney, “New Nuclear Clarity with Old Waffle,” Hindustan Times, January 3, 1999. 34. Malehea Lodhi, “Nuclear Risk Reduction and Conflict-Resolution in South Asia,” News (Islamabad), November 28, 1998. 35. “Strengthening CBMs in South Asia,” June 18, 1998, South Asia Policy Brief, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C. 36. Nazir Kamal, “Pakistani Perceptions and Prospects of Reducing the Nuclear Danger in South Asia,” Cooperative Monitoring Center occasional paper no. 6, January 1999, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 24–25. 37. Ibid., 26. 38. Chellaney, “New Nuclear Clarity.” 39. “No Move to Downsize Army, Says ISPR Chief,” bureau report from Islamabad, Dawn, May 20, 1999. 40. Ahmed and Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb, 21. 41. Zaffar Abbas, “The Hardest Choice,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 54, no. 4 (July–August 1998). 42. Ahmed and Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb.

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43. The statement was made by Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif when he was asked about Pakistan’s economic crisis in a press conference in Washington, D.C. See Shaheen Sehbai, “Why Don’t People Eat Grass?” Dawn (Karachi), August 21, 1998. 44. Eqbal Ahmed, “Reason as Spectator,” Dawn (Karachi), June 7, 1998. 45. Khalid Ahmad, “The Power of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba,” Friday Times (Lahore), November 20–27, 1998. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Quote from Mike Hammer, a spokesman for the White House National Security Council, Reuters, October 28, 1999. 49. Inaugurating a seminar titled “Pakistan’s Response to the Indian Nuclear Doctrine” at the Institute of Strategic Studies, the foreign minister declared: “In order to ensure the survivability and credibility of the deterrent, Pakistan will have to maintain, preserve and upgrade its capability.” Quoted in Hasan Aktar, “Sattar’s Address at ISS: Pakistan to Reply If India Tests Nuclear Device,” Dawn (Karachi), November 26, 1999. 50. General Musharraf has stated: “As far as the control of the nuclear system goes, let me tell you that I had prepared a nuclear strategy that I had handed to the previous Government in December last year. We had a command and control system for all our nuclear and missile assets.” See Baruah, “We Don’t Have a Nuclear Button.”

8 South Asia’s Ballistic Missile Ambitions Ben Sheppard

The debate over the consequences of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent has so far placed insufficient attention on the ballistic missile perspective. Although there is considerable discussion both within the international community and in South Asia on the ways and means for the new nuclear powers to stem their weapons programs, there has so far been insufficient examination of the alarming growth in Islamabad’s and New Delhi’s ballistic missile capabilities. The spate of ballistic missile tests in April 1999 involving India’s 2,500-kilometer-range Agni 2, Pakistan’s Ghauri 2/Hatf 6 (2,000- to 2,300-kilometer-range) and Shaheen 1/Hatf 4 (750-kilometer range) pose a greater threat to South Asia’s stability than the nuclear tests the year before. The May 1998 nuclear tests did not represent a major augmentation of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear capability in real terms, but served to underline the existing realization that both countries had already been nuclear powers for several years. Leonard Spector writes that by 1988, a rudimentary system of undeclared nuclear deterrence was emerging on the Indian subcontinent, based on the recognized capability of both states to deploy nuclear weapons during any future conflict.1 Indeed, as President Mohammed Zia-ul Haq declared in July 1988: “The present programs of India and Pakistan have a lot of ambiguities, and therefore in the eyes of each other, they have reached a particular level, and that level is good enough to create an impression of deterrence.”2 Although the tests provided invaluable data for their respective nuclear programs, both powers already possessed demonstrated nuclear designs: India from its “peaceful” nuclear explosion in 1974 and Pakistan from its ability to obtain crucial Chinese nuclear technology, including 171

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blueprints for developing a nuclear warhead for the imported 280-kilometer-range M-11 missile. The alarming change occurred in December 1998, when India’s prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, informed parliament that his country would pursue a “minimum nuclear deterrent.” In August 1999 came publication of the Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, which argued for a “minimum but credible deterrence.” This goal underlined the subcontinent’s movement toward a new but a precarious form of stability through nuclear ambiguity based on surface to surface missiles (SSMs) and with it the gradual slide toward full weaponization. “Weaponization” here refers to the permanent deployment of nuclear-armed SSMs that could be launched within a very short warning period. This would involve the marriage of nuclear warheads to SSMs, the placement of a number of mobile ballistic missiles on constant alert, and the construction of missile silos. At present, it is believed that India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear-capable SSMs are kept in storage, with warheads separated from their delivery vehicles, and would only be made fully operational in the event of a major crisis. The components are therefore effectively disassembled. Although India’s announcement about developing a minimum nuclear deterrent was seen as likely in the light of the nationalist stance the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has taken on defense issues, this declared policy seems to have forced Pakistan to pursue the same path, with all the perils that could ensue. In addition, the tests have provided a further impetus for both sides to accelerate their SSM programs. It is important to emphasize that India and Pakistan have not embarked upon a regional arms race akin to that of the superpowers during the Cold War but rather continue to augment their nuclear and ballistic missile programs in the absence of a reason not to do so.3 Neither Islamabad nor New Delhi have the money or intention to embark on an extensive arms race. Although the augmentation of SSM capabilities has been gradual over the years, both India and Pakistan have reached a key threshold in this weapon system’s evolution, with India in the late 1990s inducting the nuclear-capable Prithvi into its military doctrine. India has developed one of the most sophisticated SSM programs in the developing world. The full potential of New Delhi’s SSM indigenous production capability has only been held up by the political will to embark on a wider program. The May 1998 nuclear tests demonstrated all too clearly Vajpayee’s willingness to defy international outrage and inevitable sanctions to implement the nationalist BJP’s defense policies. Meanwhile, Pakistan has made rapid progress in recent years in its SSM capability because of extensive foreign assistance, notably from China and North Korea. Until the 1990s, Pakistan’s

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indigenous SSM program could only provide short-range and highly inaccurate missiles, which included the Hatf 1 and Hatf 2, with ranges of 50 and 300 kilometers, respectively. This dramatically changed following Islamabad’s access to Chinese and North Korean SSM-related technologies, which paved the way for the development of missiles with intercontinental ranges. In this chapter, I focus on four issues left aside in the general debate about postnuclear Asia. First, I discuss the theory that long-term stability, brought to the subcontinent by the conventional “balance-imbalance” of power, is being critically eroded by the induction of India’s battlefield Prithvi missiles. Second, the continuing dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, coupled with greater reliance upon SSMs for nuclear deterrence, has eroded the security provided by India’s policy of existential deterrence. Third, the lack of Indian and Pakistani command and control capabilities gives rise for concern in preventing an inadvertent nuclear war. Finally, the possession of SSMs that can strike deep inside their opponents’ territory represents effective means for exerting terror on population centers during a crisis or conflict. Before exploring these issues, it is necessary to lay out the ballistic missile programs of Pakistan and India. PAKISTAN

In April 1999 Pakistan tested the 2,000- to 2,300-kilometer-range Ghauri 2/Hatf 6 SSM, a year after the 1,500-kilometer-range Ghauri 1/Hatf 5 test flight, which itself signified a major advancement in the country’s missile program. U.S. intelligence revealed that the technology for the nuclearcapable Ghauri 1 missile was not acquired from China, Islamabad’s longterm missile provider, but from a new source, North Korea.4 Ghauri 2 is also strongly believed to be based on North Korean missile technology. The liquid-fuel Ghauri missiles are developed by Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), led by Abdul Qadeer Khan. Although still heavily reliant upon imported missile technologies, the North Korean connection has provided Islamabad the option to acquire long-range missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), if it so wished. This marks a major achievement for a program that has been marked as a priority for only a decade. Until the late 1980s, Pakistan focused primarily upon obtaining a nuclear weapons capability, not ballistic missiles. The 1989 Indian test of the long-range Agni ballistic missile focused Pakistan’s military establishment on the need to develop the means of delivering a nuclear strike

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with a high degree of certainty.5 The first test of India’s 2,500-kilometerrange Agni missile in 1989 highlighted Pakistan’s inferior missile capability, which comprised at that time only the Hatf 1 (80-kilometer-range) and Hatf 2 (300-kilometer-range) SSMs. Based on sounding rocket technology, Hatf 1 and 2 lacked guidance and control functions.6 Unlike many other missile proliferators such as Israel and India, Pakistan has no space launch program and, therefore, no civilian space rockets to convert to military missiles. Because Islamabad has a very limited scientific and industrial base, any Pakistani military missiles have had to be developed from foreign components with foreign technical assistance or obtained as a complete missile system.7 Pakistan’s three decades of experience in the development of sounding rocket technology has provided the country the basis to achieve its principal goal: possession of a nuclear-capable missile force with the needed range to hold significant Indian targets at risk.8 Islamabad has received significant international support in its quest for ballistic missiles. France, Germany, and possibly the United States have at times attempted to assist Pakistan in its efforts to acquire rocket technology. Of particular importance is China’s sale to Pakistan of Mseries SSMs, components, launchers, and related technology. Pakistan has proven its ability to make up for deficiencies in its infrastructure by using an intricate level of dummy companies, transshipment through multiple countries, and false bills of lading to import technology.9 In 1992 Pakistan received from China about thirty M-11 (CSS-7/DF-11) missiles, currently stored at Sargodha Air Force Base, west of Lahore.10 Pakistan’s procurement of this weapon system was due in part to Washington’s refusal to deliver the F-16s in 1990, after Islamabad had already paid for them. The M-11 missiles, which are capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to a range of 280 kilometers, can probably be deployed in the field within days of an order to become operational.11 A U.S. intelligence draft report concludes that “it is probable” that Pakistani engineers have developed nuclear warheads compact enough to fit atop these missiles,12 given that Pakistan also received from China a demonstrated nuclear weapon design of a warhead small enough for delivery by a ballistic missile.13 In 1997 Pakistan tested the 600- to 800-kilometer-range Hatf 3, believed to be based on either China’s M-9 (CSS-6/DF-15) SSM or an upgraded version of the Hatf 2. Pakistan may well have replaced the original Hatf 2 and Hatf 3 programs with China’s M-11 and M-9 SSMs, respectively, adding to the difficulty in tracking the various variants of Pakistan’s SSMs.14 The outcome of replacing the Hatf 3 with the M-9 could be the

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750-kilometer-range Shaheen 1/Hatf 4 missile, which saw its first flight test in April 1999, less than a month after the missile was first publicly displayed at the annual Republic Day parade on March 23. The Shaheen 1’s existence had first been revealed in June 1998 by Samar Mubarak Mund, the head of Pakistan’s National Development Complex (NDC).15 Thus, instead of making its own weapons from scratch, Pakistan’s SSM development program imports a complete missile system, including blueprints, indigenously produces the missile, and then renames the weapon. Reliance on Chinese missile technology has in recent years extended to the provision of an indigenous production capability. U.S. intelligence disclosed in August 1996 that Pakistan was building a missile factory, using blueprints and equipment supplied by China for the indigenous production of the M-11 or M-9/Hatf 3 missile.16 According to Mund, the missile factory has been operational since mid-1998 and is manufacturing the Shaheen 1/Hatf 4. Mund’s NDC has also developed the Shaheen 2 using Chinese solid-fuel rocket technology. The new missile has a range of 2,000 kilometers but had not been flight tested by the end of the 1990s. Clearly, China continues to play a significant role in Pakistan’s missile program, thus further aggravating the region’s instability. But China is not the only country involved. The arrival of North Korea in the late 1990s as a major contributor to Pakistan’s SSM program is especially alarming. On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage rocket referred to as the Taepodong in an attempt to place a satellite into earth orbit. Despite failing to do so, North Korea launched the Kwangmyongsong 1 into orbit, and in that launch all three stages separated successfully. According to former U.S. secretary of defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, who in 1997–1998 led an independent congressional commission examining SSM proliferation: “The three stage ballistic missile launched . . . suggests that North Korea is only a relatively short step from a deployable ICBM capability.”17 The transfer of North Korea’s 1,500kilometer-range Nodong 1 technology to Pakistan for the Hatf 5 and Ghauri 1 and Gharui 2 raises the serious prospect of Islamabad acquiring Pyongyang’s multistage Taepodong rocket technology. This would provide the foundation for Pakistan to develop ICBMs. Additional longrange missiles under development include the 3,000-kilometer-range Ghauri 3, which may incorporate North Korea’s Taepodong propulsion technology. Strategically, Pakistan has no need to develop missiles with a range greater than 3,000 kilometers. The furthest distance from the most westerly points in Pakistan on the border with Iran and Afghanistan and the far northwestern corner to the most southerly point of India is 3,000

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kilometers. In view of this, Pakistan may be content with developing SSMs with ranges no greater than 3,000 kilometers. Having the option of deploying SSMs at the furthest distance from the Indian border and still being able to target any part of India would enhance the survivability of Islamabad’s nuclear-tipped missile force. INDIA

New Delhi has one of the most advanced SSM programs in the developing world, derived in part from its sophisticated space program.18 Since the May 1998 nuclear tests, India has stepped up its missile program, developing not only land-based ballistic missiles but also sea-launched missiles. Vajpayee’s minimum nuclear deterrent doctrine envisions a triadic nuclear defense. In addition to having acquired an extensive research and development infrastructure, India continues to aggressively seek technology from other states, particularly from Russia.19 Indian research into ballistic missiles began in the 1960s, under the direction of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which was established in January 1958. In 1967, India began to develop sounding rockets, which became the basis for its satellite launch vehicle (SLV) program in the 1970s.20 Shortly after the successful launch of a satellite using the indigenously built SLV 3, New Delhi established the integrated guided missile development program (IGMDP) in July 1983, with the aim of achieving an indigenous SSM infrastructure. The first ballistic missile developed and tested by the IGMDP was the Prithvi short-range missile. Designed without foreign assistance by the Indian Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) in Hyderabad, the Prithvi program has three variants: a battlefield support version for the Indian army with a range of 150 kilometers (Prithvi SS-150) and an ability to carry a payload of 1,000 kilograms; a medium-range missile with a 250-kilometer range (SS-250) and a warhead weight of 500–750 kilograms for the Indian air force; and a boosted liquid-propellant version with a range of 350 kilometers (SS-350) and warhead weight of 500–570 kilograms.21 Particularly alarming is Indian journalist Pravin Sawhney’s assertion that all versions of the Prithvi are nuclear-capable and can be fitted with free-fall nuclear weapons with minimal fuss or reconfiguration.22 The Prithvi SS-150 has now entered service, and the work on the air force version of the missile has been completed.23 Of particular interest is the development of India’s long-range missiles, notably the Agni 1 and Agni 2 SSMs. The Agni 1 has been tested

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successfully on three occasions, most recently in February 1994 to a range of 1,500 kilometers, and an upgraded version, Agni 2, was tested in April 1999. After the latter test, India’s defense minister, George Fernandes, announced that the Agni 2 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) had become operational. In view of second-tier missile powers initiating serial production of SSMs after one or two test launches, India may well have a number of Agni 2s operational by 2001. According to a missile research plan submitted by the DRDO in mid-1999, twenty Agni 2s are to be manufactured by 2001 at a cost of $150 million.24 The induction of the Agni into India’s nuclear doctrine was primarily held up by the government’s five-year delay in ordering further tests of the missile after the 1994 Agni 1 test rather than technical difficulties. The April 1999 Agni 2 test followed months of speculation as to whether the BJP would go ahead with the Agni following Vajpayee’s December 1998 parliamentary statement, which offered the strongest indication that his country would resume the Agni testing program. The parliamentary statement revealed that an Agni missile with an extended range was currently under development and that flight tests of Agni 2 were due to be “conducted fully in accordance with established international practice.”25 India almost certainly possesses the capability to develop an ICBM. During India’s temporary suspension of the Agni missile program, New Delhi continued to gain crucial technology for its ballistic missile program from continued development of its space program. India’s successful test of its polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) in March 199626 enables New Delhi to build an ICBM, a conclusion commentators warned was possible some years before.27 It is estimated that the PSLV, if used as an ICBM, could attain a range up to 8,000 kilometers.28 The PSLV is understood to provide the foundation for India’s next two long-range ballistic missiles, the Agni 3, which is designed to have a range of 3,700 kilometers, and the 4,000- to 5,000-kilometer-range Agni 4, which is also referred to as the Surya. Regardless of whether India’s 5,000-kilometer-range missile will ultimately be called the Agni 4 or Surya, there is little doubt that New Delhi is developing a ballistic missile with a range of 5,000 kilometers. The first test launch of Surya could occur as early as 2001.29 India’s nuclear policy requires development of the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead to any area in adversary countries, such as China. Senior defense sources in India view the development of the various Agnis as essential to complete New Delhi’s desired goal of possessing a credible minimum nuclear deterrent against China. Raja Mohan, strategic affairs editor of Hindu newspaper, believes that an SSM of “something between 4,000 to 5,000 would be ideal to deal with the Chinese.”30

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But the Indian government was not content to develop missiles with a range of 5,000 kilometers. In 1993 the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) concluded a contract with the Russian space company Glavkosmos to supply seven upper booster rocket stages from 1998 to 2001 for India’s geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) program. According to Moscow’s Khrunichev Space Center (KSC), the first of the seven upper stages was delivered in September 1998, and India plans the first GSLV booster launch around 2001.31 And in February 1998 the ISRO is reported to have successfully tested an indigenously designed cryogenic engine as part of the GSLV project.32 The transfer of Russian cryogenic rocket engines suggests that India may still have difficulty in developing this technology for a flight-worthy GSLV. Alarmingly, as an ICBM the GSLV could strike targets at a distance of 14,000 kilometers. Clearly, India’s nuclear capability could transcend minimum deterrence and become a significant strategic force, comparable in range to that of the original five nuclear powers. The DRDO’s SSM programs do not stop at land-based systems: India is committing extensive resources to development of a submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) and a cruise missile variant. Referred to as the Sagarika, these missiles are likely to be nuclear-capable and would be carried by the imported Russian Kilo-class submarine, which would have to be upgraded to launch these missiles. Despite the lack of official information on the project, the Sagarika, a liquid-fuel rocket with a range of 300 kilometers, appears to exist. The rumored target date of 2005 for the Sagarika to become operational is at present unrealistic because India does not have a submarine capable of launching it.33 Development of sea-based systems also includes the Dhanush, a naval version of the Prithvi. It would be launched from a surface ship, reportedly for demonstration purposes only.34 The possession of an operational SLBM would certainly be a technological breakthrough for India. India’s defense establishment and government may feel proud of what the IGMDP has accomplished over its first fifteen years of existence, but they have failed to realize the consequences their developments pose for the region. A coalition of hawkish scientists, bureaucrats, and strategists has kept the pressure on successive governments in both countries, particularly in India, to further develop their nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities.35 India is leading the way in SSM developments, leaving Pakistan with little choice but to follow suit. Ballistic missiles are unlikely to enhance stability; in fact, they actually undermine two critical assets that have contributed to the region’s balance of power in both the conventional and nuclear dimensions.

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THE CONVENTIONAL “BALANCE-IMBALANCE”

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Stephen Cohen captures the meaning of “balance-imbalance” when he states that New Delhi’s legitimate preparations for a hypothetical twofront conflict with China and Pakistan have given India the capabilities to defeat Pakistan.36 Pakistan’s forces would be adequate to protect itself against an Indian attack but are not so large or modern that they threaten India.37 Although Pakistan, India, and China each have varying military capabilities, their conventional imbalance postures are adequate deterrents for their adversaries. Before 1998, the pre-missile threshold was itself an arms control measure; now that it is breached, the result may be unpredictable consequences for regional stability.38 In December 1998, India “deployed” the conventional Prithvi SS-150 for the first time in a major military exercise, signifying that New Delhi has fully inducted this SSM into its military doctrine.39 Although the Prithvi SS-150 was not actually deployed for the maneuvers, the missile was “factored” into the exercise.40 It was the first of the IGMDP’s SSMs to become fully operational. Code-named “Shakti,” the Indian exercise was the largest since operation “Brasstacks” in 1987. Pakistan’s response to the induction of the Prithvi SS-150 in operation Shakti was the repeated announcement of the Shaheen 1 missile.41 With a range of 750 kilometers, the Shaheen 1 is hardly a realistic response to India’s conventionally armed SS-150. The 750-kilometer range makes the Shaheen 1 unsuitable as an extension to the army’s artillery range, as the 150-kilometer-range SS-150 is employed to be. Thus Pakistan does not possess a missile comparable to the conventional SS-150 in the role India envisions for it. Indian military commanders view the Prithvi as an extension of their artillery capability by increasing their range from 40 kilometers to between 100 and 200 kilometers, depending on the variant of Prithvi used.42 Besides extending their artillery range, the SS-150 is intended to introduce operational uncertainty into the Indo-Pakistani standoff, thereby reducing the possibility of armed conflict. In practice, the procurement of this system threatens to drastically change Pakistan’s time-tested warfighting doctrines like concentration of mass, surprise, and deception. When produced in large numbers, the Prithvi missile will tilt the conventional arms balance between India and Pakistan decisively in favor of the former.43 Even if the Prithvis are not deployed on Pakistan’s border, the mere fact that India has them and will in the future possess these missiles in large numbers will inject some uncertainty for Islamabad.44 Furthermore, a ballistic missile penetration capability would make the Prithvi immune to Pakistan’s air defense system, thus creating a greater

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sense of vulnerability for Islamabad during a crisis. The demise of the conventional “balance-imbalance” is compounded by India’s ongoing modernization of its conventional forces. Pravin Sawhney, who was enrolled in the Indian army and involved in the emergence of the 333rd Missile Brigade, comments: A few Prithvi, even when not used, however will add uncertainty for the attacking commander by forcing him to disperse reserves instead of concentrating them for a break-out through enemy linear defenses. Advancing commanders will have difficulty in shifting forces between contiguous corps, resulting in time-delays for crucial objectives. Irrespective of an assured tactical air support, the defending commander would have an ability to switch fire, at will, right to the enemy’s depth and logistics support base. He will also have the ability to influence his flanks while he is defending large stretches. The command, control, co-ordination and cohesiveness of the enemy effort would most certainly be disrupted and dislocated by the presence of Prithvi and Hatf-II. In simple words, given the right surveillance, Prithvi or Hatf-II will help in harassing and forcing change of plans on a battle-field.45

The use of conventionally armed, inaccurate SSMs in complicating a country’s ability to execute its military operations is nothing new, as demonstrated by the 1991 Gulf War and preparations for D-Day during World War II. The Gulf War exposed the vulnerability of troop concentrations to missile attacks: 25 percent of U.S. combat fatalities in Desert Storm were the result of a single Scud attack against a makeshift U.S. barracks in Dhahran. Desert Shield or Desert Storm could have been severely complicated, had Saddam Hussein used missiles and weapons of mass destruction to strike the seaports and airports used by the coalition forces. It has become apparent that the six-month buildup of coalition forces prior to Desert Storm would have been remarkably risky, perhaps impossible, in the face of strikes on regional airports, seaports, and troop concentrations. One near catastrophe took place on February 16, 1991, when a Scud missile struck the Saudi port of Jubayl 300 meters from a pier that had eight ships docked.46 Two of them contained virtually all the provisions for the U.S. Marine Corps Air Wings, several carried ammunition, and one was a Polish hospital ship. Also untouched were 5,000 tons of 155-millimeter artillery shells stacked on the pier that day. The Gulf War was not the first example of missiles threatening to undermine the West’s ability to carry out a large-scale military offensive. Prior to D-Day in World War II, Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower observed “that had Germany succeeded in perfecting and using the V-1 and the V-2 missiles six months earlier, the Allied invasion of Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult, per-

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haps impossible.”47 These two wars clearly demonstrate the role SSMs could play in the event of hostilities between India and Pakistan. The demise of the conventional “balance-imbalance” has led Pakistan to place greater reliance on nuclear deterrence to compensate for its conventional inferiority. Pakistani defense planners believe that their nuclear tests have leveled Indian superiority in conventional weapons, and this situation can only be maintained if Pakistan retains the option to launch a preemptive nuclear strike.48 Islamabad’s adoption of nuclear deterrence as a means to counter conventional inferiority is also contributing to the emergence of an inherently unstable nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, clarification of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear stance, together with the ongoing augmentation of their missile delivery systems, is undermining what stability nuclear weapons have brought to the subcontinent. THE INCREASING DANGERS

OF

OPACITY

A new and precarious form of nuclear deterrence has materialized between India and Pakistan, entailing the possession of nuclear-capable SSMs that could be launched from mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs). This situation signifies a major movement away from the stable nuclear deterrence based on aircraft, which probably enhanced the region’s security. Pakistan viewed aircraft-based nuclear deterrence as positive for its security environment. In March 1996, before either side had developed nuclear-capable SSMs, former Pakistani foreign minister Ali Said stated that India’s lack of knowledge about the extent of Islamabad’s nuclear capability gave Pakistan “security in ambiguity.”49 Likewise, Devin T. Hagerty asserted that in South Asia the absence of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles meant there was little prospect of either side carrying out a counterforce preemptive attack during moments of crisis.50 He added: “Since each side in an opaque nuclear arms competition has only limited information about the other side’s nuclear forces, any deterrence derived from nuclear capabilities will logically be existential.”51 Opaque proliferators follow a policy of calculated nuclear ambiguity, mixing a public posture of restraint with covert development of nuclear weapons or at least the option to build them quickly.52 Pure aircraft-borne opaque existential nuclear deterrence appears to have been a significant counterbalance to the ingrained instability of the continuing territorial dispute over Kashmir. Reliance of nuclear deterrence on aircraft had enabled Pakistan to maintain an element of parity with

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India on the strategic level through a nuclear “balance-imbalance.” Although it is hard to gauge whether opacity led to a peaceful resolution of the 1990 Indo-Pakistani crisis, this nuclear stance may well have been sufficient in maintaining stability between the two powers.53 India’s inclusion of the Prithvi and Agni SSMs in its nuclear deterrence policy has forced Pakistan to devise a credible response, something it finds hard to do. Pakistan perceives its security environment to be more vulnerable and uncertain than before. Islamabad’s rejection in mid-1998 of a no first use nuclear weapons pact with India, in the belief that doing so would restore Indian conventional superiority, implies that Pakistan feels compelled to maintain the option of a preemptive nuclear strike.54 The demise of Pakistan’s “security in ambiguity,” coupled with India’s policy of building a minimum nuclear deterrent, suggests that a policy of calculated nuclear ambiguity or posture of restraint no longer exists. The stability opacity has brought is thus close to collapse and with it the movement toward a weaponized deterrence. What is emerging instead is a new but precarious form of opacity. During a serious crisis, Islamabad and New Delhi would very likely order the dispersal of their SSMs and related TELs to various presurveyed sights to diminish the prospect, in their eyes, of a devastating preemptive strike. Therefore, neither side would have sufficient knowledge of the adversary’s SSM and TEL locations. Counterforce nuclear doctrine would therefore be impractical, leaving countervalue as the most likely strategic posture. As yet, neither side has embraced the doctrine of placing its nuclear-capable SSMs in missile silos. The construction of silos could tempt either side to adopt a counterforce doctrine. Until such time, however, nuclear deterrence based on ignorance of where the other side’s nuclear missile forces are located in times of crisis has led to the emergence of a new kind of “security in ambiguity.” The danger of altering their strategic posture lies in the commanding effect nuclear weapons may have on stability between India and Pakistan. Nuclear weapons may influence stability more on the subcontinent than they did for the superpowers during the Cold War. Any change to either side’s nuclear posture could, therefore, have far-reaching consequences on how crises are resolved in South Asia. In light of this consideration, our preconception from the Cold War era—that nuclear deterrence based on SSMs maintains stability—is hard to transfer to the new nuclear adversaries. South Asia’s strategic thinking that nuclear deterrence is a suitable tool for stability for the region has omitted the crucial distinction that the subcontinent is too unstable to permit nuclear deterrence based on SSMs to work effectively. It is important to remember that aircraft-based deter-

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rence between India and Pakistan was viewed as stable, as President Zia said in 1988 and Foreign Minister Said echoed in 1996. Both before and after the May 1998 tests, India was satisfied that its nuclear capability, together with superior conventional forces, would deter its western rival, Pakistan. Pakistan has followed India’s lead and attempted to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent of its own, but this effort has undermined the Islamic state’s security environment. To gain a clear insight into the role nuclear deterrence may have on stability between India and Pakistan, analysts need to view nuclear South Asia with a fresh mind and consider the region’s unique factors. Comparison to the Cold War era is necessary, but preconceptions acquired from the superpowers’ experience should be avoided. Writing in the journal International Security in 1988, John Mueller argued that the postwar world might have turned out much the same in the absence of nuclear weapons. Without them, he argues, “World war would have been discouraged by the memory of World War II, by superpower contentment with the post-war status quo, by the nature of Soviet ideology, and by the fear of escalation.”55 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, and McGeorge Bundy argue along similar lines, adding that successful coexistence between the East and West occurred because there was literally no sphere of influence where dominance was a truly vital interest to both superpowers at once.56 Indeed, Cold War nuclear strategies of compulsion and deterrence provoked at least as much as they restrained,57 and thus their necessity for Cold War stability was questionable. In the case of India and Pakistan, however, continued border disputes, notably over Kashmir, indicate that they are far from being satisfied powers. Two of the three wars fought between India and Pakistan have been over the region of Kashmir. Control over Jammu and Kashmir is viewed by both Islamabad and New Delhi as essential to their national character.58 Despite limited efforts on both sides to resolve their differences over Kashmir, talks between the two powers have continued to remain deadlocked, highlighting the ingrained differences and deep suspicion that still prevails between them both. Until a resolution is found, Kashmir remains a major flashpoint that could cause a nuclear war. Sumit Ganguly remarks that as the Kashmir “insurgency drags on, and border tensions persist, war may still ensue through a mix of misperception and inadvertence.”59 The level of tolerance that does exist between Islamabad and New Delhi is not equal to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, which were, as Mueller argues, “satisfied powers”; consequently, the prospect of inadvertent nuclear war through uncontrolled crisis escalation is greater on the subcontinent than it was during the Cold

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War. When the ongoing augmentation of SSM capabilities is added, a picture emerges of a region possessing a number of negative variables that could contribute to a nuclear war. India appears to have realized that Pakistan has adopted an unstable nuclear posture by maintaining the option to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Indian defense minister George Fernandes has pleaded with Pakistan for “co-operative security” and a firm commitment to a “no-firstuse policy” to eliminate the risk of accidental, miscalculated use of nuclear weapons.60 Pakistan’s refusal to adopt such a policy has placed India into a precarious security environment of its own making. The BJP’s determination to become a nuclear power has placed further strain on Pakistan’s already suspect nuclear command and control capability and pushed Islamabad into believing that up to seventy nuclear warheads were required to achieve a credible nuclear deterrent against India.61 Meeting this requirement puts continuing pressure on Islamabad to procure greater numbers of nuclear-capable SSMs with the range necessary to threaten virtually all of India with nuclear holocaust. The serial production of Ghauri 1 and Ghauri 2 and the development of the Ghauri 3 and the various Shaheens would meet this goal. Despite this clear shift toward extensive SSM procurements by both sides in South Asia, Hagerty believes that opaque existential nuclear deterrence still works. Writing soon after the Ghauri 1 missile launch and the nuclear tests, Hagerty asserts that he has “no reason to believe that nuclear deterrence in South Asia is any less robust than it was. . . . Indeed it may be more so.”62 He even goes far as to say that “missile deployments are unlikely to generate severe instabilities.”63 The dispersal of SSMs and their TELs during a crisis or conflict may well preserve opacity and decrease the perceived risk of an successful preemptive strike, but at the cost of whether both sides could maintain complete control over their nuclear-tipped SSMs once deployed in the field. The command and control infrastructures of both India and Pakistan are still very much in their infancy, giving rise to serious concern. Just because the superpowers escaped inadvertent nuclear war during the Cold War era does not mean that other nuclear adversaries will be so fortuitous, as is discussed under the section on “Command and Control” below. CHINESE ENCIRCLEMENT

AND

FULL WEAPONIZATION

The centrality of nuclear-tipped SSMs to India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is likely to increase as these countries’ security perceptions spur

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further augmentation of their missile capabilities. A threat perception that could lead to full weaponization is India’s fear of Chinese encirclement and the belief that a significant nuclear capability is required against China. There is growing concern among the Indian political and military establishment that the close relationship between Beijing and Islamabad represents a threat of Chinese encirclement of India. China’s transfer to Pakistan of missile- and nuclear weapons–related technologies is of major concern to New Delhi, which views their collaboration as detrimental to India’s security. In April 1998 Fernandes made known his concern that “certainly there is the threat of Chinese encirclement of India.”64 This threat perception will only serve to increase pressure in India to develop a credible nuclear deterrent against China, which dealt New Delhi a humiliating defeat in the 1962 war, and further development of Indian missiles will in turn increase the pressure on Pakistan to enhance its strategic capability in an attempt to prevent a destabilizing strategic imbalance. So far, India has refrained from implementing a credible nuclear posture against China. Should this occur, however, New Delhi would have initiated a three-way arms race in the region. India seeks to reach parity with China not in numbers of missiles but in range, by developing SSMs that would make all of China a target. Doing so would require the induction of all four Agni missiles. Although China’s comparatively advanced nuclear forces would be more than adequate to counter any major nuclear buildup by India, an arms race could still spiral out of control, with Pakistan compelled to match India’s growing strategic capability as the Agni is inducted against China. In turn, Beijing might step up its military assistance to Islamabad in an attempt to offset an unstable nuclear imbalance between India and Pakistan, which would be detrimental to China’s own security. North Korea could continue to provide Pakistan with advanced SSM technology, but only long-term ally China would be willing and able to assist Islamabad’s nuclear weapons program. The most alarming part of these developments is the prospect of Beijing altering its strategic posture toward India in response to New Delhi’s strategic buildup. Stephen P. Cohen warns: “If Beijing takes the Indian actions as a threat, and moved to counter them, then the traditional misperceptions between these countries (which far exceed those between India and Pakistan), could lead to a new and far more dangerous stage in regional nuclear and strategic developments.”65 Unless India and Pakistan forge an agreement in the near future to cap their development of ballistic missiles, South Asia will continue on its path toward weaponization, hastened not just by New Delhi’s and

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Islamabad’s perception of each other but also by India’s threat assessment of China and Beijing’s close cooperation with Pakistan. India’s determination to maintain strategic superiority over Pakistan, combined with Islamabad’s access to advanced SSM technology, notably from North Korea, leaves little room for optimism that the two countries will follow an alternative course. Governments in both countries appear to be granting their nuclear and missile scientists greater freedom to develop their strategic programs. A notable exception is India’s Agni: political constraints, not technical difficulties, have held up the induction of that IRBM. As the SSM programs on both sides proceed, pressure will increase to deploy nuclear warheads on these systems as speculation mounts as to whether their adversary’s SSMs are already armed with nuclear weapons. The intervening variables influencing this path to weaponization include how much money both countries can inject into their SSM and nuclear programs and how much political will exists to proceed in developing new weapons systems. Although an increase in either of these variables is hard to predict, neither side is likely to suspend development of its SSM and nuclear programs. In addition, there is the possibility of “crisis weaponization,” whereby worst-case analysis and mirror imaging during a period of high tension could lead to both sides deploying nuclear-armed SSMs. Full weaponization—possession of nuclear-tipped SSMs that could be maintained on constant alert—would only be possible with the procurement of solid-fuel SSMs. Until the Agni 2 is inducted, none of India’s operational SSMs are purely solid-fuel missiles. The development of solidfuel SSMs would provide a rapid nuclear standby response to any crisis. Unlike the heavier and bulkier liquid-fuel systems, solid-fuel SSMs are relatively easy to move, thus making them easier to hide and shelter from a preemptive attack.66 With few moving parts, solid-fuel missiles like Pakistan’s M-11 and Shaheen 1/Hatf 4 SSMs can be kept at a high state of readiness for extended periods with minor maintenance and, most important, could be launched within minutes of an order to strike. For Pakistan, mobility, survivability, and simplicity are essential to developing a credible nuclear deterrent in the face of India’s larger strategic arsenal. Should India and Pakistan procure operational solid-fuel SSMs, a highly unstable environment could well emerge with both sides deploying SSMs on constant alert, which might lead the two countries to adopt a launch-on-warning strategy. The Agni 2 test signified that India is on the verge of inducting operational solid-fuel SSMs. Clearly, there has been no serious debate

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within India and Pakistan about freezing their SSM programs, and thus they are unwittingly proceeding down the path toward full weaponization. Vajpayee’s declaration that India will proceed with the development of a minimum nuclear deterrent suggests New Delhi wants to establish an extensive nuclear command and control capability. India’s stated nuclear position would compel Pakistan to develop a similar infrastructure as Islamabad strengthens its nuclear capability. There are serious concerns, however, whether India and, particularly, Pakistan are capable of developing a secure command and control capability. Bruce Blair states: Command and Control

Prospective nuclear rivals with fewer resources to lavish on command and control systems indeed face even higher risks. Their safeguards are bound to be cruder and weaker and are likely to be tested more often. The volatile relations between many of these states have a large potential to erupt into a full blown military confrontation, intensifying the trade off between positive and negative control and creating more opportunities for weakness in safeguards to emerge. The evolution of the postures and dangers that emerged from the Cold War . . . is a communicable legacy with a future in other nuclear rivalries.67

There are numerous well-documented cases of near inadvertent nuclear war between the superpowers during the Cold War.68 Indeed, luck often played a significant role in preventing an accidental SSM launch between the superpowers. Robert McNamara and Bundy have both commented that the superpower rivalry demonstrates that it is not possible to predict with confidence the consequence of military action because of misjudgment, misinformation, and miscalculation.69 In their analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, James Blight and David Welch offer a similar warning to new and aspiring nuclear states: “It now appears more plausible than ever that nuclear war really could have been the inadvertent result of a series of mistaken perceptions, judgements and decisions. . . . Far from solving acute security dilemmas, nuclear weapons may only make them more serious.”70 India’s 1998 nuclear tests, followed by the declaration of developing a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, has dragged it and Pakistan down a path of misguided security. An additional factor to consider here is the added pressure the new form of opacity based on SSMs will place on India’s and Pakistan’s command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capability.

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“Security in ambiguity” based on aircraft-borne counterbalance of terror poses a lesser risk of accidental nuclear war than deterrence reliant upon ballistic missiles. Although nuclear-armed aircraft can be ordered to halt their mission moments before striking, SSMs cannot be recalled or intercepted once launched, thus reducing to a alarming degree the opportunity for calling off a nuclear attack. Besides the inability to intercept incoming missiles lies the added difficulty for both sides of locating and destroying their opponent’s nuclear-armed SSMs prior to launch, compared to attacking airbases that may be used for readying aircraft for a nuclear strike. The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated that even with air supremacy and superior ground attack aircraft, “missile busting” is an extremely difficult task: not one Iraqi mobile Scud launcher was destroyed by Allied aircraft during Desert Storm.71 During a crisis, the knowledge that the adversary’s SSMs and TELs are hard to destroy could lead to further strain on India’s and Pakistan’s commanders to act hastily out of concern that their opponent’s nuclear forces are almost invulnerable. Conversely, with aircraftbased weapons, neither side would know for certain which airbases might be used for preparing a nuclear strike, but their fixed locations would provide both sides with a reasonable opportunity to destroy possible launching points for a nuclear attack. The prospect of “crisis-weaponization” occurring during a major dispute adds to the factors that could push South Asia to the brink of nuclear war. In addition, there is greater scope for an accidental nuclear strike through miscommunication with SSM commanders in the field and the prospect of operators rigging a nuclear-tipped missile to enable a launch without authorization from a higher authority. India and Pakistan may have possessed nuclear-armed SSMs several years before the May 1998 nuclear tests, but clarification of their nuclear posture, coupled with the ongoing SSM developments, has resulted in greater reliance on missiles for nuclear deterrence. Mitchell Reiss comments that psychologically, ballistic missiles would make each side feel more vulnerable and less secure than before.72 To avoid a ruinous preemptive strike, each side would be tempted to adopt a launch-on-warning strategy that would require hair-trigger responses on the basis of inadequate information and under enormous pressure—a recipe for disaster.73 The launch of conventionally armed SSMs, whether against urban centers or in support of a ground campaign, could be misinterpreted by the adversary as a nuclear attack and thus trigger a nuclear response. Since India and Pakistan have a contiguous border, their proximity to each other leaves a very small margin for error at the outset, thus increasing the risk

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of miscalculation and misperception over that present during the superpowers’ rivalry.74 The C3I difficulties India and Pakistan are likely to encounter were raised long before the May 1998 nuclear tests. In 1991 Cohen wrote that both countries would face formidable command and control problems, since neither has undertaken much work on its nuclear doctrine.75 In addition, neither possesses the technical and economic resources required for adequate protection of C3I centers several years after a decision to deploy nuclear weapons.76 At the time of this writing, only India has revealed how its C3I capability is to be adapted to the new security environment. An insight into India’s formal nuclear command and control infrastructure was revealed in a policy paper, Options for India—Formation of a Strategic Nuclear Command, prepared by the Planning Directorate and approved by the three service chiefs. Released in the latter part of 1998, the paper recommends the formation of a National Command Authority (NCA) that would decide on the use of nuclear weapons and then transfer responsibility to a new multiservice body, the National Strategic Nuclear Command (NSNC).77 In addition, the paper suggested the establishment of an National Command Post (NCP), “a robust communications center with the ability to receive information and intelligence and disseminate orders and instructions.”78 Although it is hard to judge how reliable India’s C3I infrastructure could be in preventing an inadvertent nuclear launch, New Delhi’s studies appear more comprehensive than Islamabad’s. There has, so far, been scarce information on Pakistan’s C3I capability. Despite the lack of information in the public domain, there are strong reasons to believe that Pakistan’s C3I is less reliable than that of India. Most important, India’s nuclear doctrine is forcing Pakistan to develop a greater nuclear force and related C3I infrastructure, which Islamabad may well have difficulty maintaining complete control over. New Delhi’s policymakers must consider whether the reciprocal actions taken by their rival Pakistan will undermine their own security through the risk of inadvertent nuclear war. Questions over Islamabad’s ability to maintain adequate control over its nuclear capability have persisted ever since Pakistan became a threshold nuclear power. Of particular concern is the civil-military relationship and the competing factions within the military. Since General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq’s seizure of power in a military coup in 1977, successive governments have had to endure the army’s influential role in security decisions. The restoration of democracy, from Zia’s death in 1988 until the

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1999 coup led by General Pervez Musharraf, still allowed the military to play a commanding role in political affairs. Significantly, India has voiced concern over Islamabad’s nuclear control. During a visit to Pakistan in December 1988, India’s prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, was alarmed enough on this issue to express his anxiety that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was not under the control of their prime minister but under that of the military.79 More recently, the May 1998 tests revealed distinct differences of opinion among the competing factions within the military over who controls Pakistan’s nuclear capability, reaffirming the apparent lack of civilian control. Although the final decision to test was taken by the Defence Cabinet Committee (DCC), which includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), the three chiefs, the defense secretary, and the prime minister, it seems that the chief of army staff (COAS) wished the government would show restraint and explore other options to “neutralize” the India threat.80 However, the COAS was overruled because the intelligence agencies were painting a different scenario. Ejaz Haider, editor of Lahore’s Friday Times, believes that there is “a clear difference of perception between the army and the intelligence agencies vis-à-vis the Military Intelligence (MI) and the ISI which is certainly an ominous factor.”81 The fact that Pakistan chose to test, instead of taking advantage of the tremendous economic and diplomatic opportunities afforded to the nation immediately following India’s tests, underlines concerns over the measure of influence the army has in the decisionmaking process.82 Despite General Musharraf’s coming to power, it is likely the competition between MI and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) still persists. This episode strongly suggests that the ISI not only has greater influence on defense issues than other intelligence agencies within Pakistan but, worryingly, has the tendency to present pessimistic intelligence assessments. During heightened tension, this conflict between ISI and MI could inadvertently escalate a crisis with negative intelligence reports. This adds some credence to Seymour Hersh’s judgment that both Pakistan and India are eager to provide incendiary intelligence without being sure of its reliability.83 Added to this is the ongoing internal violence that has so often been the characteristic of Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif’s tenure of office in the late 1990s witnessed considerable internal violence, notably in Karachi and Lahore. Brahma Chellaney asserts that the expansion of regional nuclear programs, seen against the background of escalating terrorist violence, has given rise to concern over the safety of nuclear facilities and the transportation and storage of weapons-grade materials on the subcontinent.84 The implications SSMs pose for the region do not end with

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increased risk of conflict and the erosion of the conventional and nuclear balance of power but extend to the terror conventionally armed missiles could exert in the event of another Indo-Pakistani war. India’s insistence on inducting the Prithvi missile into its military doctrine presents Islamabad and New Delhi with the possibility that a future conflict could well entail their population centers being targeted with conventionally armed SSMs. India’s ongoing serial production of the SS-150 has provided it with the option of exerting terror by launching SSMs in significant numbers against its western adversary. And despite Pakistan’s inferior indigenous production capability, its military could still develop a number of short-range missiles like the Shaheen 1. In previous wars between India and Pakistan, neither side has targeted population centers, and therefore it would be highly unlikely they would implement such a strategy in the event of another Indo-Pakistani war. However, this view ignores the fact that the procurement of SSMs provides New Delhi and Islamabad with further options of carrying out offensive operations. In view of the large-scale induction of SSMs on the subcontinent, consideration needs to be given to the various means with which another all-out war between the two countries could be fought. For Pakistan, an SSM’s assured penetration capability would make it a highly effective weapon to take the war home to Indian civilians as a means of waging asymmetric warfare. If both New Delhi and Islamabad really wish to avoid targeting each other’s population centers in any scenario, they would not have developed nuclear-armed ballistic missiles designed to strike cities deep into an adversary’s territory. And even if nuclear-tipped SSMs are designed to be employed against military installations, it would be irrational to say nuclear weapons could strike such targets without causing large number of civilian injuries and fatalities. The attractiveness of launching ballistic missiles at population centers, compared to using attack aircraft, derives from the SSM’s ability to deliver munitions within a short warning period and circumvent sophisticated air defense systems. The inaccuracy of the conventionally armed SSMs held by India and Pakistan makes them unsuited for use against military targets. Their real effectiveness, therefore, lies in their ability to produce terror and panic in civilian targets in an attempt to coerce governments to pursue policies more in line with the wielder’s desire.85 In his study of ballistic missile proliferation, Aaron Karp rightly states: The SSM Psychological Threat

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In the event of another Indo-Pakistani conflict, cities could be targeted with conventionally armed SSMs, akin to the “war of the cities” conducted by Iran and Iraq during their 1980s conflict. India’s greater indigenous production capability would enable New Delhi to launch a missile onslaught against Pakistan’s urban centers. Should stalemate occur on the front line, India would have the upper hand, as Iraq had over Iran in the 1980s, thus lowering Pakistani morale to continue fighting.87 Iraq’s ballistic missile attacks played a significant role in lowering further the morale of war-weary Iranian civilians and caused widespread social and economic disruption. Although the rest of the country was relatively unaffected by the missile attacks, Tehran’s misery had a strong psychological impact on the country’s leaders. The Iranian government facilitated the decline in public morale by publicizing the attacks to win international sympathy, inadvertently helping to terrorize its own people.88 As could be the case with Pakistan facing India’s greater SSM production capability, Iraq could outpace Iran in the intensity of missile attacks because it possessed a more advanced indigenous SSM infrastructure.89 The impact was not contained to the amount of physical damaged caused but also included the psychological effects inflicted on an already demoralized populace. The possible significance of SSM attacks on population centers in the event of another Indo-Pakistani war can be further demonstrated by Israel’s experience during the 1991 Gulf War. As became clear during the launch of thirty-nine Iraqi Scud missiles against Israel in eighteen separate attacks, civilians become accustomed to conventional missile strikes in the form of an “emergency routine.”90 The fact that Israel was not an active participant in the Gulf War and thus the morale of the country was dictated not by frontline action but solely by home front adaptation allows one to draw this conclusion.91 The Iranian and Israeli experiences teach South Asia that conventionally armed SSM attacks would not on their own significantly affect the outcome of a conflict, but they could magnify the countries’ morale in line with the success and failures encountered on the front lines. India’s conventional superiority over Pakistan, combined with Prithvi strikes on Pakistani population centers, would only exacerbate the

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difficulties Islamabad’s inferior armed forces would encounter on the battlefield. The SSM’s psychological effect on the subcontinent also pertains to the threat of nuclear attack. Neither side is likely to order a nuclear-armed SSM strike. However, the prospect of such an occurrence may cause thousands of civilians to flee from cities that could be attacked with nuclear weapons. Again, parallels can be drawn with Israel’s experience, where civilians were ordered to prepare themselves for a possible chemical or biological attack from an Iraqi Scud missile. The anxiety and strain encountered by civilians from the mere prospect of a nonconventional SSM strike is exemplified by the flight of terrified Israelis. Prior to Desert Storm, 14,000 civilians fled Israel, and 100,000 left Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan for areas less likely to suffer an Iraqi missile strike. It is the unknown that creates fear. In South Asia the launch of conventionally armed SSMs on population centers would remind those in the targeted regions that they are within range of a nuclear strike, thus reinforcing the fear of the unthinkable occurring. Collective unease by the population could place extensive pressure on their governments to escalate a conflict in an attempt to bring to a swift conclusion the terrorizing of their population. The targeting of the adversary’s population centers with conventionally armed SSMs would be aimed not so much at causing fatalities as at creating problems for the government, such as major population movements and low morale. The signing of the Lahore Declaration following the meeting of India’s and Pakistan’s prime ministers in February 1999 signified a much overdue cooling of tension between the two rivals, only to receive a major setback from the Kargil crisis a few months later. The declaration does serve to reduce the risk of inadvertent nuclear war because the parties must notify each other of “any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident” that could lead to an “outbreak of war.” In addition, the reduction of tension between the long-term adversaries through confidence-building measures reduces pressure on both sides to hasten their nuclear and missile programs but not to halt the gradual movement toward overt weaponization through the continuing development of nuclear and missile technologies. Unless India and Pakistan agree to stem missile proliferation, both countries could find themselves deploying nuclear-armed SSMs on a permanent basis, which would require the construction of missile silos, therefore Beyond the Lahore Accord and Kargil

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placing an overbearing strain on both sides’ command and control capabilities. A diplomatic triumph the Lahore Declaration may be, but it has done little to address the main issues of concern, as the Kargil crisis all-tooclearly demonstrated. The declaration may have actually exacerbated regional instability by hastening the transition to the new form of opacity and full weaponization. A crucial part of the agreed text was that the two sides would “engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building and conventional fields aimed at the avoidance of conflict.” A senior Pakistani official clarified this to mean that New Delhi and Islamabad will exchange information on how many warheads and ballistic missiles each nation possesses and how its nuclear weapons are deployed.92 Although this may assist in preventing inflated intelligence estimates of either side’s nuclear capabilities, it further erodes the “security in ambiguity” based on nuclear-armed aircraft that Pakistan has viewed as contributing to the region’s stability. Thus the Lahore accord has set the tone for cementing the new and precarious form of opacity and with it the erosion of the line between covert and overt nuclear deterrence. The clause on providing advance notification of ballistic missile tests confirms Islamabad’s and New Delhi’s desire to continue advancing their SSM capabilities, with all the instabilities that will continue to ensue. South Asia has passed the threshold from nuclear deterrence based on aircraft-borne weapons to the unstable deterrence based on SSMs, without fully appreciating how their security environment has actually changed. The 1999 Kargil crisis was a stark reminder of how a fourth IndoPakistani war could break out and reinforced the urgency for the Lahore accord to be followed up with real attempts to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute. The return of military rule in Pakistan, with General Pervez Musharraf having ousted Nawaz Sharif in October 1999, does raise the question of whether a Kashmir crisis with a Pakistani military head of government would reduce the prospect of a diplomatic solution being found. In view of the considerable internal criticism Sharif received following his decision to withdraw Pakistani-backed militants from the Kargil heights, which contributed to his political demise, military leaders not wanting to lose face may be less inclined to capitulate, choosing instead to stand their ground and possibly raising the stakes. Whatever the case may be, reconciliation over the disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir is essential for these powers dissatisfied with the status quo to reduce the risks of an inadvertent nuclear war on the subcontinent.

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The rejection by Pakistan of a no first use pact clearly reveals Islamabad is relying on the option to use nuclear weapons first if necessary as a means to counter the growing conventional and nuclear imbalance in India’s favor. There was a notable absence from the Lahore accord of a bilateral treaty adopting no first use. Pakistan’s adoption of first use will only put pressure on the Islamic nation’s questionable nuclear control system and may later lead to the adoption of a launch-on-warning strategy. Clearly, India’s nuclear and missile policies have given Pakistan little choice other than to reciprocate in a vain attempt to maintain a credible deterrent. India must realize the consequences of its actions on the subcontinent. It cannot be overemphasized that if India and Pakistan continue to strengthen their missile and nuclear weapons programs, they will head unwittingly toward full weaponization. An opportunity India and Pakistan failed to embrace was the prevention by both sides of the indigenous production and deployment of solidfuel SSMs. The possession of these missiles by both sides is the last hurdle to be overcome for full weaponization to occur on the subcontinent and, with it, all the perils that would ensue. Although Pakistan has already initiated production of solid-fuel SSMs with the Shaheen 1, India’s preference for using liquid-fuel rocket technology had provided a window of opportunity for a possible bilateral agreement to prevent large-scale development and deployment of solid-fuel SSMs. However, the two-stage solid-fuel Agni 2 test and India’s desire to develop a minimum nuclear deterrent against China leave little room for such an agreement, creating a high possibility of operational, mobile, solid-fuel SSMs being inducted by both sides. Until India fulfills its goal of possessing operational weapons systems, including the Agni 3 and the Agni 4 ICBM that could threaten all of China with a nuclear strike, there is little prospect of significant arms control agreements taking place. Any missile agreement should prohibit the launch of conventionally armed SSMs in anger so as to avoid the prospect of such a strike being misinterpreted as a nuclear attack. It is unfortunate that neither South Asia nor the international community involved in trying to stem proliferation there fully realize this danger and the full consequences missile proliferation will have for the region’s stability. Attempts to persuade India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and conclude a fissile material cutoff treaty will assist in reducing tension in the region, but there are additional areas that should be seriously considered. The challenge for South Asia is to ensure that any future crisis does not result in the use of atomic weapons. “Crisis weaponization” in a region

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where both states share a contiguous border and are not “satisfied powers,” coupled with suspect command and control capabilities, will lead to crisis management. It is critical for Islamabad and New Delhi to work together to enable the resolution of these variables that are collectively increasing the odds of a major crisis or conflict escalating to the use of nuclear weapons. NOTES

1. Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1988), 18. 2. Leonard Spector, with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989–1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 100. 3. Stephen P. Cohen, “Nuclear Neighbours,” in Cohen, ed., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 17. 4. Paul Beaver, “Pakistan’s Missile ‘Was a Nodong,’” Jane’s Missile and Rockets 2, no. 5 (May 1998), 1. 5. Kathleen Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of the Many (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 120. 6. Cameron Binkley, “Pakistan’s Ballistic Missile Development: The Sword of Islam,” in William Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers’ Network (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 85. Examination of the Hatf 1 and Hatf 2 pictures from various arms fairs and tests reveals these missiles’ external characteristics vary greatly from those of China’s M-9 and M11 missiles. Umer Farooq, “Pakistan Needs up to 70 Nuclear Warheads,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 10, 1998, 3. 7. Robert D. Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, 88-642F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 1988), 78. 8. Cameron Binkley, “Pakistan’s Ballistic Missile Development,” 75. 9. Kathleen Bailey, Doomsday Weapons, 120. 10. R. Jeffrey Smith and David Ottaway, “Spy Photos Suggest China Missile Trade,” Washington Post, July 3, 1995, A1. 11. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Pakistan Has A-Weapons for Missiles, U.S. Fears,” Herald Tribune, June 14, 1996, 1. 12. Ibid. 13. David Albright, “India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Arms Race: Out of the Closet but Not in the Street,” Arms Control Today (June 1993): 13. The Chinese design was proven at China’s fourth nuclear weapons’ test in 1966 at Lop Nor and involved the detonation of a warhead carried across China on a missile. 14. Duncan Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 28 (September 1998). 15. Umer Farooq, “Pakistan Needs up to 70 Nuclear Warheads,” 3. 16. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Pakistan Is Building Missile Plant, U.S. Says,” Herald Tribune, August 26, 1996, 1; “Pakistan Reported to Be Developing New TBM,” Lancaster University, http://www.cdiss.org/96dec.htm, December 1996.

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17. Ben Sheppard, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the Geopolitics of Terror,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10, no. 12 (December 1998): 40–41. 18. Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, 71. 19. Donald Rumsfeld et al., Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress, http://www.house.gov/nsc/testimony/105thcongress/BMthreat.htm, 8. 20. The dual-use capability of SLVs makes it easy for proliferators to conceal their military intentions behind civilian appearances. Apart from Japan, no country has invested in the production of SLVs solely for nonmilitary objectives. 21. Pravin Sawhney, “Standing Alone: India’s Nuclear Imperative,” Jane’s International Defense Review (November 1996): 28. 22. Ibid. 23. “Indian Defence Minister on Missile Development,” Xinhua (newswire), December 2, 1998. 24. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India to Renew Focus on Missile Technology,” Defense News, October 25, 1999, 24. 25. “PM’s Statement in Parliament on ‘Bilateral Talks with United States,’” December 15, 1998, http://www.indiagov/speeches/parl15dec.htm, par. 18. 26. Christopher Thomas, “Satellite Launch Boosts Indian Defence,” London Times, March 22, 1996, 13. 27. See Kathleen Bailey, Doomsday Weapons, 116; and Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1996), 181. Writing in 1991, Bailey stated that New Delhi’s successful development of a polar SLV (PSLV) “will enable India to build intercontinental ballistic missiles.” 28. Jim Hackett, “The Ballistic Missile Threat: India and Pakistan,” Lancaster University, http://www.cdiss.org/96dec.htm, December, 1996. 29. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India to Renew Focus on Missile Technology.” 30. Raja Mohan, interview with the author, April 16, 1999. 31. “Russia Sends India Upper Stage of Booster Rocket,” Reuters, September 22, 1998. India’s previous attempt to acquire Russian cryogenic engines was blocked by the United States in 1991 because it violated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The current contract, which was concluded in 1993, does not include the transfer of blueprints to develop the technology itself. 32. “ISRO Tests Indigenous Cryogenic Engine,” Hindu, February 27, 1998, 11. 33. Andrew W. Hull, “In Search of the Real Sagarika,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (July 1998): 24. 34. Interview with Pravin Sawhney, January 1999. 35. Cohen, “Nuclear Neighbours,” 17. 36. Stephen P. Cohen, “Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction in South Asia: An American Perspective,” in Shelley A. Stahl and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 204. 37. Ibid., 205. 38. Devin T. Hagerty, “South Asia’s Nuclear Balance,” Current History 95, no. 600 (April 1996): 167. 39. Christopher Thomas, “Indian Exercises Stir Border Tension,” London Times, December 3, 1998, 10. The nuclear variant of Prithvi was not simulated in the exercises.

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40. Rezaul H. Laskar, “New Doctrine: Army-IAF Exercises in Desert,” Asian Age, December 3, 1998, 2. 41. See “Daily on Superiority of Missile ‘Shaheen,’” BBC Survey of World Broadcasts, December 5, 1998 (FE/3402 A/4). Quoted from Jang, a paper based at Rawalpindi: “with the development of the Shaheen missile, Pakistan has responded to India’s Prithvi missile.” 42. Pravin Sawhney, interview by the author, February 1997. 43. “India’s Missile Programme: Changing the Subcontinent’s Balance of Power?” RUSI Newsbrief 15, no. 11 (November 1995): 84–85. According to a RUSI study undertaken by Pravin Sawhney, the Prithvi is ideal for striking targets such as rail marshaling yards, logistic bases, and forward air bases. It would be able to disrupt and dislocate Pakistan’s C3I system. The Prithvi’s conventional warhead will get the target to display a high degree of nervousness, which will eat into the vitals of the will of an enemy. 44. Greg J. Gerardi, “India’s 333rd Prithvi Missile Group,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7, no. 8: 362. India is introducing the Prithvi missile into its reserve forces and stationing it away from the border area with Pakistan. In this way, India’s leaders can avoid international pressure by maintaining that they have not deployed the Prithvi system, but it can still be deployed when conflict is imminent. 45. Pravin Sawhney, “India, Pakistan, China: Need for a Missile Stabilisation Regime,” paper given at the annual Jane’s Ballistic Missile Proliferation Conference, October 1999, London. 46. Thomas G. Mahnken, “America’s Next War,” Washington Quarterly 16, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 179. 47. Requirements for Ballistic Missile Defenses (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 11. 48. Umer Farooq, “Islamabad Rejects “No-First-Use” Pact for Nuclear Weapons,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 22, 1998, 15. 49. Christopher Thomas, “Pakistan Keeps India Guessing as Stakes Rise in Game of Nuclear Bluff,” London Times, March 8, 1996, 14. 50. Devin T. Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96): 112. 51. Ibid., 88. 52. Devin T. Hagerty, “The Power of Suggestion: Opaque Proliferation, Existential Deterrence, and the South Asian Nuclear Arms Competition,” in Zachary Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., “Proliferation Puzzle,” special issue of Security Studies 2, no. 3–4 (Spring–Summer, 1993): 257. 53. Devin T. Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” 112. 54. Umer Farooq, “Islamabad Rejects ‘No-First-Use” Pact.” 55. John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 13, no. 13 (Fall 1988): 56. 56. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1994), 357; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 598. 57. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 4. 58. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), 196. 59. Sumit Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency,” International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 107. 60. “Fernandes Calls for No-First-Use Policy by Asia’s N-States,” Times of India, January 28, 1999, http://www.timesofindia.com.

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61. Umer Farooq, “Pakistan Needs up to 70 Nuclear Warheads,” 3. 62. Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), xvi. 63. Ibid., 193. 64. “China and Pakistan Present a Collaborated Threat,” Times of India, April 12, 1998, http://www.timesofindia.com. 65. Stephen P. Cohen, private e-mail message to author, April 16, 1999. 66. Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 107. 67. Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), 114. 68. See Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Blair, Logic of Accidental Nuclear War. 69. Robert McNamara, Out of the Cold (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), 102; and McGeorge Bundy, Blundering into Disaster (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 140. Bundy comments that in a crisis situation, with all its inevitable pressures, it is inconceivable that decisions regarding use of nuclear weapons would be unaffected by such factors. 70. James G. Blight and David A. Welch, “Risking “The Destruction of Nations”: Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (Summer, 1995): 824. 71. Stewart M. Powell, “Scud War, Round Three,” Air Force Magazine (October 1992): 33. According to Mark Miller of Johns Hopkins University, the Allied raids “did not destroy a single mobile launcher.” 72. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 196. 73. Ibid. 74. Ben Sheppard, “The Ballistic Missile Programmes of India and Pakistan,” War Studies Journal 3, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 65. 75. Cohen, “Nuclear Neighbours,” 12. 76. Susan M. Burns, “Preventing Nuclear War,” in Cohen, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, 116. 77. Rahul Bedi, “India Assesses Options on Future Nuclear Control,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 16, 1998, 16. 78. Ibid. 79. K. Subrahmanyan, “Capping, Managing, or Eliminating Nuclear Weapons?” in Kanti Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, eds., South Asia After the Cold War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 185. 80. Ejaz Haider, quoted in Jane’s Sentinel South Asia Security Assessment, 3rd update, 1998, Pakistan, section 6.10.5. 81. Ibid. 82. Ben Sheppard, “How Far Has South Asia Gone Out of Control?” The Bulletin of Arms Control, no. 30 (July 1998): 23. 83. Seymour M. Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge,” The New Yorker, March 29, 1993, 60. 84. Brahma Chellaney, “South Asia’s Passage to Nuclear Power,” International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 69. 85. Sheppard, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” 40. 86. Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 47, 49. 87. Sheppard, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” 43. 88. Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 45.

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89. Joseph S. Bermudez, “Iran’s Missile Development,” in Potter and Jencks, eds., International Missile Bazaar, 56. 90. Arieh Y. Shalev and Zahava Solomon, “The Threat of Missile Attack: Israelis in the Gulf War,” in Robert Jursano and Ann E. Norwood, The Emotional Aftermath of the Persian Gulf War: Veterans, Families, Communities and Nations (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1996), 144. Writing from personal experience, Shalev and Solomon observed: “A new life style developed. In the morning, life went as if conditions were nearly normal. From early afternoon, there was a large outpouring of cars from the central region to outlying areas. In the evenings, most people retired to their homes close to their sealed rooms and gas masks and readied themselves for night, when the missiles would fall. At night a voluntary curfew took effect.” 91. See Zahava Solomon, Coping with War-Induced Stress: The Gulf War and the Israeli Response (New York: Plenum Press, 1995). This study provides a valuable insight into how populations respond to the threat of chemical or biological missile strikes and their adaptation to conventionally armed attacks. 92. Kenneth J. Cooper, “India and Pakistan Vow to Reduce Nuclear Risk,” International Herald Tribune, February 22, 1999.

9 Technology for Defense and Development: India’s Space Program Dinshaw Mistry

India’s space program is involved in two major activities—it builds satellites used for remote sensing, meteorology, and telecommunications and, more significantly, builds rockets that can launch these satellites. These space technologies have found both economic and military applications. In the 1970s and 1980s, India’s first satellite launch vehicle (the SLV 3) could only launch a light payload (typically, a scientific satellite) to 300- to 450kilometer-altitude low-earth orbits. Such lightweight low-orbit satellites did not have major military or commercial applications. However, SLV 3 was still powerful enough to be used as an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Agni missile. In the 1990s, India built far more powerful launch vehicles that can launch heavier satellites to the necessary higher-altitude orbits. These more advanced satellites have primarily economic applications but also offer potential military spin-offs. The polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) enables the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) to place its medium-weight remote-sensing (or reconnaissance) satellites into the optimal 800- to 900-kilometer-altitude orbit. The PSLV’s successor, the geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV), would permit ISRO to launch heavyweight communications satellites to the necessary 36,000-kilometer high-altitude geostationary earth orbit (GEO). In this chapter I review the history and development of India’s space program, analyze the capabilities of its space assets, and examine their political, economic, and geostrategic aspects. In the three decades since the inception of the space program in the 1960s, its technical objectives have remained fairly constant. However, under changing political and econom201

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ic circumstances, India’s space assets have been put to varying applications—they have been utilized for socioeconomic development or to fulfill political objectives and have produced military spin-offs and commercial applications. India’s space assets are now sufficiently advanced to find applications for power projection and force multiplication, which is achieved through satellite reconnaissance, intelligence, and communications. These increasing capabilities of India’s space assets, combined with the modernization of India’s conventional forces and the development of its nuclear forces, could significantly influence the strategic relationship between India on the one hand and Pakistan and China on the other. Such a geostrategic capability will have important security implications for the Asia-Pacific region. THE HISTORY

OF INDIA’S

SPACE PROGRAM

India’s space program has passed through two stages of development. The first stage began in the 1960s and involved setting up an administrative framework and gaining experience with elementary rocket operations.1 ISRO was formed in 1969, and the Indian Department of Space was established in 1972.2 ISRO’s first chairperson, Vikram Sarabhai, persuaded India’s political leaders to increase funding for the Indian space program at a time of national financial constraints in the late 1960s.3 Sarabhai was also instrumental in planning the gradual evolutionary development of the Indian space program. In 1970, he noted that “in a ten year time frame, one must acquire the capability not only of building telecommunication satellites such as INSAT-1 but also of launching them into synchronous orbit. . . . To begin with, we have set as a goal the development of a satellite launcher of the Scout type . . . once the basic systems have been developed for this, and experience acquired in operating them, it is estimated that a five year period from 1975 to 1980 should be adequate for the second stage of development of larger boosters.”4 The Indian space program has lagged more than a decade behind Sarabhai’s original schedule. The latter phase of the first stage of India’s space program focused on mainly experimental, low-capability projects that allowed Indian scientists to gain experience in the construction and operation of satellites and launch vehicles. In this phase, ISRO indigenously built (with foreign assistance) the Bhaskara earth observation satellites as well as a communications satellite (the Ariane Passenger Payload Experiment [APPLE] satellite) and conducted four flight tests of its SLV 3 satellite launch vehicle between 1979 and 1983.

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The second stage of India’s space program, commencing in the mid1980s, focused on more capable mission-specific systems. It involved building the PSLV and its successor, the GSLV, which were designed to launch the indigenously developed Indian remote-sensing (IRS) satellite and a meteorology and telecommunications “Indian national satellite” (INSAT), respectively. With the PSLV commencing operational launches in 1997 after three demonstration launches and the GSLV project nearing its first flight test in the year 2000, India’s space program is now emerging out of its developing stages and stands poised to join the ranks of the world’s five advanced space agencies that have GEO capability. INDIA’S SATELLITE LAUNCH VEHICLE PROGRAM

Efficiency and economy of scale have been achieved in ISRO’s launch vehicles as each utilized some of the guidance and rocket propulsion systems from the prior vehicle (see Tables 9.1 and 9.2). For example, for rocket propulsion, ISRO utilized a single 9-ton solid-fuel system in the SLV 3, allowing it to launch a 35-kilogram payload to a 300-kilometeraltitude low earth orbit (LEO). Three such systems were utilized on the augmented satellite launch vehicle (ASLV), enabling it to place a 100kilogram payload in a 450-kilometer-altitude LEO. The same 9-ton solidfuel rockets are also used in the Agni missile and as peripheral strap-on boosters in the PSLV. The PSLV and GSLV involve two major propulsion systems—a 130ton solid-fuel system, and a 37-ton liquid-fuel engine (whose design is based on the Viking engine used in the European Space Agency’s Ariane launch vehicle), both of which are indigenously built. They allow the PSLV to launch a 1,000- to 1,200-kilogram payload (the IRS satellites) to an 800- to 900-kilometer-altitude polar orbit. The same systems are used on the GSLV and are supplemented with a 12-ton Russian-supplied cryogenic engine, which enables the GSLV to carry a heavier 2,500-kilogram payload (an INSAT 2–class satellite) to a higher 36,000-kilometer GEO. The first batch of GSLVs will use Russian cryogenic engines, but later GSLVs will utilize indigenously built cryogenic engines. ISRO is developing a 12-ton (7.5-ton-thrust) cryogenic engine for launching 2,500-kilogram INSAT-type satellites. It also plans to build 12- and 16-ton-thrust cryogenic engines for more advanced GSLVs that would place 3,500-kilogram and 4,000-kilogram communications satellites in GEO. These heavier satellites would carry a larger number of transponders and facilitate a greater volume of communications.

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Table 9.1 Launch Vehicle

Indian Satellite Launch Vehicles and Missiles

Date (month/ year)

Height Weight (m) (tons)

Altitude (km)b

SLV 3

8/79,a 7/80, 5/81, 4/83

23

18

LEO: 300

PSLV

9/93,a 10/94, 44 3/96, 10/97

275

GEO: 800–900

GSLV

2000

51

402

GEO

Prithvi

3/88 (16 tests)

8

4

ASLV

Agni 1

Agni 2

3/87,a 7/88,a 5/92, 4/94

5/89, 7/92,a 2/94 4/99

23

21

21

41

16

16

LEO: 450

—

—

—

Range (km) 1,500 — —

—

Payload (kg) (satellite)

35 (Rohini)

Stage 1: 1 × 9 tons SF

100 (SROSS)

Stage 1: 3 × 9 tons SF

2,500 (INSATclass or GSAT)

Stage 1: 1 × 130 tons SF + 4 x 37 tons LF Stage 2: 1 × 37 tons LF Stage 3: 1 × 12 tons Cr

1,000 (IRS) Stage 1: 1 × 130 tons SF 450 + 6 × 9 tons SF Stage 2: 1 × 37 tons LF

150 250

1,000 250

2,000

1,000

1,500

Propulsionc (stage, weight in tons, fuel)

1,000

1 x 3 tons LF

1 × 9 tons SF + 1 × 3 tons LF 1 × 9 tons SF +1 × 4 tons SF

Source: Compiled by author. Notes: a. Mission failure. b. Key: LEO: low earth orbit; GEO: geostationary earth orbit (36,000 km altitude). c. Key: SF: solid fuel; LF: liquid fuel; Cr: cryogenic fuel.

India’s satellite launch vehicle program, though maturing, has not escaped failures—only five out of eight (62 percent) SLV 3 and ASLV launches were successful, and four out of five (80 percent) of PSLV launches have been successful. The first SLV 3 launch (August 1979), the first (March 1987) and second (July 1988) ASLV launches, and the first PSLV launch (September 1993) failed; the fourth PSLV launch (September 1997) reached the required altitude but did not precisely place the satellite into the correct orbit. In most of these cases, the hardware and major propulsion systems performed well; the failures occurred because of software problems such as the delayed ignition of stages, disturbances caused during the separation of stages, and the inability of the guidance and control systems to correct for trajectory deviations resulting from these disturbances.5

TECHNOLOGY Table 9.2

Prithvi SLV 3 Agni 1 ASLV PSLV GSLV

FOR

DEFENSE

205

Propulsion Systems for India’s Missiles and Satellite Launchers (number of units) 4-ton LF 1 — 1 — — —

9-ton SF — 1 1 3 6 —

40-ton LF — — — — 1 5

130-ton SF

Note: SF: solid fuel; LF: liquid fuel; Cr: cryogenic fuel.

INDIA’S MISSILE PROGRAM

— — — — 1 1

12-ton Cr — — — — — 1

India’s missile program partly overlaps and is partly distinct from its space program. In July 1983, New Delhi officially embarked on an integrated guided missile development program (IGMDP). The IGMDP was initially allocated a budget of Rs380 crore ($130 million) and by 1994 had received over Rs780 crore ($275 million).6 The IGMDP was pursued through India’s Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) at Hyderabad in South India, which is part of a larger military research and development apparatus, the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO).7 The IGMDP aimed at building five missiles—an antitank missile, two surface to air missiles, and the 150- to 250-kilometer-range Prithvi missile and the 1,500- to 2,500-kilometer-range Agni missile. The latter two systems form the backbone of India’s missile programs. The Prithvi missile has a propulsion system derived from the SA 2 missile of 1960s vintage. Prithvi missile production has been undertaken by Bharat Dynamics Limited, and sixteen Prithvi tests were conducted between 1988 and 1998. It bears little resemblance to ISRO’s sounding rockets, which theoretically could have been converted for use as shortrange ballistic missiles. Thus, in terms of short-range missiles, ISRO and DRDL have pursued different rocket programs. The 1,500- to 2,000-kilometer-range Agni missile is more directly derived from the Indian space program’s SLV 3. In its early years, when it was headed by Vikram Sarabhai and Satish Dhawan, ISRO consistently opposed any military application for its dual-use projects such as the SLV 3.8 Eventually, however, the DRDL-based missile program borrowed human resources and technology from ISRO. In a move resented by the ISRO community, missile scientist Abdul Kalam resigned as head of the

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SLV 3 project at ISRO and moved to DRDL to direct India’s missile program. The extent of human resource transfer between ISRO and DRDL should not be exaggerated—barely a dozen scientists accompanied Kalam from ISRO to DRDL. Kalam designed the Agni missile using the SLV 3’s first stage for propulsion, although the Agni’s guidance system is different from that of the SLV 3. The Agni 1 missile, which uses a solid-fuel first stage and liquid-fuel (Prithvi-missile-derived) second stage, was flight-tested three times between 1989 and 1994 to a maximum range of 1,400 kilometers. The project was then suspended in 1996; an official report noted that since all the objectives of the Agni technology demonstration project had been met, the project was being terminated. It added that the decision to develop and produce a missile system based on Agni technology could be taken at an appropriate time consistent with the prevailing threat perception.9 Following the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government’s assumption of office in 1998, India’s nuclear and missile activities gained momentum. India conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998. In April 1999, India tested the rail-mobile Agni 2 missile to a range of 2,000 kilometers. This missile had a solid-fuel second stage built by ISRO. MTCR TECHNOLOGY EMBARGOES

The missile technology control regime (MTCR) is a key international instrument aiming to halt the spread of ballistic missiles by denying states the necessary foreign technical assistance for missile or rocket development.10 India’s space program had initially benefited from foreign technology transfers. For example, in the early 1970s, cooperation between ISRO and Germany’s space agency resulted in the transfer of technologies relevant to propulsion and guidance systems, flight controls, material science, and wind tunnels. In the 1960s, foreign sounding rockets were launched from the Thumba range in South India, and the SLV 3 design was based on the design of the U.S. Scout rocket of 1960s vintage.11 However, despite foreign assistance becoming restricted with the advent of the MTCR, India’s space activities were not halted. ISRO and Indian industry indigenously developed a number of space and missile technologies after being denied their import—these included shell catalysts for rocket fuel, magnesium plates for the Prithvi, radiationhardened integrated circuits for satellites, and maraging steel for rocket motor casings.12 This indigenous construction typically took five years for each system and resulted in approximately a 10 percent increase in expen-

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ditures.13 These obstacles were significant in the short term, but because ISRO was not operating under rigid time constraints, the slow pace of indigenous production did not hurt ISRO projects.14 The most publicized case of U.S. sanctions against ISRO—those invoked in 1992–1994 against ISRO and a Russian firm, Glavkosmos, for the supply of cryogenic engines to ISRO—has, in the middle term, not affected ISRO activity. ISRO eventually acquired cryogenic engines from Russia (albeit without the technology). Moreover, following the U.S. sanctions, ISRO embarked upon an indigenous program to develop cryogenic engines. The slow pace of this indigenous effort does not affect the GSLV project because Indianbuilt cryogenic engines are not required for the first batch of GSLVs, which will use imported cryogenic engines. To summarize, the MTCR has delayed and increased the costs of ISRO projects, but it has not actually halted any project. THE INDIAN SATELLITE PROGRAM

India’s satellite program has achieved quicker and somewhat greater success than the satellite launch vehicle program. The first Indian satellites— Aryabhatta, Bhaskara, and Rohini—enabled Indian scientists to gain experience in satellite operations and were stepping-stones leading toward the development of more capable satellites (see Table 9.3). The 1,100-kilogram INSAT 1 satellites were somewhat unique because they had multiple roles of communications and meteorology, each carried out by different sensors on the same satellite. The INSAT 1 series was constructed in the United States by Ford Aerospace. The 1,900- to 2,100-kilogram INSAT 2 satellites are indigenously built and have transponders that are more powerful and more numerous than those on INSAT 1. Low-power C-band transponders typically support a few hundred phone lines each, whereas higher-power transponders in the extended C, S, and Ku bands each support a television channel or high-volume data and mobile communications. INSAT 2 meteorological sensors provide seven-minute repetitive coverage (useful for tracking and relaying back information on rapidly changing weather conditions such as cyclones), an improvement over the thirtyminute INSAT 1 time frame. INSAT satellites have been well utilized in the setting up of a national telecommunications infrastructure—for example, INSAT 1B facilitated the extension of television coverage to over 75 percent of India’s population, and subsequent INSATs brought almost all of Indian territory under television coverage. It should also be clarified that the theoretical promise

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Table 9.3

Indian Satellites

Satellite

Date (month/ year)

Aryabhatta Bhaslara 1 Bhaskara 2 Apple INSAT 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D

INSAT 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E GSAT IRS 1A 1B P2 1C P3 1D P4, P5, P6

4/75 6/79 11/81 6/81 4/82, 8/83, 7/88, 6/90

5/92, 3/93, 12/95, 6/97, 4/99 1999–2000 3/88 8/91 10/94 12/95 3/96 9/97 4/99

Launch Vehicle

SL-8 (Soviet) SL-8 (Soviet) SL-8 (Soviet) Ariane (ESA) Delta (US) Challenger (US) Ariane, Delta Ariane GSLV

Vostok (Russia) Vostok (Russia) PSLV D2 (India) Molniya (Russia) PSLV D3 PSLV C1 PSLV C2 PSLV C3, C4

Weight (kg) 360 440 440 670 1,100

Altitude (km) 590 530 530 GEO GEO

1,900– 2,100

GEO

1,000

800–900

2000

GEO

Function

Scientific earth observation Telecom Telecom and meteorology Telecom and meteorology Telecom (education) Remote sensing

Sensors/ Capability Resolution: 1,000 m

Transponders: 12 C + 2 S 12 C + 2 S 18 C + 2 S 18 C + 2 S 18 C + 3 S + 3 Ku 3C+2S 72m + 36m 72m + 36m 36m 23m + 6m WiFS (180m) 23m + 6m WiFS, 10m, 2m

Source: Compiled by author.

of technological advancement translating into immediate socioeconomic benefits has not been realized. This is because much of India’s population remains illiterate, despite being within the range of educational television programs. However, the INSAT series has found several more modest commercial and developmental applications. The INSAT 2 satellites provide telephone links to remote areas; data transmission for organizations such as the National Stock Exchange; mobile satellite service communication systems for private operators, the Indian railways, trucks, and road transportation; and broadcast satellite services used by India’s state-owned television agency and by commercial television channels. The GSAT series are smaller satellites to be launched on the initial GSLVs.15 From late 1999 onward, the INSAT 3 series began to replace INSAT 2.16 INSAT 3B was launched in late 1999 to provide fixed as well as mobile satellite services. This satellite would be followed by INSAT 3A, a multipurpose communication and meteorological satellite, which will also carry a meteorological data relay transponder and a search and rescue transponder. INSAT 3C would be a communications satellite similar to INSAT 3A, whereas INSAT 3D would be primarily configured as a meteorological satellite.

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The IRS program has removed India’s dependence on satellite images from Landsat and SPOT satellites. IRS 1A was launched in March 1988, IRS 1B in August 1991, and IRS 1C in December 1995, on Russian launch vehicles. IRS 1D (September 1997) and the IRS P series are launched on India’s PSLV. IRS 1A and IRS 1B sensors had a resolution of 72 multispectral (in the visible and near-infrared band) and 36 multispectral panchromatic.17 IRS 1C and IRS 1D cameras have a better resolution of 23 meters multispectral and 6 meters panchromatic. The IRS P series are quick-turnaround low-cost versions of the IRS 1 satellites, costing approximately $15 million (far less than the $50-million IRS 1 series).18 IRS P3 carried a wide field sensor (WiFS) with 180-meter resolution to monitor vegetation. IRS P4 (Oceansat) is an ocean satellite launched on PSLV C2. IRS P5 (Cartosat 1) will provide 2-meter panchromatic images, and Cartosat 2 (to be launched in 2002) will have 1-meter resolution. IRS P6 (Resourcesat) will have 10-meter resolution sensors for detailed vegetation monitoring, allowing multiple-crop and species-level discrimination. IRS P7 (Oceansat) will have fishing applications, and IRS P8 and IRS P9 are intended for atmospheric and environmental studies. The IRS satellites form the nucleus of the Indian natural resource management program. Regional remote-sensing service centers (RRSSCs) in five Indian cities and remote-sensing application centers in twenty Indian states have used IRS images for a wide range of applications. These include monitoring the environment in general, analyzing soil erosion and the impact of soil conservation measures, managing forests, determining land cover for wildlife sanctuaries, delineating ground water potential zones, mapping areas of flood inundation, monitoring droughts, estimating crop acreage and deriving agricultural production estimates, monitoring fisheries, surveying metal and mineral deposits and other mining and geological applications, and urban planning.19 POLITICAL-ECONOMIC INFLUENCES

AND

OBJECTIVES

When it was first conceived in the 1960s, India’s space program was intended to play a significant role in a broader national policy of planned socioeconomic development. In general, technology held great promise of allowing countries to leapfrog over traditional stages of development and make a quick transition to an industrial and postindustrial society. Therefore, satellite communications, educational television programs, meteorology, and natural resource survey and management were and continue to be priority areas for the Indian space program. It has also been guided by strong

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political motivations: it was intended to symbolize India’s high-technology achievements and thereby enhance India’s prestige internationally, especially among the nonaligned group of nations. In addition, the Indian space program caters to a domestic constituency—it retains considerable popularity with the Indian public, and successful satellite deployments and launches function as national morale boosters. India’s space program was sharply upgraded in mid-1972, following the 1971 war with Pakistan and New Delhi’s perceptions of a de facto U.S.-Pakistan-China convergence against India in that war. ISRO was separated from the Atomic Energy Commission and placed under the Indian Department of Space, which was set up in 1972 and assigned rigid schedules for meeting technical and applied objectives.20 Soon after the Indian nuclear test in May 1974, ISRO’s then-director, Satish Dhawan, stated in July 1974 before an Indian parliamentary committee that India had the ability to produce medium-range missiles with locally developed solid fuels and guidance systems—he was referring to the SLV 3, which was actually still some five years from its first flight test.21 In the mid-1980s, the most significant military spin-off from India’s space program emerged when the SLV 3’s first stage was used in the Agni missile. The PSLV and its successor, the GSLV, however, are more likely to find commercial rather than military applications. The commercial aspect of India’s space program became prominent in the 1990s, when, influenced by India’s economic liberalization program, ISRO’s goals widened to include offering its space services on the international market. The Antrix corporation was set up in 1992 to serve as the marketing arm of India’s space agency. One analyst noted that ultimately, “India’s intentions may be judged simply from the level of technological capabilities, whether for development or defense purposes. Does the technology achieved in the civilian nuclear and space program provide India with credible nuclear weapons and delivery systems? The answer to this question is yes—if not now, then at least in the near future.”22 India’s space program has already provided an intermediate-range nuclear delivery system—the Agni missile. In addition, India’s satellites and satellite launch vehicles have other potential military and strategic applications, which are discussed below. India’s first satellite launch vehicle—the SLV 3—was modified into the 2,500-kilometer-range (with a 1-ton payload) Agni IRBM; India’s subsequent satellite launch vehicles, the ASLV and PSLV, despite being more Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems

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powerful than the SLV 3, are unlikely to find applications as ballistic missiles. The Agni is relatively light and therefore transportable; it provides for an ideal second-strike mobile IRBM system. The Agni gives India a minimum but not a secure deterrent against China, on account of its range limitations. China’s most important cities, Beijing and Shanghai, are 2,500 kilometers away from (insecure) launch sites in northeastern India, and therefore the 1,500-kilometer-range Agni 1 or 2,000-kilometer-range Agni 2 cannot reach these targets. The ASLV and PSLV theoretically have a 4,000-kilometer and 8,000-kilometer range, respectively, and would bring China’s heartland within range when launched from secure launch sites in eastern and central India. In practice, however, it would be difficult to deploy the ASLV and PSLV as mobile, truck- or rail-mounted missiles, on account of their strap-on boosters (which greatly increase the effective diameter of the system and make it hard to deploy on mobile launch units). Moreover, the PSLV is extremely heavy and very inefficient in terms of weight-to-payload ratio; a PSLV-derived missile would weigh some 170 tons, whereas most ICBMs of capabilities similar to the PSLV weigh under 100 tons. Therefore, both the ASLV and PSLV, if they were to be used as nuclear weapons delivery systems, would have to be deployed in silos, the construction of which would be easily detected. Clearly, Indian political leaders need to give more detailed consideration to the use of the ASLV and PSLV as nuclear weapons delivery systems. The IRS satellites are primarily used for civilian applications, and the present IRS system only offers a moderate military reconnaissance capability, with the drawbacks of poor resolution and limited frequency of coverage. The LISS-3 (linear image self-scanning) cameras on IRS 1C have a 23-meter resolution in the visible and near-infrared band, permitting the detection of large military installations. The panchromatic (PAN) camera on IRS 1C has a resolution of 6 meters panchromatic, sufficient to broadly detect surface ships, aircraft, tank formations, and ballistic missile units but not to precisely identify these objects. Two important shortcomings of the IRS satellites should be noted. First, the visible and near-infrared cameras do not permit viewing through cloud cover and dense foliage. Second, the IRS satellites are unable to provide round-the-clock monitoring. The 23-meter-resolution LISS-3 camera on IRS-1C has a twenty-four-day repeat cycle (i.e., it revisits a given location once every twenty-four days), whereas the 6-meter-resoluReconnaissance

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tion PAN camera has a forty-day repeat cycle.23 These shortcomings in repeat cycles are likely to persist even with the advent of new IRS satellites; for example, a combination of four such satellites, each with a twenty-four- to forty-day repeat cycle, would together provide at best a six- to ten-day repeat cycle. Thus the IRS system would be of little use in providing daily or hourly updates of a battlefield situation to military command centers. These drawbacks can be overcome on an ad hoc basis by changing the IRS orbit to yield a shorter repeat cycle. ISRO could also increase the resolution from its satellites by simply moving them to a lower orbit. From their present 800-kilometer-altitude orbit, the LISS-3 and PAN sensors have 23-meter and 6-meter resolutions, respectively; when placed at a lower altitude (typically a 300-kilometer-altitude orbit), they would generate militarily useful 8-meter multispectral and 2-meter panchromatic images, respectively. The above adjustments in satellite orbit would expend more fuel and decrease the satellite’s life cycle. New Delhi’s defense bureaucracy has occasionally experimented with the use of IRS images for reconnaissance purposes;24 the Indian air force’s airpower doctrine seeks to use space assets for surveillance and battle management.25 As discussed above, India’s current satellites have limited military reconnaissance capabilities. The Indian military could, however, build a series of dedicated military reconnaissance satellites based upon existing IRS technology. This option becomes feasible because only small incremental costs would be involved in utilizing existing infrastructure from the IRS project and using a proven launch vehicle (the PSLV) to construct and deploy a dedicated military reconnaissance satellite system. The Kargil military operations in the summer of 1999 may have accelerated Indian efforts to use its PSLV-launched satellites for military reconnaissance, as India’s military sought to use the forthcoming Cartosat 1 for such purposes.26 India’s communications satellites have some military capabilities but do not have specifically designated military functions. The INSATs can be used for multiple access digital data transmission, teleconferencing, and remote area emergency communications, features that would be well utilized in a command and control network and for search and rescue. The constraints on effective military use of the current INSATs stems first from their inappropriate frequency range. The C-, S-, and Ku-band transponders on INSAT 2 operate primarily in the ultrahigh and low frequency ranges, which is typical for civilian communication satellites; these frequencies Command, Control, and Communications

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can easily be jammed. Dedicated military communications satellites operate in ranges susceptible to jamming. A second limitation of the present INSAT systems is that the INSAT transponders have a limited capacity; furthermore, almost all INSAT transponders have already been leased for civilian and commercial use, leaving few available for India’s military. The limitations of the present INSAT system for military communications can be corrected by releasing some transponders for military use. New Delhi could also opt to build dedicated communications satellites, a project that is technically and financially viable because costs are lowered by utilizing existing INSAT infrastructure. The PSLV can be used to launch 500-kilogram communications satellites (which would carry only a few transponders and facilitate a small volume of communication) into GEO, and the advent of the GSLV in this decade would give New Delhi a launch vehicle for heavier and more powerful 2,000-kilogram military communications satellites. India’s space assets provide it with first-generation military communications and reconnaissance capabilities, which are currently limited but can be considerably enhanced with upgrades to the present generation of systems. India’s Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine of August 1999 specifically calls for space-based communications and reconnaissance systems. These systems would affect the calculations of regional security planners on both conventional and nuclear issues. India’s satellites are presently unable to maintain round-the-clock coverage of Pakistan’s military activities; indeed, they failed to detect military intrusions in the Kargil sector of Kashmir in 1999. But they do permit the buildup (and regular updates) of a database of Pakistani targets for Indian security planners. If New Delhi acquires dedicated military reconnaissance satellites that provide daily coverage of Pakistan’s military installations, this would give it a counterforce (military target–oriented) capability versus Pakistan. The fact that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons delivery systems could be more easily destroyed by an Indian first strike would then considerably weaken Pakistan’s deterrent and consequently make Islamabad more likely to consider a preemptive first strike of its own. These factors have important implications for regional security because they decrease the stability of deterrence in the subcontinent. India’s missile programs such as an advanced version of the Agni 2 or a future Agni 3 and military ASLV would provide countervalue (cityThe Strategic Utility of India’s Space Assets

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directed) capabilities against China. Although it would take at least until 2003 for India to develop a modest nuclear deterrent force against China (comprising twenty to thirty Agni 2 missiles and more powerful Agni 3 missiles), India’s satellite reconnaissance systems enable New Delhi to counter Chinese conventional threats in the short term. India’s satellite intelligence capabilities give its military planners invaluable tactical and strategic information on Chinese military forces in Tibet. The IRS satellite system with its six-day repeat cycles or a future series of dedicated military satellites could give India’s armed forces sufficient early warning about the movement of Chinese military forces from central China toward Tibet and India, thus facilitating the deployment of Indian conventional forces in time to counter any movement of Chinese troops. With the maturation of India’s satellite-based reconnaissance, intelligence, and communications capabilities, Pakistan’s potential nuclear deterrent against India would become highly vulnerable to an Indian first strike. Further, New Delhi could also effectively counter a Chinese conventional military threat. Thus, the China-Pakistan strategic balance versus India would be radically altered. China would be unable to rely on Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent versus India, and Pakistan would have less confidence in China’s ability to balance India. The United States and Southeast Asian nations would also more seriously consider balancing any future emerging Chinese threat with India’s limited nuclear deterrence and increasing satellite reconnaissance- and communications-backed conventional capabilities against China. The PSLV and GSLV are likely to find commercial applications in the period 2000–2005, after a series of additional flight tests demonstrates their reliability to potential clients. Two small satellites, a 100-kilogram Korean satellite and a 50-kilogram German satellite, were launched (along with the heavier IRS P4) aboard PSLV C2 in May 1999. A 100-kilogram Belgian satellite would be similarly launched, along with an IRS satellite, on a future PSLV. ISRO did not gain much by launching these lightweight microsatellites, but it did acquire a market reputation that would help secure more lucrative heavier payload satellite launch contracts in the future. ISRO prices are comparable to those on the international market— a PSLV launch costs approximately $20–25 million, and a GSLV launch is expected to cost $70–80 million, and the anticipated global increase in demand for communication satellites would enable ISRO to secure at least a few commercial satellite launch contracts. Yet ISRO’s low launch rate Commercial Applications

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(not expected to increase beyond one or two launches annually for the next decade) would generate only a small annual revenue that would barely recover the considerable investment made in the PSLV and GSLV program. In general, because of its inability to be financially self-supporting, ISRO would have to rely on funding from India’s government, and its activities are likely to be slowed in times of a national financial crisis. The situation is somewhat more promising for India’s satellites. IRS 1C images of 6-meter panchromatic resolution (better than those from their previous main competitor, 10-meter-resolution SPOT images) have found a number of clients, though ISRO imagery will eventually encounter competition from 1- to 3-meter-resolution imagery on the international market.27 The International Telecommunication Satellite Organisation (Intelsat) has signed a ten-year $100 million agreement with ISRO to lease eleven Cband transponders on INSAT 2E. The INSATs are also a major asset for India’s state-owned television agency, which plans to use six INSAT 2C transponders to widen its broadcast footprint to the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Although the low capacity on the INSATs (each INSAT supports a smaller number of voice circuits or television channels than other communication satellites) makes them cost-inefficient, the extremely high demand for telecommunications in India and the Asia-Pacific region will ensure that INSAT capacity is fully utilized.28 ISRO plans to have approximately 130 transponders by 2002 (compared with sixty-seven transponders in 1998) and also plans more Ku-band transponders that allow a higher volume of communications than existing C-band transponders. India’s space expenditures have increased gradually from an annual average of approximately $70 million from 1965 to 1980 to $85 million in 1979–1980, $230 million in 1985–1986, $300 million in 1995–1996, and $350–400 million in 1998–1999 and 1999–2000.29 ISRO employs more than 15,000 personnel (both scientific and technical), and in addition a large number of institutions—more than 500 public and private sector firms, national laboratories, and academic institutions—undertake research or build components for ISRO; some 50 percent of the ISRO budget is outsourced to these subcontractors.30 In recent years, approximately 45 percent of the ISRO budget has been utilized for operational satellites and 35 percent for satellite launchers, with the rest used for space applications at various regional space centers and administrative costs. Like the space programs of other countries, ISRO relies primarily on government funding and therefore remains under constant pressure to Costs, Manpower, and Organizational Structure

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secure political support. India’s political leaders, including the prime minister, are always invited to space launches in order to secure their endorsement for ISRO activities; they routinely oblige, especially because of the prestige associated with the Indian space program. At the same time, expenditures on science and technology endeavors are at times called into question. Thus, even following prestigious events such as the 1997 PSLV launch, one editorial in an Indian newspaper criticized the Indian space program because it had not created commercial spillovers. It noted that the technological feats of space launches were “not the sort of prowess that will make us a richer, healthier or more literate nation. . . . India has to ask what its space program can deliver apart from grandeur. . . . Satellite launches will never earn as much or employ as many people as [low-tech industries that produce goods such as] cotton garments or radiator caps.”31 The Indian space program fares poorly compared with the world’s major space agencies, especially in terms of its annual launch rate (see Table 9.4). It also lags ten to fifteen years (one technological generation) behind the space programs of Japan, China, and Europe and about twenty years (two technological generations) behind the U.S. and Russian space programs. However, in terms of output per unit of expenditure, the Indian space program compares favorably with the space programs of other nations; it has provided modest socioeconomic, political, military, and commercial benefits without consuming a large portion of New Delhi’s financial resources. CONCLUSION

India’s space assets were developed for economic purposes but have found some (and offer the potential for further) military applications. In purely economic terms, India’s space infrastructure cost several hundred million dollars over a period of two decades from the 1970s through the 1980s, an infrastructure that did not provide immediate tangible economic or military benefits. It was only after this initial investment that India’s more advanced space assets of the 1990s found modest economic and military applications. India could well have purchased such space services commercially on the international market at prices only marginally more expensive than indigenous services. Thus, in purely economic terms, India’s space assets have cost more (when taking into account the sunk costs) than the revenues they have generated. However, locally supplied space services do not have to be paid in foreign currency, and this saving

TECHNOLOGY Table 9.4

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A Comparative Study of Eight Space Programs Number of Launches

1957–1988 1989–1998

United States 890 Russia/CIS 2,107 Europe/ESA 23 China 23 Japan 36 India 5 Israel 1 Brazil —

277 476 83 37 18 7 3 1

First Launch LEO

1958 1957 1979 1970 1970 1980 1988 1997

GEO

1967 1967 1980 1984 1975 1999 — —

First Use of Cryogenic Technology 1966 1985 1979 1984 1986 1999 — —

Space Expenditure

Average, 1990–1995

(in millions)

% GDPa

$25,000 $1,000–6,000b $3,200 $1,000a $2,100 $260 $20 $70

0.5 1.0 0.10 0.25 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.02

Sources: Data from Andrew Wilson, ed., Interavia Space Directory, 1992–93 (Geneva: Interavia SA, 1993); Wilson, Jane’s Space Directory, 1995–96 (Alexandria, Va.: Jane’s Information Group, 1996); and Jonathan’s Space Report, archived at http://www.harvard.edu/QEDT/jcm/space/space. html. There were 81 launches in 1998 (the majority being 36 U.S. and 25 CIS), 89 in 1997, and 77 in 1996. Notes: CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States; ESA: European Space Agency; LEO: low earth orbit; GEO: geostationary earth orbit (36,000-km altitude). a. Estimates b. Russia’s space expenditures have declined from Cold War levels of $6 billion to post–Cold War levels of $1 billion.

of foreign exchange is one economic benefit from an indigenous space program. A second set of benefits from indigenously developed space assets is political in nature. First, space assets provide international prestige and have foreign policy spin-offs. For example, ISRO would be in a position to offer a larger volume of PSLV, IRS, and INSAT services to other states in the period 2000–2005, thereby reinforcing India’s political and economic ties with these nations. Second, by acquiring technological autonomy over its space assets, India can use them not only for economic purposes but also for potential military spin-offs. The IRS-PSLV and INSAT-GSLV projects demonstrate ISRO’s ability not only to build but also to launch militarily useful and strategically significant reconnaissance and communications satellites. Doing so would greatly enhance India’s power projection and force multiplication capability in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific regions and thereby affect the strategic balance in these regions. An increasing number of nations are likely to have national satellites, but ISRO is among of group of only eight space agencies that have a significant satellite launch capacity.32 The somewhat limited capabilities of India’s space assets compared to those of the world’s major space-faring

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agencies (especially when assessed in terms of quantity and volume of services and to a lesser extent in terms of quality) restrict their performance and international competitiveness but do not significantly detract from their modest socioeconomic, political, military, and commercial utility. Within a few years, the technological advancement of India’s space assets could well coincide with and further facilitate India’s emergence as the major economic and political power in the Indian Ocean region and as an important player in the Asia-Pacific. NOTES

1. Gary Milhollin, “India’s Missiles—With a Little Help from Our Friends,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1989): 31–35. Sounding rockets carry light payloads such as scientific experiments into the atmosphere (to altitudes of 100–300 kilometers). 2. ISRO is an integral part of India’s Department of Space (DOS). Coordination between ISRO and other space-related departments is carried out at the political level through the Indian Space Commission (ISC), which reports to the prime minister. The ISC director is also the head of the DOS and the chairperson of ISRO. The ISC formulates Indian space policy, and the DOS executes ISC policy through ISRO. 3. Padmanabh Joshi, ed., Vikram Sarabhai: The Man and the Vision (Ahmedabad: Mapin, 1992). 4. Vikram Sarabhai, Science Policy and National Development, ed. Kamla Chowdhry (Delhi: Macmillan, 1974), 61. 5. H. P. Mama, “India’s Space Program: Across the Board on a Shoestring,” Interavia, no. 1 (1980): 60–62; Lincoln Kaye, “Step by Step Towards Eventual Self Reliance: The Indian Space Program,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 27, 1987, 51–53; A. K. Menon, “ASLV—Damning Findings,” India Today, January 15, 1989, 183; Raj Chengappa, “PSLV’s Deviant Behavior,” India Today, October 15, 1993, 41. 6. Tim McCarthy, “India: Emerging Missile Power,” in William Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers’ Network (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 202; Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “Enhancing Indo-U.S. Strategic Cooperation,” Adelphi paper no. 313 (September 1997), 25. 7. The 1994–1995 budget for DRDO was Rs11,800 million ($390 million), considerably larger than ISRO’s Rs7,700 million ($260 million) budget of the same year. See Nonproliferation Review 3, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 170. The outlays for Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), DRDO, and ISRO were Rs1,537 crore ($390 million), Rs2,786 crore ($700 million), and Rs1,755 crore ($430 million), respectively, in the proposed 1999–2000 budget (these figures assume an exchange rate of Rs40:$1). “Significant Allocation for Science Depts in Budget,” Deccan Herald, March 1, 1999. Besides the DRDL-based IGMDP, DRDO is also involved in other Indian military projects such as the light combat aircraft (LCA) and the main battle tank (MBT), and has developed systems such as radars, sonars, simulators, materials and composites, and parallel processing computers.

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8. “Indian IRBM Details Revealed,” International Defense Review (March 1989): 247. 9. Reuters, December 5, 1996. 10. Influenced by the MTCR’s technology barriers (but also by political-economic factors), Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, and Egypt have curbed their missile activity, and Syria, Iraq, and Libya have also been unsuccessful in missile development. However, the MTCR was unable to prevent tests of 1,000- to 1,500-kilometer-range missiles by North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran in 1998. Dinshaw Mistry, “International Cooperation in Arms Control: Building Security Regimes to Contain Missile Proliferation” (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1999). 11. Jurgen Scheffran and Aaron Karp, “National Implementation of the MTCR: The U.S. and German Experiences,” in Hans Gunter Brauch, Henry van der Graaf, John Grin, and Wim Smit, eds., Controlling the Development and Spread of Military Technology (Amsterdam: Vu University Press, 1992), 242; Gary Milhollin, “India’s Missiles—with a Little Help from Our Friends,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1989): 311–315. 12. Brahma Chellaney, “The Missile Technology Control Regime,” in Francine R. Frankel, ed., Bridging the Nonproliferation Divide: The United States and India (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995), 205. 13. Ibid. 14. A. Baskaran, “Different Stages of Technological Capabilities and the Effectiveness of Export Controls: The Case of India’s Space and Missile Programs,” paper presented at the Ninth International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Ithaca, New York, July 1997. 15. The GSATs are intended for low-cost experiments and demonstrations of technologies such as digital audio, data and video broadcasting, Internet services, and wide-band multimedia. GSAT 1 would carry two S-band transponders, a high-power C-band transponder, and two indigenously developed C-band transponders. See “INSAT-2E Launch Date Within a Fortnight,” Deccan Herald, February 1, 1999. 16. “Five New Satellites for Better Communication & Meteorological Services,” Deccan Herald, February 13, 1999. 17. Multispectral sensors acquire a separate image for each wavelength band of light; they provide good overall detection since multiple images of the same object can be compared in order to accurately determine data. Panchromatic sensors acquire a single image of the viewed area by collecting light over a wide wavelength band; consequently, objects may not be accurately identified. 18. Michael Mecham, “Cost-Conscious Indians Find Profits in Imaging Satellites,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 12, 1996, 59. 19. “Remote Sensing Tech Being Widely Used All over India,” Deccan Herald, October 3, 1997. 20. Onkar Marwah, “India’s Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Policy,” International Security 2, no. 2 (Fall 1977): 103. 21. Dieter Braun, “Wie friedlich ist Neu-Delhi’s Atom-programm?” EuropaArchive, September 25, 1974, 626. 22. Raju G. C. Thomas, “India’s Nuclear and Space Programs: Defense or Development?” World Politics 38, no. 2 (January 1986): 340. 23. Repeat cycles are inversely proportional to the swath width of a camera. The repeat cycle for IRS 1C’s 23-meter-resolution, 140-kilometer–swath width LISS-3 camera is twenty-four days; repeat cycles for 180-meter-resolution images are five days for IRS 1C’s 770-kilometer–swath width sensor and three days for IRS P3 sen-

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sors. The 6-meter-resolution PAN sensor has a 70-kilometer–swath width, yielding a forty-day repeat cycle. 24. In 1996, New Delhi’s Ministry of Defense was reported to have temporarily blocked the use of IRS 1C by the Indian Environment Ministry, Agriculture Ministry, and other government agencies in order to monitor ballistic missiles being deployed near India’s borders. See Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Exerts Military Control of Satellite,” Defense News, June 17–23, 1996, 10. 25. “IAF Gears Up for Space War,” Deccan Herald, August 26, 1997. 26. India’s defense bureaucracy stated that it planned to use the Rs250 crore Cartosat 1 (having a 2-meter resolution) for military reconnaissance. “Next Indian Satellite Will Have Surveillance Capability,” Deccan Herald, August 2, 1999. 27. Antrix and ISRO contracted a U.S. firm, Eosat, to provide marketing data from ten Indian satellites through the year 2005; in turn, Eosat has agreements with representatives from Japan, Europe, Australia, and Thailand to retrieve data from Indian satellites. Warren Ferster, “Eosat Cuts Employees to Offset Projected Loss,” Space News, November 27, 1995, 3. 28. The latest INSATs are more competitive. For example, INSAT 2 E carries seventeen C-band transponders, of which eleven have been leased to Intelsat. These transponders could provide 12,000 two-way voice links or broadcast about 100 digitally compressed TV channels or contribute a mix of both services. 29. Andrew Wilson, ed., Interavia Space Directory 1992–93 (Geneva: Interavia SA, 1993), 62; Wilson, Jane’s Space Directory 1996–97 (Alexandria, Va.: Jane’s Information Group, 1997), 59–60. Exchange rate fluctuations and inflation affect comparing data across years—in terms of local currency, India’s space budget was Rs3,500 million in 1991–1992, Rs5,700 million in 1993–1994, Rs7,500 million in 1995–1996, Rs9,000 million in 1996–1997, Rs10,500 million in 1997–1998, Rs15,000 million in 1998–1999, and Rs17,550 million in 1999–2000. In 1999–2000, Rs45 was worth $1; in 1998–1999, Rs40 was worth $1; and in 1996–1998, Rs35 was worth $1. In general, the development of more advanced systems—such as heavy propulsion systems for the PSLV and GLSV and more advanced satellites—in larger quantities accounts for the steady increase in Indian space budgets over the years. 30. Nicholas Johnson and David Rodvold, Europe and Asia in Space, 1993–94 (Kirtland, N.M.: USAF Phillips Laboratory, 1994), 10. 31. “What Value Space?” Economic Times, September 30, 1997. 32. More than a dozen countries, including an Arab-state consortium, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, and Turkey, have purchased or indigenously developed communications satellites. Earth observation satellites (civilian and military) are presently operated only by the United States, Russia, Europe (ESA and France), China, Japan, and India; Canada operates a radar-imaging satellite, and Israel has launched short-duration reconnaissance satellites. Other nations purchase remote-sensing data commercially on the international market. North Korea and Iran are seeking dual-use missile and satellite launch capability, which will be initially restricted to light-payload LEO.

10 The Indian Economy After Pokhran II Prem Shankar Jha

In this chapter I attempt to study the challenges that the Indian economy faces after India carried out nuclear weapons tests in Pokhran, Rajasthan, in May 1998. I also examine how these challenges can be met within the constraints of a fragmented political system, a “soft state,” and an adolescent awareness among its decisionmakers of their nationhood. I conclude that the direct impact of U.S. economic sanctions has so far been limited but has aggravated the problems that India already faced and complicated the task of framing an adequate response to them. These are a deepening industrial slowdown, an overvalued exchange rate, an unsustainable fiscal deficit, stagnating exports, and consequently a perceptible and accelerating drift toward another foreign exchange crisis of the type that shook the country in 1990–1991. GLOBAL REACTION

TO THE

TESTS

As had been foreseen, the nuclear tests brought down a swift economic reprisal on India. Japan announced the cancellation of aid immediately worth $1.2 billion. Canada, Britain, and Australia followed it. The United States took some time to announce precisely what the sanctions would be, but the outlines of what it would do under the Arms Control Act of 1994 were clear from the start. Over the months that followed, the United States blocked all but humanitarian aid to India from international agencies; banned lending to Indian government organizations by U.S. banks; cut off

221

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all access to U.S. technology, and sent Indian scientists back in the middle of their stints at various U.S. research facilities. But these overt acts were only the tip of a much larger iceberg. There was evidence that an old boys’ network had been activated to carry India’s economic isolation much further than even these overt sanctions and aid cutoffs would have taken it. The White House and State Department discouraged U.S. companies and banks from getting involved even in purely private deals in India. Banks stopped lending to companies that had projects under construction in India, even if they did not involve the government and money had already been committed. The large U.S. firm Hughes, which was collaborating with the Indian company Bell and Ispat to provide basic telecom services, asked for an extension in making its telecom license payments because it had to find new lenders for $400 million in loans that it had earlier tied up with U.S. banks. Enron found in December that it could find no lenders for $500 million it needed to implement phase two of the Dabhol power plant. A third company, Raytheon, decided to pull out of the international airport project in Bangalore at about the same time. Although it had other good reasons to do so, the economic sanctions could have been the last straw. Raytheon is heavily involved in U.S. government defense contracts. Perhaps the most serious impact of the economic sanctions was on the availability of technology. In November 1998, the U.S. government published a list of forty Indian companies and 200 subsidiaries with whom U.S. companies were not permitted to have virtually any relations without its express sanction. The European Union also started applying antidumping duties on Indian goods with a new vigor, sometimes taking as little as two weeks to determine adequate cause. The immediate impact fell hard on the defense sector. India’s light combat aircraft project is in serious jeopardy because the United States withdrew all support at a point when neither the indigenous Kaveri engine nor the flight control system was fully developed.1 Worse still, in sharp contrast to the careful preparations that were made to minimize the impact of the 1971 war on aid and technology flows, the Pokhran tests were conducted with little forethought about how to minimize their consequences. India lost an advanced artillery direction and range-finding radar system that the United States had developed; although it had been cleared for sale to the Indian armed forces some months before the tests, no one had thought of placing an order for it. These losses affect India’s capacity to increase the future effectiveness of the armed forces. But the more immediate danger is that it will not even be able to maintain the effectiveness of what it has. It is difficult, for example, to see how India will obtain spares and engines for the Jaguars,

THE INDIAN ECONOMY

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which are still its main low-level strike aircraft. The list of existing equipment whose battle readiness will be jeopardized is endless. India thus faces the possibility of emerging weaker after the nuclear tests than it was before them. Were the sanctions to remain in force with full rigor for a long time, it is difficult to see how India could make good the harm that the denial of technology and foreign investment can do. The Brownback amendments to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act in October 1998 and October 1999 restored funding for U.S. military training programs as well as government-backed financing and credit programs for firms doing business there. Restrictions on commercial loans and credits to both countries were also lifted. The second Brownback amendment gave the president permanent authority to waive the Glenn amendment. But an indefinite imposition of sanctions is not a realistic scenario. Sooner or later, for good and selfish reasons, India and the Western oligarchy that aspires to rule the world will come to terms with each other. The terms on which they do so—the deal that will finally be struck— will depend on the two sides’ relative bargaining strength. In this negotiation, for religious, geopolitical and ideological reasons, India does not have the power to blackmail that Pakistan has. Thus the contours of the bargain will depend on India’s economic strength at the time it is struck. THE PASSIVE INDIAN RESPONSE

The Indian government’s response to the sanctions has been devoid of any such holistic perspective. Instead it began with an exercise to assess and then neutralize their impact on the availability of foreign exchange to the country. Immediately after the tests, the government virtually advertised the fact that it had not only not worked out an economic strategy in advance but could not cobble one together even after sanctions had been imposed. The budget it presented had been framed well before the nuclear tests and still talked of doubling the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from $3 billion to $6 billion in 1998–1999. It also contained no awareness that the economy was in a serious structural imbalance and no measures to start setting this right. These omissions reinforced a return to crude protectionism, which caused share prices to nosedive and foreign portfolio investment to leave the country in what was, for India, large amounts. It also made Moody’s Investors Service downgrade India’s credit rating by not one but two grades. Duff and Phelps and Standard and Poor followed, and this increased foreigners’ nervousness about the stability of the Indian economy.

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In late 1998, New Delhi responded to mounting criticism of its inaction by announcing that it awaited an assessment by the economic ministries of the impact of the sanctions upon their programs. This statement confirmed the fear that it had understood the impact only in terms of the amount of foreign exchange the country would lose and would frame its response accordingly. The suspicion was borne out when the government announced that it expected the sanctions to cost the country about $6 billion in aid and other inflows and that the loss of aid would affect the economy only after a lag of up to two years. To counteract the reduced capital inflow in the immediate future, estimated to be around $3 billion, it floated new bond issues abroad through the State Bank of India, aimed supposedly at nonresident Indians (NRIs). When the resurgent India bonds fetched $4.17 billion in August, anxiety about the impact of the sanctions vanished. Today Indians take it for granted that that the sanctions have not worked on India, although they have brought Pakistan to its knees. Not by a whisper did any member of the government suggest that sanctions might only be the beginning, not the end, of India’s problems. THE IMPACT

ON THE

BALANCE

OF

PAYMENTS

By the end of 1998, it had become apparent that the government’s estimate of a $3 billion adverse shift in its balance of payments had been unduly optimistic. Although foreign aid inflows had fallen more or less as expected, by $1.197 billion between April and October, the first seven months of the fiscal year, every other calculation had gone wrong. Instead of doubling, foreign direct investment had fallen by $740 million during the same period. Far more serious was the outflow of decline in foreign institutional (portfolio) investment (FII) of $2.286 billion during the same seven-month period. This had turned an inflow of $1.65 billion in the previous year into an outflow of $637 million. Overall, net foreign investment fell by $3.122 billion in the first seven months of the fiscal year. The worst damage, however, occurred on the trade front. Provisional data show that in April–November 1998, the balance of trade worsened by $3.332 billion. Thus by October–November 1998, the external account had suffered an erosion of $7.651 billion. The most disturbing development was the decline in NRI deposits of $850 million between April and September 1998. This was caused not by a loss of confidence in the rupee but by a switch from the regular deposit schemes to the resurgent India bonds, which pay a higher interest rate,

THE INDIAN ECONOMY Table 10.1 Year/Month

Aid FII FDI GDRs NRI deposits Trade balance Total

225

Change in Major Components of Balance of Payments, 1998–1999 (in millions of dollars) 1997–1998 (actual) 3,162 1,583 3,226 291 20,402 –6,807b –1,707

1998 (April– June) N.A. –1.281 –276 –100 N.A. –1,479 –3,126

1998 (April– October) –1,197 –2,286 –740 –96 –850a –3,332c –8,481

1998–1999 (estimate) –1,500 –2,400 –1,000 –100 –1,200 –4,500 –10,700

Source: Compiled from data and tables prepared by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, Monthly Review of the Indian Economy, July 1998 and December 1998. Notes: a. April to September 30, 1998. b. DGCI&S estimates. The RBI estimates of trade deficit are about $8 billion higher. c. April–November 1998.

mature in just four years, and are dollar-denominated and thus shielded against changes in exchange rates. The rate of attrition in portfolio investment slowed down in November– December because of the reduction of U.S. interest rates. The dollar also weakened in relation to the European currencies and took the rupee down with it. This devaluation has raised hopes for some increase in exports. But even if the optimism were borne out, as Table 10.1 shows, the external account could not deteriorate by less than $10 billion in 1998–1999. Approximately $4.2 billion of this decline has been bridged by the NRI bonds. The rest will have to be bridged, either by fresh borrowing or drawing down the reserves. Were the government to choose the latter, India’s foreign currency reserves would fall by $6–6.5 billion to just under $20 billion. This dive will worsen the ratio between its foreign currency reserves and its vulnerable (i.e., mobile) liabilities2 sharply from the present 1:1.3 to 1:1.6. At 1:1.3, before the nuclear tests, the ratio was already somewhat high. Such a sharp rise will increase the nervousness among investors regarding even small adverse changes in domestic or foreign financial markets, which will steadily narrow the government’s policy options to the point at which maintaining the stability of the currency will become its sole, overriding objective. All other goals, like stimulating the economy to start a recovery, will have to be sacrificed before it. India’s economy will emerge weaker and more vulnerable to external manipulation than before. That is the road down which the country was headed on December 31, 1998.

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THE ECONOMIC SITUATION BEFORE POKHRAN

India was not pushed onto this road by the Pokhran tests. It had been on it for two and a half years before they took place. All through 1998, the government of Atal Behari Vajpayee put the blame for India’s poor performance on the East Asian crisis and the consequent loss of export markets. It blamed the turbulence of financial markets all across the world, from South Korea and Japan to Russia and Brazil, for the depreciation of the rupee after November 1997. Both explanations are not so much incorrect as insufficient. India was sliding into an industrial recession two years before the Pokhran tests, and its exports had been virtually stagnant in 1997 and had declined in 1998. The East Asian crisis in July–August 1997 only accentuated problems that already existed. Even the Russian default on its loans in August 1998 did not have any significant effect, for it did not accelerate the outflow of portfolio investment. The main contribution of the external economic environment to India’s woes, therefore, was to make pulling out of them more difficult. From the point of view of the economy, India decided to go nuclear at the worst possible time. A contrast with what would have happened had the tests been carried out in December 1995, as they very nearly were, is instructive. In late 1995, the economy was at the peak of a boom. Industry was growing at more than 12 percent per annum and exports at 20 percent. All that would have been needed to counteract the reduction of official development assistance and a loss of confidence among foreign investors would have been a small increase in interest rates, which would have served the purpose both of taking a little steam out of the boom and increasing the attractiveness of portfolio investment in India. That is indeed what happened in 1996, after the sharp rise in interest rates in December 1995. Between July 1996 and June 1997, there was a net inflow of $9 billion into the foreign currency reserves.3 Had there been a similar inflow in 1998–1999, it would have overwhelmed the negative impact of any sanctions. But by May 1998, the buoyancy and self-confidence of 1995 was only a memory. Industry was in a deepening recession, and exports were actually declining. Industrial growth had declined to 5.9 percent in 1997–1998 and had dipped further, to below 4 percent, in the first four months of 1998–1999. Exports grew by only 1.6 percent in the whole of 1997–1998, declined in absolute terms after November 1997, and continued to decline in 1998. Agricultural output also declined by 2 percent in 1997–1998. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the primary and secondary sectors taken together was, therefore, a mere 2.2 percent. Figures for growth in the tertiary sector had been inflated by the inclusion of salary increases

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and arrears paid to central government employees. But if these items were excluded, growth in the services sector had slowed down too. Overall, therefore, the growth of GDP was well below 3 percent in 1997–1998. DRIVEN

INTO

RECESSION

The Indian economy did not go into recession on its own. The Congress government inadvertently drove it into one. The turning point was December 1995 when, to bring inflation under control, it decided to curb the growth of money supply savagely. Interest rates skyrocketed; savings moved abruptly from the share to the money markets, and share prices crashed. The resulting rise in the cost of investment caused a postponement of investment plans. That was the start of the current recession. The slowdown began in the primary capital market. The first sign was a 48 percent fall in new capital raised on the share market by the private sector in 1995–1996. This decline had begun before the government raised interest rates in December because of the growth of political uncertainty after the Congress Party’s defeats in four important state assembly elections between December 1994 and March 1995. But it took a nosedive after the crash in share prices that resulted from the hike in interest rates. As the United Front government that came to power in June 1996 kept interest rates high and persistently denied that the economy was heading into recession, share prices remained low, and the year saw a further fall in capital raised through public issues of 20 percent in 1996–1997. The trend continued in 1997–1998, when new capital issues in the primary market during the first half of the year were barely one-third the number of the same period in 1998–1999.4 Investors’ feelings were also reflected by a decline in the registration of investment intentions. Only 307 registrations were filed between April and July 1997 for Rs28.99 billion worth of investment, compared to 443 for Rs83.78 billion in the same period of the previous year. Thus it was clear even in November 1997, when the Asian crisis first began to affect the Indian economy, that economic recovery would not be possible without a turnaround in investment. The first overt sign of the onset of recession was a sharp decline in the growth of imports. Since consumer goods imports were and still are largely banned, imports are tied closely to industrial activity. After a time lag of four months, therefore, industrial production, which had been pegging along till October 1996 at a none too impressive 9 percent, fell dramatically to 3 percent.

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The main cause was a rapid fall in the output of the capital goods sector. In September 1996, before the recession set in, it had risen by 19.1 percent over the same month of the previous year. But the growth rate fell to an average of 5.1 percent between January and April 1997 and declined in absolute terms by 5.8 percent in the next five months. During this period, moreover, the rate of decline grew more pronounced with each passing month. The output of capital goods grew by 4.1 percent in May, declined by 1.8 percent in June, rose again by 7.9 percent in July, but then fell by 8.4 percent in August and a whopping 19.3 percent in September. This decline could not be ascribed to higher imports because these too declined by 14.4 percent between April and September. What is more, the decline was most pronounced in project goods, whose import fell by 35 percent.5 The sharp rise in interest rates that triggered recession also killed India’s export growth long before the Asian crisis. All through 1996 and until August 1997, India’s high real rates of interest and the belief that the economy was still doing well brought money flooding into the country. Reserves rose by $9 billion between August 1996 and 1997. This kept the rupee strong, despite a much higher rate of inflation than in its main grading partners in the West. Between January and July 1997, the rupee appreciated marginally, from Rs35.67 to Rs35.62 to the dollar. But the dollar itself was appreciating rapidly against the European countries and the yen, and this factor, combined with India’s 6–7 percent rate of inflation, priced Indian exports out of European and many developing country markets. Steel and chemicals were the worst affected, but no sector was spared. As a result, the growth of exports fell from 21.1 percent in 1995–1996 to 5.6 percent in 1996–1997. This decline continued into 1997–1998, when exports grew by only 1.6 percent. All through 1997, as recession deepened, the Indian government made more and more strenuous efforts to deny that anything was wrong. India’s economic fundamentals were strong, its spokespeople repeated ad nauseam. Eventually, they began to believe their own propaganda, but others began to grow wary. In March 1997 Moody’s put India on its watch list of countries whose credit rating might be downgraded. Moody’s cited the government’s continuing inability to check the growth of its fiscal deficit and the palpable loss of momentum in economic reforms. The government got its first whiff of the growing nervousness of foreign investors in August. The market interpreted an innocuous remark by the prime minister that the Reserve Bank of India would establish an exchange rate band within which it would not intervene when the value of the rupee changed as an admission that devaluation was imminent and went into a dollarbuying spree. The rupee dropped from 35.7 to 36.4 to the dollar. It hov-

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ered around Rs37 to the dollar until November, when the slide began again, this time on the coattails of the second round of the East Asian collapse. THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT’S NARROWING OPTIONS

As late as November 1997, the Reserve Bank of India was attaching more importance to reviving industrial growth than to defending the value of the rupee. The busy season credit policy announced by Governor C. Rangarajan freed deposit rates and lowered the bank rate and the cash reserve ratio. But in January he was replaced by a national government that was itself living on borrowed time, and the new governor had different priorities. On January 16, 1998, as the rupee slid below 40 to the dollar for the first time, the governor announced a 2 percent increase in the bank rate and raised the cash reserve ratio by half a percent. As the revised statistics for industrial production (which updated the base from 1980–1981 to 1993–1994) were to show a few months later, there had been a very mild industrial recovery going on, which was taking place in the consumer and intermediate goods sectors, as pointed out above. Therefore, the situation in January 1998 was similar to what had prevailed in 1993. Industry was waiting for a turnaround in the capital goods sector to go into a boom phase once more. The second application of the monetary brakes killed the recovery stone dead. Call money market, the market where banks lend money to each other daily, soared immediately to 100 percent and more and remained above 60 percent for the whole of the following week. Banks raised their prime lending rates by 2–4 percent. The bank rate was gradually lowered (but the cash reserve rate was not lowered) until it reached its old level by April, but the damage had been done. From 6.9 percent in December 1997, it dropped to 4 percent in March 1998. This decline perpetuated the stagnation of industry, which in turn was retarding the growth of tax and nontax revenues and widening the fiscal deficit. A small increase in the growth rate in the first quarter of 1998–1999 (April–June) to 5.4 percent was caused not by the revival of manufacturing but mainly by a huge increase in hydroelectric power generation (35 percent). In July growth slumped back to 1.7 percent. FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Despite strenuous assertions by the United Front government that it was committed to reform, the two years before Pokhran II saw first the slow-

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down and then a tacit reversal of India’s attempt to open up and become part of the global economy. The index of this failure was the gradual loss of interest by foreign investors in the country. Foreign direct investment had begun to decline long before Pokhran II. At first sight, the statistics do not reflect this. In 1997–1998, FDI went up to $3.226 billion from $2.524 billion in 1995–1996. But a closer look at the inflow shows that of the $3.2 billion, $2.6 billion came in from April to August 1997, that is, in the first five months of the year. In the remaining seven months the inflow dropped to less than $100 million per month. The sudden drop suggests that the earlier inflow came from contracts entered into during the Congress government’s rule, before economic reforms ran out of steam. The situation did not improve significantly in 1998. Between April and October, FDI inflow was $1.316 billion, $740 million less than the inflow during the same period of 1997. The reasons for the decline in FDI are many and merit a separate discussion. In brief, they are as follows: India’s location in the world puts it at a marginal disadvantage as a base for outsourcing components and materials for fitting into a global production system. It is located midway between two of the three major consumption hubs of the world—Europe and Eastern Asia—and across the globe from the third, the United States. To attract export-oriented investment away from Brazil and Mexico or Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, it had to be that little bit more attractive—cheaper labor; better facilities; less red tape; and a better power, roads, and shipping infrastructure. India had none of these and seemed in no hurry to provide them. As a result, except in software, which needed no investment in infrastructure, and to a limited extent in the automotive sector, India got ruled out fairly early in the game as a source for global manufacturing. The FDI that came to India nonetheless came because of its huge population and supposedly huge domestic market. Foreign investors soon found that this market was not so large and that Indians were incredibly price-sensitive and did not care too much for quality. Thus the superior but more expensive products they produced found only niche markets, and these got crowded in no time. Thus consumer goods manufacturers who invested in India feel a universal sense of disappointment. Many have sold out or are doing so. Finally, even the relatively small domestic market was not unoccupied. Unlike many of the countries to which FDI has been attracted, India had an entrepreneurial class. Once this class saw that the foreigner was coming to occupy its market, it began to oppose the arrival tooth and nail. The ways in which it has done so are too many and for the most part too

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murky to describe in detail. This opposition has not brought about any overt change in policies but has destroyed any sense of urgency about economic reform within the government and the bureaucracy. However, the results are visible and were visible well before Pokhran II. The decision by Tatas to pull out of both the Bangalore airport and domestic airlines projects in June and July 1998 was the latest in a long line of failed projects. The principal victims were the investors who had shown the most interest in India to begin with: the Americans. So by the time Pokhran II took place, India no longer had even the nascent industrial lobby to speak for it in Washington that had been forming when the boom came to an end and the Congress government fell. In this environment India exploded its bombs. The denial of aid and credit disrupted investment plans and caused delays in investment, which inevitably deepened the recession, although by how much is hard to say. The worst affected was infrastructure, but trade also took a nosedive, falling by 17 percent in May 1998 and 11 percent in June before increasing by 8 percent in July. The rupee continued to slip because of an outflow of FIIs and NRI deposits. And the government kept trying to prop it up by raising the interest rate. The irrelevant budget announced by Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha and the downgrading of India’s credit rating that followed increased the nervousness of investors and depositors. The government’s only response was to defend the rupee at any cost. On August 19, two days after Russia defaulted on its loans, the Reserve Bank of India raised the cash reserve ratio and other interest rates yet again. Once again, as in January, call money rates soared briefly to 60 percent, and the rupee bounced back from 43.58 to the dollar to 42.7. The overall impact was to push up the prime lending rate by about 1 percent. The pattern underlying this set of crises and responses is thus clear. In 1996 and 1997, high exchange rates led to an overvalued exchange rate and a widening external account deficit. This was bridged by capital inflows, which made the economy more and more vulnerable to changes in market sentiment. By degrees this vulnerability forced the government to give priority to exchange rate stabilization over economic recovery. Stabilization was done in a knee-jerk manner by raising the bank and Repo rates and reducing the supply of credit. Each such increase would give the next twist to the vicious cycle of declining output, investment, and exports. Each cycle left the economy weaker and more vulnerable than before. The economic sanctions imposed after the nuclear tests therefore only accelerated this downward cycle and hastened the narrowing of the government’s options.

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AVERTING

AN

ECONOMIC CRISIS?

Was there another way to tackle the country’s mounting economic problems? Did the international reaction to the Pokhran nuclear tests affect it? The answer to the first question is a big “yes,” and to the second a smaller one. One has only to study how Alan Greenspan, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, was able to spark and then sustain the longest U.S. boom in history, to see how at any time between the middle of 1996 and May 1998 it could have been done in India as well. The strategy for economic revival should have consisted of the following:

1. Lowering the bank rate sharply and lowering the cash reserve ratio to increase the supply of credit in the economy. 2. Allowing, and if that did not happen by itself, buying up dollars to induce the rupee to depreciate further. 3. Repealing laws like the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, which strangle investment in various sectors of the economy, such as the construction industry, and announcing handsome fiscal concessions to Indian and foreign companies alike to bring forward or implement new investment plans. 4. Starting large new special economic zones equipped, Chinesestyle, with their own power supply, as well as dry port facilities that would be open to all foreign and Indian enterprises with projects that target not just the home but also the world market.

The first two measures would have lowered the cost of domestic investment and of exports. The third and fourth would have given a powerful new impetus to both domestic and foreign investment. Had these steps, especially the first two, been taken in late 1996 when the portents of recession—a decline in capital raised for investment and in imports and exports—became unmistakable and before the drop in share prices turned permanent, the government would have needed to do no more to spark a recovery. The commercial banks would have responded to a lower bank rate and cash reserve rate (CRR) by lowering their deposit and lending rates. A lower deposit rate would have reduced the attractiveness of holding money in time deposits and increased that of the share market. Even a small transfer of funds would have pushed up share prices and brought the primary market back to life, which would have accelerated the transfer of funds from time deposits to shares. The cost of investment would have continued falling, and investment plans that had been postponed for up to two years would have been revived. The capital goods “accelerator”

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would then have kicked in. The third and fourth measures would have consolidated the recovery by exerting a “demand side” pull on investment. However, the Pokhran blasts, the government’s befuddled response, Moody’s downgrading of India, and the outflow of portfolio investment, partly on account of this confusion and partly on account of the East Asian crisis, substantially increased the risks entailed by such a strategy. Lower interest rates would have made holding rupee deposits and securities less attractive to foreign investors. It could, therefore, have caused a further depreciation of the exchange rate well beyond the point that economists considered optimal. For the reasons given above, this was a risk that no one in the government was prepared to take. All firmly believed that the worsening of all of India’s economic fundamentals and India’s precarious foreign currency to vulnerable liabilities ratios had created the risk that a lowering of interest rates would be seen as a sign of panic and trigger an exodus of portfolio investment from the country. This view was pervasive within the Indian bureaucracy but contained an element of perversity in it, for it went against the grain of every foreign exchange crisis in recent years.6 Whether one looks at Mexico in 1994, Thailand in 1997, Russia in 1998, or Brazil in 1999, every crisis has begun with the central bank’s attempt to prop up an unrealistic exchange rate in the face of a widening external payments gap, by raising interest rates to attract capital inflows. The longer those countries did that, the more catastrophic was the collapse that followed. India had been going down that road for two years already by June 1998. All the rating agencies and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had been voicing their growing unease for some time, and the World Bank had issued a completely unambiguous waning against the government’s high fiscal deficit (the root cause of the high interest rate policy) in its country report for 1998. Foreign institutional investors had put India on the watch list as far back as January 1997 and had downgraded India decisively in June and July 1998. Most significantly, both portfolio investors and nonresident investors had begun to vote with their money. In the six months before the Pokhran blasts, there had been a small net decline in portfolio investment of $25 million and a simultaneous decline in the total balances held under NRI deposit schemes of almost $1 billion between March and September 1998.7 All this happened when interest rates were being raised and the rupee was propped up by the Reserve Bank. Thus to expect FIIs and NRI depositors to react in the same way when interest rates were lowered as part of a package of measures that would clearly stimulate the economy and push up share prices was counterintuitive, at the very least. But nothing could shake India’s risk-averse bureaucracy out of its lethargy.

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Even this emotional fig leaf was swept away in July and August 1998. The reason has relatively little to do with India’s economic performance and a great deal to with that of others. Japan had plunged further into recession; East Asia was logjammed in debt; Malaysia had drawn back further from full convertibility; the U.S. economic boom was showing signs of petering out; European growth had begun to falter; and Russia had defaulted on its loans. There were not many places left where money could be safely invested. India, by contrast, was beginning to look better and better. The very fact that nothing was happening there had become an asset. Therefore in July a small net inflow of capital of $20 million trickled in for the first time in several months. Toward the end of the month, the Wall Street Journal began to advise its readers to invest in the shares of Indian closed end funds in the New York stock market. It quoted a battery of investment companies whose analysts pointed out that their prices had reached historic lows and were trading at 23 to 25 percent below their net asset value (the average price, converted into dollars of the share portfolio in the Indian stock market of these funds) and, given India’s innate stability, could only go up.8 What was true of closed end funds in the United States was also true of the share market in Bombay. Share prices were at historic lows. Abroad, some of the nervousness about India caused by the U.S. economic sanctions had been dissipated by the U.S. administration’s decision to lift them conditionally with a view to make meaningful negotiations with India on nuclear nonproliferation. Confidence in the Indian economy was waiting to revive; all it needed was a credible revival plan for industry. A cut in interest rates and an investment promotion package would have provided it. But the government allowed the opportunity to lapse. In the months that followed, with each passing day the external payments gap widened, and confidence ebbed lower and lower. THE URGENT NEED

FOR

FISCAL REFORM

The measures outlined above make up only half the strategy required to achieve an industrial recovery. The other half would be to restore the balance between government revenue and expenditure. Fiscal reform has become far more important than any other component of economic reform for two reasons. First, an economic recovery without fiscal reform will not be sustainable because it will run headlong into the barrier of inflation. In 1995 India was driven into a recession because the industrial boom came on top of a

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large fiscal deficit and an even larger public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR). In fact, all through the first four years of reform, 1991–1995, the fiscal balance had grown steadily worse. Between 1989–1990 and 1994–1995, the PSBR had risen from 9.71 to 10.40 percent of GDP, which built a strong inflationary potential into the economy.9 Coming on top of that, the boom pushed inflation beyond the limits of political tolerance. India was treading in the footsteps of China, where twice, in 1988 and 1993, huge industrial surges were crushed because they led to unacceptable rates of inflation. Like India, China too was burdened by a huge PSBR because more than half of its 100,000 state-owned enterprises were losing money and were being regularly bailed out by the central, provincial, and local governments. In 1994, its PSBR was in the neighborhood of 12.5 percent of GDP, even higher than India’s. China realized that it had absolutely no option but to cut budgetary support to the loss-making state-owned enterprises, and it announced draconian steps to do so. India needs to do the same. The second reason is equally pressing: in the present international climate when international trade is shrinking, an economic recovery that is not export-driven is likely to hasten the onset of a foreign exchange crisis. In a normally buoyant and expanding world market, the very same steps that revive industrial production—a reduction of interest rates and a consequent fall in the exchange rate—will automatically increase exports. India experienced this in 1993–1994 to 1995–1996. The spurt of imports that presaged the boom of 1993–1996 was followed, after about three months, by an equally impressive spurt in exports. As a result, the balance of payments did not suffer. But in 1998, international trade was in its second year of contraction; demand had collapsed in East Asia while devalued currencies had made their exports highly competitive, and the U.S. and European booms were petering out. Thus no Indian government could rely on industrial recovery to drag exports up with it. There is thus a very real danger that the increase in imports will not be followed by a rise in exports. An economic recovery could therefore rapidly widen the external payments gap and cause a loss of confidence in the rupee. The only way to avoid this is to match the increase in money supply that will take place when credit to industry expands with a reduction in government consumption spending. In short, an industrial recovery will be sustainable only when it is accompanied by a simultaneous decline in the fiscal deficit. Money spent on industrial growth must not be new money created by the banks but money transferred from consumption to investment. There is a third, so far largely unnoticed reason that the government cannot postpone really strong measures to correct the growing fiscal

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deficit. There is an urgent need to restore faith in shares as a vehicle of saving. Share markets grew at a dizzy pace and prices soared in the 1980s and early 1990s on the wings of the fairy-tale successes of companies like Reliance, Tata Iron and Steel (TISCO), Tata Electric Locomotive Company (TELCO), Associated Cement (ACC), and a handful of other companies. Then came the share market scam scandal of 1992. Share prices crashed, and without a single newspaper deigning to notice their fate, hundreds of thousands of small savers lost a large part of their savings. Despite that setback, share prices recovered, and large amounts of capital flowed into the market once more on the wings of the economic boom, until the end of 1995, when the government pulled the carpet out from under the investors’ feet once more. Again hundreds of thousands of small investors were ruined. Today, twice-bitten small investors are steering very clear of the stock market. Instead they have gone back to that time-honored hedge against adversity—gold. In 1997, India imported 597 metric tonnes of gold, almost double the amount it imported just two years earlier.10 All through 1998, the gold fever mounted. From April to October 1998, $2.906 billion worth of gold and silver was imported, compared to a mere $722 million a year earlier. The difference of $2.2 billion exceeded the total increase in imports ($1.992 billion) in the two years. Had this not taken place, the slump in industrial production would have been fully reflected in the very slow growth of nonpetroleum imports. Such large imports of gold reflect a very high level of pessimism, not among the captains of industry, who do not as a rule invest in gold, but in ordinary people, including farmers, who do. These people will not be reassured until they see a share price rise that is sustained for a year or more. Only decisions that succeed in bringing the economy back into balance, lowering inflation, and reviving growth will bring the small saver back to the market. There is yet another reason the fiscal deficit needs to be cut drastically. Without doing so, India will not longer be able to finance its infrastructure development. Both the consolidated fiscal deficit of the center and states of 9.2 percent of GDP in 1997–1998 and the PSBR, which was probably in excess of 11 percent, fail to capture just how completely the state is bankrupt. To get a true picture, one needs to add the decline in developmental and other essential spending during this period. Between 1989–1990 and 1994–1995, the share of public sector development expenditure in GDP fell from 22.1 percent to 15.7 percent. In addition, expenditure on defense fell from 3.4 percent to 2.5 percent of GDP. There-

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fore, including the rise in PSBR, the government had transferred more than 8 percent of GDP from investment or defense to consumption. The brunt of the former cuts have fallen on the infrastructure sector. In the seventh plan, the government budgeted creation of 5,000 megawatts of power-generating capacity per year and actually created about 4,400 megawatts per year. In the ninth plan, the allocations will not suffice to create 2,000 megawatts per year. The plight of the states is far worse: new fixed investment from the public sector funds has come down to nearly zero in most states. Now even maintenance of the assets built in the past will no longer be possible. That is not the end of the story. In 1999 the center had to pay the full amount of the salary increase awarded to its employees in 1998, along with one increase in the cost-of-living allowance. The state governments faced payments of more than Rs35,000 crores to their employees.11 In all, therefore, consumption expenditure showed an irreversible rise of almost Rs50,000 crores, or nearly 4 percent of GDP. This will be financed by borrowing at the center and by cuts in the already meager developmental expenditures in the states. The government will have to offset this increase with other cuts in consumption before it even starts on the cuts that are needed to help revive the economy. To get back to where the country was in 1989–1990, it will have to transfer 11 percent of GDP from consumption back to investment. That amounts to Rs156,000 crores a year. Even that level of expenditure will be far from sufficient to meet the challenges that the country faces after Pokhran. In 1989 the country spent only 3.36 percent of GDP on education and culture, compared to the 6 percent considered the minimum needed at this time. It spent a paltry 1.56 percent on housing and urban development, sanitation, and water supply together, when these should have been absorbing three times that amount at the very least. The list of goals promised to the people at election time and then sacrificed at the altar of populist politics is endless. NO EASY OPTIONS

There are still ways to offset the impact of the salary increases and begin to cut back the fiscal deficit that are not too politically unpalatable. One is to raise the retirement age of civil servants by five instead of two years. Doing so will reduce the number of pensioners by one-third and create a pension fund whose revenues will meet the entire outgo on renewed pension payments after six years. A second method is to sell government land,

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for which there is a huge unsatisfied demand in the urban areas of the country. It is a reflection on the softness of the Indian state that even these measures are considered too difficult to implement. Beyond these actions lie no easy options. The only way to shift resources back from consumption to investment is to cut subsidies. According to the white paper brought out by Chidambaram when he was finance minister, in 1998 overt and hidden subsidies accounted for a truly frightening 14.7 percent of the gross national product (GNP), that is, Rs205,000 crores in 1997–1998. Four-fifths of these go not to the needy but to the middle classes. Most of them reflect growing, reckless competition among fragmenting political parties to pander to powerful vested interests in the hope of gaining their support. One is enough of a realist to know that this is not going to change until the aftershock of the Congress Party’s loss of dominance in democratic politics fades away, and a stable bipolar system of coalitions takes its place. Pokhran II was nonetheless a watershed. The nuclear tests were a demonstration of military power and global aspiration: they have fundamentally changed the way other countries look at India. Unless India can find a way of developing the economic power to go with such military might, its nationhood will remain in peril. NOTES

Where sources for data are not explicitly cited, they come from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy’s Monthly Review of the Indian Economy, October, November, and December 1998. 1. Both of these were being developed in collaboration with U.S. firms. 2. These consist of foreign portfolio investments, NRI deposits, short-term debt, and trade credits. 3. Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), Monthly Review of the Economy, October 1997, 180. 4. The capital goods sector determines the fate of industrial growth because of its critical role as an accelerator, both in industrial downturns and in the subsequent upswings. Government economists in India cite the orthodox definition of recession, that is, negative growth in two successive quarters, to refute the allegation that industry is suffering from a recession. This definition may be adequate for mature economies where even spurts of growth seldom exceed 4 percent per annum but is inappropriate for developing countries in the vigorous early and middle stages of industrialization. By the orthodox yardstick India has never experienced a recession in the last half century. The term recession then becomes meaningless. Decline in the industrial sector in October–December 1992, followed by an 8 percent fall in January–March 1993 (continued in fiscal year 1993–1994), kept the overall industrial growth rate near zero despite healthy growth in the consumer goods and intermediate goods sectors. But at that time the capital raised by the private sector in the primary

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share market was rising by leaps and bounds. As a result, when consumer goods demand strengthened in 1993–1994, by December 1994 the output of capital goods also began to move upward. This led to the boom of the next two years that took industrial production to a peak of 16 percent in the last quarter of 1995–1996, before the economy began its slide into recession. In 1997, by contrast, although the consumer goods and intermediate goods sectors had shown signs of revival, with growth in the former touching a peak of 10.5 percent, investors were still reducing or postponing investment. Therefore, the industrial growth rate remained relatively flat at a shade over 5 percent. 5. Data are all from the CMIE monthly reviews, September, October, and November 1997. 6. This view was shared by the former finance minister, Manmohan Singh. 7. The pattern of FII inflows and outflows suggests that this was caused only partly by the East Asian crisis. Deposits rose by $859 million from July to October, when investors were in full flight from East Asia. They began to flow out only in November. This outflow coincided with the second round of instability of currencies in East Asia but was partly brought about by the Indian Reserve Bank’s short-lived attempt to bring down the exchange rate of the rupee by lowering interest and deposit rates. This experience might lie behind the knee-jerk opposition to lowering interest rates that prevailed for most of 1998 and explains the abruptness with which policy was reversed by the government during the third round of instability in East Asia, when the Reserve Bank engineered a drastic 3 percent increase in lending and deposit rates on January 16, 1998. But the underlying reason why deposits did not flow out from June to October, flowed out in November, and had to be checked in January, was the widening perception that the Indian fiscal deficit was too high to be sustained. This perception was shared by NRI depositors. NRI deposit balances grew by almost $3 billion in 1996–1997 but remained virtually unchanged from March 31, 1997, to March 1998. The decline seen after March 1998 must, therefore, have actually set in earlier. 8. Asian Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1998. 9. CMIE, Public Finance: India’s Central and State Governments, 1996, 1. 10. BBC news feature on the international gold exhibition in Bombay, September 14, 1998. A subsequent official estimate has put the import at over 620 metric tonnes. 11. Rs15,000 crores of this is in arrears of pay. The annual outgo in subsequent years will therefore rise by Rs20,000 crores.

11 Is an Otherwise Sensible Agreement with India and Pakistan Precluded Because It Would “Reward” Nuclear Testing? Clifford E. Singer A “win-win” settlement of the current impasse over Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs eliminates sanctions for these “nuclear-capable” states. It would be contingent on their maintaining and cooperating with verification of a global moratorium on nuclear testing, refraining from weaponizing missiles, and limiting production of special nuclear material. This restraint is to continue at least as long as states that previously declared nuclear weapons tests adopt and make identifiable progress toward a goal of themselves becoming nuclear-capable states rather than indefinitely maintaining sizable, alerted, long-range nuclear weapons delivery systems. By resolving international discord over sanctions and fully integrating a global approach to nuclear export controls, such an outcome should also become a “win” result with respect to declared non– nuclear weapons states. An analysis of the impact of such a “win-winwin” outcome on nuclear diplomacy involving the United States, Russia, China, France, the UK, and Israel suggests that Indian nuclear testing could play a part in precipitating a paradigm shift that facilitates more effective global management of problems posed by the existence of weapons of mass destruction. The idea that an otherwise sensible agreement with India and Pakistan on nuclear arms should be avoided because it would reward nuclear testing is an incipient potential contributor to paralysis, and it should be rebutted sooner rather than later. Here I attempt to eliminate the concept that this idea should be a blanket policy covering all of U.S. diplomacy. I do this by constructing a clean counterexample. That is, I illustrate a settlement of the current confrontation between the United States and India 241

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and Pakistan that those interested in resolution of this confrontation may find clearly preferable to the likely alternatives, from the point of view of the national interests of these countries. It should be emphasized that the goal here is not to define the optimal politically feasible resolution of the current confrontation over sanctions and nuclear weapons testing—this would require more reflection. Rather, it suffices to construct one adequate example. The possible existence of even better examples constructed along similar lines does not belie the point to be made here. In a simple but useful terminology for outcomes of negotiations, what I illustrate here is a win-win settlement. A win-win settlement is one that leaves each party to the negotiation better off, from its point of view, than it would be in the absence of a settlement. It is obvious but nevertheless worth emphasizing that in practical terms the point of view of one party, the other party, or outside observers alone is not adequate to define a winwin settlement. Assuming sufficient perspicacity to understand what the other side considers advantageous, one of the primary barriers to a win-win settlement of particular issues concerns the concept of “procedural spillover.” Here procedural spillover refers to impacts on other disputes from the settlement of a particular dispute. By way of analogy, a labor settlement that is win-win with respect to productivity and wages compared to continuing industrial action can get hung up on charges that unfair labor practices or illegal or otherwise irregular work stoppages were used during the dispute. The concept of procedural spillover can impede a settlement on the grounds that such behavior should not be “rewarded” for fear of the impact of such a precedent on other disputes. For example, a union might oppose a settlement by the affected local in hopes of “punishing” an employer sufficiently to deter it from using what the union views as unfair labor practices to the detriment of other locals in the future. If both sides steadfastly refuse to budge on such issues for fear of procedural spillover, then the parties may be forced into the additional expense of binding arbitration, if it is available, or even into continuation of a long-standing confrontation, with a lose-lose or even catastrophic outcome for the immediate parties to the dispute. In this chapter I concentrate on the future of U.S. sanctions on India and Pakistan following the nuclear testing in May 1998. I first define what should clearly be perceived by the United States and India as a win-win outcome on the immediate issues at hand (with procedural spillover considerations set aside), compared to the alternative of continuing confrontation. I show that this settlement should also allow a win-win settle-

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ment from Pakistan’s point of view. I then return to the procedural spillover question and show why future disputes over weapons of mass destruction are likely to be more easily resolved following this win-win outcome concerning the United States and South Asia. Considering the involvement of others in such future possible disputes as a third party, the outcome illustrated here can thus be viewed as a win-win-win result. Given the possible growth of influence of commercial interests affected by the U.S.-India-Pakistan dispute over sanctions, a win-win outcome alone may actually be sufficient for an eventual settlement. However, adequately widespread understanding of the availability of a win-win-win outcome may both accelerate and increase its perceived value. THE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE OUTCOME

I start here with the hypothesis that self-imposed acceptance of categorization as a non–nuclear weapons state in a world perpetually populated by China, the United States, and others as declared nuclear weapons states will not be seen by Indian governments as part of a “win” outcome for the foreseeable future. I trust that the reader’s view of the domestic political salience of nuclear weapons in India is such that this hypothesis is plausible enough that the possibility that it might be correct bears exploring. I also start with the hypothesis that for the foreseeable future, the U.S. government would not consider a win outcome to include a rigid time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons. (I show that acceptance of such a rigid time-bound framework is sufficient but not necessary for an accommodation with India.) Making use of flexibility in longstanding Indian policy and in formulation and/or application of U.S. law will thus be necessary for construction of a win-win outcome concerning sanctions pursuant to nuclear testing. A careful look at the current situation suggests that there is (just) enough flexibility to allow this. Now it is true that long-standing policy of Indian governments led by all three parties (Congress, United Front, and Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP]) in the nuclear age has defined the United States and others as “temporary” nuclear weapons states. This view flows in various degrees from a perceived moral imperative (e.g., following principles espoused by Mahatma Gandhi); from perceptions of India’s “strategic interests” (e.g., concerning China); and from an interpretation of voluntarily accepted treaty obligations of China, France, Russia, the UK, and the United States. However, statements by Indian officials have made it clear to the careful listener that India has not been insisting on imposing a specific time-

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bound framework for elimination of nuclear weapons, but rather the creation of a process with more momentum in this direction. This observation leads us to the question of what kind of settlement could be mutually perceived as a win-win outcome in light of the considerable flexibility just outlined. Since Indian governments consistently refuse to define India as a non–nuclear weapons state, one possibility may be to include in a settlement an explicit abandonment of attempts to force a rollback of India’s current nuclear capabilities while other nations retain their current capabilities. More generally, the United States could explore the possibility of coming to an arrangement with one or more of the nuclear-capable states that have not previously signed a treaty defining them as a non–nuclear weapons state. These states would be asked to do the following:

1. Declare and observe a moratorium on nuclear testing; 2. Cooperate with the nuclear test monitoring procedures defined by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); 3. Undertake to refrain from mounting nuclear explosives on ballistic or cruise missiles; 4. Become parties to an agreement limiting production of weaponsusable special nuclear materials; 5. Be exempt from sanctions aimed at defining them as “non– nuclear weapons” states; and 6. Participate in discussions on specific procedures aimed at the ultimate goal of eliminating the category of “declared nuclear weapons states” and in other discussions with “declared nuclear weapons states” aimed at reducing the danger of use of weapons of mass destruction.

One possible U.S. approach to the last item above could involve discussions on acceptable procedures for approaching “de-alerted” status for all states’ nuclear explosives, at least to the extent that no nuclear explosives are kept mounted on ballistic or cruise missiles. Especially where only a limited number of ground-based missiles and nuclear warheads are on hand and alternative delivery methods are available (e.g., possibly in Pakistan and especially for India), a de-mounted basing mode could not only eliminate a situation of negligible warning time (e.g., as little as three minutes) but also might actually be perceived as improving a nuclear arsenal’s ability to survive a first strike. For states with fully alerted mobileStaged De-Alerting?

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based missiles, de-alerting of other fixed ground-based assets also might not be seen as a drastic step. Further discussion of de-alerting of mobile launchers and cruise missiles could then proceed on a time scale comparable to that needed to develop new or replacement launch systems, a procedure that might be perceived as causing less disruptions to current plans. This kind of staged approach to de-alerting may not be all that some would like to see, particularly in terms of the impact of this approach alone on Russia’s immediate perceived needs for improved confidence in adequate warning time and its implications for launch-on-warning decisions. Nevertheless, this approach at least in principle provides one track on the path of converting “declared nuclear weapons” states to “nuclearcapable” states. In terms of the time necessary to re-alert a nuclear arsenal in comparison to that needed for development of a conventional military confrontation, the distinction between alerted and de-alerted nuclear missiles may seem a minor one. In terms of the political salience of nuclear weaponization in India, however, this distinction takes on a different complexion. Combined with the type of policy currently used by the United States for storing aircraft-deliverable nuclear weapons, a de-alerted state for ballistic and cruise missiles would mean that countries with such a policy could not readily redeploy nuclear forces to send a fairly overt intercontinental nuclear message to a nuclear-capable state without scrambling their understanding on these matters with other nuclear-capable states. Such a deployment posture would thus constitute a symbolic abandonment of gunboat diplomacy with respect to interactions between geographically distant states that possess nuclear weapons. This works both ways. If India refrains from developing a nuclear navy, it would also pass up one type of future opportunity to send a “Don’t Tread on Me” nuclear message to the United States or current Western European nuclear weapons states, for example, by deploying nuclear weapons in the Atlantic or Arctic. Particularly with respect to the United States and Western Europe, the idea that these states take India seriously enough to assign value to the concept of mutual restraint on the symbolism of the potential immediacy of nuclear threats is not just peripheral to the question of nuclear relations. Rather, it actually goes quite close to the heart of the matter. This is somewhat unfamiliar ground from the U.S. and European point of view, and the difficulty of accepting such a concept may prove to be a significant impediment to construction of a win-win solution of the current impasse over nuclear weapons and sanctions. The practical fact of the matter that the United States and others would continue to have the ability to quietly (or even loudly) threaten nuclear retaliation for unac-

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ceptable chemical, biological, or massive conventional attacks is not the basic point here. More important, the dispatch of the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise toward India in connection with the 1971 conflict, at most an occasional footnote in U.S. strategic history, is etched deeply into India’s strategic lore. A de-alerted posture for short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles would also have symbolic importance with respect to India’s immediate neighbors. That India was defeated in an earlier war by a China immune to any possible Indian strategic deterrence is also well remembered. And the observation that the historical circumstances that shaped this strategic lore have no really plausible mirror in future events by no means fully mitigates its domestic political salience. One idea having domestic political salience in India is that India belongs in the same category as China and the other preceding possessors of nuclear weapons, at least as long as any such country possesses nuclear weapons. If this is indeed fundamental to what Indian governments will define as essential to a win-win outcome for the foreseeable future, as I assume here for the sake of argument, then only a settlement that pays some attention to this requirement will have a chance of avoiding an ongoing and potentially rancorous confrontation over the categorization of India’s nuclear capabilities. An alternative or complementary approach to eliminating the category of declared nuclear weapons states concerns the concept of a declining universal upper limit on assembled nuclear explosives holdings. Even periodic proportional reductions in such a limit would move into the nuclearcapable category all cooperating countries that refused to declare themselves non–nuclear weapons states (e.g., under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and/or by inclusion in a nuclear weapons free zone). Under the assumptions given above, substantive discussions of this approach would need to be conditional on the caveat that future limit reduction stages might not actually be accomplished on schedule, should they come to be perceived as being at odds with the security interests of the affected states. (In case of a durable impasse of this type, one can anticipate that the residual domestic political salience of the nuclear issue might lead India in particular to reconsider whether lack of progress of the declared nuclear weapons states toward the nuclear-capable category is sufficient impetus for India to remove itself from that category. However, this may well be true of any achievable understanding on these matters.) Assembled Nuclear Weapons Holdings

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Although an agreement limiting production of weapons-usable special nuclear materials could be expected to formalize agreeable constraints on the pace or extent of possible nuclear arsenal development in other countries, the immediate impact of a universal upper limit on assembled nuclear explosives holdings would likely affect only Russia and the United States in the near and intermediate term. From the U.S. perspective, some type of agreement on this issue is supposed to happen eventually at the third level of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III) process, primarily in relation to “excess” Russian “tactical” nuclear weapons. Russia has so many of these, compared to what could have remotely plausible military use, that there should be negligible military impact from any likely initial upper limit on total assembled nuclear explosives holdings. Nevertheless, more progress toward reassessment of the deployment of these weapons and storage of the special nuclear materials they contain could have a substantial impact on attitudes concerning efforts to control the potential dangers of widespread distribution of nuclear weapons. Conversely, from a Russian perspective, a practicably negotiable initial upper limit on declared nuclear explosive holdings might well need to have at least some symbolic impact on current U.S. plans to retain on the order of 10,000 assembled nuclear explosives. A properly crafted understanding should initially allow the retirement of well over a thousand of these without unmanageable operational consequence, but with potentially important salience to internal Russian political debate over U.S. intentions concerning “breakout” and latent designs on “nuclear superiority.” Prospects for future reductions in assembled nuclear explosives holdings, although touching sensitive institutional nerves on either side, should nevertheless have fairly broad general public acceptance in both countries, at least if polling data in the United States is taken as an indicator. This should be true particularly in the case of simply understood limits on total nuclear arsenals but should also follow if a more arcane arrangement tailored to the composition of U.S. and Russian arsenals can be agreed upon instead. IS THIS

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First, I compare the six-point understanding on nuclear-capable states outlined above to the alternative tack of thorough and ongoing application of U.S. sanctions law, driven primarily by concerns over rewarding nuclear testing, in part for fear of procedural spillover onto other aspects of U.S. nonproliferation policy. I do so primarily to put into stark relief the con-

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ceptual question posed in the title of this chapter. Then I briefly discuss more likely outcomes that would lead to an eventual weakening or abandonment of effective generic economic sanctions, without fully addressing the above-mentioned conceptual divide that currently separates particularly the U.S. and Indian positions on nuclear weapons. For specificity, I examine in more detail a particular outcome consistent with the above six-point framework for discussions with a nuclearcapable state. In this outcome, India and Pakistan are explicitly engaged as nuclear-capable states. Israel, however, prefers to retain its present state of nuclear ambiguity even without the strong encouragement it could receive to this end from the United States. India and Pakistan durably maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing and cooperate fully with international efforts to build confidence that no clandestine nuclear testing is occurring. They refrain from placing nuclear warheads on ballistic or cruise missiles or deploying naval nuclear weapons platforms, and there is no indication of substantial numerical buildup of other nuclear forces in any country. No new unsafeguarded facilities are built for production of fissile materials, and adequate confidence is built up that unsafeguarded facilities are not being used for high-level uranium enrichment or significant enlargement of weapons-grade plutonium stocks. All generic economic and commercial nuclear sanctions on India and Pakistan are lifted in a three-stage process, in concert with progress on establishing the state of affairs just described. First, the U.S. administration avoids actively campaigning against international loans and pursuing restrictions on commercial loans offshore. This is essentially a continuation of the sanctions waiver that supported so-called Talbott dialogues with India and Pakistan. Second, in concert with commercial interests still affected by U.S. law on generic sanctions pursuant to testing, the law is changed to eliminate such sanctions for India and Pakistan. Third, in concert with partial scope safeguards agreements with India and Pakistan and the full cooperation of these countries with remaining nuclear export controls, U.S. firms are allowed to compete with foreign firms for any future nuclear technology applications in India under an appropriate set of partial scope safeguards. (Given the likely alternative demands on capital on the scale needed for nuclear electric power plants and the comparatively limited scope of applications of biomedical and other nuclear technology in South Asia over the next decade or so, the urgency of the last step is rather modest. Nevertheless, agreement in principle on normalizing nuclear relations in this way could have noticeable impact on the acceptability in India or Pakistan of an overall settlement.) To facilitate all this, the United States would agree to discuss the long-term future of assem-

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bled nuclear explosives, starting with exploration with Russia on the overall sizes of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. The expectation on negotiations with Russia would be for continuing arms reduction talks with no a priori defined minimum on eventual possible limits on assembled nuclear explosives holdings. One possible intermediate-term by-product could be that tritium production capacity sized to current nuclear explosives holdings would not need to be fully utilized, even if it remained available on reserve on a time scale considerably shorter than that required for qualification and construction of new facilities “from scratch.” However, neither this modest economic savings nor any of the impact on U.S.-Russian relations is initially considered here as a perceived benefit or detriment in evaluating whether a global understanding concerning the category of nuclear-capable states constitutes a winwin outcome. The most immediate and therefore most operationally relevant facets of the U.S.-Russian relationship mentioned above are already “on the agenda” of bilateral arms control. Thus it is appropriate for any possible impact of a broader agreement on nuclear-capable states upon U.S.-Russian relations to be relegated here to an addendum to discussion of procedural spillover. I thus dispense with further discussion of this issue in the initial win-win assessment and return to it only after taking up procedural spillover. I now discuss four considerations relevant to a win-win analysis that serve as examples of the difference between a normalized and confrontational relationship between the United States and India over categorization of Indian nuclear weapons programs. These concern (1) the nuclear navy, (2) direct economic impact, (3) political and military issues related to energy resources, and (4) international peacekeeping. First, there can be little question of India’s interest and eventual capabilities in the area of development of a fully armed nuclear navy. India has developed indigenously based missile capabilities, has moved forward in design and construction of naval vessels, has worked with Russia on submarine operation, and has shown interest in missile “pop-up” capability. It faces larger Chinese nuclear forces with little prospect of outstripping them; and the logistics, demographics, and politics of ground-based mobile launchers are particularly problematic in India. All this suggests a possible eventual interest in submarines as a less vulnerable mobile-basing mode, albeit with a timing dependent on the overall Indian economy’s general growth and technological progress. As noted above, the concept of Nuclear Navies

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reaching for qualitative parity with declared nuclear weapons capabilities states has resonance in India, so the question of development of a nuclear navy is likely to retain political salience in India as long as nuclear military capabilities themselves retain important domestic political salience. Of course, the U.S. government prefers to avoid adding what should become the world’s most populous nation and one of its largest economies to the list of fully armed nuclear navies. Not only would this put unlimited regions of the world at additional potential risk of accidental launch or strategic calculation or miscalculation, it could also complicate the identification of the source of suspected submarine activity or missile launches. A commitment to an Indian nuclear navy under the shadow of continuing U.S. economic sanctions could also complicate and polarize discussions of sanctions: considerably greater incentive might be necessary to induce India to abandon a fully armed nuclear navy than not to develop one in the first place. On India’s side, the development of a fully armed nuclear navy will consume relatively scarce capital and technical resources. Compared to a situation of an accommodation with declared nuclear weapons states on their transition to the nuclear-capable category, the pursuit of a nuclear navy is also likely to drag India into a long and expensive confrontation with the United States and other declared nuclear weapons states. Thus, India may also view a settlement along the lines discussed here as a win outcome on this count from its point of view. Second, the avoidance of sanctions can clearly be viewed as a direct economic contribution to a win-win outcome from both U.S. and Indian points of view. This is especially true of U.S.-based commercial interests. Given the approach of other industrialized states to the question of interfering with normal commercial operations as a result of South Asian nuclear testing, it can confidently be predicted that any effective interference by the U.S. government with activities of U.S.-based firms will open up opportunities to companies not directly affected by this type of sanction. If this type of sanction lasts long enough for non-U.S. firms to become well entrenched in South Asia markets as a consequence, then the resulting effect on U.S. firms could outlive the actual sanctions regime by as much a generation or more. Clearly, there are potentially powerful influences on the U.S. government that would thus consider a solution that avoids such sanctions to be a win outcome. The permanent removal of sanctions under political conditions long sought by India would help build Economic Stress

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confidence in its economy and should thus contribute to a win outcome from its viewpoint. Third, India is a potentially important player in a number of developments related to the future of fossil fuel resources. Both India and Pakistan have strong financial incentives to contribute to political stability and moderation in Afghanistan and Iran, which are potential land routes for natural gas pipelines. India in particular also has a strong interest in predictable development of fossil fuel resources in the Middle East and elsewhere, as well as recent unpleasant experience with the negative economic impact of labor displacement and temporary oil price increases precipitated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Assuming continuing economic development in India, then India and other oil-importing countries have a mutual interest in avoiding the poisoning of political relations by continued reference back to disputes over nuclear weapons policy and sanctions. Cooperation on Energy

Fourth, India has played a significant role in assigning manpower to international peacekeeping operations in underdeveloped countries. Military cooperation of this sort can be helpful to international efforts and presumably has been supported by India in furtherance of improved international relations. However, military cooperation of this sort may also be jeopardized if India is increasingly at odds with much of the rest of the world over its overall military posture. International Peacekeeping Operations

There are differing degrees of emphasis on these concerns with respect to Pakistan, but overall Pakistan has at least as powerful a set of incentives to cooperate with construction of a win-win outcome of the current impasse over nuclear weapons and sanctions. Although Pakistan’s immediate options for an invulnerable basing mode for nuclear weapons may be much more limited, it has a very strong incentive for avoiding the costs and dangers of even a modestly paced nuclear arms “race” in South Asia. Pakistan’s incentive to avoid economic disruption from sanctions is extraordinarily compelling. It has mutual interests with India concerning access to fossil fuel resources, and Pakistan also has a potential role to play in international peacekeeping operations. Thus, although a win-win solution Pakistan

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may be constructed between India alone and the declared nuclear weapons states, it seems highly likely that this would also precipitate the construction of a solution viewed as a win outcome in Pakistan as well. PROCEDURAL SPILLOVER

I am now in a position to deal with the central question of this chapter: Is an otherwise sensible agreement with India and Pakistan precluded because it would “reward nuclear testing”? I am not trying to address here an absolute “abolitionist” perspective, for example, that any or each of the countries that have conducted nuclear explosions has committed an “abomination” and should effectively be shunned by the rest of the world until it unconditionally renounces weapons of mass destruction. This is because I am concerned here with policy decisions made by governments in the context of a rejection of this position, at least in the sense that they are committed to possession of assembled nuclear explosives as long as one or more other states are perceived as possessing assembled nuclear explosives, other weapons of mass destruction, or a sufficiently threatening level of “conventional” military force. Nor am I interested here in empty propaganda exercises, with governments lecturing other states but having no serious intention of exploring the possibility of a compromise. Rather, I am concerned primarily with the immediate practical implications of responses to South Asian nuclear tests. I have dealt above with the practical implications of a win-win solution for the United States and India and Pakistan of the current impasse over sanctions precipitated by recent nuclear testing. I will deal again below with the implications of such responses concerning Russia, China, France, the UK, and Israel. For now, I attack the implications of such responses with respect to countries declared as non–nuclear weapons states through ratification of the NPT or inclusion in a nuclear weapons free zone. For convenience, I make a rough division of such states into three types. The first type includes states that have clearly renounced both nuclear weapons and direct inclusion under a “nuclear umbrella.” Particularly interesting examples of states whose recent policies suggest their inclusion under this type include Australia, Mexico, and South Africa. The second type includes non–nuclear weapons states whose approach to nuclear weapons conditions may be significantly influenced by alliance relations with the United States. Pertinent examples of this type include Germany and Japan. The third type includes what are currently declared non–nuclear weapons states whose governments proclaim serious security concerns that might lead them in

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the direction of becoming nuclear weapons states. The most interesting examples in this category include North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. With respect to the first type of declared non–nuclear weapons states, an accommodation with the agreed-upon goal of moving states out of the nuclear weapons state category would be consistent with many states’ declared policy goals, particularly if it involved agreement on reduction and possible eventual elimination of assembled nuclear explosives holdings. Recognizing that the only domestically achievable choices for India and Pakistan for the immediate future are between moving toward declared weaponization and remaining nuclear-capable states, the realpolitik choice between these two alternatives should be fairly clear from the point of view of this first type of declared non–nuclear weapons state, however unhappy some of their diplomatic representatives may be about recent nuclear tests. Australia, Mexico, and South Africa

The second type of state examined here includes Japan and, at least formally, all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization except France, the UK, and the United States. These countries have largely cooperated with establishment of the current state of affairs, including indefinite extension of the NPT. An additional complication concerning some of these states is at least a historical interest in alliance with one or more declared nuclear weapons states. Although the end of the Cold War has changed perceptions of the importance of nuclear weapons in alliance relations, the persistence of (de-alerted) storage of an essentially token number of nuclear weapons in several European countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) other than France and the UK suggests that alliance with nuclear weapons holders still has political significance for some of these countries. According to the hypotheses adopted here, however, a necessary condition for any practicable settlement with India is recognition that declared nuclear weapons states will only enter into a program with the eventual goal of becoming nuclear-capable states if they retain the ability to put such a process on hold, should their governments come to believe that moving farther would compromise their essential security interests. The key to accommodating the concerns of declared non–nuclear weapons state allies of the United States is a clear statement that international security, not just national security, will deterGermany and Japan

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mine the progress of declared states toward the category of nuclearcapable states. It should be mentioned in passing here that states such as Germany and Japan also formally meet the first five criteria defined above for nuclear-capable states. For the reasons just outlined, such states are also bound to be consulted prior to conclusion of any accommodation between the United States and India that involves the eventual conversion of nuclear weapons states to nuclear-capable states. The immediate distinction between states like Germany and Japan and states like India and Pakistan is simply that the latter states must immediately confront contentious issues concerning their own nuclear weapons. Thus, a most pressing need exists for discussions among these states concerning the questions related to the nuclear-capable category, despite the current U.S. policy of opposing involvement in broader multilateral discussions on elimination of nuclear weapons. The approach being examined here is meant neither to infer the existence of some special type of status associated with having conducted nuclear explosions, nor to deny the obvious fact that dozens of states have the technical capability to construct nuclear weapons. It simply recognizes that those states that have tested must resolve serious issues among themselves, particularly concerning the implications of U.S. law on generic economic sanctions, and that there may be some value in bilateral or multilateral discussions among those states on the direction of their nuclear weapons programs. Next I consider a third type of declared non–nuclear weapons state. These are states for which export control and inspection regimes are often described, especially by pertinent U.S. government personnel, as having particular importance. Here I examine the relevance to such states of two possible outcomes of the current controversy pursuant to recent nuclear tests. In the first such outcome, potential exporters of items relevant to military nuclear programs (including India and Pakistan) are distracted by and at odds with each other over both generic economic sanctions and more specific nuclear export controls. In this outcome, Russia continues to cooperate with India to the annoyance of the United States, there is lack of unanimity over the importance of restraint in China’s cooperation with Pakistan, and enterprises in France and elsewhere are poised to take advantage of the resulting confusion to promote their own immediate commercial interests. In this context, the maintenance of a uniform and Iran, Iraq, and North Korea

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effective global approach to export controls is likely to be particularly problematic. The second outcome involves a complete normalization of international relations in this arena, including India and Pakistan. Not only is the contentious issue of generic economic sanctions eliminated, but a complete normalization of nuclear trade is accomplished, under partial scope safeguards for states that have not voluntarily renounced possession of assembled nuclear explosives. In this context, all these states come to an agreement on their complete cooperation concerning nuclear export controls. This includes India, whose previous de facto cooperation is converted to a de jure agreement. Moreover, instead of Pakistan being under severe economic stress and left out of any agreements concerning limits on possible sale or even strategic bartering of its nuclear capabilities, quite the opposite result ensues. This second outcome certainly seems preferable from the point of view of states interested in avoiding external assistance to possible nuclear weapons programs in declared non–nuclear weapons states. It may even be preferable from the point of view of many of these states themselves. Iran, for example, will look favorably upon an outcome that focused careful and effective attention on continued correct International Atomic Energy Agency certification that Iraq is not in possession of a “significant quantity” of weapons-usable fissionable material. North Korea might expect to benefit economically if states in general disabused themselves of the “neorealist” view that accumulation of new nuclear weapons states is so inevitable that pursuit of the arrangements undertaken to eliminate previously accumulated spent nuclear fuel from North Korea are pointless. There would be no need to provide economic incentives to North Korea to try and cap their nuclear weapons program. On the other hand North Korea would benefit economically if other countries felt proliferation was not inevitable and worked with economic incentives to prevent it. How many countries of this general type would prefer the second outcome just described remains to be revealed, but it seems that a simple choice between the two types of outcome described here would be resolved from a global win-win-win perspective in favor of a globally functioning nuclear export control regime. NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

Having at least plausibly established the existence of a win-win-win settlement from the points of view of the direct interests of the United States,

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India, and Pakistan, as well as generally concerning the declared non–nuclear weapons states, I now return to the question of possible indirect impacts on relations involving other declared nuclear weapons states and upon the relations of various states with Israel. I begin this discussion with three aspects of U.S.-Russian relations. First, as noted above, reexamination of possible futures for assembled nuclear explosives holdings might serve as a catalyst for progress in U.S.Russian relations on this topic that might otherwise be quite difficult. Second, I note that India’s nuclear testing has already been brought up as another justification for action on strategic missile defenses in the United States. If India does indeed follow up on its previous indications of interest in a nuclear navy, it can reasonably be anticipated that the symbolic significance of this in terms of regional and global reach for India will be matched in the United States by demands for technological solutions aimed ostensibly at defense but actually at countering the symbolic significance of emerging nuclear weapons states undercutting U.S. primacy. Since it is well understood that upsetting the delicate status quo concerning missile defenses could be fatal to the current approach to the U.S.Russian START process, there could ultimately be serious consequences of failing to avoid weaponization of Indian missiles with potential intercontinental reach, however peripheral such reach may be to Indian regional security concerns and no matter how circumspectly the delivery systems for such missiles might be deployed in the end. Third, a question of even more fundamental significance to the U.S.Russian relationship could also be touched upon by an exploration of U.S. willingness to discuss with India eventual U.S. transition to the nuclearcapable category. This would address a Russian concern over possible U.S. designs on conventional and nuclear superiority at Russia’s expense. It is widely understood that one of the difficulties with START II ratification in Russia is the concern that it may cement Russia into a regime that requires unmanageable expenditures in order to approach strategic parity in delivery capabilities, while the prospects for successful negotiation and U.S. Senate ratification of a START III treaty that would correct this problem remain dubious. Combined with concerns over NATO expansion, this leads to the “monkey wrench” alternative of either simple protest, holding back on tactical nuclear weapons dismantlement, or even holding out prospects for a long-term return to Russian rearmament to parity, even if only under START I ceilings. One of the subtle but important Russia

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consequences of U.S. willingness to discuss an eventual shift to the nuclear-capable category is that it could signal to Russia that the United States is not single-mindedly bent on attempting indefinite maintenance of “strategic primacy” in some politically substantive sense (whatever the actual underlying capabilities for nuclear rearmament might be). Of course, part of the problem involves the United States coming to grips with even the long-term possibility of a shift to the “nuclear-capable” category, as discussed further below. Nevertheless, all these considerations suggest that a properly managed interplay of U.S.-Indian and U.S.Russian nuclear diplomacy could be synergistic with respect to indirect impacts on U.S.-Russian nuclear diplomacy, as well as constituting a winwin-win outcome in the sense discussed above. In any case, any successful nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia is likely to require some sort of accommodation concerning the possibility of NATO expansion into the former Soviet republics, particularly the Baltic states. There is a myriad of possible solutions to this particular conundrum. One involves alternative security arrangements for the Baltics (and the Russian area around Kaliningrad) in place of NATO expansion. Given the lower profile of Baltic ethnic populations in the United States compared to those from “Round 1” NATO expansion countries and time for reflection over the pros and cons of the Round 1 expansion, an informal understanding or simple absence of action on NATO expansion into the Baltics by the United States is a quite plausible outcome. In concert with temporal distance from the breakup of the Soviet Union, aging of populations in these countries with stronger Russian-identified ethnicity, and possible eventual symbolic protection of minority rights through standard European Union mechanisms and through possible additional undertakings, such outcomes may well prove acceptable to Russia. Moreover, current conditions in Ukraine preclude any NATO expansion there, and any Round 2 expansion is likely to have enough difficulties with achieving territorial contiguity with Hungary and dealing with Romania’s strongly expressed preference for joining, both of which have considerably less domestic political salience in Russia. Thus, the Ukrainian question can be safely put on the back burner for some time, perhaps with an implicit understanding that this issue would only come up for serious consideration in context of construction of more durable security relations with Russia itself. In the context of an accommodation concerning both Russian conventional and nuclear military concerns in the “near abroad,” the idea of overall settlement of nuclear questions that involves discussion of an eventual universal transition of nuclear weapons states to the nuclear-capable

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category might indeed interest Russia; and otherwise the relationship with Russia is likely to be problematic in any case. China had begun to improve its relations with India up to the point of the recent nuclear tests, and it has shown restraint, albeit annoyance, at Indian officials alluding to the “Chinese threat” as a justification for the tests. In rejecting an accommodation with India, which could lead to Indian weaponization and possibly upgrades of its own arsenal, China could complicate its relations both with India and the United States and Russia. Although China is less likely to be enthusiastic about de-alerting than accepting of an understanding aimed at reducing upper limits initially affecting U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons holdings (even in the context of fissile materials production controls that could lead to a cap on its own arsenal through a moratorium on isolation of weapons grade fissile materials), the Chinese could still pursue one of the win-win-win forms of accommodation with India and Pakistan discussed here. China

Although France has long had a doctrine of “sufficient deterrence,” which may not seem particularly friendly to discussions of conversion to a nuclear-capable state, the size of the French deterrent has long been calibrated to Moscow’s nuclear antiballistic missile system, a consideration that is increasingly of questionable importance. In any case, the immediate operational impact upon France of either of the forms of accommodation over India that are discussed here is likely to be negligible. Narrow commercial interests in France (and the UK) might profit in the short term from self-imposed continuation of sanctions by the United States on its own firms, but these considerations are unlikely to outweigh either the long-term interest of the French nuclear industry in reducing global public fears of “things nuclear” or the overall national interest. The same is true of the UK, with the additional factors of a government that is traditionally interested in concert with the United States over nuclear weapons matters and a current leadership amenable to progress on reductions of nuclear weapons holdings. The UK arguably has an opportunity to recoup diplomatic losses it incurred with India by “taking the fall” in brokering an arrangement that spotlighted Indian agreement as essential for entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. France and the UK

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Finally, any perturbation in the international nuclear weapons environment is predictably followed by calls for Israeli entry into the nuclear nonproliferation regime, particularly during a time when the Middle East peace process involving Israel appears stalled. This should not be taken to be a signal that collapse of the NPT in the Middle East is more imminent than it otherwise would be, and in any case the best antidote to this is probably as rapid as possible renormalization of this regime along the lines discussed above. The Middle East

PARADIGM SHIFT

What I have demonstrated here is a reasonable case for the idea that an otherwise sensible agreement with India and Pakistan is not precluded on the grounds that procedural spillover from rewarding nuclear testing would prevent a win-win solution, from a U.S. and South Asian perspective, from being a win-win-win solution, from the point of view of its impact on declared non–nuclear weapons states. This concludes the central thesis of this chapter. However, it may be of interest to consider the practical utility of what could otherwise be essentially an academic point. I start by reiterating that such a solution would not necessarily be disadvantageous to nuclear diplomacy between the previously declared nuclear weapons states. Nevertheless, conventional wisdom does not currently accept that such a win-win-win solution can actually be pursued, even from the perspective of those who have carefully reviewed the considerations outlined here. The essential difficulty seems to be that, even if a large number of individuals involved in the decisionmaking process have come to the conclusion that aspects of current policy are dysfunctional, this does not imply that a collective will yet exists to change that policy. In the current context, there are three components of present policy that many people to varying degrees recognize as dysfunctional. The most mundane of these relates nuclear export controls and concerns treating yellowcake (a uranium ore concentrate consisting primarily of uranium oxide) as a strategic material. Because global deposits of reasonably priced uranium are so massive compared to current and plausible near- to intermediate-term global use, the primary commercial justification for supporting reprocessing technology in a country like India is concern that its own uranium resources may prove too shallow to support a growing domestic

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nuclear power industry in the face of refusal to accept the full-scope nuclear safeguards that may be demanded in the future in exchange for free access to the global yellowcake market. Meanwhile, existing uranium resources and stocks in all countries with unsafeguarded nuclear programs are more than adequate to support their nuclear weapons programs. This means that the primary impact of treating yellowcake as a strategic material is to undergird support for reprocessing in countries like India, which is exactly the opposite of the intent of U.S. policy. As noted above, the continuation of more generic economic sanctions on India and especially on Pakistan is widely understood to be dysfunctional, at least in terms of the commercial and economic interests of the United States, India, and Pakistan. This is widely understood, and the observations made herein concerning the broader scope of this dysfunctionality have also become apparent. Finally, the idea that the United States will need to indefinitely maintain thousands of assembled and alerted strategic nuclear warheads has also been identified as dysfunctional, at least in the broad context of multilateral arms control. This concept has precluded any serious discussion with India concerning its central requirement for active cooperation with global management of nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials, and it may have also complicated relations between the United States and Russia. Among others, a number of very prominent retired U.S. military officials have recently publicly questioned this idea, and quiet consideration of the question persists in the minds of many commissioned officers and civilian government officials. A number of events may (or may not) have prepared the ground for the May 1998 tests to precipitate a paradigm shift concerning global management of nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials. These events include the end of the Cold War; the indefinite extension of the NPT and incorporation of all technically nuclear-competent states but India, Pakistan, and Israel within it or within nuclear weapons free zones; and Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s decision to “call the bluff” on sanctions for nuclear testing. All three of these dysfunctionalities could be resolved by a simple conceptual paradigm shift, which would merely allow for serious discussion of a long-term future with no set lower boundary on the level of alerted or assembled nuclear weapons deemed necessary by future generations for the security of the United States and other currently declared nuclear weapons states. In exchange for a simple paradigm shift on a conceptual (some would say “theological”) point with modest and largely remote operational consequences, there appears to be the potential for resolution of some very immediate practical problems

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that threaten the smooth functioning of various international institutions and some significant commercial interests—and the very livelihood of millions of people, most notably in Pakistan. It should be noted, however, that some of the examples of paradigm shifts given above suggest that cool logical analysis and effective communication among individuals primed for a paradigm shift are not the only considerations determining whether such a shift will occur. Questions related to weapons of mass destruction also touch on deep emotions, and these could well impede any shift needed to construct a win-win-win solution to the problems brought to the fore by recent Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Inherent in the whole concept of paradigm shift, as opposed to gradual policy evolution, is a certain degree of unpredictability in whether or when such a shift may occur. All that can reported here are observations that the conditions for such a shift precipitated by Vajpayee’s potentially historic decision appear to exist, not whether such a shift might actually occur and precisely what might be the details of the solution to the current dilemma that it could precipitate.

12 Lest We Forget: The Futility and Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons for India S. R. Valluri

The immediate reaction of many Indian scientists and technologists in the aftermath of the May 1998 nuclear explosions was a sense of elation. They felt that they could obtain notable successes wherever the government supported them politically and financially. But introspection in a somewhat detached manner raised many serious doubts about these developments, given India’s historical background and potential future consequences. One does not have to be a scientist or a technologist to appreciate the scope of the achievement, but it enables one to better understand the implications. When one starts questioning the wisdom of the political decisions that led to these explosions, the euphoria soon disappears. Realization dawns that the compulsions of the politicians and scientists to exercise such options without examining the consequences in detail will have to be moderated in the modern world. They can lead to situations dangerous to humanity at large, apart from creating for Indians avoidable and adverse situations in the virtually unipolar world in which they now live. India does not seem to have any leverage or any viable moves to play in the chess game of world politics. India’s popularly elected leaders may not necessarily be knowledgeable about some of the implications and upheavals that can be caused by their decisions. Almost invariably, it is the scientists and technologists all over the world that propose ideas to their governments for developing such weapons. Indian scientists have a profound responsibility to examine the consequences of proposals before they are put up to the government for approval.

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THE MOVE TOWARD GLOBAL NUCLEARIZATION

If somebody already achieved a major breakthrough in any area of science and technology, others too could achieve it, either by their own efforts or by hook or by crook. It may not be easy the first time, but history demonstrates that it is not as difficult the second or the third time, given the political will, economic backing, and a reasonable degree of capability. Therefore, whenever scientists and technologists propose development of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, they do well to think of the implications. They are not working in ivory towers, and their actions can have profound consequences for humanity. Nuclear power as such, can certainly be used for peaceful purposes, such as power generation. In fact, India desperately needs it. But nuclear weapons are tools of mass destruction, and their development and deployment is altogether a different affair. It was apparently the possibility for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions (PNE) that prompted India to look into the development of nuclear explosive devices. However, the line that separates the development of devices for peaceful purposes from those intended for not-so-peaceful purposes, such as weapons of mass destruction, is thin indeed. It was reported that the 1974 Pokhran device weighed 1,500 kilograms. Crude as it may well have been, it was well within the capability of fighter-bombers to carry such a war load. Twenty years later, the priorities are now obviously for development of weapons of mass destruction. The first-ever test of a nuclear bomb (“Trinity”) took place on July 16, 1945, in New Mexico. The war in Europe was over by then. The United States dropped one bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, killing 140,000 people in one stroke and eventually 200,000 in all, out of a total population of 400,000. In Nagasaki, 70,000 people died directly and 140,000 people in all, out of a total population of 250,000. “Of the 76,000 buildings in Hiroshima, 70,000 were damaged or destroyed, 40,000 totally.” “It is no exaggeration to say,” a Japanese study reports, “that the whole city was ruined instantaneously.” A child who witnessed the explosion and survived made this comment: “The river became not a stream of flowing water but rather a stream of drifting dead bodies. No matter how much I exaggerate the stories of the burnt people who died shrieking and how the city of Hiroshima was burnt to the ground, the facts would still be clearly more terrible.”1 It need not be stressed that they were the bodies of innocent people. Such too was the potential gift and contribution of the scientists and technologists and politicians in India to serve the cause of peace in the name of developing deterrence. These are inconvenient facts to face.

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One would imagine that presumably India has achieved the ability for such destruction. Indian scientists and technologists who have developed the bombs do not seem to have personally realized the enormity and the consequences of their actions, presumably because the tests were conducted underground. Kenneth Bainbridge, the above-ground “Trinity” test director, said immediately after the explosion to Robert Oppenheimer, the scientist who was responsible for the whole program, “Now we are all sons of bitches.” Oppenheimer, a Sanskrit scholar in his own right, put it more succinctly. He recalled a line from Bhagavad-Gita, “Now I am become death, the destroyer of the world.”2 Leo Szilard, the scientist who started it all, and several others tried to get the tests and use of the bombs in the war against Japan and their proliferation stopped by having Albert Einstein write a letter to President Harry Truman. They tried to argue that it would precipitate a race in the production of these devices between the United States and Russia. By then, the politicians had taken hold of the issue, with the scientists’ concerns about its field use pushed aside. From the estimated 12–15 kiloton “Trinity” bomb, the United States and Russia graduated to megaton hydrogen bombs capable of destroying whole cities and civilizations and stockpiled them in the tens of thousands. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are asymmetrical efforts to control the spread of the nuclear arms race. They are also designed to protect the interests of the major nuclear powers while preventing others from joining the race, thus instinctively forcing others also to join the nuclear club. It is clear that the existence of the club is based on the principle that possession is nine-tenths of law and that might is right. A sizable cross-section of the U.S. scientific community, feeling concerned about what was happening, started the publication of the periodical Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. It provided a public platform to debate the dangers of nuclear proliferation. In a sense, the bulletin became, so to speak, the keeper of the conscience of the Western scientific community on matters related to proliferation and the consequences of nuclear confrontation. They were not willing to go by the establishment views of the U.S. government and its scientists. The few senior scientists in India who have spoken since May 1998 would seem to be more concerned about the constraints on their work following U.S. sanctions than about any potential dangers to humanity. It was sad that an opportunity for a momentous debate has been reduced to a personal level. Talking about the challenges posed by the hydrogen bomb, Oppenheimer stated that the challenge its development posed was “technically sweet.” It would appear that the Indian scientists and technologists

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involved in the program also felt that it was a technically sweet challenge; never mind the potential for horrendous consequences. The scientists achieved a quantum jump in the nation’s ability to create weapons of mass destruction. One wonders if really “Buddha smiled,” to quote the ironical code phrase used to inform the prime minister after the first successful nuclear explosion in Pokhran in 1974. The code phrase would seem to display a certain contempt for the value systems Buddha preached. These recent developments should make scientists ponder the potential consequences of current compulsions for the dance of death and destruction. It was apparently the testing of a nuclear device on October 16, 1964, by China that started the debate about taking up work toward PNE in India too, with Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri giving his approval in December. Vikram Sarabhai, who took over as the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) after the unfortunate death of Homi J. Bhabha in an air crash in January 1966, and Major General Som Dutt, director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), apparently felt that nuclear weapons were not needed. China’s test of a thermonuclear device in June 1967 apparently triggered the nuclear design of an explosive at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). Meanwhile, differing views continued to be heard on nuclear weapons options for India, with some (e.g., the new director of IDSA, K. Subrahmanyam) arguing forcibly for it and some others (e.g., General K. M. Cariappa, the former chief of army staff) saying no.3 It would appear that the anxiety of the nuclear and the defense scientists to establish their credentials and the perceptions of the politicians, not the potential consequences of such weapons’ field use, have guided recent Indian policies for the development of nuclear bombs. It was reported that the former prime ministers Narasimha Rao and Deve Gowda did not give their consent for testing the devices, but that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), shortly after it came to power, gave its consent. The development of these devices has long been part of BJP’s political manifesto. THE COST

OF

NUCLEARIZATION

The question arises: At what price does India nuclearize its military? Who are its adversaries, and what are its relative strengths for a nuclear race and confrontation? Few knowledgeable people believe that it will be wise for India to wage even a full-fledged conventional war with China, let alone a nuclear war. What with China’s estimated 450 nuclear warheads, compared to an estimated sixty-five Indian ones, it does not make sense to join

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the race, unless Indians wish to bankrupt and destroy themselves in the bargain.4 Rammanohar Reddy estimated that to exercise a meaningful nuclear option, after taking into account the former army chief General K. Sundarji’s estimated requirement of 150 warheads and associated delivery systems, India needs about Rs28,000 crores (about U.S.$70 billion; Rs1 crore is Rs10 million) of investment.5 Lest we forget, we may remind ourselves of the estimates given by Rao, then cabinet minister for human resource development (HRD), for setting up the Navodaya school system across the country. It was also to cost about Rs28,000 crores. He had to drop the idea, because such funds were not available. Recently, the current HRD minister M. M. Joshi expressed his inability to provide school education to all the children because the government did not have the Rs40,000 crores needed to implement it. One wonders which is more important for the nation: producing nuclear warheads and delivery systems that the government claims are needed only as a deterrent and not for first use, or educating tens of thousands of children; or, for that matter, using such funds to build up the infrastructure of the university and research system so that they could form the backbone of the industrial base of the country with the associated amplification of benefits. After the 1999 elections, when the BJP came back to power, the HRD minister was reported to have asserted his intention to make primary education a basic right of children in the country. If the government insists on continuing with nuclear arms development and the associated delivery system buildup at the costs indicated above, it remains to be seen where it will get the funds or which critical aspects of the infrastructure augmentation it will sacrifice. One cannot help recollecting the slogan of the Democrats during the 1996 U.S. presidential election: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Regrettably, it is even more relevant to India in the current economic scenario. India cannot attract any significant foreign investment because of its poor infrastructure. Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) secretary R. Chidambaram apparently argued that building a military-industrial complex (MIC) will also help develop the industrial base of the country.6 This may be true, but there are more assured and better ways of tackling the problem of industrial development. In fact, Dwight D. Eisenhower, on the eve of leaving office as president of the United States, warned the American people about the military-industrial nexus and its ability to subvert the U.S. economy. An MIC is the last thing an economically impoverished nation needs. Experience elsewhere in the world indicates that viable military strength comes out of economic strength, not the other way around. Only dictatorships try to follow this route, with disastrous results for their countries.

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THE FLAWED RATIONALE FOR INDIA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

Thrice before, in wars with Pakistan, India has won. India did not need nuclear weapons to defend itself against that country. But by exploding a nuclear bomb in 1974, India changed the situation drastically. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was reported to have remarked that Pakistanis would eat grass for a thousand years if need be but would produce one of their own. They demonstrated their capability soon after India’s tests in May 1998. It almost seemed as if the tests were intended to call Pakistan’s bluff about their capability. It turned out that Pakistan too developed nuclear weapons, thus altering the balance of power on the subcontinent when India clearly had superiority in conventional weapons. In fact, Pakistani leaders, political and military alike, openly stated that they could not win a conventional war against India. If Indians have the courage to be honest with themselves, they have to admit that India started the nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. Why should India be surprised if China helped Pakistan, considering the adage “any enemy of my enemy is my friend”? It has been stated in some quarters that Pakistan, with help from China, was developing nuclear weapons even before India started its recent exercise. If so, India should have waited and let Pakistan explode weapons first. If India could explode a bomb in 1974, it certainly had the intrinsic capability any time. But should India have invited the stigma of being the first to reignite the dormant nuclear fire in the subcontinent? The United States seemed to turn its head in the other direction in this matter, in spite of its avowed official policy of imposing sanctions on states developing nuclear weapons, until Pakistan exploded them in 1998. It is rather unlikely that U.S. officials were unaware of these developments in Pakistan. The Republicans in the Senate rejected the ratification of the CTBT and therefore denied the executive arm of the U.S government the moral right (if it had any earlier) to prevail upon others to become a party to the CTBT. The future of CTBT as a first step to universal nuclear disarmament remains a big question mark. In fact, one writer notes that while the United States and Russia signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks II (START II) agreement limiting their nuclear arsenal to 3,500 warheads by the year 2003, they are planning to stockpile more like 10,000 to 11,000 warheads.7 It is clearly an act of hypocrisy for the United States (and the rest of the big five nuclear weapons states) to preach to others of the importance of signing the CTBT under such circumstances.

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In any case, it is no longer clear what India should do with its nuclear stockpile, such as it is. Whether it is the currently estimated eighty or General Sundarji’s minimum of 150 for deterrence capability, the question arises: What does India do after these are exhausted? If India goes to war with China, presumably India would retaliate with 150 strikes after China launches 150 of theirs on first use, with 300 still remaining in their stock, not to speak of the fissile material that they apparently have for making many more. Should India mount a crash program to close the gap, to have 450 warheads to match China’s, and produce more to keep up with China and bankrupt India in the bargain? Such a nuclear race would be utter madness—a no-win situation both militarily and economically. However, if it is argued that Indian nuclear capability deters only a challenge from Pakistan, the roles will be reversed, with Pakistan trying to catch up in a nuclear race. It may well bankrupt that country, considering their already desperate economic straits. India has become the main focal point for their hatred. Desperate states can easily become rogue states in such situations. Islamic fundamentalism and state-sponsored terrorism have become next-door neighbors in Afghanistan and Pakistan, presumably under the auspices of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). If present developments are any indication, Pakistan may become a fundamentalist state soon. Is it too unrealistic to assume that nuclear weapons could then be made available to fundamentalist groups? To realize the gravity of such a scenario, one only needs to note the nightmares in the West. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, some members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had access to nuclear weapons stockpiled by the former Soviet Union. The United States has been desperately trying to encourage restraint in the potential use of these nuclear weapons by the former Soviet republics and to prevent terrorists from getting hold of them. It has been argued in the West that as long as nuclear weapons remained in the hands of the superpowers, there would be second thoughts about their indiscriminate usage, but that one could not be so sure if the smaller, presumably “less responsible” states (particularly in the Middle East) got access to them or developed them by themselves. Iraq tried and was caught in time. The only silver lining in this whole affair, such as it is, is that neither Pakistan nor India can now afford to start even a conventional war for fear that it may escalate into a nuclear holocaust by error of judgment, with disastrous consequences for both. Even a conventional war between these two countries would seem to have become too dangerous. The recent con-

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frontation in Kargil would seem to have demonstrated this truth. Having seen the abyss into which they both could fall, India and Pakistan refrained from taking the issue any farther than brinkmanship. The border skirmishes will continue and may even intensify. India and Pakistan have to learn to live with the reality of their having the ability to produce nuclear arms. Sooner or later, they will have to give up their present inflexible, untenable stands and negotiate in good faith. The chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir has publicly stated that the only viable alternative would be the acceptance of the status quo (ceding 35 percent of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan, 19 percent to China, and 46 percent to India) and making the line of control (perhaps with minor adjustments) the de jure border. It is hard to conceive any other solution in which none of the parties would lose or gain unilaterally. Any one-sided alternative from either country is doomed to fail. Accepting the current division of Kashmir is a more viable alternative than preparing for a nuclear confrontation and mutually assured destruction brought about by wrong calculations by politicians or by weapons’ reckless use by terrorists. At the turn of the century, the world is broadly divided into three groups: the big five with proven nuclear weapons capability and a stockpile of them; another group to which India and Pakistan belong, whose members have demonstrated their ability and hold a minor stockpile of their own weapons and which the big five are reluctant to formally recognize as members of the nuclear club; and a third group of nations that are operating nuclear power stations that produce plutonium as a part of the spent fuel and that can be used to build such weapons. India implicitly declared its intention to become a nuclear power by its May 1974 explosion to protect itself from any nuclear first strike from China. With both India and Pakistan openly demonstrating their weaponsbuilding capability in May 1998 and with the unresolved Kashmir dispute between them, a very unstable situation has developed in the subcontinent. Pakistan claims that it needs nuclear weapons to defend itself against India, and India claims that it needs nuclear weapons to defend itself against China. Russia has enough material to produce 120,000 bombs; the United States, 80,000; France, 4,000; the UK, 3,000; China, 3,000; Israel, 100; India, 80; and Pakistan, 20. These numbers succinctly indicate the status of the nuclear strategic scenario and what kind of threat each of the above countries presents. If a nuclear policy is not based upon a pragmatic understanding of self-interest and current realities, India can easily bankrupt itself by trying to join the nuclear club as an active member in the above scenario. Put plainly, India will do well to give up its dreams of glory of being a nuclear power by stockpiling nuclear arms that it claims

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that it will not use. There are so many other worthwhile purposes for which such funds can be put to use. Apart from freezing the current borders of Jammu and Kashmir, India and Pakistan would need assurances that they will not be held for ransom by the threat of a nuclear first strike by any other country. If the CTBT and NPT are truly intended to eventually usher in universal nuclear disarmament, a first step that the United States (and perhaps the rest of the big five) could take is to sign separate treaties with both India and Pakistan, specifying that if either country is attacked by nuclear weapons in a first strike by any country, the United States will retaliate against that country. It is precisely such a threat that compelled these two states to build their current nuclear capability. Apart from the present lines of control in Jammu and Kashmir being recognized as de jure borders, such a treaty will provide the only viable assurance that would enable these two countries to dismantle their nuclear stockpiles without endangering their national security. POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Even if it is signed, the CTBT does not stop India from making the bombs. It only says India cannot test them. One has to assume that the Department of Atomic Energy has gained enough knowledge from the 1998 tests to use computers to simulate later tests. But tests are not the real issue. India should voluntarily refrain from stockpiling the bombs and should continue to press for universal nuclear disarmament, so that no nations are considered more equal than other nations on matters related to threats of use of nuclear weapons to achieve their objectives. The United States was undoubtedly churlish in imposing sanctions on India and Pakistan. India should look upon the U.S. decision regarding sanctions as a blessing in disguise and an opportunity to bridge technological gaps, and not complain about denial of equipment or being treated as second-class citizens by the Western scientific community. If India wants others to listen to its political views, it has to be either morally or militarily or economically strong. The day Mahatma Gandhi, the apostle of peace and nonviolence, was assassinated by Nathuram Godse, India lost the right to wear the mantle of moral righteousness. Common sense dictates that India cannot call for making more bombs, given the country’s poor economic base and neglected infrastructure. Establishing such infrastructure will enable India to transform itself into a developed country and attract foreign investment. More nuclear bombs

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and their delivery systems will most certainly not feed more people, raise standards of living, or make India more competitive in the world economy. War-related expenditures have no tangible economic amplification of benefits to the society, and the so-called indirect spin-off benefits such as those suggested by Chidambaram are, at best, tenuous. There are better ways of spending public money to obtain socially relevant benefits. In all these, the scientists and technologists have an important role to play. One would suspect that the scientists in the Department of Atomic Energy prevailed upon the government to permit the tests and have used the so-called need for building deterrence capability to win the argument. In this view, they seem to have been clearly supported by the politicians out to get obvious political mileage. The power to destroy whole civilizations has been given into the hands of the politicians. Indian scientists can no longer say: “We are not responsible for what the politicians would do with these tools of mass destruction we are providing them.” When the politicians claim that these weapons are only a deterrent and that they do not propose to exercise the option of first use, the question arises: “How much deterrence is enough?” Should India be diverting funds that are more urgently needed in other areas? One wonders if there is any rational and unique way of determining the extent of deterrence. The Indian external affairs minister was recently reported to have stated that a number cannot be assigned to it. Does the Indian government seriously think that it has the wherewithal to indulge in the nuclear race and respond to social requirements as well? To do so would utterly distort national priorities. It is more important for the government to strengthen infrastructure and help the deprived and downtrodden than to prepare for nuclear deterrence, if the social responsibility of the state to its people is to mean anything. For quite some time, it has been clear that nuclear war cannot be used to resolve foreign policy issues. India should examine very carefully its compulsion to join the nuclear club. The scientific and technological community has a moral obligation to educate the society and the nation. The security situation on the subcontinent has become too dangerous for Indians to leave it exclusively to inadequately informed politicians and a few “establishment scientists” cloaked in secrecy. In his last State of the Union address before leaving office, President Truman, the man responsible for dropping the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, belatedly realized the horrors that can be let loose on humanity at large. He stated: “The war of the future would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past—

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and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations. Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men.”8 Nikita Khrushchev never forgot his initial encounter with nuclear deterrence in September 1953: “When I was appointed first secretary of the Central Committee and learned all the facts about nuclear power, I could not sleep for several days. Then I became convinced that we could never possibly use these weapons, and when I realised that, I was able to sleep again.” In the foreword to the book by D. S. Kothari, the first scientific adviser to the Indian minister of defense, titled Nuclear Explosions, India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had the following to say: “Enough is known, however, to give us some kind of a picture of a war in which these weapons are used. War is associated with death. . . . We now have to face death on a colossal scale and what is worse, the genetic effects of these explosions on present and future generations. Before this prospect, the other problems that face us in this world become relatively unimportant. . . . These conclusions (of Kothari) expressed in restrained scientific phraseology, tell us the fate in store for us if we are not wise enough in time to put an end to this horror.”9 Nehru said these things four decades ago. Is this the scenario for which Indians should prepare themselves, and is this the club India wishes to join as an active partner? It is hard to conceive of a more unstable situation in the present political scenario. NOTES

1. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster), 1986, p. 726. 2. Ibid. 3. Atomic Energy in India: Fifty Years (New Delhi: Publications Division, DAE, government of India). 4. India Today, June 1, 1998. 5. Rammanohar Reddy, Hindu, August 31, 1998; September 1, 1998; September 2, 1998. 6. Praful Bidwai, Times of India, July 1, 1998. 7. Thomas B. Cochram, in Nuclear Weapons: The Road to Zero, ed. Joseph Rotblat (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998). 8. Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb. 9. Nuclear Explosions (New Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1956, 1958).

13 A Nuclear Arms Control Agenda for India Amit Gupta

More than two years after India’s nuclear tests of May 1998, the long-term objectives of its nuclear policy have emerged: to stabilize the nuclear situation in South Asia and prevent an escalating arms race; to develop a minimum credible deterrent against both Pakistan and China; and to use India’s new nuclear status to get concessions in the international system (the use of nuclear weapons as a currency of power). To fulfill these objectives, India will not only have to develop a nuclear force structure but initiate a series of arms control measures to go with it. In order to discuss what arms control measures are feasible, it is necessary to understand the type of threats India seeks to counter, what kind of force structure would be needed to match these threats, and how and why arms control would help fulfill India’s security objectives. FORCE STRUCTURES: RHETORIC

AND

REALITY

India’s stated and implied goals for overt nuclearization are to counter the threat posed by Pakistan and China and to enhance the country’s status in the international system (although the 1999 Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine would suggest that the refusal of the major nuclear powers to actively pursue disarmament creates an international environment in which India must keep a nuclear weapons force). Pakistan’s ongoing nuclear and missile programs were viewed as destabilizing because they changed the military balance in South Asia. The fact that Pakistan had been actively supporting the insur275

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gency in Kashmir added to Indian concerns that a nuclear-capable Pakistan might try to aggressively resolve the Kashmir dispute (the May–June 1999 assault by Pakistan-backed guerrillas in Kargil is cited as further evidence of such an aggressive policy). In the case of China, India has a long-standing border dispute with that country, and China still occupies 38,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. Continuing evidence of a China-Pakistan collaboration on nuclear and missile technology issues made India believe that the country faced a deteriorating threat environment. There was also growing frustration with China’s violation of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) agreements not to transfer technology and with the fact that thirty-six years after the border war with China, not only was the territorial dispute unresolved, but China had worsened India’s security environment by placing nuclear weapons in Tibet. Politically, Indians see the development of a strong U.S.-China relationship as emerging at India’s expense and condemning New Delhi to second-class status in Asia. Militarily, the modernization of China’s nuclear deterrent, the ongoing upgrade of its conventional armed forces, and Beijing’s attempts to secure port rights in Myanmar are all viewed with concern by Indian strategic analysts.1 More recently, the revelation that China has acquired the designs for all the U.S. in-service nuclear warheads, as well as for neutron bombs, missile guidance technology, and satellites, made Indian defense planners feel that the country operates at both a qualitative and quantitative disadvantage vis-à-vis China.2 Some analysts have argued that the development of an Indian nuclear capability could be an opportunity to create an “anti-China axis between the U.S. and India. . . . Behind the BJP’s bogus anti-imperialism and the American sanctions lies the prospect of a far-reaching alliance in a new Cold War.”3 Additionally, there was a perceived political advantage to be exploited. Indian strategic analysts have argued for some time that nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them are the “currencies of international power.” After the first test of the Agni intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), India’s leading security analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, argued that the possession of an IRBM capability meant that India’s voice could not be ignored in any future negotiations on arms control and disarmament.4 After the tests, the Indian journalist N. Ram quoted an influential Indian expert as saying: “Tell us what we are and we will tell you whether we can sign. Guarantee to us that technology controls, which you apply as though we were a non–nuclear weapons state, will be removed.” Ram argues that the Indian government was claiming that if it was accepted as the sixth weapons state, only then would it be willing to abide by the pro-

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visions of the NPT.5 The Indian government hedged its bets, however, by suggesting that membership in the nuclear club did not automatically mean that India would become a hegemonic great power. Instead, its new nuclear status was to be used to “push for India’s trademark vision of a world sans nuclear weaponry.”6 In August 1999 India announced a draft nuclear doctrine that officially described the purpose of the proposed nuclear force and the shape it might take. The doctrine declares: “India’s strategic interests require effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail.”7 The report states that India will not engage in the first use of nuclear weapons. Nor will it use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states. In order to pursue a credible minimum deterrent, the country will develop forces that are “sufficient, survivable, and operationally prepared.” It will also develop a robust command and control system under civilian control. The force itself will be “based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missile and sea-based assets.” Survivability will be enhanced by a combination of “multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception.” Space-based and other assets will be created to “provide early warning, communications, damage/detonation assessment.” Finally, the Indian government will take steps to ensure the security and safety of nuclear weapons and will ensure that “unauthorized or inadvertent activation/use of nuclear weapons does not take place and risks of accidents are avoided.” The draft doctrine also repeats India’s desire for universal disarmament and global arms control and states that the country will continue working to achieve these goals. In order to create such a triad, Indian analysts have drawn up plans for nuclear forces that range from 100 to more than 400 nuclear warheads. The late General K. Sundarji, India’s chief of army staff in the 1980s, called for a mix of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), IRBMs, and nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to provide India with a second-strike capability against both Pakistan and China.8 A later study by Brigadier General Vijai Nair called for a force of 132 nuclear weapons against China and Pakistan.9 One member of parliament, Subramaniam Swamy, has called for a nuclear force consisting of 400 IRBMs as well as airborne nuclear weapons.10 Bharat Karnad, who wants India to have 300–400 thermonuclear weapons with an ICBM capability, has argued for the most ambitious force structure.11 India has already taken the decision to induct the Agni 2 intermediate-range missile into service, and reports suggest that the country may test an ICBM named Surya in 2001.12 It has been suggested that India also develop a naval capability that would serve as a second-strike force against both Pakistan and China. The

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need for a second-strike capability against Pakistan arises from the low warning time of seven to ten minutes that India has to react to an attack from that country. The need for a naval deterrent against China comes from the fact that China’s major cities would be out of range of fighter aircraft and most Indian land-based missiles. The type of naval capability desired has varied. The proposed forces include using a sea-based version of the Prithvi (renamed Dhanush) short-range ballistic missile aboard Indian surface vessels; the building of a nuclear powered submarine—the advanced technology vehicle (ATV)—and the induction of an SSBN force; and the deployment of an indigenously produced submarinelaunched cruise missile named Sagarika.13 The air-based leg of the triad would consist of nuclear-capable Jaguar, Mirage 2000, and Su-30 fighter aircraft. Recent reports also indicate that India is purchasing the Tu-22M Backfire intermediate-range bomber from Russia. Armed with a longrange cruise missile, the Backfire would provide India with a secondstrike capability against the cities along China’s eastern seaboard. An ICBM-based force would, in addition, move India into the same league as the big five nuclear states by giving it the capacity to strike targets in the developed world. This would not only provide it with a true deterrent capability but would also, in theory, allow India to sit at the big table of nuclear “haves” when it came to discussing and formulating new arms control regimes. LIMITING FACTORS

Despite these ambitious goals, a set of constraints is most likely to determine India’s eventual force structure. India’s only real extraregional threat is China, and its primary focus of attention remains Pakistan. Further, to counter the Chinese threat would require a significant qualitative and quantitative increase in technology. Developing extraregional forces would not only raise concerns among states in the area but also among the major powers. An Indian nuclear submarine, for example, would cause concern in both Southeast Asia and Australia. It would also alarm the major powers, especially China, which would, quite correctly, view the mission of the submarine to be one of targeting Chinese cities. Initially, therefore, India’s nuclear forces are likely to be focused within the region. Because these forces are primarily intraregional, the creation of large and complex force structures would be overkill. For deterrence to be achieved in South Asia, both Pakistan and India need to have the ability to

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cause unacceptable damage to each other, which can be achieved with far fewer resources than those used by the United States and the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War. For Pakistan to cause unacceptable damage, it must have the ability to destroy four major Indian cities: Bombay, India’s financial center; New Delhi, its administrative center; and Bangalore and Hyderabad, where India’s high-technology industries are located. After the April 1999 missile tests, Pakistan’s chief of army staff, General Pervez Musharraf, said that Pakistan would not try to match India in the number of missiles produced but would retain just enough missile capacity to reach “anywhere in India and destroy a few cities, if required.”14 In the Indian case, similarly, inflicting unacceptable damage on Pakistan requires the ability to destroy its two major cities—Karachi and Lahore—and its capital, Islamabad. The use of nuclear weapons in a warfighting mode along the Indo-Pakistani border does not make sense for either side because both have large population centers in that area. Further, it is difficult to draw the distinction between civilian and military targets, given their close proximity. Economic constraints will also determine the size of the future nuclear force. After a period of high weapons imports in the early 1980s, there was a reduction in Indian defense expenditures in the late 1980s and through the mid-1990s, from 3.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1987 to 2.8 percent in 1995. In 1992–1993, expenditures were as low as 2.4 percent.15 In 1996–1997, Indian defense expenditures were 3.3 percent of GDP.16 Defense expenditures will increase substantially once nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems are included in the force structure. In fact, India did increase the defense budget in 1999. If one were to use Subramaniam Swamy’s calculations for a 400strong IRBM force, the cost of each nuclear warhead would be approximately $375,000 and the price of each missile approximately $3.75 million. When the cost of a C3I system was added, the total cost of the force was estimated at about $2.5 billion.17 Since Indian pricing on defense production tends to be deflated—and hides expenditures under civil and military headings—one must assume that the cost of each warhead and missile may be significantly higher. Other sources, after taking a more conservative approach and incorporating the need for imports, put the figure as high as $40 billion.18 In terms of military expenditure, therefore, such a force would put severe constraints on the domestic economy. Adding to the economic burden is India’s continued need for economic assistance and foreign investment. The Indian economy is largely self-sufficient and will not feel the same type of economic constraints

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imposed by sanctions that the Pakistani one does. But India does require increasing foreign investment to carry out much-needed market reforms. It also needs access to Western technology to continue to modernize its economy. After the nuclear tests, investor confidence in the Indian market fell as the flow of investments almost dried up and the stock market plummeted by nearly one-fifth of its value (although one must add that the country was already in the middle of a recession).19 Maintaining access to high technology is crucial to India’s developmental plans and to the modernization of critical areas of the economy.20 In fact, India has made the lifting of technology restrictions, particularly in the area of civilian nuclear technology, a precondition for signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).21 Given that there is a need for developmental aid, technological transfers, and foreign investment, India will have to work with Pakistan to stabilize the nuclear environment in South Asia. Finally, both India and Pakistan recognize the dangers of a nuclear confrontation and in the past have backed away from potential wars that could have escalated into full-blown nuclear conflicts. In 1986–1987 and in 1990, the two countries worked to defuse confrontations that might have escalated into broader military conflicts. In the May–June 1999 Kargil conflict, both India and Pakistan took pains to state that they were exercising restraint and seeking a diplomatic solution to the crisis. In light of these constraints, what type of Indian nuclear force is likely to emerge? POSSIBLE FORCE STRUCTURE

What will likely result is a nuclear force characterized by three features: it will initially be localized rather than extraregional; it will be smaller in size than the numbers that are being thrown around would indicate; and it is likely to be “recessed” rather than deployed (even though the Indian government has suggested that it will deploy). The draft doctrine makes a distinction between peacetime and wartime deployment. What that means in operational terms has yet to be determined. Given how few targets India and Pakistan need to destroy, large forces will not emerge on either side. What is more likely is that both sides develop small nuclear forces having between twenty-five and seventy-five weapons to meet the threat posed by each other and the perceived Chinese threat to India. Both countries would make these warheads deliverable by aircraft and ballistic missiles. In the Indian case, there will probably be a sea-based deterrent as well. The naval deterrent is not going to be in the form of an SSBN force because it would be prohibitively expensive for

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India to build such a fleet. It would evoke concerns both among extraregional states and also among the major powers. Further, the development of the ATV has been plagued by delays, and the vessel is unlikely to enter service until the 2020s. Instead, India will probably develop the capability to launch the Sagarika cruise missile from its conventional submarines, giving it a limited naval deterrent capability. It will also gain a naval deterrent through the use of the Dhanush, which will be launched from surface vessels.22 The first Chinese threat to India came from Beijing’s conventional advantage along the Sino-Indian border and the fact that Chinese forces until recently had the advantage of a nuclear backup, whereas the Indian forces did not. The second threat from China came from the ability of Beijing to target Indian urban populations, whereas India, with its aircraft and intermediate-range missiles, could not attack Chinese civilian centers on the eastern seaboard. To match these threats, the Indian forces could use airborne weapons as well as the short-range Prithvi ballistic missile to stop a Chinese breakout through the Himalayan passes. Since India’s policy is one of deterrence, blocking the passes would achieve the Indian goal of halting a Chinese attack and inflicting significant losses at the tactical level. The danger of China broadening the conflict could be countered by building a limited number of Agni 2 missiles, which are expected to have a range of approximately 3,000 kilometers and thus could reach cities in China.23 Targeting cities along China’s eastern seaboard would require the development of a longer-range Agni or the use of the Surya ICBM.24 There are serious limitations, however, to trying to implement such a strategy. In its first test, the Agni 2’s range was revealed to be approximately 2,000 kilometers, not enough to target cities on China’s eastern seaboard. Although India’s Defence Research and Development Organization could develop the longer-range Surya, the time taken to develop the first two versions of the Agni and the international pressure not to test them give some idea of just how difficult it will be for India to develop a credible deterrent against China in the near future. There has also been some discussion of using the polar satellite launch vehicle (which has a range of 8,000 kilometers) as a long-range missile. Doing so is technically possible, but the survivability of the missile in a conflict situation is questionable. As Dinshaw Mistry has pointed out, making a 170-ton missile road-mobile would be a difficult and cumbersome process. The alternative would be to build silos for it, thereby making it both easily detectable and vulnerable to a first strike.25 Additionally, the nuclear force is likely to be what Indian defense minister George Fernandes called “recessed” forces—or what the Indian

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government has alluded to as peacetime deployment. This terms mean that India would develop and flight-test its ballistic missiles and produce nuclear weapons but would not mate the warheads to the delivery systems. The warheads and the delivery systems would be stored separately and only assembled in the event of a crisis.26 Current deployment of the Prithvi short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) with conventional warheads along the border with Pakistan would suggest that such a policy is in place. There are four good reasons to follow such a policy. First, past wars between India and Pakistan have resulted from long, drawn-out crises that gave both sides sufficient lead times to mobilize their forces (a similar situation preceded the Sino-Indian border war of 1962). Second, both sides do not consider it likely that nuclear weapons would be used for a preemptive strike. In fact, both countries have recognized the irrationality of nuclear warfare and, as mentioned earlier, worked to defuse potential crises that would have escalated into a nuclear confrontation. Third, a recessed deterrence policy would provide assurances to the international community about both countries’ willingness to stabilize the nuclear situation in South Asia while allowing Pakistan and India to retain their nuclear arsenals and address what they see as genuine security threats. Fourth, it will take India and Pakistan some time to build up their forces; 150 warheads will not emerge on either side in a short time. Instead, the process will probably take up to a decade, which means that both countries, for a fairly long time, will have small nuclear forces. The implications of this are best explained by Subrahmanyam, India’s leading strategic analyst, who argues: India and Pakistan have very small arsenals and for years to come they are not likely to cross the two digit figure. No one will use a tactical nuclear weapon since its use is an invitation to a much larger retaliatory strike. There are no proposals these days to have nuclear weapons on hair trigger alert. The countries are not likely to deploy their weapons lest they should lose them to even conventional strikes. Since the arsenals are small, extreme care will be taken not to lose those assets. India and Pakistan have the benefit of experience of the enormous blunders committed by the nuclear weapon powers and, therefore, have no illusions about nuclear war fighting or winning a nuclear war.27

Keeping a small but recessed force, therefore, suits the diplomatic and military objectives of India as well as Pakistan. In addition, the current policy of weaponization is being pursued by a particular regime, partly in response to the domestic political environment (just as the launch of the Agni 2 coincided with a decline in the Bharatiya

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Janata Party’s [BJP’s] political fortunes). In the foreseeable future, no Indian government could unilaterally abandon the nuclear and missile programs because of the fear of being labeled antinational and having surrendered to international pressure. But a succeeding government might decide to slow down the program by reducing budgetary allocations or weaponizing more gradually. Such a slowdown could be driven by economic considerations, international political pressure, and possibly the desire to develop better relations with Pakistan and China. Given all these facts, arms control and confidence-building measures become an attractive option both at the regional and the international level. Such measures would limit force structures and prevent a costly and dangerous escalation of the nuclear arms race. Arms control measures at the regional level would provide some indication to the international community that both Pakistan and India were working toward managing their nuclear relationship and, therefore, becoming status quo nuclear states. A reduction in regional tensions would also help create a positive environment for international investment. From a purely military standpoint, the willingness to implement arms control measures would allow for the continued development of strategic weapons systems. Without such measures, the pressure on India to cap, reduce, and roll back its nuclear program would be much stronger. However, entering into significant arms control agreements would give the Indian government breathing space to develop the weapons systems it requires for the country’s security—particularly long-range systems to counter the perceived threat from China. At the international level, having an active arms control agenda like the one discussed below would do more to enhance India’s status than simply developing a limited nuclear force. Given these incentives, what sorts of arms control measures are possible at the regional and international levels? REGIONAL SOLUTIONS

Two sets of problems must be dealt with following the nuclearization of South Asia: how to stabilize the post-test environment in the region and how to restrict the international fallout from these tests. After exploding their nuclear devices in May 1998, Pakistan and India sought to stabilize their nuclear rivalry. Initially, Indian and Pakistani proposals differed in their emphasis. India proposed a declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons by both states. Pakistan rejected the proposal because in a purely conventional conflict the asymmetry of forces favored India.

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Pakistan made three different proposals: that Kashmir be made the core issue in resolving the broader Indo-Pakistani relationship; that India and Pakistan work toward conventional force reductions; and that both countries neither weaponize nor deploy their nuclear arsenals. As a consequence, negotiations between the two countries made little headway. After almost a year of false starts, the two countries were able to initiate the first set of measures to formalize nuclear restraint in South Asia. U.S. pressure, domestic political and economic concerns, and the need to take steps to stabilize the nuclear rivalry brought the two countries to the bargaining table. At the February 1999 Lahore summit between the two countries, a memorandum of understanding was reached to develop a set of confidence-building measures.28 The two countries agreed to exchange strategic information about their nuclear arsenals and to give each other advance notice of ballistic missile tests.29 When India tested Agni 2 in April 1999 and Pakistan followed by testing the Shaheen and Ghauri missiles, both countries notified the other about the launch.30 The two sides also agreed to engage in bilateral consultations “on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence-building in the nuclear and conventional fields aimed at the avoidance of conflict.”31 In other words, both sides would exchange information on any C3I measures they planned to implement to safeguard their nuclear arsenals. Further, both countries agreed to provide notice of “any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a [nuclear] fallout.”32 There were obvious gaps in the declaration. New Delhi’s no first use proposal remained unendorsed, and Islamabad was unable to get conventional arms talks on the table or to get India to agree to a no-war pact. Moreover, Pakistan would have liked India to exercise strategic restraint (neither weaponize nor deploy its weapons), whereas India argued that it required a credible minimum deterrent against China.33 In the regional context, therefore, the first steps have been taken toward formalizing nuclear restraint—a sign not only of the awareness in both countries of the constraints they face but also of the success of lowkey U.S. diplomacy. But the one apparent weakness that emerges from this proposal is that despite an intention to exchange information on C3I, little can be done until both sides have a secure capability to do this. Without a secure C3I system, long-term stabilization will not occur. Further, as the Kargil conflict has shown, significant progress in arms control cannot be achieved without a willingness to continue the political dialogue. In such a situation, keeping nuclear forces recessed or at least not

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on alert is the cheapest and easiest option for maintaining command and control over them. ARMS CONTROL

AT THE INTERNATIONAL

LEVEL

At the systemic level, the need for arms control comes out of the changed nature of the international system. India’s nuclear policy originated in the Cold War, as did the assumptions about the advantages of going nuclear. The post–Cold War system, however, is a unipolar one, and nuclear weapons do little to overcome the overwhelming military advantage that the United States has as the remaining superpower—especially in an era in which military operations have become high-tech and conventional weapons have a high degree of accuracy. Further, the international system is one in which nuclear weapons are neither the sole source of power nor the most effective means for achieving one’s objectives. Within the new international system, India will have to operate under certain given constraints. First, international pressure for nonproliferation will continue to mount, and with it the likelihood of sanctions will also increase. Second, a simple display of nuclear prowess does not translate into significant political gains like the acceptance of India as a great power by the international community. Indian hopes for using the nuclear capability to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council were dashed when the West made it clear that nuclearization would not be rewarded.34 Third, the West is unlikely to allow the economic collapse of either India or Pakistan because of the fear that such a catastrophe would force these states to transfer weapons technology for sorely needed hard currency. Fourth, a series of economic and military constraints make it likely that in an international system of first- and second-tier nuclear states, India will at best be a third-tier nuclear state. Finally, India is an exceptional state. It finds it difficult to be an ally of the United States in the way that Israel or Britain is. There are too many differences between India and the United States about the future shape of the international system and how international politics must be pursued to allow such an alliance to emerge. Nor would any Indian government accept the status of a junior partner that such an arrangement would entail. At the same time, India is unwilling to be a rogue state like Iraq, Libya, or North Korea. The Indian government has consistently backed international law, supported the emergence and growth of international organizations, and sought to promote order and justice in the international system. Given these

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conditions, a carefully crafted arms control policy would reduce India’s security dilemma, help improve relations with the remaining superpower, and allow India to play a significant role in world affairs—something that low-level nuclearization does not allow. Building a working relationship with the United States has been the first part of this process. THE INDIA-U.S. NUCLEAR DIALOGUE

At the international level the United States, as the nation carrying out bilateral negotiations with both countries, has called for the following measures. First, India and Pakistan must unconditionally sign the CTBT. Second, both must agree to join and further the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) negotiations. Third, there must be a nondeployment of nuclear weapons. Both countries also commit themselves to not transferring nuclear and delivery system technologies.35 Fourth, the two countries must enter into a dialogue to resolve the underlying causes of their rivalry.36 At the same time, the United States has moved away from its earlier position of attempting to roll back the nuclear status quo in South Asia toward, as one observer puts it, “a quiet, conditional acceptance of Asia’s new nuclear realities.”37 In practice, the United States would need to partially accept the position of credible minimal deterrence that India has proposed. According to Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, a credible minimum deterrent would include the following features: it would safeguard Indian security; it would be deployed; it would include a policy of no first use and nonuse against nonnuclear states; and it would be deployed to ensure survivability.38 Further, the term minimal would not be quantified. Instead, its definition would remain flexible and be decided unilaterally by the government of the day.39 The problem with this approach, however, is that because there are no finite numbers, it leaves enough uncertainty to promote an arms race in the region. To prevent a spiraling arms race, the United States has suggested that India spell out its minimum requirements in concrete terms, which would allow Pakistan to postulate its own requirements and stabilize the nuclear competition.40 Further, the United States has also pushed for both countries to demonstrate prudence and restraint in the development, flight-testing, and storage of ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft.41 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has argued: “Having India and Pakistan stabilize their nuclear competition at the lowest possible level is both the starting point and the near-term objective of the U.S.

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diplomatic effort. . . . The Clinton Administration does not expect either country to alter or constrain its defense programs simply because we have asked them to.”42 The easiest way to do this, of course, is to go with a doctrine of recessed deterrence. It would remove some of the major concerns about accidental launches and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and would also give both sides a chance to gradually set up a secure C3I system. In fact, Indian officials have alluded to the low level of trust they hold for Pakistan, which makes it unlikely that the two governments could transfer sensitive data on command and control at this early juncture.43 A more complicated issue arises from the political role that India sees nuclear weapons as playing. In the initial period after the tests, India had hoped to be recognized as a “declared nuclear weapons state” and to be invited to join an expanded United Nations Security Council as a permanent member.44 Since then, India has accepted it will not get this status, and instead, it has asked that it be called a de facto nuclear weapons state. But it is adamant about salvaging some political gains out of the nuclear tests. Getting the United States to lift the ban on civilian nuclear technology would be seen as a quid pro quo that would both assuage national honor and help quiet the domestic political opposition. What makes it difficult for India to profit from its new nuclear status is the fundamental flaw in the belief that nuclear weapons are the international currency of power. Bharat Karnad, among other Indian analysts, has argued this point: “Nuclear weapons, first and foremost, promote strategic independence, are an attribute of Great Power and a manifestation of nuclear anti-hegemonism.”45 For nuclear weapons to be attributes of great power, however, certain conditions need to be met. Like currency, one has to be able to display one’s nuclear assets, which requires sufficient numbers to impress other great powers. Even if India were to make the economic sacrifice, face the wrath of the international community, and build 400 thermonuclear weapons, it would still be a second-tier nuclear state. If it built the more modest force that analysts like Subrahmanyam have called for, then it will be a third-tier nuclear power in a world where the first level of nuclear players are so far ahead that almost any Indian nuclear arsenal will seem minuscule. Only limited political leverage will be gained from saber rattling with a small nuclear force that does not have global reach. A willingness to enter into substantive arms control discussions with Pakistan could, however, be used to try and gain economic and political concessions from the international community. One possible measure in this context would be for the international community to provide the right

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kinds of economic incentives to carry out negotiations. Economic incentives, rather than coercion, have worked to resolve regional rivalries and to provide disincentives to potential proliferators. The Egypt-Israel peace treaty continues to be bankrolled by the United States, and both Ukraine’s possession of nuclear weapons as well as North Korea’s budding nuclear program were terminated by providing economic incentives. Both the Indian and Pakistani economies require inputs of foreign investment if they are to carry out successful market reforms and modernize. The incentive of investments may well persuade both sides to carry out meaningful arms control negotiations and produce visible results. One more immediate proposal would be to provide both countries with the means to safeguard their nuclear and missile assets from accidental launches and command and control problems. The Clinton administration has argued against transferring such technologies because it would only strengthen the nuclear capabilities of both states. But both countries have little experience with C3I in the nuclear realm; transferring some technologies would help increase the safety of these arsenals. There has been a call from the region for the transfer of permissive action links to prevent the unauthorized use of such systems.46 THE FUTURE

OF INTERNATIONAL

REGIMES

The critical issue at the international level is that the proliferation of weapons in South Asia not have a spillover effect into other regions of the world, particularly the Middle East. Two questions are relevant here. Will India transfer nuclear and missile technology to other states? And does the present Clinton administration’s approach of capping and reducing nuclear arsenals in South Asia (with the idea of a rollback being temporarily on the back burner) make for a viable nonproliferation policy? To take the latter issue first, current U.S. policy aims to keep India out of the nuclear club of declared nuclear weapons states. Does such a policy make sense? Joining the club means abiding by the rules of nonproliferation, which include not transferring sensitive technologies, trying to prevent the spread of nuclear and missile capabilities, and working toward disarmament. Until now, neither India nor Pakistan has transferred weapons technologies to other countries. India has had a nuclear capability since 1974 but has observed the nontransfer clauses of the NPT, even though it is not a member of that regime. Further, it has been reluctant to transfer missile technology to other states. The Indian government turned down $150 mil-

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lion worth of missile-related business with Iraq and refused to enter into financial arrangements with Libya over the purchase of defense equipment.47 Indian officials argue that the country has abided by the provisions of the NPT far better than a declared nuclear weapons state like China, which has passed on both nuclear and missile technology to other countries. Given that India has abided by the rules, entry into the club makes good sense. The alternative is that countries like India, Pakistan, and Israel form their own club where the requirements for membership may be less rigorous, leading to wide-scale proliferation. What is required, therefore, is an international legal regime or entity that admits the three countries with nuclear weapons—Israel, India, and Pakistan—as de facto nuclear weapons states. Doing so would make international regimes match the reality of the international system. This is a diplomatic initiative that the Indian government could pursue with the United States. Alternatively, U.S. policy could continue to perpetuate the idea that these are threshold states. Not only is this policy unacceptable policy for both South Asian states (and certainly Israel, if it was included in these discussions), but it will also lead to policy measures that may actually aggravate the situation. The continuation of sanctions, for example, is likely to seriously hurt Pakistan’s economy, thereby possibly forcing it to reverse its stand on nonproliferation in order to gain economic benefits.48 Reshaping international regimes or creating a class of nuclear states will not lead to widespread proliferation in the international system. States that have foreclosed their nuclear option—Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Ukraine—will not reverse their position because of the South Asian tests. International pressure and economic constraints will make such a reversal unlikely. Nor are the overwhelming majority of signatories to the NPT going to change their position because they have neither the resources, nor the political desire, nor the technological capability to carry out nuclearization. Only a small group of nations ruled by authoritarian governments continue to have the ambition to develop weapons of mass destruction. Drawing a distinction between democratic states—like Israel, India, and till recently Pakistan—and authoritarian states may address this problem: authoritarian states are less likely to abide by the rules of interstate relations, are more likely to engage in internal repression, tend to lag behind in the quest for market reforms, and are less observant of international regimes and treaties. In fact being a democracy may be made a precondition for accepting Pakistan’s nuclear status. As a status quo state, India could immediately propose and sign a treaty promising not to transfer nuclear and missile technologies. It could

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also sign the FMCT because its nuclear aspirations do not, and given its economic capabilities cannot, lead to competition with the major powers. Further, as the Indian security expert Sisir Gupta pointed out in the 1960s, going nuclear would never be enough because all it would do would be to make India the seventh, tenth, or twentieth nuclear state; the country would still have the status of a minor power. What mattered was coming up with plans to restructure the international system. As Gupta argued, if India did not use its nuclear weapons but instead used the influence gained by possessing them to push for disarmament, then its role would continue to be one that was both moral and moderating in the international system. This could be achieved, he argued, by “taking steps to advance the world to a higher level of international order and collective security.”49 As India is finding out, being a minor nuclear power gives little status in a world of major nuclear powers and, especially, in a new international system in which nuclear weapons are no longer the sole currency of international power. Responsible behavior, therefore, is the key to entry into the club of major states. Developing a substantive arms control agenda that helps make international regimes more relevant and brings about systemic stability would be the first step in this process. NOTES

1. For a discussion of China’s threat perceptions, see Ross H Munro, “Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects War—Where It Doesn’t,” Orbis 38, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 355–372. 2. New York Times, May 26, 1999. For a discussion of Indian perceptions of the Chinese threat, see N. Ram, “What Wrong Did This Man Do?” Frontline, May 8–21, 1999. 3. Aijaz Ahmad, “The Hindutva Weapon,” Frontline, June 5, 1998. 4. Cited in Amit Gupta, “Fire in the Sky: The Indian Missile Program,” Defense and Diplomacy 8, no. 10 (October 1990): 46. 5. N. Ram, “The Perils of Nuclear Adventurism,” Frontline, June 5, 1998. 6. Bharat Karnad, “A Thermonuclear Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1998), 109. 7. The Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine is available at http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_ doctrine_aug_17_1999.html. 8. K. Sundarji, “Strategy in the Age of Nuclear Deterrence and Its Application to Developing Countries,” Master’s thesis submitted to Madras University, June 11, 1984, 36. 9. Vijay K. Nair, Nuclear India (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1992), 171–172. 10. Subramaniam Swamy, “India’s Defense Needs,” Hindustan Times, July 12, 1998.

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11. Karnad, “A Thermonuclear Deterrent,” 128, 139. 12. “India Building Missile with 5,000 Kilometer Range,” Deccan Herald, October 24, 1999. 13. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “Equipping the Navy for War on Land,” Times of India, July 13, 1998. 14. John Cherian, “The Arms Race,” Frontline 16, no. 9, April 24–May 7, 1999. 15. SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: SIPRI and Oxford University Press, 1997), 203. 16. The Military Balance 1998/99 (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998), 297. 17. Swamy, “India’s Defense Needs.” 18. Jayati Ghosh, “The Bomb and the Economy,” Frontline 16, no. 10, May 8–21, 1999. 19. Molly Moore, “Bomb Tests Wound Indian Economy,” Washington Post, June 20, 1998, A1. 20. R. Ramachandran, “Sanctions: The Bark and the Bite,” Frontline 16, no. 10, May 8–21, 1999. 21. “U.S. May Accept Our Nuclear Status: Fernandes,” Hindu, July 26, 1998, 1. 22. Roy-Chaudhury, “Equipping the Navy for War on Land”; and “India Buckles: Test-Firing of Agni Put Off Indefinitely,” Hindustan Times, January 21, 1999. 23. “India Set to Test Fire Long-Range Agni II,” Hindustan Times, December 27, 1998. 24. R. Ramachandran, “Developing a Delivery System,” Frontline 16, no. 9, April 24–May 7, 1999. 25. Dinshaw Mistry, “India’s Emerging Space Program,” Pacific Affairs 71, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 164. 26. “Fernandes: US Nuclear Policy Is Hypocritical,” Hindustan Times, June 19, 1998. 27. K. Subrahmanyam, “Past Imperfect: Time for New Nuclearspeak,” Times of India, August 3, 1998. 28. The entire memorandum is available on the Indian Ministry of External Affairs website, The Lahore Declaration, http://www.meadev.gov.in/govt/lahore.htm. 29. Kenneth J. Cooper, “India, Pakistan Agree to Work to Ease Strains,” Washington Post, February 22, 1999, A9. 30. John Cherian, “The Arms Race,” Frontline 16, no. 9, April 24–May 7, 1999. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Harinder Baweja and Raj Chengappa, “From Breakdown to Détente and Entente Cordiale,” India Today, March 1, 1999. 34. Strobe Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (March–April 1990): 116–117. 35. For a detailed discussion of the U.S. position, see the interview with U.S. ambassador to India Richard Celeste, “Foreign Panorama: Waiting for the Take-Off,” Hindu, January 28, 1999. 36. Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia,” 120–122. 37. Jim Hoagland, “India: The Nuclear Challenge,” Washington Post, February 21, 1999, B7. 38. T. Jayaraman, “Nuclear Issues: A Destabilizing Misadventure,” Frontline 16, February 13–26, 1999. 39. Ibid.

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40. “Celeste Defends Demand on Deterrence,” Hindu, January 23, 1999, 13. 41. “U.S. Denies Reports on Move to Lift Sanctions Against India,” Deccan Herald, January 24, 1999. 42. Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia,” 119–120. 43. Cooper, “India, Pakistan Agree to Work to Ease Strains.” 44. Achin Vanaik, “The BJP’s Calculations,” Hindu, July 30, 1998, 12. 45. Karnad, “A Thermonuclear Deterrent,” 111. 46. Frontline 15, no. 14, July 4–15, 1998. 47. Amit Gupta, “Determining India’s Force Structure and Military Doctrine: I Want My MiG,” Asian Survey 35, no. 5 (May 1995): 456. 48. Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, “Sanctions: Modify Them,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54, no. 5 (September–October 1998): 22–24. 49. Sisir Gupta, “The Indian Dilemma,” in Alastair Buchan, ed., A World of Nuclear Powers (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966), 67.

Acronyms

ABM AEC AIADMK ASLV ATGM ATV

antiballistic missile Atomic Energy Commission All India Annadurai Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam augmented satellite launch vehicle anti-tank guided missile advanced technology vehicle

C3I C-4/I-2

command, control, communication, and intelligence command, control, communications, computerization, intelligence, and information confidence-building measures credible deterrent Combat Development Directorate circular error probable Central Intelligence Agency Commonwealth of Independent States chief of army staff cash reserve rate Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Chemical Weapons Convention

BARC BJP

CBMs CD CDD CEP CIA CIS COAS CRR CSCE CWC

DCC DCL DGMO DRDL DRDO DOS

Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Bharatiya Janata Party

Defense Cabinet Committee (Pakistan) dedicated communication link directors general of military operations Defence Research and Development Laboratory Defence Research and Development Organization Department of Space, 1972 293

294

ACRONYMS

EIF ENDC ESA

entry into force Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference European Space Agency

G-8 GDP GEO GNP GSLVs

Group of Eight gross domestic product geostationary earth orbit gross national product geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle

FBR FDI FII FMCT

HRD

IAEA ICBMs IDSA IGMDP IMF INSAT Intelsat IRBM IRS ISC ISI ISRO

JCSC

KSC KRL

LCA LEO LISS LOC

MAD

fast breeder reactor foreign direct investment foreign institutional (portfolio) investment fissile material cutoff treaty

human resource development

International Atomic Energy Agency intercontinental ballistic missiles Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis integrated guided missile development program, 1983 International Monetary Fund Indian national satellite International Telecommunication Satellite Organisation intermediate-range ballistic missile Indian remote-sensing Indian Space Commission Inter-Services Intelligence Indian Space Research Organization, 1969

Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

Khrunichev Space Center Khan Research Laboratories

light combat aircraft low earth orbit linear image self-scanning line of control

mutual assured destruction

ACRONYMS

MBT MD MI MIC MIRV MP MTCR

main battle tank minimum deterrent military intelligence military-industrial complex multiple independent reentry vehicle member of parliament Missile Technology Control Regime

OIC OPIC

Organization of the Islamic Conference Overseas Private Investment Corporation

NATO NCA NCP NDC NNPA NPT NRI NSAB NSNC NWFZ

PAEC PAL PAN PNE PPP PRC PSBR PSLV

RCI R&D RRSSCs RSS

SALT SAM SLBMs SLV SLVs

North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Command Authority National Command Post National Development Complex Nuclear Nonproliferation Act Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty nonresident Indian National Security Advisory Board National Strategic Nuclear Command nuclear weapons free zone

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission permissive action links panchromatic peaceful uses of nuclear explosions Pakistan People’s Party People’s Republic of China public sector borrowing requirement polar satellite launch vehicle

Research Center Imarat research and development regional remote-sensing service centers Rashtritya Swayamsevak Sangh

Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty surface to air missile submarine-launched ballistic missiles space launch vehicle satellite launch vehicles

295

296

SRBMs SRR SSMs

ACRONYMS

short-range ballistic missiles strategic restraint regime surface to surface missiles

TDA TEL TELCO TIFR TISCO

Trade Development Authority transporter erector launcher Tata Electric Locomotive Company Tata Institute of Fundamental Research Tata Iron and Steel

WiFS

wide field sensor

UHF UNDC

ultrahigh frequency United Nations Disarmament Conference

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The Contributors

Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor of International Relations, Michigan State University. A specialist on conflict and security in the Third World, he has held faculty appointments at the Australian National University and Jawaharlal Nehru University in India and visiting appointments at Princeton, Oxford, Brown, and Columbia Universities. His many publications include The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (1995) and India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies (1990).

Stephen P. Cohen is senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution, where he directs Brookings’ India/ South Asia program. Cohen is the author of several books on South Asian security issues, including The Indian Army and The Pakistan Army. He was formerly professor of history and political science at the University of Illinois, where he founded and directed the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, and he has served as a member of the State Department’s policy planning staff (1985–1987).

Sumit Ganguly, professor of political science at Hunter College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, is a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University for the 1999–2000 academic year. His research on ethnic violence, nuclear proliferation, and interstate war has been widely published, and he has written or coedited seven books, the most recent book being The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (1999). He is currently at work on a book that traces the origins of Indo-Pakistani hostility from 1947 to the present day. 305

306

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Amit Gupta is associate professor of political science at Stonehill College in Easton, Massachusetts, and was formerly a fellow at Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico. In addition to publishing articles in numerous journals, he is the author of Building an Arsenal: The Evolution of Regional Power Force Structures.

Prem Shankar Jha has worked for the United Nations Development Fund, edited several newspapers in India, served as information adviser to Indian prime minister I. K. Gujral, and has been a visiting professor at Oxford University and elsewhere. His books include In the Eye of the Cyclone: Crisis in Indian Democracy (1993) and Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History (1996).

Dinshaw Mistry is a researcher at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., specializing in technology policy and international relations. He has recently published articles on ballistic missile proliferation (Contemporary Security Policy); missile defense (Northwestern Journal of International Affairs); India and the CTBT (The Nonproliferation Review); and diplomacy, sanctions, and nonproliferation (Asian Survey).

Deepa M. Ollapally currently does research and programming at the U.S. Institute of Peace. After teaching at Swarthmore College from 1991 to 1996, she was head of the International and Strategic Studies Program at the National Institute of Advanced Studies in India. Her many publications include the book Confronting Conflict: Domestic Factors and U.S. Policymaking in the Third World. In 1998, she set up the first regional network of South Asian women in international security as a forum for research and collaboration and an avenue for track two diplomacy.

Ben Sheppard is an editor for Jane’s Sentinel and regularly contributes articles on ballistic missile proliferation to Jane’s Intelligence Review and other journals.. He contributed a chapter on missile proliferation in India and Pakistan to Nuclear India in the 21st Century and wrote and coedited a Jane’s Special Report titled “Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Identifying the Real Threats.”

Clifford E. Singer is a professor of nuclear engineering and director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Formerly a National Science Foundation postdoctoral fellow at MIT and an Alexander von Humboldt fellow at the Max Planck Institutes for Stroemungsforschung

THE CONTRIBUTORS

307

and Plasmaphysik in Germany, he currently researches plutonium production and reprocessing in South Asia and arms control in India, Pakistan, and China. His publications include a number of scientific articles as well as chapters in such books as Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control and South Asia After the Cold War: International Perspectives.

Raju G. C. Thomas is the Allis Chalmers Professor of International Affairs at Marquette University and was codirector of the Center for International Studies, jointly sponsored by the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee and Marquette University. His numerous publications include Indian Security Policy (1986), South Asian Security in the 1990s (1994), Democracy, Security and Development in India (1996), and The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (editor, 1998). He is currently completing a book dealing with markets and politics in India.

S. R. Valluri studied and worked in the United States for nearly twenty years before returning to India in 1964 to head the Department of Aeronautics and Applied Mechanics at the Indian Institute of Technology in Madras. In June 1985 he became the first director general of the newly created Aeronautical Development Agency of the Ministry of Defence, where he managed the design and development of light combat aircraft for the Indian Air Force. His scientific publications include articles on metal fatigue and fracture, various aspects of R&D management in India, and India’s nuclear program and its impact on military and civil affairs.

Farah Zahra, a former research fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, is a freelance defense analyst based in Washington, D.C. She focuses on South Asian security policies as well as U.S. nonproliferation policies in the region. As a visiting lecturer in Castellon, Spain, she teaches courses on nuclear proliferation. In addition to publishing in the United States and Pakistan, she was editor of World Wide Fund for Nature’s quarterly journal Natura.

Index

ABM. See Antiballistic missiles ACC. See Associated Cement Advani, Lal Krishna, 17, 147, 148–149 AEC. See Atomic Energy Commission Afghanistan, Soviet invasion of, 49–50, 89 Agni missile (India), 73, 106, 111–112, 210; Agni 2 as “technology demonstrator,” 83(n20); Agni 2 capabilities, 144(n26); as secondstrike IRBM system, 211; failure to notify Pakistan of testing, 160; first test of, 50; future of program, 176–177; Pakistani response to, 144(n25), 146, 168(n12), 182; propulsion system, 205–206; range of, 58, 87, 114, 281; reaching parity with China, 185; use with SLV 3, 201 Agreement on the Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities, 159 Ahmed, Shamshad, 148, 158 AIADMK. See All India Annadurai Dravida Munnetra Kazhagan party Akash missile (India), 111 Albania, 115–116 All India Annadurai Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party (AIADMK), 117 All India Congress Committee (AICC), 42–43 Annan, Kofi, 168(n7) Antiballistic missiles (ABM), 160 Antinuclear positions, 18–20, 30–31 Antrix corporation, 210, 220(n27) APPLE satellite. See Ariane Passenger Payload Experiment Argentina, 4–5, 219(n10), 220(32), 289

Ariane Passenger Payload Experiment satellite, 202 Arms control, 10; desirability of, 58; regional and international, 12, 285–286 Arms race: India and Pakistan’s reluctance to engage in, 172; India’s participation in, 268–270; potential three-way race with China and Pakistan, 117–118, 185 Arms race stability, 57–58 Arms transfer, 49–50, 54 Arthasastra (Kautilya), 69 Asian Development Bank, 150 ASLV. See Augmented satellite launch vehicle Associated Cement (ACC), 236 Astra missile (India), 112 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 38, 40, 51, 72, 266 Augmented satellite launch vehicle (ASLV), 203, 211 Australia: response to South Asian testing, 221, 252–253 Aziz, Chaudhary Anwer, 168(n7) Aziz, Sartaj, 149

Balance of payments, 224–225, 225(table) Balance-imbalance concept, 179–181 Banerjie, Indranil, 111 Bangladesh, 46, 100 BARC. See Bhabha Atomic Research Center Barnaby, Frank, 109 Beg, Mirza Aslam, 142(n8)

309

310

INDEX

Belarus, 5 Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), 266 Bhabha, Homi J.: birth of civilian nuclear program, 39–40; criticism of, 43; death of, 266; establishment of AEC, 72; hiding weapons development, 16; nuclear deterrence stance, 41–42; weaponization ambitions, 56 Bhagavad-Gita, 11, 265 Bharat Aluminum, 114 Bharat Dynamics, Ltd., 114, 205 Bharat Earthmovers, 114 Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 3, 18, 42 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 76, 206; “near test,” 64(n89); acquisition of hawkish members, 27; as catalyst for Islamic groups, 163; break with nuclear abstinence policy, 55–56; CTBT stance, 118; declaration without testing, 65(n102); foreign policy, 33–34; jingoism as motivation for testing, 38–39; minimum nuclear deterrent stance, 172; secularism and, 124–125; stance on testing, 6–7, 14, 23–24, 29, 115, 266; support of nuclear decision, 133; view of nuclear weapons states, 243 Bhaskara satellites, 202 Bhutto, Benazir, 147, 159, 169(n16) Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 3, 148, 152 Big five countries, 8, 24, 89, 138–139, 270 Bin Laden, Osama, 164 BJP. See Bharatiya Janata Party Blackett, P.M.S., 40 Blair, Bruce, 187 Blair, Tony, 147 Bomb lobby, 26, 95 Bond issues, 224–225, 225(table) Border Peace and Tranquility Agreements (1994), 3, 88 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 18 Brasstacks crisis, 21–22, 51 Brazil, 4–5, 217(table), 219(n10), 220(32), 289 Brown amendment, 53 Brown, Hank, 53 Brownback amendment, 223 Brownback, Sam, 150, 168(n11)

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 265 Bundy, McGeorge, 183, 187 Bush, George, 52

C3I capability. See Command, control, communication Cameras. See Reconnaissance Canada: response to South Asian tests, 47, 221 Capabilities, nuclear, 7; capabilitiesintentions dilemma, 102–108; credible deterrent, 80; decreasing upper limit of holdings, 246–247; disparities in, 287; India’s projected nuclear force, 277; levels of, 77–78, 84(n31); nuclear and missile capabilities, 110–115, 113(table); nuclear capabilities of diverse countries, 107, 270; of satellite launch vehicle program, 203–206; technology base for, 108–110 Capabilities-intentions dilemma, 102–108 Carter administration, 47–48, 49 Cartosat satellite, 209 CBMs. See Confidence-building measures CD. See Credible deterrent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 49, 164 Chavan, Y.B, 42 Chellaney, Brahma, 190 Chemical weapons, 159 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 159 Chidambaram, R., 47, 135, 238, 267 Chief of Army Staff (COAS), 190 China, People’s Republic of, 73, 216; as “temporary” nuclear state, 243; as limiting factor for India’s policy, 278; as nuclear capable state, 246; as perceived threat, 39, 61(n37), 130–133, 185–187, 281; communications satellites, 220(32); cost of arms race with, 117–118, 266–267; economic and nuclear advantages, 96; economic decline, 235; India’s potential strategic partnership with, 100–101; minimum deterrence stance, 79; minimum deterrent against, 177; nuclear and

INDEX missile capabilities, 77–78, 113(table), 270; nuclear test data, 107(table); Pakistan’s anxiety about Sino-Indian relations, 148; pre-CTBT testing, 55; response to Indian tests, 106, 258; role in India’s nuclear policy, 2–3, 266, 276; Sino-Indian war, 2, 18, 40–41, 72; space program, 217(table); stability issues with, 57–58; support of Pakistan, 21–23, 27, 44–45, 50, 52, 126–129, 174; testing at Lop Nor, 41–42; tripartite agreement with Russia and India, 116; U.S. concerns about SinoPakistani commitment, 143(n10); unrestricted war doctrine, 94; use of reconnaissance satellites against, 213–214. See also Sino-Indian war CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency Cirus research reactor, 110 Civilian nuclear program, 47, 109–110; as nationalistic force, 26; safeguarding through weaponization, 20; sustaining military program, 25 Clinton administration, 53, 74 Clinton, Bill, 147, 155; 1998 visit, 30; Indo-American negotiations, 141; waiving sanctions against Pakistan, 151 Coalition governments, 27, 49; 1991 economic and security crises, 74; affecting rejection of CTBT, 76; affecting testing decision, 134–135; AIADMK demands and threats COAS. See Chief of Army Staff Cohen, Stephen P., 179, 185, 189 Command, control, communication (C3I) capability, 187–191, 212–213, 279, 284; adequacy of India’s, 67; lack of, 173; Prithvi’s effect on, 198(n43) Communications satellites, 207–208, 212–213, 220(32) Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 19, 54, 81; BJP stance on, 118; conditions for signing, 136; future of, 137–139; India’s moral stance on, 28; India’s rejection of, 54–55, 74–77; Pakistani stance, 152, 157; preconditions for signing, 280; pressure to sign, 3, 104–105,

311

130–133, 133–135, 286; purpose of, 265; religious response to, 164; renewal of NPT, 23; United States response to, 268 Computer capability, 73 Conference on Disarmament (1996), 75–76, 132 Confidence-building measures (CBMs), 8, 158–160, 283–285 Congress Party, 19; demand for shift in nuclear and foreign policies, 42–43; economic effect of party’s defeat, 227; nuclearization decision, 26–27; overcoming 1991 economic and security crises, 74; public rejection of, 48–49; view of nuclear weapons states, 243 Constitution, Indian, 29 Conventional weapons, 180–181 Cost: DRDO budget, 210(n7); of Agni program, 177; of arms race with China, 266–267; of deterrence, 106–108; of nuclearization, 8; of projected nuclear force, 278–280; of space program, 215–218, 220(29); of Surya missile, 112; of testing, 24–25; of weapons and missile buildup, 117–118; of weapons development, 47, 80, 186. See also Economic issues Cray computers, 73 Credible deterrent, 103 Credible minimum deterrent. See Minimum deterrent Credit rating, India’s, 223, 227, 231 Crisis stability, 57–58 Crisis weaponization, 188, 195–196 Crossette, Barbara, 94 Cryogenic engine, 113–114, 178, 197(n31), 203 Cultural issues affecting strategic position, 69–71 CWC. See Chemical Weapons Convention

DCC. See Defence Cabinet Committee DCL. See Dedicated communication link De-alerted status, of nuclear explosives, 78, 244–246. See also Recessed deterrence

312

INDEX

De-mating, as safety measure. See Dealerted status; Recessed deterrence Death count, of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 264 Decisionmaking process, 15; change in political context, 27; domestic politics affecting, 133–135; economics as factor, 83(n19); factors in nuclear decision, 13–15, 129–133; long-term political factors, 17–20; role of Pakistani army in, 151–153 Dedicated communication link (DCL), 158 Defence Cabinet Committee (DCC), 190 Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), 112, 115, 176, 205 Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), 50, 111, 135, 176, 205, 210(n7) Delivery systems. See Launch vehicles; Missiles Department of Space (DOS), 218(n2) Departments of Atomic Energy and Space, 109 Desai, Morarji, 43, 48–49, 65(n103) Deterrence levels, 269; alternatives to stockpiling, 272–273; future Pakistani and Indian forces, 280–283; minimum versus credible levels, 102–103. See also Missiles Deterrence strategies, 78–79, 89–90 Dhanush missile (India), 111, 178, 278, 281. See also Prithvi missiles Dhawan, Satish, 205, 210 Dhruva research reactor, 110 Diplomacy, between India and Pakistan, 241–243 Disarmament, 51, 271; as goal of Indian nuclear policy, 75, 243–244, 290; as part of CTBT, 54; debate over India’s stance on, 42–43 Discrimination, 115, 148 Domestic issues: decline of internal security, 21–22; economic, social, cultural, and federal revolutions, 33–34; hampering development of nuclear program, 48; Kashmir insurgency, 52; leading to Pokhran I, 46; leading to Pokhran II, 116–117 DOS. See Department of Space

Draft nuclear doctrine, 68–69, 277; “China posture” of, 118; intentions and strategy, 103–104; minimum deterrence stance, 77–80 Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, 166, 172, 213, 275–276 DRDL. See Defence Research and Development Laboratory DRDO. See Defence Research and Development Organization Dubey, Muchkund, 100 Duff and Phelps, 223 Dutt, Som, 72, 266

Economic issues: 1991 economic crisis, 74, 78; affecting rate of weapons development, 81; avoiding sanctions, 250–251; balance of payments, 225(table); compared to China’s economy, 116; economic reform, 234–237; education versus weapons development, 11, 266–267; effect on nuclear doctrine, 15–16, 68–69; foreign investment (See Foreign direct investment; Foreign institutional investment); industrial growth, 229, 238(n4); pre-Pokhran decline, 225–231; recovery strategies, 232–234, 237–238. See also Cost; Pakistan Education, versus weapons development, 267 Egypt, 75, 219(n10), 220(32) EIF. See Entry into force Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC), 44, 45 Einhorn, Robert, 131, 143(n10) Einstein, Albert, 265 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 180, 267 Elections: as factor in testing decision, 29; Indira Gandhi’s alleged violations, 48–49 ENDC. See Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference Energy, conventional, 251 Energy, nuclear: as excuse for nuclear development, 16 Enron company, 222 Entry into force (EIF), 133 Eosat, 220(n27)

INDEX Espionage, 145 Export controls, of weapons programs and materials, 254–255, 259 Export goods, 227 Export-Import Bank, 118, 149 Extremist forces, in India and Pakistan, 167–168

F-16 fighter jets, 49, 174 FDI. See Foreign direct investment Fernandes, George, 18, 88, 95, 148; concerns about Chinese encirclement of India, 185; NPT renewal, 23–24; plea with Pakistan for no-first-use policy, 184; rationalizing 1998 testing, 96 FII. See Foreign institutional investment Fiscal reform, 234–237 Fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), 77, 81, 136, 286, 290 FMCT. See Fissile material cutoff treaty Ford Aerospace, 207 Foreign Assistance Act, 52 Foreign direct investment (FDI), 166–167, 223–224, 227, 229–232, 236, 279–280 Foreign institutional investment (FII), 224, 230, 233, 239(n7) Foreign policy, 15; effect of Soviet collapse on, 74; Indira Doctrine, 142(n4); major factors in nuclear decision, 129–133; nation-building goals, 124–126; need for consensus on, 30; U.S. removal of aid to India, 47 France: as “temporary” nuclear state, 243; capabilities, 77–78, 81, 105, 270; minimum deterrence stance, 79; nuclear test data, 107(table); response to South Asian testing, and U.S. sanctions, 258; rocket technology for Pakistan, 174 Freedman, Lawrence, 155

Gallup poll, 162 Gandhi, Indira, 2, 27, 45; authorization of test, 47; elections violations, 48–49; pro-Soviet foreign policy, 46 Gandhi, Mahatma, 18, 271 Gandhi, Rajiv, 27; concerns over Pakistan’s military control, 190;

313

contradictory nuclear policy, 50–51; non-attack of nuclear facilities, 159; testing under, 84(n24) Ganguly, Sumit, 183 Gates, Robert, 52 GEO. See Geostationary earth orbit Geostationary earth orbit (GEO), 201, 203 Geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV): commercial use of, 210, 214–215; range and capability of, 112, 201, 203; Russian technology transfer for, 178 Germany, 90; response to South Asian testing, 252–254; rocket technology for Pakistan, 174; space technology transfer, 206 Ghauri missile (Pakistan), 29–30, 55–56, 88, 106, 144(n25), 146, 151, 171, 173, 175; achieving credible nuclear deterrent, 184; India’s response to, 131–132 Ghose, Arundhati, 76 Glenn amendment, 151 Global military balance, 90 Goa, 59(n6) Godse, Nathuram, 271 Gold, as investment, 236, 239(n10) Gowda, Deve, 27, 266 Great Britain. See United Kingdom Greenspan, Alan, 232 Group of Eight (G-8) countries, 123, 155 GSAT, 219(n15) GSLV. See Geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle Guarantees of security, 42–46, 56–57, 91, 168(n7) Gujral Doctrine, 125–126 Gujral, Inder, 27, 28, 98, 163 Gulf War, 90, 180, 188, 192–193 Gupta, Sisir, 41–42, 290

Haider, Ejaz, 190 Hatf missile (Pakistan), 171, 173–175, 174, 186 Hegemonic stability, 90–95 Helms, Jesse, 150, 168(n11) Hersh, Seymour, 190 Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, 114 Hiroshima, Japan, 264, 272

314

INDEX

Holum, John, 139 Humanitarian grounds for force, 94–95, 98–99, 101 Hussein, Saddam, 180

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM. See Intercontinental ballistic missiles Ideology affecting strategic doctrine, 65(n103), 70 IDSA. See Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses IGMDP. See Integrated guided missile development program IMF. See International Monetary Fund Imported goods, decline in, 227–228 Independent deterrent, 100, 115–116 Indian national satellite (INSAT), 203, 207, 212–213, 217, 220(n28) Indian remote-sensing satellite (IRS), 203, 209, 211–212, 217 Indian Space Commission (ISC), 218(n2) Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), 50, 111, 177, 201, 202, 210, 214–217, 218(n2), 220(n27) Indira Doctrine, 125, 142(n4) Indo-American. dialogue, 139–140 Indo-Pakistani relations: diplomacy to break nuclear impasse, 10, 259–261; mistrust over nuclear declarations, 158–161; opacity-based stability, 181–184; potential damage to population centers, 191–193; volatility of, 167–168 Indo-Pakistani wars, 2–3, 44–46, 88, 90–91, 96–97. See also Kargil conflict Indonesia, 75, 220(32) Industrial sector, 229–230, 238(n4) Infrastructure, budget cuts in, 236–237 INSAT. See Indian national satellite Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), 72, 78, 266 Insurgencies, 128. See also Jammu and Kashmir Integrated guided missile development program (IGMDP), 50, 73, 111–112, 176, 205

Intelsat. See International Telecommunication Satellite Organisation Intentions. See Capabilities-intentions dilemma Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 190 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), 88, 112, 173, 175, 177, 278 Intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), 19, 105, 111, 134, 246. See also Agni missiles International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 47, 72, 165, 255 International community: acceptance of CTBT, 75; arms control at international level, 285–286; concerns over India’s overt stance, 4–6; effect of U.S. policy on threshold states, 288–289; response to Pokhran I, 24–25, 47–48; response to Pokhran II, 221–223; role in Indo-Pakistani relations, 126–129. See also Foreign direct investment; Foreign institutional investment International Monetary Fund (IMF), 118, 149–151, 164, 233 International peacekeeping, 251 International Security journal, 183 International Telecommunication Satellite Organisation (Intelsat), 215 Iran, 219(n10); response to South Asian testing, 252, 254–255; satellites, 220(32) Iraq, 88, 219(n10), 252, 254–255 IRBM. See Intermediate range ballistic missiles IRS. See Indian remote-sensing satellite ISC. See Indian Space Commission ISI. See Inter-Services Intelligence Islamist groups, 163–164 Israel, 174; comparative analysis of space programs, 217(table); current capabilities, 270; effect of SSM attacks on, 192–193; military supremacy, 90; NPT renewal, 53; response to South Asian testing, and U.S. sanctions, 259; satellites, 220(32); threshold position, 73 Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, 90 ISRO. See Indian Space Research Organization

INDEX Jamaat-I-Islami (Pakistani Islamist Party), 147, 163, 164 Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam, 163 Jammu and Kashmir, 18, 27, 89, 173; 1990 insurrection, 52; as factor in nation building, 125; as obstacle to stability, 183; division of territory, 270–271; domestic insecurity with, 22; Nehru’s policy on insurgency, 59(n6); Pakistani support of insurgency, 52. See also Kargil conflict Janta Dal, 19 Japan, 22, 79, 216; communications satellites, 220(32); comparative analysis of space programs, 217(table); economic status in May 1998, 234; Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 264, 272; response to Pokhran II, 221; response to South Asian testing, 252–254 Jayaram, Jayalalitha, 117 JCSC. See Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Jha, Laxmi Kant, 45 Jha, N.N., 98 Jha, Prem Shankar, 94–95, 116 Jingoism, as force for testing, 38–39 Joan B. Kroc Institute of the University of Notre Dame, 161 Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), 152, 190 Joint Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 159 Joshi, M.M., 267 Junejo, Mohammed Khan, 169(n16)

Kalam, A.P.J. Abdul, 144(n26); development of IGMDP, 26, 50, 205; on need for future testing, 81, 135 Kansi, Aimal, 164 Kargil conflict: as catalyst to Indian nuclear testing, 3–4; exercising restraint, 280; failure to detect military presence at, 213; India’s benefits in signing NPT, 96; questions raised by, 154–155; stabilityinstability paradox, 89–90; U.S. response to, 165; volatility of nuclear situation, 80, 88, 123, 193–194

315

Karnad, Bharat, 19, 84(n31); on signing CTBT under U.S. pressure, 104; on weapons and missile buildup, 117; on weapons as currency of power, 287; potential capability, 277 Karp, Aaron, 191–192 Kashmir. See Jammu and Kashmir Kazakhstan, 5 Keramat, Jehangir, 152 Khan Research Laboratories, 173 Khan, Abdul Qadeer, 51, 142(n8), 147, 153, 173 Khan, Gohar A., 153 Khan, Munir Ahmed, 63(n76) Khrushchev, Nikita, 273 Kissinger, Henry, 2, 148 Korea. See North Korea; South Korea Kosovo, 3, 88, 100, 115–116 Kwangmyongson1 missile (North Korea), 175

Lahore summit, 80, 154, 163, 164, 193–194, 284 Landsat satellite, 209 Larkin, Bruce, 79 Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, 164 Launch vehicles. See Augmented satellite launch vehicle; Geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle; Polar satellite launch vehicle; Satellite launch vehicle; Transporter erector launcher Lebow, Richard Ned, 183 LEO. See Low earth orbit Libya, 219(n10), 289 Limiting holdings, 258 Linear image self-scanning camera (LISS-3), 211–212 LISS-3. See Linear image self-scanning camera Lohia, Ram Manohar, 18 Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), 24, 136 London Club, 151 London Suppliers Group, 48 Lop Nor testing, 41–42 Low earth orbit (LEO), 203

M-11 missile (Pakistan), 186 MAD. See Mutual assured destruction doctrine

316

INDEX

Mad military momentum, 108 Malaysia: economic status in May 1998, 234 Masani, Minoo, 42 McCurry, Mike, 168(n10) McNamara, Robert, 81, 187 MD. See Minimum deterrent Menon, V.K. Krishna, 16 Mexico, 75, 220(32), 252–253 MI. See Military Intelligence MIC. See Military-industrial complex Military Intelligence (MI), 190 Military-industrial complex (MIC), 267 Minimum deterrent, 155–158; capabilities-intentions dilemma, 102–105; debate over levels of weaponization, 84(n31); declaration of Indian stance, 172; defined by Vajpayee, 286; Pakistani response to, 167; use of de-alerted status, 78–79 Mishra, Brajesh, 135 Missile programs: China, 174–175; India, 57, 102, 108–110, 176–178; Pakistan, 173 Missile technology control regime (MTCR), 110–111, 114, 130, 197(n31), 206–207, 219(n10) Missiles, 111–112, 172; launch vehicles and missiles, 204(table); nonweaponization of, 159; propulsion systems, 205(table). See also Agni missiles; Antiballistic missiles; Dhanush missiles; Ghauri missiles; Hatf missiles; Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Intermediate range ballistic missiles; Prithvi missiles; Surface to surface missiles Mohan, C. Raja, 78, 99, 177 Moody’s Investors Service, 223, 227 MTCR. See Missile Technology Control Regime Mueller, John, 183 Multispectral sensors, 209, 219(n17) Mund, Samar Mubarak, 175 Musharraf, Pervez, 88, 279; criticisms by Islamists, 164; Indo-Pakistani dialogue, 167; military role in decisionmaking, 151–153, 190; on coupling and deployment, 158 Mutual assured destruction doctrine (MAD), 80

Nag missile (India), 111 Nagasaki, Japan, 264, 272 Nair, Vijai, 277 Nalapat, M.D., 101 Nambiar, Satish, 98 Nation building, 124–126 National Command Authority (NCA), 189 National Command Post (NCP), 189 National Development Complex (NDC), 175 National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), 57, 78, 103 National Strategic Nuclear Command (NSNC), 189 Nationalism, 17, 26, 124–126, 282–283 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Navy, nuclear, 248–250, 256, 280–281 Nayar, Kuldip, 51 Nayyar, Abdul Hameed, 163 NCA. See National Command Authority NCP. See National Command Post NDC. See National Development Complex Near test, 54, 64(n89) Nehru, Jawaharlal, 27; anti-weapons stance, 42; criticism of, 18, 59(n6); nuclear stance, 145, 273; public stance on weapons and technology development, 39–40, 59(n4), 72, 83(n17); quest for global prestige, 15–16, 38; relations with China, 40–41; strategic policy of, 70 Nepal, 128 New Mexico, 264 Nixon, Richard, 2 NNPA. See Nuclear Nonproliferation Act No first use doctrine, 77, 160–161, 182, 195, 277 Nodong missile (North Korea), 175 Nonaggression pact, 160 Nonnuclear powers, 100; nuclear guarantees for, 42–46; options for deterrence, 91–92; response to South Asian testing, 252–255 Nonproliferation stance, 73, 135–136 Nonresident Indians (NRI), 224–225, 230, 233, 239(n7)

INDEX North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 3, 87–88, 97–101, 115–116, 253, 256–258 North Korea, 5, 173, 175, 219(n10), 220(32), 252, 254–255 Norway, 220(32) NPT. See Nuclear nonproliferation treaty NPT Review Conference, 74–75 NRI. See Nonresident Indians NSAB. See National Security Advisory Board NSNC. See National Strategic Nuclear Command Nuclear capabilities. See Capabilities; individual countries Nuclear capable states, 247–249, 253–254 Nuclear energy program. See Civilian nuclear program Nuclear Explosions, 273 Nuclear force, limitations on, 246–247, 278–280 Nuclear materials and technology. See Science and technology Nuclear nonproliferation act (NNPA), 24, 47–48, 131, 223 Nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT), 19, 130, 246; benefits of India’s signing, 95–96; China’s violation of, 276; decision not to sign, 72; discriminatory nature of, 132; holdout states, 5; origins of, 43–45; Pakistani stance, 165; purpose of, 265; renewal conditions, 53; U.S. pressure for India to sign, 138 Nuclear option policy, 18, 72–73, 76–77, 82 Nuclear policy: India, 57, 68–69; alternatives to stockpiling, 271–273; disarmament as goal of, 243–244; Draft Report, 166, 172, 213, 275–276; NATO’s new doctrine, 99; objectives of, 275; Rajiv Gandhi’s contradictory policies, 50–51; strategic position, 69–71; type of nuclear force, 280–283. See also Draft nuclear doctrine Nuclear policy: Pakistan, 157, 158–161, 161–163, 166–167; as response to Indian stance, 155–158; conflicting decisions and leadership issues over

317

stance, 153–155; matching India’s capability, 10–11; no-attack treaty with India, 51; public opinion of, 161–163; reliance on missiles for deterrence, 188; settling the nuclear impasse with India, 241–243, 251–252; signing the NPT, 96; stabilizing Indo-Pakistani rivalry, 283–285; threshold position, 73; type of nuclear force to be formed, 280–283; U.S. role in policy, 164–166 Nuclear program: India: aftermath of Chinese testing, 41–42; controversy over development of weapons program, 266; delivery systems, 105–106; dual-use of SLVs, 197(n20); future of, 57; India’s push for, 50; levels of weaponization, 77–78; missile program, 110–115; motives for weapons development, 71–72; origins of, 39–40; potential cost of, 266–267; settling the IndoPakistani nuclear impasse, 241–243; space research and development, 47 Nuclear program: Pakistan, 145–146 Nuclear weapons development, 266; consequences of, 271–273; cost of, 47, 80–81, 186; education versus weapons development, 11, 266–267; motives for, 71–72, 72; Nehru’s public stance on, 40, 72; Sarabhai’s opposition to, 266; scientific community’s response to, 265–266 Nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ), 165 Nuclear weapons states: disarmament and, 118; dubious behavior over CTBT, 132; failure to provide nuclear guarantees, 42–45, 45–46; path towards nuclear capable posture, 244–247; U.S.-Russian relations, 255–259 Nuclearization: India as great state, 17–19; rationale for, 6–7; regional proliferation dynamics, 31–32. See also Weaponization NWFZ. See Nuclear weapons free zone

Oceansat satellite, 209

318

INDEX

OIC. See Organization of the Islamic Conference Opacity, 181–184 OPIC. See Overseas Private Investment Corporation Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 11, 265 Options for India––Formation of a Strategic Nuclear Command, 189 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 148 Organski, A.F.K., 90 Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 149

PAEC. See Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Pakistan, 18, 57–58, 63(n79), 219(n10); ability to assemble nuclear device, 142(n8); ambivalent U.S. relations with, 168(n8); balance-imbalance with India, 179–181; Brown amendment, 53; C3I capability, 189; challenging India’s management of South Asia, 125–126; change in balance of power with India, 268–271; Chinese support of, 131; cost of Indian arms race with, 117–118; current capabilities, 113(table), 270; economic issues, 106, 149–151; effect of CTBT and FMCT on, 82; external support for, 126–129; India’s aggressive stance towards, 148–149; India’s military preponderance after Indo-Pakistani war, 89–90; India’s nuclear policy and, 278–279; Lahore summit, 80, 154, 163, 164, 193–194, 284; military response to Kargil conflict, 89; military role in decisionmaking, 151–153, 189–190; missile program, 113(table), 173–176; negotiations to avoid arms race with India, 80; nuclear policy (See Nuclear policy: Pakistan); nuclear test data, 107(table); parity in testing, 116; possible collusion with China, 185–187; pressure from Islamist groups, 163–164; progress in SSM capability, 172–173; provoking India’s testing decision, 29–30; response to Indian test, 2–3, 106,

168(n12); security guarantees, 168(n7); Sino-Pakistani relationship, 21; support of Kashmir insurgency, 52; testing parity with India, 88; U.S. concerns about Sino-Pakistani commitment, 143(n10); U.S. support after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 49–50; uranium enrichment capability, 51; use of reconnaissance satellites against, 213–214. See also Ghauri missile; Indo-Pakistani relations; Indo-Pakistani wars; Jammu and Kashmir; Kargil conflict; Nuclear program: Pakistan Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), 153 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), 164 PAL. See Permissive action links Palestinians, 90 PAN. See Panchromatic camera Panchromatic camera (PAN), 209, 211–212, 219(n17) Pant, K.C., 16, 19 Pant, Pandit, 27 Param computer project, 73 Paris Club, 151 Partial test ban treaty, 74 Peaceful uses of nuclear explosions (PNE), 44, 47–48, 264 People to People Forum, 163 Permissive action links (PAL), 162 Plutonium, 51, 109–110 Plutonium processing capability, 50 PNE. See Peaceful uses of nuclear explosions Pokhran I (1974), 21; decisionmaking factors, 46–47; final decision to test, 55–56; international response to, 24–25, 47–48; military significance of, 62(n48) Pokhran II (1998), 15, 87; decisions and results, 32–34; economic reprisals (See Sanctions); economic status at time of testing, 230; effect on already ailing economy, 232–234; India’s response to sanctions, 223–224; international response to, 4–6, 123–124, 221–223; political trigger for, 116–117; possible motivations for, 37–39; reconstructing the decision, 13–15; response of

INDEX scientific community to, 263; spurring Pakistani’s nuclear policy, 146; support for decision, 28–30 Polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV), 73, 217; as long-range missile, 281; capabilities of, 211; commercial use of, 210, 214–215; controversy over, 216; range and capability of, 112, 177, 201, 203 Politics: controlling testing decision, 25–28, 38–39, 56, 116–117; space program, 209–210 Pomfret, John, 94 Population centers, as targets, 191–193 Power. See Energy PPP. See Pakistan People’s Party Pressler amendment, to Foreign Assistance Act, 52, 53, 148, 150–151, 165 Pressler, Larry, 165 Prestige, as factor in testing decision, 31–32, 38, 57, 116 Primakov, Yevgeny, 100–101 Prithvi missile (India), 73; as threat to population centers, 191; deployment against regional threat, 105; development of, 114, 115; effect on stability, 173; ideal targets for, 198(n43); on de-alert status, 282; Pakistan’s inability to respond to, 182; propulsion system, 205; range and capability of, 111, 176; tipping the balance towards India, 179–180 Pro-nuclear positions, 18 Proliferation: controlling and limiting access to nuclear materials and technology, 47–48; global effect of, 288; possible dangers of, 10; proliferation management, 1–2; regional proliferation dynamics, 31–32 PSLV. See Polar satellite launch vehicle Pugwash Conference (1964), 41 Punjab, 27

Qiao Liang, 94

Raghavan, V.R., 19 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, 51 Rajya Sabha (upper house of parliament), 44

319

Ram, Jagjivan, 47 Ram, N., 276 Ramanna, Raja, 47, 62(n48) Ramdas, L., 19 Rangarajan, C., 229 Range, 111–114, 171–175; of Ghauri, 144(n25); of launch vehicles, 201; of Prithvi, 176, 179; of Sagarika, 178; Pakistan’s maximum needed range, 175–176 Rao, P.V. Narasimha, 74; cancelled 1995 test, 39, 54, 134–135; foreign policy, 27; opposition to testing, 266; religious dissent under, 65(n104); testing under, 84(n24) Rashtritya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 29 Raytheon, 222 Reagan administration, 49 Recessed deterrence, 280–285, 287 Recession, economic, 227–231, 234–235 Reconnaissance, 211–214, 219(n17), 219(n23) Reform, economic, 234–237 Regional remote-sensing service centers (RRSSC), 209 Reiss, Mitchell, 188 Religious groups. See Islamist groups Reserve Bank of India, 228, 229, 231 RRSSCs. See Regional remote-sensing service centers RSS. See Rashtritya Swayamsevak Sangh Rumsfeld, Donald H., 175 Russia, 7, 79, 100; as “temporary” nuclear state, 243; communications satellites, 220(32); comprehensive security doctrine, 93–94; current capabilities, 105, 270; decreasing upper limit of holdings, 247; economic status in May 1998, 234; effect of CTBT and FMCT on, 82; effect of South Asian testing on U.S.Russian relations, 256–258; India’s potential strategic partnership with, 100–101; space program, 216, 217(table); transfer of cryogenic engine, 178, 197(n31); tripartite agreement with China and India, 116. See also Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

320

INDEX

Safety issues. See Command, control, communication (C3I) capability Sagarika missile (India), 178, 278, 281 SALT. See Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Sanctions, economic, 24–25, 165, 221; against nonnuclear states, 47–48; as blessing in disguise, 271; conditions for removal of, 247–249; dysfunctional nature of, 259–261; economic benefits of avoiding, 250–251; effect on Indian economy, 106, 118, 223–224; effect on Pakistan, 149–151; future of, 242–243; international response to Pokhran II, 221–223; Pakistani indifference to, 147; possible alternative outcome to, 254–255; U.S. waiver on Pakistani sanctions, 168(n10), 168(n11) Sarabhai, Vikram: boosting research and development, 46–47; military applications for dual-use projects, 205; opposition to nuclear weapons development, 72, 266; role in development of space program, 202 Satellite launch vehicle (SLV), 203–206; basis for program, 176; dual-use capability of, 197(n20), 201, 210–211; launch vehicles and missiles, 204(table); propulsion systems, 205(table) Satellites and satellite program, 201–203, 207–209, 208(table), 212–215; C3I capabilities, 212–213; commercial applications for, 214–215; communications, 207–208, 212–213, 220(32); GSAT, 219(n15); INSAT, 203, 207, 212–213, 217, 220(n28); IRS, 203, 209, 211–212, 217; reconnaissance, 211–214 Sawhney, Pravin, 176, 180 Science and technology: as factor in future nuclear force, 280; controlling access to nuclear technology, 47–48; denial of technology after Pokhran I, 24–25; denial of technology after Pokhran II, 222; Nehru’s support of development, 72; role in decisionmaking, 15–16; social improvements through development

of, 20; technological imperative for testing, 38; technology imperative for testing, 38; weapons capabilities, 108–110 Scientific community: determining level of deterrence, 272; response to development of atomic weapons, 265–266; response to Pokhran II, 263. See also Technology Scientific-military establishment, 51 Second-strike capabilities, 277–278 Secularism, 124 Security, 9–10; as factor in decision to test, 56–57, 135–136; as factor in nuclearization of nonnuclear states, 31, 254; Chinese threat after Lop Nor testing, 41–42; combating insurgency, 4; concerns in the wake of Brown amendment, 53–54; concerns over U.S.-Pakistani relations, 49–50; domestic, 18, 27–28; erosion of strategic position, 32–33; failure of weapons states to provide guarantees for nonweapons states, 42–46; Pakistani and Chinese threat to, 55–56; Pakistani threat during Kashmir insurgency, 52; regional-to-global perspective, 7; U.S. awareness of Chinese threat, 61(n37) Security in ambiguity, 188 Security policy, 15. See also Strategic policy and position Security, guarantees of, 42–46, 56–57, 91, 168(n7) Separatist movements, 4, 22, 115–116 Serbia, 7, 88, 93, 100, 116 Shabab-I-Milli, 163 Shaheen missile (Pakistan), 146, 151, 175, 179, 186 Shakti, 179 Share markets, 236 Sharif, Nawaz, 152; attempts to compromise with India, 163; attempts to please Islamist groups, 164; Lahore summit, 154; meeting with Clinton, 155; overthrow of, 153; popular pressure to test, 147; potential for Indo-Pakistani dialogue, 167; resignation of, 169(n16); U.S. discrimination, 148

INDEX Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 27, 42–45, 60(n22), 266 Sheppard, Ben, 112 Simla Accord, 159 Singapore, 220(32) Singh, Charan, 49 Singh, Jasjit, 78 Singh, Jaswant, 67, 70, 135, 137 Singh, Sardar Swaran, 43 Sinha, Yashwant, 231 Sino-Indian war (1962), 2, 18, 40–41, 72 SLBM. See Submarine-launched ballistic missile SLV. See Satellite launch vehicle Snyder, Glen, 89 Social improvements of nuclear technology, 20 Solid fuel missiles, 186, 195, 203 Solid State Physics Laboratory, 114 South Africa, 4–5, 219(n10), 289; response to South Asian testing, 252–253 South Korea, 219(n10) Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Space research and development, 216–218; boosting space and weapons development, 47, 50; comparative analysis of various programs, 217(table); cost of, 215–216, 220(29); diverse applications of, 201–202; history of, 202–203; political motivations for, 209–210; satellites, 207–209, 208(table), 211–214; technology transfer, 206–207 Spain, 220(32) Sri Lanka, 125 Srinavasan, M.R., 51 SRR. See Strategic restraint regime SS-150 missile (India), 191 SSM. See Surface to surface missiles Stability: advantages and disadvantages of hegemonic stability, 89–90; effect of Prithvi missiles on, 173; forms of stability for India and Pakistan, 57–58; opacity-based, 181–184; risk of inadvertent war, 193–196 Stability-instability paradox, 89–90 Standard and Poor, 223

321

START. See Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Status. See Prestige Stein, Janice Gross, 183 Stimson Center report, 162 Stockpiling, 5, 51, 268–271, 271 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), 265 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 247, 256, 268 Strategic policy and position, 27–28, 32–33; attempts to avoid overt position, 78–79; cultural, structural and normative issues determining, 69–71; deterioration of India’s, 21–23; draft nuclear doctrine, 68–69; effect of testing on, 77–80; global-toregional perspective, 97–102; India’s lack of policy, 9; military use of reconnaissance satellites, 213–214; threshold position, 72–74. See also Draft nuclear doctrine Strategic restraint regime (SRR), 166 Strategic stability, 57–58 Strike deterrent capability, 87–88 Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), 160, 178 Subrahmanyam, K., 78; condemnation of U.S. hegemony, 100; criticism of strategic policy, 70; defense of India’s IRBM capabilities, 276; deterrence levels, 84(n31), 104; on India and Pakistan’s keeping a recessed force, 282; on Western nuclear monopoly, 115; Rajiv Gandhi’s policy, 51; weapons stance of Nehru, 18 Sundarji, K., 84(n31), 277 Surface to surface missiles (SSM), 111–112, 172; as psychological threat, 191–193; development of SLBM, 178; full weaponization through, 186, 195; inability to command stability through, 182–184; invulnerability of, 188. See also Agni missile; Prithvi missile Surya missile (India), 112, 177, 281 Swamy, Subramaniam, 277, 279 Sweden, 220(32) Symington amendment, 47 Syria, 219(n10) Szilard, Leo, 265

322

INDEX

Taepodong missile (North Korea), 175 Taiwan, 219(n10) Talbott, Strobe, 67, 137, 147, 286 Tanham, George, 69–70 Tashkent agreement, 44, 159 Tata Electric Locomotive Company (TELCO), 236 Tata Institute for Fundamental Research, 39, 112 Tata Iron and Steel (TISCO), 236 TDA. See Trade Development Authority Technology. See Science and technology Technology demonstrator, 73, 83(n20), 114–115 Technology transfer, 5, 288; before and after MTCR, 110–111, 206–207; cryogenic engine, 113–114, 178, 197(n31); from China to Pakistan, 185; North Korea’s missile technology to Pakistan, 175; Pakistan’s missile program, 173–175; restrictions on, 16–17 TEL. See Transporter erector launcher TELCO. See Tata Electric Locomotive Company Terrorism, 91–92, 140; World Trade Center bombing, 164 Testing: public opinion on, 30–31, 161–163 Testing, nuclear: advance notice of, 160, 284; cost of, 24–25; December 1995 “near test,” 54, 64(n89); declaration of nuclear status without testing, 65(n102); factors affecting decision, 20–21, 56; Lop Nor test, 41–42; Pakistani public reaction to, 161–163; peaceful versus nonpeaceful explosions, 44, 47–48, 264; rationale for, 6–7, 37–38; rewarding of, 252–253; strategic position in light of, 77–80; Trinity test, 264; worldwide test data, 107(table). See also Agni missiles; Decisionmaking process; Ghauri missiles; Pokhran I; Pokhran II Thailand, 220(32) Thermonuclear devices, 65(n102) Threshold position, 72–74, 288–289 Tilly, Charles, 70 Time-bound disarmament, 76 Times of India, 93, 98–99

TISCO. See Tata Iron and Steel Trade Development Authority (TDA), 149 Transporter erector launcher (TEL), 181–184 Treaties and accords: 1971 Soviet friendship treaty, 46, 53; Fissile material cutoff treaty, 77, 81, 136, 286, 290; Indo-Pakistani postwar accord, 44; Partial test ban treaty, 74; SALT, 265; Simla Accord, 159; START, 247, 256, 268; Tashkent agreement, 44; Treaty of Tlatelelco, 5; treaty with Pakistan, 51. See also Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Nuclear nonproliferation treaty; Partial test ban treaty Treaty of Tlatelelco (1967), 5 Trinity test, 264 Trishul missile (India), 111 Truman, Harry S., 265, 272 Trust, lack of between India and Pakistan, 159 Turkey, 220(32)

U.S. Engage, 151 Ukraine, 5, 257, 289 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 73; effect on India of Soviet breakup, 52–53, 74; Gandhi’s proSoviet foreign policy, 46; IndoPakistani postwar accord, 44; invasion of Afghanistan, 49–50; levels of deterrence, 103; MAD doctrine, 80; nonproliferation treaty, 43–45; nuclear test data, 107(table); overkill of weapons arsenal, 81; stability-instability paradox, 89–90; support of India, 21 Unipolar military world, 90–95, 97 United Front, 55, 76, 243 United Kingdom: as “temporary” nuclear state, 243; current capabilities, 270; drafting the NPT, 45; economic reprisals after Pokhran II, 221; level of weapons acquisition, 77–78, 81; minimum deterrence stance, 79; nuclear capabilities, 105; nuclear test data, 107(table); response to South Asian testing, and U.S. sanctions, 258

INDEX United Nations, 43–44, 88–89. See also International Atomic Energy Agency United Nations Disarmament Conference (UNDC), 54 United States, 73, 166–167; ambivalent relations with Pakistan, 168(n8); as “temporary” nuclear state, 243; as hegemonic nuclear power, 90–95, 100, 115–116; attempts to avert Pakistani testing, 147–148; awareness of Chinese threat, 61(n37), 131; communications satellites, 220(32); concerns about Sino-Pakistani commitment, 143(n10); CTBT and FMCT, 82; CTBT negotiations with India, 137; decreasing upper limit of holdings, 247; economic bailout for Pakistan, 150; economic status in May 1998, 234; effect of current policy on India, 33, 288–289; effect of South Asian testing on U.S.-Russian relations, 256–258; foreign investment in India, 231; future Indo-American relations, 1–2; Gandhi’s foreign policy and, 46; ignoring India’s security concerns, 30; Indian perception of Sino-American. relations, 276; MAD doctrine, 80; MTCR, 110–111; NPT and, 43–45, 53; nuclear capabilities, 105, 270; nuclear test data, 107(table); optimal strategy toward India, 139; overkill of weapons arsenal, 81; path towards nuclear capable state, 244–246; post-Hiroshima response by scientific community, 265; pressure to cancel 1995 test, 134–135; proposals for Indian policy, 68–69, 286–288; proposed support of India’s position, 8; response to Indian test, 47, 141, 221–223; response to Pakistani threat to India, 52; role in Pakistani nuclear policy, 164–166; space program, 216, 217(table); stability-instability paradox, 89–90; support of China and Pakistan, 21–23, 49–50, 126, 128–129; technology transfer, 113–114, 174. See also Guarantees of security

323

Unrestricted war doctrine, 94 Uranium, 47, 51, 109–110, 259–260 USS Enterprise episode, 100, 246 USSR. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Vajpayee, Atal Behari, 29; conditional signing of CTBT, 136; deciding to test, 56; economic decline, 226; Lahore summit, 154; minimum deterrence, 79, 156, 286; on command and control capabilities, 67, 78; potential for Indo-Pakistani dialogue, 167; support of nuclear decision, 133–135 Varadarajan, Siddharth, 98–99 Venezuela, 75 Venkataswaran, A.P., 100 Vietnam War, 89

Wall Street Journal, 234 Wang Xiangsui, 94 Weaponization, 172; crisis weaponization, 188, 195–196; levels of, 77–78; requirements for full weaponization, 186; safeguarding civilian nuclear program, 20; SSMs as requirement for, 195; U.K. levels of, 77–78; unacceptable consequences of, 11. See also Nuclear policy; Nuclear weapons development Weapons capabilities. See Capabilities Weapons development. See Nuclear weapons development Weapons of mass destruction, 99 White Paper on Higher Defense Organization, 152 Wisner, Frank, 39, 54 World Bank, 150, 151, 164, 233 World Trade Center bombing, 164

Yellowcake, control of, 259–260 Yeltsin, Boris, 94 Yousaf, Ramzi, 164 Yugoslavia, 3, 7, 115–116

Zia-ul Haq, 49, 152, 171

About the Book

The nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests conducted by India and Pakistan in the late 1990s substantially altered the security environment, both in the region and globally. Examining the complexities, controversies, and dynamics of this new strategic context, India’s Nuclear Security explores India’s motivations for becoming a nuclear weapons state, its proposed nuclear and missile force structure, the nuclear doctrine that the BJPled government seeks to develop, and the impact of a nuclear arms race on the country’s economy. The contributors also consider the prospects for regional and global arms control. In question is the claim of many Indian strategists that stability in the region is better served under conditions of declared—rather than covertly developed—nuclear weapons.

Raju G. C. Thomas is the Allis Chalmers Professor of International Affairs at Marquette University. His numerous publications include South Asian Security in the 1990s and Democracy, Security, and Development in India. Amit Gupta is associate professor of political science at Stonehill College. He is the author of Building an Arsenal: The Evolution of Regional Power Force Structures.

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